DEADLY TOXINS CACHED BY CIA, CHURCH SAYS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 10, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
19 SEPTEMBER 1975
NO. 19 PAGE
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
GENERAL
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LATIN AMERICA 48
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A2MINGTON POST
C; Stptem5er 1975
Ely George Lardner Jr.
?nase.taaten Post Stalt qpr}t? . _
Deadly poisons, including might be relevant to the out)
ehelifieh toxin potent enough side investigations that- werel
t,.7 kill thousands of people. then getting under way. '
teeee been found in a seeret Church and Committee Vice
' ? maintained by the Cere. Chairman John G.. Tower (Be'
arel fnteiligence Agency, Sex): Tex.) were quietly told of the
rk Church .(D-Idaho) said stockpile several months ace).
Yeeerrisy. The CIA's deputy director of
eaid the CIA kept bnth, science and teehnoiogy, Carl
elee ehelifish toxin and a Duckett, then conducted an in-
eenellen amount of cobra house investigation thrcug.h
venom "in direct contraven- one of his deputies, Sayre Ste-
of presidential orders yens, and reported the find-
enere than five years ago that ings to the full Senate corn-
materials be destroyed. mittee last week. -
eetareenliming, angel:a fee''Church said the commietee
news :leaks about the nelsons, S etall , trying to determine.
Cherch confirmed that his who in the CIA was responsi-
enate intelligence committee Mc for blocking destinctien
wouta nold pehlie hearings on tile poisons and who knew
ne,xt week despite White ab, mil: the decision. FDrineir.
Heitsc objections. CIA .7nreetor Richard Hele?nsej
now ambassador to Iran, will,
The, poisons were reportedly
questaoned on that score it.iy
i-,veloned for the CIA under
cod ime the co7Otnittee exncutive
the e m Project Netorni
v
during the 1950s. Church said aeseton eed-t
--d " ? .e."
the d'o'evxy enlight be rel "'c'rnew''etre l'"'44 " the
want to the committee's assaa-
CIA. a teeeision was made to
sination inquiry. 'He said hei disobey the Presidential er-.
hes no reason to think any of der," Church declared at, a
toeirs weec ever actually breakfast meeting with report-
neeee but the committee in.' era that preceded hie rows
vestigating, "one particular
mission"' that apparently
never eame to fruition. ?
In response to .a news. con-
ference question, Church bed',
rated he was familiar with--
but refused to comment on?
an allegation that some toxin
was sent to Africa to kill Con-
conference. He said Colby'l ap-
parent Ignorance of the cache
even after becoming CIA di.;
rector in 1973 suggested an'
alarming "looseness of cone.
mend. and eontrolowithLn the
CIA . . ."
Along with an inventory of
other unspecified materiaes,?
golese Premier, Patrice Lu- the lethal poisons were discov-
enturalia in 1961. According to ered at a CIA laboratory fact'.
the allegation, the shipment ity and mil under heavy
did not arrive until after Lu- geaxd, Church said. He said
mumbo had been asaassinated, . news reports that they were
by ether means. . -found at Ft. Detrick, aide
'Church would say only that were incorrect, but he refused
the committee was still inves- to say where they were discov.
tigating the qdestion of pro-
:Leered use of some of the poi, bred.
Church said he. was singling,
%on and that its findings Out the shellfish toxin and the ,
would be made public "in due. -cobra venom because they:
eentrse." Were the o.nly items in the.
The Idaho Democrat 'added .1.each,? whose retention,
that the retention of the. P?i- "unquestionably contravenes".;
eons, after President Nixon or-
dered destruction of such.
eteckpiles in 1969, raised grave
.
questions about internal con-
trols and supervision within, warfare and ordered the de-
ne CIA.
Church said' CIA Director struction of the U.S. stockpile
William E. Colby was appar-
ently unaware of the cache un-
til earlier this year when he
asked agency employees to no-
him - of anything AO
Nixon's executive ordee, 4
, Nixon announced in Novem-
ber, 1960, that the nation:.
would never engage in germ ?
of bacteriological weapons. A
.subsequent "clarification" op
the order made it clear thate
the order was to apply to bac4
tepto 1 ON n
ft S Ch3lre
.,ck? ,?11tg(i41/
ienTT-T
NEW YORK TIM'S
11 September 1975
C1AViewsonU
Of Poison Repartee'
By NICHOLAS Ill. HORPOCK
1 . Sp...del to The New Y+wk Times
: WASHINGTON; Sept. le ?
i,The Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence has evidence
that the Central Intelligence
Agency considered "operational
use" of the shellfish poison
I
' kept in its laberatory, ? includ-
ing making suicide pills far
agents and "aggeressive ac-
tions," sources familiar with
the events said today.
The poison, these'sources
said, was kept in a laboratori
of the technical services divi-
sion of the C.I.A., which in
1979 was under the command
of Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the man
who conducted LSD expert-I
meats for the agency. The!
Senate investigators are ex-
- pected to interview Dr. Gott- .
lieb in closed session later this
week. "
g Meanwhile, a prominent phare
mocologist, Dr. Mun-loch Ritchie
of Yale University, has asked
the agency and the senate
Committee to prevent the de-
struction of the shell-fish poison
on the ground that it could
be extremely valuable for medi-
cal research. He said the poison,
was similar to a one once men-
toned in the James Pond books
by Ian Fleming.
The 'poison, called soodtexin,
as properties that make it rera
and extremely veluable for re-
search on such net-Yr.-us system
diseases as multiple scleroSis,
Dr. Ritchie said.
'agrees that the' potions shPui'S;i
have been disposed of.
- He also sharply disputed a
report in yesterday rnorrung
editions of The Washington.
:Post quoting unnamed sources,'
as stating the poisons were re-,
tallied on grounds that they
;might be useful for expert-
mental purposes.
He said the shellfish toxin,
.for which there is no known
antidote, had been kept by the
CIA in such quantities "as
could kill many thousands of.
people." far more than what.
might be needed for any Mho-.
ratorY experimentation.
Church could not say whg
the CI.A had the poisons de-
veloped or why it kept them
despite the Nixon decree, but
he said he assumed they were.:
meant for individual targets.
"I'm not prepared to charge;
today that the CIA ever in-1
tended to conduct mass bac-
teriological warfare . against;
foreign nations," he said, "L.
'
-? br. Pitafie- said -he.belitveil
the C.I.A.:3 "saxitoxin"eiwas .
part of a batch prepared by
the . Army at the Edgeierid
Arsenal in Maryland in' the
nineteen-sixties. He said that if
. was one of the deadliest poisons
. known.. to . mankind, but added '
?that because- of its value tee
imedical research, "it would be
r. !mina' to destroy this ,m0,-
'Aerial." '. . ? . ? -- -.
Pr. Ritchie contended teat '
tcereful 'controls weld'. be
..a7erlieert out to keel) the palson
from misuse. He said-smite:mite
which is distilled from hetes. '
clams, is similar . to tetra--
dee-rye:ire a poison made by the
rpariese from puffer title. The
puffer fish poison ' was men?
itiened in 2renes. pond weds,
Kit said.
,le After President Nina or.
'dosed the destruction of thrall,-
!nal and bacteriological weapons.
,.in 1969,. following the siping
of an international treaty lime
iting biochernic warfare. it
liecame -virtually impossible fox'
medical researchers ? to obtain
eaxitoxin, Dr. Ritchie said. lbe
commercially manufactured Jap-;
, anese poison is not as good
for research, he said. . ?
? .? '': Intelligence sources .said that
'there was some 'documentary
-
evidence to indicate that, aver
:the years the intelligence agency
:"at least considered" .using the
shell-fish poison. ? .The agency
also maintained a supply . of
cobra venom. .
l'''' ? One potential use of the Shell-
:fish poison, because it is one of
:the fatest acting poisons, was
ito make suicide pills that so
United States agents might be
: able to kill 'themselves - after.,
? being caught, sources said. The
. poison acted so swiftly, these
sources said, that the agents'
captors would have no time to.
administer an antidote. .
Other intelligence - sources,?
however, said -that. there we
memorandums suggesting ree ?
gressive actions". in which the
? shell-fish poison could be used.' ?
They. Would not ela.sorate.
' ? There were also indicatioirs
that the agency ? had materials
for such uses as 'disabling guard -
'doge at a foreign 'embassy with-, ? .
out killing them. This would aid.i
'the agency in entering and leav-
ing a premise guarded by dogs!:
without the owner's knowing'
' the intrusion had, been made.
The Senate Committee, under
the chairmanship of Senator, '
Frank Church, Democrat efl
Idaho, is. investigating ' why
. these two poisons were nott
destroyed' by the agency fol-
lowing the Presidential order ;
? in 1969. 'According to' iatell,i-4
wince sources, though: Dr..,
Gottlieb headed the divisione
' where the materials were Tee
' tained there was "no lingo& .
? lion" violated the order andi '
had them preserved.
ie
/ Senate 'investigators. ore'
" seeking to learn, intelligence.
? :sources said, whether Dr.' Gott- .
lieb could shed any light on..
howthe Presidential order was
. ,
handled at the agency. .
i...;.Mr. Church,said that in add-
Akin to the cobra and shell-
.iefish Poisons, - the C.I.A. had
hoarded . large. , quantities of
would have 'to assume that the
? , other dangerous chemicals.
:044Rippancoone*R0960037 r eY figure in the b r-
I [Acidly targeted.'" t week. ,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDF'77-0043,2R000100370001-6
WASHINGTON POST'
17 September'1975
CI AA TeriQ,
Of Exotic
Tearions
Electric Gttn,
Untraceable -
Poison Pellets
; By George Lardner Jr. ?
Washington Poet Staff Writer
The Central Intelligence
gency spent some $3 mu.
on on a secret stockpile ;
f deadly poisons and corn-
anion weaponry such as a
art gun that could kill its
ictims without leaving a
race, CIA Director Wil-
iam Colby acknowledged
esierday.
Testifying, calmly in lecture-
all tones, Colby told the
enate intelligence commit.
cc, at its first public session
hat middle-level CIA. of-
icials improperly stored away
ome of the most deadly toxin
n 1970 in defiance of an or-
er by President Nixon that'
uch materials be destroyed.
-Top officials of the. CIA clis-
overed the ;forbidden cache
n an apparently long-neglected vault earlier this year.
. The arsenal included not
nly deadly shellfish toxin re-!
ortedly capable of killing!
hundreds of thousands" of
eople, but also strychnine,
cobra venom,, cyanide pills
nd other exotic compounds
such as 10. pounds of "1:12:,",a
chemical that attacks the cen-
tral nervous system..
Several dart guns were also
found, including a .45 caliber--
sized electric gun capable Of
silently firing poison pellets
that would dissolve in a vic-
tim before any autopsy could
be perfortned.
One CIA memo made-public
by the Senate committee de-
scribed the 'gun as "a non.-
diseernible microbioindeula-
tor" that could fire accurately
at ranges up ?to 250 feet, Tiny
pellets that could carry a half-
milligrarn of poison and "Cap-
able of being used in a noise-
free disseminator" such as the
dart gun had also been devel-
oped, the Oct ob er, 1967,
memo declared.
The same document dis-
c ose;d atdvolnerability" -study
of the. -New York City sub-
way- sYstem to determine "the
threat of infection to subway
passengers" in a .covert bio-1
ogical attack.
The menio, addressed to the 1
chief of the CIA's technical!
services division, added that 1
the vulnerability study prod-
uced information about "meth-
ods of delivery which could!
be used offensively!'
At one 'point during his
testimony, Colby said some
of the CIA's secret_ records
on the development- of the
poisons and incapacitating
agents?known as Project
Naomi?had been destroyed
in November, 1972., He -also
?? said there Was a memorandum
of agreement reflecting the
destruction of those records
between then-CIA Director
Richard Helms and the chief
-of the technical services divi-
sion, Sidney Gottlieb.
CIA special counsel Mitchell
1Rogovin said later, however,
that Colby "misspoke!' Rogo-
vire said there was no such
memorandum and that "we
have no reason to believe"
that any records on Project
Naomi were destroyed.
? Committee investigators ap-
parently remain' skeptical.
"We have evidence that there
are memos which one would
think shoultk exist but which
no longer exist," the commit-
tee's ; chief counsel, Fritz
Schwarz, told reporters,
; Gottlieb, according to Rock-
efeller Commission sources,
was responsible for the de-
struction of CIA drug-testing
records, including the adminis-
tration of LSD to unwitting!
subjects. R.ogovin suggested
that Colby may have had this
; in mind when he referred to
Project Naomi. As for the
memo to Helms, Rogovin -said
?
!it actually came from the.
j chief of the Army Chemical
!Corps and simply dealt with
the Army's -development of
}Various ,toxins for the CIA; at
1Ft. Detrick, Md.
The focal point of the testi-
mony was the nearly 11 grams
I?approximately half an ounce
i?of shellfish toxin that was
!found along with the strych-
nine and other materials
! in an 8-by-10 foot storage room
at the CIA's "South Labora-
tory," a building near the
1State Department.
Emphasizing the potency of
; the poison. Committee- Chair-
man Frank Church ID-Idaho)
isaid that Carl ?Duckett. head
of the CIA's directorate of sci-
' ence and technology, testi-
fied in executive session that
? if the 11 grams were adminis,
tered orally; .- they would be
1"sufficient to kill at least 14,-
000 people."
! Oral doses. Church stressed,
are also "the least efficient
way" to administer the toxin.
If the "sophisticated equip-
ment" found along With the
"toxin were used instead, he
said, the half ounce would be
enough to kill many more peo-
ple, with estimates "-varying
upwards into the hundreds of
thousands.''
When President Nixon re-
.
'non/teed biologic,ar Warfare
the fall of 1969 and followed
up on Feb. ?14, 1970, with or
dors- to destroy "all. existir.e
stocks of toxins" not needed
for defensive research. Colhy:
said high-ranking CIA officials
knew that the-p' at Ft.
Detrick, including, the shell-.
fish toxin, should, be de-
stroyed.
"D i s c u-s atolls with Mr.
Helms, director of central in-
telligence, and Mr. " Thomas
Karamessines, the depUty
rector for plans in 1970, have
established that both weee
Aware of the requirement that
such material be disposed of,"
Colby tesitfied. ?
"They recall that clear' in ,
structions were given that the
CIA stockpile should be de- -
strayed by-the Army and that,
in accordance with presider,:
tial ? directives, the agency
should get out Of the BW
(biological warfare) business,"
he said.
? The former CIA scientist re-
sponsible for hiding the shell-
fish toxin away, Nathan Gor-
don of Silver Spring, testified
; however, that he never got the
word.,
13.6eatedly emphasizing the
expense and the effort in-
volved in manufacturing the
!shellfish toxin?experts say It
takes tons of shellfish to
produce a single gram?Gor-
don made plain that the pros-
pect of destroying it troubled
him greatly. As head of the
!tiny chemical branch of the
CIA's technical services divi-
sion in 1970 he said he and,
his ? two colleagues in that!
1--branch decided to keep -the
poison without even tolling!
Gottlie b, their immediate!
superior. .
Under lengthy questioning'
by committee members, Gott-
- lieb maintained at times that
Nixon's orders did not cover
"chemical agents"?a category
he claimed the shellfish toxin
fell into.
Sen. Walter F. Mondale (D-
Minn.) pointed Out, however,
that this conflicted with a
CIA memo on Feb. 16. 1970
that Gordon admitted drafting
at Gottlieb's suggestion. ?
Entitled "Contingency Plan
for Stockpile of !Biological:
IVarfare Agents," the memo
I noted that 'Nixon had just
"included all toxin weapons"
in calling for the destruction
of bacteriological stockpiles.
The document then listed '10
biological agents?such as ilia?.
terials designed to bring on
tuberculosis?and six "toxins,"
including 5.1 grams of "para-
lytic shellfish poison."
Gordon then warned that
the CIA stockpile might be
destroyed, and' said that if the
agency's director ''wishes to
continue this special capabil-
ity," it could be transferred
to a private firm in Baltimore
and secretly stored "at a cost
no greater than $75,000 .
? "1..7
;. The memo, was drafted for
signing by Karamessines, as
head of the CIA's covert ope-
rations division, and addressed
to CIA Director Helms. as a
proposed' contingency : plan.
'Colby, however, said an inves-
tigation indicates that the
memo never even got to.Kara--
rressines,
! Gordon said his immediate.?
boss, Gottleib. told him to for-
get the idea and said the pro,
;:gram at Ft. Detrick with the.
,sPecial operations division of !
!Army biological experts would:l
. have to he ended. -
! Subsequently. however, Gor-'1;
'don said, the Army projecte
;officer .at Detrick, Charles
Senseny, called him and of-
fered to send him the CIA's,
_five grams of shellfish toxin
"for our potential use" some
Gordon said he' and .his'
? two -colleagues in the tIA
chemical .branch .. quietly.,
? agreed.
Questioned sharply about
the fact that the CIA would
wind up with almost 11 grams
Of the toxin instead of the 5.I
grams it was supposed to
have, Gordon said he could
only conclude that Detrick's
:special operations division
wanted to save the Army's
stockpile ?from destruction
also. He said he was unaware,
l'of the double shipment Until
'this year.
Sen. Church said he found
iGordon's disclaimers 'of a con-
flict between his actions. and
1Nixon's orders "rather astound:-
Mg.' Gordon, however, voiced-,
:no regrets and said he stilt,
,feels that retention of the-
toxin v.-as "in the interest ?
the agency's policy" of matia,'
taming behavioral con Cr ol- :
materials.
. .
CIA Director Colby said the:
program with the Army fixe
malty began in May, 1952, and ??
"was tied to earlier Office of
Strategic Services World War.
IT experience, which, included::
the development of two, dile'
ferent types of agency suicide ?
pills to -be- used in the event.,'
of capture. and a successful
operations using BW materials:.
to incapacitate! a Nazi leadert
temporarily."
One of the. CIA's earlieStt?
requirements, Colby said. Was;
to find "a replacement fon the
standard cyanide issued 1-'
-to agents in hazardous situ-
ations in 'World War U. ?
He
said this effort ultimately'
centered on development of a
small drill coated with shell?
fish toxin. ?
He said. however, that the
9/.11y use of the expensive.'
poison was in Francis CarY
Power's disatrous (1-2 flight
over the Soviet Union in May. i
1960, when he "carried such
a device concealed in a silver!
dollar."
Powers tossed away the sit=
ver dollar on being : shot
down, hut kept the poison!
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- Fiprpved For Re1ease,2001/0
NEW YORK TIMES
18 Se tember 1975
:pin. ,"He ?cibilously. did dii6f.1
use It," Colby. said. ? . -- ? ,t,. :
. Instead; the committee was
told, Powers' _Russian captors;
found it and tested it on.?a.
.thige which died in 10. seconds'.
,Under questfoning. by
Church. Colby readily agreed,
h o w e v e r. that the shellfish
,toxin and other poisons develd
toped u it ri e i Project Naomi,
were designed for offensive t
uses although he was unaware!
-of any actual applications. i
Excep t for the sheillishi
toxin and perhaps some other' .
items such as.the cobra venom,I
the CIA's stockpile at Detrick!
,was apparently destroyed. The;
i' cache at the CIA's South}
'Laboratory, where the toxin
}
. was founded, evidently tt
coo
? sisted of a potpourri of items}
from Detrick plus . chemical;
compounds that CIA scientists;
' had "collected" and store cit
away in earlier years. I
' Colby said he was not awarei
of the secret cache or even of;
Project Naomi until this year,
hither. he asked agency em.-]
ployees to bring any question-I
able activities to'his attention.i
Sen. Mondale said he *asl
especially upset bY. the fact!
that there are so few records'
about the program. He said!there was no evidence that'.
the National Security Council}
ever autborized it and no clocu-i-
mentary proof that the stock-}
pile was ordered destroyed ini!
1970. e s
s .11
"In short; the record's all
, mess," Mondale told Colby.;1
.'Does that bother you?": 1,1
"It certainly does," the CIA!'
drectur sd
ai- ? ' ' ' L
NEW YORK TIMES '
18 September 1975
7. ran'sit Autko ray
Says N6, Que Knew
About C.I.A.' s Test
A spokesman for the Transit ?
Authority said- yesterday that
as far as could be determined-
now no one.. in ? that 'agency
had any knowledge -of a secret
Central intellieence. -Agency.
project in .which i the .city's sub-,
ways were used to test the
vulnerability of esubway asyse
. ?[
terns ? to" biolOgicel-warfare
attack. .?
A C.I.A. mensoranduradmade
public during a' hearing of the
'Senate .Select Committee on
Intelligence ? in Washington on
Tuesday said that the test "pro-
vided a means of assessing
the threat of infection to subway
passengers". and demonstrated
how to use such an attack
"offensively."AccordingAccordin ?to Congressional
sources, C.I.A. officials had said
tthat in the test the subways
were flooded with a "harmless
eamtalant" of a 'disease-carrying
. gas.. No information was dis-
dOsed on when or ? how the
'test was conducted.
The Transit : Authority
spokesman.. -said: "As - far as
,we can determine at this time..
no one here knew. of the test.
We cannot Comment until we
know more about WhatAp
supposed to have happened.
We are looking into .the mat-
ter."
POISORARMS BAN
IS TED BY HELM
Tells Panel He Gave Oral
to Halt C.I.A, Job,
but Did Not 'Follow Up
tBy NICHOLAS -M.. HORROCK
t., Special to The N'zra York Timee
t-'
,a WASHINGTON,. Sept. 17----;
tRichard Helms, the former Die
t,-4.ector of Central Intelligence,
,told. a Senate Committee today
.e.that he had issued an . oral
iconernand to halt . the C.I.A.'s
biochemical weapons program
tend .to. destroy. its stockpiles,
Aut. that he had v never fol-
tiOwed no to find out if his
'torder had been carried out.
l- ? -
ea- He also testified that he had
frever issued a written order on
he matter.. '
Mr. Helms, now the Ambas-
sador to Iran, went before the
!Senate Select Committee on
;Intelligence accompanied by
11.ornas Karamessines, his for-.
fiter deputy for ? covert opera-
lions, Mr. Helm told the corn
e-
goatee that when he . learned
%in February,' 1970, of President
:Nixon's order that 'all biochemi;
real weapons he destroyed, he
a. n a , Mr. Karamessines agreed .
?hat the C.I.A. "had no choice
tbut to comply." "We agreed
t,n terminate the program," he
aid.
tss Mr. Karamessines? told. the
, ornmittee that he and Mr.
iHelma discussed the matter
hwith Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, the
tdire.,ctor of the Technical Seined
tees-Division of the C.I.A., which
_1:i.ad over-all control of the pro- .
gram. Mr. Karamessines - said
tthat it was his "understanding
rwith Gottlieb. that all toxins
in possession of the agency
'be returned to Fort Detrick
;7,or oestruction."
rs.at ?
lL . 2d Day of Hearings
..e.t Mr. Helms and Mr. Karames-
!eines appeared as witnesses in
the second day of the Senate
:committee's. public ,inquiry .
s,why the C.I.A., failed:??teodp
e?grOy
drivo deadly ' biocheinital. ' poi-.i
f.(31ttS, a shellfiah toxin .and a
rnpoison derived from cobra can-
can, after the Presidential order
iqr.O. 1970,
e' The committee's counsel.
T...A.O. Schwarz 3d, said that
l;the committee would question
Dr. Gottlieb about the poisons
0, ?
nand others matters in a closed
,session on Tuesday. lie said,
ehowever, that Dr. - Gottlieb's
'lawyers had "indicated" that
Itheir client might invoke his
,constitutional _right wider the
,Fifth Amendment not to an-
-swer questions that might tend
..to incriminate him. - ? ?
e? If Dr. Gottlieb does invoke
.. tthe amendment, Mr. Schwarz
said, the committee may consi-
tesder whether it will, grant. him
: CIA-RDP77A0432R00010637000t-.6:
,klin =nits/ 'from prosiiiititte to
.7get the full story on the record.
Mr. Helms-told the committee
-that he knew of an 18-yeareo1dr
C;.I.A, joint program
with the .. Army's Biological
Warfare Laboratory at Fort De-
trick Md to develop biochemi-
cal weapons.
He said that ?he had been
,aware that the prograrn deve-
-loped biochemicals and such
ldeliverd systems as dart guns,
,but that he., had never ordered
,such weapons used against hu-
pan beings. "I don't ever recall
,considering it, let alone author-
,izing it," he said.
, Mr. Karamessines said that
,he had "no recollection of the
?actual use of any of the mater-
,ials," but acknowledged that
?if they had been used to kill
,a watchdog in- a foreign opera-
,tion he might not have been
,informed. He said that he was
,sure he had never ordered their
? used against a human being:
"As Mr. Helms and others
who know me are aware, I
would not have continued rat
the C.I.A.] if there was a re-
quirement -for the killing of
a human being," Mr. Karames-
sines said. He has spent some
30 years in covert operations
with the Office of Strategic
Services and the C.I.A.
Three Made Decision
Mr. Helms testified that be-
fore President Nixon ordered
biochemical warfare weapons
destroyed, he asked a National
Security Council committee to
study the question. Mr. Helms
said, howeventthat he had not
told the committee that the
C.I.A. possessed such wepons,
? mainly because It was not
cleared to have such informa-
tion under national security
standards.
He also said that he had
never doubted that the Pros-
ident's order applied to the
C.I.A. Beth Mr. Helms and Mr.
Karrnessines said that they
were "surprised" to learn five
year later that all the rater-
ials had not been destroyed.
Dr. Nathn Gordon, who was
in charge of biochemical mater-
ii& in the Technical Services
Division, testified yesterday
that he and two other men
in his section had decided to
ese#,a,ioe.supplies of the sheUfish
toxin and the poison made from
cobra venom. ..
Dr, Gordon said that although
he knew about the 1970 Pres-
idential order, he did not regard
the materials as being covered
ander it. Moreover, he said,
he had received no written di-
rective from the C.I.A. hie-
rarchy to get rid of the mater-
ials.
Today, Mr. Helms said that
he had not issued a written
order on the matter because
Mr. Karamessines and Dr. Got-
tlieb accepted verbal orders as
"orders written in blood." He
said that he felt Dr. Gottlieb
and Mr. Karamessines were
,two of the most honorable men
in the country, and that he
never doubted that the order
would tie tarried out.
WASHINGTON POST
14 September 1975
Rockefeller
Cites-Need for
,urveillanee
NORMAN,' Okla.,: Sept.. 13
(AP)?Vice President Rocke-
feller said today that attempti
against, the life of President
Ford show a need for tougher
domestic Intelligence opera-
tions by the government.
Rockefeller told an airport
nexvs conference in Oklahoma-
City that the FBI and other,
agencies authorized to gather
intelligence in this country
need More help:
"What has happened does
indicate the ' importance of
having intelligence," he said.
"And I thinks it's an element
of the United States is review-
ing CIA and the entire intelWt
ger ce structure."
Rockefeller, who headed the
government panel that studied
charges of illegal domest' c
snooping by CIA, said no mas-
sive violations were found and
the charges are deceiving the
"I think that we do see from
what happened in the case of
the President that it is essene
tial that the FBI and the local
law enforcement agencies pre-
serve records of those who
have been outspoken or active
in efforts to undermine the
*freedom of this country or de-
stroy democratic society by
force or to kill leaders of this
:society," he said..
Rockefeller said, however,'
that he , felt public officials
and political' candidates
should be prepared to take the
risks that go with the job and
that the Secret Service is do-
ing all that can be done rea-
sonably to protect them.
Rockefeller's two days of
speechmaking, handshaking
fund-raising and frequent
news conferences featuring
local questioners were paid
for by the Republican Party,
as was a corresponding trip by
President Ford, , ?
ved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6
THE NEW YORK 'TIMES; WEDkESDAY, 'SEPTEMBER 17, 1475
Mibukh the &Ned Is:P*on, the CIA. Reiiela0Ons.Briiik
' By LINDA: CHARLTON
Spezia! to The Ne., York Times
? WASHINGTON, Sept. 16?
Every now and then the hear-
'ing :room was ,s!,vept by ner-
vous. giggles, today, as when
. the, Central ?Intelligence.
Agency's former top chemist
said that 'all he knew about
a, lethal. shellfish toxin was
that he' had' been told "it's
gocid stuff.",
. The .chemist, Dr. :Nathan
Gordon? _provoked ,another
Muffled snort during the,
.hearings by the Senate Select
:'Committee 'on Intelligence,
When he went on to talk
about another C.I.A. item,,
this one guaranteed to pro-,
dike ,nothing" more lethal'
Than "a real severe case of
the tummies."
Dr. Gordon 'Was not trying
'to be funny. He-Wes 'trying to
explain how it :was, in ap-
parent defiance of two Presi-
-dential edicts, he had held
onto 10.9 grams of the shell
figh toxin enough to kill
thousands of persons?in the
,vault of his laboratory.
Dr. Gordon. a tall, stoop-
ing man, with dark-rimmed
spectacles and thinning hair.
brushed back to curl over the? on Nervous Giggles
,
taken advantage of a Senate
collar of his blue suit, had
? rale that allows a subpoe-
naed witness to bar tele-
vision or other cameras dur-
ing his testimony.' SO the
Senate hearing room, the-:
'same grand, marble-pillared
chamber that once echoed'
? with Senator Sam J. Ervin
Jr.'s declamations, was light-
ed only by four heavy crystal
chandeliers.
Dr. Gordon, told the Sen-
ate anal, yes, he had stored
the shellfish toxin, which
? works by blocking the trans-
mission of nervous-system
Impulses. But he insisted that,
he had done so because, first;
he did not believe the 1969
and 1970 While Hose direc-
fives applied to the C.I.A.
and, second, they applied to
bacteriological agents, not
chemical one, anyway.
- He said that he thought it
important for the agency to
maintain "a potential capa-
bility in? behavioral materi-'
els,' 'meaning the shellfish'
poison and similar laboratory,
triuMphs. .
? Dr. Gordon's chief, Richard.
Helms, the former Director,
of Central Intelligence who
WASHINGTON STAR
10 September 1975
is now Ambassador to Iran;
sat in a reserved seat in the:
front row of the spectator
section. He seemed detached'.
and impassive, and he fiddled
with the cardboard "re-
served" sign as he listened
to Dr. Gordon.
During the morning, 'the,
:present directOr, William E.
Colby, told the committee
about some of the ways the
C.I.A. had devised to deliver
its various poisons, including
a formidable dart gun that'
:his lawyer, Mitchell Rogovin,
handed to the committee. 7
No Pointing
"Don't--point that at me,"
said Senator Frank Church,'
Democrat Of' Idaho, the corn-'
-mittee ?chairman,. lightly but,
nervously. Mr. Colby had told ?
the committee that the dart
'gun fired nearly silently and
was accurate at 100 meters.
Ite described, but did not
thave with him, such other de-
- vices as a fountain-pen dart
launcher and a bolt that,
When placed in a machine,
exudes its poison as the ma-
' chine warms in use. He had
brought the dart gun at the
committee's request.
Mr. Golby'a? account of Why
the shellfish taxin was not de-
.stroyed differed from Gor-
don's. The direator -said that
the "retired agency ? officer"
in charge?who turned out to
be Dr. Gordon?had. "made .
this decision based on the -
fact -that the. cost and diffi-
culty of isolating the shellfish
toxin : were so great that it
simply made no sense to de-
? stroy it, :partictilarly - when
there would be ? no future
source of the toxin."
But he also said, that the
precioua poison has been used
only once+ It ;was.% the .said,
'given to the I3-2 spy plane-
-pilot, Francis .Gary powers,
for the 1960 flight over the
_
Soviet :Union. Mr. Colby said
the toxin was ma tiny poison
needle concealed in a silver
dollar, to provide Mr. Powers
with "as optidn" in case he
was shot down: He was shot
. down, hut that was an otpion-
he chose- not to exercise: -
,
By Orr Kelly
Washington Star Staff Writer
Agents of the FBI have been as-
signed by the Justice Department to
investigate possible criminal actions
,involving the operations of the Cen-
' tral Intelligence Agency.
Robert Havel, spokesman for the
department, said Yesterday that the
? btireau agents were first called in to
probe one aspect-of the case several
months ago, but he said their work
had since been expanded to cover
other aspects.
The FBI probe is linked to the
Work of a committee made up of 13
lawyers from the criminal division
and three lawyers from the civil
' rights division- who are studying
possible violations of the criminal
laws by both the CIA and the FBI.
THE WORK of the committee is
? being supervised by Kevin I. Moro-
ney, a deputy assistant attorney
general who has long worked with
the CIA and the FBI. Also involved in -
? the probe are Dep. Atty. Gen. Harold
R. Tyler Jr., and Asst. Attys. Gen.
.Richard Thornburgh and J. Stanley
' Pottinger.
Assignment of agents from the
FBI, which is sometimes seen as a
rival to the CIA, to investigate the
intelligence ageney is ahighly
unusual step. Until recently, the CIA
even had an agreement with the Jus-
tice Department that permitted
agency officials -to discipline agency
employes, without notifying the Jus-
tice Department, even in case's in-
volving possible violation of the
criminal laws.
Havel refused to Say what possible
violations of the law were involved in
the FBI's part of the investigation.
HOWEVER, information made
available over the last eight months,
in newspaper reports, the report to
President Ford by CIA Director Wil-
liam Colby, the Rockefeller Report
and congressional investigations has
opened up the-possibility of violations
of- the criminal law in the foliowing
areas:
? Did Richard Helms, former CIA
director and' now ambassador to
Iran, commit perjury when he told a'
Senate committee the CIA had net
been involved in efforts to overthrow
the Chilean government?
? Is ? anyone criminally responsible
for the CIA's involvement in domes-
tic spying?
9 Did the CIA or its agents violate
the law by opening mail without a
warrant? ?
'4
? Was there any violation of the law
by the CIA in its reported involve-
ment in assasination attempts
against rulers of other countries?
? Did the CIA operate ? beyond its
legal authority in other areas ? and
did this involve violation of the
criminal laws?
? Did high ranking officials of the
government order the CIA to carry
out illegal activities ? and, in the
process, violate the criminal laws
themselves'?
The most likely areas for prosecu-
tion involve the perjury laws and
those covering the sanctity of the
mails.
On the other hand, Justice Depart-
ment lawyers say, it is quite possible
that the CIA, in its domestic spying
efforts, overstepped its authority but'
not in such a way that any individual
can be held responsible, for violating
the criminal laws.
So far, Havel said, the lawyers in-
volved in the probe have not felt the
need for help from professional
investigators in their investigation of
possible violations of the law by the
FBI or its agents. If they should need
such help, Havel said, investigators
from another agency would be called
in.
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ApproVOO For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6 -?
NEW YORK TIMES
13 September 1975,
President Bars House Unit
r From Seeing ata
By NICHOLAS
Special to The
:. WASHINGTON, -Sept. 12 ?
President Ford ordered today
? that the House Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence be cut off
from all classified documents,
. and he forbade Administration
officials to testify before the
committee on classified mat-
ters. He also demanded the
.return of classified material
now in the committee's hands.
His actions appeared to place
the White House on the most
serious collision course with
Congress regarding ? investiga-
tions of the intelligence agen-
cies since the sweeping in-
quiries began ?earlier this year.
At the center of the dispute
is the committee's decision
yesterday to make public four
words from a 1973 intelligence
agency summary, over the ob-
jection of officials of the in-
telligence community.
The words were made public
along with about 400 others
last nights but neither commit-
tee members nor Government
officials would identify the
phrase at issue:
However, authoritative sources
said the four words were
"and greater communications
security," which were part of a
list of activities taking place in
? Egypt the day the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war broke out.
The House committee voted
6 to 3 in a closed session yes-
terday afternoon ?to disclose
the four words in making pub-
lic a paragraph from a Defensl
Intelligence Agency secret sum-1
.mary of the activities. The
summary was. prepared on Oct.
6, 1973.
Mitchell Rogovin, counsel
for the Director of Central In-
telligence, told the closed ses-
sion that the intelligence agen-
cies belie.ved the words com-
promised national security by
revealing the "sources and
;methods" used to gather intel-
Iligence. .
1
Today, in a news conference,
William E. Colby, the Director
?
,of Central Intelligence, said he
:believed that keeping the four
'words secret was worth risking
a constitutional confrontation
between the President and the
House.
' The confrontation began
early today. Rex E. Lee, Assis-
tant Attorney General in charge
of the Civil Division? appeared
before the committee on behalf
of the President and called the
publication of the words of
"irreparable harm." He relayed
Mr. Ford's order.
M. HORROCK
New YCC1C Times
committee of the House that it
may not continue to Operate."
Mr. Lee said he believed it was
up to the committee. ?
Since the committee investi-
gatipn covers almost entirely
national security matters, Mr.
Ford's ban was considered of
grave import.
, Later, Mr. Pike, Democrat of
.Suffolk. County, told a report-
er, I for one would be very
isurprised if the committee votes
Ito return the documents that it
already has as a result of sub-
poena, and I'd ? be even more
isurprised if the members voted
,not to continue operation." -
- Several hours after the morn-
ing hearing, the C.I.A. received
a subpoena from the commit-
tee dated today.?
Both Mr. Lee and Mr. Colby
stressed that they were con-
cerned as much about the com-
mittee's future acts as about
what had been done.' se ?
When asked why' executive-
branch cooperation, with the
committee had been curbed,
Mr. Colby said, "We're going
to stop it until we can work
out an arrangement where we
have some assurance that there
won't-be any revelations with-
out our discussing it together."
- 'A committee source said he
felt the committee could pro-
ceed with information from
sources outside the Govern-
ment and with leads developed
, through the classified docu-
ments it had already received.
Court Delays Feared
The committee has always
had the option of going to
'court to enforce its subpoenas,
but both committee members
and Mr. Ford know that the
time spent in court would seri-
ously hamper the future of the
investigation, which is schede
uled to be completed by Jan.
31. '-i ;
t Until the Administration
made an issue of the four-word
phrase, no one had paid any
attention to it. The words ap-
peared In this context:
"Egypt [deletion] large scale
mobilization exercise may be,
an effort to -soothe internal
problems as much as to im-
prove military capabilities. Mo-
bilization of some personnel,
increased readiness of isolated
units, and greater communica-
tions security are all assessed
as parts of the exercise You-
tine."
:. Long-time intelligence agents
said that "and greater commu-
nications security" would alert
the Egyptians and Russians to
the fact that the United States
had penetrated their communi-
cations and even penetrated it
:when efforts were made to
have greater security. If a par-
ticularly sophisticated technique
;were being used to protect corn-
.munications. these words would
tell an intelligence analyst that
the United States had intruded
Representative Otis ?G. Pike,
the committee chairman, re-
sponded, "In other words the
executive branch is tellinge the
APP
NEW 'Oil( TINES
11 September 1975
C. I A. Given White House Data
On Ground They Be Kept Secret
Spedal to The
WASHINGTON, Sept. 10?
Representative Otis G. Pike,
chairman of the House Select
Committee on Intelligence.
said late today that the Ford
Adininistration was delivering
materials in response to a
committee subpoena, but under
the condition that the docu-
ments not be made public.
Earlier today, in a special
meeting, the -House committee
voted to subpoena briefing pa-
pers given to Presidents John-
son and Nixon on four major
international crises during their
Presidencies. Included were the
1973 Arab-Israeli war, the 1968
Tet offensive in South Vietnam,
the 1974 Turkish invasion of
Cyprus and last year's military
coup in Portugal.'
After a series of negotiations
between Mr. Pike and White
House officials, the Administra-
tion tonight began to deliver
material relating to the 1973
Arab-Israeli war. Originally,
Mr. Pike said, he had been
promised unclassified material.
Instead, he said, the Ad-
ministration has sent him secret
New York Times
material from the National Se-
curity Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency, which, he
said,, White House officials said
could not be made public. He
said the question of making it
public would be "negotiated"
later.
Meanwhile, Mr. Pike said, he
planned to begin hearings to-
morrow on American intelli-
gence on the Arab-Israeli war.
"These materials will not be
read at the hearing, but ques-
tions will be based upon them.'
said Mr. Pike, Democrat of
Suffolk.
The House committee has
consistently bristled at the ef-
fort by the Administration to
have matters handled in secret.
The House hearings are ex-
pected to examine the question
of whether the intelligence esti-
mats made by the various
agencies were accurate and
enabled the Presidents to prop-
erly respond to the crises with
which the were faced. These
are the second set of publio
hearings conducted by Mr..
Pike's committee.
said. -
But most suggested that nei-
ther Egyptians nor the Soviet
Union had any real doubt that
United states communications
spying was excellent and this
'phrase would have little conse-
quence.
Over-All Effect Feared
Administration sources said
that the White House had be--
come increasingly concerned
with the 'aggressiveness of the
House committee and with the
effect this would have on other
;committees. When the House
i committee voted yesterday to
'declassify documents "unilater-
lally." one well-placed Adminis-
tration source said, it raised thel
:specter that other Congression-
al committees might decide to
j follow. suit. ?
I The intelligence agencies and
defense units supoly a vast
amount of classified material to
!Congress and have over the
lyears been able to ."work out"
releases of the material that did
.not quote specific language or
conersromi se security.
"When .Mr. Pike took that
on." one source. said. "he was
shakine the whole tree."
Mr. Pike is apparently well
aware of this. During the
panel's public hearing today,
Mr. Pike objected to the past
arrangements between, the ex-
ecutive branch and Congress.
"That's exactly what's wrong,
Mr. Lee." he said. "For decades
committees of Congress have
not done their jobs and you've
been loving it. You could come
un here and whisper in one
friendly Congressman's ear. and
NEW YORK TIMES
13 September 1975
C.I.A. AIDES HELD
LIABLE FOR CRIMES'
WASHINGTON, Sept. 12 (UPI)
The Justice Department has
ruled that whatever immunity
they may have enjoyed in the,
past, Central Intelligence Agen-
cy employes will henceforth be
subject to Federal prosecution
for criminal offenses just. as
any Federal employe, Senator
Charles H. Percy said yesterday.
The Illinois Republican said
he had received a letter from
the Justice Department signed
by Assistant Attorney General .
Richard L. Thornburg stating:
"The Central Intelligence
Agency is . now, therefore, un-
questionably bound by the same
requirements as other executive
branch departments and agen-
cies with respect to referral of
allegations of Title 18, U. S.
[criminal] code, on the part of
its officers and employes."
. Mr. Percy said that the policy
statement, approved by Attor-
ney General Edward H. Levi,
put an end to a recently re-
vealed 1954 secret agreement
between the C.I.A. and the Jus-
tice Department whereby the
agency handled investigations
into criminal offenses of its own
?employes and their disposition.
C.I.A. officials in earlier hear-
ings argued that although in-
telligence operations were not
involved in crimes ranging from
theft of Governnient property to
embezzlement, the intelligence
duties of the offenders mightf
have been, compromised in an.
open trial.
-oOrcf KoPfkgealgrAtfide/108rt C4A6RDP717404,3R14606100 70001-6
5 in the mess we're in:" .
? Approved-ForNISEK Release 2Rtfi9Nthiefk-?9137-00432R000100370001-6
22 September 1975 16 September 1975
INTELLIGENCE:
Four Lithe Words
? In the months since its illegal domes-
tic operations were first disclosed, the
CIA and its sister intelligence agencies
have stoicly endured a steady drubbing
from Congress and -the press?and for a
time last week, it looked like more of the
same. The Senate select committee led
by Frank Church revealed yet another
CIA misdeed: the agency had apparently
.violated a direct Presidential order and
'Secretly retained a Stash of lethal poison.
The Church committee's counterpart in
the House quickly followed suit, releas-
ing a top-secret report that found U.S.
intelligence . to have been "starkly
wrong in reading the outbreak of the
1973 Arab-Israeli war. This time, howev-
er, the CIA counterattacked, accusing
the House committee of releasing the
kind of documents that could endanger
the nation's security.
? The controversy over the missing poi-
son dated to a 1970 order by Richard
Nixonthat all stockpiles of material used
in chemical and biological warfare be
destroyed.. Despite that, a recent CIA
Inventory turned up a small container of
cobra venom and eleven grams of saxi-
toxina nerve poison extracted from
butter clams?reportedly capable of kill-
ing 20,000 people. No one was quite sure
What the CIA had in mind for the poison,
though most agreed it was designed for
individual killings (or even -suicide pills
for CIA agents themselves) rather than
wholesale targets.
? The broader question was whO in the.
CIA had deliberately ? disobeyed the
? -President. One former agent hunched
-that Nixon had secretly told the CIA to
keep the toxins, but agency director
William Colby conceded to Church that
a violation of Presidential orders had
taken place, The likelihood was that
some mid-level official had done it on his
own. But whether it was a subordinate or
the director himself made little differ-
ence, according to Church. He said?
stricter outside controls were required.
? No War? lithe Senate committee hart
scored against the CIA, the agency itself
soon .scored against the House Commit-
tee. To.prove his claim that -U.S. intelli-
gence had failed to predict the 1973
,Arab-Israeli wareRep. Otis Pike of New
LYark released a Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) document issued, on June
6?hours after the outbreak of hostil-
ities?that concluded: "Mobilization of
some personnel; increased readiness of
:isolated units and greater communica-
tions security are all assessed as parts of
the exercise routine. . . There are still no
military or political indicators of Egyp-
tian intentions or preparations to resume'
? hostilities with Israel."
Colby charged that publication of four
-Words?"and . greater communications
'-seturity"e?might have jeopardized U.S.
intelligence "sources . and methods,"
Presumably some inside line on Egyp-
tian communication procedures. Pike
dismissed that argument as invalid. And
he was furious when the White House
Sept an assistant attorney general to
realaim all classified doctiments?or ex-
act a standard pledge that the committee
x?,ould not declassify any material with-
out executive-branch approval. "That's
exactly' what's wrong," stormed Pike.
"For decades other committees .of Con-
Four Little Words
And CIA's Failures
Four little words from a classified
document, we were told, could endan-
ger national security.
Gerald Ford, who prides himself on .
his even temper, threw something
like a fit over them He stamped the
presidential foot and said the House
Select Committee on Intelligence
must forthwith return to him all the
classified docuinents he had so
generously sent up to them.
The four little words, which Were
eventually disclosed by the CIA, pro-
vided no enlightenment. "And great-
er communications security" doesn't
sound like a phrase to signal the end
of western civilization or even com-
plicate the life of an agent in the
Balkans.
But against Rep. Otis Pike, D-N.Y.,
the chairman of the committee, the
four words were the only stones the
President could throw.
PIKE IS going after the wrong
thing in his investigation. He is not
beguiled by assassinations, poison-
ings and other reprehensible covert
activities. He is going for the agen-
cy's throat. He is examining its very
reason for being: its performance in
intelligence activities.
He is compiling a litany of failures
in spying, which is what CIA defend-
ers say it does best.
-Pike has found out that their
record has been lamentable: CIA
failed to foretell the Arab-Israeli War
in 1973, the invasion of Cyprus in
1974; the coup in Portugal, the Arab
oil embargo, the Indian nuclear
explosion and the Tet offensive
1968:
The four words that caused the
commotion occur in a classified docu-
ment which is called "A Preliminary
Post-Mortem Report on the Intelli-
gence Community's Performance Be-
fore time Arab-Israeli War." The
agency morosely concludes that
agents of both the Defense Intern-
gress have not done theirjob, and you've
loved it." Not only would the panel
retain the contested papers, Pike indicat-
ed, but it issued a new subpoena?for
Vietnam war documents?returnable
this week.
That seemed to prefigure a major
court test. But Pike, whose committee
franchise expires next January, was re-
luctant to lose the time in litigation, and
the intelligence community seemed
fearful of setting a legal precedent for
Congressional declassification The li-
keliest outcome seemed to be some sort
of negotiated settlement in which Con-
gress would continue to probe, but more
caution-sly, while the White House eon-
tinned to provide- the witnesses and
documents.
?SANDRA SALMANS with ANTHONY MARRO in Washington 6
gence Agency and the CIA were
"simply, obviously starkly wrong."
On the morning the Egyptians
marched, the Watch Committee was
still receiving reassurances from
agents warning of nothing more seri-
ous than "small-scale action."
Last Thursday, in executive ses-
sion, the committee members and
Mitchell Rogovin, CIA Director Wil-
liam E. Colby's counsel, haggled for
two hours over release of the spooks'
classified failures. Rogovin insisted
on the deletion of 13 words, including
the fateful four. By vote of 6 to 2, the
committee, decided that the Ameri-
can people had a right to know about
"and greater communication securi-
ty," which any alert ham operator
could have noted at the time.
IN EVERY case; Rogovin insisted
that publication would "endanger
sources and methods."
At the committee's defiance admin-
istration panicked. An emergency
meeting was held in the office of
White House counsel Philip M. Bu-
chen. A counterattack was launched'.
An assistant attorney general, Rex
E. Lee, was chosen to do up to Capi-
tol Hill and instruct Otis Pike in his
responsibilities.
It was a suicide rhission. Pike is not
the kind of man who quails at the
sight of a representative from the
Justice Department or pales at the
suggestion that he is violating House
rules and the Constitution.
Lee bravely spoke of the "necessary
accommodation between the execu-
tive and the legislative," reproved
Pike for a "serious breach in the use
of classified information in an
improper manner."
He urged, in those paragraphs Pike
allowed him to complete, "a return to
the traditional approach" ? "the
same' way that for decades other
committees.. . ."
Pike landed on him. "That is what
is wrong, Mr. Lee," he said, "For
decades other committees of Con-
gress have not done their job and you
have loved it."
ADVISING Congress, Pike contin-
ued in the same biting tone, has
meant that "the executive branch
Comes up and whispers in one friend-
ly congressman's ear or another
friendly congressman's ear, and that
:is exactly what you want to continue
and this is exactly what I think has
led us into the mess we are in." .
By concentrating on the supposedly
defensible aspect of the intelligence
community's activities, Pike poses
the greatest threat to CIA's contin-
ued existence. He may not endanger
"sources and methods." He endan-
gers survival. Evil is forgivable on
Capitol Hill; incompetence is not.
Even the agency does not defend
what Frank Church's Senate commit-
tee is looking illtD. Colby and compa-
ny don't mind those ex-post-facto
examinations of the indefensible, and
have cooperated, with an occasional
show of reluctanee.
But when Pike reveals they're, not
even doing what they're supposed to
do, he's telling CIA's darkest secret.-
No wonder four words were used as
an excuse to try to close down his
dangerous prying.
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WASHINGTON POST
12 September 1975
rong'
g ar net r. By then, Cline testified, "M
Washington Post Staff writer staff and I had concluded tha
U.S. intelligence experts hostilities probably were im
'were "starkly wrong" abont
the imminence of the 1973 war
in the Middle East .that led to
the Arab oil boycott, .the
House intelligence committee
disclosed yesterday.
.According to portions of a
top-secret postmortem subpoe-
naed from the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, ' there were
plenty of danger signals be-
fore hostilities broke out on
. Oct. 6,1973, but not a single
agency in the government's in-
telligence Community took
-them seriously enough i to
produce an official warning.
The former director of one
of those agencies, the State
Department's Bureau of In-
telligence and Research, told
the committee he felt that the
war, and the oil boycott it
produced, could have been
avoided by diplomatic efforts
if the dangers had been recog-
nized.
Instead, even after the war
had started, the so-called
Watch Committee, which was
set up to advise the National
Security Council in, times of
crisis; said it could "find no
lard evidence of a major, co-
. ordinated Egyptian-Syrian of-
Tfensive."
y before Oct. 6 "failed to turn
t up any official statement from
- any office or committee re-
sponsible for producing fin-
ished, .analytical intelligence
which contributed anything
resembling- a warning" as
such. ' ? ?
The study found that "in-
stead of warnings, the Com-
munity's analytical effort in
effect produced reassurances
. . . that the Arabs would not
resort to .war, at least not
deliberately."
Despite the benefits of hind-
sight, the report said there
was' no escaping the fact that
"the principal conclusions con-
minent ' and drew up a draft
memo to that effect. He said
he asked that Kissinger be 'no-
tified "that we had reached
this conclusion" but learned
later that night that the State
Department secretariat and
Kissinger's personal staff "did
not want to trouble him in
New York at that late hour
8 or 9 o'clock in the evening."
A phone call to Kissinge
might not have made muc
difference at that point, Clin
said, but at least it would no
have been true. as has bee
written, that when the secre
tary went to bed that night h
"was sure . . that ther
cerntng the imminence of hos-
by Egyptian President Anv ser
Sadat. In addition, Cline salt:,
under the so-called "detente.
treaties, the Soviet Union was
obligated to consult with .the
United States on threats:: to
peace.
? . Rep. Morgan F. Murphi(D-
III.) said he the-eight this "a ?
pretty dangerous situatiorol',
"The bottom line is 4've
really got a one-man show'; in
foreign policy, Murphy pro-
tested. He said he thought
some "meddling- in Dr. tKis-
singer's activities" was "long
overdue." .
Cline said Congress shtiiild
consider legislation prohibit-
- tilities reached ? and reiterated I ing the same person fromehe-
e .
bv those responsible for in.' ing simultaneously Secretary
e
telligence analysis were?quite
simply, obviously, and stArkly
?wrong."
wouldn't be a war."
[The State Department last
night disputed Cline's testi-
mony, saying that Kissinger
"had. grown increasingly con-
cerned" in the Week preceding
the war "that hostilities might
break out." A State Depart-
ment spokesman said Kissing-
er had requested assessments
of the situation "every 48
hours" from the CIA and the
State Department's intelli-
gence bureau that.Cline head-
ed.
["During -that period the in-
telligence agencies were in
? The mistaken findings and agreement that hostilities were
predictions of the Watch Corn-
not imminent," the spokesman
anittee and other agencies said. All of their reports . . .
were made public only after a
closed-door committee debate predicted that there would not
sprompte.d by , CIA protests. be a war."
Other, more 'generalized por- "The spokesman said it was .
. tons of the secret postmor- "astounding" that if ...Cline
tem were released at a morre? "was in fact concerned about
ing meeting. ? - ? the outbreak of war he did not
? .. The hearing also brought a take effective ,action" through
. sharp attack on Secretary of available channels' to "assure
State Henry. A. Kissinger, that the secretary or other
liwhose penchant for secrecy responsible officials were
' was blamed for repeatedly de- warned."]
' .priving intelligence ex.perts ? Censored segments of 'the
sif vital information during.
"Preliminary Postmortem Re-
he Nixon administration. -
or of in at the
port" ? on. the U.S. intelligence
. tf
Ray S. Cline, ? former direct-
community's performance
nrior to the -1973 Arab-Israeli
I,State Department, said the i War were read into the public
."passion for secrecy" at the I record at the hearing by Wil-
Mixon White House was so in- I liam Parmenter, chief of the
tense that "senior intelligence i CIA's Office of Current Intel-
officers could not find out I ligence. ? .
InoW to assist our policymak- 1 The war broke out on Oct.
ibeg process.'' . ' 16, 1973, when Egyptian forces
[ He said he grew so discour- I crossed ' into Israeli-occupied
[aged and dismayed that by the territory on the East Bank- of
' time of the Middle East crisis,Ithe Suez Canal. Syrian Mall-
on the night of Oct. 5, 1973, he I try and armor attack i the
decided against bothering Kis- Golan Heights the same day.
iiiger, who was in New York, I- According to the study on
with the newfound conclusion I the results of American spy-
that fighting seemed about to ! work, however, a thorough
break out. 'search of the reports issued
of State and White Houseead-
viser for National Security Af-
fairs. Kissinger holds both
The study emphasized that posts. Cline maintained That
finding by noting that U.S. the only job of the President's
experts had been provided NSA adviser should be a 'ort
with "a plenitude of informa- of honest broker between the
tion which should have sug- secretaries of State and pe-
gested, at a minimum that fense, making sure the Presi-
dent is getting all the faets.
they take very seriously the
threat of. war in the near By a vote of 6 to 3, the .COm-
term." mittee decided at an executive
These signs, Cline testified session yesterday afternoon to
under questioning by Rep. release samples of the errone-
James P. (Jim) Johnson (R- ous intelligence assessments
Colo.), included Egyptian after Chairman Otis G. Pike
troop movements, cancellation (D-N.Y.) complained about the
of military leaves, imposition top-secret label the CIA and
of tight recurity by the Egyp- other agencies wanted to keep
tians, and on Oct. 4, 1973, the on them.
evacuation of dependents of The CIA's Parmenter
Soviet advisers from Egypt claimed that disclosure of
and Syria. these mistaken predictions
Emphasizing tim e Soviet could compromise "intelli-
withdrawal, Cline said the Rus- gence sources and* methods,"
sians were given advance warn- but Pike said he found ,that
ing of the attack into the Sinai incredible.
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
16 September 1975
--FOUR LITTLE -WORDS-
-have provoked a serious clash between, the White Houser
and the -House Intelligence Committee -over the .use of
top-secret documents furnished to the panel. ? -
President Ford is demanding the return of: all' the
data because Chairman Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) incorporated
one short passage blue-penciled by the Central Intelligence-
-
Agency in a report devoted to., establishing that U.S.
intelligence failed to predict the Yom Kippurwar.
'In" defending the panel's -action, Pike, is on shaky,
ground. Words which ? appear innocent enough to lay-
men's eyes may convey considerable meaning and provide
valuable information to-the operatives of another. country. .
As a: matter of fact, we can see .no purpose in releas-
ing verbatim excerpts from intelligence documents at all. ?
The .reports ? could easily.: be paraphrased without.
losing their essential -flavor. Or; as in the instant case;
? Without altering the conclusion that .:-the ? CIA. misinter-
preted the signs of impending conflict in the Middle East
in..1973.,
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
14 September 1975
^,
CIA Probe
Help
Help Sen. Church
Enter \ 176 Race
BY ROBERT L. JACKSON
Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON?When 'open Sen-
ate hearings on the Central Intel-
ligence Agency start Tuesday,. the
country may get to know a lot more
'about a boyish-looking liberal Demo-.
crat named FrankChurch. ?
Church. who was the nation's
youngest senator when Idaho first
elected him at age 32 in 1956, has
more than enough work these days.
e Aside from being chairman of the.
Senate's long investigation into the
CIA and other intelligence-gathering
agencies, he is chairman of a foreign
relations subcommittee that is prob-
ing evidence of international bribery
and payment of illegal U.S. campaign:
contributions by some major defense
contractors and oil companies.
- .
Church had begun quietly to orga-
nize a drive for the Democratic pres-
idential nomination last January. His
sub sequent appointment to head the
Senate's special committee on .intel-
ligence activities forced him to call
off those plans?at least temporarily.
Some believe the CIA hearings and
their wide televison exposure will
boost him to national prominence. If
-that should happen, he may rekindle
? his presidential campaign, when the
panel's work concludes by next
spring.
? The committee's seven-month in-
vestigation so far has been conducted
in closed hearings. When he finally
was ready to go public, Church tried
to give the coming hearings a big
buildup. The effort failed.
Church coyly told reporters that
the first day or two would deal with
"a very important subject. that has
not yet come to light." But word be-
an to leak out from Administration
sources that he was referring to the
CIA's retention of bacterial poisons,
and Church was forced to provide de-
:tails.
'Subsequent hearings will deal with alleged abuses
. against U.S. citizens by the CIA, the FBI, the Internal
Revenue Service and other intelligence agencies. The
committee's findings on the CIA's alleged involvement in
plots to assassinate foreign leaders will be made public in
j a report.
Church is not, known as a tough-skinned, hard-nosed in-
vestigator. On the contrary, during his 18 years ,in the
Senateehe has been regarded by some, as a bit soft, some-
-"what erudite and more eager for compromise than con-.
, frontation.
He is cautious and deliberate. ,When he 'speaks, he
t knows how his sentences will end... In briefing reporters
after dozens of closed hearings by his CIA committee,
Church has been precise in his remarks, yet reluctant to
give sensitive de:tails.
- His patience has paid off in obtaining CIA records. Al-
though the White House and CIA at first resisted giving.
IChurch the top-secret material he wanted, Church spent
weeks working out a careful agreement for handling dif-
feient files.
"We think We have it all, he said, referring to records
I that deal with the CIA's alleged involvement in foreign
lassassination plots. In an interview, he acknowledged that
there 'were gaps in the written record but said that this
I was "not because anything was withheld but because the
evidence simply doesn't exist in some cases."
No date has been set for release of the assassination re-
port. ?
I "It's like writing 'War and Peace,'" Church said, refer-
ring to the length of the report. "We have reviewed a
vast number of documents, including National Security.
.Council files, and have taken 8,000 pages of testimony
i from over 100 witnesses." ?
As to why the committee felt it necessary to disclose
, any CIA involvement in assassination plots, Church said: .
"It's an aberration, really, from the traditional American
i practice in the world and our historic principles. It fell to
i us to do this job because the Rockefeller commission
'would not treat it." This was a reference to the Commis-
sion on CIA Activities Within the United States, a group
headed by Vice President Rockefeller.
Church said the report would address such questions as
'!'how did it happen and who ordered it." ?
1 "Some of the conclusions we reach will have general ap-
plication to the rest of the CIA investigation," he added.
? "They will deal with the command and control of the CIA"
Church said in July that the panel had found no direct
involvement by former Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower
.and John F. Kennedy or former Atty. Gen. Robert F:
Kennedy in plotting foreign assassinations. Some Republi-
cans on the committee have said there is no direct
:evidence to clear these officials, either.
Lacking presidential direction, the CIA "may have been '
.behaving like a rogue elephant on a rampage," Church
suggested at that time.
It was Church's early interest in foreign affairs and in
questionable CIA activities in Chile that resulted in his
seeking?and obtaining?the chairmanship of, this corn-I
mittee. Senate Majority Leader.Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.)
appointed him to the job last January.
Following 1972 disclosures of close ties between the
'government and the International Telephone & Telegraph
Corp., Church?as a member of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee?investigated links between ITT and
CIA in Chile. He did so as chairman of the subcommittee
on multinational corporations, the same panel that now is
investigating international payoffs by large companies.
The* subcommittee?acting on evidence obtained by
syndicated columnist Jack Anderean?found that MI' had
. offered the CIA $1 million to prevent Marxist SalVador
.Allende from gaining power in Chile. ITT had large hold-
ings 'in that country.
"CIA turned down the money but proceeded on its own
to do the work," Church said. His subcommittee was the
first to obtain testimony from a CIA agent about foreign
covert operations.
Church believes "a very pervasive sickness" is afflicting
the United States. Among the symptoms, he said, is "con-
tempt for the law" by some large corporations and-
. government agencies alike. ,
"Big corporations ama showing contempt for the law
with payoffs and bribery abroad and illegal campaign
contributions at home as though regard for the law were
of no concern in the board rooms," he said.
Federal agencies such as the CIA, FBI and Internal
Revenue Service, he said, have violated- the constitutional
rights of U.S. citizens by illegal wiretaps, burglaries or
surveillances.
"These are the very agencies that are charged- with
upholding and obeying the laws," Church said,
? Church's introduction to ethical and political questions
came early. His father, the late Frank Forrester Church
Sr., a political conservative who owned a sporting goods
business in Boise, insisted that his son debate him on ma-
jor issues of the day.
"My father was deeply intereSted in politics bur he mis-
trusted all politicians," Church said. "He hated (President
Franklin Delano) Roosevelt with a vengeance."
Young Church, a mamber of the junior high school de-
bating team, made frequent. trips to the library to investi-
8
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"gate his father's statements. ?
? "I found that the other side was much more persuasive,"'
he
he said. "I began, to like the Democratic Party."
His love for public speaking led him to enter?and win
?an American Legion national oratory contest at age 16.
Critics say Church has never outgrown a foundness for
the sound of his own Voice. He loves to declaim?some
times even when briefing reporters on the CIA commit-
tee's business.
. One -speech he would like to forget, however, was his
nationally televised keynote address to the 1960 Demo--
cratic National Convention?a flowery, podium-pounding
oration that Church acknowledges was dreadful. "I didn't
know any better," he smiles.
Church's inner toughness, his friends say, was demon-
strated in his little-known bOut with cancer while he was:
a law student, first at, Harvard and later at Stanford, in
:the late 1940s.
What began as a severe pain the lower back was diag-
nosed as cancer of the stomach and groin. Doctors per-
formed radical surgery but told Church they could not re-
move all the affected areas.,They said the 23-year-old stu-
dent had only months to live.
? But a, radiologist at Stanford, in a routine review, of
Church's file, decided his cancer might be receptive to X-
-ray therapy:- He prescribed a treatment that would be
agonizing. Church was told he would be taken "literally to
the edge of death" by daily radiation treatments that'
would turn his skin purple while killing the malignancy..
For several weeks he suffered severe nausea every, day
after each treatment A six-footer, he went down to a ske-
letal 80 pounds.
-In this crisis, as in his public career, Church says he
could not have made it without his wife, Bethine, his high
school sweetheart whom he married in 1947. When they
'met, Bethine's father, the late Chase A. Clark, was gover-
nor. of Idaho.
Friends say the politically astute Mrs. Church is one of
the senator's most influential advisers.
? . Church's voting record in the Senate has placed him in
the liberal bloc on almost every issue except gun control.
There, reflecting home-state interests,. he has fought gun
legislation on grounds it would serve only "to harass
sportsmen and other law-abiding citizens."
Church's opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam,
which he first expressed in a Senate speech in 1965, re-
sulted largely from his service on the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee.
"When I first came to the Senate I was pretty rhuch a
knee-jerk liberal," he said. "It was considered unpatriotic ,
to oppose U.S. foreign policy. We all accepted the slogan,
THE WASHINGTON STAR
12 September 1975
COM men tary
James 3. Kilpatrick (WTOP TV and Radio): "A word
Of encouragement is in order for. the House Ethics
Committee in the matter of Michael Harrington, a
congressman from Massachusetts. There had been
some apprehension that the committee would quietly c,
sweep the Harrington affair under the nearest riy
Now it appears that on Sept. 17, after a procedur
led in the complaint: against Mr. Harringtonita.S.:aleen
corrected, the committee will get down to serious
deliberation. The facts are not in much dispute. Last
. year Mr. Harrington wanted to look at some secret
,testimony in the files of the Armed Services Commit-
tee, having to do with CIA activities in Child. The com-
mittee rules permit members to read such transcripts,
provided they agree not to divulge the contents in any,
way whatever. . . . By his own unapalogetic asser-
tion, he immediately went out and dishonored the
. rules. Since then,.Mr. Harrington has sought to justify
his willful breach of House rules by denouncing the
CIA's conduct in Chile. But the issue before the Ethics
Committee is not the conduct of the CIA in Santiago,
but the conduct of Mr. Harrington in Washington."
'Politics ends at the water's edge.' ? ?
- "But my education began after I was appointed to the
Foreign Relations Committee two years later." .
Church said he was shocked to learn that "we were giv-
ing $350 million, a year to rich Western European coun-
tries. It was the old Uncle Sucker business." - ? ? -
"I began to look more critically at military aid and other
aid programs?how we often wound up arming both sides
in a conflict and getting blamed by both," he said.
Church recalled the early 1960s, when the United-States
chiefly assisted the South Vietnamese with American ad-
visers and limited aid.
"I went along with it, believing that we were assisting.
the Diem government to prevent the Communists from
taking over," he said.
But Church said he became "increasingly cynical when
we began sending in our own people in large numbers."
. In February, 1965, he broke with the Johnson adminis-
tration in a speech that called for a negotiated settlement
in Vietnam.
A furious President Lyndon B. Johnson zeroed in on
Church's remark that. he (Church) agreed with columnist
Walter Lippmann on Vietnam. Johnson told reporters he
had advised Church: "The next time you want a dam in
'Idaho, you go to Walter Lippmann for it."
Church said that Mr. Johnson had never told him this,
"but he probably wished that he had said it."
Continuing his opposition to U.S. involvement in South-
east Asia, Church was coauthor with former Sen. John
Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) in 1970 of the landmark legisla-
tion that came to be known as the Cooper-Church amend-
ment. It prohibited the use of funds for introducing com-
bat troops into Cambodia and Laos.
The first statutory limit of its type ever imposed by
_
Congress, the Cooper-Church legislation was followed by.
additional restrictions on the President's war-making pow-
ers in 1971 and 1973.
Church's familiarity with foreign affairs has undoubted-
ly been an asset in his CIA investigation. Aside from in-
vestigating U.S. links to the murders of foreign leaders,
his committee has sought documents and testimony about
CIA covert operations abroad.
Activities abroad, however, are not likely to be dis- ?
closed in the public hearings. Church and other committee
members have said they do not want to impair the effec-
tiveness of the CIA but only to show where reforms and
improvements are needed.
?
Whether Church decides to seek his p4ty's nomination
for President will largely depend on ho*, well the com-
mittee does its work and how the public 'perceives its ef-
forts.
"This investigatior.," Church says, "could be a minefield."
PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
11 August 1975
A promotion campaign "in exile" has
been scheduled for author Philip Agee,
whose controversial "Inside the Compa-
ny: CIA Diary" ($9.95) was published by
Stonehill August 8. Fearing possible gov-
ernment prosecution of Agee, Stonehill
substituted a series of interviews, talk
shows and other programs by phone
from Windsor and Toronto, Canada, in-
stead of the major 20-city tour previously
planned for him. Agee is currently being
heard in all the planned 20 cities on both
radio and TV. Meanwhile, his book sold
two printings of 50,000 copies before
publication and now has an additional
50,000 on order, for a total of 100,000 in
print. "Inside the Company: CIA Diary"
is a full selection of the Saturday Review
Book Club and the Library of Political
and International Affairs Book Club, be-
sides being used by 11 Macmillan book
. clubs.
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9
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WASHINGTON POST
19 September 1975
False
in 8 Tet S
By George-
Washington P
'A former Central Intelli-
gence Agency analyst charged
yesterday that the Commu-
nists' 1963 Tet offensive in
South Vietnam caught 'U.S. of-
ficials by ? surprise because en-
emy .strength had been
"deliberately downgraded" to
mislead the American public.'
"Although our aim was to
fool the American press, the
public and the Congress, we in
intelligence succeeded best in
fooling 'ourselves," former CIA
intelligence expert Samuel A.
Adams told the House intelli-
gence committee.
Backing up some of his
charges with what he de-
scribed as notes based on still
secret documents, Adams
said the distortions were con-
doned by- a number of high-
ranking officials, including
former U.S. Ambassador to Vi-
etnam Ellsworth Bunker, for-
mer White House national se-
curity adviser Walt- W. Ros-
tow, former CIA Director
Richard Helms, a n.d Gens.
Creighton W. Abrams, Earle
0. Wheeler and William C.
Westmoreland.
He said they were among
these "who knew there was an
attempt going on-to fool the
press" and thus the American
public.
Still battling with the White
House over secret government
documents relevant to its in-
vestigations, the committee
went ahead With yesterday's
hearing as part of an effort to
make the impasse as painful
a.s possible for the Ford ad-
ministration.
? -They're going to be aw-
fully sorry before we're
:done," predicted a committee
'source. "Debating an empty
I -
chair can be very effective,"
said another. "That's what
we're doing."
Angered by the committee's
insistence' on the right to ,
declassify secret documents,
President Ford last week de-
manded the, return of all clas-
sified papers that House in-
vestigators have obtained so
far and vowed to produce no
morn government witnesses at-
records unless the committee
changes its position.
Chairmen Otis Pike (D-N.Y.)
said yesterday he was confi-
dent of winning ?a court fight
on the issue and added that it
would have to start "relatively
soon" if the committee should
choose that course. But. he
seemed content for the. mo-
ment to rely on the pressure of
public hearings.
The committee's ranking Re-
publican, Re-p. Robert McClory
lame
r rise
Lardner Jr.
not Staff WrIter
(Ill.), was reluctant to continue
yesterday's session in public
after Adams .started reeount-
ing the contents of various
"Secret. Eyes Only" cables, but
the committee voted 6 to 3
against going into executive'
session.
"I don't think anything the
witness has revealed or is go-
ing to reveal is going to jeop-
ardize our operations in Viet-
nam," Pike said caustically. .
Chief analyst! on the Viet-
cong for' seven of his 10 years .
with the CIA, Adams has been
highly critical of the agency'
since he resigned in 1973, espe-
cially over his unsuccessful ef-
forts to persuade the U.S. in-
telligence &immunity- to ac-
cept more realistic estimates
of enemy troop strength.
Unlike other U. S. intelli-
gence foulups, Adams said,
the, astonishment over the
thassiv'e nature of the Tet of-
fensive "stemmed in large ,
meaSure from corruption in
the intelligence process." U. S.
military officials were so un-
prepared, he said, that in the
days following Tet, some 1,200
American aircraft in Vietnam
were destroyed or damaged,
mostly by shrapnel from artil-
lery shells.
The trouble, Adams said,.
was that "American intelli-
gence had so denigrated the
:Vietcong's capabilities that we
simply could not have pre-
dicted the size of the Tet at-
tack." -
As the CIA's only full-time
Vietcong analyst in 1966, Ad-
ams pointed out however, that
he came across documents in- ?
dicating that the strength of
the Communist forces in Viet-
nam?then officially estimated
at just under 300,000?was ac-
tually twice that, or close to
600,000. By mid-1967, he said,
the evidence of a much bigger
enemy army was so massive
that the CIA agreed with him..
Gen. Westmoreland's com-
mand, however, began lobby-
ing to keep the estimate below
300,000. Adams charged, be-
cause it feared public reaction
to higher numbers.
To back up his assertions,
Adams cited portions of a
"Secret, Eyes Only" cable
from Gen. Abrams in Saigon to
Gen. Wheeler, then head of
I the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on
!Aug. 20, 1967. Adams said it
'frowned on ? higher troop
strength estimates as "in
sharp contrast to the current
overall strength figure of
about 299,000 ' given to the
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NEW YORK TIMES
19 September 1975
. press here." ? .7 -? ? ...IV
Gen. Abrams, the witness
said, then suggested dropping:
two categories of Vietcong i
from the strength estimate. I
"We have been projecting an!
image of success over the ye-
cent months," Abrams report-
' edly declared, adding that if
the higher numbers were to
, become public, "all those who
have an incorrect view of the
- war 'will be reinforced and the
task will be more difficult."
After a conference with CIA.
, officials, Adams said, West-
moreland's -. public relations ,
staff prepared a "blatantly:
misleading" draft briefing for 1
.the press which was circulated
among officials in Washingtonl
and Saigon for comment.
, Ambassador Bunker voiced
his views ? on the proposed
briefing with a "Secret, Eyes
Only" cable to White House
adviser Rostow, Adams added.
He said the Bunker cable
stated that telling the press
that certain categories of VC
!troops had been droppd from?
the new enemy est im ate
"seems .to me simply to invite
trouble. We may end up with
stories that enemy strength is
!greater rather than less."
-1 The press - briefings began in
1Saigon in ? November and re-
porters were told that enemy
strength had actually declined
! to 242,000 because of, heavyd
casualties and plummeting mor-1
? ale.
Chairman Pike said hej
found Adams' testimony
"absolutely devastating."
'We rely on our intelligence
to provide us with objective
.data," Pike said. "In this case,
it seems to me that political .
decisions were made after
which intelligence was shaped
to fit the 'political decisions." I
.. -.Adams also told -of a 1969
study he did with a colleague
that concluded there were 30,-
000 Vietcong planted 'in the
South Vietnamese government
and army. By .contrast, Adams
said, he knew of only one spy
the United States had among
the Vietcong 'before the Tet
offensive.
On one occasion, he said,
the spy came up with what
amounted to the plan for the,
ITet offensive in Danang.-
The information was turned
over to the CIA station in Sal-'
gon?which did not bother. for-,
warding it to Washington?
and to the Marines, who "did,
pay attention," Adams said
They deployed their forces so
raeit that they decimated the
Vietcong who attacked Dan-
, ng. Among the victims was
the secret agent, Adams said.
"We were back down to zero
after Tet," Adams said. "The.
. score was 30,000 to zero." .
10
FALSE TROOP DATA
IN VIETNAM CITED
Ex-C.I.A. Man Quotes Secret
?apers to Show Deliberate
Underrating of Vietcong
By JOHN M. CREVVDSON
Special to The New York Times
, WASHINGTON, Sept. I8?A
former Vietnam specialist for
the Central Intelligence Agency
today quoted to a House com-
mittee from what he said were
previously undisclosed military.
and diplomatic cablegrams sup-
porting his previous assertions
of a deliberate effort to under-
value the strength of Commu-
nist forces in South Vietnam.
Samuel A. Adams, who
served for seven years, as the
principal C.I.A. analyst studying
the insurgents, told the com-
mittee that the surprise of the
Vietcong's 1968 Tel offensive
had resulted largely from un-
derrating the Communists'
strength by as much as one-
half.
Mr. Adams resigned from the
-C.I.A. in 1973, impugning its
honesty in connection with
underestimates of the size of!
the insurgency. As a witness
for the defense at the ePnta-
gon papers trial in that year,
Mr. Adams said there had been
"political pressures in the mili-
tary to display the enemy as
weaker than he actually was."
He made the same point in last
May's issue of Harper's maga-
zine.
As evidence of his assertions,
Mr. Adams included in today's
testimony parts of two secret
cablegrams transmitted from
Saigon to Washington in the
fall of 1967. He did not display
copies of the documents.
The first, he said, was a
"secret eyes only" message
sent Aug. 20 from the late Gen.
Creighton W. Abrams Jr., then
the denuty American military
commander in Vietnam, to Gen.
Earle G. Wheeler, the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
By that time, Mr. Adams told
members of the Select Commit-
tee in Intelligence of the House
of Representatives, thre was
documentary evidence that
Communist strength was nearly
600,000 troops.
Gneral 'Abrams's message
said the ,newly found higher
numbers were "in sharp con-
trast to the current over-all
strength figure of about 299,-
000 given to the presS here,"
Mr. Adams said.
General Abrams "thereupon
suggested dropping two eaten
gories of VC from the strength
estimated in order to keep it
at its old level," Mr. Adams
said.
."The main reason for this,
he indicated, was 'press re-
action,'" Mr. Adams added.
Representative Otis G. Pike,
the Long Island Democrat who
heads the select intelligence
committee, asked Mr. Adams
whether a "fair ca iracteriza-
lion" of his testimuny would
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support the inference that "in-
telligence was shaped to fit de-
cisions that had already been
-made." "Yes, Sir," Mr. Adams
? replied softly.
General Abrams's position
was supported, Mr. Abrams
said, by Ellsworth Bunker,
then the ambassador to South
Vietnam.
Mr. Bunker suggested in a
cablegram on Oct. 28 to Walt
W. Rostow, President Johnson's
national security adviser, that
no public mention be made of
the dropping of the two cate-
gories of Vietcong forces from
the strength figures.
"Given the overriding need
to demonstrate progress in
grinding down the enemy," Mr.
Adams quoted Ambassador
Bunker as having said, "it is
essential that we do not drag
too many red herrings across
the trail."
To make such a disclosure,
the Bunker message cautioned,
"seems to me simply to invite
trouble.
"We may end up with stories
that enemy strength is greater
rather than less," the ambas-
sador added:-"Far better in our
view is to deal with the matter
orally if it arises [in hones of]
forestalling many confusing
and undesirable questions." ,
Two weeks later, Mr. Adams
noted, the military told the
press at a briefing in Saigon
that Communist strength had
actually declined to 242,000,
"due to heavy casualties and
plummeting morale."
The Tet offensive of 1968 is
one of four international crises
that the Pike committee has
chosen as models for its cur-
rent inquiry into whether intel-
lengence agencies, and princi-
pally the C.I.A., were providing
sufficient forewarnings to pol-
icy-makers.
The intelligence panel last
week subpoenaed a number of
secret intelligence documents
dealing with official foreknowl-
edge of the Tet offensive, the
1973 Middle East war, and last
year's invasion of Cyprus by
Turkey? all of which caught
the United States off guard to
some extent.
After the committee made
public over the C.I.A.'s objec-
tions a single phrase from an
intelligence summary dealing
with the Arab build-up in the
1973 war, President Ford or-
dered that the committee's ac-
cess to further secret documents
be halted. The matter is now at
an impasse.
The committee's- decision to
go ahead with the testimony of
Mr. Adams is being interpreted
as an effort by Mr. Pike to dem-
onstrate to the White 'House
that his investigation will con-
tinue with or without its assist-
ance, and to put pressure on
the President to provide docu-
ments and witnesses to report
critics of the intelligence agen-
cies.,
Thil-nd?a;,'Se;'teinI;er 11., 1975
Crosby S. Noyes-
We have tied the hands
of inte ence agencies
In the frenzy of Introspec-
tion that always follows an
attempt to kill a president,
the Secret Service and the
intelligence agencies in
general are coming in for a
good deal of predictable
criticism.
It is outrageous, we are
-told, that a known follower
- of Charles Manson was al-
? lowed to get within a couple
feet of Gerald Ford. In the
same way, the Warren
? Commission had some
? harsh things to say about
federal agencies which had
"no rundown on dangerous
characters in the Dallas
area in November, 1963.
Well, considering the
? unmerciful beating that all
the federal intelligence
agencies have been subject-
ed to of late, what happened
was not too surprising.
Domestic surveillance of
dangerous characters is
equated to "gestapo tac-
tics" by a large part of the
population. We have creat-
.ed a climate in this country
today in which it is a won-
der that the intelligence
services continue to func-
tion at all.
We must at least be
honest with ourselves. No
doubt, as Governor Brown
says, there are a lot of
crazy people in the country.
But there are no more than
the normal number. And if
the danger to presidents
and other prominent lead-
ers seems greater than it
has been in the past, we all
undoubtedly deserve a
share of the blame.
Including, of course, the
President himself. Gerald
Ford has made haste to as-
sure us that what happened
in Sacramento "under no
circumstances will prevent
me from contacting the
American people as I travel
from one state and com-
munity to another." Ford,
of course, is doing no more
than his predecessors have
done, but with a good deal
less reason. The day when a
president had to expose
himself to potential assas-.
sins in order to contact' the
people is long gone, but the
tradition is more powerful
than the dictates of common
sense.
So presidential mingling
will continue, even if it is
the mOst dangerously fatu-
ous way that any president
can spend his time. To stop
exposing himself to assas-
sins would be to capitulate
to the threat of violence.
And since that would be bad
for the macho image, presi-
dents and other political fig-
ures presumably will keep
on capitulating to violence
the hard way, and the na-
tion will suffer the conse-
quences.
It May be that the Secret
Service will be able to fig-
ure out more foolproof
methods of protecting their
man in the future and may
even have a certain sanc-
tion for the time being for
stepping up the surveillance
of the more obvious threats.
But what about potential -
threats to the security of
the nation itself? Why at-
tach such enormous impor-
tance to the protection of
the person of a president,
when the protection of the.
institutions he represents is
considered a form of fas-
cism by so many?
Thanks to Vietnam and
Watergate, we live in a time
that glorifies the virtues of
dissension and rebellion
against authority that en-
courages cjvil disobedience
by groups or individuals
and sometimes condones
violence in a "good cause."
Thanks also to Vietnam
and Watergate, we live in a
time in which all of the evils
of the government and the
society all of the frustra-
tions and anger of the citi-
zenry are focused on the
political leaders, and espe-
cially on the president. To
be sure, it is one thing to
preach that the system is
rotten and should be de-
stroyed, another to try to
kill a president. But unfor-
tunately, there is a perva-
sive tendency among some
people to make the two
propositions virtually syn-
onymous.
Charles Manson was a
product of this climate Ly-
nette Fromme is a product
of this climate As they say.
it's just something you have
to live with.
THE NATIONAL REVIEW
29 August 1975
Li The CIA should have no trouble fill
Ing vacancies left by disenchanted ems
ployees. A spokesman for the organiza-
tion says job applications tripled, in
Jan 'try and have been increasing since.
Lieutenant General Vernon Wal-
ters, deputy director, of the CIA, re-
cently told American Security Coun-
cil in Washington that the U.S. was
in "a tougher power situation than it
has been since Valley Forge." For the
first time in the nation's history, a for-
eign country has the "power to destroy
or seriously cripple the United States."
. . . In a similar vein, Peter Deriabin,
a KGB officer who defected to this
country, says: "What is going on in this
country is the destruction of the CIA.
This is what the KGB and the GRU
[Soviet Military Intelligence) have
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DAILY TELEGRAPH) London
6 September 1975
_THE recent brouhaha about?
' the CIA long since reached
::the point where --:any- absurck
ity could be alleged, and-,
:even- believed, by - some
'people. Perhaps the view ?
advanced, on- a similar occa-
sion, by the official organ. of
?a . ruling Communist party
-might be taken?even by the
? most purblind of the Left?as
-.-narrying some -authority.-
After ?Tfoting. the spread bf
?
nenumours. that the C IA was re-
sponsible far fires, strikes. fights
and high level political plots, it
. concluded: "When the sources
and objectives of this kind of
.` confidential ' information are
Studied more closely, and when
we analyse. them. more thor-
oughly, it will not be difficult
for us to find that-the 'CIA
obsession' is being spread and
encouraged in our country by"
- [various enemies of the State
and in particular the. "bureau-
cratic" (i.e. pro-Soviet) forces].
?"It is easy enough to. identify
them and..see their intentions.
Jt is perfectly well known from
which circles, from which sides
they stem." added Borba (Octo-
ber 31, 1967) in the name of
the Yugoslav Communist
leadership.
Cui bona? is, as Borba im-
plies, a good question to ask
in these circumstances; and the
natural answer is alSo supported
by evidence,. The KG B "
information" department has
been hard at work in all parts
of the world: that great pur-
veyor of d?nte, the Soviet
Press, even lifted ? stories,- so
planted, that the C IA had
organised the assassination of
King Faisal.
In America, as President Ford
lately pointed out, the campaign
? against the CIA has begun to
reach the stage in which the
United St-ate, alone among the
Powers. is largely deprived of
one or its most essential
-agencies. As is customary in
America, any sort of allegation
-
can be and is thrown about in
the Press, leaked by. alleged
"authorit-ative" sources, in an
atmosphere in which it is impos-
sible for the Ci A to work. The
original attacks on it, based on
tevidence which bore some rela-
ttion to fact, were not very
impressive.
? But when it was found that
the American people still
thought it all right to have a
-.Secret intelligence service, all
sorts of new knaveries were
produced: up to and including
a vast array of assassination
plots, none of which ever pro-
duced any aSsassinations.
Similarly when it was re-
vealed that the CIA had inter-
vened in Chile, going to the
terrible lengths of providing
_ak
for ru ours
By ROBERT CONQUEST- -
while the Communist embassies "it was- disclosed yesterday"
were restricting themselves to that the CI A had, in the 1950s
arming and training para-mil-i- Fsrael technological sup-
tary bands. There was a great port to -help her manufacture.
uproar. When it appeared that atomic bombs. That this was vile_
110 one had been much impres- journalism emerged in the next
sed, a whale new set of charges sentence. It had not been "dis-
closed" at all,. it. had been
aliened by an odd American.
journalist writing in Penthouse.
Moreover, even he had not in-
- chided the suggestio f nisi pro-
vided in the headlines and
opening paragraph, that it was a
CI A ? on the conc
tnary, alleging merely that the
Eisenhower Administration had
so decided, a-nd had charged then
CIA with the task.
so bad as not to need substan-
tiation were added. This appears,
as Borba 'noted., to be norm-al
anti-,C I A practice.
cl'n this country, too, we have
-seen something of an attempt
to foment the hysteria com-
plained of by Borba. Unsubstan-
tiated, and indeed in many cases
simply false, stories have crept
into the lower reaches of the
Press. There are officers of the
American Armed Forces ? in
London in connection with our
Joint military defence, and the.
failure of the alliance 'to neg-
lect similar liaison on intelli-
gence matters has been repre-
sented as a terrible offence.- -
One officer so engaged was
denounced as a prominent
? " dirty tricks" figure: these
"dirty" tricks turned out to
have been the American secret
sponsorship, in the post-war
years when vast Russian funds
were being poured into attempts
to take over the student arg,a-ni-
sal:dons and into mas.sine pro-
paganda exercises, of
non-totali-
tarian students and independent
intellectual magazines.
Attacks on the CIA on such
-silly grounds have not had much
effect in this country except on
professional anti- Americans,'
often American themselves. It
will be remembered tha-nfive or
ten years ago, it emerged that
Encounter had been so funded.
The then screams of outrage.
however, fell largely on deaf
ears.- Even the Guardian re-
marked -that if the CIA had
supported such an independent
magazine, so much the better
for the CIA. Even Marxist
and other socially ern-agt! con-
tributors rallied strongly to
Encounter's defence, as having
always given the fairest forum.
In the end, a tiny group of,
zealots were 'shown to be the
only ones to have . been
impressed by the revelations.
? The present campaign, one
imagines, will similarly founder
on the residual sanity of the
British. But it still drags on. A
recent egregious example was a
front page piece in the n171e;
funds for opposition newspapers ,(August 21, 19(3) asserting that
12
Needless to say the Penihovse
article according to the Times;
went on to "disclose" (once
more) many alleged CIA
assassination plans?none of
which, of course, had led to any
action. The interesting paint,
however, is that it revived an
old canard about an attempt to
assassinate Sukarno in the early
.'60s, a story long since known to
-
h-ave been based on a K GM,
"disinformatian" forgery car-
ried out through the Csechoslo-"
yak secret agencies. Since the.:
Czech - expert .responsible
defected a few years later, the
matter is known in considerable
detail.
And so .it goes. Perhaps- I
should say at this point that I t
myself have never worked fain
or been paid by the ?C I A.or any '
other intelligence organisation,
and rnaq: Annssne who suggested
otherwise would find themselves
facing a cracking suit for darn- -
ages. Why? you may ask. if I
regard the CIA as a reputable,
desirable and necessary organi-
sation? Because it would be a
falsehood told with malicious in-,
tent.
I did ance think, indeed, just
to annoy. of starting a maga- .
zine to be called Culture. Intel-
lect. Art. Which reminds me
that the C I A's rival on the
world scene continues to oper-
ate on a vast scale in this coun-.
try as everywhere else, and that -
one understands that there is
considerable speculation at.
Westminster, in connection with
recent. proposals (in the interests,
of " streamlining "). to an-taiga.'
mate the Orders of the Garter,
and the .Bath. as -to the name ?
of tile first Knight of the. com-
bined orders. and so openly en-
titled to KGB.
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_
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
6 September 1975
THE CONSPIRATORS ?
ONE OF. THE sure.- signs of unbalanced judgment is an
over-ready-belief some . conspiracy theory of history.
Some people still, probably. think that whatever happens
in.the world is.,ordained,,bylews. or Wall Street financiers
oriFreemasoris or the Iike. But-they have recently been
outnumbered bythose.w.hoare convinced that not a sparrow
falls but it is the work of the American Central Intelligence
Agency?the-:CI.A.- It iS 'probably useless to invite such
people to-read .:ROBERT.-:.CONQUEST'S brilliant analysis of
their condition on page 10.. Such delusions are normally
based on inner disturbance which reason and ridicule are
alike powerless to cure.
WASHINGTON POST
18 September 1975
Kenneth Rabin:'
?. ?
. Oddly enough, there is one 'country above all' 'whic
the most reasonable people may be forced, however r
luctantl3r, to acknowledge the power of conspiracy. Th
country is not America with its C I A, but Russia with i
K G B. Anyone who has read. KATKOV'S' " 1917 "
TIBOR SZAMUFLY'S RussianL. Tradition "? will know
the conspiratorial atmosphere in' which in Tsarist Russi
the revolutionaries and the secret police alike operate
Th.e heirs . of these conspirators: now. rule :Russia, and a
still conspiring. No, this is not to., say that they ordai
allthings7,--bn the contrary. But one thing they have me
successfully achieved; This is to leave America more or le
bereft -of an intelligence service of any kind while the
own,--infinitely-mare-ruthlessr proliferates everywhere-
Propaganda, American- tyle
As one who served briefly in USIA s:
- and now teaches ptiblic relations, I'
was prone to linger over James Mich-
ener's report on the Stanton Commis-
sion (Post, June 21, 1975). The commis-
sion's conclusions about American
information policy abroad ("Political'
officers back to State. Voice of Amer-
ica set free A new agency-for cul-
tural affairs, autonomous but report-
ing to the Secretary of State.") are
generally sane, striving towards the
Mr. Rabin is an assistant professor
of public relations at The American
University.
separation of powers seen in the Brit-
ish Information Service, which is em-
bassy based; the British Council, an
autonomous cultural agency; and the
-external service of BBC. But neither
Michener's own rationale nor any prior
reports of the comi-nission's work got
to the core of the problem, the need
for a clear governmental commitment
to a distinctively American propaganda
style in foreign affairs.
Viewed from such a perspective,
what's going on with USIA, our overt
propaganda agency, is really a mirror
on what's been going on recently
? vis-a-vis USIA's dark twin, the former
"U.S. Bureau of Roads."
. Both USIA and CIA, it should be
remembered, sprang from highly suc-
cessful American psychological opera-
tions in World War 11?OW! and OSS,
the purveyors of what one scholar
called "white" and "black" propagan-
da, respectively. Both agencies were
charged with their current general
responsibilities during the Cold War
era. And, for reasons that are not en-
tirely unrelated, both strayed far from
the mark and are now being tinkered
with.
Tinkering, in this case, may not be
enough. '
We must begin, I suspect, by eon--
fronting the bald truth that the idea
of propaganda is felt to be somehow
un.American; thus, the word is never
used in public dialogue about the
American government's overt or covert
attempts at manipulating public opin-
ion either overseas or a
3243731161/WelFor
ener, for example, makes no mention
of propaganda in his discussion of the
proposed USIA reforms. How can we
make recommendations for something
whose name we refuse to utter?
Since the word is used here, a defi-
nition _should be attempted: Culling
from the thoughts of Lippman, Lass-
well, Dooh, Choukas, and Ellul, let
us agree for now that propaganda is
the persuasive communication com-
mon to a technological or mass society
and aimed by one interest in that
society at various internal and exter-
nal audiences to gain either passive
or active compliance with the origina-
tor's point of view.
"White" propaganda, it follows, can
be described as overt in varying de-
grees. And because it is overt, it is
-likely that it contains a higher degree
of truth, or at least can be perceived
for what it is'?distinctions that should
make it more valued in a contemporary
democracy.
The varying degrees of overtness
are encompassed by what Leonard
Doob called revealed, partially-revealed
and delayed-revealed propaganda. The
first is the propaganda that is attrib-
uted from the start?a USIA film, an
institutional advertisement from an
oil company. The second is the propa-
ganda that is revealed to some people
more completely than others ? the
standard press release that a journalist
corroborates but then rewrites in a
standard news story for tile general
public. The last is anoll..:r word for
the teaser ad that promotes something
over time, revealing nnste information
on a step-by-step hs is
The point is, it's propaganda and
there's nothil as, un-American about it..
"Black" propaganda, on the other
hand, is fully concealed, totally covert
and attributed incorrectly, if at all. A
recent example was the disclosure
(Post. July 3. 1975) of "Forum World
Features Ltd." as a CIA-financed press
service whose cover had been com-
promised. This is the propaganda we
were taught to be wary of on the
eve of World War IT, propaganda de-
signed for use against one's enemy in
.mortal combat, propaganda which has
given the whole craft a tainted image
and caused the need for endless eu-
phemisrns?information offices, public
RegkVe266I/081/08c:rdWiRDP-PP01043AR066111,68188181t119 Murrow era was the
The linguistic mutations underscore
the difficulty: America is compelled
to propagandize but all propaganda
has come to leave a bad taste in our
collective mouth. Who will tell Ameri-
ca's story? Can we successfully limit
' the use of "black" propaganda to sit-
uations where there might be an ab-
solute threat to world peace?
The Stanton Commission is not the
first to avoid these questions. ;
Congress, itself rather opposed to
propaganda, has dealt with both USIA
and CIA in consistently unrealistic
ways. In the case of CIA, no questions
?were asked and "black" propaganda
multiplied. In the case of USIA, the
wrong questions were asked and
"white" propaganda was handcuffed.
This occurred because all propa-
ganda?"white" or "black"? is fraught
with the risk of embarrassing failures.
Since CIA's activities were never
questioned on the Hill, its failures
and excesses were left to rot in moun-
tains of classified files. Since USIA's
activities were constantly questioned
by Congress, its failures and excesses
were broadcast sufficiently enough to
cause the agency to retreat from any
serious attempt at innovative and sys-
tematic molding of world public opin-
ion.
Hans Morgenthau, writing on the
failure of overt American propaganda
as meaningful foreign policy alter
native as far back as 1960, summed
up USIA's approach as "praise of
one's own product and disparagement
of the competitor's," a refusal to ele-
vate propaganda strategy?"white'
propaganda strategy, at least?to
equal position with the diplomatic
strategies of war, aid, trade, and such.
Our overt propagandists were not in-
volved in key policy decisions; it was
a case of world public opinion be
damned by either inattention or im-
proper?in the moral sense?attention.
Congressional short-sightedness to-
wards USIA (VOA was treated separate-
ly and somewhat less critically, it should
be noted), has been paralleled, as
Morgenthau implied in 1960, in the
executive branch. With one notable
exception?Edward R. Munrow?in
choice of USIA directors and others?
including Dr. Stanton?in choice of
public sector advisers, American
Presidents have tended to select those
who would guide- the aspect of over-
seas propaganda that seems most
valid for, an open society, with an
eye to domestic political debts rather
than functional effects, indeed, most
old hands at USIA (the ones who were
old hands when I was there in 1967-70,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370001-6
NEW YORK TIMES
12 September 1975
Single 'high -water 'mark- in agency
staff morale.
It can be contended, I think, that
USIA and the "white" propaganda
function in American foreign policy
have arrived at their current low
state by virtue of self-fulfilling proph-
ecy: all propaganda is bad; decision
makers who could not or would not
criticize our most devious propaganda
scored their oratorical points against
the overt material; Presidents came
to perceive USIA as just another
agency for second- and third-level
patronage appointments; USIA staff
morale deteriorated; the agency was
consulted. less and dictated to more;
and our overt propaganda operations,
so successful in World Wan II from
the government's point of view, and
perennially successful in the sense
of American advertising and public
relations, deteriorated in foreign
affairs.
It is doubtful, then, that the Stanton
recommendations will have any great
effect on propaganda. Some propa-
gandists, may get shuffled about, but
the need for a choice of an open style
of propaganda as a key factor in our
foreign policy remains unanswered.
NEW YORK TIMES
17 September 1975
Seri te A ti-Toxin
Tile Senate Select ComMittee on Intelligence is trying
to find out why the Central Intelligence Agency has been
storing shellfish toxin and cobra venom?"enough to-
kill thousands of people", ? along with instruments'
designed for their delivery, not to mention a, silent
poison-dart gun that could kill without a trace. it should
find out?especially in view of former President Nixon's
Order for the destruction of this deadly stockpile and
this country's announcement to the world that it had
in fact been destroyed.
It is bad enough that the United States ever engaged
in the manufacture of a weapon of such indiscriminate.
horror; to have retained it in a secret arsenal against
the order of the Commander-in-Chief must be put down.
as the most reckless kind of insubordination. Senator
.'rank -Church of Idaho, the committee chairman, was
mild in ascribing the episode merely to a _"looseness of
Command and control within the C.I.A." It was, more
like willful sabotage of the nation's proclaimed policy?
all "the worse for the effect it could have on current
Soviet-American negotiations to renounce all efforts
t tampering with the climate as an instrument of war.
Senator Church is right to hold open hearings on the
subject,-contrary to the .vishes Of the AdministratiOn.
Supposedly the decision tO leave these deadly poisons
on hand?unguarded at that?was made by a middle-
level official of the C.I.A..
WilliamT. Colby, the C.I.A.'s present director, concedes
the gross violation bet finds the records too incomplete
to pin down the responsibility. On whatever level the
defiance of orders occurred, the public should know
where and how its appointed guardians have both failed
and endangered it. It is time for the C.I.A. to learn,
openly and beyond further question, that it is of value
to the country only as long as it subordinates itself to
the public will, as expressed by elected government.
. ..?
estroy the Monster
By Torn Wicker
a The disclosure that the Central
Intelligence Agency hoarded :a supply
Of deadly poisons in direct contraven-
tion of Richard Nixon's order to
"destroy such poisons in 1969 is only
one more bit of evidence that this
'agency is a Frankenstein's monster
that must be destroyed.
,.There are several ways 'to explain
the stockpiling of shellfish toxin and
cobra venom against express Presi-
dential orders. First, the poisons might
secretly have been ordered preserved
by Mr. Nixon himself. Or the top
command of the C.I.A. might have
made the decision to retain them, for
:reasons of its own. Finally, lower-level
,authorities within the agency might
-have disobeyed their own immediate
superiors and saved the poisons
against some' real or imagined needs.
It does not mean much that the
:C.I.A. itself apparently disclosed the
retention of the poisons to the investi-
gating committee headed by Senator
Frank Church of Idaho. It could be,
of course, that the present C.I.A.
command has only recently discovered
the cached poisons, as is being con-
tended; but given this agency's record
of subterfuge, concealment and distor-
tion of the record, it is just as easy
to suppose that the disclosure was
made only because of recent inquiries
-into "C.I.A. activities, and the pos7
sibility that the truth would have been
uncovered anyway.'
-However the matter is viewed, few
incidents could more dramatically dis-
close the dangers of this many=
chambered house of deceit, fear, power
and secrecy. If Mr. Nixon ordered the
poisons secretly preserved against
his own stated policy of renouncing
bacteriological warfare, then he should
not have had a secret agency able
and willing to do his bidding. If the
agency took it upon itself to con--
travene Mr. Nixon's declared policy,
it could only have done so because
of the power and autonomy derived
from, its ability to operate in secrecy.
If lower-level officials disobeyed
their own superiors as well as Mr.
Nixon and stockpiled the poisons
against national policy, then as Sen-
ator Church has said there was an in-
credible "looseness of command and
control within the C.I.A."---a laxity
all the more frightening because if the
agency's top officials cannot control
their underlings, then there is no way
to impose outside political control on
the agency itself.
That is why the illicit stockpiling
of the poisons?whatever use might
have been intended for them by who-
ever was responsible?is one of the
more frightening disclosures about this
?
shadowy agency. It is reminiscent of
the report that when James Schlesin-
ger, while briefly the C.I.A. director,
ordered a halt to all questionable
counterintelligence activities in 1973,
agency security officials Increased the
numbers of his bodyguards. If they
feared for his safety within the agency,
then what might not uncontrolled
agents be capable of outside the C.I.A.?
Illicit domestic spying, secret and
loosely controlled experiments with
drugs, connections to the underworld,
plots that may or may not have been
authorized to kill various foreign lead-
ers, now the hoarded poisons?such
abuses are the inevitable consequences
of great power, essentially unchecked,
cloaked in the mystique of national
security, and authorized to operate in
secrecy. No amount of Congressional
oversight could have prevented the
stockpiling of those poisons, or their
possible illicit use; and whatever may
yet be disclosed about the assassina-
tion plots, and who may have author-
ized them, it is clear that they could
have been and perhaps were under-
taken on the agency's own initiative.
Such secret power is intolerable in
an open, democratic society. Just as
IN THE NATION
C.I.A. "covert" technrques came to be
employed in domestic politics by the
White House "plumbers" under How-
ard Hunt, so might eyen more danger-
ous C.I.A. tactics and attitudes,
spawned in the dark atmosphere of an
anything-goes operation waging secret
wars in the name of national security,
further contaminate the national life.
Enough is already known of the
Church committee's findings?it is
plausible to suppose that there is more
to Le disclosed?to support a recom-
mendation that the C.I.A. as now con-
stituted be abolished. Then, its pre-
sumably able and useful sections de-
voted to the straight collection and
analysis of intelligence could be re-
organized into a su'ccessor agency un-
burdened and unsullied with "covert"
operations and vast secret powers to
overturn governments, harass other
nations, subvert or kill their leaders,
and thwart their legitimate aspirations.
Such powers not only have no place
in a decent society; but if permitted
will almost inevitably be turned against
the society that grants them. ?
To the extent that covert operations
of some kind may be legitimate and
necessary, surely an overpowering
secret agency is not required to carry
them out. Depending on the nature
of the case, some small, efficient unit
within the State Department or th
military would be sufficient, and in
finitely easier to control.
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xi THOUSE
CTOBER 1975
-
?,
Approved For:Release 200/08/08ZIA-RD177=00432R000100370001-6
2341
E,.
11
HOW THE CIA HLLPED
BUILD THE MOST
D, ,SH
,
OSef5temhe( II 1973
Pe?-*
ernetne:?Centrahlntelligence,-7e
? e-eAgericy-'!??and-American*.:big-e
us hes sigersted the consti
tkiQ?ofChjl,-'-
ean-inudinS??r-
Aliend Gosseis he, free-
d
jkiled during ne coup and
ton fOeuSliig onChiie
rh
:Kissinger and his associates
tote irChileanaffajrs:Thuswe
trordexterif 'of the U ry:.
-'--;,:iritiVryentienin Ojai:Sol:1th A'rnt.ene
a:cah cce:intry,a.rid .the stunning.
fer-c!
.,..h..,4:5i:eharacteri?ed[a.S. being
anS land_
ing..ei-":
t'adO for
tion of bLrnan rignts with the
najunta'duringea;.dispussieTgenA
lec-
Eures
kissInger
:aereSsittne.arnbassader''S
patch, rep or!' .the
that Kissir'ge ?and the (C'St
?
..ccrelj ri"eeds such lectures
'-'bereaUS.t...; he hir.-S yet t6..a.Cceprn11:
y responsibility for the fact that Chile has
? come the -most brutal and repressive
ctatorship this side of the Iron Curtain, a
iuntry where it is a. felony-to think Marxist
'Lights, let alone act on them.
What has been happening in Chile ex-
eds, in fact, the worst features of modern
ornmunist regimes (Cambodia under the
-net- Rouge rule being a backward-sod-
exception) where summary executions
d massive disappearances of citizens
e no longer in political vogue. Today's
He is a gruesome result oAp4tIolViadif-0
gees and the CIA's clients?Chilean gener- $400,006 to help anti-Allende parties.
els and admirals and their rightwing civilian For the next three years, no stone was left
allies?have wrought upon one el the West- unturned by Kissinger, first to keep Allende
em Hemisphere's most impressive democ- from assuming the presidency, and then to
.racies. We must all accept a degree of re- destroy his government. As much as $8 mil-
sponsibility for the suffering of thousands of lion, according to Colby, was earmarked
Chileans tortured by their new masters, for (but not entirely spent) for the CIA to "de-
' the 7,000 Chileans who remain in political stabilize" the Allende government. The
prisons, for the military kangaroo courts that Treasury Department and the Export-Import
are still operating, and for the fact that, con- Bank were mobilized to deny Allende des-
trary to our pre-revolution expectations, perately needed credits for the imports of
Chile's economy is in absolute shambles. everything from airliners to food. The Nixon
This state of affairs may explain why administration leaned heavily on interne-
Chile's President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte tonal financial institutions to cut off loans to
(the army's commander in chief, who led the Chile; credit lines frcm commercial United
coup despite his assurances of loyalty to States banks dried up overnight. Thus the
Allende until the very last day) decided whole might of the United States was
early in July to prohibit a visit to Chile by the applied aaainst an impoverished nation of
ten million inhabitants whose only crime
was to elect freely and democratically a
Socialist (not Communist) president.
? The Annericanjustification for this assault
on Chile was offered by Kissinger in a
background press briefing on September
16, 1970. On September 4:Allende had
come in first with a 36.1 percent plurality
over two other candidates (a conservative
former president, Jorge Alessandri, and a
,leftist Christian Democrat, Radomiro To-
pre). Since no candidate had a majority; it
. became necessary to have a runoff election
.in Chile's congress. Having failed to
achieve Allende's defeat in September. the
United States concentrated on forcing Ales-
sandri's victory in the October 24 runoff (the
American Embassy in Santiago had insis-
tently predicted that Alessandri would win).
Faced with the runoff, Kissinger, at his
most cynical, offered the following rationale
for American intervention:
"It would not be at all illogical for the
[Chilean] congress to say. 'Sixty-four per-
cent of the people-did not want a Communist
government. A Communist government
tends to be irreversible. Therefore we are
going to vote for the No. 2 man.' This is
perfectly within their constitutional preroga-
tives. However, the constitutional habit-has
developed that Congress votes for the man
who gets the highest number of votes. But
then, of course. it has never happened be-
fore that the man with the highest number of
votes happens to represent a nondemocrat-
ic party, which tends to make his election
pretty irreversible. I have yet to meet some-
body who firmly believes that if Allende
wins there is likely to be another free elec-
tion in Chile...."
Let us pause here for a moment. Trans-
lated into pain language, this means that
the United States was arrogating to itself the ,
right to define fcr another nation what consti-
lutes democracy and what the constitutional
process in Chile should be. This, of cOurse,
is a notion the United States would never
tolerate if applied to itself or one of its allies.
Besides. Kissinger vies cle.liberately rais-
United Nations Commission on Human
Rights. He may have regretted his earlier
decision, in mid-1974, to let the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights
tour his prison camps and take depositions
from the prisoners. Last October this com-
mission, a body of the Organization of
American States which is not famous for
being outspoken on controversial subjects,
produced a devastating report describing
tortures and daily violations of the most
elementary human rights.
Pinochet's action in barring the U.N.
commission annoyed even the State De-
partment, which, ever so gradually, is Mov-
ing away from its nearly unquestioning sup-
port of the junta. Shortly after Chile's deci-
sion to keep out U.N. investigators, Deputy
Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll "dressed
down," in the words of a U.S. official, the
Chilean Deputy Foreign Minister who was in
Washington that week. Such specialists as
William D. Rogers, the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs, have also
been quietly warning the junta that it may
wind up as an international pariah if it per-
sists in its attitudes.
The State Department took an especially
dim view of Pinochet's behavior because
the U.S. had gone along with most of the
? OAS foreign ministers earlier this year in
delaying action on the 177-page report of
the Inter-American Human Rights Commis-
sion pending a more up-to-date study by the
U.N. panel. As matters stand now, the OAS
report remains pigeonholed. Still. it should
be made compulsory bedtime reading for
Henry Kissinger: it might be sobering for
him to absorb the nightmarish catalogue of
crimes and brutalities in Chile that he
.helped to set in motion.
Notwithstanding his public denials of an
American role in engineering the anti-Al-
lende coup?denials that were later contra-
dicted by sworn statements of CIA Director
William E. Colby in secret testimony before
congressional committees--there is no
question that Kissinger was the principal
mover in the campaign against the constitu-
tional Allende government. After all, it was leading his audience by saying that Allen- .
Kissinger who blithely remarked at a meet; de's party was "nondemocratic." Allende
ing of the top-secret White House "Forty belonged to the Socialist Party, a traditional .
Committee," the group presided over by one in Chile. It was allied with the Comrnu-
him and responsible for all major covert in- nist Party under the Unidad Popular (Popu-
telligence operations,-"I don't see why we lar Unity) coalition?just as the French So-
need to stand by and watch a country go cialists had an electoral pact with French
Communist due to the irresponsibility of its Communists. if one is to take Kissinger liter-
own people." This was on June 27, 1970, ally, then America cannot tolerate any alli-
more than two months before the Chileans ance anywhere which includes Commu-
even went to the polls. That day the first fists. This "Kissinger Doctrine," which calls*
funds were authorized for the CIA to start for Amer'
can intervention !Pita ['Mei 661/18/0 ijaYe I AASIP1 740 4 32:Refike00 electedie gr eovveerr nvmi eedn ot
?
15
;
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-004.32R000100370001-6
-
the recipe for everything from subver-' made Helms and Kissinger look like liars. This was, in effect, what the CIA told the
on and invasions to new Vietnams. but he evidently assumed that his testimony International Telephone and Telegraph
But let us go back to Kissinger's scenario.: would' be kept secret from the public. Mem- Company's director John McCone (himself
gain, it is important because it clearly set bers of the House Armed Services Commit- a former CIA director) when he asked late in
e stage for the intervention and blood- tee were not expected to break a secrecy June"whether the United States intended to
aths to come. To quote him further: pledge. surrounding the testimony. Her- intervene in the election to encourage the
"Now it is fairly easy for one to predict rington, who is not a committee member, support of one of the caed;siatees who stood
t, if Allende wins, there is a good chance was allowed to read the Colby testimony for the principles that are basic in this coun-
at he will establish over a period of years after taking a similar pledge. Appalled by try." Richard M. Helms. then CIA direct
me sort of Communist government. In that what he read, he asked House and Senate and a specialist in clandestine operations.
ase you would have.., in a major Latin leaders to take prompt action. He was ig- told IvicCorte that the administration would
merican country.... a Communist gov- noted. As Harrington tells the story, he de- mount a "minimal effort" to oppose Allende..
rnment, joining, for example, Argentina, liberately violated the pledge out of a sense This was the $400.000.
hich is already deeply divided, along a of despair that the CIA's misdeeds in Chile ITT, which had over S100 million investe
ng frontier, joining Peru, which has al- would never become known to the Amen- in Chile (chiefly in the local telephone co
can 'public. The congressional establish- -pany); was not satisfied, however, with thi
ment was unforgiving: he was bounced off "minimal effort." In a gesture of astoundin
the House committee investigating intelli- effrontery, ITT offered th E.i CIA $1 million o
gence and the House Ethics Committee its own corporate money to help defeat At
decided to try tO censure him. lende. The offer was made at a July meetin
The Chilean story becens in 1964?and
this fact should remind us that Kissinger does
not have a monopoly on American interven-
tion and that the CIA gladly lends itseif to
political subversion no matter who sits in the
White House. Allende had been one of the.
CIA's favorite targets for quite a few years. In
1964, he was the principal contender for the
presidency against Eduardo Frei Montalva.
a Christian Democrat who ran on the plat-
form of "Revolution with Liberty." This was
intended as a political antidote to Cuba's
Fidel Castro and his penchant for trying to
foster revolutions in Latin America.
Chile, which was Latin America's most
politically sophisticated nation, always had
a strong leftist tradition. In 1958, when Jorge
Alessandri won his six-year term, the leftist
coalition (then knOwn as FRAP) made a
good showing. In 1964. Allende, who had
spent some time in Cuba as Castro's guest,
was perceived in Washington as a formida-
ble opponent against Frei, the Christian
Democrat reformer.. Rather than support a
rightist candidate, and what would be a los-
ing cause, the United States cast its lot with
Frei. According to subsequent testimony by
Director Colby, the CIA spent $3 million in
covert support of Frei's election, financing
newspaper and radio publicity as Well as
seeing to it that millions of escudos.. were
spread around in the right places. (Some
students of Chilean politics believe that the
tote; amount spent by the CIA in 1954 was
far in excess of the S3 million.) In the logic of
American foreign policy, there was nothing
wrong either with overthrowing govern-
ments or helping frienc.ny ones to win power.
The covert pro-Frei intervention in 1964 was
authorized by Lyndon Johnson who, a year
later, sent American troops to intervene in
the Dominican Republic's civil war.
In mid-1970, it was the Nixon administra-
tion's task to insure that the "wrong" man
was not elected in Chile. Kissinger's per-
sonal entry into the picture took place at the
June 27 meeting of the "Forty Committee,"
when the CIA was authorized to spend the
$400,000 to back Alessandri, largely
through the .financing of electoral propa-
ady been heading in directions that have
een difficult to deal with, and joining
olivia, which has also gone in a more left-
t. anti-U.S. direction, even without any of
ese developments." ?
Kissinger here revealed his ignorance of
atm n America?her politics, cultural tradi-
ons, ideological alignments, and regional
valries. He overlooked Chile's traditional
nsions with Peru (going back to the Pacific
am in the 1870's) as well as with Argentina
d 'Bolivia. He ignored the fact that these
ur countries have totally different soci-
ties, and that it simply did not follow that
ommunism in Chile, even if it came to
ass, would necessarily infect all her
eighbors. In hindsight, of course, vie know
at the three years of the Allende re-
ime?which never, by the way, became an
utright Communist dictatorship?did not
ave the slightest impact on Argentina.
eru. and Bolivia. To Kissinger, however, it
as necessary to prepare public opinion for
that he had in store for Chile.
The history of covert American interven-
on in Chile can be divided into two parts:
e period prior to Allende's inauguration on
ovember 4, 1970, and the period after-
yards. In each case. both our money era.
he clandestine "dirty trick's" resources
he CIA were used without the knowledge
pproval of the American Congress.
Congress. or at least some members of.:
egan learning about all this activity one.
fter the fact. Although a Senate subcornme-
ee ferreted out the facts about the first CiA
contribut;on- to Chile sortie time beforc.=
cup, congressmen were kept in the dark fp-
some months afterwards about the full ex-
tent of the U.S. involvement. In some cases
they were simply lied to by the CIA. Ce
February 7, 1973, for example, then CIA Di-
rector Richard M. Helms said, "No, sir."
when asked by a member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee if the agency
tried to ."overthrow" the Chilean govern-
ment. He repeated his "no. sir reply when
asked whether the CIA had "any money
passed to the opponents of Allende."
Late in July the CIA's general counsel
acknowledged to Congress that "perjury"
may have been committed in earlier agency
testimony. The finger clearly was pointed
at Helms. But Kissinger. too. may have per-
jury problems for having denied?before a
Senate committee-that there was any U.S. ganda. One may ask why so little money sure on Christian Democratic congressm
involvement in the Chilean coup. a month was being authorized to beat Allende in to vote against Dr. Allende, or in any event
after it happened. 1970 whereas nearly ten times as much was weaken Dr. Allende's position in case
The web of official lies was first destroyed expended six years earlier. A possible ex- was elected." Here, then, we have the e
when Representative Michael Harrington. a planation is that EdwardM. Korry, then the traordinary picture of the CIA conspiri
Massachusetts Democrat, took it upcn him- American ambassador in Santiago, was un- with a powerful multinational corporation
self last year to leak to newsmen the es- flaggingly assuring the State Department intervene in the domestic affairs of a friend
Sence of secret testimony by Colby. the new that Alessandri, the rightist, would carry the country. It seems like the worst Marxist d
CIA director, acknowledging that millions of day. The $400,000, then, was just a cheap rnonology come true.
dollars had been funneled to Chile. Colby insurance policy. Even before Allende was toppled, t
,kheitrimittee that was already too
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDPM-00432ROINFruirsruoul-b
between ITT's president. Harold S. Geneerr
arrd the Cl'A's Western Hemisphere.divisio
chief, William V. Broe. Helms arranged th
get-together between Geneen and Broe or
McCone's request. (The CIA's "old-bo
netwcrk" .was obviously highly effective..
Broe, however, turned down ITT's offer t
help finance United States foreign policy. #
did not seem necessary.
But on September 4. the news of Allende.-
lection hit Washington. The adrninistratio
and. ITT sprang into action. Kissinger at
ready had in hand a secret study of th
Chilean situation?a document known a
National Security Study Memorandum-9
prepared by his staff in July?and he was
ed no time.
On September 15, Nixon presided over
secret meeting in Chile. attended by Ki
singer, Helms, and Attorney General Jch
Mitchel!. It was conducted outside the "Fo
ty Committee." on which the State Depa
merit and the Pentagon are represente
Nixon told Helms to "come up with sorrt
ideas." and authorized an initial SIO milli?
expenditure. The CIA understood this as
"blanket authorization" to get rid of Anend
On September 16, Kissingeds backgroun
briefing made it clear that the United Ste
would not tolerate Allende. On Septernb
18. he presided over a meeting of the "Fo
Committee." and decided to let the CIA i
mediately spend S350.000 on buying ant
Allende congressional votes for the Octob
rurioff election. It was an idea of su
monumental absurdity that the CIA's men
the field in Chile. told Washington that i
simply would not work and that any.attemp
to bribe Christian Dernocratie congress
men, who held the decisive votes, could
easily discovered and cause. the Unite
States vast embarrassment. The vote-bu
leg project thus never got off the ground
On September 29, Helms instructed Bro
his Western Hemisphere chief, to meet wit
Ned Gerrity, an ITT vice president, to di
cuss Chile. According to Gerrity's testimon
before a Senate subcommittee, "Mr. Bro
proposed a plan to accelerate econorm
chaos in Chile as a means of putting pre
._40Itiroved,For.7R6104-0-;00,1108,1*:"ciAlRop77Hoo43.2RoOptqoro00.16-
. '
g into the CIA-# involvement had asked gas grenades for a coup attempt on behalf included the cutoff Of financial assistance.
is prescient geestion: "Did the members orAlessandri. Allende's runoff rival. But Ales-. The ostensible reasons for this cutoff were
. the 'Forty Committee' adequately consid- sandri apparently would have no part of it. Chile's poor credit standing and Allende's
r the possibility that, once having launched and the arms were returned unused. refusal to pay what United States Copper
e U.S. on the road of covert intervention, After Allende's inauguraeon on? Novem- companies regarded as just compensation
.her, more direct measures might become bet. 4. 1970, the new American strategy ran: for the takeover of their properties.
ecessary to insure the desired result: along two parallP1 tracks. One was the : There is ample evidence that C1A-linked t
ceping Allende from becoming president economic blockade to"accelerate econom- Chilean groups organized marches by
Chile?" The answer, as it turned out. was ic chaos" in Chile, as the CIA's Bill Broe put housewives protesting high prices and
resounding "es." Kissinger was armed it to ITT officials, and the other was plain _shortages (this had worked well in Brazil in
ith the options in NSSM-97, the National subversion. known in the agency's Ian- 1964) to create social unrest and more polit-
ec. urity Council staff study that gave shim guage as "covert political action." ical polarization. CIA funds are believed to
e full range of interventionist steps in Kissinger. as was said later, becameNix-
have been used to launch and maintain a
hile?and he arid the CIA were ready to go. cn's "Chiiean Desk Officer" the had not yet crippling strike by Chilean truck owners in
The ploy of buying anti-Allende votes hay- become the se.creeasy of state and acted as
g been declared unworkable. the CIA and the president's special assistant for naticnal
s Chilean friends turned to direct action. security affairs) in coordinating anti-Allende
e congressional runoff election was ap- activities. lee was overseeing the work of a
roaching and something had to be done at special Chilean task force composed of
nce. A confidential communication from representatives of v-arious government agen-
s Santiago office to its New York head- cies and presiding over occasional meet7
uarters said on October 16 that "unless ings of the "Forty Committee" which, as time
ere is a move by dissident Chilean military wept by. kept increasing the flow of funds of
ements by this time next midweek. the the CIA for anti-Allende subversion. Nixon,.
onseosus ... is that Salvador Allende will of course, wholeheartedly supported thefl
in the October 24 congressional runoff campaign. t
asily." The CIA was sending similar re- But the official posture was sanctimo-
orts to Washington. Allende was evidently niously dishonest. Thus on January 4, 1971,
ware that a conspiracy by Americans was when anti-Allende activities were already in
foot because he alluded in a speech that full swing. Nixon said that, although he
eek to Chile "swarming" with CIA agents. didn't "welcome" Allende's election, "We
What Allende might not have known was
at the chosen instrument for the operation
gainst him was a retired army general
amed Roberto Viaux. Vieux. who had tried
n abortive military move during Septem-
er, was in touoh with the CIA through a
roup of extreme right-wing Chilean civil-
ns determined to prevent Allende's final
ictory. The CIA knew that Vieux and his
'ends planned to kidnap Gen. Ren?chnei-
er, then commander in chief of the Chilean
rmy. and niake it appear a plct by Allen-
e's supporters. The hcpe was that the Chii-
an military would then be provoked into a
oup leading te the cancellation of the 'run-
ff election. It was a half-baked idea inas-
uch as Schneider was known to be corn-, 1976." In testimony that is being disclosed
nittecf to the army's political neutrality?e here publicly for the first time, Colby sae:
hilean military tradition?and the leftists of "We did have an interest in groups opp.oseo
niclad Popular could have no possible to Allende to help insure that [his] govern-
eason to capture the general. ' ment was not successful."
On October 13. the CIA informed Kissin- Economically, the American objective
er of the Vieux, plot, but it was decided to was to deprive Allende of the means of rue-
iscourage it. The reason was that the CIA ning a viable government. As a senior State
/as involved in a parallel conspiracy with Department official told a group of visiting
en. Camilo Valenzuela. a commander of university professors, the United States
he Santiago garrison. in whom the agency wanted to make sure that the economic col-
ad greater confidence. He. too, wanted to lapse of the Allende regime would serve to
idrtap Schneider. teach the rest of Latin America that Marxism
But the CIA Could not stop Vieux. On the simply cannot work. The basic formula.
orning of OctOber 22. as General Schnei- then, was a combination of economic and
er was entoute to his office, his car was political subversion. At the same time.
locked by several vehicles. Five civilians American army, air force, and navy advisers
randishing guns tried to drag ..him out of attached to the Chilean armed forces (they tors as the drop in copper prices, in addition
is limousine and transfer him to another were never expelled during Allende's short to self-fulfilling prophecies by the United
car. But when ' Schneider reached for his tenure) began to work quietly on their mile States. Applying economic screws to Chile.
service revolver, the kidnappers panicked tary friends in Chile. While the Export-Import Washington did succeed in destabilizing
and shot him lo death. Not surprisingly,Bank, for example, refused to guarantee the ' the Chilean economy even further than Al-
Schneider's murder failed to produce the
sale of Boeing jetliners to the Chilean na- lende'S inept team of economists had man-
expected results The Chilean military corn- tional airline on the grounds that Chile's in aged to do. By mid-1973. therefore, the
mend closed ranks behind the constitution-
ternational credit rating was insufficient, the conditions were ripe for a coup. The right-
al process and Allende was elected by the Pentagon sold 65 million of military equip- ists and the Americans persuaded most of
Congress two days later?October 24. If ment to Chile?on credit. Shortly before the the military commanders that it was their
anything. Schneider's death swung a num-
1973 coup, the administration indicated patriotic duty to oust the Allende regime. An
bar of votes in favor of Allende.
, plans to sell Chile F-5 jet fighters, also on abortive attempt, carried out without coor-
,For reasons that remain unclear, the CIA.
credit. And, on at least two occasions, arms dination with other units, took place in June.
,
on the very day the congress was voting were secretly flown to Chile from Miami by and loyalist forces put it down easily.
.'
authorized agents in Chile to give the Valen-
aircraft controlled by a CIA "proprietary" But on September 11, a full-fledged coup,
zuela group three machineguns and tear-
company. started by the navy. threw Allende out o
.
-
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17
1972?another "destabilizing" measure.
We know from President Ford's own admis-
siorr that CIA funds were turned over to
anti-Allende newspapers that openly called
for the Socialist president's removal. And
we know that CIA money was given to anti-
Allende political parties.
There is no question that Chile's upper
Classes and a part of the middle class were
badly hurt by Allende's moves toward
socialism. But nothing happened during Al-
lende's nearly three years in office to war-
rant Kissinger's predictions that. com-
munism was really taking over in Chile. The
congress, where Allende had no majority,
went on functioning the entire time?and
often blocked Unidad Popular' legislation.
were very careful to point out that that was The press remained free. There were no
the decision of the people,of Chile, and political prisoners. Oddly, some of Allen-
we accepted that decis'ee.. For the Unit- : de's principal domestic political problems
ed States to have intervened ... in a: free came from the extreme leftist groups out-
election and to have turned it around, I think; side his coalition that tried to force his hand
would have had repercussions allover Latin toward total radicalization. Some of these
America that would have been far worse groups engaged in terrorism against the
than what has happered in Chile." But of right, just as rightists practiced terrorism
course we were intervening and we had ro against the Unidad Popular.
intention of stopping. That Allende, contrary to Kissinger's
As Colby (a more candid man than Kis- claims, was not attempting to establish a
singer) testified in secret session before a "Communist dictatorship" was confirmed
Senate subcommittee on March 12, l97. by. Of all people, a senior Defense Intelli-
"Our objective was to help create conci- gence Agency (DIA) analyst during a secret
tions which would make it impossible fee hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Allende or Unidad Popular to succeed . . Inter-Americari Affairs on October 31, 1973,
Paul F. Wanner. the DIA analyst, said that
"as the internal situation deteriorated
Allende disregarded Castro's advice to
consolidate his gains and eliminate the op-
position." And in the congressional elec-
tions of March 1973, Allende emerged with
greater strength in Congress and well over
40 percent of the popular vote?a marked
improvement over his 1970 tally.
A case obviously can be made that Al-
lende grievously damaged the Chilean
economy. Inflation was running around
1,000 percent a year, foreign currency re-
serves were depleted, and shortages
mounted. But in truth this was a combination
of the Allende regime's economic incornpe-
tence, and such uncontrollable external fac-
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ours. He died inside the besieged La
oneda palace, wearing a helmet and
Tutching a submachine gun, an incongru-
us bespectacled figure of .a middle-class
hysician whose ascent to the presidency
Chile had shaken faraway Washington to
score. His widow and others claim he was
eliberately assassinated (see page 72).
he junta says he committed suicide. But
hat we know for certain is that Allende and
s many as 10,000 of his followers were
lied in the bloodbath carried out by the
ctoriouS junta.
Would the coup have happened without
nited States involvement? There are some
ro-Allende Chileans who believe that,
ooner or later, either a coup or a civil war
ould have. taken place because of the
Otarization of the Chilean society and the
ountiriC inner pressures. But the fact re-
ains that the United States did play a,role
, Creating the conditions that led to the
eptember revolution. And having played
uch a role, the United States must share the
eSponsibility for the horrors that have swept
bile during the past two years. There can
e no deLibt that Chilean blood and Chilean
uffering are on our hands. Big Brother-like.
he military has taken over education in Chit-
an schools. And no end of imprisonments,
ortures, and the denial of the most ele,rnE.,,n-
ary forres of civil rights is in sight. In fact,
inothet promised late last June that there
ould be no elections in Chile so long as he
arid my successor" are alive.
'Economically, the Pinochet junta did little
improve Chile's situation, although one of
e ?justifications for the coup was that Al-
ode was leading the country to ruin. Ac-
erding to the London Economist (hardly
ti-spect of leftist sympathies), food prices in
hilehave gone up "between ten and twen-
"tidies" since the junta assumed power.
flation was raging at 95 percent in the first
uartet of 1975, suggesting that the rate for
e year will be around 400 percent?Less
an in Allende's time, but also without his
egime's social, justification for it.
In human terms, the price paid by the.
hileans forthe "liberation" from Allende is
imply horrifying. Let us examine some of
he conclusions of the Inter-American
ommission on +lumen Rights (whose
merican representative was former Am-
assador Robert F. Woodward): - ?
.et'WhiIe executions by shooting without
nor, trial in the application-of the so-Called
awof flight' [the shooting Of escaping pris-
ners) had ceased, the right to life could not
e. considered adequately protected in the
roceedings of War Councils, which ... re-
eatedly were handing down death penal-
es in circumstances. that do not satisfy the
quirements of due process."
0 .`!The right to personal security had been
nd was-directly and seriously violated by
e practice of psychological and physical
buse in the form of cruel and inhuman
eatment.. .1 The useof electric shock, the
reat of harm to close relatives, sexual at-
eks, covering the person with a hood,
lindfolding the person for weeks, etc., are
asonably proven facts."
"Ten months after ,the events of Sep-
mber, around 5,500 persons remained.
eprived of their liberty, according to fig-
es supplied by some of the !Chilean cabi7
etj ministers. Many of these persons had
een arrested without any charges brought
gains,t them, and they continued in deten-
on without being brought before the courts.
. The situation was even more serious due.
to the fact that the,;rawsltre, a Iso many persons
regarding whom it was not known whether
? they were free or imprisoned,- or even
whether they were living or dead." ,
(The Commission issued its report in Oc-
toberl 974, but, according to reliable
lomatic information, at least 1.500 persons
were arrested in December 1974 and
ary 1975 for no known reasons. Later in 1975,
the total political prison population in Chile
stood *around 7.000?and new arrests were
being reported almost daily.)
? "Freedom of expression' ... None of the
mass communication media are free to dis-
seminate thought oreinform the public. . ."
? "Right of assembly:.This right was virtu- ?
ally se:spendeci." ?
* 'F;eetiom of opinion: .. . As a reF.,ult of
Decree-Law .77, Marxism is generically
considered as a felony. The term *Marxism'
is used as though it were a label fora crime.
Consequent!;.', .any individual professing
Marxist ideology is considered as a crimi-
nal. regardless of whether he can be shown
to have actually committed acts defined- as
crimes under criminal law. He can therefore
be punished for 'what he is' or 'what he
thinks,' regardless of 'what he does.' The
commission of the same act in the same
circumstances can give rise to different
legal consequences depending on the per-
sons who committed the act and their politi-
cal ideology, without any rule of justice or
reasonableness to justify such disparity."
The Inter-American Commission, whose
report is accompanied by pages of specific
examples of human rights violations ("Pris-
oner ... shows deep marksof maltreatment
on the wrists, both arms, and the upper and
lower back.. lacerations and scarring on
the genitals, which ... can only be pro-
duced by the application of electric shock.
. May suffer permanent damage to the left
testicle and scrotum"), was not the, only
group to denounce the junta's brutality.
in a report issued late in 1974, the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists charged that
"forevery detainee who has been released
in recent months, at least two new arrests
have been made," adding that the legal sys-
tem under the junta "continues to con-
travene basic principles of justice accepted
by civilized nations." .
In May 1975, the New York Times reported,
that "political detentions in the Santiago
area alone were running at. about forty a
week. and the Court of Appeals was still
receiving s:orn statements of torture from
the victims.' relatives."
Also in May. the International Labor Or-
ganization .said in a special study that at
least 110 Chilean labor leaders may have
been killed or executed during the first year
of the junte's rule. The ILO said the Chilean
government had confirmed that ten of them
were "executed" and fourteen died while
trying to escape. The junta, the ILO report
added: tied to prove that the labor leaders
Cieed tor reasons other than that they
were "trade unionists or that they exercised
trade union activities:"
This political repression is directed by
DINA, the national secret police, and mili-
tary intelligence services. An undetermined
nurnbe.r of DINA and military intelligence
officers have been trained in the United
States or at home under, public safety pro-
grams of the Agency for International De-
velopment in the years preceding the 1973
coup. It is impossible to confirm reports that
others have been so traihed since the coup.
? The junta describes all the above charges
as part of a Communist campaign waged by
the Soviet Union to discredit the new re-
gime. But both the Roman Catholic Church
in Chile and, strikingly, the Pentagon's intel-
ligence experts do not see it that way at all.
Santiago's Raul Cardinal SilVa Henriquez
has repeatedly and publicly denounced the
tortures and arrests in Chile?to' no avail. -
And Paul Wallner, the En's Chile Special-
ist, told the, House hearing in October 1973
that the,situation of political prisoners was
!"worse in Chile than in Cuba because of
sheer numbers and the passage Of time."
One Could go on end ;on reciting the
known acts of political executions, impris;
onments, and tortures in Chile since Sep-
:tember 1973. There is, for example a study'
prepared by a Chilean exiles' group claim-
ing that by 1974, the junta's rule had pro-
duced 22.048 widows and 66.667.1atherless
children. Then, there is a list of 247 "assas-
sins, torturers, violators, and criminals of the
'Chilean mil itaryjunta," naming officers from
generals and admirals ,clown to army and
police privates and civilians. One typical
'allegation reads: "Major P.... Scores of
wotkers have been tortured on his orders
and then assasinated without trial. For-
bade the burial of bodies so that they re-
emained for weeks in open fields to be de-
voured by anirrials.... The body of Andres
Si Iva.appeared without a head the body of
Daniel Mendez had its arms' torn off:, that of
Ruben Vargas was without, ears; that of See
gundo Pedrero without one arm;,that of Or-
lando Barriga without hands and nose; that
of Rosendo Rebolledo .with one leo. torri
away at its root. ..." There seems to be nO
end to these tales of honor..
But all this brings us back tOthe question
of American conscience. What has the Veit-
ed States . government said?or done.?
about the Chilean tragedy, the traged?, we
helped to set in-motion?
For the -ecord, both the Nixon and the
Ford administrations have maintained total
public silence about the junta's atrocities.
The State Department protest over the U.N.
Commission was made privately.
With some -40,000 Chileans abroad., the
best the State Department could' do nearly
two years after the 1973 coup was to con-
vince the Justice Department 'to ellOw 400
Chilean families to enter the United States
on a case-by-case basis. This, in contrast to
the more than 100,000 South Vietnamese
refugees we processed almost instantly,
was the extent of our humanitarianism.
At a news conference on September 16:
1974, President Ford was asked why the CIA
engaged in covert operations against Al-
lende in Chile. His reply Summed up our
government's attitude: It was done, he said;
"in the best interest of the people of Chile.
and certainly in our best interest." 0
In our July issue, Penthouse erroneously
identified George Constantinides, a retired
CIA official, as the new head of counterintel-
ligence. We are-advised that this post is now
held by George T. Kalaris, formerly CIA sta-
tion Chief in the Philippines. The CIA never
discloses the names of.its division chiefs.
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HUMAN EyENTS
1.3 September 1975
Secret
e
By ROBERT CONQUEST
The KGB, the Committee of State Security, is thern
most important Single institution in the Soviet Union:
Its dual role is to keep the Communist party in power
and to control foreign governments. Mr. Conquest, a
British authority on Soviet affairs, compares the KGB
with the CIA in the following article.
Since the war (and up to 1975) over 500 Soviet offi-
cials have been expelled from more than 40 countries...
This is a truly extraordinary number, particularly
when we consider it does not take into account the
sudden departure of Soviet diplomats v;ilien their
agents have been arrested, which does not rate as
- : -
"expulsion."
Perhaps more remarkable still, and a reflection on
the common sense and politicarcourage of the.non-:
Soviet states, is the fact that over 70-of these expelled
turned up later as Soviet representatives in other coun?
tries. Eight of these were even expelled ? for a second'
time from their new host-countries. And sNikolai
Vasilyev even managed to score three expulsions,
having been thrown out of France before World War
IL .
As such figures show, one important advantage of
the huge Soviet effort is that it tends to swamp the
limited security services of the other nations. In Brit-
ain, over 100 diplomats and others were wandering
-Arotind trying to effect espionage contacts, and it was
almost beyond the ability of the Britiah services to
shadow each of them all Of the time. However, the
Russian effort collapsed. Partly this wal because of a
useful defector, a common cause of Soviet debacles.
But there was also the ineptness of most of the partici-
pants in these human-wave tactics. B:itain expelled
over 100 Soviet " diploniats" in 1971.as a result,
Any sensible country would clearly abate the nui-
sance and insist on cutting down the Soviet represen-
tation to a normal level. But though their efforts are
a very severe distraction to MI5 in Britain and its
equivalents elsewhere, nevertheless these semi-ama-
teur operations are not to be taken too seriously.
They usually owe their jobs to family connections in
the Soviet New Class; their training m ot capacity-
for espionage is limited; they blunder frequently and
involve the USSR in grave diplomatic: scandals. Ex-
cept as a distraction, and to the extent that very oc-
casionally one may make a suitable contact And pass
it along to the real professionals, they must still be
regarded as a comparatively minor effort when. it
comes to actual results. r: In addition to these clumsy fellows, there is a small-
er nucleus of often brilliant professionals. It is be-
lieved that no more than a dozen or so a year are
graduated from the highly selective KGB training
schools. Thcy have shown themselves capable of su-
perb and extremely damaging operations like the lift-
ing of the whole NATO weapon deployment from the
American top security base at Orly in 1962-63. ?
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ant)
If we compare the KGB with its main opponent,
the American Central Intelligence Agency, various
differences emerge. It is, of course, an enormous
advantage to the KGB, that them is never any
question of it coming under public criticism in the
USSR.
:.To illustrate the difference, try to imagine recent
events in the United States happening in the Soviet
Union. An employe of the Soviet government hands:
over secret documents to Pravda; Pravda prints them;
and the man in question is tried on a minor charge
and acquitted?that would be the Russian equivalent
of the Daniel Ellsberg case. A member of the Supreme
Soviet?the equivalent of , Michael Harrington--
discovers and prints confidential information about
KGB arrangements in, say, Chile; these are printed in
Pravda and lzvestia; arid the result is the KGB boss
Yuri A,ndropov is forced to appear before a committee
of the Supreme Soviet, to try to justify such conduct.
? It will be seen at once that the CIA operates under
constraints which would be regarded as laughable to
the point of lunacy in Moscow. To do the other West-
ern powers justice, one should add that even in France
or Britain such a public hamstringing of the essential
security and intelligence services would be quite un-
thinkable.
And when one adds that a m'ajor alle-
gation against the CIA in Chile was that
it had provided funds for opposition
newspapers and strike organizations?
and not, as the KGB had done through.
the North Korean Embassy, arms and
terrorist training?one wonders what
on earth is in the minds of alleged pro-
Westerners ainonp, its critics.
Moscow-Funded
Stu- dent Radicals
It may be remembered that in the early
'50s free organizations Of students and
others and a number of free periodicals
were kept going with the aid of American
secret funds. Without these, the huge
sums pumped from Moscow into such ;
front Organizations as the International ;
UAion of Students would have received
no rebuttal. Yet people now complain I
even of that!
Unlike the CIA, the KGB also ope-
rates?and on a far vaster scale again?
inside Soviet territory. While the Ameri-
cans divide their intelligence activities
into two autononfous bodies, the CIA
and the FBI, the KGB is a highly co-
ordinated organization with considera-
ble overlap even between the depart-
ments working at home and abroad. ?
For example, a foreign diplomat (as
in one case including a French ambas-
sador) may be compromised sexually by
: ciA-RwRoppgRaw9SIATANIA to be-
19
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coming a- tool back home of the KGB
external services. Nor would there be
any of the curious jurisdictional legalisms
by which the CIA is now charged with
activity against American citizens while
in America. How anyone with a trace of
common sense can imagine that it is
suitable for surveillance of- a suspect,
perhaps on the briefest trip home, to
cease at the airport and be handed over
to a different organization unaccustomed
to his habits, is a mystery.
This is one of the many problems the
CIA has, but which does not affect the
GB. The latter is, moreover, a body
aerting incomparably more political
veight in its own right than its American
ounterpart, with its head, Andropov,
nking as a full member of the ruling
olitburo.
Recent allegations against the CIA
ave been made by "defectors" from it,
uch as Philip Agee and Victor Marchetti.
Much of our knowledge of the KGB alsO
omes from "defectors." But again, we
nd a difference which is well worth
oting. .
: -
KGB defectors have to -be carefully
idden, given false identities and placed
where their late employers cannot find
them. A number of those for whom in-
adequate precautions were taken have
been found .dead in mysterious, and
sometimes not so mysterious, circum-
stances.?poisoned, shot, pushed 'out of
windows. ?
- -
The new batch of CIA "defectors,"
on the other hand, live in comfort in
countries allied to the United States,
write their books and even have them
published. in New York. The mere
. thought of a KGB man settling in
-Hungary, exposing his employers (let
alone having his work printed in Mos-
cow), does not begin to make contact
with reality at any point.
,
In tne competition with the CIA, the
KGB has many other advantages. With
:lundreds of.thousands of Eastern Euro-
peans entering America in the past few
decades it is clearly much easier for the
Soviet authorities to put in trained
"il-
legals," or to maintain "sleepers."
In the comparatively easygoing polit-
ical circumstances of the non-Commu-
nist countries, there must always be a
proportion of people who will simply
swallow pro-Soviet views, and be at least
potential Soviet agents. Besides, few
countries have the huge police forces,
"internal passports" and registration
agents available to the Soviet security
authorities.
Then again, while there is no doubt
that large numbers of Soviet bloc sub-
jects would eagerly assist enemies of
their government in any way possible,
the KGB can prevent or monitor every
such contact. Foreigners in the USSR
are proportionally few compared with the
security forces available to cope with
them. From countries like the United
f th
ids
States there are hundredo ousa
of visitors to all parts of the wher
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itis not difficult for them to be con-
tacted without supervision. But Soviet'
visitors abroad are limited both in theic
numbers and their tested loyalty-quotient.
This does not always work, as the USSR
seems to be fairly unpopular even with
its most loyal subjects. It is estimated
that about 2,000 Americans are con-
tacted overseas every year by the KGB
with a -view to reeruitinent, while similar
attempts on Soviet subjects are rather
few.
High Rate of
KGB Agent Defections
Few, but not negligible. And, more-
over, the successful contacts of the CIA
and other Western services include KGB
melt themselves. For one of the vulnera-
bilities of the KGB is the extraordinary
high rate of defection to the West. This
applies not only to minor figures, but to
some of its major operators, including
illegal Residents. These men, carefully
selected and checked and counter-checked
for highest political reliability, neverthe-
less come. over at a rate which time and
time again destroys whole KGB networks
and gives a vast amount of information
to the West. . .
It should be noted, too, that this is al-
most wholly one-way traffic. There have,
of course, been a few occasions when high
Western intelligence officials have de-
fected, as with Kim Philby. But in his
case, and the others, it has always been a
question of an already indoctrinated
Communist agent infiltrating the Western
.services. In the case of the KGB men, it
is of operatives who start off completely
.loyal to their service arid its regime, and
are subverted by exposure to truth and
to liberty. ?
The ways in which the CIA is now being
hindered and hampered by its own people
are quite astonishing. It is already much
smaller, and disposes of much less re-
sources, than its giant opponent. It is not
Only a David fighting a Goliath, but a
David additionally handicapped by a
heavy ball and chain, and dazed by the
occasional half-brick hurled at him by one
of his alleged supporters. On the face of it,
one would expect a walk-over for Goliath-
KGB. The remarkable thing is, even
LOS ANGET,ES TIMES
5 September 1975
Ford and CIA
I read with misgiving mueh of
what. President Ford said before the
57th annual convention of the Ameri-
can Legion (Times, Aug. 20). espe-
daily in regard to the CIA.
? No doubt any "reckless" congres-
sional actions undermining the CIA's
legitimate operations would be "cata-
strophic," as Ford said, but is that
really what Congress is trying to do?
On the contrary, Congress is inves-
tigating and is chiefly concerned
with illegal activities, which Ford eu-
phemistically referred to as being
granted some terrific KGB successes, how
well balanced the combatants are.
As for current anti-CIA hysteria in cer-
tain countries, it might be worth referring
its sillier sponsors to the following analy-
sis, from a source which even they might
find authoritative?theofficial organ of a
Communist party:
"Among all the information and stone
circulating in the country, especially re
cently, there are many which insist tha
many of our problems and difficulties ar
either inspired, or directly created by th
IA's activity . . . . However, whe
the sources and objectives of this kind o
'confidential' information are studie
more closely, and when we analyze the
more thoroughly, it will not be difficul
for us to find that the 'CIA obsession' i
being spread and encouraged in our coun
try by . . ."
At this point the Belgrade-official Borb
(Oct. 31, 1967) goes on to blame a van
ety of enemies including, especially, pro
Soviet elements.
And so: there: really is a world-
wide confrontation between the KGB
on the one hand and the CIA and the
intelligence services of the other non-
Communist countries on the other.
The present comparative relaxation in
international tension has in no way re
stilted in any relaxation of pressure by
the KGB. Indeed, the larger influx o
Soviet citizens and the setting up of ne
Soviet consulates has given it greater
oppertunities. The ussi---ifi at
home and thinly spread in. the field, ha
conducted largely a. defensive operation,
? even though accompanied by occasional
brilliant forays into the Soviet side.
On the whole, and partly as the result
of the KGB's blunders, the .CIA prob-
ably has ?:::e slight advantage in spite of
everything. The various ?recierif successes
of Russian and Communist foreign
policy are in the main due to other
reasons. The KGB, some of the Soviet
leaders seem to feel, is not really pulling
its full weight. This may have something
to do with the current major attempt to
destroy the CIA's effectiveness by con-
centration on the attacks now being
launched against it by naive (or worse
elements in the U.S.A. itself.
"improper." Despite the leaks and the
publicity of the investigation, few of
the most bitter congressional critics
of the CIA would like to see the
agency weakened, let alone. abol-
ished.
? It may appear that the Senate com-
mittee headed by Frank Church (D-
Ida.) is too aggressive for the Ford
Administration to handle. If so,
should not part of the blame lie with
Ford himself, whose Rockefeller-
headed blue ribbon panel might have
failed to do its homework adequately?
KEN DEDLER,
? Palm Springs
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18 September 1975
or the
Detente, detente, that's all
you hear these days. The latest
Member of -the detente club is our
southern neighbor, Cuba. Congress-
men and-Serators are working 'hard'
.to establish a new relationship
With Cuba. Rowever it would ap-
pear that not everyone in govern-
ment wants detente with Cuba.
? A shortwave and AM station in
Jhonduras(Central America) ha S begun
a campaign of propaganda broadcasts
directed against Cuba. ? Their
theme is both 'anti-communist' and
eanti-Cuban'.
What's so special
about this HOndutran station is that
its name is RADIO SWAN and in the
1960's it was owned and operated by .
our own Central Intelligence Agency.
? Radio Swan was ..originally con- .
structed on Swan Island in the
Caribbean by Caymen Island laborers
under the direction of the C.I.A.
It began operation with a 50,000
watt AX transmitter on 1160KHz, and
a 7,500 watt shortwave transmitter.
on 6,000KHz, in September of 1960.
At the. outset of operations,
Radio Swan claimed to be owned by
the Gibraltar Steamship .Company
(who had no steamships) located at
437 5th Avenue in New York City.
Later in 1960, Gibraltar moved to -
18 E. 50th Street, New York City,
and shared offices with Radio Press
International, a news subsidiary of
a-local'Rew'York Radio station (AM).
Radio Swan blew its cover dur-
ing the Bay. of Pigs invasion. Radio
Swan broadcasted instructions and
directives to the invading CIA army.
Needless to say, after that most .
people realized that Radio Swan, was
in reality a CIA propaganda station.
After the Bay of Pigs, things
began to get hot for Gibraltar
Steamship in New York, so they hot
footed off to Miami. Once in
Miami, Gibraltar opened offices in
the Langford building at 121 SE
First Street. At this time they
still claimed that Radio Swan was ,
a regular commercial shortwave sta-
tion, owned and operated by Gibral-
tar.
Between One 7th and 15th of
. .
November, 1961 Radio Swan changed
its name to Radio Americas. Still
they continued with the anti-Castro ?
and anti-communist broaddastine.
-r
In 1963 Gibraltar Steamship
Company vanished as quickly as it
appeared. It was repleced by-
another C.I.A. front called
Vanguard:Servie.CorPoration. Not
being one of the more creative
C.I.A..fronts, Vanguard kept the ,
old Gibraltar offices in the Lang-
ford Building as well as the old
Gibraltar telephone number: -Van-
guard claimed that it owned Radio
Americas and leased the Swan Island
facilities from the Gibraltar
Steamship Company.
In the late 1960's Radio
Americas left the air for unex-
plained reasons. Vanguard also
folded its tent and disappeared
into oblivion. In 1971 the United
States, after 100 years of 'occupy-
ing Swan Island, returned it to the.
Honduran Government who claimed the
ownership of the island. At this
time it was thought that any chance
of Radio Swan/Radio Americas reap-
pearing was gone.
However, early this summer,
Radio Swan reappeared using 1100KHz
AM and 6185KHz shortwave. . They.
are still on the air as of this
writing with violent anti-communist
programming slanted against Cuba.
This 'new' Radio Swan uses the
nailing address of P.O. Box 882,
San Pedro Sula, Honduras. (Note
that. Honduras currently owns the
island.) In a letter received by
noted shortwave listener Ralph
Perry, Radio Swan acknowledges
their former ownership by the C.I.A.
but fails to state' their current
'affiliation'. In this letter,
Radio Swan states, "As you know,
the Communists are trying to take
over LatircAmerica. We found it
necessary to pet Radio Swan back on
the air again in defense of?Demo-
cracy and the free world". One
might inquire who is the 'we' to
which Radio Swan refers. Could it
be that in this year of letepte,
that, the C.I.A. has once again set
its sights on Cuba? Certainly
Radio Swan does not qualify as a
'bi-centennial' station, or does
it? In any case, give a listen for
them between 1AM and 6AM Chicago
time on 6185 (6.185z) short- -
wave. After all it could very well
be your tax dollars paying for it. ?
nly.
Congress
Itself'
By Anthony Lewis
WASHINGTON, Sept. 17?The Sen-
ate Intelligence Committee, with its
televised hearings on secret C.I.A.
poisons, provides the immediate drama
in Washington. But the parallel House,
investigation may have a more pro-.
found impact on the larger issues-
raised by American 'intelligence activi-
ties in recent years. The reason lies in.
contrasting attitudes toward the cru-
cial question of Executive secrecy.
Senator Frank Church and his com-
mittee have followed what an assist-
ant attorney' general, with what may
have been excessive candor, called the
"traditional approach" to getting clas-
sified documents. That is to negotiate
with Executive officials about what.
will be provided and promise how ,it
will be handled.
Representative Otis .Pike and the
House committee are 'insisting on 'their.
right to examine all the relevant' evi-
dence on their own terms. They will
make no promises on what they'will
do with subpoenaed documents.
Why is .that so important? One
experienced person put it as follows:
"On that position hangs the whole4
question of whether Congress can
exercise effective oversight of -the-
intelligence community in future. If a
Congressional committee cannot' say,
'we want X' and get it Without negoti-;
ating and promising, you open your-
self to the charm and the lawyers and
the whispering in the ear."
What that observer, was describing
was the process that has effectively
protected Presidents and their intelli-
gence men from serious scrutiny for a
generation. Congressional curiosity,
when it arose, was ,headed off by a
confidential that with a friendly
member, or a .whispered 'warning of ,
grave consequences to, our security. -
To know ho wthe charm works one
has only to watch Richard Helms, the
ABROAD AT HOME
!former C.I.A. director, testify to the-
Senate committee so smoothly and
smilingly, A C.I.A. employe who vio-
lated orders by keeping poison fol-
lowed "the human impulse to do the
greater good," he said; yes, and good
was self-defined--which is the essence
of danger in secret activity. It
was an "aberration," he added; yes,
like the Bay of Pigs and Chile and the
Phoenix assassination program in
Vietnam.
The larger point underlying the vari-
ous intelligence inquiries is the need'
for .accountability. Intelligence agen--
cies do need privacy, but our system
requires that they be ultimately ac-
countable to a detached scrutineer,
which is Congress.,
Accountability is inconvenient to
Presidents and their agents. That is
why, as Congressman Pike said, the
executive branch urgently wants to
continue the old , charm-and-whisper
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WASHINGTOR POST
13 August 1975
.Meg Green field
approach in dealing with Congress. It
- is why President Ford has seemed so,
strangely agitated over the House in-
vestigation?because it might not be .
subject to control.
The President chose to draw the is.:
sue of power with the committee over
a molehill, its release of four words
from a classified document. The words;
"and greater communications security,"
stipposedly might have told someone
othat,. w-e knew something about com-
munications in Egypt's Army, the sub'-
:ject of. the report.
Why, if a private citizen had pub'
lished these four words, Mr. Ford said:
.it. Would be "a serious criminal
ense." Do his lawyers really think a'
judge and jury would convict on those'
innocuous words? In any event: his.
analogy is false. If. a C.I.A. director
were a private citizen, he would be
,subject to different rules, too. If a
horse had stripes, it would look like a
, zebra. Congress is not a -private citi-
zen.
Mr. Ford's remark is actually ex-
tremely revealing. It shows the old
attitude that "the Government" means:
only the executive branch; Congress is
a second-class branch, which gets in.
formation?and thus a share of power
?only by the executive's charity. If
.461 is the attitude, nothing has been