JURY HEARS TAPE OF NIXON ORDERING LIMIT ON INQUIRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100340003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 12, 1974
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 18 18 November 1974
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
1
GENERAL
23
EASTERN EUROPE
25
WESTERN EUROPE
26
NEAR EAST
28
FAR EAST
32
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
39
Destroy after backgrounder
has served its purpose or
within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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NEW YORK TIMES
12 November 1974
Jury Hears Tape of Nixon
Ordering Limit on Inquiry
? By LESLEY OELSNER
_ Special to The New York Times
: WASHINGTON, Nov. 11?Parts of the three White
House tape recordings that led to Richard M. Nixon's resig-
nation from the Presidency were played today to the jury
in the Watergate cover-up' ? ,
. spira..or in the case-last March,:
was pardoned by ?residentl
Ford on Sept. 8 for any Federal
crimes he may have committed
while in office. The former
President has been subpoenaed
,by the prosecution and defense
but whether he testifies de-
pends on his health.
The other defendants in the
case are John N. Mitchell, the
former Attorney General and
director of the Nixon re-elec-
tion campaign; Robert C. Mar-
dian, a former Assistant Attor-
ney General and political coor-
dinator for the re-election com-
mittee, and Kenneth Wells
Parkinson, an attorney hired by
the committee- after the break-
in.
Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehr-
lichman have made clear that
they will attempt to shift the
blame for Watergate' to Mr.
Nixon. Mr. Ehrlichman's chief
lawyer, Williarn S. Ernes, told
the jury in his opening state-
ment that Mr. Nixon "deceived"
and "misled" Mr. Ehrlichmari.
_The testimony by General.
Walters and Mr. Gray, like the
tapes, was laregly a repetition'
of what came out in the Senate
Watergate hearings and the im-
.
peachment proceedings.
The story, as presented to-
day, began at 9:30 A.M. ? on,
June 21, 1972, when Mr. Ehr-
lichman spoke to Mr. Gray on
the telephone.
Mr. Ehrlichman, according to
Mr. Gray, said that John W.
Dean 3d, then a White House
counsel who is now in a Fed-
eral prison, was going to con-
duct a Watergate inquiry for
the White House. Mr. Gray, ac-
cording to the testimony, was
to deal directly with Mr. Dean,
who was expecting a call from
him.
Mr. Gray told the jury that
he called Mr. Dean, who re-
quested a meting, held at 11:30
When a defense lawyer ob..' that morning. Mr. Dean, accord-
jected to the prosecution's line ing to Mr. Gray, said that the
of questioning, Mr. Neal replied: Watergate affair was "extreme-
"There's no other 'way you ly sensitive" and that he would
can show the agency?from the sit in on F.B.I. interviews with
former President of the United White House staffmen.
,States to Haldeman and Ehr- Mr. Gray said he had told
lichman to Waters to Gray? Mr. Dean at a later meeting of
and that is the obstruction the various "theories" the F.B.I.
[of justicel." was considering, including one
"It's-the act itself," he added. that the C.I.A. might be in-
Mr. Neal then repeated his volved.
point: "We have a direct agen-
cy from the President to Halde-
man to Ehrlichman?to Halde-
man and Ehrlichman?to Wal-
ters to Gray."
1 After a recess, the question-
ing was allowed to proceed the
way Mr. Neal wished.
? Out of te presence of the
jury but in open court, the
chief prosecutor, Jaines F. Neal,
said that the tapes and the
other eVidence today proved
"a direct agency" in which Mr.
Nixon's "agents" obstructed
justice at Mr. Nixon's order.
The tapes, made public last
Aug. 5, contain Mr. ,Nixon's
conversations with H.R.`lialde-
man, then his chief of staff and
now one of the five defendants
in the trial, on June 23, 1972,
six days after the break-in at
Democratic headquarters in the
Watergate complex.
Tapes Often Faint
They show Mr. Nixon telling
Mr. Haldeman to direct officials
the Central Intelligence
:Agency -to tell the head of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation
to Emit its inquiry into the
break-in. They show that Mr.
Nixon wanted the curtailment
for political reasons- rather
than concern over national se
curity.
The tapes, often faint and
sometimes difficult to hear,
were played in conjunction with
testimony by Lieut. Gen. Ver-
non A. Walters, Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence, and
L. Patrick Gray 3d, then acting
head of the F. B. I.
General Walters testified
about getting the directive from
Mr. Haldeman, in the presence
of John D. Ehrlichman, then the
chief White House adviser on
domestic matters and now an-
other of the defendants, and
passing it on to Mr. Gray; Mr.
Gray told of receiving it.
The C.I.A. theory, according
.to Mr. Gray, was considered
because of the C.I.A. involve-
ment of some of the Watergate
burglars and because the C.I.A.
was known to have complex
financial arrangements.
What happened in the next
Mr. Nixon, who was named few days, according to the tes-
an unindicted alleged co-con-, Autiony, was an attempt to keep
Ap_proveo
the authorities'from connectin
the break-in with the Nixon
re-election committee.
On June 23, Mr. Nixern and
Mr. Haldeman met in the Oval
Office. The tape of that meet-
ing, particularly difficult to,
hear, shows Mr. Haldeman'
talking to Mr. Nixon. He says:
? "The way to handle this now
is for us to have Walters tall
Pat Gray and just say, 'slay
the hell out of this. This is, al;
business here we don't want
you to; go any fu'rther on it."
Then came the sequence that
has caused much controversy
at the trial. Mr. Haldeman says
a word that the prosecution
contends is "Gemstone," the
name ?d the illegal intelligence-,
gathering operation that led to
the break-in, and that Mr. Hal-
deman's lawyers contend is
something like "convention" or
"dovestome."
At the Haldeman' lawyers'
behest, the jury was given a
transcript bearing the notation
"unintelligible" instead of
Gemstone. '
The transcript Mr. Nixon re-
leased in August contains
nothing.
The prosecutors then put tin
a second tape of a Haldeman-
Nixon conversation an hour
and a half later.
A Slight Delay
T. ere was a slight delay
when Judge John J. Sirica no-
ticed that one of the jurors,
Mrs. Marjorie Milbourne, did
not have her earphones on.
"You have to listen," he told
her.
She put the earset back on.
In, this conversation, Mr.
Nixon was more specific about
the directive to be given to the
C.I.A. officials.
Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Nixon
said, should tell the C.I.A. offi-
cials "this is all involved in the
Cuban thing, that it's a fiasco,
and it's going to make the
F.B.I. and C.I.A. look bad, and
it's likely to blow the whole,
uh, Bay of Pigs thing which we
think would be very unfortu-
nate for the C.I.A. and for the
country at this time, and for
foreign policy, and he
just better tough it and lay it
on them. Isn't that what you
fl
H. Yeah, that's the basis
we'll do it on and just leave'
it at that.
P. I don't want them to get
any ideas we're doing it -be-
cause our concern is political."
According to the testimony,
the conversation was imme-
diately followed by a meeting
!among Mr. Haldeman, Mr.
1Ehrlichman, Mr. Walters and
!Mr. Helms.
As General Walters told it,
'Mr. Haldeman said "it was the
President's wish" that General
iWaiters inform Mr. Gray that
continued investigation of cam-
paign contribution checks
might lead to C.I.A. assets and
undercover operations in
Mexico.
' Then, as both Mr. Gray and
General Walters testified, the
Deputy Director of the C.I.A.
Went to the acting head of the
F.B.I.
At a' 'meeting between Mr:
Gray and General Walters on
'July 6, according to testimony,
'General Walters, turned over a
i
!written statement saying that
the C.I.A. had no, interest. The
two men, 'apparently -assuming
;that Mr. Nixon was unaware of
the pressure from White Hous0,
;officials, agreed that Mr. Nixed
should be told,' and Mr. Grayl
ordered his inquiry into the
checks to be resumed, accord-
ing to the testimony. ? 1
At the Senate Watergate, -
hearings, Mr. Gray said that he
had warned Mr. Nixon on July
6, "People on your staff are
trying to mortally wound you
by using the C.I.A. and the:
F.B.I." -
mony today. At a bench Con-
ference, Mr. Neal said that he
was about to question Mr. Gray
'about the, statement. Mr. Frates
objected., It was agreed that
the queStion would not 1),'
;asked. ,
I
! On direct examination. unaer,
. questioning by Mr. Neal, Mr.1
;Gray repeated his earlier testi-
mony about destroying docu-',
ments at the behest of Mr..;
Dean and with the apparent ac-
quiesence of Mr. Ehrlichman. '
On cross-examination, Mr.
Frates sought to limit the ef-
fect of that testimony, getting
Mr. Gray to concede that Mr.
Ehrlichman had not been th&
one to tell Mr. Gray to halt the
Watergate investigation.
Mr. Neal on redirect then'
sought to limit the effect of
this concession. .
Who had told Me. 0-ray to,
limit the inquiry? The prose-
lcutor asked. . ? . - .
Mr. Dean, the witness replied:
Who had told him to talk to
Mr. Dean about Watergate?
Mr: Ehrlichman, he replied.
_ Thomas C. Green, William G.
Hundley and Frank Strickler,
all defense counsels, cross-ex-
amined Mr. Gray briefly.
Mr. Green and Mr. Hundley
asked whether Mr. Gray had
ever talked to their clients
about limiting the F.B.I. investi-
gation. Mr. Gray said he. had
pot.
Mr. Strickler elicited a state-
ment from Mr. Gray contradict-
ing General Walters, that Gen-
eral Walters had not told him
on June 23 that he had just
been to the White House.
Subpoena Pending
Mr. Walters was not cross-
examined today because of a
pending subpoena for material
that may be necessary for the
cross-examination.
Mr. Haldeman's attorneys
;disclosed this morning that on
;Friday they subpoenaed Repre-
sentative Lucien N. Nedzi of
'Michigan, chairman of the
House Armed Forces Com-
mittee's Intelligence subcom-
inittee, Calling for transcripts
and other material relating to
testimony and interviews be-
fore the committee by Mr. Wal-
ters, Richard C. Helms, former
Director of Central Intelligence.
and Mr. Gray in the spring of
,.9/1,,r731.. Strickler exlained the.
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Wastingian %plats
'Monday, November 11, 1974
itibpoena in court by citing 'a
committee report that, he said,
indicated "inconsistencies' in
Mr. 'Walters's testimony on
May 16, 1973, and his state-
ments on May 23, 1973, "both
as to omissions and changes in
language."
Judge Sirica said he -would
? give, the prosecution time to
submit a memorandum on the
subject. Then, told that a law-
yer for the House subcommittee
was in court, he asked what the,
? panel's position would be.
The lawyer said that, under
House procedures, it was a
question of what the Speaker's
or the full HOUse's position
would be. He said that a House
rule prohibited a committee's.
production of information sub-
mitted in executive session, and
that when the Congress recon-
venes on Nov. 18, the subpoena
? is to be delivered to the speak-
er.
The matter was left in abey-
ance.
In another development to.
'day, Judge Sirica denied the
mistrial motions filed last week
bY lawyers for Mr. Mitchel and
Mr. Parkinson following the
'Government's ? disclosure that
one of its supposed witnesses,
William O. Rittman, a former
Justice Department official, had
withheld and lied about a cru-
cial memorandum.
The memorandum was pre-,
? pared by E. Howard Hunt Jr.,
one of the seven original
Watergate defendants, arPi de-
scribed the "conimitrnents" - of
'money and Pardons that had al-
legedly been offered to the sev-
en men .in return for their
silence about,Watergate.
Attorneys for Mr. 'Mitchell
and Mr. Parkinson had con-
tended that they had been prej-
udiced by the government's be-
lated disclosure because their
cross-examination of Mr. Hunt
at the trial had been based on
the assumption that Mr. Ritt-
man was a credible witness.
Judge Sirica rejected the de-
fendants' arguments, saying,
"This was no mischievous sur-
prise sprung on one side by the
others"
"The Government promptly
notified the defense of the new
development," he said in a sev-
'en-page ruling, "and all parties
have had time to prepare for
the proffered admission of the
new piece of evidence."
Rulings Postponed
Judge Sirica postponed a rul-
ings on whether Mr. Hunt
would be recalled to the wit-
ness stand and .whether the
memorandum was admissible as?
evidence. The matters had not
been raised in the defendants'
motions, he said, and "there
will be time to consider them
when they do arise."
Joan C. Hall, who was
Charles W. Colson's secretary,
testified that she ? received
telephone calls in August and
October of 1972 from Mr. Hunt
and his wife, Dorothy. The
Hunts, she said, were seeking
Mr. Colson's aid, but Mr.
Colson, then a White House
special counsel, refused to talk
to them.,
Mr. Hunt was indicted in
September, 1972, for having
helped organize the Watergate
alters Recalls
ove to 1 volv
IA in
4
By Barry ICalb"
Star?blews Staff Writer_
Deputy CIA Director Ver-
non A. Walters today testi-
fied that former Nixon
aides H. R. Haldeman and
John D. ? Ehrlichman at-
tempted to involve the CIA
in the FBI's Watergate
investigation six days after'
the Watergate arrests.
Walter's testimony at the
Watergate cover-up trial
was in preparation for the
playing of three 'June 23,
1972 tape recordings of con-
versations between Halde-
man and then-President
Richard M. Nixon -- the
recordings which ,triggered
Nixoh's resignation last Au-,
gusts:
Haldeman 'and. Ehrlich-
mairare two of the five de-
fendants in the trial.
WALTERS. has 'told his,
story before, but not since
the June 23 tapes were
made public.
Walters said he and then-'
director Richard.
Hems were summoned to
..the White House the morn-
ing Of June,23 with Heide.'
malt and Ehrlichman
Ehrtichman's White House
officte. -
?
Walters said Haldeman
began by saying the Water-
gate case was "making a
lot of noise," that Demo-
crats were trying to
"maximize it," and that
"the investigation was lead-
ing to some important peo-
ple and it might get worse."
?
THE TRANSCRIPT of
the first June 23 tape ?
which recorded a conversa-
?
burglary, -and was later con-
victed. He had been hired by
Mr. Colson to work at the
hite House. .
The prosecution had said sev-
eral times last week that today
would be the day when the
June 23 tapes were played, and
that this would be the week
that the prosecution got to the
"important" part of the case.
As a result, the courtroom
and the hallway outside were
liammed, One woman stood in
?line crocheting a baby's jacket
Ifor a church bazaar, a "water-
gate jacket," she said; a 'half-
dozen young men and women
arrived early with sleeping
bags; lawyers queued up for the
attorneys' spectator section.
Johnny Cash, the singer. Who
is a friend of Mr. Neal, the
chief prosecutor, attended the
proceedings. ? 1
tionheld before the meeting
with, Helms and Walters ?
shows Nixon and Haldeman
exptessing concern that the
FBI's investigation of some
Nixon campaign checks
which were routed through -
Mexico ? and of another
check which was not ?
, might lead to the Finance
Committee to Re-elect the
President.
The transcript shows that
Nikon instructed Haldeman
to direct the CIA to ask the
FBI not to pursue the Mexi-
can investigation further.
Walters said that at the
meeting, Haldeman told
him and Helms "It is the
President's wish that Gen.
Walters _go to the acting
director of the FBI and di-
rect him that the pursuit of
the FBI investigation in
Mexico . . . might uncover
some operations of the
- att..;
? HELMS REPLIED that
he had spoken the previous
- day with acting FBI Direc-
tor L. Patrick Gray III
"and had told him(Gray)
that the agency was not in-
? volved (in the Watergate
? bugling)," Walters testi-
fied.
? Walters said, however,
that Haldeman was not
swayed by this remark,
replying, "Nevertheless, it
has been decided that Gen.
Walters will go" to tell
Gray that the FBI's investi-
gation "may uncover some
assets of the CIA."
? Walters said the only part
he could recall Ehrlich-
man's taking in the conver-
sation was to say that Wal-
ters could call Gray from
the White House, if he want-
2
'
i Ehrlichman's- lawyers'
have contended that Ehr-
jichman did not know the-
:true purpose. of the June 23
? meeting, 'and was tricked
the cover-up by Nixon.
,and Haldeman that day. ?
A--4- ? -
',WALTERS also recount-
, ed conversations later that
day :with Gray, and in the:
? following days with then-
White House Counsel John .
,W. Dean III.
Walters said that he met
with Gray the afternoon of
'June 23 and told him that he
? 'had been instructed by the
VIiite House to say that the-
-FBI investigation in Mexico.,
?"could uncover some covert
-CIA assets for activities
? ,there."
He said he told Gray he
1.vas aware that Gray had
'spoken with Helms the.
.previoUs day: However,.
Walters said, in view of his
discussion with the White,
House, he told Gray that
"since the five suspects
have been arrested (at the
.Watergate), it would be bet-:.
? ter if the investigation
tapered off there."
Walters said that after his
with Gray, he and -
Helms called in the CIA
operatives responsible for
*operations. in Mexico, to
'find out if the FBI investi-
gation might jeopardize
- CIA activities there. He-
indicated their answer was
that it would not. ?
IN CONVERSATIONS
?with Dean on June 26, 27
and 28, Walters said, Dean
attempted to have Walters
involve the CIA in the
Watergate operation, even
though Walters told him
there was no such involve-
ment. He said he finally dis-
suaded Dean.
On July 6, he said, he met
with Gray and apparently
in response to a request by
Gray, said he could not
write a letter saying the
FBI investigation was
jeopardizing CIA activities
in Mexico. "and if I was
asked to do so, I would re-
sign."
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Washington Post
7 October 1974
Brazil Papers
Report.CIA Tie
Reuter ?
RIO DE JANEIRO, Oct. 6--
A former American Methodist'
missionary, reported to have
. been tortured by Brazilian se-
curity police, admitted to be-
ing a.1.7.S. Central Intelliganee
Agency ageit. the -jornal' do
Brazil newsPdPer said .here
?
to-
day.-
The newspsaper :said Frede-
rick Morris,40, who works as
a part-time ''?.i.jotirriallst for
. America* diuhlicationS,. made
the ,confession4o;Military se-
curity police who arrested him
in the northeastern city of Re-
'elle Monday.
A U.S: embassy 'spokesman
iin Brasilia said thereport Was
the first he had heard of Mor-
ris' alleged links with the CIA.
Friday the U.S. embassy pro-
tested the reported torture of
!Morris. .
The American consOl in Re-
cife .confirmed. bruise ? and
cortusions on Morris' lower
back., buttocks and wrists
tch,en he visited him Thursday,
the embassy announced.
The Estado de ? Sao Paulo
and the Diario de Brazilia said
Morris had confessed to hay-
ing? links with Brazilian ec-
clesiastical circles and a for-
eign security agency. -
WASHINGTON MONTHLY
November 1974
by John Marks
Several times in the last few years,
this magazine has suggested that the
- quickest single way to improve the
conduct of American foreign policy
would be to get rid of the covert
agents and clandestine operators in
the A. In the spirit of practicing
what we preach, we pr'es'en't the fol-
lowing article, which tells how t6
identify a great zumber of the
Agency's "secret". operators. Our.
Purpose is to hasten the day when our
intelligence organizations concentrate
on their real work?collecting and
analyzing infornzatiOn from open
sources?and to cut the ground away
from the James Bonds and the
Gordon Liddys of the world before
they get us all in any more trouble.
Both the Soviet and American
intelligence establishments seem to
sham the obsession that the other side
-is always trying -to ?bug ,them. ,Since
the other side is, in fact, usually
trying, our technicians and their
technicians are constantly sweeping
military installations and embassies to
make sure no enemy, real or imagined,
has succeeded. One night about ten
years ago, a State 'Department security
officer, prowling through the Ameri-
can - embassy in Santiago, Chile, in
search of communist microphones,
found a listening device carefully
hidden in the office of a senior
"political officer." The security man,
along with everyone else in the
embassy, knew that this particular
"political officer" was actually the
Central Intelligence Agency's "station
chief," or principal operative in Chile. ?
Bugging his office would have indeed
been a major coup for the opposition.
Triumphafilik,' the security man
ripped the microphone out of the
wall?only to discover later that it had
been installed by the CIA station chief
himself.
The reason the CIA office was
located in the embassy?as it is in
most of the other countries in the
world?is that by presidential order
the State Department is responsible
for hiding and housing the CIA. Like
the intelligence services of most.other
countries, the-CIA has been unwilling
to set up foreigi offices under its own
name, so American embassies?and;
John Marks is an associate of the center for
National Security Stuches and co-author of
3 The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence.
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S
less frequeritly, military bases--
provide the: needed cover. State
con fers respezt ability on the Agency's
operatives, Idressing them up _with the
same titles and calling cards that give
legitimate diplomats entree into for-
eign government circles. Protected by
diplomatic immunity, the operatives
recruit local officials as CIA agents to
supply secret intelligence and, espe-
cially in the Third World, to help in
the Agency's manipulation of a
country's internal affairs.
The CIA moves its men off the
diplomatic lists only in Germany,
Japan, and other countries where large
numbers of American soldiers are
stationed. In those countries, the
CIA's command post is still in the
U.S. embassy, but most of the CIA
personnel are under military cover.
With nearly 500,000 U.S. troops
scattered around the world, the CIA
"units" buried among them do not
attract undue attention.
In contrast, it is difficult for the
CIA to dwell inconspicuously within
the American diplomatic corps, since
more than a .quarter-.of the 5,435
employees who purportedly work for
State overseas are actually. with the
CIA': Ti places such aki- Argentina,
Bolivia, 'Burma, and 0.-1'ana, where
the Agency has special-interests and
projects, there are about as many CIA
operatives under cover' of substantive.
embassy jobs as there are legitimate
State employees. The CIA also places
smaller contingents in the rank of
other U.S. government agencies which
operate overseas, particularly AID's
police training program in Latin
America.
What is surprising is that the CIA
even bothers to camouflage its agents,
since they are still easily identifiable.
Let us see why the embassy cover is so
transparent:
riThe CIA usually has a separate
set of offices in the (embassy, often
with an exotic-looking cipher lock on
the outside door. In Madrid, for
example, a State Department source
reports that the Agency occupied the
whole sixth floor of the embassy.
About 30 people worked there; half
were disguised as "Air Force per-
sonnel" and half as State "political
officers." The source says that all the
local Spanish employees knew who
worked one,vhat floor of the embassy
and that visitors could figure out the
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same thing.
EICIA personnel usually stick to-
gether. When they go to lunch or to a
cocktail party or meet a plane from
Washington, they are much more
likely to go with each other than with
legitimate diplomats. Once you have
identified one, you can quickly figure
out the rest.
Dile CIA has a different health
insurance plan from the State Depart-
ment. The premium records, which
are unclassified and usually available
to local employees, are a dead
giveaway.
siThe Agency operative is taught
early in training that loud background
sounds interfere with bugging. You
can be pretty sure the CIA man in the
embassy is the one who leaves his
radio on all the time.
!Ironically, despite the State De-
partment's total refusal to comment
on anything concerning the CIA, the
Department regularly publishes two
documents, the Foreign Service List
and the Biographic Register, which,
when cross-checked, yield the names
of most CIA operatives under embassy
cover. Here is how it.works:
America's real diplomats have
insisted on one thing in dealing with
the CIA: that the corps of Foreign
Service Officers (FSO) remain pure.
Although there are rumors of excep-
tions, CIA personnel abroad are
always even the cover rank of Foreign
Service Reserve (F.SR) or Staff (FSS)
officers?not FSO. Of course, there
are some legitimate officials from flu-
State Department, AID, and US!!:.
'who hold FSR and FSS ratings, ace
care must:15e.taken to avoid confusing
-these people with.the spooks.
To winnow out the spooks, you
start by looking up in the Foreign
Service List the country in question,
for example, China. The letters in the
third 'column from the left signify the
man or woman's personnel status and
the number denotes his or her rank.
On the China list, David Bruce is an
"R-1," or Reserve Officer of class I,
the highest rank. John Holdridge is a
regular Foreign Service Officer (FSO)
or the same gtade, and secretary
Barbara Brooks is a Staff Officer, class
4.
PEKIK6 MS. LIAISOK OFFICE) (CO)
Veva David K E chief USW
Roldridie John H des ctief UStO
Jenlins Alfred les des chief USW
firuts Barbara A. set
McKinley Brun spec asst
herd ..... sec
Anderson Donald psi ca
Mull Janice E. sec
UIjianes R ..... .... psi off
Pascoe 3 Lynn.. ........... pol cif
korr,witr Herbed econ/crra off
Morin Annabelle C. sec
Roe'itia!ivl Frederick._ econ/crn1 off
ratiban R.stert atha cif
kaffers SEC
Lambert ctrosirec off
totes Robed toms/recoil
LI 5-73
0-1 5-73
R-I
5.4 5-73
0.6 5-73
5-5 5-73
0-4 6-73
5.8 12-73
R-3
0-5 7.73
0-3 6-73
5-7 7.73
Of 4-73
0.3 4-73
5-6 5-73
R.6 2.74
54 7.73
, Morin foils
gen wolf
0-6
3-72
PeferSon Robed
cond/rec off
R-6
7,73
' Riley
cOnd/reC off
5-5
5-73
Now Holdridge almost certainly
'can be ruled out as an operative,
'simply because he is an FSO. Not
much can- be told one way or the
other about FSS Brooks because, as is
the case with most secretaries, the
;State Department does not publish
much information about her. David
Bruce might be suspect because of his
"R" status, but a qujck glance at the
Biographic Register, -.w.lijCh gives 'a
brief curriculum vitae -of all State
Department personnel, shows him to
be one of the high-level political
appointees who-' have "R" status
because they are., not members of the
regular Foreign Service. Similarly, the
Register report on FSR Jenkins shows
that he had a long career as an FSO
-before taking on the State Depart-
ment's special assignment in Peking as
an FSR:
Bruce, David KE-b Md 2/21/98, ret (Evangeline
Bell). Princeton U AB 19. Mern Md bar. US
Army 17-19, 42-45. col overseas. PRIV EXPER
, priv law practice 21-26, meat State legis 24-
26. 39-42, with bank-priv bus 28-40, chief rep
Arts Red Cross (England) 40-41. GOVT EXPER
with Off Strategic Sers 41-45, asst sec of Corn
47-48, ECA Paris R-1 chief of mission 5/48.
STATE AEP to France 5/49. Dept under sec of
state 2/52, consult to sec of state 1/53. Paris
R-1 poi off-US observer to Interim Con.an of
EDC, also US rep toEuropeanCoal-SteelCorn-
rnunity (Luxembourg) 2/53. Dept consult to sec
of state 1/55. Bonn AEP to Germany 3/57-
11/59. London AEP to Great Britian 2/61-3/
69. Dept R- I pers rep of Pres with per, rank
arrib to lid US del at Paris meetings on Viet-
Nam 7/70-4/71. Peking chief liaison off 3/73.
? Jenkins, Alfred leSesne-b Ga 9/14/16, ret. Emory
U AB 38, Duke U MA 46. US Army 42-46 1st
It. PRIV EXPER prin-supt pub schs 40-42,
STATE Dent ESO unclass 6/46. Peiping Chin
lang- area trainee 9/46, 0-6 11/46. Tientsin
pol off 7/48, 0-5 4/49. Hong Kong chief poi
sect 7/49-. Taipei tool off 7/50, 0-4 6/51. Dept
3/52. 0-3 9/54. Jidda couns, dep chief mis-
sion 2/55. Dept del Nat War Coll 8/57, 0-2
2/58, dep dir Off lot SE Asian Alf 6/58, reg
plan ad Bu of Far E Alf 8/59. Stockholm
courts. deo chief mission 10/61. cons gen 3/62,
0-1 3/63. Dept FS insp 8/65, det Nat Security
Cowie 7/66, FS insp 1/69. dir Off of Asian
Communist Aft 7/70, superior honor award 71,
dir for People's Rep of China, Mongolia,
Hong Kong-Macao aft 2/73. Peking dep chief
liaison off 4/73. Lang Ger. {v,,--Martha Lip-
piatt).
Note that there are no gaping holes
in their career recordsAnor did either
of these men serve long tours with
nameless Pentagon agencies, nor did
they regularly change their status
from "R" to "S" to "GS" (civil
service).
Now, for purposes of comparison,
examine the record of the CIA's man
in Peldng, a "political officer" named
James R. Lilley:
Utley, fables R-b China Am parents 1/15/28.
on. Yale .0 ,5)I.t. US Army 46-47. GOVT EX-
PER anal Dent of Army 51-58, STATE Manila
R-6 7/58. Dept 10/60, Ph.-Lorn Penh 9/61, R-5
3/63. Bangkok 4/63. Dept 8/64. Vientiane pol
off 6/65. 10-4 5/66. 5-2 4/68. Hong Kong 5/
68, 10-4 5/69. Dept 7/70, GS-15 fgn all off
4/71, 10-4 det lang trng FSI 7/72-4/73, Lang
Fr, Rom. (w?SaUy Booth).
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The Foreign Service List provides
another clue, in the form of diplo-
mats' official assignments. Of all the
jobs real State Department. representa-
. 'lives perform, political reporting is
generally ? considered to be the most
important.. 'Although genuine ? FSRs
frequently hold administrative and
consular slots, they are almost never
4liven the important political jobs. So
. yhere an .FSR does appear in the
listing wit ,.-.a political job; it is most
. likely that the CIA is _using the
'position? ;for . cover. There is an
exception to this rule: ? a compara-
tively few minoritygroup members
who have been brought into the
'Foreign Service as Reserve 'Officers
under a special program. They are
found exclusively in the junior: ranks,
and their biographic data is complete
in the way the CIA people's is not.
Finally there is another almost.
certain tip-off. If an agent is listed in
the Biographic Register as having been
an ."analyst" for the Department of
the Army (or Navy or Air Force), you
can bet that he or she is ? really
working for the CIA. A search of
hundreds. of names found no legit-
imate State Department personnel
as ever having held such a job.
- In an embassy -like the one in
Santo Domingo, the spooks in the
. ? political. section. outnumber the real
j FSOS by at least seven to three:
Political Section
Ezyer Joel pol off
R-5
7-72
Cruz ger Frederiik. A pot off
R-7
9-72
Burnous James pot off
0-4
7-72
Chafin Gary E pot off
Clayton Thomas pot off
0-6
R-3
8-73
5-71
Enviggins Joan H ..... pol off
II-7
342
Fambrini Robert pot off
S-2
6-73
Creig David N Jr pot off
R-5
8-71
cue Janet sec
5-8
12-73
Markoff Stephanie set
5-8
6-73
Merriam Geraldine ?. elk-typist
S-9
243
&looney Robert C__............ pot off
R-6
8-72
Mmris Margaret clk-typist
SIO 12-73
Pascoe Dorothy I. sec
S-7 244
Cyan Doridald pot off
R.8
8-73
&Whams Albert pol off
0-3
7-73
While Dondald Ryan is an "R'' in
the political section, there is not
sufficent data published about him to
verify his status.
It was by studying these docu-
ments that I learned that the CIA has
sent an operative, to Peking. For
confirmation, I. called the State
Department's ranking China expert,
Acting Assistant. Secretary of State
"Arthur Hummel. After I identified
?inyself a a reporter working on a
magazine article and explained where
I had gotten my information, Hummel
shouted, "I know what you're up to
and I don't want to contribute. Thank
you very much!" and slammed down
the phone.
Another State official confirmed
that the decision to send an operative
to Peking was made in early 1973, bw -
declared. that making. public the
operative's existence could "jeopard-
ize" -Chinese-American relations.
Neither this official nor any of his
colleagues seemed willing to consider
the notion that the .U.S. government
was under no obligation to assign a
? CIA man there?or anywhere else for
. that matter. The first American
mission to China since 1949 certainly
. could have been staffed exclusively
With real diplomats if Concern about -
damaging relations Were so high. To
have excluded the Agency from
Pekin?, however, would have gone
against a basic axiom of the post-
World. War II foreign policy establish-
'
met-it: the CIA follows the flag into
American embassies.
The-Chinese government-is presum-
ably clever enough to identify the
'operative by sifting through the public
documents available. In fact his arrival
may well have been cleared with the
Chinese., who probably wanted recip-
rocal privileges for their .secret Service
in Washington. Such are the arrange-
ments the world's spooks are so fond
of working out with each other?the
Soviet KGB and the CIA even
exchange names of intelligence ana-
lysts assigned to the other's capital.
Sacrificing 'State'
Much to the alarm of a few high
State Department. ,officials, the pro-
portion of CIA to Stite personnel
abroad has been steadily rising Pa
recent years. The .precise figures are
zealously guarded,: but several State
sources confirm the trend. They cite
as the main reason for this tilt toward
the CIA a series of government-wide
cutbacks that have hit State pro-
portionately harder than the CIA.
What troubles State is not, as one
career diplomat put it, "the principle"
that State should provide the CIA
with cover. That is unquestioned, he
*says. Rather, Most legitimate diplo-
mats do not like being a minority
within their own profession or having
the rest of the world confuse them
with the CIA's dirty tricksters. They
generally regard themselves as working
at a higher calling.
While the State Department has
been comparatively honest in accept-
ing the personnel cuts ordered by the
Johnson and Nixon administrations,
two sources familiar with the CIA
budget report that the Agency has
done everything po(--.:1)1:: to escape the
reductions. Tr- ..itionally, when out-
siders?eve". eresidents?have tried to
meddle ofith the Agency's personnel
allot- ,ent, the CIA has resisted on
"-.ttional security" grounds. And
when that argument failed, the CIA
resorted to bureaucratic ruses: cutting
out a job and then replacing the
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person eliminated with a "contract"
or "local" employee, who would not
show up on the personnel roster; or
sending home a clandestine support
officer?a specialist in things like
. renting "safe houses," "laundering"
money, and installing phone taps?and
then having the same work done by
experts sent out from Washington on
? "temporary duty." ee?
Just this spring, the State Depart-
ment took official, if secret, notice of
its declining presence oVerseas com-
pared to the CIA elip Secretary
Henry Kissinger authopzed a high-
level study of State-CIA staffing. The
Department's top administrator, L.
Dean Brown, who had urged the study
be made in the first place, gave the job
to Malcolm Toon, a career diplomat
? serving as U.S. ambassador to Yugo-
slavia. Toon returned to Washington
to compile the top-secret report.
Asking not to be named and
? Not only does the State Depart-
ment provide the CIA with cover,
but the Senate?and especially its
Foreign Relations Committee?
encourages the current practice of
sending over 25 p-Ororcfetit of our
"diplomatic" corps abroad under
false pretenses. Every year the
Foreign Relations Committee rou-
tinely approves and sends to the
full Senate for its advice and
consent lists of "Foreign Service
Reserve Officers to be consular
officers and secretaries in the
Diplomatic Service of the United
States of America." In 1973, of the
121 namesTsubmitted by the State
Department, more than 70 were
CIA = operatives. According to a
knowledgeable source, the com-
mittee is informally told the
number of CIA people on the lists
but "not who they are." No senator
in memory has publicly objected to
being an accomplice to this cover-
building for the CIA.
refusing to provide the specific fig-
ures, a source close to Kissinger says
that Toon's report calls for a
substantial reduction in the number of
CIA operatives abroad under State
cover. The source adds that Kissinger
has not made up his mind on the
issue.
Kissinger has always acted very
carefully where the CIA is concerned.
One of his former aides notes that the
Secretary has regularly treated the
Agency with great deference at
government meetings although he has
often been privately scornful of it
afterwards. In any case, Kissinger is
unquestionably a believer in the need
for the CIA to intervene covertly in
other countries' internal affairs?he
was the prime mover behind the
Agency's work against Salvador Al-
lende in Chile. The question of how
much cover State should provide the
CIA, however, is chiefly a bureau-
cratic One, ang is not basic . to
Kissinger's foreign policy. The Sec-
retary therefore will probably not
take a definite position until he sees
how much opposition the CIA will le,
able to stir up in the White House
in the- congressional subcommittees
that supposedly, oversee the Agency. ?
The CIA his lost no time in
launching -its counteroffensive. At a
`July 19- off-therecord session with
key Democratic corefessional aides,
Carl Duckett, the CIA's Deputy
Director for Intelligence, complained
about the reductions recommended
by the Toon report. According to a
source Who was present, Duckett said
that even without further embassy
cuts, the CIA now doesn't *have
enough people overseas.
CIA officials must be especially
concerned about. Toon's recommenda-
tions, since in countries where there
are no U.S. military bases, the only
alternative to embassy cover is
"deep," or non-official, cover.. Ameri-
can corporations operating overseas
have long cooperated in making jobs
available to the CIA and would
probably continue to do so. Also, the
Agency would.proba bly.have to make
more use of smaller firms where fewer
people would know of the clandestine
connection. Two examples of this
type are:
* Robert Mullen and Company,
the Washington-based public relations
concern for which E. Howard Hunt
worked after he left the CIA . and
before the break-in at Democratic
National Headquarters. Mullen pro-
vided CIA operatives with cover in
Stockholm, Mexico City, and Singa-
pore, and in 1971 set up a subsidiary
in cooperation with the CIA called
Interprogres, Ltd. According to a
secret Agency document released with
the House Judiciary Committee's
impeachment evidence, "At least two
[CIA) overseas assets have tangential
tasks of promoting the acceptance of
this company as a Kullen subsidiary."
* Psychological ASvsessitient Ass-
dates, Inc., a Washington psychor
logical consulting firm specializing in
behavioral research- .and analysis. By
the admission of- its president John
Gittinger, most of the company's
business since it was founded in 1957
by three ex-CIA psychologists has
come from Agency contracts. The
firm had two "representatives" in
Hong Kong, at least until June of this
year.
Unless their cover is blown, com-
panies of this sort and operatives who
work for them Cannot be linked to the
U.S. government. But the Agency has
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NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1974 -
learned over the years that it is much
more difficult and expensive to set up
an Operative as a businessman (or as a
?missionary or newsman) than to put
him in an embassy. As a "private"
citizen, the operative is not, auto-
matically exposed to the host coun-
try's key officials ? and to foreign
diplomats, nor does he have direct
access lb the CIA communications
and support facilities which are
normally housed in embassies. More-
over, as an ex-CIA official explains,
"The deep cover guy has no mobility.
He doesn't have the right passport. He
is' subject to local laws and has to pay
local taxes. If you try to'put him in an
influential business job, you've got to
go through all the arrangements with
the company."
? Who Needs Gumshoes?
?
Everything argues for having the
intelligence agent in the embassy?
everything, that is except the need to
keep his existence secret. The ques-
tion then becomes whether it is really
that important to keep his existence
secret?which, in turn,Tadepends on
how important his clandestine activi-
ties are.
Could any rational person, after
surveying the history of the last 20
years, from 'Guatemala to Cuba to
Vietnam?and now Chile?contend
that the CIA's clandestine activities
have yielded anything but a steady
stream of disaster? The time has come
to abolish them. Most of the military
and econozge tkntelligence we need
we can get from our satellites and
sensors .(which already provide nearly
all our information about Russia's
nuclear 'weaponry) and from reading
the newspapers and the super-
abundant files of open reports. As for
political intelligence?which is actually
an assessment of the intentions of
foreign leaders?we, don't really need
this kind of information from Third
World Countries unless we intend to
muck about in their internal affairs.
With the Soviet Union or China?
countries powerful enough to really.
threaten our national security?timely
political intelligence could be a great
- help: But f6r the past 25 -years we
have relied;.*Ion open sources and
machine-collected intelligence beCause
our agents have proven incapable of
penetrating ;these closed societies.
There is not enough practical benefit
.gained from the CIA's espionage
activities to compensate for our
nation's moral and 'legal liability in,
maintaining thbusands of highly
trained bribers, subverters, and bur-
glars overseas as "representatives" of
our government. The problem of
getting good, accurate, reliable in-
formation from abroad is a complicat-
ed one, beyond the scope of this
article, but, to paraphrase Mae West,
covert has nothing to do with it
Approvea 'F or lielease
By John D. Marks
WASHINGTON?Now that President
Ford has publicly asserted that the
United States has a right to "de-
stabilize" foreign governments, other
countries might consider Whether to.
permit entry to America's. agents of.
subversion, operatives of the Central
Intelligence Agency. , . .
These people, after all, engage' in
covert activities that the. Director of
Central Intelligence, William E. Colby,
recently admitted would .be crimes if
committed in this countrY.
Why should any sovereign,. nation ,
stand for that sort of thing, and, more
important,' what can a country do to
protect itself from C.I.A. attack?
Foreign governments could inform
the State. Department that employes
of the C.I.A. and other United States
spy agencies are not welcome and
must be withdrawn immediately if the
United States wishes to continue dip-
lornatic relations.
? Admittedly, Britain, ? Canada. andr
South Africa would probably not' expel
the C.I.A. because the agency' operates
in these countries mainly to' exchange
intelligence data and maintain close
liaison. ??
; Similarly, the Soviet Union almost
certainly would not want to expel
C.I.A. operatives, since the ,United
States would surely retaliate' with
similar 'action, breaking an unwritten
rule, that both powers have a .right
to spy on the other.
But allied and third-world countries
that have no wish to infiltrate our
Government or to "destabilize" our
democratic institutions?as the-C.I.A.
did to Chile's?might declare rthem-
selves espionage-free zones. They
could make clear that their refusal to
? allow the operations of the..- C.I.A.
(or -K.G.B., or any other foreign in-
telligence service) should not be con-
sidered an unfriendly -act.. ? -
Since all C.I.A. personnel are abroad
on false pretenses, finding them in'
order to expel them would be a poten-
tial problem but one greatly -simpli-
fied by the C.I.A.'s standard procedure
of sending most of its operatives
abroad as bogus State Department of-
ficers.
Over 25 per cent of the people who
are listed as working for the depart-
ment overseas are actually with the
C.I.A. And by cross-checking two un-
classified State Department publica-
tions, the Foreign Service List and the
Biographic Register, most of the C.I.A.
operatives, normally listed .as Foreign
Service 'Reserve Officers, can be dis-
tinguished from America's real diplo-
mats; the Foreign Service Officers.
While there are Reserve Officers
who do not work for the C.I.A., those
who do are conspicuous by incomplete
biographic.?1. data, which usually in-
cludes long service in such vague-
..;";???!."P...
sounding. jobs as "Political analyst,
Department of the Army." ? ? .
Identifying American military-intel-
ligence personnel abroad is even.
easier. In countries where there are no
United States forces stationed, most
of them are simply ' called .defense
attaches.
C.I.A. operatives under "deep cover?'
?primarily as American businessmen
but also as newsmen, missionaries, and
- students?would be more difficult to,
spot than their "diplomatic" brethren,1
but a government could handle many
of these by announcing that any cor-
poration knowingly concealing a C.I.A.
man would he subject to expropriation.
Certainly not all United States intel-
ligence operatives could be discovered,
but such tactics could seriously disrupt
C.I.A. operations. Nevertheless, even
the most determined and clever gov-
ernment could probably not stop the'
flow of secret- C.I.A. funds of the type
that President Ford has admitted were
secretly paid to Chilean Opposition
leaders and newspapers.
As long as there are citizens willing
to accept the laundered C.I.A. funds,
the agency will contrive ways to get
money to them.
? For example, in Greece the C.I.A. has
over the years recruited thousands of
political, military, police, labor, news
media, and academic figures. Now as
Greece restores democracy and moves
away from America's 71I-encompassing
embrace, there is real fear in the
Greek Government that the United
States will act to stop' what Washing-
?ton policymakers perceive as a left-,
ward drift. -
While the Greek Government could
probably identify . and . expel most of
the C.I.A. operatives-60, according to
one newspaper report?the many
Greeks already in the C.I.A.'s employ,
would remain as potential fifth colum-
nists to which the agency could pro-
vide assistance.
Perhaps the way for Greece to rid
herself of the C.I.A.'s pervasive influ-
ence would be to' declare a general
amnesty for all citizens who are with
the agency. If genuine forgiveness were
promised in return for immediate co-'
operation, and stiff penalties protnised
for those convicted of Staying on the
C.I.A. payroll after the amnesty period,
enough of the C.I.A.'s Greek contacts
might provide sufficient information
to enable the Government to start un-
raveling the agency's extensive agent
network. '
The point is that foreign govern-
ments de not need to stand by idly
while the C.I.A. attempts to "destab-
ilize" them.
John D. Marks is an Associate of the
Center for National Security Studies
in Washington and 'co-author, with
Victor Marchetti, of "The C.I.A. and ?
the Cult of Intelligence."
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PRESS?SCIMITAR, 'Memphis
3.5? October 1974
?
uper-Secret Agencies Are Sending Billions
ering Military Information f r U.S.
First of three articles
. By ALAN HORTON
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer
ASHINGTON. ? The recent publicity
about "dirty tricks" in Chile and alleged
ties to the ousted military junta In Greece have
magnified public belief that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency...4CLALLLITIE clo a k-a Oral:ger
?-???-?
operation of the U.S. govern-
ment.
But the fact is that at least
three-fourths of the $4,000,000,-
000 to $6,000,000,000 which the
United States budgets annually
for intelligence goes to mili-
tary agencies.
The CIA, with its vast net-
work of spies, secret military
units and secret funds, oper-
ates on an annual budget of
only $750,000,000 and its full-
time regular payroll includes only about 15,000
persons. The public seldom, if ever, hears about
the military agencies.
Actually, the spy business has become so so-
phisticated that most -intelligence-gathering is
now done by exotic military sensors, satellites
and spy planes, although the CIA director heads
the board that picks the spy targets and the CIA
helps develop spy technology.
? * * *
MILITARY intelligence is handled by:
O The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
This is an "umbrella" Outfit that analyzes data
produced., by the three military intelligence
commands.
? T h e National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO). This is so secret its name is classified,
although it has been identified publicly. It
spends over $1,000,000,000 a year for spy satel-
lite systems. It's part of Air Force intelligence.
? The National Security Agency (NSA). A
-little-known big spender ? at least $1,000,000,-
000 a year ? its two main jobs are to intercept
foreign radio and electronic signals at listening
posts around the world and to keep U.S. com-
munOtions secure from enemy eavesdroppers.
0?.The Army Intelligence Command, Air
Force Intelligence Agency and Naval
Intelli-
geace Command. -These gather .much of the
data used by the DIA and CIA to. estimate for-
eign military capabilities. They don't use cloak-
and-dagger techniques but rather modern tech-
nological spies in airplanes, satellites, ships and
submarines to gather information:'
There are reports in intelligence circles of
several other agencies, but they apparently are
so secret nobody will admit they, exist, if they
do.
? * * *
ACTUAL appropriations for all of these ?
. and for the CIA ? are secret, So the known
figures have to be approximate, but it's esti-
mated the military agencies budget $3,000,000,-
000 to $3,000,000,000 annually for ,a payroll of
nearly 100,000.
Military spying is a hush-hush 'world of ? con-
verted cargo planes and ships loaded with elec-
Horton
8
tronic gear, remotely piloted drone planes,
high-altitude spy planes and satellites known as
Big Bird, Big Ear, 647 and Vela: They carry
high-resolution and infrared cameras; receiv-
ers to intercept, store and relay signals; the
most sophisticated sensors and computers, and
Laser communications.
Without those robot military spies ? Rus-
sian models are less sophisticated but adequate
? no strategic arms limitation agreement
would have been Possible in 1972. Neither side
would have had a fool-proof way ,to watch for
violations by the other.
Democratic Senator William Proxmire of
Wisconsin, impressed with satellite technology,
.said recently: "It appears that U.S. photogra-
phy can identify ground targets under one foot
in size from 100 nautical miles in space. Fur-
tnermore, certain satellites collect electronic
-emissions which aid in the identification and
pinpointing of targets."
* * *
AVIATION WEEK Magazine reported that?
one infraredscanner can find pleasure boats on
:the Potomac River from 600 miles up. Using
such satellite sensors, U.S. experts long have
spotted Russian nuclear blasts a n d rocket
launches.
Soon satellites will beam television pictures?
of Russian objectives to U.S. photo analysts in-
stantaneously.
But satellites cost too much to do the entire
job. Besides, half the globe is dark and a fifth
covered by clouds. So electronic intelligence
(ELINT) planes routinely fly near the borders
of foreign countries ? especially those friendly
with Russia or in the middle of potential trouble
spots ? listening and recording.
One such plane was downed by North Ko-
rean MIGs in 1959 and another ducked into
clouds over t h e Mediterranean to escape
Libyan jets 18 months ago.
T h e most revolutionary of the manned
reconnaissance systems are the bullet-fast SR71
Blackbirds. For eight years they were so secret
that Air Force spokesmen wouldn't admit they
existed.
* * *
LAST MONTH defense officials permitted a
Blackbird to compete for official international
speed.records which it had been setting secretly
for years. But before the Blackbird made its
public appearance, all its sophisticated sensors,
cameras and other gear were stripped off.
No longer are Blackbirds flown over Russia
and China ? although the planes' cameras
can see well into both countries by flying along
the borders at 80,000 feet ? but they do. fly over
North Korea, North Vietnam and the Middle
East when necessary. If the planes did fly over
Russia, experts are confident their missile fool-
ing gear would protect Blackbirds from attack.
But Blackbirds have their faults, too. Rue
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cinfr thing, they cost $7,000,000 each per year ta
Ope7ate and maintain, and ',ley use 12,000 gal-
lons of fuel each on a normal mission. Only
eight are flown regularly and 16 more are kept
in storage.
All of those intelligence systems and many
more collect prodigious amounts of data de-
scribed by the mysterious acronyms ELINT,
RADINT, PHOTINT, COMINT and SIGINT for.
electronic, radar, photo, communications and
signal intelligence.
..,.
BUT EVEN 8vit1t...all the da?a, the system is
:
not perfect ? analysts have iSreconceived no-
tions, data is subject to. yaryipi interpretations ?
and .clues are ovOooked.\ ? 1 .
. - .
-Both the DIAland CIA failed to predict the
Egyptians and S ians would,attack Israel Oct.
6, 1973, although n.rptrospec7psignificant clues
were available. ..4/ : ?,. ?? .,
In 1068, defense and C1.-`, ; analysts goofed a
chance to predidt the precise timing of the,Rus-
sian invas:mi,of Czechoslovakia. ss ?
.,,.
Militaintelligence's image also has been
hurt by., Army spying on civilians? now. al-
legedly stopped ? and by the tendency to over-
estimate enemy capabilities in order to justify
multibillion-dollar U.S. weapons systems-. '
? ? The DIA head, Army Lieutenant General
..Daniel 0. Graham? who has held. various top
jobs in the CIA and DIA, asks that: the Presi-
dent have faith in DIA's estimates;saying they
. are now "credible." - ?-..: i-- ...'1:3-I ? ,
. In the meantime, much to-the chagrin of the
defense intelligence establishment; the CIA will
continue to prepare military threat estimates
. which often are not so scary: as: those? of the
.......
military. -
-
ITS^IS-SENTINPT., Knoxville
16 October 1974
* -
THE MAN in charge of the vast Military
intelligence community is Albert C. Hall, gray-
ing, articulate assistant defense secretary for
?
intelligence and a pioneer in missile control and
.space systems.
Hall's Pentagon office windows are equipped
with devices to foil eavesdropping from outside,
even by sophisticated instruments which meas-
ure and interpret voice Vibrations on window
panes.
"DIA is striving to be objective," Hall said,
"with the defense secretary looking. over--its -
shoulders and the CIA making indeperfclent
analyses. When there are differences, they are.
closely scrutinized. That's healthy."
He said military intelligence must improve
its assessment of other nations' military train-
ing, leadership, morale and tactics. ?.
But he admitted there is no remedy !Or the
major disadvantage of U.S. intelligende ?
America's open and Russia's closed society.
"They get for free what we spend millidno
learn," Hall said. . ???
Before the first U.S. Trident submarine-was
-under construction, the Pentagon told ,ron-
gress how many missiles it would carry a'nd
their range. Even the number of warheads foer
missile Soon became .public knowledge. The
United States, on the other hand, didn't kno-w
about Russia's ne- ? Delta submarine Until one
was being built.
* * *
NO MATTER how much America spends on
intelligence, there never will be a satellite or a
sensor that determines a potential enemy's in-
tent, or analyzes consequences.
Old-fashioned cloak-and-dagger spying is
needed for. that.
By-ALAN .HORTON
-7.- Scripps-Kowcird Stott Writer
With a budget that ?Otit-'
siders-estimii 'Ais around $750 million annually -
and a fullt -V payroll of 15,000, the Central
Intelligence AOncy (CIA) doesn't seem like
much by Federal bureaucratie standards..
. :But it"is-not likely that any other U.S. Gov-;-
ernment agency- is so revered and despised,
respected and feared -all- at once.
That's because the CIA; while keeping 3
. .
hard eye on the Soviet Union and other poten-
tial U.S. adversaries, secretly plays its own
"dirty tricks" to protect American interests
abroad.
And, despite its small budget itral payroll ?
the figures are guesses because the real fig-
ures are highly secret ? the CIA is bigger and
more powerful than it looks. Its tentacles
reach to the upper levels of industry, foreign
trade, labor, finance and other power centers
-through a systetri of front companies, paid
consultants, contracts with private. industry
and agents worldwide.
TERMED BEST-PAID
CIA agents are reputed to be the best-paid
of Federal bureaucrats, starting at $11.600
annually, according to some sources. And sen-
ior agents quickly work up to $20,000 to $36,000
a year. The (ally unforgivable sins for
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agents. according to former employes. are
,
homosexuality and drug addiction because
they can lead to blackmail.
Workers at the headquarters here call their
buildings and grounds "'the .campus.?' The
Second of a Series
-even-story. modernistic building stands in the
Middle of -a 125-acre park on a bluff on the
Virginia side of the Potomac River, eight
miles from the White House.
Downstate, near Williamsburg. Va., is the
CIA's 10,000-acre "farm." disguised as Camp
Peary on the historic York River. Camp Peary
is one of several bases ? from North Carolina
to Nevada and frorn the Panama Canal zone to
Saipan ? where CIA trainees .are taught
cloak-and-dagger techniques.
? And near Tucson. Ariz., is another segment
or the CIA jigsaw puzzle, the home base of
Intermountain Aviation, probably still one of
the many secretly owned and operated
companies called "proprietaries." Intermoun-
tain purports to train, supply and deliver for.
est service "smoke jumpers.
- ? ?
To be truly secret, of course. the CIA needs
its own fleet of airplanes. And' when they _are.
not needed for CIA operations, why not lease
them? Many CIA "proprietaries" are believed
9
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sands, conducting milliondollar businesses
and . providing. "deep covertta lor. . ,covert
operations. ?? ?
Basically, the CIA is divided intotwo parts
analysts and clandestine operators, int lud-
,?ing both spies and dirty. tricksters. The
clandestine services spend more. than half the
CIe! budget.
"-Analysts look ? down on the clandestine
stt-a?ice operatives as "athletes and police-
men." according to nne former agent. Many in
? the c'andestine services don't have much use
for analysts, who don't get, their hands dirty.
Fewer than 5000 CIA personnel are said to
be stationed overseas, and only about 3090 are
in the clandestine services.
Many of those 3000 are assigned to U.S.
embassies with covers as foreign aid. diplo-
matic and Military officers. Others are in deep
? cover as businessmen, students and, allegedly.
even missionaries.'
CORPORATIONS PROVIDE COVER
. In addition. there are the thousands of paid
foreign agents, consultants, contractors, for-
eign security police and intelligence officers -?;?
often foreign politicians paid ,and trained by
the CIA.
A number of multinational corporations
provide cover for CIA ,agents in Western Eu-
rope, Latin America and the Far East. Offices
in Amsterdam. Mexico City and Singapore had
to be closed in a hurry recently. when one CIA
front was exposed.
? Director William E. Colby. 54, who rose
through . the ranks of clandestine services,
. says the CIA is not conducting covert actions
?-?? dirty tricks ? anywhere in the world today.
But neither he nor President Ford will
foreswear covert actions in the future al-
though they imply they will be used sparingly.
Some lawmakers insist, along with Rep.
Michael J. Harrington (D-Mass.), that "we
can no longer measure our conduct by that of
oursuppo'sed rivals-burl:1y 'standards we have
set for ourselves as a nation."
One former CIA agent. Philip B. Agee, said
in disgust that the agency i>trapita-lism's po-
lice force." And when covert actions are ex-
posed that's the way it looks to the world. ?
But when it coMes to a congressional vote,
,
. as it has several times in the last
Congressmen won't outlaw covert actions-, Say-
ing ,the natians, needs a third- alternative to
-sirri-ple diplomacy and sending in U.S. troops.
Early this month,the_ Senate did pass an
amendment. outlawing covert -actions- except?
those thought by the.P.resident to be crucial to,
national security. But the bill was sent-back to
committee. - - _?-? ? ? ?"?-?-_. ot ? ?
Many congressmen. in defense.of the CIA
? and its functions, point out that the-Soviet's
KGB ? the equivalent of the CIA ? has 90,000
agents abroad, seducing. suborning, spying,
subverting, sabotaging and training and arm-
ing guerillas. .
KGB FINANCED CUBA OVERTHROW
Australian intelligence soucrces say -the
'KGB has a total of 250.000 men and women
devoted entirely to espionage and counteres-
pionage ? foiling enemy spies. That's 10 times
the total of the United States and its major
allies. And no one doubts that the KGB can
call on Czechslovakia, polish, East. German,
Hungarian or even Cuban spies for help any
time. ? . .
? Even' the most optimistie GoVternment
sources doubt the FBI is able to catch even 30
per cent of Russian spies in the United-States.
"The KGB financed the overthrow of
Cuba," said Sen. Milton D. Young (R-N.D.),
member of one of Congress' four CIA over-
sight subcommittees. "And now they're doing
a lot in the Middle East."
Will President Ford keep the CIA from
meddling in the-affairs of foreign nations? No
president has been able to do that since the
CIA was established in 19-17.
President Harry S Truman. who was often
quoted as opposing covert actions, ordered
agents to Greece- to help fight Communist
guerillas. and to Italy to beat the Communists
at the polls. ? " ??'" ? ?
. President Dwight D. Eisenhower-used the;
CIA to put the Shah of Iran in power in 1953: ,
'help defeat the Communist Huks in the Philip-
pines in the mid-1950s; overthrow the
Communist-dominated government in
.-
1Guatemala in 1954.
. Several CIA covert actions failed miserably': .
in the Eisenhower years. ?
The CIA in 1958 used B26 bombers in an'
attempt to depose Sukarno in Indonesia and'
not only failed but saw a CIA pilot captured
and exposed to the world. ???
,
_ Efforts to roll back .the Iron Curtain in Po-
?.
I land. Albania-and the Ukraine also were fruitj-:
less..
I U.S. SPY PLANE DOWNED
It .was durink, the Eisenhower years that
;the CIA suffered its worst humiliation. t -
In 1960 'Russia shot down a CIA U2 spy
:plane :and captured its- pilot co focus the
world's attention on that rk.re event, Russia
cancelled the 1960 Eisenhower-KhrUshchev.:
tsummit meeting.
? Presigent John Ft Kennedy's biggest mis-?-
? take was approving a CIA-financed and plan-
ned covert action. using Cuban refugees. in a
1961 military attack on Cuba at the Bay of
Pigs:
? He later ordered the CIA to eaStablish an'
army of Southeast Asina mercenaries backed
by a secret CIA Air America Air Force to
? fight the North Vietnamese in Laos.
By the late 1960s, the Army had grown to
30,600 men. ?
President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the
CIA to track down Cuban reVolutionary Che
'Guevara in 1967 in Bolivia to use its secret'
Air Force.to suppress a revolt in -The Congo
(now Zaire) in 1964 against President Mobutu. .
'I It has . also -been' charged that Johnson
. ordered the CIA -to turn over some of its B26
bombers to: Portugal in 1965 .to. help put down
revolts in Portuguese African colonies, even ?
though Congress banned arms exports for-use
in colonial wars.
?
LINKED TO GREEK MILITARY -
In more recent times, President Nixon ap-
proved CIA plans to fund opposition parties,
newspapers and, it has been charged. strikers
in Chile daring the Marxist reign of Salvador
Allenda Gossens. who was killed during a mili-
tary coup last year.
And there are charges that the CIA had
close ties to the Greek military junta recently
. replaced. raising 'suspicions the CIA was con-
nected somehaw to both the origtinial coup and
the junta's'support for the Greek-backed coup
on Cyprus earlier this year.
President Nixon also asked' the CIA to.
block the FBI's Watergate investigation. The
? CIA, in violation of laws prohibiting domestic
spying. had provided Watergate burglar E.
? Howard Hunt with a wig. speech-altering de-
vices and false credentials and prepared a?
psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg who
leaked the so-called Pentagon Papers,
The CIA also has taken heat from a num-
.ber of ether directions lately.
. Some congressmen have charged director.
Ctilby with seeking to develop a public image
for hinaSelf and his agency, something previa
Oitslyt considered taboo. Colby has said his
tag'ency?should be accountable to the public,.
SOME EXPECT MORE ?
And Administration officials ? particularly
Searetary Of State Henry A. Kissinger in re-
:cent years ? continue to expect more from!
CIA intelligence analysts then they have been.:
able to deliver. .
Military officers occasionally have
criticized CIA estimates of Russian and Chi- .
nese military power and have demanded a
? louder voice in judging enemy military tactics,
and equipment. ? - . ? i
Navy admirals . still are burning about:
Colby:s recent congressional testimony that.
Navy plans to improve a base on the island of:
Diego. Garcia could fuel a naval arms race in:
the Indian Ocean. They also believe the CIA1
does not give the Soviet Navy enough credit. 1
Complaints also are heard that the CIA;
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does not hire' many blacks and has not pro-
rooted women to important supervisory and
'overseas positions. . .
? It has long been .said. for?example, that the
? CIA will never use an 'American woman ? a:
? foreigner, yes ? to seduce and compromise... ?
A CIA official conceded: "We perhaps;
could have more wo-men in top jobs. And
we've tried to recruit blacks. But We've found;
that few blacks have studied foreign relations:
and are interested in Us." ?
BUDGET IS REVIEWED
? But it is the charge that the CIA is preoc-
cupied with covert actions that has triggered :
. introduction of a flurry of hills in Congress to
bring the CIA under tighter congressional con-!
TRE8S ?SCIMITAR,. Memphis:
17 October 1974
"717A.WAlg.4
?
trol. and: some proposals to outlaw covert
actions. .
? Some 150 such bills have come and gene"
- over the past 25 Years;.
? Subcommittees of the House and Senate
-
appropriations coriimittees?do review the intel-
ligence budget including that of the CIA. And
House and Senate armed -services subcommit-:
?tees, particularly that of Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi'
(D-Mich.), ? conduct increasingly frequent!
hearings into CIA operations.
"Listen," said an ex-CIA agent: "The CIA:
' is .right when it says you only hear about itsI
, failures. not its 'successes. There has never
been a CIA agent who defected:*
Rest in Cloak
Third of Three Articles
By ALAN HORTON
. Scripps?Howard Stcff Writer
WASHINGTON. ? The cloak-and-dagger
world- doesn't recopize detente. In the
-intelligence community, the Cold War contin-
ues. ? : s
In fact, U.S. spies May have more work
sseass- - today than ever before, hot be-
cause the United States no
longer is the sole superpower
but because there also are
staggering economic and po-
litical . threats to American
interests ? the energy crisis,
worldwide inflation, interna-
tional terrorists, etc.
In the back of U.S. policy-
makers' minds is always the
nagging belief that the Russian-
KGB (Committee for State Se-
curity) supports such terrorists and works to
undermine U.SriCcess to Mideast oil. ?
* * *
THERE WAS A SLIGHTLY serious ring to
China's charge earlier this year that the KGB is
humbling the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
in "worldwide espionage and subversive activi-
ties." China is in pretty good position to know.
Last year, for example, the KGB was said to
have backed a coup in Afghanistan.
Russian spies have been caught planning
sabotage in England and are now presumed to
be arming the Irish Republican Army in North-
ern Ireland. British intelligence is being kept
busy there.
Other- KGB plots were uncovered in recent
years in the Sudan, Egypt, Mexico, Colombia,
Bolivia, Tunisia, Ghana and the Congo.
Few doubt that Russia financed Fidel Cas-
tro's overthrow of the Cuban government.
* * *
TODAY RUSSIA is busy arming and training
? Palestinian guerrillas with the latest:tactics and
weapons including antiaircraft missiles. Israel's
security forces continue to assassinate Russian-
armed Arab terrorists.
Thus, much of the U.S. intelligence operation
must be devoted to winning friends in nonalign-
ed nations in the Mideast and Latin America,
a n d predicting the political and economic
consequences of world events.
But the CIA's main job Is to judge Russian
military intentions and capabilities. ?
Horton
It is a tricky job because the Russians are
testing four n e w powerful intercontinental
ballistic Missiles and the CIA must learn the
missiles' capabilities and which and how many
will be deployed where. -
Judging Russian tactics and intentions is
extra tough because of the "closed" Soviet soci-
ety and the army of Soviet counterintelligence-
agents.
"Monitoring detente" is the way some intel-
ligence officials jokingly refer to that part of
their job. Arms limitation talks depend on
them,
* * *
BUT SEARCHING for Russia's secrets is
only a part-time job. Other tasks now assigned
to the CIA include:
O Collecting data on international terrorist
groups and, as much as possible, neutralizing
them.
O Protecting U. S. access to strategic
materials around the world including oil and
rare metals.
O Keeping a close eye on the economic cli-
mate worldwide and country by country.
O Helping dam the flow of illegal narcotics
into America from overseas.
O Training and equipping the so-called Se-
curity forces of friendly nations. -
The CIA has on hand a bank of paid consult-
ants, the top scholars at many universities and
its own analysts, scholars in their own right. "_ ?
And it has access to all the information gath-
ered by the entire U.t. intelligence community
and that of much of the Western world.
* * *
THE CIA HAS TIES to multinational corPo-
rations, labor and financial circles, student
groups, even foreign government and business
officials. And CIA agents are hidden in most
U.S. embassies.
One can only surmise that the CIA is busy at
this moment learning how the new leftist gov-
ernment in Portugal will view U.S. rights to
La jes air base on the Azores, a crucial way-stop'
for planes en route to the Mideast.
Some CIA analysts must also be asking
themselves: "Will sky-high oil prices bring
down Italy's next government too?" ?
There may well come a day ? perhaps
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the not-too-distant future ?when domestic at-
tacks on the CIA will not involve alleged med-
dlina4' in other nations, hut rather .over cozy
CIA ties with multinatiohal oil companies, or
international money markets. -
? After all, critics reason, the CIA may have
to supply information to get a little information
or help in return: Some of that.. information
could provide a competitive advantage .to-a.
multinational corporation.
? k
AND THERE MAY BE more need for so
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
U November 1974
,Donald-Kir
C.77
et!?4 .???
? .?
? ?
ert
iia
Imagine this scenario';.A dissident
:Syrian ? colonel 'ippi.iiabiest. .the`
?.t..-Aeorges' Hotel in Beirut. and says
he can overthrow the violently and-
American, Israel-hating regindeq,,fn
:Damascus if you will be So" kinitfas los;
put up $5 or $10 million for arriaS,:-ani-L:?
inimition, and other material support.
_ . .
?
:You're not a total idiot-4n fact;you're
? a` Central Intelligence Agency operative
as
fluent in Arabic' as you are in French
You check out -the:colonet tlioroly
ilia you dikoyei lie' for' real.:"That
behind his rather toothy; superficially--;
.:suave, but nonetheless engaging' enough ?
smile, he does quite honestly entertain.
The dream of toppling-the gm:eminent.:
of Syria, :reaching an agreement" with
? .Israel, and ? initiating a..genuinely -non-"
aligned foreign.policy..`All for the good-
of thy people,'Z'he'sayS, reverting now.
to.-.:the French .iri which he was tutored,.
asateen-ager 1
people"; indeed:. You're thinking.
jour people, or at least your, stand4ng with your superiors at "the agency,
is :everyone seems to rfet?the
? :cu. You excitedly' send .:lorig:scrupii-:-
. .?
f.lously coded messages ;outlining the
terms Of th proposition,. the, backgrou n
'of the good colonel, your assessment of
his chances of success in the context of
'Syrian, 'rea.lities?all the "objective"
-.faC4f..inii Can muster.
:71ie.;decision on what to do now rests
**estimably; ivith the White House,. with
Heiiry ' with. -CIA: Director
William :Colby and other policy-makers
. .
Does the foregoing provide merely
thd"cititline for the opening of. a rather
banal'Jspy'dramaL.-or could it happen?
DoeS?inydne -in the CIA, or in Wash-
Jngtoir;'.:.:still entertain fantasies of sup-
:Plyiii0earet armies, buying politicians
?'and :entire political parties, subsidizing
newspapers and magazines, and other-
Wfie::?influeneing:the course of history?
Syria' itself 'might seem.-- to offer
lewt;inaritediate Possibilities for med-
dling,-.:CIA ;peratives can point with a
certain pride .,:to*- some of their 'other
achierenaelits.:'Y%.They did; 'after all,
..Contrilinte tOlie-dovmfall of, the Leftist
vJlhd&iCljle even .4 they were not
:able....,to?.preep:t his election. They did
m.aintain ara al-My in in Laos that provided
the only !i?al. defense ori-the ground for
'theAmerican-supported regime irk Vien-
.2.t.iane:.before?:,the signing of ...the peace
agreement joy."neutralizing" the Conn-.
try: They did prop' up Oolonels in Greece,-
'anti-Comnatunst noliticiansin'Italy, even .
a' genuine, popular hero like President '
Magsaysay in the Philippines.
li-There were also some notable failures '
*that is, f;these .examples might- be
:construed is ??.f `Succ-esses2" 'There was
the fiascrinf Colonel's revolt in-Indo-
riesia in the late 1.950s and of an elabo-
rate plot against Priiice't.Norodom Sihi-
-monk in.Canabodia it.. the-'early 1060s-Lto
cite just a couple:of,blots on the record.
Yet; . beyorid- The. knOwn .facts, the
question is at the CIA has really ac-
? coniplished.: by these _activities. Are
America's interests truly served by an
agency that, fationa1i7es all manner, of
,f)
called friendly, governments to be brought into
? line with American policy. The CIA also may be
assigned that job.
That's what some congressmen fear.
, That's why so many bills have been- intro-
'? duced to improve congressional oversight of the
U.S. intelligence community.
"Congres-rnust. -insist on becoming ,.a CIA
observer and Consumer," as Senatop-,Stuart
Symington put it. ?
Over? the past 25 years, 150 tch bills hay-
been introduced. None passed,
--
;_nondemocratiO, conduct In the name of
pr,eserying - lines. of ? defense against
CominunisatZ7Does? it matter that the
Soviet Union'sPerids five or six times as
--Much as.the? United States on overseas
intelligence :activities? Or- does the
United States lose so- much in the way
:of tarnished ideals and sunken self-es-
' :teem, no t-.1.6 mention a' besmirched
? image abrdad,. as to negate any short-
range gain? Intelligence types are ask-
ing these questions too?and wondering
whether or not the .CIA should revert
? solely to' its ori&al. function. as an in-
telligence-gathering .agency and let it'
-go 'at that:.. ? - ?
The debate is not' theoretical. It is a
matter for. practical consideration
'among. 'high-level 'officials.
? The' questiOn One .of theta asked was
what would. fjou do if some colonel of-
fered to .knock over the government of
Syria for; 'a few inillion_dollars. The int-
? :mediate -issue seemed 'esoteric. There
does not seem to have been any such
. offer. The- CIA 'man on the St. Georges'.
terrace isnot awaiting instructions from:
Washington-:-at least on that topic'. i
. ,Yet the issue beneath the question is
'relevant and topical. As of this writing
. no one?no one in government, at any
rate?has advanced a definite answer.
There is. no real policy, no overall
view on. the rights and wrongs involved.1
NEWSWEEK
4 Nov 19711.
'THE UNEASY UNDERCOVER MEN
A book by a onetime Central Intelligence Agency man,
soon to be published in England, has Washington's entire
intelligence 'community on edge. The CIA understand-
ably fears that any identification of its agents exposes,
them and their families to harassment or even physical
danger. And the appendix to the new book, by ex-CIA
man Philip Agee, lists the actual and code names of no
fewer than 432 CIA staff members, agents and "cover"
operations.
12
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SUNRAY 7.1.1\M t London
27 October 19714.
,
xeS"tae
? rafe??
_
C..), By Godirey Hodgson and
Tra-aleervarmaeraa,-.---eiangimamMEI"'"??'"aa
!P '..1// ,q,S
I DON'T SEE WHY we need ane I 1' d I only put in tlirew the Chilean e?conomy
let an policy as a Whole.
Add. Kissinger's own words:
taken in confunction with his
handling of the Chilean affair,
raise in no remote or , hypo-
thetical form the question:?
What would Kissiftger do if
he thought there was imminent
danger of a government in
Western Europe "going Com-
munist because or the irre-
sponsibility of its people
There is already Communist
Participation in the present
Government in Portugal. There
is a realistic possibility of Com-
munist participation in the
Government of Italy and per-
haps also in that of Greece?
two countries where American
satrate-gic interests-are far more
important than in Chile Before
one can even attempt to ans-
wer that question.however.
one must understand question.-
depth
and breadth of American
involvement in. the Chilean
tragedy. :- -
to ? stand by .and watch, a qullcatirm in case some
country go Communist because. r.ladman appears down there
of thp irrponsibility ,of its. ,.yno, without instructions,
people,Y.'
.?? ? talked to somebody. I have
ar2solutely no reason to suppose
But Kissinger was not telling
the truth, either in 1970 or in
1073, if he meant to . deny all
American in v v e in e n t in
Allende's fall.
' Kissinger and the Forty
Committee did not stand by
and do nothing. ,
On the contrary, from the
autumn of 1970- until the
spring of 1971, the United
States Government, on Kis-
singer's .orders, sought to
destroy the Allende Govern-
ment by all means short of a
massive. invaSion like that
top secret Forty Committee, -mounted by President Johnson
charged with the overall direc-e in the Dominican Republic in
tion of US intelligence gather- :1965.
ing and clandestine operations: Kissinger, in fact. 'treated
around the world. . Chile as a test case, or?as the
The country. which Dr Kis- present director- of th..; CIA,
singer, in the summer of 1970,, William Colby, reportedly told
suspected of imminent " irres- ?.a committee of Congress on
April 22 this veare=as a proto-
ayne or laboratory experiment
.to test the techniques of heavy
ii 'modal investment in an
to dhsered:t and bring
dawn a government." It was a
lecheleue that became known
by ? a riemorable euphemism:
" isat ion." ?
'The " experiment " in de-
stabilisation took the form, not
of a solo performance by the
CIA, but o, a broadly orches-
trated campaign in which all
the resources of the US gov-
ernment, short of actual mili-
tary intervention, were de-
ployed. Specifically, it is now
clear that the US government.
on Kissinger's orders, used
economic pressures. diplomatic
quarantine and clandestine
internal interference in the
effort' to bring Allende down.
It made available?so the
CIA director has now admit-
ted to Congress?more than
$S million for secret CIA
meddling in Chilean politics
? Three years 'later, on scpe between 1970 and 1973.
?
:n-ernment was ? overthrown Tbe .dheos
iciu:)?, 11, 1973, Allende's
,n ini:titary coup. and Allende By ?vithholding loans from its
The spesker was Dr Henry.
Kissinger. The date was June'
27, 1970, ant the occasion was
a meeting, ia the basethent.'of
the West Wing of. the White
House, of what might be called
the most plwerful sub-com-
mittee in the Western world:
Kissinger was talking to the
chairman of the- American
Chiefs of Staff; the Under--
Secretary of State; the Deputy-
Secretary of Defence; and the
Director of Central Intelli-
-genre. With Kissinger himself,
in his capacity as President.
Nixon's national security ad-
viser, these five made up the
ponsibility," was Chile. The
Forty Committee was meeting
that day to decide what line
American policy ought to follow
if Dr Salvador Allende were to
win power at the elections that
September. Allende, himself a
Marxist, though also a constitu-
tionalist and a parliamentarian
of more than 30 years' stand-
ing, was the leader of a Popular
Unity coalition which included
five parties, one of them the
Chilean Communists.
On September 16, shortly
after Allende did indeed win
the biggest share of the popular
vote, and shortly before he-
was constitutionally installed
as president by an overwhelm-
ing vote of both houses of the-
Chilean parliament, Dr Kis-
singer told a group of Mid-
western journalists, in one of
his famous "deep background"
briefings, that the United
States did not have much
influence over what happened
in Chi'e. ? ?
. -
::. lthelf was killed. On .October own agencies, and by using its
t?t Nisaineer said: " The CIA had (decisive) ? influence with in-
nothing to do with the coup.
to the hest of 'my knowledge
into chaos?for which it then.
blamed. the Chilean govern-
ment.
It poured in money to sup-
port the Right-wing truck-
owners' strike which all but?
paralaysed the ? Chilean
economy after October 1972.
? More than 100 Right-wing
trade union leaders were
flown to the US fur training
and indnctrination at a special
school in Virginia which is sup-
ported both by the US govern-
ment and by big corporations,
with ? interests in Latin.
America: such as ITT, United
Fran. and ?W.? Fe Grace.
?-In spite of everything, -how-
ever, the experiment failed. By
-early 1973, there ? were signs
that the Chilean 'economy
might turn the corner. And in
, March, 1973, in national parlia-
mentary electione, Allende con-
founded the CIA's predictions
and increased his share of the
popular vote from 36 per cent
to 44 per cent.. a.
It was at that point that Dr
Kissinger decided to, play it
rough. ?,
The evidence we.- have un-
covered suggests that when the
Chilean armed forces moved
in to overthrow, Allende in
September. 1973, they did so
with clandestine American
help. Liaison seems .to have
been supplied, not by the CIA,
but by the US navy. ?
In an unpublished interview
before he was .inysteriously
murdered in Buenos Aires this
month, General Carlos Prats,
non-political Defence Minister
in the Allende government
until he was forced out shortly
before the coup, told a free-
lance journalist,- Marlise
Simons, that US backing ef the
coup was coordinated through
the American naval mission in
Valparaiso. where ? the 'coup
began. ? Other sources support
General Prats's account-on
several details, though tere.
are still some questions about
the degree of US nmilitary
involvement.
: What is more disconcerting
is that Kissinger's decision to
intervene surreptitiously in
Chile appears on close exam-
ination to have been no freak.
On the contrary, it fits in with
ternational agencies, including, the strategic logic of his, and
the "Vorld Bank, it deliberately President Nixon's, . foreign
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IN THE SUMMER of 1970,. the
CIA conducted its own private
poll on the Chilean elections.
It predicted?quite wrongly,
as it turned out?that the con-
servative candidate.' Jorge Ales- ?
sandri, would win with 40%,.
of the votes. --- ?
Washington, -however, was
taking no chances. Just how
far the American intelligence
services were prepared to go,
even before Allende took
. power, is suggested by the far-
cical episode of the naval brass
band.
The Chilean embassy. in
Washington was bemused to
notice that the US Navy, in
the first eight months of .1970,
had applied for visas for no
fewer than 87 officers, NCOs
and civilian employees, all for
the period of the Chilean elec-
tion.
The embassy politely queried
the applications, and was told
by the State Department that
the visas were for members of
a US Navy band which planned
to tour Chile; giving concerts
in a spirit of US.C.,hilean friend-
ship. The Chilean diplomats
couldn't help noticing just how
much brass there was in the
band: to be exact, three full
captains, three commanders
and 15 lieutenant-commanders,
many of them with previous ex-
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perience of intelligence \vo
The embassy theref
expressed scepticism about
musical nature of the ban
duties, and was e prom
honoured with a visit fi-em t
very Senior American cifici
There had been. a stupid n
understanding, one of th
expiained. Of course the n
men were not a- baud. Th
visit was connected with
annual joint US-Latin Ameri
manoeuvres, c o d e-nam
'4. Unitas." The. Chit ea
reminded their visitors ti
Chilean participation in
H70 _Unitas had been cancel
some "'months before Ja
sagged.. The officialsee-ithdre
and the applications' for vi
were Caneciled. ? ?
Without fanfare; - howev
the Navy was back -in 1973.
rk.
ore
the
d's
tly
wo
ais.
em
avy
air
the
can
ed
n s,
tat
the
led
w,
sas
er,
AT 'THE JUNE- 27 meeting
the Forty Committee, it w
agreed that the CIA shou
spend 8400,000 dollars in sr
port of Allende's oppotien
The. agency may have done
littleotbetter than that. Thr
weekshlater, on July, 21, t
offieeshafethe public. relatio
firm in ?SantThgo whicli w
handling the AleSsandri-ra
paign were burgled-within
few days its financial recor
were published in a Left-wit
paper. They showed paymen
to the Right-wing- Cathol
tudenta! Federation, and
middle - --class profession
'7roups: nothing surprisine6 i
that But they also recorde
mvaterious payment - ?
$600,000 from someone ident
fled on the stub only a
' Charlie " Not Carlos: Ch'arii
t seemed clear that there w
oine large?and non-Chilean
ecret paymaster.
.
-Three days later, Henry Ki
singer ordered his staff to pr
pare a paper on Chile. Th
document, NSSM 97, laid ot
che American options in ca
Allende won. These include
nutting? ? an internation
queeze on the Chilean eco
my, and supporting his ove
hi-ow- by his opponents i
Chile, on the model of U
aipport for the overthrow o
resident Goulart in Brazil i
964. . . ? ?
On September 4, Allend
uly emerged as the leader i
he popular elections, by
hort head. Kissinger did no
ide his attitude. On Septem
yer 16 he told editors in hi
a ck ero tin d briefing h
lunt terms: "If Allende win
here is a good chance that h
nil establish over a period o
ears some form of Communis
overnment," and that thi
-ould present " massive prob
ems for us."
He also told the editors tha
he US had little influence ore
vhat happened in Chile Bu
n that he was being mare than
ittle disingenuous: For the
ret Forty Committee had
t met to diaeuss Chile again.
sate on the evening of
tember 15 the US ambas-
or in Santiago. Ed Korry,
of
as
Id
ip-
ts.
a
ee
he
ns
as
a
ds
ig
ts
ic
to
al
of
s
C.
as
1
ec
us
ep
ad
gat a message from. Washing-
ton " giving him the green
light to move." Ma task: keep
Allende from taking power.
AS THE EVIDENCE of Kissin-
ger's " hard " policy in .Chile
has accumulated, many people
have had difficulty in squaring
it with his reputation as a
non-ideological " moderate
and with his, on the whole,
successful pursuit of detente
with the Soviet Union; .
Two ?clues help to resolve
this apparent contradiction.
The first is the correction of a
widespred misunderstanding
of Kissinger's, and Nixon's,
foreign policy. The essence of
that policy was not a reduc-
tion of the American commit-
ment to contain ComMunisth.
On the contrary?as Nixon
himself- said in an interview
with this newspaper in Febru-
ary 1970?it was an effort to
resist a tendency fed by
failure in Vietnam, to isola- The CIA was Only one of the
tionism. ,It. was not ?a policy instruments for Kissinger's
of withdrawal, but "a revised will. He sat at the .contians
policy of involvement." Kis- of a giant console, able to
singer's innovation lay only in direct now the CIA, now the
the degree to which American State Department, the Treasury
involvement was to be direct or the Navy Department as
and visible. - ?
each seethed best fitted for his
enal Soviet policy as well.
. gested that US hanks shouei
. . ,.
. , not renew credits, that Us
.,
THE GREEN LIGHT message companies should drag their
to Ambassador Korry illumin. - feet in remitting money or
ales ? another point that has shipping spare parts to Chile,
been misunderstood. The and that the US should ,with-
Allende government's antag? draw all technical help. Gen-
001st was not the Central een, McCone and Gerritv de-
Intelligence Agency. It war cided?so they told the Senate
the government of he United sub-committee?to have noth-
States. ::,-- ? ? .- - - ?. - ing to do with this plan.' But
Kissinger has recently been
.. ....e
it- is clear that the riecndon to
telling sympathetic renortere -strangle the Chilean economy
that most of the S11.5;.2-CStiOlIS was taken at the Forty
for covert actin in cnee were Committee itself.
made by the CIA But the CIA ------ h?-?-- ? - -- ? --
was under the orders of the "FROM THE VERY DAY of
Forty Committee, of which our electoral*. triumph: on
-Kissinger was at all times the September 4. 1970." Salvador
chairman. Kissinger took..,) Allende told the United Natioes
much interest in Chile one general assembiy in 1972, ." we
official has told the New York have felt the effects of a large-
Times, that he became " in acale external pressure against
effect. the Chilean desk officer. lis Which tried to -Prevent the
g g
He made sure that'policv was inauguration of a overnment
made in the way he and the freely elected hY the people'. : .
President wanted it." to cut us off from the world,
to strangle our economy and
paralyse trade in our princinal
export, copper, and to deprive
us of access to sources of inter-
national funding." ?
He was not exago.erating.
The Nixon Administration
tried to give the imnression
that its economic blockade of
Chile was a re-monse to
Allende's nationalisatiun of -the
US-owned c o p p e r mines.
? "Nixon and. Kissinger pro- purpOse. That was to destroy
.poeedaetepVy on tiworld scale,
I
the constitutional government
ifilsefaet;- thenidea-----ofe-ee:Viot-1 of Chile . ??? ?
Itemisation," Anti-CoMmunists! ... After the Forty. Committee Nationalisation, however, came
around the world were to do ? ; meeting in mid-September the as no surprise: it passed the
their own fighting, backed ' CIA began to - show. a new Chilean parliament without a'
wherever possible not with interest in the ambitious plans single negative vote. What was
American troops, . but with which the International Tele. . controversial Ives Allende's,
money, -, arms, air power, phone. and Telegraph corpora. .decisicin to offset the compensa-
and, if necessary, 'selective , tion had been putting forward .tion due to the two big copper
clandestine operations. , . since' the summer f?or savine companies, Anacoada and Ken-
'Ibis was ? the meaning of democracy (and its oWn invest. :necott, with a deduction for what
the "Nixon Doctrine," enun? ment in the priva w
tely-oned , the Chilean Goverernent regarded
1 as " excess profits," so that the
elated in the spring of 1970, telephone system) in Chile. :companies would receive no corn-
in the special context of South- ' Contacts between ITT and ipcnsation in the end. *? . -
East Asia, but with world-wide the CIA were cosy to the point ; But that decision was not an-
implications: of a confusion of identity. John flounced until September 23,
" In cases . involving other McCone. former CIA director, 1119a7d1. peye ilt el:: h L-4 eGme,eorrirmome?et ,
types of aggression (ie non- was on the board of ITT. He weapon aeailrinsl . tine eChilean
nuclear aggression) '' we shall talked to his successor, Richard. Government for months: indeed
furnish military and economic Helms, and to De Kissinger. it was in the autumn of 1970
_assistance , . . But we shall The chairman of ITT. Harold that Kissinger personally chaired
look ? to the nation directly Gcneen. and the senior vice- a series of meetings whose whole
-threatened to . assume the president. Edward J. Gerrity, purpose, one participant has
primary responsibility of met William Broe, whose. lob said, "was to ensure that Allende
providing the manpower," bore the intriguing title:- wasn't going to get a penny."
It was the chis sic policy of ." Cnlief of the CIA elatieirc::',, os?LiS in
had poured into
eighteenth-century Britain: the services (also keown as dm onaceapitnal for US firms operating
1 the 1960s. The return
golden cavalry Of St George. Directorate of Pees), 'd'edes:i there doubled over the decade,
And Chile was the first Hemisphere Division.", but the effect on the Chilean
impartant test case. Before the Forty Cerme::: 'e economy was not so happy.
The second clue is the reali- meeting, ITT seems to 1?:?' ,?Almost all the profits made by
sation that Kissinger's pursuit been the suitor. MeCone ::-?3
. LS firms were. repatriated, and
of detente with the S o y i e t Geneen offered to nut e ? Chilean per capita income rose
mill ion dollars to deeee
Allende. They were told o
Kissinger, in effect, " don't
us, we'll call you."
Union, so far from inhibitiee
the suppression of an indepen-
dent. Left-wing government
such as Allende's, positively
demanded it. Kissinger's plans
for a stable world system, and
Nixon's hopes of " a generation
of peace," rested, as much as
on anything else, on the Soviet
Union and the United States;
agreeing to respect each other's1
spheres of. interest?that is
what detente. means for ? his-
from Plans, contacted 1-1-1
singer.
Gerrity. When they met in h ?
An independent Marxist York nroe propnsed ccc c': 1'-
government in Chile not only orate plan for tesrer.en.,.;
challenged American domino- Chilean economy in e
Hon in the US spnere. By offer- bid to persuade the Cle.
ing, an alternative model of perliernent to v-?te
"
revolution " to other Latin Allende 1
American count i h decomine rho
Last-ditch )1(.
?
Then. on September 22.
quote the Senate sub-c
mittee's report, '-for the eisd
time . . . the Government tee-
the initiative." Broe, the ;e:
r it t teat- Among Other the e. ;,,,,e ? On eeenst Ii 1971, almost
14
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y less than 1.a7, per annum
over the second Ifalf of the
decade. In 190 the US Agency
. for International Development
reported officlaily to Congress
that its programmes in Chile had
"failed dismally."
In the meantime, Chile had
become extraornarily (leper,-
dent on the US. By- 1970 its
foreign debt per head was tho
second highest in the world (after
only Israel's). Imports, export.c
and investment u ere dominated
by US corporations, and so were
We more advanced sectors of th?t
economy.
The US Government understood
the leverage this economic grip
gave it. "The best way to get
at Chile," wrote Kissinger's aide
Arnold Nochmanoil, "is through
her eennemy." ?
k?,
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1 ,t-ve 71 *a er.04:4 Le{A7,!' A He21,1,2 i
ef.t 1...i dee:3:on. ca
-ex,-.-t-,5 pr.,:lis." . K:ssir.:4:7"
.1i:inter:I'd the f.....?zt cerew. Tilo.
(a t.-S.
{7:werrnient anincv) 1.,:mne..1 en:xn i
H:Mie's reet:.-t f-r? 321 .in:,:en
? , in loans and IZKin gu3ranteoi .
'..a enable !.AN, the chilen -
-
national airline, to buy three
Boeings., though LAN's repay-
ment record was flawless.- me ?
In the meantime John Connally,
then Secretary of the Treasury,
had already ordered US repre-
sentatives on international finan-
cial institutions to oppose all
loans and aid to Chile. Two main
institutions were involved. ? One
was the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, whose US director;
responsible to Connally, was in
:a position to wield a veto on
loans. He used it to see that a,
Chilean request for $30 million
for a- petrochemical complex
never even came up for a vote.
Between 1959 and 1970. the IADB
?had lent Chile over $300 million:
After Allende took power, the
only loans made, in three years;
were to two 2-light-wing univer-
sities, for a total of under 812:
million. ? ? ? ---
The pretext
? The other was the World Bank,
whose president is always. an
American and whose US director
is . answerable to the Secre-
tary ? of the Treasury. Before
1970, the bank had lent Chile
$234 million. After Allende
became president, it did not so
much' as Process a single loan
request from Chile. -
The pretext was US indignation:
over the copper mines. let the
aextent-of -Washington's true inter-
est in the copper issue was re-
vealed after the coup in 1973i
In November that year Reuter's
reported that Orlando Saenz, one
of the juntaismmain economic
advisers; had said: "Now the
Government of the US considers
this is a problem for the Amer-
ican mining companies:" -
- Since 1946 Chile, as a show-
case of liberal democracy, had
received $540 million in develop-
ment loans. After Allende was
elected, all aid was cut off.
There were just two exceptions.
In December 1972 the secretary
of :the white-collar "greniios
(Right-wing middIe-class profes-
sional associations) was invited
by the American Institute for
Free Labor Development to
enrol in a course on "advanced
labour economics" at a univer-
sity in Washington. Altogether
108 Chileans from the gremios
and unions were trained et
AIFLD's school at Front Royal,
Virginia, 50 or so miles away.
These were the cadres for the
; truck-owners' aid other Right-
wing strikes.
The other es:motion was mili-
tary aid. In the fiscal year end-
ing 1970, it was $800:000. In
; the year to acne-1971, it was $5.7
In 1971-2 it 'was $12.3
million. o:
The pattern of aid revealed
all too clearly the strategy
described with brutal frankness
in an IT!' memorandum in 1970:
!' A more ? realistic hope among
those who want to block Allende
is that a swiftly-deteriorating
economy will touch off a wave
of violence leading to. a military
? ?
?
THE ECONOMY deteriorated
fast enough, and there was cer-
tainly a wave of violence. It
would be a mistake, of course, to
attribute all Allende's troubles
to American intervention.
Whether you call' them reforms
or revolution, the Poptdriz? Unity
Government's own policie played
their part in ?bringing on econ-
omic crisis. ?
Agriculture is an example.. In
1960, fewer than 3 per tent of
the landowners owned more than
40 per cent of the land. In 1971
and 1972 more than a third of
the agricultural land ? in the
country changed hands as these
vast holdings were split up: As
'a result food production fell by
.8 per tent. in 1912, and wheat
production by 16 per cent. -
; Food Shortages and rising
prices squeezed the lower middle.
class. They added a dimension
of mass panic and anger to the ?
'tenacity with which the wealthier
Chileans defended their privi-
leges. None of that was created
by the Americans: ?
Yet into this troubled and vul-
nerable country a massive weight
of covert American influence was
thrown, and it was thrown on
the side of increasing economic
chaos, and, exacerbating social
violence. - "? ?
Over the three- years from
September 1970.. to September
1973 the Forty Committee?so
William Colby, director of the.
CIA, told the congressional com-
mittee last April?spent at least
$8. million on "destabilising"
the .Allende Government. Presi-
dent Ford has said that the
money was used. "to; help and
assist the preservation of opposi-
tion papers and electronic media
and to preserve Opposition poli-
tical papers." Quite apart from
the fact that opposition news-
papers and parties continued to
operate throughout the Allende
period, but Were shut down imme-
diately after the 1973 coup, it
was a funny way to nut it. ?
For the CIA money was .used
to subsidise. El Mercurio, the
Right-wing daily which kept up
a running fusillade of scare
stories throughout the Allende
period, except fOr a couple of
brief periods' when, it was- tem-
porarily; closed for advocating
armed insurrection. It was used
to infiltrate almost every politi-
cal party and movement in Chile.
.American money also went to
the extreme Right-wing para-
military group, Patria y Libertad,
which was formed in 1971. And it
was used to finance a whole
series - of demonstrations and
strikes, in-...a_...crescendm;
-violence. 7 '
In December 1971, there was
the March of the 'Empty Pots.
Five thousand women, organised
by the Christian Democratic and
National Parties, and including
a noticeable proportion of upper
middle-class ladies, many. with
their maids, marched through
Santiago banging cooking pots to
protest against fpod shortages and
the visit of Fidel Castro. Left-
wing counter-demonstrations -led
to rioting.
In October 1972 the middle-
class opposition to Allende came
to another climax with the strike
? called by the Confederation of
Truck Owners,- a serious matter
in a country 2,300 miles long
with few railways. This and a
series of other bosses' strikes"
lasted for a month, threw the
economy into chaos, and forced
Allende to bring the military
into his government. There is
little doubt that the strikes were
financed with CIA money.
? Indeed William Colby himself,
it would seem, has come close
to admitting it, in what deserves
, .
to become a Classic exposition
of the clandestine operator's
technique of the "cut-out." An
?
. .
unnamed official, thought with
good .reason in Washington to be
Colby, himself,. -told Seymour
Hersh f the' New York Times
that the trucloowners. could well
have got:. some of the agency's.
d' If We give it to A and then.
A gives it to B and C and D, in
a Sense it's true that ID- got .it'a
but the q`Oestion is: Did we give
it to A knowing that p :Would
get it? "eil;a: s a., .?>?-..e.? ?
? ? - -a,' ? ? ? ; is
AND YET, IN SPITE of every-
thing, bc, early 1973 it ivas'appmo
cot to time cold-eyed watchers in
Weshington that their " labora-
tory 'experiment " had hot;
worked. ea:. - ? . - ? s. ? .
...-
Warning sign .
There -we're several- warning
signs. Food. supplies improved.
Allende's government was streng-
thened politically be bringing in
several generals as Ministers?
and especially by General Carlos
Prats as Minister of Defence. No
man .of the Left, he regarded it
his professional duty to serve any
constitutionally chosen govern-
ment Then canie Allende's sur-
prise success in the elections on
March 4. Within three weeks the
Forty, Committee met again, and
Washington's antagonism towards
Chile moved into a new phase of
masked hostility.
Eepecienced students of Latin
American. politics have assured
us that you can usually tell when
there is a coup coming, because
the number of CIA men in the
local. US embassy under what is
called. "official cover "? goes up.
It may have been so elsewhere,
but .in Chile what happened was
the exact opposite.
An official who was in the US
embassy in ;Santiago at the time
confirmed to us in an interview
last week that in March 1973,
Kissinger called off the CIA. He
didn't want the agency too prom-
inently associated with the coup
which, from that month on, he
knew was only a matter of time.
Instead, the indications are that
communications were left to the
US Navy, The naval brass band
got into the act, after all.
From March on. events moved
fast in Chile. The tempo of
-s trikes ;- and demonstrations-
against the government built up.
Violence had not traditionally
been a conirnonplace of Chilean
politics. ? But from April on, San-
tiago got used to almost daily*
assassinations, riots and street-
fighting between Patria y Liber-
tad and government supporters.
On June 29, the 2nd tank
regiment mutinied and moved on
La Moneda, the presidential
palace. Prats personally led the
loyal troops who surrounded them
and put down the mutiny.
In the last week in July the
crisis went spinning into its final
phase. The truck-owners went on
strike again, followed by the taxi-
drivers. Terrorism increased. And
on July 26, in. mysterious circum-
stances, Commander Arturo
Araya, President aklaande's naval
ADC. was murdered at bis -home
at night. The Right-wing Press
blamed Left-wing terrorists. One
of Allende's. personal aides, lfow-
ever, has described to us the
dramatic confrontation at which,
.? ?
,in Allende's preience, ;army intel-,
ligence compelled the head of
the Special Branch of the police
to admit that Araya had been
murdered by a Right-wing group,
and that there bad been a con-
spiracy to feed 'a false version
of events to; the Press.
On August 7 several hundred
loyal; sailors and naval officers
were arrested by naval security.
:Two days later, the .heada of all
four armed services (Army, Navy,:
Air Force, and Carabineros, or-
national police) .joined the Gov-
ernment-. '' ?
On August 24, General Pmts.
was forced from ecoinmandl.
Allende was doomed. Even before
Prats finally left, the Centre and
.Right in Congress 'had .joined
In voting for a declaration that
the ? Allende government was
"illegal" and calling upon the
military to take power. ? -
On September 10? for the first
time, workers at a Santiago fac-
tory resisted an .Air Force de-
tachment which had come to
search for arms: Before dawn
:the next morning the Navy
'occupied Valparaiso.. The coup
had begun.- ? ? . . .
Before it was . over.. Salvador
Allende, lawyer and constitution-
alist, was dead, gun in hand, in
the Moneda Palace. Several thou-
sand 'fellow-believers in Popular
tinity.died with him elsewhere. -
A THREAD of navy blue runs
through the secret. 'history of
Allende's downfall. One probable
reason. for the murder of Com-
mander Araya, we were told
a former member of Allende"-
staff, was that it cut Allende ob
from all knowledge of what w.
going on at naval headquarters
For it seems to have been the
thatmuch of the planning of till
coup ? was done. Andit wa
through the US naval mission i
Valparaiso, Chile's main seapo ?
and naval sbase,, that the 1.3-"
government would haVe kept
touch.
General Prats said so in
inariy words. Some two mont-
after the coup, journalist Marli 4
Simons visited the exiled genera
in Buenos Aires, where he wa?
working as a book-keeper in .
tyre factory. (He was murder,.
in Buenos Aires earlier' thi-
month.) .
"The real co-ordination an
planning for the coup," Pra
said, "took 'place in Valparaiso.:
That was where officers in th:
conspiracy -secretly met the. If'
Marine attache. And Admi ,
Toribio Merino, second in co? :
mand of the Chilean navy an
senior naval officer at Valparaisa
kept close personal touch with tit;
same man, . LI-Colonel Patric'
Ryan, US Marine Corps. ?
On September 10, ;Prats sal*
the day before the coup, Merin'
requested that the America;
ships due. to arrive for joh
manoeuvre.s, stay out of Chilen.
waters, but remain on the ate,
offshore. ,
The nominal head of the 127"
naval mission in Valparaiso w ?
Captain Ray E. Davis, US Na
But Davis was also head of fit
whole US embassy militar
group,' with headquarters i.
Santiago. and normally spe
only :from Wednesday to Sat _
day each week in the nava
mission office on the s,event
floor at 749 Calle Prats ? a
ironic coincidence of name. =
was Ryan who was responsibr
for liaison with Merino. An
Merino was one of the chief con
planners, and is now a mein ea
of the Chilean junta. ?
By coincidence we have a ta
talising elimpse of the dashi.
Colonel Ryan and his helpers
work. Two Americans front Sa:
tiago, a girl called Terry Sitno
and Charles Horman, were.stra
ded in Valparaiso by the eau.
On the terrace of their hotel Ilk,:
met a man who introduced
self as hiring come to ail
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or the third time, "to do a job
or the navy." Although the
hone was not working, he
bowed detailed knowledge of
-hat was happening.
Next day they were approached
y none other than Colonel Ryan,
. ,
Who offered to-help them get
back to Santiago. He boasted that ,
he had information on everything ,
that happened 2443 hours in
advance and would know as soon
as the road to Santiago was open.
Over the next two days both
Simon and Homan saw a ?good
deal of Ryan and his colleagues.
They talked freely about the
coup, of , which they approved,'
and of their own inside know-
ledge. At one point they were
driving *with Ryan when he was
stoped at a roadblock. He pro-
duced, and let Terry Simon
examine, a. card identifying him
by name as an officer in the
Armada de Chile. * . ?
? Ilorman was later picked tip
by. the _Chilean military police
and disappeared. His wife,
parents and Terry Simon believe
the Chileans may have killed him
because he knew too much about
American liaison activities.
Why might US naval, intelli-
gence have been used for liaisbn
with the Chilean conspirators?
Three reasons can be suggested.
One is that in the late 1960s the
US Navy set up a special secret
communications network , linking
it with each of the navies of
Latin America. the very existence
of which is still classified. Using
it, the US and Chilean navies
could communicate directly in
total secrecy; bypassing embassies
and even the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in Washington. ?
A second reason is that, as
Admiral Gene La Rocque, former
director of the Inter-American
Defence College, told us, "re-
lations between the US and-.
Chilean navies have always been
close." Largely this reflects 'pro-
fessional admiration and common
interests. But in this connection
it is interesting that Colonel
.Ryan boasted to Terry Simon
that he had escorted a Chilean
admiral on a million-dollar shop-
ping expedition for naval equip-
ment in the US the month before
the coup. ? . ? e
Above all there were the Unitas
manoeuvres. Four US Navy
vessels were involved: two guided
missile destroyers, the USS Rich-
mond K Turner and USS Tattnall,
the destroyer Vesole, and the sub-
marine USS Clamagore. On Sep-
tember 11, having finished their
joint manoeuvres with the Peru-
vian Navy, they steamed south-
ward to begin manoeuvres with
the Chilean Navy. ?
The State Department an-
nounced that "on receipt of in-
formation about the situation in
Chile they were redirected and
ordered not to go into Chilean
territorial water .or ports." The
ships, however, were just outside
territorial waters, at the crucial
period of the coup..
The manoeuvres had been
planned eight months earlier, so
the Chilean high command knew
that US naval units would be off
the coast on September 11: "Any
time you have US naval forces
offshore that suggests the sup-
port of the United States,"
Admiral La Rocque pointed out,
and he conceded that the date
of the coup was probably chosen.
at least in part, because of the
scheduled manoeuvres. .
Thre abortive mutiny of late
June had failed because the
military were divided. In Sep-
tember, there were still some
units loyal to Allende, but not
enough to save a ?
It looks as though contingency
. plans were made against,. the
possibility of civil' war, none the ?
less. On August 22 a Communist
deputy, Jorge Insunia. burst into
a *night session of the Chilean
parliament and demanded that
it go into immediate secret ses-
sion. He - had been told by
President Allende,. he said, that
he had been informed by Prats
that Bolivian troops were deploy-
ing near the frontier between
Chile and Bolivia in the vicinity
of the huge Anaconda' copper
mine at Chuquicamata. Insunza
said that Allende had told him.
that Bolivia was backed by
Brazil, and by the US Air ?
Force. _Opposition . d.e put
cheered... . ?.- ,
Whether any such . double
insurance policy had .been taken
out or not, it; seem; ..that. the
military conspirators had the
symbolic ,'-support of the US
Navy. And if General Paats ?
is to be believed, the Y also had
help with Planning through the.
naval mission in Valparaiso. , ?
. . .
KISSINGER.. never male any
bones of the fact that when he
was worrying about Chile, Europe
was also on his mind.
On September 20 this year,
.Kissinger and President Ford
received nine congressional
leaders, to the. White House to
discuss the CIA's covert opera-
tions in .general as well as what
the .CIA did in Chile. He
reported to have expressed con-
siderable concern at the prospect
of Italy "going Communist," and
to have said that whatever
criticisms were now beieg made
of the CIA, if Italy did go Com-
munist, the United States would
be criticised for not having done
enough to save her. ?
Portugal now seems to. be
causing Dr Kissinger even more
worry than Italy. While in Italy
vet another effort is being made
-to establish a Centre-Loft coali-
tion' that will exclude the Com-
munists from power, in Portugal
the Communist Party is already
in the Government.
This week the Washington
columnists Rowland Evans and
Robert Novak, who in the past
have had excellent access to Kis-
singer, revealed that the depth
of Anxiety over Portugal's sharp
move to the Left can be measured
by the fact that the United
States has Cut Portugal off .from
certain highly classified military
and nuclear information com-
monly available to all nientbers
of Nato,"
Portugal tks
The decision, Evans and Novak
saY, seems to have been taken
after Alvaro Cunha!, director
general of the Porte,1:ticse Com-
munist Party, joined the Govern-
ment. ?
Our own "Jith
Pi+rtuwese diplimiits confirm
CC! nn. talks
Pre on: Fraii.and
red the presi-
dont. Generai Costa
uas accompani.i.d by th.? Sncialist
icador. Mario Sonrcs, a kw days .
320 were apriarriitly not as eau
as was generally reported. Kis-
singer apparently made it clear
that the US could not toleraie
a Communist government in
Portugal.
In the circumstances, it is
hardly surprising that there Fnii
widespread rumours and reports
of American covert political acti-
vities in Portugal and, to .a lesser
extent in Greece and evee
Spain as well. The French
-satirical weekly, i.e Canard
Enchain& . for example', has*
reported that General Vernon
Walters, deputy director of the
CIA, has recently visited both
Portugal and Italy. The general's
office confirms that lie has indeed
been in Lisbon and elsewhere in
Europe?en holiday.
Even more titillating, for con-
noisseurs of the CIA legend,. iS
the news that Irving .Brown has
been on the warpath again.
Brown runs the European opera-
tions of the AFL/CIO, the
American equivalent of the TUC.
In 1943 and 1949 he. played a
key role in setting up "third
. force" trades unions in both
France and Italy. Some would
say he . helped to save Western
,Europe from Communism, of' ars
that he helped to split the Euro-
pean Left.
In .1967, he was identified in
the Saturday Eve:.ing Post by a
former CIA official and by the
Washington Post as having
;worked' for the CIA. which than-
:nelled money to anti-Communist
unions through him. .
Last year he ? returned to
Europe after- eight years of con.
cern witheAfrican .affairs, because
?he told us?George aieany, the
fiercely anti-Communist head .of
the AFL/CIO thought that not
enough was being done, to
strengthen. the.Centre in Europe.
In eatly May. after the'Cae-
? tano dictatorship fell, Brown
arrived in Lisbon to see what he
could do to develop anti-Commu-
nist Unions in Portugal.
In July he travelled to Rome,
where his goal' was to try to en-
courage splits in the Italian trade ?
union movement and stop tha
trend towards .a unified, Com-
munit-dominated union mo;P-
ment.\
When we asked this week
whether he was still working fur
the CIA. he reacted wearily.-
'" Why ask me? You know jus'
as well As I do that if I was 7..
wouldn't tell you, and if I say I
am not, then* you won't believe
me. hfcwadays. if Mount Etna
erupts, people say its the fault
of the CIA."
After what happened in Chile,
? that, too, is not perhaps alto-
gether surprising. ?
Washington Post
30 October 1974
The askingtonrtfferry.Go.' Roland
1. By Jack Anderso# :1
? -CIA-Plant?Iliespite the sensi-
tivity of U.S.-China relations,
the Central Intelligence Agency
has quietly placed an operative
in the U.S. mission in Peking.
He is James R. Lilley, a "politi-
cal Officer" who has also served
in Cambodia, Thailand, and
Laos. ?
This is but one of the explo-
sive revelations in a soon-to-be
published Washington Monthly
article by investigative journal;
1st John Marks, co-author of
"The CIA and the Cult of Intelli-
gence." Marks, now an associate
of the Center for National Secu-
pity Stidiei, also discIosedlhat
lover a fourth of the 5,435 State
'Department employees 'who
work overseas are actually un-,
idercover. CIA 'agents, and the ;
number is steadily rising. The ;
enate Foreign Relations Com-1
mittee routinely approves the;
ppointment to sensitive postt-;
of Foreign Service Reserve Offi-1
ers who are in realitk CIA.'
agents. Of the 121 names submit; ;
ed to the committee last year, :
0 were agents, he wrote. I
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DAILY TEIEGRAF-ii, London
1. Novealxir 19A
11.0BERT MOSS On
THE fuss about C IA involve-
nitInt in Chile has died down
for the 'moment in Washing-
Ion, but the chances are that,
when Dr Kissinger returns,
[ from his present journeyings,
he will find the issue still
-there to- haunt him.. Gen.
dropov, chief of the KG R,
must be convulsed with
laughter at ,the sight of so
many..American Senators and
newspaper editors protesting
that their country has no
right to pursue any sort of
covert foreign policy.
President Ford said the oh-
!ions when, in his attempt to
justify the fact that the CIA
spent [S8 million to support ()p-
ima:atoll parties and media under
President Allende, he pointed
out that the Russians were
spending considerably more on
such operations and tend to con-
duct them far more ruthlessly.
It is only necessary . to glance
back oYer the past few years to
see that the Russians have made
a tremendous investment in in-
telligence activities in the effort'
to depose non - Comniunist
regimes. Even in Latin America,
which has always ranked low
on their order of priorities,
the Russians have been doing
. some ? very -curious things.
In March, 1971. the Mexicans
expelled five KG B officers, who
had been masquerading as Soviet
diplomats, because they had
helped 'to finance and organise a
? guerrilla group called the Re-
volutionary Action Movement. A
few months later. Ecuador- ex-
pelled another- three llussian ?
officials for their role in funding
the Marxist-dominated Confed-
eration of Ecuadorian Workers
which had used the money to or-
ganise a general strike origin-
ally planned to co-ordinate with
.a Left-wing coup.
,
In Chile, Russia's hand was
obvious again, although, as in
many similar cases, the Cuban
, intelligence organisation. the
D G I, served as Moscw's in-
the implications of America's 'passion for
iliseiosure"
,
strurnent. The D GI has now
been completely colonised by the
KG B. and operates under the
? close surveillance -of a KGB
general in Havana. A -DGI
officer, Luis Fernandez de Ofia;
occupied an office next to
Allende's: reading his correspon-
dence and screening his visitors.
-There was, it is true, a personal
factor involved: he became
Allende's son-in-law by marrying
his daughter, " Tati," but it was
more th-an a family affair..
The Continuing inquest into
the Chile affair is part of the
malign legacy of Watergate
and the Vietnam . war. Both
undermined the confidence of
ninny Americans in the integ-
rity of the Ad-ministration and
have created an enormous
bandwagon in favour of public
supervision of every aspect of
policy - making. They ? also
created a passion for disclosure
that now makes it impossible
for anyone to assume that con-
fidential .information will be
kept confidential.
One of the most dangerous
aspects of the Chile, affair -is
the way that the names of
political. parties, newspapers
and radio stations and trade'
union organisations that are
alleged to have received CIA
funds have been bandied about.
? If public hearings go further,
the next step, no doubt, would
be the naming of Chileans
alleged to have had some rela-
tionship with the American-.
Government. This would not
only put them. on the death
lists of the terrorist organisa-
tions that have espoused the
cause of "Allende the Martyr "
it would discourage people in
other situations who might
contemplate turning to the
Americans, rather than Rus-
sians, for outside support.
The lirnits of the C IA in-
volvement in Chile have been
muddled beyond recognition.
During ? the first months of
Allende's government, before it
became apparent that the Marx-
ists in it were bent on a total
seizure of power, the Americans
experimented With a policy of
conciliation. This was largely
the work of Ambassador Korry,
who, for example, tried to
negotiate with Allende over the
nationalisation of major Alfieri-
can interests, such as the big
copper companies. He actually
offered Allende a deal that
would have enabled the Chilean
Government to pay compensa-
tion -with official bonds under-
written by the American
Treasury.. The deal, however,
was rejected by Allende after
it was vetoed by the leader of
Yie extremist wing of the Social-
ist party, Carlos ,Altamitaim-
It was not the CIA funds
that finally brought about the
conp d'etat in September last
year. ? At best, they served to
keep in being a number of news-
papers that would otherwise
have collapsed as a result of
spiralling costs, declining adver-
tising and frozen prices. Without
that critical voice, and without
the major strikes, also partly
financed by the Americans, that
served to demonstrate wide-
spread hostility to the regime,
the Marxists in Chile would
have found their road to power
much. less stony. It was not in
- power of the ?Americanss.
? however, to bring together the
broad range of political force;
that united to topple the regime:,
A cynic might even say that the:
conclusive proof that the cod,
was not essentially the work ci&
the CIA was that' it worked
so smoothly.
,
Perhaps it "is not goott
enough ?? for .Americans, or,
America's allies, to conclude:
that what "our" side does is
justified because the "other 't
side is doing the same,, or worse.:
But when it is seriously pro.::
posed, as in two recent books':
on the CI A, that covert opera
tions should never be licensede
it has to be pointed out that;
this would leave a tremendous-
vacuum in many areas the:
Communists wmild not be slow:
to exploit. The things that were.:
done in Chile would have pro-.:
yoked little comment if theye
had been done to oppose Hitler,:.
or, for that matter, the Soviet"
regime (although, in the latter:
case, there might have been:
complaints about the threat td;
detente). Yet it often seem
that it is only when the Cora
munists have won that peopl
realise that they had been on:
the way to winning. .
Russia remains en expansionist
power---and its chances for fur-,:
them expanion, given the effects:
of the oil crisis, the risinee,
strength of the Marxist Left in;
southern Europe and the pros-
pect of a new phase of American:
isolationism, are probably greatO:
now than at any time since the,
immediate post-1945 period. The;
Americans and their allies ar
? increasingly on the defensive.
The Americans exerted thein.4
selves, to a fairly minimal extent,
in what was seen as an attempt
to prevent Chile becoming a part
of that expansionist bloc. There
is no reason, in present condi-
tions, why that should be regar-
ded as a monstrous?or immoral
?thing to do.
WASHINGTON POST
12 November 1974
Kiss* geir Stresses Need for high-Caller orei n
Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger said yesterday that
the United States "cannot rely
on star performers" to develop
or carry out its foreign policy
- but must have a Foreign Serv-
ice with a high standard of
performance.
Speaking to the seventh an-
nual awards luncheon of the
American Foreign Service As-
sociation, Kissinger, who has
been criticized for carrying
out American diplomacy sin-
glehandedly, said:
"We cannot rely . .. on the
possibility that someone will
come along every few years to
manipulate events. This can-
not be done by any President
or Secretary of State. What
we need is a high standard of
rperformance that is carried
?[,' out through the decades."
The secretary ? encouraged
Idissent ? "for which we bear
no visible grudges" but said
it must be kept within the
Iservice. Once decisions are
made, he said, they must be
carried out with discipline
characteristic of tile Foreign
, Service. Kissinger bas angrily
denounced "leaks," which he
attributes to junior officers
dissatisfied with his decisions.
The United States. Kis-
singer said, is passing through
one of the most difficult peri-
ods in world affairs, compli-
17'
cated by "a very searing expe-
rience"
domestically. Follow-
ing World War H there was
a period of great ceativ-
ity, he -said, in which America
drew unconsciously from its
own domestic experience, in
effect bringing the tecnhiques
of the New Deal to other coun-
tries that shared the same
democratic traditions.
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30th general assembly
'EDITOR & PUBLISHER
, 26 OCT 1974
IA A asks Ford to Mien y
papers that got CIA money
The 30th general assembly of the Inter
American Pres i Association in Caracas,
Venezuela last week vigorously con-
demned the reported CIA "support" of the
"opposition press" in Chile under the
Allende regime and called on President.
Ford "to clarify once and for all" the
sdope of CIA intervention by naming the
newspapers which accepted fitancial as-
sistance of that nature.
"All 'free newspapers of the Americas
are justly offended by this action of CIA
which casts doubts on the integrity of the
hemisphere's press and makes it possible
for the enemies of a free press to circulate
all sorts of slanders and defamations
against it," the IAPA said.
The organization requested President
Ford to "order the CIA to put a stop to
any subsidization of newspapers or jour-
nalists" and condemned, at the same time,
newspapers and journalists who accepted
such assistance.
The IAPA action came after prolonged
debate on the reports of CIA intervention
in Chile and following vigorous denials by
editors of El Mercurio in Santiago, El Sur
WASHINGTON POST
01 November 1974 Y-
in Conception, and El Rancaguino in Ran-
cagua, that such payments had been made
to them.
The general assembly condemned ine
military government of Peru for its expro-
? priation of -the independent press of Lima
and declared "that government an enemy
of the free press." The association deplored
that some journalists and press organiza-
tions in various parts of the hemisphere
? have approved the attitude of the Peruvian
government.
The action was taken after reports by
two 1APA members who had visited Peru
prior to the assembly?Guido Fernandez,
editor of La Nacion of San Jose' Costa
Rica, and Rafael Molina, editor of El Na-
cional of Santo Domingo. They had talked
to previous owners, editors and reporters
as well as the government-appointed edi-
tors and concluded that a free dialogue no
longer exists under the "independent
Marxism," as they called the new regime.
Following three days of reports, IAPA:
? Condemned the absence of freedom of
the press and other civil rights in Chile;
? ? Said the tyranical regime in Haiti
CIA Activities: Focusing on the Wrong Issue
Recent discussion of .CIA activities
abroad has focused upon the Wrong is-
sue. if one accepts (as one Must) that
-military action can sometimes be a ra:
tional step, then one must also accept
that hostile , measures ? short of war
(such as subversion) also are rat:anal
measures._ It is illogical, therefore, to
argue that the U.S. should, never, un-
der any circumstances, seek to
"destablize" or, in' plain words, under-
mine and destroy any other govern-
ment. In a world where, the activities
of governments relative to each other
are controlled by power and not by au-
thority, virtually all seem to have
some propensity to undermine some
others. Arab governments undermine
one another and presumably, would
undermine the Israeli Government if
they could. The Israelis must be pre-
sumed as Well to undermine any gov-
ernments they can. Bangla Desh exists,
in part, because India collaborated in
? what was virtually?if not technically
?the undermining of Pakistan. And,
no doubt, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
? each would undermine the other if
they had the ability to do it and to get
. away with, it.
The reported CIA activities are im-
portant and objectionable for other
reasons. ?
1. They represent hostile -Sets taken
with no evidence that the implications
of those acts were considered ma-
turely. Accordingly, while they might?
if successful?aehieve some immediate
purpose, there is no evidence that they
actually served the interest of the
United States in the international polit-
ical arena, and that they might actu-
ally serve to injure that interest.
2. They represent a species Of
grossly unacceptable Executive action,
without any indication that that action
is approved by a substantial majority
in Congress and the nation:
3. Moreover; to speak of this action
as within presidential prerogative?if
there is such a thing?ot any other
variant of presidential authority is to
be technically right, but factually
wrong. It is now clear that much of
this action is beyond the scope of pres-
idential review, in that it is contem-
plated, organized, initiated, and execu-
ted before the incumbent President
(whichever one one means) has an ef-
fective opportunity to approve or :to
disapprove. .
The principal issue, then, is whether
de-stabilization is wise at a given time
and whether it is properly authorized,
controlled, conducted, and terminated
when it is no longer approved or effec-
tive. What we cannot wisely contemplate,
in short, is 'hostile action taken with-
out mature consideration, outside any
framework of authoritative political
.approval, on the motion of some self-
initiating bureaucratic nucleus which
cannot be ealled to account. .,
? Matthew Holden, Jr.
Professor. Department of P,)litIcal
Science, Unlveraity of Wisconsin.
Madison.
, .
does not permit a free press;
? Protested to the government of Nica-
ragua for depriving newspaper editor Ped-
ro Joaquin Chamorro, La Prensa, of his
civil rights and denying him an exit visa
. from the country because of his published
statements that his country's elections
were a fraud;
? Declared that because of censorship
there is no freedom of the press in Brazil;
? Denounced the lack, of a free press
and the violation of human rights in Cuba
and asked the Organization of American
States net to lift sanctions against that
country until the Castro regime has given
proof it is ready to restore a free Dress ?
and human rights and release political
prisoners including dozens of journalists.
? Declared that the existence of govern-
ment agencies which monopolize distribu-
tion of governments' commercial advertis-
ing constitutes a threat against a free
press;
? Noted that eight publications have
been shut down by the Argentine govern-
ment and said the recent adoption of an
anti-subversion law throws shadows on the
people's right to information;
? Reported that after IAPA had ac-
cused the 'government of Ecuador of re-
fusing to authorize publication of a new
newspaper, Extra, the government had
changed its mind and expressed satisfac-
tion to the President of Ecuador for that
development.
IAPA found that in Panama the press
is owned or controlled by the government
and in Paraguay there is a state of per-
manent sieg,e and censorship.
The association found that in Canada,
Argentina, El Salvador, the United' States,
Trinidad/Tobago, Barbados, Puerto Rico,
Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Jamaica,
Costa Rica, and Colombia there are isolat-
ed obstacles but a deep foundation to sup--
port a free press. ?
Venezuelan President Carlos Andres
Perez opened the IAPA meetings empha-
sizing the importance of a free press with-
in democratic systems of government.
Press freedom is indispensable to the dem-
ocratic system and added the "system is
defeated and losing prestige in a large
part of Latin America. . . . Other ban-
ners are being raised up before our peo-
ples which promise bread and order but
not liberty. But we must not compromise
liberty."
In a veiled complaint against the U.S.
press, the president complained that mass
media in industrialized nations are failing
to inform the public adequately. OTt events
and issues in Latin America.
"/ am aware of the fact that I am
speaking to editors who have suffered exile
and imprisonment but I am also aware
that in their countries many citizens have
been unable to express themselves because
special interests have blocked them from
doing so. This is a form of dominance ex-
ercised by the stronger over the weaker.
"The IAPA could be a powerful instru-
ment for the demonstration that freedom
of expression should not be compromise
by special interests or ideological dogmas,"
the president said.
18
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New York Times
? 27 October 19714
- By ALVIN SHUSTER,-.::.
. Special tq Ttte New Yerk. Times .?
-LONDON, Oct. 26--The'
Brit-
ish spy, as etched in fiction, is
that handsome chap who wears.
the right clothes, appears in the
right places at the right time,
carries the right weapons,
-
drinks martinis of the right mix
and -never does anything
wrong. - ? ? -- -
? In reality, what he does is a
complete mystery: And the Brit-
ish these days are learning far
More about activities of agents
of the United States Central In-
telligence Agency ? -than., they
could ever hope to learn. about
, their, own 'espionage establish-
-meat.
rhe
i ?
The ,- -,contnoversy over the
covert .operakins of' the C.I.A.
has once more underscored ma-
jor.: differences between the!
400- year 7 old foreign' .eintel-;
ligence service here .and its!
/much . younger counterpart
across the Atlantic. ? ? .
? Britain's intellIgence service, ,
popularly known as M.L 6 and i
the most legendary spy organi-i
zation around, .operates underi
tighter reins, with far less Mon-
ey and much greater .secrecy.
'Even if it did subvert foreign
? governments, the British public
would not read about it in
newspapers or hear politiLians
derna:nd,explanationS.
? There are no significant
checks by committees of the
House of Commons, no open
appropriations for its activities.
Books published by former
agents usually deal, not with
? THE HARVARD CRIMSON
6 Nov 1974
spionage: A Mystery to Britons
recentrhiStory, but with' exper-
iences during World War II,
when British spies Were in their.
glory:- ? .. : ? , ., :-,,,, .. 1
, .../. 'Shrinking' Service - !
The government rule barring
public access to. official docu-
ments for 30 years?relaxed six ,
years ago from 50 years ;----1
means that new material -on
World War H has now become
available. . .
"Our agents today are more'
tightly controlled despite the
lack of Parftmentary watch-
'ings," said one expert. "The
foreign intelligence service is
responsible to the Foreign Of-
fice and it just doesn't run off
and do things .an its, Own with-
toutall-around clearance."
There is some 'question any-
way as to just how active the
service is these gays in such
"black arts" as throwing mon-
ey to foreign politicians or en-
gineering military coups. The
general assumption .is that!
covert operations of that naturej
are kept to a minimum and left,
more and more to the United',
States, which can, 'afford fart
Inuire -cla aks: a Ed daigers,- not to I
:Mention expensive . satellites'
'and electronics.
r For one thing, the service isl
5 limited in funds. The estimates!
of its annual budget, well hid-.
,i-den in spending figures ap-i
proved by Parliament, range;
'! from $25-million to about $100-!
'million a year. Even the higher'
!estimate ' pales in comparison i
Iwith the C.I.A.'s exPenditures;
which are belieVed to be-About,'
Elisberg .8.4
Aniticipdted cliqpan:
$750-million.
'Moreover, the British foreign
intelligence -Service operates
tinder a bureaucratic structure;
designed to confine the seopej
for free-wheeling activity. It ?
does not work independently ?
but reports directly to the For-
eign Office, where some control
is exercised by' a Permanent
Under Secretary.
Although the work of the
two civilian Intelligence serv-
iges is thus scrutinized, their
directors have the right to go
directly to the Prime Minister
and bypass the formal chains
of command. An intelligence
Unlike Congressmen, Mem-
bers of Parliament rarely make
demands for more control over
the intelligence comniunity and
spern Content with the present
?system. Questions are raised
;politely on those infrequent oc-
casions when the spies get in
trouble ' or their tactics are
revealed.
?
'The image of the intelligence
service was, for example, badly'
tarnished in 1956 when a Royal;
Navy frogman, Cotndr. Lionel
Crabb,' disappeared after diving
near Soviet ships in Portsmouth,
Harbor at the time of the visit',
to Britain of Nikita S. Khru--1
shchev. Even then, the Govern-
ment said little. The Prime Min-
ister, then Sir 'Anthony Eden;
, announced that it "would not
be in the national interest to
disclose the circumstances" of
I the frogman's death. ?
More recently, ? controversy
?
By SETH ICUPFERBERG and RICIIARD H.P. SIA'. ?
Daniel Ellsberg 'S2 'told' an off:the- which journalists agree not to publish what'
record Niemdn fellows 'meeting Monday, they learn?as "a method of plugging
that William E. _Colby, director' of the newsmen into the government bureaucracy
and making them part of it."
A Senate subcommittee learned ,last
, .
summer of CIA'fun'ding Of 'opposition to
Allende's gOvernment, beginning in 1970,
The New York ?Times reported two days
after, the coup that: "senior American
officials" acknowledged having advance
word of it. . ? I
?
But the Times reports,, did not
specifically eke CIA foreknoWledge of
Allende's overthrow:: And White House
and State .Department officials contended
that reports of the coup . did nol. reach,
responsible officials until after it began.
They implied that the reports were not
taken seriously beCause?rumors of a coup
had. been "current throughout 1973.
"There ? was absolutely no way of
night and describing such briefings--:-in knowing beforehand that on any of these
Central Intelligence ? Agency,' has
acknowledged that he "knew of the im-
minence of' 'the September 1973 Chilean
,Military Coup. - ?
Ellsberg* also quoted Colby as saying
that "a political decision. was made not to
inform" the Popular Unity government' Of
Salvador Allende- Gossens.
Colby's remarks came in the course of a
conversation during a conference of former
ciA agents,. government officials ? and
journalists on the CIA and covert actions.
The Center for National Security Studies
sponsored the Washington conference,.
which was held this September 13 and 14.
? Ellsberg Made" public his talk with the
Niemans yesterday, denouncing -Colby's
,
off:the-record meeting with`Niernans last
;hasl_focused not on what' the;
British agents are doing abroa4
?hnt on 'what they are doingl
within Britain. M.I.5, the coun-
terespionage group, is believedl
to. be particularly, active in -
dealing , with terrorists in
Northern Ireland, working!
closely With Scotland Yard's
Special Branch.
The secrecy of it all seems, to!
be generally accepted here, The
l
name of the head of the foreign!
-intelligence brand' is published!
in the British press only after it
appears abroad.
' The Britisti. Public wOuld be;
more likely:- 4o recognize the!
name of William E. Colby, the:
Director of Central Intelligence'
in the United States,, than they
would that of Maurice Oldfield,
who-heads fo-reign intelligence
operations for Britain. The
name of Mr. Oldfield's prede-
cessor, Sir John. Rennie, ap-
peared only after his son had
been arrested on a . heroin
charge. ,
Normally, the press hero is
not permitted to name the in-
telligence chief, whose Working
title is "C." Newspapers are
subject to a so-called D-notice
system, under which the. press
, is notified Prior to" publication
? that' a- particular news item
could violate security laws.e.e..._
"Yo can -describe one majort
difference this way," said one
official here. "Colby goes up to
Congress to testify about what
? the C.I.A. has done. Here, if you
lust publish the name of Old-
field you could be in trouble." fi
_
dates, including the September 11 date,-a
coup' .attempt would; be made," Paul J.
Hare, a State Department spokesman,
said on September 14, 1973. -
....?,'The administration had been receiving
rumors: of unrest in the Chilean military.
for more than one year," Gerald L.
Warren, . White House spokesman, told
reporters that . week: "Asids,..from these
rumors, the President had no advance
knowledge of any specific plan for a
coup.,',sb' erg saii'd Colby told him he was
aware of and agreed with the "political
dccision"?presumably made by theft:
national security adviser Henry A.!
Kissinger '50 or then president Richard M.,
Nixon?not to alert Allende to, the
im-
.pending',i'nilitary revolt; - ": ?
"I said, 'Did you know the 'plans' for this
coup just before it happened," Ellsberg.
told the Niemans. "Colby did not appear
to be mincing any words about how much
they knew. A political decision was made
not to tell Allende what we knew?now. -
there would be no political decision if what
we knew Was what we read in UPI.' .
. James C. Thomson Jr., curator of the_.
Nieman Fellowships, "released a* tape of-
Ellsberg's talk with the Niemans yesterday'
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afternoon, after Ellsberg said his remarks ,
shotild heOn the public record.
Ellsberg.. also said he would not have :
agreed to meet with the Niemans if he had ?
: realized his' , appearance would help
'! "legitimize". Colby's.
Ellsberg quoted Colby as saying that he
. would hive "preferred" 'that the Popular
Unity candidate for president of Chile lose
? the election 'scheduled for .1976: ._
. But Ellsberg said there 'vas an "un- ..
?? mistakable inference" that.. the CIA
"preferred" this coup to happen than not
to happen?and indeed Colby made that
very, clear during the day, that he preferred
the current regitne to -the past regime?'
HARVARD CRIMSON
6 Nov 1974
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 October 1974
Mirror of opinion
CIA: a new mandate
,
Long before the recent disclosure
that the CIA had played a relatively'
minor role in the overthrow of Chile's ?
Marxist President Salvadore Allende,
critics of the agency were forever
noting that its ? secret. operation's
abroad have been conducted with,
neither the knowledge nor the appro-
val of Congress.
The charge was only partly true, for.
most of the CIA's activities have been
scrutinized by at least a handful of
congressional leaders. And they could
scarcely have remained "secret"
very long if they had to be explained,
debated and approved by Rep. Mike
Harrington and 534 other congres-
sional overseers.
Now, however, Rep, Harrington
. and other critics of the CIA can no
longer claim that the agency is oper-
ating without a congressional man-
date. For in their zeal to blow the
agency's cover and eliminate its
I secret operations, they forced their
colleagues to make a choice.between
outright rejection or authorization of
the CIA's covert activities. And pre-
dictably, the tactic boomeranged; the
CIA won the contest hands down.
The issue was brought to a head in '
the Senate when Sen. James Abou-
rezk, (D) South Dakota, offered an'.
amendment to outlaw all the CIA's
"dirty tricks" and other secret oper-
ations abroad, other than intelligence
gathering, in peacetime. The issue
was r,Jenly debated, and when the
time came for a vote the Senate
rejected the amendment over-.
whelmingly 6847, a margin of 4 to 1.
Hence, by implication, one house of
Congress has served notice that it is
aware of the CIA's secret operations,
and that it approves of and accepts
responsibility for them. From now on
it will be rather difficult for people
like Rep. Harrington to complain that
the Congress has been kept in the
. dark and that it hasn't given the CIA a
mandate for its covert activities. ?
Boston Herald American
'By GEOFFREY D. GARIN and GORDON D. MOTT'
Central Intelligence Agency Director "destabilize the CIA," plainly could be
William Colby was briefly confronted by heard by the participants at the. Nieman
demonstrators last night during an off-the- session, but apparently did nOt disrupt the
record dinner meeting with this year's meeting.
Neiman fellows at the Faculty Club. ? ; Daniel Ellsberg '54, who spoke to the
While 150 demonstrators marched Nieman fellows Monday afternoon, was
outside the Club, a delegation 'of six among the protesters. Ellsberg carried a
protesters entered the building to ask placard that said "William Colby Murders
Colby" to meet with the marchers and Humans and Democracy."
answer questions about the CIA's role in
Chile. -
After an interchange between Colby, the
protesters:and Nieman Curator James C.
Thompson, the CIA director declined to
.meet outside with the demonstrators and
When the six proteiters confronted'
Colby inside the Faculty Club just before
the dinner began, the CIA director said
he Would not come outside -because "I've
been invited to a private party."
' 'Thomson then told the six protesters
the -delegation rejoined the picket line. that Colby "has been doing a lot of open
outside. ? talking before a lot of iiubliO gatherings,",.
The protest, the largest at Harvard since adding, "He's the most open CIA director
last winter's Honeywell demonstration,
lasted an hour and a half and was marked
by a series of chants condemning Colby
and the CIA.
The demonstrators walked ? directly
beneath the windows of the room where
Colby ate and shouted "Colby, killer" in
the direction ,of the windows.
The chants, which included a call to
ever invented."
, ?
At the end of the confrontation, one
demonstrator, Philip T. Aranow '69,
turned to Colby and said, "You're a
wonderful killer."
"Thank you," Colby responded.
After the six demonstrators departed,
Colby said he did not mind the protest.
"It's part Of life," he said.
Thomson said he thought the protesters'..
request that Colby answei their questions
Was "reasonable, as was his [Colby's1
response."
think the Niemans- will give Colby a
liat'cl time Thomson, said before the
20 dinner.... '
?
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EVENING NEWS, Tokyo
10 October 1974,.
THERE was once an Amen-
can republic, one of whose
roost illustrious founders, Tho-
mas Jefferson, would have pre-
ferred not to have closer trade
or maritime dealings with
Europe than it had with China
at the time.
The declaration of universal
neutrality, which George Wash-
ington offered his countrymen
as a political testament at the
end of his second term as presi-
dent in 1796, was in large part
--inspired by this?autarky, this re-
fusal to be involved in the Old
World's wicked and degrading
squabbles.
This is also the spirii of the
Monroe Doctrine the fifth
president of the United States?
proclaimed on December 2,
1823 as a warning to Europe
not to meddle in the Americas.
One important phrase of this
celebrated message deserves to
be quoted: "It is still the true
policy of the United States to
leave the parties concerned to
themselves in the hope that
other parties pursue- the same
course."
Non-Interference Concept
The story of how the United
States rolled back the heirs of
the Spanish Empire well beyond
the Rio Grande, provoked
Spain into an unequal combat
and threw it out of Cuba and
the philippines, and carved out
for itself a piece of Colombian
territory for building the Pana-
ma Canal is today a part Of,
,history, but it illustrates the
North American concept of
"non-interference" (it applies
only to the others) in the desti-
nies of Latin America.
Europe's 'brigands" always
found other brigands to chal-
lenge their plundering and tres-
passing, so giving rise to an
infernal cycle of battles and re-
turn matches. But the United
States intended to remain mas-
ter in the closed field of the
"hemisphere."
There is no need to go over
the "doctrines" successively en-
unciated over the years and
which, after the Second World
War, justified American post-
war interference by tacit or
open reference to the liberation
of Europe from under the Nazi
heel. The U.S. intention then
was to safeguard, not the
"hemisphere," but the whole of,
the "free world."
Eur ope an reconstruction
could not have proceeded in an
atmosphere of trust in the fu-
ture if this protection had not
been provided. The undoubted
'debt of gratitude European
countries owed the United
States earned Washington the
pained or servile (depending on
?CIA Operation
st Interests
' By Alain Clement
Le Monde
Every country has its in-
telligence service, and nobody
minds that., But the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA),
which grew out of the ,old
OSS during the cold war, and
has become sort of spies'
Pentagon and headquarters
for mounting 'destabilisation"
operations, has acquired a re-
putation all its own. Highly
secretive by definition, ,the
CIA is practically outside the
control of Congress.
In a recent interview he
gave the U.S. newsmagazine
Time, William Colby, the
present director of the CIA,
confirmed that one of the
functions Of his department
was -to "positively influence a
situation through political and
paramilitary means."
But these disclosures and
the recent revelations of CIA
activities in Chile have not
impaired the. confidence of
the U.S. Congress in the
most occult of American in-
stitutions: on September 24,
the House of Representatives
defeated by 291 votes to 108
a motion seeking to prevent
the CM. from interfering in
the domestic affairs of for-
eign states.
the nation) indulgence of its al-
lies for its bloody bungling: the
counter-revolution in Guate-
'mala, Bay of Pigs, Marines sent
to the Dominican Republic, the
'Vietnam war and so on.
All these weren't especially
honorable undertakings, but
weren't they also the result of
over-zealousness? After all,
how could one reasonably hesi-,
tate to choose between the U.S.
cop and the Soviet commissar?
Finally along came' Richard
Nixon, with Henry Kissinger in
tow. It was goodbye to ideo-
logical crusades, swift expedi-
tions and the race for planetary
supremacy! Washington went
back to old-fashioned realpoli-.
tiking and the age-old defense
of "national interests" (even if
the dimension of the United
States made the limit's of such
interests somewhat unclear).
Washington launched detente
as the first step toward a "con-
cert of nations" without dis-
crimination, and invited all the
nations of the world to build a
lasting "peace structure" bene-
fiting everybody.
The frightening botch-up in
Cambodia, Washington's irrita-
tion over Europe's uncoopera-
'tive stand on logistics during the
Arab-Israeli war in October
1973, and the false maneuvers'
over Cyprus were snags which'
proved quite simply that all the
bugs had not been shaken out
of the new system.
And now Mr. Colby discloses
that things weren't that simple.
As an honest man he doesn't
deny that he had spread some
small change around in Chile to
"raise the morale" of those who
opposed Allende's experiment,'
even though he swears he did
nothing to hasten the Chilean
leader's downfall. Nor does he.
deny "conducting" intelligence
with the aid of the most up-to-
'date methods so as to enable
U.S. diplomacy to ,know just
:where it is going.
CIA's Functions
It's clear, of- course, that for
him this diplomacy is not like
any other. He admits it would'
be going too far to wish to im-
pose democracy in the four cor-
ners of the globe, but he sees
the CIA's various functions
bound up by a philosophy of
action. The mission he is as-
signed by the government some-
times calls for influencing "a
situation by political or para-
military means."
Suggestions for action may
spring from within the CIA it-
self, from examination of speci-
fic data. Or they may come
from outside, from "an ambas-
sador, from the State Depart-
ment or from the National Se-
curity Council staff. They'll
say: 'Why don't you guys do so
-and- so?" This is apparently
how major policies are tackled.
And indeed, why resort to intri-
cate formulas when in so many
places it is so much easier to
buy, gull, and help change the
course of "movements" which
tend to develop in a direction
21
lo ?
hile
contrary to that desired' by
American "security"?
What happens to the princi-
'ple of non-interference in all
this? Mr. Colby's reflections do
not take him so far: The idea
:that a country may have the
sovereign right to self-determi-
nation, even if this is at its own
cost should it be mistaken, does
not occur to him.
Chile had gone astray and
had to be helped back on the
straight and narrow. "The Al-
lende regime was not democra-
tic." And what was even
more offensive, it was based
only on a minority (a number
of American presidents have
also been elected on minority'
votes, but that is none of Chile's
business). ?
The last word should be left
to an American journalist, Eve-
rett G. Martin of the Wall Street
Journal, who wrote on Septem-
ber 18: "The opposition forces
demonstrated time and again
-through various by-elections and
the 1973 congressional elections
that they were the majority. It
seems ,a, kind of arrogance for
Washington planners to think
that the Chilean majority would
let its protesting voice disappear
entirely from print' and from
the airwaves even if established
publications and stations col-
lapsed by the dozens."
Why. bother about this "pro-
testing- voice" since it is pre-
sumably. the president of the'
United States who ruled that the'
CIA's field operations were "in
the best interests of the people
of Chile"? What if France had
elected Francois Mitterrand
president? It is comforting to
know that the "best interests of
the people of France" would
have been in good hands at the
White House.
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ULTIMAS NOTICIAS, Caracas.
27 September 1974 .
Commentary: "Venezuela and the CIA"
by: Movement for Socialism (MAS) leader JOse Vicente Rangel
(Text) It is silly to exaggerate the importance of the CIA and to see the CIA
everywhere, but at the same time it is unforgivably naive to underestimate this
organization and to see all the charges levied against it as a propaganda ploy or as an
attempt to discredit an intelligence service merely because it is American. The CIA
? has too long a history to be taken lightly.
The influence of the CIA should be investigated within the framework of national policy
and as befits a threatened nation. Its participation in the country's politics,
economy and cultural activities should be investigated. There is :.to doubt that the
? persistent U.S. threats against petroleum producing countries--of which our country is
a prime target for obvious reasons?demand a serious eValuation of the situation and
a review of our mechanisms for defense.
The CIA has been participating in world affairs with varied success since it was created
by special law during the Truman administration. It may be said that since 1947 it has
been present at every major world event. It is worthwhile to note by way of reference
that the CIA is very often depicted as being completely autonomous with regard to the
presidency of the United States. This line of thinking attempts to portray the CIA
? as responsible for all the dirty work and as carrying out activities of which the
president is hardly or very vaguely aware. In this connection it is worthwhile to cite
the following excerpt from the book by Wise and Ross, The Invisible Government:
"On 23 November 1963, during the first hour of his first full day in office, Johnson
was taken by McGeorge Bundy?who had served as Kennedy's personel liaison with the
Special Group--to the Situation Room, a small command post located in the depths of
the White House basement. There, surrounded by super-secret maps, electronic equipment
and communicatiors lines, the new president was briefed by the head of the Invisible
,Government, John Alex McCone, Director of the CIA and member of the Special Group.
Although Johnson knew the men who headed the Invisible Government and knew about much.
of their work he did not begin to understand and see the full scope of the Invisible
Government's organization and secrets until that morning."
? Claude Julien states in The American Bmpire: "The CIA never makes a major decision
without agreement from the president of the United States." He adds: "There is no
CIA policy distinct from that of the State Department or of the White House.
Eisenhower's memoirs establish without the shadow of a doubt the collective
responsibility of the U.S. Government in the operations carried out against Mbssadeq
in Iran and Arbenz in Guatemala."
But should there still be any doubt about the CIA's international activities and
presidential support for them, one need only turn to the recent statements made by
President Gerald Ford justifying the role of the CIA and to Kissinger's statements
cynically accepting CIA intervention in the overthrow of Allende. And there is more:
An AP dispatch datelined Washington, 25 Septembet, reported that the CIA had won an
important victory in the U.S Congress "when the House of Representatives rejected
by a vote of 291 to 108 an amendment which would prevent the CIA from spending money
to subvert or destabilize the government of any foreign country."
If there is a close link between the CIA and the presidency of the United States and
if the congress of that nation refuses to cut off CIA funds so that it may continue
operating against any foreign government, is it not then advisable that in view of the
crisis which has arisen between the United. States and Venezuela, we Venezuelans should
be wary of CIA activities?
What is being done in this connection? Is there any program aimed at uncovering the
activities of CIA agents in Venezuela? What record is being kept of the numerous
personnel that service has scattered within the most varied activities of our country?
This is not an attempt to create a psychosis about the CIA in Venezuela; but we would
be pretty stupid if we do not open our eyes and it would be unforgivable for our
government to believe that a power of this kind can be challenged with impunity.
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- LONDON TIMES
23 October 1974
The man-who lipped the price Ofileteiit6
In contemplating the agree-
ment reached between the
United States and the Soviet
Union, by the terms of which
the United States grants sub-
stantial and very valuable
unilateral trading advantages
in return for a promise that
the Soviet regime will take a
single step in the direction of
an elementary act of national
decency that has been common
to all civilized states for cen-
turies, the first thing to note is
the Byzantine nature of the
,formalities.. involved; ,because
of the Soviet leaders' under-
standable terror at the thought
of telling even a small part of
the truth to their people, the
agreement ? takes the weird
form of a concordat between
President Ford and .Dr Kiss-
inger on the one hand, and
Senator Henry Jackson on the
other. The unspoken premise,
of course, is that Dr Kissinger
was empowered by the Soviet
authorities, at the end of his
protracted negotiations, to
offer the terms laid down in
the Ford-Jackson agreement;
the deal obviously included a
provision that no public refer-
ence to it need be made within
the Soviet Union.
That is a small price to pay
for an agreement of so historic
a nature and with such enor-
mous implications; indeed, if
the Soviet dictatorship keeps"
the agreement, or even goes a
substantial way towards doing
so, the document .enshrining it
deserves to rank with the Most
significant statements ever
made in the history of the
United States, and I can envi-
sage future generations of
American children learning to
recite its terms as they now do
the Declaration of Independ-
ence, the Bill of Rights or the
Gettysburg Address.
It is difficult to know where
to start in examining this
astonishing event, the true
magnitude of which seems so
far to have been scarcely un-
derstood. I might as well
begin, therefore, with a
resounding salute to the man
who, almost single-handed, was
responsible for bringing it to its
triumphant conclusion. Senator
Jackson is an American politi-
cian in the admirably forth-
right tradition of his namesake
the seventh President. He
fights for his country, his State
and his, own political career;
he does not spare his political
foes and does not ask them to
,spare him; he conceals, meta-
phorically speaking, a knife in
' his boot, knuckledusters behind
his back and a cosh in his hip
pocket, and uses them cheer-
fully whenever he thinks it
necessary; and if he has .a
motto it is sorely Pistol's assets
,tion that Holdfast is the only
dog, my duck.
Senator Jackson was deter-
mined to do something about
the plight of the Soviet people,
and in particular about their
?inability to leave their vast
prison-house, even if they
promised never to return. In-
stead of making indignant
speeches to give himself and
his hearers a feeling of 'virtue,
he took the exact measure of
the power which the American
Constitution gives to ? a deter-
mined, popular and intelligent
Senator, and proceeded to use
that power. The trade Bill that
was to ? give Soviet Russia
"most favoured nation" status
in commercial dealing with the
United States was desperately
needed by the Soviet leaders ;
more .to the .point, it was des-
perately wanted by Presidents
Nixon' and Ford, and by Dr
Kissinger?in their case not on
economic grounds, but because
it- was the Soviet price for
d?nte.
But Henry Jackson's price
was higher. It was an easing of
the cruel restrictions on those
who wished to leave the Soviet
Union, and an end to the
savage persecution of those
who applied, to do so. And he
organized enough of his fellow-
Senators to ensure that the
Bill, provided they stood their
ground, would not be passed
without the Soviet leaders pay-
ing that price. Every kind of
E.,Plawr7,,,T.M.TZ"."131
Bernard Levin
IiiiEreeMtse-segeemg.testi
political pressure was brought
to bear on him and his sup-
porters; he stood firm, and
kept them no less faithful. He
was told that there was no
chance of Soviet agreement to
so humiliating a bargain; be
greeted the news with thumb
to nose. The President publicly
pleaded for the Bill to be
passed without strings
attached; . Jackson, tied the
strings more tightly. .
Now I do not sing Senator
Jackson's praises simply
because he deserves it, but
becaose among the most tre-
mendous implications of what
has happened is its demonstra-
tion that in the great debate
between him and Dr, Kissinger,
he was right and Dr Kissinger
was wrong. The Kissinger argu-
ment is that it is proper to,
give the Soviet Union what her
leaders want, provided that we
also get what we want; the
corollary to the argument is
that the nature of the things
they want is no concern of
ours. Senator Jackson's view is
more positive. It is that we
can, and should, judge the
Soviet Union's demands in
themselves, and not simply
regard them as characterless
weights on the other end of
the' seesaw, to be balanced by.
equal weights on this; the cor-
ollary to the Senator's argu-
ment is that the nature of the
things they want does affect
the price we ask. Dr Kiss-
inger's devotion to freedom is
not to be doubted; hut he has
maintained throughout the
negotiations that it ,is useless
to demand something as valu-
able as internal reform from
the Soviet leaders, because
they simply will not concede
it, and we will therefore lose
the chance of getting useful
external concessions. The im-
portance of Senator Tackson's
victory is that it shows how
low have been the prices we
have hitherto asked from the
Soviet Union, and how much
more we can now ask.
,Beyond that vital lesson,
tere are others to- be learnt?.
and taught. It is widely
believed that Senator Jackson's
campaign, and the agreement
itself, concerned the fate of
the Soviet Jews. That belief is
mistaken; nowhere in the
agreement is the word Jew
mentioned, and Senator Jack-
son has been scrupulously
careful, throughout the battle,
to make clear that he was
fighting for the 'right of Soviet
citizens- to leave their country
if they wished4 irrespective of
their religion or descent.
Nothing less, after all, would
have been proper ; of course
the Jews have led the fight to
be allowed to emigrate from
the Soviet Union, but only
because of the historical acci-
dent that they have somewhere
they can go. But I doubt if
more than a minority, and pos-
sibly a small minority, of
Soviet Jews positively want to
live in Israel ; many want only
to get out of the Soviet Union,
and that is a feeling that is
certainly not confined to Jews.
The word of mouth now Immall'
spreads in the Soviet Union
with astonishing speed ; if the.
authorities keep the agree-
ment, and Jews are seen to be
leaving in large numbers and,
without prior suffering, there
are bound to be others, per-
haps ultimately millions of
them, who would demand the.
right that their governors have
conceded. (One of the most
touching, and?in its implica-
tions appalling aspects of the
Jewish emigration of recent
years is the 'way in which Soviet
citizens with remote Jewish
ancestry which they have always
tried to conceal . or reject
because of Soviet anti-semitism,
have been demanding to be,
classified as Jews, in the hope
that they might thus be able to
get out.)
That is a prospect to stretch
the imagination almost to
breaking point. But it also car-
ries with it another, less
happy, implication. What sort
of response are the new, non-
Jewish emigrants to receive
from the West ? It may soon
be that, at last, through the ,
courage and determination of a
great American patriot anti ;
humanitarian, theywill have
m
obtained from Russia's modern
tyrants the right that even the
worst of the Tsars freely
accorded. Are we then to mock
their right and deny their
hope ? Rather let us .say, as was
said to their grandfathers d
Give me your tired, your poor, -
Your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free.
The wretched reffise.of your teem-
ing shore,'
Send these, the homeless, tempest-
tossed, to me: -
I lift my lamp' beside the golden
door. '
There are, of course, hori-
zons still more distant. Dr Sak-
harov's immediate reactien to
the announcement of the
agreement was to say, quite
rightly, that the Soviet people
will be truly free - when they
can not only leave their
country, but when they can
leave and return at will: This
is, indeed, almost a, definition
of freedon, and Dr. Sakharov,
bravest of the brave, is right,
to demand it in those- terms.'
To put it another way, there is
yet another implication in the
success of Senator Jackson's
Campaign?that in dealing with
tyrants we must harden our
hearts against feeling grateful ;
every concession they, Make
must be used as a lever to pry
open the next. -
One step at a time. If this
historic agreement Is kept by
the Soviet authorities, I shall
soon be able to greet Colonels
Ovsishcher, Davidovand
Alshansky, to shake the hands
of Professors Voronel and -
Levich, and to embrace Vladi-
mir Bukovsky. And all because
Senator Henry Jackson, that
mastiff of freedom, bit deep
and would not let go.
(0 Times Newspapers Ltd 1974
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ASIXECIMErail
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WASHINGTON POST
12 November 1974
Tad &lac
issin er s Miscalculations
Secretary of -State: Kissinger has
? dangerously misjudged Soviet inten-
tions in the Mideast, despite ?Seeret
personal warnings to 'him by. Chairman
Leonid 'Brezhnev last March in Mos
cow that there would be no peace in
; the Mideast if the ? United States per-
sisted in "going it alo.ne" diplomati- ?
catty with the 'Arabs and Israelis. At
that time, ? Brezhnev accused Kissinger
ot"ruses" and "trickery."
The cumulative result of Kissinge-
rian miscalculatiens--?-some -diplomats
call it -Kissinger's "greed" in -freezing
out. the Russians?is the latest crisis
raising the threat of a new Arab-Ise .
raeli war.
Kissinger, in effect, helped to create
a a situation in which the Arabs, frus-
trated by the , lack of . diplomatic
? "movement" with Israel he had prom-
ised them after the 1973 war, have
turned again toward Moscow for
politi-
cal and military help. For similar rea-
sons, 'a new sense of ;Unity against Is-
rael emerged from the, recent Rabat
? ? summit with the all-out support?of the
financially ? powerful oil-producing
states. '
The Soviets, feeling vindicated, are
obviously -delighted to oblige. They
have been heavily rearming the Syri-
ans for some time. And all indications ?
are that Soviet military supplies 'will
start flowing anew- to Egypt even be-
fore Brezhnev. visits Cairo in January. ?
Only six months after Nixon's and'
- Kissinger's triumphal tour, it is Brezh-
nev's turn to be hailed once more 43
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's? fa-
vorite ally. President Ford's get-ac-
quainted meeting , with Brezhnev . in
-Vladivostok late this month might Well
.be overshadowed by the gathering Mid-.
east crisis:
In the light of this developing situa-
tion, it is. instructive to look at the' se-
cret record of Soviet-American differ-
ences, including Brezhnev's 1973 warn- \
. ings that an Arab-Israeli war was in
the offing. A part of this record, never
before made public, was presented by
Brezhnev himself to a Western states-
man at the Kremlin earlier this a,-Car.
Even allowing for Brezhnev's self-serv-
ing bent, his account is worth ponder-
ing.
Speaking of his conferences with
Nixon three months before the min:
tion of the Yam Kippur war, Brezhnev
Mr. 'Settle, a former foreign corre-
spondent, is now a free-lance writer,
working out of Washington.
recalled that "at San Clemente, I kept
Nixon up almost all night on the Mid-
dle East, trying to convince 'him of the
need to act together, Otherwise, there
would be an ex-plosion .. Nixon didn't
heed my words. And there was an ex-
.-plosion-inthe Middle East."
We don't know Nixon's and Kissing-
er's response to Brezhnev's alleged en-
treaties, but American diplomacy was
then singularly inactive in the Mid-
east, even though the administration
already had intelligence. that Egypt
and Syria were preparing for war. But
Brezhnev told his visitor that after-
ward "Nixon wrote a letter to me say-
ing he had underestimated the gravity
of the problem." ? ? ?
The United States and the Soviet
Union did. cooperate in, a fashion in
.bringing about a cease-fire.' Subse-
quently, a two-day Arab-Israeli peace
conference was convened in Geneva
under Soviet-American co-chairman-
ship, with only the' Syrians staying
away.
Kissinger quickly concluded, how-
ever, that Geneva was the wrong fo-
rtim because the negotiations would
bog down in propaganda. The Soviets
would also acquire a permanent pres-
ence in Mideast affairs. Instead, he
concentrated on military disengage-
ment 'between Israel 'and Egypt and
? Syria, and then on. the "second step" of
seeking Israeli pullbacks in the Sinai
and the occupied West Bank through
separate negotiations with Egypt and
Jordan.
The Russians inevitably saw it as an
end-run to exclude them from Mideast
diplomacy. As Brezhnev told his West-
ern visitor, "I berated Kissinger here
in Moscow," during the Secretary's
visit late last March, "for the U.S. be-
havior in the Middle East."
Brezhnev said that "we had agreed
at the United 'N'ations and elsewhere
that the United States and the Soviet
Union would work together to secure
peace." But, Brezhnev, added, "then
Kissinger began a series of ruses, and
attempted to go it alone. . .. We must
;4
act together, or there no tran-
quility in the'llichge East . . . Israel, I
too, knows our strength, and wottld.
want us to guarantee. It was even
agreed to better relations with Israel. ;
-4
Then, there was Kissinger's trickery:
which is not the way to deal with .
this. . ."
Kissinger kept' betting that-. his
lonely diplomacy would succeed, but
none of the contenders Vas willing to
budge toward an "interim agreement."
As Arab tensions . and frustrations
mounted, Kissinger's strategy began to';
disintegrate.
.
His hopes to minimize RusSian
volvement faded as Egypt sent its fore
eign minister and its army thief Of
staff o 'Moscow in late October. And -
at Rabat, the Arabs ended the Chances:1
for Kissinger's piecemeal negotiations !.
when they recognized the Palestine .1
Liberation Organization?with which ,1
Israel refuses to deal?as the de facto-.11,
power, rather than JOrdan, to govern.
the West Bank and East Jerusalem in. A
the future.
This ruled out Israeli-Jordanian'..
talks. Parallel negotiations between Is-
rael and Egypt were similarly under-
cut, for Sadat lost in Rabat his free-.''''
dom to bargain separately with Israel, it
despite the Egyptian President's public'
endorsement of Kissinger's diplomacy ?
this week.- -
'
Could. Kissinger have defused the
Egyptian switch back toward the So-
viet fold and forestalled Rabat's back-:
ing of the PLO if he had initially gone
the Geneva way, despite Israel's objec-
tions and Sadat's lukewarmness? -
Perhaps. Moscow, after all, is a fact -.
of life in the Mideast. Even to Israel, a
conference deadlock would be prefera-
ble to the prospects of war. The Sovi-
ets might have been locked in a diplo-
matic situation in which it would have
been harder to rearm the Arabs and ?
champion the PLO.
This may be why Kissinger is now -
rethinking the relative merits of Ge-
neva which, as the Shah of Iran told
him the other day, is better than noth-
ing.
But with the ascendancy of the PLO,
Israel's archenemy, it may no longer
be possible to construct even a diplo-
matic charade in Geneva. Thus, Kis-
singer may have missed a great oppor-
tunity.
24
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DAILY TELEGRAPH London
25 October -1974 -
'''?
NEW YORK TIMES
5 November 1974 -
Soviet.- Reports Expulsion
Of Two Amellean Jews
Special to The New York Tintes '
: MOSCOW, Nov. 4 ? TWO
American Jews have been ex
-
pelted from the Soviet Union
for allegedly distributing Zion-
ist literature, badges and ciga4
rette lighters to Jews in Soviet
Georgia, the official press
agency Tass reported tonight.
Tass quoted the Georgian
Communist party newspaper
Zarya Vostoka as saying in an
article today that the two
Americans, identified as 'Ira
Jeffner and Joel Michaels, were
"hunters of souls" who had
visited synagogues in Tbilisi,
Sukhumi and Batumi by posing
as religious Jews.
The newspaper article, Tass
said, showed "to what tricks
foreign Zionist circles resort to
agitate Soviet Jews to emigrate
to Israel:"
? American embassy officials,
contacted here, said they were
not aware of the reported ous-
ter and knew nothing about the
two menU involved. Tass said
that Jews in Batumi had "in-
dignantly reported" to Soviet
authorities an attempt by the
-two men to leave a bag of
anti-Soviet literature" at the
synagogue.
THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
1 NOVEMBER 1974
-.OLYIVPICS IN MOSCOW
THAT RUSSIA SHOULD OFFER (indeed, clamour) to hold
the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow is odder than it looks
ht. first glance; so is the Olympiti Committee's. acceptance
Nothing Wrong with the spoiling facilities, it seems, if
everything promised is ready in time. More hotels are
promised too, -and not without need. The thought of the
existing establishments, in which at the best of times if
can take an hour to get a plate of soup, coping with a
million extra inmates is really petrifying. For the rest,
the Russians have engaged to mend their ways utterly,
at least while the Games are on. Anyone can come. Any
qualified team can compete. There will be no visa troubles.
Once in, visitors will apparently be free to wander where
? they will.. No baffling bureaucracy; no rudeness, unpleasant
incidents or " mistaKes; " no packed audiences of soldiery..
jeering officially unfavoured teams. It all sounds too good,
. to be true.
Will the KGB really stand by, fuming with impotent
. .
rage, while a million potential wreckers and enemies of
: the people pour in and wander all over the place ? - Or.
will it in fact redouble its vigilance at this time of dire
peril? Will visitors really be free to wander about, not:
only in Moscow, but everywhere-? Will they be free to
bring in with them, and to take out, whatever reading
matter they please? Will they be free to make contact
with ordinary Russian people, or Russians with them?
Can they visit Russian homes? Will they be free to cOm-:
mit with impunity such heinous, Crimes as chang--
- ing inoney unofficially, or selling' -a pair ofshoes?
Will all the clamps really be off ? ? And if so, what will
hapren ? If the Olympic Gaines could . help in any way
to normalise the life of the poor Russian people, to
allow them to rejoin the civilised world, there is a case
for holding them in Moscow, not only in 1980, but as.
.," .
a: permanent fixture.
other cruel deception
Agreements governing the liberty of people
ought to be precise and transparent because. the.
:.people' have a ?right to know What will happen
- to them. Is there ? an :agreement between Dr
:-Kissinger and the Russians which foresees the
-emigration of 60,000 Jews a year? 'Or is there
'only an agreement between President Ford and
Senator Jackson which says the 'same thing .but
,is not acknowledged by the Russians? Ever
since October 18 When the deal was stated to
have been done, the Russians have been saying
with increasing 'emphasis that as fao as they are
concerned the deal ,never existed. Mr Brezhnev
?
has said so. Various east European radio and
? television commentators have said so. Last week-
the Soviet Ambassador in Paris said so. Even
...the White House has now 'begun to say so. A
presidential spokesman was saying on October 21
that a statement made from the White House
on October. 18?one that appeared to be per-
fectly clear at the time?had been "widely mis-
understood."..What are the Soviet- Jews to make
of it all ? _
.
The evidence ? becomes more confusing and
less encouraging as time goes on. The contents
? of the deal?if such a:thing exists at.all?seemed'
clear at the beginning. Senator Jackson described
it as "an historic understanding in the area of
? human rights." He said that he "understood that
the actual number of emigrants would rise
promptly from the .1973 level and would con-
tinue to rise to correspond to the .number of
applicants and may therefore exceed 60,000 a
year." Dr.' Kissinger's letter to Senator Jackson
was not specific about numbers, nor did he say
anything about historic understandings in the
area of human rights. On the other hand, he
did seem to say that a deal had been done. There
had been "discussions with Soviet representa-
tive's" who had assured the United States that
emigration would be regulated from now on by
specified criteria. Dr Kissinger said it was
assumed that 'the application of these criteria
would mean that the rate of emigration would
"being to rise promptly from the 1973 level and
would continue to rise to correspond to the
number of applicants." He did not say who had
made the assumption?the Russian' representa-
tives or the Americans.
It is easy for diplomats and White House
officials to find reasons for saying that in these
matters vagueness is a virtue. They can say that
it would be unrealistic to expect the Soviet
Government to admit that someone had been
interfering in internal Soviet affairs. Equally they
can say that it would be unrealistic to expect
Senator Jackson to let the Soviet trade agreement ?
through Congress except in return for some, sort
of triumphant public announcement from the
White House. They can' say that all will be well
in the end provided no one tries to be too precise
or to penetrate what is now a quite thick bank
of diplomatic fog. This may satisfy the Russians.
It may even satisfy Senator Jackson.. But why
should it satisfy the Soviet Jews? It is they,
after all, NAio have had 'their hopes raised..
23
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
10 November 1974
ermari intelligence-
PlOgued by Bunglings
Spy Business Found. in a 'Desolate'
State, Country Called 'Sieve' for Secrets
EY JOE ALEX MORRIS JR.
Times Staff Writer
BONN,?The CIA may be
In hot Water over Chile,
'but nowh:ere does-the spy
business seem to be in
such dreadful shape as in
West. Germany.
? Horst Ehmke, who as a
former cabinet minister
had the responsibility of
overseeing the Federal In-
telligence Agency, recent-
ly said it was in "a deso-
late state." This appeared
to be indirectly substanti-
ated by recruiting ads the
agency recently placed in
West German papers, call-
ing on patriotic you men
to.join in .this exciting and
adventurous business.
In Chile, the CIA and
Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger are accused of
engaging in nasty business
? designed to overthrow
President Salvatore Al-
lende. But at least the.
coup ? 'whoever en-
? gineered it?was success-
ful.
?Here, - the accusations
-against the West German'
agency are not of success-
ful, only dubious opera-
:Lions. They include
-charges of delving into the
bed and booze habits of lo-
cal politicians, and of pad-
ding the spook network
with relatives. Not to men-
tion the dramatic, if dread-
fully regular,, disclosures
of Communist successes in.
'penetratinghigh echelons
hire.
If it .sounds More amus-
Mg than alarming, that's
the way it's always been
with 'West German intel-
ligence agencies. which
employ about 12,000 peo-
ple. But there is a serious
side, too.
West 'Germany is a hap-
py hunting ground for
Communist spies, and un-
told secrets have found
'their way eastward
through this Jam!, which.
an American chief opera-
tive here once described as
"a huge sieve through
which secrets easily flow."
Recently, the truth of
that statement has become
increasingly obvious. A
Communist spy, Guenter
Guillaume, was arrested
last April while working
literally at former Chan-
cellor Willy Brandt's el-
bow. But there is some
doubt whether enough
evidence can be collected
to prosecute him. The dis-
closure forced Brandt to
resign.
' Since then, the fur has
begun to fly as pOliticians
and other concerned peo-
ple demanded an explana-
tion how a spy could, un-
detected, reach the exalted
position of personal advi-
ser to the Chancellor. The,
investigation is still under,
way on several levels, but
already it has produced
some startling disclosures
and destroyed a few
myths.
The most important. of
the latter concern the fa-
mous "Gehlen organiza-
tion," the federal intel-
ligence agency run until
recently by a nebulous fig-
ure from the Nazi past,
Gen. Reinhard Gehlen.
Gehlen ran Adolf Hitler's
eastern intelligence ser-
.
vice during the war. After-
wards; the U.S. Army hap-
pily took over his organi-
zation, located at' Pullach
near- Munich, and even-.
tinily: It became the core
of the new-found Federal
Republic's external intel-
ligence network; always
with the shadowy Gehlen
at the helm..
The fact that so little was
known about the Gehlen
organization publicly only
enhanced the aura of mys-
tery about it. Even the dis-
closure in the early '60s
that one of Gehlen's
closest confidants was a
Soviet spy failed to dim his ,
luster. -
The public furore over
the Guillaume affair has
led to the unlocking of pre-
viously tightly sealed
doors. Gehlen emerges
somewhat less shadowy,
and .a great deal more as a
man of questionable
professional ethics with a
propensity for feathering
. the bed with his own re7
latives.
The spadework is 'now in
the hands of a parliamen-
tary investigating commit-
tee. But even beforehand,
enough doubt about the
true worth of Gehlen and
his agents was raised to,
start up a bureaucratic in-
vestigation into the Geh-
len organization, known
by its German initials, the
BND (for Bundesnachrich-
tendienst or federal intel-
ligence service).
Some fascinating infor-
mation has come to light.
Although it has not been
officially published, the re-
port notes that among the
BND employees were two
of Gehlen's daughters and
their husbands, the hus-
band of a third daughter,
Gehlen's brother, an illegi-
timate daughter by a for-
mer Secretary. and Geh-
len's brother-in-law. Al-
together, more than 100 re-
latives of top END officials
were hired by the ofgani-
zation.
Testifyinab before the
committee, Ehmke further
subtracted from whatever
_
luster remained on the
image of the Gehlen orga-
nization. Ehmke revealed
that he had ordered the de-
struction of END dossiers
on about 54 prominent
West German politicians?
dossiers apparently main-
tained despite a strict ban
on internal and domestic
activity by the organiza-
tion.
A high official from the
BND told the committee
last week that there were
more than 54 dossiers .on
politicians. But he stressed
that the great majority
were started during the
years when the Gehlen or-
ganization was under U.S.
government control.
As the Americans do
with the CIA and FBI, the
Germ,ans have split
domestic and foreign intel-
iigenee operations Into two
? separate organizations, the-
; domestic under the Interior'
Ministry and the foreign
; coming directly under the
chancellor's office.
This division of authori-q
ty obviously hasn't im-
proved the efficiency of.
either the. END or its.-
domestic counterpart', la-
boriously known as the Of-
fice for the Protection of
the Constitution. The inep-
titude of this office, which
is supposed to protect
West Germany against en-..
emy spies, was well illus-.
trated by the Guillaume.,
case. .
Even before Guillaume
"fled" to West Germany in
the mid-50s as a Commu?_.
mist agent in refugee's
clothing, a private organi-
zation known as the Inves-
tigating Committee of
Free Jurist had fingered:
him in Berlin for suspicious
activities. .When Gull,
laurne ? was:called to work
in the Chancellor's office,.
the heart of West German
government, a routine Se-
curity check was made on,
him.
The West Berlin author-
ities?each of the II West
German states has its own
Office for the Protection of'
the Constitution, each one
more jealous of its prero- ?
gatives than the next--
sent an abbreviated report
on Guillaume to headquar-
ters in Cologne. There it
was promptly misfiled,
and Guillaume came out
clean.
For this kind of serince,.
the West Germantaxpayer
shells out well over $100
million a year.
This was only the start
of a series of curious
goings-on. Some were so
unusual that the political
opposition began to smell
what they suspect was the
biggest coverup since Sal-
ly Rand put. her fans back
on.
The bizarre operations of
the intelligence communi-
ty here have been partly
unclothed by the parlia-
mentary investigation
committee. Gehlen hasn't
yet appeared, pleading il-
lness, but the deputies have.
looked closely at the Office
for the Protection of the
Constitution.
What they have found
26
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was a jumble of explana-
tens as to what happened.
none of which, quite
seemed to jibe. Most of the
fingers Point at the head of
the office, one Guenter
Nollau, a man with close
links to the ruling Social
Democratic Party.
Nollau's office comes di-
rectly under the compe-
tence of the Interior Minis-
try; then run by Hans-Die-
trich Genscher, the cur-.
rent foreign minister and
Free Democratic Party
leader in the coalition ca-
binet. From testimony
both gave to the investi-
gating committee, it is
?evident that Nollau didn't
inform his minister thor-
oughly of the suspicions
about Guillaume's spying
WASHINGTON POST
5 November 1974
Victor Zorza
activities. ?
Nollau said he informed
Genscher "as broadly as
seemed necessary." Gen-
scher, retorted that he got
"not a full, but only a par-
tial briefing" from Nollau.
The two men also contra-
dicted each other on
whether Nollau rec-
ommended that Brandt'
should take Guillaume
with him on a summer va-
cation in Norway in 1973.
The spy was the only per-
sonal aide with Brandt on
that trip, and it is alleged
Ize had access to top secret
military documents at the
time.
Brandt said he kept
Guillaume on as his aide at
the recomm endation of Noli
lau, even though he
thought it a bad idea. He
Communists
In AT
Countries
Repeated rumors of CIA plots to
"de-stabilize" the Portuguese regime,
prompt the question: What did Dr. Kis-
singer mean When he said that "I don't
see why we need to stand by, and
watch-a country go Communist due to
the irresponsibility of its own people."
The quotation is from the minutes of
the "40 Committee" discussions in 1970
on secret operations in Chile.
It is difficult to Credit the rumors
from Lisbon, if only because informed
opinion in Washington agrees that it
would be the height of folly to prompt
a coup in Portugal. But Kissinger has
other ways of pursuing his objective,
and some politicians in the NATO
countries are worried -that he may go
too far. They believe that he is trying
to use NATO to manipulate the inter-
nal politics of the member countries.
The Communists now in the Portu-
- guese government, and Communist
leaders in Italy, say that they don't
want to take their countries out of
NATO. To advocate departure from
NATO would be to give the impression
of moving toward the Soviet camp and
to lose public support. NATO member-
ship is seen by some people as a guar-
antee of democracy and thus, per-
versely, as the condition under which
'their country could afford to have
Communists in the government.
Therefore Washington, by eounte-
nancing Portugal's membership of
? NATO, may appear to be signalling
Rome that Italy too could stay in
has said he resigned as
chancellor because of this
mistake. One unanswered
question is whether Gild--
laume was protected by
higher-ups in the Social
Democratic Party.
A bigger unanswered
question is- what to do
about the mess in Bonn's
intelligence services. Even
Prof. Ehmke, the most out-
spoken of the critics of the
BND and a man who, as
minister in the Chancel-
lor's office during Brandt's
_tenure in offide was re-
sponsible for watching the
organization, has little to
say in this respect.
An intelligence pool, in
which all the various agen-
cies would assemble their
information, could .have
NATO as well as have CoMmunists
hi-
the coalition. This is certainly not the
message Washington wants to convey,
and it has engaged in some elaborate
behind-the-scenes maneuvering to get
its point across.
' Now the meeting of the NATO De-
fense Ministers comprising the Nu-
clear Planning Group, which was due
to be held in Rome this week, has been
postponed. One reason Washington
gate was that it could not disclose
highly secret information to a govern-
ment whose Communist members or
officials might pass it back to MoscOW.
. It was serving notice also on Italian
politicians who favor a coalition with
Communists that, ultimately, they
might have to choose between such a
coalition and NATO membership.
Portugal's request for economic aid
during President Gomes' recent visit
to Washington also elicited a polite
lecture from Kissinger about the diffi-
culty of getting congressional aid ap-
' propriations these days, especially for
countries with Communist connec-
tions. Portuguese officials argue, as po-
litely, that economic aid would aVert
the impending massive unemployment,
and the concomitant political unrest
which could- push the country further
to the left. By delaying the aid, and by
using it as a political lever, Washing-
ton may be hastening the very result it
wants to prevent.
Any basis for predicting the likely
course of events has now been swept
away by the new electoral law which
increased the electorate from two mil-
lion to five. Some public opinion polls
taken privately in Portugal indicated a
Communist vote of between l and 20
per cent, but that was before the new
law. The March election will produce
only a Constituent Assembly, not a
new government, and therefore the
chances are that the Communists will
stay on in the coalition.
In a country where the Catholic reli-
gion and tradition count for so much,
the danger is not of a massive vote for
caught Guillaume at an'
early stage, he suggests...,
But any fusion or closer
melding of the agencies'
would not only be uncon-
stitutional but unwise.
'Would you like to see-
the CIA and the FBI under,
one roof?" he asks. -
The prospects, then, are..
for more fun and games
the spook business here.
At best, some of the more
dubious and and most inef-
ficient aspects of the oper-
ations will be eliminated.
But there seems a good,
chance that West Germa-.'
ny will continue to be a
happy hunting ground for
enemy agents and other
persons such as weapons
dealers who in the past
used the BND as a cover
for their activities. ?
the -Communists which Would catapult
them to power. Nor do present Com-
munist tactics in Western Europe call
for the use of coalitions to take over,
slice by slice, the governments of which
they are members.
The salami tactics they once used in
Eastern Europe have been replaced by"
a strategy more suited to the Western
democratic tradition. This may not be
accepted by all Communists in all
West- European countries. Some party
officials obviously find it difficult to
shed the habits of a lifetime. But the
political climate does not favor them.
What Europe's Communists now
want is to convert the sizeable vote
they often get in national elections
into a share of government power com- ?
menstirate with it. They want an op-
portunity to show that the policies.
they advocate are worthy of even wider
support. And . they want to engage,
from the inside, in all the power
games and intrigues which the estab-
lished political parties have practieed
in seeking to dominate the political
life of their countries.
Non7Communists and anti-Commu-
nists in the West obviously have a po-
litical as well as an ideological stake in
preventing such Communist domina-
tion. But unless they recognize the
change which has come over Western
Communist parties, and adjust their
own tactics accordingly, they are more
likely to advance the Communists' ob-
jectives than to thwart them. For the
United States, and for NATO, this
means evolving a new formula which
would allow NATO membership of
countries with Communists in their gov-
ernments, rather than theatening to
isolate or to east out such countries.
The Soviet Union can afford to in-
vade its allies. The United States can-
not, and will not, and must therefore
find other ways of dealing with the
problem.
cD 1974. Victor Zr
27
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THE ECONOMIST kEMEER 9, 1974
wo noes that say yes
to war
The rules of the game have changed. Mr
Kissinger pushed his stamina by taking
in the Middle East at the tail end of his
prodigious tour that began in Moscow on
October 23rd, but it was vital that he
should learn at first hand just how much
the decisions taken at the Arab summit at
Rabat last week have hardened the Arab-
Israeli bargaining scene. When he was
last in the Middle East, less than a month
ago, it was doubtful whether his piece-
meal technique of separate agreements
was still feaSible; now, after Rabat, it
almost certainly is not.
It's that "almost" which seems to
have been foremost in Mr Kissinger's
mind when he landed at Cairo on
Tuesday evening. His main purpose
was to find out whether a separate
Egyptian-Israeli negotiation could yet be
salvaged from the Arab rulers' argument
that bargaining for the return of the
Egyptian; Syrian and Jordanian land that
Israel occupied. in 1967 -should be
collective and simultaneous. On Wed-
nesday President Sadat said he saw no
reason why the Rabat decisions should
have "put any block" on the step-by-
step procedures. But the Arabs are
unlikely to let these procedures get
very far until Israel accepts, at least
in principle, the public and far more
important Arab ruling that the Palestine
Liberation Organisation should even-
tually control the Palestine territory (the
West Bank and Gaza) now occupied by
Israel.
There is no evidence that when Mr
Kissinger visited Jerusalem on Thursday
he tried to get Israel to rethink its flat
refusal to treat with the PLO. Israelis,
fearful that the pressure will come, were
deeply concerned by President Ford's?
comment at his news conference on
October 29th that Israel will have to
negotiate "either with Jordan or the
PLO". The State Department quickly
said that this was merely a slip of the
tongue, but then on Wednesday a
spokesman said that the phrase still
stood. The huge rally in New York on
Monday protesting against the PLO's
participation in the UN debate on the
Middle East due next week is an early
warning of the domestic difficulties the
American Administration ill run into
if or when it starts leaning on Israel
to qualify its attitude.
Forestalling Mr Kissinger's arrival,
Israel's prime minister, Mr Rabin, re-
iterated on Tuesday his government's
uncompromising rejection of the PLO
as a negotiating partner. The sense of
impending danger brought all his
ministers and indeed all his party in
what appeared to be a straight line
behind him. There was not a whisper
of the kind of deviation that in July
had allowed Mr Aharon Yariv, the
information minister and a former
security chief, to suggest that negotia-
tions with the PLO would be possible
if the guerrilla organisation acknowledged
the existence of the Jewish state and
all that this implied. Mr Yariv's con-
dition is of fundamental importance?
and was no doubt a central issue in the
long discussion that President Sadat had
with Mr Arafat immediately before
Mr Kissinger's arrival in Cairo. But so
far Israel's official line is to reject any
negotiation with the PLO, and the
PLO's is to reject any acceptance of
Israel.
Israel's refusal to consider talks with
the PLO is not unlike the Arab refusal,
after the 1967 war, to consider direct
talks with Israel?a negative attitude
based on fear. In fact, in both instances,
the question of Who negotiates with
whom is less important than what is
negotiated about. The PLO is reported
to have delegated negotiating power to
Egypt but this is basically irrelevant.
The question Israel has to answer is
whether it is prepared to consider
NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1974
COAST U.N. CENTER
1AD1AGED BY BUB
rp Special to The New York Times
LOS ANGELES, Nov. 10?A
omb went off early this morn-
g and caused extensive dam-
age in a 'United Nations infor-
Mation center bookstore in the
Wilshire section of the city. No
6ne was injured.
''The Los Angeles police said
that the bomb, which exploded
at. 2:45 A.M. in a deserted busi-1
ness district, , had shattered!
eass in several buildings. The
police estimated the damage at
$5.000.
Shortly afterward, anony-1
in!-Ns phone calls were received
by The Los Angeles Times and
.1.)y radio station KFWB.
? The police said that the mes-
sages, similar in content, were
made by a young man who re-
ferred to the bomb as "a thank-
;you note from the P.L.O. [Pal-
?estine Liberation Organization]
to the United Nations." In the
call to The Los :Angeles Times,
the man added; "for letting
them address the United Na-
tions.."
In closi g, the railer added
Cr which
, ui
D-Acoa I_ ague.
L u ted Nations has
handing over the West Bank to an ,
; independent Palestinian authority. That
in turn is linked to the question of the
, PLO's recognition of Israel.
Mr Rabin on Tuesday repeated Mrs
Meir's long-held view that there is room
for two states only between the Mediter-
ranean and the desert: Israel and one
other. The implicationaleft by various
Israeli leaders is that it is for the Arabs
themselves to work out whether. the
"other" state should be Palestine or
Jordan. But now the chips are down,
do the Israelis really Mean this? One
reason for thinking that they do not,
really, is that there could scarcely be a
clearer call for revolution in Jordan.
King Hussein, now obliged to accept
that his claim to the West Bank is past
history, is putting up the barricades.
He has ruled out the possibility of a
future confederation between Jordan
and the envisaged Palestinian state (a
compromise that a lot of Palestinians
on both sides of the line were looking
forward to); even more disconcertingly
he has declared that the Palestinians
in Jordan (believed to number more
than half the 2m inhabitants) will soon
have to stand up and be counted as
Jordanians or as visiting Palestinians.
The king used to be almost alone among
leading Jordanians in insisting on the
wider view of Jordan and its continuing
responsibility to the Palestinians under
Israeli occupation; he is now carrying
the abandonment of this policy to its
logical conclusions.
So King Hussein is out of the game.
The Israelis are still in it, and in the
West Bank, and the PLO still seems to
say no to Israel. It is an impasse that
could mean war again.
agreed to let' representatives of
the P.L.O. 'participate in the
'General Assembly debate on the
Middle East, starting Wednes-
day.
A police. spokesman said
?Ihere have been a number of
incidents recently involving the
Palestine -Liberation Organiza-
tion which is opposed to the
State of Israel; and the Jewish
.Defense League. Several bomb
scares, picketing and protest
marches, have occurred, he
said, but he added that this
.was the first time a United Na-
,tions organization had been
The Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation announced it would in-
vestigate to determine if "revo-
lutionari or terrorist activity"
was involved.
The ,bookstore, Tun by the
Los Angeles chapter of the
United Nations Association, is
a nonprofit organization that
distributes United Nations lit-
erature and raises funds for
United Nations organizations.
"The most immediate and
serious loss is the destruction
of UNICEF. [United Nations
international Childrens Emer-
gency Fund] Christmas cards,"
said Dr. John Erving, president
of the local ? United Nations
Association. The sale of the
cards benefits starving and
homeless children around the
world. lie said the blast de-
.1:,,ved about :310,(0i) to $15,-
worth of cards and U.N.
calendars.
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THE ECONOMIST NO1r7AIBER 9..1974
If it has to be
war
If war does break out again in the Middle
East neither the Israelis nor the Arabs
can achieve quite the surprise the Arabs
brought off last year. The Israelis, super-
sensitised by their unreadiness in 1973,
have overhauled their intelligence ser-
vice, and are alert in their forward
positions, on their radar sets and on
their communications monitors. The
Arabs, for their part, are keenly alive
to the threat of an Israeli pre-emptive
strike. And to launch a ground attack
?either side would have to build up its
forces in one of the limited-force zones,
which are inspected to some extent by
.UN troops, and would then have to
. cross .the UN buffer zone itself. It is
hard to see all this happening without
the other side getting some warning. _
? But there are many ways to knock
an enemy off balance: the time and
place of the attack, and the size and
weaponry of the attacking force, can be
manipulated in unexpected ways. A
boldly-executed quick strike by either
side could well decide the outcome
of a new conflict. To strike first has
always been a good military tactic;
it worked well for Israel in 1967 and for
Egypt in 1973. And the 1973 fighting
showed that there may now be a new
kind of warfare?the snort battle of
-attrition. Modern weapons have become
so potent that they can kill large num-
bers of men and destroy enormous
quantities, of material in no time at
all; the 1973 war ground up some
.?800m worth of equipment in a week.
This puts an even bigger premium on
getting in the first blow.
There is another reason why Israel in
particular might decide to attack first.
Time is against it. Arab money is buying
an arsenal of modern equipment from
the west, which could eventually find
its way to the front-line countries. Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait have ordered large
quantities of weapons recently, includ-
ing supersonic fighters, air defence
missiles and tanks.
Against this, one lesson of the 1973
war is that conventional warfare is now
in one of those periods when tech-
nology, favours the defence. Many
aircraft were destroyed by missiles in
the 1973 fighting, and by guns after
being forced into the guns' range-by the
threat of the missiles. Tanks were
broken up by new lightweight anti-
tank missiles and by modern tank artil-
lery using new kinds of ammunition.
But the edge may have been taken off
these novelties by now. The Israelis,
who depend much more on air power
than the Arabs do, now have new
American electronic equipment which
will go a long way towards countering
the . anti-aircraft missiles, the Sam-6
especially, that did so much damage in
1973. And they should have learned
that tanks must be supported by in-
fantry and artillery when attacking a
well-armed enemy. They certainly
learned that the Arabs are good soldiers
when properly led and trained. The
Where the armies face each other
VA
Egyptian I limited_ .
Israeli force zones
UN forces
--- - ------_-----I-ES / '
eireL6 /Damascus
I
...
'--ISRAELI..--../
-."
Tel Aviv
..?11 JerutAanilemman...------'
Port Said_L-, v C
..,?.--_------- / \
%
I
Eilat 1 \ '
JORDAN \
t I 7
/
% I
. ,
....,
? r
??
SAUDI ARABIA
?
Syrian limited -
Israeli fforce zones
UN forces
o
,Gahlee
1
Arabs think so too. The trouble there
is that Egypt and, even more, Syria
may have forgotten the 1973 war's
signal message to them: that at the end
they Were losing it.
If fighting starts again in the next
few weeks, Israel will be relatively
stronger than it was when the 1973
war began, _although perhaps .not ,by
much. The United States has replaced
its losses of equipment and provided
some new things; it is reported that the
rate of supply has been accelerated in
the past few weeks. It has delivered some
TV-guided "Maverick" missiles which
are the sort of technical advance that
could upset the lessons of the 1973
war by permitting accurate bombing at
long ranges, with the planes less exposed
to missiles and guns. But the central
question here is whether the Americans
have also given Israel laser equipment
and the guided bombs that go with it.
One of the major question marks,
if war breaks out again, is whether the
United States will be willing?or indeed
able?to undertake another immense
resupply operation of 1973 propor-
tions. Not only are its own stocks of
weapons a lot lower now, but there is a
serious question whether the present
Portuguese regime would permit the
transport planes to refuel in the Azores.
If it would not, and the other nations
along the route balk as they did last
time, it would be virtually impossible
for the United States to give the kind
of emergency transfusion of weapons it
did during the fighting in 1973.
Russia has also done a major re-
equipping job, and Syria, like Israel, is
probably better armed now than before
the last war. Russia has let the Syrians
have some Mig-23 "Flogger" aircraft?
at least the equal of any plane Israel now
has?and it has delivered more aircraft
and other modern equipment to other
2.9
/.1
0 Miles ID
JORDAN I
Arab countries. But these deals have
been kept very secret: an accurate
assessment of the numerical balance of
power in planes, tanks and other
weapons is not possible.
How the fighting might go is pure
guesswork. The most likely beginning
is a first strike by Israel, possibly in the
Golan Heights. The Israelis would try
to drive deep into Syria in an attempt
to destroy the Syrian army, and perhaps
take Damascus. One objective would
be to prevent the Syrians using their
long-range Scud missiles against Israeli
cities. Since the Syrian army is probably
better equipped than Egypt's, and is
closer to Israel, it would make one
kind of sense for Israel to attack it
first, while holding the Egyptians in the
south.
As an immediate response to an
Israeli attack, or conceivably as a first
strike of their own, the Arabs might
launch large-scale air strikes on Israeli
oil-storage sites, and simultaneously
mine Israel's deep-water ports from the
air. They would lose a lot of aircraft to
Israeli fighters, but this is probably the
best use the Arabs could make of their
air power; if it worked, it would reduce
Israel's ability to fight a war to a few
days. The entire Syrian army could be
thrown at once into the fighting on the
Golan Heights to try to stop the Israeli
advance while the Egyptians attacked
into Sinai, perhaps threatening the Abu
Rudeis oil fields. It would be essential
for the Arabs to keep the momentum
up; once the front became static, the
Israelis could reinforce the Syrian front
rapidly.
Speculating on the result may be
easier than trying to foresee the action.
The probability, if Israel escapes being
crippled in the first few days, is that it
would win in the next 10 days. It would
be a bloody fortnight.
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DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
it November 1974
? PETER GILL;' in Da.--cci, a/-3*n.""-r-7aT;gg:irLn?i?n7ror---r
India and Bangladesh which the World Food Conference considers this week.
? COMPLIMENTS
spilled from the
lips ;?.)f Di Kissinger' in 'India
? and Bangladesh last week as
if they alone were the language of
diplomacy. Yes, India was very
Much a major power, and no, it
? was not often you had the privilege --
of meeting someone of the vision
? of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Prime
Minister of Bangladesh. It is pos- .
charted. In large parts of western
? India during the summer, rainfall
was far below normal and crops
withered. In Bangladesh and in the
? eastern Indian States of West
Bengal, Assam and Orissa, the rains
were far top plentiful. Crops did
? not ripen, or were washed away
by floods.
A depressing cycle of poor crops
throughout the world in the past
? three years has led to? the most
critical imbalance of demand over
supply. It is this situation to
which the world's food planners
will address themselves this week
and next in Rome.
eleto s
dia's cupboar
sible, but on past experience ,most
unlikely, that this and much more
besides will mute official Indian in-
dignation I'hen a CIA plot is next
unearthed within ten thousand
miles of New Delhi, and that the
Beegalis will be constrained from
burrarig down American libraries
when Washington next upsets
?,Chl more important issues Dr
Kissinger got nowhere.- There is,
no prospect of the Indians ever
viewing with sympathy the Ameri-
can plan to build up the British
Indian Ocean base of Diego Waroia.
As for any modest American arms
shipment to Pakisten, that will be
immediately and automatically in-
terpreted in New Delhi as an act
Of appalling ill faith.'
e. ? <
'Diplomacy of :tins sort is no
longer the pritaity it was when
Governments in the region were
moving with painful deliberation
to Clear up the mess left by the
'1971 Indo-Pakistani war. The im-
portant factor now is food.
' Left to' himself, Dr Kissinger
might even have liked to "see at
first hand the effects'of the famine
that now grips much of eastern
India and Bangladesh. . Tomorrow
he addresses the opening session of
the __World Food Conference in
Rome, and a vision of skeletal
adults and starving children would
have illuminated his speech rather
more than statistics, but India is
embarrassed by the famine;
Bangladesh much less so.
It was Mrs Gandhi, the Indian
Prime Minister, who proclaimed
the country's self-sufficiency in
food three years ago, and vowed
never again to accept grain on the
eheap from America. Later, as the
gap. between basic- need's and
anticipated production widened,
her Government dithered about
asking for help.
Several million tons were
bought, but still the gap widened.
Now the Indians have asked the
Americans and others for help,'
although Dr Kissinger, in another
delicete compliment, refrained
from putting it quite like that.
The Bengalis have yet to find
such self-respect. The world, it was
argued, owed them a living after
the 1971 war, and the world
coughed up, in the largest United
Nations disaster operation ever.
mounted. Since the present
famine began, the begging bowl
has been proferred to anyone who
could help, American, European or
Arab.
On the face Of it, the famine in
India and Bangladesh this year can
he easily explained and precisely
Dr Kissinger himself, with solid
achievement behind him in Viet-
nam, the Middle East and in
detente, will be seeking to strike
yet another blow for humanity. He
told the Indians as much last
week: "We will offer a compre-
hensive programme as our contri-
bution to freeing mankind from
the eternal struggle for-sustenance.
We will increase our production at
home, so there will be more food
available for shipment abroad, and
we will help developing nations in,
crease their own production, which
is the only long-term solution to
the problem."
Politically unpopular
Part of Dr Kissinger's plan
appears to be to shame the oil
producers into reducing their
prices?" no nation or. bloc of
nations can impose its narrow in-
terests without tearing the fabric
of international co-operation "?
and then harness surplus oil funds
to the fight against famine..
Western agricultural technology,
backed by Arab funds, could well
lead to increased food production
in 'India and Bangladesh. Reduc-
tions in the price of oil would also
ease the. foreign exchange shortage
facing India and Bangladesh and
enable them to spend rather more
money on development than on
survival.
There are other? sides to the
famine that the diplomatic Dr
Kissinger will almost certainly
side-step. He may even think it too
indelicate to mention that famines
are caused just as much by too
many, people as by too little food.
India once enjoyed a fine reputa-
tion for her financial and political ?
commitment to .family planning,
but in the past few years she has
lost it, Politicians find that refer-
ences to birth control win them, no
votes, and may even cost them a
few, so they have ahnost stopped
talking about it.
When the economic blizzard hit
India last year, the family. plan- .
ning budget was drastically cut.
Indeed, the grim facts of life con-
fronting India and Bangladesh
seem to equire a more urgent and
less sophisticated response.
The Bangladesh Planning Com-
mission has hinted darkly at the
? possibility of introducing commit.
sory birth control. Sterilisation,
compulsory abortion or ?disincen-
tives for couples who err by having
too many children naturally horrify.
liberal Westerners, but they do. not'
have to stand by and watch whole
communities battered and uprooted
by famine.
,
There are other areas in which'
the Governments of India and;
Bangladesh can be held respone
sible for failing to guard against
famine. The weather over the past
few years 'has certainly been:
against the farmer, but Govern-
ments in planned economies have
a more than usual duty to support'
their rural producers. Instead,
farmers in the granaries of western
India have gone without fuel with;
which to drive irrigation pumps
and agricultural machinery. Many
have also had to do without ferti-
liser because the factories that
should produce it are either func-
tioning at well below capacity
in the case of Bangladesh, not'
functioning at all.
In predominantly- agricultural
societies, food production and dis-
tribution play an abnormally large
pa-rt in national politics. Govern-',
ment parties, the Congress it?
India and the Awami League in
Bangladesh, are deeply 'enmeshed.
in the politics of food and find,
themselves again and again coming
out in favour of the bigger farmers
and the bigger merchants, who are
also their biggest vote gatherers."
In India, the Congress is wedded
in theory to the notion of sweep-
ing hind reforms, but little is ever'
done about it. New Delhi regularly
denounces hoarding, and does so
even more fervently at a time of
famine or elections, but at local
and district level the biggest
offenders are often Congress
politicians.
In Bangladesh; such corruption'
and profiteering is a way of life.
At a time of particular shortage
and pronounced public disquiet,
the Government , announced
another drive against the corrupt
and the profiteering, but the
politicians and officials who find
themselves briefly behind hers are
the unlucky ones. Honest officials
who try to do their jobs eon-
scientioth?ly are watched like
hawks by party bosses, lateanwhee
the landless poor become poorer
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SONDA7 TEIEGRAPH, London
27 October 197I,
HE grave internal crisis
threatening India -- com-
ounded of food shortages,
dustrial stagnation, infla-
on that makes British price
ises seem modest and per-
asive official corruption ?
as this year reawakened in
Indian newspaper editors an
'most dormant instinct for
ampaigning journalism.
Among national papers
eeking to expose Govern-
en t deficiencies,
he Hindustan Times of New
elhi has led the way and it
as now paid the penalty.
eorge Verghese, 47, soft-
poken editor for almost six
ears, has been told to go.
A Cambridge economics grad-
ate, he worked briefly for the
asgotv?Hercild and the Neins
hronicle in London before
oining the -Times of India,
nother of the big four Delhi
apers, shortly after indepen-
ence. But it was his three years
s Press secretary to Mrs.
andhi, Indian Prime Minister,
hat now provide the richest
r.ony.
Trouble began in February
ten the Hindustan Times pub-
shed two blistering articles
temising the "pre-election
weeteners " deployed by Mrs.
andhi's Congress Government
o win the assembly elections?
Uttar Pradesh, India's largest
te?" A factory her. an
rrigation scheme there, a uni-.
ersity everywhere, railway lines
or the asking and gifts for
v.erybody, all from an ??empty
xchequer and in defiance of
ational plans, programmes and
riorities.'
..?
"Whatever the result," wrote
THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 9, 1974
India
by PETER GILL in New Delhi '
? Mr. Verghese in an editorial
before the anticipated Congress
victory, "this much is certain,
India has' lost."
In March he returned to the
attack in two signed articles in
the Sunday Supplement, now
? closed for lack of newsprint.
They were closeiy, almost den-
sely, argued and largely con-
structive, but there were acid
observations about Mrs. Gandhi.
"The Prime Minister has no
programme, no 1,vorld view, no
grand design . . bereft of a
frame. She has merely reacted
to events and failed to shape
them. This hes- been her
tragedy. She has a mandate, but
no mission."
Last month the seal was set
on Mr. Verghese's career when,
under the withering ,.headIine
"Kanchenjunga, here we come,"
. he dismissed as fraudulent
India's official justifications for
incorporating Sikkim; her tiny
Himalayan protectorate, 'into
the union.
He called it "genteel annexa-
-
tion without representation,"
and added: "... A protectorate
moving to 'freedom with
India' by annexation through
constitutional legerdemain."
The conclusion, approvingly
quoted by Peking Radio, was
even- more damning: "Perhaps
no need for the common man
to ask for bread. He's getting'
Sikkim."
The man who sacked George
Verghese (he is not due. to go
Love is war
FROM OUR INDIA CORRESPONDENT
ndia's backward and notoriously cor-
rupt state of Bihar was the scene of a
showdown this week between its govern-
ment and Jayaprakash Narayan, the
ageing Gandhian leader who has been
campaigning for months to oust that
government from power. On Monday
Mr Narayan called for a massive siege
around government offices in Patna,
e state capital. Large numbers of
olice and para-military forces kept the
emonstrators at bay but Mr Narayan
imself was slightly injured. He respon-
ed by calling for a one-day general
until the new year) is Urishna-
Kumar Birla, chairman of .the
IlinduStan Times and scion of the
'mighty Birla industrial' empire in
Calcutta. The Birlas. who arrived
in Calcutta some 80 years ago to
trade in silver and opium, now
control a network of more .than
40 huge companies.
Although pposition news-
papers have. claimed that Mrs.
Gandhi applied direct pressure
on the Birlas to remove' their
editor,-both Government spokes-
men and Mr. Ti. K. Birla deny
the charge. "I do not take
orders from the Prime Minister,"'
Mr. .Birla from,
a deputation of
Hindustan Times journalists.
But Mr. Birla is _known to
have political ambitions, and has
twice .tried without success' for
election -to -the -Indian?parlia-
ment. His last attempt, in Uttar
Pradesh in February. failed
when Mrs.. Gandhi's Congress
party refused to back him as an
independent candidate for the
upper house. "No one believes
that George Verghese is saying
all this independently," Mr.
Birla is reported to have told a
senior Indian journalist to
whom he offered the Hindustan
Times editorship.
"They always involve us with
these criticisms, and our posi-
tion is false."
?
Neither Mr. Birla not Mr.
Verghese is talking publicly
about the sacking, but the issue
may be forced into the open
strike against the "barbarous atrocities"
of the police.
Mr Narayan is demanding the disso-
lution of the Bihar assembly as a first
step towards restructuring the entire
Indian political system to rid it of cor-
ruption and the abuse of power. But
Mrs Gandhi, who gave in to a similar
demand in Gujarat last spring, has
declared that she will not repeat that
"mistake" under any circumstances.
She realises that if she yields in Bihar
she will soon be faced with the same
situation in other states, especially
nearby ones such as West Bengal. But
there is no doubt that Mr Narayan's
efforts are. winning him considerable
support throughout the country as he
echoes the most pressing grievances of
when the Indian Press council
hears complaints from Mr.
Verghese's supporters. A
further dispute over the publi-
cation of private correspOndence
:between the two men could land
the laW-:courts.
So for Indian editors and inde-
pendent journalists, the sacking
of Mr. Verghese is further evi-
dence of what they regard as an
insidious , official campaign to
erode Press freedom in India..
In a series of adjudications
this month, the Indian Press
_ council has condemned State
, governments for withdrawing
official advertising as punish-
ment for papers refusing to toe
the line. The council has also
pronounced on the official Indian
practice of offering journalists
cut-price housing and .prece-
dence in obtaining telephones,
scooters, and cars, yet withdraw-
ing these same privileges when
journalists criticise the
Government.
The Poona High Court had to
step in last month to order the
State electricity board to restore
power to ?a local - newspaper
group which had continued
printing with the aid of a tractor
engine despite official dis-,
pleasure. The editor of one
Bihar newspaper was murdered'
by "persons unknown" after
running critical articles on
smuggling rackets, and the:
offices of another were burnt
down while, according to the:
Press council, officials Stood by
delighted. ;
Staff at the Hindustan Times
fear that the future indepen-
dence of the paper has been
gravely compromised by the
Verghese affair. Mr. Birla has
already stated privately that the
next editor will have to con-
sult him on all -matters of
editorial policy, and the Indian
government itself may be
waiting in the wings,
"We can't say too much or
else the Government will say
that Birla is running the paper
badly and appoint a couple of
directors to the board," said Mr.
C. P. Rsmachandran, assistant
editor of the Hindustan Times
and chairman of a new corn-
mittee to protect its indepen-
dence. "Then we'd be finished."
the Indian man in the street.
Modelling his method of agitation on
Mahatma Gandhi's non-cooperation
against the British, Mr Narayan has
called upon Bihar farmers to stop pay-
ing land rent and talks, of organising
a "parallel legislative assembly". But
most ominous for the ruling Congress
party is his bid to win over the
police by calling upon demonstrators,
in effect, to make love not war. Despite
his denunciation of the police, he invites
his supporters to fraternise with them
and persuade them to change sides.
Police discipline has not broken down so
far but the sheer numbers of the central
government's forces despatched to Bihar
this week indicate that Mrs Gandhi is
taking no chances.
31
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NEW YORK TIMES, ,S'ATURDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1974
Montagnard Uprising Poses a Threat to Saigon Drivel
?
? By JAMES M. MARKHAM
Spedat to The New York Times
BAN ME THUOT, South Viet-
nam, Oct. 25?An armed re-
bellion of dissident montagnard
tribesmen has broken out in
opened .betwen them."-
,
Sympathy and Fear
For theiepart,7many montag-
narcis ,find 'themselves caught
between mixed feelings of sym-
pathy and fear of the rebels and
nervousness about the Govern:
the province of Darlac and May ment police reaction. A dee-
be spreading into neighboringi ument issued in the name -of
'
corners of the strategic Central the rebels charges that from
.
July through - September -160
Highlands. ' ' tribesmen have - been
If it continues to grow; thekilled and masSacrede others
uprising, which is
the to captured andsubjected .to
have some 500 men under savage .torture."
arms, coiild imperil the Saipan Another, -dispassionate source
Government's struggle against
put .t.le number of montagnards
the Communists in the high- 1
I arrested by the*Government at
lands.
Some people here believe that about 100. Some were reported-
ly taken as suspects in acts of
the Communists .haveeinfiltrat-
ed the nascent movement. 0th- banditry and murder, others for:
ers argue that a Government
crackdown on the rebels is ra-
pidly alienating tribesmen who
are not disposed to join the in-
surrection and who hate the
Communists.
Warning' by Official
1;:"it's going to he very bad
ere," warned Y.Jut Buon To,
the dynamic, 31-year-old head
of ethnic minority sep.ices in The rangers have so far not
the. highlands. "I don't think clashed with the lightly armed
they can ever solve it with the rebels,, who have avoided direct
military. It should be solved by fighting with. regular militarY
the political." " . units and have devoted most of
? "I don't want. to get my their energies to whining over
people, killed," he added. 'They 'villagers and- trying to stay:
are ethnic minorities?they are alite..
going to. be come more minori= The montagnard revolt, which
ty./1 :is 'thought to be led by a.disaf-
Compounding the problems, a fected former ? civil servant.
wave of brutal killings and rob- inamed Y Kpa Koi, is .not With;
beries?attributed by some to out precedent. In 1964 and.
the rebels, by others to bandits lagain in late 1965, montagnard
who justify pillage in the name Itroops, rallying to the standard
of the United Front for the
IStruggle of the Oppressed Ra-
ices, staged bloody rebellions
;that had to be put down with
force.
Grievances .Pare .Many
But, until recently, the'
and, most importantly, govern-1 gave their rebellion the en.
ment in the highlands. . ? dorsement of Y Bharri. Enuol,
Public services, particularly the principal Fulro leader. e .
health and education, have. The whereabonts. of Mr. Y'
been skimpily provided. Many Bham Enuol is a mystery. His
montagnards, live ,in squalor, customary residence in Phnom:.
with illiteracy and ? disease; Penh but some montagnards
their population _growth rate ?say .he is in Indonesia, while
yet another report says he is ill
in France:- ? ?
. "Oh, Fulro, Fulro," saidane
French coffee planter, sipping a
beer in Ban Me Thuot'S dingy
French restaurant. ? "Before,
they put it all on the backs of
the Viets.. [Communists]. Now
they blame the Fulros. The Fail-
.ros don't need to. steal refriger-
ators; they don't kill old. ladies
in the middle of the streets."
'Though the rebellion began in
IDarlac Province?whose popu-
lation of 270,000 is estimated to
be 45 per cent Vietnamese .and
55 per cent montagnard?there
are signs that it has begun to
spread. Occasional acts of vi-
olence on the Darlac pattern
have been noted in adjoining
.highlands provinces.
The movement's future may
well 'depend on the Govern-
ment's response. Nay Luett, the
montagnard Minister of Ethnic
Development, has so far taken
a hard line. Mr. Nay Luett, who
spent four years hi jail a decade
ago for agitating on behalf of
his people, denied on a recent
claimed the rebellion in the. visit here that Fulro even ex-
name of Fulro. isted.
No one has a convincing ex-7 .. 'The rebellion 'has produced
planation for his action., considerable anguish among
Though he had headed the Dar- imontagnard leaders who are
lac .chapter of a short-lived. I not unsympathetic to the griev-
montagnard political organize- 19.nces that may have produced
tion that succeeded Fulro after it. ? ? ?
the reconciliation with Saigon ' .? "Right now there are a lot of
in the late sixties, Mr. Y Kpa, ,truintagreards in the middle?,
Koi was not a well-known fig- I they eannot adjust to what they
ure in Fulro itself. should do," said 'Mr. Y Jut
? Some people say that he ran
into double with the law over
appears to be close to nothing.
Moreover, the montagnm,i
peoples numbering perhaps
800,000?have suffered cruelly
in the war. In 1972 and 1973
alone, 150,000. montagnard?
were reportedly made refugee?
by the .fighting; some 70 per
all, cent of a montagnards now
' !lye outside tlaeireoriginal home
areas, according to one study:
; At a time of political unrest
and economic stagnation
throughout South Vietnam,
many people here are not sur-
prised to find the rnontagnards
?or, so far, the advanced
Rhade tribetstirring, too.
But some informed monta.g-
riards find Mr. Y Kpa Koi, who
is a strong-willed, little-educat-
ed veteran of the French colo-
nial army, a scnneWhat unlikely
figure to emerge as the Che
Guevara of the highlands.
A;Jarai tribesman in his early.
40's, Mr. Y Kpa Koi, whose wife
is R'nade, was, until late m No
yernber, 1973, a senior adminis-
trator in the Ban Me Thuot La-.
bor Department. Then he van-.
ished into the forests and pro-'
their presumed sympathies
with the rebels. ?
At present, two battalions of
Government rangers ? about'
800 men?are set-up in blocka
ing positions outside montag-
nard villages in Darlac Province
while policemeraand militiamen
check.the papers of young high-
landers.
of rebellion?have heightened
tension between Vietnamese
and the- montagnards. That
word is the generic name for
the Central Highlands. tribes-
men who are not of the same
racial origin as the Vietnarriese,
.In August, when the violence iGovernment?of President Nguy-
reached a peak, .about 50 len Van Thieu had succeeded in
people, mostly Vietnamese civi- !mollifying most of the leaders
lians, were 'reportedly killed inlof Fair?, asthe organization is
highway ambushes and holdups, :known. after its initials in
in remote villages in Darlac. !French, and had broiaght many
Province. : 1,of them into the civilian admin-
While the violence has abat-!iistration. By comparison with
ed, Vietnamese traders, taxi-I :previous Vietnamese regimes,
men and truck drivers are still i the Thieu Government treated
terrified of the lonely roads.' the montagnards fairly well.
, But the montagnard grievan-
ces' are legion. Vietnamese en-
trepreneurs and officials have
Senior Vietnamese officials
carry handguns for fear of
assassination.
"There had been- a certain, encroached on and stolen their
Union, an understanding, be- land, often swindling the high-
tween the two communities," landers with . complicated
said -a French priest who has bureaucratic and legal
lived in the highlands for many maneuvers.
years.'--"But now a gulf. ha a Vietnamese , dominate trade
Buon Soathe head of the ethnic
minority sources, adding that
some shady lumber deals in-1 he has been threatened several
volving Chinese middlemen and, fames by Kpa Koi partisans
that his idealism was colored who want him to join them.
by opportunism. A few suspect "They need leaders" he said.
that the Communists may have Judge Y Blieng Hmok, the
had a hand in his defection, president of the montagnard
Wh tev er his motivations,
Mr. Y Kpa Koi gradually at-
tracted a number of armed
men, many of them demobi-
lized irregulars who had kept
the automatic rifles and gre-
nade launchers that had been
supplied by the departed Amer-
ica.
Took General's Title
court here, expressed a perva-
sive sadness over the racial
schism brought on by the revolt
and the Government's response
to it.
"Without the Vietnamese the
montagnards cannot live," he
said. "But without the montag-
nards, the Vietnamese cannot
work in the Central Highlands.
"But now the Vietnamese do
:Mr. Y Kpa Koi took the title not understand the montaa-
of general and soon his troops nards and the montagnards do
were displaying a letter in the not understand the Vietna-
Darlac villages that purportedly mese."
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BALTIMORE SUN
7 November 1974-
Thien's removal from
Vietnamese .,.ear dwind
? By ARNOLD* IL ISAACS
Sun Stall Correspondent
Saigon ? To the dismay of
American officials, events inj
South Vietnam in recent weeksj
have left many Vietnamese
firmly convinced that the
United States is no longer sup-
porting President Nguyen Van
Men.
Whether it is true or not ?
and American diplomats argue
strenuously that it is not ?the
belief is Teal enough to play a
significant role in the spread-
ing movement to drive Mr.
Thieu from office. -
Sharp cutbacks in American
military and economic aid this
year have contributed to the
widespread impression that the
,U.S. is ditching its old ally.
But the most important factor
was probably the resignation
of former President Nixon.
The Americans have sought
to persuade the Vietnamese
that Washington's commit-
ments remained unchanged in
the shift of administrations.
But the Vietnamese, schooled'
in a traditional culture, tend to
view political events as flowing
not from abstract values but
from the, interplay of powerful!
figures. In their eyes, Mr:
'Nixon was Mr. Thieu's patron,
Iand his departure represented'
a heavy blow to Mr. 'Mien.
A typical comment was that
of Tran Van Tuyen, opposition
leader in the lower house of
South Vietnam's national as-
sembly.
"One of the major reasons
for the blossoming of these
movements" ? the protests
against Mr. Thieu ? "was
former President Nixon's step-
ping down," Mr. Tuyen said in
a recent interview.
"The Vietnamese consider
America has been the most
important supporter of Mr.
Thieu, and the most enthusias-
tic was Mr. Nixon," Mr. Tuyen
said. "Now Mr. Nixon is gone
land Mr. [Henry Ad Kissinger
[Secretary of State] who is
:unfriendly to Mr. Thieu, is still
here."
',.Senator Vu Van. Mau, head
kof the Buddhist-oriented Na-
tional Reconcilatiort. Force, re-I
Marked that "Mr. Thieu repre-I
'tented Mr. Nixon, but Mr.'
Nixon is no longer on the polit-
1,61 scene . . . with the present
difficulties it will be very diffi-
cult for Mr. Thieu to -stay in
office. ?
?
Mr. Nixon's political gliost-1
jhaunts Mr. Thieu. in otheri
!ways as well. The example of
!a President resigning after los-
ing the confidence, of his peo-
ple was not lost on Vietnamese
loppesitionists. It is not at all
;unusual. to hear Vietnamese
lhopefey cite Mr. Nixon's ex--
ample in predicting that Mr.
Thiel' will step down voluntar-
ily Jather than risk chaos ?
and Communist advances f? in
the country.-
They believe, this not be-
cause ' they believe in Mr.
Thieu's :goodwill but because
they: -regard him as being, so
thoroughly under the American
thumb that when Washington
decides it is? time for him to
?
go, he will obediently ?leave
office.
The Nixon resignation and
the decline of U.S. aid are far
from the only causes of the
recent wave of unrest, which
sterns from much more funda-
mental roots in the war-weari-
ness and economic hardship of
the Vietnamese population.
Still, American diplomats
are spending a good deal of
time in trying to convince their
Vietnamese contacts that U.S.
policy has not changed.
Last week, at the height of
anti-Thieu disturbances in Sai-
gon, U.S. officials in Washing-
ton leaked a story that the
Ford administration is consid-
ering asking Congress for a
supplemental $300 million in
? military aid for South Vietnam
on top of the $700 million Con-
gress has already approved.
The story was played promi-
nently in Saigon newspapers ?
it was bannered in the eng-
lish-language Saigon Post ?
and it appeared deliberately
timed to underscore American
support for Mr. Thieu at a
time?when he was under at-
tack.
lice. urged as
U.S. support
NEW YORK TINES
9 November 1974
44 Saigon Legislators Complain
:To U.S. Congress About Thieu
By DAVID K. SHIPLER
Spectal to The New Ycrk Tirats .
SAIGON, South Vietnam,
Nov, 8?A group of 44 opposi
tion legislators called on the
United States Congress today
to use its influence to stop the
repressive tactics of the South
Vietnamese Government.
r The legislators, all Deaputies
an the lower? house of the Na-
tional Assembly, issued a writ-
ten appeal that denounced "be-
fore domestic and international
'public opinion the Nguyen Van
Thieu authorities' pilicy of bru-
talizing Deputies, priests, re-
porters and of the savage re-
,pression of the people."
This was an apparent refer-
ence to the clash 'Oct. 31 be-
tween policemen and demon
strators in Saigon in which
about 75 civilians and police
men were injured. Some of
those beaten were fvlegislators.
"The U. S. Government
Should bear responsibility for
that policy of brutalizing the
Deputies and massacring the
people by the Nguyen Van Tha
ieu authorities, who have used
U. S. aid and assistance to re-
press the people."
,. Immediate Action Sought
The Deputies appealed to
"The U. S. Congress and parlia-
Ments of freedom-living coun-
tines to exert their influence to
\immediately and efficiently put
an end to President Nguyen'
Van Thieu's repression of the
Deputies and the people."
? They called for "leaders of
associations, religious groups,
cultural groups, intellectuals;
journalists and all democracy
'and freedom-loving people in
the country ani abroad to sup-
port our struggle for this miser-
able and repressed people."
- At the same time, Tran Van
president of the Saigon Bar
Association, issued a statement
33
that denounced the Govern-
ment for the police hehavior
Oct. 31. He charged that the po
lice had "committed acts of vi-
olence (pushing, rock-throwing,
barbed wire barricading, etc.)"
The 44 deputies, part of a
156-member lower house, cline
mostly from two opposition
blocs?the People Social bloc.
made up mostly Buddhists, and
the Nationalist 'bloc, a Roman
Catholic group supporting the
anticorruption protests of the
Rev. Tran Huu Thanh.
??????
Faith in U.S. Influence
Although their appeal con-
tained no reference to last,
Tuesday's Democratic sweep of
the United States Congressional
elections, its significance can
rardly have escaped them,,
There is a kind of unquestioned'
faith among -manp Vietnamese:
that the United States Govern-
ment has infinite' capacities ti
influence events in Vietnam.
Sime of those involved in the
recent . Anti - Government'
protests here rave hoped for,
some sign of approval frim the-
United States, Embassp Ameri-
can officials have reportedly
been ordered to stay far awayi
from potrest groups and de
monstrations, lest peiple read'
great significance into their
presence in the vicinity.
The embassp, meanwhile, has
sail nothing to alter the im-
pression trat Washington con-:
tinues to suppirt President Tri-1
eu as the legitimate head of
state; but tre Congressional:
cuts in aid this year have dilut-
ed the perceived support none-'
theless, and the oppinents of,
President Thieu today wer&
clearly hoping ti turn the pa
lice violence if last week tol
their advantage with -the new
Congress.
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? CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 November 1974
?Saigon aid
cutbacks
being felt
Political impact swift?
as Thieu foes rally
? By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Saigon
? As a result of congressional cuts in
American aid to South Vietnam, Sai-
gon's armed forces have reduced
their use of ammunition, fuel, helicop-
ters, and fighter-bombers.
But experts here say that the cuts
have not yet markedly weakened the
South Vietnamese military machine.
The "real crunch," they say, may not
come until early next year.
"The danger point for ammunition
would not be until perhaps next
February," said one official, . who
keeps an eye on the supply situation.
But, the aid, cuts have already had
their effect on local politics, and a
political crunch could be coming
before the military one. The cuts have
helped convince many of the oppo-
nents of President Thieu that the
United States is slowly withdrawing
NEW YORK TIMES
3 NOVEMBER 1974
U.S?,G
?
? its support for Mr. Thieu. , Their
? conviction that Mr. Thieu's position
has thus grown wobbly has greatly.
emboldened them.
"Many Vietnamese felt that Presi-
dent Nixon's fall was a real blow to
Thieu," said a Western diplomat in
Saigon. '"rhat plus the aid cuts in-
dicated to them that Thieu was not so
strong."
"There are two important factors in
the background to the opposition
? movement against Mr. Thieu," said
? Tran Van Tuyen, leader of a bloc.k of
opposition deputies in the lower house
of South Vietnam's National Assem-
bly.
"First there was the departure of
-Mr. 'Nixon ? Thieu lost his protec-
tor," he said.
"Second, the U.S. Congress showed
that it could withdraw aid from a
repressive government." ?
"These are some of the reasons why
the Vietnamese press grew more
courageous and began violently criti-
cizing Mr. Thieu's policies," the legis-
lator said.
Air activity cut back
On the military side, Vietnamese
Air Force officers say that they have
reduced their fighter-bomber mis-
sions by about one third as a result of
the aid cuts. The Air Force has
permanently grounded about 70 of its
Al Skyraider fighter-bombers.
Military sources say that helicopter
missions have been cut by about 45
percent in recent months. The South
als
In aig n
Have ing
f t e 60's
By LESLIE H. GELB
? WASHINGTON ?From the beginning of Amer-
ican involvement in Vietnam, it has not been a-
, geographical abstraction and not a people and
a culture .to most American leaders. And, even
as the awareness of the war fades, Vietnam remains .
- a landscape?or rather, an objective. "It" must not
? be taken over by the. Communists.
' Administration leaders do not usually talk about
the American objective in Vietnam. That would be
? bad politics. But when they do talk, they stress
? Washington's willingness to accept any solution that ,
comes about through peaceful means.
? Many Administration officials ackowledge that
this is mcre a hope than an objective. The reality
, is that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong will
? Vietnamese Navy is planning reduc-
tions in both its blue water and
riverine forces.
"At some point, we're going to have
to reduce the consumption rate for
fuel to the point where we stop
- running some trucks," said one
source. "There is a serious danger of
our not having enough fuel to get
, through the fiscal year."
American staff reduced
The U.S. embassy in Saigon an- ?
nounced last month that as a result of
?aid reductions, the United States was
cutting the jobs of some 1,300 Amer- ?
ican civilians working in South Viet-
nam. Most of them have been helping
to maintain and repair Vietnamese .
aircraft.. _ ? _
American officials said the cuts
were being made so that military aid
could be concentrated on "high prior-
ity" items such as ammunition, fuel,
? spare parts, and medical supplies.
But the officials added that even after
, these cuts are made, some 500 Amer-
ican technicians would continue to
; work with the Vietnamese Air Force. '
The dilemma for President Thieu,
as some observers see it, is that if he
cracks down too hard on his political
opponents,. he will elk losing even
more support from the U.S. Congress..
But if he fails to crack down hard,
people may grow less and less fearful
? of coming out against him. Moreover,
those who supported him might begin
to feel that they were backing a loser,
and that could prove dangerous for
President Thieu as well.
'
not abandon their dream Of liberating South Vietnam'
and unifying the country, ? . . ? .
The impression seems to have grown that the
American objectiVe has changed. President Nguyen
Van Thieu is under fire from Catholic and Buddhist
- groups, and Washington seems to be doing
little about it. Perhaps, some speculate, the Ford
- Administration is getting ready ,tO drop President
Thieu. Congress is slashing aid to Saigon, and the
White House does not seem to be complaining: Per-
haps, some begin to hope, Mr. Ford will quietly let
the Saigon regime slip away.
? But again, the reality is otherwise. A glance at
the battle between Congress and the executive over
the new Foreign Aid Bill over the past two months
shows how dearly the oid objective is still held.
This is what happened, The Administration pro-
posed a new $4-billion aid bill, including a $400-
million Middle East "peace package" for Egypt,"
- Syria and Jordan, $250-million in additional food ?
aid, almost $500-million for Cambodia, almost $150-
million for Laos, and about $1-billion in economic
aid to Saigon. In a separate bill, the Administration
, also asked for $1.45-billion in military aid to Saigon.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved
funds for the Middle East and food aid, but cut
total aid to Cambodia down to $347-million, Laos
?to $100-million, and South Vietnam to $1.28-billion..
Of equal importance, the committee eliminated the
President's prerogative to juggle funds from one
country to another and from one account to another.
The House Foreign ,s.ffeirs C.emraittee seemed headed
- in the same direction.
, Sensing that this v..as '.ing to a phase-out of
American aid to Saigon, Secretary of State Kissinger
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made a -critical decision. Ile would sacrifice the new
? bill with money for the Middle East, and food aid
and save his flexibility on Indochina by pushing for
Congres'sional continuation" of the old bill.
. This decision cost Mr. Kissinger on Capitol Hill,
,but it cleminstrated the depths of his feelings about-
? the Saigon regime. Mr. Ford's own feelings on the
Matter are not clear.
_Together, the President and his Secretary are act-
ing in other ways to sustain the "commitment". As
in recent years, the bulk of the food aid, program
?will again go to Indochina. Pentagon funds will con-
tinue to pay for more than 5,000 personnel in South
Vietnam. The. commitment, or objective, seems to
endure. .
An Echo trorn. the Diem Era
,President Thieu, according to news accounts from,
Vietnam, seems to be in deep trouble and has had
to make concessions to lessen the effectiveness of
protests over corruption and repression. Ford Ad-
ministration officials maintain that Mr. Thieu is still
strong and is gaining in support. The stories and
the official responses have the ring of the early
1960's and the days of President Ngo Dinh Diem.
What the White House might do if Mr. Thieu
were actually overthrown or if he stepped down
voluntarily is something leaders do not like to think
about. No one mentions going back with American
WASIIINGTON POST
Monday, Nov.4,1974
-Viet iJiee
ire on
V lila ers
- forces. United States action, they say, depends on.
exact circumstances of Mr. Thieu's possible
, removal. ?
In the early 1960's,'a generil and a diplomat were
dispatched to South Vietnam to study the situation..
When they returned and told their widely divergent
tales, President Hennedy asked if they'had gone to .
the same country.
In 1974 staff members of the Senate Foreigh Re-
lations and House Foreign Affairs Committees paid -
separate visits to Vietnam.
The House staff report concluded: "U.S. economic.'
and military assistance has strengthened South
Vietnam economically, militarily, and politically.
? This strength makes it unlikely that the North Viet-
namese can win a military or political victory in the
South in the foreseeable. future, if ever." ?
The Senate staff report concluded that in the
absence of a true peace settlement, "there seems to.
be, at hest, little prospect of anything but a con-
tinuing military struggle and, assuming that the
maintenance of South Vietnam remains a U.S. policy
objective, a continuing requirement for U.S. eco-
nomic and military aid." ' '
Administration officials continue to quote Henry"
Kissinger as saying "that to lose,.gracefully is ,still
to lose."
against the 'Thieu government.
He said fighting broke out
when seeret police tried to
take microphones from the
demonstrators .and broke up
two altars in front of the
church. He said government
troops burned 10 houses in the
village.
The government sources
said a Roman Catholic monk
involv-ed in a land dispute
with the goverenenent had wom-
en and children lie on the
road. to block troops sent to
free a policeman the monk
was holding as a hostage.
?_They said one of the monk's
-.bodyguards fired on the po-
lice, seriously wounding a po-
liceman, before the police
opened fire on the crowd.
Meanwhile, Sen. -Vu Van
Mau. leader of the Buddhist-
backed National Reconcilia-
tion Forces, said that at least
50 legislators have signed a
petition calling , for Thieu's
resignation. He. said the full:
list of signers' would be pub-'
lished soon.
The South Vietnamese com-
mand reported more than 100
casualties on, both sides in
heavy fighting near Highway 1
in the central coastal province
of Binhdinh.
In Phnom Penh, the Cambo-
dian command said 86 rebels
and 3 government soldiers
were killed in two days of.
fighting in the Parrot's Beak
region near the border with
South Vietnam.
rrona News-ixspat.chts
SAIGON, Nov 3?An appo-
iiition s.tnatOr said today that
South Vietnamese police fired
into a crowd of antigovern-
ment demonstrators, killing
one and wounding 12.
Official sources said the
shooting stemmed from a land
dispute and- had no political
overtones. A government
Spokesman said the senator's
? Story was a "fabrication"
aimed at slandering the gov-
ernment of President Nguyen
Van Thieu.
The government sources
said ? police fired on the
crowd, killing one civilian and
wounding others, after a po-
liceman was shot and serious-
ly wounded.
Sen. Dban Van Luong said
the incident occurred Satur-
day in the village of Cinlitairt
70 miles northeast of here. He
said six witnesses had told
him about it.
According to Sen. Luong's
Informants, 1,000 persons had
gathered near the Roman
catholic church to protest
35
NEW YORK TIMES
20 October 1974
Tanaka Tries to Damp
-
Down Nuclear Issue, but
epprts of Entry of Atom
-
Arms Into Japan Persist
SDedal to The New York Times
TOKYO, Oct. 19?The cry of
"Yankee go home!" sounded
once again in, Tokyo this week
as Japanese demonstrators led
by saffron-robed drummers and
lantern-bearers marched past
the Premier's office and the ?
United States Embassy.
. The demonstration, which in-
volved about 1,600 men and
women, according to the police, $,
was organized by the Commu-
nist party and its antinuclear
affiliate, an erganizationknown
as diens-vo. It ,sss 4;reeta-'
against the entry into Japan of
inuclear weapons aboard United;
I States warships?an emotional,
'issue in this nation that still
' bears the emotional -scars- of
the atomic bombing of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki.
Premier Kakuei Tanaka and(
his Foreign Minister, Toshio!
Kimura, are vigorously trying
I to damp down the issue ofl
1 American nuclear arms in la-
pan before President Ford's(
arrival here Nov. 18 for a four-
day visit. But it refuses to go;
j away as reports continue to I
I circulate that the United States
ihas brought nuclear weapons!
into Japan, with the secret p'er-'
mission of the Japanese Gov-
ernrnent.
Mr..Tanaka and Mr. Kimura
deny that this has happened.
The Premier told Japanese pro-
vincial governors Wednesday
- that "the Government's three-
point nonnuclear policy of not
manufacturing, not eossessing
and. not allow- ing the entry Of
nuclear weapons will. be firmly
maintained." ' -
Categorical Denial
,nnyr: Kimura has categorically
denied the existence of any
agreement permitting the Unit-
ed States to bring nuclear
weapons into Japan and has
declared that the United States
would not do so without Japa-
nese Government approval.
The United ?States State De-
partment has been more cau-
tious. When news reports of a
secret "transit agreement" were
published in 1971, the depart-
ment categorically denied them.
Now it has shifted its ground,
refusing either. to confirm or
deny similar reports. As a mat-
ter of policy, theUnited States
never confirms or denies the
presence of nuclear arms any-
where.
The current nuclear issue
divides into two parts. One in-
volves the question of a pos-
sible secret transit agreement
allowing the United States to
bring nuclear weapons into
Japan on ships or planes tem-
porarily, but not to deploy or
send them into action from
here. The second is whether the
United States is actually bring-
ing in nuclear arms under thatl
agreement.
The evidence that the transitl
agreement exists is contained
in National Security Study
Memoranda written in 1969 at
the direction of Henry A. Kis-
singer, who was then President
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? '
"Richard M. Nixon's adViiet:' ot
national security. .1
withdrawal of nuclear weapons:
from Okinawa at the time of
the island's return to Japanese
?
control, the memoranda
to the "transit agreement" with'
the notation that it was a sen-
sitive and closely held secret.1
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in-
sisted that the United States in
? WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1974
Victor ZOrza'
any case retain its rights to
move nuclear weapons through
Japan itself and extend them
to Okinawa after the transfer
of minis ration there. They
contended that this was essen-
tial to maintain the United
'States nuclear deterrent-in East
I The issue of withdrawal Of
;all nuclear weapons from Old-
!nawa was left unresolved and
, was passed up to Presfdent
? Nixon for his personal decision.
He said he would decide after
all other points had been settled
with the Japanese Government.
In May, 1969, Mr. Kissinger
wrote a National Security Deci-
sion Memorandum for the Pres-
ident agreeing? to open nego-
tiation with Japan. Among the
points in that memo were that
Japan must agree to permit the
'United-States to continue using.
bases on Okinawa with only
slight restrictions and must
ease restrictions on American.
use of bases in Japan proper._
Implicit in that memorandum
was a continuation of the trans-
it agreement,
(eo
The Sino Soviet Reconciliation
-Thoblind spot which causes so many
officials, in Washington as well as in
other capitals, to deny the significance
,of the warmer Climate between Mos-
cow and Peking could cause them to
miss a truly historic turn of events.
The reconciliation between Russia and
China that is now taking shape could
be as important for the world as the
Sino-Soviet conflict was when it finally
emerged in the open in the early 1960s,
after simmering under the snrface for
several years.
The halting steps toward some sOrt
of reconciliation became clearly visible
when Peking began to play down the
danger Of war with 7.ussia more than a
, year ago. The new. Peking Alogan pro-
claimed that Russia was making only
"a feint to the East" while threatening
the West--but it was accompanied,
somewhat inconsistently, by the old ac-
cusations that Moscow was also Pre-
paring an attack on China. Most
Western analysts chose to regard Pe-
? kung's talk of an attack as significant
? and to dismiss the new theme as mere
propaganda.
But it was propaganda with a differ-
ence. Peking was giving Moscow a
choice. The Kremlin could respond to
the new slogan, or ignore it. Moscow
sent back a number of positive signals,
but these were overlaid by the menac-
ing noises generated by the continuing
Peking power struggle. The reconcilia-
tion with Russia is obviously a major
issue in the power struggle, and the
anti-Soviet noises made by the hard-
line faction in the Chinese leadership
were wrongly regarded in the West as
a rejection of Soviet overtures by Pe,
king.
More recently, however, Peking's
preoccupation with a sudden .Soviet at-
tack on China has greatly diminished.
NEW YORK TIMES
11 November 1974
CRING FORD VISIT
DEBATND IR SEOUL
Token Endorsement of
Park's Rue Is Feared
by Oppositionists
By FOX BUJ ILRFIELD
soma) to Tat tiev York Tunes
Approved
Chinese leaders have instead taken to
telling foreign visitors that the Soviet
Union was not going to make war on
China in the near future. This Could
only mean that those who last year
coined the slogan about the "feint to
the East" had since prevailed in the Pe-
king struggle, and that the prospect of
reconciliation implied' Inthe slogan a
'year ago had now become a -matter of
practical politics. -
The latest Chinese message of greet-
ings to Moscow on the October Revolu-
- tion 'anniversary, which hints at Pe-.
'king's acceptance of the Soviet offer of
a non-aggression treaty, thus does not
come out of the blue. The analysts who
last year refused to attach any impor-
tance to the early signals cannot easily
switch tracks now. But higher officials
who nourish Kissinger's view that a
reconciliation is unlikely are taking
upon themselves a major political re-
sponsibility, as did the officials who
told the West's leaders in the late
1950s that there was no such thing as a.
Sino-Soviet conflict.
Just how far official blindness can
go is shown by the response which the
Assistant Secretary of State, Walter
Robertson made in 1959 to a series of
articles which argued that Russia and
China were locked in a secret struggle.
Peking, he insisted, "works closely
with Moscow." It was wishful thinking,
he maintained, to forecast that they
would allow any differences between
them to outweigh "the dominant prac-
tical military, political and economic
advantages they derive through contin-
ued close cooperation."
The articles, which had argued that
"friction between MoscoW and Peking
is just beginning, but it may yet be-
come the most significant development
in the long cold war that lies ahead,"
were based on much the same kind of
?
SEOUL; South Korea, Nov. 10
.---President Ford's forthcoming
Visit here later this month has
set off angry opposition from
many Koreans who feel his trip
amounts to approval by the
United States of President Park
Chung Hee's tough one-man
kule.
Md in a country that has
long been ardently pro-Amer-
ican, dependent on the United
States for its very existence,
Mr.' Ford's visit has roused
some of the first anti-American
eentiment heard here in years.
In the last week alone a
evidence as the -material which led me
to write, more than- a year ago, that
signs of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation
were now becoming apparent. The fact
that I was right in 1959 does not neces-
sarily make me right now. But the fact
that most government analysts and of-
ficials were wrong then should serve
as a reminder that they do not have a
monopoly of wisdom, and that they
could be as' wrong now as they were
then.
At that time officialdom refused to,
accept the evidence because it did not
fit in with its preconceived notion of .
the Communist monolith. Dr. Kis-,
singer and his associates, who have
used the Sino-Soviet conflict to play off
'Moscow and Peking against each '
other, so that it became a key factor in,
the structure of detente, may now be
affected by similar prejudices of their,
own. -
The Sino-Soviet conflict helped
Kle-
singer to get President Nixon to Pe-'
king, and it helped him to get from the.
Kremlin some of the concessions on
SALT which made Nixon's Moscow
summit such a spectacular pre-election
success. The Sino-Soviet conflict cer-
tainly helped him to maneuver both
sides into forcing Hanoi to negotiate,
bra peace agreement. Without such
negotiations detente among the great
powers would have been impossible. .
Kissinger publicly rejects the very
notion that he could play Russia and
China off against each other, but he'
can hardly deny that the United States
has derived great profit from their con-
flict. His diplomacy suggests that he
and his associates expect to derive no
less advantage from it in the future."
Could they have been blinded to the
emerging new reality by wishful think-.
ing, as their predecessors were?
1974, Victor Zorza
grolip of 300 Korean Roman '
Catholic priests, about half the
nation's total, called for Pres-
ident Ford to "reconsider" his
trip. At the same time 21
Protestant clergymen, including
nine American missionaries, de-
manded in a statement that
Mr. Ford cancel his visit "be-
cause it shows support for the
Park regime, which does not
have the trust of the Korean
people."
. One Presbyterian minister
the Rev. Ho Byung Sup, was
arrested by the Korean Central
Intelligence, Agency for ti ying
to mimeograph the statei lent.
There have been other demands
that President Ford meet with
Opposition leaders and that he
convey American concern to
Mr. Park over his increasingly
repressive actions. ?
Source of the Vehemence
The vehemence of Korean
opposition to the Presidenttal
,
visit the first since Lyndon B.
Johnson came here in 1966,
stems in large measure from a
Korean tradition difficult for
Americans to understand.
? For as a people often forced
Into subservience by their larg-
er neihbors, Koreans have de-
- mentality of looking
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to others for l.:oth protection
and legitimacy, In earlier cen-
turies. envoys from China con-
firmed- Korea's kings in their
.power, and in more recent
times. Koreans say, this func-
tion has been transferred to
the United States. .
But American diplomats in-
sist that Mr. Ford's visit has
nothing to do with Korean
politics and that therefore Mr..
Ford should not get involved in
meetings with opposition fig-
ures, or express concern', to
President Park.
As Ambassador Richard L.
Sneider put in a meeting with
American missionaries last
week, "the American Govern-
ment does not interfere in
Korean domestic affairs."
Instead, according to one of
the participants, Mr. Sneider
said that Mr. Ford "cqmes with
broader purposes," to reaffirm
U.S. commitments in this part
of the world. If Mr. Ford did
not come here, after his earlier
stop in Japan, "North Korea
would take this as a 'sign
and might miscalculate," Mr.
Sneider told the missionaries.
, There are still 38,000 Ameri-
can troops in South Korea, two
decades after the end of the
Korean war, and Washington
has provided Seoul with more
than $10-billion in economic
and military assistance. ?
Many Koreans clearly see the
Visit in different terms from the
efficial American view.
"There is no question that
inost Koreans believe President
Ford is coming here 1.9 bless
,Park _Chung Hee, .it is the nat-
ural assumption for us to
make," explained the editor of
a major newspaper. "It saddens
me, because it reduces the high
regard we have for the United
States."
One Invitation Turned Down
The editor asked that his
name not be used, lest he be
detained by the secret police.
Earlier this year 203 Koreans,
including the only living former
president of the country, a
Catholic Bishop and Korea's
best known young poet, were
convicted of subversion by se-
cret military courts.
:`There has been speculation
that Mr. Park might release
some of these prisoners as a
gesture of moderation in con-
nection with President Ford's
visit. However, a ranking
Korean official said yesterday
that the Government instead
would release a small number
Of Americans held in Korean
jails as convicted criminals.
. Whatever their officially
stated position, there is evi-
dence that some American
lomats believe President Ford's
visit creates a dilemma for the
United States.
; A request by the Blue House,
the Korean equivalent of the
White House, for Mr. Ford to
appear with President Park at
a mass public rally was re-
portedly turned down.
. American officials here are
also known to feel that their
bands are tied in trying to in-
fluence Mr. Park's conduct be-
cause the United States is in
a conscious phase of decreasing
its involvement in other na-
tions' affairs. These officials
recall that 10 years ago, in a
different era, Samuel D. Berger,
then American Ambassador in
Seoul, put pressure on Mr. Park
? PAR EASTMN ECONMIC_ REVIEW
18 October 1974 -
i ideological foes woo Japan
By Koji N
Tokyo: The Japanese ploy of using Chi-
na as a lever to bargain with the Soviet
Union ? it was such strategy which saw
the acquiescence of hawkish, anti-
communist leaders in the establishment
of formal relations with Peking ? has
once again produced diplomatic over-
tures. For in virtually simultaneous ac-
tion, Peking and Moscow have broach-
ed the subject of concluding World War
H peace treaties with Tokyo.
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin was,
quoted by Komei Party Chairman
Yoshikatsu Takeiri as having said, in
Moscow on .October 2, that the ground
for peace treaty talks would be prepared'
when Japanese Foreign Minister Toshio
Kimura visits the Soviet capital in De-
cember or January ,and that the agree-
ment could be concluded when he
(Kosygin) follows this with a visit to
Japan. ? - e ?
The following day, Chinese Deputy
Premier Teng Hsiao-peng told a Japan
Socialist Party delegation in Peking that
a peace treaty between China and Japan
'should be formalised as soon as possible
and, to this end, all obstacles should be
'overcome, the Controversial Senkaku Is-
lands issue being shelved.
While neither Moscow nor Peking has
made an official bid for peace treaty
talks to be held at Government level,
Tokyo believes it is only a matter of
time. Meanwhile; the Japanese Govern-
ment has ? adopted a non-committal
stance. Whichever way Japan jumps on
the question of treaties, it is dealing
with loaded issues.
The Japanese are aware that the
Soviets are interested in the incorpora-
tion of the Asian Collective Security
System in any treaty; Tokyo sees this
system as an instrument designed to
contain China. Japan is not willing,
therefore, to be a party to a Moscow.
orientated deal if China will be anta-
gonised.
At the other end of the scale, there is
the ticklish problem of the northern ter-
ritory, currently occupied by the So-
viets but over which Japan claims
sovereignty, which may be offered as
strategic bait to induce Japan into ac-
cepting the collective security concept.
Japan has long claimed four islands si-
tuated off the northern tip of Hokkaido.
Moscow has been refuting the legiti-
macy of such claims for the past eigh-
teen years. The reversion of two of the
islands ? Habomai and Shikotan, the
and got him to hold elections.'
During Mr. *Ford's one-day,
stay, he is scheduled to have a
two-hour meeting with Mr.!
F irk at the Blue House and,
akamura
closest of the group to Hokkaido was
promised in 1956 with a joint declara-
tion about a peace treaty. But the
Soviets have also claimed that the terri-
torial issue has ',long been resolved."
There is one school of Japanese diplo-
matic thought which believes the return
of the two islands would be a cheap
price for Moscow to pay if such a deal
ensures Japan being party to the collec-
tive security philosophy.
Yet another side to' any peace treaty -
with the Soviet Union is Japan's possi-
ble involvement in Siberian programmes
for the development of cnide oil and
natural gas. Japan is not, however, as
enthusiastic about such a joint under-
taking as it was a year ago when there
was the promise of an annual supply of
25 million tons of Tyumen crude oil.
Despite this Japanese cooling over the
project, the Soviets still have, in the
crude oil idea, a powerful negotiating
card. Oil is Japan's weakest suit. -
In Peking, there is the realisation that
a Soviet-Japanese treaty concluded ahead
of a Sino-Japanese agreement would in-
evitably be used by Moscow as an anti-
Chinese political weapon. It is be-
cause of this, Tokyo feels, that Chi-
na has even offered to forget such a
burning issue as the Senkaku Islands be-
sides a Peking willingness to shelve the
diplomatic determination of Taiwan as
regards Japanese activity.
It is reasonably certain that China's
crude oil offer to Japan contributed to
Tokyo having second thoughts on in-
volvement in Siberia. China, scheduled
to supply the Japanese with 5 million
tons of crude oil during 1975, told an
economic delegation from Japan that it
could export 10% of its crude output to
Japan by 1980. That annual output is
projected at 400 million tons.
Since Japan views the Soviet Union as
its potential No. I enemy, it is likely
that a treaty with China will precede
any agreement with Moscow. From the
other side, a "China treaty first" move-
ment might be the death knell for not
only a Japan-Soviet agreement, but also
for any hopes of solving territorial
disputes.
And, finally, there is the United
States to consider. Washington's deal-
ings with both China and the Soviet
Union has a major bearing on Japanese
policy. Japan's path might well be de-
cided by American dealings with the
two communist giants.
!ater be a guest at a state
dinner given by the Korean
leader. Mr. Ford will also lunch
with American troops at Camp
C?el,sey near Seoul,
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CIA Chickens
THE NEW LEADER
BA Oct . 1974
i Vang ? Pao has become Chicken
i Farmer Yang Pao. .
. ? !? Long Cheng lies about 100 miles
VIENpANE?Over the past 10 north of Vientiane, the Laotian cap-
years, CIA-eMployed 1.13. opera- ital. Once dominated by the rattle
tives trained, transported, supplied, of gunfire and the roar of American
and advised a 15,000-man guerrilla aircraft, it currently crackles with
army, composed mostly of Meo the sound of cackling chickens as
tribesmen, as it fought ?pro-Corn- a result of a $25,000 CIA invest-
munist Pathet :Lao and ' North ment. Some 2,560 birds, brought
Vietnamese forces. In addition-, the i in batches from Bangkok every two
Americans, many of them cx-Green K!wee. s,
arc housed there in five spe-
Berets with Vietnam combat expert- tially designed structures. After be-
encc, taught the Mcos to man radar
A ing raised for eight or nine weeks,
? installations that guided.
' United are sold kr a local market scrv-
? States bombers toward targets in 1 .ng
several thousand Mcbs.
North -Vietnam, and -sent. teams of
The general, who for more than
tribesmen On forays into the Pco-
a decade used CIA funds not?only
pie's Republic of China. Ito pay his irregular forces but also to
? The China missions, hoWeveri
!build and furnish a number of lavish
were brought to a halt by the 1972
; houses for his Six wives, makes ap-
Sino-Ainerican d?nte; Americani
! proximately $1,000 a pronth from
bombing of North Vietnam stop.ped
;the enterprise (the average per cap-
training activities were terminated
last spring, in accordance with
peace agreements ending this na-
tion's, civil conflict. Consequently,
-CIA agents, looking for a fresh field
of -endeavor.' have turned . to civic
action projects. Centered in Laos
- Where the Meos are concentrated,
cally a benevolent one, and his
the new programs involve substarilp
rofits are not excessive by local
tial sums of money and their pur-
standar(ls." in fact, the community
? pose' is plain: to retain influence,
benefits because the chickens sell
over an important segment of the
for below-normal prices. .
populace in a strategic part of the . Besides chicken-raising, the CIA
country. ? has backed a cattle-breeding pro-
The agency's primary contact in gram and the e5tab1ishment of farm-
the area is the flamboyant general wily),
1 centers providing agricultural
Vans "Pao, a 46-year-old Meo who commodities at reduced rates. Al-
runs northern Laos like a feudal though th .se
e projects are adminis-
lord, and who is now reaping sig-
terecl by the Agricultural Develop-
nificant rewards from poultry rais-
ment Corporation (ADC), an agen-
ing, the CIA's most successful civic cy
nominally under Laotian govern-
pursuit. in a transformation that
mcnt control, they depend upon
took place at Long Cheng, the Meo
ita income in Laos is $60 a year).
An American: close to him is will-
ing to overlook yang Pao's in-
come. "At first it bothered me,"
he says, "but after a while you
come to realize that .this is the sys-
tcm?and it works. Yang Pao can
be called a dictatOr, yet he is basi-
American support for survival, and
leader's longtime base and formerly when budgetary cutbacks in the
a CIA field headquarters, General U.S. Agency
for International De-
velopment (to) threatened to dim- '
Six American agricultural experts
at present supervise ADC.ventures.
? All are genuine civic action workers,
not CIA hands. "These men are my
employes in the purest sense; they
have no other professional con-
cerns," explains Charles Mann, who'
has headed AID'S annual.$50 million
pi;ogram here Since 1969. Stilt,1
when asked about the source of!
ADC funds, Mann ? replies: "Nol
cornme.a."
As for the six experts, they preferl
to ignore the question of financing.
"I'm not happy about where the!
money comes from," says one, "butt
I am concerned With civTc develop-i
ment. and I care 'a great deal about!
the Meos. The source of our funds,1
and the motives behind them, mean
little to mc, cornpared to what wel
are doing for these people."
On the other hand, Senator Ed-
ward M. Kennedy, chairman of the.
Senate subcommitte? on refugees.: ?
feels the CIA's current approach:
raises "troublingquestions."He has.
long opposed the agency's use of
humanitarian programs as a cover,'
and recently declared: "Despite our:
country's general support for the::
cease-fire .agreement and the new
? government, several indicators Sug-
gest that the intent of sane of our
remaining presence in Laos can
only help to perpetuate old relation-
. ships and the division of that coun-,
try."?ARNOW ABRAMS
mate or severely curtail ADC oper-
ations last February, an infusion of
CIA money put the organization
back in business. Altogether,. the
CIA 'has spent over $t00090 on its
civic action undertakings.
38
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Sitoday, Nov. S, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST.
. ?
'
I 1
?
??????
t ing
11
;
By Joseph Novitski
Special to The Washington Post
f: BOGOTA, Colombia, Nov.
;2?The diplomatic and eco-
nomic wall that was built
around Cuba by the United
, States and its Latin Ameri-
i.can allies more than 10
:years ago has begun to
..crumble under pressure
,.!from the Latin Americans.
For 14 years, three U.S.
'-:administrations have used
-economic aid, diplomatic
_pressure, military interven-
tion and the CIA to enforce
a political and economic em-
bargo cutting Cuba off-from
Latin America.
Now, for the first time
since Cold-War-tensions be-
gan to ease, detente is being
allowed into Latin America.
But the Cold-War years left
their mark and left Latin
countries feeling more like
I the colonies of an empire
!: than partners in an allinace.
"American economic dom-
inance in this part of the
7 world exists as a matter of
fact," Carlos Lleras Res-
; trepo a former president of
:I Colombia, said in a recent
interview. "But the Latin
countries have learned, af-
ter voting along to keep
China out of the United Na-,
tions for 20 years, that the
U. S. changes its diplomatic
position strictly in accord-
- ance with its own interests
7 and that there is no need to
"The wall isolating Cuba
from its natural neighbors-
and trading partners in the
United States, the Carib-
bean and in South America
was designed to keep Fidel
Castro's formula for so-
cialist revolution from
? spreading through the hemi-
sphere. The United States
f began this isolation by cut-
ting off Cuban sugar imports
and all U. S. exports to the
island in 1960, a year after
Castro came to power, and
; by backing the abortive in-
vasion at the Bay of Pigs
the next year. ?
t Latin American countries
then helped to build the
I V,;all,'slOW1Y?ana:reluctantly,
. under intense U.S. pressure,
with unilateral actions and
collective diplomatic deci-
sions taken between 1961
and 1964. Recently, many of
the same countries - which
: helped start the quarantine
have taken the initiative to
end it.
Mexico originally voted
against the 10-year-old col-
lective decision forbidding
! trade and -diplomatic tele-
' tions and has never re-
spected it. Over the last-
four years. first Chile, under
'..the late President Salvador
? Allende, then Peru, Argen-
tina and Panama, have disre-
garded the collective deci-
sion and have exchanged
diplomatic missions and
goods with Cuba.
? Others want to follow, but
decorously. So Colombia,
Costa Rica and Venezuela,
the firmest U.S. allies when
the embargo was set up by
the Organization of Ameri-
can States, have requested
that the original decision be
reconsidered.
Next weekend, a confer;
ence of OAS delegates from
- 23 countries will meet in
Quito and the required two-
thirds majority is expected
to vote to leave each mem-
ber country free to choose
its own kind of relations
with Cuba.. For the first
time in the history of the
Cuban controversy, the Unit-
States, so far as Latin
diplomats in three countries
have been able to determine,
has no clear position.
"The problem is over now,
said Arturo Frondizi, presi-
dent of Argentina when the
- United States 'under the-
Kennedy administration be-
gan pushing for the isola-
tion of Cuba. Frodizi was
one of the former presi-
dents, foreign ministers and
diplomats interviewed in Ar-
gentina, Brazil and Colom-
bia over the last two weeks
on their role in resisting or '
helping the isolation of
Cuba,
"Now we're heading to-
_
ward the full 'N reincorpora-
tion of Cuba in the Latin
American community,"
Frondizi said. "But what has
changed is the relation be-
tween the U.S. and Russia,
not the relations with Latin
.America."
IShlating Cuba from Latin
America failed to bring
down Castro's government
or force it to change course,
? as three U.S. Presidents ap-
parently hoped'it would. In
the view of those inter-
viewed, it halted the spread
of Cuban-style revolution -
only when the United States
was willing to intervene in
Latin internal affairs. For
these filen; the policy had
three other effects that
were predicted by public fig-
ures as it was taking shape
in 1961 and 1962.
? Frondizi made his predic-
tions in letters to and con-
versations with his friend
President John F. Kennedy.
-.The late Francisco Safi
Tiago Dantas -of Brazil, then
foreign minister, made his
publicly,in speeches.
First, Cuba, despite Cas-
tro's vaunted nationalism,
became a Soviet satellite.
Frondizi, trying to head off
the isolation in December
1961, warned Kennedy that
it would. But the Argentine
president come away with
the impression that Ken-
nedy was under strong do-
mestic pressure to "do some-
thing" about Cuba.
"Imagine that Kennedy
asked me, in Palm Beach,
not to send my memoranda
on Cuba through diplomatic
channels," Frondizi said.
Then, the inter-American
system of defense alliances
and the OAS, which had
been built on the principle
of self-determination for all--
member states, was strained
to the breaking point. Some
say it has broken down as
the result of U.S. interven-
tion and of internal differ-
ences. ?
All those interviewed as-
serted that the precedent for
intervention set by the 1962
decision to expel Cuba from
the inter-American system
opened the way for the U.S.
invasion of the Dominican
Republic in 1965' and for
,
'massive CIA &Import, for opo::.
position to President Al=
lende, who was closely allied
to Cuba. ,
"The U.S. became the -
great judge of the fitness of
governments in the hemi-
sphere," said Sen. Julio C.
Turbay, who argued with -
the United States in favor
o'f diplomatic action against-
Cuba when he was Colom,
bian foreign minister in
1961. "That was not what we
had intended." _ .
This was the second ef-
fect seen by the Latins. Fi-
nally, Latin domestic poli-
tics became increasingly .
radicalized under the pres---
sure to line up-- on the U.S.
side in the Cold War. Stume
bling democratic govern-
ments that had favored
Cuba's right to go its own
way fell to military coups in
Argentina in 1962, in Brazil-
in 1964 and in ' Chile last
year.
"U.S. action in these years
radicalized our internal .
processes and contributed to
the failure of democratic ex-
peripients to change social
and economic structures,"
Frondizi said.
"I believe opposition by
. our two countries to the ex-
pulsion of Cuba from the in-
ter-American system was
one of the factors contribut-
ing to the military coups in
Argentina, and later, in Bra-
zil," Frondizi stated. The-:
? former president added that
there were, of course, strong
internal political drives
leading to the coups in both
cases.
There were also internal
reasons behind subsequent
coups in Bolivia and Ecua-
dor. which sided with Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Mexico and
Chile at the OAS conference
in Punta del Este, Uruguay,
in January 1962 and did not
vote for the U.S. resolution
expelling Cuba. Ogly Mex-
ico, among the countries
that opposed the measure,
'has kept the same form of
government since 1962.
"Intervention is , bad in
any event," said Carlos
Lleras, president of Colom-
bia from 1966 to 1973 and a
staunch U.S. ally. "It is not
the U.S. role to decide the
fate of individual countries.
But it has, and the result
has been that the U.S. winds
up supporting right-wing
3.9
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dictatorships in the name of
anti-communism. These re-
gimes are r-JPressive of hu-
? man rights and ?that gives
the U.S. a verg bad image."
? In the beginning, U.S. hos-
tility to Cuba also? took a
more positive form. It was '
channeled into the Alliance
? for Progress, a huge, "'
hemi-
sphere-wide effort, under-
? written by the United
? States, to show that demo-
? cratic governments could
also deal with social and
economic development prob-
? lems successfully.
The alliance, begun by
President Kennedy in Au-
gust 1961, was an instru-
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 November 197/4
Stands on food,
Chile criticized
By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
As Western Hemisphere foreign
ministers gather in Ecuador to take
up the issue of ending diplomatic and
economic sanctions against Cuba, the
United States is coming in for a new
round of criticism from Latin Amer-
ica.
? " In the first place, Secretary of State
-Henry A. Kissinger will not attend the
foreign ministers' sessions ? an ab-
sence that, to many Latin Americans,
Is an affront.
But the criticism of the United
States goes deeper than the Kissinger
absence.
? The meeting in Quito, the Ecuado-
rian capital, stems from a Latin
'American initiative to take a fresh
look at the Cuba question: Should the
government of Cuban Prime Minister
Fidel Castro be restored to hemisphe-
. ric good graces?
Washington is-reluctant to support
the move, questioning whether Cuba
has stopped exporting its revolution
and meddling in the internal affairs of
Latin American nations ? the rea-
sons for the sanctions against Cuba in
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MON.I2120
114 November 197h
A US. gaffe on
913
the first place.
But most Latin American govern-
ments think that Cuba has stopped
those practices and that relations
should be re-established.
Moreover, Latin Americans ask, in ?
effect, who is the United States to cast
a judgment about meddling in inter-
nal affairs? One Latin American
ambassador in Washington last week
noted that it was the United States
that spent millions of dollars to
"destabilize" the government of the
late Sqlvador Allende Gossens in
Chile. ?
"How can Washington talk of
Cuba's export of revolution when it
was engaged in exporting its concept
of gnvernment to Chile, meddling in
Chilean affairs, and trying to unseat a
legitimate government?" this am-
bassador asked.
The view is widespread. Dis-
closures in early September of Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency activities in
Chile have had a decidedly negative
effect on Latin America.
There is also growing Latin Amer-
ican cynicism over Washington's mo-
tives in the international arena. The
United States came in for a scathing
attack at the World Food Conference
In Rome by Argentine Foreign M.in-
Cuba?
Latin American efforts to end
diplomatic and economic sanc-
tions against Cuba came within
two votes of success at the Quito,
EcuadOr, meeting of hemisphere
foreign ministers. Guatemala and
Haiti, originally lined up with the
majority wanting an end to the
sanctions, decided at the last min-
ute to abstain from voting.
There is strong hemisphere sus-
picion that Washington had a hand
in these two vote changes. The
United States denies it, but it will
take More than verbal denials to
convince a growingly skeptical
Latin America that all was open
and aboveboard at Quito.
Robert Ingersoll, head of the
U.S. delegation, claimed after the
vote that "we have not worked
against the resolution," noting
that the U.S. abstained. But many
Latin Americans agree with Gon-
zalo Facto, the Costa Rican for-
eign minister who said the absten-
tion-placed Washington "squarely
with the minority" on the Cuba
issue.
Given the present mood in Lati
America, Washi
risk of becoming isolated-from its
hemisphere neighbors who dis-
agree with the U.S. not only on
Cuba, but also on a whole range of
political and economic issues.
Secretary of State Henry Kis-
singer's absence from the Quito
session has come in for sharp
criticism also. In explaining Dr.
Kissinger's absence, Washington
argued he was busy elsewhere and
that anyway the Quito meeting
was ill-timed and too hastily orga-
nized.
This sort of argument, however,
really begs the question. Wash-
ington's closest neighbors deserve
Dr. Kissinger's attention. More-
over: the Cuba issue itself has
been on the hemisphere agenda for
months.
The whole affair appears yet
another U.S. gaffe in Latin Amer-
'Jean bolicy. Dr. Kissinger would
be well advised AO make amends
by early consultations with hemi-
sphere leaders. Delay in trying to
undo the damage done at Quito
will only make U.S. efforts in
Latin America more difficult in,
ister Alberto J. Vignes, who accused
. the U.S. of playing politics with food.
Equally strong criticism from sev-
eral other Latin American delega-
tions is the result of Washington's
failure in recent months to consult
with Latin American nations on key ?
world issues, observers say. -
Much of this criticism goes right to
Mr. Kissinger's doorstep for, since
the April conference of the Organiza-
tion of American States in Atlanta,
Dr. Kissinger has busied himself with
other parts of the world.
Rather than using his powers of
diplomatic persuasion with the Latin
Americans, he seems to have shoved
the region onto the back burner ? or ?
so runs the Latin American feeling. ?
What it all boils down to is an
Increasingly critical view of the
United States by Latin Americans..
Such criticism is nothing new. But
there had been a feeling in 1973 and
"again early this year that Latin
America and the United States, with
Henry Kissinger displaying interest
in Washington's hemispheric neigh-,
bors, were on a smoother course than
In the past.
Such hopes appear dashed, and the
Quito session may well, in the view of
observers of inter-American affairs,
show increasing Latin American criti-
cism of the-United States.
WASHINGTON POST
14 November 1974
Peru President-
Lists Diplomats
As CIA Agents
Reuter
LIMA, Nov. 13,?Peruvaian
President Juan Velasco Alva--
ado said tonight that his gov-
ernment had quietly expelled
several CIA agents including
a senior U.S. embassy official,
since taking over in 1968.
Answering press questions,
General Velasco said: "With-
out any scandal and without
publicity, we invited the am-
bassador of the United States
to withdarw several members
of the CIA from the country,
including the number two at
the embassy, named Siracusa,
and a certain Ortiz."
[Ernest V. Siracusa was dep-
uty chief of mission in Peru in
the late 60s and Frank V. Ortiz
Jr. was supervisor of the po-
litical section, according to
;State Department lists, which
!show both of them subse-
1
iquently assigned to Uruguay.]
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NEW YORK TIMES
14 .November 1974
No Victors'. at Quito
-
No winners emerged from the abortive meeting of
t, foreign ministers in Ecuador that failed by .two Votes
to repeal the official sanctions invoked against Cuba
. in 1964 by the Organization of American States. Fidel
. Castro may claim a( psychological victory because
. twelve of twenty-one voting delegations? favored repeal;
but he cannot fail. to be disappointed that the effort
fell short. of the necessary two-thirds majority.
? The most conspicuous losers were the sponsors of
the repeal resolution, Costa Rica, ?Colombia and Vene-
zuela, who counted on support that did not materialize.
Another loser was the United 'States, whose silence
throughout the Quito deliberations hardly fitted the
. absent Secretary of State Kissinger's promise of a
"new .dialogue" with Latin America and whose, absten-
tion on the vote was widely regarded as 'abdication. of
r, responsibility on a .critical ,problem. ?
? In deciding on abstention, obviously in part for
? NEW YORK TIMES
8 November 1974
Inter-American Blueprint
A privately-funded commission , headed by- former
Ambassador 'Sol M. Linowitz has produeed a report that
could vastly improve this country's relations with Latin:
America if carried out by the Administration and Con7
-gress. The great virtue of this effort is that it substitutes
Specific recommendations-33 in all?for, the highflown
rhetoric that has Characterized too many previous United
States initiatives in the hemisphere.
The recommendation that commanded the most atten-
, tion because it will ,be put to an immediate test at a:
meeing of American foreign ministers in Ecuador is the
call for an end to the fourteen-yea' attempt to isolate
.Cubain the Americas. The commission urges Washington
,to seek "a more normal" relationship with the Castro
regime, to, end its own embargo on trade with Havana,
and to be' willing, at. the meeting that begins in Quito
today, 'to support repeal of the sanctions invoked against
Cuba by the Organization of American States in 1.964.
Repeal may be voted at Quito whatever Washington
does; but the commission rightly fears it ? niay be the
United States that is isolated in the hemisphere if it ?
maintains the hardline policy. No miracles should be
expected; but it is time to liquidate an ineffective
policy and try to ease CUba's return to a more con-
structive pattern of inter-American and international
relations'. '
Of comparable importance for 'improving' this country's
relaticins with its hemisphere neighbors is the commis-
sion's strong support for a new and long overdue treaty
under which jurisdiction over the Panama Canal Zone
.would eventually pass to thea Republic of Panama. It is
imperative for the United States to remove what the ?
report calls "one of the last vestiges of Big Stick diplo-
macy" under terms that insure uninterrupted use of the
canal and a continuing United States role in its defense.
In two other areas where decisive policy changes are
critically overdue, the commission would ban unilateral
United States militarii intervention in Latin America,
such as that in the Dominican Republic. in 1965, and
would end all covert interference in the domestic politics
of other American nations such as the activities sup-
ported by the C.I.A. in Chile in 1970,-73.
* ? *
The, commission's recommendations. on the more dra-
matic inter-American prohlems?Cuba, Panama, covert .
political interference-..should not obscure its detailed
suggestions it r removing a host of Other irritating and
Approved For Release 2001/08/08:
domestic political reasons, the Ford Administration
ignored the recent recommendation of the non-partisan
:Commission on United States-Latin American Relations
that Washington "take the initiative in seeking a more
? normal relationship with Cuba" and back repeal of the
O.A.S. embargo. It also lined -up with authoritarian
? military regimes and against the hemisphere's few
remaining democracies.
?? The biggest loser of all, however, is the O.A.S.'itself,
whose relevance had already been sharply questioned
by some member states. With some justice, the twelve
who voted' for repeal called the requirement for a
two - thirds majority "a procedural absurdity," and
rightly branded the sanctions "anachronistic, ineffectual
.
and irksome." Seven members have already ignored the
O.A.S. embargo to restore relations with the Castro
regime. At least four more are likely to do so within
a few Months. The twelve supporters of the repeal
resolution correctly, asserted that its defeat at Quito
",`seriously compromises" the authority of the O.A.S.
self-defeating policies and practices little known tb:iiie
general public and. often the products of special-interest .
lobbies. It Would, for example, eliminate the United States
veto. over Inter-American Development Bank loans?a :
frequent-target for. Latin-American attack?while main;.
taming, the level of this country's contributions to the
? ? ?
Congress is asked to repeal legislation that' tries to
Mandate economic sahctions in disputes about such
matters as fishing rights or the expropriation of North
American properties. The report rightly says that these
sanetforis are usually counterproductive; and it Makes
the point that the national interest does not autornati-
.cally coincide with "the perceived interest of an individ,
, .
Here, in sum, is a report that clothes practical idealism
in common sense. It never loses sight of genuine United
States interests While ruthlessly pruning away presumed
or imaginary or long-outdated interests. It would be
hard to produce a better blueprint .for the "new era"
and "mature partnership'.' in inter-American relations
that Secretary of State Kissinger has Promised.
? .
...The Missing American
ft is ? a Matter of regret that Secretary of State
Kissinger is. unable ,to attend what seems certain to
be., the most momentous meeting of the Organization
of American States since it' nearly foundered in the
aftermath of the United States military intervention
in the Dominican Republic, in 1965.
For many Latin Americans, no hemisphere issue
has more immediate importance than the question of
opening thedb.or for Cuba's return to the inter-American
system. This is the only item on the agenda for the
meeting of American foreign ministers now getting
under way in Ecuador.
Mr. Kissinger favorably impressed his Latin-American
counterparts when he made a special effort to open a ?
dialogue with them at the United Nations a year. ago.
In three subsequent' encounters, he has made progress
in defining a fresh United States approach that he called
"the policy of the Good Partner," arousing enthusiasm
with his proposal that the American foreign 'ministers
meet regularly for candid, informal discussions of pres-
sing hemisphere problems. It is particularly unfortunate
that his excruciating schedule of world travel forces la
him to be absent at Quito. ? '
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