HOW IS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION WORKING? WELL, NO ONE KNOWS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 19, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

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INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
22 AUGUST 1975
NO. 17
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
EAST EUROPE
WEST EUROPE
EAST ASIA
LATIN AMERICA
PAGE
Destroy after backgrounder has served
its purpose or within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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WASHINGTON STAR
19 August 1975
#4P-Acr17111
riTv:tticapary
By Orr Kelly
Washington Star Staff Writer
A neatly printed sign hangs on one
wall of the suite of offices occupied
by the FBI's Freedom of Information
Unit in the new J. Edgar Hoover
building. It says:
WHEN IN DOUBT
CROSS IT OUT
James Farrington, director of the
bureau's FOI unit ? which has
grown 1,000 percent since nevi
amendments to the law went into ef-
fect six months ago ? seemed a little
taken aback when the sign was
pointed out to him and he quickly as-
sured a reporter it was not official
policy.
But ?in a court deposition earlier
this year, FBI Agent Richard C.
Dennis Jr. described how the when-
in-doubt-cross-it-out policy works in
practice:
"We would take a black grease
pencil and. . . probably would delete
in most instances all the names men-
tioned in the file unless . . . I was
positive that the information had
been made public, that there was
absolutely no invasion of privacy.
"I?would probably delete the name
of the individual it was about or who
. . . gave us the information, and I
would delete information which
would tend to identify any of those
individuals, based upon the fact that
it possibly could be an invasion of the
individual's privacy." .
THE FBI, along with the CIA and
the Internal Revenue Service, is
among the worst in complying with
the law designed to open up many
government records to public inspec-
tion.
At the other extreme,'surprisingly,
is' the Pentagon, which is often cited
as doing one of the best jobs in com-
plying with both the letter and the
spirit of the law.
A recent Army bulletin, for exam-,
ple, advised officials dealing with
freedom-of-information requests
that it is better to "err on the side of
waiving fees than to charge exces-
sive or inappropriate fees."
"And remember," the bulletin
said, in contrast to the sign at the
FBI, "the key principle about col-
lecting FOIA fees is, 'When in doubt,
dont.'"
Since the new, more liberal,
amendments to the act went into ef-
fect six months pgo today, agencies
throughout the government have
been buried by a blizzard of re-
quests for information ? far more
N
sands of requests, the bureaucracy
has responded in typical fashion ?
by expanding.
When the amendments weat into
effect, the FBI's FOL office was
inconspicuously located in two small
rooms in the main Justice Depart-
ment building with a total of some
700 square feet. Early in March it ex-
panded to 1,500 square feet. By early
May it had moved into the new build-
ing, ballooning to 10,100 square feet.
And by mid-July it was up to 11,200.
square feet and growing.
At the CIA, the new task of provid-
ing information to the public
occupies the time of between 50 and
80 full-time workers. In the week of
July 3-10, 130 clerical workers put in
1,648 hours handling FOI requests
and 154 professionals put in 2,223
hours on the same job.
"I THINK you will agree those are
enormous figures," said a spokesman.
for the agency.
Despite that effort, the
CIA seems bogged down in
a morass of requests. In the
first Six months of the year,
4,038 requests were re-
ceived. But as of July 10,
804 of those requests had
not even been logged in ?
dated and stamped as hav-
ing been received. In al- '
'most all cases, the agency
was failing to meet the
law's requirement that the
person, requesting informa-
tion get a yes or no answer
?within 10 working days.
: Still, the law has resulted
in some major disclosures
of information that would
otherwise have remained
,hidden away in the bureau-:
?cratic woodwork. . 7
It was in response to a
suit filed under the FOI law
by Morton Halperin, a for-.
mer government official
and one of the most active.
users of the law, that the'
CIA gave up CIA Director
William Colby's report to
President Ford on problems
within the agency.
But the report was deliv-
ered to Halperin's attorney
at his home at 8 o'clock one
night and then immediately
distributed to the news
media with no indication
that the release was in re-
sponse to an FOI suit. Halp-
erin suspects the agency
hoped to get credit for the
release of the information
requests than anyone had expected. without calling attention to
-
And, to attempt to handle these thou-
the fact that the FOI law
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that are reluctant to release
information.
Because the amendments
are new and untested, there
are sharp differences in the
way requests are handled
by different agencies.
At the Department of
Health, Education and Wel-
fare, any employe can
grant a request. But only 16
officials in Washington and
10 regional offices have the
authority to deny a request.
Thus, even though HEW
agencies get an enormous
number of requests ? an
average of about 1,800 a
week to the Social Security
Administration alone ? the
average requester receives
a response in less than 16
days.
AT THE FEDERAL
Trade Commission, the
policy is just the opposite.
Requests come to a Free-
dom of Information Office
at the rate of 15 to 20 a
week. But that office cannot
grant requests ? it can
only deny them. If any of
the nine exemptions under
the law applies, the decision
on whether or not to release
the information must be
made by higher officials in
the agency.
"If you have everyone
giving out information,
someone is going to make a
mistake" said Barbara Van
Wormer, supervisor of the
agency's FOI office.
There is, in fact, some
justification for such cau-
tion.
Regulatory agencies
such as the FTC and HEW's
Food and Drug Administra-
tion are increasingly aware
of what they call "reverse
FOI law" ? cases in which
someone, usually a corpo-
ration, goes to court to pre-
vent the release of informa-
tion.
There were 222 lawsuits
related to requests for
information under the FOI
law being handled by a new
office in the Justice Depart-
ment's Civil Division in the
first half of this year. But
there were also some 90
other cases in which the
government was in court
defending the release of
information that someone
claimed should not be
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released.
MOST OF THE WORK of
the litigation section, how-
ever, is obviously devoted
to defending in court the
decision of some agency to
withhold information. Jef-
frey F. Axeirad, who heads
the office, says he now has
six overworked lawyers ("I
came in one Sunday," he
says, "and the others were
already here") and hopes to
get more.
Mark Lynch, who runs a
freedom of information unit
for Ralph Nader and is one
of a growing number of
specialists in FOI law, says
Axelrad is goiag to need
them, at the rate things are
going.
"Some of these agencies
are taking a really arro-
gant, independent atti-
tude," Lynch said.
Charles Hinkle, who has
long headed the Defense
Department's office of se-
curity review and who now
has taken on the responsi-
bility for clearing FOI re-
quests received by the
secretary of defense and
Joint Chiefs of Staff, agrees
that the number of suits
filed is a good measure of
how well an agency is
doing.
He is proud, he says, that
the department has not
been sued under the law ?
an indication that informa-
tion has been denied only
when there are solid rea-
sons under the law for
doing so.
By this measure, the IRS
is clearly a problem area
with 25 cases now in the
courts.
Louise Brown, of the
Public Citizens Tax Reform
Research Group, tells of
one request that produced
some 800 pages of docu-
ments after months of
delay. When Brown protest-
ed that there was an unex-
plained gap in the data, the
IRS agreed to do some
more checking. Finally,
much later, the agency
coughed up another 2,000
pages.
"This is just another
method of keeping se-
crets," she said. 'They
give you a partial answer
but they keep the really
significant documents."
Lynch and Thomas M.
Susman, chief counsel of
the Senate subcommittee on
administrative practices
and procedures, who has
been involved in FOI legis-
lation-for years, like to tell
horror stories of experi-
ences with some of the
more recalcitrant agencies.
SUSMAN TELLS of the
person who had a long ex-
change of correspondence
with the FBI -- demands'
for additional identification,
demands for more detail on
the subject and then a de-
mand for a notarized 'copy
of the person's signature.
The result was the release
of two insignificant news-
paper clippings.
Lynch recalls the experi-
ence of Daniel Ford, direc-
tor of the Union. of
Concerned Scientists, in
Cambridge, Mass.
Ford said in a telephone
interview that his group
asked for information from
the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission on its ultrason-
ic technique for finding
cracks in pipes and got 38
pages of documents. They
were told that the search
for more information would
cost $39,000.
"We appealed' ? and.
caused the agency some
embarrassment,' Ford
said. "They agreed to
waive the fee and then pro-
vided us with something
like 39 more pages of docu-
ments. This material was
enormously interesting. It
revealed that the ultrasonic
technique is unreliable and
that the agency didn't tell
Congress the technique
doesn't work."
Another incident recalled
by Lynch ? not so much a
horror story as an illustra-
tion of how useful the law
can be ? involves the at-
tempt of Advertising Age
magazine to get informa-
tion from the Army.
Early this year, the
Army put out a fact sheet
touching on the highlights
of a five-volume inspector
general's report on a $40
million advertising con-
tract, John Revett, senior,
editor of The magazine, re-
called. "They said it sum-
marized the report. We filed
an FOI request for the parts
of the report we were inter-
ested in.
BY THAT TIME the new
amendments to the law had
gone into effect and the
Army had a new general
counsel.
"What we got was sub-
stantially different from the,
fact sheet," he said. "We
would not have known what
really happened if we had
not gotten the documents."
If it had not been for the
successful use of the law,
Revett said, the magazine
would probably have been
at a dead end in its pursuit
of the story of the contract
because its sources in the
Army had been scared into
silence.
In one particularly fla-
grant case, Lynch said, a
State Department official
certified in a court affada-
vit that some documents
were properly classified. It
was later learned, Lynch
said. that the official had
not examined the docu-
ments ? and that he could-
n't have read them if he had
because they were printed
in French, a language he
did not know.
Barbara Ennis, who has
headed the State Depart-
ment's FOI office since
April, said she hadn't heard
of that case. But she said
she hoped those Who say the
department is doing a bet-
ter job now than it used to
are right.
? The law requires reports
from the agencies and from
the attorney general next
March to tell Congress how
the law is working. At this
point, no one in the govern-
ment knows the total num-
ber of requests received nor
how many of those are
denied; no one knows the
total number of persons in-
volved in handling FOI re-
quests, although it is cer-
tainly several thousands,
and no one knows how
much it is costing the gov-
ernment to provide infor-
mation under the FOI law,
although the cost is certain-
ly many millions of dollars.
But there is a general
feeling, both among those
seeking information and
those handling requests,
that the law is providing
significant amounts of
information, not primarily
to the news media, but to
individuals and businesses.
IT IS OBVIOUS, from the
experience of both large
organizations such as the
Pentagon and HEW and
smaller agencies, such as
the Energy Research and
Development Administra-
tion and the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration, that
the law is workable. It is
also obvious, from the ex-
perience of agencies that
say they have had problems
complying with the law,
such as the FBI, CIA and
IRS, that the appeals
procedure and the chance
to go to court will eventual-
ly result in the release of
information for the persist-
ent requester.
In the first six months,
the law has resulted in the
release of Red Cross docu-
ments on Vietnamese
prisons; the Peers report on
the My Lai Massacre; the
Colby report to Ford; docu-
ments on the FBI's Cointel-
pro operations; a CIA study
of "Restless Youth;" a
virtually uncensored ver-
sion of the Pentagon
Papers; the Pumpkin
Papers ? and one page of
the FBI phone book.
But none of the informa-
tion disclosed so far seems
to have justified fears with-
in the administration that
national security would be
endangered by the release
of information under the
law..
CHRISTIAN .SCIENCE MONITOR
8 August 1975
I- Rusk disclaims recent
charges against CIA
Santa Fe, N.M.
Former Secretary of State
Dean Rusk says he is convinced
"that no foreign leader was
killed by a smoking gun in the
hand' of any-employee of the
CIA or agent of the CIA."
Mr. Rusk, now a law professor
at the University of Georgia, -
also told newsmen Wednesday
that during his tenure as secre-
tary of state under Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson he never
discussed the possible assassi-
nation of Cuban Premier Fidel
Castro.
"I must say I was fully sur-
prised to learn that somebody
might have turned to the Mafia
at some point. How in the world
could anbody put the leaders of
organized crime in the position
to blackmail the government of
the United States by getting
them involved in something of
that sort. It's stupid."
He said the role-of the CIA in
foreign affairs has been exag-
gerated. Mr. Rusk was in New
IViexico'to visit his son, David,
and his family, who live in Albu-
querque.
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U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 18. 19M
Both Sides of Debate
EW LW T R
"Leakage of Secrets
Poses a Great Danger"
USN&WFI
Interview With
William E. Colby
Director,
Central Intelligence
Agency
Q Mr. Colby, in your view, is a new law needed to protect
official secrets in this country?
A Yes. We need a new law because the present legislation
is inadequate to protect our intelligence activities. The
present law applies essentially only to people who turn
secrets over to a foreign power with intent to injure the
United States. It does not apply to employes or former
employes of the Central Intelligence Agency who deliberate-
ly, leak to the press the names of intelligence agents or
information concerning some very sensitive technical system
that we operate.
Q Is that a serious problem for-you?
A Yes. A former CIA official is publishing a book here that
names every individual, foreign and American, with whom
he worked - while he was employed by the Agency. He
obviously includes in that list the names of many of our
officers, many people who worked with us in foreign intelli-
gence services, and many private foreign citizens who
worked with us at various times. As a result, some' of these
people have been exposed to possible legal action in their
own countries. Others have been exposed to terrorist action.
0. And there's nothing you can do about it?
A The CIA attorneys tell me there's practically nothing I
can do about it?certainly nothing as far as criminal prosecu-
tion is concerned?even though all of us at the Agency
signed secrecy agreements as a condition of employment and
as a condition of getting access to sensitive material.
Unlike a number of other Government departments, there
is no law which the Justice Department may utilize to bring
criminal proceedings against an employe or former employe
of the CIA who merely reveals our sensitive material.'
Q Do you mean that the CIA has even less power to
protect secrets than ordinary Government departments?
A Very much so. An Internal Revenue Service employe
who reveals your income-tax return without proper authori-
zation can be prosecuted. A member of the Department of
Agriculture who releases cotton statistics to some friend is
guilty of a crime. A member of the Census Bureau who
reveals an individual census return commits a crime.
0. The CIA has been operating for 28 years. Why has this
problem suddenly become so acute as to require a new law?
A The main reason stems from the various investigations
now going on. In these investigations we are taking an over-
all look at our intelligence system in order to update the old
image. In the process, the amount of leakage of sensitive
secrets poses a great danger to running an effective intelli-
gence service in the future.
O. In what way have these leaks damaged your intelligence
operations?
A A number of countermeasures have been taken by
other countries because they learned of certain activities of
ours. These countries have been able to frustrate our contin- O. Senator Cranston, why are you opposed to a new law
ued access to that particular form of information. that would provide additional protection for official secrets?
We're in a situation where we are losing agents. There's no A I believe that we already have more protection for
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j
question about it. And I am sure there are situations in which
a number of foreign intelligence agencies have considered
whether to Dive us a particularly delicate item, and they've
said: "Well, these days, no. It might leak." We are developing
a reputation in other intelligence services of not being able
to keep secrets in this country.
O. Isn't there a danger that a new law to protect intelli-
gence secrets might be used to cover wrongdoings by CIA?
A I think we are going to eliminate the potential of cover-
ups in several ways as a result of the investigations now going
on. Looking ahead, I think we are going to have clearer lines
of direction of the CIA and much better supervision within
the executive branch and by Congress. The better the
external supervision, the better the internal supervision_ This
will tighten up everything and would prevent the use of new
legislation for anything other than a good reason.
Moreover, I think we've had a rather rich lesson in the last
couple of years of the dangers of trying to cover things up. In
a big Government bureaucracy you really can't cover up,
because somebody always writes a memorandum or leaves
the service and tells about it, and an enterprising reporter
finds out about it.
a Who would determine what are real intelligence secrets
that require legal protection?the CIA itself?
A No. I would have no problem in demonstrating to a
judge in chambers, if necessary, that any case brought under
a new law involved a sensitive intelligence matter and was
not an arbitrary or capricious prosecution. Only after a judge
had established that fact would the case go to trial?in
public. That would determine whether the defendant was
guilty of communicating the secrets illegally. The secrets
themselves would not be exposed in open court. ;
O. In your view, should the press be held liable for publish-
ing intelligence secrets?
A I don't believe that I should be able to prosecute a
newsman who picks up something and then publishes it, and
the new law I proposed would prohibit such a prosecution. I
do think the individual within the system who gave it to him
should be punished, however. I am not in favor of the sort of
Official Secrets Act that Great Britain has, which makes it a
crime for anyone to release secrets?whether officials or
newsmen.
O. What are your chances of getting the kind of legislation
that you advocate to protect secrets?
A Well, if I were asking for this legislation on my own and
in isolation, I admit the chances would not be good in the
present climate. But in the process of taking a fresh look. at
our intelligence structure as a whole, we Americans cannot
responsibly consider how to run an intelligence organization
without resolving this problem of how to keep a few Ameri-
can secrets.
"We Aire dy Have More
Protection Than We Need"
Interview With
Senator
Alan Cranston
Democrat,
Of California
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official secrets than we need. My main concern is that
classification of information by the Government is out of
control. Too many different people have authority to classi-
fy?and they often do it with excessive zeal to protect
themselves and people higher up. They often seem more
interested in job security than in national security. Not long
ago someone with direct experience testified that mote than
99 per cent of classified material should not be treated that
way.
We would open up a very dangerous situation if we started
to write laws that anybody who transmits or receives any
classified information without proper authority is guilty of a
crime.
Q What should be done to protect Government agencies
against wholesale leaking of secret documents?
A I'm more concerned about the need for protecting
reporters and the free flow of information to the public than
I am about the need for protecting Government agencies. I
think that we need a shield law to exempt reporters from
prosecution for refusing to reveal their sources.
A great deal of the information that the American public
gets about what its Government is up to does not come out in
formal press releases. It comes from digging by the press and
from leaks by officials who think the Government is doing
Improper things. If you close that off, you would threaten the
free press and the ability of the people in this democracy to
, know what is going on.
Q Do you consider the leaking of official secrets desirable?
A Yes?if the official secret is information that the Gov-
ernment is improperly hiding from the public and which the
public has a right to know. That is a very important part of
democracy.
A free press is an essential restraint on government; it is
basic to our constitutional concept of a government of
limited powers. I think the Founding Fathers had a very
acute understanding of that when they wrote the First
Amendment. They were more concerned about protecting
people against the abuses of government than enabling the
government to do things for people?or to people.
Of course, there are areas where I am very strongly
opposed to the revelation of classified information. But I
want to be certain that the information is properly classified.
O. How would you do that?
A Well, it's necessary to define very precisely the categor-
ies of information that are really vital defense secrets. In my
opinion, these would be limited to cryptographic informa-
tion, plans for military-combat operations, information re7
garding the actual method of operation of certain weaporiS
systems, and restricted atomic data. The disclosure of infor.7
mation in these categories obviously would be very damag-
ing to the United States and should be against the law. -
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 August 1975
'Afterthoughts On the CIA'
In his good column, "Afterthoughts on the
CIA," Joseph C. Harsch wrote: "It is
noteworthy that many newspapers both in the
United States and abroad assumed that the
Rockefeller Commission report would be a
whitewash, and some rushed to a whitewash
conclusion on the first day after publication.
Only after reading the text was it generally
realized that this was a remarkably honest
job."
The comment needed to be made, and I am
glad to see it in the Monitor. Many news-
persons are still freaked out and trigger happy
from their Watergate high: This hyped-up
state causes them to display a distorted
perspective in many areas of reporting and
comment ? to the disservice of the public:
Denver Philip Lattimore Carpenter
4
There are other areas of information involving national
defense where disclosure would not necessarily be damag-
ing?for example, cost overruns on weapons development. I
? think it would be proper for somebody to blow the whistle on
that if he were aware of abuses. In this category of informa-
tion, we need the tightest possible definition of what can be
classified as secret. Also, we must take into account the
intent of anyone who reveals this sort of information.
I am absolutely opposed to any catchall phrase?like
national security?to cover information that should be classi-
fied as secret. We've learned in the Watergate and other
scandals that the term "national security" is subject to the
broadest possible stretching to cover up wrongdoings.
O. What about the CIA? Is additional legislation needed tn
prevent officials or former officials of that Agency froth
revealing names of agents and similar secrets?
A The CIA should have adequate protection, but we have
to think out very thoroughly precisely what that protection
should be. I think the naming of agents is improper. But if an
agent acts in violation of the law, that's something else again.
In a case of that sort, it's a matter of individual judgment
whether or not it should be made public.
Basically, it's my view that the CIA has had too much
power?and this has led to a lot of abuse. You can't really,
draw a distinction between the use of power by the CIA to
protect sensitive information and the use of that same power
to do almost anything they choose and then cover it up. We
certainly need more control over the intelligence agencies?
and that control must include a greater ability by Congress to
decide what should and should not be classified as secret.
0. The news media have revealed a number of intelligence
operations?such as the salvaging of a sunken Russian sub-
marine and interception of telephone conversations between
Soviet leaders and the Kremlin. Should the press be liable for
compromising such espionage operations?
A No. I would leave the decision whether 'or not to
publish to the professional judgment of the press. I don't
think that you can start writing definitions of information
that it is illegal for the press to publish, without making ;
governmental restrictions on the availability of information
subject to vast abuses.
O. Is it possible to operate an effective intelligence organi-
zation in this country in those circumstances?
A Yes. We obviously need an intelligence community, but
we don't want to subvert what we are supposed to be
protecting?which is our fundamental democracy?by giv-
ing Government agents power that is too sweeping.
Basically, I believe that because Government is getting
bigger and bigger and ever more powerful, we have to be
very much on guard against giving it authority and secret
power without proper, constitutional restraints.
BALTIMORE SUN
13 August 1975
if
ass
e fin
d r Saxe s ys
s CIA neildlin
New Delhi (AP)?Declaring
he is "fed up" with leftist
charges of CIA involvement in
India's political crisis, William
B. Saxbe, the United States am-
bassador, said yesterday he has
told Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi he would resign if he
learned of any U.S. meddling.
Mr. Saxbe, departing from
the low profile he has main-
tained since arriving in March,
said he has met in Washington
with "the highest authorities in
all agencies that might he con-
cerned," and "I have .assured
myself there is no agency of the
U.S. government that is in any
way interfering in India."
Furthermore, Mr. Saxbe
said, "I have told Mrs. Gandhi
that if I found out to the contra-
ry I would resign."
The former attorney general
and Republican senator from
Ohio made his remarks in an in-
formal interview after appear-
ing in an embassy variety show
where he donned judicial robes
and sang a brief part from
"Fiorello."
Mr. Saxbe said he is "fed up
with some of the wild charges
the radical left was making,..
that the state of emergency was
brought on by the actions of for-
eign governments."
Mr. Saxbe said that in Feb-
ruary and again in June he met
with officials from the State
Department and other agen-
cies, and he was assured there
was no "interjection or inter-
e will quit
in India
ference" in Indian affairs.
Asked specifically if he had
met with Central Intelligence
Agency authorities, Mr. Saxbe
replied: "I had a close relation-
ship with the CIA when I was
attorney general and there was
no problem with that."
Regarding the U.S. position
toward Mrs. Gandhi's June 26
declaration of a state of emer-
gency and suspension of civil
liberties, Mr. Saxbe said the In-
dian government has said the
crackdown is temporary, and
"for the time being we have to
accept that."
Mr. Saxbe said India had
"substantial problems" and'
that only time would tell if Mrs.
Gandhi's method of dealing '
with them would be effective.
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 Angus t 1975
iv] -ser
rights vs.
protecting
S secrets
By Robert P. Hey
. , Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
A spotlight has been thrown anew here on a
basic conflict; the right of the government to
keep important information secret vs. the
right of Americans to know all the facts they
can.
The conflict occurs in an important section
of a major bill now before Congress. In its
entirety, this bill for the first time in years
would recodify the nation's federal laws.
But the controversial section, as now pro-
posed, would punish ? possibly by jail
sentence ? any government employee who
discloses any classified government informa-
tion to anyone not authorized to have it.
Proponents say this provision is important
to protect important secrets from disclosures
which could harm the nation's interests by
providing important information to potential
enemies.
, Opponents say the section is so sweeping it
would endanger the public's right to know
government information not essential to na-
tional defense. They say that if legal punish-
ment automatically awaits government offi-
cials who provide this information to the
public, often by "leaking" it to newsmen,
these officials will stop providing important
but undam aging information which the public
should have.
Without such leaks, they say, the facts about
Watergate-related activities of Nixon adminis-
tration officials might never have become
known.
The man now aiming the spotlight is
Indiana's Democratic Sen. Birch Bayh. A
supporter of the basic recodification principle,
he wants to separate the problems of legiti-
mate national security from bureaucratic
withholding of information the public should
have. To accomplish this he proposed Tuesday
changes in the existing bill.
Senator Bayh proposes that it "be an offense
to transfer any classified information directly
? I The Was gtelm itgerry.GoZtound
gin
By Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten
CIA chief William E. Colby
has complained that the investi-
gations into CIA activities are
impairing US. intelligence ef-
forts. - .
' This is disputed by our
sources on the inside, who insist
that the CIA hasn't been seri-
ously, hampered in gathering
the intelligence that really
counts.
Most vital information needed
to safeguard the nation is pro-
vided by planes, satellites, ships
and stations loaded with tech-
nological wonders.
Through these magic eyes and
ears, the CIA has been able to
eavesdrop on conversations in-
side the Kremlin, photograph
Soviet naval movements clearly
enough to identify individual
sailors and calculate where ev-
ery factory in Russia is located,
what it produces and how much
it produces.
,The hullabaloo over CIA
abuses hasn't stopped the spy
satellites from spinning around
the earth several' times a day
and photographing the sights
below. Nor has it kept the spy
planes from completing their
usual missions.
:In aerial photographs of So-
malia, Africa, for example, ana-
t r
to a foreign power or agent thereof With intent
to injure the United States."
But the more difficult question, Senator:
Bayh notes, is "what type of information is s
essential to the security of the United Stops
that the government can legitimately pnnigh,
its disclosure by anyone, the First Amenx
ment notwithstanding."
? In his amendment he proposes a two-
pronged approach: "First, it very precisely
and narrowly defines the type of infermation.
covered; and, second, it adopts an additional,
requirement taken from the Supreme Court's1
decision in the Pentagon papers case that the
information's disclosure must pose a 'direct
immediate and irreparable harm to thesecu-
rity of the United States.'" '
Senator Bayh would restrict to these areas
the "vital defense secrets" whose disclosure;
could result in criminal punishment: "Our
basic code mechanism"; operating plans for
military combat operations; information re- .
garding the actual method of operation of
weapons system; "general atomic energy
secrets."
First test for the Bayh ?amendment is
expected to tome late next month or early in
October, when a subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee takes up the amendment
? and others to differing segments of the
omnibus bill, which the Indianian and other
commitee members are proposing.
THE WASHINGTON POST.
Monday, August 11, 1975
la to e)
lysts first spotted a huge hole on
the side of a hill. The aerial
shots of Soviet ships in the area
also disclosed some peculiar
packing crates that the CIA had
seen before.
Nations, like Individuals,
have certain habits, and the So-
viet Union had a habit of crating
technological gear in special
crates. A whole section of the
CIA is devoted to what insiders
call "crateology." ??
By examining the *phot-o-
graphs of the crates and noting
a new excavation site, the CIA
concluded that the Soviets were
establishing a missile storage
base in Somalia.
The Soviets are 'now . fully
aware of the techniques that the
CIA used to spot, their missile
storage site, for that Matter, the
Soviets know far more about
CIA. operations than do the
American people,
The investigations on Capitol
Hill may hamper the CIA in
abusing its powers but not in
collecting intelligence. The CIA
never Iliad a license to violate
the law. BY overstepping its?le-
gal and proper bounds, the CIA
brought the ? spotlight upon it-
self.
Strange Story?American au-
thorities on Guam have called
for an investigation of charges
that several refugees ? were
drugged last spring to prevent
them from returning to their
homeland.
The refugees, now awaiting
repatriation, insist they were
?doped and hauled to.Guam un-
der duress. Their strange story
sufficiently impressed Norman
Sweet, then the top refugee au-
thority on Guam, that .he fired
off a confidential cable to the
Stateljepartment requesting a
"therougliAnve.stigation? of /the
charges.!!
cablewhich was sent
thfougit military channels on
Thly 26:. included a detailed
statement;from 13 refugees. Ac-
cording ste their account, they
had been caught up in.the evac-
uation from :Vietnam but had re-
considered andhad? asked to be
??
sent home. ?
lnstead,;.:!'three.., . American
colonels" toldthem they' would
have to continue' with 2,000
other refugees from Thailand to
Guam. When the 13 protested,
the colonels allegedly "claimed
they would send us to jail ... We
agreed to be sent to jail inThai-
land. They stated they would
shoot us. We knelt down accept-
ing the execution."
Later that evening, the disaf-
fected refugees charged, the
'Americans "hand-locked each
of us and .carried us to a room
where we received sleep-ill:hie-
te
ing injections . . . after we're"
awake (the next day) we real-:
ized that we were lying on a red- -
colored ground, full of dust.:
We're then told that we arrived":
in Guam. ?
They complained that the In-
jections had caused pain and ?
paralysis. So they were taken WI .-
a dispensary where, they said.'
"an American Dr. Captain asked
us what kind of sickness. We .
told him about the story of. our .{
sleep-inducing injections. Un-
fortunately, he did notbelieve I
that. .
. "He asked us to undress so
that he could see the injections.
After discovering four injec-
tions on each of us, two on the
arms and two on the thighs, then_ ;
he believed the story and under-'
stood our situation."
. Footnote: A spokeswoman for
the refugee program -lar charges had been raised ear-
lier by Vietnamese airmen.- It:-
was determined that they were
under the control of the Thais at. ?
all times. The United States,:
therefore, had no part in their
drugging if it occurred. The 2*
repatriates who have now
?brought charges, she saidonay
be some of the original com-
plainants. If so, the previous in-
v e.stigatlon will stand.
*WM, United retttilre
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SATURDAY REVIEW
9 August 1975
Failed Patriots
Inside the Company:
CIA Diary
by.Philip Agee
Stone/till, 639 pp., $9.95
Reviewed by Harrison E. Salisbury
So much has been written about the
CIA in recent months that it is time
to pause a moment and reflect on pre-
cisely what the Central Intelligence
Agency is and how it got that way. There
is a lesson in the origins and evolution
of CIA that we must absorb if we are
ever to cope with the critical problem
it now presents. There is no point rush-
ing into half-measures to try to "curb"
the CIA if we do not comprehend the
fundamentals of the problem. In this
task, Philip Agee's comprehensive, often
tedious, prolix, thoughtful, and remark-
ably illuminating study can be of great
assistance.
_
CIA, it should be firmly stated, was
not founded by evil men. It was
not created as some kind of dark con-
spiracy to subvert American democracy.
Quite the contrary, it was established
by brilliant, intelligent, patriotic Ameri-
cans who had accumulated substantial
experience in intelligence and covert
operations during World War II. To-
day's scandal is rooted in this very cir-
cumstance?the founding of the agency
by men who won their spurs pulling off
incredibly daring parachute entries into
Norway, spiriting valuable scientists out
of Nazi-occupied Europe, filching Nazi
secrets out of the Wilhelmstrasse, and
enlisting eccentric nationalists like Ho
Chi Minh in the Allied war effort. The
objective of these men, founders of the
romantic, quixotic, remarkably success-
ful OSS during World War II, was a
simple one: to defeat the enemy?Nazi
Germany, Fascist Italy, jingoist Japan.
In war anything goes: the dirty trick,
the criminal deceit, blackmail, torture,
brute force.
When CIA was established in 1947,
its basic cadres and leadership came al-
most intact from OSS. These men saw
their objective in 1941 terms. Only now
the enemy was the Soviet Union. It was
not yet hot war, but the Cold War was far
advanced. The Soviet Union and its pre-
sumed allies, Communists and Commu-
nist states wherever they might be, were
an enemy precisely as deadly as Nazi
Germany. Maybe more so.
When their task is conceived in these.
terms, what was more natural than that
these clever, sophisticated, often uncon-
ventional men should seek to fight fire
Harrison E. Salisbury is author of the forth-
coming novel The Gates of Hell, a pan-
oramic study of Russian life in the last half-
century, to be published in October by
Random House. ?
with fire? They knew, or thought they
knew, a great deal about the Russians
and the operations of their covert agen-
cies and intelligence branches. The men
of CIA set out to create an operation that
could fight fire with fire?meet the Soviet
intelligence networks, the KGB, and all
the others on their own terms. If KGB
bribed and subverted, so would CIA. If
KGB had its execution teams, so would
? CIA. If KGB infiltrated democratic insti-
tutions, CIA would infiltrate Communist
institutions. If KGB set up false-front
organizations, so would CIA.
One has only to flip through the pages
of Agee's book?only now released in
this country because of earlier fears of
CIA legal action?to see how successful
CIA was in creating a mirror image of
the Russian intelligence forces. In coun-
try after country, CIA penetrated the
power structure of the local government,
staged or encouraged coups d'etat to put
"reliable" men into power, bribed the
press, falsified the news, manipulated lo-
cal politicians, subverted elections.
And all of this, CIA and its leaders
thought, was good. It was protecting
America, protecting democracy, holding
back the red wave of subversive Com-
munist plotting that threatened to end
our way of life. These words are cliches.
The goal and thought of CIA was not.
If the law had to be bent, if dirty hands
had to be used, if scurrilous schemes
had to be invented?these were all, means
to a noble end: the survival of the United
States and the confusion of its enemies.
How THIS WAS DONE Agee details in
page after page. He was a lower-echelon
agent working in Latin America, but
reading his account one soon realizes that
it makes no difference which country
he happened to be working in, because
the story was always the same: be alert
against any manifestation from the Left;
support the military and the dictators,
for they are the only persons upon whom
we can really rely?they can be bought
and will stay bought.
Slowly the terrible truth begins to
emerge: the men who fought KGB not
only imitated and improved upon its
methods; they began to think like KGB.
Only in Russia, and only among the
most hard-line Stalinists, have I heard
the kind of reasoning that CIA, em-
ployed to justify its terrible means. A
process that only an Ionesco could de-
pict began to occur. The loyal, thought-
ful, patriotic mcri of CIA began to look
and act more and more like their coun-
terparts?the ogres of KGB.
Gradually, even the goal of CIA be-
gan to disappear in the mirage of bureau-
cratic momentum. Its life as an on-
going institution became more impor-
tant than the adivities in which it was
6
nominally engaged.
CIA did not really notice that thanks
to its efforts America's "friends" around
the world more and more became the
antithesis of democracy?the military
dictators of the Middle East; the pur-
chasable colonels of Latin America; the
Francos, the Salazars, the Shahs, the
Chiang Kai-sheks, the shabby rulers of
South Korea and South Vietnam. With-
out noticing, the CIA became more and
more distrustful of the essentials of
democracy?free choice, free speech, the
democratic process. Our allies in West-
ern Europe began to arouse concern.
Were they really safe? What if a left-
wing government came to power in
France? Who could say whether the
British Labor Party was really secure?
As Agee notes?and the point can be
stressed again and again?the CIA by its
' charter is not an independent agency.
It is an arm of the President. It can un-
dertake nothing on its own. It is a secret
pair of eyes, an extra daring pair of arms
for the White House. It is the Presi-
dent's instrument, nothing more nor fess.
Congress from the beginning abdicated
its responsibility to oversee, and that is
the way the CIA wanted it and still wants
it.
THE PRESIDENT, whoever he may be,
thus cannot escape responsibility for
CIA. If CIA murdered foreign leaders
or plotted to murder them or provided
logistics to murder them, the responsi-
bility is the President's. The CIA is pre-
eminently "The President's Men." They
have no life or responsibility of their
, own.
The CIA policy of supporting cor-
rupt, rotten, dictatorial, anti-democratic
elements has now come home to roost.
By aiding the suppression of normal po-
litical give-and-take and of normal,
growth in the political process, and by
suppressing wherever possible any manii
festations from the Left or procedures
leading to social change, the CIA has
created a situation in which violent
change and violent revolution become
almost inevitable in the "backward"
countries of the world. If the lid is
slammed shut on the pot too long, the
pot will eventually explode. And this is
precisely what CIA has brought about.
This situation can obviously not he
cured by a new congressional "over-
sight" committee nor by any number of
Rockefeller investigations. It can be
cured only if Congress and the President
comprehend that CIA must be their joint
instrument in the furtherance of Amer-
ican policy, and if both work hand in
hand to lay down guidelines which en-
sure that in fighting communism CIA
does not succeed in destroying democ-
racy at home as well as abroad. 0
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SOVIET ANALYST
7 August 1975
?
uestions of Evidence
c by ROBERT.. CONQUEST!i
A recent short piece in. the-London Times .(25'::"' they remain 'quite' idiosyncratic. Indeed he, him-
July- 1975) on the revelations". Of 'the:Czecho';,
slovak Secret Police defector, Josef Frolik, put
.forward a; curious: argument for rejecting them,-
?Frolik, the correspondent Brogan) argued;
.had.on-reachine 'the,West got in 'touch With the
CIA:: Anything h,..s_e'cilly,..a_s_124eretoTe-iiis) Times
-
Times :writer demonstrates, in a truly exem'plary
manner, the. pervasive way. in .which-myth Ape,.
. . ?
_comes the accepted thing .in the media.
? j6; t :? t ? ? ? s .s.t 1 -
.A
It is not the: purpose of:thipiece:to-discus's
Frolik's: allegations, nor. even to ,note that the
,iPatrick Brogan -:formulatiori must automatically
'lead 4ci' the' dismiSsarof 'all information frorn'
Soviet official since these-are'alWaySin
itobch?With'the-CIA'. FOr'-the 'Times man gave one
.substantive argument, or -rather assertiorV'He
-asserted- quite" flatly 'that' the "Penkovsky''Papers
-sufficiently 'illustrated the unreliability 'of any
material 'which' could'bonceiyebly have passed
? 4
? ?
'';??.. Now,. it. is certainly true that some: documents
? relevant to-Soviet activity are dubious, or.at any
'rate touched up. The, existence of such documents
is often put forward as though.it refuted genuine'
ones .of almost identical . content. The Zinoviev-
,;Letter was.a. few years.ago once again "exposed",
with 'no fresh arguments or evidence whatsoever;,
.,by:a team -of' journalists: (In 'fact; the real issue
.:was not the genuineness of the documentsamuch
.as th.e? use or- abuse made of it-by the Conserve;
-Alves in the ;1924 election).. Though. even on:this;
:real proof still; lacking the. document itself;:on
..the ,baiance. of probability,' appears not to bean
authentic original But all of its substance and \AN.
?
luelly...alhof _its .phreseology come from genuine
documents issUedby. the Corhintern;-;'-'
.1
her,recept:rn.emoirs, .the widow of the late'
politburq .rae...rnber:Ottor Kuusinen tells-of; how,-
when a...team:9f rponoglot British left-wing: invesv,
tigateraoof, :the, matter went to Comintern head-
quarters, the?more secret of these cJoctiments were
.understendably..removed before they were shown
the.file, to the aMusement of all participators).
?
:This 'is relevant to present-day ma tters,las there
,is0 certain parallel,here,:of soit.seems,:with the
document: recently' published by the: Portuguese.
Socialists,-. which purported 'to be instrUctions
from the 'Soviet Central- Committee:to :the:Portu-
guese Communist Party.. Appearing' in Parisin the,
absence ofany Socialist newspaper in-Lisbon,:this
was-! instantly denounced .:as -'the
forgery: iby
..French Communists.:1.P 1-e c;
)-1 ? ?
, They have now abandoned this line of argul
client.; since it can be shown without question that
the instructions were' preciselythose given Udder
the signature of Boris Ponomarev to the Western
Communists 'as: 'whole, so that, the ','forgery''
would amount' in any, case to no more -than- the
'Specification of Portugal and the Portuguese Party
as recipients. (see Soviet Analyst, Vol. 4, NO. 14)
?
to the Penlaw. ski)" PaperS,"it is quite untrue
that`they,have been shown to be falsified in any
r. ictor Zorza, it is true, urged this view:
Fr-froM his arguments being generally accepted,
self,' much to his credit,' is including in'. his next
. .
collection: (the forthcoming appearance of which
is-another reason.to advert to the matter) a brief
summary ioff:..the!objectioos. made; to ,,his iyieNN?st
An automatic acceptance of any 'advocacy 'Lend-
ing to Support a correspondent's view. as being
absolute established fact' is-;?-unfortuliately,'One of
thoset things..' which, se4en to-be inseparable frdm
'partisan journalism.: BUtthe cas. ei'otthe PenkOvsky.
Paper'ts!Worth-:fevie-wing. once"agairfisince!apart
froni. friereitinforma don they ;ConStitute-, onerof
thoe dOcurnent?llikelho-Of SVetlaria' -AllilueVa
and Milovah flajilas),in'.thefr time,)whicht-give-a
particUlaril/piofthind insightintiiithe-vvhole'nature
and, conductra!the Soviet ruling caste ?and'if
.hoti genuine) c-otirte,
,1' 7;b1rt's fi7r1F4 r+.:1=}
colonel .,:Perikovsky,,: it be -:reniembered,
transn-iitted,a vast. amount. pf..information,,ta:the
West, before. his. arrest and execution:qhe Rpers-
?naturally. .da not include the sensitive intelligence
-side.of his rePoits: They- are; rather,- that .-section
pf his -cOm.munications, in which he, as he.madeit
clear himself, tried to put on record b.is2rn.
:experiences, :and. judgments. To. that.,extent?.prid.
Unarguably -theY, have been 'edited":".''' "
? -
PenkcivskyV rribtivation Ci 1IfWeVii "idn
?rlii ? ," ? ???--?-?? ? -? - .1, ,,d?"
IVIrf2cirza, g,-arguments?against.the .authenticity
of these Papers'is.two-pid: general end partcular.
His:sgeneral-argument: is little?more'than'to.,..the
effect .that 'PenkoVsky'"Would not have dane:SOL
end-so or so-and-so. He would not have'Sentany:
thing but intelligence reports, owing.tothe'greater?
.1P6F3:,:r
??1' ' 1r,
.?BUt itis:cjear.that.Penkovsky. wished to!put on
record in.:the:West with great.urgency ;everything
he,could.:.copvey about jife. in Russig..,Thee-iption
tha toverie; couple of.. years he would have :ref rain7
ocI;,frpm, or-been ,unab.le. to, intermingle
straight, intelligence:Teporting a good. deal- ot.this
othermateriaj seems.baseles.s.. N.or;cap it sensibly
be,held.that this',could have brought: pim .greeter
risk,than. he was running -already:: the.idiscoyery
of.A,manuscript,or,microfilm,.of hostile gossip in
his drawer would have been a trifle compared with
the military information. and espionage equipment.
. . .
-?.-
On the other hand, such conditions of:reporting
account for the repetitive and sometimes strained
and emotional nature of his communications ?
the ('often !discursive, 'verbose, -almost ?conver-
setionar.style Mr.. Zorza thinks, is the opposite of
what, one: would- expect in material. written undee
difficult circumstances.: On the contrary,, it is con-
cise and careful writing ?that.;is.?thprod.uct :of,
calm and time.
? ? * '''''''''' ? '1,V.?'
Zorza continually says thato manlike
Penkovsky-'.'vvould not have" done.this, that or:the
other, in circumstances in which others feel that
he :mightwel.ljeave...P.cnovsky's-. description, of.his
earlier rcareerr:whic'n :shows every sign ? ofibeieg
written Under less pressure:than otherparts'of:the
book,- includes a few pages. on'the:course 'of the
war in Russia and his part in it easy..to write,
? ? ? ? . ? ? .
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quite -unCompromidingTh'foUndjand-'entirely
natural-if originally planned as the background to
a" more coherent' autobiography:than proved posi?
sible...butrforAVIrieZoria?even'this'is-suspect?.;P,
It..does?seem.possible?thatet, least;some of .the
reaterial?Toapheve .been ,taped directly during. his
jnterviews.!?in., London:- if,,Tso,..-its? inclusion! can
harctly.be objected ,to, (.1t:vvould,...however,,:rnean
-that -'there wa.i,no-Russian-?manusCript!;. ',The
'stress .which-Mr...Zorza lays on.:the.negative point
of,,the non-production of:such a manuscript seems
anyhow. misplaced :S even thevyritten?rnaterial.
would;presurpably: be: intermingled,,withi.intelli;.
genc reports, and unlikely to be released.) In.fact,?
Iry general;it? does'not.seem'that any weight'nf:sed
be attached. tO,these ekternalYcriticisrnswhich
,ie the rrieresteSsurnptiOn&;Irt6":sx-v?-1-3?72;!??91trwki-',
.f);.;??? .?? "?ili6t-
Zoria..a..;interna/;:, textual, _criticism ,is
:';curnulati\re";.and we must .deal,with a:number of
.the: first . place,..some, of. hi,s5rpoyitare ,
.dycarcely, points ot?.all, ? *-1.
.: ?? : ? ? . ? . ? : ei"r11 ??1r), ?
(a) ? Penkovsky says he learned! of-the- Berlin
Wall four daysbefore East Berlin.. was actually
Closed? Off;* but,' says Zorza; he,vvas'..in' London at
that time In'facLhe.was"in Moscow on 10 August
end .the Wall- Went. LIP On'the-13th,:a;discrepantyman' coOnt'c'iritteri ,:
? da
??
.
(b) ? M,? Zorza condeinns--ejeference to
Mr; an
.'"RSFSR Communist Party leader" on the grounds.
that?there?is.no separate Communist Party of the ?
RSFSR. But?there e separate Party Bureau: for
.the RSFSR and'the *official described (Churaev)
was-lts. Deputy .Chairman;i. ?So the: description..is
'both. correct and natura0
.i.:r.(6)' "'Of a' number'Of..PhiaSeS;-Mr.' Zorza simply
?.
says tharthey are not.the usual, Convention.a 1-*Parti/ ?
expression :' But 'whY'-shoUld'they be?'ll'Khrush.:
,
? ? ? ,?
chev? had -spoken' of-,ZnuKov s ? "Bonapartist 'ten:?
dencieshowr? does''thiSr'stop. PenkovskY 'from
.describing this as an accusation of ';Napoleonic
cksaracteristics!!?_'
?'.(d).-} 'Russians do, in fact, speak on occasion.
of "Europe" when .they mean non-Russian Europe,.
'as against Zorza'sessertion to thecontrary':
c' (e)."Mr:Zorza's.' remarks that
reports5hat 'sSeveral' SoViet- leundhes- 94)%18.4d
putniks/ took .the lives -of' their .cr.,
would 'have -detected this throdWi't?:, Akiidrirq
of ship-ground signals indiatirrovi-i'l'aritVedailii
Penkovsky is quite explicitly not aSENr-tiribi-W3111
only. reporting ? vvhatphibbasi hearigi tembinca
?sentenceyvhich ?,e,spc/clay; the. pejo tFon.thi.ca?aa
p?-forgery might).?gptu'obanIc?cs;.qe,,the reeniJoring
argument-could:not possibly disprove the pOint,-?
? ad-the majority ? of -rocket accidents take?place:on
or nearthe launching pad.'. 1 .%??
? ?? ? ? ? ? ^ ?? ? ? ,.! .1?1,5 ..e,i?4,.11-14:1.1E.r,, ?
'Strategic view misunderstood
-? Above all;Tit?is my- impression thats:Mr: Zorza
has largely, misunderstood Penkovsky's chapter
. on strategy, which is central to his argument. Pen-
kovsky is stating a case indeed: he is deeply con-
cerned with the ? common ' "first str ike"'.view? of
nuclear war prevalent' in Soviet military' circles:
But he: does-not,. as Zorza implies, claim that 'it
was' not opposed:: On 'the. ,centrary he frequently
says that' many.' generals. 'did oppose ''the 'first
strike",-? theory,-maintaining only that it ? was': the
'theory .that "the -dominant faction -was'coming
-.round tol'in :Krushchey'stime. This' might be
.disputed,.but it-fits in with most other information:.
, tr?., ?--,- ,? ? -? .
Certain other; of Mr, .Zorza's objections seem,
if anything, to prove the opposite of-what he
imagines. For example; (1) ,Penkovsky' ironically
describes seeing in uniform with some genuine
soldiers*."e certain N. S.' Khrushchev"' whom he
had not 'seen before. But of course (Mr.'Zorza
points out) he must have known of Khrushchevs'at
that time First Secretary', of the'Ukrainian .Perty:,
?Yes, and what of it?)!
? ': ?? ;71' .
.' (2) Penkovsky speaks of Khrushchev's removal
in 1957; of the ,"Anti-Party Group of Molotov,
Malenkov, and..Bulganin",; but Bulganin;though
involved in the Group, was not actually removed
until 1958. This, too, is a fact known even.to the,
most superficial student of Soviet affairs :i
'
In both these? cases, one can surely take. for.
granted .that an organisation disposing' of num.:
bers of independent experts would excise the
solecisms, if only on the ground that they drew
unnecessary suspicion. In a genuine manuscript,
however, they are not in the least unnatural, being
at most hasty :condensations.. What Mr. ? Zorza
(who otherwise seems 'to. rely on what looks like
minor translating slips) is asking us to believe is
that an, organisation . capable, .of, large-scale ,bio7
graphical :.cletail :Of minor; military%and` politica
figures is ignorant of, or incapable of producing:
the most widely, known .facts_ of ,Soviet.
. ? 3,0 .; .
history... "'?-? - ss` ?
? ? ? --.???.;. t . I-, S.;
That Mr. Zorze'serguments are unsound does
not,'? of, course,- prove the ? authenticity.; of the
Papers.. Indeed, it is difficult to see how "proof.:
could .be forthcoming., But, the. considerations in .
favour', oVauthenticity are very weighty..A large
-amount of. ,factual detail, is given;,none of which
has been., shown-, to be false.-.The
general,?concerns much less the high officials who
would__ be ; the ?best sensationalism-value,'. than
(apart from the soldiers) men, like? Churaevsand
Gvishiani, of great interest to students but almost
unknown .:to the public. The description of Soviet
society is 'similar' to (though 'more detailed than),
_accounts given by 'a variety' of Russian .writerS,
The tone is extremely consistent, 'and the 'mores...
sion. of a single 'personality angry, urgent;
under' heavy 'dtress 'and full of determination
?
.,.?
Mr. ZorzaZf seeks to impose on this real Pen-
kovsky an imaginary "efficient spy" who-would
not" have written in this way,, and clearly to. find
that this impersonal figure is incompatible with
the 'material is to prove nothing. Unless prevented
by "arbitrary incredulity", it seems that we should
accept the authenticity of, the Penkovsky papers,.
at least until far more cogent reasons are.give.n.for,
:..,... ? ,
not doing so. . . . . _
Meanwhile, even in the present Washington
?climate of moronic CIA-bashing, it is a little odd
tto find "the'fact of one expert on Soviet affairs
:thinking that a document put out in the name of a.
'Idead man was fabricated being taken as destroy-
ing the credibility of evidence 'advanced more
than a decade later by a living defector ? which
is quite obviously "authentic" in the 'sense 'that
? Zorza claims' the Penkovtsky Papers. are not: for.'
there is no doubt that he in person is actually put-
ting it forward. Josef Frolik's statements must be
ljudged on their!' merits.... So must newspaper
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NEW YORK TIMES
13 August 1975
SECOND U.S. PLAN
:ON CHILE IS CITED
-
?Proposals to Use Military
Diplomatic Pressure to
-
-,--Bloolc Allende Reported
--By'INTICHOLAS M:HORROCK
Special to The Sew York Times
;WASHINGTON, Aug. 12-
-The Nixon Administration
,planned a covert campaign to
?keep Salvador Allende Gossens
fronl becoming President of
,Chile .in 1970 through military
and diplomatic channels sepa-
mtee from operations of the
Central Intelligence Agency, au-
thoritative Government sources
.S6aid today.
According to these sources,
The Nixon Administration
Planned to prevent Dr. Allende
from assuming the- presidency
through the C.I:A. on one hand,
as reported earlier in The New
York Times, while looking into
the possibility of , applying tra-
ditional, though secret, military
and diplomatic pressures on the
other hand. The Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence is
examining both channels
through witnesses from the
C.I.A. and military 'agencies..
The outlines of what one
Government source called a
"two-track" approach was en-
compassed in a subpoena issued
today by the Senate committee.
The comMittee is attempting to
obtain documents, tapes and
other materials from Presiden-
tial papers of Richard M. Nix-
on covering events between
Sept. 4 and Nov. 3, 1970.
The subpoena requests any
materials: relating to a series of
Meetings between Mr. Nixon
and Henry A. Kissinger, who
Vas then his adviser on nation-
gal security affairs, and various
Officials of the State Depart-
Ment, Department of Defense
and Central Intelligence Agency.
The papers are not in Mr.
Nixon's custody. Congress en-
kted a 'law stating that the
papers, tapes and other materi-
als accumulated by the Presi-
dent while he was in the White
House were the property of the
people. Mr. Nixon is contesting
this in court. Meanwhile, cus-
fody is temporarily held by the
White House.
4.7116 subpoena was directed
to Philip Buchen, counsel to the
President, and arthur Sampson,
director of the General Services ,
A, dministration, who has tem-
pbrary custody.
Part of the Nixon Admin.
ihrtion's approaches in 1970
wera?outlined by authoritative
Government sources to The
New York Times last month.
Eleven days after Dr. Allende,
a Marxist, won a plurality in
C44,ilean elections o nSept. 4,
1970, President Nixon met with
Richard Helms then the Direc-
tor ot Central Intelligence.
According to these sources,
he forcefully ordered Mr. Helms
to make every effort to come
up with ideas to keep Dr. Al-
lende from taking office. Three
days later Mr. Kissinger met
privately with Thomas Kara-
messines, then chief of covert
operations for the C.I.A.
, This meeting, not previously
disclosed, was held at Mr. Kis-
singer's request, according to
one knowledgeable source. "Mr.
Kissinger was concerned about
the harsh orders given by Pres-
ident Nixon," this source said.
There are no minutes of the
meeting, but the Senate com-
mittee has interviewed Mr. Ka-
ramessines about its content
and has obtained his handwrit-
ten notes, this source said.
Economic Steps Discussed
i,Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Kara-
messines discussed "economic
methods" of taking action
against Dr. Allende, this source
s-aid.
?,'Later, the Government sources
have said, Mr. Karamessines
told Mr. Kissinger of a plot of \
retired military personnel and
other rightists to kidnap Gen.
Ren?chneider, chief of the
Chilean General Staff, and thus
lay the base for the military to
step in to "restore order.'
Kissingen, these sources
joined with Mr. Karames-
sines in the conclusion that this
pfain could not work and re-
jected offering support for it.
*Mr. Kissinger testified before
tlie Senate committee for over
three hours today on this sub-
jet. In a brief meeting with
reporters; he declared that dur-
Mr, the Nixon Administration
ere was no policy to assas-
sinate any foreign officials or
laders or any plot to assassi-
nate any foreign leaders."
The Senate committee today
sUbpoenaed any materials from
Mr. Nixon's papers "including
pans for a military coup, the
passage of machine guns, other
weapons, gas masks, gas can-
isters, or the kidnapping or
death of Gen. Ren?chneider,
the bribery of Chilean politi-
cians, the use of propaganda,
including media personnel on
the payroll of the Central In-
telligence Agency, and the use
of: private business interests."
.According to authoritative
sciurces, during this period of
planning with the C.I.A., the
Nixon Administration was also
examining whether it could
apply what one source called
"more traditional pressures' to
keep Dr. Allende out of power.
:On Sept. 22, 1970, a White
House meeting was held by Mr.
Kissinger. It was attended by
U. Alexis Johnson, then Under
Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, David Packard, Secre
tary of the Army, Mr. Helms,
Adm. Thomas Moorer, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Viron?Peter Vaky, a staff mem-
ber of the National Security
Council, John N. Irwin, Under
Secretary of State, and Mr.
.Keramessines.
LONDON TIMES
25 July 1975
The
extraordinary Czech
- spy caper'
Washington
Mr? jesef Frelik, a major in-the
? Czechoslovak secret police who
defected to the West in 1568
with an accumulation of dos-
siers giving names and records
of all Czech spies in the West,
has made in a book* a number
of sensational claims about his
success in winning agents
among leading members of Bri-
tish trade unions, and men-
tions ;three Members of Parlia-
ment : who he claims were
Czech spies.
? According to Mr Frolik, who
Was "labour attache ". in the
:?embassy in London from 1564-
66, there was a plot to lure Mr,
Edward Heath?then an up-
and-coming Tory Minister?to
'.'Prague. and there incriminate
,him.
, Mr ? Frolik, . who now lives in
; ?
,anonyMous obscurity in.
, America, says the Czechs con-
- duct a very extensive spying
operation in Britain, presum-
? ably to supplement the activi-
ties of the KGB. He regularly
changes jobs and aliases, and
?believes that his former corn-
miles found his hiding place
recently :and tried to murder
him.
Such an act of revenge' is
not -very ? surprising if Mr Fro-
Ilk's Memoirs . are to. be
believed_
He does not ?name his MPs,
although the identities of two
ofthem, are perfectly clear.
No-r does he name the union
leaders, although at least one
of them is easily identifiable.
The allegations are, so . serious,
and in the nature of things
cannot ? be substantiated, that
Mr Frolik's testimony must
obviously ? be treated with the '
utmost caution.
..Furthermore, be is under
the ? wing of -the CIA (he WriS
welcomed on Ins arriral iii
Washington by the Director of
the - CIA, Mr Richard Helms
himself) and the Penkovsky
papers are a sufficient example
of the need to treat CIA mate-
rial,' ex-CIA . apents and CIA
proteges with much scepticism.
Mr Frolik says that his evi-
dence against the three MPs
was hearsay: he 'did not con-
trol their, activities himself. Ile
was a witness at the trial of
Mr Will Owen, MP, under th2
designation "Mr A ". -----
Mr Frolik emerged briefly
into the liiceright le it
December (he says that the
story was leaked by the British
Secret Service) when he was
said to have suggested that Mr
Joan Stonehouse had probably
defected. He admitted in an
interview here that ire had
made that suggestion to 'a
representative of MIS who flew
to America to ask him for any
suggestions he might have of
Mr. Stonehouse's whercano4;t3.
- He will not reveal the iden-
tity of his third MP, ce.cept to
say that it was a woman who
is no longer in the House.
He names no names in his
baok, for fear of libel and to
do his new British friends a
favour, he Says. 'What ? he is
claiming is that three or four
of the dozen most important
union leaders in .Britain, gen-
.eral secretaries, of huge organ-
izations who. are not known to
be communists, arc KGB
agents.
e' ' He says'that they ire not
spies but that they ate ready
to ? disrupt the British economy
or bring- it to a complete halt
on orders from Moscow.
" Mr .? was a great friend of
mine. We often talked z'oeut
this ", he sold. But he offers
no substantiaeian beyond his
own memory and his own
. ?The..." Heath caper.", _accord-
ing to Mr Frolik, consiLeied of
bringing a distim-,,aelied Ceeelt
musician, Professor lareslev
Reinberger, to London and get-
ting him to invite Mr Heath to
Prague to .try out the organ in
the Church of St ' James's
there. The idea was to pro;-}:e
Mr Heath to 'commit. some
folly, - and then to b!aciemail
him. - ?
Mr Frolik says the invite_on
was at first accepted and then,
at the urging of British coun-
ter-intelligence, rejected_
The rest of Mr Ft-Wes book
is the more usual stuff of 'spy
stories. He claims that Isis ee I-
leagues had a " Czech Phiiby "
In a special section of British
Intelligence which deiet with
Czechoslovakia, who betrayed
the whole network . to the
Czechs in the 1950s.? saes
that this chanter was heavily
censored by MI6, but that he
will restore the cuts in the
A mercan edition.
? Again, this would be more
convincing if Mr Frolik were
not, already suspect because of
his unsubstantiated charges
aeainst trade unionists.
The Frolik Connection. by
Josef- Frolike. published by Leo
Cooper, ?3.93.
Patrick Urogart
WASHINGTON POST (PARADE)
10 August 1975
Q. The sins of the CIA--is it not fitting and right
that these should accrue to the various Presidents
;of the US. under -whose 'authorization the 70X per-
formed acts both legal and K. K.-, Falls
. -
Church, Va.
-A. it is fitting and right. The CIA did not and does?
9? not perform major operations without the approval-
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CHICAGO TRIBUNE
13 JULY 1975
?
Komityet Gosudarstvennoy? Bezapase
nosti. the Committee of State.'Securitee
or the KGB, is the most important -sin-
gle institution in the-Soviet Union. It is
the powerful secret .force that keeps,So--
net Communism in power and seeks`to
keep . foreign governments and , their
leaders under observation and control.
Inside the Soviet Union it is referred to.
in whispers. Outside .it is an object. of
curiosity and 'terror.. The KGB . may
have as many as 90,000 agents around
the world. Today and on ?Monday the.?
mysterious KGB will be examined by 1
Robert Conquest, a leading British au- ?
thority on Soviet affairs and -author of
."GreatTerror".and "Power and Policy)
In the U.S.S.R." ? ? ? ? ? L.
retent appointment of-a-.
new Sovietambassador to.. Iceland,: mayl
not sOurid like a every impOrtant. event, :
But vheri oiie adds' ;that thereisanseiii.-1
question, Gcorgi Ferafanov, is aeKGB I
officer specializing i-t politiealeSubveeg,=1
Sion :anclewhen. one; Considers :.the _efforts
beininide Simultaneously'. in-shisbon to.
neutraliie. NATO's other keie'Atlaritic.1
outposts' in 'the..AzoreS, it falls inte:placei
as one More highly,SignifiCant ?mOVe.-in
a worldwide .secret war against the
non-
Soviet riatigns.:7,:;?
. -Meanwhife'e the last few mohths have
seen, t r a Ord i tie r velOp in thel
formation DepartMent has', contrived 'tO;
get published' in!minor Arah?PeriOdfcals,
to be 'then, W`Cightily.: reported ,inthe
Moscow press,- streng.? .euggestiOns,ethat!;
the .CIA was responsible for. the :aSSaSSi'.1:;
nation of King Faisal 0:Sandi Arabia:
Apart from :the. massiVe- buildup of.
KGB Operations :based in Lisbon,'South
'America has been swept 'by rumors of ;
strange CIA- aetivity, while Washington '
itself is full of' investigators apparently -
..determined, to, obtain and publish, that-:
organization's allegedly dreadful secrets. ;
. .
Thee etteMpt, to 'put responsibility !
for the murder of King..Faisal on the,
CIA' went as follows: Pravda [in its In.
lernational -Review March' 30,-:1975;
and again in' its CoinMentator's''column.
on March 311 publicly launched the sug-
gestion.
:Without flatly:. asserting it, Pravda
used such expressions as "many observ-
ers" and "commentators in a number of
:foreign newspapers" who were allegedly
asking,.-"Was- not-the -long arm of the
?CIA inv.olved-in the:shots in Riyadh?" ?.
This -etory::?which, as -.evei7????possible '
political aridAtiler.7Consideratiort: makes.
quite' certainly-untrue;:is a type
pr*luct Of the,KGB's important,Dis..
:information DePartraent;?-hich' has been
'particularly active- lately. 11 [and its
.Czechoslovak and Polish subsidiaries] is
,puttingr a-massive effort into planting
:false information about various individu-
,.: .
:.als and organizations regarded as hostile
-.to. 'See/let interests. The targets upon.
which the department, now appear ? to be
'concentrating are the CIA; Radio Liberty;
,end. Various Russians now in the yest?'!
;!Alexander-SolzhenitsYn fer,peeee; ?
!nth' e seems little doubt that,.naany-Pf
1.tbe: current campaigns against the 'CIA
.cettaineceuetries.!!are largely spon-
? sored, by the. ;Disinformation Depart:;-
,rneptThere. is. nothing new. .in this, As:,
;long' 'ago ? as 1964; :a .niimbereof forged
-!documentS were passed to.the .Indonesi;,
:an government ptirPorting -Ito -prove a
?CIA assassiriation plot on President Sue
ItarliO'S life, Lind even a plahried Anglo4
'.Arherican:leVasion. of Indonesia
ieeThiS: was largely done theW aoCz,ech-
-eplovakintermediary, ,and fult!details of
.the .operetion .:,became knowii ,after.1963.
when Oteiof the Czech deceptien,Speciali
.Ladislav?'..Dittman,.? defected .to. the.
West r
One -major disinformation,- operatien
now being-currently waged?undercover.
of the idea of detente?is that' against
,Radio Liberty and?Radio Free Europe...
The channel here has normally been the.
Poles. And the method is a reliance .on
.forged documents in implicating somed
the radio steetione'Eastern Europeans in'
pro-Nazi activities. It has been possible
lit recent cases to expose the forgeries:- e
These attacks' on individuals are part'.
of a larger scale campaign to destroy or
emasculate the "free" radios.' The Ra-
dio
Moscow and Radio Wars e;w contime:.
ally pump out mit-Western Propaganda.
?on their English language and other for-7
?
eign services, these counties' represen-
tatives in the.. West spend much ' effort -
treing to persuade Western statesmen--
like former Sen. J. W. Fulbright [De .
Ark.)-ethat beaming to. their own popu-
lations. opinions, not approved bY.,their
government.... is bad for. international
amity. " ?"..
:.? _ . . .
? There is also -Sante 'Indie'itiOn ;that :a
few- Of ?;thei.more':aaiVefigures' 'in. the
U. 8.',8tate. Department 'lend .teWard rej;
itticting these libertarian erbieeS ? in the'
hope 'of obtaining some sorted' illusory.
"detente" advantage from the Russians..::,
.; The Disinformation Department is Of
Course, only eneeofs the ? variouS divi-
ssions into which the. KGB's.sovast _appae
.ratus is organized:That body hasite
headquarters at the notorioui.. LybYana;
ka Prison, scene of some of.lheereost
notorious executions .of the Soviet Perio,d
and an easy walk' froth Moscow's:. Main
tourist area. ,There, its chief;;Yuri!An:e;
.dropov, sits in the third-f]eor offinefeoM?
which no less than 'five of:. his .nredece.se
.sors, have been dracE,,eci to the cells be-
low, and later. to the execution cellars'
, still further. down.-''
10 10
? HIS ESPIONAGE and terror activities!
abroad are run by his First Chief Direct.-
torate with its main 'offices outside Mos-
cow, well away from foreign viewers.
[Operations against foreigners in the
U. S. S. R. come under ? the Second Die;
rectorate.) This First Chief Directorate
is divided into 23 subciirectorates,
cial Services, Special- Departments, and:
OrdinareeDepartments. Ten of these lat-
ter ?Cover: the world on a geographical,
basis.? ?
. .. ? -
In .addition, there is .GRU, the intelli-
gence arm of the Soviet armed forces,.
theoretically an independent organize
--
tion. There was ? always a certain
amount .of rivalry between the KGB and
the GRU. ??
,
,;-The secret police shot two successive
'heads of. military intelligence in Stalin's
Buts the GRU' is considerably
.smaller *organization than the KGB; And'
'since the discovery in 1963 that the GRU
had itself been penetrated by the British
:and Americans thra C.ol. PenkovskY; the
smaller ,organization 'virtually lost its
independence, S and -may now be regard-
:ed as little more than a branch of the'.
? The First :Directorate cohducts ? the
'major parted its foreign 'operations then'
Soviet' embassies. All reports indicate'
that approximately 40' per cent of .Soviet
diplomats and other citizens abroad are:
full-time employes of. the KGB, while!
..the others are .on 'call -for assistance
when tequired.',.: .S. ? s
_ . ?
Even- an- ibaSSidorS 'May. be -KGB. of&
"cers.L-in fact.:Soviet secret policemen.
:are given, major-posts. in all sorts of
:,.organizations, and in the most casual-,
'looking and unembarrassed sort of way.
'Just as they thought; nothing' of ap-
pointing a couple of secret police gener-
als to the, Supreme' Cburt in 1967, so we
'find such extraordinary figures as that
'Of. KGB Geri. Pitovranoir as senior vice
-president of the Soviet chamber of corn-
in'iree.-. His: previeeel 'activities '.inclUded'I
top espionage 'essigninent?. in' .!
and a post as KGB 'resident In Peking.
Now he turns,' Up ',at ? trede fairs. and
congresses for the' protection: of patent
eigete.e.
An even edderezapPointir.ent;e: if ? that'
were possi5letie: thate:of .'Dzhermeri
Gvishiani as vice Chairman-Of the. State'
Committee On Selene .Technology, withe
special responsibility . for foreign'
eco-
nomic negotiationseJle. formally. .served
in the GRU,/ancl.is not only a lifelong
professional secret. policeman [his father
M. Gvishia.ni was 'one! of ? Beria's most
? notorious assistants),' but- he ?is a meat.-
her of that caste to the extraordinary
extent of having an artificial first- name
composed of the first syllables of the
two first -chiefs of the Secret Pollee,
Dzherzinski and Menzhinski. It- is .natu-
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' ?
rat enough that Western businessmen in
contact with the U. S. S. R.. should be
regarded as prime KGB targets, but this
. .
sort of thing seems to 'indicate a marked
contempt for them?in. many cases only
to well justified. ??? . ?
Whether a top diplomat is the KGB
"resident" or that post is held by 'a
-"chauffeur," he ivorks in a locked and
closely guarded room, the Referenturn,1
from which. even the' ambassador
less himself a' serving KGB officer]. is.,
barred, -* ' ? ? ? ?
? . ?- ? ? ? ? .7 .!????
...MIS. VAST' -effort' In. intellIgenee and.
subvetsion? is the -main -reason for- the
eruirmeusiy inflated size': of the ? Soviet
recresentation-abroad:. There have re.?
cehtty been. complaints?typical, enoughl
?ones?from Thailand, that the total staft:
'of the Soviet embassy. in Bangkok is 250.!
The Thais have five at their mission in;
Moscow. It is true that there are only 251
--that is -only 'five times as many?whol
are- listed :as .:"cliplomats": in the Soviet
angkok?setup, but unlike the Thais ini
MOSCOW, the-Russians in Bangkok use;
Soviet, citizens for. every, .conceivablel
post such as maid or driver. The Thais;
dre.thus in the unhappy position that alt
the ancillary staffers of the Thai Em-",1
bass!, in Moscow consist of KGB agents;j
while, with 'notable lack of reciprecity,:
those in the Soviet embassy in .BangkoXi
.are KGB agents, too.
? .
, The Thai case is a glaring one and the
Thai newspapers have personally listed:
not only embassy figures such as the;
seCond secretary, Anatoly Smirnov, est
'CHICAGO TRIBUNE
3_4 JULY 1975
rKeGprBesoenffting.:tty:440ni, c,oltlitehel?rt.. Tasovsis:i
.felt s
ot..itiiiipepiganiirfilzinaert.olTLheansod f
vet-.. o
tkre;Irde-
compound in
houses ./e- fEa'acil,nz,ket.h.oBkycos t: them
em and
e
-of rin ds e
Between
I trede. ??? ? ?.? ? .? . e. ? .
At least, in legal..
can raise .is SE;
I millionsworth 1J,.
1- But thruout the,
I PorPortion betweeewthreldntuhneirbeerisOfasditalsf--
i members operating in -.Russian &abase.
I sies in a given country compared with,
1 that country's embassy in Moscow. The'
1. British solution?of throwing out at least.
that section of the surplus -which is'
known to be engaged in active espionage,
?is clearly the right one. But in. recent,
practice, almost everywhere, there has
been a large increase in the. Russian.,'
representation.. This . came,. naturally-.
enough, with detente,, ?
,'-
--The director of thePBT, Clarence M.
? Kelley; noted that Soviet bloc official,,
' representation in the United States has::
tripled during the last 15 years, while
Soviet intelligence agents ? have in--
_ Creased fourfold:. They had the added,.
'advantage, he. pointed out, of..a great
-increase of cultural and commercial
del-
egations, Of which contained int'elti-
?gence personnel.. - ? .
- When one considers: that. the FBI's-
total-field force, which of course has to
cover a large number of other types .of
...crime, is limited to 8,500 and that .there
are now about 1,100 Soviet citizens living.
the United States and employed by
I'afficial Soviet agencies; it is'remerkable
Rating the CIA and KGB
.that god results are still obtained.:
:. . . . ? . ? : "
? ONE 'SUCH . was the recent.--thrtne-
years-olci. .? operation . in which a
*translator at the ?United Nations...was- .
caught -red-handed trying to obtain sie?
.cret information at the other end of tie.
country. [The Soviet permatenteet 7 -
Tat the United Nations form a part:it:dm:
1 -ly useful KGB-"center and severalUf Ets)
'leading officials have been identified .` ,
i
.KGB.men.]-:.... .-:. ,???-?:,
?.-.- ?,
,-?-.? .,,,,,...-.* ?7-:,
: -. In addition tO.the "legal" resident,c0r,
..ating from his; security room -in eaciti-
embassy, the:KGB maintains an,!`illetizri.
-resident.. These Men have no contact* ?'
the ordinary course of events, with42E4 .-
cial ISoviet . representatives,. and theirl. ?.,;.
...messages. and .information go to-?
from Moscow-by other means,' thin
dio or highly illegal, couriers. ?They.baft-;
included such well concealed and eFiec-
five. characters as Col. Rudolph Abel-'.---' .:
- :
. A significant 'point about ,KGB viz-
lions is' their extraordinarilyema:
scale, with which their rivals cat
compete. Well over 2,000 Soviet citizegs
have actually been identified to tagE
part in clandestine operations -abrord;?
and this is to say 'nothing of sat
:
. .. . ., .
? agenti, arid of recruits in. the countries? '.
concerned. The* West German ? F'-ovesn4
i,m th
ent; -which estimates that 'e're4re.
'about 11,000. agents operating in its--
Iritory,. has recorded 35,000 . individual:44*
]rtempts to recruit -West Germans ?dig
i-the-last 20 years. ?-,*-1-;-,-!.;---.?'.-? ? -?.?.....1?
- - .. ?_
iy ;' ?
? .
The KGB, the Cornmittee of..?
' Suite ?SecuritS,,- is the most ?;
z? important single institution in .
- the Soviet Union. Its dual role is
to keep the Communist Party.
In power to control
foreign governments. ..
_Robert Conquest, a British ..
-authority on Soviet affairs, .
described on Sunday how the
KBG moves to discredit its.-
- free-world opponents.
_ Today, he compares the ?
KGB with the CIA.
By -.Robert. Conquest
LONDON?If the KGB is compared
with its main opponent, the American
CIA, various differences: emerge. It
is, of course, an enormous advantage
to the KGB, that there is never any
question of its coming under public
-Criticism in the U.S.S.R. ,
- To illustrate the difference, try to
imagine recent events in the United
States happening in the Soviet Union.
- An employe of the Soviet government
. hands .over.? secret documents to
Pravda; Pravda prints them; and.the
man, in question is tried on a minor
.charge and acquitted:--that. would be
the Russian 'equivalent of the .Daniel ?
Ellsberg case: ?
- A member of the Supreme Soviet?
the equivalent of Michael Harrington
?discovers and prints confidential in-
formation 'about KGB arrangements
in,? say, Chile; these are printed in
Pravda and lzvestia: and the result
is that KGB' boss ?Yuri. Aridropov is
'forced to appear before a committee
of the Supreme Soviet, to try to justi-
fy such conduct. . ?
. 'In:that light it can be'seen that the
CIL& operates under constraints which
would be regarded as laughable to
the point of lunacy in Moscow.
- ? ? ? -
UNLIKE THE CIA, the- KGB also
.operates?and on a far' vaster -scale
again?inside Soviet territory. While
the Americans divide their intelli-
gence -activities into two autonomous
'bodies; ? the CIA and the FBI, the
KGB is a highly coordinated organi-
zation with considerable overlap even
between the departments working at
home and abroad. ? -
For example, a foreign: diplomat
[as in one-:case including a French
ambassador], .may ? .be , compromised
sexually by agents in.MbscoW 'with a
view to becoming a tool: back home:
of the KGB external services. Nor'
would there be' any of.'the"curiou
jurisdictional jegalisms by ? which the
CIA" is now ?'charged with activitY*
against American citizens while in
?
America. ,
How anyone With a trace of com-
mon sense can imagine that it is suit- '
. able for: surveillance of a suspect,
.perhaps on the briefest trip home, to
cease at the airport and be handed
over to .a .different organization unac-
customed to his habits, is a mystery.
This is one of the 'many problems
the:CIA has; but which does not af-
-lea the KGB. The latter is, more-
overe? a body .exerting inicomparably
.more political weight in its own right
than its American counterpart, with
,its head, Yuri, Andropov, ranking. as
a full member of the Politburo.
.Recent allegations against the CIA
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;have been made by "defectors" from
sit; such as Philip Agee. and -Victor
Marchetti. Much of our knowledge of
?the KGB also *comes from "defec-
tors." Bur again, we find a difference
which is well worth noting. KGB
defectors have to be carefully bidden.
given false identities and placed
where their late employers cannot
find them. ?
A number of those for whom inade-
.
qtiate-PrecatitiOns '.Were- taken have
been, found dead in mysterious, and
:sometimes not so-mysterions, circum-
,stances?Poisoned, ',shot,: pushed out
of windows': The new batch . of CIA
."defectors" on the other hand,live in
comfort in Countries allied to the Un-
ited?States; write their books and even.
have them published in New York. .
The mere thought of a KGB man
1settling in Hungary,: exposing his em-
ployers (let alone having ..his 'work
printed in Moscow) does not begin to
make contact with' reality at any
point. . .
" erIii--the competition with the CfA,
:the icGp has many other advantages.
:?,With hundreds of thousands of Eastern
;Europeans entering America ? in the
last few- decades it is clearly much
!eaSier. for the Soviet authorities to
'Vut?in trained ."illegals,", or to main-
Lain "sleepers." In the comparatively.
? easy-going political circumstances of
the non-Communist countries, there
must always be a proportion of peo-:
pie who ..will *simply Mali= pro-Sovi-
et Vie;vs;: arid: be 'at. least potential:
Soviet agents. ?
_BESIDES, FEW Countries have the'
huge police forces, "internal pass-
1:iorts" and registration agents availa-
ble to the Soviet security authorities.'?
Then again, while there is no doubt
that large numbers of Soviet bloc'
subjects would eagerly assist enemies,
of their government in any way-pose
;sible,. the KGB can prevent or monitor,
'every such contact, ? ? y
Foreigners in the U.S.S.R. are pro-?,
portionateiy few compared with 'the.,
security forces available to cope with
them. From countries like the United
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
12 August 1975
e
States there are hundreds of thou-
sands of visitors to all parts of :the
world, where it is not difficult for
them to be contacted without supervi-
? slop: But Sovietevisitors -abroad are
limited both In 'their numbers and
their tested loyalty-quotient;
,?...
- This does not always, work, as' the
U.S.S.R. seems to be fairly unpopular
even. with its Most. loyal subjects. It
is estimated.' that. about 2,000-Ameri-
cans are- contacted overseas ,every
year by the KGB with a view to re--
cruitment, while similar attempts.on ?
Soviet subjects are rather few. .e ???
.Few, burnot negligible. And-mor-
over, the. successful contacts of, the
-CIA and other.- Western services -in-
clude KGB men themselves. For one
of the :vulnerabilities of the _KGB. is'
the extraordinarily high rate of .defec-
lion ? t?he .WeSt. This apialies not
only to minor figures, but 'to some of
its major' operators, including-illegal
residents. These men, carefully_ se-,
lected and ? checked and .. counter-
checked for highest political reliabili-
ty, nevertheless come over at a-rate
which time. and time 'again' destroys
KGB- networks and gives:infor-
mation to the West. ,r
THE WAYS in which the CIA-is ncit
being hindered and hampered' by its*
own people are quite astonishing. it
is already much smaller, and, dispos-
es of much fewer 'resources,. than its.
giant opponent: -It. is. not -only a,
David fighting a Goliath, but.a David:
additionally handicapped by a heal/14
ball and chain, and dazed' by the..oce
casional half brick hurled at. him by]
one'of his alleged supporters.- On the!
face of it, one would expect-'2.'walk:.!
over for Goliath-KGB. The?remarka-:i
ble thing is, even granted some ter.:
rifle KGB successes, how well...bal-,
enc-adthe combatants are
???? As for current anti-CIA hysteria.inl
certain eountt:ies, . it might be.-.worthi
referring-. its -sillier ? sponsOrse_ti the!
following analysis, from-ea.: sourcei
Which even they might find authorita.
five?the:official organ of a'.'Coxtimu:ei
would be Most unfortunate," Said
Rep-. Robert NIcClory?of Illinois,.rank-
ing RepUblican-. bn.' the- j-Riuse Select
Committee ,gri??-:Intelligenbe;- "if. even
?the appearance:_of refusal to cooper-
ate with. this committee was given:"
the appearance is the'.
reality so far. Central Intelligence
Agency Director William E. Colby, ap-
pearing before the committee, has re-
fused. to give it much of the informa-
tion it wants, on that familiar ground'
of "national security."..... - .
? -.Let,us say right off that the fact
that. the "national -security",rationale
been...r.nuch..-abused to cover up:
rime .and corruption does 'not mean.,
that thereare- no such -things- as. legi-
,timate .-ecrets.? ?That,, however,- does
tat. resolVe, the; conflict _between 'gen--
*_
ecura
:iiine--"riational: security and -account-
-ability- under- the .Constitution. -,-?
H:The;commuttee has,. after been
-dUlY" authorized by the House to .con-
duct ? its. -investigation?an , investiga-
tion.- Which itself -has. a-great deal to
.do.with. protecting our n,ational secur-.
,ity..and the right, of American citizens
'against-.'abuses: by. our intelligence
,agencies.- . ? ? ?
..nist Party: -
"Among all the-information and sto.-e:
ries circulating in the country,; esp-e-1
daily recently,' there are many-which;
jnsist that many of our problems- and!
difficulties are either inspired,i?or:?dise
redly created by the CIA's aclivity.-1
?.??. However;.?when the sources and';
objectives of this kind of 'confidere:t
Hal' information, and studied more;
closely;' and..when we' analyze them!
More thoroly;'? it will not ? be .diffie
cult for"us'to find that the "CIA -ob-:
session!,'.is:being spread and 'encour-
aged in our country by
At this point the Belgrade official
.newspaper, Borga [Oct. 31,- 1967)
goes on to blame a variety. of ene-
mies including, especially, pro-Soviet
elentents:T.-ee .7 ? ?1
:AND SO!' There r-ea-lly is-a world-
wid e confrontation .between the KGB:
on -the one .hand and the CIA and
the' intelligence services of the other
non-Communist cou.ntrieseon the oth-
er.
'
The present compar?v& relaxation
in ? international tension*. has in no
tvay resulted. in .any relaxation of:
presstire by "the, the-
, larger- of Soviet c.itizens ? and
the setting up of new Soviet consu-
lates has given it greater opportuni-
ties. The CIA, 'harassed at horn& and
'thinly -spread -in the field, 'has con'
ducted largely a defensive operation,
even tho accempanied by occasional .
brilliant forays into the Soviet side.
On the whole, and' -partly ? 2s the
-resulteof the KGB's blunders, the CIA
-probably has the slight advantage in
spite of, everything.. The various .re-
cent sUCcesses of Russian and Com-
Munist foreign policy. are in'the main
due to other reasons. The KGB, some
, of the Soviet leaders seem ?to, feel,.is
e
not really, pulling as full ? wei ght..Th is
may ha;.ie something .to, do with the
' current major attempt to? destroy the
. CIA's effectiveness by concentration
an the attacks now being launched.
' against it. by naive- for. worse) .ele-
ments in .the United States itself..,
Robtrt CortquesT
? ? _
?The'-basic principle_ is that no man.
Can be judge in his own cause, and no
jnstitution; either. The worst abuses
'of national security, in fact, arose out
of the Executive Branch's arrogating
to. itself the sole right to define what
'national security is.
':-How is the committee supposed to
function if it doesri't- ask questions?
:realistic to expect it to take only
such information as those investigat-
ed_choose to give:It? Congress did not
'buyithat principle during theimpeach-
ment of Richard:Nixon, and it cannot
be expected to buy it?nowi.
WASHINGTON POST ( POTOMAC )
10 August 1975
SEE THE WORLD
-
Applications for employment at the Centred Intel-
ligence Agency tripled last January and have con-
tinued to increase steadily, a CIA spokesman con-
firms. The bleak job market is surely a reason, but
the Agency partially attributes the increase to the
unprecedented publicity the CIA has received since
disclosures of some of its exploits. Seems some
folks outside of Washington didn't even know the
Langley giant existed.
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Approved For Release 2001/0
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
14 August 1975
Charles W: Yost
-00432R000100370003-4
Time for the verdict on CIA
Washington
The Central Intelligence Agency has now
been under intensive investigation for about a
year ? by the Rockefeller Commission, by a
special Senate committee, most recently by a
special House committee. How long is it
necessary or desirable that this public washing
of dirty laundry go on?
Certainly there has been plenty of dirty
iinen. The investigation has shown that clearly
enough. Things were done by the CIA in the
1950s. the 1960s, -even the 1970s, for which the
American democracy finds it very distasteful
to be reminded that it bears the responsibility.
Foreign officials, political parties, and
newspapers were sabventioned, or bribed if
one wants to put it crudely, foreign govern-
ment agencies were bugged, pilfered, or
otherwise penetrated, coups d'etat were orga-
nized which overthrew governments or, more
often, failed to do so, assassinations of foreign
leaders were canvassed, though there is no
evidence any were actually committed. Even
,counterespionage or countersubversion inside
the United States was carried on occasionally,
in violation of CIA's basic charter.
Many of these and other CIA activities cost
huge sums of money which were spent with
practically no surveillance by the Congress
and certainly no public knowledge of what was
going on: Only a very small number of
officials in the White House and the State and
Defense Departments were privy to all of this
vast and dubious enterprise. Certainly the -
Soviet Government was far more cognizant of
it than was the American public.
Of course the justification for these prac-
tices was that they were indulged in on an
enormous scale by the Soviets, America's
adversaries in a deadly cold war, that the U.S.
had to fight fire with fire, that covert
operations and intelligence must by definition
,be carried out in secret, else they will fail of
_their purpose.
IneWashington Star
? It is, moreover, almost certainly the case
that, while many aspects of implementation
were known only inside the CIA, all major
opefations of all kinds were authorized by high
authority in the White House, the State
Department, or the Defense Department.
Indeed many of them were inspired and
directed by those authorities.
These now widely known facts, however, do
not answer our opening question ? has the
investigation now_gone far enough?
No doubt the two congressional conimittees,
if they should continue for another year or for
five, could continue to unearth further sen-
sational evidence of activities now held to be
nefarious, even though at the time they were
held by presidents and secretaries of state to
be fully justified. Very probably the com-
mittees have only scratched the surface.
? What, however, is the object of the in-
vestigation? Presumably it is not just for
public titillation, though one must admit that
the appetite of the American media and public
for spy stories, for scandal in high places, even
for self-flagellation, seems almost insatiable.
Presumably the investigations are not
merely to provide publicity and platforms for
members of Congress and their staffs seeking
political exposure and popularity. What then is
the object?
One would suppose one object to be to
inform the American people, at long last, of
the highly questionable activities in areas of
covert operations and intelligence gathering
which have for so many years been carried out
by their agents in their name without their
knowledge.
The purpose of their being informed, more-
over, would be to enable them to decide,
through the Congress, whether they wish to
terminate all these activities, whether they
wish to preserve some, if so which ones, and
? what machinery should be established to
ensure, insofar as possible, that only those
Thursday, August 7, 1975
535 watch ogs?
Secrecy, like power, tends to corrupt and
absolute secrecy corrupts absolutely ? except,
? of course, in the House Democratic caucus. On
that Actonian principle, Rep. Otis Pike and the
House select committee now investigating the
CIA might have an unanswerable case for fore-
' ing that agency to make budget insiders of all
535 members of Congress.
But the principle doesn't apply: The secrecy
of the CIA budget is not absolute. Thirty-eight
';members of Congress know, more or less, how
? much money the CIA spends and for what.
? Hence, if Mr. Pike's committee concludes that
? the chosen 38 have done a bum job of guarding
the national interest and of steering the CIA
away from idiotic misadventures, it might
properly call for their discharge and the substi-
tution of 38 others.
But it is absurd to suggest, as some of Mr.
Pike's hearties are doing, that the CIA can have
535 budgetary watchdogs while conducting
effective.secret operations. Mr. Colby is right in
fearing that their barking could alert the bur-
glars. It is a fact that there are some members
of Congress who don't want a secret intelligence
agency in the first place, and some among them
would unhesitatinglyleak all the secrets out of
activities of kinds sanctioned by Congress and
people shall be carried out.
If these are indeed the objects of the
investigation, it seems high time that the
investigators resist the temptation to prolong
the striptease in which they have become
involved, and that they buckle down to the
more serious and necessary task of drafting
policies and machinery to govern these mat-
ters in the future.
It seems reasonable to presume that they
-will decide that the United States needs to.
maintain some sort of an intelligence appa-
ratus abroad, even though they may well
conclude that some of the methods used in the
past were unwise or unnecessary and should
henceforth be banned. It is even conceivable
they might decide that some capacity for
covert operations should be retained, even
though to be used' very rarely and under
severest safeguards.
If these presumptions are reasonable, it is
not reasonable, nor in the public interest, so to
blast the reputation of the CIA that no one
abroad, even in friendly countries, will wish or
dare to be associated with it. Intelligence
apparatuses are delicate instruments.. Once
broken, they are very hard to repair. So
indeed is the good name of the American
Government, in its "intelligence" capacity as
well as any other.
So I should strongly urge the prosecution
that sufficient evidence is now in, that the jury
?.that is, the Congress ? should be asked to
render its verdict before the end of this year at
latest, and that that verdict should not be
punishment for the past but sound policy for
the future.
-% The author of this article writes from a
background of 40 years as a United States
diplomat.
fo 1975 Charles W. Yost
What seems to be going on now, among the
more zealous congressional assailants of the
CIA, is a bad case of overcompensation. It is no
doubt mortifying to reflect that until an enter-
prising New York Times reporter rubbed con-
gressional noses in CIA folly Congress had slept
blissfully on. Now that the pendulum has swung
so sharply and the lights have come on there is a
real danger that Congress could wreck the agen-
cy in the name of correcting abuses.
The CIA director, William Colby, shouldn't
have to explain anything so elementary as the
need for reasonable secrecy in intelligence work
? if only because the lives of agents might be at
risk. That he must not only explain the need for
secrecy but actually defend that need in the face
of the deliberate obtuseness of the Pike commit-
tee is remarkable.
There are hundreds of sensitive federal
agencies, all more or less vital, whose budgets
and functions are a complete mystery to most
congressmen, perhaps even to Represerillative
Dellums. That is why we have a system cf dele-
gated authority. If Congress has impa kd :nay
delegated that authority, let it be redelegated.
But even if the fact disappoints Representatives
Pike and Dellums, it is too late to go back to
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Approved For
WASHINGTON POST
4 August 1975
.A. Forum' Defended
' Your newspaper has carried a
lengthy item from Bernard D. Nossiter
in London, about the alleged involve-
ment of .the Central Intelligence
Agency in Forum World Features, a
news service which I created and ran
for 10 years. -Not surprisingly, since
the story is based on a highly inaccu-
rate and tendentious article in Time
Out, Mr. Nossiter's contribution is a
?curiousInixture of fact, smear and fan-
tasy. To say that Time Out is "a
weekly that blends leftist political
sommentary with an entertainment
?
guide" is one way of puttir g it: the eu-
phemistic way. It would alto be accu-
rate to say that it is the favorite Lon-
don vehicle for drop-outs, Marxist ac-
tivists and the drug and hippie culture.
In a recent issue, it carried an article
In. defense of paedophilia?better
known as child molestation and a
crime in all civilized countries.
I cannot comment on matters upon
which Mr. Nossiter claims to have
greater knowledge than I. I hope, how-
ever, that you will allow me space for
one or two comments on points of de-
tail. In fact, during the whole of my
period at Forum World Features, we
never, once carried an article that
could be described as "propaganda,"
except in the eyes of paranoiacs. If Mr.
Nossiter can produce a single example,
I shall be very surprised. I cannot an-
swer for items that appeared in the
Congress for Cultural Freedom's previ-,
oils give-away, service. ,. .
? arfic Nossiter describes me as "a well-
known British-- 'writer of rightist
views." Well, it depends on where you
draw the center line, doesn't it? My
late boss, Geoffrey Crowther, used to
describe the politics of The Economist
(on which I served for 10 years) as
'extreme center." I wish I had coined
that phrase, as it precisely reflects my,
own political position. But when one
stands as far over to the trendy left as
Bernard D. Nossiter, then I suppose
the center does appear to be "rightist."
Mr. Npssiter siva, correctly, that I
hung up on him. The reason for this
.was that he had thought .fit to adopt a
hectoring and inquisitorial tone, which
. I fo-ind offeisive and boring. I am a
busy man.
He attempts to prove me a liar by
quoting a Department of Trade entry
showing me as the "person running
the business" when Forum World Fea-
tures discontinued its service. I cannot
help it if dilatory solicitors or an in-
competent public service did not duly
:note the change of management. In
fact, I wrote. my/letter of resignation
to Richard M. Scaife on 18 March 1974,
and it became effective at the end of
June 19'14.
Finally, Mr. Nossiter says that the
Institute for the Study of Conflict
"puts out low-keyed reports on tactics
to deal with 'subversives' at home and
abroad." In fact, the ISC?an inde-
pendent, nonprofit making institute?
provides realistic and factual guides
on situtations of conflict all over the
world, and from the right as well as
from the left, but has never yet pub-
lished any practical guidance on com-
bating the phenomena which we de-
scribe.
INWIN)1/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4
Sept 1975
London.
Brian Crozier,
14
5117;17:17.;?4 , yet, incredibly, no one in Congress move
against the agency, and it continued born
ing and sending young Laotian men into th
meat-grinder of war.
Now, two years after a cease-fire end
the war in Laos, much of the CIA's activit
there remains classified "Top Secret" as th
agency continues to enjoy a position of un
accountability shared by no other segme
of our government. ?
The CiA says that all but its usual intelli
gence-collecting apparatus has bee
pulled out of Laos. But given the agency'
success at concealing its activities in Lao
-
zzb, ;;, j 4
AORF THARTEN:.YEARS
.CINC.7.0NDUCJEC!
AN ILLEGALWAR_ THAT
-OST-BILI IONS. 05:DOLLARS:
P THATCOVERED,
? ? , -
r_ -1
DG r-
-1--colNTS
- know for certain that the CIA is not at war a
--i ? in the past, how can we know? How can V/
this very moment in some other far-off plac
Warn. e rec.ora :haf few Americans have heard of; a war tha
.is an intettigence agency.
. . - - most Americans want no part of, secret o
'cr-a?:-....)tion.bt.-it:'.-rt:,:va5-not.an agency to :con- otherwise'?
.Ouct.war;lt:,.Ves an agendy to r'P ter - At its peak, the secret war in Laos cos
.;_gende-..7.Se.natoriStu-art'Syrninototi. of American taxpayers some 5500 million a
combat an arrny of nearly 40.000 Meo and
year. as a fel,v hundred CIA agents sent into
t he, i ritCit f arts ing other hill tribesmen they 'nad recruited and
thersenot%,vithstanding..theage.ncy oiLrocl trained. The CIA's "irregulars" were superb-
headlei:g .iintia a.11.:11.-scale-wai, in the rernotE.,. ly outlitteci with American-style fatigue uni-
forsns, M-16 rifles, grenades, mortars, ma-
chine guns, recoilless rifles, and howitzers;
and they were backed up by American
bombers, which the agents directed in
massive raids that scorched the verdant
Laotian countryside: obliterating whole Vil-
lages. slaughtering tivestock, and devastat-
ing crops. Most of the bOrntsing was done by
? United States Air i=orce and Navy jets. But
some of the early strikes were flown by
CIA-hired pilots and throughout the secret
war the CIA flew its own transports and heli-
copters to shuttie troops into battle and re-
supply them.
There were few spectacular battles
against the Communist Laotian insurgects
and the North Vietnamese regulars, but
casualties mounted steadily. In despera-
tion, as their units became depleted, the
CIA's irregular commanders began.forcing
. ten- and eleven-year-old boys into the army.
Finaliy, when there were no more children to
draft. the CIA went to Thailand and hired
more than 21.000 -volunteers" to keep the
war going.
By 1970 large groups of tribesmen, weary
of the fighting, had begun deserting the CIA
army. They wanted the war to stop. Prince
SouvE...nna !Mourne the prime minister of
Laos. also yearned for peace. But by then
Laos had become an In-:Portant adjunct of
the war in Vietnam?North Vietnamese were
pouring through the country to infiltrate
South Vietnam and the Americans were at-
tacking them with waves of bombers. The
Americans believed that if there were a
cease-fire, public opinion would compel
them to stop bombing, but the infiltration
could continue because it was so difficult to
detect. So re6ardless of what the Laotians
wanted. the Americans kept bombing.
In those days the United States was being
torn apart by angry debates over the war in
Vietnam, and President Nixon. in reaction,
had started sending American troops home.
But there was no outcry at all against the
equally brutal acts ol war being perpetrated
in Laos becauSe no one knew about them.
Presidential fascination with Laos was
kindled in the cold war days of the late
1940's and early -60's. Because of its.strate.-
gic location, sandwiched as it was between
:Southeast-Asiari -counthp.of' Labs. -It ..was- a ?
;Secret .war?never..d.ectared,---neve'n?,and'cften deniediha raced for.
r.:ane,
'Mbre.than.ten:-Years as -6.tt6ntion fccLised O.
tf-tejfghling-Jrt fteighboring.Vietnem:Tens di,
Anolisaads-Aver.e.-killed dollars
-zrciy.9:61-.4):a.--des6er.ata-atternbtltd,:''sav6nt.:::
----iOnly.tne'erestoents;,vhddl'ected the CA
1c2osee:Itrste.-.isenho?:yerrithen.,kerineby;*-..%
aild.Misted:"thel;
f e`i7i-C a n oeoote ano preenaecit!,:ie.,; ?le r6',
Actually, nothing could have been more
contrary to the public interest. For by trans-
forming the, CIA into a personal hit-squad,
the presidents robbed the people of a voice
in the affairs of their country. short-circuiting
the very essence of democracy.
The secret war in Laos was a flagrant
abuse of power by the Executive and the
CIA, as were such illegal intrusions as the
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. the support of
mercenaries in the Congo. and the instiga-
tion of uprisings and coups elsewhere in the
world.
What set the CIA operation in Laos apart.
however, was its scope and size?it was one
of the biggest and most expensive under-
takings in the history of the agency. As the
richest and most powerful single force in
Laos, the CIA virtually charted the course for
the entire country, inflaming a war that Was
more important to a handful of Washington
officials than to many Laotian villagers. and
.fueling it long after the Laotians were ex-
hausted and aching to quit.
It was a war that might well have been
shortened had it been open to public scru-
tiny and had the CIA been under effective
supervision and control by Congress, in-
stead of being able to operate as an inde-
pendent, almost private organization.
' Until last December, however; when the
New York Times reported large-scale do-
mestic spying by the CIA. there had been
little public sentiment for restraining the
agency. Senator Stuart Symington, for ex-
ample,, exposed some of the CIA's deeds in
Laos in Senate hearings in 1969 and 1972,
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3
China. North Vietnam. South Vietnam. gaVe the appaiaraece of sending home the- game. They were content to quietly furnish
Cambodia. Thailand. and Burma. President 100 Green Berets who. under CIA direction theachips of ?.ver to the Pethet Lao and North
Truman was Con?anceci Laos was the place had been building the secret army in the Vietnamese to keeo the fighting in balenc-e.
in -Southeast Asia to draw the line agz:iinst back coentry Ii fact, many of the Green So vinat result.ed was =3 kind of warring 'e
toe dread "tide of Communist aggression." Pr' es simply shucked off their fatigue uni- trality in which onlv :he Laotian pecele
President Eisenhower saw Laos as ane first forms, slipped into civvies, and went on hurt n nd only the American people.we.re in
in a c'nain Of dominoes vihich. if lost to the about their business of turning tne opium- the dark. -lhere were occasional tirades
?,...notrt telto to zhe ot gr owing hill people into riflemen. In the be against Arnerican vioietions of Laotian neu-
-Free ,,vor!,:t?? iii
cc tr'Ido. ginning they extended the, charade by treaty in Communise radio broadcasts'. and
spending their nights in Thailand. so they they were frequently quite accurate. But
als
could say they were not stationed in Laos. what American would belies/ea Communist
American offici i.v.r4r: caugat in
k-artme. thouela al the one hano triev want-
di-
The story that eventually leaked out was that broadcast? (That's ,,veat we all said when
i. to eep Lao ou of ne hancis of
these men had retired from the military and the COMMUniStS broadcast tne first reports
c ks t t' the ?
"Reds." but on the ether. dtdn., ta had become contract emplbyees of the CIA. .of the. My Lai massacre.)
_ But in any case. th w
ey ere in violation of the Because Washington decided to proceed
eommit American troops to a 1;-.1nd ar i"
Asia (:rat mistake was latr made in soades 1962 agreement because, if they were not in Laos with a ccmbination of force and
e
in Vietnam, of course) and they were deathly. "foreign military personnel," they were con- stealth, the CIA got the military job. The
tainly "foreign civilians.' and. both were agency, Or "the company," as it is also
afraid oi provoking China and the Soviet -
Union into a nuclear war. banned. called, had a well-deserved reputation for
The solution thy hit upon was to set up an In his news conference of March 23, 1961. both secrecy and illeeal acts, and it was
Presiden.t Kennedy recalled- that the "clear also believed that because it was smaller
.0 everything in its power to see that, on
inte,rnational con game: Washington e iould premise of Inc Geneva accords of 1954. than the Pentagon, the CIA would be lass
paper, Laos was a neutral country. But with w'nich gave the states of Indochina their in- bound up in red tape and more flexible in
equal vigor. *strongly relying on the CIA, dependence from France. had been that the field. The CA was in the business of
Nashington would see to it secretly that the Laos would be neutral?"free from external running agents and agent' networks
brand of neutralism actually practiced was domination by anyone." He added that the throughout the world with only a handful of
aro American It as a beautiful scheme -
efforts ale Communist -dominated group to Americans pulling fne striags and it was felt
: w
low-risk, relatively low-cost (it cost S500 destroy this neutrality [had] never ceased." that the same kind of operation could be
million a year while the Vietnam debacle calling special attention to a Soviet airlift of used to run thla., war in Laos.
grew into an S83-million-a-day habit). and
supplies then under way and a reported in- With Alice-in-Wonderland logic:Ameri-
0Waprofile? so there wouldn't be a lot of flux of North Vietnamese military advisers, can officials claimed later that secrecy was
assiing with the folks at home, who never He failed to mention, of course, that the necessary in Laos to avoid giving the Corn-
seemed to understand foreign oolicy the CIA had brought down at least two Laotian munists a diplomatic advantage-and to give
vay the presidents did. anyway. All that was governments?in '1959 and 1960?which the appearance of preserving the 1962
equireci taaexecute the game plao in Leos'
had seemed to be "too neutral" and seemed ,agreeme.nts for a tirne when allpartiesgenu-
was a lot of lying and cheating. and that in danger of sliding toward the Communists. linely wanted peace. They never mentioned
proved to be no obstacle for the CIA and a The 'United States has no desire to. inter- :the ease with which one could move in
succession of presidents. se-
vene in the internal affairs of Laos," a State cret?the usual second-guessers didn't
For openers,. in ordey to get the Chinese Department spokesman in Washington have to be dealt with?nor did they mention
ad the Russians to agree to a neutral Laos said, as the CIA was maneuvering to ?get a the value of secrecy in Laos to presidents
he U.S. had to pretend that a truly neutrat rpore pro American government into power striving to look like men of peace.
Laos was precisely what it wanted, in late 19;0.) Nor did the president mention The CIA's work in Laos was a ciaiight to
"First we strongly and unreservedly sup- that Brigadier General John A. Heintges the "cost-effective," cnart- and graph-wield-
cot Me goal of a neutral and inrb=p?=rident and nearly two hundred other American ing policy managers in Washington. For at
aos, tied to no-outsid power or grouo ,soldiers, posing as civilians in sport shirts the peak of the war only about 400 CIA em-
e of
owers, threatening no one, and fr,,,e from and slacks. had been functioning as a Mili- ployees were engaged in Laos on the
fly domination. ... in the pas; there has tary Assistance Advisory Group (MARC) for ground, comaaared to half a million Amer--
ean any ,00ssible dround for misunder- several ye,ars through the 1950's and early cans next door in Vietnam. Certainly Viet-
tending of our desire for a truly neutral 1960s, training Laotian regular army troops nam was a much bigger war, but there was
aos, there should be none now.- and equipping them with weapons in direct no denying that the CIA was getting "more
That was President Kennedy at a news violation of the 1954 peace agreement. bang. for the buck" in Laos. .
onference in Washington on March 23. (General Heintges's name Mysteriously The CIA was onc of several agencies that
961. speaking with full knowledge. that CIA disappeared from public army records in constituted the American -Courary TeaM" ra
gents and 400 Green Berets were recruit- 1959, in an apoarent effort to suggest that he Laos. with the ambassador as the chief. But
ng and training Meo tribesmen expressly to had "retired." Years later he was back in the CIA was clearly the dominant farce. a
nsure that a "neutral" Laos would tilt toward uniform with more stars on his shoulders, had the war, the action. just as MA.CV
in
he U.S. Some of the agents and Green Be- serving as commander of the United States Saigon had, and thc other agencies si:peed
els had been secretly working with the Army Infantry Center at Fort Benning. Ga., into a wedge of support behihri it '-aith
ribesmen since the late '50's? and in several important posts in Vietnam, money and men so that ;he CIA haat en.any
Kennedy kept repeating the lie and in July
including deputy to General Westmoreland. rildre resources than budget SMed tO
e ,
1962 in Geneva, fourteen nations. including He retired in 19(1.) suggest. 'The United States Agency fer In-
he U.S., China, and the Sovit Union
Continuing to attack the perfidy of the ternationai Development (6SAID). wee
e.
igned two documents guaranteeing the Communists. Kennedy also remained silent more than 600 employees in Laos, ?.aes 'ee
eutrality of Laos. The second of the two was about the four AT-6 World War li-era trainer largest of the agencies and it provided
protocol detailing procedures for the planes the U.S. had fitted with rockets and c_ovtetrnforArraneuricrnabn ssy o
ereomf bCalAagaeln,ts,r2rsirpre'
vithdrawal of foreign military personnel bombs an ,:i given to the Laotians at the start tila e
rom Laos as well as "foreign civilians con- of 1961. in another violation of the 1954 i/Bwuptetrhiceancii, .svtainsctaiosnsigonf ,,,,,dv agencyohitchlost _
ar
ected with the supply. maintenanee. and peace agreement.
toring and utitiaation of ?war materials." In The. Russians. the Chinese. the North cance. because in practice the whole
dr''''on. inc claus which seemd to leave Vietnamese. and the Laotian insurgents. Country Team" was an anti-Communise
e e
lo aroom for in the protocol viho called thernselves the Pr' flit Lee learn, working for the CIA's objectives. "Ev-
? t o.
erbade t'ne introduction of arms and war (which means State of Laos). ,we en't feelee erybody ,,vas sort of paramilitary," said one
USAID cfficial whose, job ?.-vas dispatohaie
b trie official lies. for their side ?ias le.eling
naterials except for "conventional arma-y e t
nenta necessary for the national defense of ane cut of the bornbs. and bullets. As it-
airlifts of rice and ammunition to tn ribes-
0.us..3iztrls and tiv?, men and their families. "There w,esn't any
evolved. however. the .
aos." ? ? , around a. That was the nature of the
shortly after the 1962 agreement was Chinese decided rather quickly that Laos way
paa,-,.. ai real estate were-, ask- program."
oncludeca the United States withdrew WaS hardly a Take, for example, Edgar "Pop'' Buell, a
ing blowing up the world for and they ,
pore than two hundred advisers from Vien- ,
lane, the sleepy capital city of Laos. and .seemed rather grateful that the Amer:ctins olksy. grandfatherly, Indiana.. farmer whohad gone to LacIs to work for the Interne-
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tonal Voluntary Services after his wife died. airp anes an supplies we would double.
nd Iated 'joined USAID. Buell had arranciE.-d the cost of the operation."
he first contact between the Meo and the Williamson had it turned around. how-
IA. Than, walking, flying, and parachuting ever. USAID didn't have the aircraft; the CIA
nrough northeastern Laos he set up a did, unde.r the coverof a company called Air
.uiltwork of landing zones and drop sites America. The airline rented its services .to
hat were used for delivering rice and arms. USAID which then billed the Department of
uell was short and stubby and literally Defense for the numerous missions it flew in
ount:',ed with "can do" enthusiasm. H. direct support of the CIA's war. Whether the
poke English and Lao in jumbled sen- Pentagon then paid the bill or fon,varded it to
ence.s. but he communicated excellently. OA headquarters was not clear.
is eyes growing stern behind black-framed . . . -
lasses and his brow furrowing deeply The CIA was such a pervasive force in Laos
hen he. had a point to make. His uniform that it set the tone for life in the American
as khaki shirt, trousers, and sneakers. He community. Laos virtually became a CIA
ever carried a gun, but everyone remem- company town. Intrigue, elusiveness, and
ars the time he went out with the Meo and mystery became a part of everyone's role,
hewed them how to biow up six bridges and they loved it.
nd twelve mountain passes along Route 7. When I was there both in 1968 and in 1972
here were countless tales of how he had it was by far the spookiest country in Asia. I
raved rifle and mortar fire. to lead hysterical felt it the minute I walked into the bar of the
illagers to safety during Pathet Lao and Hotel Lane Xang in Vientiane. The handful of
forth Vietnamese attacks; and he was al_ Americans in sport shirts and sunglasses
vays there to cheer his side on in a good lowered their voices and turned away. Any-
ight. ' where else in Asia, they would have either
In July 1961, Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lens kept on chatting or invited a stranger to join
ale, a longtime CIA operative and expert in. Making my rounds as a newspaperman
n guerrilla warfare, reported in a top secret to the offices of the ambassador and his staff
able to Washington that 9,000 Meos had I could feel everyone keeping a polite dis-
een equipped for guerrilla operations. tance. No one suggested I drop by for a
But he discovered that "as Meo villagers drink or, perhaps, dinner?which was rather
re overrun by Communist forces and es standard elsewhere?and when I invited a
en leave food-raising duties to serve as couple of officials out to, dinner one nicht
uerrillas, a problem is growing..ove.r the their conversation was guarded and they
are and feeding of noncombat Meos." hurried off early. Even those officials whose
"CIA has given some rice and clothing to jobs Were digging wells and building pig-
elieve this problem:" he told his superiors sties wanted to get in on the fun, so they.
n the cable published in the Pentagon Pa- &inked around pretending they knew some-
ers. but he added he felt that an organized. thing secret, -
efief program was needed.. , . Men like Tony Poe. however, had no need
Buell's efforts were aimed mainly at rem- to pretend. Their real lives were wild
dying the problem Lansdale had de- enough. Poe was the most infamous of the
cribed, and refugee relief became one of CIA operatives in Laos. a hard-drinking.
SAID's biggest programs, along with a fanatically anti-Communist former marine.
arge medical program which, among other tall and solidly built with the constitution of a
nings, provided treatment for the Meo sot- tank and the disposition in combat of a
ers and their families, i wounded lion.
In 1972 USAID officials said they were "The Laotians don't believe he can be.
ceding 220,786 "refugees," about half of killed," one American official told Fred
horn were irregular soldiers and their de- Branfmah. the co-director of the Indochina
endents. The others were pure civiiiane Research Center and a veteran of four years
'ho had been uprooted by the war, to a in Laos. . .
arge extent by the American bornbing. , "The guy is an unbelievable piece of
here were hundreds of thousands of other .niuscien. the American continued with
isplaced persons, but according to USAID Branfman. "The only thing I'd take him on
hey had found their own means of subsis_ with is a .45 Thompson and I'd want at least
ence. a fifty-yard lead before he got to me, that's
Senator Edward Kennedy caused trouble how tough I think Tony Poe is. He's one of the
or the American operation in .Laos with most efficient killing machines in the busi-
omplaints that the supposedly humanitar_ ness. He gets totally drunk every night, but
an relief agency was being used to support yet he can wake up after four hours' sleep
military operation, and run fifty miles. The guy has been Shot to
Responding to questions about the sena- pieces; he's been surrounded and fought
r's charges, Jack Williamson, who was his way out of hilltop positions all over Laos
nown as the refugee affairs officer in 1972. for the last fifteen years."
xplained that USAiD functioned as "a can- Poe worked closely with the main body of
,ai supply agency" as a matter of expedi_ the irregulars in the mountains of the north-
ncy. east for several years. Then he struck off to
"CAS needs rice for troops and depen_ the northwest where. among ether things, he
ants of troops?an army travels on its ran agents into China and organized local
ally," Williamson said. "They're essen_ hill tribes into anti-Communist fighting
ally pretty much in the same areas as our units. One of his assignments for the CIA
efugees and it makes sense to combine the before Laos was reportedly training Tibet-
elivery system." (American officials seemed ans in the mountains of the western United
neasy about calling the CIA by its proper States to infiltrate, back into thei'r homeland
arne. They often called it "CAS," a eapee_ and drive out the Chinese.
ism that meant "Controlled American .Branfman said that to encourage his
ource.") . troops Poe once offered a reward for enemy
"We're trying to save the taxpayer some ears and hung a plastic bag on his front
oney," he went on. "We're not doing any porch to collect the trophies. But he had to
anky-panky. If they had to have their own discontinue the practice when he discov-
ered then his reen were netting too arabif';eus
could find jeet
to get th.e ears. Once. Brarifman said. Poe
asked e cceple of pilo:s to ielke a present to
his boss, Pat.Laoctry. at a CIA office in Thai-
lend. The pilots became curious about the
horrendously foul odor coming from the
package and ripped it open. Inside was a
freshiy decapitated head.
Tony Poe was not he only blood-and-outs
swashbuckler in Laos. But most of the other
CIA agents, as well as the U.S. government ?
employees who functioned as CIA paramili-
tary personnel, were much more like your
suburban neighbor. They liked the S20.000
a year or so they were knocking down, they;
liked being part of a big team effort, they
liked the special status they enjoyed in thel
backward country and many repeatedly ax-
tended their tours. Blaine. Jensen, aryldaho
farmer who spent .ten years working along-
side Pop Buell. put it simply. "A bunch of us
came over and found it very interesting," he
told me one day. "We fe.it we were doing the.
people some good. The people [the Mao]
are a yen./ likeable bunch of people. That's
the only way I can explain it."
The CIA ran the war from a squat, twee
story concrete building with towering an-
tennas sprouting from its roof in an 'Amen-
?' can compound in a residential section of
Vientiane. The compound was enclosed by
*a high chain-link fence, and was patrolled by
:units of the U.S. Embassy's 500-man, blue-
uniformed private guard force. Nearby in.
the same compound were the offices of the
:200 or so American military' attaches who,
advised individual units and did the high-
' level planning for the Royal Laotian Army
and Air Ferce. The regular army Ircops
numbered more than 70.000 arid primarily
!maintained defeneive positions whne the
smaller irregular force led by the CIA bore.'
the brunt of the fighting. The compound ale?
held the offices of the USAID officials who
'saw to it that the irregulars and their de.pen-
* dents received food, ammunition. and med-
ical attention. There was an American-style
bar and grill where you could get a slice ot.
apple pie and a cup of coffee, hamburgers.
milk shakes, or perhaps a cold Bud and a
side of fres. Next door was a movie house to
escape with John Wayne or Paul Niewman.
and munch buttered popcorn.
Every morning at nine o'clock. except for
Sundays, the CIA station chief, the ambas-
sador. the army and air force military at-
taches. the embassy "bombinie officer," the.;
head of USAID. the Chief of transportation:
and a few other key officials gathered in a
small, bug-proof room on an upper floor of
the American Embassy for a daily secret
updating on the war. Seated around a rec-
tangular conference table, the men would
report the significant developments in their
special areas. Unfelding his map and flick,
ing a silver pOinter over the Fnottled green
terrain. the CIA station chief, the American
commander of the irregulars. would tick oft
ambushes. attacks. and withdrawals; per-
haps quickly outline en, assault that was
shaping up. The Air Force attache, a colonel
in civilian clothes, would plot the latest 3-52
strikes or -Arclights." as they were more
cornmcTly called, and report on the nui-nbet
of fighter bomber raids that day. The head si
USAID would probably give a rundown
how many tons of rice had been air,
dropped, with possibly the notation that a
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requently used bridge had been blown up. - Long Tieng at a time when Laos was the and chased them out." He seemed to forget
rid sceit went. - major supplier for the GI drug market in as he spoke in 1972 that even with "Uncle'
In early 1972, the American ambassador Vietnam. McCoy said, too, that Air America Sam's" help, the tribesmen had been
as G. McMenne Godley In, Yale '39. He planes were sometimes used to transport mauled and displaced.
vould quietly Scratch at a note pad as offi- the Mao Opium. Fcreigners?that is, nonof- One.theory expressed guardedly in Vier-
late spoke in the secret morning briefing, tidal Americans such as newsmen?could Ilene wee that the initial fighting among the
eePing a running account of "enemy" ca- visit Long Ting. which was officially de- Meo had been a mailer of, clan disputes.
ualties. Then, when everyone had finished, scribed as a baseof the Royal Laotian Army, Some took up with the North Vietnamese
e would announce the total, his spirits lift-
ng visibly if it were a particularly high fig-
re. Godley, who had served in the Congo in
e mid-1960's when CIA mercenaries, with
it support from Cuban-exile pilots, were.
ightingtinsurgents, was a huge, hearty man
ith a passion for the war and the role he
layed as -supreme field commander. His
avorite weapons were the bombers, espee
sally the B-52's, and his gleeful discourses
n them and the "ordinance" they delivered
arned him the nickname "G. Arclight
Hugh 'ToVar, the CIA station chief at that
me, was a slender, sophisticated and intel-
gent former OSS officer who had para-
huted into Laos at the end of World War Ii
rid shared the ambassador's zeal for the
ecret xvari As head of the "Cougtry Team,"
he ambassador was nominally the supe-
ior, but as commander of the most promi-
nt troops, the station chief gained extra
tature,?just as Westmoreland and Abrams
ad on the Vietnam Country Team. and in
ractice Godley and Toyer appeared to work
only by obtaining permission from the and some turned to Vientiarie and the
American Embassy in Vientiane, and pereAmericans. The strong feeling was that
mission was rarely granted. without- the CIA's arms and encouragement
When I arrived in Laos in March 1972, the fighting would never have reached such
Long Tieng had been under heavy artillery a high level and that very likely reirommo-
fire for several weeks and the CIA. the . dations couid have been made which wore:.
; -a
regulars, and their families had retreated have verted the slaughter of the Meo.
south to a place that i.vae, marked Ban Xonoe Early on, the clans allied with the CIA
the maps but which most of the Americans developed a draft system by which village
called Site 272. Site 272 was a dreary flat elders forced young men into the army.
Whether the elders were acting-out of cone
spot amid the strikingty beautitut lineestone
peaks and spires of northern Laos. It vas rnunity spirit or because they were beino
dominated by a steehmat runway. The CR Paid a "head price" by the CIA I couldn't
had taken over the western side of the field, !personally determine. But McCoy wrote in
is book on the narcotics traffic that when
thrown up rough-lumber shacks to shelter h
!its super-secret electronic gear. and Posted Ger Su Yang, the leader in the village of
restricted.' signs Across the metal strip 'Long Pot, refused to send young men. to the
".
was a he.ndful of shacks where USAID field irregular army in early 1971. the Americans
men Coordinated airdrops of rice, canned stopped dropping rice to his people.
meat.' and cooking oil. The USAID hespital. In a hospital bed at Site 272. thirty-sev-
that had been at Long Tieng was there, t en-year-old Lieutenant Bounhoun Madera.
oo.
whose left leg had just been arhputated
not far from a steamy shack where -Air
'below the .knee talked about haw he had
America pilots i.irere wolfing down ham-
b
burgers between flights. The field was fre-
een "recruited- thirteen years earlier. ?Jou
must be a soldier if you are a man because-
! netic. Planes seemed to be fighting to land
n almost equal footing. ." . "
Well before the briefings begen.! and to take off. No sooner did an aircraft the leader tells you you must he said If
_ you don't want to go you are put in prison. 0
screech down than cargo handlers were fil! "
vith the morning mist stiii clinging to the .
ce paddies, the pilots of the CIA's airline.
ir America, in their gray trousers and
lhite shirts, had tossed- clown ham and
ogs and flapjacks at the airport cafeteria in
heir:eerie and were on their way "up con-
ry," in lurribering, unmarked C-47's carry-
rig CIA field operatiees. armed to the teeth
vith the. latest automatic rifles and pistols
net tons of food and combat supplies for the
rregulars.
Until early 1972 a good many of the
planes each day headed for the village of
Long Tieng in a ruggedly beautiful valley
ighty miles north of Vientiane. There for
nearly ten 'years the CIA operated' its main
forward base for the secret war, training and
equipping' tribesmen, iworking out.. daily
strategy, and sending them into battle. A
mile-long paved runway sliced through the
heart of the vaiiey with stacks of bombs,
for
youe
ing it with rice and ammunition and waving you pay someone else to go
it off again. Knots of hill tribe women, mainly Nearby in another bed, a fourtn-year-
Meos with their baggy black slacks and
old soldier with a broken leo said his two
older brothers had been taken into the army
blouses, coiorfui sashes, and heavy silver
before him. Then one of them waskilted. he
jewelry; waited ? stoically to beard aircraft ?
that would take Ahem to their distant vil-
said, "so I had to take his position."
lages.
"I don't like army life," the boy said. "If
there were not so many enemy I would like to
Site 272. on the southern Sedge of the _ !
mountains, not far from the flat.Vientiene be a soldier. I'm afraid."
Plain, was the end of the line for the tribes- Senh Sai, fifteen. said he wanted to be-
men,
men, the bottom rung on the ladder of re-
come a soldier because of the money. but
treat, where they found themselves pantino he added, "the big people asked us to be
when the cease-fire came. For them and the soldiers. They ordered us."
CIA the war had been a series of costly At a tiny outpost cut into the. side of a
'delaying actions, their few advances fol-
mountain top, a ten-year-old boy with
!lowed by greater setbacks. Some of the American-made hand grenades clipped to
tribesmen had fled from provinces high
his belt and an American-made mete rifle in
up
on the map of Laos edging on North Vietnam his hands was asked if he enjoyed being a
and China. Others had come from the Plain -soldier. "I don't enjoy it," he said with a shy
of Jars. But all of them had given up a home smile."I want to study. .. : But pressure!
into , ?
somewhere in the nigh lands under pressiee pushed
forklifts for loading them. and a cluster of be a teacher more than -I want toi light."
from the Communists. They loved the moue-
communications shacks at either end. The It was total war in the mountains of Laos.
tains, felt heartsick in the flats, and even
shacks were crammed with powerfui, top- with no safe exit for anyone. Recounting the
became physically ill there. That was why
secret electronic e.quipMent for eavesdrop- losses in one battle, a young, angular-faced
they had originally joined forces witth the -
ping on the Pat'net Lao and directing. irregu- irregular soldier in camouflaged fatigues
many trib
CIA, e,srnen told me. The Commu-
said that 300 Meo had been killed, mostly'
ter troops over great distances. Just back
rusts would come into the villages, they
from theairstrip were bunches of tin-roofed ! civilians. ?
said, organize the people into work parties .
hUts for some 30,000 civilians and the. sev.- ! "We use civilians to carry ammunition,
1 to dig trenches or carry !ammunition and
i he explained. "We don't have any other way
eral thousand irregulars -who had garri- supplies and. in the evenings, lecture them
soned theebase.: There was also a 150-bed ! on Marxism. The tribesmen I met didn't like to support our soldiers."
hospital maintained by USAID. The airstrip! being bossed around and they didn't care Those who somehow managed not to fight
for either the CIA-backed side or the Corn-
was not teng enough for jets and was used i? much- for the lectures. So at the first oppor-
-I tunity they ran away. When the CIA offered munists sometimes found the shifting war
mainly by i the litele, single-engine if-2S
bombers of the Royal Laotian Air Force, Air I them.guns they gladly accepted, figuring suddenly in their own village, with ma-
America transports. and big-winged he.lio- they could take back their homes from the chine-gun bullets whining overhead and
couriers that often landed and took off in a intruders. ? ? mortars and bombs flattening homes. There
There was no "arm-twisting" to get the was no choice but to run. It was always har
few hundred feet cn the side of steep moim- -
tains. But frequently Jolly Green Giant res- Meo to fight, one of the highest ranking going. and exhaustion and disease took
Cue helicopters of the American Air Force Americans in Laos told me, annoyed at tne , their toll. Those who stayed alive were often
idled thereon-standby foe a "eilay Day" call siiggestion that the CIA had made can came beggars of sorts
non confused and disoriented and many be-
from an American bomber pilot in trouble, fodder of the tribesmen. !. depE.-ricle:11 upon
I Arnerican rice drops.
Alfred VV. McCoy, in his book The Politics of "If it (had not been for Uncle Sam' !
s sup-
Heroin in Southeast Asia. said the tribesme.n, port," the American official continued, It was a tragedy that ke,pt repeating itself
whose main cash, crop had always been Meo would have been destroyed years ago. endlessly grinding the people down. One
opium, also operated a heroin factory at ThP Natth-Vi,aWarateR t;,/ni ? ,,,- man of twenty-seven told me his family had
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en uprooted seven times in twelve years.
middle-aged woman, whose husband ;
ci only son had been killed in the fighting.
id she had taken flight five times. Lt. Tsjon
..ng said his village had pulled up stakes ,
panic every year for efe.ven years. We
ist everything.- he said without einotee
Ve lost some of our family mernheis: too.,
he enemy captured more fee.) 200 of the
22 people in the villa ...Ie.:. y-seven died.
f disease, fever, iiiaiaria and seven by
pirits. We really don't like moving, but we
ave to."
As these "assets.- as the CIA referred to
e hill people. withered, the agency in-
reasingly looked to Thailand for man-
'ower. despite a legislative ban against
.S. support for forces of a third country in
aos. (Senator Symington charged that the
se of the Thais in Laos violated the legisla-
ive restriction "in letter as well as in spirit."
tut the CIA continued unchecked with its
!legal recruiting.) What attracted the Thais
vas money. A private who signed up with
he CIA to go to Laos. for example. was paid
early three times the salary of a private in
he regular Thai army. The so-called Thai
'volunteers" were given Lao names and Lao
dentity cards by the CIA. They were sent to
aos in Thai units and Stayed in the units
ether than mixing with hill tribe companies
.nd battalions. After futfilling a one-year
contract they were free to go home. About 30
percent. however, tired quickly of the hard
living and deserted.
One of the things that kept the hill people
going so long was their leader, Vang Pao,
an ambitious. French-trained soldier who
attracted the attention of the first Americans
who ventured into the mountains of Laos. As
the CIA funneled money and arms through
Vang Pao. his stature and power spiraled,
eehing hirRahead of the traditional I1/4.4eo
leaders. He was mane a major general in
he Royal Laotian Army with responsibility
or an entire military region, the highest pos-
ition a hill tribesman had everiattained, and
e became the singular leader of his
people. I found tribesmen who loved him.
others who despised him, but no one ready
to cross him. When he said. "Move out." the
troops moved out. Partly to solidify his posi-
tion in the polygamous society. the story
_ AL...inn. Pao_
ea- poeeeiing
CIA money intended for his troops, of shoot-
ing men with whom he had differences, and
of torturing prisoners. His brutality was
never denied, but most Americans claimed
the general was less corrupt than other Lao-
tian officers with whom they dealt.
-fhere were times during the long war
when even Vane Pao warite..0 to quit. But Pop,
accercling to Dee A.
Seim nch-e. who .,,rote te..eel% about Bee:
fif-e eiei Ntee) ca;ted ildrieir Pop.
, 18
Sceenohe recalled one evening ai:er a
!reat when Duel: found Vang Pen
alone in his. French colonial villa at Long
Tieng. disheveled and in tears.
According to Schanche. Buell .listened
tiriefiy. then shouted at Vang Pao, "Get hold
of yourself! You lost a battle. You-ain't lost
the war. And you ain't lost your pec-,pe
either. Sure, their morale's all shot to hell
right now, but they'll get over it." ?
Then. Schanche went on. Vang Pao
straightened and looked ruefully at Pop. "I
know you speak harshly to me for my own
good. my father." he said. "Maybe it is not as
dark as I have been telling myself since
retreated from Pha Thi. But it is bad. You saw
my soldiers when You were there. I took you
with ma to insc.)ect the new recruits. Did you
not see them? A third of them were only
twelve years old. Their rifles are longer than
they are. They should be in school, not fight-
ing. When you locked at them, couldn't you
see?" Again he began to stream tears. "The
good ones are all dead. my father. Dead.
These are all I have left. It is late. We have
fought for nine years. There is no way we can
"But you can hold. General, you can
.hold." Buell replied.,
"Hold what?" Vang Pao continued in the
same dispirited vein.
"it ain't all lost. General. You know that."
Buell saig. "We can figure sornethin* out::
Talking v-eth a correspondent tree-,,ere
oacia Television once. Buell sei,?s?el: eon-
sidered himself and Varic;;Feiaiis partners M-
an anti-Communiet ie---eede. They both- felt
bad that yuuee uoys were being u-sed as-
soldiers, he said. But when he was asked if
would like to see a ten-year-old grandson
of his carrying a hand grenade made by a
foreign power, Buell replied. "I sure as hell
would. if he was holding off an enemy such
as the North Vietnamese. My oWn grandson.
Even at five years old, if he could do it."
Buell always expressed his love for the'
hei peopie ee he retired from USAID
after suffering a heart attack. he settled in
Vientiane. working at a school for blind
children from the hill tribes.
By 1972, the war the CIA had entered as a
counter-guerrilla campaign had become,
from the American side, largely an air war.
Even_ with the Thai reinforcements, the
many smaller bombers.-
. Laos had been shaken by twice as much
bombing as North Vietnam. Sections cf the
once-populous Plain of Jars had been
turned into cratered moonscapes.- and sur-
vivors told of living for weeks in caves and
trenches, venturing out only after dark.
But during most of -the bombing?from
May 1964 until March 1970?PresidentS
Johnson and Nixon baldly denied that the
air raids were taking place. Even as villag-
ers fleeing the bombing streamed into Vien-
tiane telling of skies filled with attadcing
American planes, American officials in-
sisted that U.S. aircraft were only carrying
out "armed aerial reconnaissance.-Vrat is..
surveying the land and striking only self-
defense.
Finally. though. on March 6. 197a. amid
what he called "intense public specutation""
over growing American involverrznt
Laos, President Nixon went on nation{ tele-
vision to put "the subject into pe.rspective...-
The president's statement was broadly mis-
leading and littered with lies and omissions_
but it did put on record for the first tine tile
fact that American planes . had. indeed.
been secretly bombing Laos for six vars.
Nixon asserted that the bornbirt.) had
been initiated at the request of the Royal
Laotian Government and that set?.5-eieueel
strikes had been flown "only weenireqwest--
eci by the Royal Laotian Gove.rnment.."
On the contrary. hcwaver. Joseph a
GOUlden, in his book Truth is the Frr-.Casts-
a!ty, reported that not only had Pris.me Soks-
vanna Paona not rquE!s,,--ri st.vt
bo t-
5.!' but that re- had not
been ireorreed teat it was beginnim. a
when he. :-.1:scov E.:red the air raids. heter.a..-z-z-
erted to resieei unless they ..vere'felted L,
t:..vo days. however. Gouijen said. t:z.e.
American ambassador in Laos thet. Leon:
arc:tint-ler. :-.^.anaged to cairn the c?aceari,J
turn his prc-test into an "invitation." furthoec
more, dii-_,,lornats in Vientiane told me la
1972 that'Souverina Phourna felt the berr( '
ing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail was of= vetch
to Laos and wanted it stooped sob-acct.:L.:
proceed witn attempts to make peace we-4:
the Communists. But the diplorn saii
-
Souvanna Phouma had no hopes of.aborn.:-
ing halt because of American concern wiz;
Vietnam.
While forcefully condemning the Con-1
munist vioiations of Laotian nearality
Nixon continued, like his predecessors.. ti
'deny that the. U.S. had breached theagrea
-rnentse He made no mention whatsa-evero.
the Ci;:, end ?
a part.of the general armed forces iro-whic.?
the Laotian government had "requ..=ste...J.:
assistance from the U.S.
The president stated flatly that "noArneri.
can stationed in Laos has ever been&itted
ground combat operations.- but win
.4-rieeeae_r_ns:,Incteles_Tirnes fp, undtkafa
was being run by a coalition similar to th
government the. Laotians had started wit
shortly afTe.r independence in 1954,. re
dii?ference. however, was that aft- sorn
eighteen years of political and mialani
tervent:on by the CIA, the Communist cc
trolled much more of the population an
land and held a stronger position in th,
coalition. The CIA's single largest I-Mita
effort had been a dismal failure.
In the-enci. the CIA was denied even- th
gratitude. of tne hill people it had armed
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UNION, Sr Diego
6 August 1975
having kept them out of the hands of the
Communists. Chatting in the Cod!. dark
loboy of the Constellation Hotel one morn-
ing in Vientiane. Touby Lyfoung. one of the
most inik:ential political leaders of the Mao.
!Did me his people would surely have gore
i:h the Communists had the CIA not inter-
vened. And that. he said, would have been
better. --Even if the Communist regime had
riot been paradise." he said. our pcpie
would not have 'died. There would *nave
ttee.a no w ar.: 0
fib article in a series on i;aler-
ccr's intelligerce ccrnmrif:iti.)
NEW YORK TIMES
19 August 1975
POWER TO SPY HELD
A TOOL FOR TYRANNY
4 WASHINGTON, 'Aug. . 17
(UPI)?Senator Frank Church,
Democrat of Idaho said Sunday
that the spy technology of the
Government is so massive that
Americans would have "no way
to fight back" if a dictator took
control. ? ? : , . .:. ' -
Mr. Church, chairman of the
Senate committee investigating
the Central Intelligence Agency
and other intelligence gathering
!agencies, said his panel is look-
ing into the security index ,of
'tbe Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, emergency offices of
the Mount Weather computer
system and the military's con-
tingency plan for martial law.
.,--Mr. Church warned that the
nation's "very extensive capa-
bility of intercepting mes-
sages," which he said was es-
sential in keeping track of for-
eign enemies, '"at any time
could be turned around on the
American people."
..- He said that if the country.
should - come under` tyranny,
"tile most careful effort to corn-
bine together in resistance to
the Government, no matter how
privately it was done, is in the
reach of the Government to
know, such is the capability of
this technology. We must see
tO it," he said, that the Central
,Intelligence Agency "and all
agencies that possess this tech-
nology, operate within the
law and under proper supervi-
sion so that we never cross
that abyss."
LOS ANGELES TIMES
8 August 1975
- :-..,---i
CIA Malady
Ernest Conine's (July 18), "Why the
?Big Flap Over CIA Contact Men?"
.speitlights the paranoia that has
seized so many of our political lead-
ers and opinion formers.
The CIA malady is not only vir-
ulent, it is so contagious that the nor-
mal good judgment of ordinary vot-
ing citizens is being paralyzed.
After these many weeks of increas- ,
ing hysteria, during which even the
?CIA executives have been badgered
into apologies for just and proper ac-
tions, how can we return to sanity
before irreparable damage is done?
? Sen. Frank Church, the chairman .
of one of the congressional commit-
tees investigating the activities of the
:Central Intelligence Agency recently
compared that organization to---2 a -
"rogue elephant charging out of- con-
;
-trol." .
More recently many responsible
citizens have begun to compare the el
investigation into the activities of the
CIA, with Jhee witchhunts -the..
McCarthy era M the 1950s.
Both .evaluationi have validity:
:..each in its .own, context, each in its
Own time period:' . ?
7 ' In some respects CIA has- behaved
? like 'a rogue elephant, although not of,
recent date. 'In its heyday the Agency
violated .its 'charier by spying on
Americans within the United States
of America. It succumbed to pres-
sure from the White House to take
parf in:improper activities. It un-
doubtedly had a hand in more than a
few revolution's here and there. And
there were probably times when it
even' diScussed the possible assassi- ?
nation of foreign leaders. ? =
:
However, that is all in the past and,
even at the- worst, its irresponsibili-
ties and transgressions were accom-
panied by skillful intelligence activi-
ty if incalculable value-to the nation:.
Today the CIA is prostrate. Its mo- :
rale: is -sapped, its ability to recruit
'agents is damaged and, as Secretary
of Defense James Schlesinger said
over the. weekend, .the sources _ of
information available to the CIA are
drying up.
In this context ? the continuing
harassment of the Agency particu-
larly in the limelight of congressional
hearings, where immediate drama
has more weight with the public than
a voluminous report a year from now
that few will bother to read ? is
reMiniscent of the McCarthy era:
What we are seeing is investigative
overkill at its worst. The question
nol,v,is not whether the CIA can be
? I wish it were possible to impose
month of silence. We could then
hope for a, rational action by Con-
gress to correct the few defects in
authorizing legislation and oversight
procedures. During the silence those
who have been hysterical would then
be ready to praise the CIA for its ac-
r
rAl
bridled and controlled by .Congess,
but whether it can rise from the
ashes And that brings the discussion
to the: central point of whether we
need a- CIA at all. We can't recall
- that even the severest critic of the
agency has said that we do not
? Whatever its failings, the functions
of the. CIA are vital to our national
-security. An ? agency of that sort is
essential to provide the. President
. .and the defense establishment the
information: they need both to con-
duct intelligent foreign' policy and to
provid?' for the security. of the citi
zens ()the United States of America.
- I
?
Mr. -Schlesinger, himself the head
? - -
. of the. CIA:recently, reminded us that
there'ils no other. way to obtain the
intelligence we need; Satellites are
inadequate because photograpIB do
not think and, as Schlesinger !bated,
they do not reveal intentions'.
The message that he left with the
CIA investigators merits the consid:
eration of every American who be-
lievg that he has been wronged by
.the CIA, or that American institu-
' tioi4 have been subverted by CIA
activities.
? We tend to forget, Mr. Schieskige
said "that the most valuable of
social welfare services that a society
canTrovide for its citizens is to keep
-
thern alive and free."
e
Put -another ,way? we can and
'should insist that the CIA. not have
? the l willy-nilly right- to open our
. mail?but we should also do nothing
that sacrifices our right to have
-private mail in the first place.
We ? silo-1.11d also remember that
? while we must set the rulesby which
the CIA operates, we will lose the
game every" time if we insist upon
using padded gloves while our oppo-
nents are using brass knuckles.
compliShments and urge its con-
tinued operations as ar.i essential tool
of our administrative process.
Simmer down, America! Think
quietly for 30 days; then act calmly.
WILCOXPim
Laguna Niguel
19
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16 AUGUST 1975
finumunonitnitinuml This Week iiiWaShi7/010n
iiiminlinuinimuniminimintuilitionnimminininionmotimmintutimtimmintuitui
I!!
E-:
olby Gets Some Praise in Congress
By sMark- R. Arnold ?,-
?? For much of the 27 months that he
has headed the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), William E. Colby has
suffered the fate of one of those mech-
anical targets you see at amusement
parks--the kind that gets shot down
?whenever it raises its head.
? Traditionally, directors of U.S. in-
telligence have been able to keep their
heads low and their agency's activities
beyond the searchlight of public scru-
tiny. But that has not been Colby's
Revelations about CIA involvement
in burglaries, buggings, drug tests, as-
:sassination plots and its keeping of
files on U.S. citizens have taken their
4011 on agency morale and threatened
to wear out Director Colby's welcome
at the White House.
"They're taking a 'microscope to
activities formerly viewed only through
?
News
Analysis
a telescope, if at all," says one student
*of the agency, referring to the recent
spate of investigations?journalistic,
Presidential, and congressional.
But Colby, .to judge from: recent
?
appearances, is accommodating him-
:self well to- the demands? for: greater
'disclosure in post-Watergate Washingr.
-ton, and is earning himself some ten-
tative praise- on Capitol Hill for ;his:
.co-operation. ??
Difficult to Judge
Last :week,' he made two - appear-'
ances before the House Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, his. 40th and
.41st appearances before Government
investigators this year. He began by
saying, "It -would be disingenuous to
-say that I welcome this process, but
we will , work constructively with you
to.show both the good and the bath"
How much of both good and bad
?
Colby in fact disclosed is hard to
judge because much of his testimony
took place behind closed doors. In one
executive session, he :satisfied a' key
demand of the 13-member House panel
by outlining the secret budget for U.S.
foreign intelligence. This information
the agency has previously shared with
only a handful of lawmakers on the
Senate and House Appropriations com-
mittees. Chairman Otis G. Pike of
New York said Colby's ? presentation
had been "remarkably candid."
But in sticking his head up before
the Pike panel, Colby got knocked
down once again. Rep. Les Aspin of
Wisconsin drew from the intelligence
chief the admission that the National
Security Agency (NSA), which moni-
tors foreign communications, some-
times picks up conversations of U.S. ?
:citizens while eavesdropping on over-
seas telephone calls.. ?
' ? - Colby replied that intercepts involv:-
ing citizens are "incidental" to agency
monitoring of foreign communications.
Aspin insisted, however, that the ac-
tivity is not incidental but "random
.?
scanning." He also? argued that the
practice is illegal -" under Supreme
Court rulings limiting warrantless wire
taps to national-security cases involv-
ing foreign__ agents. ? The committee
later took its inquiry behind closed
doors after the White House warned' it
was treading in an "extremely sensi-
tive" area.' ?
The House investigation and a com-
panion inquiry by the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, chaired by
Idaho Democrat Frank Church, are run-
ning on separate but complementary
tracks. The Church group is exploring
CIA operations, beginning with involve-
ment in assassination plots against for-
eign leaders. It has yet to hold an open
session, though the panel has been tak-
ing testimony since the spring. .
.The Pike committee, seeking to
avoid duplication of the Senate group's
work, is zeroing in on the size and shape
of the. intelligence establishment, its
,budget practices, and the degree of
oversight, from the White House and
Congress. ?? : . ? .
?:? Members of both panels are Imown
to believe that intelligence operations
should be subject to tighter congression-
al supervision. In addition, there is
some sentiment in Congress for elimina-
tion of ,the CIA's responsibilities for cd-
vert operations, which would leave the-
agency as a purely intelligence-gather-
ing organization. Such a step would be
PRESS?HERALD, Port1and9 Me.
4 August 1975
bitterly resisted by the White Rouse
and powerful congressional friends of
the agency.
-
'Thanks, Not Abuse'
In his congressional appearances?.
Colby conducts himself as a calm, sCr
phisticated professional, seeking to
co-operative while championing in
low-key way the present prerogative
of his agency. Occasionally, he becomei
defensive, as when he said last week
that CIA personnel "deserve the cowl-
try's thanks rather than the' abuse they
are receiving today."
For the most part, though, he patient-
ly fields inquiries about the mechanics
of agency operations while requesting
that questions about sensitive agency
policies be handled behind closed doors.
Pressed as to why the CIA should have
greater flexibility in its transfer of
funds than other agencies, Colby re-
plied last week, "If we are offered a
document of tremendous intelligence-
value; we can not tell the seller to re-
turn next year when we have had an
opportunity to budget for it."
His basic -message is that though
there have been abuses in the past, the
agency must be preserved. "The world
has changed, the country has changed,'
the intelligence business has changed,".
he told the Pike committee. Replied
freshman Rep. Philip H. Hayes of In-
diana, "Congress has changed too."
is healthy that the Central
Intelligence Agencys:, illegal
activities should be expOsed but
the. excesses of congressional and'
press-probing have damaged the
? agency and the country.
....The CIA's mission of providing
authentleiiiformation about
foreign; affairs to our government
is vitally:. essential. .4k* sound
foreign policy. is Impossible
without.-this service. Judgments_
in the best, interest of the United
States by:the Executive.branch,on.?
overseas Matters. :depend
reliable intelligence and analysis.
But-there- isl reason to believe-
that .the orgy of .attackson. the ?
agency-by_some politicians -"and
'part -of the press-has reduced the
CLk's effectiveness. Certainly our
allies-are Wary about an intima
relationship-.'"with the agency.
Its :1-
.wn their morale:shaken,.
"are-',I.rii.nriing scared and
:.such-
timidity is bound tobereflected in
the conduct' of covert.migsions, in
the recommendations and 'action-::
whichTth&:record -will show: have.,
often helped to avert cnss
abroad..-.7;,
.z
Worse, some of the revelations
here at home have actually' lifted
the lid from -,sCIA?-:':operations,
? enabling other' nations-:to take
steps. to thwart our -information
gathering: The-New:. York Times,
for example, with' disgraceful
irresponsibility;: actually
disclosed that our. "specially-
equipped'; submarines were-
monitoring Soviet missile :.. ac-
tivities: for- 15 years and .often
. doing it inside Russian territorial
waters- :The Times can be .proud
? that it led -the. 'Russians to: take
'countermeasure-s, including
devices -around targets to nullify
? our electronic spying gear_ and
underwater mines:-
?
-"r -
Siich" international spying; as
unpleasant" as it may be, is routine
:necessity with all nations and the
keeping -an ,eye on Soviet
missile activities was doing its
job,;a job in the-interest of the
American people. Because it went
- astray in its domestic activities
does not justify reckless exposure
?.of its:legitimate -performance on
behalf of national security.
20
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NEW YORK TIMES
11 August 1975
rug rests a' 'Federal Project for
Mind-
By JOSEPH B. TREASTER
American military and intelli-
gence officials watched men
with glazed eyes pouring out
rambling confessions at the
Communist purge trials in East.
ern Europe after World War II,
and for the first time they be-
gan to worry about the threat
of mind-bending drug ? as
weapons. '
Then, a few years later, came
the reports of American G.I.'s
being brainwashed in Korean
,prison camps.
"Here were people who had
stood up against the Nazis,
,suddenly standing up and con-
fessing everything to the Com-
munists," one employe of the
Central Intelligence Agency re-
called the other day. "For the
first time, our prisoners of war
were denouncing their own
county. What in the world was
going on?"
?No one in the United States
knew for certain. So, as the
/story is now told, the C.I.A.
began investigating a wide
aPeiaty of then little-known,
mind-altering 'drugs, including
LSD, which is lysergic acid
diethylamide, and trying hem
out on human beings. So did
the Army, the Navy and, event-
ually, the Air Force.
In the two months since the
Rockefeller Commission first
disclosed the C.I.A.'s experi-
ments with LSD, there have
been many fragmentary reports
on drug testing in the military-
intelligence community.
From these reports, and new
information turned up in inter-
views and other research, there
emerges the story of a vast
government program ranging
over nearly a quarter of a
century, a program that, pri-
marily in the name of national
security, subjected more than
4,000 persons to such psycho-
chemical drugsas LSD, marijua-
na and a number of other chem-
ical-compounds that could pro-
duce hallucinations, euphoria
and hysteria.
? Government in Vanguard
The story is one of a Federal
Government that played the
role of foremost pioneer in
research on a family of drugs
that in the ninteen-sixties
found their way into the streets
of America as the seeds of a
new counterculture.
- It is a story, also, that makes!
clear that the intent of the
drug experiments went beyond
the Government's contention
that they were merely defen-
sive in nature, aimed at learn-
ing how or when an enemy was
using the compounds and how
to protect against them. In
fact, there is ample evidence
that military and intelligence
planners hoped to add these
drugs to the United States'
arsenal of offensive weapons.
The Rockefeller Commision
reported, for example, that the
C.I.A. considered several "op-
erational uses outside the!
United States."
And in the late 'fifties there
were a number of references
in military publications to psy-
ing agents" that could be used
to knock out an enemy for a
few hours or a few days with-
out doing permanent -damage,
a concept that one retired gen-
eral the other day called,
"winning without killing."
Included in the commission's
disclosure of the C.I.A.'s drug
experiments earlier this sum-
mer was an account of the
?death of a man who had
jumped from a New .York City
hotel window .after having been
surreptitiously given LSD.
As the identity of the victim,
Frank R. Olson, became known,
and as other details of the in-
cident emerged, servicemen and
civilian researchers who had
participated in military drug
experiments began telephoning
newspapers and television sta:-
tions.
Several Projects Confirmed
At first the armed forces re-
fused to comment, but eventu-
ally spokesmen confirmed.sev-
eral drug projects. In the small-
est, and apparently the only ef-
fort not directly related to mili-
tary activity, the Navy said it
conducted a single study with
20 persons between 1950 and
1951 to evaluate the therapeutic
value of LSD in treating severe
depresSion.
The C.I.A. and the Army,
which was the principal re-
searcher for the Department of
Defense, say they discontinued
their LSD experiments on hu,
mans in 1967, but the Army
says it went on with other
drugs that could cause hallu-
cinations until about two Weeks
ago. In addition, the Air Force
says it continued to sponsor
university research in LSD
through 1972. -
Civilian scientists and medi-
cal researchers generally agree
that "there probably was good
reason to test these drugs on
humans?given the perceived
threat and the fact that there
existed no alternative means Qf
determining, the impact of the
psychochemicals on men. But
they have been extremely cirit-
ical of the procedures followed,
by the C.I.A. and the Army.
In most of the C.I.A.'s experi-
ments with LSD, the Rockefel-
ler Commission report said,
the subjects were unaware that
they were being administered
the drug?a practice that Dr.
Judd Marmor, president of the
American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, says he considers unethi-
cal and dangerous. -
The standard ethical ;proce-
dure in human experimenta-
tion in the United States is
to obtain prior informed con-
sent from subjects. There is a
danger, especially with such a
potent psychochemical as LSD,
that an unsuspecting subject
will suddenly feel he is losing
mind and, in despair, at-
tempt suicide, many research-
ers believe.
Despite the death of Frank
Olson, which occurred in the
fall of 1953, apparently not
long after the C.I.A. began ex-
perimenting on humans with
LSD, the agency continued to
administer the drug to ?unsus-
imost 25 Years
years, the Rockefeller Commis-
sion reported.
The agency's Inspector Gen-
eral learned of the practice,
questioned the propriety of it,
,and called a halt, the commis-
sion said, but the C.I.A. did not
finally abandon its test with
these drugs for four more
years. During that time, the
subjects were allegedly in-
formed volunteers at various
correctional institutions.
The Wife and. three adult
children of Mr. Olson, who for
22 years had been in the dark
about the apparent motivating
factors in his death, have taken
the first steps toward suing the
C.I.A. for what they call the
"wrongful death" of the head
of their family.
David Kairys, one of the law-
yers for the Olsons, says his
firm, Kairys & Rudovsky of
Philadelphia, has also taken on
the case of the survivors of a
marine colonel who fatally shot
himself nine years ago after a
C.I.A. job interview in which
he later said he believed he had
been drugged.
The Army says it admin-
istered experimental drugs only
to persons who had volunteered
"without the intervention of
any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress, over-reaching or
other ulterior form of con-
straint or coercion." The volun-
teers, however, were rewarded
with three-day passes ? every
weekend and given an extra
$45 a month in temporary
duty pay. ? ?
The volunteers were told, the'
Army says, that they were be-
ing given a "chemical compound
which might influence their be-
havior," but they were not told
before or after the test the
specific name of the drug, such
as LSD, or that it might cause
them to hallucinate or to feel
panic or discomfort.
Follow-up studies were done
on only a handful of the mili-
tary men tested, an inquiry
over the last three weeks
shows, and there was no indi-
cation that the C.I.A. had con-
ducted a followup on any of
its subjects.
Concerned Over Validity
Dr. Marmor, the head of
psychiatric asseciation, said:
"One might argue as to whether
[The Army] had obtained in-
formed consent, but if you tell
the subject everything you might
well invalidate the experi-
ment."
Dr. Van M. Sim, who was di-
rector of the Army's program
of testing drugs on humans for
22 years, and is now being in-
vestigated for alleged misuse
of the pain ? killing drug
Demerol before he came to the
military, used the same ratio-
nale in explaining his methods
in a recent news conference,
saying that to provide more in-
formatiorr to subjects might
prejudice the experiments.
Dr. Marmor said that in the
Army tests there apparently
had been "some consent and
edge. And that kind of pre-
paration gives an individirat
some kind of protection. What
I'm concerned about is an in-
dividual quite unsuspectingly(
given a drug."
Representative Thomas .1.
Downey, a Long Island Demo-,
crat who has called for a Con-,
gressional inquiry into the
sue, says he finds it "inexcus-
able" that the Army did not
tell its subjects what drug they
had received after the experi-
ments so that, in the event of
aftereffects, they might have
some sense of what was hap-
pening.?
He is disturbed, too, that
there has been no substantive
follow-up of' the Government
test subjects.
Dr. Sim said in an interview
at his home in Bel 'Air, Md.,
near the Edgewood arsenal,
that on its own initiative the
Army had done a follow-up it
1971 on two men who had re-
ceived LSD, and 38 who had
received other drugs, and had
not been able to distinguish
between those subjects and a
control group that had received
no drugs.
He said he had felt the sam-
ple was too small, and that he
was not entirely confident
about the follow-up techniques
employed, but he said he dklet
have at his disposal emu&
money or medical officers to
expand and continue the follow-
up "and nobody seemed par-
ticularly interested in this."
' Dr: Situ said he and his staff
had themselves taken all of the
drugs being tested, and he said
since neither he nor the others
had experienced any trouble-
some aftereffects, 'we didn't
expect the other men to feel
anything either." _ .
In 1972, a retired Army lieu-
tenant colonel, William Pa'
Jordan, who said he had been.
stricken with epilepsy a yeari
after participating in an expezia`
ment with psychochemicals,
asked that the Army do a
follow-up on his test group of
34 men.
The Army initially turned the
colonel down but later reversed
itself after Senator Lawton
Chiles of Florida wrote a letter
in his behalf.
In the ensuing followup the
Army said it was ableto find
only 27 of the 34 men. One
had been killed in Vietnam,
seven reportedly said they
were not interested, and 19
were examined for two to five
days each and finally given a
clean bill of health.
The Army now says it val.
attempt to follow up on all of,
the servicemen it has given the.
drug, a total of 585 of the more
than 3,000 men who parC.d-
pated in the over-all drug pro-
gram.
Most of the others had re-
ceived drugs that cm c3t..se
hallucinations, but tli:3Amy
said it had no plans to follaw?
up on these men. Even in defa.,
ing with only about 600 men,'
,chochemicals as "incapacrtat- peciting subjects for 10 more . e ? vo- Dr. Sim said he thought the'
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effort would take years, and
some Army doctors expressed
skepticism that any meaning-
ful results would be achieved.
The Army said it had no in-
tention of attempting to get in
touch with the approximately
900 civilians who were given
LSD in Army-sponsored experi-
ments at the University of
Maryland, the University of
Washington and the New York
Psychiatric Institute.
The Air Force said it like-
wise was not planning to re-
view the health of the 102 ci-
vilians who took LSD in stud-
ies it paid for at New York
University, Duke University,
the University of' Minnesota,
the Missouri Institute of Psy-
chiatry at the University of
Missouri in St. Louis, and the
Baylor University College of
Medicine at the Texas Medical
Center in Houston.
In addition to those given
LSD by the military and intel-
ligence organizations, the Na-
tional Institute of Mental
Health said that it had con-
ducted tests on more than 3,000
volunteers?prisoners, mental
patients and other civilans ?
for 15 years ending in 1968 in
an effort to determine the
drug's medical value, particu-
larly in treating psychiatric
disorders and chronic alcohol-
ism.
The Food and Drug Adminis-
tration said its records showed
that 170 research projects with
LSD had been approved over
the last 10 years, but that only
six were currently under way
at five institutions, including
the Veterans Administration
Hospital in Topeka, Kan.
The V.A. program, according
to officials of the agency, in-
volves an average of two care-
fully selected mental patients
a year, The Associated Press
reported yesterday. The patients
have been hospitalized for long
periods and have not responded
to other treatment, the V.A.
said.
Other Tests Listed
The other research, a spokes-
man said, is being done at the
Vista Hilt Psychiatric Founda-
tion in San Francisco, the Medi-
cal College of Birmingham in
Birmingham, Ala., the Langley
Porter Neuropsychiatric Insti-
tue in San Francisco and the
Maryland Psychiatric Institute
in Baltimore, which has two
projects.
Dr. Sim said he knew of no
cases in which participants in
the program he directed at the
,E,dgewood Arsenal in northeast
Maryland had suffered serious
consequences, nor had he heard
of any adverse reports concern-
ing the subjects in the experi-
ments carried out for the mili-
tary at universities and re-
search centers.
However, the Rockefeller
Commission said that in a num-
ber of instances, subjects in the
C.I.A. experiments became ill
for hours or days. after being
given the drug and that one
person had been hospitalized.
The commission said the de-
tails of the hospitalization and
many other aspects of the
C.I.A.'s drug testing could not
be learned because all of the
records concerning the program
?a total of 152 separate files
?had been ordered destroyed
in 1973.
Commission sources say that
the chief of the C.I.A. drug
testing program, Dr. Sidney
Gottlieb, a 57-year-old biochem-
ist who was personally in-
volved in the fatal experiment
in 1953, ordered the destruc-
tion of the records in an appar-
ent effort to conceal the details
of possibly illegal action. Dr.
Gottlieb is reportedly in India.
Psychechemicals Defended
Arguing in favor of using
psychochemicals as offensive
weapons in 1959, Maj. Gen.
Marshall Stubbs, the then chief
chemical officer of the Army,
wrote in the October issue of
The Army Navy Air Force
Journal:
"We know the concept is
feasible because we have run
tests using a psychochemical
on squad-sized units of soldier
volunteers. They became con-
fused, irresponsible, and were
unable to carry out their mis-
sions. However, these were
only temporary effects wtih
complete recovery in all cases."
The Army says it never pre-
pared large quantities of LSD
for offensive-use and that it
discontinued experiments with
the drug in 1967 because "all
necessary work to define the
chemical warfare threat from
this compound" had been com-
pleted. Several other military
sources, however, said the
Army stopped work with the
drug because its effects were
regarded as too unpredictable.
A few years earlier, the Army
adopted a psychochernical that
it calls BZ as its standard in-
capacitant, and a department
spokesman said that bombs
filled with the agent are now.
stockpiled at the Pine Bluff ar-
senal in Arkansas. So far, the
Army says, BZ, whose chemical
name is 3-quinuclidinyl benzi-
late, has been used only in
experiments. Like LSD, BZ is
a derivative of lysergic acid.
An Army training manual
lists . the symptoms caused by
BZ ,as dry, flushed s kin, uri-
nary retention, constipation,
headache, giddiness, hallucina-
tion, drowsiness and, some-
times, maniacal behavior. Also,'
researchers say loss of balance
and inability to stand or walk.
are common.
Dr. Sim said that most of
the military drug testing took
place at the Edgewood Arsenal
in laboratory conditions, after
the subjects?mostly soldiers,
but also some airmen? had
gone through a week of medi-
cal, psychological and psychi-
atric examinations.
But he said that he and staff
members had also done field
testing with military volunteers
at several installations in the
.United States.
i In the United States last
week to attend a scientific
meeting, Dr. Albert Hofmann,
the Swiss chemist who acci-
dently discovered the halluci-
nogenic effects of LSD in 1943,
said he had begun working with
lysergic acid, in hopes of de-
veloping a stimulant for circu-
lation. He was unhappy, he
said., that LSD had ever been
considered as a tool of war.
"I had intended to prepare a
medicine," Dr. Hoffman said,
"n)t a weapon."
Disclosures of Colonel Michael Goleniewski
Colonel Michael Goleniewski, a former director of the:
Communist Polish Army counterintelligence, who wor'ked
in close liaison with high level KGB officials and Soviet
satellite intellieence officers while being in secret contazt
with western intelligence, has now dramatically illustrated
the warning issued by Sir Martin of MI-5. As a result of
his defection to the West,, arranged primarily by the CIA,
Colonel Goleniewski has become the' single most impor-
tant foe of Soviet KGB espionage operations against the
Free World.'
Colonel Goleniewski brought to America numeroes
Communist intelligence documents, including data on 240'
intelligence agents working for the KGB in western
Europe and .America. His 'disclosures have led to the
arrest of many leading KGB agents and 'none of his in-
formation has turned out to be untrue or inaccurate..
Consequently, what has turned out to be the most sensi-
tive revelation by Goleniewski may have been a key spark
for the purge of the .CIA Counterintelligence Staff and the
frenzied 'left wing attacks to discredit and neutralize that
vital agency, seriously weakened and penetrated as it k
Intelligence Digest Weekly Review statement _
'Colonel Goleniewski has established personal contact
with your Intelligence Digest correspondent and his in-
formation caused the following statement which appealed
in the 21 May 1975 Intelligence Digest Weekly Review,
"Brief intelligence items:"
? -*
? "There is yet another factor involved in the attacks on
the CIA, especially its Counterintelligence Staff, which con-,
-cerns allegations that a very prominent US official operatire
at the highest echelon of government was formerly coot.-
nected with a Soviet-directed espionage network. It is
reliably reported that the lack of response to these alley,:
lions resulted in some ? resignations from the CIA Counter=
intelligence Staff. All information on this factor has been
'blacked-out' by the left wing American press."
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
19 August 1975
'Ford and Olsons'
Your editorial on "Ford and Olsons" is
saccharine and shortsighted. It tells only a
small part of the story, and fuzzes over the
major problem of CIA.
It is fine that President Ford apologized to
the widow and family of Frank Olson for
Olson's death a score of years ago after CIA
'gave him LSD without his knowledge. The
action by CIA was treacherous and tragic.
But the same President Ford believes that
counterespionage and subversion in foreign
countries is the natural order of things. The
same Gerald Ford has played sleepy-dog on
the charges that the CIA plotted the deaths of
Diem, Lumumba, and Allende, that it tried
many times to kill Castro. The same President
played sleepy-dog concerning the infiltration
of the American peace movement and the
American liberal movement by CIA and other
intelligence agencies.
The serious problem of global CIA activity
cannot be brushed aside with smiles, cosmet-
ics, or image building. The real issue is
subversion and killing in many parts of the
world plus subversion at home by the
intelligence community.
South Dartmouth, Mass. T. Noel Stern
e?et
22
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NATIONAL GUARDIAN
New Left Independent Weekly
20 August 1975
ci-
`
?
The following "open letter to. the Portuguese people"'
was written by Philip Agee, a former agent of the Central
Intelligence Agency and author of the book, "CIA Diary:
Inside the Company." Agee, who has recently visited
Portugal. worked for the CIA for 12 years, engaging in
counter-revolutionary activity in Ecuador, Uruguay and
Mexico. His experiences, he sayS, led him to become a
"revolutionary socialist" and his subsequent expose of the
CIA. naming hundreds of undercover agents and
operations, has seriously hurt the agency. The "letter"
was distributed by Fifth Estate, an anti-CIA group.
By PHILIP ...- ?
, . ?
_ .
. The revolutionary process in Portugal is being attacked
by the guardians of capitalist countries' interests, of which
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency is the most notorious:
and powerful:: see the .1 signs daily, -These :
-counterrevolutionary activities are'similar to what.! did
the CIA for more :than 10 years' during the 1950s.::and
1960s. I send-this letter -as part af a continuing effort .by
-many 'Americans to. end imperialist intervention ? and.i
. support to repression by. the U.S. government::
In the Azores as well as in mainland Portugal; in thel
Catholic Church,. in political parties and -even within the-!
.;armed forces, the CIA and its allies are working to create'
enough chaos to justify an attempt .by the so-called
,moderates to take over the revolutionary government: -1
the fall of fascism in Portugal,.!.have, tried to
? follow developments and have twice visited-your country.
? While my study of the visible signs of CIA intervention is
still incomplete, there is good reason to alert You to what I
have seen. Last week a :U.S. senator announced that the
Communist Party of Portugal is receiving S10 million per
month from the Soviet Union, a figure he attributed to the
-CIA. Two days later Deputy CIA Director Gen. Vernon
-Walters (who visited Lisbon to _survey . the political
situation in August 1974) confirmed the senator's claim.
:Secretary of State Kissinger, for his part. publicly warned
The Soviet Union 'recently that assistance by them to the
Portuguese revolutionary process was endangering
detente.. These statements suggest .that. the American:
"people are- being prepared for another secret foreign:
adventure by the CIA .. ? , ?
I will describe below:what I believe are CIA operations,.
along With a list of names and residences in'Portugal of as:
many of the CIA functionaries I can identify.
? The size of the. overall U.S, government mission-in
Portugal is shocking, _especially its heavy dominance by
military -personnel; The mission totals 280 persons of
?whom about 160 -are-Americans, with the rest being
PortugUese employes. Of the Americans, 105 are military
personnel assigned :mainly to the Military Assistance
'Advisory Group, the office of the Defense Attache, and the
CQMIVERLANT command of NATO.,- - ,, ? -
:??? ? ?:: ? ? *-
HIDDEN AGENTS - ? . ?
? Of the approximately 50 American civilians in the
mission, about 10, I believe; are employes of the CIA. No
less than -10 additional CIA functionaries are probably
working in Lisbon and other cities, having. been assigned
ostenSibly for temporary duties so that their presence is .
not included on embassy personnel lists, nor reported to
the Portuguese foreign ministry.
One must also assume that additional CIA operationS"
officers have been placed under cover in American military
units in Portugal,. where their_ experience in political:
operations?far superior to that of their . military
colleagues?will be most effective. While efforts to divert
the 'revolution through Gen. Spinola have failed, new
efforts are being made daily in the struggle to stop the
revolution. -
131
-
,1 rA-1
11 '61 r.1 ? 6.,
? '
? -
Y/ 1,11 s
11 a
P 11 I4.
: ?
4-?
te7.1
.111 ? ?
? N.:ta csik,
" -'?
_Without, doubt, the CIA... officers .? other U.S.:
embassies, most likely in Madrid, Paris and London, have.
personnel ,assigned to Portuguese operations that. are
'undertaken .in those countries rather ? than . in Portugal
'proper. The most sensitive operations of the CIA probably
..are- occurring in other European cities2rather..than
. .
..? Whospecifically are responsible for operation's against.
Portugal? The CIA is only one of the various U.S'.'agencies-
work-mg against the. revolution, under. the,' guidance' of'
Ambassador Carlucd, Although .Carlucci is not -a.. CM
agent,- he must carefully-direct:and coordinate all
counterrevolutionary operations, including .those of the
military services. His top-level team includes: Herbert
Okun, his minister/counselor and deputy chief of missien;
John Morgan, the chief .of the Adm.. Frank Corley,
chief of the Military AssistanceAcivisory. .Group; Col_Peter
Blackley, chief of the Defense:Attache Office; Charles
Thomas,- counselot .for political affairst. and Navy Capt.
James Lacey, senior U.S. inilitary representative on the
COMIVERLANT NATO Command. .Each of the U.S.
Military units;- along with CIA. and. State ? Department'
personnel, areresponsible for one-.or more of the specific
counten7evolutionary programs. ...?-... ? .
In order to preserve imperialist interests in Portugal, the
.revolution must be diverted from its current directions and.
the U.S. governmentis not alone in its efforts. I strongly
'suspect that Kissinger many months agourged the leaders
of-. Western 'European ? _governments: to..." intervene
themselves directly ? to -reverse .the .Portuguese revolu-
tionary process, arguing that the problem is essentially
European -and that the CIA has; been limited in its
capabilities, by recent ievelations. In 1948, ? when . the
Communist Party of Italy was about to Win the elections,
the U.S. government alone, threatened to halt aid for
reconstruction and even to launch a military invasion. In
recent days, the EEC presidents themselves have
threatened. to withhold financial assistance from Portugal
unless their style of democracy is established. Other
similarities between postfascist Portugal and post-World
War 2 Europe are striking. In Greece, France and Italy,.-
the U.S. government established governments submissive
to American economic interests while simultaneously
providing alternatives to left-wing governments led by the
same political forces that provided the backbone of the
resistance. in World War 2. .
The chosen- solution in that era was predominantly
Chriszia.n Democracy or Social Democracy and the trade
union movements corresponding to each. The promotion of
t*.eest same forces in Portugal since April 1974 suggests to
me that the CIA, -probably in coordination vith other-
Western European intelligence services, is attempting the
s2me. solutions that. were successful in other .countries
following World War 2.
What specifically is the CIA doing in Portugal? .The first
priority is to penetrate the Armed Forces Movement in
,ordet-to collect information on its plans, its . we.aknesses
and its-internal . struggles-,, to identify the so-called
moderates and others who would be favorable.to Western_
strategic- interests_ The-- CIA would use information
colieed from within the AFM for propaganda inside.-and
outside Portugal designed, to divide and weaken the AFM.
Other CIA- tasks. include: .false documents and rumor_
campaigns, fomenting of .strife; encouraging conflict and.
jealousy- Moderates. are being assisted. where possible in-
their efforts. to restrain. ? the ?-? pace. of '.revolutionary
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development toward socialism_ .The final goal is for the-
so-,called moderates to take: control of the AFM and all
-Portuguese military institutions: , ? ? ?-? se-
' -The U.S. military.--schools have trained .over 3000 ?
Psorteguese military personnel since 1950. Detailed files
have- been accumulated on. every one of_theratheir
personalities, politics,. likes - and dislikeS,... strengths,
.weaknesses and vulnerabilities'. Many of these will have
already been Selected as contacts to be developed within
the Portuguese military establishment, with emphasis on
developing close relations with as many AFM members as
possioie. ' ? . ? ? .. ? ?
SignifiCant efforts have already been made?and these, .
zoo, have failed to date?to strengthen Social Democratic
and Christian Democratic political parties. -The CIA's
corroal procedure is to maintain friendly relations (and
often ? .ro give financial support) with.. leaders of
"moderate" opposition political parties who are forced to
live in exile. The purpose is to reap large benefits when
see! politicians re,turn home. Often paid agents are
infiltrated into these exile groups in order to obtain
additional information: The CIA may have intervened in
nhe recent electoral campaign to assure that the-results
...would. "prove" that the majority. of Portuguese favor- a:
more-"moderate" pace for the revolution. James Lawler,'
? the CIA deputy chief of station in Lisbon, engaged in just.
such operations in Brazil (in 1962) and in Chile. (in 1964)1
'vslse.re many. millions of dollars were spent by- the CIA to!
promote the election of .U.Snapproved "moderates." .
s he trade unions. the CIA has also been unsuccessful sc.,
-far, but obvious efforts-continue. As in Italy and Francei
after World War 2, the CIA is trying to split the trade:
usilon movement by _ establishing an.. affiliate of the
Internatioeal Confederation. of Free Trade Unions and by
promoting ties between Portuguese industrial unions and -
the International Trade Secretariats. Michael !loge's and
Irving Brown, both officials of the AFL-CIO with notorious
ties to the CIA, visited Portugal last year. Although the
capitalist-controlled trade union...institutions failed to
establish footholds when the trade union law was approved
in January, !::the- ICFTU- is-, still trying,- through its
representative in Portugal, Manuel Simon: -
?
? The CIA is also using the ROinan Catholic church for its
ends. Recently a reliable source- in Washington told me
that large amounts of money are. going frora- the United,
States to the Catholic church for combating the revolution
in Pertaigal. 'The- church's opposition . to the. W-arker'S
control of .Radio Renascena should alert us-to the identity
of interests-between the church and American economic -
concerns. . - . ? .
_
Propaganda carn,,a_ aigns are central for_all in-toot:tent CIA .
political operations. These campaigns prepare ' public
. opinion by creating fear, uncertainty, resentment,
hostility, division and weakness.. Newspapers, radio,
television, wall painting. postering, fly sheets and falsified'
documents of all kinds?the CIA 'uses many different
techniques.. In Portugal, these have had little success so
far, mainly because workers have taken control of the
public information media. But the CIA must continue to
aid?in every-possible way?the efforts of "moderate"
political forces to establish and maintain media cutlets that
the CIA Can use for placing its materials. - ? - ?
Outside. -Portugal -the campaign to discredit . the
revolution is having success. In Europe and America we
see the themes' clearly: "The AFM has failed to follow the.
will of most Portuguese as reflected in the April elections
t?-?.:'. .The Portuguese people have sadly 'lost' their freedom
with the diminishing imporrance of the elected assembly
The press has-tiost' its freedom . .?-". Portugal needs
'stability' to .Solve its social and economic probtatrna- .
The revolutionary leadership is inept and unable to stop ,
the economic downturn . These propaganda themes ?
are preparing the U.S. and Western public opinion for
?acceptance of intervention and a strong right-wing military!
government. ?.These ? themes- present the usual, false
dilemma: Portugal will have either capitalist democracy or
cruel, heartless communist dictatorship, with attendant
dull, austere livingeonditions. There has, of course, been
little comparison of Portugal today with the cruelty and
hardships of capitalist economics under the former fascist
political system.
ECONOMIC WARFARE 7 . -
. _
As in the campaign against Chile, economic warfare is
the- key for cutting away ? public ' support_ from the
revolutionary leadership. By withholding credits and other
assistance from bilateral- and multilateral commercial
lending institutions, great hardships will befall the middle
and working classes. Private investment credits can be
frozen,- trading contracts- delayed and cancelled and
unemployment increased,. while. imperialist propaganda
will place the blame on _workers' demands and the
government's Weaknes rather than on lending institutions .
and their deliberate poiicies of credit retention. The effects1
of these programs in Chile during the . Allende .
administration are known to all. .. ? -- .
Propagaada exploitation of economic inedship. will thus!
prepare at least a limited public acceptance of a strong
military government that suddenly appears to "restore
'national dignity, -discipline, and purpoae." If there is a .
.Portuguese Pinochet, he. ought to be .identified now.
In coming months we Will probably see intensification of
the CIA's operations to create Fear, uncertainty, economic.
disruption, political division and the appearances of chaos.
Political assassinations must be- expected.: :don with
bombings that can be "attributed" to the, re.volittionary
left. Morgan, the head of the CIA in Lisbon, learned the-Se
kinds of operations when he served in Brazij (1966-1969)
and in Uruguary (1970-1973). The "death squads" that
were established in those countries during the last decade
must be anticipated and stopped before they flourish in
Portugal... .
? Greate,r militancy by reactionary elements in the
Catholic church must also be. expected in their effort-to
undermine ? the revolution. .As "moderate" electoral
solutions become more and more remote, the CIA and its
sister services ? will.. increasingly promote Chile-Style
. "stability" as the only remaining way to "save" Portugal.
? , The separatist movement in the Azores; already gaining
momentum among U.S. residents of Azores origin, may be
promoted by the CIA. as a last. resort for.preserving U.S,
:military bases there. In Angola, the CIA is not standing
?,Idly by, where exceptional natural resources must be kept
in' capitalist hands. The FNLA is likely being supported by
the CIA through Zaire in .order.to .divide the country .and
.prevent MPLA hegemony...
What can be done to defeat this intervention? Clearly
the revolutionary process itself and the people's support
and participation through organs of popular power is the
strongest defense. Nevertheless, .imperialist agents ought
to be identified and exposed by using many of the CIA's
own- methods ? against them:- Careful control must ? be
maintained of all entries and exits of:Portugal- by U.S.
citizens, both through immigratiOn control and through the
issuance of visas for diplomatic and-official passports by-
Portuguese embassies and ?consulates.
.!1n the CIA, 1-worked .to install in . Uruguay a system
whereby all visitors' visas from socialist countries would
require ,.? approval s of .. the . Uruguayaa 'director of
immigration, with.... whom. 'I - worked closely, giving
recommendations, _on- each visa_ request. Background
investigations.* of the! employment!, histories of U.S..
government official's usually reveal which ones are:CIA
officers posing as diplomats. Moreover, all "private" U.S.-
citizens must bemonitored for possible CIA- connections:
businesspeople, tourists, professors, students and retired
people. .Once' these people have ? been. exposed, the
Portuguese people themselves must be prepared to take
the action needed to force the CIA people out of Portugal.
The slogan ."CIA Out" must become a reality: ? . ?
??-?.- The. shocking U.S. military presence in Portugal could
be ended altogether. The only -"advice". and
"assistance" that a U.S. military group can now give in
Portugal is how. to make a counterrevolution.. ?, . ?-?
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AD4 REPORT VOL. IV
JULY 1975
rilNThLLENCE 1N. A ral DF1S""
r
Lt. General Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA,
says that the United States may be able to succeed in
cirtying out intelligence operations in a goldfish bowl. But
he adds that if we do it will be like going to the moon. We
will be the only ones ever to have done it.
General 1,1/alters-made this remark at the American Security
Council luncheon .in Washington on. July 23, 1975. News
media treatment of his candid remarks on the CIA and the
dangers facing America today is symbolic of what is wrong
with the approach of important elements of the news
media's coverage of the CIA investigation.
The Washington Star on the day following General \\tellers'
talk carried three stories on the CIA, occupying 70 column
inches of the paper (over half a page). The stories were
headed: (1) "Did CIA Cause Colonel's Death?" (2) "CIA
Panel Will Call Kissinger" (3) "Nixon Tied to CIA Effort in
Chile." Not one word was said about General Walters' talk,
even though The Star had a reporter present. The New
York Times also ignored the story. The Washington Post
devoted six inches to General Walters, burying the report in
a story headed: "Clifford Urges Limit to CIA Activities."
We were informed that both the AP and UPI carried stories
on the Walters' talk on their wires, but no paper we ex-,
arnined used their stories.
The only respectable report we found was in he conse.rva-
Live weekly, HUML711 Events, which led its August 2 "Inside
Washington" report with a 375-word story on the Walters
talk.
The reporter who covered the talk for The Washington Star,
Norman Kempster, told ALM that he did not do a story on
it because Walters had not said anything new. It would
appear that in the minds of some journalists the only thing
that is newsworthy is material that is critical of the CIA.
Statements that put our intelligence activities in proper per-
spective, defending what has been done, are sinePy not
deemed to be worth reporting_
On February 3, 1975, a top reporter for The New York
Times, Peter Arnett, stated in a talk at the Air War College,
"It seems to me that this is geing. to be the year that the
'spooks' (CIA) get theirs, or they have to start answering
questions...Many reporters that I kri.,w are starting to go
to Washington and are trying to find all the security people,
all the discontented CIA officers and others who could feed
the, grist for the mill to find the story of what went on. I
think there are going to be some embarrassing stories-about
this in the next few months and the next year."
At that time, Reed J. Irvine, Chairman of the Board of
AIM, made this rejoinder to Mr. Arnett: "I am afraid that
the big story is one that the press is missing entirely. It may
be that this is the year when we are going to destroy our
internal security establishment,, when we are going to
destroy or ,ge-atly weaken our defense establishment, and
when, indeed, we are laying-the groundwork for.the demise
of democracy, of the citadel of democracy, the United
States, because of the intent of the press to bring about an
immediate end without thinking of the ultimate conse-
quences."
In his American Security Council talk, General Walters
voiced a similar warning. Solzhenitsyn has, of course, ad-
vised us that.i.ve are faced with a very dangerous situation in
the world, but this is not the -message that usually comes
from high government officials in these days of detente.
Despite what Norman Kempster of The Washington Star
BOWL
says, it should be news when the No. 2 man at the CU
gives a Solzhenitsyn-like warning.
General Walters told his audience that the country was in
"a tougher power situation than it has been since Valky
Forge." The reason for this, he said, was that for the first
time a foreign country has the "power to destroy or seri-
ously cripple the United States."
General Walters pointed out that despite detente, the
Soviets were deploying four new, different types of int
continental missiles, with signs of a fifth on the horizon:
They are building larger and more powerful submarines ant
increasing the number and improving the quality of their
tanks. He said: "We see in all areas a tremendous military
effort being made to modernize and improve the Soviet
forces beyond what seems to me to be necessary for eittrr
deterrence or defense."
The General noted that the Doolittle Report on the CM.
twenty years ago had concluded that the U. S. was faced
with a ruthless and implacable enerny who was determined
to destroy us by any means in their power. Asked whether
we faced that kind of enemy today, General Walters sail:
"I think we are facing a very tough situation. I think the
? tactics may have changed, but I don't think the long-terra
goal has changed very much."
General Walters said that our position was especially dm-
gerous because the people of the United States and mostof
the Western World failed to perceive the great threat pod-
by the growing military strength of the Soviet Union, givig
it the superiority that might enable it to force its will eel
the rest cif the world.
Asked if the CIA had failed to convey its perception of the I.
danger to higher officials on the National Security Council,
General Walters said: "We have simply conveyed the infor-
mation. They must draw their conclusions from it." .
The Attack on the
Intelligence Community'
While welcoming a responsible, constructive investigatiore,
General Walters suggested that the current assault on the.
CIA is, in part, unfair and is also being promoted, in part,i
by people with ulterior motives. He emphasized the point
that activities that were accepted twenty years ago are!
being condemned today. Standards would continue to
change, and he feared that 15 or 20 years from now the:
CIA might be condenmed for having failed to do things that;
it could not-do given current attitudes.
General Walters noted that many people now expect the
intelligence services to operate with a degree of purity that
will not be reciprocated by our enemies. He said you were.
going to have a rotigh time if you fought by the Marquisof
Queensbury rules when your opponent was using brass
knuckles. The Doolittle Report had said that we would
have to match the dedication and ruthlessness of our
placable foe. That is not a popular idea today, but General
Walters pointed out that even our revered Founding Fathers
recognized, the need for covert operations. He said George
'Washington mounted three kidnap attempts on Benetl.t:t
Arnold, and from 1772 to 1775, Benjamin Franklin ed'.
his position as assistant postmaster to run a mail intercept!
on the British. Personally he did not think it was a "dirty
trick" to help democratic forces survive in a hostile .envintin-i
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ment.
Walters stressed that there was a need for secrecy. Harry
Truman had said that he did not believe the best interests
of the country were served by going on the principle that
everyone had a right to know everything. Truman had also'
said that it did not matter to the United States whether its;
secrets became known through publication in the media or
through the activity of spies. The results were the same.
General Walters said the CIA had been hurt and its ability i
to carry out its mission had been impaired by the attacks
upon it. He said: "People who used to give us whole reports
are giving us summaries, and people who?used to give us
summaries are shaking hands with us. People who used to i
help us voluntarily are saying don't come near me. This
must be a delight to the America-is-wrongers. For the
people who believe that the U. S. represetits the best hope
of mankind for freedom in the world, it is not an en-:
couraging factor.
The Big Story
What is the big story today? Is it that a dozen years ago
high officials, perhaps the President, plotted unsuccessfully
to assassinate a foreign dictator? Is it that a decade ago the !
CIA accumulated information about Americans who were ,
THE WASHINGTON ST-AR
18 AUGUST 1975
Letters to theV editor\
leaders in the effort to frustrate our very -costly efforts to
keep Southeast Asia from falling into the control of the
communists? Is it that the CIA conducted 32 wiretaps m27
years?
General Walters said: "We have spent an enormous amount
of time rummaging through the garbage pails of histoxy,
looking at the '50s and '60s, but the question of whether
we are going to continue as a free and democratic nation is
going to be decided in the late '70s and '80s, and I hopesve
will spend an appropriate amount of time on that period,
which is going to determine how we and our children live in
the future."
The news media are so absorbed in reporting the titillaling
gossip, the tales of those disaffected employees that Per
? Arnett said his friends were hunting down, that they have
no time or space to consider what they are doing to instikt-
tions that are vital to our survival. The Washington Pest,
which buried General Walters' talk, devoted 24 column,
inches of text and 17 column inches of photos on July I2
to an unsubstantiated charge that Alexander Butterfield
; was a CIA "contact" in the White House. This was pada
, the lead front page story of the day. Three days later Th
: Post published Butterfield's categorical denial of the allest-
tion in a 12 column-inch story on page A-3.
It reminds one of a sheep dog chasing after hares while the
coyotes devour the lambs.
?.?'i,-.4?;-?;?-.7.'::::Sa;;;.:-.:.7.E.?-..":7.7.;.!..'?L77:".2:-.. ? .. -:"- .te
74: For some months I have shared
the concern of many others about
the reported lack of internal securi-
ty among some of our congressional
committees. While quite in sympa-
thy with the need for the legislative
side of our government to- have
more knowledge of the workings of
such important agencies as the FBI
:and CIA, it is with great apprehen-
-sion that I view disclosures which
have to be made by the agencies,
supposedly in seorecy, but appar-.
ently subject to public disclosure. -
'? -Having worked under a variety Of
Security conditions, necessitating
various clearances, I have, been
presumably investigated frequently
and in depth. It is my understanding
that no congressman or senator is
WASHINGTON POST
16 August 1975
CI
,
_ --
required to have such clearance
investigations to allow him access
to classified material. The reason .
for this is understandable ? up to a -
point. But it gives no assurance that
they understand even the rudiments
of security practices. V? --
papers nomer _
The recent situation brought -
about through the ransacking of
Sen. Howard H. Baker's home
exemplifies the situation. Judging
from the reports from his staff, as
well as himself, it would appear
that from time to time he would
take classified documents home .
with him to work on, even though it
was contended that no such docu-
ments were in the house at the time
Of the break-in. Whether there were
Gets Dng C se Extension
The Central Intelligence,
ency has asked for and re-I
Ived an extension of the!
g. 15 deadline for deliver-I
g secret documents to a ,
use Government operations!
beommittee investigating!
e dropping of drug charges!
ainst a former CIA agent.'
A staff member of the Guy-
'uncut Information and Emil-
dual Rights Subcommitteel
id yesterday the CIA ap?
peat-ed to be- "cooperating"
and the threat of a subpoena
to CIA Director William E.
Colby would not be used un-
less it became evident the doc-
uments would not be pro-
duced. ?
The .CIA was given an ex-
tension until early next week
to hand over documents con-
cerning the CIA activities of
Puttaporn .K.hrainkhrtran, 31, a
former CIA operative in Thai-
'land, indicted in 1973 for
!smuggling about 60 pounds of
1rai,v opium into Chicago.
T h e Justice Department
later dropped the charges
when the CIA refused to turn
over documents which he said
would aid his defense. The pre-
siding judge had told federal
prosecutors he would dismiss
the case unless the documents
were produced, the prosecu-
tors said.
_
such documents or not is scarcely
the point. The very fact of taking
classified documents home is re-
garded as one of the prime and
cardinal sins by security officials..
- - lam certain that if, as a pverri-
ment employe, I had been Emmet to
have taken classified papers to my
home, I would not only have been
severely chastised, but probably
fired.: AndI certainly-would have
_ lost my security clearance.. -
, What line 'of reasoning makes a
senator without background investi-
gation less of a security ri..4t than
any of the hundreds of other people
who work for the government, or '
government contractors, and who
are investigated to high heaven be-
fore being alIowed-to handle dassi-
s
fied papers?
The scary thing about the How-
ard Baker affair is that it discloses
the practice: of congressmm and
senators presumably to take classi-
fied papers to their homes or else-
where for convenience. With this ,
knowledge in the open, all of their ;
homes should be regarded as fair
an&profitable game for agents-to '
break through our security__ -
. - ? ? ? ?? ? ?
,3?.116- ; .;71,,,auris ton S. Taylor;
- Neoie;.*1 4,4,40 a. ZAdletine
? holectiow and Atemazazwrots
Washington, D.C. ' ? ?
26.
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Washington
? ?,.???43F1
-4 1_, ?
.4
- -
The last secret
ac-'4 n -a tropical summer's
night, with the dogwood
wilting outside and the
vena gnats dropping like flies,
a number of us are bask-
ing in the chill of a centrally air-
conditioned neo-Federal house,
guests at a quintessential intimate
Georgetown dinner party. The lineup
is not half bad. The host advised two
Presidents. The guest of honor is the
nation's hottest young movie- direc-
tor. -Assembled for his edification
are: one Senator; one former Sena-
tor who tried for the White House
and missed; and one of the two re-
porters who retired Richard Nixon.
, Yet the star of the evening turns out
to .be a merely successful Washing-.
ton attorney .who advised only one
-President. ? ? ?
.Just as the rent-a-butler is clear-
ing away the spinach souffl?the at,
torney is called to the telephone. By
the time he returns, the rest of the
guests are well into the boeuf Boor-
guignon. Pale, Sweating, his collar
loosened to facilitate breathing, the
lawyer -explains that a reporter had
called that afternoon with a story
suggesting that several Of the law-
yer's former White House colleagues
? were in on a :plot to assassinate Fidel
? Castro. The reporter had asked if
? such a thing could be true. "I don't
know," the lawyer had replied.
? Now one of. the former White
House colleagues had got wind of the
lawyer's "I don't know" and had
tracked him down to the dinner par-
ty. The colleague, seemed to feel that
the lawyer had damned him with
faint comment, He was, one gath-
ered, hysterical, going so far as to
suggest that the .lawyer had ruined
his life.
These days, the lawyer says, he is
no longer very sure of anything.
Maybe these guys tried to assassi-
nate Castro and .maybe they didn't.
He really doesn't know. "Ninety per-
cent of us went along playing it
straight," says the lawyer, "but God
only knows what the other ten per-
cent were doing. I'm beginning to
suspect that there may have been a
second, underground government un-
der Kennedy and Johnson."
Something is happening and you
don't know what it is, do you, Mr.
Jones? Out of a clear blue sky, Nem-
esis has descended on Washington
and is having a field day. The last
three years have yielded more ca-
sualties than the three decades that
preceded them. The Best and the
? Brightest may be next on the list. Or
ESQUIRE
SEPTEMBER 1975
where people believe hardly anything
that anybody says, there is only one
test for truth which is widely ac-
cepted as foolproof: whatever is se-
cret must be true. To possess secrets
is to know -what is really going on.
To have secret information on some-
one is to be in the catbird seat: Once
you become known as an owner of
secrets, you are Well on your way to
becoming powerful. (This is why the
Pentagon, the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and
certain congressional committees
classify everything in sight?instant
secrets.)
Any Secret-holder with the slight-
est amount of brains or ambition
goes out and puts his secrets to work
in the market. There are three ways
of doing this:
1. You can hold_ on to your secret
and -collect modest dividends in .the
form of favors from people who have
heart attacks every time you remind
them of what you have on them.
2. You can trade your secrets for
other secrets.'
3. You .can risk cashing in your
secret in return ?for a spectacular
gain. That is, you can leak your se--
cret to the press, thereby precipitat-
ing a scandal that will topple your
enemies.
For years, the Washington secrets
market was a pitiful thing. . Most
politicians fancied themselves to be
gentlemen, a conceit which is fatal
to active trading. The prime example
was Harry Truman. who could have
made an easy killing in the market
with one quick phone call to Drew
Pearson. "Say, Drew,. do you have
any idea- what was going .on in the
back seat of Ike's jeep? . Well,
maybe you ought to look into it. . .?.
Sure, I'll have my secretary .send out
the ftle?this afternoon." Harry could
have spared us the Eisenhower era,
but instead he sat on his secret for
twenty-five years and ended up actu-
ally giving it away to Merle Miller,
who turned it into a small fortune.
But then Harry was the kind of
hopeless straight arrow who called a
son of a bitch a son of a bitch and
kept his secrets secret.
??What could you expect of a town
where the main outlet for secrets
was called Washington Merry-Go-
Round? Pissant stuff, that's what.
The casualties could be counted on
the, fingers of a lobster. Sherman
Adams, Bobby Baker, Tom Dodd.
The only bright spot was Joe Mc-
Carthy, an inspired gambler who
cashed in everything he had and
went for a real ride. McCarthy might
have cleaned up in- the secrets mar-
ket, except that he was twenty years
ahead of his time..??
Probably the most successful se-
cret-trader in town was Lyndon John-
maybe the whole damn C.I.A. son. He was no- gentleman and he
? The Washington secrets market is had an excellent nose for garbage,
clearly out of control: In a town two attributes that stood him well in
the little secrets crap game that
some of the boys were running upon
Capitol Hill. Lyndon didn't get tube
? majority leader without having the
'goods on at least half the members
of the U.S. Senate, but his technhaties
, in those days were instinctive and '
? crude. It wasn't until he reached the;
White House that lie acquired the-so-
phisticated apparatus. of which he!
had always dreamed: F.B.I. files and '
Pentagon briefings for source mate-
rial, and national TV for exposure.1
i Unfortunately, this windfall went to
1Johnson's head, and he ended up:
floating a mammoth issue of phony
stock, which is to say that he as-
sured the American people that he
was in possession of secrets that kis--
tified waging a war in Southeast? ;
Asia. When his secrets turned est to
. be nothing- more than a bund e of 1
-worthless, trumped-up statist-its,.
.I01.1nao? took the bath he deaervel
? Johnson's demise gave the serrets
:market at much-needed lift, because
lit started off a large-scale ems:inn of
the credibility of politicians every,-
' where, thus making them more vul-
. net-able to secrets. Even a few ?mein-
}pars of the traditionally reverential
-.national press corps began to see
? that they could publish secrets 'With -
o u t getting hanged for treason. But
it took Watergate to turn the secrets
.market into the crazy, go-go exFaav-?
aganza that it is today. The big pan-
ic that began on June 17, 19'12,
brought into the secrets market a lot
,
of people who wouldn't have been:
there otherwise?people like John
Dean. and James McCord, who could
hardly wait to dump their secrets
into the maws of the Ervin commit-
tee, The. Washington Post, and any-
one else who put in a decent bid.
Most of these people had no Choice
in: the matter, but that is oft the
case with pioneers. The important
thing is that they established the
trend of going for broke in the se-
crets market and made it pewtible
for every American to blow the
whistle on his fellow citizens -with-
out fear of being branded a stool.
pigeon or fink.
The first genius of this exciting;
revitalized market?its Bernie Corn-.
feld, in fact?is Seymour Hersh of
The New York Time.. Nobody Imowa,
how much Hersh is worth, and he is
too crafty to let on. One moment he
talks as if he has at least twa hun-
dred thousand major secrets locked -
up in his desk drawer, and the next
moment he has you thinking that he
couldn't find the Washington Monu-
ment. When Hersh is talking his
best game; yea can almost believe,
that he has enough secrets to explain
every sinister turn in American his-
tory over the last ten years. If he
wanted to, Hersh could put .41 his
secrets -together and drop them with
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one great thud. But he is too smart
to blow all of his capital at once. In-
stead, he drops them slowly, one by
one, and watches as ripples of panic
spread all over Washington. Then he
*sits back and waits for terror-strick-
en secret-holders to come running to
his door, begging to sell him what
they have for practically- nothing.
With the market as volatile as it
seems to be right now, the danger is
that Hersh may precipitate a crash.
The scenario, as I imagine it, goes
like this:.
After a lengthy investigation, the
Church committee issues a report
which rashly claims to expose "every
last secret of the C.I.A." Forced to
defend his honor, Hersh unloads the
Big One on the C.I..A.?a billion-
dollar secret iIn-is
been saving for just such a rainy
day. Stirred up by Hersh's twenty-
thousand-word tale of murder, rape
and plunder, public protest reaches
such a strident pitch that Gerald
Ford announces 'his decision to shut
down the C.I.A. and turn the Agen-
cy's. Langley headquarters into a
cancer research center. In retalia-
GAZETTE, Beaufort, S.C.
6 August 1975
tion, high- officials of the J.A. leak
their Ford dossier, which :.includes,
among other bombs, photocopies of
the President's high-school I.Q tests.
Public outrage over the Ford revela-
tions leaves the House of Represent-
atives no choice but to vote a unani-
mous bill of impeachment. When that
happens, Ford, who was not for noth-
ing the minority leader, lets out ev-
erY secret he ever collected on his old
buddies in the House. Then he puts
in a phone call to San Clemente.
"Dick,- old pal, remember the 'par-
don? Hell, you don't have to
thank me agaire-just give me a little
dirt-on Rooky?there ?must be some-
thing on the tapes." Ford hangs up.
and immediately persuades the Vice-
President to invest three and a half
'million dollars in buying off. the Sen-
ate, thereby insuring a verdict of not
guilty in the ?impeachment tr:al.
House members, quick to notice the
sudden increase of Bentleys in the
Senate parking lot, launch a full-
.scale investigation. In the course of
it, various cOngressmen unload all
the secrets they have compiled on
their Senate colleagues, against
whom they were one day planning to
run. Finally, Warren Burger steps .
in, declares both the executir and
legislative branches unconstittibnaL
and sets up the Court as a "n-man
? judiciary junta?until new ?elmticras- '
can be held."
? All of this happens with thespee&
of a Rube Goldberg contraption be-
ing sprung, and it makes thegeil-,t.t.
of Terror look like a Boy Saga jam-
horee. Within weeks, the federatigov- ,
ernment is totally decimated,mmt re-
ports of tarrings and featheriegs are
so widespread that not asi?gI
Washington official dares to geliwhi
face in the continental UnitedStat
Those unable to i;i:_fn on as adaches?
in the.Singapore reftert and
have their feature. : altered 1:47-ph..--
tie stirgery,like Hoffman_ ,
The crash lue4 rned ouL Ike se-
crets market. to such a total vster.t.
that there is not even one inendelp,
left in all of Washington. At Sefoot
of the Washington Monume4,,htut-
dled in a-ragged overcoat, Sepaotur-
Hersh sits with a -sign that rzachtz
"Used Secrets Five Cents." Mere- '
are no buyers. -R.
- - ?
-
Iare??:,'', sign ' in-
. .
vestigations7 :Ofi'-the. Central
Intelligence- -? Agency could
create ; an atmosphere in
Washington similar to .:that,
which prevailed during the
Watergate affair. While there is
a world of difference between
the Watergate scandal and the
:problems .of monitoring in;
telligence activities, the CIA
affair *s is 'heading down:the-
liVatergate path of reckless
rumor and speculation. -
The. facts. about Watergate
eventually came out?facts
shocking enough- virtually to
bring an administration. to a -
halt . and :to -force the
resignation Of a president. The
CIA investigation is no threat to
.the present administration, but
" an orgy of suspicion 'and in-*
nuendo. about CIA activities in
the past could have as 'un-
settling an effect on our foreign
relations as did the long agony
of Watergate.' "
cts_aboat__ theClk
? oyerstoppin;?its-; bounds in
American.?
Citizens haVe;ifeen' laid 'oil rby
the Rockefeller':-Commission,'
*putting most of the speculation
on that subject. to rest. It is the
commission's - n inconclusive;
,report o, . alleged CIA in--/
volVerrient : foreign',
assassination plot's.': that has*
opened -the: dopr.--for the .now--
familiar process. of. leaks of
confidential information about'
investigations in progress.
To begin with there is a limit
to the facts that can be obtained
about discussions that took
place among government of-
ficials a decade or more ago.
Vice President Rockefeller was
perhaps too candid, in his
remarks. before a television
audience about . the in-
conclusive nature 'of in-
formation on the chain of
responsibility for CIA activities
during the Kennedy years. As,
he has learned, to Say that a
story cannot be proved false is
interpreted as saying it might
be true. .;
When President Ford turned
over Material on alleged
assassination plots - to
Congressional committees. and
the Justice Department,'ne
urged that it be handled with
"utmost prudence" in view of
its extraordinary sensitivity. It
is nott Surprising that he is
already dismayed with the
leaks and speculation that have
ensued. While a. House com-
mittee acted properly, in
denying access to CIA material
28
to a congressman who leaked
secret testimony -onte before,
there are still many holes in the
sieve.
It:would be most ngrettable
if responsible congressional
leaders and JuStice.i:Depart-
ment attorneys who, by their
oath of office are obliged to
exhibit sensitive prudence in
handling information, are
accused of a "cover-up"?
another term familiar from
Watergate days. The fact is
that there are aspects of CIA
operations that need to remain
secret?not by any _means to
protect any rindividual but to:
protect.' the United :-States of
-America. '
-? Members of the nel,vs
need :.? to - balance that,-. con--
sideration with their dedication
to the public's right to know,
and there is the additional point
that the CIA investigation may
involve people who: are not
alive to defend themselves.:
Above . all, neither national
security nor the reputation of
people living or dead should be
subject to speculative charges
by politicians looking for a
cause celebre to make namey
?
for. themselves. .
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THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
2 August 1975
efore the ink is
For. thirty years .the peoples of Europe have
lived in- peace because of two unused words,
one Russian and the? other American. The
balance of nuclear fear .has kept the cOntinent
,peaceful. The Helsinki agreement now offers
Europe the opportunity to make- cooperation
instead of terror the basic reason for not getting
killed by your neighbour. The chief merit of
Helsinki's 300,000 words is that they set standards
of international behaviour and of behaviour
stowards individuals which are higher than those
which much of Europe has so far experienced.
Frontiers are not to he changed except by agree-
ment; and high time too as the Greek Cypriots are
no doubt saying to themselves this morning. No
state shall interfere with the government of
another; and high time too as the Hungarians
? (1956) and .the 'Czechs (1968) must also- reflect
today.? . ?
. Does all this mean what it says ? :Yes,
said Mr Brezhnev on Thursday, though will they
.believe him in Prague? Yes, said Mr Ford
yesterday, though Will they believe him in Chile?
t:It remains to ? be seen. And what is seen will
. depend more on the, governments of the super-
'Powers than on the other 33 Helsinki participants
;put together. For Helsinki has not abolished the
iron curtain?which is the super-Powers' basic
? territorial bargain or changed its location.
Thirty years ago yesterday Truman, Stalin, and
Attlee agreed at Potsdam that a. line running
from the Baltic to ? the Adriatic 'S would divide
a -Soviet sphere of influence from a Western one.
Helsinki did not alter this line (the only man
who beat. it was Tito in 1948) and the states on
one side of it still have different forms of
government to those on the other. For all its
fine words the Helsinki agreement does not say
? that these forms of government are open to
.change. A western-style democracy in Czecho-
slovakia would be no more acceptable to the
.Soviet Union now than it was before, or than a
Communist dictatorship in Italy would be to the.
?- United States. .
? To change these: attitudes would have been
?RASHINGTON POST
17 August 1975
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
ry
impossible. The merit of Helsinki is that it covers?
as much common ground as could be found and
that much of it may be. fruitful. For example,
there ought to be no real obstacle now to pro-
gress towards a Mutual Balanced Force Reduction
in Europe. The MBFR conference in Vienna has
been wasting its time since the spring when the
Soviet delegation, presumably with the possible
cancellation of Helsinki in mind, began to drag
its feet. MBFR is a worthy cause and ought.
to be the object of the next big European
diplomatic effort. Fewer men-at-arms mean more
money for other, more benevolent things, and
if both sides reduce their forces fairly security
is not endangered.
Another piece of business which Helsinki did -
not?and could not?finish is the dispute over
Cyprus. This is a clear case of one country
(Turkey) altering a frontier, or establishing a
,new one, by force at the expense of another
country. Which makes nonsense of the hallowed
Helsinki principle that frontiers are unchangeable
except by agreement?a principle to, which
Turkey yesterday ceremoniously subscribed.
-Archbishop Makarios was justified in wondering .
aloud about the sincereity of the Helsinki pro-
ceedings as a whole. -
Helsinki coincides with one other develop,'
ment which is out a tune with the fine words
pronounced in Finland. If it is true that the
Soviet Communist Party is suhsidising the
Portuguese one then this marks a quite serious
departure from established postwar Soviet policy.
Ever since. the Second World War the Soviets have
refrained . from fostering revolutionary
- communism in countries west of the iron curtain
to which they, agreed at Potsdam. They have
maintained correct diplomatic relations with.
'established and elected governments. West of ?
the iron curtain (though not to the east of it)'
they
they have refrained from encouraging Commu-
nists to overthrow those governments, in France,
Italy, Denmark or anywhere else except, ?
apparently, in Portugal. If this is what they are
doing now they are flouting the spirit of-Helsinkii.
and doing so before the ink is dry.
Moynihan's Undelivered Speech
The State Department bureaucracy
4ast week killed a blunt speech drafted
oy ambassador Daniel Patrick Moyni-
Ian and aimed at Third World mem-
)ers of the United Nations, showing
..:hat the reality of U.S. isolation in the
U.N. is not yet accepted at Foggy Bot-
Even Dr. Moyniblin's veto of U.N.
nembership for Communist North and
South Vietnam was a surprisingly
:lose call, Despite some opposition
adthin the State Department, he got
le green light to veto the two Viet-
:anis in response to the U.N. Secur-
.ty Council's refusal to even consider
membership for South Korea: ?
Moynihan had planned to accom-
pany the Vietnam vetoes with tough ,
talk relating them to the Korean exclu-
sion. He drafted a speech noting that
votes over the years on South Korea's .
membership in the U.N. had ,been sup-
ported by countries with multi-party
systems and opposed by countries with
one-party systems.
? .Moynihan's draft speech then deliv-
ered this message to the Communist
and Third World One-party nations:
You cannot turn the U.N. into a one-
party system by excluding the South
Koreas and including the Vietnams.
Such realism is not objected to. by
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
But with Kissinger in Montreal for a
speech on veto day, Aug. 11, the State
Department bureaucracy succeede,1
ash-canning the speech. Instead, Moy-
nihan made a brief 'statement barely
suggesting the outlines of the full
speech.
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The State Department's attitude re-
flects its congenital insistence on
maintaining Warm bilateral relations ,
with individual countries no matter
? how roughly they treat this country in.
multilateral organizations. Moreover,
in handling Third World countries
? with kid gloves, Foggy Bottom seems
to be living in a past world when U.S.
strategy at the U.N. was aimed at
maintaining. majority support on key. .
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
6 August 1975
votes.
The harsh inevitability ? that the
United States Will be .badly outnum-
bered on future U,N, votes means
Moynihan may well resurrect his one-
party speech. Beyond speeches, how-
ever, the United States may have to
start pressuring individual nations to
convince them that consistent anti-
Amercan votes could be costly for
them. ,
POLAND SELLS BO 1ES
WILSON, summing up the Helsinki conference in
arliament yesterday, spoke of "a new spirit of co-opera-
on" which should provide the basis for more fruitful
relationships." He dwelt particularly on the articles relating
o freedom of movement and the rights of individuals. A
sobering, indeed sickening, example of the chasm between
uch expectations and the hard realities of dealing with the
ron . Curtain countries, is provided by an agreement
etween West Germany and Poland actually concluded at
elsinki. Under it 125,000 people of German origin in
he former German territories awarded to Poland in 1945
ill be allowed by the Polish Government to go to
Germany. In return Bonn will grant Poland a credit of
180 million which in effect amounts to a gift, plus a
lump sum of ?236 million on other accounts.
Poland has already bilked Germany on this issue.
The Bonn-Warsaw treaty of 1970 provided for the release
f the Germans, but only a relatively small number have
eeri allowed to go. ?This; may be why the present cash
WASHINGTON POST
14 August 1975
Roioland Evans and Robert Novak
Probable Israeli-Egyptian agreement '
in the Sinai will prevent a showdown
of Thi,rd-World efforts to expel Israel
from the U.N. But Ambassador Moyni-
han and the United States will face a
tough test when the regular general
assembly session next month votes on
a Communist-Third World resolution
calling for removal of U.S. troops from
Korea./
prices are bele* current rates. East Germa-ny has sold
West Germany thousands of "political prisoners" much
dearer., These auctions have become a major source of
income' for the East German Government, which can
always round up a batch when the balance of payments
needs a fillip. In addition, as part of the 1970 agreement
under- which the East Germans reduced their interference
with West Berlin traffic and allowed more visitors in, Bonn
has paid hundreds of millions of pounds under various
headings such as road repairs. Further" easements" have
been offered for ?545 millions.
This obnoxious trade in human beings, in. its various
aspects, is the basis of the Helsinki bargain. The West
has paid a huge price in irrevocable diplomatic concessions_
In -return the Communist Governments give vague and
suspect undertakings to allow a few of their own people,
and also to a tiny number of foreigners, isolated glimpses
of those, freedoms of movement and action,to which they
already have multiple international, and constitutional
commitments. At least the West should have insisted on
something tangible as an earnest of a -change- of spots--
the dismantling of the illegal Berlin Wall for instance.
Why had Mr WILSON nothing to say about that? ?
. tst'I
issinger, Schlesinger and SALT
Although the Pentagon now has
been brought into the heart of policy-.
making on Strategic Arms Limitations
Talks (SALT), there is widespread sus-
picion that Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger will abandon the mili-
tary's position if necessary to avoid.
stalemate with the Soviets.
The, fact that Kissinger finessed the
Defense Department out of a seat at
recent SALT conversations in Hel-
sinki, while not inherently important,
demonstrates he is not fully sharing
the stage. There is, moreover, in-
formed opinion .high in the govern-
ment that Kissinger will not endanger
a SALT agreement by sticking to the
Pentagon position on critical ques-
tions affecting long-range security of
the United States and short-range po-
litical success for Gerald R. Fordk
If Kissinger seeks new compromises,
the final decision will be President
Ford's. He maintains total confidence
in Kissinger, and some high-ranking
officials cannot imagine him breaking
with his Secretary of State if that
would prevent 1975 agreement with
the Soviets. Other officials, however,
believe the President's interests are
not identical to Dr. Kissinger's and
that he must be prepared to support
the harder-line Pentagon position.
Actually, preparations for U.S.-Soviet
SALT sessions at Helsinki were far
less of a one-man show than in the
past. Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger, Kissinger's arch-rival in.
side the 'administration, attended two
top-level planning sessions. .Schles-
inger and Gen. George Brown, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with
the' President' at a third meeting,
'which did not include Kissinger.
The result: a unified U.S. position at
Helsinki, including Kissinger's accept-
ance of the Pentagon's tough standard
for counting Soviet MIRVs (multiple
independent re-entry vehicles). That
turned into a vindication of Schles-
inger's arguments for hard bargaining
when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev
agreed in Helsinki to MIRV verifi-
cation.
But picayune maneuverings over
whether the Pentagon would have its
own man in Helsinki undercut this
unity. As we reported earlier, Schles-
inger requested that a high level
Pentagon representative attend the
Helsinki bilateral negotiations about
SALT. Acting on Kissinger's recom-
mendation, Mr. Ford replied the So-
viets wanted'. only four persons per
side?definitely excluding the military
of both nations.
Schlesinger, therefore, sent nobody.
But at Helsinki, the cozy four-man
game suddenly doubled, with eight
Americans and eight Russians sitting
in?including. unexpectedly, Gen. Mik-
hail Kozlov, deputy chief of the Soviet
general staff.
Pentagon officials concluded Henry
had tricked them again. Elsewhere in
the bureaucracy, the interpretation
was that Kissinger was determined
not to let his Kremlin counterparts
think he was being outflanked by
Schlesinger. Nothing occurred at fiel-
30
sinki to alarm the Pentagon. But Kis-
singer's maneuverings raised doubt
about how long he?and the President
?will stick to these hard bargaining
points:
The Soviet Backfire bomber: The
Kremlin contends it is only a local
weapon and is not to be counted
among strategic weapons according to
the SALT agreement reached in Vladi-
vostok last November. But the Back-
fire can easily reach the continental "
United States on a one-way flight and,
by refueling in Cuba, could make a
round trip. Therefore, the U.S. insists
the Backfire must be counted among
strategic weapons.
Cruise missiles: The Soviets claim
the Vladivostok agreement counts as
strategic weapons subsonic cruise mis-
siles, fired from bombers, with a range
over 600 kilometers. But the U.S. mili-
tary contends that this conveniently
discriminates against U.S. cruise mis-
siles which could reach the Russian
heartland.
Missile size: The Pentagon, backed
by U.S. disarmament director Fred
Ikle, considers it vital to negotiate
reductions in the huge Soviet ad-
vantage of larger missiles and believes
Brezhnev is now ready to negotiate.
The question a U.S. survival may
depend more on missile size than on
any other issue. But in the short run,
the Backfire bomber is most politi-
cally combustible. Should the U.S. per-
mit this menace to the U.S. heartland
to be omitted from strategic weapons,
Mr. Ford would be open for intense
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pprove
.
political assault.
When Kissinger first returned from
Helsinki, colleagues found him pessi-
mistic about prospects for a SALT
agreement this year and wedded to a
tough bargaining position. But more
recently, the officials describe him as
reverting to his old theme of this
NEW YORK TIMES
11 August 1975
COMMANDOS TRAIN
FOR EMBASSY DUTY
Navy. farce Would Protect
U.S. 'Lives and Help Curb ,
? ? Terrorism Abroad
By EVERETT R. 14LLES
Special to The Nel? York Times
t. SAN DIEGO, Aug. 10?Navy
Seal comihandos have received
special training for possible as-
signment to -American embas-
sies in countries plagued by
,gtierrilla terrorism, according to
Navy soirees here.
The Seals?the name is de-
rived from sea-air-land, denot-
ing the scope of their opera-
tions?would monitor guerrilla
and revolutionary activity and
give counsel to the foreign gov-
ernments on counterinsurgency
tactics;?while at the same time
reinforcing security for the lives
and property of Americans. '
Assignment of these special-
ists?trained in such _counter-
insurgency tactics as hit-and-
run abductions of enemy mili-
tary and political leaders?to
embassies in perhaps a dozen
countries was said by a Navy
informant to have been under
consideration. at the Pentagon
and State Department for some,
time. . ?
Discussion of the proposal,
has been accelerated,vhe said,
by the recent deterioration of
the American military position
in the Mediterranean, rising '
or
e ease
being the last chance for agreement
that would avoid additional multi-bil-
lion-dollar defense requirements. If he
follows that through by recommend-
ing key concessions, Mr. Ford will face
the most difficult and most fateful
choice of his presidency.
6 1975, Fled 1tatergrises,
anti-Americanism in some Afri-
can countries and anxiety over
events in Korea, the Philippines
and other Asian areas.
Seizure by Japanese terror-
ists last week of a part of the
American Embassy in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, along with
a number of hostages, was be-
lieved likely to spur the dis-
cussions.
Navy sources 'stressed that
the Seals, some 2,500 of whom
have been trained here and at
Little Creek, Va., over the last
13 years, would be assigned
only to embassies in "friendly
countries?'
Most Are Vietnam Veterans
The countries under consider,'
ation were not identified here,
but one informed source said
they included capitals in Eur-
ope, the Middle East, Africa,
the western Pacific and, pose
sibly, South America.
Selected groups of the Navy
commandos, totaling 75 or 80
men out of a current force of
about 300, were said to have'
been given the special training'
to equip them for possible em-
bassy duty, including language
and political courses. They
would be accredited as embassy
naval attaches and assistants.
Almost all are veterans of Viet-
nam combat.
Seal units of two to six men
each are .alreacly stationed at
American military bases over-
seas, in both jthe Pacific and
Atlantic, and ,1 others are at-
tached to military assistance
Missions in countries that have
defense alliances with the
United. States. ?
An officer of the specialized
warfare command in charge of
Seal training at theNavy's
Coronado amphibious base here
said .that if the commandos
were attached to embassy staffs
their role would be largely ad-
NEW YORK TIMES
10 August 1975
U.S. ARMS SALES
HIT NEW RECORD,
72 Nations Bought $9-Billion
Worth in fisGal '75
By JOHN W. FINNEY
? Special to The York Times
WASHINGTON, Aug. 9 ?
Foreign military sales by the
United States in the fiscal
year ending June 30 reached
a record $9-billion, with nearly
half going to three Persian Gulf
, states.
Defense Department figures
show sales to 72 countries,
the bulk In Europe and the
'Persian Gulf.
,
The total was not expected,
the Defense Department says,
After a new high of $7-billion
was reached in fiscal 1974,
largely because of substantial
orders from Iran and Israel,
the Pentagon had foreseen sales
leveling off or even decreasing.
The situation changed with
a dc,cision last spring by Bel-
gium, Denmark, the Nether-
lands and Norway to purchase
the F-16 fighter developed for
the Air Force by General Dy-
namics. The cost will exceed
. .
..Congressional.Criticism
While no firm orders for
the F-16's have been placed
the Defense Department decid-
ed to include agreements on
them in its sales total for the
1975 fiscal year.
-00432R000100370003-4
visary. But he added that "ac-
tual field operations using the
skills they ,employed so suc-
cestfully in Vietnam could not
be ruled out, should emergen-
cids arise'
A former officer of the Coro-
nado specialized warfare com-
mand said, it was "reasonable
to assume" that any Seal units
as-Signed to American embas-
sies would work closely with
agents of the Central Intelli-
gency Agency, who are listed
by many embassies as cultural
and commercial attacMs.
Used in Phnom Penh ?
? A Navy spokesman in Wash-
ington acknowledged that in
one instance, Navy Seals had
been assigned to embassy, duty.
After the withdrawal of Ameri-
can troops from Cambodia and
until shortly before the Com-
munist takeover of the country,
he .said, Seals were assigned-to
the American embassy in
Phnom Penh as Navy attaches
and assistant attaches. Five
Seal officers served there be-
tween 1973 and 1975.
"At the present time no Seals
are assigned to American em-
bassies overseas," the spokes-
man said. "Except for the Kh-
mer Republic [Cambodia] there
have been no Seal assignments
to other United States embas-
sies."
Military sources acquainted
with the Seal program here said
that preparations for ultimately
sending the counterinsurgency
specialists to American embas-
sies began in January, 1972.
That was a month after the
last Seal units were Withdrawn
from Vietnam, leaving behind a
few advisers to the Vietnamese
Navy's Seal-type force they had
trained, the Lieu Doi Nguoi
Ngay, or "underwater soldiers."
Comdr. Deniel Hendrickson,
commander of Seal Team 1 for
At the samelime the depart-
ment, in the face of Congres-
sional Criticism that it was in-
discriminately ? pushing sales
abroad, provided a breakdown
designed to show that not all
involved arms' and ammunition.
Of the firm orders placed,
the breakdown showed, 44,4
per cent were for weapons and
ammunition. Spare parts,. large-
ly for weapons, accounted for
23.2 per cent, while 12.4 per
cent was for such support
equipment as cargo aircraft,
barges, trucks and communica-
tions equipment and 20 per
cent was was for such support
services as construction, supply
and technical training.
The breakdown is part of
a new case 'being advanced
by Defense Department offi-
cials in support of military
18 ,months until March, 19724
when he moved up to the
nado training base's operatio
command, said that after Vi
nam, the Seal training
shifted "from unconventio
warfare techniques, largely
Jungle environments to
worldwide capability on
stand-by basis."
Commander Hendrickson s
the Navy foresaw a need for
Seal force that could handle
variety of unconventional wn.-e
fare missions in other countries,
helping foreign governmeift
detect potential guerrilla activ-
ities without upsetting sensrei
rive diplomatic balances."
Describing the shift in traink
ing, Commander Hendrickson'
said it was anticipated that
Seals would ultimately be se
ing abroad on embassy attache
duty or with military adviso
groups.
"Then we will be in a bet
position, to provide expert cou
set to our Government, to picks
danger spots and prevent const
flicts wherever possible," hq,
said. "We can advise the h
country and, if necessary, p
vide assistance before it is tata
late and help the armed forcesf
of those countries to coun
guerrilla efforts."
Although the Seal teams we
set up in 1962?on order fronts
President Kennedy at the time
of the Cuban missile crisis?it.
was not until late in 1966 that,
the Navy acknowledged theie
existence. Their exploits in,7
Vietnam were not disclosed of
finally until Seal Team I frormt
Coronado received a Presiden-
tial eitatien in November, 1968,
for "extraordinary heroism in
action" between July, 1966, and
August 1967.
Seal Team 1 here and Seal
Team 2 at Little Creek are each
reported to have about 122
men on a stand-by basis at
present,
sales. Their contention is anti
while all are ostensibly for nn7,-I
tary purposes some can haeei,
an indirect economic benefit'
by promoting development.
The Largest Orders
Large orders were placedlyi
Iran, with $2.5-billion; Saul
Arabia $1.4-billion, and Keil
wait, $366-million, all cge
Persian Gulf. Other big buyem!
were Australia, with $157-re1
lion, Canada, $101-million; Tfei
wan, $104-million', West Ger--1
many, $283-million; Gree.cel
$195-million; Israel, $83S-m1-1
lion, and South Korea, $21:.el
All the rest were considerah2e)
lower than 8100-million. ? t
The breakdown showed Ileee
of the $1.4-billion in sales
Saudi Arabia, $318-rodlion weet_
31
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for weapons and ammunition,
?$212-miilion for spare parts.
$63-million for support equip-
ment and $596-million for sup-
port services. For Iran the
?figures were $1.5-billion, $353-
WASHINGTON POST
15 August 1975
Claytoit Friwhey
si
i.;
Ti
million, $170-million and $259-
million. Miscellaneous items
made up the balance in both
cases.
With the easing of Congres-
sional restrictions on the sale
of sophisticated weapons to
Latin-American countries, the
United States has been return-
ing to its role as the major
supplier. The Defense Depart-
ment listed $137-million in
sales to 18 Latin-American
countries in the last fiscal year.
e Voice of the Pentagon
?
,James Schlesinger is usually referred
to as the Secretary of Defense, but
In practice his principal role seems
to be director of public relations for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their
principal propagandist and lobbyist.
He's one of the best front men the
Pentagon has ever had. What Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger used to
do so masterfully for Richard Nixon
'?articulate and sell his master's policy
L?Schlesinger does almost equally
well for the chiefs.
In the process, he is also being
useful, in a special political way, to
the commander-in-chief, Gerald Ford,
for Schlesinger's tough talk and in-
creasingly belligerent stands give the
President some protection from the
right wing of his own party.
The defense secretary's recent
gratuitous references to "first strikes,"
resort to nuclear weapons, armed
intervention in Korea and other pro-
vocative statements have prompted
Moscow to charge him with playing
"dangerous games," but this response
has only ' enhanced Schlesinger's
standing with the President's cold
warrior critics.
While differences between Schle-
clinger and Mr. Ford, as well as bet-
ween Schlesinger and Kissinger, are
attributed more to nuance and style
than substance, there is no denying
that' the Pentagon spokesman sounds
far more belligerent, and intention-
ally so.
'Since Schlesinger has not been con-
tradicted, reprimanded or told, dir-
ectly or indirectly, to pipe down, it is
obvious that the course he is pursu-
ing has the passive, if not active, ap-
proval of the White House. And it is
NEW YORK
not hard to see why.
Mr. Ford inherited a detente with
Russia. - It is the centerpiece of the
Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy.
Without it, there is no recognizable
policy. At this point, Mr. Ford has
little choice but to sink or swim with
it, but more and more it is playing
into the hands of his conservative
critics, a distressing development for
a President soon to face election.
In the last few weeks, Mr. Ford has
been under heavy attack for various
efforts he has made in behalf of
detente, such as going to Helsinki for
the signing of the new European
Security Pact, allowing the sale of
millions of tons of U.S. wheat to
Russia and refusing to see Moscow's
implacable critic, Alexander Solzhen-
itsyn.
So it is not strange that Mr. Ford
would permit, even welcome, the off-
setting hard line of his defense
secretary, which is such music to the
enemies of detente. As the presidential
election year approaches, Schlesinger
may be allowed, indeed encouraged,
, to go further, for there are signs that
Mr. Ford may himself be getting a
little skittish about detente, or at
least' its political value in an election
year.
It Is difficult to see how, at this
late date, the President could dump
detente and its architect, Dr. Kis-
singer, but in the coming months it
would not be surprising if the Secretary
of Defense began to rival the Secretary
of State as the key adviser on national
security affairs.
Everything that Schlesinger has
said and done lately has helped the
-President with the critics he fears
TIMES, MONDAY, AUGUST II, 1973'
most ?. the Reagap-Goldwater-Thws
mond-Helms Republicans?while it is
just the opposite with Kissinger. It
was Kissinger who advised Mr. Ford
not to see Solzhenitsyn, and it was
Kissinger who paved the way for the
President's controversial trip to
.Around the White House they agree
that Kissinger for the time being is
indispensable, blit it is also recognized
that there is a more natural bond
between Mr. Ford and Schlesinger_
The President has always instinctively
been a hawk, a cold warrior and an
unlimited military spender.
In his two years at the Pentagon,
Schlesinger, with the enthusiastic ap-
proval of the President, has increased
the military budget by $20 billion
annually, and he frankly projects
adding on another $40 billion to $50
billion in a few years.
While Kissinger's has lately been
counseling patience in dealing with
Portugal's left-wing military govern-
ment, the President and Schlesinger
continue to talk as if a Marxist take-
over would be intolerable for the
United States. The defense secretary's
argument is that our Mediterranean
Sixth Fleet would be seriously en-
'clangered.
George McGhee, former U.S. Under
Secretary of State and former ambas-
sador to Germany, notes, however,
that "despite the fact that our air'-,,
craft carriers, submarines, cruisers
and destroyers have steamed up and ,
down the Mediterranean shores since
1946, we lost our dominant influence
in the Middle East even before the
introduction of the Soviet fleet.'
49 1975. Los Angeles Times
Soviet Warship esign Emphasizes First Strike Rolq
By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Aug. 10?A
Navy study has concluded that
superiority of Soviet warships
in firepower has been achieved
by sacrificing the endurance,
electronic sophistication and
crew comforts emphasized in
American ships.
The study by the Naval Ship
Engineering Center Hyatts-
ville, Md., helps provide an
answer to a question that has
been troubling officers and
members of Congress as they
have watched the Soviet fleet
expand with new classes of
heavily armed warships.
Increasingly over the last
few years, the question has
been raised as to why the So-
viet Union is able to build war-
ships that appear to be smaller,
faster and more heavily armed
than those in the United States
Navy. The question, in turn,
has been used in reverse by
such officials as Secretary of
the Navy J. William Midden-
dorf to emphasize a threat
posed by the Soviet Navy.
Priorities of Fleets Differ
The answer supplied by the
study was that the Soviet
Union' has not achieved any
breakthrough or significant ad-
vance in naval ship design.
Rather, it finds that the Soviet
Union is building large num-
bers of relatvely small, fast
warships with impressive fire-
power "to satisfy misson re-
quirements and design priorities
different. from those" of the
United States Navy.
The study is summarized in
an article in the August issue
of the Proceedings of the
United States Naval Institute
by Capt. James W. Kehoe, who
is assigned to the Naval Ship
Engineering Center.
In effect, the study finds the
United States Navy could build
warships like those of the
Soviet Union if it wanted to
change its priorities and mis-
sions for the fleet.
The characteristics of the
Soviet warships, according to
the study, are dictated by the
mission for the Soviet fleet of
"sea denial"----or denying other
nations, in particular the
United States, certain uses of
the sea.
The sea-denial mission, it
points out, ,requires a design
emphassis on heavy firepower,
a first-strike capability.against
enemy shipping and high speed?
and good sea-keeping capability
rather than endurance.
In contrast, the mission ern-,
phasis in the United States
Navy has been upon sustained
control over the sea lanes and
projection of striking power by
means of aircraft carriers. Such
missions have established ship
design requirements in the
United States Navy for en-
durance so the ships can op-
erate or extended deployments
without dependence on land
bases and for electronic so-
phistication so escort ships can
provide antiaircraft and anti-
submarine protection for the
carriers.
The contrasting missions, the
study finds, have led to differ-
ent priorities in design o
warships. 32
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The design priorities, in de-
scending order, in Soviet war-
ships, have been on weapons,
propulsion; electronics, endur-
ance and crew comfort. In con-
trast, the study finds that the
priority order in the United
States Navy is electronics, crew
comfort, endurance, weapons,
and propulsion.
Less Space for Weapons I
The emphasis on electronics
and crew comfort means less
space for weapons and ammu-
nition. This helps explain, the
study finds, why Soviet ships
in general carry about twice as
many weapons as American
ships.
ini the study
points out that the Soviet ships,
in their emphasis upon higher
firepower, have little or no
NEW YORK TIMES
10 August 1975
. .
capability for reloading their
major missile and torpedo
weapOns systems mounted on
the decks.
"This design philosophy," it
observes, "suggests that these
ships are being configured for
a pre-emptive first strike in a
short, intense conflict."
A question being raised in
Defense Department circles is
whether the Navy, caught in a
budget squeeze by the high
cost of its nuclear-powered
warships and envious and
turbed by the firepower of.
Soviet warships, will not be'
driven toward the same design-
philosophy if it wants to ex-,
pand the present fleet of 500
ships.
he Ford Trip Riskei Little
And Accomplishes Little
By LESLIE H. GELB ,
'
WASHINGTON?Some scenes of recent weeks go right
to one of the questions that is beginning to consume Presi-
? dential election-minded Washington: How much detente is
? enough, or, put another way, how much d?nte is good pol-
itics? .
* There is Aleksandr Solzhenitzyn, the Russian Nobel
? laureate, regaling a Washington audience on the perils of
detente, a process, so he says, of aiding Soviet leaders in
cementing their ,control over Russian society and Eastern
Europe. Listening and applauding in seats of honor are
none other than President George Meany, of the A.F.L.-
C.I.O., Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, former'.
Secretary of Defense Melviri Laird, and Senator Henry M:
? ,Jackson. About' the only thing this group has in common '
its lack of admiration for Secretary of State Kissinger,
, who 'hasrjust advised President Ford not to see Mr. Sol-
, zhenitzyn. '-
? There are the millions of tons of grain destined for -
Russia piling up on the docks while the longshoremen
, Wonder whether loading the ships will drive up the price of ,
bread to the American consumer. Meanwhile, the farmers'
and. traders are getting ready to sell more grain to Moscow.
? Then, there, is Mr. Ford in Helsinki (Mr. Kissinger
standing obligingly in the background) signing the Euro-
pean security agreement so desired by Moscow, followed by
e? head-to-head talks with the Soviet Communist party lead-
er, -Leonid I. Brezhnev, on another strategic nuclear arms
? Finally, to counteract the charge that the document
,Mr. Ford just signed in Helsinki forever doomed the nations
? of Eastern Europe to Soviet bondage, Mr. Ford flies off to
demonstrations with the leaders of Poland, Rumania and
Yugoslavia. ..
D?nte is obviously a very 'tricky business. To be sure,
each United States President wants to do those thing t he
pees as right, that is, to insure that Washington is getting
as much peace as it is giving to Moscow. But it is difficult
to "do what is right" or, indeed, to do anything or nothing,
. without landing in a political minefield.
Every United States President who has gone to a meeting
with, his opposite Soviet number learned., quite quickly,
? that the, American people like detente and want peaceful
' relations with Moscow. But each had to puzzle a great
, deal about public support for particular agreements with
? the Russians.
Nuclear arms control agreements go over well with the
political center and with some liberals, only to be attacked
by other liberals and most conservatives. Grain sales are
applauded by grain farmers and damned by consumer
groups. Sales of manufactured goods are hailed by big busi-
ness and condemned by labor. Human rights issues such as
tying nondiscriminatory trade status for Moscow to the
freer emigration of Soviet Jews, causes schizophrenia all
over the politicallancls6ape.
Mr. Ford is tip-toeing through this in the traditional man-
'ner. He is flying to foreign countries which,, ipso facto;
makes him a world leader. Administration officials acknowl;
?
'4
4
4
. _
edge that Mr. Ford's trip to Europe would have meant
something only if it' had not occurred. In foreign policy
terms, nothing much was either risked or gained. He is
trying to occupy the political center: signing the European
security agreement and. saying it doesn't mean much, aP::
proving a big grain sale for Russia but warning that het
watch the next one carefully. .
But try as he might, the one, big new Soviet-America'
deal that Mr. Ford will not be able to side-step is on stra,-
tegic nuclear arms. By most accounts, this agreement Will
be signed this fall or it probably will not be signed at all:
And by the lay of the politics, there is practically no accord
that he can cut with Moscow that will not be cut tip by the
conservatives in his own party and by Mr. Jackson. -
a-'
A Case of Oversell
?
?
Strategic nuclear arms have a symbolic importance in
world politics and United States politics that often trail;
?scends their military significance and far surpasses public
understanding. There is no doubting that each side has the
capability to destroy the other under any circumstances.
And yet the very unspeakability of nuclear war fires th
imagination in a way that has led leaders and public
opinion in most countries to gauge relative Soviet ana.
American strengths by the nuclear forces that each pos`-,
sesses and the mutual agreements that they reach- in this
area. Thus, by the fall at the latest,' Mr. Ford will have to
choose between the pluses of another nuclear pact with
Moscow and the minuses of losing conservative support. -
Mr. Ford will probably have the support of most liberals
whatever agreement on nuclear arms he reaches with Mos.-'
cow. This is not because liberals believe?he is negotiating
the best or the most comprehensive nuclear arms deal (in
fact, many think it is too little, too late), but because they
feel trapped. In their eyes, to- oppose the deal and join
forces with the conservatives to defeat it, would be to
destroy detente?and that they do not want to do.
State Department officials express unusual concern about
the political fate of "their d?nte policy. They know that
their boss, along with former President Nixon, oversold the
benefits of detente, in part to sell it in the first place and
in part for political reasons. Along' with Mr. Kissinger now,
they have been moving to readjust public expectation about
detente, but they realize as well that the damage has
already been done. Some speculate that a hardened publid
attitude might cause the Russians to make some additional
'concessions to save d?nte.' But most seem to feel that
if Moscow and Washington are to reach any new sig::
nificant accords, they had better be consummated soon.;
before election year.
Election year is already rushing in on sun-baked Wash:.
ington. The surest sign is the increasing number of con-
versations where only high principle is attributed to one,
self and only base cynicism to one's opponents. In the proc;
ess, the question of how much d?nte is good for peace .is
being submicrged by the question of how much detente is
good politics. ?
Leslie H. Gelb s a New York Times Washington diploi
matic correspondent.
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DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
7 August 1975
HUNGRY RUSSIA
RUSSIA CANNOT FEED HERSELF. Before the 1917
revolution she was one of the world's major grain export-
ers. The family-run farms produced enough for the
population and a hefty surplus. The Communists " collecti-
vised " agriculture, since when the country has been in
permanent food deficit. STALIN let the peasants starve.
1(HRUSCITEV began buying grain abroad. BREzHNEV, with
increased resources to hand from higher prices for
Russian-exported raw materials like oil and gold, has
greatly extended Russian buying of foreign grain: ? '
. Quite regularly, ?the anyway - inadequate 'Russian
harvest "fails," due to climatic conditions. Nature comes
in to reinforce the endemic: inefficiency of the collective
farm system. When this happens, as it did in ,1972,
Russian purchases abroad can have a disruptive and diS-
tiorting effect on the.world economy. In that year, Russia
--SUNDAY TIMES, London
3 August 1975-
THE "Krushchey Spring!' was a
reversal of the 30-year-despotism
of Stalin.' It was both defensive
reaction against the monstrous
power of the security organs
which had been nurtured by the
ruling elite and also a reaction
to the impossibility of economic
development in a closed society
Which retained strong elements
Of slavery and feudalism in an
age of scientific and technological
revolution,
When the Stalinist myth was
exposed from the pulpit of the
General Secretary of the Soviet
Communist Party?the spiritual
and worldly overlord of the
Country?social thought began
gradually to " unfreeze " and
values to be feappraised. Soon
the' elite noticed first timid and
then increasingly assured mani-
festations of a resurrection of the
intelligentsia, the truly, inde-
pendent thinkers who vanished
Shortly after the Revolution. And
neither the end of the Krushchev
Spring nor the large-scale repres-
sions practised by his successors
could put a stop to the process.
'On the other hand the rapid
erosion lin people's Minds of the
quasi-religious status of Marxism-
Leninism, and a certain 'improve-
ment hi living standards, gave
rise to a Soviet version of the
consumer society in which the
old fanaticism of the masses was
replaced by a spiritual vacuum,
filled with alcohol.
Having lost its ideological basis
the regime became entangled in
: the snares of insoluble contradic-
tions arising from the incompati-
bility between the problems posed
by the new epoch and the primi-
tive, bureaucratic structure of the
regime. The only way for it to
Lend off the inevitable fiasco was
to :emerge from economic and
Scientific isolation and expand its
contacts with the West. Yet at
the same time unanimity of
bought just under 20 million tons of grain, from America
alone. By clever, super-capitalist-style operations on the
market, Russian buyers organised what 'is now referred
to in America as "the- great grain robbery." To the
subsequent, embarrassment and anger of Washington,- a
good part .of 'their purchases; was actually subsidised by
.,., the American Government under the then existing rules.
; 'Now there are well-fourided-reportS -tha-t this -Year's
. 'harvest in Russia will, again be bad, necessitating the
purchase abroad of up to perhaps 30 million tons. i
Purchases already made in America ? amount to: about 10
million tons. Mr Buzz. the Agriculture . Secretary, has
placed a " hold " on further sales until the next American
crop report, due on Monday, -As well as the economic
effects of Russian purchases (highly inflationary-for food ,
prices in 1972), there is a strong political' background to
this whole 'question. Should' the West continue to bia
RussIa ouryearly,as part of a sham "d?nte
S llET
1)LEIVPA
Detente plus
extermination
VICTOR FAINBERG
thought had to be preserved as
the basis of society--" granite
unity of party and people." Dis-
sent 'must be exterminated..
Dissent is that part of the newly
reborn intelligentsia which not
only is not afraid to think, but
does not hide its opinions. The
dissidents demand that the
authorities take the window-
dressing of the Soviet political
myth seriously.
In his final plea at his trial,
playwright and essayist Andrei
Amalrik said: "We demand that
you act in conformity with your
own constitution, your own laws,
and the United Nations Declara-
tion of Human Rights. But we
know that you cannot act in con-
formity with these laws (ie grant
freedom of speech, of the Press,
of assembly, etc) because if you
don't jail ten men who come out
and demonstrate there will be
hundreds the next time, and then
thousands." This paradoxical situ-
ation in which the man who
defends the constitution of his
country is considered a dissident,
is resolved by means of concen?
tration camps, prisons and lunatic
'asylums.
One has to give the Soviet
authorities -their due: they know
the worth of words. For a five-
minute demonstration of protest
against the occupation of Czecho-
slovakia my friends Larisa
Bogoraz and Pavel Litvinov were
each given five years' exile, and
myself five years' imprisonment.
For his appeal to Western psy-
chiatrists about the Misuse of
psychiatry in the 'Soviet Union
Vladimir Bukovsky was sentenced
to 12 years Imprisonment, camps,
and. exile. Ukrainian. historian
Valentin Moroz gat 14 years for
writing a book on the political
camps. For publishing art under-
ground literary-political journal,
Ukrainian poet Zinovy Krasivsky
got 12 years.
But the dry figures of ? these
sentences are no true reflection
0 Victor Fainberg, who spent five
years in Soviet menial hospitals and
lwisons, was allowed to emigrate
last year. He .now eampaiyns from
.London for Soviet human riglds,
of their; real significance. People
like Bukovsky cannot be silenced
even in the camps. And they are
killing them. Not 'with bullets,
as they did under Stalin, but by
starvation, cold, the damp of
prison cells and the lack of
medical treatment. To this end
they have carefully devised a
system of punishments: strict
regime, special regime, isolation
cell, and so on.
When I 'read speeches or
articles on the subject of detente
I feel like asking: what sort of
d?nte have you in mind? It is
unrealistic to seek rapprochement
with a great nation which is ,
thoroughly fenced off from you
by a wall of ideological and
political isolation. The so-called
rapprochement can only be the
Soviet leaders?for whom -this I
isolation, which they maintain by ;
such shameful means, is a sine
qua non of their political being. '
Do you not think that detente ?
in such a form with one side
flouting all the standards set by
international law and its own is
tantamount to letting a Trojan
horse into a commonwealth of
nations?
, The paragraph in the Helsinki
agreement concerning non-inter-
ference in the internal affairs
of the countries which are its
signatories has aroused a great
deal of argument. A broader
interpretation of this paragraph
suggests that it excludes even
petitions and 'other diplomatic
measures which have always been
used to alleviate the fate of the
innocent who have been con-
victed. I believe that measures, ,
of this kind are first and foremost
acts of humanity, not politics.
Outsiders should not refrain
from protest on the grounds that
such actions are " political." The
Soviet system makes this unavoid-
able, it 'is maintained by the
destruction of dissidents.
34
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BALTIMORE SUN
8 August 1975
George F. Will
U.S. Brea
Washington..
Speaking with rare conci-
sion and customary inaccura-
cy, Vladimir I. Lenin declared
that the 1917 revolution would
produce "bread and freedom."
Freedom has not arrived,
because the Soviet Union has
not yet passed through the
"glorious transition period"
between the dictatorship of
the proletariat and the wither-
ing away of the state. But
bread will , be along any day
now?when U.S. grain sales
compensate for the Soviet Un-
ion's reactionary weather.
For about the 58th time
since 1917, an unusually dry
winter or wet summer, or vice
versa, or both, has prevented
the Soviet Union's collectiv-
ized agriculture from fulfill-
ing the promise of scientific
.socialism.
So the Kremlin has ear-
marked some money (perhaps
diverted from the fund for the
subversion of Portugal) for
the purchase of huge amounts
of the United States grain that
,.are produced in suchinexplic-
,ably large quantities in spite
of the internal contradictions
and imminent collapse . of
American capitalism.
_ Actually, if the collapse.
-comes in the next few months,
the Russians will be peeved.
They have contracted for ap-
proximately 10 million metric
tons of our grain, and proba-
bly least 5 mil-
lion more tons.
? The ? Soviet Union has Ig-
nored its formal promise,
, made at the 1973 summit con- -
ference, to provide projec-
tions of their agricultrual
needs (just as they will ignore
'all significant promises made
At. Helsinki, , including . the ,
and N
Freedo'm in Soviet Union
promise to publish adequate
"economic and commercial
information"). So we are un-
sure about the exact size of
the Soviet appetite for our
grain.
*We will know that size only
when it is to late to do any-
thing about it?after Soviet
purchases- have driven U.S.
grain prices far above the
prices they paid when they en-
tered the market. But Ameri-
can policy holds that detente
is a bargain at any price.
Anyway, it would violate
the "spirit of Helsinki" to
wonder aloud if more grain
might spring from the Eura-
sian earth if that earth were
hoed vigorously by the Soviet
soldiers who are tied down at
the task of nailing govern-
ments in place with bayonets
in Prague and elsewhere. Be-
sides, if we don't sell the Sovi-
et Union at least 15 million
tons of grain?an amount ap-
proaching the 19 million tons
of the memorable 1972 grain
sale?the Kremlin will face
the soct of internal unpleas-
antness that one detente.part-
.
WASHINGTON POST
13 August 1975
ner should spare the other.
The Kremlin needs grain
primarily for livestock feed.
Soviet leaders rashly prom-
ised to increasetheir subjects'
protein consumption. For that
purpose the leaders will spend
money not required for re-
pairing the Berlin Wall or for
cheating on the 1972 strategic
arms agreement.
World grain markets can-
not-supply the 40 million tons
of grain the Soviet Union
probably will need to make up
its shortfall. Even if they buy
15 million tons of U.S. grain,
the Soviet people will have to
slaughter a lot of livestock
prematurely.
? But without that U.S.
grain, the Kremlin would be
severely embarrassed, and
there might even be social un-
rest in the workers' paradise.
Of course, there may be some
unrest in the U.S. when the
prices of our beef, bread and
other foods begin to reflect
the price of what is left of our
grain.
There is a first time for 'ev-
OV1
olz
ies
enitsyn
erything, so conceivably the
U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture is correct in saying that
we are not in for a repeat of
the 1972 "great grain rob-
bery." According to a govern-
ment study. that transaction
earned $700 million, but cost
consumers $1 billion in higher,. -
food costs.
Unfortunately, we could "
have more confidence in -
USDA assurances if the de-
partment were not guessing
about the size of ?oviet de-
mand and U.S..suppl
Fortunately, U.S. supply
may be even better than ex-
pected if there is a lot of rain,
soon, in the Midwest. So to
cope with the myriad prob-
lems caused by Soviet pur-
chases, a former USDA of fi-
cial recently suggested a pos. -
sible policy: "We can only
hope the rains fall."
' Even a policy of dynamic- -
hoping has shortcomings. It
does nothing to get grain to
some of the hundreds of mil-
lions of people who need it -
even more than do the Soviet ?
people.
By Carroll Kilpatrick
washincton Post Staff Writer
VAIL; Colo., Aug. 12?Sec-
retary of State Henry A. Kis-
singer tonight denied a report
that he had made a "deal"
with the Soviet Union which
led to President Ford's ini-
tial refusal to meet with Rus-
isian author Alexander Sol-
zhenitsyn. ?
However, Kissinger said in
a telephone interview with a
reporter here that he had
urged the Soviet governmentI
to permit the Nobel-prize-win-I
ming author, to emigrate. about!
a month before he was al-
lowed to do so in February,
1974. Mr. Ford became Presi-
dent in August, 1974.
The new development in
the Ford-Solzhenitsyn meet-
ing controversy came after
, the Associated Press, in a dis-
patch from Scottsdale, Ariz.,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08:
;quoted Warren Rustand ap-
pointments secretary to the
!President, as saying the Pres-
!ident's refusal to see the fa-
!mous author was the result
of an agreement between the
United States and the Soviet
!Union at the time Solzhenit-
syn went into exile.
The AP report produced a
Ifrenzy of activity here, with
, White House press secretary
Ron Nessen telephoning Rus-
tand and Kissinger to try to
find out what had happened.
Nessen told reporters that
Rustand denied Saying what
the AP quoted him as saying.,
Rather, said Nessen, I-Zustand
Insisted he reported he had
heard "rumors" about the ar-
rangement in Washington.
Nessen then quoted Kissin-
ger as saying that the initial
CIA313DP77-00432R00010
decision by the President not
to meet with Solzhenitsyn
when he was in Washington.
"was not based on any ar-
rangement made with the So-
viets at the time Solzhenitsyn
left the Soviet Union."
Nevertheless. Nessen ton:
ceded that Kissinger 'tad .
some informal conversatans
'with the Soviet government at
the time of Solzhenitsyn's de-
parture" from the Soviet
Union.
That comment led reporters
to the conclusion that Kis-
singer .at least had entered
into an informal agreement
that the United State's gov-
ernment would not use the
Solzhenitsyn case to enilar-
rass the Soviet Union.
When Nessen said he had ?
no information to support
that conclusion reporters ask-
ed him to telephone Kissk....-;er
again to clarify the mae.er.
When he refused, a reporter
asked to use Nessen's tele-
phone to reach Kissinger.
The Secretary of State took
the call immediately .and de-
nied "absolutely" that isrel
was any agreement heieu
the United States and the
U.S.S.R. with respea to the
writer. Kissinger said he had
urged the Kremlin to let: Sol-
zhenitsyn leave the county,.
3iord6T4waS no deal of znY
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4
!kind as to how Solzhenitsyn
was to be treated in the
Test," Kissinger said.
? . Expressing annoyance at
the questioning,, the secretary
said, "this thing has become
an absurdity" and flatly, de-
nied that there was any con-
nection between his earlier
conversations and Mr. Ford's
, initial refusal to receive Sol-
zhenitsyn when he . was in
!Washington this summer.
Kissinger would -not .say
what Soviet officials he talked!
with about release of the well-!
known author and critic of
communism, .
Following criticism of the
President for not seeing the
writer. Mr. Ford issued an
invitation- and Nessen said to-
night that Solzhenitsyn con-
tinues to have an "open invi-
tation" to visit the White
House and meet with the
President.
NEW YORK TIMES
12 August 1975
'Normalized' Prague?
Of all the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe,
Czechoslovakia undoubtedly imposes the most repressive
conditions on its people. The secret police keep the
populace under intensive scrutiny. The worst blows are
aimed at Czechoslovakia's foremost writers, some of
whom have even seen their children denied the right to
enter high school because they will not conform slavishly
to Prague's demands.
Czechoslovak press and radio routinely turn out the
most heavy-handed anti-American propaganda in Europe.
They portray the United States as a partner of Nazi
Germany at the end of World War II, with General
Eisenhower a collabora:tor of Hitler. The role of the
American Army in helping liberate Czechoslovakia in
1945?a liberation in which 1,500 Americans died?is
never mentioned, while there is unceasing and nauseating
tribute to the Soviet Army as the sole instrument of
Czech liberation from the Nazis.
The present rulers of Czechoslovakia, led by the Soviet
gauleiter, Gustav Husak, are propped up by the bayonets
and tanks of tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers who
continue to occupy Czechoslovakia and make it for all
practical purposes the sixteenth constituent "republic"
of the Soviet Union. None of this is likely to be changed
by the ritualistic Husak-Brezhnev pledge last weekend to
observe the. Helsinki declaration.
Under the Ford Administration's flabby interpretation
of detente, all the many unsavory aspects of Czecho-
slovakia must be ignored in the interest of full normal-
ization of relations with Prague. T.he sole barrier to
an immediate move by Washington to give Prague
eighteen tons of Czechoslovak gold held since World
War II, along with access to American credits and the
like, is the refusal of some American businessmen to
accept as part of the projected deal only a fraction of
the value of assets which were confiscated in that
.country a generation ago.
All this, we would suggest, is a 'gross misreading of
the requirements of, detente and a memory lapse about
the need for d?nte to be? a two-way street. There is
no need to hurry about full normalization while "Hate
America" propaganda is routine in Czechoslovakia and
a Stalinist-type tyranny oppresses Czechs and Slovaks
alike. When there are serious signs of real normalization
in Czechoslovakia, then Washington can give serious
thought to normalized relations.
The economic issues involved here are insignificant
? from the national point of view. The central questions
are of decency and morality, and the lack of need, to
say the least, for unseemly haste in fully accepting the
most repulsive regime among the Soviet satellites.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 August 1975
Another Soviet grain drain
Are American consumers about to be
bamboozled again because of U.S. grain sales
to the Russians?
So far the Soviet Union has purchased just
under 10 million tons of grain and the
administration insists the impact on American
food prices will be marginal. It is not yet
clear, however, how much the Russians will
buy this year If their faltering grain crop '
turns out even worse than expected, addi-
tional purchases could be heavy.
If Arthur Burns of the Federal Reserve is
right and domestic prices shoot up as a result,
President Ford will confront an irate public.
Americans remember only too well the 1972
Soviet grain deal, which caused food prices to
soar for the next two years.
The picture is different today. There are no
more price supports to grain exporters which
enable the Russians to pay a low price.
Moreover, the purchases are smaller and the ?
U.S. harvest is larger.
The administration is in fact happy about
these sales. Food has long been an important
component of American exports that earn
money to pay for imports of oil and other
commodities. Proponents of free trade argue
that export controls, while they may keep
prices down for some goods, simply increase
the cost to Americans of other items imported
from abroad. - ?
Furthermore, it is argued that American
farmers have to be able to export their grain if
they are to keep expanded acreage in produc-
tion. Now that soil-bank subsidies are lifted,
the farmers are out on a limb. If they cannot
sell the grain, they will not plant it in the
future. That would be self-defeating at a time
when the world demand for food grows.
Yet consumers are understandably sus-
picious that they are always the victim of
manipulation and end up paying the price for
Soviet inefficiencies in farming. Part of the
problem arises from the secrecy that attends
so much of the grain dealing, which is carried
on by private American companies in Moscow
and does not become known until it is over.
The Russians, for their part, are equally
secretive. Under an agreement with the
United States they are supposed to provide
periodic reports on crop production, con-
sumption, foreign trade, and so on. But they
withhold crucial data, such as forecasts of
their import requirements.
Somehow a means ought to be found of
bringing Soviet-American grain negotiations
into the public domain ? and of making the
Russians rather than the Americans pay the
price of Soviet failures in agriculture. The
administration should be alert to the political
liabilities it faces if the American consumer
finds the price of bread and flour climbing (as
it already is) and concludes that he has been
had.
36
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NEW YORK TIMES
19 August 1975
nited State s Qre:
ni. the West Europ
; DAVIS, Calif.?In the aftermath of
.America's Indochina debacle, it has By Robert J. Lieber
become fashionable to view the future
with- concern and trepidation or to
find that "we are close to a national
nervous breakdown," as Secretary of
,State Kissinger has said. As applied
'specifically to Western Europe, such
fears and their concomitant -mood of
.Spenglerian gloom are clearly exag-
gerated.
- In Europe, there has been a resur-
gence of left-wing strength within
?some of the prinicipal Socialist parties,
,but both left and right within these
Parties remain strongly wedded to
democratic values.
?
; This commitment profoundly divides
them from the Communists and is evi-
dent, for example, in the character of
Frangdis Mitterrand. and the French
Socialist party.
Mr. Mitterrand's electoral and pro;
grammatic alliance with the Commu-
nists has been a striking success for
the Socialists.
By creating an attractive rejuve-
nated party, not least\ by his willing-
ness to propose substantial and occa-
sionally radical measures of domestic ,
reform, Mr. Mitterrand has succeeded
.in making the Socialists the senior
partner..
? Clearly, it is Mr. Mitterrand who has
exploited the Communists,. thereby-
contradicting the conventional wisdom
7?borrowed from the Eastern European
context of 1944-47?that if you sit
down to dine with the Communists
it is they who will devour you rather
than vice v,ersa.
As for Britain, the United States
press and television commentators
have?in a tone of prophecy?told us
of the smell of "Weimar" or of "Ar-
gentina" in the air.
- Britain's troubles are significant, but
the assessment of these has been my-
opic and, at times, hysterical. Con-
sider Britain's past economic and
political disarray: major labor strife
and the specter of civil war over Ire-
land on the eve of World War I, griev-
ous losses in the 1914-1918 war, the
General Strike of 1926, economic crisis
in 1931, 22 per cent unemployment in
1932, economic and political misman-
? agement throughout the 1920's and
1930's, appeasement, Dunkirk and the
. costly victory in World War H, eco-
nomic crisis in the late 1940's, "stop-
? and-go" economics in the 1950's and
1960's, and the frequent perils of
sterling.
In this perspective, the present crisis
recedes in both gravity and unique-
ness4What is more, fundamental polit-
ical questions go begging. Britain's
high inflation and wage settlements
involve a definite pattern of income
redistribution and class-based politics.
The Heath Government of 1970-74
enacted whopping tax advantages for
business and for upper- and upper-
middle-income families.
More recently, the Labor Govern-
ment and the trade unions have exact-
ed an even more marked redistribution
Of income in favor of their own con-
stituencies.
In any case, the Labor Government
has begun to deal with hyperinflation;
the Common Market referendum has
?predictably?provided a resounding
endorsement of Britain's continued
membership; oil has begun flowing
from the North Sea, and?above all?
Britain remains a rational, viable and
civilized society and polity.
n P lic
an Left
To the extent that the Western
European democratic left successfully
addresses itself to pressing social and
economic problems it strengthens the
fabric of the societies and makes them
less susceptible to the kind of turmoil
that fosters the growth of Communist
movements.
Indeed, I would\juxtapose to Secre-
tary Kissinger's penchant for quoting
Spengler the view that in order to
preserve it is necessary to change.
In this sense, the domestic difficulties
faced by Eastern Europe and the
-Soviet Union may prove more intrac-
table than those in Western Europe.
As for the question of a viable bal-
ance of power in Europe, the situation
is less grim than it has been painted.
There is no valid presumption that
governing parties of the democratic
left will neglect security factors.
Note that Sweden (Social Democrat-
ic) spends the same proportion of
her gross national product on defense
,as does France (Conservative-Gaul-
- list), that Britain and West Germany
under Labor and Social Democratic
party Governments respectively, main-
tain adequate defense establishments
and close Atlantic ties, and that a
French Socialist Government would be
Ii1-.ely to continue Gaullist policies in-
volving a strong national (and nuclear):
defense. ? ? '
The future alignment' of Western
Europe will also be shaped by Amer-
ican policies whose ingredient of real-
politilt has often ? Snd ironically ?
proved evanescent. Before 1973, by
treating the Greek and Portuguese ?
authoritarian regimes as favored allies
we over-identified ourselves with these
ill-fated and unpopular Governments;'
In the case of Greece, this 'policy
(as well as Secretary Kissinger's inept
actions involving Cyprus) has led the
present moderate Government of-
Greece to call into question the Amer- ?
ican military presence there. In Portu-
gal, United States policy may have
played into the hands of Communist
elements in the Armed Forces Move-
ment.
Similarly, President Ford's recent
visit to Spain can be seen as an en-
dorsement of the tottering dictatorship. -
of Adolph Hitler's erstwhile and aging
ally, Generalissimo Francisco Franco.
In Spain, as recently in Greece and
Portugal, change will come, but when
it does the legacy of United States
policies is likely to have earned the'
enmity of moderate and democratic.
elements.
The societies of Western Europe are ?
complex and pluralistic. Visions of a
Communist coup like that of Prague,
1948, or of Finlandization?enforced,
neutralization?do not correspond to
existing realities.
Except for Portugal these countries,
are not in imminent danger of capture,
or even major influence by Cornmu-,
nists or pro-Soviet elements. Even in
Italy the Communist party .is in no
position to assume political domina- ?
tion for the foreseeable future.
To the extent that dangers might
arise they are likely to owe as much
to American mistakes as to .indige-
nous factors. .
Without the albatross of Indochina
around our necks, perhaps we will now
be able, to address the area with a
sense of proportion and sophistication;
and without becoming frozen into pa- ?
sition by nostalgia for old patterns
and relationships. .
Robert J. Lieber, associate professor of
political science at the University of
California, Davis, is author of "British ,
Politics and European Unity" and
"Theory and World Politics."
a a
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LONDON TIMES
6 August 1975
Will d?nte
force Italy behind the-
Iron Curtain?
Clare Boothe Luce,
who was American ambassador
to Italy from
1953 to 1957, contributes
this 'week's ?Coltifnri.
in our. International -Womed.s',
As the. accepted leader of the free
world, the United States creates, to a
large extent, the political climate in it.
The effect of US political and cultural -
d?nte with Soviet Russia has been to
create a world climate in which com-
munism has become politically and
culturally respectable.
D?nte has strengthened communist
parties?and weakened democratic
parties in the western democracies.
Because of d?nte, many democratic
parties have begun to suffer defections
both from the left and the right. Oppor-
tunists on the left hasten to join forces
with the upcoming Marxist socialists. situation is dangerous, precisely
Those on the right, who refuse to ? because d?nte has now made, the
accept political detente with their communist alternative to democratic
domestic communists, have no choice government, much more acceptable
but to join hands with the hard-core' ,than it -was in the Cold War era.
anti-communist elements, whose Italians.- no longer fear that the US
programmes are all too often neo- would not recognize a communist Italy,.
fascist" or "militaristic ": extend aid, or -refuse to trade with it.
heat. .deaL with Russia, and
the extension
In the new climate of d?nte, hich The US w
. of credits are ample
tends to make the anti-communist right proof that a communist Italy would not
almost as -disreputable as it was in- the-
fascist era, the weakened centre i be cut off from US commerce, support:
s ?
forced to weaken itself even more by and friendship.
joining the communists in attacking its ? Despite the efforts of the communists
right-wing defectors.. Thus, there is a? to hasten the collapse of the Christian
gradual erosion of .the centre towards Democratic government by endlessly
the left. Sooner or later. the point iS agitating - the most unreasonable
reached where the centre can no longer, economic demands of the electorate, if
govern, because it can no longer form it were not for d?nte, there would be
a parliamentary majority. And in order t no reason to fear the entrance of the
to avoid civil strife, and maintain the communists into the government. But
facade of democracy, it must bring the detente has maximized not only the
communists into government. gains of communist political penetra-
? non of .Italy, but also the gains of
The great gains seored by the' Com': ?
munist. Party in the recent Italian communist cultural penetration.
elections are among the first?but nor In their struggle tO create a corn-
the last?sour fruits of detente. ' munist world, the men of Moscow are
f
American liberals, whose passionate long-range- totalitarian planners and
belief in economic determinism might campaigners. They have neglected no
astound Marx himself, have attributed field of human thought or endeavour.
the communist, gains in Italy entirely For three decades now, seemingly a-
to the adverse economic conditions
political communists have been 'care-
prevailing there, and have failed to see fully woven into the fabric of Italian
culture. Twenty-five years ago, the
their connexion with political and cul-
tural d?nte. ? . American Embassy was aware of a corn-
It is true that there is consider munist directive instructing every
economic
Italian communist to concentrate on
economic discontent in Italy. Like all converting the youngest male member
the democracies, Italy is plagued by of non-communist families. Today,
inflation and Unemployment, and has
been hard hit by the ?rising costs of
fuel. But even when the Italian
recession is taken into account, the
fact remains that the majority of, the
people are better off today than'they
have been in their entire history.
Moreover, "economic discontent " is
par for any .democratic course. As
Tacitus once observed about the human
appetite for the goods of this world,
"There is no such thing as enough ".
And the desire of a democratic
electorate for more---and more-L-iS
increased, rather than satisfied by the
progress it has previously made. In the
past 25 years, no country in Europe has,
made relatively more progress than
Italy, and no electorate is demanding
more of its government. ? .
All political scientists seem agreed
that the hour when a democracy begins
to collapse is when the people's
demands,, exceed ? the country's
resources, and refusing to face this
fact, they begin to raid their own
Treasury. . . ? ?
? The resources of Italy today are.
simply not adequate to meet the
excessive demands that the people are
'making of '_ their Government. This
38
these cultural' ConVerts, now matured;
are present in large numbers, not only
in the party,' but also in the Italian
educational system, the arts, the profes-
sions, the media, the military, and even
in the church. . r!
In the Cold War days, this process
of cultural Penetration was called
"subversion ", and was stoutly resisted,
, especially by the church. In the climate
of " peaceful coexistence ", resistance
?even by the Vatican?is viewed as
"religious intolerance ", or an undemo-
cratic, even " fascist " attitude.
The political and cultural coup de
grace to anti-communism was recently
delivered by President Ford himself.
when he refused to receive Nobel Prize
winner Alexander Solzhenitsyn in the
White House. When the world's most
famous anti-communist, and political
exile, who has won his credentials as
a " freedom-fighter " in Russian labour
camps, is persona non grata to the
leader of the free world?how can
anyone in Italy, or anywhere else, fail
to get the message that communism is
" in " and anti-communism is out " ?
The President later changed his -mind,
but by then it was too late and Mr
Solzhenitsyn declined the invitation.
So long as the United States fails to
realize that the struggle against Soviet
world expansionism is being lost in the
cultural and political field, it will be
impossible for democratic governments
to devise effective strategies, no less
find convincing arguments for keeping
their domestic communist parties from
increasing participation in 'govern-
ment. It is predictable that once the
communists enter . the Italian govern. '
ment, the pattern, with variations dic-
tated by local considerations, will
eventually follow that of Czechoslo-
vakia.
? .
. The Mediterranean, once the Mare
Nostrum of the Romans, is still a wes-
tern. sea. But if Italy slips behind the.
Iron Curtain, nothing short of the
Third World War will -keep it from
becoming a Russian lake. When this
. happens, the US defence of Europe will
become impossible. And the USA will
be isolated.
Altogether a ? pretty heavy price to
pay, when one conies to think of it, for
a d?nte that has produced nothing for
the West but a very slight increase in'
trade, and a series of nuclear disarma-
ment deals that have, on balance,
favoured the Russians.
4) Times Newspapers Lid, 1975
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? CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
21 August 1975
Joseph C. HaFet',1
Communist [oss hi
It wasi a very good thing indeed, and
imelhing which should be more widely noted
an it has, that communism in Portugal is
I ing pushed back by the Portuguese people
emselves without any appreciable outside
elp and certainly without the intervention of
the American Central Intelligence Agency
Jr by any other form of American inter-
ention.
There has been encouragement to the
. ? ialists in Portugal from outside. It has been
mostly in the form of advice and encour-
? gement, supplemented with some funds,
torn socialist parties on the outside
? rimarily from the socialist parties of France
? d West Germany. But the American role
(largely for accidental or mistaken reasons)
I as been nonexistent. The Communist failure
in Portugal ( which it already is) can never
be pinned on American intervention no matter
what the Communists themselves may claim
in their propaganda. '
American nonintervention has been due in
part to the immobilization of the operations
side of the CIA. Current investigations and
disclosures of past CIA mistakes and the
generally bad reaction to the last CIA inter-
vention in a similar situation (Chile) have for
the time being taken the CIA out of play. Its
intelligence appraisal work goes on unchecked
and undamaged, but its clandestine side is
simply not operational under present circum-
NEW YORK TIMES
17 August 1975
Portugd
stances.
Add that pessimism prevailed at the top
levels in Washington when the Communists in
Portugal opened up their bid for control. The
tendency was to assume that since the CIA was
immobilized all was lost and Portugal would
be the next victim to communism. There was
a defeatist attitude based on the fallacy that
communism wins wherever American resis-
lance is absent. -
Happily the pessimism was unjustified. The
Portuguese people themselves have exhibited
a vigorous reluctance to hand over their
country to a minority capable of gaining only
some 12 percent of the vote in a free election.
It is healthy indeed for everyone, perhaps
especially for Americans, to learn that anti-
communism exists all by itself in a sturdy and
vigorous native form. Americans are not the
only people who know that Stalinist-style
communism is a tyrannical condition unsuit-
able for free men. Americans have no
monopoly on awareness of the dangers or of
willingness to take firm action to resist it in its
aggressive forms.'
There is also a reminder in recent events in
Portugal that Communists are neither all-
powerful nor all-wise. They have generated
almost no real power in Portugal. And they
have done some exceedingly stupid things.
, ?
Support for Portug 1...
After long assuming that a Communist takeover was
almost inevitable in Portugal, Secretary of State Kissin-
ger has finally set United States policy?in its public
? ,expressions, at least?onto a more constructive tack.
- His Birmingham speech offered just the kind of psycho-
logical support that Portugal's embattled democratic
' forces have been needing as they press their resistance
? to Communist-backed Premier Gongalves and the radical
left-wing minorities of the Armed Forces Movement. ?
Much of the credit, for this belated show .of encourage-
ment must go to the energetic United States Ambassador
in Lisbon, Frank Carlucci, who made a flying trip to.
Washington last weekend for urgent consultations. Dis-
patched to Lisbon just seven months ago, Ambassador'
Carlucci from the start sent back reports and reconi-
,mendations that shook up Washington's fatalistic, prede-
termined notions.
Last April's election,' in, which the non-Communist
They have probably set their cause back by
another decade.
For example, the Communist parties of both
France and Italy have long been cultivating a
"law-abiding" profile. They have claimed that
they seek power only through the ballot box.
They have purported to have become domes-
ticated and law-abiding. And this new image
was helping them greatly throughout Western
Europe ? particularly in Italy.
The Portuguese experience has exploded
the theory of a benign form of communism in
Western Europe. The Portuguese COITIMU-
nists refused to accept the verdict of the ballot
box. They reached for decisive power after
being defeated overwhelmingly. They an-
nounced they were not impressed or in-
fluenced by such expressions of popular
preference.
The arrogance and the baldness of their
behavior in Portugal can now be added to the
list-of events which cause men to resist them
wherever they can. The suppression of popu-
lar will in Hungary and Czechoslovakia took
care of a lot of earlier illusions.
The CIA intervened in Chile on the astunp-
tion that otherwise Chile would be captured by
the Communists. Would it? We can never
know. There was a counterrevolution ? and a
brutal one at that. If Portugal comes out of its
ordeal by its own efforts ? everyone will be
better off. And we will know the answers.
parties scored such a resounding triumph, added weight
to his cautiously sanguine assessments; the past week
or so of popular resistance to Communist authoritarian-
ism confirmed that forces of democracy and moderation
need not be written off in Portugal.
This resistande is all the more impressive for having
so clearly lacked the same sort of tangible support from
abroad that the Soviet Union is providing the locaf,
Communists?and which, in an earlier era, the Central,
Intelligence Agency might have been tempted to'con-
tribute through a variety of covert actions.
There is a world of difference between undercover'.
manipulation of another country's political affairs and,
open expressions of sympathy from an allied govern-
ment for the majority will against 4 ruthlesssminority's
power play. The United States and the allies of Western ?
, Europe are now approaching a common position toward
,the Portuguese struggle; both are holding out the prom-
ise of economic aid and support?without which.P,ortu-
gal cannot begin to restore its threatened social fabric
?once it is clear that the country's political develop-
ment can proceed along democratic lines. ,
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BALTIMORE SUN
28 July 1975
Where the Powers Converge
.41?IMMISMOIM
?1?1?11????????
Korea: the Enduring Test of U.S. Asian Policy
Washington.
Many problems face the Unit-
ed States as its thirty years of he-
gemony over what we used to call
"free Asia" are ending. But the
severest tests could come in Ko-
rea where Americans already
have fought one war and there is
concern lest it stumble into anoth-
er great tragedy.
After all, it was the Korean
War in 1950, as?Yale University's
diplomatic historian, Gaddis
Smith, recalled in a recent New
York Times Magazine article,
that "inaugurated a generation of
American warfare in Asia, froze
relations with China in a hostile
mold for two decades and led to
the debacle in Vietnam." Another
Korean war would be infinitely
more dangerous and disastrous
than Vietnam because Northeast
Asia is the geographical meeting
point of China, Russia and Japan.
And the United States meets all of
them there by virtue of its mili-
tary presence in South Korea.
? ? ?
Unfortunately, a lot of
thoughtless, hard-line talk pre-
vails which only intensifies a
complex, tense situation. In South
Korea, the harsh, repressive re-
gime of our ally, President Park
Chung Hee, almost daily justifies
its totalitarian policies at home
by predicting an imminent new
attack by North Korea. It de-
mands that the United States
"demonstrate by' deeds its firm
determination not to commit the
same failure on the Korean penin-
sula as it did on the Indochinese
peninsula." This is a form of dip-
lomatic blackmail, challenging
the United States to "prove," in
. the wake of Vietnam, that it is not
a "pitiful, helpless giant."
In Washington, the Ford ad-
ministration tries to bolster U.S.
"prestige" by proclaiming?also
almost daily?its determination
to stand by its treaty commit-
ments. It even encourages hints
that if there is another Korean
war the use of "tactical" nuclear
weapons against North Korea
By R. H. SHACKFORD
cannot be ruled out. That is sup-
posed to keep North Korea guess-
ing, even though we would call it
nuclear blackmail if another
country were doing it to us.
Meanwhile, North Korea keeps
repeating what it has claimed for
25 years?that unification of Ko-
rea is essential and inevitable,
'while it maneuvers diplomatical-
ly for victory at this fall's United
Nations Assembly to remove the
U.N. flag?merely a symbol
?from South. Korea and to get
majority support for American
troop withdrawal.
? . ?
All this, and more, coincided
with the 25th anniversary of the
start of the Korean War on June
25, 1950. But another, equally im-
portant anniversary, although ig-
nored, occured last Saturday?the
22d anniversary of the armistice
which ended three years of terri-
ble fighting in Korea. That armis-
tice still prevails. But no genuine
effort by either side has been
made since then to take the nor-
mal next step?to negotiate a
peace settlement.
The question of reunification
of Korea, an enduring notion, is
unrealistic today short of a total
military victory by one side or the
other.
But that does not mean that
there is no opportunity for diplo-
macy on the Korean problem to-
day. It is essential. If detente has
any fundamental meaning at all,
it is to prevent controversies in
small countries leading to conflict
between large ones.
There are six countries with
direct and vital interests in what
happens in Korea. Most immedi-
ate, of course, are the two Koreas
which, a couple of years ago, had
talks for a short time on ways to
resume contacts and live-and-let-
live. There are the three major
countries who are Korea's neigh-
bors?Japan, not much farther
away (125 miles) from Korea,
across the Korea Strait, then Cu-
ba is from Florida; Russia, whose
major Pacific city and naval
base, Vladivostok, is only 75 miles
from the Korean. border, China,
which shares a border of more
than 400 miles with North Korea.
Then there is the United States
which converted South Korea aft-
er the Korean War for all practi-
cal purposes into a colony, even
though in 1947 it had been ready
to get out of that country "with
the minimum of bad effects."
The stakes and the rivalries in
the area are tremendous, and
some of them date back long be-
fore Marxism, Leninism or
Maoism became household words.
But it should not be beyond the
ability of rational men in these six
countries to find a formula for
preventing a war that no one
wants. The formula appears to be
so obvious as to be too simple.
Reunification of Korea, long
ago relegated to the propagand-
ists, must be abandoned as a fea-
sible objective for the forseeable
future. It must be left to time, and
more importantly, to the Koreans
themselves eventually to decide.
? ? ?
The status quo?two Koreas
?is the basic formula for avoid-
ing another war. And the surest
way to avoid such a war would be
agreement among the large pow-
ers?the U.S., Russia, China and
Japan?to persuade the two Ko-
reas that the status quo is in their
vital interests, too. Even that idea
is Korean. It has been suggested
by the leading critic of South Ko-
rea's dictator Park, Kim Young
Sam, who leads the New Demo-
cratic Party. He proposed that the
six nations primarily involved
meet to find a way to guarantee
peace in the Korean peninsula.
There is no longer any chance in
South Korea for such dissent from
the regime's policies?virtually
all dissent having been banned in
May by President Park. ?
Unhappily, most of the talk
about Korea, even in Washington,
is about another war. At a recent
40
Ford press conference there vias
talk (in response to questions)
about whether the President
would use nuclear weapons if
North Korea attacks South Korea..
The President wouldn't say yes?
but he didn't say no?only that nu-
clear weapons would "be used in
our national interest as t
should be." There were no ques-
tions?and, therefore no answers
?about any diplomatic initia-
tives
? ..
In his recent Speech to the Ja-
pan Society, trying to woo Japan
into a new partnership after y.
of ignoring that country, Sec ?
tary of State Kissinger vowed "to
maintain the peace and security
of the Korean peninsula . We
will assist South Korea...But we
shall also seek all honorable ways
to reduce tensions and confronta-
tions." He made no specific
suggestions. .
What more honorable way is
there?not forgetting the skepti-
cism that greets any claim abont,
"peace with honor"?than an ef-
fort to get the six nations most,
crucially involved to seek an
agreement to maintain the status
quo in Korea and to stop S-211c
about "going north" or "going
south" or using nuclear weapons?
What more honorable way is
there?not forgetting the skepti
cism that greets any claim about
"peace with honor"?than an ef-
fort to get the six nations most
crucially involved to seek an
agreement to maintain the status
quo in Korea and to stop talk
about "going north" or "going
south' or using nuclear weapons?
Winston Churchill used to say.
"better to jaw, jaw, than to war.
war." Now that we have "cele-
brated" the 25th anniversary of
the start of the Korean War with
talk about another war, what
more honorable way to "cele-
brate" the 22d anniversary of the
end of that war by trying a lita,
"jaw, jaw" to prevent another.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4
The Washington Star
Monday, August 11, 1975
18 Moe. to Prepare
Pus
As!
By Fred S. Hoffman
Associated Press
U.S. intelligence analysts,
believe Thailand and Malay-
sia have about 18 months to
prepare for major Commu-
nist insurgencies.
Reports indicate that
infiltration into Thailand
already has increased since
the Communists won in
neighboring Indochina this
spring. ?
Malaysia is less vulner-
able than Thailand to
large-scale overland infil-
tration because it does not
border on any Communist-
run country.
But intelligence sources
say Malaysian insurgents
have become more aggres-
sive in recent months and
have sent emissaries to try
and obtain U.S. small arms
captured by Communist
forces in Indochina.
INFORMATION collect-
ed by U.S. intelligence in
Southeast Asia indicates
that massive infiltration
into northeast Thailand is
likely to begin in early 1977
with the objective of "liber-
ating" 16 provinces,
sources say.
By that time, intelligence
specialists believe, the
Communists will have ce-
mented their control
throughout Vietnam and
Laos and will be ready for a
major effort to promote
insurgency in neighborning
Southeast Asia countries.
Worried Thai leaders al-
ready are embarked on
diplomacy aimed at achiev-
ing a live-and-let-live ar-
rangement with the
Communist Vietnamese,
considered the principal
threat. The Thais also have
been courting support from
Communist China in hopes
of countering the Viet-
namese.
MALAYSIAN officials
are said to anticipate one or
two years of grace before
facing serious insurgency
troubles. To get ready, they
are reported expanding
their army, police and vil-
lage guard forces.
Last week, Thai. Defense
Minister Pramarn Adirek-
sarn said in Bangkok that
"thousands of insurgents"
have been receiving war
equipment from foreign na-
tions which he did not
BALTIMORE SUN
13 August 1975
Air ree confirms dru ging.
of 13 Ir(ietnamese refu ees
Washington (AP)?The Air
Force confirmed yesterday that
it drugged 13 Vietnamese refu-
gees and put them on the last
plane from Thailand to Guam
while they demanded to be re-
turned to Vietnam. ?
The Air Force issued a state-
ment after Representative
?Joshua Eilberg (D., Pa.), chair-
man of the House immigration
subcommittee, said he had
talked to 12 of the refugees and
was told they had been
drugged, beaten and taken to
Guam against their will.
The Air Force, however, had
no comment on the alleged
beatings and on Mr. Eilberg's
statement that the Vietnamese
had told him they were threat-
ened with jail and then death if
they refused to go to Guam.
"Near hysteria, they [the
refugees] demanded to be re-
turned to Vietnam and threat-
ened suicide if they were not re-
turned immediately," the Air
Force said.
It said the Vietnamese were
sedated with sodium pentathol
and also given the tranquilizer
thorazine.
The Vietnamese had been
flown from Vietnam to Thai-
land, and Thai officials ada-
mantly refused to let them
stay, so a decision was made by
U.S. and Thai officials "to se-
date the Vietnamese and take
them to Guam," the Air Force
said.
The 13 Vietnamese said that
when they boarded the plane in
Vietnam, they had been told it
was flying to the delta region,
not out of the country, the Air
Force said.
"Hours of discussion failed
to persuade them that there
were no means to take them
back," the Air Force said. "The
Thai officials were adamant
that they leave Thailand imme-
diately." -
The Air Force said the Viet-
namese were sedated with
medicines regularly given in
evacuation situations "for the
patients' comfort or where be-
cause of Mental or emotional
disturbance they may pose a
threat to themselves or others."
An Air Force nurse accom-
panied the 13 Vietnamese on
the flight and "no ill effects
were noted," the Air Force
said.
"Although they were helped
aboard the aircraft, all 13 were
ambulatory during the flight,"
the Air Force said. "And all ex-
cept one, who insisted on being
carried off, left the aircraft at
Guam without assistance."
The decision to sedate the
Vietnamese and take them to
Guam with other refugees, the
Air Force said, was made with
the hope that they could be re-
patriated expeditiously.
The Air Force said the inci-
dent occurred May 1 after
South Vietnam had fallen and
the drugs were administered by
U.S. medical personnel at Uta-
pao Air Force Base in Thailand.
Mr. Eilberg had said he
would conduct a formal slab--
committee inquiry into the in
dent if the Air Force did mg
give him a full explanation.
Mr. Eilberg, who is at GUM
with subcommittee membeza
on an inspection trip, sag
through his Washington office
that he did not know why tbe
refugees were beaten sad
drugged.
He said the 13 Vietnams
were among 65 people who hat
fled to Thailand at the timed
the fall of Saigon but changed
their minds and asked to retain
to Vietnam.
"After being threatened by
Air Force officers, 52 of the Va-,
etnamese agreed to go
Guam. The 13 who did not were
then threatened first with jab
and then death if they did rot
go to Guam," Mr. Eilberg's as-
nouncement Said.
Mr. Eilberg said he was tog
during the interviews "that ffe
13 were then beaten and tbes
each person was carried kr
four Americans into a roam
where they were given
injections in their arms and bat'
in their legs."
The Vietnamese said 11-
reported the incident to as
"American doctor captain" wily
told them he believed their
story, Mr. Eilberg said.
The chairman said he dna
not know the identity of the LT-
Force officers allegedly respza-?
sible for the drugging or the tie-
my captain who examined the
Vietnamese.
name..
About the same time
Gen. Kriengsak Chama-
nand, chief of the Thai joint
military staff, spoke of
"preparing our defense
strategy and reviewing the
military situation daily" in
light of increasing internal
insurgency and uncertain
relations with Thailand's
Communist neighbors.
But U.S. officials long
have been critical of Thai-
land's armed forces. Those
forces have received more
than $600 million in
U.S
Approved For Release 200148/
equipment but were unable
to suppress even a relative-
ly low-level insurgency
while the North Vietnamese
were concentrating on
gaining Communist victory
in Indochina.
AMERICAN officials also
have been unhappy over
what they consider Thai
failure to act effectively in
recent years to improve
economic and other condi-
Although the Thai
northeast seems the pre
objective, U.S. intellig=e
specialists say the VII-
namese Communists pan
to expand subversion in,
other areas of Thailand as
well.
The Communists are re:-
ported to have agents in 42
of Thailand's 71 provinces.
They are said to have a
goal of training in Nara
tions in Thailand's impov-
Vietnam some 500 Ti
s
erished northeast prov-
Communist and 500 Vi
namese living in northm
089'61A-RK77-00432R00011)0217a01003-4
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NEW YORK TIMES
18 August 1975
Indochina in Flux
The Communist bloc's own power struggle for pre-
eminence in Indochina shows signs of, intensifying, just
three months after the United States abandoned the
:? region in defeat. A complex tangle of ideological and his-
torical rivalries is provoking friction, not only between
; China, and the Soviet Union but between Vietnamese and
Cambodians, and among differing factions in their revo-
-lutionary regimes.
Long-standing strains between Hanoi and Peking
' showed up openly in the correct but low-key treatment
: accorded a North Vietnamese delegation visiting Peking
last week. Their rivalry is also evident in the maneuver-
.. ing of both sides' partisans in the shadowy. .leadership
, of Cambodia. When Phnom Penh recently announced the
appointment as new Deputy Premiers of two politicians
linked to Hanoi's Vietminh movement, Peking raaio
? hastened to reveal that a top-level Cambodian delegation
was about to visit the Chinese capital?the first foreign
trip by any of the Cambodian leadership since the Khmer
Rouge took control last April. On arrival in Peking, the
Cambodians were received with warmth and fanfare.
Especially baffling, is the status of Prince Norodom
Sihanouk, former Cambodian head of state. who lived
in exile in Peking for five years. Though the rebel forces
;vvho.nominally recognizrd his leadership have assumed
WASHINGTON STAR
30 July 1975
_
7-2
to
power, the Prince made no apparent effort , to return'
: to his capital; indeed, he even left Peking for a long
sojourn in North Korea.
The United States is hardly in position to influence
these obscure maneuvers. even if it had an interest in
doing so. But increased flexibility in Washington's ap-
proach to the new Communist regimes could help them
maintain their independence of both Moscow and Peking.
. There is no visible logic, for example, in the Ford
Administration's attitude toward private economic
iniatives that could lessen Vietnamese dependence on
Communist aid. A prominent American banker is per-
mitted to visit Hanoi on an exploratory mission, yet
American voluntary organizations are explicitly barred
from sending economic and development aid to affiliated
institutions in Vietnam?aid that they were permitted
to supply even while the war was raging!
President Ford himself imposed this ban, reportedly
against? the recommendation of Secretary of State Kis-
singer. -At least one affected organization, the American
Friends Service Committee, intends to keep fighting the
decision.
Fishnets and tractors donated by private Americans
are not going to change the course of Indochina's Com-
munist politics. But they are symbolic of the change in ,
official American attitudes which will have to occur if -
the United States ever expects to play a more construc-
tive role in Vietnam's peace than it did in Vietnain's war. "
By Denis D. Gray
Associated Press
BANGKOK ? The fate of tens of thousands of Indo-
chinese refugees still in Thailand hangs in the bal-
ance: the United States is not prepared to take the
? bulk of them; the Thai government says it cannot keep
them, and the United Nations is only starting to tackle
the problem.
Thai and American officials estimate there are 90,- '
000 to 50,000 Cambodians, Laotians and Vietnamese in
Thailand. And while the influx of Vietnamese has stop-
ped, Cambodians and Laotians continue to come in.
Cambodia fell to the Communist-dominated Khmer
Rouge in mid-April, South Vietnam fell on April 30 and
Laos since has come gradually under the dominant
influence of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao.
Judging from the latest instructions from Washing-
ton, U.S. officials say, at best one-third of the estima0
ed 7,000 Cambodians in Thailand might be allowed into
' the United States.
BUT NO MENTION is made of the largest refugee
group, the Meo hill tribes people of Laos, who were
considered among the best and most loyal fighters the
U.S. government supported in Indochina.
The United States has to date taken in about 80 per-
cent of the Indochinese refugees that have already
been resettled outside of Thailand, according to United
Nations and U.S. Embassy statistics.
Thailand has been saddled with the problem of car-
ing for the refugees mostly because of 1,700 miles of
border with Laos and Cambodia and proximitY to Viet-
nam.
It faces the refugee problem with considerable po-
litical embarrassment -since the Thai government- is
anxious for peaceful coexistence with its new ,
Communist-dominated neighbors.
"Our standing policy toward the refugees is to send
all of them back to their homelands while helping
them the best we can for humanitarian reasons,"
Premier Kukrit Pramoj told newsmen recently. "We
don't want the refugees to create misunderstandings
with our Indochinese neighbors." '
MOST WESTERN observers, however, do not fore-
see the Thais actually forcing refugees back across
the frontiers and predict that some at least 'may quiet-
ly be allowed to settle in the country. But largely, Thai
policy has been one of "wait and see," hoping the
United States and other countries will take the refu-
gees off their hands.
Several reliable U.S. diplomatic sources and Amez:i-
ban refugee relief workers here say high-ranking Thai
officials have told them privately that the lives of the
refugees are not being made too comfortable so as to'
dampen any desires for staying in Thailand perma-
nently.
U.S. Embassy officials in the refugee program say
many of the remaining 2,000 Vietnamese refugees in
Thailand meet the two criteria for admittance to the
United States ? employment by the U.S. government
at the time of the American evacuation of South Viet-
nam or having a relative in the United States.
VERY FEW OF the Cambodians meet such
requirements for entry and almost all the 2,400
"spaces" set aside by Washington for Cambodians
coming from Thailand have now been filled and the
refugees flown out of the country, the officials say.
These "spaces" were not subject to the normal crite-
ria.
A State Department cable earlier this month: said
Cambodian and Laotian "leaders" and "high-risk
personnel" ? those whose lives might be in serious
danger if they returned to their homelands ? would be
granted entry, the officials said. It is difficult to esti-
mate how many refugees could fit into these two cate-
gories, but a diplomat charged with the Cambodian
refugee problem said between 2,000 and 3,000 might
qualify.
The estimated 4,000 ethnic Lao and 34,000 Meo-
tribesmen have not been designated as "refugees" by
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003t4
the American government ani consequently none has
to date been admitted to the United States, the officials
say.
U.T. KADRY, the regional director of the U.N. High
Commission for Refugees, said in an interview that his
agency has not yet provided aid to the camps but has
helped several hundred "legal entrants" from Indo-
chinese nations, including payment for their air fares
out of Thailand.
? "Legal entrants" are people with proper exit docu-
ments and identification papers and they form a minor
fraction of the total refugee population in Thailand.
, Kadry said he hoped a recent meeting between Thai
Foreign Minister Chatichai Choonhavan and U.N. offi-
dals in Geneva would produce some concrete steps
'toward "a permanent solution" to the refugee prob-
? lem.
The foreign minister told newsmen that the
International Red Cross and the U.N. High Commis-
sion would send representatives to see what could be
done to help the Thai government in dealing with the
refugee problem. Chatichai said Prince Sadruddin
Agha Khan, the head of the commission, told him his
,agency would try to allocate some funds for the refu-
gees.
? .
? THOUSANDS of the refugees live under conditions
which a U.S. diplomat charged with the Cambodians
described as "generally poor." He said that during his
recent visit to one of the largest refugee camps, about
1,000 Cambodians had no meat, vegetables or fruit to
eat and that only a small bag of rice and some dried
fish were provided daily to each family. He added that
BALTIMORE SUN
13 August 1975
Mary McCrory
he detected signs of malnutrition and fever, especially
among the children, and said medical care was sub-
standard.
"They get just enough to keep them alive," he said
of conditions at the Aranyaprathet border camp. "The
people are literally packed together like in a concen-
tration camp. They don't want these people
comfortable, they want them out."
? Least is known by Thai and American officials about
the Laotians, the most recent of the refugee groups. ,
One embassy official said about half of the estimated
4,000 ethnic Lao might qualify for entry to the United?
States.
HE SAID THE United States would probably not
permit the Moo hill tribes people to go, especially
since they would probably want to emigrate en masse.
To control the refugee population, Thailand has an-
nounced that all who fail to register and obtain proper
identification papers by Sunday will be arrested and
charged with illegal entry.
Statistics compiled by the U.S. Embassy and the
United Natons give the following breakdown of
Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees in Thailand who
were accepted by foreign nations as of early July:
United States 6,500, Malaysia 700, France 600, Canada.
-300, Norway 83, Austria 29, Italy 8, New Zealand 1 and,
Belgium I.
One refugee official at the American Embassy said'
representatives of other nations occasionally stop by to
enquire about procedures for accepting refugees but to
date have taken no action. ?
?
Reprisal Guides U.S. and Vietnam
Washington.
- As usual, the reflex for re-
'prisal is guiding our relations
with Vietnam.
Upon the Security Conn-
:nirs rejection of South Korea
,for membership in the United
:Nations, the United States
-promptly threatened to veto
-the applications of North and
South Vietnam.
The principle evoked was
_resistance to what the State
? Department terms "a selec-
.tive program of universality."
? Said a representative of
-the- American Friends Service
'committee, whose application
.forlicenses to ship machinery
to Vietnam was turned down
recently by the State Depart-
ment, "It seems as though
some people in this govern-
ment are still fighting the
var."
7.- The reason given, by the
.way, was that while private
agencies like the Quakers can
.send food and medicine to the
war-ravaged country, "devel-
opmental items" cannot be li-
censed. The machinery was
destined for a small workshop
for the handicapped.
The UN action is explained
by Philip M. Habib, Assistant
Secretary of State for East
Asia and Pacific Affairs, as
meaning that "the other side
can't decide who is eligible."
"We don't want to exclude
anyone," he says, "but how
can anyone argue that South
Vietnam belongs, when no-
-body even knows who their
thenAppro
around and say South Korea Thieu regime.
doesn't belong?" If what are called "normal ,
The UN explanation is that relations" were resumed,
it is customary when only one those people could communi-
half of a divided country ap- cate with their friends and
plies to turn it down. North families.
Korea has evinced no interest.
What the episode illus-
trates, beyond what some call
"sandbox diplomacy," is that
it may be a long time before
the Ford administration can
bring itself to acknowledge
that the Viet Cong won the
war and to sit down as equals
with Madame Binh of the
Provisional Revolutionary
Government.
The secretary of state
keeps saying we have to see
how the South Vietnam gov-
ernment "behaves," as if it
were a newly released felon.
Mr. Habib concedes that
there is "no evidence of a ma-
jor bloodbath," but tells of re-
ports of "massive repressive-
ness and brutal re-education."
If and when the Saigon
government changes from
military to civilian?a move
promised vaguely for later
this month?the pressure for
recognition from U.S. busi-
nessmen, private voluntary
agencies, Americans with
relatives in Vietnam and
those people in Congress who
regard the present policy as
vindictive would increase.
The people most affected
by diplomatic recognition, of
course, would be those refu-
gees who dramatically fled
the country, with our help, long our disastrous and futile
The administration last
month decided to offer "vol-
untary repatriation" as an op-
tion to the refugees?some of
whom were admittedly
scooped up willy-nilly?and
turned the whole matter over
to the UN high commissioner
on refugees.
Since that time, a UN
spokesman said, the office has
received and processed 3,000
applications. The Saigon gov-
ernment required each appli-
cant to fill out a question-
naire.
Most put down "reunion
with family" as their reason
for seeking re-entry.
The UN has opened an of-
fice in Hanoi and made a writ-
ten promise of another in Sai-
gon. The new regime is so far,
however, not holding out open
arms.
"It has other priorities,"
says a UN refugee commis-
sioner representative.
It would seem that self-in-
terest as well as humanitari-
anism?not to mention the
oft-voiced concern for the
MIA's?might dictate a
change from the present isola-
tionism. After all, it was to
avoid that sin, we were told,
that we had to maintain for so
15 August 19 75
NEW YORK TIMES
Zaotiani Charge
Two U.S. Diplomats
With Spy Activities
? BANGKOK, Thailand, Aug.
,114 (UPJ)?The Laotian Govern-
.
inent has accused United States
i
Embassy officials in a diploma
tic protest of "spy and sabotage
activities" in photographing a
government compound.
The note was delivered yes-
terday by the Foreign Minis-
try's chief political officer to
the chargd d'affaires, Thomas,
orcoran. - Embassy officials
said there would be no answer.
The substance of the protest
Was broadcast by the Vientiane
`radio and printed in Laotian
newspapers.
It said that two embassy
Officials had taken photographs
'onkthree occasions at Kik:meter,
94 the former compound of
'the. Agency- for International
Pe2elopment.
'.f.The aforesaid acts of the
two Americans are acts violat-
inc.: Laotian law as well as
international law, in particular
thd Vienna Treaty of April 18,
1961 on diplomatic relations
ris.1 privileges," the note said.
It said the picture-taking
constituted "spy and, sabotage
activities in Laos."
? "The Laotian Foreign Minis-
try hereby demands that the:
I:Ttited States Embassy be re.?
spbrisible for any consequences
that might arise from the af;,.:-e-1
'said acts," it added. "The
tian Foreign Ministry 'yarns)
the United States Embassy for;
the first and the last time to'
prevent the recurrence of such;
illegal acts."
government is, and
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
27 July 1975
AS. THETWO VIETNAMS ,ADJUST
eu.na
i BY GARETH rOlaTER .
, ?
The future relationship ? between North' -
and South Vietnam .remains Unclear to :-
outsiders. There have, been indications in
'hoth public and private Vietnamese state-
dnents that formal reunification will not
;take place for years. Nevertheless, there .
?Ilas been much speculation that the North
iast,al ready moved to take over the
istration of the South, in the ;form of the'
Saigon Military Management Committee.:
,(MMC). :
???; The assumption underlying this specilla;.
..-
.tion is that the present adthinistrative
?the revolutionary army in ?South Vide
..)iam constitutes North Vietnamese hegee
*ony. This widely, accepted assumption is
measure of the ga0 between Vietnamese.
? e'.ealities and the language which has.
koverned American thinking about Viet-
.,
,?
ealam for the past decade.? ? .; ,c
U.S. officials first convinCed, thernielveS
hnd; then convinced the American public':
that it was; essentially a war between ;;
North Vietnam and ,South ;Vietnam. The''..e
uttonfusion? of the; leadership of the. Lao
Tong Party as well, as the revolutionary
rhrmed "forces in the South with North
Vietnam continues to confound 'American
4.inderstanding of the nature of the new re-
Igirrie in Saigon. ' ?-? . ? . 7
The misconception begiifg, With 4trUtht
the basic line of the Vietnamese revolue -
_lion on problems of strategic importance is
sion of 'our cotintryno longer exists." ,
But the Vietnamese leaders have rong
distinguished between- their dernand'. for
. the removal of external constraints on the:,
e two zones created by the Geneva accord Of
1.1954 and the question of how formal reun-
ification, would come about: On external
constraints, they have been inflexible and
unyielding in diplomatic contacts; on reun-
ification, they have been willing to corn-
promise from the beginning of the Conflict.
The political unity which, ? has 'now, been '
achieved by the Victory of the revolutiona-
; ry forces in the South does not mean,-
therefore, that the South will new be sub-
sumed into ? a unitary adininistration, or.
subordinate to the North. ? ?
. The Military Management Cominittee for ,
Saigon and surrounding Gia Dinh province.
? has often been 'identified as -belonging; to
the "North Vietnainese "NVA';"
as officials 'and journalists called it during'
the war. -.'e; ,
But the "NVA".? was always a? figment ;of
the American iMagination, necessary. to
'the official position that the boundary line ?
between, the ; -ionee 1.corresponded
somehow to the fundamental political cite-
''age in the'CountrY; No such .term existed?.in the 1.evolutIoeary vocabulary on either
side. of ;the line.. The relationship betw-een
'ethe CoMinimist military structure and the
geographical division of the country re-
quires a brief histerical resume for proper
; ; ; ; ' ; ? ?-e -
ective :? '
etermined it has been today. as as since the Pers P
eginning of the revolution ; by the Lao The Vietnam .Peoples Army (Quan Doi
,Pong Party Central .Coinmittee.'? Most of e; .'leThan Dan Vietnam); which was thetriilita;-?
-etli?embers of the Central Committee?, e. arm of the Viet Mirth movernent during
;ithough *by no means all of them?have . e its resistance against' the French, Was 4
national army with units in-every area . of ?
:." the-country: Only because,' Geneva.
Jjagreement called-for a temporary regroup,'
merit ? of .the :Viet" Minh and; the French
fortes: *?'-the;:entire Vietharn People's
? ArmY -(VPA)' physically concentrated in
; ?? the northern zone after May, 1955.
The importance of its southern com-
ponent is indicated by the fact that,
by 1959, five full VPA divisions out
of a total of 20 were made up entire-
ly of southern regroupees.
. When the struggle resumed in 1960
in South Vietnam, southern cadres
who had regrouped to the North be-
gan to return to the South to help
lead the military forces of the Na-
tional Liberation Front. But instead
of leading the struggle in the name
of the Vietnam People's Army, which
was clearly an all-Vietnamese institu-
tion, the party set up a "People's
Liberation Armed Forces" command
in the South in 1961, which was os-
tensibly independent of the VPA.
The PLAF claim to separateness
from the North was to become a ma-
jor target: of American propaganda,
given the fact that many of the
PLAF's officers and troops would:
come from the VPA.
44? Why did the party attempt to;
}Seen :physically located in Hanoi foi.' the
. .
past two decades, for obvious reasons. But
that does not, make it a "North Vietnam-
ese". leadership or a "North Vietnamese"
Communist Party in' any meaningful politi-
cal sense. For ?the Central committee in-
cledes representatives of the party., from
all, three 'traditional regions of Vietnam?
north, center and south.
It is' the political leadership of the pear
tentral Committee over a nationwide. or-
tanization whieh insures' that, beneath the. ;
.:present formal division of the country, the
;'.two zones Cannot drift apart or be posed in .
; ?
'.:4 former correspondent in Saigon, .and
formerly a 'research associate ? at Cornell,
Gareth .Parler- is director. of the Indochina ? . ?
? Resource Center, in Washington. He spent,.
.18 days id Hanoi last December and fan-,
nary. Ills book. on the Paris. agreement, "A..;.:
. Peace Denied,' is to 1?e published in Scptern-
ber.
? ? ? A, ?.
, ? -
:?1
'! opposition to each 'other. And now that the
demarcation line at the 17th parallel is no
'longer an international boundary forced',
'on the Vietnamese by an outside power
-but merely an administrative convenience,'
'Col: Gen.' Tran Van Tra,.chairman of the
'.Military Management Committee in 'Sai-
gon, could declare on May '15,' "The diVie
maintain an exclusively "southern
military command in the form of the
PLAF? Central Committee member
Hoang Tung, who participated in the
decision, explained to me last Jan-
uary in Hanoi that they feared a di
rect American military intervention
in the conflict in the South if there
was any provocation. If the North,
was directly, involved, he 'said, the
United States probably would attack
North Vietnam, which was then in
the midst of an ambitious five-year
development plan. ;
Nevertheless, the entire military'
leadership from South and South
Central Vietnam from the first resis-
tance war were all still in the North.
They would be needed as the milita-
ry conflict in the South steadily esca-.
lated. Gen. Tran Van Tra, a native?of -
South Vietnam's Quang Ngai pro-
vince who had been secretary of the
party committee for the South as
well as commander of the entire in-
terzone of Eastern Cochin Chine, or
Nam 130 (roughly the southern half
of South Vietnam) from 1950 to 1954,
returned to the South in 1963 to be-
come commander in, chief of all
armed forces in the South and secre-
tary. of the party military committee
once more. Some zone commanders
also were southerners.
; There was thus a high degree of
continuity in the PLAF command
and staff with the military leadership
of the caner Viet Minh resistance in
Nam Bo. But while it favored officers'
who were natives of the South, the
VPA Command did not hesitate ,to
send northerners to the battlefront
when their experience was needed.
As larger numbers of northern
troops moved into the South, the
United States portrayed their pre-
sence as an. instrument of northern
domination of the South. What few
Americans knew but most Vietnam-
ese remembered vividly was that
northerners had come to the South to
fight in the anti-French resistance as
well. In December, 1945, when the
resistance had just begun in the
South but there was no French pre-
sence in the North, the Ho Chi Minh
government had sent 10,000 northern
volunteers to the South 'in what was
proudly called the "Nam Tien"
(March South). In the Vietnamese
historical context, therefore, the arri-
val of northern troops after 1965 had
a precedent as an act of solidarity
rather than of domination.
In the last stage of the war, U.S.
_officials carried the argument of
northern hegemony over the South
to its ultimate conclusion, claiming
that southerners no longer played a
significant role in the Communist
military forces in the South. Lt. Gen.
Daniel 0. Graham, director of the De-
fense Intelligence Agency, testified
last January that southerners had
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constituted 'Only 20% of the Commu-
nist forces in the South after the Tet
offensive and that by 1975 the num-'
ber of southerners in the PLAF was
But this testimony is contradicted
by National Security Memorandum
No. 1, compiled in January, 1969,
which revealed that the CIA official- ,
ly estimated at the end of 1968 that
there were somewhere between 145,-
000 and 210,000 southern Communist ,
/troops, including the support troops
and guerrillas, normally included in
" the order of battle, or about 60%.
, ? The number of indigenous southern' .
troops fell sharply from 1968 to 1972.
because of the hundreds of thousands
, of casualties from U.S. firepower, the
, depopulation :of the South Vietnam-
ese countryside, and the decision by
? the ,Lao Dong Party leadership
against continuing to throw its main
force units against the Americans
. while U.S. troop withdrawal proceed-
ed. But the role played by souther-
', ners in the PLAF was still vital. ?
s Official Administration estimates of
Communist troop strength included
80,000 southern main-force troops
and another 50,000 guerrillas by the
.beginning of 1975, or about 40% of
the total estimated Communist force
? in the South.
. Once Saigon surrendered on April
'30, moreover, northern troops essen-
tially faded into the background. Ac-
cording to an eye-witness account, in
s.' the first days after the takeover by
the Provisional Revolutionary
Government, the North Vietnamese;
? soldiers were ordered to turn in their
weapons and wandered around the:
city as civilians. It was the southern'
- guerrillas and cadres who came into,,
the city to reestablish and maintain,
, order. It was southerners who went
into the neighborhoods to talk with-
- the people and acquaint them with.,
the new regime, according to
?,,,
- eye-witness. -
The members of the Military. Man-
agement Committee, are certainly no
-strangers to the Saigon area. Chair-
man Tran Van Tra has spent-nearly.:
two decades commanding troops in,
the region. And while the MMC's spe....
cialized sections in the various minis- ,
tries, include a number of northern
officers as well as northern techni-
cians brought in to assist in postwar ?
tasks, they are supplementing rather,
than replacing southern officers and,
technicians. The MMC is only a tem?
porary body Whose mandate is estab?
lishment of the social, econemic and'
administrative basis for the work of,:
the PRG.
The rumors that the PRG will no'
longer have a political or administra,7
tive role are premature. While the.,
PRG has stayed in the background ,
since the April takeover, it has not:
been idle. According to the well-in,f
formed correspondent for the Far
Eastern Economic Review,. Nayane
Chanda, PRG officials have been stu-:
dying long-term problems, making,
observation trips to the countryside'
and planning policy guidelines. Sai-.:
gon radio broadcasts on a June 4 ses-
sion of the PRG cabinet in Saigon'.
make it clear that the MMC is re-
sponsible to the PRG. s
? *
The ? prospect for the next few,
months, therefore, is not for a sudden.
?move to reunite the two zones under-.
Hanoi's administration, but for a)
southern government which would;
begin the slow evolution toward a sct
ciety more compatible with the,
northern zone. The party leadership-,
has no desire to impose a Socialist-:
system on the South while there is
substantial opposition to it. "We are,
? in no s'hurry to establish socialism-,
there," said Hoang Tung in a conver--
?sation with American visitors in.
1973, noting "the reality in the South.
that a large part of the population
still doesn't approve of socialism."
For the foreseeable future, South
Vietnam will have a mixed economy
in which those industries already in
government hands under the old re-
gime or which do not have sufficient
private investment will be nationa-
lized, while small industry and agri-
culture 'will remain in private hands.
?
This mixed economy in the South ?
will remain for a "relatively long per-
iod," Hoang Tung told recent visitors
to Hanoi, even after reunification.
On the political plane, the revolu-
tionary government will also try to
accommodate non-Communist politi-
cal groups and personalities which
were not connected directly with the
United States and the former Saigon
regime. Like the Union government
after the American civil war, it will
prevent those who were active sup-
porters of the Saigon government
from immediately reentering political
life. But some of those who were op-
posed to American intervention will
be able to form parties, publish news-
papers and run for office.
What was formerly called the
"third force's can be expected to be
represented in a reorganized PRG
when it assumes full responsibilities,
as well as in a new assembly when it.
is elected. PRG officials in Canada re-
cently confirmed that the PRG would
"broaden the basis of government itiZ
the future," by adding those who had,
been anti-United States, during the,
war. Gen. Tra has reaffirmed the
PRG's intention of holding an elec.?
tion for a new government at an un?Li
specified time in the future, afterl
Which the PRG, could remove thee,
"provisional" from its name.
The Vietnamese revolutionaries"
feel strongly about reunification of"
their country, believing, with Ho Chi
Minh, that "Vietnam is one country,.
the Vietnamese people is one people.'
Rivers may dry up, mountains mar,
erode, but this truth will not change."s
But. after 80 years of French cola-)
nialism and 20 years of American
dbminance in the South, they are:
prepared to move with deliberation':
and patience on the problem or
bringing the two zone's under a single'
administration, avoiding policies,
which would suggest the imposition,.
of the system in the North on the:,
South. The result, they hope, will be
the development of a consensus in i
the South on the terms under which
the two zones would once more be)
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WASHINGTON POS
10 August 1975
The President's Turni
n Panama
rrIlE PRESIDENT'S delay in moving to consummate
? -11-:? negotiations for a new Panama Canal treaty
threatens to produce at least three kinds of damage.
First,- despite the Panamanian government's efforts to
? maintain control, it may be impossible to prevent riots
or Sabotage that would deny the United States and ...
other nations the continued, efficient use of this .
major .international waterway. Second, failure to negoti-
ate- a treaty Would inflame American relations not only
With Panama but also with all other Latin American
nation's that are united on this issue as on no other?
in r.bbt1Vphilosophy_a1id diplomatic position.. American
failure to set aside the "big stick" with which Teddy
Robseyelt acquired the Canal Zone, and to move . into
new-? association respecting Panama's sovereignty,
would -be condemned everywhere. Finally, My. Ford,
by having created a messy and unnecessary crisis on
the U.S doorstep, would project the image of a Presi-
dent unable to handle foreign affairs?an image that
can- only lihrt his, prospects for re-election next .year.
:With these negative prospects so unmistakable, why
then -is Mr. Ford dragging his feet on a new treaty? It
has been 18 months, after all, since his Secretary of
State. promised, in Panama.: "In the President's name,
I Ifettby commit the United States. to complete this
negotiation successfully and as quickly as possible."
And-it. has ?been more than: four months since negotia-
tions th Panama were effectively suspended. The
reason for the suspension was a disagreement between
the Defense Department and the. State Department
over how the U.S. relationship with Panama ought
to be changed. - .
The pentagon's attitude is perhaps best conveyed by
the---fact that, though. seaplanes went out of use years
ago; the Navy has wished to retain a seaplane ramp site
in Panama for "contingency planning." With just such
inflated " and over-anxious conceptions of its own de-
fense.,reSponsibilities, the, Pentagon has resisted efforts
to :return' control of the Canal Zone and canal to. Pan-
ama. The period 4of return .contemplated in a- new
treat, .by the way?a period in which the United
States would retain major rights?stretches out over
? several .decades. It is not as though the American flag
were .to be hauled down tomorrow. And it is not as
though, once the Panamanian flag alone were flying
in the Zone, that -the United States would allow itself
to be shut out of- the canal. On that point surely the
Panamanians have no illusiOns: Unrestricted transit
will- remain a vital interest that the United States can
be expected, at almost any cost, and by almost any
means, to protect. '
,
NEW YORK TIMES'
17 August 1975
TI.e
'Forgotte
Americans
By James Reston ?
s
The State. Department, on the other hand, has argued*
-7-persuasively, in our view?that the best way to en-
. sure continued American .use of the canal is to make
a new treaty that will drain off the nationalist bitter-
ness that the Panamanians feel about the old one. Teddy
Roosevelt's Secretary of State conceded, at the time,
that the 1903 treaty was "vastly advantageous to the
United States, and we must confess, not so acWantageous
to Panama." What hurt the Panamanians most was
:the treaty provision granting the United States control.
Over its most vital resource?a swath . cutting the:
country in half?"in perpetuity." No modern nation
. can be 'expected to tolerate such a legacy of imperialism. !
And since riots or sabotage ire-the only likely ,threat 4
to the canal, it makes all the more sense to take a -!
diplomatic step?a n:ew treaty?that will at least re.-
duce if not eliminate the possibility that the threat. will
become a reality. Not making the new treaty, in our, -
"view, very nearly 'guarantees that this threat will in
fact . Materialize, and under conditions that promise i
no sympathy for the United States, from the rest of J.
the hemisphere. ?
? Mr. Ford, however,? so far has not chosen ?to break
the bureaucratic impasse that preparation of an Ameri-
can negotiating position has reached. The apparent,
reason is that he fears a political backlash from the
rightWing conservative elements that are tightly organ-
ized to maintain the status quo. Some of his political
advisers have been telling him that it would be ".politi-
' cal suicide" on .the eve of an election year to hand to
? the likes of Ronald Reagan the ammunition that- an
enlightened treaty stance might provide. We submit,
however, .that Mr. Ford ought not to allow himself to
be intimidated by the specter`of a backlash/ on this
issue. Just before Congress went on .holiday, for in-
stance, more than 60 senators agreed to oppose an anti-
treaty resolutien being prepared by Sen. Harry Byrd
(I-Va.)?an impressive display of pro-treaty strength.
If the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to swing publicly be-
.hind a reasonable negotiating position, then the op-
position in Congress and the eountrY wotild surely be
'reduced to a manageable hard core. .
President Ford L then, has no good reason that we
,can see for allowing ;questionable political and bureau-
cratic considerations to stand in the path of. an _action
that the national -interest plainly requires. He ihntild
stop following course?delay?that could provoke
canal-closing riots and that could cost the United States
. heavily in its international relations, especially in Latin
America. He should move promptly to complete negor
Hations on a new treaty, with Panama.
'
MEXICO CITY, Aug. 16?In the
last few days, the Foreign Secretary
of Mexico, Emilio 0. Rabasa, has been
in Moscow signing air economic, sci-
entific and technological agreement
With the Soviet Union and the other
members of. the Communist economic
bloc.
At the same time, President Eche-
verria of Mexico, whose term of office
ends next year, and who is building
support as a "third. world" candidate
146
to succeed Kurt Waldheim as Secre-
tary General of the United Nations,
was completing a three-week trip
across the world from India, the Mid-
dle East, and Northern-Africa to Cuba.,
These widely ignored events are re-
minders of two significant facts: First,
that while the United States has been
preoccupied with other parts or the
world, our neighbors in the Western
Hemisphere have been strengthening
their ties with Europe, Japan and the
Soviet Union; and second, that while
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the Soviet Union - has been' steadily
building- its sphere of influence in
Eastern Europe, and China has been
attempting the same in Southeast Asia,
the United States "special relation-
ship" with. Latin America has been
?steadily declining.
Ten years ago, when the cold war
was in full swing and the Cuban crises
were bitter memories, Latin America
acquiesced, though grudgingly, in the
economic and political dominance of
the United States and tended to fol- ?
low Washington's lead in the United
Nations.
The Situation is quite different now.
Politically, the cold war has abated.
Cuba is less of a public issue, while'.
the 'U.S. domination of Panama and
the Canal has become the most alarm-
ing and diyisive issue since the Bay of
Pigs?and is now regarded here and
elsewhere in Latin America as a major
threat to Henry Kissinger's Latin
American _policy. .
. Economically, with the increase of
industrialization of the major Latin
American states, the direction, volume,
and terms of trade in the hemisphere
are changing dramatically. Latin
America seeks more access to the
United States markets ? the United
States trade surplus last year was $1.2-
billion ? and Latin America's markets
are becoming more important to the
big multinational U.S. 'corporations,
the control of which is causing new
problems and tensions in thig part of
the world.
The Linowitz "Commission on U.S.-
Latin American Relations," headed by
Sol Linowitz', former United States
?
NEW YORK TIMES
11 August 1975
Hopes of Nicaraguan Opposition Rise
th S t of t e . nvoy
Ambassador to the Organization 'of'
American States, summed up the prob-
lem as follows: In the last decade,
"Latin America has changed; the rela-
tions between Latin America and the
U.S. have changed; the role of the U.S.
in world affairs has changed. . . .
"Lack of sustained official and gen-
eral public interest in Latin America
by the U.S. makes it hard to impress
on our country's citizens, or even on
its officials, how much has been- hap-
pening in the Americas. But unchang- .
ing. policies in the face of rapidly
changing conditions is a sure recipe
for trouble."
Secretary of State Kissinger and ,
William D. Rogers, his intelligent and
well-informed Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, are aware of
all this, but Mr. Kissinger is preoccu--
pied with other problems: of arms con-
trol with the Soviet Union, the price ,
of oil, the--problems of peace in the
Middle East, and the latest crisis in
Portugal.
In the short run he is probably right.
He is dealing with the immediate tur-
moil of world affairs and this requires
48 hours every day. But in the long
run, the security of the United States
and even its relations with the rest of
the world, may very well depend on
the stability of the Americas as a
whole?perhaps even more than al-
most anything else. Ideology is a mat-
ter of transitory opinion, but geog-
raphy is an enduring fact, and this is,
an immediate problem in our relations
with the rest of the hemisphere.
For there is much criticism in this
Part of the world about Washington's
excessive rhetoric. Presidents Roose-
velt, Kennedy, Johnson and Secretary
Kissinger, in his offer of a "new dia-
logue," have all recognized the impor-
tance of a new deal for the new world,
but it has been, a long time coming,
and the problem remains and deepens.
It is immensely complicated, for ?
most of these countries are producing
more people than food or goods, and
they are at different stages of develop-
ment, with alarming gaps between the
very rich and the very poor.
. The danger of a guerrilla war
against,United States control of Pan-
ama is very real and a threat to our
entire hemisphere policy. The danger
of illegal Mexican immigration into the '
United States ? 710,000 illegal Me7r- ?
jeans were arrested in the United
States last year?is even more of a ,
menace for the future, with Mexico's
population expetted to go from sixty.
million at the present time to 125 mu-
lion by the end of the century.
So one fact is fairly obvious. The
hemisphere is not getting the atten-
tion and priority it deserves from. the ?
United States.
This may be ore redson why Panama
is bringing the Canal tq, the point of
crisis, and why the Mexicans are male-
ing agreements with the Communist
economic bloc and identifying them-
selves with the organization of the-un-
derdeveloped "third world." They are
in trouble at home, in Latin America
and the Caribbean, and they are trying
by new alignments and sharper con-
frontations to gerinir attention:. .
By. ALAN RIDING
Special to The New York Times
International Studies. Normalr
diplomatic practice is for one,
or two months to pass between
the departure of an ambassa-!
dor and the .arrival of his suc-'
cesmr.
piplomatic sources said that
'General Somoza, who t was
'trained at West Point and
whose family has ruled this
Central American republic for
the last 40 years, has also tried
MANAGUA, Nicaragua I?The
imminent replacement of thej
controversial United States
Ambassador to Managua, who
over five years has become a
friend and adviser of the long-
time dictator, Gen. Anastasio
Somoza Debayle, is both rais-
ing hopes and causing concern
? here.
Opposition groups are hoping
that the withdrawal of Ambas-
sador Turner B. Shelton will
mark the end of the total iden-
tification of the United States
'with the regime and perhaps
lead Washington to press Gen-
era! Somoza to liberalize his
Government.
President Somoza, on the
. other hand, is , reportedly so
worried that the change of am-
.bassadors could affect his re-
lationship with Washington
that he campaigned to have Mr.
Shelton's assignment extended.
When this failed, according to
:diplomats here, he arranged for
the Ambassador to remain in
Managua until the last possible
moment.
As a result,- Mr. Shelton will
leave Nicaragua on the morning
of Aug.' I), several weeks
behind schedule and just hours,
.before the arrival of his succes-'
sor, James D. Theberge, former;
director of Latin-American!
'studies at Georgetown Univer-
sity's, Center for StrategiA00-
?
flection of the United States'
immense political influence
over Nicaragua. The United
States occupied and governed
the country between 1912 and
1925 and again between 1927
and 1933, and since then
Washington's backing has been
a key factor .in enabling the
Somoza family to perpetuate it-'
self in power.
"American ambassadors have
to influence Washington to of- always been seen here as sort,
fer Ambassador Shelton a pres_ of viceroys or proconsuls," at
tigious new assignment on the foreign official explained, "and!
!ground that his abrupt demo_ both the Government and the
tion or dismissal would imply opposition have always tried
censure of his close ties with to win their support."
the Nicaraguan President.
But well-placed sources said
the State Department had no
intention of offering the 59-
year-old Mr. Shelton, 'a former
movie industry executive, an-
other diplomatic post and that
his only hope for a government
job lay with the White House.
They added that Mr. Shelton's
relations with the State De-
partment had long been
strained and that he had taken
to sending his reports to Secre-
tary of State Kissinger in his
capacity as head of the White
House's National Security,
Council.
What His Critics Charge
'
The main criticism of Ambas-
sador Shelton has been that he
has ? cultivated his relations with
General Somoza to the exclu-
sion of all other political fig-
ures, particularly well-known
opponents of the regime. The
fact that he speaks no Spanish
has also helped isolate him
from many Nicaraguan sectors.
"Shelton's biggest hero is
Somoza," a diplomat said, "and
Somoza obviously trusts Shel-
ton completely. Shelton is prob-
ably more exposed to the local
president that any other United'
States ambassador in the;
world. He spends at ,least 101
hours a week with Somoza and
half the time they re alone and;
The controversy that has conal no one knows what they dis-.!
stantly surrounded Ambassador
ciNttIPFciteRe1eartEP2001,1913 Oakt 61A143413F127e#3043aRd
147
ever, it was no secret that Gen
eral Somoza relied heavily on
lAmbassador Shelton's advice.
!After the earthquake in Decem-
ber, 1972, that destroyed down-
'town Managua and took over
10,000 lives, Mr. Shelton not
only arranged for 500 Amen-
can soldiers to be flown from;
the Panama Canal Zone to help!,
;in the emtrgency and symtio1-1
!ize United States support; but
Ihe also spent long hours help-
ling General Somoza re-estab-
lish a semblance of government.
In December last year, after
12 prominent Nicaraguans were
kidnapped by leftist guerrillas,:
the Ambassador again acted as!
President Somoza's closest con-1
fidant and was constantly by
his side.
General Somoza's apprecia-
tion of Mr.. Shelton has been
'demonstrated bY the large num-
ber of official going-away par-
ties arranged in his honor, in-
cluding one given by the Presi-
dent himself in the National
Palace. The Ambassador's final
days here are also being
covered in the official news-
paper Novedades with the
solemnity of a space-mission
countdown.
Opponents of the regime
are not alone in being upset by
the Ambassador's partiality..
Sharp disagreements between
itailuisWoltn,d ,several senior
YR.r'United States
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370003-4
Embassy became common l
knowledge in local political cir-
cles.
Sitting in his office besidet
signed photographs of ? Presi-
dents Nixon and Ford, the Am-
bassador defended himself
against his critics. "It's the job
of an ambassador to establish
the best possible relationship
with the president of a friendly
country,"
he said in an inter-
view. 'I don't think of it in
terms of a personal relation-
ship, but I think President So-
moza is a very nice man. He is
lfriendly to the United States,1
the does a good job and he's al
hard-working leader who hasj
done a lot to improve things in
this country. I'm sure if there
were elections supervised by
the United Nations, General
Somoza would win."
The announcement of Mr.'
Shelton's withdrawal sparked
rumors in opposition circles
that his successor would be
more liberal, but embassy per-
sonnel have hastened to ex-
plain that Ambassador The-
berge "may have a different
personal style but will proba-
bly have the same politics."
They point out that Mr. The-
berge's recent publications in-
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 August 1975
Details conflict
Q.11..e... leftist
- By James Nelson Goodsell
,
Latin America correspondent of
,The Christian Science Monitor,,,
, .
- -
BuenOs Aires
Some ?sort of collusion between Chilean
securiti:offciers and groups in Argentina is
thought to lie behind the mysterious deaths in
Argentina of 119 Chilean leftists, who were
known to have been under arrest in Chile...
The
, ? ? _ -
_The bizarre and complex details of the case;
which could mushroom into a trans-Andean
? scandal.-are coming to light here and in
:Santiago, the 'Chilean capital.
? ? ?
The case may well have been a factor in the
decision last month of the Chilean military
government to bar the planned visit to Chile of:.
a United Nations human rights committee.? ...
In the Past months articles have appeared in
Chile's controlled press indicating that the 119
were killed in guerrilla skirmishes in Ar-
gentina. But there is no word in these reports
on how, the Chileans got to Argentina while
supposedly under arrest in Chile.
,
The information for these articles was said
to come from two sources: an Argentine
magazine, Lea, which put out its first and only
issue on July 15 and a Brazilian newspaper
that sources in Rio de Janeiro indicate does
not even exist.?
The same Chilean newspapers also reported ?
dude books entitled "The So-
viet Presence in Latin America"
and "Russia in the Caribbean."
Nicaragua's main opposition
leader, Dr. Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro, publisher of the
newspaper La Prensa and presi-
dent of the Democratic Libera-
tion Union, expressed the hope
in an interview that Ambassa-
dor Shelton's successor "is a
correct person who does not in-
terfere in the struggle of
Nicaraguans to obtain their
liberation and Who discontinues
the ,policy of supporting cor-
rupt dictatorships like that of
the Somozas." .
those on the list had turned up in Buenos Aires:
But when family members of the two came
to Buenos Aires to check the stories, they
discovered that the bodies were not those of
their loved ones. Further investigations dis-
closed that the identity cards with the bodies
were not those of the missing Chileans and.
: probably were fabrications, ?
_
"-
The 119 were, in the Main, One-time mem-
bers of the now outlawed extremist Mov-
imiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR).?
They were arrested at various times in 1974.
Most were under 30, and at least one-fourth of
them were women.
Once arrested, the majority simply dropped
out of sight despite strenuous efforts by their
families, human rights organizations, and
others to get information on their, where-
abouts. In a few cases, information did come
from specific sources ? the International Red
Cross, released prisoners, and, in at least one
instance, from the Chilean Foreign Ministry_
U.S. Reassures Nicaragua
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Aug. 10 ?
State Department officials said
the Ford Administration had re-
cently assured Nicaragua thatl
the replacement of Ambassador,
Shelton was "not to be taken,
as representing any change inl
United States policy" toward'
that country.
The officials said that Nica-
ragua had been told that Amer-
ican foreign policy was con-
ducted "with countries, not
with persons," and that a
normal ambassadorial term was
two years.
The Foreign Ministry last year wrote the
British Embassy in Santiago confirming that
Christian von Yurick was being held under
"preventive arrest" and that he was in
"normal" health. But it made no mention of
Mr. von Yurick's son, Edwin, and the son's
wife, Barbara, who also were missing. All
three now appear on the lists of those killed in
Argentina. The British Embassy had inquired
' about the von Yuricks at the request -of
relatives in England.
The newspaper accounts of the Argentine
deaths suggest that the Chileans in question
were killed fighting with guerrillas in north-
western Argentina. but the battle is said by
Argentine military sources never to have
taken place:
Yet Chilean authorities continue to talk of
the guerrilla skirmish as a major one. Chilean
newspapers quote the Curitiba, Brazil, news-
paper 0 Dia, as mentioning a battle near the
. Argentine city of Salta. But sources in Rio de
Janeiro say there is no newspaper 0 Dia in
in late July that the bodies of at least two of Curitiba.
48
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