THE VALUE OF THE C.I.A.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 1, 1974
• Content Type: NSPR

? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA,RDP77-00432R000100340004-6
CONFIDENTIAL
25X1A
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 17
4 November 1974
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
1
GENERAL
28
WESTERN EUROPE
29
NEAR EAST
31
FAR EAST
33
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
41
Destroy after backgrounder
has served its purpose or
within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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NEW YORK TIMES
1 NOVEMBER 1974
The Value
Of the
? C? I? A?
By Ray S. Cline
? WASHINGTON?The surge of senti-
mental piety and outrage over the
public disclosure that the Central In-
telligence Agency had attempted to ?
influence the Course of political events
in Chile in the nineteen-seventies has?
'shed' more heat than light.
All great countries attempt to influ-
ence events in other countries when:
these events affect . their interests: '
Other nations try to influence our
domestic politics; the Soviet Union
and China have a well-defined and
widely-known philosophy of attempt-
ing to promote violent social and po-
litical revolution in all non-Communist
countries.
The C.I.A. did not invent covert
political-action programs?that is, ac-
tion to influence political events abroad
without the Government's official
hand showing. It was Soviet efforts to
intervene through local Communist
parties and large-scale infusion of
money into Western Europe that first
led to a C.I.A. counter-effort.
President Truman took this step on
the advice of very competent and pa-
triotic men, particularly Gen. George
C. Marshall and Defense Secretary
James V. Forrestal.
This happened in 1948, a crucial
year, especially for the future of Eu--
rope. The Soviet occupation of Czecho-
slovakia and the Berlin blockade
frightened most Americans then. Fear
of Soviet domination of most of
Europe led to the Marshall Plan and
creation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
The same fear led to the decision
In favor of secret efforts to assist
moderate, center and center-left po-
litical leaders re-establish a multiparty
parliamentary system in Italy and in
other nations threatened by strong
local Communist movements supported
by Moscow.
NEW YORK TIMES
20 October 1974
PRESS GROUP ASSAILS'
C.I.A. ROLE IN CHILE
CARACAS, Venezuela, Oct.
19 (UPI)?The Inter-American
Press Association yesterday con-
demned the United States Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency's fin-
ancing of Chilean newspapers
opposed to the leftist govern-
ment of the late Salvador Al-
lende Goseens and urged Presi-
dent Ford to identify the re-
Thus, American funds were made
available to democratic political parties
and the democratic press. Because the
Europeans were determined to avoid
one-party dictatorship and Soviet
domination, they accepted this covert
aid; using it to their advantage, and
ours. ? -
The C.I.A. did not act on its own.
It has never initiated such covert
programs without approval of appro--
priate authorities acting on the Presi-
dent's behalf or on direct instructions
from the Presidant himself.
The authority for such decision-mak-
ing is the National Security Council,
set up in 1947 to deal with military
and political considerations in Ameri-
can strategic and foreign policies. The
C.I.A. is purely an instrument of pol-
icy. To belabor it for carrying out
covert-action programs is pointless.
The tendency to blame the CIA..
for failed programs when they are pub-
licized is dangerous because the effect
on the public and on Congressmen who
vote for C.I.A. funds is to discredit the
country's whole intelligence organiza-
tion.
The best term for this organization
is "intelligence community" because
it is a coordinated group of agencies
in the State, Defense and other depart-
ments as well as in the C.I.A. Most
of the agencies' work involves collec-
tion, evaluation, analysis and report-
ing of intelligence. The entire intel-
ligeece community's total effort
devoted to covert political actions of
any kind in recent years has been
between one and 2 per cent of the
total program.
This level is falling. There are no
political-action programs under way
.now. It would be a shame if a furor-
over the Chilean operation caused the
C.I.A. to be so damaged in public
and Congressional esteem that it can-
not carry on its absolutely indispensa-
ble work on behalf of our safety.
The Chilean program, whether well-
advised or not, was focused on
furnishing money needed to keep the
opposition news media alive so that
groups whose activities are consid-
ered compatible with United States
interests would continue to be heard
despite efforts to silence them. It also
provieied campaign funds to center
parties, mainly the Christian Demo-
crats. The money spent in Chile, and
other places, was spent to keep op
cipients of the moneY.
1 The action on the final day
of the association's 30th annual
general assembly marked the
first time it has criticized the
United States in a report of its
freedom of the press committee.
The five-day convention, at-
tended by some 400 United
States and Latin American pub-
lishers, also condemned the
take-over by the Peruvian Gov-
ernment of six newspapers- and
what it called a lack of press
freedom in Brazil and Argen-
R000100340004-6-
tions before the voters.
The principal supporters of Presi-
dent Salvador Allende Gossens' ad-
ministration intended to establish a
dictatorship of the revolutionary left,
abolish Congress and neutralize or
destroy the entire managerial and
middle class. The administration re-
ceived aid and credit from Communist
countries, Much, of which it did not
have time to use, totaling about $600
million. The United States gave about
$8 million to the parties fighting to
keep Congress and constitutional
democratic guarantees alive unti the
.1976 election._ . .
, I hope the center groups still sur-
viving will be able to restore parlia-
mentary government. If so, it probably
will be done without American help,
in view of United States Congressional,
and public criticism. . ?
Clearly, American covert aid should.
'be given rarely, specifically 'when it
will help stabilize a friendly nation's
politics by keeping constitutional
government alive.
. Perhaps the effort in Chile was a
mistake. It certainly did not succeed.
Everyone is entitled to his own view
'of whether Americans will ever again
want, or be able, to conduct covert
political action to support like-minded
people abroad when our help would
make a crucial difference in their
survival. I suspect that in the troubled
world situation ahead the responsible
consensus will again favor it just as
in 1948. ? ' .
I think we should not be obsessed ,
with piety but instead should think
earnestly of every way possible short
of total war to insure that our society
and political structures and alliances
with like-minded peoples will continue
to flourish in the face of a threatening
international economic and political -
environment.
Ray S. Cline, executive (Erector of
studies at The Center for Strategic
and International Studies. Georgetown
University, was from 196.9 to 1973
director of the State Department's
bureau of intelligence and research.
Re participated in department delib-
erations on issues involving Chile be-
fore the 40 Committee, the high-level
intelligence board that reviews the
Government's covert activities.
tine.
The C.I.A. payments made
during the administration of Dr.
Allende, who died during a
right-wing military coup 13
months ago,. became known
last month.
? The press organization elect-
ed Julio de Mesquite Neto, pub-
usher of 0 Estado de Sao Paulo
of Brazil, as its president, suce"
ceeding Robert U. Brown of
Editor and Publisher, a New
:York-based trade magazine.
1
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NEW YORK TIMES
16 October 1974
Foreign Companies Aided Anti-Allende
By JONATHAN KANDELL
Special to The New York Times
SANTIAGO, Chile ? The
widespread strikes that set the
stage for the military coup that
overthrew the late President
Salvador Allende Gossens were
partly financed by funds pro-
vided by companies based in
Mexico, Venezuela and Peru,
according to leading Chilean
businessmen.
. The businessmen, ranking
members of the SOFOFA, the
most important industrial asso-
ciation in 'Chile, said that they
had personally channeled these
funds?amounting to $200,000
?to striking truck owners,
shopkeepers and professional
groups in the weeks preceding
the fall of the Allende Govern-
menton Sept: 11, 1973.
They said that a company
called Protexa, based in Mon-
terrey, Mexico, contributed
$100,000 to the anti-Allende
campaign and Grupo Mendoza
of Caracas, Venezuela, $50,000.
Money From the C.I.A.
The businessmen said that a
Peruvian concern, which they
declined to identify, gave close
to $50,000 to help finance the
Chilean strikes.
It was disclosed in September
that the United States Central
Intelligence Agency had secret-
ly financed unions and trade
groups for more than 18
months befOre? President. Al-
lende was overthrown. More
than half of the $8-million au-
thorized for clandestine C.I.A.
activities in Chile was used to
provide benefits for anti-Al-
lende strikers in 1972 and 1973,
according to United States In-
telligence sources.
How the funds were chan-
neled to Allende opponents was
not disclosed. The Chilean busi-
ness sources did not link the
money they received to the
C.I.A.
"I would have no way of
knowing whether. those funds
were indirectly from the C.I.A.
or whether those companies
were merely sympathetic to our
cause as they claimed they
were," said one businessman.
"We did not 'ask any ques-
tions," he added. "We had a
very tough time collecting
funds both here and abroad be-
cause people were giving up
hope that things could change
in Chile."
"All these stories that money
was pouring into Chile to fight
Allende," said another busi-
nessman. "They were just not
true. It was not that easy."
The sources described a half-
dozen fruitless fund - raising
trips through Latin America,
Europe and the United States.
"Most of the time, we were
promised money and it never
came" said a former SOFOFA
member. "The Europeans espe-
cially madelools of us."
The sonrces said that the mo-
ney from the Mexican, Vene-
zuelan and Peruvian companies
,suddenly started to arrive dur-
ing the first half of 1973 in time
,to help finance the anti-Allende
,
strikes that began in July of Strikers, Chileans Sa
that year.
Protexa, the Mexico-based
concern, was founded in 19451
as a small manufacturer of
waterproofing material for
roofing. It has grown rapidly
and now owns at least eight
Mexican companies, and has:
eight affiliates abroad, includ-
ing Asfaltos Chilenbs Protexa,
with offices in Santiago.
According to business sour-
ces, Protexa was not expro-
priated or seized by workers
during the Allende years when
hundreds of foreign and
Chilean companies came under
government control.
The Grupo Mendoza, one of
the largest Venezuelan business
groups, is involved in machine-
ry imports, cement and paper
production and other activities.
Chilean sources said they did
not know of any affiliate here
of the concern. ? '
SOFOFA officials said the
money was distributed to strik-
ers weekly in July, August and
September of 1973. The dollars
were converted on the black
market at up to 500 per cent
the official exchange rate.
"We were giving the truckers
about $2,000 a week," said one
'businessman, adding that he
believed the truck owners also
received support from other
fi-
nancial sources. Le6n Vilarin,
the -president of the Truck
Owners Association, has been
traveling in Europe. Previously
he has asserted that the truck-
ers depended on their own fi-
nancial resources dur?ng the
strik. Other ranking Members of
the Truck Owners. Association
could not be reached or com-
ment.
Firm Foes of Allende
The truck owners ? about
40,000 controlling some 70,001),
vehicles?were the stanchest
opponents of . the Allende
Government during its waning
months. Their 50-day strike
crippled this country's econo-
my, which depends far more
heavily on trucks than on
the state-owned railways for
the movement of goods.
The truck owners' hostility
was due to the Marxist coali-
tion Government's efforts to
create a parallel, state-owned
trucking group. Mr. Vilarin, a
former Socialist party member,
liked to surprise critics by
pointing out that he was once
an Allende supporter. Even af-
ter the coup, he kept a large
photograph in his office show-
ing the late President embrac-
ing him.
The opposition to Dr. Allende
was broadly divided into those
who sought a military coup
with an end to civilian politics
and those who wanted to tem-
per the President's socialist pol-
icies and defeat his coalition
through elections in 1976.
The C.I.A. helped finance
both groups even when they.
were in bitter disagreement
with each other. Although de-
fenders of C.I.A. intervention in
Chile, including President Ford,
have asserted that the goat of
the agency was to maintain de-
mocratic -political parties and!
other institutions, its rule of
thumb apparently was to throw
;its weight behind the strongest
'source of opposition to the Al-
,lende Government.
At times, this meant' support-
ing strikers intent on overthrow-
ing the Government and at oth-
er dines it meant heavy finan-
cial contributions to anti-Al-
lende candidates when legisla-
tive elections were considered
the best method of overturning:
Dr. Allende.
Some Were Annoyed
-In interviews, left-wing mem-
bers of the Christian Democra-
tic party, which received heavy
financial support from the
C.I.A., recalled with annoyance
the agency's support of a 26
day work stoppage by truck
owners,- profeesionals and busi-
nessmen that failed to over-
throw Dr. Allende in October,
1972.
At that time, a left-wing,
member, Ren?uentealba, was
the party's secretary general.!
He called a party meeting with
Mr. Valarin to tr yto get the
truckers and other strikers to
moderate their demands. ?
"We asked Vilarfn who was
funding the strike" said a rank-
ing Christian Democrat who
'participated in the meeting.
"All he said was that he wanted
to bring down Allende. We told
him that we were willing to
back the strikers' legitimate
economic ? grievances, but that
we would not go along with a
coup."
The October, 1972, strike
ended when Dr. Allende,
-backed by moderate Christian
Democrats, persuaded military
leaders to join his Cabinet. Al-
lende opponents thought the
military officers would put a
brake on the Government's so-
cialist program while both sides
geared up for the March, 1973,
legislative elections.
The C.I.A. contributed $1.5-
million to opposition candi-
dates who banked heavily on
gaining a two-thirds 'legislative
majority that would have en-
abled them to remove Dr. Al-
lende by impeachment:
Although the opposition par-
ties maintained solid majorities
in Congress,. the Marxist coali-
tion received a surprising 43.4
per cent of the. popular vote,
,compared with 36 per cent re-
ceived when Dr. Allende was
voted into office in 1970, and
picked up two Senate seats and
six seats in the Chamber of De-
puties.
According to informed sour-
ces, the C.I.A., which had cor-
rectly predicted an Allende vic-
tory in 1970, underestimated
Allende support in the 1973 le-.
gislative elections, predicting
less than a 40 per cent vote for
the Marxist coalition.
The disclosure of C.I.A. aid to
anti-Allende groups has caused
relatively little impact in Chile.
Few Chileans, even leftists, be-
lieve that the C.I.A. itself could
have provoked the coup or ac-
counted for the widespread 'dis-
content with the Allende
Government.
Most Chileans assumed all
along that the agency was in-
volved in the country's politics
along with intelligence groups
from Communist countries.
As long as we could main-
tain our political independence,
we would have taken money
from the C.I.A., the Russians or
anybody,", said Gabriel Caceres,
a leading fund raiser for the
PIR, a small party .that broke
away from the Allende. coali-
tion. "We didn't because it was
not offered." ?
El Mercurio, theleadinA anti-
Allende newspaper, which is
reported to have receivd finan-
cial backing from th?C.I.A., has
published news of the disclo-
sure in detail.
'Such Incredible Cheapness'
In editorials, the newspaper.
has asserted that the disclosure
"undoubtedly has Communist
inspiration, , which blows
through the minds of liberals in
the Country to the north."
The newspaper added that,, if
anything, the C.I.A. was
f"miserly." "Spending $10-mil-
lion for the fall of ,Allende,"
stated a recent Mercurio editor-
ial. "have you ever seen such
.incredible cheapness?"
Among Christain Democrats,
the main concern over the dis-
closures appears to be the ef-
fect they might have in reduc-
ing financial contributions to
the party from Christian Demo-
cratic sources in West Germa-
ny.
Spokesmen for the military
junta have responded to the
charges of C.I.A. interference
by suggesting that the issue is
basically an internal United
States matter. The junta,-which
has strongly rejected a return
to civilian politics, has also
sought to dismiss the charges
as evidence of the corruptness
of the 'political party system be-
fore the coup. ?
"Nobody has suggested that
C.I.A. bought off military offi-
cers," said Federico Willough-
by, a ranking Government offi-
cial. "AS far as we are con-
cerned, this was all a symptom
of the political decomposition
in the country before the mili-
tary junta took power."
? Mexicans Deny Involvement
S.pec:a1 tf, The Ntmv Yrq-k Times
i MEXICO CITY, Oct. I5?Al-
Fredo Molina, executive vicei
I president of Protexa, said yes-
terday that it. was "absolutely'
false" that the company helped
finance the anti-Allende strikes.,
"At no moment did we have
any contact with the strike;
movement," he said in a tele-
phone interview from his of-
fice in Monterrey. "Nor were
we ever asked. We had a policy
cf not interfering in Chilean
politics in any way."
Mr. Molina sail that Pro.
texas Chilean affiliaie was
"symbolically" taken ovee by
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WASHINGTON POST
12 October 1974
Tom Braden
Decision-Making and 'Covert Operations'
This town is disturbed about what
the CIA did in Chile and is asking
itself where to place the blame and
how to prevent something similar
from happening again.
? Some people?Sen. James Abourezk.
(D-S.D.), for example?are saying that
so long as you- haVe covert operators
ready to operate somebody is going
to approve a plan to use them, and
that the best way to avoid future mis-
adventures is to abolish the jobs of th
operators and forbid the hiring of-any
more.
? On the other hand, Sens. Howard
Baker (R-Tenn.) and Lowell Weicker
(R-Conn.) think they can envision
occasions when covert operations
might be essential to the survival of
the nation. What went wrong in the
Chilean affair, they say, is that Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger approved
a plan which was not only not essential
to the survival of the nation but not
even conducive to the nation's good.
They have introduced a bill to give
Congress an official oversight function
on covert operations. But they are
not very clear as to whether Congress
should approve the operations in
advance or merely be told -about them
after they are under way. 'P-'.
The ambiguity points up the weak-
WASHINGTON POST-PARADE
27 October 1974
?mess of their, arguments. If Congress
knows officially about operations in
-advance, Congress is responsible for
a lot of dirty business, and no repre-
sentative or senator wants to be so
responsible. On the other hand.- if
Congress were merely told about.
covert operations after the fact,' what
good would that do?
There's a third aspect to the argu-
ment, and it is put forward by Sen.
Frank Church (D-Ida.). Church spent
a lot qf time last year investigating
an earlier CIA effort in Chile ? the
campaign to defeat Salvador Allende
at the polls. Obviously, he didn't probe
deeply enoitgh. At the same time he
was getting testimony 'about a 1970
operation, the CIA was off on another
one.
What irritates Church even more
is that Henry Kissinger, whom he
regarded as a friend, was 'a great deal
less than candid with him when
Church asked him questions about the
downfall of Allende.
Kissinger kept repeating he knew
nothing of the coup?without saying
he knew a good .4.ea1 about what
brought about the coup. He also told
Church that the CIA intervention Was
limited to paying newspapers and ra-
Q. Recently I attended a
conference on the CIA in
Washington, D.C., where I
heard a professor from
Vanderbilt University?I believe his name was Ran-
som?cite an exchange of letters between Adm.
Sidney Souers, first temporary director of the CIA,
. and President Truman, who founded the CIA. Both
were disillusioned with the agency. Can you fill me
in on the details??David Marks, Washington, D.C.
A. On Dec. 27, 1963, Admiral Souers, then chairman
of the board of the General American Life Insurance
Co. in St. Louis, wrote Truman a letter in which he
:!ted: "...Allen Dulles caused the CIA to wander
far from the original goal established by you, and it is
certainly a different animal than I tried to set up for
you.
"It would seem that its principal effort was to
cause revolutions in smaller countries around the
the "Marxist union" about six
imonths before the coup but
Ithat "in practice we continued
,to administer the factory and
after the coup everything-con-
tinued quite normally.'
sneciai to The New York Times
CARACAS, Venevuela, Oct.
15? A spokesman for Grupo
Mendoza today denied "em-
phatically" making any con-
tribution to the campaign to
overthrow President Allende.
Approved For Release.
dio stations which Allende was trying
to put out of business.
Church took him at his word and
then discovered that the CIA had also
paid for the truck strike which para-
lyzed the Chilean government and led '
directly to the death of Allende. .
What disturbs Church is the lack of
trust as well as the lack-of judgment..
He's even willing to finesse the judg-`
ment. Perhaps, he says, Kissinger had
reasons for the operation which are
not now clear. But if so, why not ex-'
plain
plain them to key members of the
Foreign Relations Committee? Why
dissemble to the very people who are
trying to help him with detente and- -
in the Mideast? ?
. Right after World War II, this coun-*
try was asking itself whether a demo-
cracy could engage in covert opera-
tions. Experience since then seems to
demonstrate that it can but only at the
tremendous risk of judgment and gov-
ernment by the few. Chile is another
example of that risk.
':The question people are asking now
is whether the decision-making group
can be enlarged, the judgment made
more responsible and the risks mini-
mized.
CII1974. Los Angeles Times
globe.
"As bad as that was, it was worse to try to conduct
a 'war' invading Cuba with a handful of men and
without air cover. The campaign had been designed
and carried out by Mr. [Richard M.) Bissell who was
on my staff in the N.S.C. (National Security Council).
He had been a professor at Harvard and wrote good
staff papers, but he had little or no experience in
practical warfare. As a matter of fact, it is my under-
standing that he has never worn a uniform.
"With so much emphasis on operations, it would,
not surprise me to find that-the matter of collecting
and processing intelligence has suffered some."
In reply, Truman on Jan. 17, 1964, wrote Souers:
"Thanks for yours of December 27. I more than
appreciated it, and I am as happy as I can be that my
article on the Central Intelligence Agency rang a bell
with you because you know exactly why the organi-
zation was set up?it was set up so the President
would know what was going on...."
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
31 October 1974
Argentine Senate blasts
interference by U.S. CIA
By the Associated Press
Buenos Aires
The -Argentine Senate has con-
demned interference in the affairs of
other nations by the United States
Central Intelligence Agency and sim-
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NEW YORK TIMES
20 October 1974
C LA.Said to Have AskedFunds forChile
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times
? than S50,000 was actually spent
because of the coup d'etat in
Chile the next month.
Mr. Eagleburger's intention in
? briefing Mr. Schorr, the sources
said, was to rebuff off-the-
record statements made to the
,newsman earlier by Ray, S.
;Cline, the former director of
the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence. Mr. Cline par-
ticipated in 40 Committee de-
.liberations on Chile from 1970
to 1973 and has recently criti-
cized Mr. Kissinger's role at
? those Meetings.
The disclosure of the docu-
ments took place less than a
week after Mr. Kissinger,
through his spokesman, had
publicly called such leaks "a
disgrace to the Foreign Serv-
ice" and dangerous to national
security.
One of -the 1970 documents
shown to Mr. Schorr included
the name of a Chilean Govern-
. .
ment official who served as a'
conduit for C.I.A. views and
also apparently helped relay
funds to anti-Allende forces.
Such information traditionally
has been among the most close-
ly guarded government secrets.
A number of persons familiar
with State Department opera.'
tions expressed doubt that Mr.
Eagleburger would have shown
Mr. Schorr such documents
without the direct ;or indirect
concurrence of the Secretary of
State.
Mr. Eagleburger has- denied
showing Mr. Schorr any docu-
ments and insisted that he had
personally made the decision to
brief Mr. Schorr. "I did not,
show any documents, cables,
letters or memoranda to any-
body," he said. "I did not
describe any of the particular
events that were being argued
about. All I . provided was a
general broad statement {deal-
ing with Mr. Cline's- role]."
"Henry's role was only to
ask me to do a check of the
files," Mr. Eagleburger. said.
"It was me, on my own, who
told some people what the files
said."
Mr: Schorr has made no
public use of the materials;
reportedly supplied by Mr. i
Eagleburger and in a telephone'
interview refused to discuss;
the issue, adding: "I don't:
know what you are talkingi
about."
I The first word of Mr. Eagle-
burger's action came indirectly1
from State Department officials'
who learned that. a search had:
been made of the department's! I
special vault containging its 40
Committee documents.
In a telephone interview yes-
terday, Mr. Eagleburger ac-
knowledged that Mr. Kissinger
had authorized file searches
both of the National Security
Council minutes in the White
House and of the 40 Committee
documents stored in the State
;Department in an effort "to see
whether we &mid come up with
something that would indicate
whet her those l M r. Cline's]
statements were correct."
As Mr. Eagleburger described
it, the file searches began short-
WASHINGTON, Oct. 20?The
Central Intelligence Agency
. sought to finance an extreme
right-wing opposition group in
!Chile six weeks before the over-
!throw of. President Salvadore
'Allende Gossens in September,.
_1973, highly reliable sources:
'said today.
.The sources said that the
first Word of the C.I.A.'s. at-
tempt to become involved with;
the, extremist group became!
known two weeks ago when al
,-close aide to Secretary of State'
Kissinger leaked. documents in:
an effort to discredit a former
high .Nixon Administration in-
telligence official who was,
known to be privately critical
of Mr. Kissinger's role in Chile.,
.The documents, although in?
tended to show that there was
a. consensus inside the Admin-.
? istratiOn over the clandestine
C.I.A. operations in, Chile, have
instead .raised new questions
'about the _extent of the secret
United 'States involvement ;in
the overthrow of Dr. Allende.
The sources said that Law-
rence S. Eagleburger, Mr. Kiss-
inger's executive assistant,,
leaked three summaries of :pro-'
posals for clandestine C.I.A.
operations in Chile during a
briefing for the CBS television
newsman Daniel Schorr. The
documents had been prepared
for 'meetings in 1970 and -1973i
of the 40 Committee. the high?
level intelligence board that re-
views covert activities for the
United States Government.
A Reactionary Group
The 1973 document, sources;
said, ;showed- that as late as
July 5. 1973. the C.I.A. recom-
mended to the 40 Committee;
that -$200,000 be -provided clan.:
destinely to the National party
in Chile, a conservative group
that had urged Chileans to re-
ject?with violence if neces-
sary?the Allende Administra-
tion as "illegitimate" and "un-
constitutional."
The Nationa lparty was con-
sidered to represent the views
of the propertied class in Chile
and, in the year before the
overthrew of Dr. Allende, was
known to have close ties to
Patria y Libertad, a reactionary
group that openly boasted of
its involvement in military ef-
forts to overthrow the Allende
Government.
Since the first published dis-
closures last month of the C.LA.
operations in Chile, knowledge-
able Ford Administration . offi
'cials have mainted that the
;main goal was to enable mod-
I erate political factors to sur-
vive the Allende period: .
Whether the 40 Commit-
tee specifically .approved the
proposed funds for the National!
party could not be learned,
but William E. Colby, the C.I.A.
director, told a House intelli-1
gence subcommit tee Periled
;Mk year that $1-million was
authorized in August, 1973, for
use in Chile. Mr. Colby further
testified, however, that less
Rightists in '73
ly after Mr. Kissinger learned!
that Mr. Cline, who retired last!
year, "had made some state-
ments about his opposition to
a number of activities in Chile
and Henry and Nixon had over-
ruled him and the State Depart-
ment."
"It is true," Mr. Eagleburger
added, "that I have told some
people who asked about it that
the documents made available
demonstrated the opposite of
what Cline said."
? "I guess that I have ,.t) say
that a chec kof the fil:s showed
nothing to support the conten-
tion that Mr. Cline registered
any opposition to proposals
that had gone to the 40 Com-
mittee on Chile," he added. "In
? fact, those files demonstrated
the opposite."
In an interview with The
New York Times published
Thursday, Mr. Cline said that
the impetus for the Chile pro-
grams had come from either
Mr. Kissinger or President
Nixon, or both. Mr. Cline also
confirmed that the C.I.A.'s ac-
tivities in Chile included the
financial support of strikes by
shopkeepers and truckers.
President Ford and Mr. Kis-
singer have said that the C.I.A.
!funding in Chile was limited to
lopposition- newspapers and pol-
iticians.
Told of Mr. Eagleburger's
efforts to contradict his views,
Mr. Cline said that he was "un-
willing to comment on the
staff papers prepared for 40
Committee meetings."
"No one should discuss in-
ternal papers of such impor-
tance," he added.
Mr. Cline, who served with
the C.I.A. for more than 20
years before becoming the
head of State Department in-
telligence, is now executive di-
rector of the Georgetown
University School of Strategic
Studies,
The Three Documents 1
The three documents des-
cribed by Mr. Eagleburger dealt'
with the State Department's
comments on C.I.A. proposals!
to be discussed at 40 commit-
tee meetings.
According to reliable sources, i
Mr. Cline, as director of in-
telligence, could make addition-'
al recommendations or com-
ments on the documents, which
were to be forwarded to the
Undersecretary for Political Af-
fairs, the official who tradi-,
be
tionally represented State on
the 40 Committee.
The first document, the
sources said, was dated Aug.
31, 1970, and dealt with the
C.I.A. recommendations in. case
the pending Chilean presiden-
tial elections resulted in a run-
off involving Dr. Allende.
Three proposals, or options,
for investing money in amounts
ranging from $350,000 to $900,-
000 were reported discussed,
with the State Department urg-
ing limited funds or no funds
at all for covert activities. Mr.
Cline, in a handwritten com-
ment, called for major financial -
support for anti-Allende forces
if it could "make a differente"
between victory or defeat- for.
Dr. Allende, the source said:
A second document, dated
Sept. 4, 1970, the day Dr.
Allende barely won the Chilean
election, reportedly discussed a
C.I.A. proposal for bribing
members of the Chilean Con-
gress, which, under that coun-
try's Constitution, would have
to ratify the election and thus
ultimately choose the President.
Wymberly Coerr, then thd
State Department's coordinator
for 40 Committee staff recom-
mendations, urged that Trio
,program involving what he
termed "subornation" be initi-
ated, according to the sources.
Mr. Cline, in another -hand-
Written comment, reportedly
depicted Mr. Coerr? as being
"hung up" ? on the emotional
overtones of the word suborna-
tion. "In the world of realpoli-
tik," Mr. Cline is said to have
written such activities do take
_place. .
Spending Authorized '
The 40 Committee eventually
recommended that $350,000 be
spent in an attempt to bribe
the Congress, which voted
nonetheless in October to ratify
Dr. Allende as President.
The third document, dated
July 25, 1973, was said to have
been forwarded to William
Porter, then the Under Secre-
tary for Political Affairs,"by
Jack B. Kubisch, then the As-
sistant Secretary for State for
Inter - American Affairs. The
document reportedly discussed
C.I.A. proposals for clandes-
tine financing of the anti-Al-
lende political parties, includ-
ing a specific recommendation
that $350,000 be given to the
Christian Democrats and an- .
other suggestion that $200,000
be given to the National party.
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NEW YORK TIMES
17 October 1974
'-DOUBT ON U.S. ROLE
IN CHILE RECALLED.
;
Ex-Intelligence Aide Asserts,
C.I.A. and State Dept. 'Went,
Along' With Nixon Plan '
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Oct. 16?Ray
S. Cline, a former high-level
intelligence official in the
Nixon Administration, said to-
day that he was dubious about
the ultimate wisdom of the Ad-
ministration's covert interven-
tion against President Salvador
Allende Gossens of Chile but
that he supported it because
he feared more serious inter-
vention by the Soviet Union.
Mr. Cline, who was inter-
viewed by telephone, is the
first high official to permit his
name to be used in confirming
published reports that the role
of the Central Intelligence
Agency in the effort to oust the
Marxist Government included
the direct financing of a num-
ber of anti-Allende trade groups
and labor unions, including
truckers.
Despite warnings about the
Allende Government's inten-
tions relayed in the intelligence
reports, he said, many high of-
ficials did not believe that clan-
destine operations would ac-
complish the "goal in mind"?
to keep a center coalition alive
until 1976.
"State and the, C.I.A. were
dubious - but naturally went
along," Mr. Cline said, because
the White House?either Nixon
and Dr. Kissinger, or both?
decided the push the program."
"They key role in this whole
thing was in the White House,"
he added, "but it's impossible
to tell whether only one or
both were enthusiastic about
it because the orders came
through Kissinger and the 40
Committee. It was a National
Security Council decision and
not a decision made by the
C.I.A. or the State Depart-
ment."
'Resistance Strikes'
"Some of the money was in-
tended for financial support of
the small businessmen and the
truckers in their resistance
strikes against the Allende
Government," Mr. Cline said. "I
think it was very logical to en-
'able those groups to keep alive
economically so that we could
maintain a core of private
entrepreneurs until the .1976
elections."
Disclosed by C.I.A. Chief
The extensive C.I.A. role in
Chile became known Sept. 8
When it was reported that the
Agency's directar, William E.
:Colby, had told a Congressional
Committee that $8-million in
.clandestine funds, was author-
-ized for operations against the
. Allende Government between
-1970 and 1973. Dr. Allende died
a military coup that over threw his Government in Sep-
, tember, 1973.
? Mr. Cline served as director'
;of. the State Department's Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Was.
directly involved in much of
the planning and discussions:
.that went on in the 40 Com-I
-mittee, the top-level intelligence
board that oversees all covert
,operations of the intelligence
agency. Before joining the State
Department, from which he re-
-tired last year, Mr. Cline served
:more than 20 years with the
-agency, eventually becoming
:its- deputy director for intelli-
-gence.
His account of the assistance
.?
,ito labor groups flatly contra-
dicts both the public and pri-
>Nate descriptions of the C.I.A.
iale presented by President
Ford and Secretary of State
-.Kissinger.
At a televised news confer-
ence on Sept. 16, Mr. Ford said
:that Dr. Allende had been at-
tempting to suppress opposi-
, tion newspapers and politicians.
He added that the "effort that
was made in this case was to
help and assist the preservation
of opposition newspapers and
electronic media and to pre-
Serve opposition political_ par-
.:ties."
" Program Termed Broader
In the interview, however,
Mr. Cline said the program?
as approved by the 40 Commit-
tee, he noted?was far broader.
"What the C.I.A. was trying
to do," he said, "was to see that
.at least 50 per cent and proba-
bly 60 per cent of the electorate
,would be disillusioned by the
time. of the presidential elec
lions in 1976" ? when, under
the Constitution, Dr. Allende
could not run again
- "Well," the former State De-
partment official added, "by
.1973 they were totally disil-
lusioned with him." Mr. Cline
was alluding to the protests
and strikes in the last months
of the Allende Government.
"I decided to speak out be-
cause I feel that there's such
a superficial understanding as
to why the United States has
tried to assist democratic po-
litical organizations abroad,"
Mr. Cline asserted.
"I'm not happy about the',
way I can defend them because!
think our strategy was not
unreasonable or immoral. It
was our duty to preserve insti-
tutions which we call free"
He explained that the ulti-
mate goal of the clandestine:
activities was to enable the I
center coalition factions of the
Christian Democratic party to
survive the Allende period.,
4`And," he said, "I think 'the I
renter groups did survive, as
they might not have under a
prolonged Allende Commonist
?
BALTIMORE SUN
15 October 1974
CI A rivals Cuba
on 1AS.ag?a
, By RICHARD O'MARA
Rio de Janeiro Bureau of The Sun
Rio de Janeiro?Central In-
telligence Agency skulduggery
in' Latin America is expected
to preoccupy, the foreign minis-
ters 'at next month's meeting Latin America: The overthrow
of the Organization of Amen- of President Jacob Arbenz of
can States at least as much as
the Cuba question, the issue
for which the meeting is being
convened. .
In fact, the potential for em-
barrassment to tile United
States at the frthcoming
meeting in Quito, Ecuador, is
so great that some observers
here-suggest that as the real
reason Henry A. Kissinger, the
Secretary of State, is not likely
to attend..
Both
Both Cuba and the CIA are
sensitive subjects with Ameri-
can diplomats and policy-mak-
ers in Latin America.
The . OAS meeting will be
held November 8. The member
states will have to vote on
whether to end the 10-year
economic boycott of Cuba. A
majority of the members are
expected to approve ending the
embargo.
According to a report out of
Washington published hers yes-
terday, Mr. Kissinger, will not
attend the Quito conference. A
State ? Department spokesman
said the secretary's schedule
was filled through November.
The CIA has become some-
thing of an obsession with
many Latin American leaders
since its subversive, activities
against the government of Dr.
Salvador Allende of Chile be-
came known in early Septem-
ber. Sunday, a former foreign
minister of Colombia, Alfredo
Vasquez CarrIzosa, published
an article in a Bogota newSpa-
1 per that blamed the weakness fired the Imaginations of many
of the OAS on the CIA. Latin Americans, who before
! Writing in El Espectador, that were not so disposed to
'Mr. Vasquez described the CIA find U.S. spies behind every
as "the mysterious arm of the plot and economic bad break.
United States." Its interven- These imaginations are ex-
tions in the affairs of other pected to be fully alight in
countries, he argued, has be- Quito next month, especially if
come "an inter-American prob-.Mr. Kissinger is not there.
lem."
The former Colombian politi-
cian recalled the CIA's three
most spectacular operations in
Guatemala in 1954, the unsuc-
cessful invasion of Cuba at the
Bay of Pigs in 1961, and the
Chile operation.
Because of these, and other
less visible operations. he
wrote, the OAS has been con-
verted into a "debating aca-
demy, a forum for discussion,"
an organization "without arty
real power in hemispheric af-
fairs." ? ?
The reason, he maintains, is
because the Latin American
members have tacitly given
the United States the right to
intervene in their domestic af--
fairs, even though this is in
violation of the Charter of. the
OAS.
The Vasquez article is only
the mt,st recent attack against
the CIA, and indirectly,
against the U.S. government.
In late September two Argen-
tine- politicians, Rodolfo Uig-
gros- and Hector Sandler, attri-
buteduch of the terrorism
and violence in their
country to t`a,,, CIA.
Mr. Sandie, a left-wing con-
gressman, suet, -isted that the
CIA was behind t`ie new right-
wing assassinatie.i squad ac-
tive in Argentina, the Argen-
tine anti-Comrnunist Alliance.
Most observe.r,- agree that
the revelations. mad:, Wash-
ington September 7, ?the
Nixon administration had
thorized $8 million to subvert',
Dr. Allende's government,
which was ousted in 1973. has
NEW YORK TIMES .
22 October 1974
CORRECTIONS
In an article published
Thursday, Ray S. Cline, was
quoted as saying that trade
groups and labor unions in
Chile, including truckers, had
received direct financing
from the Central Intelligence
Agency. He actually said they
bad benefited indirecily from
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Nrw REPUBLIC
28 Sept. 1974
Getting to the Bottom.
Of the CIA Cover-up
Tad Szulc, in his article that follows, writes about Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency subversion in Chile and the
hiding of it from congressional scrutiny. The judg-
ments that led to secret intervention in Chilean politics
deserve to be criticized, but at least the CIA was with-
in its legal authority.under its charter. That is not the
case with CIA's complicity in Watergate "extra-agency
activities." The law barring the agency from under- i
taking domestic operations was dearly violated. More-
over, when former CIA Director Richard Helms gave i
misleading and inaccurate answers to questions posed
by senators about past CIA assistance to Watergate
conspirator E. Howard Hunt, who worked for the,
Nixon White House, he was covering up .possible
criminal activity;
On May 21, 1973 Helms was recalled from his post
as ambassador to Iran and questioned under oath by
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychi-
atrist, Dr. Lewis Fielding, by then had been uncovered,
along with information that CIA had given equipment
and aid to Hunt who had directed the illegal entry.
Helms said he had never heard of Dr. Fielding until
the psychiatrist's name appeared in the newspapers.
When asked about photographs that had been taken
by Hunt with a CIA camera and developed by-the
agency, Helms swore, "I do not know what the con-
tents of the film were in the latter part of August
[1971]." One senator asked if anyone at the agency who
. reviewed the film thought Hunt might be contemplat-
ing a break-in. "I never heard anybody at the agency
mention such a theory," Helms replied and later ad-
ded, "nobody had given us the slightest indication
that anything underhanded was afoot."
Helms was asked why CIA had cut off its assistance
to Hunt on August 27, 1971. Twice the former director
said it was solely because Hunt's requests had. be-
come "too extensive." To support that, he recollected
that Hunt asked to have a secretary brought back from
Paris and a covert New York telephone and address
established for him. Helms never mentioned the
photographs and what they appeared to show as the
reason for the agency's stopping its aid to Hunt.
A review of the House Judiciary Committee material
on the Ellsberg break-in and CIA's role indicate Helms',
Senate testimony was not the true agency -story. On:
July 7, 1971 White House aide John Ehrlichrnan called
then CIA Deputy Director Robert Cushman, and ac-
cording to Cushman's secretary's notes, said: "I want
to alert you that an old acquaintance [of Cushman's],
Howard Hunt, has been asked by the President to do
some special consultant work on security problems.
He may be contacting you sometime in the future for
some assistance. Lwanted you to know that he was in
fact doing somethings for the President. He is a long-
time acquaintance with the people here. He may want
some help on computer rims and other things. You
should consider he has pretty much carte blanche."
Cushman did not know that Ehrlichman's call had
? been prompted by Hunt's then-White House boss
Charles Colson. And at the time Cushman could not
know that the reason for the call was to pave the way
for Hunt to get alisguises, false identity cards, a clan-
destine camera and tape recording equipment from
the CIA which were to be used for domestic political
purpoises.
In making this July 1971 request to the agency for
"carte blanche" aid to Hunt and wrapping it in vague-
ness about "security problem4" Ehrlichman and
Colson seemed to- be sure they-iCFolild encounter no
CIA demand for proof that Hunt was not violating the
agency's charter? and the law?prohibiting domestic
operations. Would Cushman have cared? Why were
these White House aides either. unaware of the law or
not fearful such an illegal request, if identified, would
be turned down, or worse, exposed to the public? -
gain, another flashback ,-- this time to 1969. Ac-
cording to the-House Judiciary Committee's final re-
port on the impeachment articles against Richard
Nixon: "In 1969, Haldeman and Ehrlichman asked the
Central Intelligence Agency to conduct physical sur-
veillance of Donald Nixon, the PieSident's brother,
who was moving to Las Vegas. Haldeman WaS re-
ported-to have feared that Donald Nixon would come
into contact with- criminal elements." Thereafter is
cited a report by the CIA inspector general and Deputy
Director Cushman dated June 29, .1973. Thefl House
report goes on to. say that the CIA refused to under-
take that mission because it had "no jurisdiction to
engage in domestic law enforcement or internal a 0
se-
curity activities.. ." So some line was drawn.
Sometime after the July 7 Ehrlichrnan call to Cush-
man, which was dutifully reported to the CIA staff
meeting the next morning, and before July 27, 1971,
CIA was asked to prepare a psychological profile of
Daniel Ellsberg. The request came from White House
aide David Young, who along with Hunt and others
were investigating Ellsberg. Young reportedly said
that both Henry Kissinger, then running the National
Security Council, and Ehrlichrnan wanted CIA to help.
Helms' director of security, Howard Osborne, to whom
the request was first, made, has stated he initially
told Young it would hare to be cleared by Helms, since
Ellsbeig was "a United States citizen who was pre-
sently involved in a legal sense with the United States
government." He.lms approved the project after talk-
ing to Young. He told Osborne that nothing was to
be sent to the White House "without his personal
prior approval." It is interesting that Helms, in later
testimony on the matter, said he complained to Young
that for the agency to write a profile on an American
citize.n was "an imposition," since CIA knew nothing
about Ellsberg. Nowhere did Helms complain that the
task involved CIA in a domestic matter. Later Helms
was to weasel out some language in the law that per-
mitted the agency to study problems associated with
the security of CIA classified documents.
Vi th the profile project approved, FBI documents on
Ellsberg and published materials were sent to the CIA
employee who handled the job, Dr. Bernard Malloy.
Meanwhile Hunt followed up on the July 7 Ehrlich-
man call and visited CIA Deputy Director Cushman
6
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y . ape o at meeting relates that Hunt
said the equipment was needed because of "a highly
sensitive mission by the hite House to visit and
elicit Information from an individual whose ideology
we aren't entirely sure of.. That "individual" was
? Clifton DeMotte, a man who supposedly had informa-
?tion on the Kennedys. Hunt also said it would be a ?
"one time opteration] . . in and out." Cushman did ?
not ask if this was a domestic activity, instead he
said: 'I don't see why we can't" provide the equip-
ment. The next day Hunt .got what he wanted. One
week later Hunt called the CIA technician who sup- o
plied the first material and asked for a tape recorder
and additional, help, including credit cards, a second
speech alteration device and a New York address and p
telephone number.
On August 11 the CIA's first profile on Elisberg was .6
delivered -to the White House, after having been re- s
viewed by Helms. Attached to it was a note from CIA
Security Director Osborne stipulating: "I know that H
you appreciate that however thrs is used, the agency
should not become involved."
The report disappointed Young and his colleagues
at the White House. That same day, Young and Emil
Krogh proposed "a covert operation be undertaken
to examine" the files of Ellsbera's former s ct-Cati t
the technicians began to question the use to which
Hunt was putting the equipment. The camera had
been used by Hunt and Liddy to clandestinely photo-
graph Dr. Fielding's office, inside and outside, in
order to prepare for the burclary, Th- photographs
were reviewed by CIA technical supervisory person-
nel before they were delivered to Hunt. They revealed
a shot of a parking space with the name "Dr. Fielding"
dearly visible. They also disclosed shots of the office
and one .CIA official speculated at the time they were
"casing" photographs. Deputy Director Ctishman's
ffice was informed. A decision was made to tell Hunt
that no more requests for assistance would be honored.
According to Gen. Cushman's aide, the CIA technical
eople thought the assistance given Hunt "appeared
o involve the agency in domestic clandestine opera-
ons," a finding confirmed by the CIA general court-
el's office. That same day, August 27, Cushman called
Ehrlichman at the White House and told him aid to
tint was being halted because of those concerns.
On September 3, 1971 the break-in-at Dr. Fieldirtg's
ffice took place. On October 14 or 15, 1971 the CIA
echniciart who had developed the pictures for Hunt
was told Gen. Cushman was lunching with Hunt the
briefingext day and wanted a complete briefing on what
assistance Hunt had been given. The technician in-
cluded in the briefing material z:erox copies of the
Hunt photographs. What happened at that meeting
(if it took place) between. Hunt and Cushman, and
why did the CIA deputy-director at that time want to
be brought .up to date ox + Hunt's requests? Did the
agency figure out that there was a relationship between
e Ellsberg profile and the Hunt casing job of Field-
ng s office? Was any additional material supplied
y CIA on Ellsberg after the Fielding break-in? I've
sked that question several places and have no answer.
is known that the final CIA profile wept to the White
ouse on November 9, 1971 and carried with it a note
om Helms stating: "I do wish to underline the point
at our involvement in this matter should not be
vea/ed any context, formal or informal." Though
elms was later to testify he meant the work might
flect adversely on the capabilities of the agency, the
en who put the study together have said that their
ncern was that the "agency's involvement become
own and particularly that it might come to light
uring any proceeding."
Dr. Lewis Fielding. Thus plans were launched for
the subsequent break-in, and on the following day
Mr. Malloy of CIA met with Young, Hunt and G.
Gordon Liddy to discuss the agency .report on Ellsberg.
Malloy has recalled that when he was told that Ellsberg
had been under the care of a psychiatrist, Dr. Field-
ing's name was also given to him. Though Huntaske
Malloy to keep his name out of any report on the meet-
ing, Malloy responded he could not. The White House
aides asked Malloy what additional material he needed..
to expand what had already been done. Malloy, sug-
gested data from Elisberg's early life, "from nurses
or close relatives...." ?
Conversations continued to take place over the nex
? weeks between Malloy and Hunt with the latter pre?s
su:ing for a new profile. On August 25, 1971, Hun
and Cordon Liddy requested and received additiona
disguise material from CIA, along with a. camera con-
ce..zied in a tobacco pouch. A day later the CIA tech-
ncian who delivered the material was called ? long
distance by Hunt and asked to meet him at six am at
Dulles Airport to receive the, camera and film ard de-
th
1
a
It
fr
th
re
re
CO
kn
velop them. The film was taken for development but Walter Pincus
EDITOR Sc. PUBLISHER
12 October 1974
)11y ?
CT;iit
Et ..11ereurio of 'Santiago, Chile, has
,1.?;:iod it was the recipient. of CIA funds
(1-2&P, Septonlber '28, Page 14)..In a cable
to .1.:&13, I:ono Silva, director of El Mer-
curio, said:
"A pa rlinmentary ? group from the
Pemoeratic Party, in its campai;m
Cie prose.nt achninistration, not
Ile:lit:At-ain using Et MOI.curio fee their pur-
? xvithout any proor,-that.it? hal Leen
one of the nowsl,r,ilers that had i ?F.V.0(1
?I'?.'sCi?-'t lid CO!!`, th CIA. An c.litor of,
cven thattli I have no par-
ticipatitot Iii the fit:at:clot af:a!es of the
ni:wspaper, I laa-Av that its inc...ine has a
normal ?and legal o?rigin, Lizov:a hY an in- ?
. volvc,1 and carefully controlle;I!)y I
and tax authorities of the country. Not
even in our worse ta,.inents of political
per::::cat!on, thero any slistrlov of
doubt al-at seeP!aatters.."
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NEW REPUBLIC *
28 Sept. 1974
Candid but Mistaken about Chile..
IAThere Presidnt
by 'Fad. Szulc
Gerald Ford's first public pronouncement on a con tro
?versial foreign policy question?secret intervention
in Chilean politics prior to last year's bloody coup
d'etat ?was as startling in its sweep as it was erroneous on virtually every point of fact. Probably the first
.American President to do so publicly, Mr. Ford last
week delivered an extraordinary defense of covert
intelligence operations abroad, claiming that in this
particular case it was "in the best interest of the people
of Chile, and certainly in our best interest," and that
"our government, like other governments, does take
certain actions in the intelligence field to help imple-
ment foreign policy and protect national security."
By thus advertising the subversion engineered on a
continuing basis by the super-secret "40 Committee"
of the National Security Council, the President handed
the worldwide Communist propaganda mill some of
? the best grist it has had in years.
Now for the facts.
Mr. Ford stated that the US government "had no
involvement in any way whatsoever in the coup it-
self." In the strictest sense, this is probably true: the
Chilean army needed no further physical help from
us to launch the September 11, 1973 revolution and the
subsequent terror. Chile's armed forces are equipped
mainly with- US materiel, and Our military. advisers
worked with the Chileans throughout the Allende
period. Likewise between 1970 and 1974, when the US
deprived Chile of commercial credit, including credit
for vitally needed food imports, it supplied the Chilean
armed forces with at least $30 million worth of arms,
primarily aircraft,. on credit. A squadron of S-5 jet
fighters: was delivered a few. Weeks before the coup
,and more planes were in the pipeline. The regime fell
:after jet fighters bombed the presidential palace.-For
what it was worth psychologiCally, a US naval task
force was. off the shores of Chile the week of the coup
in preparation for joint exercises with Chilean war-
ships: Most loans to Allende's Chile were refused by
the US on the grounds that Chile lacked credit worthi-
ness, although this was no bar to military credit sales.
What of US assistance. to anti-Allende forces before
the coup and before Allende took office? Here is where
the President was misinformed, perhaps by Secretary
of State Kissingerwho himself is caught in a credibility
squeeze on -
Until the surfacir. ig of secret Clonessional testimony
last April by CIA: -Director William E. Colby, the ad-p.
ministatiort had. insisted, as did Kissinger a month
after...the coup, that. the US did virtually nothing to
damage Allende. C_Olby testified, however, that the
CIA spent eight million dollars in Chile between 1970
and 1973 to prevent Allende, in effect, from governing
Ford and Frankfurter
Q. Mr. President, under what international law do we
_
have a right to attempt to destabilize the constitu-
tionally elected government of another country? And
does the Soviet Union have a similar right to try to
destabilize the government-of Canada, for eXample, or
the United States?
A. I'm not going to pass judgment on whether it's
permitted or authorized under international law. It's
a recognized fact that historically as well as presently
such actions are taken in the best interests of the
countries involved.
Presidential press conference, Sept. 16, 1974
I remember shocking him [the Judge Advocate General]
. . when he came into my room and said, "Frank-
furter, I want you to help me. I've just been over to the
White House"?this was just after we had seized. the
customs house at Vera Cruz (April 19141 "and I'm
asked to write a memorandum whether that seizure
should be treated as an act of war and what its status
is in international law. Will you work with me on that?"
I said, "General, I'm going to ask to be excused. I
don't have to work on that. I know the answer to that."
"You do?"
"Yes, I do."
"What is the answer?"
"It would be an act of war against a great nation; it
isn't against a small nation."
"I can't give him that." ?
"I know you can't, but.that's the answer."
from Felix Frankfurter Reminiscences
Reynal & Company, C) 1960 by Harlan B. Phillips
efficiently. He also said that three million dollars had
been expended in 1964 to keep Allende from winning
in that election. This is how Mr. Ford explained these
-pre-coup activities: "In a period of time, three or four
years agp, there was an effort being made by the
Allende government to destroy opposition news me-
dia, both the writing press as well as the electronic
press. And 'to destroy opposition political parties. And
the effort that was made in this case was to help and.
assist the preservation. of opposition newspapers and
electronic media and to preserve opposition political
parties. I think this is in the best interest of the people
in Chile, and certainly- in our best interest."
The President's statement is inconsistent with
reality in these respects:
1) The US, through authorizations issued by the 40
Corrunittee, embarked on undercover support of the
anti-Allende press and opposition parties nearly four
Months before Allende took office. Former CIA Direc-
tor Richard Helms te_stified last year that $400,000 was
approved for media support in Chile on June. 27, 1970.
After Allende won a plurality, but not a majority in
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the elections on September 4, 1970, the US, according
to Colby's testimony, invested $350,000 to bribe Chil-
ean congressmen to vote against Allende in the run-
? off in the Congress on October 24. So there was no
. question of saving opposition parties and press at that
time from persecution by Allende.-
2) After Allende became 'President, minority
Marxist re-gime, the Unidad Popular, did Precious little
to "destroy opposition news media." El Mercurio, the
principal anti-Allende newspaper in Santiago, was
closed down only once for several days, after publish-
ing an. editorial calling, in effect, for insurrection.
When its owner, Augustin Edwards, fled Chile im-
mediately after Allende took office (Edwards came
to the US and became a member of the board of di-
rectors of the Pepsi-Cola company, which is headed by
Richard Nixon's close friend, Donald Kimball) the new
governnient began tax and antitrust litigation against
the Edwards empire. While El Mercurio remained the
voice of the opposition (it could be read in the waiting
room of the Chilean embassy in Washington, along
with pro-regime leftist publications), the Edwards
family was divested of its bank and other nonpress
holdings:A right-wing newspaper, La Tribuna., ran into
some trouble after charging in print that Allende had
been expelled from medical school for raping a 14-
year-old girl. -
The Allende regime did refuse to authorize the
Catholic university in Concepcion to go on the air
with a new radio station. The university thereupon
set up a relay from the Catholic .university's station
in Santiago. After the regime began jamming these
broadcasts, persons believed to be linked to rightist.
militant groups blew up the jamming facility.
3) There is no evidence. that Allende was out to
?
"destroy opposition political parties," 'unless we are
. willing to say that the Nixon administration was out
to destroy the Democrats here. The Chilean Senate
.and the Chamber of Deputies, both with anti-Allende
:.'majorities, functioned until the day of. the coup.
Allende resisted pressure from the extreme left of his
coalition to call a plebiscite to abolish the existing
Congress and replace it with a hand-picked unicam-
eral parliament. There were few political prisoners in
Chile under Allende_ Today there are over 20,000.
If the opposition was not in that much' trouble
(Allende failed to win.a majority in the Congress in the
1972 parliamentary elections), the question arises why
the CIA. needed eight million dollars to._ preserve-
the "best interest- of the Chilean people. Colby, who
WASHINGTON POST-PARADE
20 October 19714
Q. Of the men who have been directors of the CM?
Adm. Roscoe Hillenkoetter, Gen. Bedell Smith, Allen
Dulles, John McCone, Adm. William Raborn, Richard
Helms and William Colby?which one in your opin-
ion has been the best??GT., Langley,Va.
A. William Colby. He is a modest, strong, efficient
director whose experience in the intelligence com-
munity goes back to 1944. Colby has had visited
upon him the sins of his predecessors; many of them
almost unforgivable, and under the circumstances, he
is more precise in his statements,. told a conference
on the CIA. and Covert Actions in Washington, DC
earlier this month that all That money.went to Chile
to help "our.democratic friends" to survive until 1976,
so that they couldthen vote the Marxists:out of office.
Addressing..., specialists, Colby knew: better than. .to
argue that the. CIA was saving the opposition from
destructiOn by-Allende. : ;,-
4) Mr. Ford; asserted that ..the 40 Committee keeps
the appropriate congressional committees informed
of its plans for covert intrigue. This is not so. The 40
Committee as such has never briefed the ,Congress
and, as far as it is known, Kissinger, . who runs the
secret group, never confided in congressmen on its be
half. There is an oversight authority in four subcom-
mittees over the CIA's activities, but these bodies meet
seldom and their members rarely ask searching ques-
tions. Colby has acknowledged that the congressional
subcommittees are told of CIA activities post facto
rather than before the fact as Mr. Ford claimed. ?
The day after the President spoke, the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee voted unanimously to
reopen its investigation of the US role in the Chilean
events. Its staff. recommended that perjury or con-
tempt. citations be considered against formir CIA
Director Richard Helms and former senior. CIA and
State Department officials for misleading the Senate
in earlier testimony. And the senators want to hear
again from Kissinger, who heads the 40 Committee.
The question I find so puzzling is why Mr. Ford is
so misinformed about the history of our involvement
in Chile?and about the Chilean situation in 1970-
1973.-- and why the 40 Committee. approved the eight.
million dollars: for covert operations, a rather large
?
sum to keep ,Chileans newspapers going and "our
democratic friends" in pocket money. lf, in the name
of democracy, the US was aiding the opposition in
Chile against art elected government; was it also aid-? .
ing,the press and the opposition under dictatorships
ins Brazil, Greece. and Spain or the Soviet Union? It
would be interesting to know. Is it helping the new
opposition in Chile, where a police state has been
constructed by,. the military junta? Kissinger claims
that the US must not interfere in the internal affairs of
others?even to encourage Soviet dissidents.
If the issue was the nationalization by Chile of US
foreign investments with inadequate.inderanification
or none, why not admit it insiead of sermonizing
about the opposition press and parties? WhY doesn't
this "open administration" come clean?
has carried the burden well. Moreover he has been
sensitive to the rising opposition in this country to
"a secret government" and has opened the hereto-
fore closed CIA window enough to provide the
agency with a new image. If he can resist the tempta-
tion of introducing new legislation calling for 10-
year jail terms and $10,000 fines for anyone writing a
book about the CIA, he will retain the admiration
and high standing he so richly deserves.
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NEW YORK TIMES
23 October 1974
Issues and Debates
C.I.A.'s Covert Role.. Should the_
By Dmnp, BINDER er the United. States should
saniat to The New York Times have at this phase in ita, his-
tory a 16,000-member
WASHINGTON, Oct. 22?.
intelli-
Prompted by new disclosures
gence agency, with an esti-
of covert operations of the,
mated ?annual budget of $750-
-
United States Central Intelli- Million, functioning. on a
?
gence Agency in Chile, a worldwide scale.
growing number of Congress-, Adm. inistration
men are demanding that such ? ?
.agency actions be curtailed or. Point of View
stop.ped altogether. ?
The. involvement of the
Reduced to its most simple
,
form, as.expounded by Presi-
C.I.A. in subverting' foreign
dent Ford on Sept. 16, the
governments deemed hostile
United States is big in the
to American interests has be-
intelligence field because the
come fairly well known over
other side?the Communists
the years?the buying of vota
?is big in italt is-a logic also
ers, the, arming of plotters,?
. the .infiltration of labor un-, w applied to the strategic-
eapons race. -
ions and all the other"black"
It wai held justifiable in.
arts of ?intelligence.
the late nineteen-fifties to
? The catalogue inclUdes;
monitor. Soviet Missile deael-
C.I.A. activities in Iran, Gua-1
opment with U-2 spy planes,
ternala, the Dominican Re-!
public, Cuba, Bolivia, Berlin, a practice Nikita S. Khru-
Albania, Greece, Italy, the shehey damned in 1960 when
Congo, Indonesia and 'Indo-1 a U-2 was shot down over
china. ` the Soviet Union. Now both.
Covert operations of the sides maintain sirhilar sur-
Chile type have a long his-
veillance with apy satellites,
tory, dating, from the very
inception of the "central in- and the United States holds
telligence group" on Jan. 22,a its efforts doubly justified.
1946, under President Harry In the Chile-. situation, a
S. Truman. Within a short justification by United States
time American agents were intelligence officials was that
buying up Italian parliarnen- the . Communist powers,
tary deputies by the dozen notably the Soviet Union and
and using secret funds to Cuba, invested a great deal in
help Italian ? conservative men and material in Chile on.
forces stop the Communist behalf of theAllende Govern=
influence in trade unions.
The justification then, and ment.
The President said: "Our
almost always thereafter was Government, like other gov-
to halt the spread of Com-
ermnents, does take certain
? munism and support free in-
-stitutions. , actions in the intelligence
What made the case of field to help implement for-
Chile different? eign policy and protect na-
tional security. .
.Background ? The clincher followed: "T
am reliably informed that
When the highest Adminis- Communist Mations spend
tration officials, includingSec- vastly -more money than we
retary of State-Kissinger, de- do for the same kind of pura
clared flatly last .year that poses."
the United States was not Mr. Colby, with wide ex-`
involved in the Military coup perience in intelligence, ap-
that overthrew President plies a sophisticated line of
Salvador Allende Gossens argument. In the year since
of Chile, Senators and Rep- he became director of intelli-
resentativeS took them at gence, he has told newsmen.
their word. on and off the record ?
Now. in light of new dis- and public audiences that
closures from secret testi- properly conceived intelli-
molly by William E. Colby, gence operations constitute
the Director of Central Intel- an indispensable defensive
ligence, and other revelations weapon.
in the press, it seems obvious He is careful to distin-
to at least a score of legis- gulch between the .three
lators on Capitol Hill that branches of intelligence: the
they were at best Misled and gathering of raw intelligence
at worst lied to. material by secaet means,
The furor over ilie Chile the analysis and estimating
operations of the C.I.A. may of raw intelligence gathered
also be related to the mood both clandestinely and opeh-
of the times?marked by the ly, and the deliberate actions
aftermath of the Watergate taken to. disrupt adversaries,
'scandal and. the strengthen- whether they be constituted
Mg of East-West d?nte. geveriiments or other intela
Both post-Watergate attitudes ligence agencies.
and the feeling that interna- Few domestic critics of the
firmal tensions have eased an- C.I.A. dispute the necessity
pear to he conducive to the for the secret gathering of
questioning of the reasoning intelligence?by human, elec-
hehind covert intelligence op- tronic or photographic means.
orations. None dispute the need for
At the heart of the cmrent analysis and estimation of
debate is the question whet- adversary capabilities,
? It is the nature and .pur-
? pose ,of covert operations
that have drawn the. sharpest
fire, especially from Con-
gress. Mr. Colby's response? ;
made ',in- public- early hi Sep--;
tember and previously in pri-
vate? is, that the covert cap;
bility i's a "useful dagger .ita.
the sheath" ranged an-long-the
Multitude' of other. military
and economic weapons avail-
able to the Administration..
The Critics'., View
? "1 'don't think the C.I.A.'
should be engaged in covert'
operation at *ill," Senator`
J. W. Fulbright, the Arkansas-2
Democrat who heads the San- ?
? ate Foreign :Relations Corii;,
mittee, said last Month:. 1:
think it should be an intel-
ligence-gathering - operation..
Their- covert operations get'
involved in elections ',in for,
eign countries and we usuallY
end up, electing. the wrong.
-
? Mr. Fulbrig,ht has joined a-
.
?
group of 12 Senators spon-
soring a new bill that would
create a 14-member joint
C6ngressional committee t6
oversee the United States in-'
telligence community.
The, legislation was pro-
poSed by Senators Lowell P.
? Weicker Jr? the Connecticut
Republican, and Howard H.
Baker, the Tennessee Repub-
lican, who asserted last month
that Congress had' been re-
? miss in exercising control of
the C.I.A.
They were following up
the protest by Representa-
tive Michael J. Harrington,
the Massachusetts Democrat,
that the Administration was
telling one thing about the
Chile operations in public
hearings and a different,
darker tale .in private ses-
sions with the House intelli-
gence subcommittee.
10
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,aa
NEW YORK TIMES
23 October 1974
Ex-Envoy to Chile
Denounces Leaks
Discrediting Aides
? to Ta s NEW York "notes
WASHINGTON, Oct. 22?The
? director general of, the foreign
service has expressed concern
.in the State Department's
newsletter about "malicious or
calculated" leaks aimed at dis-
crediting high officials. ? ?
.. Nathaniel Davis, former Ain-
bassador to Chile, wrote in his
regular column in ?the monthly
newsletter that there were
three kinds of leaks.
. The first, "the classic secu-
rity breach," is not :a major
gents Come
Home,
Mr. Colby had gone into
considerable ' detail about'
? C.I.A. operations in Chile
at an informal session last
April of the seven-member ?
subcommittee headed . .by
? Representative Lucien N.
Nedzi, the Michigan Dem-
ocrat. The subcommittee was
exercising its authority to
eaersee C.I.A. operations.
In legislative practice,
however, the intelligence
subcommittee does not ap-
preve or veto the details of
covert operations.
There is one .more argu-
ment against covert - operaa.
.tions of the Chile variety. a
"They are stupid," said a
retired CIA. official . who
participated in some. "The
case of Allende is a ?classic
example. He would have
gone down the drain all by
, himself as any intelligent
person 'could see. It didn't
help him. along."
I ' Finally, there-is a question
of ethics, whether the ethics
' of .individual C.I.A. opera-
tives whose zeal 'might have
carried theta beyond their
,authority in places like Chile
or Greece, .or the ethics of
:the United States as a naal
, At the beginning of the
anonth, Senator James Abou-
rezk, Democrat of South. Da-
kota, submitted an amend:
rnent to the foreign aid bill
that Would e havhalted all
covert -operations by the
a, Before ?it ? was ':'defeated.,:
i..6g to 17, Senator Abouretic
,said: "There is no justific<
.ttion in our legal, moral.,pit
religious prineiples (Or operac
tions ot agency.whiCli?
..'restilt. in aassaasinations; -salt
,ota-ge. political , diaruptionsa
or other meddling in anothe"r
country's internal affairs, ajt
_ . .?
-in the name of-the Arneric(h.
? people,
problem now; he said. The seC-
ond kind, be said, involves in-
formation by responsible of-
ficers "to clarify policy or fact,
to promote understanding, and
reduce mischief."
"The greatest damage, to
constructive interchange be-
tween foreign service officers
and the press results from the
third kind of leak,- he said.
"This is the leak designed to
cut down a superior or col-
league, or to gain advantage in
an internal policy question in ?
dispute."
? Mr. Davis's article did not.
specify which leaks had caused
concern, but he has made clear
in private his, own unhappiness'
with articles printed recently'
on the 'Central Inteili;encel
Agency's -involvement in Chile I
while be was ambaszador there.I
? Approved For Release 2001/08/00 CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 .
RADIO:TV MONITORING SERVICE, INC:.
3408 WISCONSIN AVENUE. N. w, -:- WASHINGTON. D, C.
20018 -:- 244-8682
? PROGRAM: .
'.-
'
EYEWITNESS NEWS
DATE:
TUES., OCTOBER 1, 1974
STATION OR NETWORK:
'
..WTOP TELEVISION
TIME:
600 PM, EDT
EX-CIA OFFICER REPLIES. TO WTOP CRITICISM OF CIA
ANNOUNCER: A recent WTOP editorial criticized the
role of the Central Intelligence Agency in Chile during the
'regime of President Salvador Allende. With an opposing view,
here is Thomas Ernst.
THOMAS ERNST: As a former CIA and U. S. Air Force
dntelligence officer, I take issue with WTOP's recent editorial
regarding the covert operations of the Agency. In my judgment
WTOP erred in its criticism of the'Agency and in the covert
nature of some of its activities.
I believe the American people and most liberal
critics of the CIA would support many of the follbwing'tovert
operations, and I ask; would.WTOP object to a covert operation'
designed to free black political prisoners in racist South
Africa? Would WTOP object to secret activities directed
against the. racist government of Rhodesia? If such covert
-actioh would result in a bi-racial and black majority govern-
.ment in that country, I think not.
Would most Americans, liberal or conservative,
object .to CIA-directed operations in Southeast Asia to free
,POWs and. MIAs? Again, I think not. Would WTOP and most Ameri-
cans object to covert operations designed to free Soviet 'Jews
from that still oppressive country? I think not
Who could object to Secret CIA. moves to capture or
kidnap-Arab terrorists or PLO leaders who planned and'.ordered
the Mahlot massacre? Hopefully, not WTOP.
For these reasons I believe the majority of the Ameri-
can people should and do-support such CIA operations. In cl\%s-
ing, I ask WTOP to criticize the policy makers like Mr. Kissi,:ger,
and I ask that it refrain from criticizing the CIA in its
necessary secret operations- Thank you.
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.:LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 October 1974
e Intrigues Before Allende Fe
dr,
B RD' FAGEN.
?? ? .
:Nly wife and I gained firSt-hand er;
perience of ;American involvement. in
Chilean affairs a few months after we
.arrived in Santiago in February, 1972.
That was when a...U.S. Foreign
Service officer?an acquaintance of
mine?got in touch with-me and said
that the U.S. Embassy in Santiago
had succeeded in infiltrating all-
parties of the Popular Unity coalition;
but that it had not Yet managed to.
infiltrate the Movement Of the
Revolutionary Left,. a. group outside
the governnient and critical of it.
? This US.'officialtho? light my uni-
versity connectiOns?:which he knew.
about at first handrnight ? provide.
links for infiltrating that group. He.
offered to change money for me on
the black market. Because of our old
association and strictly for toy own in-
formation, he also sketched the
number and. distribution of CIA
agents masked as regular diplomats
in the U.S. Embassy in Chile?about.
one-third of the total.
--
I doubt that I was the only Ameri-
can citizen approached in this man-
ner. I hope I was not the. only one to.
refuse. The incident is a measure of
how blatantly ? the U.S. Embassy
operated 4.4ng that period.
There was Tic) question by the mid-
die of 1972 that the Allende Govern-
ment was in serious trouble. The in-
flationary. spiral was twisting, up-'
ward, shortages- of foodstuffs had -
developed ? although much was
available on the black market?and
the centrist Christian Democrats', led'
by ex-?resident Eduardo Frei, (.vhorri
the United States had once actively
supported) were in open alliance with
the right-wing National Party. Many
members of this center-right coalition
has. passed in word and deed far .
beyond the point of "loyal opposition.",
The political and economical situa-
tion was ripe for'what later came to
be known as "destabilization:'
In October. 3972, the massive waIk-? ?
out or truckers, shopowners, .and
busine-ssm en in opposition began.
Those. ef ns living in Santiago Were .
.arnazed at the seeming .ease with
which thousands 'of, persons
withoet yen:ale income?and ..vit'nout
savings because of. the inflationary
spiral?were able to support
.thernseees: The dollar rate on the
black ,--earket dropped, indicating that
_fresh sc..Irces ot currency were flow-
ing into :he country. It was everyday
specula:ion in-Santiago, both on the
?Right and Left, that the United States
was funding the walkouts, specula-
Wan later confirmed in the recent dis-
closures about CIA. actiVities.
H Despite political and economic dif-
ficulties, however, the government
was actually gaining support at the
polls. Much to the dismay of hi a op-
ponents, in the congressional elec-
lions of March, 1973, the Allende:
.coalition gained electoral s.trength,
receiving 44% of the total vote.
electron' was the
first step toward the military coupe
. Convinced-that Allende could not be
.removed constitutionally?his con-
Richard Fagen; professor of
politi-
cal science at Stanford, was in Chile
for 18 months 177.1972-73 as a consul-
tant to the- Ford Foundation, and visit-
ing professor at the Latin American.
'Faculty of .the Social Sciences-. He-is
coauthor of !..Latin. America- and the.
United States: the Changing Polflical
Realities.".,
;gressionar sUpport would have-had
to drop below. 33%. for him to be im-
peached?the- Ilight, began to plot in
earnest:Violence, sabotage...and a fi- ?
nal series, of crippling strikes
"wracked Chile" during July and. Au-
gust of 1973. The full role.of the CIA-
in these events is yet to be told.
Throughout this period, the.
Chilean politica/ situation was fra-
gile, the economy Was in trouble,
and class, and political tensions ran,-
high. We now 'know that .S3 to-S.II
? ? ? -
Million were tied"covertly tcie Sup-
port opposition newspaper's, parties
and strikers.The United States in-
filtrated political parties, and, as now
.conceded, attempted to buy votes in
order to prevent the election of Allen-
de. ? ?
Fui-thermore, 'because the CLA. and
its friends certainly had the Means to
change their dollars into Chilean cur-
rency, somewhere other. than at the
.Central Bank; the moneypuMped
.into Chili may.actually have bought
540 to 550 million worth of subversive
activities and services. With a
raging black market, opposition par-
ties, newspapers, and- operatives
could be purchased in dollars at a
very substantial discount. All of this
makes ?a mockery. of official claims
that the United States did nothing?in.
Mr. Ford's words?but ensure 'that'
democratic institutions and parties.
survived." :What Washington did do
was Put.a very substantial thumb on-
._ .
'the Scalesetipping theni: against the
. .
.freely elected government of Chile.
'AgainS.E.the background of what:
we .now know.of CIA.in.'VOlvereent in.
. Chile, the statemenii'hy.. high ? US.
olficials that.'we'djd not participate
iri?the overthrow ,.of. the Allende
GoVernment.'F- .areeSerionsly
misleading. Perhaps- the ? United.
StateS did not participate in the plan-
ning' Or help -in .thee.attatk on. the!
'Presidential palace...--eBut as
recognized. iegalt
Sxsterrie -accesseries,hefore-the-fact
niiist..4hare ,fesponsibility-with' those4
? who actually corernit the criminal act,,
'eterzliiiciugh the forra en-MAY-not be;
present at the scene of the crime. :
-..ktragic as .the4vent.s in Chile are;
0-perhaps even: more. signWleanCe .tol ?
'Wolericaris i.s theincre.
coverup?'fa1sa.-jdtjfjcatiQn$ ,and
? outright ?told to . the
American peoI?y the highest' of.:
? ? ?
ficials of the Ford Adminis tra tion. For
- -1
' example, in justifying covert CIA ac
tivities, the President has claimed!
that "there was aneffortbeinba made!
- :by: the government of Salvador Al-i
Iende to:: destroy' oppositiono.newmediaV
_ and. to _destroy oppo.sitiOn:.
This . .
does,eriotLkefIect.- the true
:predoup situation .in Chile. Actually,. _
-thenp.po.sitiOn .parties.. and. "
newspapers :kept functioning froriaI
? l'?1970,to?.19;73??--,andTfidot. only-.becaUseei
oikr:goiiernmenii,ivaS .pouringinianeY7
rink) them:el:1 faCf,iOne of the most'sict-
eChilean constitutionalism had Occiirai
Tedin 1970 vehentheCL9..tried tobuY1 ?
..oPpcisition-votes in-Congress sti.as-tol
prevent Allende from assuming thel
presidency
To a11 Of. this sorry recent history
theekey actor: and prime villain"has.4
been. Secretary.: of State Henry A.'
.Ki:ssinger.:As head of the Forty Corn-,
inittee,e. Kissinger' Was the Clii6fi
'architect.of covert, operations against'.
the.''Allende government. It..was he.!
.who',, first articulated the "domino
theory" of the "threat" that Chile
(with' a population '5%,. and
Wealth less tharele,"'aethat of the-Unit-
ed States) posed to this country. "I
. don't think we should delude
ourselves that an Allende takeover in
Chile would not present massive 'pro-
blems for us ....".Kissinger said. in .
1970- ?
This is the Same man- who just a.
? few weeks ago told the U.S. ambas-
sadOr in Chile to-cut out the politi-
cal- sCience lectures" because the am-
. bassador brought up the. question of
human rights with members of the
junta when he "should have been".
discussing military "aid. .
All of " this betrays. -a scenario in'
.which. the-- U.S.' goverriment?:once
again?has, set itself implacably
against p.Diitical and economic ex-
perimentation in.the Third World. 1
It's the sPirit of 'Vietnam and.
Watergate at work in hemispheric:
. politics. This scenario; in Chile as in
Vietnam, involved disregard for the
sovereignty and rights of others, the
violation of national and international
law, dirty tricks by-the CIA and other
agencies, cozying up to :repressive
governments, and withholding vital-
information from Congress. and the
American electorate: . . -
The people of Chile and Latin
America .deserVe better from ? the
government of the United States?
arid so do the American people.
12
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Approved-For Release 2091/08/Q8 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010.0340004-6
? LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 October 1974
taS. Ought to Suspend
Co-vert Actrvmes Abroad
? ? 1
- BY DAVID WISE..:-.. ?-?
When Soviet Party chief Leonid Council. The .purpose of the CIA, as.
nneethnev Neae in Washington in 1973 tset forth in the law, was to. pull.:
together the intelligence in:orma-
? - ? ?
?
fora summit .rneeting, Richard Nixe
tion that-the ...President needs to'.,
? on- introduced him to a short, th-----7'n' inakn decisions in the .field of foreign '
-.man with graying' btack hair,. Sharp ne_,,licv.
features: and very cold blue eyes bee There is nothing* in the law
about - overthrowing goyernments-:
hind glasses rimmed in flesh-colored ..n.
-mere- is language, however, permit-
. ? . . , ?
plastic frames.
-ting the CIA to perform such "other
BrezhneY-Stared Tor a moment at. .functions :as the NSC may direct.
Williana?:. -:Colby, director of the n Under :this umbrella clause, ..the
. . . _ . .
?CIA has engaged in its global dirty .
David Wise.is the coauthor -tricks,. manipulated the- ? politics .of'
Invisiae Government," a critical study ..'other countries, directed a secret
. of the CIA, and of "The Espionage war in Laos, funneled millions of
Establishment." His .1atest ,book is dollars -through foundation-conduits
'The Politics_of Lying.1
into student, academic. _and. laboe
groups, dropped agents by para-
.
? Central ? Intelligence Agency; and ? chute in various 'countries and
asked:!'IS.he a dangerous man'?" ? served as the clandestine arm of the
Colby yeplied soothingly: "The US. foreign policy.
more we ? know of each other,. the A partial list of such covert opera-
safer we-both will be. bons includes the .following:.?
The answer was disarming, but it ? Btirmat In the 1950'se4he CIA fi-
-alsci? was. consistent with?the CIA's nanced approximately 12,000 Chi-
current strategy of emphasizing its nese Nationalist troops who fled to
information, intelligence-gathering, Burma as the Comminnists took over
-:.and analytic functions, andedown- mainland 'China in .1949. The CIA's
:playing covert operations . or. troops, discovering poppies to be
irty;-Axicks more profitable than politics, soon
? The- CIA does indeed collect: became'heavily involved in the opin ?
ibreign intelligence. But its Direntor! um trade.
ate of Operations?which Colby for- ? China: In the 'early 1950's, the. in-
nerly headed?also conducts secret telligence agency air-dropped agents ?
political operations. around the into the People's Republic of China.
.globe. These have ranged from pay- To CIA men, John T. Downey and ?
Inents to foreign Political leaders Richard Fecteau, were captured and
and attempts -to rig elections, tO-? spent 20 years in Chinese orisons be-
overthrowing governments and pa- fore they were released.
ramilitary invasions. CIA-backed Philippines: Also in the early
coups .have sometimes resulted. in 1950's, the CIA backed Rainol'a 'Men-
the assassination of the political saysaans campaign against the Com-
:leaders who are overthrown. At munist Huk- zuerrillas.
times, the CIA has even operated its Lean: In 1953, the CIA overthrew
own air force, army and. navy.
the government of Premier Mo-
Increasingly, these. secret. opera ?-
'lions have .coMe- under criticism, in hammed Mossaciegh, who had na-
tionalized the Iranian oil industry.
and out .of Congress. Covert activi-
ties have focused nublic attention on The coup was led by CIA agent Ker-
the question of whether the United mit "Kim" Roosevelt. grandson of
President Theodore Roosevelt. The
States 'nas the right to intervene se- ?
operation kept the?shah in -power,
cretly in the internal affairs of other
and in its wake, American oil compa-
. nations. And secret operations have
raised basic questions about the role ?? ries were permitted into Iran_
' of an intelligence agency M. a demo-
Guatemala: In 1954, the CIA top-
chacy. ?pled the Communist-dominated
.
Recent disclosures that the CIA government of President Jacobo ,Ar-
apparently with the approval of high ben, - Guzman of Guatemala with the
help of a. CIA air force of old World
officials nof the Nixon Admhtistra? -
War II .fighter . planes. President ?
lion, spent $8 million in Chile to
Eisenhower later confirmed that he
'de.stabilize" the Marxist novernn '
ment of Salvador Allende hc'ave in- i had. approved theCIA operation.-
creased demandn for either an end to 'Indonesia: In 1958," with a secret
'such secret .political operations, or air force of B-26 bombers :the CIA
tighter control by Congress over hacked Indonesian rebels againsi. the.
aA, or both. government- OfnPresident . Sukarno.;
One of the -CIA: pilots; Allen ?Law-:
The CIA was created in 1947 ais
.rence Pope, was shot down and cann
The successor to the Office of Strate-: -.tined; he wan freed in 1267. through,
eric Services (0S3). The same legisln- -the intervention of Robert F. Kenn-
ton created tlie National Security rnn, ?
Approved For Rele'ae 2.001/08108 olA-RCP-737-
Tibete In the late 1950s, the CIA
. .
established a secret base at Camp'
Hale, Colo, nearly. 10,000 feet high
in the Rockies; and there trained
..Tibetan guerrillas to return to their: ?
homeland to fight against the Chi-
nese Communists. CIA covert opei?alei
:tars later Claimed that some of the:
:rinbe. tans trained: in Colorado helped'
:"...the Dalai Lamano escape to India i?
1959. nen'. -?n'? - ? ? nee
ba: -In-1961;a brigade of Cuban-
. .? exiles trained by the CIA on a.coffee
Plantation- tie-Guatemala.' invaded
Cnba at the .Bay of Pigs in art unsuc,
? cessfut attempt to overthrow ?? the:
government of Fidel Castro:: More.
than .250. of.the invaders died on the;
..beacheS.and almost 1,200 were cap-
tured in-President Kennedy's. worst.
foreign-lponcy disaster; -
In 1963, the ?CIA worked' ?
;closely-with the. South Vietnamese
.
-generals Who. carried out the coup,-
against President Ngo Dinh. Diem, ?
Who was. killed. In Vietnam; the CIA,
also s-eated the Phoenix program.'
.which kilted 20,587 Vietcong during
the period_Williern Colby headed it,
. ,.b...etweeti..1968 and 1971n..
? rt. tinlinna:-.-In- 1967, antearni of CU'
operatives; was ? sent n to:? Bolivia,
'where_theyhelned to tack down Er-
nestiaq-Chenr Guevara..former .aide -.to -
Caste&....J.Guenara was tapturen and
: The rationale for all such covert
CIA operations is that.they are justi-
fied and necessary to protect Amen-
can national security. A secret five-
? man government committee,. known
-over the years by various names and.
currently. as the Forty Committee,
has the responsibility of approving
covert -operations in advance. At ore-
? sent, the chairman of the committee
is Secretary of State. Henry A. Kis-
singer. Its other members are Un-'
der.secre tate/ of State for Political Afn
. fairs Joseph J. Sisco; Wiiiiam P. Clen
merits, Jr.., the deputy ',secretary of:
? ?defense; Air .Force Gen_ George S.
Brown,. chairman of the Joint Chiefs:
of Sniff, and Conoy...
. _
The? extent to -which- .thc Forty ri
.Committee controls secret CIA. oper-
ations remains uncertnin -for the i
very reason.th7+ the conirnittee, like"
? the CIA itself,. oper-ates in great se-I
-crecy. -In any . event; nwhaV cantron ?
-does exist.. iswithin the executive
.branch: the :Forty Committee does.
not _in clud e : anyemembers of 'Con-
gress in-its- ranks. Nor, as far as can
be determined, does.theCIA'discuss?-
its- covert onerntions to- any signifi-
cant extent with the four. shadowy
House -and --Senate subcommittees
that. supposedly monitor CLn.acitivi:
? ties. In the case of Chile.,--Various Ex-
ecutive -branch. witnesses assured
congressional committees, that thel
.? 'United -States had*--not!Internen-edi
against Allende. ne. ni
. In an-era of cold War, secret inter-!
nvention _in_ other: countries might
have seemed justified .to manyi.
00432040061tTEP33b084g6r4t appealtiustin,
13
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fled today. There is no moi-al or legali
.basis for covert operations.-_the-l7i
act does' not specifically. authorize
then-I?anti such. tatervention..vio-1,
Yates the charter of the United Na-i
tions,-which the United -States is;
pledged to respect. ? , :?
? i
- Moreover, the. Constitution gives1
Congress the war power; secret oper.-
ations involving paramilitary actioril
and the overthrow of goVernmerits
are clearly the equivalent of unde-
clared war and, on their face, unconH
? stitutional.
1
The price of secret operations is;
too high in a democracy that rests on
LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 October 19714
the consent of the governed. Often,
'the government has lied to protect:
.covert CIA activities: Such ? official
lying has eroded confidence in our
national leaders and the American
system of government.
..1
It is 'high time that the CIA Put.
away its cloak and. dagger -and!
packed up its bag of deadly tricks.!
The CIA should be conned to gath-
ering intelligence overseas. Pres-
idea: Ford, Secretary Kissinger and
their successors- should ccr7duct. a
foreign policy that is visible and ac-
countable to the -American peop:e.
President Must Balance
Interests, Share Planning
33 Y HAARY ROSITZXE
'Chantrnent with secrecy deepened
.. From the Bay of Pigs to the cur-
rent Chilean case, there have. been
sporadic denunciations of the CIA's
'action operations abroad?in the
press, in books from inside and out-
side Washington's intelligence.
establishment, and occasionally. in
:Congress. ?'
The issue is 'heightened rather
than resolved by President Ford's
statement. that. "our government,
like other . governments, does- take.
certain actions in the intelligence
field to help implement foreign pol-
icies and protect n.atipnal security.'i
The central question:- Should the.
United States employ secret means.
to interfere in the affairs of other'
countries?..The debate is waged on
two levels?moral and pragmatic.
For pure. men of principle, covert-
action is imperrnissable as A means.
whatever the end. Covert actions are
Harry Rositzke, retired after many
years in operations with the OSS and
the (IA, is' the author of "U.S.S.R. To-
day!,
immoral not only because they are.
secret and therefore violate the can-
ons of an open society, but also be-
cause by interfering in the domestic!
affairs of another country they vi-
]ate the U.N. Charter and the mora/
and .legal principles of American.,
society.
At a more realistic level,?the cri-1
4.1que of secret operations addresses'
itself, to profit and loss: Are secret
;operations worth carrying out?
? On the loss side are not only the
"moral objections. but the conspic-
? arous failures of the past (the Bay of
Pigs), the sinister image of the CIA
;abroad (the .bogie of "-American jai-
oerialism"), the compuision of the ex-
ecutive to lie in public and to Con-
gress in order to keep secret its spon-
sorship of ."unofficial" actions.
(Chile), and the domestic disen-
oy "Vi a tergate.
- What are the'entries on the profit
side?. The list of' pass :successes on
the public record is 'short. President
Truman authorized large-scale offi-
cial and unofficial support for the
-democratic parties in the 1`..24.S
an elections to prevent a Communist
victory=and the Communists lost.
President Eisenhower triggered a
coup in Tehran in 1953 to keep Irs-rt-
Put of tile Soviet sphere-?--and it stta
is.. The following year he authorized.
a coup in G u atemal to- pre verit'thc.:.
export of Soviet arms into the West-
ern hemisphere?and the coup sue-.
ceeded without bloodshed.
What are the secret successes? No
one knows outside the small elite in
the executive.
-Political action operations ?
played a ?ma rginaCrole in American .
'foreign policy since 1948, but the full
record is. not available either to Con-
gress or the public. For a decade al- ?
ter World War II they -played-a tan-
gible but minor role in the A.mericart
*effort to restore a stabilized, demo-
cratic .Europe. Through its contacts ?
with non-Communist politicians and-
government.?:i- officials, with.,,labor
.leaders, and media figures, the CIA
added its influence .to that of the
State and .Defense Departments in
containing .the expansion of ,Soviet
poWer-.west of the Elbe. ?
In the late 1950s and 1960s, the fo-
cus of political operations shifted..to-
the Third World, the terrain chosen
by Moscow to weaken the "ironer-
lists." In the .Near East,. in Africa.
briefly, and in Southeast Asia,
covert operations played the part
in furthering overall American ob-
jectives, however, ill-conceived some
of these objectiVes.raay appear in re-
:trospect.
In Latin-America the political si-
tuation became even more challeng-
ing after Castro's:victory, and coun-
terinsurgency, became the order of
the day.; for.-- half.. a s dozen federal
:14
agencies:-The.CIA's political. action
'operations were aimed mainly' at the
:legal and .illegal?Coinniunist. parties
supported.. by Moscow with money,
-? training and:advice:at he insurgent,
..groups working-out-of Havana, and.
at the' minor rash of "Chinese par-
ties" that broke_ out in the mid-6Cs
? The evolution of purely domestic ?
surgenties- and ? of. urban terrorist;
groups further broadened the chal-
lenge .to.*, local .?,?security agencies
working in concert pith the CIA_ .
.;.It is niistake.tolhir24 that all CIA
operations ..irr..Latin America' were
? aimed at supportMg.right-wirig
tarists. Arnerica's.jultimate goal in*
Chile's 1964 election. of course, was.
to thwart the election of Salvador
Allende. but Washington-put its
money on., a.. refonn-minded...Chris-:
tian Democrat. Eduardo -Frei, 'and' -
actively sought the achievement oC
his goals. ?.-breaking up the domiri-,
ant financial oligarchy, for instance.:
- :art action ,.arm
government,: the.. CIA ., historically:
has .Ottracted; Many liberals to its
ranks, for they saw in it a chance to
,bring democratic 'reforms to. parts of
:the world that:most needed it. One
:reason that the-CIA now is widely,
'perceived as far-right is that its fail-
ures have been more publicized thani
k3-successes, and these usually have
involved: strictly anti-Communist ac-
tivities, as in Annde's Cone. -
. In the new 'world of. detente,_it.is
often argued, secret 'action opera-
tions are no longer needed..Detente,
however broadly defined, has not of-,
fected Soviet competition on the:
ideological and -political front_ :Mos-71
covr :continues to . exploit the re-;;
sources of its.built-irt political action,
instruments?the' Crtrty4ilinist par.:
ties:-..abrOad.:. 4 continues tri-export .
. .
str.ong.antf.American propaganda an
-
its awn radios and news services, and -
by'. the distribution al--.anti-:capitalist
!literature... and , general subsidies to
'local 'editors 'and .colii-nristsr The;
KGB continues-to recruit 'agents
influence"... ?-? -
Secret political action is not th4
only .antidote' for:secret Soviet 2C??
but it is One-ir-sfrument. Situa-
tions are bound to arise, especially in
.Latin. -America or the. Near East, in
-
which the 'President Will find a
_get' American action is tlie_only
ef-
fective ., response_ Such -.occasions
may be rare; but it. would be foolish
to deprive-him of the sea-et option-
...Who will measure the profit' and
loss of such operations? ?
It is a fundamental-and frustiting
fact that the pragmatic equation can .
be 'written only -within the execu-
.tive. The broad. .moral-pragmatic
issue' is inevitably reduced to the
question of controllinc, the action of
. the executive?and here frustration.. ?
persists. for there are no adequate
?
answers.
A-? Hoover-type commission on in-,.
_ _
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Approved For Release 2001108108 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6 .
ke.11igence and secret operations can,
at., best, make broad bureaucratic.
?ant""policy. recommendations. Con-
gressional oversight. can do no more
than rubber stamp executive deci-
sions or hold,drama tic post mortems.
Legislation, a -"foreign intervention
control act*, for example, is impossi-
ble. to write on such a rarified 'sub-
ject,.nor can Congress or a.commit-
tee vote on individual strategic oper-
ations that are to be carded out se--
.cretly.
? . ? ? ..-
. The burctea is clearlyon.the Pres-
.ident to re:solve. at least some of the
public suspicion and distrust about'
secret political actions abroad: He
can change the 'machinery of secret
committees to bring in. a broaderad--
versaryv of view in the initial
-stages of secret action proposals. He-..
can make:, 'the National Security
'Ccuncil as a.whoTe.responsible for
.ral recommendations to him-He can-
exercise his., sharpest judgment or
the possible profit and.cost of each.
operation..And he is the-Only man.
who can bring to bear a moral judg-
renL
that reflects the values,of the,,
'electorate..-as.
? . . .
". The President can take 'one furthei-I
,step to brfne".iri the people.: He can.,
as-range for the participation of
se-
lect congressmen a the National
curity Council's deliberations on se-?
cret action propcisAls '
" Who monitors the PresidentZ.1n1
any government, secret ? aetivitiesi
are peculiarly the province of the ex-
ecutive-: secret negotiations, -back-i,
door diplomacy, foreign intelligence
and domestic security operations,-i
covert action operations. In a repu'ol
lic.without an official secrets, act
there is only one check on what he;
does in secret?the pres.'.... ? .!
? The, adversary relationship" be-
tween the media and the executive
on official secrets may in individual
cases entail some damage to national
. interests, but without private inves-
tizators, we cannot know;- who
doing what to us or for us.. Expcse
of the government's secret .opera-
tons. whether an Cambodia. or Chile,
can throw light on: the acts of the
past. and provide a cautionary signal,
for the decisions of tomorrow:
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
18 October 1974
Uncovering the CIA:
is congressional oversight needed? ?
? By Editorial Research Reports
The past two years have not been
kind to the American intelligence
community in general, and especially
not to the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Tainted by Watergate, the CIA is
taking it on the chin for having spent
$8 million to "destalailize'! the Marx-
ist regime of Chile's late president,
Salvador Allende, The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee immediately
launched an fnvestigation into the
matter. ?
In addition, Sens. Howard H. Baker
(R) of Tennessee and Lowell P.
Weicker (R) of Connecticut have
introduced legislation to establish a
14-member congressional oversight
committee for all federal agencies
with intelligence functions. These in-
clude not only the CIA but also the
FBI, Secret Service, Defense In-
telligence Agency, and National Secu-
rity Agency.
The idea of an intelligence over-
sight committee is hardly a new one.
In s an extensive survey of the in-
telligence community in 1966, a team
of New York Times reporters found
that the "overwhelming consensus"
of those interviewed was that Con-
gress should not attempt to "control"
the' CIA through a special committee.
It was felt such a panel "might
-become anew intelligence empire on
Capitol Hill that could exert a direct
policy influence on the CIA separate
?from and challenging the President's
policy decisions."
Covert activities
If the CIA ?did nothing but gather
and evaluate intelligence, It would
have few critics. But the agency also
engages hi covert political operations
LONDON TIMES
8 October 1974
Mr McMahon's
denial on
CIA connexion
From Our Correspondent
Melbourne, Oct 7
Mr William McMahon, the
former Liberal Pritne Minister
of Australia, denied today that
his Government had authorized I
the Australian Securityintelli-
gence Organization to cooperate
with the American Central In-
telligence Agency in any activity'
designed ? to overthrow the
Allende Government in Chile.
Mr McMahon said that there,
was no 'truth in the, allegation
(reported to have been made
by an unnamed official in the -
United States State Department)
that the Australianintelligence
organization had acted as a
watchdog for the CIA in Chile.
? The Liberal Government It, ?
?
abroad, and these occasionally have
brought it into disrepute. The disas-
trous invasion of Cuba at the Bay of
Pigs in 1961 is perhaps the classic
example of a bungled CIA adventure,
From time to time the agency's
intelligence-gathering activities also
cause embarrassment, as when the U-
2 spy plane was shot down over the
Soviet Union in 1960.
President Ford and Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger both de-
fended the CIA's covert activities in
Chile as in the best interests of that
country as well as of the United -
States. Others are not so certain.
"Special operations pose dangers
not only to the nations against which
they are directed, but to ourselves,".
wrote David Wise and Thomas B.
Ross in "The Invisible Government,"
a book about the U.S. intelligence
Community. "Thei,aise the question
of how far a free socit. in attempt-
ing to preserve itself, emulate a
closed society without bet. -..ning in-
distinguishable from it."
Apprehension justified
? The CIA's involvement in NS ver-
gate, limited and reluctant thoug it
was, has raised questions about -i.e
nature of the agency's activ!`it.3
within the United States. Vic... r
Marchetti and John D. Marks, a
thors of a recent book about the CIA
say that Americans are justified in
feeling apprehensive.
? "Nurtured in the adversary scling
of the ? cold war," they. w:lte,
"shielded by secrecy, and spurrec
by patriotism that views dissent as
threat to the national security, the
clandestine operatives of the CIA
have the capability, the resources, the
experience - and the inclination - to
ply their skills increasingly on the
domestic scene." . ?
The CIA's capacity to defend itself
against such attacks is limited by its
overriding need to operate in secret.
To provide a detailed rebuttal might
expose sensitive matters of national
security. Still, the mover for greater
congressional oversight of the CIA is
gathering force and may become law.
affairs of other nations. It
would certainly have never
countenanced activities whose
object was to overthrow . the
legally elected Government of
Chile. .
Mr McMahon also repudiated
any ? suggestion that the CIA
might have contributed funds
to the Liberal Party genera)
election campaign earlier this
year.. This suggestion has been
made in a book entitled
Looking at the Liberals just,
issued in Melbourne and edited
by Mr Ray Aitchison, a former I
-Can bers-a journalist.
" I can assure you we would
never accept funds from the
nor ae
said, had made it a suit ii ?
15 Approved For Reitaatseidt00410810814 :0 hve 77-0-#3t1=1061310 thv ever been
04400044fir? 1
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NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1974
Kissinger Assures India That A.Won't interfere!
By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times
NEW DELHI, Oct. 30 ? Sec
retary of State Kissinger bluntl
assured India today that th
Central Intelligence Agenc
would not interfere in the po
litical situation here. .
Mr. Kissinger, ending a three
day visit to New Delhi, said
at a news conference: "I rejec
the implication that the United
States is engaged on a sys-
tematic basis in undermining
any government, and, particu-
larly, constitutional govern-
ments. Exactly the opposite is
true."
In making the comments be-
fore departing for Bangladesh,
Mr. Kissinger sought to ease
the persistent and expressed
fears of Indian politicians, in-
cluding Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi, that the C.I.A. was
bent on subverting India. Amer-
ican officials-here have termed
the fears obsessive and Mr. Kis-
singer was questioned several
'times about the agency as well
as United States involvement
in the coup.
? A year later, American news-
papers reported that the di-
rector of the intelligence agen-
cy, William E. Colby, had told
Congress that the Nixon Ad-
ministration had authorized
more than $8-million for covert
activities ?by the agency in
Chile between 1970 and 1973 in
an effort to prevent the elec-
tion of Salvador Allende Gos-
sens as President after he was
elected anyway, to make it
impossible for him to govern.
Dr. Allende died in the 1973
0 coupe.
Asked by several Communist
newsmen about United States
- involvement in the coups in
y Chile, and last summer In
e Cyprus, Mr. Kissinger replied:
y ? "The United States did not
- foment the overthrow of a ccin
stitutional government in Chile
- That has been made suffi
ciently Plain by the President
"Secondly, the United States
had nothing whatever to do
with the coup in Cyprus. This
is simply repeating totally un-
founded propaganda.
"Thirdly, the United States
is not engaged, directly ,or in-
directly in any attempt to influ-
ence the domestic situation in
India."
Mr. Kissinger added: "It has
not authorized such a program,
it is not engaged in such a pro-
gram and it has repeatedly
pointed out that if any of its
officials should ever be caught
? in unauthorized action, we
_would take strong measures."
'New Page' Turned
Mr. Kissinger's visit to India
has been widely applauded by
Indian and American officials.
The Secretary relaxed ?and
seemingly cheerful at a crowd-
ed government auditorium, said
that "a new page". had been
turned in Indian-American re-
lations.i
"In terms of the purpose
that we set ourselves, which
was to establish a basis for a
new and mature relationship,
I consider the trip completely
successful," Mr. Kissinger said.
He flew from here to Dacca,
Bangdalesh, on a trip that will
also take him to Pakistan, Af-
EDITOR & PUBLISHER
-28 SE'P 67.1
?
CIA infhl.ertee.
111 CiiI-
coidepd by TAPA
.The Inter American Press Association
issued a statement September 2ri condemn-
ing attempts' by governments to influence
:newspapers thr'ough financial support. .
The statement, signed by IAPA presi-
dent Pohert U. Prown, publisher and edi-
tor of Eurron & Pc-nmstiEn, was iss,ted
after the. New York Times disclosed that
*the Central Intelligence Agency had se-
cretly financed Chile's .striking labor
unions and news media threatened by Sal-
vador Allende's minority. government.
In testimony, September 19, before the
Serate Foreign Relations. Committee, See-
' rt.t.try of State henry Kissinger asserted
tloit the intelligence ,agency's involvement-
in Chile had .been authorized 'solely to.
keep alive political parties and nc.ws
threzttened by Salvador Allende.'s mi-
nority Government.
? -Ford favors CIA
'President Gerald It. Ford, revealed at
his September 11; prc..ss conference, that he
supp-qded the CIA involvement in Chile
and said that it had been auth:lriz:2..1 be-
cause "Ilicre was an effort being made 1,y
the Allen -le Government to destroy
0 i
an stan, Iran, Europe and the
Middle East.
Mr. Kissinger's visit, at the
behest of the Indian Govern-
ment and his first time here in
three years, was largely de-
signed to lift relations between
India and the United States.
Resentments linger here over
Washington's support for Pak-
istan before and during the
1971 war that resulted in the
Creation of Bangdalesh.
'Also, many Indians view the
$10-billion in United States eco-
nomic assistance to India in
the nineteen-sixties as a sym-
bol of dependence and a soiree
of American political leverage
there.
Americans See Hostility
Americans often contend that
the Indian Government has been
hostile to the United States in
recent years and has spent too-
much time lecturing and criti-
cizing successive United States
Administrations whileignoring
repressive tactics of the So-
viet Union, such as crackdowns
on dissidents.
t? Moreover, Indian comments
that the United States seeks to
exploit India's poverty political-
ly and economically have soured
the relationship and annoyed
Americans.
Mr. Kissinger said today,
'while discussing food aid to
India, "I think one of the as-
pects of the relationship that is
Ideveloping now between India
iand the United States is that
;we can talk to each other free
of complexes.
I
r One of the complexes that
;has affected our relationship in;
sit ion news media both the writing press
as well as, the electronic press, and to
destroy opposition parties.'
Times' S91.11'CPS deClarCd that "less than
half of the money made available fcr
clandestine_ activities in Chile was pro-
vided for the' .direct support of the al-
legedly threateled new-spapers
and raWo-television stations, referred to
Mr.? Fora." ?
An official disclosed to Seymour Hersh
Nc"..v York Times reporter that "i-oine
finneinl support for newspaper and radio
stations was needed in Chile, ben use
wouldn't have been good to have strikes
if nolx-,ely k WM'S it."
11(.rsh s111-Xested that most of the funds
invested for propaganda purposes, acc'erd-.
ing to his sot:rees, "went to El .1ferci(r,,
the main oppse-;!tion newspaper in Chile.
It was the only. ser:ous political force
t'ne new-spapers and tele\ isic41 s::- ?
lions there," tin soarer' Mited.
JA PA pfesident. I;rown explained in a
statement:
?'.11.c: Inter Amerik?an Press .Association
deplori-s reports that the CIA has spent
funds in Chile to supinIrt the opine.dtic;n
press under Preside..t. Allende. The lAPA
condemns any attempt by Cre,Trnments to
eithcr !,.fl.r.seut or nm!ncially s6ppo:'t
11PWspa per
:?11,11) S'App,,rt 111(1.r.".:Iden,:',.."
16
the past has been who wasl
:asking whom, for what. And'
secondly, whether the United
',States was doing anybody ? a
ifavor by extending aid. --I
i "Let me say first of all that
;when the United States under-
'takes a certain measure,' with
!respect to India or any other
Country, it does so in its own
linterest as well as the interest
lof the other Country." - - ,
Decision on Food Awaited
1 Mr. Kissinger said that' a
"final judgment' on food aid
,for India would-be made when
he returned to Washington-next
month. Current estimates are
that India will receive about
500,000 tons of food at-prefer-
antial prices within the next
.few months. Indian sources said
'that by next summer the total
lof new American food aid,
might reach one million tons..
, On ? other issues, Mr.?Kis-1
singer, who spoke with news-
. .
men more than 30 minutes, con-
ceded that there was "an ab-
sence of identity .of views" on
the establishment of a -United
States naval base on the Indian
Ocean island. of Diego Garcia, ,
about _1,000 miles south of
India. . .
He declined to discuss the
possibility of lifting or relaxing
the United States embargo on
the supply of weapons to Pakis-
tan.
"I .do not think it is appro-
priate for-me to -make state-
ments that affect other cowl-,
-tries on the while',
I'm in New Delhi," Mr. Kis- i
singer said.'
JAPAN TIMES
5 OCTOBER 1974
CIA's Agents Listed .
-LONDON (Kyodo-Reuter) ?
A former United States spy
turned Marxist, Philip Agee,
Thursday moved to embarrass
the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy (CIA) by making public a
list said ? to be the agency's
. operatives in Mexico.
A book by Agee, to be pub-
lished here in January, tells of
'his work ,with the CIA in Lat-
in America up to the time he
resigned, disillusioned, in
1969.
Thursday he told a press
conference held above a
Fleet Street pub that he want-
ed to expose CIA officers and
drive thdm out of the coun-
tries where they operated.
He said his list of agency
personnel in Mexico, under
Station Chief Richard Samp-
son; was drawn up recently
."by comrades who I trained
to follow the comings and go-
ings of the CIA."
? The 39-year-old writer, who
now lives in southwest Eng-
land, attacked the agency as
the "sectet political policy of
American capitalism and the
enforcer of economic ex-
ploitation."
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
29 October 1974
DESPITE COLBY CLAIM, IT WASN'T AGENCY'S FINEST HOUR
The CIA in Laos: 'An Equivocal Success'
!
B.Y CHARLES A. STEVENSON
The Central Intelligence Agency doesn't
brag very much, nor does it get many com-
pliments. With its reputation. tarnished by
such misadventures as the Bay of Pigs and
.secret support to opposition groups in
Chile, the CIA is seldom credited for its po-
litical analyses and its intelligence on So-
viet weaponry.
So it was somewhat unusual when CIA
Director William E. Colby emerged from
,the shadows in September to defend covert
operations. And it was ironic that he decid-
ed to praise the "effective but modest man-
ner" in which the CIA operated in Laos.
Over the past dozen years, he said, "a small
commitment of CIA Americans and a small
expenditure? had defended Laos so well.
that the battle lines remain "essentially un-
changed."
To a student of American policy in Laos,
this was hardly a "small" effort. ,
The CIA spent about $100 million per
year in Laos in the early 1970s ? an
amount equal to about half of that small
country's total gross national product in
those years. Together with even larger.
sums openly given in military and econom-
ic aid, U.S. assistance dwarfed the local
economy, giving the United States a dom-
inating influence.
CIA-financed Americans?probably num-
bering fewer than 1,000?supported, sup-
plied, advised, and in effect commanded a
45,000-man army (at its peak) in a bloody,
decade-long war.
This struggle produced an estimated mil-
lion refugees and left uncounted civilian
casualties. The Meo and other hill tribes,
for whose benefit. and protection the CIA
aided the conflict, saw their villages devas-
tated and their populations decimated. .
Even U.S. air support, which dropped 21
million tons of bombs during 1964-73, could
not alter the outcome of the war?a
stalemate.
Whatever one's judgment on the magni-
tude of these efforts in Laos, the most ba-
sic question is what we want the CIA to
do?and to be.
When established by law in 1947, the
CIA's chief purposes were "to correlate and
evaluate intelligence" and to coordinate -the
,various intelligence activities of the
government. Authority for covert actions
was derived from a catch-all clause allow-
Based in Washington, D. C., Charles A.
Stevenson is the author of "The End of No-
where," a study of American policy toward
Laos.
..ing the CIA "to perform such other func-
tions and duties related to intelligence af-
fecting the national security as the Nation-
al Security Council may from time to time
direct."
Although Director Colby favors no re-
strictions on the CIA's ability to conduct
covert operations, he did tell the Senate
Armed Services Committee .last year that
the agency "undoubtedly" went beyond
.what Congress had intended by running
the war in Laos:
? This admission suggests that we should
look more closely at the record before ac-
cepting the CIA's 'effective but modest"
ac-
tions in Laos as a good example to follow.
The CIA got a key role in Indochina on
Aug. 20, 1954, when the National Security
Council adopted a policy of "covert opera-
tions on a large and effective scale."
Acting sometimes without the knowl-
edge or approval of the U.S. ambassador,
CIA agents in Laos proceeded to bolster
their own chosen factions as cabinets were
'made and broken.
According to U.S. personnel in Laos at
the time, the CIA supported groups which
brought down Prince Souvanna Phouma's
.neiltralist coalition government in 1958 and
almost succeeded in bringing down its suc-
.cessor in 1959. (This later attempt was
foiled when the U.S. ambassador, unable to
harness the CIA. obtained diplomatic sup.:
port for his stand from other nations.) -
In 1960, the CIA helped rig elections to
. keep its clients in power. When an indigen-
ous, grass-roots military coup returned
Souvanna Phourna to 'power later that
year, the CIA continued monetary and
material aid to its military friends, who
sent rebel forces to oust the government.
All the while, President Eisenhower and
the U.S. ambassador proclaimed their sup-
port for Souvanna Phouma.
' CIA assistance to the hill tribes, which
had been organized into a 9,000-man army,
also contributed to the breakdown of the
1962 Geneva agreements on Laos, which
had put Souvanna Phouma once again in
charge of a coalition government.
-As the conflict in-Vietnam intensified.,
the United States expanded its efforts in
Laos and secretly aided the fighting there
as a rear-guard action against the North
Vietnamese. Said former Secretary of State.
.Dean Rusk: "After 1963 Laos was only the
wart on the hog Of Vietnam."
The U.S. Air FOrce concentrated on the
so-called Ho Chi Minh trails leading
through Laos into South Vietnam, but it
also bombed heavily in support of Laotian
.units, the most aggressive and effective of
.which were the CIA's clandestine army. -
As the Meo were forced to rely more and
more on preteen-age boys for soldiers, the
CIA expanded its secret army with Thai
."volunteers" Eventually these forces: num-
bered over 40,000 ? and could mot really
be kept secret.. _
Some 'members of Congress and theiress
had piecemeal knowledge of these activi-
ties, but they generally accepted the opera-
tions as a useful adjunct to the Vietnam
war.
Now, according to news reports, the
CIA's presence in Laos has been greatly
reduced. A new, shaky coalition govern-
ment has brought peace.
A new mood is taking over in the United
States as well ? a rejection of the-cold
War mentality of the 1950s, of unrestrained
presidential power and of secret wars.
Many people are beginning to question
whether the President should have, in ef-
fect, a private army to use to intervene in
other nations (often in their domestic polit-
ical affairs), with little it any accountability
to Congress and the public.
- Colby has justified covert CIA operations
as the only choice "between a diplomatic
protest and sending the marines." In Laos.
however. other Options were available and
used with some beneficial effect: suspend-
ing aid, soliciting international diplomacy
or refusing to deal with certain self-pro-
claimed local governments.
.These steps were at least open to.
public
scrutiny, while the CIA's clandestine mani-
pulations and intervention were not.
Secrecy tends to produce a moral blind-
ness toward the means, ends and conse-
quences of U.S. actions. In Laos. the CIA's
'record of political interference' and of
bloody, stalemated war can be judged, at.
best, only an equivocal success.
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WASHINGTON POST
27 October 1974
.S. Said to Fear Lisbon Shift to Left
By Miguel Acoca
Special to The Washington-Post
LISBON?Secretary s of
,
State Henry Kissinger, appar-
enUy skeptical of U.S. Ent-
bassy reports from here mini-
mizing the peril of a Commu-
nist takeover in Portugal, sent
high-level intelligence and. dip-
lomatic experts to this Iberian
:country recently to make inde-
pendent evaluations.
Informed sources said that
,Xissinger dispatched Lt. Gen.
-
k Vernon Walters, deputy direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence
:Agency, to Lisbon in August
'for a "personal appraisal."
:The general, who speaks excel-
:lent Portuguese and is consid-
.ered a specialist on Portugal,
;was in Lisbon from August 9
to 12 for meetings with high
government officials and se-
nior U.S. embassy staffers.
The CIA would not com-
ment on the persistent reports
sof Walters' visit, refusing even
rto confirm that it took place.
LA CIA spokesman said that
,:the agency never comments
;)on the travels of its top per-
;sonnet.
1,, Two weeks ago, Kissinger
sent a four-man State Depart-
;
anent mission to Lisbon for
still another independent re-
:view of Portugal's future
:course, the sources said. The
!group, headed by Alan Luk-
:ens, director of the depart-
ment's Iberian section, in-
'eluded Robert Ryan, a depart-
;ment monetary expert, and
:Michael Samuels, an authority
?on Portugal's African colonies.
:The identity of the fourth mis-
sion member was not dis-
closed.
The pro-Soviet Portuguese
Communist Party has become
;an important factor in Portu-
gal since the right-wing, pro-
:U.S. dictatorship which ruled
Portugal for 48 years was de-
:posed in April. The young mil
-
:Rau officers who have been
running the country since
Then have given the Commu-
nists a Cabinet post and full
'participation in the country's
new military-controlled gov-
ernment. Much of the strength
and popularity of the Commu-
nists derives from their long
.!underground fight against the
+dictatorship, which had out-
lawed the party, ?
: While . nothing could be
!learned of the thrust of Wal-
.ters' report to Kissinger,
sources said that the Lukens
:group diverged from the em-
bassy's appraisal. The extent
:of the differences was not dis-
closed, but sources said that
the embassy's reporting had
'grown more cautious as a re-
sult.
; The sources said that Kise
singer and others in Washing-
ton were obsessed with the
lear that Portugal will be the
:first country to go Communist
,in what was called "a southern
?Europe domino theory" also
involving Spain, Italy and
''Greece. This fear apparently
has been fed by pessimistic in-
telligence assessments, press
reports stressing the power of
the left in Portugal, and the
Anxieties of multinational
'companies with interests in
Portugal and its African colo-
nies.
? Washington apparently
fears that the emergence of
the .Portuguese Communists
following the fall of the dicta-
torship will be duplicated in
!neighboring Spain, the last re-
maining pro-American rightist
1 government in Western Eu-
rope. . ?
_. Since his visit to Portugal,
Walters has also been in Spain
'for secret talks with high
Spanish officials, the sources
said. The CIA deputy direc-
tor's latest visit reportedly
took place two weeks ago
when he had a briefing on
Portugal with senior Spanish-,
military and civilian authori-
ties.
Spanish and U.S. officials
are known to be concerned by
the potential for Communist
- infiltration from Portugal,,
which has a long and hard-to-1
guard border with Spain. The'
Communist Party has been1
banned in Spain since the end
of the civil war in 1939. but it 1
has remained a major clandes-
tine political forge in indus-
-trial urban centers and the
backbone of opposition to
Generalissimo Francisco
Franco.
Another recent visitor to
Spain was William 'Colby, the
, CIA's director, but sources
said that he had merely stop-
ped in Madrid on his way east.
One source, however, pointed
out that visits to Iberia by
high 'U.S. intelligence official
I could become more frequent
because the Mediterranean
has risen in U.S. priority.
Many Portuguese rightists
who fled following the popu-
list military coup in April are
now living in exile in Madrid.
Some have been heating a
path to the U.S. embassy in
Madrid to lobby for their
views and to plead for help in
presenting a Communist take-
over.
Conservatives and moder-
ates still living in?Portugal are
'also said to be seeking to in-
fluence the United States.
Informed sources here said
that during Walters' visit in
August, he met with Gen. An-
torilo de Spinola, then provi-
sional president. At the time,
Spinola, a conservative, was
locked in a struggle for power
18
1 with populist Prerper Vasco
Goncalves and the coordinat-
ing committee of the Armed
Forces Movement.
Spinola resigned Sept. 20 af-
ter failing to win a bid for
one-man rule and martial-law
powers. He sought to curb
Communist activities and the
leftist-controlled press and to
increase his control over the
decolonization of Portugal's
African colonies.
. Both U.S. and Portuguese
government sources have pri-
vately confirmed Walters'
meeting with Spinola, and a
subsequent conference with
Gen. Francisco da Costa Go-
mes, the armed forces chief
who succeeded Spinola.
? High-ranking revolutionary
military officers have claimed
repeatedly that there are at
least 100 CIA agents operating
in Portugal, striving to create
"another Chile."
The news that Walters had
been in Portugal, reported ,in
Atigust and September in the
_Portuguese press, aggravated
WASHINGTON POST
9 October -1974
C Rol..e.
Is Alleged
Portugal-
..:: By Jonathan C. Randal
NW-shin:ton Post POreigu Service .
:PARIS, Oct. 8?the- U. S.1
Central Intelligence Agency
was instrumental in. persuad-
ing executives of unnamed;
multinational companies .ini ?
Lisbon to -subsidize a conserv-1
ative newspaper and right-i
wing. political ? parties?last!
summer, the satirical weekly;
Le Canard Enchaine says ini
its current issue. ? I
In an' article by investiga-
tive reporter . Claude. Angeli,t
the French weekly stopped;
short of. Suggesting that. the;
CIA actually financed the
litical parties ? -or the newspa-1
per, called 0 Tempo.
The CIA also tried to get(
the now ousted chief of state,
-
Gen. Antonio de- Spinola, to
approve a new radio and tele-
vision station to be ?financed
by Bulhosa. a Portuguese com-
pany, two unnamed Lisbon ra-
dio stations and two unnamed
Brazilian stations, the weekly,
added.
The inclusion of the Brazil;
ian interests was to "allow the
Americans to be present in,
the deal," the paper said, with-
out making clear whether Spi-
nola had agreed or if the:new,
station was ever set up.,
Gen. Vernon Walters, dep-
uty director of the CIA, spent'
a week's vacation ? appar-,
potty in August in southern
the fears of leftists of a rightd
ist countercoup during the'
crisis which culminated in Spi-,/
nola's resignatipn.
Rightists took the visit to I,
mean that United States was
casting its lot with Spinola
and his ideas.
Leaflets and posters linking
the CIA with Portuguese right
began \, to appear throughout,
Lisbon as the crisis devel-
oped, and walls were sprayed,
with anti-CIA Slogans.
'The special. Revolutionary.
Security Command, led by ?
Brig. Gen. Otelo de. Carvalho
began to track foreigners com-
ing into Portugal; particularly
anti-Castro Cuban exiles,. Chi..!
leans, Spaniards and Amen-
cans. This led to a 'series . of
raids on luxury hotels here.
Also placed under surveil-I
lance was the Brazilian em-
bassy, which security officials;
suspect of being a conduit for
counter revolutionary activ-
ities.
Portugal "as an innocent tour-?
ist" after visitin .Mediterra-
nean countries, the-- weekly
sad sarcastically. . ?
[In Washington, the CL',re-
fused to confirm or deny
whether Walters had visited
PortugaLl
The- newspaper also said
Secretary of State Henry Kis-
singer let the revolutionary
Portuguese leadership know?
In May that the "United States
was not opposed to independ-1
ence for Guinea Bissau, butt
would not stand for the Portti-
guese giving up the Canei
Verde Island; to the Guine-
ans."
Kissinger's warning was:
based on fears that "one day"'
the Soviets would set un a na-
val air base on the strate-!
g,ically located islands off the
coast of West Africa if they!
ceased to be' Portuguese.
The newspaper credited U.'
S. ambassador Stuart N. Scott
and the CIA with sizing up
Spinola early on as a ?"bad
bet." Spinola was judged un-
able to reach political compro-
mises and over-optimistic
about his real influence in the
Army and the willingness of
the public to back him.
By May, Washington had de-
cided to step Ira contacts with ?
the Portuguese general staff,
but that effort apparently was
not a success, the weekly sug-
gested, noting ?that a purge of
officer ranks was-already un-
der way.
The conflict between the!
Portuguese Communist and
Socialist parties is Oeing
closely followed by the CIA,:
the weekly said. It quoted an.
nnamed American diplomat,
'as saying 'nogically we should
play the Socialist card but I
don't know if my, government
will make up its mind to do
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WASHINGTON STAR
20 Oct. 1974
Betty Beale
"MY COUNPAY HAS
BEEN lating for a
. ?
month now," said Manuel
Trucco, Chilean ambassa-
dor to the OAS, at a diplo-
matic dinner. "The CIA
could not have destabilized
the Allende government
for $8 million. It's ridicu-
BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
.6 October 1974 ?
JOHN P. .110CIIE
?
at
About the only thing the Central Intelligence
?Agency (CIA) has not been Warned far in recent
months is the Honduran flood. (And some, KGB
operative has probably suggested that mystery
planes were seen seeding the rain clouds so the!
agency may yet end up with the flood on its door.
bus." step.) When the Greek junta withered away, for
.Manuel Trucco is no fly- example, Americans were suddenly in bad odor in
by-night observer. He has Athens as the old charge resurfaced that the CIA
served his country in such had sponsored the 1967 coup, which put the mili-
capacities as undersecre-
tary of foreign affairs,
ambassador to Bolivia, to
the OAS in the 60's, presi-
tary junta in power.' In addition, the United States
generally came under attack for sustaining the.
junta. ?
ow as ar as CIA Involvementn the events
dent of the OAS commis- of 1967 is concerned, let us set the 'record straight.
skin on economic affairs, By accident, I was sitting with President Johnson I
and now again as his coun-
and national security adviser Walt Roston When
try's envoy at the Pan ?we heard of the coup. (We were in the president's
American Union. So in compartment of Air Force One, en rotate back to
view of the horrified reac-
the United States from Konrad Andenatter's fu-
tion of certain senators neral.) Johnson and Rostow did not look knowing.
and columnists over the
ly at each other and wink ? the president blew
.
CIA supposedly causing his very substantial cork. Poor Walt spent the
the downfall of President rest of the ride desperately trying to find.out what
Allende, his comments are had happened in Athens. If the President of the
? United States has, as advertised, the. most sophis-
worth hearing. ? fleeted communications equipment in the world,?I
First he had something would hate AO, see how unSophisticated stuff
to say about the $350,000 works. When 'we got off the plane at Andrews
the CIA allegedly spent to AFB some hours later, we still didn't knOW who
bribe Chilean congress- had gone what to whom in Greece.
men not to vote for Al- ? It turned out that American intelligence had
Al-
lende. "It's ridiculous be- been worried about -a Military coupe but .by an
cause everybody, had entirely-different cast of Greek characters! -The
decided to vote for Allende bunch that pulled it off had gone- undetected. -
anyway. He had an agree- When it began, 'the American ambassador pre-
nient before the election
with the Christian Demo- pared to Implement "Operation Prometheus" (a
crats. The vote was 0 to
contingency plan against a Communist coup) and
16 ?
offered the king a helicopter to go to Salonika and
30 for him."
Second, Allende had rally his allegedly loyal troops. The king refused.
nearly $2 billion in govern-
That was the extent of American involvement.
ment funds at his corn-
Note that our effort was to maintain the constitu-
tional monarchy.
mand compared to the $3
??: ;ere ?
million. "Allende during ? 'Once the colonels were in power, what should
his three years in
.govern-..we have done? Send the Sixth Fleet and land
ment had $450 million in Marines? Or treat the junta as the government of
reserves; he got a credit of
over $850 million from the
U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia
and even Spain. He didn't
pay any of the $800 million
debts to foreign countries
? during those three years;
and he negotiated another
$140 million credit from
abroad. On top of that the
money in circulation in
Chile increased fiftyfold in
three years. It broke the
economy . and paralyzed
everything."
And third, as for the
truck strike which the CIA
is now said to have paid
for, thereby paralyzing the
Allende government,
Trucco says: "The truck-
ers did not have any spare
parts, and Allende would-
n't give them the currency
or the permission to im-
port spare parts, so their
50,000 trucks were being
paralyzed. They struck in
1972 and again in 1973. The
only difference in '73 was
they concentrated tAear
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trucks in the mud on the
outskirts of Santiago.
"I have no idea if the $8
million was earmarked
(by the CIA to overthrow
Allende) or not, but-if so,"
Trucco said, "it wasn't
enough to even get one
Greece and Continue on a business as usual basis?
; Or privately put the heat on the dictatorship to
restore civil rights, a free press, and other consti-
tutional guarantees? When I was young, I thought
a question like this could be simply answered, but
:in watching the internal debate In the U.S. gov-
ernment over Greek policy I learned an awful lot.
Let me put It in question and answer forme
- Roche: Why can'tfwe cut off military supplies?
until thy release'political prisoners and restore
civil rights? Are the Bulgarians or the Albanians
planning to invade if Greek tanks aren't up to.
? e ?
. Answer: bo you want the Sixth Fleet to oper-
ate in the Eastern Mediterranean? .
- ? 'Roche: Of course; it's essential If the Arabs
lump. Israel and the Soviets threaten to get into
the act. (As indeed happened about six weeks aft-
er the Greek coup.)
Answer: Then you must want to maintain our
base at Suda Bay on Crete. Without it the fleet
has to go all the way to Italy for supplies.
Roche: What you are saying is that, in overall
strategic terms, the colonels in Athens have us
over a barrel?
The question answered itself. In fact, as cur-
rent developments in Athens ? the semi-exodu
'
from NATO in particular ? indicate, whoever
rules Greece has us in a strategic bind.
Reluctantly I concluded we could not put the
arm on the Greek junta, though in fairness we did
persistently urge it in private to modify its re-
pressive tactics.
However, we now have in the case of Chile a
? Situation where direct pressure in defense of hu-
man rights creates no strategic problem. In Sec-
retary Kissinger's phrase, "Chile is a dagger
pointed at the heart of Antarctica." Yet the SET-
retar,y of State recently reprimanded the Ameri-
? can ambassador, David II. 'Popper, for linking
possible American military assistance to an eas-
ing of the military dictatorship.
Having been to the other side of the moon, I
am incapable of a pious shriek, but the burden of .
proof Is clearly on Kissinger to demonstrate the
rationale for "gigging" Ambassador Popper.
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1.04 Znett rand
:?Wed., Oct. 16, 1974
BOOK BLOWS COVER
CIA and Mexico:
Close Association
Leaves Red Faces
BY STANLEY ME1SLER
Timaa Staff Writer
. MEXICO CITY?Both the. United'
States and Mexican governments
have been embarrassed recently by
an accelerating serie,z of revelations
about the work of the U.S. Central.
Intelligence Agency in -Mexico.
The revelations are far different
from those 'about the CIA efforts in
Chile to weaken the government of
the late Salvador Allende. There has-
been no hint that the CIA is doing'
anything to hurt the government of,
President Luis Echeverria of ?Mexi-.
Co and his ruling Party of the Insti-
tutional Revolution (PRI). In fact,
the stories stress that there has been
close cooperation between the Mexi-
can government and .the CIA.. That
is what makes the revelations so em-
barrassing to Mexico,
Though it won't be listed on any
public agenda, a disens.s 10 n . of.
changes in CIA personnel and per-
haps operation stemming from the
'revelations will probably take up
' some of the time of President Eche-
verria and. President Ford when
they meet at the border towns-of
No-
tales, Ariz., and Nagales? Sonora,
-
next Monday. .
The revelations- have come from -a
former CU agent in Mexico, Philip
B. F. Agee, who is now 'living in
London. Publishers in London and
Paris plan to publish his book, "In-
side the Company: A CIA Diary." in
January. In advance of publication.
Agee- has been talking with news-
men about the work of the CIA in
Mexico and the rest; of Latin Ameri-
ca. These interviews have made the
front pages of most Mexi-
can newspapers.
In some ways, the reve-
lations have been less
startling than the Mexican
reaction to them. They
have provoked confusion
in government statements,
recriminations among pol-
iticians, accusations and
counteraccusations, and a
campaign by some Mexi-
can journalists and polti-
cians to blame a good deal
of Mexico's troubles on the
CIA.
.In an interview in Lon-
on in early October, Agee
amed 35 agents within'
he U.S. Embassy in Mexi-
o City and two others
outside-. He said that Rich-
ard Sampson was the CIA
station chief. in Mexico
and that Jonathan Henke
was his assistant. Both are
classified officially as po-
litical officers of the em-
bassy.
There were obvious er-
rors on Agee's list. One
man listed had left the
emb as sy a few months
a go. Another, Winston'
Scott, whom Agee identi-
fied as a former station
chief now living in
feigned retirement in
Mexico, died a few years
ago.
Despite this, most inde-
pendent observers believe
that the list is, in general,
very accurate and up to
date. The identity of most
of the CIA agents within
an embassy is usually an
open secret, known both
by other employes of the
embassy and by outsiders,
like American newsmen,
who spend much time
talking with embassy- offi-
cials.
The-publication of. the
list has .Put. the Mexican
government in :a kind .of
quandary. It is doubtful
that .many of the Lames
? surprise Mexican officials.
Most of the CIA employes.
listed were probably what
are known in. the .diplo-
matic world as "revealed
agents." . That term de-
scribes CIA agents, usual-
ly working in an embassy,
whom the. I.T.S. govern-
ment identifies to afriend-
ly and cooperative govern-
ment.
But the 'Mexican
government does not want
to be known as friendly,
and cooperative to the
CIA.' A few days after the
list was published, a Mexi-
can delegation asked the
Interparliamentary Union.
meeting In Tokyo to con-
demn the interference by
intelligence ? agencies in
.the internal affairs Of oth-
er countries. The Mexi-
cans, however, cited .the
CIA in Chile, not Mexico,
as an example.
? So ' 'far, the Mexican
government has not ex-
pelted' any of those on the
list. Asked about this at a
news conference. P r e s-
Went Echeverria. in a
mild and somewhat con-
fusing comment. said, "In
regard to two or three of
the people, we can never
expel them from the coun-
try because they died
some time ago. The others
are officials' of the Ameri-
can Embassy who worked
there publicly in different
offices.
? "This man (Agee) Was
here. in 1968," ? Echeverra
went on.. "and he had in-
terests, who knows why,
tci make, these declare-,
tions, and, curiously, he is
very,. insistent about the
'subiect. But there are
cdead people on the pub-
lished list. I believe that it
:will. soon be made more
precise for me who is dead
.and who works in. the
American Embassy,
? This is the present si-
tuation. We are going to
invite this man to Mexico
to help us find them."
The reaction of the U.S.
Embassy has been about
what might be expected.
When Agee's first revela-
tions came, U.S. Ambasa.7
dor Joseph John Jova told .
Mexican, newsmen, -"You'
have to realize that ,Agee
is a bitter, fired ex-em-
ploye. That's why you
should take these things
with a grain of ?salt."
But once the list was
published, ? the embassy
switched to, silence. With-
out denying the accuracy
of the list, the embassy
has refused to comment on
? ?
it. .
..4surring the list iS gen-
-erally accurate, it is ob-
vious that the work of
some CIA agents has been
handicapped by the loss of
?Cover. F'''ew Mexicans. will
'want to 'keep up friend-
ships with those On- the
list. The CIA obviously
needs to send at least a
Sew new agents to Mexico
now.. ?
Watergate burst, a
prominence to the :CIA
'operations in Mexico. Ac- ?
cording.to the House Judi-
ciary Committee, the aides
of fOrmer President Rich-
ard M. Nixon tried in vain
in 1972 to persuade the
Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation that its investiga-
tion of campaign' money
laundered in ?Mexico
would hurt the CIA's oper-
ations there. The CIA,
however.. refused' to sup-
port the White House on.
the contention. In the Sen-
ate. Watergate. COmrnit-
te's in-.-es-tU:.-mti?:2., ? Sen.
Howard Baker Ft-Tenn.)
- learned by accident that
'the CIA had disbanded a
Washirton pubic rela-
tions firm in 1972 because
it feared that a former
agent was going to. re-
veal that the firm .was act-
ing as its cover in Mexico
City. Watergate conspira-
tor and former CIA agent
E. Howard Hunt Jr, .had
once been identi;:ied as an
employe of the firm, the
Robert Mullen Co.
The former agent who
worried the CIA was
Agee. Agee, now 39, re-
signed from the . CIA in.
1969 after working for the'
agency for 12 ?year t in
,Washington; Mexico,
Ecuador and Uruguay, Af-
ter resignation, Agee
.visited Cuba three times.
In early July, a U.S.
government source told
newsmen 'in Washington
that Agee had revealed -
CIA secrets to a Soviet se-
cret agent in Havana.
Agee denied this and said
he had visited ebbe only
to gather more material
for his book.. The U.S.
source later withdrew the
accusation' but said "the.
presumption is that he
(Agee) was very forthcom-
ing in . Havana, and that
Havana was very forth-
coming with Moscow." In
any case, the source said
the CIA. arranged some of
its Latin American opera-
tions after Agee's visits to
Cuba: -
in his many press inter-
views and leaks of his
manuscript, Agee has de-
scribed -Mexico as an ex-
tremely important base of
Coperations for the CIA.,
"Because of the strategic
importance of Mexico to
the United States, its size
and proximity, and the
abundance of enemy (i.e.,
Communist) activities, the
Mexico City (CIA) station
is the largest in the hemis-
phere," Agee has said.
Agee has also character-
ized the 'relations between
the CIA and the Mexican
government as "exception-
al," claiming that Mexican
security forces collaborate
' closely with CIA agents
In fact, according to Agee,
former President Gustavo
Diaz Ordaz preferred
meeting with station chief
Winston Scott rather than -
U.S. Ambassador Fulton
Freeman in the late 1960s,
causing conflict between'
the. station chief and the
ambassador. This conflict
man, who is now president
has been denied by Free-
of the Monterey Institute
of Foreign Studies in Mon-.
terey, Calif.
The close relationship
between Scott and Pres-
ident Diaz Ordaz began,
according to Agee, in the
previous Mexican admin-
istration when Diaz Ordaz
was secretary of the interi-
or. the official in charge of
Mexican security. Agee.
has alse giiti that .1")rcside-iit
Echeverria, when he was .
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secretary of the interior in
Diaz Ordaz' administra-
tion, worked with the CIA
station chief. But acrbfd-
ing to Agee this personal
relationship with the CIA
was broken when Eche-1
verria took over the office
of president in 1970.
This disclosure has so
upset the Mexican govern-
ment, Agee has said, that
the Mexicans have tried to
pressure his publishers to
delete all references to
Echeverria in the book.
Besides naming the
American agents within
the U.S. Embassy, Agee
has said that at least 50
iMexican agents, working
for the Americans, have
infiltrated the Mexican
government, t h e ruling
party and other Mexican
oianizations.
The Ministry of the In-
terior issued a statement,
saying, "The government
of Mexico does not permit
and will not permit activi-
ties in our territory by any
foreign agency, no matter
what its origin, that tries
to interfere in our internal
affairs:" The ministry
promised an investigation
of Agee's charges.
? Although the govern...
meat has not expelled any
American on Agee's list of
CIA agents, some Mexi-
cans have peen using the
publicity over Agee's dis-
closures to blame many of
Mexico's troubles on the
CIA.
JAPAN TIMES
5 OCTOBER 19711
CIA Airline
BANGKOK (UPI)?A civi-
lian airline with links to the
U.S. Central Intelligence'
Agency (CIA) has begun
flights that include parachut-
ing military supplies to? belea-
guered Khmer garrisons, offi-
cials said Friday.
A U.S. spokesman said C130
transports operated by Bird
Air, headquartered in Wash-
ington State, started some sup-
ply flights from U Tapao Air
Base in Thailand ' this week
and was expected to take over
the airlift from the U.S. Air
Force by Oct. 14.
The Pentagon announced
last week that Bird Air would
fly the four-engine transports
belonging to the Air Force
with civilian crews under
a $1,760,000 contract. A spokes-
man said the move was aimed
at reducing U.S. military pre-
sence in Khmer.
? WASHINGTON STAR
17 October 1974
'? By Harry Rositzke
'Special to the Star-News
According to its author, "Without
Cloak or Dagger" will set the record
straight on CIA's remarkable success in
its operations overseas, a "balanced
and accurate" inside account to place
against the dismal record of publicized
failures and hostile exposes. It pro-
fesses to offer "the truth about the new
espionage," though author Miles Cope-
land has stated that he left the CIA
more than 17 years ago.
It is a naive and unpersuasive per-
formance.
, What emerges is the writer's main
bent, as a schoolmaster. Apparently an
,intelligence instructor in his early days,
he refers frequently to training courses,
curricula, and lectures. Like any good
? teacher, he likes tidy rules and number-
edtoxes.
THE MOST ludicrous example of
the author's schematic approach is his
model for "the ideal espionage opera-
tion." An agent is handled, through a
Cutout,. by a principal agent who,
through a cutout, trarrmits both in-
structions from and intelligence reports
to a resident who in turn contacts his?
"case-officer" ? five points of contact
and possible exposure. Ideally, the
case-officer handles only one agent,
though elsewhere the author notes that
the best case-officer is the busiest case-
officer.
The author also has a flair for making
flat statements that are wrong:
About half the agents in the world
have been recruited through their
wives, and many agents are wives (this
is a notion, IChrushchey tells us, shared
by Stalin).
? Blackmail now plays a greater role in
recruiting agents than it ever did be-
fore.
O Most spies do no know what espio-
nage service they are working for.
O Espionage services use "intelligent,
emotionally stable women for a wide
variety of purposes including the
f the CIA
17.3UBLISIZTRS WEEla.,Y
30 Sep 19711.
UNDERCOVER: Menioirs of an ?
American Secret Agent. E. Howard
Hunt. Putnam, $N.95 ?
As few do, Hunt's absorbingly written
memoir providcs.an authentic view of the
.hangover, in our time, Of the romantic
good guys VS; had 'guys notion .that had
unquestionable validity during World
War IF when I hint went on NVOIAN jde
"ops"' for the OSS?Mexico, China; Ja-
pan, etc. Hunt was a derring-doer in a
murderous business chose "enemies list".
Caine ready-made...It seems inevitable
that the . patriotic justifications would
carry over from hot war to cold war--
and ultimately to the Oval Office. H tint's
fast-paced narrative, read with .sophis- ?
Books
WITHOUT CLOAK OR DAGGER. By
Miles Copeland. Simon & Schuster.
351 pages. $8.95.
seduction of prospective agents" (it is
reassuring to hear that "the CIA is now
out of the brothel business").
0 Until the CIA developed modern
methods (whatever they are), its spies
were "universally unreliable."
0 The British and Americans normally
run operations into a country from an
outside capital.
Copeland is a romantic at heart. He.
dresses up CIA officials with droll, non--
existent nicknames in the best spy-fie-
tion tradition: Mother, Kingfish, Jojo,
Fisherman. He casually tosses around
such hip phrases as "termination with
extreme prejudice (i.e., liquidation)."
- A FAVORITE phrase of Copeland's
is "creative intelligence." What stands
out in his account of CIA operations is ?
his own creative imagination. After as-
serting in his preface that the CIA can-
not be as ineffective as it appears to be.
?otherwise, there would be no CIA ?
he proceeds to garnish his tale with en-
tirely mythical examples of its great
prowess, especially in operating inside
the Soviet Union: The CIA sends agents
into a remote Siberian village to get
data on its electric supply; It runs full-
time Communist Party workers as.
principal agents with contacts through-
out the Soviet Union; it covers vast
areas of the USSR and China with -
agents sent in by air and across the bor-
der, etc. etc.
It is all very heady.
The author's cheerfully laudatory
comments on CIA performance have led
some observers to see his book as a CIA
bult-up job. With friends like Copeland,
the CIA has no need for the surfeit of
enemies it now possesses.
Harry Positzke is a former employe
of the CIA.
ticaied hindsight (and an eye on some
seemingly disingenuous passages), fasci-
nates as it carries through his postwar
CIA career (Mexico and the Guatemalan
coup: the Bay of Pigs) right into Hunt's
step-by-step story of Watergate and its
aftermath. Et hardly seems in hint's na-
ture to re-examine the undcrk nu as-
sumptions of his lifetime of undoubted
patriotic. service. But few readers can es-
cape the weight of his personal tragedy?
wife dead, his life shattered. For that rea-
son, its pungent readability and its "reve-
lations" aside, his book seems the most
.moving, account. by tiny Watergate figure
thus far. National ad-promo canif)aign.
?I l's?' oven, her II 1
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THE MURDER OF .CHE GUEVARA ACCORDING TO MARCHETTI AND MARKS
Athena EPIKAIRA in Greek 5 Sep 74 PP 32734, 41
ifext7 EPIKAIRA starts today the exclusive publication of
1-he most revealing document that has ever come to light on
the activities of the American CIA. It concerns the book
"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Victor Marchetti and
John Marks, two former CIA senior officials.
The things revealed in the 1.400 pages of the Marchetti and
Marks book are truly shocking; so much so that the CIA tried
through every legitimate and illegitimate means to prevent
its publication. When the CIA found out that it could not
stop publication, it resorted-to the courts and asked for?
the deletion of 368 "hot" paragraphs which referred to
specific persons and events. Publication was delayed for
over a year. Finally, the courts "cut" 168 paragraphs and
allowed the other 200 to go through. From the very first
week of publication the book became an instant best-seller
in the United States, the first book in American history to.
have been censored before publication.
In the two chapters published today by EPIKAIRA, the, authors
reveal how the CIA developed into such a powerful agency
that operates beyond the law, and CIA's involvement in the
capture and execution of Che Guevara in 1967 in Bolivia.
CIA: Above and Beyond the Law
A powerful and dangerous cult is currently prevalent throughout the United
States--a cult which holds spying as its god. The saints of this cult are
the professional agents of the CIA. Its patrons and protectors are the
highest officials in the federal government. Its membership which extends
beyond government circles includes leading personalities in industry, commerce,
finance and labor. Its friends are many in all those sectors which exert
significant influence on public opinion, the academic world and the media.
The cult constitutes a secret fraternity of the American political elite.
The CIA is both the center and the main instrument of this cult. Its task
is intelligence and counter-intelligence, propaganda and nprovocatsia"--
the deliberate distribution of false information--psychological warfare
and paramilitary actions and activities. It infiltrates and manipulates
private institutions, it even establishes its own organizations?known as
"companies"--when this becomes necessary. It recruits agents and mercenaries.
It bribes and blackmails foreign leaders to carry out the most malodorous
objectives. It uses any means to accomplish those goals, without any
reservations as to the methods used or as to the moral consequences of its
activities. The CIA's most potent weapon is its covert intervention in the
internal affairs of countries the American government wishes to control or
influence.
The Presidents Lie
The cult insists on directing the US governmental affairs without informing
the people and without public participation. It does not accept any checks
on its activities from the legislative bodies or the press. Its followers
believe that they alone have the right and the obligation to decide what
is needed to serve the national interest.
The "mentality, of secrecy" is cultivated in a climate of illegality and
fraud. It encourages professional amoralism--the belief, that right
objectives may be achieved by unholy and normally unacceptable means. In
this way, the leaders of the cult keep their official activities out of
22
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a*
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public view with constant vigilance.
Whenever necessary, the members of the cult--including the presidents of
the United States who always know, generally approve and often inspire the
more significant CIA operations--have lied without shame to protect the
secret service and to conceal their own responsibility for its actions.
The Eisenhower administration lied to the American people on the CIA
involvement in the Guatemala coup in 1954, on its support to the unsuccess-
ful uprising in Indonesia in 1958 and on the mission of Gary Powers with
the U-2 spy plane over Russia in 1960.
The Kennedy administration lied on the CIA role in the unsuccessful
invasion in Cuba in 1961 and confessed its involvement only after the
catastrophic failure of that operation.
The Johnson administration lied on the extent of the American commitments
to Laos and Vietnam and totally concealed the role of the CIA.
The Nixon administration, too, lied on the CIA attempt to "manipulate"
Chile's election in 1970.
For the cult followers, 4ynocricy and deceit as well as secrecy are the
,sacred methods used to prevent the public from learning about the CIA's
secret operations and to avoid any accounting on those operations by the
American government.
Blunders and Luck
The absolute secrecy surrounding the CIA's activities has resulted--and
continues to do so--in keeping the public from even imagining how many
times the agency has failed. In the sector of classic syping, the CIA's
secret services have failed dismally in their efforts to infiltrate their
major targets. The Penkofsky affair, in the early 1960s--the only intelli-
gence operation against the Soviets for which the CIA can be proud--was
just a "lucky break" due entirely to the British Intelligence Service.
The widely-advertised operation of the Berlin tunnel in the middle 1950s--
in reality it was a giant wiretapping network?resulted in meager gains
in terms of significant information that could be of use to the CIA brain-
trust. The true value of that operation lay in the embarrassment it
caused to the KGB and the favorable publicity it brought to the CIA. Not
.a single intelligence success was scored against China.
The CIA secret services were more successful in counter-intelligence than
in the sector of classic spying. But even in this case, the successes are
mostly due to luck. Most successes were not due to CIA spies but to the
good offices of escapees who divulged all they knew in exchange for gaining
safety for themselves.
In the CIA's favorite sector of covert activities, the Operatives scored
their greatest successes but it is also true that their blunders and
failures often very seriously embarrassed the United States.
Specifically, the CIA played a basic
the Iron Curtain following the first
dismally in its efforts to push back
Bamboo Curtain in the late 1940s and
by questionable means, in its effort
other parts of the world.
Even Against the USA
role in keeping Western Europe outside
Cold War period, although it failed
the Iron Curtain as well as the .
in the 1950s. It also succeeded,
to prevent communist expansion in
Some of its "successes," however, boomeranged and hit the American govern-
ment itself. It is hard to understand how the CIA braintrust failed to
realize that it would have been more prudent for the agency not to get
involved in Guatemala, Cuba or Chile, to avoid its secret role in Iran or
in other parts of the Middle East and to avoid getting so deeply involved
in the internal affairs of Soutbeaet A.
084-tarlioffratilkoboigels04444. But
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the CIA became involved and the American nation has to live with the
consequences of those activities.
More recently, the Watergate investigation revealed some of the CIA secret
operations within the U3 itself and presented a terrifying picture of the
methods used by the CIA for so many years in other countries. Its assis-
tance to the White House "plumbers" and the attempt to put all the blame
for the cover-up on the CIA revealed to the American public the dangers'
involved for a democracy in an inadequately controlled secret intelligence
agency. The issue is simple: Should the CIA operate in keeping with its
original objectives--as a coordinating agency responsible for gathering,
evaluating and processing information for the perusal of the appropriate
officials as they formulate government policies--or should it be allowed
to operate in this fashion for so many years as a secret instrument of the
White House and of a clique of powerful individuals who are not subject
to accounting for their actions and whose main objective is interfere
in the internal affairs of other countries--and possibly of the United
States as well--through agents, propaganda, covert paramilitary interventions
and all kinds of dirty tricks?
Hunting Che in Bolivia
When Ernesto "Che" Guevara disappeared from the political stage in Cuba in
the spring of 1965 nobody could give a specific explanation. Some reports
said that the Argentine revolutionary, a physician and a comrade-in-arms
of Fidel Castro, had challenged the authority of the Cuban leader and that
he had been imprisoned or executed as a result. Other reports claimed that
Guevara had lost his mind and with no hope of recovery he had been confined
to a country villa in one of Cuba's provinces. Some other reports said that
Che had formed a band of devoted followers and had left Cuba to start
another revolution somewhere else.
At first the people in the CIA did not know what to believe. But gradually
some information on Guevara's whereabouts began to filter in from the CIA
field stations. The clues were loose and imprecise but they all seemed
to point to Africa. In the Republic of the Congo (today's Zaire) another
uprising had broken out and the reports from the CIA agents there indicated
the presence of foreign revolutionaries. Some of their methods and tactics
revealed Guevara's unique style. But the uprising fizzled out suddenly
before one could verify those reports. By the fall of 1965 that area was
calm again. But the CIA mercenaries--some of them "Bay of Pigs" veterans--
who assisted the Congolese government in putting down the uprising were
convinced, and so were their superiors in Washington, that Che was indeed
in that area.
It was later.that the CIA learned that Che Guevara and a band of over. 100
-revolutionaries had slipped into the Congo from neighboring Tanzania in
the spring of 1965. Their objective, was to spark a general uprising in
Africa but their revolutionary zeal found no worthy imitators among the
native guerrillas and the local population. "Disillusioned, Che returned ?
secretly 6 months. later to Cuba to make plans for his next adventure At
that time, however, all that the CIA knew wasthat he had disappeared again.
Once again conflicting reports regarding his role, his health, etc, began
to reach the CIA. In early 1967, reports reaching the agency pointed to
the heart of South America--to Bolivia.
Mary of the: CIA officials in charge of secret operations were convinced
that Guevara was the brain behind the guerrilla movement in Bolivia's
southern mountains but some of the CIA top leaders were reluctant to
agree. In spite of this climate of doubt, come CIA special operations
agents were sent to Bolivia to assist the local forces in their' fight
against the guerrillas. Ironically, not even the then president of Bolivia,.
Rene BarrientosIbelieved that-Guevara was involved in the guerrilla move-
ment.
Two months later, in April 1967, two events dramatically reaffirmed the
belief of the CIA agents in Bolivia as well as in the CIA headquarters
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that Guevara was the leader of the guerrillas. At the beginning of the
month, a unit of the Bolivian army caputred the guerrilla base in Nanda-
chausu fEransliteration7 where they found a wealth of documents, pictures
and diaries left by the guerrillas as they fled. Included in the material
seized by the army were pictures of a slightly balding gray-haired man
with glasses who bore a striking resemblance to Guevara, as an exhaustive
study of the pictures revealed. Moreover, two fingerprints seemed to
resemble those of Guevara. The documents further revealed that some of the
guerrillas operating in Bolivia were Cubans, possibly the same individuals
that had gone to the Congo with Guevara.
Ten days later, the French leftist journalist Regie Debre was arrested
near Muupamba /transliteration7 together with two other foreigners who
were suspected ofhaving contacts with the guerrillas. Debre had disappeared
a few months after he had cone to Bolivia to collect material for a geo-
political study. As he stated several months later, Debre escaped
execution thanks to the intervention of the CIA operatives who accompanied
the Bolivian forces which arrested him. Those CIA agents later showed him
certain confidential data which convinced him that the CIA knew much more
about his activities abroad and especially in Bolivia than he could ever
imagine. Debre initially refused to admit that he knew anything at all
about Guevara's involvement in the guerrilla movement. But soon he gave
in and started talking in an effort to save himself from being tried and
executed.
The clues were coming in fast. But the CIA director, Richard Helms,
continued to refuse to believe that the legendary revolutionary had indeed
appeared again and that he was leading another revolt. Helms derided the
reports of the field agents who claimed to have in their hands prel)f of
Guevara's presence in Bolivia. Helms was of the opinion that Guevara
was probably dead.
But Thomas Karamesinis, chief of secret operations in the CIA at that time,
who had presented the case to.Helms, did not give up his conviction that his
agents were on Guevara's trail. Other CIA "advisors," some of them Bay of
Pigs veterans, were soon dispatched to Bolivia to help in tracking down
Guevara. A group of specialists from the American Army Special Forces came
to La Paz from the Canal Zone to train Bolivian commandos in anti-guerrilla
warfare.
The-secret services were obsessed with Guevara, and in a way they were
afraid of him. He was a constant, irritating reminder of their Day of Pigs
failure. Unable to vent their anger on the American officials who had
undertaken that desperate operation, and without any possibility of getting
even by destroying Castro himself or his Soviet or Chinese allies-, the
CIA Secret Services continued to deplore their failure--until the reappear-
ance of Guevara offered a provocative target to the CIA. His arrest or
death would give the CIA an opportunity to take revenge for past failures.
.A$14,200 Reward
In the summer of 1967, while the men of the CIA Special Operations division were
helping the Bolivian army in its pursuit of Guevara, reports came in regarding
the way he had entered Bolivia. It was made known that he had arrived in La Paz
in Noverber 1966 from Havana by way of Prague, Frankfurt and Sao Paolo, traveling
with a false Paraguayan passport and disguised as a bald, gray-haired bespectacled
merchant?totally different from his familiar appearance on posters, Fifteen
other Cubans had preceded him to help him with the Bolivian operation,
There was no longer any doubt that Che Guevara was in Bolivia, leading the
guerrilla movement in the country's southern region. The Bolivian govern-
ment offered a reward of $41200 for Che Guevara--dead or alive. Now his
extermination was only a matter of time.
In the following months the guerrillas met one defeat after another at the
hands of the Bolivian commandos who had been trained by the Americans and
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were assisted by CIA advisors. One encounter on the last day of August
ended with the death of the mysterious Tania, the only woman in Guevara's
guerrilla band. Although she appeared as a Cuban secret agent, a liaison
between the guerrillas and Havana, it was at last revealed that this East
German woman was in reality a double agent. Her main employer was the
Soviet KGB which--like the CIA--wanted to keep an eye? on the Cuba-financed
revolutionary activities of Guevara in Latin America. Less than 6 weeks
later, on 8 October, Guevara himself was wounded and captured near the
small mountain village of La Biguera.
,As with Debre earlier, the CIA advisors who were with the Bolivian aliv
tried to bring Guevara alive back to La Paz for an in depth investigation.
.But the commander of the Bolivian units had orders to execute him. The
only proof he had to bring back was the head and the hands--irrefutable
proof that Guevara was dead.
While the CIA advisors were trying. to delay the Bolivian colonel, the
chief of the CIA field station in La Paz was trying to persuade President
Barrientos of the long-term advantages to be gained by having Guevara moved ?
.from the mountains to the capital as the government's prisoner. But
.Barrientos was adamant. He claimed that Dare's case had caused him enough
headaches and Guevara's arrival at the capital alive night possibly set off -
demonstrations by university students and leftists--demonstrations that the
'government might find impossible to contain. -
Desperate, the field station chief turned for help that same evening to
the CIA headquarters at Langley but to no avail. Convinced that neither
the field station nor the Washington headquarters could convince Barrientos,
,the CIA chief agent at La Higuerammade.an effort to interrogate Che.
But the revolutionary did not appear willing to 000perate. He was willing
to talk about political philosophies and the revolutionary movements in
_general but he refused to give any information on the details of his
Bolivian operation or on his previous activities in other areas. The CIA
had to be content With his personal diary which he carried at the time of
his arrest.
Che 16 Executed
The final decision came from the capital early the next morning. The
prisoner was to be executed on the Spot and his body, tied to the landing
gear of a helicopter, was to be transferred to Villagrande for identifica-
tion by a small group of journalists and government representatives. Then
the body was to be buried in a nameless grave outside the city. As soon
as the CIA agent learned of this order...rushed to the school building
where Guevara was being held and made a last attempt to interrogate the
prisoner. There was not much time left. The execution would.take place
in a couple of hours.
Guevara' s last moments are described in a rare, moving report sent by the
agent to the CIA headquarters. The Cuban, a veteran CIA liaison officer,
remarked that Guevara was certain at the beginning that somehow he was
going to come out alive from this ordeal. But when he finally realized
that he was about to die, his pipe slipped from his mouth. But soon he
regained his composure and asked for some tobacco. His painful leg wound
seemed no longer to bother him. He accepted his fate with a stoic sigh,
without asking for any last favor. The 5gent7...apparent1y felt admiration
and compassion for the man whose capture and aecution he had aided. A
few minutes later Che Guevara was dead.
The following summer Che's diary appeared suddenly and quickly reached the
hands of his comrades in Havana and some of his American admirers--the
magazine RAMPARTS--which immediately verified its authenticity and began
its publication, to the great discomfort of the CIA and of the Bolivian
government which had made public only those parts which supported their
charges against Guevara and his guerrillas. In the confusion of conflicting
accusations, Antonio Arguentas, the Bolivian minister of interior,
disappeared in July while an orgy of rumors identified him as the in
who had given the diary for publication. As minister of interior, Arguentas
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was the chief of the Bolivian Secret Service, which had close ties with
the CIA. Arguentas himself was a CIA agent.
It soon became known that Arguentas had escaped to Chile where he intended
to seek political asylum. But the Chilean authorities delivered Arguentas
to the CIA field station and the agent who was initially his superior
was immediately dispatched from the Washington CIA headquarters to bring
him back to his senses. But in spite of the CIA admonitions, Arguentas
continued to speak in public against the CIA and its activities in Bolivia.
He denounced the Barrientos reglme as an instrument of American imperialism,
criticized the government for its handling of the Guevara case and then
he disappeared again, causing a serious political crisis in Bolivia. During
1968, Arguentas appeared from time to time in London, New York and Peru.
Sometimes deriding and sometimes threatening the CIA agents in every field
station who were trying to keep him from talking, the former minister
confessed that he was the one who made Che's diary public. He claimed that
he didso because he agreed with the motives of the revolutionary and with
his effort to impose popular social, political and economic changes in
Bolivia and in the other countries of Latin America. In the end, to the
consternation of the CIA and the Barrientos government, he revealed that
he had been a CIA agent since 1965 and that some other Bolivian politicians
were also included in the CIA's payroll. He described the circumstances
of his recruitment and he revealed that the CIA had threatened to disclose
his radical past as a university student and thus destroy his political
career if he did not agree to become an agent. Finally the CIA came to
some agreement with Arguentas who returned voluntarily to Bolivia--
apparently to stand trial.
During the flight from Lima to La Paz, Arguentas told a NEW YORK TIMES
reporter that in the event "something happened" to him, a tape recording
with all his charges against the CI 1 and the Barrientos government would
be delivered to certain persons in the United States and in Cuba. The
tape, he said, was in the custody of Lieutenant Mario Teran. Strangely,
Teran had been previously identified as the man who executed Guevara.
In his interview, Arguentas hinted at the extent of his potential revela-
tions by disclosing the names of several CIA officials with whom he had
worked together in the past: Hugo Murrey, field station chief, John
Hilton, former field station chief, Larry Sternfield and Nick Lendiris.
He also revealed the identity of some CIA liaison officers who had assisted
in the capture of Guevara: Joli Gabriel Garcia, a Cuban, and Edie and
Mario Gonzales, Bolivians. Arguentas also stated that the Gonzales brothers
had saved Debre's life. He claimed, however, that Barrientos and even the
American ambassador did not know the full extent of the CIA's infiltration
into the Bolivian government.
The last act of the story was written the following summer, almost 2 years
after the death of Che Guevara. President Barrientos was killed when his
helicopter crashed on his return from a tour. Six weeks later, Antonio
Arguentas, by his own admission a CIA agent who was to be tried for treason
and for the publication of the Guevara diary, was murdered in one of La
Paz' narrow back streets. A month later, Herbert? Rojas, the guide of the
Bolivian commandos and of their CIA advisors in the search for Guevara
and one of the very few people who probably knew where the revolutionary
leader was buried, was murdered in Santa Cruz.
The tapes with the incriminating evidence, which Arguentas claimed to have
entrusted to Mario Texan, disappeared.
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LONDON OBSERVER
13 October 19714
piu
fil
'as hln
?
by our Foreign Staff
?
'COPIES of the television
film ..The " Opium'- War-
'Lords,' shot in Burma by
two yoUnnb Briton's' 'Lind
Screened by ATV last
week, are being flown to
the United States in an
attempt to rouse official
and public interest in the
startling offer it contains.
'In interviews in the. film,
officers of the rebellious Shan
State Army (SSA) undertake
to destroy the region's poppy
Crop, believed a major sOurce
Of the heroin sold illegally
to addicts on the streets of
;America. ?
In return, the SSA wants
$12 million (about ?4.500,000)
and American help towards
14 permanent solution' of
jts prolonged rebellion
against the Burmese central
Government.
? ??With the co-operation of
SA, the two British film-
makers, Mt- Chris Menges
and Mr Adrian Cowell, spent
more than' a year in Shan
State filming the conflict be-
een rival war-lords cen-
tred on the opium convoys
heading* towards America's
illegal drugs market. The two
also brought out a written
tatement of the SSA's offer.
But the American Nar-
tics Bureau, Mr Cowell
says, at first ? showed no
nterest in the plan. When
ressure was applied by Mr
ester Wolff, a New York
emocrat and chairman of
he House of Representatives
arcotics sub-committee, the
mean considered the SSA
lan?and rejected it.
At this point, Neither Mr
tolff nor the bureau had
en the British film, which
any viewers believe adds a
rear deal to the credibility
f the Shan State's Army's
Ian.
-The hope now is that the
28
KACHI
kSTATE
CORM
1.?
7-R7KtIaboN
? 0 100 2001
Miles
0111NA
ES
LAOS
THAILAND' i
n-n---BAY?BANGKOK,
:=E3ENA 1:=7?
?
film will be shown on
America's national networks,
enabling Mr 'Wolff?if he is
returned to the House at the
coming elections?to ? revive
the 'issue. ?
Mr Cowell says Mr Wolff
. .
is xvilling.to meet some Of the
Shan leaders at the ?Thailand
? border: It might be possible
to persuade them to Send
representatives to the US and
talk about their offer.
At least a? third of the
world's illegal narcotics sup-
plies are produced in this
area of Burma and the quan-
tity passing through the, Shan
area each year amounts to
about 400 tons, in the form of
opium. The total production
of . To rkey?n?ow the primary
concern of Mr Wolff's sub-
committee?is only about 100
tons.
The 400 tons of Opium the
SSA and its allies are now
offering to burn, under inter-
national supervision, is the
equivalt,-,nt of 40 tons of
heroin, which would be worth
about ?400 million sold on
the streets of America. In
addition, American efforts to
impede the illegal drugs
traffic cost vast sums of
money every year.
Our Washington corres-
pondent tells us that Ameri-
can opposition to the plan is
based on the belief that an
operation aimed at acquiring
and destroying the whole of
the tribesmen's poppy crop
could not be Made to work.
It is also, feared that much
of the ?money would be used
to buy arms for use in the
Shan rebellion-7.m which the
Burmese Government would
obviously raise the strongest
objections.
NEW YORK TIMES
27 October 1974
Ford, Moscow and Pekin
WASHINGTON
By Jarnes Reston
-WASHINGTON, Oct. 26?The 'rela-
tions between the United States and
,both the Soviet Union and China have
.changed in subtle ways since Presi-
;dent Ford moved into the White Hotise.
Washington's 'policy toward the two
major Communist states remains the
'Same, but Moscow - and Peking are
'rbeing very cautious about Mr. Ford,
:who is a new figure on the world
'stage, and they are wondering what
:he's like, how long he will last and
vwho will succeed .him.
, All the civilities and diplomatic
courtesies of the last couple of years
were extended "to Secretary of State
Kissinger in his latest mission to Mos-
cow, but progress toward the control
-of nuclear arms was slight_at best, and
for obvious reasons.
Any really serious agreement to end
the nuclear arms race could not begin
to be effective for two or three years,
and it would limit freedom of action,
for the major nuclear powers there-
after, but who would be President of
the United States in three years? Mr.
Ford, whom the Soviets don't know,
or maybe even "Scoop? Jackson, the
:Democratic Senator from Washington,
,who is regarded in Moscow with al-
most as much suspicion as Mao Tse-
'lung and Chou- En-lai.
So there is a pause now in talks
among representatives of the big con-
tinental and nuclear nations. Nobody
knows what is going to happen after
the departure of Gerald Ford in Wash-
ington or the aged leaders in Peking.
.They are all willing to meet but not
'to decide, and particularly not to lock
themselves into long-range policies for
a future nobody can foresee.
There is another change in the re-
cent propaganda of both Moscow and
Peking. They seldom agree these days
in their relations with one another, but
-lately they have been agreeing about
the economic crisis 'in the capitalist"
world. Both have been dramatizing
the problems of inflation in Europe,
the Unitecb.States and Japan; the crises
Of colonialism in Portugal; the transi-
tion from fascism to monarchy in
Spain.
Both have also been supporting the
Arab oil states against the industrial
capitalist states and seeing in the "en-
ergy crisis" a new economic oppor-
tunity to weaken the free world, and
'-a new strategic opportunity to block-
ade Europe, Japan, and even the United
States at the, source of their oil and
:industrial power in the Middle East.
Leonid I3rezhnev, by all reports, was
very tough on Mr. Kissinger in Mos-
cow. He was bitter about Senator
Jackson's insistence on the immigra-
tion of 60,000 Jews a year from the
Soviet Union to Israel and astonished
that Mr. Jackson would be allowed to
Rome out on the White House steps
And define, inaccurately, the compro-
mise. Mr, Kissinger was furious about
this and President Ford ignored it at
?
first and finally had to correct it, bu
Mr. Kissinger had to deal with thi
confusion when he got to Moscow. -
President Ford, out campaigning fo
Republicans in Congress, is not reall
putting his Mind to this world prob
lem. He is looking for Republican seat
in the House and Senate, and arguin
that somehow this will help deal wit
these larger world questions. n
The truth is that even his own Cab
inet, which is also trying to deal wit
.iflation, the balance of payments, th
Russians and the Chinese, thinks tha
? he is not only wasting his time bu
_ is raising doubts about his judgment.
In the next two or three years, the
? leadership of the United States. Chin
_ and probably the Soviet Union, i
going to pass from the old generatio
to the new. In the United States, i
may .pass fromnGerald Ford to Nelson
Rockefeller, to Henry Jackson, or even
? to a third-party conservative coalition
of Ronald Reagan and George Wallace.
In China, it may even pass from the
anti-Soviet leadership of Mao Tse-tung
and- Chou En-lai to a new military
junta that will revive the Soviet-
Chinese Communist alliance agains
? the West,
Nobody knows, so everybody ; is
waiting. Mr. Kissinger hoped when' he
came to Washington that he was going
to define. and organize arrangements
? for the coming world, but it is not
working out exactly as he had hoped.
There is no political, economic or
financial stability in the world today.
Last year, it seemed that the major
powers were coming together on the
control of arms and the avoidance of
? war, and they are still trying to do so.
But on the problems of food, energy
and population, and on the organiza-
tion of a new order of the world, they
are still deeply divided.
In fact, the political trend now is
toward division and confrontation. The
Communists are seeking economic dis-
array of the capitalist world as con-
firmation of their Marxist prophecies.
The Jacksons and Reagens in America
are swinging American politics toward
nationalism and anti-Communism, and
the Russians and Chinese are watching
all this with their usual skepticism.
The result is that no big deals abotit
disarmament or anything else are like-
ly to be made in the next few years
with either the Russians or the Chi-
nese or even the Europeans: They know
that American power in the world is
probably decisive, both economically
and militarily, but they don't know
how President Ford is going to use
that power or who is going to succeed
him.
So the Russians have been polite
with Mr. Kissinger in Moscow, and the
Indians will probably also be polite in
the next few days, and so will the
Chinese when he goes to Peking later
on. But nobody is in a mood now to
make any long-range commitments:
We are now in a holding operation for
the next few years. waiting to find out
who is going to come after the tem-
porary leaders who now preside over
the major capitals of the world.
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NEW YORK TIMES
27 October 1974
uro es
Communists
djust, for
Power's Sake
By? ANDRE FONTAINE
PARIS?Lenin in his day- denounced the treason
of the Social Democrats and broke with them be-
cause they rejected what he saw as inescapable re-
course to violence and instead 'accepted "class col-
laboration." What would he say today? seeing the
Communist parties of the Latin part of Europe set
out, one after the other, on the very road? he
condemned?
The French Communist party has just held In a'
Paris suburb an extraordinary congress, the first in
its history. Its objective was to turn into durable
strategy, not to say doctrine, the political line that
has led to its alliance with the Socialist party and
aims to gain power legally, even if it is shared. The
French Communist chief, Georges Marchais, does nth
hesitate to reduce to mere "nuances" the past dis-
agreements of his party with Charles de Gaulle to
be able to invite "the authentic Gaullists" to join,
the union of the left.
The Italian Communist party is going even further.
While in France it is a case of having the right
beaten by the left, the Communists of the Itailan
peninsula are campaigning for an "historical corn-
promise" with the Christian Democrats in order to.
avert a threat to existing freedoms posed from the
extreme right.
The same game is played by the Spanish Com-
? munist party, now reconciled with the Kremlin after
a long quarrel. The party's boss, Santiago Carillo,'
has taken up contacts in almost all quarters, includ-
ing the army.-And, together with Rafael Calvo Serer,
.the Catholic and monarchist who was one of the
founders of the famous Opus Dei and one of the
pillars of the Franco regime, he has constituted a'
"junta of national union" which aspires to govern
the country after the Caudillo has left the scene.
Finally in Portugal, the Communist party is al-
ready partaking in power through its Secretary
General, Alvaro Cunha!, back from a long exile in
Prague immediately after the fall of the Caetano'
regime. In a short time he has become the principal
political force in the country and has officially
rejected all references to "the dictatorship of the
proletariat," a notion going back to Marx and as
fundamental to Leninist thought as that of class
struggle.
The Rise of the 'Maoists'
As always when an extreme left movement
modifies its political line, a more eXtremist move-
ment arises on its left. That is the case in all four
countries. In France, the radicalism that had its high
point in May, 1968, appears to have lost ground
since and the "Maoists" are now only a handful.
But "gauchiste" influence has much increased inside
of the rejuvenated Socialist party.
In Italy and in Portu
94)3tOgetitgiiik8i6Wg 2001/a/08 :
is surfacing. Particularly in Lisbon, there is not a
day when the radical press does not denounce
"revisionist" compromises. In Spain, the clandestine
nature of politics does not permit a clear idea of the
balance of forces,, but a Marxist-Leninist party
favorable to the Peking's ideas does exist, especially
among the Basque separatists responsible for the
!assassination of Premier Carrero Blanco. These
groups do not hesitate to resort to armed action.
It is significant that the 'softening of the Com-
munists' doctrinal positions comes when everywhere
in Mediterranean Europe they are closer to power
and in Portugal share it already. Violen8e does not
seem necessary when the inability of capitalist states
to face world economic crises and social imbalances
is leading a growing number of voters to put faith
in those who promise them a society, at once more?
equitable and more rational.
, Elementary tactical intelligence should thus suf-
fice to lead the Communist parties to adopt a
moderate line that respects existing institutions. But
doubtless there is more: The party workers and
Communist leaders?it is enough to watch them in
the flesh to be convinced of this?have not escaped
the sociological changes of the Western countries.
The time of the robots remote-controlled from Mos-.
tow, if it ever existed, died with the myth of Stalin-
?ist infallibility. It is, incidentally, manifest that in
the East there is too much need for Western tech-
nology and capital for there to be much encourage-
ment for violent adventures: The Chilean tragedy is
still too much in the minds of all the Communist
leaders, and who knows how the United States
would react?
The Americans, it would seem, find themselvess-
embarrassed by ? the erosion of their positions. in
Mediterranean Europe. For having recklessly bet on -
regimes cut off from all popular root., they lost,
two vital bridgeheads. Admittedly Portugal has
? stated its intention to remain in NATO, in
spite of the presence in its governmeet of a Com-
munist Deputy Premier. As to Greeceeif it has left
:NATO, like France it remains a member of the At-
lantic alliance, and the vigor with which the Com-
munists are denouncing as premature the Greek
elections scheduled for November confirms the im-
pression that they have little chance -of winning
,more than 15 per cent of the seats. However, in
-both cases, the Soviet Union has applauded the
downfall of dictatorships while the United States
? cannot wield as much influence on the new teams-
as it did over the old.
If, added to this, the precarious situation on Cy-
prus is taken into account, where the local Commun-
ist party can take advantage of the idea prevalent on
the island that it was the Central Intelligence Agency
that encouraged the coup against Archbishop
Makarios, the balance sheet appears negative for the
United States. The United States would be wrong,
though, to view those events. through the spectacles
of the Cold War. Much as the Eastern Communist
regimes are keeping their distance vis-a-vis the
Soviet model, the West European parties are dif-
ferentiating themselves as they approach power and
ally themselves with other political groupings.
It is significant that in France, where the current
in favor of the left has been so powerful over the
last 18 months, the Communist party has regressed
rather than progressed in elections, whereas the So-
cialist party?supposed to he its "hostage" according
to government spokesmen?has registered a specta-
cular advance. This means that the memories of the
Stalin .era and of the .invasion of Czechoslovakia
still weigh on the image of the French Communist
party. Perhaps it cannot enlarge its area of influence
without establishing more clearly the distance be-
tween itself and the superpower of which it used
to proclaim itself the unconditional ally. If that day
came, many things would change, not only in France
but in all of Europe, perhaps inclusive of the Europe
east of the Iron Curtain,
Andre Fontaine is managing editor of Le Monde.
This article was translated by the Paris bureau of
11X-iii3PWAM3V2SIR000100340004-6
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NEW YORK TIMES
27 October 1974
yORX TIMES
27 OCT 1974
The U.S.
Is Scouting
Iberian Regimes'
? , .
The extent of existing and potential
Communist influence in Portugal's new
regime is known to worry Secretary of
State Kissinger, so much so that he has
sent a four-man mission to Lisbon to
scout the situation; there is anxiety-as
well 'in Washington over the political
in I
uncertainty in Spa. ?
.
S.4_ The instability on the Iberian Penin-
sual could create doubt about the con--
-timed existence of a number of United 1
States and North Atlandc Treaty Orga-,1
nization military bases. During The
Cyprus fighting, Greece withdrew from
NATO, and American ships have since
been prevented from using anchorages-;
there. . ?
In Spain, the United States has:four i
Installations, among them one at Rota,
home for Polaris submarines, and an
air base at Torejon near Madrid. Under
present age agreements, which are to
be renegotiated starting,-Nov. 4, the
United States has given the ?Franco
Government about $1-bililon in mili-
tary and economic aid since 1970.
Spain, not a member of NATO, would
like to extend the present arrange!.
!trent :in the form of a mutual defense
treaty, something the United States
has so far avoided. ? ? -
In Portugal's Azores Islands, the
United States leases the Lajes Air
Base. In return for a five-year renewal
of the lease, Portugal wants increased
aid in an amount not yet made public....
Both Spain and Portugal say that,
despite their desire for change,: they
want to keep their military ties to the
United States. President Francisco da
Costa Gomes of Portugal, on his return
from the United Nations and Washing,
ton last week, took care to stress the
importance he placed on his country's
NATO link.
But other influential members of the
new military regime are not so enthu-
siastic about the American presence,
either military or diplomatic. They
have expressed fear that Washington
might start to treat Portugal like Cuba
or Chile. ?
Brig. Gen. Otelo de Carvalho, head of
the Lisbon garrison, said: "The Ameri-
cans have a morbid terror of Commu-
. nism, and have a series of organs to
fight against it. The C.I.A., which uses
the niost incredible methods--and you
only have to look at the example of
Chile?is probably the most dange-
rous, but it is not the only one."
en in an Aegean Boat
FOREIGN AFFAIRS'
By C. L. Sulzberger
PARIS?The most urgent task Henry
Kissinger has set himself on his cur-
? rent diplomatic foray is moving the
-Cyprus crisis along the path to
.peaceful settlement, thereby healing a
.aerious breach in NATO. The under-
taking's magnitude may not compare
with the ultimate goals -sought in
sontinued talks with Russia; but the
immediate dangers of failure are great.
Mr. Kissinger's efforts to get some
Motion on Cyprushave been delayed
by two things. First, the United Statas
Congress sought to impose a handicap
on Presidential policy-making by
'abrupt termination of aid to Turkey.
This would have removed a principal
:trump from the Secretary of State's
hand as he began negotiations. Even
now he has very limited leeway but
? -at least he is not in a position of
appearing to be an outright bully to
the Turks, something he must avoid.
The second obstacle has been
Turkey's failure to replace the Ecevit
Government after it resigned. Mr. -
Ecevit's widespread popularity, stem-
ming from the landings in Cyprus,
?'nevertheless hasn't yet enabled him
-to make a deal with other party
leaders and his parliamentary backing
-remains a minority pending next
:spring's elections.
Thus, curiously, the politic 's of
Turkey where a strongman seemed
ato be emerging, have proved to be a
,greater hurdle than the politics of
Greece, where an entire system of
'government has been replaced. Mr.
Kissinger desperately hopes to see a
new Turkish Cabinet formed under
.Mr. Ecevit within the next few days
_so he can include Ankara--and perhaps
-Athens?on his forthcoming schedule
-and pull Cyprus away from the brink.
, No contemporary Greek leader save
:Constantine Caramanlis, the provi-
sional Premier running for formal
;leadership in the Nov. 17 elections,
_Ithe first in many years, has the
? eastrength and prestige to get a sensible
_deal with Turkey accepted by the
:,Greeks. Therefore Mr. Kissinger hopes
.to obtain some yield from the Turks
by early November, in order to im-
prove Mr. Caramanlis's vote-getting
-position and set the stage for Greco.
Turkish talks.
Before Mr. Ecevit's resignation, he
had already promised Mr. Kissinger
This waa a plan to split the island
into -mixed provinces with the largest
of the five dominated by Turkish.
speakers situated in the north. But
when Mr. Kissinger passed the formula
On to James Callaghan, chairman of
the first Cyprus peace talks in Geneva,
the British Foreign Secretary failed to
;present the paper.
Mr. Kissinger's Margin of maneuver
is very slender. Congress has put a
time limit on future Turkish aid ? un- ,
less Ankara budges considerably on
Cyprus. This has irked many Turks
who a..alt of quitting NATO completely.
The Greeks themselves have already
withdrawn from the alliance's military
commands but are moving very slowly -
to implement their decision.
The Secretary of State's chances of.
cutting the Cyprian knot depend al-
most wholly on two. men: Mr. Ecevit
as Premier in Turkey and Mr. Cara-
mantis as head of the first parliamen-
tary government Greece has had since
1967.
Curiously enuogh, although both
may seem to symbolize vigorous na-
tionalistic and somewhat anti-Amer-
ican feelings in their own countries,
they are also acknowledged to be real-
istic, strong-willed?and Possessing.
broad vision. And Mr. Kissinger's rep-
utation as a dii.lomatic miracle-maker
rides along with. them. .
Mr. Kissinger, aware of the political
intricacies inside Greece and Turkey
and of the ancient passions involve
was quietly proceeding along lines de-
sired by an emotional Congress re-
sponsible to well-organized American
lobbies.
But Congress did not sufficiently
appreciate either the present complex-
ities or the past historical background.
Professor Arnold Toynbee wrote in
1923 ("The Western Question, in Greece
and Turkey") words that could apply
today in Cyprus:
The Greeks have shown the same
unfitness as the Turks for governing a -
mixed population. .. The herd instinct
can be relied on, as it cannot be in the
West, to override the interest and
judgment of the individual . . . Each
nation fears that its own hostages in.
the other's territory may be:ill-treated
and that the other's hostages in its
own territory may undermine its sov-
ereignty, and such expectations have
a fatal ? tendency to realize them-
selves . . ."
The United States Congress is per-
less acquainted with this back-
nd than it ought to be. But then,
oynbee also wrote: "Western sen-
nt about ? the Greeks and the
s is for the most part ill-informed,
ntly expressed and dangerously
ential."
. _ _ _
initialhaps
concessions. It wasn't entirely grou
simple for him because of his politidal as T
situation and also because he had time
initially offered a cantonal solution Turk
after the first Turkish landing in viole
Cyprus,
influ
30
_
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NEW YORK TIMES
? 27 October 1974
Subcontinent's
? Leaders Face
The Enemies
Within
'
E
The
Smartest
Around .
Zulfikar All Bhutto
By BERNARD WEINRAUB
RAWALPINDI ? Prime Minister Zulfikar All Blintto .of
Pakistan rarely goes to bed before 2 or 3 in the morning,
and sometimes he hardly sleeps at all. He prowls his official
residence, reading documents, leafing through American
news magazines, writing statements, abruptly phoning for-
eign diplomats about food imports or arms supplies or aid.
Within the past few weeks, Mr. Bhutto has been partic-
ularly busy. He has stepped up his pleas to the United
States to relax the ban on arms sales to coincide with the
visit this week of Secretary of State Kissinger to India and
Pakistan. Mr. Bhutto visited Baluchistan, the most troubled
province in Pakistan, and announced that "organized" re-
sistence by anti-Government rebels had ended. He has ex-
pressed readiness to hold talks with India over the peren-
nial Kashmir issue. At the same time he has been exultant
over a quiet but significant breakthrough in Indo-Pakistani
relations: the resumption of telephone and postal links be-
tween the two nations after a break of nearly three years.
Mr. Bhutto's activity ? he makes pronouncements and
calls news conferences with the abandon of a New York city
mayoral candidate is a measure of the style and pace of
Pakistani politics. After three years in power, and after tak-
ing over a divided and undisciplined nation, Mr. Bhutto has
thrust Pakistan forward and sought to shape a new identity
for the country of 70 million. The results are mixed.
Pakistan's internal problems are glaring. The nation, with
an annual per capita income of about $110 and illiteracy
that totals nearly 80 per cent, is impoverished and riven
with despair. One out of every four babies dies before the
age of five.
Nevertheless, Pakistan's economic position seems sur-
prisingly bright, compared with that of her neighbors. In-
flation is running at 25 per cent annually, but the Govern-
ment subsidizes such essentials as wheat, flour, vegetable
oil and sugar. ?
Pakistan says she needs to import about a million tons
of wheat, but this is because the current record crop of
about 8 million tons was below expectations. Pakistan does
not suffer from the large-scale food problems of India or
Bangladesh.
Even the oil price increase has been less damaging to
Pakistan than to her iahhor
ApprOValuF d'&g4t200 ilk38/0?1:
imports will reach $385-million 'next year, but loans from
two fellow Islamic nations, Iran and Saudi Arabia, will help.
Although the economy has proved surprisingly buoyant,
Pakistan is weighted down by internal troubles. Rebellious
tribesmen in Baluchistan resent Mr. Bhutto's efftors to gain
firm central control in the state, which could be a potential
source of oil.
There are troubles along the Afghan border, persistent
Pakistani fears of being Swallowed up by India, and a con-
sistent need by Pakistan to feed her own military machine.
Without\ American arms, Mr. Bhutto relies on China for
weapons as well as support. The relationship is based on
the mutual fear of Soviet involvement on the subcontinent
and the anxiety, on Mr. Bhutto's part, that Moscow is step-
ping up its role in the area.
As an independent magazine, Outlook, commented last
spring in a discussion that dealt with the enduring angers
on the subcontinent that trap India, Pakistan and Bangla-
desh: "It is a bizarre setting in which cupboards full of
poverty-stricken skeletons are rattling with the din of
sophisticated and outdated armaments. Countries which
cannot afford to provide two square meals a day to their
teeming millions are wrapped up in visions of hegemony,
spheres of 'peace' and their 'manifest destiny.'" The mag-
azine, like several opposition newspapers, has since been
banned. ' --
Bhutto supporters assert that the 1971 Bangladesh war, '
when Pakistan lost her eastern wing, still affects the nation,
13hutto critics point out that several assassination
attempts have been made on his key opponent, Khan Abdul
Wali Khan, leader of the?National Awami party, whose-
strongholds areBaluchistan'`and, the Northwest Frontier
province. Lesser Opposition figures 'eave been "bullied" and,
tough security, police generally forbi?ct ,are public gather-
ings. Defenders of Mr. BhUtto, however,, and even some
of his critics, maintain that the Prime Minister is adept and,
pragmatic, and his singular achievement remaia,s impres-
sive: He has restored some self-respect to a nation that was
an object of scorn three years ago.
The
Pivotal
Figure
Indira Gandhi
NEW DELHI?She has been called the Empress of India
and the most powerful woman in the world. In New Delhi,
she is known as "Mrs. G." or "Mataji," Big Mother.
Whatever the title, Indira Gandhi remains the pivotal
figure in the nation of 580 million, a woman who has
plainly decided to move in .new directions at home and
abroad. To Prime Minister Gandhi, the changes are neces-
sary because India's economy is in a shambles, food scarci-
ties are growing, the mood in the cities where inflation is
limbing annually at 30 per cent, seems bleak and uneasy.
India is hardly. on the verge of revolution, but the nation
does face a deepening crisis. To avert it, Mrs. Gandhi has
reshuffled her Cabinet, cracked down on smugglers, sought
to fragment her political opposition and in foreign affairs,
seems bent on easing relations with the United States.
Beyond these shifts, and intertwined with them, is a
persistent and melancholy criticism that the idealism and
adventure in democracy of the 1950's has turned cynical,.
that too many people are going hungry, that there are too
many allegations of corruption and manipulation and police
activities. Government allocations to maintain law and order
have doubled in the past five years, and climbed by 52
times in the last 24 years, a figure termed "alarming" by
a parliamentary committee.
"The nation is adrift," said one columnist. Jayaprakash
Narayan, an ailing figure whose prominence dates to the
time of Mahatma Gandhi, has abruptly emerged politically
to frighten the Congress party. He said the other night that
Jawaharlal Nehru "was one hundred times more democratic"
than his daughter, Mrs. Gandhi, who has served as India's
CiRtMrs. Gandhi prot
11e'mA34a0 0a t10100m004-
are immense. The
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nation needs anywhere from 5 to 10 million tons of food
imports to avid widespread starvation. The population is
growing by 13 million each year, and per capita food con-
sumption is steadily declining. Industrial growth is negligi-
ble, despite sizable assistance. Land reforms have failed.
Shortages of water, seeds and fertilizer have throttled the
"green revolution." ?
Mrs. Gandhi's critics place much of the blame for the
nation's faltering policies on radic'al?and unkept?promises
such as "Garibi Hatao," or "Abolish Poverty." "The appeal
of the Garibi Hatao promise was based on the fact that
it articulated the vast needs of society," Rajni Kothari, a
prominent political scientist said. "The violence that is
engulfing the country is the result of the Government's
failure to even make a start in fulfilling that promise."-
? Perhaps the key criticism of Mrs. Gandhi is that the
Government has twisted its priorities and has concentrated
on the development of heavy industry despite the fact that
India is an agrarian nation: 80 per cent of the populace
lives on farms:
To critics, the symbol of India's distorted priorities was
the nuclear blast on May 18. Indians insist that the blast
was "for peaceful purposes" but the'Government obviously
weighed the propoganda and military impact of the surprise
move. As the Economic and Political Weekly said recently:
"Deaths from starvation are taking place. No famine is go-
ing to be declared. But officially the country will continue
its 'progress.'
"This year it was the first nuclear implosion followed by
[the takeover of] Sikkim, Next year, perhaps, it will be an
Indian version of the sputnik, and we will have arrived in
space. Once you hate Attained such heights, people and
their need for food must indeed seem remote and trivial."
The annual outlay for agriculture has dwindled. Last year,
for example, it was about $1.03-billion. This year it amounts
to $850-million. ?
In fairness to Mrs. Gandhi, who remains an aloof and
chilly figure, the task of dealing with India's poverty is
extraordinarily difficult. "I think that the only reason I'm
able to survive this with equanamity is that I'm just myself,
regardless of the situation in the country," she has said.
"I know the condition of the people. There's nothing I can
see that I don't know about already. It's not that you
don't feel it but?it's like a nurse and illness. You see it
in perspective."
To Mrs. Gandhi's numerous critics, however, the recent
steps taken by the Prime Minister are cynical gestures to
cope with India's emergency. Yes, critics say, Mrs. Gandhi
has finally reshuffled her Cabinet and placed Jagjivan Ram,
a tough and powerful figure, in the key post of Food Minis-
ter, a position that has too often been held by inept figures.
But the Cabinet, the critics add, consists of merely the same
old faces in new jobs. ?
Even critics have welcomed the crackdown on smugglers,
whose illicit trade threatened to damage the economy. But
there is resentment that the pay-offs by the smugglers, and
the alleged involvement of government officials, is ignored.
Moreover, the seizure of the smugglers under emergency
measures coupled with the increased use of such laws to
arbitrarily arrest strikers, students and terrorist suspects as
well as the dismissal of an anti-Government newspaper
editor, B. G. Verghese, have spurred debate about the
quality of India's democracy. The nation remains an open,
free-wheeling society, with a lively press, but recent events
have left Indian intellectuals uneasy.
In recent months, Mrs. Gandhi has managed her foreign
policy with some success. Relations with Pakistan, always
fragile, are still so but India's friendship with Iran has
deepened, with the recent visit here of Shah Mohammed
Riza Pahlevi. Now Secretary of State Kissinger's visit is
expected to lift relations between Washington and New
Delhi whose friendship soured during the 1971 Bangladesh
war when the United States sided with Pakistan over India.
32
"It's a question of Kissinger and Mrs. Gandhi meeting again
and, hopefully, hitting it off after three years," said one
American source here. "If they do, that's fine, and if they
don't, well. ..."
The American merely shrugged. ?BERNARD WEINRAUB
The
Father
Figure?
Sheik Mujibur Rahman
r.Jy KASTURI RANGAN
NEW DELHI ? After winning Bangladesh's admission to
the United Nations, when China withdrew its opposition,
Prime Minister Sheik Mujibur Rahman returned home this
month asserting that his country's "dark days" were over. famine {threatening and industry almost entirely idle,
there w_ere sthne to whom his optimism seemed premature.
The diplomatic breakthrough at the United Nations was
accompanied by a shipment of 5,000 tons of urgently needed
rice' from China. The Dacca Government has also received
an offer from the United States of 150,000 tons of wheat
and rice. and the promise of a large development loan.
But the grain from the United States has not arrived and
officials in Dacca complain that Washington has ignored a ?
plea to speed deliveries by diverting some grain going to
nearby countries. Only last weekend, because of prodding by
the United Nations, an American shipment of 10,000 tons of
rice to Indonesia was diverted, but even this consignment
will not reach Bangladesh before the end of this month.
Officials here are hurt by the belated sympathy for the
millions of people starving following floods earlier this year.
Further, more than a half-mililon workers have been
rendered jobless by the closure of hundreds of factories be-
cause of a shortage of fuel and raw material. Nearly 200 big
textile, jute, sugar and paper mills, perform on the average
40 per cent below normal capacity. At least 10 of the 70 jute
mills, which contribute the bulk of foreign exchange earn-
ings, were closed for, many months by labor troubles.
According to the Government, the floods destroyed nearly
a third of the expected grain crop; the loss in crops, homes
destroyed and factory production could exceed $300-mililon.
Foreign observers say that, even with foreign aid, 100,000
people could starve.
The Government has concluded that these compulsions re-
quire Bangladesh to adjust its foreign policy to maintain
good relations with all the parties seeking influence on the
subcontinent, not just with- India and the Soviet Union, but
also with China and the United States.
But relations with the Soviet Union and India, the two
countries that wholeheartedly backed Bangladesh in win-
ning her independence from Pakistan four years ago, have
cooled. Despite a recent pledge of $21-mililon dollars from
the Soviet Union, people remain suspicious about Moscow's
gestures.
Smuggling over the 1,300-mile border the two countries
share is the principal irritant in relations with India.
Despite these troubles, Sheik Mujib's popularity remains
intact. Even though his administration is saddled by inexpe-
rienced, inefficient and corrupt officials, there is hardly any
political opposition to his rule. He is still venerated by most
? people as the father of the nation.
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WASHINGTON STAR
21 October 1974
? By Henry S. Brads her
Star-News Staff Writer
SAIGON ? Throughout Indochina
today; the gloom is deepening.
The old threat that has loomed
larger ever since the United States
-began withdrawing from South Viet-
nam has now acquired a greater,
sense of immediacy.
Government officials, politically
aware citizens and diplomats are
wondering with growing concern
whether this blood-soaked peninsula
is moving with accelerating speed
toward eventual control by North
Vietnam, or by local Communists
under strong influence from Hanoi.
This concern still falls consider-
ably short of desperation, despair
or a sense of inevitability. A col-
lapse of anti-Communist morale is
not in sight. But there is a distinct
ebbing of confidence in long term
prospects. It results from a strong
apprehension that resistance to con-
tinuing Communist pressure cannot
be sustained at an adequate level.
THE WAR GOES ON in South
Vietnam, little affected by the
American unilateral declaration of
peace almost two years ago. Cam-
bodia, too, suffers unending war,
stalemated at the present level of
outside aid to the two sides. The
fragile cease-fire in Laos has shift-
ed the nature of that struggle with.
out ending it. And in Thailand,
Communist insurgency continues
with North Vietnamese aid.
The basic problems remain the
same as they were when the Ameri-
cans were here with their half-mil-
lion soldiers and their willingness to
pour in whatever money and
material was needed to meet the
threats to friendly governments.
If the Americans had never been
here, those governments would not
exist in their present form, but they
were and they do and hence the
gloom.
The problems are the same; the
old solutions are either no longer
available or no longer work very
-well.
With American support dwin-
dling, the governments of South
Vietnam and Cambodia, and non-
Communists in Laos who are now in
uneasy coalition with the?
Communists, are caught between
continuing Communist pressure and
their own inability to generate
greater internal strength.
No one knows just where the
threshold lies at which U.S. military
keep viable the Saigon and Phnom
Penh governments, and the non-
Communist element in Vientiane.
Computing a dollar figure for each
country is complicated by unstable.
local factors, varying degrees of
corruption and wastage, and
deliberate exaggeration of need in
order to provide a margin for cuts.
There is also the psychological
factor of maintaining confidence in
each country. The feeling.is. wide-
spread in Indochina that the United
States public in general and Con-
gress in particular misjudge the
threshold, or simply do not care.
Congress has cut military aid to
South Vietnam in the year which
began July 1 to about one half in.
real terms what it had been the
previous year, and chopped econo-
mic aid to Saigon, and. refused to
give special military aid to Cam-
bodia like that which kept the
Cambodian army going in the last
fiscal year.
Just how- real and direct
is the tie between aid cuts
and the ability of these gov-
ernments to survive is, how-
ever, open to debate.
A SENIOR AMERICAN
official in one of the Indo-
chinese countries said can-
didly the other day that "I
don't know how we can
spend all the money" that
was left after Congress had
made cuts in the now-post-
poned version of the foreign
aid bill. A deputy premier
in another of the countries
said, "American aid is more
than sufficient if we can use
it properly" ? adding that
it is not used properly now.
Some military officers in
the third country feel that
their army could and would
fight better if it had less
American equipment and
ammunition to perpetuate
the addiction to inappropri-
ate U.S. Army tactics.
These are, though, dis-
puted opinions. The more
general attitude, as well as
the official posture, among
both government ministers
and diplomats is that while
inflation is pushing up the
threshold Congress is going
the opposite direction.
The psychological result
is perhaps as significant as
any measurement in 105mm
artillery shells. M79 gren-
and economic aid will be too low to ade launchers and gallons of
aviation fuel. If the feeling
spreads in these countries
that they cannot keep going
on the old basis, not only for
lack of ammunition but also
because inflation makes it
impossible for a soldier to
feed his family, then that
alone can cause a crumb-.
ling.
. Some of the same top offi-
cials who talk one moment
of the desirability of negoti-
ations with the Communists
? whether directly with
Hanoi or with local ele-
ments whom they view as
Hanoi's agents ? speak the
next moment of the im-
placability of the adver-
sary. They remain equivo-
cal whether their hope of a
negotiated settlement is
sufficient to overcome their
assumption, based on long
and bitter experience, that
North Vietnam will never
settle for less at the negoti-
ating table than it hopes to
win from protracted war.
HERE IN SOUTH Viet-
nam "our war will not be
solved by military means, it
must be negotiated," Hoang
Duc Nha said in an inter-
view the other day. Nha,
the minister of information,
has been President Nguyen
Van Thieu's key adviser
and was the only South
Vietnamese official to sit
with Thieu in all the tortu-
ous negotiations two years
ago that finally produced
the Paris agreement, which
was supposed to halt this
war but did not. . ?
The Cambodian regime of
President Lon Nol has been
seeking futilely for years to
establish contact with its
enemies in order to negoti-
ate a truce but the other
side appears to be divided
and rejects every negotiat-
ing offer, even when the re-
gime retreated last July to
offering talks without any
preconditions.
In his office at the educa-
tion ministry in Phnom
Penh, from which his prede-
cessor was dragged to a
mysterious death last June,
acting Premier Pan Sothi
said recently that "low-
intensity war is the pros-
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Norodom Sihanouk's exile
regime to take away the
Cambodian seat in the
United Nations is causing
grave concern.
"A doubt exists that we
could go on and fight the
war" if the seat is lost, Pan
Sothi said, because the cli-
mate of confidence would-
be destroyed.
Laos has negotiated, and
the result has been the re- ,
establishment of coalition
government, which has
broken down twice before in
the last two decades. Now
members of the old Vienti-
ane government that had
been fighting the Pathet
Lao are-worried that the
Pathet Lao are deminating
the coalition. One of them,
Major General Oudone Sa-
nanikone, said in his De-
fense Ministry office recent-
ly that "the war goes on, a
political war now." He com-
plained that the
Communists had all the
advantages in the coalition,
getting a share of power in
Vientiane without giving up
any control of their own
territory and supported by
the neutralist premier,
Prince Souvanna Phouma,
in arguments with the
rightists. .
The deputy foreign minis-
ter of Thailand, Major
General Chatichai Choonha-
van, in his ministry building
overlooking the fabulously
spired and tinted roofs of
the royal palace at Bang-
kok, said that if North Viet- ,
nam "wanted to bring back
peace in one region it could
in a few days." But Hanoi
goes on supporting wars
and the Communist insur-
gency in Thailand, he said.
The opening up of demo-
cratic debate in Thailand
which began a year ago
with the overthrow of mili-
tary rulers who committed
the country to American
policy in Indochina has
created uncertainty over fu-
ture attitudes of this situa-
tion. For now, however,
American warplanes re-
main on standby alert in
Thailand for possible re-
sumption of bombing in
Indochina.
IT IS ONLY in Thailand
that basic policy toward the
Communist problem seems
to be under active consider-
ation.
Officials and opposition
political leaders in South
Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos talk gloomily of short-
term prospects. There is a
marked reluctance to dwell
upon the ultimate result of
the current gloomy trends
in the economic and mili-
tary situations, should they
continue unchecked by
some presently unforesee-
able change of circum-
stances. Some kind of men-
tal block seems to make it
impossible to face the possi-
bility of losing these long
wars and falling under the
control of the enemies, or a
single enemy for those who
see the local threat as only
a front for Hanoi. This
block exists on conversation
with outsiders, anyway.
It is generally assumed
among foreign observers
and even among lower offi-
cials that many of the top
people in these countries
are looking ahead to the
possibility of collapse. Al-
though no proof is offered,
many say that Swiss bank
accounts and other fallback
arrangements are being
made with funds which
originate through U.S. aid.
Diplomats are also more
open in their speculation
about the future than local
people, being less personal-
ly involved. Many of them
wonder aloud whether the
three Indochinese countries
are already on an inevitable
slide into Communist con-
trol, and how long it will
take. A few years? A dec-
ade?
It is an impossible ques-
tion to answer, as everyone
realizes, even though the
essential importance is the
pessimism of the asking.
The ability of nations to sur-
vive apparently hopeless
situations is often surpris-
ing; and conditions that look
desperate can sometimes
drag on indefinitely.
THE MILITARY situa-
tions in South Vietnam and-
Cambodia are the primary
reason for the regional
gloom. Economic problems
are generally seen as a re-
sult of the continued fight-
ing, although the difficulties
of paying former soldiers in
Laos suggests that a cease-
fire alone fails to remove
economic problems. Since
the Paris agreement sup-
posedly went into effect in
South Vietnam almost 21
months ago, fighting has
continued at approximately
the same level as it did in
between major offensives of
the war. Each side has been
guilty of violating the
cease-fire when it felt it
could gain territorial or
population advantages.
The Saigon government's
internal propaganda has
wavered between proclaim-
ing a major Communist
offensive to be underway or
te be imminent, as if the
Thieu regime cannot itself
decide. This has been paral-
leled by U.S. embassy
wavering that has appar-
ently been keyed to efforts
to obtain larger aid alloca-
tions from Congress.
The current intensive
'fighting around Hue and Da
Nang along South Viet-
nam's northern coat, and
in almost uninhabited parts
of the central highlands, is
more jockeying for future
positions of value in any big
Communist offensive than a
major drive in itself.
There is no doubt that the
North Vietnamese army, at
a currently estimated
strength of just below 200,-
000 soldiers in the South, is
stronger than it has ever
been. It has more artillery,
some big enough to shell
government positions from
outside the range of return
gunfire, more armored
vehicles, more anti-aircraft
cover and better mobility
than when it launched the
last big offensive at Easter
1972.
The development of roads
and pipelines into
Communist controlled areas
of South Vietnam has sig-
nificantly changed the pros-
pects for any future up-
surge. Hanoi can now rush
reinforcements south in a
few weeks instead of taking
months on the old bomb-
harassed Ho Chi Minh trail.
The trail itself remains in
use, contrary to North Viet-
nam's obligation to remove
its troops from Laos after
the cease-fire there. In
Cambodia some 50,000 sol-
diers, labeled by the Ameri-
cans "Khmer Communists"
34
for lack of any more dis-,
criminating identification of
probably still disparate
opponents of Lon No!, con-.
trol most of the country.
Neither side presently has
the manpower or arma-
ments to make a decisive
breakthrough. The Phnom
Penh government just stag-
gers on from one dry season
to the next wet season,
reacting to what the enemy
does.
"As long as U.S. aid stays
at last year's level, this war
could go on for another 10
years," one informed ob-
server commented as Con-
gress was cutting the aid.
Unlike the Viet Cong, how-
ever, enemy propaganda in
Cambodia does not talk of a
long war. It emphasizes
that the withdrawal of U.S.
aid would bring a quick end
with the collapse of Lon
Nol's regime. Pathet Lao
_
troops in Laos, who have
mostly replaced in forward
positions North Vietnamese
units that did the actual
wartime fighting for them,
have been jockeying for ter-
ritorial advantage, particu-
larly around the royal cap-
ital, Luang Prabang. But a:
Pathet Lao spokesman in
Vientiane, the government
seat, serves .cold drinks and
talks of his side observing
the cease-fire. He also still
insists U.S. and Thai mili-
tary forces must leave Laos,
although independent ob-
servers agree that they al-
ready have.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 October 1974
Cambodia UN mission
occupied by protestors
United Nations, N.Y.
- Four women and six men occupied
the Cambodian Mission to the United
Nations on Third Avenue early Tuesday
morning, pushing two young
Cambodian staff members out of the .
building, writes David Anable, Monitor -
staff correspondent.
The 10, apparently all Americans
identifying themselves as members of
an "anti-imperialist group in New ?
York," were removed within an hour or
so by the police, and, according to
Cambodian Government sources,
:charged with criminal trespass. ?
The aim of the occupation seems to
have been to dramatize calls for the
Lon Nol government's replacement by
Prince Norodom Sihanouk's
government-in-exile ? both at the UN
and in Phnom Penh itself.
The UN is scheduled to debate.
Cambodian representation here next .
month. It remains touch and go as to
whether the present government will be
able to retain its UN credentials. .
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IN-77;14en %Anus
Tuesday, October 22, 1974
Ecc
INDOCHINA IA/CONY
ic Woes intensify
By Henry S. Bradsher
Star-News Staff Writer
SAIGON ? Duch Stile sat
on a wooden bed in the gar-
den outside his weather-
beaten house near Phnom
Penh, talking with the quiet
air of an educated man, but ,
worried.
"I tried to get a job as a
taxi-bus driver, but I could-
n't. Some of the other teach-
ers have part-time jobs, but
even then it's hard."
Before war came to
CaMbodia, Duch Side earn-
ed 78,000 riels a month at
his school. It cost about 8
percent of that to buy the
basic staple, rice, for his
family.
Now he earns 30,000 ries
and rice takes up half of it.
Other 'food expenses take
the remainder. His wife is ,
able to earn only 400 riels a
day in the marketplace ?
not enough for all the other
things the family reds.
?On the outskirts of Sai-
gon, Nguyen Van Than, who
was called away from
teaching to fight in the
army, is now back teaching
SS pupils all subjects in five
elementary grades after
losing his right eye in com-
bat.
When he started teaching
in 1960, Than paid one-sev-
enth of his salary of 5,500
piasters to feed his family. I
Now it costs two-thirds of
his current salary, 34,000
piasters. He and his wife
sew mosquito nets at home
to try to make ends meet.
While hundreds of thousands, per-
haps 2 million, persons are unem-
ployed and unable to pay for enough
rice, even people on fixed govern-
ment salaries in .Indochina like
teachers are hard-pressed theses
days to survive. Both South Viet-
namese and Cambodian soldiers,
whose monthly pay has been ,whit-
tied, down by inflation to only
enough to feed their families for
about 10 days, are resorting to loot-
ing and petty extortion from the
people they are supposed to be pro-
tecting from Communism.
IT WAS just such military abuse
of the civilian population in Viet-
nam more than a decade ago that
alienated popular support and ena-.
bled the Viet Cong to built up its
strength. The massive American in-
volvement in Vietnam reduced this
problem for some years. But now the
combination of reduced U.S. aid and
roaring inflation has brought it
back to South Vietnam, posed addi-
Approved
tional problems for Cambodia and
led to rioting by soldiers in Laos.
These three Indochinese countries
have for years existed on American-
money.
The United States provides ap-,'
.
proximately two-thirds of the com-
bined civilian and military financial
needs of South Vietnam. As the
Cambodian government's territorial
control and tax base have contract-
ed, the U.S. contribution to the n,a-
-tional budget has risen from about a
nuarter two years ago to two-thirds
now ? and if military supplies are
added, the American share comes
,close to 90 percent of total expenses:
Laos would scarcely 'have'
monetized
'monetized, economy without U. S,
'aid.. , , ?
All three countries are worried
how they might survive in the fu-
ture. Their economies have been
adapted to the modernization that
War has brought, and it is no easier
to send an unemployed Saigon dock-
worker or former U. S. army camp
laborer back to the rice paddy than
it is to get a laid-off Detroit factory
hand to return to a Kentucky farm
?harder, even, when the farm is
now occupied by the enemy.
Officials in Vietnam and Cambo-
dia are even more urgently con-
cerned with the possibility that
reductions of military aid will leave
- their soldiers without adequate aril-
munition to withstand Communist
attacks. Some outposts have been
abandohed as no longer feasible to
maintain with less firepower avail-
able, enabling the enemy to- expand
his control.
Despite the arguments being
made for continuing American aid
at more or less same levels, there is
widespread skepticism among ob-
servers in Indochina that even the
full amounts would do much more
than keep the governments grinding
into seemingly endless wars, rather
than solving basic problems. It is
even uncertain that the same levels
would remain adequate as inflation,
both the imported worldwide vari-
ety and that spurred by deficit fi-
nancing in these countries, eats into
resources.
NOR IS THERE any-certainty
that aid cuts will have the theoreti-
cally ideal effect of forcing clearer
thinking about priorities and sensi-
ble economies in spending. The
Indochinese governments look even
less capable of that than most.
In none of these countries is there
any serious long-term consideration
of economic problems. They all
have planning ministries but plan-
ning is impossible under the strain-
ed circumstances.
In fact, Vietnam and
areconcerneW t
FproReleitaes
;. le;
little better in Laos. ? '-
This makes the Nixon and Ford
administrations' requests to 'Con-
gress, for "postwar reconstruction
assistance" a sad joke. There is
nothing post about the wars in Viet-
nam and Cambodia, nothing is
being reconstructed while the de-
struction goes on and fighting
deters any meaningful productive
investment, and rather than assist-
ance the U. S. aid is primarY suste-
- nance. .
' Nonetheless, the administration
has contended that a five-year pro-
:gram of declining aid for South
Vietnam would enable this country
-to take off into economic self reli--.
ance. This was an early salespoint
on this year's foreign aid program.
It was not thought up by U. S. eco-
nomic experts in Saigon. When
bressed on the idea that South Viet-
-nam can become selfsufficient with-
in- any foreseeable future, 'they
agree with the foreign observer who
commented that the idea depended
upon half a dozen or more favorable
assumptions all coming true, but
none of them looked very likely. '
, Only the 'glimmer of offshore oil
holds much encouragement, and the
Communists are trying their best to
discourage foreign exploration for it
off. South Vietnam. Cambodia is in-
volved in disputes over delineation
of its offshore waters with Vietnam:
and Thailand, -which between them
want to reduce Phnom Penh's share
to almost nothing, while Laos is left
out in oil like almost everything else
of economic value.
For years this correspondent has
been hearing in these countries
moan ? from U. S. officials about
congressional cuts in aid appropria-
tions. Each year there would be
explanations how goods in the pipe-
line or some fortituous circum-
stance had allowed the client gov-
ernment to survive the previous
year's cats, but this year the full
amount was really needed if eco-
.nomic stability and the war effort
was to be maintained.
The repetition of the year after.
year suggested considerable water-
.ing of aid requests to insure that the
reduced appropriation would still be
enough. But if there was water, offi- -
cials contend, it has evaporated and!
Congress is now cutting into essen-
tials that help these countries stay
led and armed. The contention is
hard to evaluate, but the visible
problems of declining living stand-
ards tend to support it.
"AN ECONOMY with less resili-
ency than ours would have collaps-
ed by now," the minister of trade
and industry, Nguyen Duc Cuong,
said in a recent interview.
Cuong said the country faces a
dilemma whether to put primary
emphasis on fighting inflation,
"only 50 percent this year if we are
lucky," or on trying to spend out of
the recession caused by U. S. froop
Withdrawals, imported inflation, the
war and other problems. "We can-
not expect the economy to do any
Cambodia better" if U. S. aid i3 eta, CtIntlg
miiii0PaltsrDP77-0%4p2Rdotfli On40010211/6' hone to manage
t4
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so the situation won't be too explo-
sive::
President Nguyen Van Thieu
vows that South Vietnam "will cer-
tainly be ready to fight until the last
drop of blood, the last bullet and the.
last grain of rice," if the United
States fails to provide enough aid._
In a rather gloomy speech recently,
one in which he only vaguely de-
fended himself against corruption
charges, Thieu said the U. S. gov-
ernment had promised him ade-
quate aid at the time of the so-called
? cease-fire. Americans are now "en-
countering economic and? financial
difficulties," Thieu said. "Neverthe-
less, they cannot swallow their
promises and shirk their obligation
to one of their allies."
When the Paris agreement was
:signed 21 months ago to let the'
Americans out of the war, the U. S.
_government also promised, Thieu
? said, that it "would react vigorously
to 'Communist violations of the
cease-fire, their continued infiltra-
'tion into the South and their lack of
respect for the Paris agreement.
?-
? "What have we seen so far?''
Thieu asked. "There has been no U.
S. reaction to the Communist infil-
.tration into the South and their
grave violations of the cease-fire.,
This is. because of the U. S. internal
situation."
In an interview, Tram Van Lam, '
who as foreign minister signed the
Paris agreement for South Vietnam,
said that Henry A. Kissinger had
given him assurances during the ne-
gotiations which have failed to work
out. Now it does not make sense for
the United States to cut its aid, Lam
protested. ? ? ?
" While such protests are heard
from the government, old political
opponents of Thiel/ have beenreiri-
vigorated by the signs of fading
American backing for his regime.
THIEU HAS COME to represent
American interests in Vietnam in
the eyes of many people here, fairly
or unfairly. He has been able to
deliver aid. Now if he can no longer
deliver, his usefulness is more like-
? ly to be questioned..
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the?
ousted leader of Cambodia who now
from Peking fronts for Communist
effort to take over his country, said
the other day that the territory con-
trolled by the Lon Nol regime is
"nothing but an economic corpse ?
a 'non-state' which has no economy
of its own and is surviving with
great difficulty on the constant and
massive aid injections from its U. S.
masters."
Early this year the U. S. embassy
in Phnom Peah was saying that it
had a virtual blank check from the
Nixon administration to provide
whatever military and economic aid
was needed to sustain "the finest
example of the Nixon Doctrine in
action," as the former president
once called it. Now the mood has
changed.
Congress has been closing loop-
holes which made it possible to find
extra money for Cambodia. At the,
same time the Communists have
shut off the flow of rubber from
their zone, bartered against U. S.
aid goods, which provided the
Phnom Penh regime with its only
significant foreign exchange earn-
ings.
CORRUPTION is a problem in all
three Indochinese countries but in
none is it more of a drain on the war
effort and homefront economic
stability than in Cambodia. ?
"We copy the French in so many
'things" in this former French
colonial area, one official in Phnom
Penh commented, "its a shame we
don't use their system of taxing vis-
ible wealth instead of official in-
come." The visible wealth-of gener-
als and some civilian officials since
U. S. aid began flowing into Cambo-
dia has increased enormously while
salaries have remained low.
But Marshal Lou Nol ignores the
obvious corruption of top military
and civilian officials, making .it
:impossible to clean up a malignant
situation. When the U. S. embassy
insisted last spring that repaYment
be made for some stolen aviation
gasoline provided by American aid,
it was paid ? but the payment origi-
nated ultimately from other U. S.
'funds.
? The economic situation in Cambo-
dia, where inflation is now running
some 250 percent a year in the
Phnom Penh enclave, is a major
factor in political unrest. Subsidiza-
tion of rice at such a low level that
much was smuggled abroad while
,the United States shipped more in
NEW YORK TIMES
25 October 1974
SEOUL" REPORTERS
DENOUNCE REGIME
Strike Wins Page 1 Display
of Attack on Press Curbs
Special to The Neer York Times
SEOUL, South Korea, Friday,
Oct. 25?Reporters for South
Korea's largest newspaper call-
ed off an unusual 11-hour strike
last night when their publisher
acceded to a demand for publi-
cation of their statement de-
nouncing Government press
restrictions.
Dong-A-Ilbo, one of the most
influential national newspapers,1
is being published this mornin,,,
with an anti-Government resolu-
tion adopted by its news staff
on its front page.
The agreement by Kim Sang
'has now been reduced. But that
overdue measure of raising rice
prices touched off demonstrations
? against the government. '
In Laos U. S. aid is now support-
ing a government in which the
Communist Pathet Lao holds half
the places and has more than half
the influence. A Pathet Lao spokes-
man explained that his side did not
mind the continued aid so long as
American intentions were good,
meaning money but no influence.
" In fact, the Communists apparent-
ly hope the United States will con-
tinue to help foot. the bill for that
primitive country with some expen-
sive modern tastes which Ameri-
cans helped develop. Aid promises
have recently been collected from
North Vietnam, North Korea, China
and other Communist countries, but
some Western nations have been
put off by rather pre-emptory de-
? mands for free plane tickets and
hotels for a Cambodian aid mission
to go beg from them. Thailand has
an independent economy, troubled-
lae most others in today's world
but standing without massive
American backing. But while the U.
S. Air Force continues to use Thai
bases, American aid has been slash-
ed and troop spending is off, raising
questions in Bangkok of whether
there should be some direct tie be-
tween bases and aid:
Man, the publisher to run the
three-point resolution was inter-
preted as a major victory for
the Korean press, which has
been fighting off and on against
restrictions by the Government.
About 180 reporters of Dong-
A Ilbo and its affiliated radio
200 students, clergymen, and in-
tellectuals have been court-
martialed and the press has
been under tight control.
In the ?Dong-A Ilbo matter,
the publisher withdrew a pro-
posal that the resolution be
station protested the arrests and Printed on the back page when
questioning of the managing he realized that there would be
editor and his three deputies no paper today if he did not
give way. The half-century-old
paper hal a circulation in ex-
cess of 600,000. ?
Two weeks ago President
Park told the owners of news-
papers, news agencies and
broadcasting companies that he
would not tolerate challenges
to the Constitution. he spe-
Newspapers have paid exten- cifically asked for control of
sive attention to developments younger journalists who, he as-
n South Vietnam, apparently serted, are fostering campus
as an oblique criticism of their unrest.
Government. Dong-A Ilbo has a long his-
President Park declared an tory of political suppression.
emergency two years ago tolIt was closed numerous times
crack down on his political op-under Japanese colonial rule
ponents. Since then more than, and President Syngman Rhee
by intelligence agents. The edi-
tors have been under intermit-
tent interrogation for allegedly
having prominently reported
recent student demonstrations
here and stirrings in South
Vietnam.
Oblique Criticism
36
suspended it for a month in
1955 when it became too crit-
ical to his policies.
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WASHINGTON STAR
- 21 October 1974
U.S. SAYS HANOI EXPLOITS DISSENT
CIA Role 19 ffl
4:151.0
By George Esper
Associated Press
SAIGON ? The United States
Embassy today denied that the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency is involved
in demonstrations against South
Vietnam's President Nguyen Van
Thieu and accused North Vietnam
of a "crudely obvious attempt to ex-
ploit the dissent"
The U.S. Embassy statement was
issued after anti-Thieu demonstra-
.tors in Saigon yesterday burned a
police jeep and stoned the National
Assembly building. Quieter anti-
government rallies were held in
Hue, Can Tho and other towns.
THE EMBASSY cited Viet Cong
statements in the past two weeks
.charging that the CIA is giving sup-
port to dissident political groups in
South Vietnam.
"The United States does not en-
courage, nor does? it support in any
way, any political faction in Viet-
nam," the American statements
said. "These accusations are utter-
ly groundless and totally false."
' The statement also said that by
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
destruction of roeds, bridges and
other important installations in
military attacks, Hanoi is "seeking
to increase the economic suffering
of the South Vietnamese people in
the hope that it can exploit po itical-
ly the resulting misery."
, THE WET CONG claimed Oct. 12
that the United States was trying to
infiltrate agents into the dissident
South Vietnamese political groups'
to "manipulate and turn" the dis-
sent to its own benefit.
The Communists charge that the
United States is conducting a
"double-faced" policy: Pushing
Thieu to make reforms to strength-
en his position and the same time
trying to develop a position of influ-
ence with the opposition in case
Thieu is overthrown.
officials contend that the
Viet Cong is conducting the
"double-faced" policy: Assailing
the United States for its support ol
Thieu and at the same time accus-
? ing the United States of preparing a
fallback position should he be oust-
ed.
SOME ANALYSTS say they be-
lieve the Viet Cong is laying the
groundwork, should Thieu be forced
out, to refuse to cooperate with his
successor by claiining that the
United States was behind . the
change. So far, however, there is no
suggestion that the anti-Thieu
BALTIMORE SUN
22 October 1974
Unrest in South Vietn.am
movement is strong enough to top-?
? ple him.
The demonstration in Saigon yes-
terday began with a march by about
100 politicians, Buddhist monks and
nuns and Roman Catholic priests
? through downtown Saigon.
They were joined by several
hundres students and children who
broke away from the older people;
burned a police jeep smashed the
ornate glass doors and porcelain
flower pots at the National Assem-
bly building, and burned portraits
of Thieu.
At least two of the demonstrators
were injured, and a govertunent
spokesman claimed 36 policeman
were hurt.
In Inchon, South Korea, mean-
while, an American bishop, the Reg.
William McNaughton of Boston, ledi
SOO Roman Catholic priests, nuns
and laymen yesterday in a demon-
stration that police tried to break
up withitear gas.
The marchers shouted "Dictatori-
al regime go away" in the second
antigovernment protest since Au-
gust, when President Chung Hee
Park lifted two goventunent decrees
banning political dissent.
'South Vietnam seems to be heading into another of
its convoluted political crises. As the war rumbles
on and economic hardships increase, opponents of
the Thieu regime are showing a surprising capacity
to stage im i
two months ago, President Nguyen Van Thieu
seemed still at the height of his police-state powers.
The legislature was utterly under his thumb and
political foes either were in jail, in hiding or
ostentatiously inactive. While his regime was as
unpopular as ever, no real protest wds in evidence.
Why the change? Why the spectacle of crowds
marching on the National Assembly building in
Saigon with many a Thieu poster cross-hitched by .a
large black X? One reason is that Thieu has been
duly warned by the American Embassy that any
display. of harsh strongarm methods would so
outrage the U.S. Congress that economic and
military aid would be slashed even more deeply.
Another reason?a more pervasive one?is the
? growing intolerance of the Vietnamese people for
the corruption that riddles their government from
cop to general. When American money and arms
were giving the Vietnamese economy a phony flush
of prosperity, graft was tolerable to the masses?to
those who were doing better than ever provided they
were not being killed or maimed or uprooted. But
now that inflation and joblessness are rampant in
the wake of the U.S. troop withdrawals, the average
citizen can ill-afford to feel the extra squeeze of the
petty shakedown.
pr ess ve pretest demonstrations. Only
Perhaps the most striking thing about the current
wave of protests is the part being played by con-
servative Catholic anti-corruption groups. As
stanchly anti-Communist as ever, these Catholic
dissidents feel Hanoi and the Viet Cong can b
overcome only if the South Vietnamese population
more content with its government. The emergenc
of the Catholic opposition to Thieu has been a
companied by more resistance on the part of Bu
dhists who reflect the terrible war-weariness of th
country and seek a vaguely defined "nation
reconciliation."
The real potency of current protests- I
questionable because no creditable civilian alter
ative to Thieu's military regime has emerged. Th
Catholics and the Buddhists are by no mean
mlfied, among themselves or with each other, an
he oldline political figures are keeping their head
o low as to remain invisible. If Thieu should b
verthrown, the current betting is that the coup
ould be engineered by another military clique
hen the old game of Saigon musical chairs could
egin again.
As unrest crescendoes in South Vietnam, the
nited States as usual is lacking any definable,
ngrange policy. We are still playing it by ear, still
egretting our involvement; still uncertain how best
withdraw. Once again, the folly of our en-
nglement in a conflict wehave never understood is
oming home to plague us?and the people we
ought we were helping.
Jo
to
ta
th
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Approved
WASHINGTON POST
13 October 1974
For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340004-6
THE TIMES (LONDON)
12 Oct 1974
Bugged pen set
By Philip A. McCombs
Wa,hi lig ton Post Foreign Service
SAIGON, Oct. 12?Low
army morale is threatening
President Thieu's traditional
military power base at a
time when . he is under
mounting political pressure
to enact democratic reforms,
make peace, and end cOrrup,
tion.
Desertions duriqg a re-
cent period reached the
staggering rate of between
4,000 and 5,000 a week, ac-
cording to reliable Sources.
At that rate, more than 20
per cent of the 1.1 million.
man armed forces would de-
sert during the year, al-
though many of these might
be repeaters. The rate is in-
creasing.
Also, government soldiers
are dying at a rate of 300
per week this year, a 50 per
cent increase over last year.
Army pay continues to be
low, and field commanders
are reporting that lack of
rice for soldiers and their
families is becoming- an
even bigger morale problem
than the aggressiveness of
the Communist forces.
The Communists are tak-
ing advantage of Saigon's in-
creasing morale problems
by massing overwhelming
forces to' score dramatic psy-
chological victories against
small isolated outposts; iso-
lated towns and even battal-
ion-sized government units.
Government soldiers are
still firing five times as
many shells as the Commu-
nists, hut this is less than
half the firepower that was
available to the government
a year ago before severe
congressional military aid
cuts began.
The army is riddled with
corruption, and reports from
the field indicate that: the
common soldiers are in-
creasingly unhappy with
this as reports of anticorrup-
tion rallies in major cities
spread thrbugh the ranks.
"There's no talk of a mili-
tary, coup right now, but
there's more direct criticism
of Thieu in the army than
there ever has been below."
said a well-placed Western
observer.
A military librarian at the
armed forees headquarters
made the front pages here
the other clay in a public
protest when he declared,
"high-level army corruption
has eroded the eonfidence
and fighting spirit of the
soldiers."
The soldier, Sgt. Dao Vu
Dat, cited widespread
-stealing of food, uniforms,
ow
Army
erile
orale
in Canberra
was 'a disaster '-
and military equipment in-
tended for the Lighting
men." He said there is wide-
spread embezzlement of
pension funds intended for
the', fatuities. of. dead sol-
diers,
President Thieu promised
in his Oct. 1 speech to the
nation to try to eliminate
corruption in the armed
forces by the. end of the
month, and as commander-
in-chief he has issued orders
- to accomplish that.
But Thieu's problem, ac-
cording to, observers here, is
that he cannot get rid of the
numerous high-ranking eor--
rupt generals under -his
command without destroy-
ing his power base and thus,
bringing about his own dem-
ise.
Thieu has retired or fired
more than a dozen generals
since the beginning of the
/year, but the changes were
of little significance since
many of the generals had
long before already been
placed in insignificant jobs
because of old age, physical
disabilities or alleged cor-
ruption.
Western diplomats and
other sources picture Thieu
as enmeshed in an intricate
web of corruption and favor-
itism with many of his top
commanders that makes it
Impossible for him to fire
them.
His positicin is - becoming
increasingly delicate as the
result of Mounting pressure .
from his political opponents
that he clean house.
Thieu, a lieutenant gen-
eral at the time of his elec-
tion in 1967 and a partici-
pant in the 1963 coup that
overthrew President Ngo
Dinh Diem, has skillfully
played off the loyalties, aspi-
rations and greed of his gen-
erals to keep himself firmly
entrenched and immune"
from coup attempts.
Most of the generals who
are considered non-corrupt
and apolitical are serving ?
far from Saigon in the
northern part of South Viet-
nam where there is no possi-
bility of their suddenly mov-
ing against Thieu in a coup.
These include the com-
mander of the first military
Region (the Hue-Danang
area), Lt. Gen, Ngo Quang
vTruong; 1st Division corn.:
mander Brig. Gen. Nguyen
Van Diem; '3rd Division
commander Brig. Gen,
Nguyen Duy Ilinh; Maj.
Gen. Le Quang Luong, com-
mander of the Airborne Di-
vision, and Brig. Gen. -Bui
The Lan, commander of the
Marine Division. _
Gen. Cao Van Vien, com-
mander of the joint general
staff, is considered an apoli-
tical general, but Thieu'
makes all the important mil-
itary decisions himself .and
uses Vien only to implement
them.
In the important southern
-areas of the country around
Saigon, Thiel.' has installed
mostly corrupt, politically
loyal commanders, sources.
say.
? Lt. Gen. Pham Quoc
Thuan, commander of the.
Third Military Region
,around Saigon, has lost
large numbers of soldiers in
the crucial fighting in the
Iron Triangle 20 miles north
of Saigon. "
He has failed to retake
key positions lost to the
Communists, and has gained
a reputation among most
Western observers here, in-
cluding the U.S. Embassy, as
a corrupt general 'com-
pletely beholden to Thieu.
The commander of the
Mekong Delta south of Sai-
gon, Gen. Nguyen Vinh
Nghi, has developed a simi-
lar reputation, as have the
commanders of the several
divisions stationed near Sai-
gon. All of these men have
come under attack by the
growing Catholic anticor-
ruption movement.
r..t. Gen. Dang Van Ouang,.
Thieu's right-hand military
assistant in the presidential
palace and an old colleague,
is considered by many
sources to be one of the
worst examples of a corrupt
officer in the country.
-"Suffice it to say that he
is a very nasty piece of
work," summed up one ob-
server.
Observers here think that
if a military coup is to be
prepared, it must originate
among the regimental com-
manders?Colonels and lieu-
tenant colonels?who have
been profesisonal soldiers for
a decade or more, and who
are in close touch with their
men and concerned with
their welfare. So far there is
no sign that this is happen-
ing.
Saigon Veterans Aid
Anti-Thien Forces
From Nev.'s Dispatches
SAIGON, Oct. 12 ? The
leader of 200,000 South Viet-
namese war veterans today
threw his support behind
growing anticorruption pro-
tests aimed at President
Nguyen Van Thiett's govern.
From Our Correspondent
Melbourne,?Oct.13 ?
Mr. Anthony Eggleston the,
former press secretary and
confidant of Sir Robert Men-
2ies, Mr Harold Holt and Mr
John Gorton when* they were
Prime Minister, said today that
he was reSponsible for putting
a " hugging " device in the
Prime Minister's office in Par-
liament House in Canberra.
He said : "I suggested a
tape be installed to record
peess conferences and Harold
liolt agreed. The commercial
firm we called in .during the
middle.icii 1966 suggested the
buggink device so that Harold
would not have his desk clut-
tered up with a microphone.
The device installed was a pen
set with a " bug " inside it and
two tape recorders on a 'shelf
in the private secretary's office
next door,
"But the bug proved a.
disaster. Harold never could
get used to it. It was so realis-
tic he kept ripping it out of its
socket thinking it was a real
pen. it was so much trouble
having it fixed up all the time
that eventually we had a plug-
in microphone installed in its
place."
Mr Eggleston had never
been in-.0Ived in using the
device for anything but provid-
ing a transcript ? of press con....
ferences. As far as he was con-
cerned no one had been taped
? unless he was aware of it. Mr
Eggleston is now a senior
adviser to Mr Snedden, the
Liberal Party :coder.
Mr William McMahon
today confirmed the existence
of the bugging device but said
that it had never been used
while he was Prime Minister.
-ment. ? '
The chairman of the
staunchly anti-Communist
War Veterans' Association,
Nguyen Dinh, told reporters
President Thieu had failed
to give direct answers to
corruption charges,
"The government has to
review its leadership before
it is too late," he said.
In Phnom Penh, military
sources said today that Com-
munist rebel gunners shot
_down a Cambodian air force
cargo plane near the provin-
cial capital of Svay Rieng,
killing two of 18 persons
aboard.
The Pathet Lao today re-
leased its third batch of
prisoners to the Vientiane
government in Laris. In the
ceremony, 24 Laotian sol-
diers were handed over un-
der the supervision of the
International Control Com-
misSion. The government
side has already released all
its Pathet -Lao prisoners.
In Saigon, a Communist
spokesman said the Viet-
cong will refuse to negotiate
on peace or. missing .?meri-
cans until South Vietnamese
President Thieu is over-
thrown.
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NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1974
Americans. -
Feel Ill Will
In Laos City ?i
By DAVID K. SHIPLER
svet:ai to Tbe kew Yoric T1mot.
LUANG PRABANG, Laos
Oct_ 29?In this tiny royal
capital, where the Commu-
nist-led Pathet Lao has made
its most pronounced impact
since the coalition Govern-
ment was formed last April,
!there is a slight air of ,anti-
Americanism.
The Pathet Lao members
who have entered into Luang
Prahang's life more confi-
dently and more fully than
that in Vientiane, the admin-
istrative capital?have re- 1
cently been showing propa-
ganda films of the intensive !
American bombing that was
directed against their terri-
tory during the Indochina
war. The ,films were shown
first to schoolchildren, later
to the general public.
Some of the few Americans
who live here are not con-
vinced that the Pathet Lao is?
trying deliberately to gener-
ate anti-American feeling, but
that seems to -be the effect.
"Kids make funny eoises at
you when you walk by," one
long-time American resident
complained. "That never used
to happen." Another, who
speaks Laotian, says that
children on the street now
chant, "Foreigner! Foreigner!"
when he passes.
Suspicion of C.I.A. Links
One civilian, not employed
by the Government, is con-
tinually accused of being in
the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy. 'Maybe they had these
feelings all along and now
just feel free to express
them," He speculated. "Or
? maybe I'm just paranoid."
? Associating with Ameri-
cans seems to carry a cer-
tain stigma for Laotians in
!Luang Prabang A Laotian
who drives a big American
car for the United States aid
mission here has asked for a
more proletarian vehicle, one
official reports.
"Friends hesitate to come
to our house," another Amer-
! lean said. "One came one
night by making a feint to-
ward Souphanouvong's
!house." He was referring to
;Prince Souphanouvong, who
is the titualr head of the
.Pathet Lao.
? He said that another old
friend, a rightist Government
?official, "hardly talks to us
!anymore."
1, The American went on to
tdescribe several instances in
!which Laotian acquaintances
ihad deinurced from keeping
company with him in public.
iIn one wase, he recalled, when
the suggested having a drink
:in a crowded hotel bar, his Different Mood in Vientiane Pathet Lao has not yet de-
'Laotian guest nervously The atmosphere is coni- cided what to do about Kilo-
;chose a remote ? and vir- pletely different in ,
itually deserted ? placeApprovedfattlRelea Vientiane
se 21104/04/08 :IletKADP77-00432R000100340004-0
?
NEW YORK TIMES
22 October 1974
Japanese Leftists Attack Ford's Visit
By RICHARD HALLORAN !years. Leftist organizations,
!during the Vietnam war, desig-
nated Oct. 21 an annual "inter-
national antiwar day" for
protest meetings and demon-
strations.
The new issue is reports of
the presence of American nu-
clear weapons here. -
The conservatives, who have
ruled Japan steadily for a quar-
ter century, have followed a
policy of not making and not
acquiring nuclear weapons and
pee.a t The NesYork Times
TOKYO, Oct. 21?Japanese
leftists began a drive to stop
President Ford's scheduled visit
here next month with huge ral-
lies all over Japan today.
The organizers, led by the
Communist party, the Socialist
party and the major labor
unions, said that 2.2 million
people had taken part in 456
demonstrations, including one
that drew an estimated 70,000 not. allowing such weapons to
flag-carrying and banner-way- come into this country.
ing people here in Tokyo. But recent testimony in
Kakuo Honjo, chairman of the Washington before ?a Congres-
rally held in Meiji Park in cen_ sional committee by a retired
tral Tokyo tonight, said in e ,United States Rear- ADmiral,
brief interview that "we're try. Gene R. LaRocque, has made it
appear that the Japanese
Government has misled its
people. Admiral LaRocque tes-
tified that American warships
regularly called at Japanese
ing to create an atmosphere or
mood among the Japanese
people to stop Mr. Ford from
coming here." He said he did
not think there would be physi-
cal violence if the President' Ports with nuclear weapons
came but that the leftist groups aboard.
were trying to generate so Premier Kakuei Tanaka's
much vocal opposition that Mr.
Ford would cancel the trip,
Government has vigorously
denied that nuclear weapons,
himself. . if they were brought in, were
The critical question is whe. allowed in the Japanese per-
ther the leftists can build up a mission. There is evidence,
sustained outflow of anti-Amer- however, of the existence of
ican sentiment strong enough
to prevent the President's four-
day visit, scheduled to begin
Nov. 18. With the rather light-
hearted, carnival atmosphere
that prevailed tonight, it
seemed doubtful that they had
made much headway toward
their obIective.
The liftists, however, have
the first real issue they have
had since the end of the Viet-
nam war, which undoubtedly
accounted for the largest turn-
out they have had at this an-
nual "antiwar day" rite in
a secret "transit agreement"
that permits the United States
to bring nuclear weapons into
Japan temporarily.
The Government's denial
seems not to have been very
effective. Yomiuri Shimbun,
Japan's second largest cir-
culating newspaper, said in an
editorial: "Many people now
believe that nuclear weapons
are being secretly brought
into Japan despite the three
nonnuclear principles and that
the Government has always
been aware of this."
;the bank of the Mekong"
f River,
' One of the clearest indices
of the state of Laotian-Amer-
'jean amity is the Laotian-
American Association, an or-
ganization funded by the
United States Information
Service and devoted to joint
cultural and linguistic en-
deavors.
Attendance Delining
Peter Coombs the director
of the organization's Luang
Prabang branch, says that
since the Pathet Lao moved
into town, the number of Lao-
tians attending association
functions had dropped.
The enrollment in English
language courses, for exam-
ple, has fallen to 300 from
400. And although Mr.
Coombs recalls having been
able to invite about 20 Lao-
tion friends to his house for
movies at an earlier time,
"I'm lucky now if four show
"People keep asking when
the L.A.A. is going to close,"
he said.
At the rally here tonight,
peaker after speaker rose to
denounce the United States
and the Tanaka Government,
then to demand the abrogation
of Japan's security treaty with
the United States and the
closing fof American military
bases here. The nuclear issue
was also stressed.
Moreover, the leftists point-
edly. recalled events in 1960,
when swirling riots in the
streets forced the Japanese
Government to cancel Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower's
scheduled visit at the last mo-
ment because the Government
could not guarantee his
safety.
Tonight, a Communist speak-
er said: "We must read this
historical lesson and resort to
a new action to stop Ford's
visit. Let us have an even
larger-scale movement to stop
ford." The response from the
audience, munching on hot
dogs, noodles and rice lunches
and drinking Pepsi-Cola bought
from portable stands that
ringed the rally, was tepid.
After the rally, the leftists
streamed out of the park for
demonstrations through the
city. One procession wound
past the Parliament building
and near the American Embas-
sy. It was boisterous ? but
peaceful, more full of sound
than of fury: ,
Ultraleftist radical factions
demonstrated in other parts of
the capital but they seemed far
more concerned about their
rivalries with one another than
with the nuclear issue or Mr.
Ford's visit. In any case they
were controlled by special riot
policemen, who made 11 ar-
rests.
whose population is generally
regarded as less enthusiastic
about the Pathet Lao. There
the Pathet Lao contingent has
not made its presence felt so
acutely as in Luang Prabang.
There have been some de-
mands from workers for the -
expulsion of foreigners from
_certain skilled jobs in Vienti-
ane, but on balance Ameri-
can affluence and exclusivity
are tolerated there.
American officials who have
water tanks by their spacious
houses in Vientiane get water
delivered by United States
Embassy trucks when city
water pressure is low. When
an American official moves
into a house, the residence is
wired to an embassy genera-
tor so he will not have to de-
pend on the erratic Vientiane
power system.
Even the ultimate in Amer-
icana still exists?Kilometer
6, an American-style suburb
at the edge of Vientiane, com-
plete with huge American
automobiles in the driveways
of ranch-type houses. Accord-
ing to intelligence reports the
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BALTIMORE SUN
31 October 1974
Forced isolation takes toll on
By MATTHEW J. SEMEN
Suu Staff Correspondent
Seoul?A year and? three
months of forced _seclusion has
begun to take its physical and
emotional toll on Kim Dae
;Jung, the once-controversial
South --Korean opposition
leader.
The former presidential can-
didate has been denied permis-
sion to leave Korea and kept
under constant surveillance
since his abduction from a
Tokyo hotel room in August,
.1973.
Harassed by threatening
phone calls, disturbed by mys-
terious gunshots at night; con-
stantly trailed, bugged and
phone-tapped, the 49-year-old
f6rmer politician is a virtual
prisoner in his own house.
' "With so many, many things
to make me nervous, the most
NEW YORK TIMES
19 October 1974
difficult thing has been to con-
trol myself," Mr. Kim said. "I
can well understand how politi-
cal prisoners in Russia end up
suffering from mental prob-
lems."
Mr. Kim is suffering from
sciatica, and said his condition
has deteriorated considerably
during his confinement, with
particularly strong pain in his
legs. He walks stiffly, has trou-
ble bending over, and said he
cannot sleep well at night.
He said he frequently. takes
sleeping pills and sleeps during
the day instead of at night. His
face appears puffy and aged,
and his mind wanders occa-
sionally during a conversation,.
While he was still anxious to
talk about politics last spring,
in a recent interview Mr. Kim
appeared preoccupied with his
own problems.
My house is surrounded.
They have surveillance sta-
tions in buildings on three
sides of me. Wherever I go,
two cars follow me. If I see
friends, they are taken in for
interrogation," he said. ,
"Basically, I am a politician.
I know my people are out
there, and still remember me,
and support me," he said.
"But I am completely cut off.
My name can't be mentioned
in the news media, and I
go anywhere or see anyone,
except foreign visito"s."
Mr. Kim, who won 46 per
cent of the vote in the nation's
last free presidential election
three 'yearsago, now is also in
the midst of an extended legal
case bared on. alleged cam-
paign-law violations stemming
from that election.
Although the South Korean
Anti-Red Priest Leads Foes of 'Thieu
By JAMES M. MARKHAM
Spedat to The New York Times
SAIGON, South Vietnam,
Oct. 18?The Roman Catholic
priest at the of the thinly dis-
guised movement to oust Pres-
ident Nguyen van Thieu reck-
ons that 3,000 South Vietna-
mese colonels and lieutenant
colonels passed through his
courses on anti-Communist
Psychological warfare.
"Among my students, I can
count six generals," said the
Rev. Tran Huu Thanh, chuckl-
ing. "It is because of this that
'Thieu is afraid of me."
Father Thanh no longer gives
those courses, because he is
busy trying to get President
Thieu to resign. He sees no con-
tradiction between the lifetime
he has spent combating Vietna-
mese Communists and his cur-
rent efforts to overturn their
No. I enemy. ?
"It is a labor that I have pre-
pared for over the past 30
years," the priest said, speaking
French. Father Thanh, a calm
man on the surface, chain-
smokes even at demonstrations,
flecking ashes over his black
soutane.
About two months ago, the
59-year-old priest, a member of
the Redemptorlst orcer, entered
a tentative opposition scene
that was dominated by over-fa-
miliar names and faces, veter-
ans of unsuccessful causes.
He had begun his pastorate at
Hue at the end of World War
H, training young Catholics to
counter the mounting influence
of the Vietminh. And it was
there that he began his cam-
paign against Mr. Thieu.
In Hue last Sept. 8 Father
Thanh and several thousand de-
monstrators were tear-gassed
by South Vietnamese police-
men. He had launched a de-
Tear-Gassed at Hue i
monstration, ?and his political
career, with an audacious, six-
point accusation that charged
President Thieu and his family
with gross acts of corruption.
Since then "Accusation No.
i
1," as t was called, promising
others to come, has become the
catalyst of a revived opposi-
tion Mr. Thieu has been put on
the defensive, at least for the
moment, and Father Thanh is
the Opposition's hottest politi-
cal property.
'Tacit Approal' of Rome
The priest says that he has
the "tacit approal" of the Vati-
can for his activities. That be-
came apparent on the morning
of Oct. 1, a day when P?res-,
ident Thieu was to go on the airl
to defend himself, and when
the cautious Archbishop of Sai-
gon, the Most Rev. Nguy-
en Van Binh, endorsed the anti-
corruption front.
"We are only demanding, at
first changes in the Govern-
ment, not a change of the
Government," Father Thanh
said, ticking off a familiar list
of generals frequently accused
of corruption. But he said that
he "certainly" hoped that Pres-
ident Thieu would ultimately
resign. "But softly, not by
force," he was quick to add. ,
Mr. Thieu's resignation, he
speculated, could be followed
by elections for a constitutent
assembly in which the commu-
nists would be invited to parti-
cipate "in a political party, like
in France," as he put it "We
accept the Communists in the
bosom of Vietnamese politics,"
he said.
Though he has spent his adult
years trying to undo the politi-
cal handiwork of-the Vietminh
and .the Vietcong, he obviously
retains an admiration for their
skills at indoctrination: "They
use logic," he said.
While he is generally pigeon-
holed as a "rightist Catholic,"
he says he endorses "the' Com-
munists' Promises of social re-
form" while rejecting their au-
thoritarian methods. "That is
why, even todaytoday, my anti-
Communisin is different from
that of this Government," he
said.
The early work in Hue honed
his anti-Communism. ."Of 80
cadres I had, 40 were arrested
and shot by the Vietminh," he
said deferring to workers. In
1954, he was sent by Rome to
northeastern Thailand to work
among pro-Communist Vietna-
mese refugees and afterward to
Hanoi,, where he aided people
seeking to flee the north in the
wake of the Geneva agreements
that created the two Vinams.
"I left Hanoi by the last air-'
plane," he said, and the next
day Ho Chi Minh came into
Hanoi. Father Thanh returned
to Saigon and presented to
them Premier Ngo Dinh Diem a
plan for a network of anti-Com-
munit agents along what was
to become known as the Ho Chi
Minh trail, in Laos and 'Cambo-
dia. The plan was rejected but
Father Thanh was offered the
job of forming Republican
Youth cadres under the direc-
tion of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the Pre-
mier:s brother and the power fi-
gure of the regime.
Subsequently, the young
priest was appointed head of
the School of Personalism and
set about writing textbooks on
the foggy, eclectic doctrine to
which the new government
tried to anchor itself as an in-
tellectual counterweight to
Communism. This was a mix-
ture of the Christian existentia-
lism of Gabriel Marcel, Domini-
can ideas about the distribution
of wealth and Mr. Nhrs -perso-
nal philosophical insights.
ark foe
Supreme Court recently asked
the Appeals Court to review
the Kim case, the favorable
Supreme Court action has
served to further drag out the
already, lengthy, proceedings.
Meanwhile, the government
says Mr! Kim cannot leave the
country as long as the court
case is unresolved.
Mr. Kim said he wants to
accept a teaching position at
Harvard University. In addi-
tion, he said he wants to un-
dergo medical treatment in the
United States.
He said that, although he has
been told he should be hospi-
I talized, he is afraid to enter a
South Korean hospital for fear
of being drugged, poisoned or
killed in the hospital.
Mr. Kim's situation has also
made life difficult for other
members of the Kim family.
His second son, for example.
has been unable to get a job,
and Mr. Kim's wife and chil-
dren must "be very careful"
about whom they see.
Mr. Kim said he would like
to see President Ford when he
visits !.?.re at the end of Nov-
ember. However, he said be
realizes, "it's almost impossi-
ble, for protocol reasons.
"I sincerely hope that Presi-
dent Ford will
And his aides wi
seek to hear more voices than
just the government side
here" Mr. Kim said.
"I hope he will have a
chance to learn of the strong
democratic will of the Korean
people,, and to see that we
can't. have security and stabil-
ity in South Korea until we
;have democracy.
40
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NEW YORK TIMES
24 October 1974
CHILE IS ACCUSED
BY JURISTS GROUP
kternation'al-BodY beClareS
I 'Repression Is Widespread
* and More Systematic
Special to The New York Times
GENEVA, Oct. 23?The Inter-
national Commission of Jurists
charged today that political re-
pression in Chile was now
"more ubiquitous and more
systematic" than at any time
since President Salvadore Al-
lende Gossens was overthrown
by the military 13 months ago.
"For every detainee who has
been released in recnt months
at last two new arrests have
been made," the commission
said.
The 40-member commission
Is a private organiziion based
in Geneva that draws support
from lawyers groups in na-
tional chapters in 50 countries.
It describes itself as "strictly
nonpolitical" and is recog-
nized by the United Nations.
The commission gathers in-
formation for its reports from
lawyers on the spot, observers
sent to follow trials and spe-
cial teams such as the three-
man group that went to Chile
last May to study the situation
there.
Lawyers Supplied Data
Most of the information'in
today's report was obtained
from Chilean defense lawyers,
the commission' secretary gen-
eral, Niall MacDermott, a Brit-
ish lawyer, said. "I cannot be
more precise than that," he
declared.
? The commission said that
from May to August there were
700 known arrests of political
suspects in Chile. Most of the
? arrests, it said, were carried
out without warrants by un-
identified persons in plain
clothes armed with machine
guns.
Since Miguel Enriquez, lead-
er of the Movement of the Rev-
olutionary Left, was killed on
Oct. 5 in a shotout with secu-
rity forces there have been 600
further arrests, according to
the report.
.The commission said that the
announcement last month by
Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte,
the head of Chile's military jun-
ta, that the "state of war" was
being ended and that all prison-
ers who were prepared to go
abroad would be released was
'designed for external con-
sumption."
The legal system, it declared,
"continues to contravene basic
principles of justice accepted by
civilized nations."
Besides individual arrests,
there are mass arrests in the
shantytowns, with the inten-
tion apparently being to intimi-
date the population, the com-
mission said. Some 10,000 to
15,000 people have been arrest-
ed in this way in recent
months, it reported, with most
being released after seven to 10
days.
The effect of such measures,
including the extension of mili-
tary control over the schools,
has been t "heighten the fear
and tension ainong the working
population," the commission
said.
'The Great Injury'
? Before the military coup
d'etat Chile was a "participa-
tory democracy," the commis-
sion said, in which all sections
of the population through trade
unions, professional associa-
tions and other groups took an
active part in the national life.
"All this has now been sys-
tematically supressed," the
'commission said. "This is per-
haps the greatest injury of all
to have been inflicted on the
people of Chile."
The present members of the
commission include Edgar
:Faure, the former French Pre-
mier; Masatoshi Yokota, the
!former Chief Justice of Japan's
Supreme Court; Sir Adetokunbo
!Ademola, the former Chief Jus-
tice of Nigeria, and Eli Whitney
Debevoise, a New York lawyer,
' who is chairman of the five-
man executive committee.
Another member is Sean
;MacBride, winner of hte Nobel
Peace Prize and former Irish
;Foreign Minister. Mr. MacBride
:served ,for seven years as sec-
retary general of the commis-
sion.
NEW YORK TIMES
31 October 1974
Puerto Rican at U.N. Sees
'Genocide' by Imperialists
. ! By PER KIHSS
'Special to The New York Times
UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Puerto Rico's political develop-
Oct: 30?The United Nations Ments for omitting what he
heard charges today. that, said was abstention by more
"North American imperialists"; than 320,000 voters in the 1952
were embarked on a "plan of constitutional referendum boy-
genocide" in Puerto Rico that cotted by the former Nationa-
has led to sterilization of 200,- list party.
000 women, or 35 per cent of While his own party, which
those of child-bearing age. proclaims Marxism -Leninism,
Juan Mari Bras, Secretary- abstained in the last election in
General of the Puerto Rican So- 1972; Mr. Mari Bres asserted it
cialist party, asserted in the 24- had gathered 72,000 signatures
nation special committee on co;- of former voters to make it eli-
lonialism that the alleged plan gible for inscription in the 1976
also involved migration of one ballot. He said Senator Berrios'
million more Puerto. Ricans to own election by 94,570 votes in
:the mainland in 10 years. He 1972 represented almost 10 per
said. two million had already cent of that year's vote.
come north "expelled from the _On what by coincidence was
territory by deplorable condi- the 24th -anniversary of the
tions of the colonial system." bloody 1950 Nationalist revolt,
Mr. Mari bras called on the Mr, Mari Bras contended Puerto
committee in a fortheeming Rico ix./as subjected to United!
1975 session to condemn the al-
leged plans and "replacement
of our country by foreigners."
Another pro-indenpendence ad-
vocate, Senator Ruben Berrios,
president of the Puerto Rican
Independence party, ' whose
hearing was put over until Fri-
day, endorsed this and other re-
commendations as jointly deve-
loped.
Both island leaders said the
sterilization figures had come
from the Commonwealth's fa-
mily planning department. Last
month, the Office of Puerto
Rico in Washington estimated
the island's population had in-
creased 223,000 in three years,
to 2,912,000 in mid-1973.
The 24- nation committee,
headed by Ambassador Salim
Ahmed Salim of Tanzania, vot-
ed with General Assemblyy ap-
proval last year to collect poli-
tical; economic, social and oth-
er data on Puerto Ricans' rights
and "to keep the question un-
der continuous review."
. Right to Self-Determination
The United States contends
the committee lacks compe-
tence to consider Puerto Rico
on the ground that the General
Assembly in 1953 voted that
Puerto Ricans had exercised
their right *to self-determination
in setting up the common-
wealth status and should no
longer be listed as non-self-
governing.
Mr. Mari Bras had also been
heard by the special committee
with Senator Berrios last Au-
gust. Today he criticized a com-
mittee reapporteur's report on
States control of trade, compul-
sory military service, superior.
Congressional Federal judicial -
power. -
He declared the Common-
wealth Government .'without I
shame" advertised that such in-
dustries as t extiles achieved 6 !
per cent profits on the island !
compared with 2.5 per xcent on
the mainland; metals, 18.9 per-
cent as against 3.9; electrical
machinery, 31.6 per cent as
against 3.9?much of which he
attributed to low wages.
The Socialist party- leader
urged the committee at a 1975
session to call upon the United
States for transfer of power to
Puerto Rico without conditions
and to send a visiting mission
to the island to "sound out the
people."
Senator Berrios had planned
to describe worsening economic
conditions in which he said
Puerto Rico had a "negative
growth" of 2 pr cent in its eco-
nomy last year for the first
tim in 20 years.
Consumer prices, he said,
soared 23.7 per cent in the year
nded last June, compared with
53 per cnt the year before.
Public debt, he went on, has ri-
sen to 83.9-billion, an total
bt, including private, to
12.6-billion?which he reck-
oned at $4,345 per capita.
In the year ended June 30, he
asserted United States interests
had taken $895-million in direct
earnings and interestf from
Puerto Rico, up from $762-mil-
lion, the year before.
1 -
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NEW YORK TIMES
22 October 1974
U. S. Policy and Soviet Subs
By Barry M. Blechman and
Stephanie E. Levinson.
WASHINGTON ? Today marks the
twelfth anniversary of the Cuban mis-
sile crisis. At its conclusion, in 1962,
the Soviet Union conceded that it
would no longer deploy strategic of-
fensive weapons in Cuba.
Eight years later, in September,
1970, after renewed tensions, this
commitment was broadened to disal-
low the servicing of submarines from
Cuban ports.
Let, last April, a Soviet Golf-class
?this is an Atlantic alliance designa-
tion?diesel-powered strategic missile
submarine visited Havana. No confron-
tation ensued this time. What hap-
pened to bring about this change? And
what implications can be drawn from
this incident for United States policy?
There is no question that in 1970
the Soviet Union built a facility for
servicing submarines at the Cuban
'port of Cienfuegos. The construction
work included barracks, recreational
facilities, a water tower, rehabilitation
.of an existing pier, and the sinking of
moorings for visiting submarines.
Also, two barges, associated exclu-
sively with the disposal of effluents
from nuclear-power plants, were
brought to the port. All these facilities
Still remain. All that is necessary to
make use of the base is the arrival of
a' submarineand a tender. .
As a result of United States pro- i
tests, Soviet plans to operate from the
port were shelved, at least temporari-
ly. An understanding was reached in
1970 defining what the Soviet Union s
would and would not do with respect
to the basing of naval vessels in Cuba.
But this agreement remains secret to s
all but a handful of officials. Further- e
more, the official United States inter-
pretation of the agreement seems to
have narrowed.
Initially, United States concern over a
the Cienfuegos facilities was directed
at preventing the Soviet Union from N
basing strategic missile submarines in a
the Western Hemisphere. In this sense, c
the understanding was viewed as
an extension of the 1962 Kennedy-
Khruslichev agreement on nondeploy-
ment of strategic weapons in Cuba.
In the face of recent visits by the
Golf-class submarine, the understand-
ing is now interpreted to apply only
to nuclear-powered vessels.
The Defense Department's current
position is summarized in a statement
by former President Nixon in January,
1971, that "in the event that nuclear
subs were serviced in Cuba, or from
Cuba, that would be a violation of the
understanding."
If, in fact, this, was an accurate de-
scription of the agreement, it was vio-
lated in February, 1971. That month,
a nuclear-powered November-class
submarine with a tender visited Cien-
fuegos. Whether the submarine actu-
ally was serviced in the port remains
a moot point, but there were no Unit-
ed States protests. Nor did the United
States protest subsequent visits by-
Echo-class submarines ?nuclear-pow-
ered vessels carrying tactical missiles.
It seems evident that the So-
viet Union has been probing the
margins of the 1970 understanding. It
has done the following, in this order:
put a nuclear-powered attack subma-
rine into Cienfuegos with a tender,
put a nuclear-powered tactical missile
submarine into Cienfuegos with a
tender, diesel-poweredstrategic
missile submarine into a different Cu-
ban port quietly, and put a diesel-
powered strategic missile submarine
nto a different Cuban port publicly.
This is just what may be learned from
the public record.
The ramifications of this activity
hould not be overstated. The Soviet
Union has not, as yet, challenged the
understanding directly, by for example
ending a Yankee-class nuclear-pow-
red strategiv submarine into Cien-
uegos.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the
oviet Union is gradually but deliber-
tely encroaching upon the agreement.
? Since the military advantages that
vould result from the establishment of
submarine base in Cuba are not
ommensurate with the risk of pro..
NEW YORK TIMES
15 October 1974
A TIMES REPORTER
IS BARRED BY CHILE
SANTIAGO, Chile, Oct. l4
(UPI) ? The military Govern-
ment annOunced today that a
New York Times correspondent,
Jonathan Kandell, had been
permanently banned from the
country. Mr. Kandell was
turned back when he arrived at
the airport.
Comdr. Enrique Montero, Un-
der Secretary of the Interior,
yoking a strong political response by
the United States, Soviet motives must
be more complex.
? In effect, the submarine visits pro-
vide a test of United States willing-
? ness to take risks in its broad relations
with the Soviet Union in order to
prevent a shift in the two sides' rela-
tive military capabilitie
- If this indeed is the Russians' pur-
pose, then the United States response
to the visits?essentially an endorse-
ment of the Russions' conduct?can
only encourare similar future actions.
Thus, thij series of submarine visits
to Cuba poses a political challenge for-
United States foreign policy.
More important, if this Soviet tactic
is successful over the long-term United
States reluctance to insist on compli-
ance with the accord could help bring
into question its credibility in world ?
affairs. Ahe implication of this assess-
ment is that the United States should
adopt a firm attitude toward Soviet
submarine activity in the Caribbean.
This does not mean that all opera-
tions should become a cause celebre.
It would be difficult to balk at those
types of visits for which the Soviet
Union has established precedents.
New ?steps, however, such as the
servicing of a Golf-class sub in Cien-
fuegos, should stir a strong reaction.
Only by demonstrating a willingness
to make issues of single events that
in isolation appear relatively insig-
nificant can the United States cause
the Soviet Union to understand that
normalizing our relations requires
mutual concessions.
Barry M. Blechman and Stephanie E.
Levinson are staff members of the
foreign policy studies program at the
Brookings Institution.
said that Mr. Kandell, normally
based in Buenos Aires, "would
never be permitted to return"
to Chile.
Although he gave no details
on the ban. Governn-rent sources
said it was because of ob.i.ieCr
tions to articles by Mr. Kandell.
Friends of the correspondent.
said that Mr. Kandell
barred from entering the coun-
try after he arrived at Padahueli
International Airport outside!
Colum-
bian airliner.
Santiago on an Aviaries Colum-I
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