THE PRESIDENT RESOLVES TO FIGHT

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330006-5
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• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 27, 1974
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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CONFIDENTIAL
31 MAY 1974
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MA v 27, 1974
WATERGATE
The President Resolves to Fight
"I am not guilty of any offense under
the Constitution that is called an im-
peachable offense.-
So said Richard Nixon last week as
both he and the U.S. Congress dug in
for a long and fierce struggle over wheth-
er the President should be removed from
office. At the White House, Nixon told
Conservative Columnist James J. Kil-
patrick in a rare interview that after
"long thought," he had resolved not
to resign "under any circumstances."
Moreover, he ruled out "the rather fat-
uous suggestion that I take the 25th
Amendment and just step out and have
Vice President Ford step in for a while."
If impeached by the House, Imkton
said he would "accept the verdtct m good
grace." But he promised a vigorous de-
fense during the Senate trial that would
follow. He explained: "I would do it for
the reasons that are not?what do you
call it?those of the toreador in the ring
trying to prove himself; but I would do
it because I have given long thought to
what is best for the country, our system
of Government and the constitutional
process." Nixon believes that the remov-
al of an innocent President through
either "resignation or impeachment
would have the traumatic effect of de-
stroying Rhe nation's1 sense of stability
and leadership ... I will not be a party
under any circumstances to any action
hich would set that kind of precedent."
Resignation Benefits. The inter-
view, which was requested by Nixon,
was the first he has permitted in his sec-
ond term as President (see story page 16).
The unusual way that -he chose to de-
? clare his determination signified the ur-
gency he placed on stilling the rumors
of his imminent resignation. They have
hirled about the White House since he
released edited transcripts of 46 tape-re-
corded Watergate conversations with
his aides.
, Similarly, on Capitol Hill last week,
Democratic and Republican leaders
alike tried to quell rank-and-file con-
gressional demands that Nixon step
down and save the nation the trauma
of impeachment and trial. Senate Dem-
ocratic Whip Robert C. Byrd of %Vest
Virginia warned that a forced resigna-
tion would polarize the nation. "A sig-
nificant portion of our citizens would feel
? that the President had been driven from
office by his political enemies," he said.
"The question of guilt or innoeence
would never be fully resolved." Senate
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield de-
clared that "resignation is not the an-
swer." House Speaker Carl Albert ad-
vised that it was preferable "for _the
constitutional process to run its course."
The Democratic leaders may well
have been sincere in their statements
against resignation, though in private.
they did not convincingly deny that they
would be greatly relieved if Nixon did
step down. In fact, House leaders even
ordered staff members to examine res-
ignation's possible financial benefits to
Nixon. They found that if he were rg-
Approved For
moved from office by conviction in the
Senate, he would get a pension of only
about $12,000 a year, due to him be-
cause of his 18 years' Government ser-
vice as a Naval officer, Congressman
and Vice President. If he left voluntar-
ily, he would also get the normal pres-
idential pension of $60,000 a year, plus
up to $96,000 annually to maintain a
staff and office. But the overt Democrat-
ic strategy has been to act as statesmen,
avoid obvious partisanship and leave
talk of resignation to the Republicans.
G.O.P. leaders, however, were hav-
ing no part of it. Although none defend-
ed Nixon's conduct, they clearly had de-
cided against asking Nixon to resign
despite their outrage over the tawdry
portrait of his presidency revealed by
the transcripts, Tennessee Senator 'Wil-
liam Brock, chairman of the Republican
Senate Campaign Committee, said that
Nixon has a right to a Senate trial "if
he wants it, which he seems to." Senate
Minority Leader Hugh Scott of Penn-
sylvania added: "I think our nation is
strong enough to withstand the function-
ing of its own Constitution." The Re-
publican leaders doubtless also had in
mind the possibility that Nixon could
be acquitted. White House Speechwriter
Patrick Buchanan warned that if Re-
publicans forced Nixon out of office and
he were later found to be innocent of
wrongdoing, it "would be close to fatal
for the Republican Party."
Pleading Guilty. As the pressure
for resignation eased, Nixon's men kept
walking into Washington courtrooms to
face justice. Dwight L. Chapin, 33, once
the President's appointments secretary,
was given a term of 10 to 30 months for
lying to a federal grand jury about his
role in directing Donald Segretti, the po-
litical dirty trickster of Nixon's 1972
campaign. Chapin said that he would
appeal his case to the Supreme Court if
need be. (Chapin is the fifth former
White House aide or consultant to be
sentenced to jail. Three others?John
W. Dean III, Frederick LaRue and Jeb
Stuart Magruder?have pleaded guilty
to taking part in the Watergate cover-
up and are awaiting sentencing.
A day later Richard Kleindienst, 50,
the former U.S. Attorney General,
pleaded guilty to the charge of a mis-
demeanor stemming from his confirma-
tion hearings, which were conducted by
the Senate Judiciary Committee. In ef-
fect Kleindienst admitted that he had
not been completely candid when he tes-
tified that as Deputy Attorney General,
he had not been pressured by the White
House to drop an antitrust case against
the International Telephone and Tele-
graph Corp., which was to pledge up to
$400,000 to the G.O.P. In fact, the Pres.
ident himself had given Kleindienst
such an order (which Kleindienst re-
fused to carry out), saying. "You son of
a bitch, don't you understand the Eng-
lish language?"
Kleindienst, who could be sent to
jail for as long as a year but may get a
suspended sentence, is only the second
convicted of a crime. (In 1929 Albert
Fall, President Warren G. Harding's
Secretary of the Interior, was given one
year for bribery in the Teapot Dome
scandal.) Watergate Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski agreed to let Kleindienst
plead guilty to a misdemeanor, in part
because the former Attorney General
had cooperated with the investigation
of the ITT affair.
In the House, the Judiciary Com-
mittee's impeachment inquiry seemed to
be moving more slowly last week than
originally expected. Chairman Peter
Rodino planned to hold the first tele-
vised public session this week. But it ap-
pears the week will again be spent be-
hind closed doors as the committee
continues to hear evidence accumulated
by the staff in its investigation of 41 al-
legations of wrongdoing by the Presi-
dent. Last week the staff presented ev-
idence on the Watergate cover-up and
how $450,000 in funds from Nixon's re-
election campaign was paid as "hush
money" to the seven original Watergate
conspirators. This week the committee
will hear about Nixon's taxes, campaign
financing and campaign "dirty tricks."
At the earliest, the public phase of the
hearings may not begin until next week.
Even though the committee mem-
bers had promised to keep the staff ev-
idence confidential, excerpts of its tran-
script of a Sept. 15, 1972 conversation
between Nixon and two top aides
leaked. In a letter to Rodino, Presiden-
tial Attorney James St. Clair protested
that the leaks were "prejudicing the ba-
sic right of the President to an impar-
tial inquiry on the evidence." St. Clair
demanded that all further proceedings
be conducted in public "so that the
American people can be fully informed
with regard to all the evidence present-
ed." Rodino recommended instead that
Nixon release all the Watergate-relat-
ed tapes and other documents that he
has refused to yield to the committee
and Jaworski.
The leaked excerpts contained ma-
terial deleted as irrelevant from the
White House transcript of the Sept. 15
meeting. Although the omitted passages
offered no new evidence ofNixon's guilt
or innocence, one of them did provide a
fresh example of his vindictiveness. In
it the President said that the Washing-
ton Post. which was vigorously inves-
tigating the Watergate scandal, would
have "damnable, damnable problems"
in renewing the licenses of two televi-
sion stations that it controls. Nixon also
said of Attorney Edward Bennett Wil-
liams, who was representing both the
Post and the Democratic National Com-
mittee at the time: "We're going to fix
that son of a bitch."
Relevant Conversations. The
committee sent two new subpoenas to
the President. One demanded eleven
tapes of his conversations with aides on
April 4, June 20 and June 23, 1972. Spe-
cial Counsel John Doar said the tapes
are needed to determine if Nixon had
prior knowledge of the break-in at the
Democratic National Headquarters on
June 17, 1972, and if he participated in
the beginning of the cover-up the fol-
lowing week.
The second subpoena demanded the
President's daily schedules from April
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to April 1973, when the cover-up was
unraveling; from July 12 to July 31,
1973, when it was disclosed that pres-
idential conversations were taped; and
from October 1973, when Nixon fired
Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald
Cox. Doar said the committee needed
the logs to determine whether there were
other conversations relevant to Water-
gate that should be requested. Nixon
seemed unlikely to comply with the sub-
poenas; the deadlines are this Wednes-
day. St. Clair once more contended that
Nixon's already released transcripts
provided all the evidence needed to es-
tablish his role in Watergate.
Many constitutional experts believe
that Nixon has no right to refuse the Ju-
diciary Committee's subpoenas. In an
article published by the Yale Law Jour-
nal last week, Harvard Law Fellow
Raoul Berger called the President's
claim that the material is protected by
Executive privilege an "extraordinary
spectacle ... (that] stands history on its
head." He also attacked St. Clair's ar-
gument to the Judiciary Committee that
Nixon can be impeached only for in-
dictable offenses. Berger called it "a pas-
tiche of selected snippets and half-
truths, exhibiting a resolute disregard of
adverse facts." He went on to say that
both Nixon and St. Clair disregard the
fact that the framers of the Constitution
saw impeachment as an exception to the
doctrine of separation of powers and
carefully made impeachment "both lim-
ited and noncriminal." Of St. Clair, Ber-
ger concluded: "He is not so much en-
gaged in honest reconstruction of history
as in propaganda whose sole purpose is
to influence public opinion."
Timetable for Trial. In another
dispute over Watergate evidence, Fed-
eral Judge John J. Sirica took under ad-
visement White House lawyers' pleas
against surrendering 64 presidential
tapes to Prosecutor Jaworski. The Pres-
ident contends that Jaworski has not
demonstrated that he needs the mate-
rial. Among the tapes sought are three
of conversations between Nixon and for-
mer Special Counsel Charles Colson on
June 20, 1972, just three days after the
Watergate break-in. The prosecutors
hope that tapes of the conversations will
shed some light on two other presiden-
tial conversations held the same day: one
with former Chief of Staff H.R. Halde-
man, which was partially obliterated by
an I 8V2-minute mysterious buzz; the oth-
er with former Attorney General and
Campaign Director John Mitchell,
which presidential aides claim was nev-
er taped. The prosecutors believe the
tapes may also explain why Nixon could
not shake the fear, as he put it on April
IS, 1973, that Colson was "up to his na-
vel" in the Watergate affair. Colson has
specifically denied any involvement in
the break-in.
With a presidential resignation no
longer a serious option, many in the
Congress and elsewhere in Washington
figure that impeachment by the House
is a foregone conclusion, thotighil. is far
too early to predict the outcome of the
An Error of Transcription: "Bah" or "ACT"?
While recovering from a slipped
disc, Municipal Bond Trader John B.
Northrop (right) of Huntington, N.Y.,
spent four days carefully reading Pres-
ident Nixon's Watergate transcripts
--and discovered a rather sloppy error.
His find drew an admission from the
White House last week that two typists
had independently transcribed the same
portion of a meeting between the Pres-
ident (13) and Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Henry E. Petersen (HP) on April
16, 1973. The overlap slipped by, and
the two versions appeared in tandem in
the published transcript as separate con-
versations. The error was not caught
sooner because the versions differ so '
markedly, underscoring the House Ju-
diciary Committee's argument that only
the tapes will suffice as evidence in its
impeachment inquiry. Comparisons of
parts of the two versions:
FIRST VERSION
HP: Personally [inaudible], well, I've
been [inaudible] and have advised the
Jury of that fact and two that [Acting
FBI Director L. Patrick] Gray, from
what [former U.S. Attorney Harold HI
Titus who has [inaudible] of the
[inaudible] over there has to go 4o see
Sirica.
P: I don't think [inaudible] that's
[inaudible].
HP: That's [inaudible]. I don't think
he will do anything unless it's in the cur-
rent [inaudible] of proceeding he's in
[inaudible]. I can't conceive a point
which of Titus and?if there.
P: This timing thing 1 think is terribly
important?you know.
HP: I think it is.
P: Can't have the President?after
all?after all these months and what
we've gone through and now once I have
learned something of it I say "bah."
SECOND VERSION
HP: [Inaudible] question. (inaudible]
I told him one, I would be willing to go
[inaudible] and advise his lawyers of
that fact and, two, that they?and by
that I mean Titus who has the best rela-
tionship with Sirica over there?is
going to have to wait and see Sirica,
ah?
P: [Inaudible].
HP: That's a problem. That's a risk
we would have to take. I don't think he
will. I don't think he will do anything un-
less it is the context of a proceeding in
his court. I can't conceive of him urging
the [inaudible] of Titus and [inaudible].
P: [Inaudible] timing on this is ter-
ribly important you know, because
HP: I understand it is.
P: You can't have the press?after
all these months and what we have gone
through and all. Once, I find something
out?I say?ACTI
Senate trial. To speed up the process,
Democratic House leaders plan to pass
the remaining appropriations bills be-
fore July 1, thus allowing the Represen-
tatives to give complete attention to im-
peachment. The leaders' current time-
table calls for the House Judiciary
Committee to finish its investigation by
the end of June and if it votes an im-
peachment resolution as expected, for
the full House to vote on the matter by
July 31. If articles of impeachment are
approved, Nixon will be given a month
to plan his defense, enabling the Senate
to begin the trial by Sept. 3?the day
after Labor Day. Although the Senators
will meet six days a week with no re-
cess for the fall campaigns, the leaders
are not certain a verdict can be reached
by Election Day, 'Nov. 5. At all costs,
they want to keep the trial from going
on into next year, when the 93rd Con-
gress expires and the 94th begins. If that
happens, some congressional experts be-
lieve that the impeachment process
might have to start all over again, an un-
thinkable prospect.
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TIME, JUNE 3, 1974
Nixon: No,
o, a Thousand Times No
Facing demands for Watergate-re-
lated White House evidence on three
fronts, President Nixon last week hung
tough, adamant and defiant. He flouted
the constitutionally sanctioned im-
peachment process by informing the
House Judiciary Committee that he will
ignore all pending and future subpoenas
for White House tapes and documents.
He directed his attorneys to appeal Fed-
eral Judge John J. Sirica's succinct rul-
ing that Special Prosecutor Leon Jawor-
ski's subpoenas for 64 tape recordings
are legally binding upon the President.
He took legal action to kill court-sanc-
tioned subpoenas for White House files
from two defendants in the impending
Daniel Ellsberg burglary trial, thereby
advancing the possibility that charges
against two of his former aides, John
Ehrlichman and Charles Colson, may
, have to be dismissed.
Nixon's strategy of storv.walling all
subpoenas carried at least one clear in-
ference, based on both longstanding
legal precepts and simple logic. By pub-
licly releasing the edited transcripts of
46 Watergate conversations, Nixon had
presented his own best evidentiary case
against impeachment; damning as those
documents may prove, the material he
is now withholding must be even worse.
Nixon is apparently gambling that his
refusal to deliver such evidence will be
seen in the end as a somewhat techni-
cal procedural matter carrying less dan-
ger of impeachment and conviction than
would the contents of the material itself
if yielded.
To be sure, the President couched
his subpoena rejections in terms of prin-
ciple rather than in the concrete con-
cerns of survival. The three objects of
his defiance:
I. THE IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY.
Although the President's decision to
choke off any further turnover of White
House tapes or documents to Chairman
Peter Rodino's impeachment committee
had been signaled clearly by Presiden-
tial Defense Counsel James St. Clair,
Nixon's formal declaration carried a
ring of finality. Feigning ignorance of
the purpose of two subpoenas issued by
the committee on May 15, Nixon wrote
Rodino that "I can only presume that
the material sought must be thought to
relate in some unspecified way to what
has generally been known as Water-
gate.'" Nixon noted his counsel's re-
ports that the committee may issue more
subpoenas and termed this "a never-
ending process" that would "constitute
such a massive invasion into the con-
fidentiality of presidential conversations
that the institution of the presidency it-
self would be fatally compromised."
To yield more tapes, Nixon also ar-
gued, would merely "prolong the im-
peachment inquiry without yielding sig-
niflcant additional evidence.'-There-
fore, he concluded, he would decline to
produce tapes and presidential diaries
already subpoenaed and would similarly
refuse to obey all subpoenas "allegedly
dealing with Watergate" that "may
hereafter be issued."
The Nixon letter ignored the solid
legal argument, affirmed by at least six
past Presidents, that the doctrine of Ex
ecutive privilege to#12,14X1Wiiiffigrtikiel
conversations with aides is not applica-
ble to an impeachment proceeding. Con-
stitutionally, impeachment is the ulti-
mate check upon the Executive Branch
by the Legislative and necessarily
breeches the normal separation of pow-
ers between the two. Moreover, since
Nixon had waived confidentiality for
the 46 conversations of which he had re-
leased 1,254 pages of transcripts on
April 30, his reassertion of confidenti-
ality now seemed both inconsistent and
arbitrary. Once again, Nixon was at-
tempting to dictate to the committee
what evidence was relevant to his own
possible impeachment; no principle of
U.S. law permits a potential defendant
to make such a decision.
The President at the same time di-
rected St. Clair to reject a Rodin? com-
mittee request for 66 tapes or documents
related to two other areas of its inquiry:
Nixon's role in the Government's set-
tlement of antitrust suits against ITT in
1972 and in the Administration's rais-
ing of milk-support prices in 1971. Both
actions followed promises of financial
support by ITT and milk producers to
the Nixon re-election effort. St. Clair
noted in two letters to the Judiciary
Committee's chief counsel, John Do'ar,
that "voluminous" material had already
been supplied to the committee on both
topics. He promised only that the tape
of one conversation on the ITT matter
would be "reviewed" and that a tran-
script of "the pertinent portion thereof,
if any," would be furnished.
Although anticipated, the Nixon-St.
Clair cutoff clearly angered many mem-
bers of the Judiciary Committee. Speak-
ing for the committee, Rodin? called the
rejection "a very grave matter" and im-
plied that it will be taken into consid-
eration as a possible impeachable of-
fense. The committee's second-ranking
Republican, Robert McClory of Illinois,
termed Nixon's decision "very unfortu-
nate. It hurts him with the committee.
We were very specific and justified each
request." The committee's frustrating
problem is that it has no practical way
to force the President to relinquish the
evidence withheld.
After listening last week to more of
the tapes acquired from the White
House and the Watergate grand jury,
committee members found numerous in-
consistencies with the White House
transcripts. Rodino complained that the
transcripts omi (ted words and sentences
of conversations and changed some
wording from that clearly audible on the
tapes. Further. the White House had at-
tributed statements to the wrong peo-
ple and even added words not on the
tapes. "This is a very unsatisfactory kind
of evidence," protested Doar. Added Al-
bert Jenner, the committee's Republican
counsel: "Even in a routine civil case,
secondary evidence such as this is not ac-
ceptable until every avenue for the best
evidence has been exhausted."
Despite the imperfections in the
transcripts, the committee members
seemed in general agreement that they
had heard the most damaging evidence
in the two weeks of closed review of ma-
terial assembled by their staff. They
heard the celebrated March 21 tape of
to do s9 was
eNixooctoMmbpayippingmon-
ey to keep Watergate Burglar E. How-
ard Hunt from talking about all his
White House "plumber" activities. The
tape convinced most listeners willing to
discuss it that Nixon had clearly ordered
Dean to make a payment to Hunt to
"buy time," even if such blackmail
would be impractical in the long run.
Nixon was variously quoted as saying
about the hush money: "For Christ's
sake, get it" or "Jesus Christ, get it" or
"Goddammit, get it." There was little
doubt that the expletive emphasized
Nixon's command; his statement was
neither a question nor a devil's-advo-
cate exploration of options.
II. THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR.
Nixon's refusal to comply with more
subpoenas from Prosecutor Jaworski
also poses dire risks for him. Unlike
those of the Judiciary Committee, Ja-
worski's demands for evidence are un-
disputably confined to criminal matters
and are moving through the clear-cut
channels of the judicial process. This
means that in all probability, the dis-
pute will end in a Supreme Court de-
cision to either quash the subpoenas or
order Nixon to honor them. The latter
seems the most likely result, and any re-
fusal by Nixon to obey the highest court
would make impeachment all but cer-
tain. But the White House strategy could
be based on the sluggishness of the ap-
peals process and the belief that any
order to produce the tapes would come
after the impeachment debate and pos-
sible Senate trial have run their course.
Jaworski wants the tapes both to
prepare for the prosecution of the seven
former Nixon men indicted in the Wa-
tergate cover-up and, as required by law,
to supply the defendants with any Gov-
ernment-held exculpatory evidence that
might aid their defense. Sirica brusquely
dismissed St. Clair's claim that the
courts have no power to rule on Exec-
utive privilege and must honor such con-
fidentiality whenever it is invoked by a
President. Sirica noted that he had been
sustained by an appeals court last year
when he rejected that same argument
after Archibald Cox, Javyorski's fired
predecessor, had subpoenaed Nixon
tapes. Sirica ruled that the contention
thus "was without legal force." The ap-
peals court had added in its decision that
"not even the President is above the
law."
Sirica's decision revealed that this
time, however, the White House had
raised a new objection, not one used in
the Cox case. Sirica wrote that St. Clair
had argued that the courts lacked ju-
risdiction to enforce the subpoena be-
cause the dispute was an "intra-branch
controversy wholly within the jurisdic-
tion of the Executive Branch to resolve."
While Sirica conceded that such an, ar-
gument might apply to a dispute be-
tween a President and his Cabinet mem-
bers, he ruled that it did not apply to
Jaworski because "the special prosecu-
tor's independence has been affirmed
and reaffirmed by the President and his
representatives." Sirica decided that Ja-
worski had specifically been granted the
right to challenge assertions of Execu-
tive privilege in court and that the con-
trary argument by St. Clair that Jawor-
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therefore "a nullity."
The use of that argument by St. Clair
obviously infuriated the outwardly af-
fable but tough-minded Jaworski. He
dispatched a letter to the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee complaining that St.
Clair was now challenging his right to
take the President to court, and this
could "make a farce of the special pros-
ecutor's charter." Nixon's top aide, Al-
exander Haig, had assured him he would
have that authority, Jaworski wrote, as
had Attorney General William Saxbe
when questioned about this by members
of the Senate Judiciary Committee dur-
ing his confirmation hearings. Nixon
had asserted that Jaworski would be giv-
en "total cooperation from the Execu-
tive Branch," but had not publicly con-
ceded that the prosecutor could
challenge him in court. Strictly as a le-
gal matter, rather than one of promises
and honor, some lawyers see validity to
St. Clair's argument.
The Senate Judiciary Committee
promptly backed Jaworski's position. It
voted to support Jaworski's right to pur-
sue the Nixon tapes in court. The com-
mittee also wrote to Saxbe, urging him
to "use all reasonable and appropriate
means to guarantee the independence"
of the special prosecutor.
On Friday St. Clair met Sirica's
deadline for filing an appeal. But Jawor-
ski, moving quickly to speed up the pro-
cess, directly petitioned the Supreme
Court to decide the key issue without
waiting for an appeals court ruling. He
requested the court to hold a hearing
and render its decision before its court
term expires in June.
M. THE ELLSBERG BURGLARY CASE.
Nixon's refusal to supply White
House documents subpoenaed by two of
his most influential former aides, Ehr-
lichman and Colson, could work to their
great personal advantage. Federal Judge
TIME, JUNE 3, 1974
Gerhard Gesell had ruled that they were
entitled to the material as part of their
defense against charges of having con-
spired to deprive Los Angeles Psychi-
atrist Lewis Fielding of his civil rights
in the 1971 burglary of his office. The
break-in was carried out by Nixon's
team of White House plumbers in an ef-
fort to gain information on Pentagon Pa-
pers Defendant Daniel Ellsberg, who
had consulted Fielding.
As a Friday deadline for delivering
the documents arrived, St. Clair instead
presented a motion to quash the two sub-
poenas. It included a formal claim of Ex-
ecutive privilege, signed by Nixon,
which contended that the information
sought by the defendants was confiden-
tial and that its disclosure "would be
contrary to the public interest and det-
rimental to the national security."
Openly disturbed at Nixon's action.
Judge Gesell lectured St. Clair. -When
the Government brings a lawsuit, it must
produce the relevant and material ev-
idence it has or drop the suit." Then he
pointed out the uniqueness of the situ-
ation. "We've got a very special prob-
lem here. We've got two governments.
There's the special-prosecutor Govern-
ment, and then there's the people in the
other Government that he's trying to
prosecute." And Gesell cut caustically
to the core of the matter. "We're get-
ting down to the basic question of what
the President considers his duty to en-
force the criminal laws to be."
No Privilege. When St. Clair weak-
ly offered to let Colson and Ehrliclunan
look through their personal papers at
the White House and select exculpatory
material, Gesell bristled. "You mean the
defendants could take what they want-
ed and leave behind things that might
incriminate them? What kind of a law-
suit do you think this is, Mr. St. Clair?
We can't have a system where a defen-
Boy Scout Without a Compass
? In January of last year, still flushed
with the thrill of stage-managing Rich-
ard Nixon's triumphal second Inaugu-
ration, Jeb Stuart Magruder had to take
care of what he hoped was one last nui-
sance left over from the previous year.
Putting a handsome, confident face on
whatever anxiety he may have ,felt, he
appeared in Judge John Sirica's Wash-
ington courtroom and testified
falsely as a witness for the pros-
ecution at the trial of the Wa-
tergate burglars. Shortly after-
ward, he hopped a plane to
California to explore launch-
ing his own elective career for
secretary of state.
Last week Magruder, 39,
was back before Sirica, this
time as a confessed felon. On
June 4, the very day of the Cal-
ifornia state G.O.P. primary he
might have won if the Water-
gate cover-up and his personal'
game plan had worked, Ma-
gruder will go to jail. The ten-
month minimum sentence for
his part in the scandal was stiff-
er than he expected after more
than a year of cooperation with
the prosecutors. His pretty wife
Gail could not hold back the
tears, but Magruder kept his
composure as he read a pre-
pared statement to an impas-
sive Sirica:
"I know what I have done,
and your honor knows what I
have done. . . Somewhere be-
tween my ambition and my
ideals, I lost my ethical com-
pass. I found myself on a path
that had not been intended for
me by my parents or my prin-
ciples or by my own ethical in-
stincts. It has led me to this
courtroom."
To take advantage of Ma-
gruder's renewed notoriety, the
New York City publishing
house Atheneum rushed into
print with his memoirs, An
American Life: One Man's
Road to Watergate, which
were originally scheduled for
release in mid-July. When Magruder
surrenders next week to federal mar-
shals who will escort him to a minimum-
security prison in Allenwood, Pa., the
338-page volume will be on sale for $10
in book stores along the East Coast.
Written for a reported $100,000 ad-
vance with the help of Freelance Writ-
er Patrick Anderson, Magruder's book
contains only an occasional hint of the
abject contrition that marked his final
statement to the bench, and it offers lit-
tle fresh evidence about the evolution
of the Watergate crimes. He guesses
Nixon was involved all along in the cov-
er-up: "Based on my knowledge of how
dant is in charge of selecting the ma-
terial to be used against himself. I want
those documents produced."
Perspiring, St. Clair demurred. "I
have no authority, at this time; to agree
to waive [Executive) privilege." Snapped
Gesell: "There is no privilege, Mr. St,
Clair. We're preparing for a trial. The
Government has the option of disclosing
all information known to it or dismiss-
ing the suit." St. Clair contended that
there was no precedent for any ruling
that the Government must waive all
claims of privilege when it prosecutes
someone. Gesell promptly ticked off half
a dozen cases and added: "These are
simply a few handy cases that come to
mind. There must be 40 to 80 others."
"I'm interested in a fair trial," Ge-
sell declared. "So is the President," re-
plied St. Clair. Said the judge: "I'd like
evidence of that by his producing these
relevant documents."
Sustaining his worst tongue-lashing
yet as Nixon's defender, St. Clair then
absorbed a Gesell lecture: "The impact
of the action you are taking is to head
this case in the direction of dismissal.
Now I want a personal assurance that
the President knows exactly what this
means. You appear to be ignorant of the
cases. While you're a distinguished law-
yer, an advocate with a fine reputation,
I want to know if the President is de-
liberately aborting this case by not sub-
mitting the required evidence." Pressed
again by Gesell on the need to release
"the whole story," St. Clair nervously
wiped his brow and replied: "I've got
no authority to accede. I'm in a very dif-
ficult position." Retorted Gesell: "Well.
I've got to talk to you. I've got. nobody
,else to talk to."
St. Clair finally agreed to discuss the
matter again with Nixon and to submit
a written explanation by June 3.
the White House operated, I would sus-
pect that once the burglars were arrest-
ed, Nixon immediately demanded and
got the full story, and that thereafter he
? kept in close personal touch with the
cover-up operation." But he does not
know for certain. It is nonetheless a re-
markable book, affording damning and
often unintended insights ,into the au-
thor's character and the atmosphere of
the Administration in which he worked.
Magruder begins with two chapters
on his childhood and youth. He reveals
that he grew up in a family overshad-
owed by scandal: his grandfather's ca-
reer as a New York shipyard executive
was ruined in the early 1920s when he
was convicted and jailed for misappli-
cation of $300,000 in bank funds.
Reviewing his undergraduate days
at Williams College, Magruder recalls
that it was a dilemma over his sex life
that led him to initiate his famous
friendship with the Rev. William Sloane
Coffin Jr. Magruder was dating a Vas-
sar girl named Judy: "We felt a great
physical attraction for one another, one
that caused us both to be uncertain ?
to how far we should carry our 1.
ship. Finally I went to Bill Colliii t,
vice." The reader is left wondering what
counsel Coffin offered.
Hack Away. Magruder's book sug-
gests that he was, and still is, oblivious
of the moral ramifications of many acts
he confesses so candidly. He recounts
working on an automobile assembly line
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the summer after his freshman year.
The foreman taught him how to cheat
systematically on the job: "I
did as the foreman suggested,
and even then it was hard to
keep up." Period. On to the
next anecdote.
Twenty years later, he tried
to talk White House Counsel
Charles Colson out of sending
a phony supporter of Senator
George McGovern to a homo-
sexual rally "because it was
likely that the trick would be
found out." When he discov-
ered that Political Prankster
Donald Segretti was busily sab-
otaging the Democrats during
the Wisconsin and New
Hampshire primaries, he sent
John Mitchell a memo headed
"Potentially Embarrassing Sit-
uation," urging that Segretti be
supervised "lest he harm the
[Republican] campaign." (The
job of overseeing Segretti went
to E. Howard Hunt )
Magruder is mauer of fact
to the point of Boy Scout in-
souciance in reporting how he
dutifully carried out an order
from Nixon to spread the word
that an unfriendly journalist
was a Communist agent, or
how he produced, on H.R. Hal-
deman's demand, an eight-
? point plan to discredit NBC's
David Brinkley. Haldeman
was pleased. "Jeb, damn good!
Hack away. H.," he wrote on
Magruder's memo.
Looking back on the Wa-
tergate break-in itself, Magru-
der has mostly tactical regret:
"[G. Gordon] Liddy should
have had a middleman be-
tween himself and the burglars
so they could have no idea they
were working for us, and even if arrest-
ed wouldn't implicate us." Liddy & Co.
reflected "an exaggerated view of Amer-
ican political reality" shared by the
White House.
The term "public relations" is ubiq-
uitous in the book, just as the concept
has been obsessional in the Nixon Ad-
ministration. Magruder says that the
very words public relations were cap-
italized in presidential memos. The
day after the C.R.P. wiretappers were
arrested, a solicitous bodyguard in
Los Angeles asked Magruder why he
seemed worried, and Magruder tried to
appear carefree by replying, "It's just a
little PR problem back in Washington."
Magruder's evocation of the prevail-
ing mentality in the White House is. in
its way, nearly as revealing as that of
the Nixon transcripts. In the best locker-
room and fraternity tradition, all the
President's men had their nicknames.
John Dean told the Ervin committee last
year about H.R. .("The Brush") Halde-
man and John ("The Pipe") Mitchell,
but Magruder adds to the list. Trans-
portation Secretary John Volpe was
"The Bus Driver"; Defense Secretary
Melvin Laird was "The Bullet"; Post-
master General Winton Blount was
"The Postman"; and Martha Mitchell
was known as "The Account," an ad-
vertising term for a client. Nixon him-
self was above nicknames; in memos and
meetings he was referred to as "RN,"
or "the President," or occasionally by
his military code name, "Searchlight."
Mere Mortals. Nixon's once much
feared palace guard emerges as more
petty than sinister. Magruder describes
how Haldeman once gave his young aide
Larry Higby a brutal dressing-down for
failing to provide a golf cart to take him
200 yds. across the presidential com-
pound at San Clemente. Haldeman
loved to make his far-flung assistants
jump by activating their Pageboy beep-
ers, especially when traveling in Air
Force One: "[Nixon] and Haldeman
and Chapin and the others in the trav-
eling entourage would get up there,
30,000 ft. above the earth, and some-
thing would happen to them. It must
have been the close-in atmosphere, or
perhaps the plane's well-stocked bar or
something about the altitude that made
them feel God-like, but they would in-
variably begin to rain down calls upon
us mere mortals here on earth, and there
was no way to talk to them or reason
with them." Magruder characterizes
Press Secretary Ron Ziegler as "a for-
WALL STREET JOURNAL
" 24 MAY 1974
Washington Wire
A Special Weekly Report From
The 'Wall Street Journal's
Capital Bureau
?
NEVER AGAIN, the CIA insists. Burned
by Watergate entanglement, intelligence
staffers vow to avoid any comparable do-
mestic involvement in the future. Director
William Colby issues steer-clear instruction,
but the real guarantee is staff readiness to
explode.11 it seems the agency is being mis-
used.
mer Disneyland guide who was scarce-
ly more than a ventriloquist's dummy."
Magruder came to the White House
from a cosmetics-marketing firm.
The No. 1 villain of Magruder's
piece is Colson, whom he calls "an evil
genius." Despite his reputation as el
grandmother-stomper, Colson comes
across as almost pathetically small-time.
When not waging interoffice battles
against then Communications Director
Herbert Klein, Colson seems to have
been preoccupied with setting up some-
thing called Silent Majority, Inc., a pro-
posed conservative research institute to
counter the influence of the liberal
Brookings Institution.
The author manages to make even
Liddy seem like a logical addition to the
Nixon team. After cataloguing exam-
ples of Liddy's unstable, potentially
homicidal behavior, Magruder con-
cludes blandly: "My personal distaste for
him aside, he seemed like the right man
for the dual job we envisioned [legal
counsel and supersleuth for C.R.P.1 .
He was, in short, a professional, and ours
was a campaign that looked to profes-
sionals for guidance . . . Perhaps it was
just bad luck that he got there, or per-
haps there was a certain historical in-
evitability to Liddy?perhaps if there
had been no Liddy we would have cre-
ated one." Elsewhere he quotes White
House Aide Gordon Strachan as saying
more succinctly, "Liddy's a Hitler, but
at least he's our Hitler."
Only on the subject of Nixon does
Magruder offer a sustained, considered
judgment: "Without question, Nixon
had the potential to be the greatest con-
servative political leader of his time; he
knew his goals and he had the skills re-
quired to achieve them. Yet he had a
fatal flaw too, an inability to tolerate
criticism, an instinct to overreact in po-
litical combat. I don't know which came
first, the liberals' loathing of Nixon or
Nixon's loathing of the liberals, but the
passions fed on one another, grew more
and more bitter, until once he achieved
the presidency, Nixon could not resist
the urge to use his awesome powers to
'get' his enemies. A President sets the
tone of his Administration."
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WASHINGTON STAR
, 16 May 1974
411r rani
By James J. Kilpatrick ?
01974, Washington Star Syndicate
President Nixon will not resign
"under any circumstances." He will
not surrender his office even tempo-
rarily to Vice President Gerald R.
Ford under the 25th Amendment.
If the House of Representatives
should vote to impeach, he will ac-
cept the outcome 'with good grace."
He will then defend himself to the
, very end of a Senate trial.
The President made these views
, perfectly clear?emphatically clear
. ?in an exclusive interview in the
Oval Office on Tuesday morning.
He acknowledged that he had
given "long thought" to the possibil-
ity of resignation. For one overrid-
ing reason he has now discarded
that option and will not consider it'
again: For him to resign under the
pressure of mere popular opinion, in
his view, would fatally weaken
?residents of the future.
As for taking temporary refuge in
the 25th Amendment: This a "rath-
er fatuous suggestion," advanced
by people who "do not know what is
going on in the world."
The President talked soberly and
sadly of the Watergate affair. He
said it was true, as John Mitchell
? had surmised, that he would have
***blown my top" if he had knowp of
the bugging at the time.
He recalled how much he had re-
sented it when he learned that his
own offices had been bugged in his
1962 gubernatorial campaign. He
also remembered 1968 with equal
resentment: "There was not only
surveillance by the FBI, but bug-
ging by the FBI, and (J. Edgar)
Hoover told me that my plane in the
last two weeks was bugged."
MR. NIXON also discussed the
now famous White House tapes:
? He thought he was wrong ever to
have permitted these recordings in
the first place, but he supposed the
remaining tapes eventually will be
deposited in a presidential library
for the use of historians 25 or 30
years hence, after the participants
are dead.
In a long soliloquy, Mr. Nixon
spoke of the need for a strong
? American President, equipped by
experience to deal at the summit
,with world leaders. He wa-s-asked
whether, if worst comes to worst,
and he is put on trial by the Senate,
he could simultaneously manage the
affairs of the country and look after
his own defense.
"Yes," he said grimly. "And I in-
tend to."
During the course of the interview
?more a monologue than an inter-
view?the President spoke with
be here,
iimterld to be here.'
guarded optimism about Republi-
can prospects in November, when
he expects the "gut issues" of peace
and prosperity to favor his party.
He got in a few mild licks at the
"ultra-liberal" press. He termed
himself both a conservative and a
Wilsonian.
THE PRESIDENT looked well
and strong. He also looked his full
60 years. In response to a question,
he said he sleeps very well?"as
well as anybody at this age sleeps."
Having profited from earlier crises,
he has been able to survive Water-
'gate without "tingling nerves and a'
churning stomach."
To this observer, it seemed evi-
dent that the President has lost.
some of the edge of sharp incisive-
ness that he exhibited a few years
ago. His conversation tends to run
off on tangents. A reporter, study-
ing his shorthand notes, finds them
littered with broken sentences. But
the President plainly is in command
of his situation: "I am a disciplined
man," he said at one point. He is not
about to quit.
Mr. Nixon spoke from behind his
desk in the Oval Office. Outside the
great windows, a crew of White
House gardeners puttered about the
lawn. His mood was at once re-
flective and determined.
Once he raised his voice in anger
when this correspondent suggested
that the President's associates
might have "betrayed" him by fail-
ing to keep him informed: "I'm not
going to indulge in a conversation
with you or anybody else condemn-
ing men who have given very great'
service to this country."
Otherwise he reacted even to
sharp questions with quiet good
humor. In an hour and 20 minutes,
not a single expletive had to be de-
leted.
WHAT OF the future? "I would
have to rule out resignation. And I
would have to rule out the rather
fatuous suggestion that I take the
25th Amendment and just step out
and have Vice President Ford step
in for a while. If the House should
vote an impeachment, and we go to
trial by the Senate, of course I
would follow that course.
"It would be immensely time-con-
suming, but I could do it, and I
would do it for reasons that are not
?what do you call it?those of a
toreador in the ring, trying to prove
himself, but I would do it because I
have given long thought to what is
best for the country, our system of
'government, and the constitutional
process.
"I am a disciplined man, and you
can be sure that what would come
first, even in such a trial, would be
the business of this government."
The President feels he is equipped
and experienced to handle the great
issues he sees ahead?"our dialogue
with the Chinese, the enormously
important negotiations which will
continue with the Russians, and the
very delicate situation in the Mid-
east."
, Mr. Nixon turned away from his
interviewer and gazed at the gar-
dens without seeing them. He talked
of the role he wants to play in the
search for relative peace: "We
have one of those times when cer-
tain forces are coming together that.
May never come together again. We
Must seize this moment. If we do not
seize it, the world will inevitably
move to a conflagration that will de-
stroy everything that we've made?
everything that this civilization has
produced."
FOREIGN policy, he said, no
longer is made by foreign ministers.
It is made by heads of state. "I have
to be here, and I intend to be here."
It would create a gap for a Presi-
dent to say, "Well, I've been
im-
peached by the House, and I'll just
step aside, and somebody else will
step in." In Mr. Nixon's view, "It,
would be wrong!"
This is the key point, he said, on
resignation: "The United States
holds the key as to whether peace
survives and whether freedom sur-
vives. That demands' a strong
United States?strong militarily,
strong economically, and strong in
the character of its people, a people
with a sense of vision, not turning
inward and tearing each other
apart, and not becoming soft as
they become rich.
"But it also requires, whoever
may be in this office, a strong Presi-
dent. I will never leave this office in
a way which resigning would be, or
failing to fight impeachment would
be, that would make it more dif-
ficult for future presidents to make,
the tough decisions."
If he should resign now,' Mr.
Nikon said, "knowing that I am not
guilty of any offense under the Con-
stitution that is called an impeach-
able offense," every president in
the future would be constantly por-
ing over the polls and looking over
his shoulder toward Capitol Hill.
A piesiden-t, he said, cannot be
strong if he worries incessantly,
about his popularity or about the
possibility of impeachment. He did
not mean that a president should be
6
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'bullheaded or arrogant.' It is only
-
that a president "must do what is
right, whatever the public opinion
may be at the moment."
Unless the United States has such
' presidents for the next 25 years,
,"the chance for peace and freedom
to survive in the world is down the
'tube. That's the reason I won't re-
sign.
"I WILL not resign," the Presi-
dent repeated, "and I will of course
? present the case on impeachment
before the House as effectively as
we can. I shall accept the verdict in
good grace, but I know that the
United States of America means
something in the world today not
just because of its military and eco-
nomic strength, but also because it
has stability in its leadership.
"Resignation or impeachment
? would have the traumatic effect of
,destroying that sense of stability.
and leadership. And as far as this'
particular President is concerned, I
will not be a -party under any cir-
cumstances to any action which
would set that kind of precedent."
? -Two weeks ago, the President
was reminded, his chief counsel,
James St. Clair, had met with the
press. St. Clair was asked if all the
national security incidents that the
plumbers engaged in had been
made public. St. Clair had respond-
ed: "I don't know. I doubt it.' The
President was asked for comment:
Had all the incidents been reveal-
ed?
"There are some that have not
been and never will be," he said.
Sen. Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) and How-
ard Baker (R-Tenn.) know of these
Unpublicized matters, Mr. Nixon
said, but the national security con-
tinues to demand that the incidents
be kept under wraps.
THE CONVERSATION turned to,
general comment on the necessity,
as the President sees it, for secrecy
in the conduct of foreign affairs.
"You cannot in today's world
have successful diplomacy without
secrecy. It is impossible. I used to
say that I believe in the Wil'- :an
doctrine of open covenants openly
arrived at. But that was Wilson at
his idealistic best and his pragmatic
worst. Open covenants, yes; there
should be no secret agreements that
.the country is not totally committed
?to. But openly arrived at? There
would be no covenants. It is impos-
sible. And it is particularly impossi-
ble when you are dealing not with
,your friends, but with your adver-
saries."
Surely this was true, the Presi-
? dent said, in the opening to China. It
never would have occurred without
the highest secrecy. Nobody knew
about the overtures save the Presi-'
dent, Henry Kissinger, and few
aides sworn to secrecy. Mr. Nixon!
was asked: Did his vice president
know?
mate disposition of the presidential
tapes.
"They were made, curiously
enough, in a very offhand decision.
We had no tapes, as you know, up
until 1971. I think one day Haldeman
walked in and said, 'The library be-
lieves it is essential that we have
tapes,' and I said why? He said,
well, Johnson had tapes ? they're
in his library at Austin ? and these
are invaluable records. Kennedy
also had tapes, and he said, 'You
ought to have some record that can
be used years later for historical
purposes.
"I said all right. I must say that
after the system was put in, as the
transcribed conversations clearly
indicated, I wasn't talking with
knowledge or with the feeling that
the tapes were there. Otherwise I
might have talked differently."
"My own view," Mr. Nixon?
added, "is that taping of conversa-
tions for historical purposes was a
bad decision on the part of all the
presidents. I don't think Kennedy
should have done it. I don't think
Johnson should have done it, and I
don't think we should have done it."
? The remaining tapes, the Presi-
dent supposed, would be deposited
in his presidential library. He had
given no thought to their disposi-
tion. But in any event, the tapes
would be protected by adequate se-
curity and careful guidelines so that
none of his former associates would
be embarrassed in their lifetimes.
. THE PRESIDENT mused that
historians eventually would benefit
from the candid give-and-take of the
.war years. He supposed a tape must
exist of "the loneliest decision of all,
the bombing of Dec. 18, 1972, which
brought the war to an end." That
decision was opposed by all his
Cabinet members save one, and
supported only by John Connally.
An earlier decision on Cambodia
"had very little support from my
advisers."
As for the transcribed tapes im-
mediately at issue, he sees no rea-
son to permit their further examina-
tion by technicians. "We've already
done that." He scoffed at the notion
that damaging material had been
.removed deliberately to prevent the'
House Judiciary Committee from
discovering it.
"The committee now has con-
structive possession of all of the
tapes ? of all 42 of them. The chair-
man and ranking member can listen
to them at any time." It is an "open-
'ended invitation." They can come
hear for themselves. "And believe
me, I wouldn't have made the offer
if there was anything to hide."
Was publication of the transcripts
a gamble? The President did not
see it that way. Gambling, he said,
offers a choice. He had played a lit-
tle poker. He knew that you had a
choice of getting in the pot or stay-'
ing out. "In this instance we had no
choice."
' He would have preferred to turn
over no tapes at all. That was the
right position in the beginning, and
"had we prevailed in the courts, it
was the position I would have stuck
to." But the public had to be as-
sured that he knew nothing of
Watergate or the cover-up, and that
?
he did something about it when he
learned the facts.
s "I did an awful lot. I cut off one
arm, then the other arm, and April
of 1973 was about as rugged a peri-
od as anybody could be through."
The worst hour came with his re-
quest that H. R. Haldeman and
John Ehrlichman submit resigna-
tions. "There was nobody who could
talk to them except me.'
He was asked how he let the
Watergate affair get out of hand at
the beginning.
"As I look back," he said, "and
here history will have to record
whether I made the right decision in
terms of the allocation of my time,
my major error was not doing what
many persons very appropriately
criticized me for doing in previous
campaigns ? that was always run-
ning my own campaign."
In other years, he recalled, he
had checked everything out himself.
In 1972, "I didn't look at budgets, I
didn't look at personnel ? I just did-
n't pay enough attention to the cam-
paign." He never would have toler-
ated the Watergate incident if he
had known of it: "I believe in hard,
tough campaigning, but I believe it
has to be fair.
WHEN HE first learned of the
original Watergate arrests, he was
concerned for the embarrassment it
would cause his campaign. Soon his
concern broadened: He feared the
FBI's investigation would become
entangled with CIA operations in
the national security, and this he
was determined to avoid. The
thought never crossed his mind, he
said, that blackmail, hush money,
and a cover-up might emerge.
Ruefully he conceded that such a
'thought probably should have cross-
ed his mind, that "we better do,'
something to keep these guys in
good shape or they are going to tell
all the story." But he was preoccu-
pied with other things ? chiefly
with the final stages of disengage-
ment in Vietnam.
"Agnew?" The President seemed
incredulous. "Agnew? Oh, of course,
?not."
?RETURNING to contemporary
issues, Mr. Nixon responded to a '
question about the_ oriein and .ulti-
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, MAY 25, 1974
Governing During Impeachment
By Marcus G. Raskin
Congress while asserting its im-
',peachment power must also guarantee
to the citizenry a functioning Govern-
? ment within the framework of a con-
stitutional democracy. What follows,
, in an open memorandum to Congress,
Is a series of steps designed to achieve
, this end. ?
'
I. If Congress, through formal con-
stitutional means, asserts its loss of
confidence in President Nixon by a
' successful impeachment vote in the
? House against him, those national
emergency powers Congressionally
given to the President, and which de-
pend on the President's persoftal dis-
cretion, should be withdrawn. Such
powers must revert to Congress.
It may be necessary to divide "emer-
' gency" powers. They include powers
granted to the President in the event
of natural disaster, economic difficul-
ties or trade negotiations; powers over
internal security, national security and
? foreign policy, as well as use of the
military and control over it.
The powers that are Congressionally.
granted,to a President do not include
his own residual or "inherent" pow-
ers. Those are stripped from a Presi-
dent once he is successfully impeached
, by the Senate, although politically such
powers begin to drop from him once
the impeachment process begins.
Residual powers have the color of
legitimacy only because the President
is trusted by Congress and the people.
The nation's political health requires
that the President's discretion should
be 'sharply decreased once he .is im-
peached. His role must be limited to
that of administrator of the laws, thus
forfeiting the power of independent
policymaking.
2. In the succeeding thirty days,
members of the Joint Chiefs of, Staff,
? military commanders, the National
Guard, as well as all members of the
? executive branch and policymaking
members of the bureaucracy should be
:given a memorandum from Congress,
. signed by its leadership, that details
? the meaning of their oaths to 'the Con-
-stitution, to the atithority of Congress
'and to the laws of the land. ,
I The oaths and memorandum sbould
be circulated throughout the Govern-
ment and be posted in Qovernment
and military offices, and in paramili-
tary offices of the Central Intelligence
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion and Secret Service. The Civil
Service Commissioners should meet
with appropriate committee chairmen
on how to effect smooth, operations of
the Government during this period.
3. A dialogue should begin among
leading members of the judiciary and
among Armed-Services, Appropriations
and Fore/An-Affairs Committees to
identify crises and make sure that no
foreign or national security crisis oc-
curs because of the impeachment.
Once the House votes impeachment
the President should be separated from
unilateral decisions on the use of
troops or weapons of mass destruction.
He and groups within the Government
should be' insulated from instigating
any sort of crisis, military or other-
wise, that would disturb the task of
weighing impeachment evidence fairly,
or the .Government's smooth and just
functioning. And the. United States
should conduct its world business
without flexing its military muscles, .
managing its foreign affairs in a care-
ful and deliberate manner.
4. To insure constitutional stability,
notification should be given to the
chairmen of the appropriate commit-
tees and the House and Senate leader--
ship by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coun-
tersigned by the Secretary ,of .Defense,
of all troop?including the National
Guard?Movements, naval movements,
deployments inside and outside the
United States, as well as security ar-
rangements concerning nuclear arms.
The Defense Department should file
information with appropriate commit-
tee chairmen and the House and Senate
leadership on those covert operations
or actions that are likely to, or might,
cause internal or international reper-
cussions. This arrangement should
hold from the beginning of the im-
peachment debate on the House floor
to the time the President is vindicated
or removed from office.
5. A concurrent resolution should be
passed rejecting the first use of nu-
clear weapons. ,
6. The chairman. of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee or the Ma-
jority Leader of the Senate, from the
beginning of the formal impeachment
on the House floor, should sit in on
all National Security Council and Cabi-
net meetings. The Speaker of the
House or his nominee should attend
Cabinet m,eetings if he so desires.
7. The Senate and House should pre-
pare a concurrent resolution that states
.that no troops can be used in battle,
hostile actions or war or police actions
by the President without legislative
concurrence of the House and Senate.
8. The House and Senate leadership
should appoint a special committee to
receive briefings from career members
of the various Government agencies
during the impeachment proceedings
in the House, during any hiatus be-
tween House and Senate action, dur-
ing the Senate trial, and after the trial
until President Nixon is acquitted or a
new President is inaugurated.
Watergate events should not be
read to mean that the .military, or
paramilitary groups of the Secret Serv-
ice, F.B.I. or C.I.A., have been insu-
lated from either corrupt or dangerous
practices, from cabals or crimes.
Watergate's questionable activities are
not the only ones in Washington. ,
9. The Speaker and the Majority
Leader should meet with the heads of
the television networks and the Fed-
eral. Communications Commission to
set up telecast times for reporting to
the public during the impeachment
period. One purpose of such reports
would be to sustain loyalty to the con-
stitutional democracy.
10. Meetings should be initiated,
with mayors and governors, individual-
ly and through their collective or-
ganizations, ?to discuss the impeach-.
ment period. These leaders should
formally receive copies of the basic'
? memorandum to be sent to Federal
officials that outlines the powers of
Congress to regulate the armed forces,
the National Guard and the paramili-
tary.
11. Since the impeachment period
has brought a profound sense of drift
in the Government and important is-
sues have gone unattended, and fright-
ening structural changes in the con-
stitutional system have been made, the
sense of drift and some of these struc-
tural changes can be corrected.
- It is time to develop a national'
committee of reconciliation that will
take in left and right to recommend to
Congress a national program in for-
eign and domestic policy that will lay
out what a minimum program must be
over the next five years, while stating
clearly what national and internal
security structures decrease the politi-
cal and economic freedom and security
of citizens:
Such a committee might also begin '
the task of meeting with appropriate
Cabinet ?heads and the appropriate
committees of Congress to discuss a
legislative program that would provide
the basis for a national-policy dialogue
through 1976.
12. One of the crucial problems of
the present system is that the people ?
have very little confidence in it. One
reason for this loss of confidence Is
that the citizens do not identify with'
any branch of Government. Congress
as an institution does not directly re- ?
late to the people on a daily basis; if
otherwise, this would give people the
feeling that they are involved in gov-
erning.
Members of Congress' should estab-
lish a mechanism in their districts for
public hearings on national and re-
gional issues to define policy. It is
especially critical during a period of.
profound dislocation that our citizens
feel they can in fact defend the Con-
stitution and view the Government as
a lawful enterprise. This message
must be conveyed throughout the en-
tire period of impeachment. And
beyond.
Marcus G. Raskin, a member .of the
National Security Council in the Ken-
nedy Administration, is co-director of
the Institute for Policy Studies.
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SANTA MONICA EVENING OUTLOOK
13 MAX 1974
CIIA ChEe:i7 Cites New
intellioence Nizihocis
_
One of those contribu-
By CLIFF TARPY tions grew from the "bad
habit' that America had of
disbanding intelligence.
operations once a war was
over, requiring its hasty
reassembly before the
beginning of a new one.
This changed during
World War II when the
first intelligence director,
William Donovan, set up a
continuous information
gathering system that Col-
by called the "analysis,
assessment and estimating
process."
The value of that system
showed up during the Viet-
nam conflict, he said, and
were revealed with the
release of the Pentagon
Papers, "in which the
various national estimates
on Vietnam were shown to
have been independent, ob-
jective, assessments of the
likely future curse of
events there."
Colby admitted that the
CIA 'made mistakes"
with the information
gathering network, citing
the information, disguises
and equipment made
available to the White
House "plumbers".
However, noting that the
National Security Act of
1947 prohibits "internal
security functions," he
said,, "I am confident and
have assured the Congress
publicly that it will be
respected in the future."
Unique Aspect
The third unique aspect
of American intelligence,
Colby said, is the CIA's
relationship to Congress.
"Some of the foreign
counterparts around the
world display considerable
shock when they learn that
I appeared in an open hear-
ing before the television
cameras as a part of my
Evening Outlook Staff Writer
Central Intelligence Ag-
necy Director %%illiain E.
Colby, speaking in Century
City Friday night, credited
a new brand of intelligence
based on improved tech-
nology for breaking the
ground with the Soviet
Union in the Strategic
Arms Limitations Talks
? (SALT) talks.
"In the common unders-
tanding, intelligence is
still linked with secrecy.
and spying," Colby told a
dinner meeting of the Los
Angeles World Affairs
Council.
But, he said, "we in
America have changed the
scope of the word 'in-
telligence' so that it has
come to mean something
' different froin that old-
fashioned perception."
Colby credited that
'change, in part, to the
"technological genius of
Americans."
Varied Talents
"We have applied to in-
? telligence the talents of our
inventors, of our
engineers, ad and of our
scientists," Colby said.
"In the short space of 18
years since the U-2 (spy
plane) began its missions,
we have revolutionized in-
telligence." ?
? In the past. American in-.
telligence officers had to
resort to piecing together
, information largely from
"circumstantial ev-
dence."
Technical advances,'
however, "not only pro-
vide a better basis for
? decisions about the na-
tional security of the
United States, it also ena-
bles us to negotiate agree-
ments such as the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty and the
Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty," Colby said.
Only after America was
able to moniter com-
pliance with arms treaties
from afar did the U.S.
become confident enough
of its, own intelligence to
'Senate confirmation," Col-
by said. "Many of them
would never be subjected
to detailed scrutiny by
their Parliament and their
identities are frequently
totally unknown."
The CIA is subject to
oversight by Congress, he
said, and some of law-
enter arms reduction
talks, lie said. ,....makers are privy to the
agency's operations.
In addition to improved Unlike other nations' in-
technology, modern in-
telligence operations, the
CIA has a substantial
degree of public exposure
but at the same time must
operate largely in secrecy,
esai .
teristics peculiar to "We will consequently
America and from,
the continue to arouse wonder-
nature of our society.
ApprovedrnrrtFteksagtpcnootoare8
telligence gathering has
also been advanced by two
other means, which Colby
referred to as having
-stemmed "from charac-
LOS ANGELES TIMES
23 May 19714
CIA Plan o Declassify
Secret Charter Told
BY maw AMMON
Times Staff Writer
WASHINGTON ?
Offi-
cials of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency'have
? drawn tentative plans for'
; disclosing the Secret char-
? ter which has enabled the
CIA to conduct operations
., outside the bounds of con-
gressional or public scruti-
ny for more than a quarter
century, it wag learned
Wednesday.
Drafts of unclassified.
versions of the agency's
. top secret , operating au-
thority have been written
for ranking officials' re-
view and will be studied
' further by its legal experts
before they are forwarded
to. the National Security
. Council. at the White
; House for clearance.
The move was viewed by
some outside the CIA as
an effort to mend an
image tarnished 'by the
Watergate scandal and to
, further Director William
E. Colby's wishes that the
agency appear more; can-
'did about its role. ? .
No firm decision has
been made on how or
when such a document
would be released, but
agency officials have de-
cided that at least the
broad outlines of the se-
cret charter should be tie-
c.. ;sifted.
4 The real specifics of the
CIA's operating authority
- are known to only a few
: senior members of Con-
gress who lead committees
charged with overseeing
the agency.' 'Ioqven they j
were unaware of. the de-,
tails until last year.
After exposure of effortL,
to use the CIA in the,'
Watergate coverup and its ?
assistance to the burglars .
of the office Daniel Ell-'
sberg's psychiatrist, the',
secret charter was shown,'
to Sens. Stuart Symington
(D-Mo.) and John L. Mc-,
Clellan ID-Ark.). Neither -
was permitted to keep a
copy of the document.
The secret charter is in
the form of National Se-
curity Council Intelligence
Directives, "enskids" as
they are called, which ?
have been written since
the National Security Act,
Of 1947 established the
CIA.
The first of the direc-
tives is understood to have
authorized the conduct of
covert CIA operation8.?
abroad, and others to have
approved activities bring,
lug a major expansion ot
the intelligence bureauc-
racy.
Prof. Harry Howe Ram; ?
som of Vanderbilt Univeri,
;sity, one of the country'S?
academic authorities on
U.S. intelligence activities
has complained that ex-
pansion of CIA activity via.:
the National Security
Council Intelligence Direc-
tives amounts to a writing
of laws by the few people,
who direct, the country's
intelligence apparatus.
foreign associates as to
our openness, and concern
among some American
citizens that we still must
keep some information
secret if we are to conduct
an intelligence effort at
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TRUE
JUITE 1974
13:17,/, marn.ir l'!1 .1:71D 7111127:13
TI3g7114 LL5SILT:
Cloak-and-dagger derring-do
and Mata Han high jinks are
out. Today's dirty work is done
by quiet types from Dullsville
BY MILES COPELAND
H.LUJTRATED HY JOHN 5TY0A
ollowing the Lambton-IelliCoe af-
fair, in which two members of the
British nobility were discovered to
have been consorting with call girls, a
security commission was formed to as-
certain the extent to which the British
Government's security had been endan-
gered. Members of the commission, un-
der Lord Diplock, concentrated on the
question of whether or not either of the
unfortunate peers might have blurted
out TOP SECRETS while engaged in post-
coital pillow talk?and whether the fact
that one of them was smoking pot dur-
ing intercourse had a bearing. They
dealt only summarily with the question
of possible blackmail, since it was ap-
'parent to all of them that the lords, both
basically good and honest men, would
have scoffed at any blackmailer.
British security officials no doubt had
their reasons for letting the report go un-
..challenged, but they must have been ap-
palled by its naivet?Some espionage ?
services make extensive use of prostitutes
?and "sex bars." massage parlors, escort
services, model studios, and all, the rest
?but not to tease secrets out of their
targets. They use such resources only to
get their targets into compromising posi-
tions, so that blackmail cAn follow. As
security officials well know, there was no
danger whatever that either of the two
lords, whether on pot or alcohol, would
give away secrets to the prostitutes. Can
you imagine I.:111)1)ton. with a pufT on his
joint, saying, "Darling. I simply must
tell you about the X5-1 1"?or the prosti-
tute having the faintest idea what he was
talking about even if he did? The danger
was not loose talk while "under the in-
fluence," but exposure to blackmail-7-
and not blackmail by some Soho, pimp,
but" by a trained "case officer" using
highly sophisticated methods.
Before settling down with their find-
ings in the Larnbton-Jellicoe affair, mem-
bers of the piplock Commission would
do well to study how the modern espio-
nage service works. They niay start by
considering how the KGB does, in fact,
try to penetrate our two governments,
arl-Fi]ci
LL;,,3?
then move on to a consideration of what
our two services do to penetrate "the
other side."
let us start with the case of "Emily,"
an attractive but shy lady who, one
spring evening, met a kindly, handsome
man of about 40 whom we may call
"Foster."
Emily was personal assistant to the
Assistant Secretary of State who headed
a departmental bureau dealing with an
important segment of the Third World.
As such, she had access to all the secrets
of that bureau?exchanges with the
British and the
French with respect to policies, inten-
tions of the U.S. Government in* con-
nection with the carrying out of these
policies, secret agreements with leaders
of governments in the Third World, and
contingency plans of a U.S. fleet in the
event of conceivable emergencies. Foster
was "in insurance," and had no visible
interest in international politics.
The meeting, which occurred at a tea
in honor of the famous anthropologist
Margaret Mead, took place on the same
day that Emily had received bad news
about her mother. Emily's mother, a
whining, malingering widow of 80
years, had just learned that she had
cancer. The doctor had pronounced her
beyond the stage at which an operation
would help and had predicted that she
would live for a few, more years and
would then die a slow and painful death.
. There was nothing remarkable about
Emily's meeting with Foster, except that
in the course of the evening he spilled
yin ros?ver her new dress and Emily,
,already upset, burst into tears. Foster
apologized profusely and insisted on ac-
companying her to her home in George-
town, where he waited until she changed
Into a housecoat so that he could take
the wine-splotched dress to "a French
laundry I know that can remove any kind
of spot." After one nightcap, they shook
hands at the door, and Foster departed.
Their friendship blossomed. It was
"not the great romance of the century"
as Emily later admitted, but it was "very
pleasant and undemanding."
Foster didn't 'seem to want anything,
not even sex, and he took no interest
whatever in Emily's job. He seemed
genuinely to enjoy Emily's company,
and he knew all sorts of cozy little restau-
rants?in Georgetown, out Massachu-
setts Avenue, across the Maryland line
from southeast Washington?where they
could talk and share personal confi-
dences. They went to plays, concerts and
the movies. Foster obviously wasn't rich,
Excerpted from the hook Without Cloak or Doecrr,
by Miles Copeland. Copyright ri 1974 by hltles
Copeland. Reprinted by perinission of Simon &
Schuster, Inc.
?
but he could afford all the simple pleas-
ures, and he treated Emily in such a way
that she had no sense of being "culti-
vated."
? Before many months had passed,
Foster induced Emily to lean on him
financially. At first the amounts were
small, and Foster had to use the argu-
ment "It's for your mother." Later, the
amounts were larger and more regular,
and without realizing it Emily began to
count on them as a part of her normal
income. Foster asked for nothing in re-
turn, except for an occasional quick kiss
'?though his manner did suggest that
his feelings were not entirely platonic.
Indeed, for him not to have done so
would have appeared unnatural.
Then, one day, Foster asked Emily for
a small favor. Being in the insurance
business in a town where an enormously
high percentage of the population were
government-employed, he naturally
wanted to "break into the State Depart-
ment marker?which, . according ? to
common belief, consists of careerists who
not only receive extremely high salaries
but have extensive private means. "I
could make my living just selling life in-
surance to your friends," Foster told
Emily. He then asked for a list of her
acquaintances at the State Department,
together with brief descriptions of their
various assignments.
Emily resisted at first, arguing that the
State Department publishes annually a
Biographic Register, a Foreign Service
List, and other such materials which are
easily obtainable' from the Government
Book Store on Pennsylvania Avenue.
Foster explained that he wanted "not the
sort of stuff one would find in a register,"
but personal information that would in-
dicate which employees were particularly
good prospects for insurance. "I could
arrange a cocktail party and have you
meet some of them," said Emily. "No,
not yet," said Foster. "Besides, for a
while we must keep it confidential. Don't
tell anybody."
Emily didn't understand why the in-
formation she could give Foster on her
friends would be of any real help to him,
or why the information should be kept
secret, but she did as he asked. Soon she
was gossiping freely about her associates
and even about some of the confidential
matters with which they dealt. Occa-
sionally, remembe-'ng her Departmental
security indoctrination, she would giggle
and say, "I really shouldn't be telling
you such things! You must never tell
anyone I told you!" Foster assured her
that he wouldn't.
Foster, an officer of the U.S.S.R.'s
secret intelligence service, was putting
Emily through what, is known as "pre-
recruitment development." Rule number
one is "Never ask the prospective agent
to do anything that is beyond what his
conscience will allow: The first task in
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developing the prospective agent is fa
expand his conscience gradually, so that
he will eventually do what you want him
to do without qualms." By the time
Foster was asking Emily to bring home
secret documents in the evening (to be
photocopied, and replaced in the files
when she returned to work the following
morning), she was ready. In fact, he
knew that she had become a Soviet agent.
Emily served Soviet Intelligence for 14
years?without incident. She built up a
sizable bank account in Beirut, Lebanon,
and within a few years she could have re-
tired in comfort. Foster disappeared
early in her career of espionage, but an
attractive, in-
dependently wealthy, intelligent woman
can always uncover romantic possibilities
even when she has entered her fifties.
Then one spring morning, almost 14
years to the day after Emily first met
Foster, a Soviet defector being interro-
gated by experts at the CFA "human li-
brary" in the Allegheny Mourit,3 men-
tioned offhandedly: "We kncw all along
about the stuff you planted on us on
?the---affair." Upon being pressed by
the interrogator, he described "the stuff"
in some detail and, although he couldn't
identify the exact source, he had inferred
from the content that it came?or was
supposed to have come?from the office
of Assistant Secretary?and that the
source was probably the secretary's .per-
.sonal assistant. He said that Soviet
analysts, after many years, had come to
the conclusion that much of the informa-
tion was fake.
,,The investigation led straight to Emily.
And Emily, under the kindly questioning
Of. the State Department's chief security
officer, who had been her friend for
many years, confessed all.
' What to do? Here was a longtime
Soviet agent planted deep inside the De-
partment's inner circles of secrecy, who
had passed over to the Soviets God-
knew-what information. Possibly, the
harm had not been too great because,
if the Soviet defector was to be believed,
the Soviets had for some years regarded
Emily's information as fake. Only one
conclusion could be drawn with any de-
gree of certainty: the harm resulting
from revealing the affair to the public
would greatly outweigh -any advantages
to be gained from bringing Emily to
trial. There was simply no way to ex-
plain to the public how even the finest
security system cannot prevent penetra-
tions such as Emily's. So when a CIA
expert on "disinformation" suggested
that the Department exploit the Soviets'
apparent belief that Emily had been a
deception agent all along, the Depart-
ment's security authorities leaped at it.
Emily was left at her post, but during
?
the following weeks she sVas_rnade to
'pass the Soviets materials that would be
seen through as fake but would, retro-
actively, increase their suspicions of the
genuine materials they had received in
the past.
Eventually, Emily got off scot-free?
except, that is, for having to return to
the U.S. Government most of the $100,-
some administrative post and, shortly
thereafter, under an arrangement with
the security office, she announced that
she had contracted some nervous disease
and would have to seek less demanding
employment outside of Government.
She is now working as a librarian in some
rather small New England town.
"Emily" is one kind of spy the Central
Intelligence Agency's instructors in
"Management of the Espionage Opera-
tion" have in mind as they train new
officers. "First," begins the opening lec-
ture in the course, "you must put out of
your mind all you have read about spies.
The spies you have read about, by the
.mere fact that you have read about them.
are exceptions. The spies who interest
us are the ones who do not get caught.
and who therefore are not to be read
about."
The lecture indicates that most spies
live uneventful lives, often to retire in
comfort on earnings stashed away in
foreign banks. It includes the phrase,
borrowed from British Intelligence, "A
good espionage operation is like a good
marriage. Nothing out of the ordinary
ever happens in it. It is uneventful. It
does not make a good story."
Naturally, teaching new officers-about
typically effective spies, not the bumblers
who get caught, poses awkward prob-
lems. The officers study case histories of
those few spies for "the other side" who
were effective enough but were caught
by accident. They also study histories of
spies on their own side who lived out
long careers without getting caught, and
whom they can learn about by reading
sanitized accountr from CIA operational
records. There is a limit, however, to how
much can be learned from reading about
successful CIA spies. Since they are all
of other nationalities and cultures, it is
difficult for the new officers to identify
with them. CIA trainers want their stu-
dents to get the feeling of espionage, of
what it feels like to be a spy, and they
therefore prefer to teach case histories of
Soviet spies working against American
targets, since these spies are American
citizens, usually of educational and social
backgrounds similar to those of the stu-
dents themselves. Once they get a feel
for the motivations, foibles and anxieties
of these, they can move on to a more
difficult step, that of understanding citi-
.zens of Communist countries who are
agents of the CIA.
The spies whose case histories are first
taught to students in the CIA's school on
espionage management are American cit-
izens of these categories:
I. The "Emily"?the spy who was
originally spotted by a KGB recruiter.
also an American citizen, who recog-
nized his or her potential. and who was
conditioned, recruited and trained, like
the original Emily, according to conven-
tional principles of agent management:
2. The "Mickey"?the "walk-in" spy
who, because of special knowledge and
experience, was able to get in touch with
a foreign in-
telligence agency and offer his servizcs with-
out being spotted by counterintelligence:
000 which she had accumulated in the 3. The "Philby"?the long-tern agent,
Beirut bank. Emily wArip*AttrErftdit Reltrfigitehl,11060084VGIPIRIVP77,101043
11
recruitment was outside his assigned target
and took years working his way into it:
4. The "Willie"?the spy who is actually
working for one intelligence service (e.g.,
the Soviets') but who, for at least part of
his career, is led by his "principal" to ,be-
lieve that he is working for another (e.g..
an industrial-espionage organization, a
credit-investigation organization, or a news-
paper columnist).
The case histories that most conveniently
illustrate these categories are cases of Soviet
penetrations of Western targets, but they
are with only minor differences also illus-
trative of Western penetrations of Com-
munist targets?or of penetrations of any
country's secret installations.
"Even the CIA can have its penetrations."
said defense members of that Agency when
they heard about Emily. "Only the CIA
could have penetrations like ickey's." re-
torted State Department officials when,
months later, they learned of the CIA's most
serious known penetration. "Mickey," as we
shall call him, was a "walk-in" agent who
could never have made his initial contacts
with the Soviets without his CIA back-
ground and skills. Having decided that he
had information for which the Soviets
would pay large sums, he figured out a
basic operational plan for extracting the
information from CIA files, and then made
contact with the Soviets. His professional
training made it easy to avoid traps that
invariably catch the amateur "walk-in," and,
once he had made contact, he set his own
terms. Soviet Intelligence could take them
.or leave them. It accepted.
Mickey was a mad Irish-American who
felt strongly about politics only when he
was drinking, and even then his feelings
were such a mixture of extreme right-wing
Conservatism and leftish resentment of the
CIA's "Ivy League dilettantes" that his best
friends, when they were questioned just
after his capture, were unable to give any
clues as to where he stood on the major
political issues of the day. In all probability,
security analysts eventually decided, he had
no political views: certainly, when he event-
ually tried to justify his behavior in terms
of political convictions ("It will look better
for you if you appear to have been moved
by ideology rather than simple financial
greed." his legal adviser had told him), he
could speak only in cliches, and these were
interspersed with outbursts totally incompat-
ible with the politics of his Soviet employers.
When Mickey approached the Soviets, he,
was a senior member of a CIA unit that
received "raw information" from all the
U.S. Government's sources?published ma-
terials, reports from diplomats and intelli-
gence "stations," technical gimmickry and
liaison with friendly governments. His unit
then processed the material into "finished
intelligence" summaries that were sufficient-
ly dependable, timely and brief for the
President of the United States. Mickey had
virtually all the TOP SECRI r security clear-
ances; he attended lop staff meetings not
only of the CIA itself but, on occasion, of
various bureaus of the State and Defense
departments. Ilis closest friends were CIA
officers who dealt with the Agency's most'
sensitive problems. He knew as much as it
was possible for one man to know, given
, the U.S. Government's "need to know"
policies, about how our Government saw
the rest of the world. mainly Soviet Russia.
Although he was excluded from discussions
of policy, he was able to observe policy-
makers' reactions to the intelligence they
received, and so could accurately estimate
the policies they would recommend. For
the U.S.. Government, he was a topflight
intelligence analyst: for Soviet Intelligence.
203Z01211,71VAVtihoen:z.. 'agent., said "Had
one
aof
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his Superiors. "he might have received serv-
ice decorations from both sides."
Mickey died "of a heart attack" late in
1964, just as his interrogation was ending.
The penultimate paragraph of the report of
Mickey's interrogation, the one entitled
"Financial Arrangements," was never fin-
ished: but the paragraph on "Mode of Op-
eration" was complete, if chillingly brief. It
said simply that at irregular intervals, per-
haps as often as three to five times a month,
Mickey took secret documents home with
him in the evenings (as do many senior
officers of the CIA), photocopied them, and
returned them to his office the following
morning. To avoid being detected in the
course of the security office's nighttime spot-
checks of the files, he habitually substituted
dummies for those documents he had re-
moved. I-le met his Soviet case officer at
bimonthly intervals, and his weekly de-
liveries of photocopies and written reports
were made via dead-letter drops and "brush"
contacts in public places?the men's room
of the Mayflower Hotel, a neighborhood
movie house, the locker room of a public
athletic club, a municipal golf course.
All was routine; nothing out of the ordi-
nary ever happened. There was no "story."
In all the .maily years that Mickey worked
, for the Soviets, there were only two "inci-
dents." The first occurred when, through
elaborate special arrangements, Mickey
crossed into East Berlin to meet "head-
quarters officers" who'were curious to see
such an exceptionally productive agent; the
, second was the one instance when a check
of the files by the security office took place
on the one night when Mickey forgot to
substitute dummies, and particularly sensi-
tive documents were found to be missing.
This latter incident led to an investigation.
While it is not unusual for documents to
be missing from files of officers who insist,
despite regulations. on doing "homework."
it became increasingly evident that Mickey's
comments and behavior did not reflect the
kind of knowledge he would have had were
he doing "homework" on the documents.
Mickey's successful and uneventful ca-
reer as a Soviet agent lasted just under 13
years, from early 1952 until late 1964.
"There is literally nothing extraordinary to
be found in his case history," the chief in-
vestigating officer told Admiral William
Reborn, then Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency. His motivations, insofar
as they could be determined from the in-
terrogation, were unremarkable?in fact,
they were shared by numerous other Agency
officers any one of whom, under conceiv-
able circumstances, might have been moved
to sell out to the Soviets. There was nothing
ingenious about his "walk-in" approach;
there was nothing in his behavior that could
have been prevented by any reasonable
security precautions. After all, the security
office could not possibly keep every mem-
ber of the CIA under 24-hour surveillance.
There was not even anything remarkable
about his financial situation: he was not in
any particular financial difficulty when he
first approached the Soviets, and the
$100,000 or so he must have collected from
the Soviets was not reflected in his spending
habits. The money is probably still intact in
some Swiss bank.
Like the Emily affair. the. Mickey case
was hushed up. Nothing would-have been
gained by calling public attention to the
fact that such an important penetration had
taken place, particularly since similar pene-
trations might .still be in progress. ?
Kim Philby, the Soviet agent who pene-
trated the British Intelligence Service, is a
"famous spy," 'out his fame resulted from
a fluke, as did his discovery. Had he not
escaped to Russia, he would almost cer-
tainly have been liquidated (as Mickey was)
?Approved For
s
or neutralized (as Emily was) and the
world would have heard nothing of him. He
meets our qualifications for men studying
as a "real" spy. He was of proved effective-
ness; he was caught really by chance; and
his personal history indicates that he was
not unique?that there may be others like
him still planted in Western governments.
The Philby case has some, but not much,
relevance to modern-day espionage. During
the Thirties, when Hitler was on the rise
and the economic depression in the West
was at its worst, the Soviets recruited to the
cause of Communism scores of young men
and women?Americans, Britons, Euro-
peans?who had not yet chosen their ca-
reers. Of these, a percentage were in-
structed, first, to "go underground" and
conceal their Communist sympathies; sec-
ond, to seek employment in their respective
governments. Of these, the majority fizzled
out?either because they decided to come
into the open with their Communist views,
or because they lost interest in the cause
altogether, or because they were unable to
find government employment that fitted
both their personal interests and those of
the Soviets.
The "Philby". is entirely a feature of
Soviet Intelligence. Our intelligence serv-
ices never had the opportunity to develop
a political movement behind the Curtain,
and even had they been able to do so it
would have been practically impossible to
maintain the kind of contact with them nec-
essary to sustain their enthusiasm over the
years. More important, with "Emilys" and
"Mickeys" being a dime a dozen behind the
Curtain, there has been no need for Western
intelligence agencies to go to the expense
of developing "Philbys."
The "Philby" is not only peculiar to the
Soviets; he is also peculiar to the "old espio-
nage." Today, although the Saviets still
waste considerable time and money on per-
sons who just might one day work their
way into targets of importance, they find
that Philby's young counterparts are as anti-
Soviet as they are anticapitalist and anti-
"imperialist." Besides, these students seem
incapable of sustained activity either as
Soviet Intelligence agents or as employees
of the targets they are supposed to penetrate.
Still, the Soviets try?in American, British
and European universities. Their success
has been so slight that Western security
agencies have all but discontinued their
"doubling" of the few who succumb. Most
are so feckless as counterspies that they
could be of little help to the Soviets as spies.
So why bother? "Philbys" are worth our
serious attention only because a few older
ones are already in our governments.
When "McCarthyism" was at its height, a
sensationalist Washington columnist one
day received a letter.of unquestionable au-
thenticity giving highly confidential infor-
mation.about the State Department's harsh
treatment of employees accused of Com-
munist sympathies. The letter was a viola-
tion of security regulations, but the intention
behind it kept it from being a contravention
of the nation's espionage laws. The writer
had no thought of communicating the in-
formation to a foreign power, but only
wanted to make the public aware of what
he honestly thought to be an injustice.
Although the letter was signed simply "a
patriotic American," it took only an hour
or so of discreet inquiry for the columnist's
chief investigator to determine the author's
identity. Without informing the columnist of
his intentions, the investigator approached
the employee, swore him to secrecy, prom-
ised him monthly "expense money," and
made arrangements for him to continue to
indulge his patriotic impulses by furnishing
weekly reports. Some of the reports would
Release 2001/08/08 : CI1RDP77-00
be published as having come from "a source
close to the' State Department." with details
altered to mislead the Department's security
officials as they tried to run down the leak;
the rest would be kept in the columnist's
office as "background material" to support
other stories. It was a satisfactory arrange-
ment to both men?if not to the columnist,
who was not told about it.
The investigator, it happened, was not
only a reporter; he moonlighted as a "prin-
cipal" of the Soviet KGB. As an investigator
he was able to use the columnist's reputation
as a crusader to employ informants. Some
remained mere informants. happy' in the
belief that they were merely exposing to the
public deficiencies of the bureauCracy.
Others, after development, became regular
Soviet agents?in other words, "Einilys."
Those who remained unaware that they
were reporting to a foreign power were
"Willies"?i.e., agents who don't know
they are agents. They wouldn't think of
working for an enemy government, but
their sense of morality is not offended at
the idea of furnishing information to pri-
vate companies or individuals, or even to
"friendly" governments. They grow like
garden weeds at times when the public be-
lieves official-secrets acts are being used to
hide the bureaucracies from well-informed
criticism, and when for any other reason
there is disrespect for security laws.
After the suspicions of the "Willie" have
become aroused, he is. like any of the other
types, more likely to continue his espionage
work than to turn himself in. Most security
officers believe that hundreds of uncaught
"Willies" may exist in Western govern-
ments. Certainly thousands exist in govern-
ments of the so-called Third World, having
been planted there not only by Soviet In-
telligence but by our own intelligence serv-
ices. They even exist in the Soviet Union.
One"Willic"thinks he is giving tips to an
industrial concern seeking government con-
tracts; another, that he is giving informa-
tion on his co-workers required for purposes
of credit investigations; another, that he is
keeping a right-wing religious group in-
formed of "left-wingers" in his office. The
stickiest"Willies"are those who think theyaie
working for Congressmen or prominent
newspaper columnists, because in many
cases they really are?except for the fact
that the principals who collect the informa-
tion give it not only to their respective Con-
gressmen and columnists, but also to Soviet
Intelligence. In any case, termination of a?
"Willie" is normally awkward. as "termina-
tion with extreme prejudice" (i.e., liquida-
tion) of"Willie"cases is frowned upon by
most security services.
To the CIA's espionage specialists, agents
can so'easity be typed as "Emily." "Mickey,"
"Philby" and "Willie," that variations of
these names arc used to categorize new cases
-of foreign agents and even, sometimes, to
categorize agents of our own. "We have
managed to plant an Emily in the Algerian
Foreign Ministry," a CIA espionage spe-
cialist might tell a colleague. The British
have similar categories: so do the Soviets?
although, of course, they are more in line
with national characteristics. A review of
the operational files of any espionage
branch, however, would surely reveal that
fewer than half its agents fit these cate-
gories. There is a wide range of agents who
fit no category except "miscellaneous."
Even the mast discip'..:ned. textbook-minded
espionage officers are occasionally unable
to resist the temptation to recruit agents
who do not fit the accepted patterns. For
example, there is 'that silly little sub-lieu-
tenant," as British security officers call
David Bingham. the Navy officer who had
his wife "walk in" to the Soviet Embassy
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in London to offer his services. Before the
working day was over, the British security
authorities knew of the approach and had
set about making arrangements whereby
Bingham would have access only to ma-
terial..genuine and fake, that British Intelli-
gence "disinformation" experts had cleared
for passim Meanwhile. the Soviets. pre-
sumably realizing that so naive an approach
would have been spotted by British surveil-
lance, only set up expandable operational
facilities for the .Binghams?and, no doubt.
assumed that the material they delivered was
generally fake.
Why did they bother? "The temptation
to follow up on such an approach just to sec
where it will lead is irresistible," a CIA
case officer once told me apropos of a
similar case. "We spend far too much time
on such matters." Why, then, do the courts
' make such a fuss over cases like the Bing-
hams? There are a number of reasons, all
centering around the fact that important
detected Soviet spies rarely reach the courts.
and it is essential to make the most of the
"miscellaneous" ones who do. In sentencing
Sub-Lieutenant Bineham. Mr. Justice
Bridge of the Winchester Crown Court de-
scribed the officer's action as "a monstrous
betrayal of your country's secrets," adding,
"The damace you may have done to these
interests is incalculable," while counter-
espionage analysts estimated that most of
the Binghams' information could have been
obtained by technical intelligence or in-
ferred from overtly obtainable publications.
It is the fact that there arc some "miscel-
laneous" agents (certainly more than the
professionals think there should be), whom
the courts are allowed, when they get
caught, to make a fuss over, that gives
writers of spy books and the general public
the impression that they are what the
espionage business is all about. Perhaps it's
just as well. Many professionals no doubt
think it useful for the public to have such a
false impression. But there is one aspect on
which I think it important that the public
be set straight. This is that most spies are
not oddballs like the .Binghams. It is not
their peculiarities upon which ? spymasters
play to recruit them, but what CIA psychol-
ogists have come to call "normal vulner-
abilities."
Why do spies become spies? I knew the
original "Emily" very well; I knew the
original "Mickey" to speak to. and he and
I had many mutual friends; I knew at least
three U.S. Government and two British
Government employees who turned out to
be "Mickeys"; I knew the most famous of
them all, Kim Philby, better than anyone
else, excepting two or three British intelli-
gence officers. I have also had in-depth in-
ierviews with a representative number of
Soviet and Satellite defectors and former
CIA and SIS agents who were recruited as
they worked for official Soviet and Satellite
agencies. Even so, I still have no firm views
on what makes spies spy and defectors
betray their countries.
And I don't think anyone else has. A re-
view of the whole range of known spies and
defectors shows that the ideologically mo-
tivated agent is a rare bird, indeed. Most
espionage agents don't themselves fully
comprehend what they do, and-in most
cases the very simplicity of their motivations
makes them hard to recognize.
I believe that experience comes frighten-
ingly near to indicating that as many as
one out of three government employees
who have passed all the security clearances
might become, provided the right circum-
stances, agents of a foreign power. A CIA
cam officer confronted with a target within
the Polish Government?to which only
HARPER'S
June 19714
UP FRONT FOR THE
by Robert T. Wood
Without Cloak or Dagger, by Miles
Copeland. Simon and Schuster, $8.95
(July).
CIA
ILES COPELAND is an old whore.
IV.11 This is not the libelous state-
ment it seems, as anyone with Mr.
Copeland's background well knows.
In the Central Intelligence Agency,
"old whore" is a term used to des-
scribe ..an officer so . experienced, so
devoted to his trade, so loyal to his
organization, and so accustomed to
following orders that he will accept
and do a creditable job on any as-
signment without regard for moral,
ethical, or possibly even legal consid-
-etations: 'Within -the 'Agency it is Iv
high compliment to professionalism.
No outsider can be sure Mr. Cope-
land qualifies for the title, of course,
because the most ambiguous aspect
of this latest book on the CIA is the
status of its author. An alumnus of
the wartime OSS, Mr. Copeland
claims he served as a consultant to
the newly formed CIA and was called
back from time to time thereafter to
review the .systems he had devised.
He never claims to have been a staff
employee of the Agency, yet he says
that espionage has occupied most of
his working life. In 1957 he estab-
lished himself in Beirut as a security
consultant, which, he alleges, is still
? his ?octu pa:ion todry 'his -knowl-
edge of the Agency and its workings
is both intimate and up-to-the-minute.
To ask Mr. Copeland when, exactly,
his employment with the CIA ended
might be a little like asking David
Eisenhower how much rent he pays.
The temptation to compare Miles
Copeland to Victor Louis is irresist-
ible. A mysterious Russian who began
as a small-time black marketeer mov-
ing 'about on the fringes of the for-
eign community in Moscow,- Louis
landed an assignment as correspon- ?
dent for a London newspaper and
made several trips outside the Soviet
Union, rushing in to places, like Tai-
pei, where Russian diplomats feared
to tread. The speculation, which will
probably never be confirmed, is that "
he obtained his unusual privileges
and freedom of movement by virtue
Robert 7', ood irorked for the CIA lot. art'-
rnteen
tential spies are at least as plentiful as po-
three persons have access?would be con-
fident enough of penetrating it to assume
success. Although we have no sure way of
knowing, the converse is probably equally
true. A CIA security officer once said. "Po-
of his relationship with the KGB 'de-
partment of misinformation, whose
mission it is to mislead the rest of
the world concerning Russian 'capa-
bilities and intentions. Like Victor
Louis, Miles Copeland is a highly
visible and easily accessible pellson
of nebulous status who can go places
and say things that responsiblq' of-
ficials cannot. Mr. Copeland, 'who
on at least one occasion has said
things about CIA activities that re-
sponsible officials later had to deny,
has been described by one journalist
as "the only man I know who uses
the CIA as a cover."
NIL COPELAND has written this
book, he says, to counter a flood
of misinformation on spies and coun-
terspies that appears on television, in
movies, books, magazine articles, and
newspapers. To give. him his due,
there is more inside information on
the subject presented here than has
probably ever appeared publicly in'
one place. To begin with, Mr. Cope-
land makes it clear that espionage is
a relatively minor source of intern-
`gtneein fot the.elan-
destine services often seem to be the
tail that wags the dog, and of course
the descriptions of them make the
best reading. His explanations of the
planning and organization of a pene-
tration operation and of the procedure
for developing, recruiting, and hand-
ling an agent are in some cases over-
elaborate and in others oversimplified,
but generally they are accurate. The
account of the position and operation
of the CIA 'field station, cataloguing
many of the problems faced by a CIA
officer serving overseas, will be new
to most readers and might even be
instructive for foreign-service offi-
cers and foreign correspondents who
thought they knew all there was to
know. Add to this a text liberally
salted with footnotes?most of them
fascinating anecdotes in their own
right?and the result is an interesting
and readable book.
Unfortunately, the large quantities
of good information in Without
Cloak or Dagger serve a4 a vellick
for an equal amount of misinforma-
tion on the Agency, more.misinfor-
mation, in fact, than all that's been
produced by the movies, television
shows, or publications that Mr. Cope-
', land complains of. Moreover, the mis-
information is presented very author-
itatively, with no hint to enable the
uninitiated to distinguish the true
from the false. His intent, in a great
many instances, is clearly to mislead
the reader and Iva a totally false
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and performance.
In describing field operations, Mr.
Copeland stresses their defensive
nature, stating, with a certain candor,
that "the mission of the CIA station
is ... to stay out of trouble." Most
of the sixty or so stations around the
world have, he says, no more than
. two or three case officers,* and, ideal-
ly, a case officer is responsible for no
more than one operation. Contrasted
with this low-profile view of the CIA
overseas are his assertions of an im-
pressive amount of successful activ-
ity. He claims that "over the years,
,there have been literally thousands
of CIA agents in the U.S.S.R., Red
'China, Cuba and other communist
countries," and that both agents and
American personnel move easily and
securely in and out of these "denied
areas." The implication is that both
Peking and Moscow are swarming
. with. CIA spies and that no state se-
cret is safe from them.
? The facts as I was exposed to them
were vastly different. In the days be-
fore I began to worry about becom-
ing an old whore myself, I 'served
for several years at a station With
considerably more than three case
officers. During one particularly hec-
tic summer, I met regularly with and
handled no fewer than twenty agents,
one of them with an additional five
subagents. My workload had been
expanded by taking on handholding
chores for some operations of my
colleagues who were on home leave,
hut the average load for case officers.
is, I suspect, closer to twenty than to
one. Even after I had achic.vcd the
relative luxury of handling only one
fairly high-level agent, I continued
to manage four or five other agents
in support of my operation and other
station operations, and I considered
myself underemployed at the time.
It's embarrassing to admit .that
China was my primary target and
all my best efforts resulted in not one
penetration of the Chinese military,
party, or government above the vil-
lage level. The other case officers at
the station were similarly unsuccess-
ful, as had been every other case of-
ficer who had worked on the target
for the previous twenty years. We
consoled ourselves only with the
knowledge that our colleagues in the
units working against the U.S.S.R.,
with more personnel and, more mon-
__
Mr. ...Copeland corrects a popular
misconception by explaining that staff
CIA employees are almost never desig-
nated as agents, in the sense that. FBI
officers are known RS "special agents."
In intelligence an agent is someone, usu-
ally a foreign national, hired to provide
information or perform other services.
,The staff employee who contacts and di-
Acts him, anti in 'general handles'
"case," is known as a "case officer."
ey and, presumably, more urgency,
-would have fared just as miserably
but for the greater tendency of Rus-
sians to defect. Their one outstand-
ing agent was not developed through
any positive effort on their part; he
had sought them out.
Early in the book, Mr. Copeland
describes the CIA's arrest and phys-
ical elimination of a headquarters
employee who had served for years
as an agent for the Russians. If he
expects anyone to believe this story,'
it must have occurred to him that he
is confessing to a role as accessory
to an administrative murder. The
CIA has no police powers, let alone
authority to act as judge and execu-
tioner as well. There are no doubt
plenty Of 011-1CCI S, young 'andold,
who would not hesitate to carry out
an execution if ordered, but it is in-
credible that there is a single ad-
ministrator at any level of the Agency
who would take the responsibility of
ordering it. Although the Phoenix
program, a wholesale assassination
of key insurgent leaders in Vietnam.
was directed by then Ambassador
William Colby, it was carried out
principally by the Vietnamese them-
selves, not by CIA officers. Phoenix
had the full approval of higher au-
thority, so the burden of Agency re-
sponsibility was minimal. It was not
at all equivalent to the secret liqui-
dation of one renegade staff employee
in. the basement of tlz-,--.1.angley head-
quarters.. If this incident had really
happened, it. would be foolhardy in
.the extreme for anyone involved ever
to mention it; a second execution
would . be far more likely than the
rT-1.11E MOST IMAGINATIVE invention
Rof the whole book is the cabal, or
inner circle of Agency old-timers,
who pop up 'to illustrate a point now
and then. Known only by exotic
names like "Mother," "Kingfish."
"Jojo," and "Lady Windemere."
they go on about the business of mak-
ing the Agency run, regardless of
changes in administration or policy.
The last three of those mentioned, on
the basis .of their described respon-
sibilities, appear to be no more than
specialists in single unit that sup-
ports operations without getting di-
rectly involved in their execution or
command; these positions would not,
account for the importance or influ-
ence Mr. Copeland ascribes to them.
Mother is the eminence grise. Like
the others, he was present at the birth
of the Agency, and, faced with the
frustration of wondering what de-
cisions the Congress was making for
the future of the fledgling Central
Intelligence Group, he characteris-
tically suggested, "Penetration be-
gins at home," thus showing that in-
tragovernmental spying was not an
invention of the Joint Chiefs. It was
also Mother who .fabricated a com-
plete espionage operation in those
early days just to expose the gullibil-
ity of a unit competing with his for
influence in the new Agency.
In spite of his early start and un-
doubted talents of maneuver, Mother
somehow never made it to .the top.
but he enjoys a certain amount of
autonomy today as headpf. the Agen-
cy's counterterrorist effort, a huge
computerized data bank storing back-
ground information on millions of
persons, both American and foreign,
who could conceivably become in-
volved in terrorist activity, as well as
millions more who could not. Mother
is, of course, an imaginary character,
but, aside from that, there is no way
for an outsider to judge the truth of
the Agency's so-called counterterror-
ist activities. It is not legally autho-
rized to keep files on American cit-
izens. The significant thing is that
the author wants his readers to be-
lieve it is doing so.
The CIA may well become the
world's most powerful government
agency, according to Mr. Copeland,
because it has access to the most
knowledge. Removing the dangers
inherent in a powerful government
agency, he adds, is not a matter of
decreasing the power, but of ensur-
ing that those who exercise it are
incorruptible and truly responsive to
public intereA. "CIA officials believe
that their agency is already incorrup:
tible and ... as responsive to public
interest as any other agency." Inter-
estingly enough, he does not claim
anywhere that the Agency is respon-
sive to higher authority. On the con-
trary, he gives examples where it has
specifically been unresponsive and
implies that it will continue to be so
in cases where higher authority is in
conflict Ndth its own particular view
of the public interest.
The overall picture that emerges
from this book is of a Central Intel-
ligence Agency enormously compe-
tent, frighteningly ruthless, spectac-
ularly successful, terribly powerful,
and absolutely trustworthy, the sort
of ideal government organization
that only a fool or a charlatan would
tamper with. The author has com-
posed a presentation that could com-
pletely revamp the Agency's image.
It has been apparent that ever
since his days as executive director,
William Colby has been trying to
renovate his organization's image.
The impression he wanted to project,
as a friend of mine put it, seemed to
be 1.'something like a cross between
General Motors and the League of
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Women Voters." There is an om-
inous implication in this book that,
by improvinc, the Agency's image,
Colby intends to enhance its power
and independence as well.
A great many people are going to
take Without. .Cionk,or Daggpr. se-
riously, but I doubt that anyone with
the necessary authority will ask the
Agency how much they had to do
with it, or precisely what their re-
lationship with Mr. Copeland is. Un-
like the general run of Walter Mittys
who claim to have some intimate re-
lationship with the CIA, Miles Cope-
NEW YORK DAILY IIEWS
2 6 MAY 1974
(-A
? r'P fi ri
t.2 F)
)47.
0
land clearly has one, but neither he
nor the Agency is going to define it
voluntarily. -In the foreword, .Mr.
Copeland says, "I must make it. clear,
however, that no one at CIA ... or
any other official agency has 'cleared'
this book or in any other way im-
plied approval of my writing- it." In
early November of last year, I wrote
a letter to Angus Thuermer, assistant
to director William Colby, asking
several very specific questions about
the clearance of a magazine article
that appears, in somewhat different
form, as chapter nine of the book.
By JOSEPH VOLZ
Of The News Washington Bureau ?
' THE GREAT OLD legends in spying, people like
:Mata Hari and Richard Sorge, afe.being eclipsed by
a new generation of super snoops with names like
"Cosmos" and "Big Bird."
The man in the trench coat and the beautiful
seductress coaxing secrets out of government big-
wigs are being automated out of jobs.
? At. the Central Intelligence Agency in the
. ,Washington suburb of Langley, 'Va., hundreds of-
clanuesline operatives, known as "spooks" in the
, trade, are being asked to take early retirement. The
reason: spy satellites, used by both the Soviets and
' the United States, can now uncover military secrets.
. that an army of humans might never unravel.
The Soviets reportedly have rocketed at least 10
radar satellites into earth orbit in the last four
..years, operating over the Indian Ocean . and the
' Baltic Sea. ?
?
Threat fo Polori7?
Although the Soviet program is still considered
experimental, with the satellites staying up for only
, a few weeks at a time, the sky spies pose a potential
threat to the previously invincible U.S. Polaris sub-
marines. The Cosmos satellites may be attempting
to find U.S. subs deep in the ocean by detecting the
-heat given off by their engines.
Pentagon sources also believe that the Soviets are
experimenting with satellites that can detect even
the smallest amount of radioactivity coming from
the nuclear subs.
Until now, the Navy has boasted that only its
; missile-carrying subs could hide successfully from
the Soviets, that land-based U.S. Minuteman
missiles or bombers can easily be targeted.
The Soviets also fired pff a barrage of spy
satellites last year over the "Israeli-Egyptian bat-
' tlitfront. Unmanned Voshkod satellites, big enough
? to carry two men, were launched to snaj. pictures of
? the battlefield at. noon under good lighting con-
ditions.' ?
The U.S. Air Force, very hush-hush..about its own
satellite program, reporledly launched some Mideast
spy satellites from Vandenberg Air Force Base,
Calif. ?
.. ? ?.
?
Mr. Thuermer's reply was unequiv-
ocal. ?Ail Aaency employee:," lie
said, "sign secrecy agreements, and
the federal courts have determined
that the secrecy agreements are en-
foreeaMe contracts." The aetnal re-
view of manuscripts is a security
function, and on that basis he de-
clined to answer my questions, hut if
the man who sits next to the diritc?tor
of Central Intelligence 'admits he 'had
the machinery to stop publication
of this book and didn't, that should
be approval enough for anyone. 0
This kind of technological wizardry can hardly be
matched by an agent on the ground, who may spend
years winning the confidence of government
bureaucrats before gaining access to military
secrets. Anil espionage experts wonder if the value
of the information that only human spies cad collec-
t?such as urine samples of foreign leaders?is
worth the effort and the cost.
Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger dispat-
died' a batch of spies and dirty ?tricks experts into.
retirement during his brief tenure as CIA director
last year.
? Of course, the espionage game will always need
humans and, occasionally, a spy can work his way
into the confidence of an important world leader.
The most recent. success story was Guenter
Guillaunie, the East German spy who served as aide-
de-camp to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.
Cmillaume's arrest last month led to Brandt's abrupt
fall from power.
A major drawback to human spy idissions is the'
risk of 'being caught, confessing, and embarrassing
the- folks back ?home. Francis Gary Powers,. for
example, was shot down while piloting his U-2 spy
plane over the Soviet Union in May, 1960, and a
'planned Soviet-U.S. summit conference blew up as a
result of .the uproar after the Russians captured
Powers. The capture of the spy ship Pueblo off
North Korea in 1968 caused more problems, for the
United States when the crew was forced to "con-
fess." Satellites, of course, can't be tortured.
Air. Force Secretary John L. McLucas is par-
ticularly interested.. in sattellite. technology, but.
'greets questions about sky spying with -a smiling
"no comment." However, it is known that the. Air
Force.has? been in the spy satellite business for quite
sonic time.
Four years ago, for example, the Air Force fired
off the first of a series of satellites from Cape Ken-
nedy eqUipped with tv cameras and x-ray sensors to
watch over the Soviet Union, China and North Viet- ?
nam. The satellites were designed to give early war-
ning of Any enemy missle shots from land or from
-subs. The sensors can detect the exhaust of a rocket
'fired off a launch pad, and the cameras can snap
pictures of troop movements or missile sites.
In recent years, the U.S. has been developing ex-
pensive. satellites like Lockheed's Big Bird which
can stay up for months. But the Russians have been
firing off more satellites, according to Pentagon
sources.
There are still some bugs to be worked out of the
'satellite programs, as Gregory R. Copley of Defense
Foreign Affairs Digest reported recently. The
Cosmos _satellites used by the Russians during the
Arab-Israeli conflict "apparently did not transmit
tlieir photos back to earth via electronic mama but
in capsule form' by parachute. This kind of delivery
is too slow for rapidly developing battlefield con-
ditions...
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MAY 22, 1974 FEDERAL TIMES
CIA Pushes Jobs Equality
Secrecy.Y50 Possin
By Beth Price
Special to Federal Times
WASHINGTON ? The super-
secret Central Intelligence Ag-
ency (CIA), located in a Washing-
ton suburb, is in a vise of its own
Making: Namely, how to promote
equal employment opportunity
programs at the agency without.
blowing their cover.
Like all federal agencies, the
CIA is under orders to increase
the number of minorities, espe-
cially blacks, and women em-
ployed ,at most levels of the
agency.
But unlike other federal agen-
cies, the CIA shuns publicity and
cherishes its low profile. The
less said about the international
intelligence-gathering agency,
the better, most officials would
agree.
Behind the fenced and tree-
barricaded grounds, leading up
to the massive white headquar-
ters building just off Route 123
in McLean, Va., several CIA em-
ployees are trying hard to at-
tract more blacks and women
especially for professional posi-
tions. And trying equally hard to
be quiet, about it.
,They're mulling the problem
of how to clear up some of the
Misconceptions blacks and
others have about the CIA and
how to get some of them to apply
for jobs. This they want to do
without letting on to too many
people exactly how many blacks
they want, how many they have
now, or what the agency needs
them for.
The same quandary is met
with the CIA's women employ-
ees. Although the problem isn't
to hire more women, because
the percentage of women is rela-
tively high, there is a dilemma
when it comes to promoting
women into executive positions
or moving them into male-domi-
nated departments. -
?
Where does the CIA find the
qualified women and yet keep
quiet about their efforts to do
so?
The director of equal employ-
ment opportunity at the CIA, a
white male who asked not to be
named, has attempted to find
one solution to the recruitment
problem. He has opened up a
walk-in office in Rosslyn.
Without seeking publicity
about it, he and his staff, who
also asked not to be named, try
to encourage people of minority
races and women to drop in and
inquire about possible employ-
ment at the CIA.
? The Washington Area Recruit-
ment Office of the CIA is located
at 1820 N. Ft. Myer Drive, Ros-
slyn. The phone number is 703-
351-2028, and interview hours
are 9 a.m.-3:30 p.m.
But despite this unmasked out-
post, the CIA still has a long way
to go in its recruitment program.
One complicating factor is the
necessity of reducing the work
force at the agency, which
means that some people are
being laid off and some posi-
tions are going unfilled at the
same time that the agency is
trying to attract blacks and
women.
The percentage of blacks em-
ployed there is just over five
percent. For women, the figure
is 32 percent. However, the fig-
ures are incomplete because the
CIA won't reveal how many peo-
ple altogether work for them.
To recruit more blacks, the
EEO director said, a black as-
sistant will be hired soon.
Other efforts have included
importing 25 black college
professors to CIA headquarters
for a tour and to show them that
much research and analysis goes
on there. Not all CIA work is
clandestine or police-like, the
EEO director said.
The agency is preparing a bro-
chure for its recruiters to hand
out, "describing the true nature
of agency missions and func-
tions, etc., in order to dispel mis-
conceptions of agency employ-
ment among minority groups,"
the EEO director said in his 1974
affirmative action plan. ,
By 1980, the CIA hopes to have
a black employee percentage of
8-9 percent, according to the
EEO director.
There's no problem with the
number of Orienthls employed at
the agency, and the situation
with Spanish-surnamed employ-
ees is "uncertain, . . . We're
looking into it now," according
to the EEO director.
Many women at the CIA are
underemployed, that is, cluster-
ed at grades 5-9, often in clerical
or secretarial positions.
The main thrust of the
women's panel at the CIA is
to promote more women into
upper-level positions, not neces-
sarily to hire more women. The
women's coordinator, a white,
said: "We're not after promoting
unqualified people. We're after
equal opportunity, not more
equal."
She's hoping to set up some
programs that will help women
get into "bridge jobs" and then
onto the career ladder.
To accomplish its 1974 affirm-
ative action goals, the CIA is
, trying to bring more blacks into
its summer intern programs and
? into its work-study programs for
college students.
? The agency also is encourag-
'ing its employees to persuade
their black friends to consider
employment at the CIA.
This however becomes rather
difficult for some employees
who are instructed to be dis-
creet, if not secretive, about
their place of employment.
The dilemma in which the CIA .
finds itself is highlighted by a
remark in the 1974 affirmative
action plan. One of the agency's
objectives, according to the
plan, is "to participate in com-
munity efforts to improve condi-
tions which affect employment
in the federal government."
Commenting on that objective,
the EEO director wrote: "For
security reasons, CIA is unable
as an organization to participate
in many activities and programs
not connected with its sensitive
mission. Employees, however,
are encouraged to participate in
civic activities as private PM-
zens but maintainin-
, al anonymity if -
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WASHINGTON POST
1 3 MAY 1974
allace H. euel, Correspondent,
Central Intelligence Agency Aide
. Wallace R. Deuel, 63, a fo'r-
mer newspaper correspondent
and Central Intelligence
Agency aide, . died Friday
while en route from Washing-
ton to Chicago on a private
ambulance plane.
Mr. Deuel, who lived at 1605
45th St. NW, suffered from
emphysema and had been in
failing health ? for the past
three . years. He was planning
to stay with his son, Peter M.
Deuel, in Chicago.
After extensive reporting
experience abroad, Mr. Deuel
was diplomatic correspondent
in Washington for the Chicago
Daily News from 1945 to 1949
and then for the St. Louis-Post
Dispatch for the next four
years before he joined the
CIA. He retired in 1972.
Born in Chicago, Mr. Deuel
was graduated from the Uni-
versity of Illinois in 1925 and)
for the next three yea' rs'
taught political science and in-
'ternational? law at the Ameri-
can University in Beirut,
which then was part of Syria.
He joined the Chicago Daily
news in 1928 and for a period
wrote "think" pieces on the
.Middle East before moving to
the paper's New :York bureau.'
In 1932' he was assigned to
Rome, where he wrote numer-
ous stories on the developing
Fascist regime.
Mr. Deed became chief of
the Berlin bureau of the Chi-
cago Daily News in 1935. His.
dispatches on the Nazi regime
appeared not only in the Chi-
cago Daily News but also in
'litany other papers throughout
this country. .
He ,covered the campaigns
of the German armies into Po- ?
land and other areas of West-
ern Europe and in 1942 pub-
lished a book, "People Under
Hitler," Considered one of the
best accounts of Nazi Ger-
many. ,
In 1941, Mr. Deuel had been
given a leave of absence by
the Chicago Daily News to
serve ? as special assistant to
Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan,
director of the Office of Stra-
tegic Services, forerunner of
;the CIA.
IHe was with Gen. Donovan
until 1945. He was also a spe-
cial assistant to Ambassador
!Robert J. Murphy, serving as
political adviser on Germany
to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower
at SHAFE headquarters in
1944-45.
, Mr. Demi had received the
Sigma Delta Chi Award in
1947 for his excellence in re-
porting.'
In dditic;ri to his son, he Is
' survived by a sister, Susan
? Shattuck, of Urbana, Ill., andi
seven grandchildren. ?
WASIIINGTON Pon
1 5 MAY 1974
C01. DonaidW. Bernier Military
Intelligence Expert on Russia
Retired Army Col. Donald
W. Bernier, 61, a retired mil-
itary intelligence officer
who specialized on Russia,
died Sunday of cancer at his
home, 6307 Orchid Dr.,
Bethesda.
Born in Chicago, he grad-
uated from the U.S. Military
Academy at West Point in
1935 and served with the in-
fantry In this country and
Hawaii before transfcring to
the Military Intelligence
Service in 1940. Two Years
later he received a master's
degree in Slavic affairs from
Harvard University.
, Col. Bernier was assigned
to Europe and North Africa
as well as to the War De-
' part ment here during World
War II.
His assignments. included
? that of chief of counterintel-
ligence under the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelli-
gence in the European Thea-
ter if Operations and chief
of the Russian Liaison Sec-
tion of Allied Force Head-
quarters. He helped organ-
ize the military element of
the Allied Control Commis-.
Man for Italy.
? Reporting back to the War
? Department in 1944, Col.
DONALD W. BERNIER
Bernier was chief of the
Russian branch in the Office
of the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence and
later was deputy chief of
the EurasAn branch.
He was a War Department
delegate to the Council of
Foreign Ministers in Mos-
cow in 1.1.,7 and later served
as assist; A military attache
in Mosco
After 'irther service in
Czechosh ?aida; Col. Bernier
returned here as assistant
chief of staff for plans and
operations of the Army Se-
curity Agency. In 1453 he
was named chief of the par-,
liamentary.staff of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency.
He then saw duty in
Alaska and Ohio, and in
1956 came back to Washing-
ton as deputy director of the
? Army's Foreign Intelligence
Office. ? ;
In 1961, Col. Bernier be-
came a special Defense De-
partment representative to
the Coordination Staff of
the Director of Central In-
telligence, a position he held
until retirement from the
military in 1965.
He then worked as a re-
search scientist at American
University until 1972.
Col. Bernier's decorations
included the Legion of
Merit.
He is survived by his wife,
Loretta, of the home; two
sons, Bruce, of Bethesda,.
and Maj. Barre Bernier, of
the Presidio, San Francisco;'
two brothers. Maj. Gen. Jo-
seph Bernier, of Bethesda,.
and Gordon, of Green Bay,
..Wis., and a sister, Dorothy
Coan of Chicago.
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GENERAL
NEW YORK TIMES
30 May 1974
The Meaning of Torture
By Anthony Lewis
BOSTON, May 29?The use of tor-
ture as a political instrument is an
evil beyond justification or compro-
mise, a practice officially condemned
by every tivilized society. Yet it goes
on, in many places around the world,
and arousing people's interest in the
subject is singularly difficult. Perhaps
we find the reality so unbearable that
we turn away rather than contem-
plate it.
Such thoughts are provoked by
fresh reports on the savagery prac-
ticed by the military junta in Chile.
Evidence of torture in Chile has been
published by, among many others,
Amnesty international, the highly-
respected group that favors no ide-
ology except humanity. Amnesty's
findings are summarized with telling
simplicity in an article by Rose Styron
in The New York Review of Books.
Victor .lara, a folk singer, was held
with thousands of others in a Santiago
sports stadium. He was given a guitar
and ordered to play. As he did, the
guards broke his fingers, then cut
them off. He began to sing, and they
beat and then shot him. Several wit-
nesses have described that death,, It
is a relatively mild example of What
Mrs. Styron relates.
Many reports tell of the use of elec-
tric shock to make prisoners "con-
fess" tp what their captors desire.
Sexual assault is a common theme.
Mrs. Styron mentions a women's
prison, Casa de Mujeres el Buen Pas-
tor, where young girls are sent from
prison camps, pregnant, "with their
hair pulled out and their nipples and
genitals badly burned."
At least one complaint of such treat-
ment has been made officially in the
Chilean courts. Mrs. Virginia Ayress
complained that her daughter, Luz de
las Nieves Ayress, had been beaten,
sexually abused, tortured with electric
currents and?in a scene right out of
"Nineteen Eighty-four"?had rats and
spiders put on and into her body.
The courts forwarded the complaint
to the armed forces.
People are arrested, tortured and
summarily killed in Chile for any rea-
son or no reason. Large numbers of
doctors have been arrested, some be-
cause they did not join in a strike
last summer against the leftist Govern-
ment of Dr. Salvador Allende. Amnesty
has an appeal from Chilean doctors
saying that 85 of their profession' are
in prison, held without any charges;
another 65 are said to have been shot
or died of torture or untreated wounds.
Last month the 28 Roman Catholic
bishops of Chile, in an unusual public
statement, condemned the practtice of
torture and arbitrary arrest. The junta
routinely denies torture reports or, in
the words of its Interior Minister, Gen.
Oscar Bonilla, dismisses them as
ABROAD AT HOME
"damaging to the national interest."
But what has all this to do with the
United States? Secretary of State Kis-
singer has told us that this country
cannot reform the internal policies of
other governments. As a generality
that is fair enough. But it is not
, enough when we have a share of
responsibility.
However much the Allende Govern-
ment contributed to its own downfall,
the United States made things worse
by cutting essential economic assist-
ance?except to the Chilean military.
Since the coup, Washington has given
strong support to the military regime:
Unlike other Western countries, we
have offered no asylum to Chilean
refugees. And we have said nothing,'
officially, about the murder and sav-
agery.
Words would matter in this in-
stance. If the United States spoke out
against the torture, if our Embassy
in Santiago was active in watching
the trials and other visible manifesta-
tions of oppression, if more American
lawyers joined international legal
groups in protesting the junta's law-
lessness, if Congress moved to attach
conditions to aid, those who rule
Chile would almost certainly listen.
But the present Government of the
United States shows no concern for
human rights. Henry Kissinger and.
his President were silent for months
while their allies in Pakistan slaught-
ered the Bengalis. Washington has
nothing to say about a Greek Govern-
ment that rules by terror. Or about
the Government of South Korea,
whose kidnappings and brutalities
make Communist regimes look almost
decorous by comparison. (For a stu-'
dent to refuse to attend class in South
Korea "without plausible reasons" is,
a crime punishable by death.)
Some of the nastiest governments
in the world today were born or grew
with American aid. That being the
case, the most modest view of our
responsibility would require us to say
a restraining word to them occasion-
ally. But we say nothing, we hear
nothing, we see nothing.
There was a wonderful example the
other day?funny if it did not involve
so much suffering. The State Depart-
ment said it knew of no political
prisoners in South Vietnam, because
Saigon's stated policy "does not per-
mit the arrest of anyone for mere
political dissent." Thus the thousands
of non-Communists in South Viet-
namese jails were made to vanish, the
twisted creatures in tiger cages waved
away. Thus the idealism that once
marked America's place in the.world
has become indifference in the face
of inhumanity.
NEW YORK TIMES
27 May 1974
The Poppies of Anatolia
A totally unnecessary Confrontation is brewing
between the United States and Turkey; unless it can be
talked out in terms of reason and good will, serious
resentment could erupt to jeopardize Western security
interests in the eastern Mediterranean.
The issue is the cultivation ef poppies for opium,
banned by the Turkish Government since 1071 after
lengthy discussions with the United States. Under nation-
alistic political pressures at home, the new Turkish Gov-
ernment is giving serious consideration to lifting the ban.
Against such a possibility, demands are being raised in
Congress to suspend all economic aid to Turkey, a drastic
move which ?could weaken the Turkish,,commitment to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Both sides have a grievance in this complex mis-
understanding. For American authorities the Turkish ban
is central to the increasingly successful campaign against
heroin addiction. ,United Nations and Federal Govern-
ment drug enforcement authorities point to a dramatics
decrease in the amount of illicit heroin reaching the
streets of New York and other pstern seaboard cities;
an estimated' 80 per cent of heroin formerly came from
Turkey through the illicit "French connection" network.
Though there are other potential sources of raw opium.
--particularly Southeast Asia?international efforts there
have scored notable success in disrupting new illicit
channels of supply. ? '
From the Turkish point of view, however, the ban has
been a deprivation for some, for others a provocation.
? Poppies are traditional and legitimate crop for a small'
but real segment of Turkey's farm population?not for'
opium but for the edible oil, seeds and Stalks. The $36-
million American aid program to compensate Turkish
farmers for lost income has, by all accounts, failed?
little of the money ever reaching the farmers themselves.
Turkish anger has . been aroused by misleading reports
that the United States is encouraging opium production'
elesewhere, for pharmaceutical needs. Fortunately an offi-
cial plan to cultivate poppies in this country for that
purpose has been definitively shelved. Some Turkish poli-
ticians have turned the ban into an emotional issue of ,
national pride.
The way out of this apparent impasse lies not through
threats and acts of national defiance by either side. If
?file. American aid program has been ineffective so far, it
should be revised and strengthened?not necessarily
.with more money, but by better implementation, includ-
ing small-scale industrial projects to convince the Ana-
tolian farmers, and their mentors among the politicians,
that they have something to gain by abandoning their
poppy crop.
The Turkish government has already shown readiness
to remove one irritant to Turkish-American relations; an
amnesty measure has reduced the life sentences Pasied
on several young Americans arrested in possession of
drugs, though the remaining prison sentences may still
seem excessive to many in this country. With a modicum
of good will, and recognition of each other's legitimate
concerns, there is no reason why both sides cannot bene-
fit from continuation of the Turkish poppy ban.
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THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
16 MAY 1974
Nerve gas plans
America's European allies
are becoming increasingly
disturbed at the prospect of
military deployment of stock-
piles of a new .type of nerve
gas, the Government here has
admitted.
In addition, arms control
authorities in , Washington
believe that the production of
the nerve gas in the "binary"
form could damage, or even
. permanently ruin, the current
Geneva negotiations on banning
chemical weapons. The Penta-
gon's controversial plans for
' producing the gas would thus
! appear to be heading for trou-
ble.
Binary gas is. composed of
two chemical agents, each rela-
tively harmless, which become
a lethal gas only when com-
bined.
The Administration's first
, admission of the European dis-
quiet over the probable use of
binary nerve gases came yester-
day, on the final day of Con-
gressional hearings into current
US chemical warfare policy.
Mr Leon Sloss, a senior State
Department official with respon-
sibility for military policy, told
NEW YORK TIMES
27 May 1974
From SIMON WINCHESTER,
a subcommittee on national
security policy that " our
NATO allies are less than
enthusiastic in accepting
binaries. It is our judgment
that any effort to deploy or
expand our overseas stockpile
or to increase the number of
sites would run into serious
diplomatic difficulties."
Mr Sloss declined to tell the
Congressmen anything more
yesterday. "I would need to go
into executive (private) session
before I could go into the views
of the Europeans any further,"
he said.
After the hearing, bovt4ever,
he did say that the British view
3n binary nerve gases ? which
he hinted was not overwhel-
mingly enthusiastic ? had now
been communicated to the
American ' delegates to the
Geneva conference in the past
months. He said that most
opposition in Europe would
result from any increase in the
size of America's nerve gas
sto'ck'pile: were it to be
retained at the same size as
present, " there may be trouble
. . but I can't really say."
The development of binary
Anarchy in Energy
There is no such thing as energy policy in Washing- ?
Aim today. The most that the Administration and Con-
gress alike have been able to muster all these months
is a series of ad hoc responses to crises as they develop,
followed by deterioration and disinterest in executive
and legislative branches when the specific crisis fades:
?, The White House moves to speed up licensing
procedures for construction of nuclear power plants;
but no one has figured out how to resolve the acute ?
shortage of skilled labor needed to build the plants? ?
and that is turning into the real bottleneck, even for
those who harbor no practical or environmental doubts
about the Wisdoin of relying on nuclear power. '
? The Administration calls for the expansion of coal
production, but the manufacturers of mining equipment '
are already well behind in meeting present demand, with
limited capacity for expanding their production. Without
more mining equipment there cannot be. more mines.
? Oil men are urged to increase. their rate of explora-
tion, but once they. designate new sites to drill, they/
face months?even years-7d delay in getting delivery
of the steel pipe with which the drilling is done.
8 Private capital is about to launch an oil shale indus-
try ,in Colorado, after years of false starts, but there ?,
won't be Much point in that?quite, apart from the
potential environmental damage?if the' pipeline to dis-
tribute the finished product is not authorized and built.
? The Secretary of Commerce, Frederick B. Dent, ?
says that American business could save nearly a quarter
of the nation's oil consumption by conservation methods ?
using present technology; .but the Government has yet
to employ anything more than appeals to patriotism to
encourage revisingfia
orry Europe
Washington, May 15
nerve gases has been going on
in American military labora-
tories for the past decade. Basi-
cally, the technology that has
noev been developed by scien-
tists working at the Pine Bluff
arsenal in. Arkansas, enables
the well-known and .extremely
deadly nerve agent GB, or
"Sarin," to be stored safely in
the form of two relatively inno-
cuous chemical agents which
will only produce the lethal gas
when combined.
Currently, the Pentagon
would like to fill stockpiles of
155 millimetre howitzer shells
with the two 'precursors : once
fired from a gun the two
substances combine, and GB is
released on impact.
The argument advanced in
favour of binary gases is that
they are much easier and safer
to store and transport, and that
their development will alleviate
much of the public fear of the
siting of present stockpiles,
such as the 'huge nerve gas
dump at Tooele in the Utah
desert,
The Pentagon currently con-
alders its nerve gas stockpiles
? which it keeps purely, it
keigise&VftlY6/08
says, for their deterrent func-
tion ? are inadequate, and it
would like to deploy binary
gases in a wide variety of tac-i
tically useful places. Europe,
where the 115mm cannon'
would be a prime defence
against potential Communist.
military activity, Is the natural
first choice.
At present there is believed
to be just one nerve gas stock-
pile in Europe. This is thought
to be at Hanau, near Frankfurt,
on the site of an old Second
World War cyanide store.
There are seven storage sites
on the continental United
States, and one reserve stock-
pile on Johnston Island in the
Pacific. The Pentagon, bowing
to public pressure, is reducing
its stockpiles of GB and VX at
some sites ? such as at the
Rocky Mountain Arsenal near
Denver, , where neeve gas
canisters and bombs lie at the
end of the main airport
runway.
At the same time the
Defence Department is organis-
ing a discreet public relations
exercise to convince the public
that development of binary
gases is both necessary and, in
the long run, more safe.
? Reliance on the price mechanism to bring fuel 1
supply and -demand toward balance has a certain phil-
osophical attraction, but neither the Congress .nor the
Administration has found, the way to alleviate the, added
burdens of fuel. costs on the poorer segments of the
population, who already pay a disproportionate share of '
their modest incomes for energy.
These ate typical of the inter-related problems which
turn the making of energy policy Into something requir-
ing far more coordination than the Administration has '
yet been able to provide. More than forty Federal Gov- ,
ernment agencies, bureaus and commissions play their
separate and distinct regulatory roles in energy policy- ?
making, often in ignorance of what the others are doing
and without any clear, guidelines of national policy
against which to measure . their individual decisions.
. Yet concrete proposals to bring a semblance of order,
into the decision-making process have repeatedly fallen
to the bottom of bureaucratic in-boxes to languish
unimplemented 'and possibly unread. Such seems to be
the fate of, the ten-month study directed by Atomic
Energy Commissioner,William 0. Doub completed last'
month. Though commissioned by the White House, this ?
comprehensive organizational? plan is being rapidly
buried, under official explanations that the energy crisis ?
has passed and things seem to be working well enough
as they are, .
Things are not working, either toward the stimulation
of new energy supplies or the encouragement of energy
conservation.' The only movement in the legislative and
bureaucratic morass seems to be that of shifting hier-
archies and jockeying .for jurisdiction. Anyone seeking
an example of what happens to an administrative struc-
ture without adequate direction from the top can simply
observe the fate of energy policy in the post-Watergate
:t+ArlFt11112#1titlettr2R000100330006-5
19
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BALTIMORE SUN
23 May 1974
CIA data said to call Bonn aide Red spy
By GENE OISIII
Bonn Bureau of The Sun
Bonn ? West Germany's po-
litically charged atmosphere
sparked still another security
controversy yesterday with the
news that a magazine intended
to publish an alleged Central
Intelligence Agency study iden-
tifying the West German chief
of internal security as an East
German or Soviet spy.
In the wake of the spy scan-
dal that led to the resignation
of Chancellor Willy Brandt,
news, of the magazine's inten-
tions prompted Immediate
high-level inquiries between
Bonn and Washington.
Afterward, the Bonn govern-
ment announced that Kenneth
Rush, deputy secretary of
state, informed the German
ambassador in Washington that
"the story contained not one
word of truth, the article is
completely unfounded and that
the American government ca-
tegorically denies it." .
The target of the scheduled
article, Guenther Nollau, the
6-year-old chief Of the West
German internal security
agency, taking a cure at a
health resort near Munich,,
called the magazine report
"rubbish"? and "lies." He said
he intended to take all possiblet
measures, including legal ac-
tion, to prevent -publication of I
the article, scheduled for next
week.
Ferdinand Simoneit, chief
editor of Capital, the magazine
ir question, said in a telephone
interview that he fully in-
tended to publish the article as
scheduled.
He declined to say where the
magazine got the alleged CIA
study, hut said that it was from
sources who in the past have
proved to be reliable. He said
the material was checked out
with former West German in-
telligence operatives, including a better placed 'spy than Guil-
Reinhard Gehlen, former chief
of West Germany's foreign in-
telligence service.
On the basis of these checks,
he said, the magazine decided
there was something to the
alleged CIA study...
According to the afticle, the ism.
CIA ha S discovered that ' Mr. Simoneit, the editor,
Guenther Guillaume, the per- said he was informed 'yester-
son& aide to Chancellor day by a "middle man" that
Brandt who was discovered to Chancellor Helmut Schmildt
be an East German spy, was wanted to meet with him later
one of four agents in high- in the day, but no time was set.
ranking government positions. Mr. Schmidt, meanwhile, re-
According to the article,
Guillaume, who only ranked No
said flatly that no member of
laume. the West German internal se-
The agitation in Bonn over curity agency, officially called
the intended article was ettrib- the federal Office for the De-
utable no doubt in part to the fense of the Constitution, has
fact that Capital specializes in been under suspicion or under
economic Matters .and is not investigation by the CIA.
normally given to sensational- With the U.S. Embassy
statement in hand together
with the State Department
denial in Washington, the,
ehantellor apparently decided
that a meeting with the Capital
editor was not needed. The
government announced last;
night that no such meeting was;
planned.
Mr. Nollau, the West Get-,
portedly had an emergency
meeting with Werner Maihofer,
3 in' importance among the the new interior minister, and man security chief, came to
four, was sacrificed in an ef_ Klaus Beetling. the new gov- West Germany from East Ger-
fort to divert suspicion away ertiment spokesman, over the many as a refugee in 1950 and
from more impOrtant spies, matter. worked ever since for the fed-.
one of whom was Mr. Nollau. Shortly afterward, the Amer- eral agency that he now heads.'
The diversionary tactic did
not work, the article states,
because it was determined that
East Berlin was getting infor-
mation that had to come from
ican Embassy announced there
was no such -CIA ..study as
mentioned by the magazine.
Later, the embassy spokesman
NEW YORK EMS
27 May 1974-
GERMAN MAGAZINE
CANCELS SPY REPORT
BONN, May 26 (UPI)?In the
face of a threatened lawsuit
and of denials by the West Ger-
man and American Govern-
ments, a West German maga-
zine today canceled plans to
publish a report that the United
States Central Intelligence Agen-
cy considered the chief of West
Germany's Intelligence Service
,a Communist agent himself.
Ferdinand Simoneit, editor of
the business monthly Capital,
said that further research had
cast "serious doubt" on the re-
port that C.I4, agents here had
informed Washington that they
.believed that Gthither Nollau,
director of the federal Office
for the Protection of the Con-
stitution, might be an agent for
East Germany. '
Mr. Uollnit threatened to sue
and he and the two govern-
ments denied the report four
days ago when Mr. Simoneit
announced that he intended to
publish it.
"New information has cast
serious doubt on the authentic-
ity of the paper which was said
to be a private study made by
the C.I.A." Mr. Simoneit said.
"Capital will not publish the
article about Nollau.'
20
He was made chief of the
agency in 1972, despite charges
from some quarters that he
could be a security risk.
NEW YORK TIMES
27 May 1974
Leftists Bid Lisbon Free
.Cuban Officer
Speetal to The New York Times
LISBON, May 26 ? Soldiers
used tear gas tonight to dis-
perse a crowd of ultraleftists,
including many black Africans,
whO were. demonstrating for
the release of a. Cuban Army
officer captured by Portuguese
forces during operations
again'st guerrillas in Portuguese
Guinea.
The military, authorities or-
dered broadcasting stations
here not to report on the mat-
ter. But two independent Lis-
bon radio stations issued pro-
tests against what they termed
censorship.
The Cuban, identified -as
Capt. Pedro Rodriguez Peralta,
35 years old, was captured in
the rebel-held territory of Por-
tuguese Guinea in November,
1969. He was sentenced here in
June, 1972, to 10 years and a
day in prison for his alleged
role, advising the rebel move-
ment.
Captain Peralta was released
from prison earlier this month
under an amnesty and trans-
ferred to the officer's wing of
Estrela Military Hospital, on a
'hill here. He is being treated'
for what is described as a sore'
arm and is still under deten-;
tion.
Last night, participants in a
leftist protest against continued
fighting in Portugal's African
possessions marched to the
hospital in western Lisbon and
started an all-night vigil, shout-
ing, "Free Comrade Peralta."'
Army military policemen
kept the demonstration under
control. Late last night, five
armored cars were posted at
the approaches to the hospital.
They were withdrawn this
morning.
A police, officer told the
demonstrators early today that
the Cuban was being detained
"because of strong national in-
terests" and could not be. re-
leased at once.
The officer added 'that Cap-
tain Peralta's status would be,
cleared up by international
negotiations, and denied ru-
mors that the Cuban would he
exchanged for an agent of the
United States Central Intelli-
gence Agency. The protesters
disbanded this afternoon.
Lisbon newspapers asserted
last week that Washington had
asked Portugal to request the
release of a C.I.A. agent, identi-
fied as Lawrence K. Lunt, who
was serving 30 years in a.
Cuban prison, in 'exchange for'
Captain Peralta.
The Cuban charg?'affaires
in Lisbon is scheduled to begin
talks with Portuguese officials
about Captain Peralta in a feW
days.
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WASHINGTON POST
24 May 1974
Lisbon Ifficer Questions
Long-Term U.S. Intentions
By Miguel Acoca
Special to The Washintrton Poet
LISBON, May 23?Despite
Indications that the U.S. gov-
ernment approves the goals of
the new Portuguese junta,
some young officers who cap
ried out the last month's coup
are suspicious of long-term
American intentions.
One of these officers has
charged that large numbers of
U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency operatives have been
active in Portugal in recent
weeks, not just in Lisbon but
In the northern industrial cen-
ter of Oporto.
The officer, who was among
founders of the Armed Forces
Coordinating Committee that
led the coup, also charged that
the CIA maintained a cornmu-
-nications vessel I called
"Apollo" off Lisbon. '
They refused to provide
names of the alleged CIA
agents but said that Portu-
guese military intelligence has
a list of names. In making the
charge, he gave credence to
similar allegations by the Cen-
tral Committee of the Portu-
guese Communist Party.
Americans here dismissed
charges of CIA activity on the
ground that such allegations
are a standard ingredient of
leftist propaganda.
President Nixon, it was
pointed out, has sent friendly
notes to President Antonio de
Spinola and Prime Minister
Adelino Palma Carlos. Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger
also has privately messaged
Foreign Minister Mario
Soares, and U.S. Ambassador
Stuart N. Scott was the first
diplomatic chief of mission to
call on Spinola after the gen-
eral became chairman of the
military junta. "
The coordinating committee
source made clear that the
armed forces movement wants
to cooperate with the United
States and said he wondered
what "so many CIA agents are
doing in Portugal." He said
that the seven-man military
junta, which remains in power
as part of the Council of
State, does not wish to anta-
gonize the United States.
He indicated that for this
reason the Cape Verde Is-
lands, strategically located 300
miles west of Senegal in the
Atlantic Ocean, would not be
included in the cease-fire talks
Which are to begin Saturday
In London between Portugal
and the PAIGC, the liberation
movement of Guinea-Bissau
and Cape Verde.
The 10 islands, with a popu-
lation of 250,000, could serve
as a naval and air force base
in the South Atlantic. The
United States and NATO have
repeatedly turned down offers
to set up a base on Cape
Verde.
In his writings, Gen. Spinola
has declared that Portugal
could not permit the Cape
Verde Islands, which lie on
the sea lane plied by super-
tankers loaded with Middle .
East oil bound for Europe and
the United States, to fall into
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
10 May 1974
Communist hands.
That Cape Verde was not
part of the London negotia-
tions with PAIGC was con-
firmed by Soares in an inter-
view published yesterday.
There is no doubt that this re-
lieved serious American con-
cern about the future of the
islands.
I Not so clear, however, is the
Ifuture of Nacala, potentially
the best deep-water naval har-
bor on the Indian Ocean
shores of Mozambique where
Frelhno guerrillas have been
waging a successful insurg-
ency.
Although the military and
civilians in the new Portu-
guese government are confi-
dent that Frelimo will accept
their offer of immediate cease-
fire talks, the liberation move-
ment has yet to indicate a
willingness to negotiate.
Long before the coup, Por-
tugal offered Nacala to the
United States as a base site
but the offer was declined.
The Portuguese even asked
the U.S. amabassador to visit
the harbor, but the Invitation
was rejected allegedly because
of political implications in Af-
rica and the Middle East.
But the situation has
changed radically since the
April 25 coup ? even though
the U.S. embassy appears to
have reported as long ago as
early March that young offi-
cers who wanted to end the
colonial war were preparing to
topple the dictatorial regime.
The embassy is thought to
BONN SPY SCANDAL
T ENTY-YE A R
TRAIL OF 1LUDERS
By DAVID SHEARS in Bonn
WEST GERMANY'S spy scandal, which
toppled Herr Brandt from his pedestal,
is a tale of blunders and contradictions,
personal innuendos and misleading , official
statements.
The skein of this stranger-than-fiction plot is made
up of piquant stories of Herr Brandt's personal indis-
cretions as well as the classic material of spy novels?
codes, Nato secrets and
have predicted the abortive]
March 16 uprising, which coor-
dinating committee members '
have characterized as a ,dry
run to determine the reactive
capacity of the deposed gov-
ernment.
It is unclear whether the
embassy was aware of the
April 25 drive and of the'
armed forces program, which
was in preparation since last
September. But there is no
doubt the embassy was sur-
prised by inclusion of two
icommunists in the Cabinet
and that it is skeptical about
the cohesiveness of the pres-
ent coalition.
The U.S. base at Lajes, in
the Azores Islands, is deemed
crucial to any U.S. effort to
supply Israel by air, as occur-
red during the October
Mld-
east war.
For the past few years the
United States, concerned
about the adverse effect of
Portugal's colonial war on
Western European allies and
on the newly independent Af-
rican states, prodded Portugal
to find a peaceful solution to
the fighting in Africa.
According to the Coordinat-
ing Committee source worried
about the CIA, the United
States was an ambivalent ally
when Portugal had the will to
fight and, how that Portugal
wants to halt the war and cre-
ate a democracy, the CIA is
snooping around.
"It is very hard for us," he
said. "We wanted the U.S. to
define itself then, and we
want the U.S. to define itself
land its aims now."
clandestine letter-drops.
Its ramifications cover two
decades of history and stretch
from Moscow to Washington
by way of a lonely cabin in
central Norway.
Perhaps (limier Guillaume
was itot the most datigerons spy
in post-war history, lie was not.
like Fuchs or the Rosenbergs,
arrested for passing atomic
secrets to Russia. But his role
as one of Herr Brandt's trusted
personal assistants certainly
'make S him a "big fish" in
espionage annals. ? ?
,Essentially the Brandt-Guil-.,
laurne affair raises three basic
? questions:
1. Why, was a man already
known to have been a Com-
munist agent allowed to pene-
trate the Federal Chancellery?
2. Did Here Brandt continue to
trust his aide even after the
warnings from 'security
agents?
3. How much of a role did fear
of disclosures about his pri-
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vale life nlay in the Chancel-
.lor's derision to resign ?
The answers are emerging?
only by instalments from a fog
of confusion. But :at least this
much of the picture seems Clear.
Warning signs
Firstly. when Guillaurne was
being screened for his Chancel-
lery job at the turn of 1969-70,
there Were several signs that he
was a security risk.
The Federal intelligence ser-
vice (II ND) told the Chancel-
lery's security: chief that its
dossiers showed Guillaume to
have worked for the East
German publishing house "Volk
und Wissen " in 1954-55, just
before coming to the West as a
refugee."
Iii this capacity, the 'B ND
reported, Guillaume had travel-
led in the West seeking? to 'in-
filtrate West German, pub-
lishers.
Herr Ehmke, then the mini-
ster, in charge of the Federal
Chancellery, ordered further
Inquiries which produced. on
Jan. 27, 1970, the reassuring
conclusion from the Office for
the Protection of the Constitu-
tion that there was no reason
ha deny Guillaume a job hand-
ling papers marked "secret."
Former agent
? iGuillaume had also been
named by .a semi-private West
Berlin intelligence organisation,
the COmmittee of Free Jurists,
as a former East German agent.
Herr Finlike confronted Guil-
laume with these charges dar-
ing an interview on January 7,
3970 and naturally Guillaume
denied that he had ever been
an , intelligence agent.
,Herr Leber, Bonn's pre:sent
Defence Minister; wrote a warm
testimonial to his Social Demo-
cratic party colleague, praising-
his ? " and ? "devo-
tion to freedom and democracy."
The upshot was that he was
cleared to handle "secret" and
later "top secret" material.
'German newspapers are asking
why the Federal Chancellery
failed to follow . the B N D's
advice and insist on a more
thorough investigation. Did Herr
Ehmke override the objections to
Guillaume out of loyalty to a
party colleague? ?
There is little doubt that
Guillaume en loved the support of,
Influential Society Democrats in
Iiesse, the state where he had
posed its it f orrositt party worker.
Secretary a spy
But this is not all. Unmention-
ed in .the official 16-page docu-
mentation on Guillaume's screen-
ing was that while working in
the party's south Hess branch
he engaged a secretary named
Ingeborg Sieberg who was un-
covered in 1966 as a spy.
Yet there is no sign that this
episode?which must surely have
figured in the files?was even
considered when Guillaume was
checked in 1969-70.
SmalLwonder, then, that Herr
Ehmke was forced.two days ago
to renounce any claim to a seat
in the next Bonn cabinet. But
Herr Genscher as Interior Mini-
ster is also under a cloud, ? not
to mention Herr Leber who
wrote the testimonial letter.
-Both men are neverheless
assured of portfolios in the
Schmidt administration due to
take office in a week's time: Herr
Genscher cannot be dropped
because he is in line to succeed
Herr Scheel as. leader of the
Free Democrats, junior partner
in the coalition, when the latter
is elected to the presidency.
Thus the new government will
inevitably start out still bearing
some of the odium of the Gull-.
laume affair.
Contradictory stories
To the second. basic question,
the extent to which Herr Brandt
continued to confide in Guil-
laume even after the warnings
that he: was a security risk, the
ex-Chancellor himself has given
contradictory accounts.
In his television broadcast on
Wednesday night he admitted
that while in Norway last
summer he ? had let Oull?laume
see sec'et 4&timents. Less-than
two weeks earlier ,he liao
assured parliament that Guil-
laume had not been entrusted
with secret files ` because this
was outside the scope of his
duties.",
Bonn: Government spokesmen
insisted at first that Guillaume
had been cleared to handle only
" secret," material, but later con-
ceded hat, he had been given
access to " tOp seCret " papers.
Just when the counter-espi-
onage ? authorities told Herr
Brandt his aide was under sus- .
picion has not been officially re-
vealed. But it was certainly in
the spring of last year, and one
account gives the date as May
29.
The Chancellor was sup-
posedly advised ft; keep Guil-
laume in his job and to go
ahead with plans to take him
to Harmar in Norway, where
Herr Bran:dt's Norwegian-born
wife owns a lakeside holiday
home.
Nixon letter
Yet Guillaume was the only
staff assistant to accompany the
Brandt family on this month-
long holiday in July, German re-
ports say that Herr Brandt al-
lowed - the following papers to
pass through Guillaume's hands:
1 A letter from President
Nixon outlining suggestions
' ? for reorganising Nato.
2 Other Nato and state secrets,
.transmitted between Bonn
and Hamar in code over a di-
. rect teleprinter line, seen by
Guillaume after decoding.
.3?Confidential position papers
and memoranda concerning
!; Ostpolitik relations with East
. Germany and Moscow. it Was
these to which Herr Brandt
was referring, when he said
he had felt constrained in his
East European policies as a
resu?It.
47-Person:al exchanges between
the Chancellor and other
, heads of government. Letters
to other Socialist party
leaders such as Mr- Wilson
would:, have crossed Guil-
laume's desk in any case be--
cause of his.capacity as liaison
-man with party headquarters.
The question remains un-
answered: Why did Herr Brandt
open the floodgates 'of ,state
secrets to a suspected spy? Was
the Chancellor so trusting that
he simply refused to believe his
security advisers 'until they
brought conclusive proof of
Guillaume's guilt?
French-discovery .
? ?According to Quick magazine
of Munich, an anti-government
weekly reputed to have good
contacts with 'the' B ND: French
secret service agents had un-
covered Guillaume's spy activi-
ties as early as, September 1972.
? Its report yesterday 'quoted
French sources as saving that'a
Russian K GB defector 'named
Vadim Belotzerkoysky hod
recOgnised Guillatime in a TV
film of Brandt with ihis aides.
The 'Russian had leapt tb his
feet'arid cried: "That man 'was
With me in the Kiev Militatv
Academy 11 "
If this is true, it raises still
more questions. Why wps Her'
Brandt not told immediatel
about the French suspicions, in
stead of being kept waiting unti
the following May? Or did no
the French inform 'their perma
counter-espionage colleagues?
One theory voiced by :Quir
is that the French kept quie
because the found it useful lo
tune in to Guilla.ume's secre
radio transmissions. but this is
dismissed as' absurd by Allied
Intelligence sources in Bonn:.
Der Spiegel, another German
magazine, claims that the French
knew as early as 1970 that there
must be a spy in Herr Brandt's
vicinity.
They had learned from an
East German' bank employee
who had defected to the West
that someone in ? the Bonn
Chancellery was being paid
monthly sums through a secret
account. They did not at that.
time know his name.
This same report say g that
BND files dating back to 1956
showed the existence of ? an
agent whose first and last names
both began with "G "?but even
after Guillaume' had come under
suspicion nobody had thought
of 'the. connection. . ,
Praise overdone
Whether the full tale will ever
. be told is unlikely. But from all
these and other reports it seems
that Herr Genscher's lavish
praise as an Interior Minister for
the detective work of his
counter-espionage sleuths was
somewhat overdone.
: The final question is the most
delicate of all: The issue of
Herr Brandt's private life and
the :possibility of blackmail.
'In his broadcast the former
Chancellor said one reason for
his resignation was fear that
" my private life would' have
been dragged into speculation"
concerning the spy case. But at
the same time he. renutiated as
" grotesque " any suggestion that
a Chancellor could he black-
mailed, least of all himself.
Bonn is. rife with rumours
and innuendos Which have been
circulating for years. in this
resnect West Germany is no
'different from other capitals?
published gossip about an
alleged affair between the late
Pre.sident Kennedy' and Marilyn
Monroe being .just one example.
.22
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NMEatt
Sunday, May 19, 1974 ME WASHINGTON POST
U0 0
Nolv
For
Still
case ill In4Ii
By Judith Miller ?
The tinier is Washington correspond-
ent for The Progressive magazine.
AN AMERICAN nava base in the,
Indian Ocean is an idea which has
been patiently awaiting its time. For
more than 15 years, Pentagon and Sen-
ate leaders have blocked the Navy's ef-
forts to establish a permanent naval
presence in the area, but this year, the
Navy's plan to build a base on the In-
dian Ocean island of Diego Garcia may
finally outlive its opposition.
The Navy now argues that the pro-
spective reopening of the Suez Canal.
will lead to an expansion .'of the al-
ready impressive Russian naval pres-
ence In the area and that such a pros-
ect necessitates immediate congres-
sional approval of $32.3 million to ex- .
pand the Diego Garcia facility.
Public testimony* and secret corre-
spondence between the Pentagon and
Capitol Hill, however, indicate that
.these supposedly "new" factors justify-
ing an expanded U.S. presence on Di-
ego Garcia are little more than ration-
alizations for the Navy's persistent ex-
.pansionist aims in the Indian Ocean.
'$ Specific plans for a more permanent
.naval presence in that area date from
the late 1950s. Retired Rear Adm.
,Gene La Rocque, who now heads the
Washington-based Center for Defense
Information, recalls that in the early
,1960s, the Navy wanted to station na-
:Val forces in six islands, including Di-
ego Garcia. According to a State De-
riartmetit official, the 'U.S., fearing a
pal ttIt'al vactittin tin or the It ill IA with-
'dr:twat from commitments "East of
:Suez," persuaded Britain in 1965 to form
the British Indian Ocean Territories
(BIOT), an administrative entity includ-
ing Diego Garcia and several other In-
dian Ocean islands:
?`: The real purpose of these territories
became clear the following year, when
the U.S. and Britain signed 'an_agree-
'ment making BIOT available for the
:defense needs of both governments.
- ? According to former State Depart-
ment intelligence officer John Marks,
the CIA was an enthusiastic supporter
;In the mid-1960s of a permanent U.S.
;presence somewhere in the Indian
;Ocean since it was assumed that when
.China tested an ICBM, it would do so in
that area, Approved For
23
rest
Project Rest Stop
, IN TESTIMONY before a House For-
' eign Affairs subcommittee, former
Pentagon systems analyst Earl have-
nal said that the proposal to build
.a base on Diego Garcia first emerged
in the Defense Department in the sum-
mer of 1967, but was rejected. Senate
staff aides recall that the Navy pro-
posed the Diego Garcia base in 1968 to
then Armed Services Committee
Chairman Rithard Russell, but failed to
to win his support.
In 1969, a proposal for a Project
Rest Stop?the construction of a $26
million "austere naval facility"?ap-
peared as a classified line item of the
fiscal year 1970 military construction
budget. The project was approved by
both House and Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committees, but the authorized
funds were deleted by the Senate Ap-
propriations Committee.
In an attempt to save the project by
having the funds reinserted during
House-Senate conference, then Chief
of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas
Moorer appealed to Senate Armed'
Services Chairman John Stennis in a
letter dated December, 1969. Moorer,
expressing "deep concern" over the
status of the classified Diego Garcia
project, claimed that deletion of funds
for the base would have an "adverse
strategic effect of major importance."
According to Moorer, the Diego Garcia,
base was "the Navy's number one pri-
ority of all items" in that year's mili-
tary construction program.
At about the same time, the Navy
sent a memo to the Senate Armed
Services Committee stressing the atm
evie impol'illtWe of i ho A111)1)(111 btlf4ein
construction. The Navy argued that
the base would provide the President
with "a range of involvement options
from no involvement to whatever in-
volvement is deemed necessary."
The Navy memo further noted that
Diego Garcia, if necessary, "could be
quickly converted for use of PolariS
submarines." The justifications cited in
the memo for an Indian Ocean naval
base are identical to those expressed
now: increasing Soviet presence and
Chinese influence and the vacuum cre-
ated by British withdrawal from the
area.
Despite Moorer's attempts to solicit
Stennis' aid, efforts to save the 'project
were not successful, and Project Rest
Rt2Ittragbe200Pt#081;46ffil Ctliote4DPN-00
tempted the next year to secure funds
in the FY 71 budget for Diego Garcia
expansion. This time, it requested $18
million for a smaller-scale "communi-
cations facility," involving radar and
satellite operations, supposedly in-
tended to replace the National Secu-
rity Agency installation at Asmara,
Ethiopia.
Congress approved the request, an
agreement was signed with the British
and the Navy began building a dommu-
nicatiens facility which included con-
struction of naval support 'base
infrastructure: harbor, roads, an 8,000.
foot runway and permanent facilities
for 250 men. -
Talking to Moscow
A T THE SAME time, the National
Security Council staff issued two.
secret National Security Study Memo-
randa highly critical of plans for such
expansion. The memoranda, dated
Nov. 9, 1970, and Dec. 22, 1970, con-
cluded that the U.S. had minimal stra-
tegic interests in the area and that
those limited interests were not amen-
able to protection by military interven-
tion. The memoranda encouraged the
government to seek an agreement
with the Russians to limit American
and Russian naval deployments in the
area.
The Soviets did approach the U.S.
about such an agreement privately in
early 1971. In June of that year, Soviet
leader Brezhnev again referred in a
,speech to the possibility of naval de-
ployment negotiations in the Indian
Ocean. The U.S. approached the Rus-
sians three months later but failed to
pursue the matter vigoroncly, claiming
that "clarli'leailmi" from the U.S.S.it,
had not been forthcoming.
Congress now is considering the
Pentagon's request for a $32.3-million
expansion for the communications fa-
cility into what the Navy calls an
"austere" support base?virtually the
same proposal it rejected in 1970. -
The House recently approved, but'
the Senate deferred action on, the $29
million sought for Diego Garcia expan-
sion in this year's supplemental mili-
tary authorization bill. Having failed
to slide the funds through in the sup-
plemental without much debate, the
administration is preparing for the
coming confrontation with the Senate
over the base.
432puottiongegmpst is refining its
rationale for the base. In Senate hear-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330006-5
Ings this March on the supplemental
request, Pentagon and State Depart-
ment witnesses stressed the Soviet
buildup in the Indian Ocean. Though
State officials continue to emphasize
Soviet expansion of facilities at Berb-
era, Somalia, administration officials
recently have been softpedaling the
Soviet menace argument. Instead, they
are stressing the "flexibility" Diego
Garcia would provide the U.S. in its ef-
forts to "reinforce" diplomatic initia-
tives in the Middle East through a na-
val presence.
The National Security Council is
preparing yet another National Secu-
rity Study Memorandum, one which
re-evaluates American strategic inter-
ests in the Indian Ocean in light of re-
cent events in the Middle East and at-
tempts to justify the Diego base ex-
pansion.
Administration officials now argue
that funding the base expansion might
, actually induce the Russians to con-
sider Indian Ocean arms limitation ne-
gotiations seriously, since a base in Di-
ego Garcia would give the U.S. the op-
tion of matching Soviet ship levels in
the area.
A "Zone of Peace',
OPPOSITION to the project, how-
ever, appears to be growing. The
Diego Garcia base is opposed by
,nearly all of the nations bordering?
the Indian Ocean, most of whom sup-
port a United Nations resolution aimed
at establishing a "zone of peace" in the
Indian Ocean. In addition to India,
which has recently denied Soviet re-
quests for port facilities, traditional.
U.S. allies such as Australia and New
Zealand have criticized the planned ex-
pansion.
Britain apparently also is having sec-
ond thoughts about the project. Ac-
cording to a State Department official,
the U.S. and Heath governments nego-
tiated and agreed in principle to a new
supplemental executive agreement au-
thorizing construction of the base, but,
at last report, the new Wilson gov-
ernment still withheld its approval.
State Department officials are confi- ?
dent, however, that Britain eventually
will sign the agreement rather than
,risk losing American assistance in
modernizing its strategic defense sys-
tem.
Several senators, however, are at-
tempting to use the Diego Garcia ex-
pansion to express opposition to execu-
tive agreements in general as opposed
to treaties, which require Senate ap-
'proval. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee recently approved an
amendment to the State Department-
USIA authorization bill requiring that
any agreement on Diego Garcia with
Britain be approved by Congress.
The Navy has pegged the project's
urgency to its prediction that Soviet
presence in the Indian Ocean will in-
grease markedly when the Suez Canal
reopens. Pentagon critics La Rocque
and Ravenal contend that, in times of
conflict, reliance on waterways as vul-
nerable as the Suez Canal makes no
'military sense.
In addition, in a recent issue of the
Economist, a British magazine which
consistently supported U.S. policy in
Vietnam, the Pentagon's claim that
current Soviet naval deployments are
greater than that of the U.S. is termed
misleading. The magazine?reports that
both France and Britain have been in-
creasing their deployments to the area
and that combined U.S., British .and
French forces outnumber Russian de-
ployments.
Moreover, in a secret memo sent to a
Senate committee only a year ago, the
Pentagon acknowledged that, though,
the Soviets have had naval forces in
the Indian Ocean since 1968, only once,
in December, 1971, during the India-
Pakistan war, did Russia deploy major
combat forces there. Soviet naval pres-
ence in the area, according to the
memo, is designed primarily to "show
the flag." It further noted that mast of
the Soviet ships in the area are mer
chant vessels, hydrographic researck
ships and vessels being tested in teopt
cal environments.
Opponents like Ravenal and La Roo
que argue that congtruction of the DI.
ego Garcia base would goad the Sold-
ets into further strengthening theit
forces, since they now lack reliable
and secure shore-based support facili-
ties in the area comparable to what is
planned for Diego Garcia.
BALTIMORE SUN
28 May 1974
Tass says Israel
bars emigration
? Moscow Bureau of The Sun
Moscow?The Soviet Union,
which has a backlog of an
estimated 120,000 applications
from Jews wishing to emi-
grate, accused Israeli authori-
ties yesterday of forbidding
people to leave that country.
Costs and Carriers
ONE OF THE strongest but least
discussed arguments against the
project, however, is its direct and indi-
rect cost. About $65.3 million already
has been spent on construction and op-
eration of the current Diego communi-
cations facility. In the next two years,
the Pentagon is requesting $37.5 mil-
lion for construction and equipment
and another $78 million for Navy Sea-
bee pay and support for the planned
expansion. But the total constructlpe
and operations ebst of $1130.1 millionls ?
minuscule compared with the cost of a
single additional aircraft carrier.
Despite Pentagon denials, critics of
the expansion argue that, if approved,
the base will be used by the Navy to
justify aircraft carrier construction at
a time when current plans call for re-
duction of the active force to 12 attack
carriers. Frequent naval visits to the
area since the October Middle East
War already have resulted in postpone-
ment of the retirement date of two
carriers.
The Navy has claimed that it intends
to keep a carrier task group in the In-
dian Ocean for only six months of the
year. During hearings on the supple-
mental request for Diego Garcia funds,
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm.
Moorer assured Sen. Stuart Symington
(D-Mo.) that no new additional carriers
would be needed to keep a carrier task
group in the Indian Ocean for six
months of the year.
It is doubtful that U.S. expansion in
the Indian Ocean can be stopped. De-
fense Secretary James Schlesinger
announced in December that the U.S.
would re-establish the pattern of regu-
lar U.S. Indian Ocean vessel visits
which were disrupted by the Vietnam
war.
Although the Pentagon agreed to
close the Asmara communications post
In order to gain approval in 1970 of the
facilities on Diego Garcia, Pentagon
sppkesmen recently testified that As-
mara was being phased, down, but not
phased out.
Congress, however, can stop the ex-
pansion of the planned support base
on Diego Garcia, which many see as
the beginning of a permanent U.S. na-
val presence in the Indian Ocean-.--a
presence which could stimulate yet sn-
ot her arms race In another part of the
world.
A commentary distributed by
the official news agency, Tass,
declared that many persons,
particularly recent immigrants
to Israel, "express a desire to
leave but the authorities do not
permit them to do so."
Tass attributes the desire to
leave to Israel's economic dif-
ficulties and emphasizes the
number of American Jews who
are leaving.
124
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BALTIMORE SUN
2/1 May 19711
India's current plight called worst 'since
By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun Staff Corresporrient
New Delhi ? "This is the
Worst time of our history since
independence," a prominent
Indian social scientist said re-
cently.
The same sentiment is echo-
ed all across India. S. Bhootha-
lingam, a prestigious econo-
mist, wrote in his economic
journal Margin that 1973 opened
in "gloom and anxiety" to be-
come "among the Worst if not
the worst" year in recent his-
tory and that 1974 promises to
be no better.
A teacher in Calcutta says
that the current crisis "is the
worst we have had," and a
foreign economist long in-
volved in Indian affairs re-
marks: "My knowledge of
India goes back a long time
and it's never been worse."
India's ills include unprece-
dented inflation, economic
Stagnation, growing hardship
among the people and political
unrest reflecting a massive
less of confidence.
Prime Minister Indira Gan-
dhi's government is facing a
national railway strike, the
most serious expression 'so
far of worker discontent and
one which could have disas-
trous effects on the economy.
The national .malaise is all ,
the more acute because it has
overtaken the country only a
bare two years after what waS"
perhaps the high point of In-
dia's 27 years as an independ-
ent nation.
Harvests had improved
In 1971, the country had just
decisively defeated Pakistan in
war. It had enjoyed three suc-
cessive good harvests, and
with yields improved by
"green revolution techniques
was in striking distance of
being self-sufficient.
Grain imports that year
were less than half-million
tons, compared with an aver-
age of 3 to 5 million in pre-
vious years, and India was
even able to offer food aid tol
the new state of Bangladesh.
Indians optimistically con-1
eluded that their chronic food 1
problem had been beaten at
last.
Mrs. Gandhi, whose ruling
Congress party had been re-
turned to power the year be,
fore with a sweeping victory
by Indian political standards,
,raised hopes with her promise
to abolish poverty and social
Injustice. ? mas or better?rose from 2.6
2 The euphoria did not last ?
million to 3.5 million in the
long. The summer monsoon in
1972 failed and crops were af-
fected disastrously, with total
grain production in 1972-197313
falling by 15 million Wis ro
?I
below the peak two years ear-
lier.
Prices shot up. the govern-
ment had to go back on the
world market for grain im-
ports, shortages developed and
an ill-conceived effort to na-
tionalize the grain wholesaling 1
system proved .a costly failure.
On top of the food crisis
came the world oil crisis, driv-
ing up living costs even more
sharply and affecting such cru-
cial economic sectors as trans-
portation, power and fertilizer.
27 per cent cost rise
The official cost-of-living
index rose 27 per cent in a
year, far exceeding any in-
crease in post-independence In-
dian history.
Economists generally agree
the impact on the urban civil
servant and the industrial
worker?the bulk of the middle
class?is far worse than the
official figures indicate. The
inflation is expected to con-
tinue at least at the same rate
for this year.
The hardships of the urban
middle class make up one of
the principal reasons why the
current crisis seems different,
and possibly more disruptive,
than past crises in India's his-
tory.
, About 80 per cent of India's
1585 million people live in the
country's half-million villages,
not entirely unaffected by
modernization but still molded
in the traditional peasant cul-
ture which accepts good and,
bad years fatalistically.
The 20 per cent who live in
cities and towns, however,
have had their expectations
raised. "By and large these
people have witnessed a very
steady improvement in their
living standards," Sawar La-
teef, the respected economic
correspondent of The States-
man of New Delhi, says.
It is these people who bear
the brunt of not only the infla-
tion but also the sluggishness
lof the economy. .
? Unemployment rise
A recent government eco-
nomic survey reported that un-
employment soared from 5.6
million in June, 1972, to 7.6
million a year later?and in
India, as in all underdeveloped
countriesi the unemployment
rate means principally that of
the modern, urban sector of
the economy.
The "educated unemployed"
?those with high school diplo-
with broad popular support,
broke out this year, first in the
relatively prosperous state of
Gujarat and then in Bihar, one
of the poorest states in the
country.
The government has at-
tempted to portray the dis-
orders as the work of its politi-
cal adversaries. But most ob-
servers feel that they are mas-
sive, spontaneous uprisings
against not only economic
hardship but also against gov-
ernment institutions that seem
too inefficient, too corrupt, and
too unconcerned with the enor-
mous problems of the people.
Everyone concedes that Mrs.
Gandhi cannot be blamed for
the weather or the oil crisis. ?
But she is charged with mis-
management and with a failure
to persuade Indians that their
sacrifices are being met by
concern and competence in
their leadership.
Uttar Pradesh election
The government's attempt to
take over grain distribution
was a shambles, and finally
had to be abandoned this year.
Nationalized industries on the
whole are doing poorly. There
was little or no increase in
production in major industries
in 1973, and there is little
improvement so far in 1974,
with production impaired not
only by poor management but
worsening power cuts and
transportation difficulties.
The slide in Mrs. Gandhi's
popularity, or at least in public
confidence in her government,
was reflected in the voting
earlier this year in her home
state of Uttar Pradesh, a mam-
moth, poverty-ridden state j
, with a population of 80 million,'
more than all but seven of the;
1947
world's independent countries.
Her Congress party had "won
43 per cent of the Uttar era-
desh votes in 1971?a sizOle
victory in India's fragmeled
political system. This yedt it
received only 32 per cent, and
barely held control of the ltate
legislature; the voting tuOiout
was reported extremely, low,
suggesting that many Indians
simply have turned off all poli-
tical leaders.
Pained defensiveness
Government leaders tend to
react with pained defensive-?
ness to the charges hurled at
.them.
"We are being charged that
India has not developed, is not
doing anything," said Mohan
Dharia, the minister of state
!for planning.
; "But the country has prog-
ressed. Since 1947 we have
raised agricultural production
, from 55 million tons to 110
1million tons.
I "In . 1947 we weren't pre-
pared to produce a bicycle with-
out some foreign components;
today this country produces
motorcars, trucks, railway loc-
omotives and airplanes. A
whole infrastructure has been
erected. Is this a record with-
out positive achievements?"
'Acknowledging that social
and political unrest are grow-
ing, Mr. Dharia said, almost
plaintively, "Should we not be
credited for struggling to pre-
serve a democratic system?
That has made our struggle
more difficult. It is very easy
to impose discipline in dicta-
torship, in a fascist system. It
is not so easy in a democratic
system."
same period, representing a
potentially explosive reservoir
of social discontent.
Major disorders, in''laity led
trOdsrittlenFtelintSEntneht48/08 : CIA-RDP77-00352R000100330006-5
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NEW YORK TIMES
? May ??
.ISRAEL CRITICIZED
ON WAR ESTIMATE
Failures in Evaluation Laid
to Intelligence Service
Prior to Conflict
By DREW MIDDLETON
Israel's intelligence service;in
the past regarded as the best
in the Middle East and the equal
of larger services, is under se-
,vere criticism because of its
failure to assess correctly-Arab
intentions before the October
war last year.
United States civilian and
military intelligence communi-
ties, including a task force at
the Command and General
, Staff College at Fort Leaven-
worth, Kan., have studied with
dismay the errors of Israelis
in evaluating their own infor-
mation and the material made
available to them by Western
Intelligence seivices.
Information now available
shows that as early as Sept.
24, the Central Intelligence
Agency and the National Se-
curity Agency, which special-
izes in electronic intelligence,
were convinced that a major
Arab attack was coming and
warned Israel. The Israeli com-
mand rejected the warning.
This rejection is in accord
With the attitude of Israeli in-
telligence throughout the pre-
war period.
An official Israeli Govern-
ment report, issued after a
lengthy inquiry, blamed Maj.
Gen. Eliahu Zeira, the director
of military intelligence, and
Brig. Gen. Arieh Shalev, 'his
principal assistant, for a "to-
tally insufficient warning" of
the Egyptian and Syrian attacks
on Oct. 6.
From all accounts, Israeli;
Arab and neutral, it appears
that the Israeli intelligence
service was locked into a doc-
trine that held that Egypt
would attack only if she had
enough air power to knock out
the Israeli Air Force and its
bases.
No Aerial Preparation .1
Egypt and Syria attacked atl
2 P.M. on Oct. 6 without thei
expected aerial preparation.
Not until 4:30 A.M., the official
report said, did. military intelli-
gence tell the Government that
war, could be expected that
Averting.
The commission of inquiry,
headed by Dr. Shimon Agra-
nat, president of the Supreme
Cdurt, found that "a doctri-
naire adherence" to the aerial-
preparation theory was at the
bottom of the failure to evalu-
ate correctly warnings from
the Suez Canal front.
Egyptian operational plans
CHICAGO TRIBUZ!
2 0 MAY 1974
7:31-61,1 C
I i.e. ooke
. . ?,
after- sv ch
NEW DELHI, India, May ID
[API?The King of Sikkim
.said today that Hope Cooke,
the debutante who became his
queen 11 years ago, moved
back to New York after opposi-
tion politicans accused her of
being an American spy.
But King Palden Thondup
Namgyal, 99, said that he
hopes his wife Will return to
Sikkim sonic day.
? The king was considered a
living god and undisputed rul-
er in his Himalayan land until
a political uprising in April,
1973, reduced him to a figure=
head. ?
,
. MISS COOKE, 33, left Sik-
kim a few months later. Ever
since, the official story has
been that she went to New
York only to enroll her two
'Were in fact quite different
from those enshrined in Israeli
doctrine. Gen. Ahmed Ismail,
? then commander in chief, chose
a "meat grinder" strategy,
based on the extensive use of
tanks, artillery .and missiles,
that would decimate Israeli
units as they entered the bat-
Ile, and rejected a far-reaching
air offensive.
All sources agree that suf-
ficient information was avail-
able to General -Zeir,a and his
? research department.
"And yet," the Agranat re-
port said, "the correct conclu-
sion was still not drawn" and
the department's evaluation
was "'low probability and even
lower than low probability of
the enemy launching a war.'"
.The Arab build-up on the Go-
lan Heights and west of the
Suez Canal began in Septem-
ber. On the latter front the
Egyptians cover plan fooled the
Israelis.
The Egyptian Army had held
major exercises every autumn
since 1969 and the Israeli's re-
fused to become concerned
over what appeared to be an-
other maneuver, particularly
since the brigades involved in
the exercise appeared to with-
draw from the canal area each
evening.
The Egyptians, however, ac-
-cording to neutral sources,
were withdrawing only one
battalion of the brigades each
evening and leaving two-thirds
of the units in assault positions
ft Slldcirn
TfoeS: kmg.
children in 'school and to ar-
range medieal treatment for
the king's daughter by his late
first wife.
, Friends of. Miss Cooke in
New York 'said the former
debutante does not plan to re-
turn to Sikkim. But they said
there is no immediate talk of
divorce and the king agreed,
"There is no question of di-
vorce or anything like that,"
he said emphatically. "I have
not run away with another
woman nor has she run away
with a man." ? -
THE REAL' REASON his
wife left, he said, was that she
was hurt by allegations that
she was trying to exert Ameri-
can influence on the land-
locked Indian ? protectorate of
200,000 inhabitants.
"She had done a lot for Sik-
kim," the king said. "She de-
veloped Sikkimese textbooks,
which are being published by
Oxford University. But our op-
poncnts said she was trying to
introduce American textbooks
and an American education'
system in Sikkim. ?
"She also had assisted some
students to 'go 'the United
States on some visits. But all
this became distorted. The
allegations were very wrong
and unfortunate. Naturally,
she was not. used to these po-
litical thrashes, where she was
variously called. a CIA' agent
or an American spy. She felt
hurt, and that was to be ex-
pected. I'm hurt myself, but
tha is part of ,my job.? .?
close to the canal.
By Oct. 1 the amount of
Egyptian military traffic picked
up by listening stations Main-
tained by Israel in the Sinai
desert had surpassed that re-,
corded in previous maneuvers.
At the same time pictures
from the American satellites
showed that the Egyptian con-
centration was on a far larger
scale than anything in the past.
,. A Lieutenant's Report
The intelligence service
could not be diverted by
alarming reports from junior
officers. Early in October Lieut.
Benjamin Siman-Tov, reporting
on Egyptian Army movements,
told Lieut. Col. David Gedaliah,
the southern command intelli-
gence officer, that on the basis
of his analysis the Egyptian
maneuvers were being used
only as camouflage for a
preparation for a general
offensive.
The commission of inquiry
found that Colonel Gedaliah, in
reporting to the southern com-
mand, "erased the penetrating
questions" posed by Lieutenant
Siman-Tov 'which could have
raised doubts as to the evalua
tion of the Egyptian deploy-
ment as an exercise."
Colonel Gedaliah explained
that the junior officer's view
contradicted that of the in-
telligence service which Ile and
the commander in the south,
Mak Gen. Shmuol Gown. both
acceprea.
26
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WASHINGTON POST
22 May 1974
David B. Ottaway
Disaster in the Desert
The Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace has recently issued a
I report that amounts to a searing in-
dictment of the international commu-
nity in general and the U.S. Agency
for International Development in par-
ticular for their failure to prevent the
death of untold thousands in the now
5-year-old drought in Africa. The re-
port raises a major issue: Is there an
International moral imperative to save
lives that overrides even the preroga-
tives of national sovereignty?
The drought afflicting the African
Sahel, that 2,500-mile belt of near/
wasteland just south of the Sahara Des-
ert, has galvanized the world commu-
The writer covers Africa for The
Washington Post.
; nity into mounting an emergency re-
lief effort the likes of which that neg- ?
lected continent has not seen since the
civil war in Nigeria. Some $340 million/
, has been spent so far on food and med-
teal supplies to keep alive several mil-
lion? nehnads and peasants living even
In the best of times on some of the
world's most wretched earth.
Nonetheless, thousands have died,
. many of,them needlessly. Why has this
happened?
Roger Morris and Hal Sheets, the
two authors of "Disaster in the Desert,
Failures of International Relief in the
West African Drought," tell us it was
because of a "pattern of neglect and
Inertia within U.S. and U.N. agencies,
first in spotting the approaching ca-
lamity and then in administering relief
to the millions of victims.
"An administrative and bureaucratic
disaster was added to the natural ca-
lamity?inevitably at a higher cost in '
human lives and suffering," the report
charges. Both ATI) and the U.N. Food
and Agricultural Organization were
"haunted by rudimentary failures to
heed early warnings, to plan in ad-
vance and to monitor and coordinate
the rescue efforts." .
The 66-page report is relentless in its
- pursuit and expose of the rivalries,
jealousies and inadequacies of interna-
tional relief agencies in their handling
of relief operations in the Sahel. But it
seems-excessively belligerent and unu-
sually sparing in complement toward
organizations that nonetheless man-
aged to save several millions of lives
under exceptionally difficult circum-
stances.
The authors seem well aware of the j
physical handicaps under which relief
groups are operating: few coastal ports
? capable of handling supplies, rudimen-
tary inland rail-and-road systems, al-
erything from crop production to pop-
ulation censuses and often slow-mov-
ing local bureaucracies.
They are even aware of the thornier
moral and political issues. At one
point, they ask:
"What responsibility did the Mr!-
cans have to distribute relief supplies
equitably? What international pres-
ence, if any, did massive outside relief
. obligate the Africans to accept in or-
der to assure the international commu-
nity that the aid was used properly?"
The two authors continue:
? "Was it possible, in the midst of cri-
sis, for the African states to suspend
for a time some of their sovereignty to
help save their own people? Or would
the unpleasant political subjects, as
for AID policy-makers, have to be
someone else's problem?"
These questions are never answeretti I
Yet they have been far tougher to deal
with than most of the physical obsta-
cles. While the international relief
agencies have had their share of fail-
ings, which have accounted for many
needless deaths, the drought-stricken
African nations have been responsible
for many more because of stubborn
pride over their national sovereignty.
The problem was no better illus-
trated to this correspondent than in
? Mali last summer when thousands of
nomads, having lost their camels and
other animals, began to congregate
around the few small remote towns,
particularly Timbuktu, in the northern
part of the country.
At one point, I visited Timbuktu to
find that food supplies were scarce in-
deed and medical provisions practi-
cally nonexistent. Famine-weakened
nomads, particularly the children and
elders, were dying from diarrhea pro-
voked by American-supplied sorghum
which they had never before eaten. ,
Yet there were food and medical sup-
plies stocked in the Malian capital of
Bamako, the United States had three
C-130 transports shuttling relief goods
about the country and there were for-
eign medical experts available to help.
The problem lay less with AID or
the United Nations than with the Ma-
- lian government, which was deter-
mined to run the rAief campaign itself
and would brook no outside interfer-
ence in its intern)]. affairs. The more
outsiders pushed, prodded and criti-
cized, the more inflated and stubborn
' the Malians becam
It was not that the Malian govern-
ment was doing tothing. It had al-
ready mobilized itt army and even its
prisoners to help get relief supplies
distributed to the r istant north. But its
sense of prioriti!s did not always
match those of fo.:3ign relief workers,
nor did its judgme:t of the seriousness
. of the situation.
The issue of no tonal sovereignty is
older in black Africa (most of the
countries there gained their independ-
ence in the early I960s). This is cer-
tainly understandable given most
black African states' prolonged and of-
ten bitter experiences under Western
? "Hordes of well-meaning
. outsiders have descended
upon these hapless coun-
tries in an effort to save
their peoples from
starvation."
colonial rulers and the fact that West-
ern and Eastern aid "experts" are still '
trying to tell them how to run their
, economies and governments.
The drought seems even to have
quickened the issue as hordes of well- '
meaning outsiders have descended
upon these hapless countries in an ef-1,
fort to save their peoples from starva-
tion. In some cases, governments have
sought to hide the seriousness of the -
drought from the outside world, some-
times out of legitimate fears of damag-
'ing the tourist trade and sometimes
out of a more selfish concern for possi-
ble political repercussions at home. '
(The drought has been a major factor
in the fall of both the Ethiopian and
Niger governments already this year.)
The Carnegie report argues in effect
that the solution to the problem of tia-'
tional sovereignty, as to all the failings
of the relief agencies, is international
sovereignty. It proposes the establish-
ment of a supra-national relief organi-
zation incorporating an early warning
system and standing facilities for rush-
ing supplies to the disaster area and
then monitoring the equitable distribu-
tion of food.
But that such a super international
relief agency would be any better
equipped morally or politically to deal
with national sovereignty than AID or
the FAO remains doubtful in this writ-
er's opinion. African governments
have shown no less sensitivity and re-
sistance to the proddings of U.N. offi-
cials .than to those of U.S. of French
diplomats.
It might, however, eliminate some of
the petty jealousies and rivalries
among Western goverhments, and be-
tween them and those of the Commu-
nist East, that has been responsible for
some of the disorganization in the in-
ternational relief effort in the Sahel.
Any steps that can be taken to. save
lives in times of natural disaster would
certainly he welcome in Africa as else-
most meaningless guestimates of ev- no less burning for being 10 years where in the world. ?
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WAS? HINGTON POST
22 May 1974
Decries 911unklamene of Ally
SehiesinYer
? By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Secretary of Defense James
R. Schlesinger argued yester-
day that South Vietnam does
not eserve to be punished be-
'cause of American disaffec-
tion over its own involvement
in the long war in Southeast
.Asia.
The United States, he said,
still has an "implicit commit-
ment" to South Vietnam,
? al-
though in a narrow military
sense neither South Vietnam
nor Southeast Asia, for that
matter, were essential to U.S.
national interests.
The commitment, Schle-
singer added, required the
United States to keep shipping
needed quantities of military
supplies to Saigon.
"We told them they were go-
ing to do the job and we
would supply the tools. Now,"
he added?referring to pend-
ing congressional cuts In the
aid request?"there is some
question about whether we
are going to do that."
"Surely," the defense chief
went on, "after all of the in-
volvement in South Vietnam,
the South Vietnamese deserve
something better than a retro-
active punishment for our hav-
ing gotten involved in the war
on their side."
"If we continue to give them
support and they fail to sur-
vive," Schlesinger said, "that's
a different issue from pulling,
the support out from under!
them.
"It is unworthy of us," he ,
told newsmen, "in my judg-
ment, to behave on this issue
in such a niggling manner."
The Pentagon civilian boss
met with reporters at break-
fast yesterday, just hours be-
fore the House of Representa-
tives was slated to vote on a
NEW YORK TIMES
23 May 1974
Use of U.S. Funds
For UNICEF Helps
In Hanoi Is Barred
By KATHLEEN TELTSCH
swim to The New York Times
UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.,
May 22 The United States
insisted today that its money
should not be use for aid that
the United Nations Children's
Fund provides for North Viet-
nam and for Communist-con-
trolled areas in the South.
efends Viet Aid
proposal to slash further the
Nixon administration's latest
request for military aid for
Saigon. The vote was post-
toned.
The "niggling manner" that
Schlesinger was referring to
involves -a proposed cut of
$700 million in the Pentagon's
request for $1.6 billion in new
military aid for Saigon for fis-
cal1975, which begins July 1.
The Defense Secretary's
point was that in the context of
a total defense budget request
of $92.6 billion and in compari-
son to the $28 billion a year
the United States was spend-
ing on the war at its peak
(which he said would cost $50
billion today), the amount df
new aid was relatively small.
Congress, however, appears
headed on a different course.
Last month, legislators re-
buffed a Pentagon attempt to
raise the ceiling on Vietnam
aid for the current year above
the $1.1 billion level to which
it had ? been originally cut.
. Then the Senate Armed
Services Committee chopped
the new fiscal 1975 request
down to $900 million. The
House Armed Services Com-
mittee had only reduced the
$1.6 billion request by $200
million, holding out the pros-
pect of a compromise some-
where in between. But the
amendment now pending on
the House floor would match
the Senate panel's $700 Million
reduction.
Pentagon critics argue that
Saigon's armies have tradi-
tionally wasted vast amounts
of U.S. ammunition and sup-
plies. They also argue that in-
creasing aid rather than cut-
ting it would signal South Vi-
etnamese President Nguyei?k,
Van Thicu to continue indefi-
nitely?at U.S. expense?with laid actually buy?
military rather than politicall Schlesinger said he was un.
solutions to his problems. .
Schlesinger agreed yester-
day that the "real issue" in
the current debate is the
"signals we are giving to both
North and South Vietnam."
But he added that t h e con-
gressional cuts would lead to
dangerous interpretations in
both \ capitals.
He claimed the image of
"prodigal" wasters of ammuni-
tion is "not based on observa-
tion but on presupposition,"
and that Saigon's army has
been on "strict rationing" of
fuel and ammunition in recent
months.
Calling attention to what he'
describes as "Massive" viola-
tions by Hanoi of the Paris
cease-fire agreements, Schle-
singer argued that the con tin-
ing fighting in the south is not
a result of "undue aggressive-
ness on the part of Thieu."
From a purely military or
tactical standpoint, Schle-
singer conceded under ques-
tioning, U.S. national security
would not be disadvantaged
by what happens now in Viet-
nam.
"Aside from these intangi-
bles" of a moral commitment
for support, he said, "I would
not describe South Vietnam or
Sotheast Asia as an area of
the world in which our na-
tional interests are high."
But even some congres-
sional critics privately con.
cede that the "intangible, im-
plicit commitments" Schle-
singer mentioned will con-
tinue to ? provide Congress
with- a dual dilemma: What
happens if the aid is slashed
further and the fighting goes
on by both sides to Saigon's
disadvantage? How much real
defense does a certain level of
? The American decision, was
passed along to UNICEF's
board by Michael N. Scelsi, the
United States member, who
said it reflected Washington's
.."deep disappointment" that the
Communist authorities lacked
genuine commitment to see the
Indochina conflict settled
peacefully.
, Although the United States
is the largest single contributor
to the aid agency, Washington's
decision would not block the
undertaking. It will, however,
require that the ,agency use
other financing for these spe-
cific projects.
The Children's Fund, which
has been providinghelp on a
nonpolitical basis to more than
100 countries, has had a sig-
nificant aid ptogram in South
Vietnam since 1956.
Board members were eager
to provide the same type of
but Hanoi has been reluctant
has been reluctant to accept
a UNICEF operation last. year.
The agency will spend a to-
tallof $44-million over the next
three years for aid in Laos,
Cambodia, North Vietnam and
South Vietnam. Some $18-mil-
lion will be spent in North
Vietnam, mainly to rebuild pri-
mary schools and $4.5-million ?
, in Communist-held areas in 28
certain about what the impact
might really he if a $900 mil;
lion level were approved. He
envisioned some morale prob-
lems and some "gradual" re7
ductions in Saigon's million-
man army and its equipment
level.
He said the United States
could continue supplying
"significant" quantities of con-
summables such as ammuni-
tion, but probably would not.
be able to continue replacing
major equipment on the one-
for-one basis permitted by the
Paris accords.
Under questioning, Schle-
singer expressed the "feeling"
that the administration's
Watergate problems with Con-
gress had spilled over to some
extent onto the Pentagon's Vi-
etnam requests.
"It's plain that in regard to
? our legislation on the Hill,
that present discontents are
not particularly helpful to
gather up votes necessary to
get the bills across.
"Nor," he added, "is there
enormous speed over there (at
the White House) with regard
to processing whatever it
is the White House is process-
ing. Their attention is di-
verted."
Privately, White House offi-
cials including Vice President
Ford, have been critical of
Schlesinger for his handling
of the Pentagon requests
which were cut on Capitol
Hill.
Schlesinger also' sought to
correct his own earlier indica-
tions that as Much as $6 bil-
lion extra may have been al-
lowed to remain in the de-
fense budget by the White
House to pump up the domes-
tic economy.
He said about $1.5 billion in
actual spending was retained,
equal to perhaps $2 billion to
$3 billion in ohligational au-
thority.
'South Vietnam. mainly for
health services for children and
for shelter. About $11.2-mil-
lion will be spent in South
Vietnam for health, education
and water supplies.
The United States statement
was intended as a polite warn-
ing that Washington did not
want any part of the projects
for North Vietnam or Vietcong
to be financed from general
resources of the Children's
Fund. The United States con-
resources.
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NEW YORK TIMES
19 May 1974
'U.S. Admits Rain-Making,
1967 to 1972, in Indochina
By SEYMOUR
Special to The N
WASHINGTON, May 18?The
Defense Department has ac-
knowledged to Congress that
the Air Force and Navy partici-
pated in extensive rainmaking
operations in Southeast Asia
from 1967 to 1972 in an attempt
to slow the movement of North
Vietnamese troops and supplies
through the Ho Chi Minh trail
network.
Testimony made public today
showed a considerable disagree-
ment within the Pentagon about
the military value of the top-
secret rain-making effort.
The testimony also revealed
that former Defense Secretary
Melvin R. Laird has apologized
to Congress for having cate-
gorically denied two years ago
that rain-making efforts had
been going on. Pleading ignor-
ance of the operation, Mr. Laird
said that he had "never ap-
proved" it and that he had un-
derstood that it had not taken
place under former President
Lyndon B. Johnson. '
A First in Warfare
The cloud-seeding program,
which Defense officials said in-
creased local rainfalls up to 30
per cent was the first known
use of weather warfare in mili-
tary history.
The Pentagon's- admission'
came during a top-secret hear-
ing last March 20 before the
Senate Foreign Relation's sub-
committee on the oceans and
International environment.
Dennis J. Doolin, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of Defense,
and Lieut. Col. Ed Soyster of
the Army, representing the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, told the sub-
committee that 2,602 cloud-
Seeding missions were flown
M. HERSH
eta York Times
from an Air Force base in Thai-
land, dropping a total of 47,409
canisters of rain-producing sil-
ver iodide or lead iodide over
North Vietnam, South Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos, beginning
on March 20, 1967.
The rain-making reached a
peak in 1971, according to Pen-
tagon statistics made available
to the committee, with more
than 11,000 canisters dumped.
Well-informed sources have told
the New York Times that the
operations at that point were
tightly controlled by Henry A.
Kissinger, the President's ad-
viser for national security.
"This kind of thing was a
bomb, and Henry restricted in-
formation about it to those who
had to know," a former Govern-
ment official said. ,
In his testimony, Mr. Doolin
defended the program by noting
that, "If an adversary wanted
to stop me from getting from
point A to point B, I would
rather he stopped me with a
rainstorm than stopped me with
a bunch of bombs."
"Frankly," he added, "I view
this in that context as really
quite humane, if it works."
The testimony revealed that
the cloud-seeding was halted
on July 5, 1972, two days after
The Times published a lengthy
article about the highly classi-
fied operation. Defense officials
denied at the time that any
rain-making had been attempt
ed over North Vietnam.
In a January, 1974, letter
made public by the subcom
mittee, former Defense Secre-
tary Laird apologized for his
categorical denial in 1972. "I
have just been informed," Mr.
Laird wrote, "that such activi-
ties were conducted over
North Vietnam in 1967 and
again in 1968."
In his testimony, Colonel
Soyster of the Joint Chiefs told
the committee that the Penta-
gon had authorized cloud-seed-
LOS ANGELES TIMES
26 May 1974
Hanoi Incre
.117 1:101:GT.1 MrAilT1-1111
Times Staff Writer ,
.SAIGON---AVith embar-
rassing freentency of late,
.Snuth Vietnam's urbane
spokesman, Lt.
Col. Le Tiling Then, has
been announcing the loss
? el' 'this or,that outpost?
the impression usually he,
lin given of brave defen-
ing over North Vietnam on July
II, 1967. The program there
was terminated on Nov. I,
1968, the colonel said, when a
bombing halt was announced
by President Johnson.
Dispute Over the Effect
The colonel estimated the
annual cost of the cloud-seed-
ing operations at $3.6-million,
and said it began with a series
of tests in 1966 in the Laos
panhandle that had been au-
thorized by the Pentagon's Re-
search and Engineering office.
Later, Colonel Soyster said,
Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp
Jr., then Commander in Chief
of the United States Pacific
Fleet, concluded that rain-mak-
ing "could be used as a valu-
able tactical weapon."
There was some dispute be-
tween Mr. Doolin and Colonel
Soyster about the efficacy of
the program, which was highly
classified throughout the Gov-
ernment because, Mr. Doolin
acknowledged, of its sensitivity.
The colonel told the com-
mittee that the Defense Intel-
ligence Agency had estimated
"that rainfall was increased in
limited areas up to 30 per cent
above the predicted for the
existing conditions?sensor re-
cordings and other information
following seeding indicated
enemy difficulties from heavy
rainfall."
To buttress that view, he
presented charts that showed
significant drops in enemy
troop and supply movement in
eastern Laos during two weeks
in 'June, 1971. During one of
those weeks, the colonel said,
there was a typhoon in the
area; in the other, he said, "we
were most active with seeding
activities.'
Asked for his assessment.
Mr. Doolin suggested ? that he
did not share the military's
enthusiasm for the rain-making
program. "When you look at
the amount of rainfall that
was in these given areas any-
way," he said, "and what was
added to it possibly by these
extra seeclings. it looks to met
like you are getting 21 inches
In a given area and we add
two inches."
"If 1 was on the bottom," the
Pentagon official added, "I do
not think I would know the
difference between 21 and 23."
Colonel Soyster insisted that
rainfall was increased, but
added that the Pentagon was
unable to learn how much.
Civilian Scientists Skeptical
Mr. Doolin, who has been a
Pentagon official since 1969
and served with the Central in-
telligence Agency 'previously,
told the committee that despite
his high position he did not
learn of the secret rain-making
until the columnist Jack Ander-
son wrote about it in March of
1971.
"I made inquiries at the time
?simply for. my own edifica-
tion," he testified. "to find out
if the rain that was artificially
generated in a given area would
deprive a friendly country also
in the area of rain. For example,
were we denying water to Thai:
rice paddies? I was told no, that
was not the case, that there
was so much moisture in the
air that you could not reduce
the amount really in another
area; and not to pursue the
matter."
Nonmilitary scientists have
been far more skeptical, how-
ever, about the possible con-
sequences of cloud-seeding, a
debate that led Senator Clai-
borne Pell, Democrat of Rhode
Island and the chairman of the
subcommittee, to begin investi-
gating the issue in 1972.
Dr. Matthew Meselson, a pro-
fessor of biology at Harvard
and a former Government con-
sultant, was quoted in Science
magazine in 1972 as warning
that "It is obvious that weather
modification used as a weapon
of war has the potential for
causing large-scale and quite
possibly uncontrollable and un?
predictable destruction."
ases Its 'Nibbles' in SOUlth VEZM
ders succumbing to great
odds. ?
The announcements are
usually ? coupled with out-
rage at yet another Com-
munist violation of the Pa-
ris cease-fire agreement:
It. is not advertised that
the defenders sometimes
pulled up .stakes on their
own when they realized
Approved For Release 2001/08/08:
that help was unlikely to
appear.? .
And since the official
government policy is to
defend every inch of
sacred soil, the ,:ommti-
, niques have not nflected
the frequent hig17. corn-
' mand judgment. ti-tat the
cost was simply .getting
too high?as look e lace in
April when the ' nen at
CIA-RDP77-00432i0001
29
Tong Le Chart pulled nut.;
without much fight aft or
Previously holding t h
post for 16 months.
When the cease-fire was.:
signed the South Vietnam-
ese held 30 more or less 4,
? "major" outposts strung
through the sparsely inha-
bited mountains and jun-
gles along the Laot inn and
Cambndian border., While
00330006-5
Mat ',a
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330006-5
7.:the? Amerkans were in
[-Vietnam?or at least. while
r 1.3,S. air support was avail.;
:able -7- these spots were-
', tenable., if vulnerable.. Se-
?rriou: s assaults brought ev-
..erything from B-52s to
?-gunships spewing stagger-
ing sprays of ammunition.
- Helicopters flew in food
and ammunition and flew.
, out the wounded. Embat-
:Alert outposts knew they
were part, of a big show.
't Nowadays the Sonth
: Vietnamese air force Is on
lean ammunition and fuel,
, rations and is almost fully,
extended. The high com-
? mand is loath to risk hell-
-Copters over jungles hid-
ing Soviet-built heat-seek-
ing missiles. An .oUtpost'
?under attack can be large-.
Ay' on its?own, particularly
.f the weather is bad. The
isolated soldiers out there:
have gotten that word.
-About half of the border
/outposts, have fallen or
been abandoned under
;pressure (often exaggerat-
ed) in the last year-land-a-.
,half. . ?
Yet the cumulative loss
isOlated posts and God-
, fer.,??aken hilltops is giving
',rise to apprehension ,that
the military men in Hanoi
are now preparing one ?
more 'massive assault on
South Vietnam. This .ap,
prehension has been
fueled by rerwonahly ae-
_cora f r. hut hardly voncl1-.
sive assessments of in-
'creased North Vietnamese
.strength. ("They are now
sending men down, not
bardware,' one knowl-
The North VietnameSe,
having shown their mus-
cle and created several
'thousand refugees to
further erode the South
Vietnamese econom
have probably already ac-
complished what they set
out to do?though they
may continue to grind
away if the price is right.
The thinking of some
really hard-nosed officials
in Saigon is that Hanoi is
once again giving t h e
screw another turn and
stepping up the salami
? tactics which have proved
. effective. While infiltra-
geable analyst said. "And
some of their units are up
to 90% strength and some
"a ctually overstrength.
That type thing just
; hasn't happened before.")
' The creeping advance on
outposts is currently lap-
'ping at the garrison town
of Ben Cat, a whistle-stop
'district ca pita I some 25
miles above Saigon nif-
what newsmen long ago
loosely tabbed as an "inva-
sion corridor."
? This is because Ben Cat
'roughly guards an area
where jungle and rubber
plantation ,country opens
on the populated farm-
lands which Saigon must' ?
defend; and the Saigon
command is now calling in
regular battalions from
three. nearby divisions to
'do so. They are not the:
best troops in the world
but they will surely suf-
fice, holding the North
? Vietnamese to relatively
minor victories on the bat-
- Cefield.
tion has increased?thus
.strengthening Hano s
ability to opt for an ulti-
.
? mate massive offensive
the alarm bells have
not yet called the Penta-
gon or Saigon's Joint Gen-
eral Staff to man the
walls.
That being said, It
should quickly be added
that there is plenty of
cause for alarm in South
Vietnam. The presence of
about 300,000 North Viet-.
namese and Viet Cong
troops hardly makes for a
'rosy picture.
The picture ,could be
painted in even starker
terms if officials desired
(for instance, there are re-
liable reports that the
North Vietnamese are
cleaning out their hospi-
tals in border and forward
areas, one sign they may
soon be expecting more
fighting and a new flow of
casualties). But the South
-Vietnamese are torn be-
tween conflicting desires:_
? One day they cry wolf?
,.
hoping for more congres-
sional dollars ? and the
next day they extol the
tranquility of the country-
side ? hoping to attract ,
foreign investment.
The fighting that has
, been going on almost
never gets full treatment
in military communiques.
Officials have privately
admitted that Saigon's
communiques are. do c-
Awed to preclude accusa-
tions of cease-fire viola-
tions. It can hardly be
doubted that the North
Vietnamese do precisely
the same thing. . ?
Meanwhile, the hordes of
newsman once covering
South Vietnam largely de-
parted with the American
troops. 'Furthermore the
Saigon 'government
dis-
courages battle coverage:
In addition,. the old easy
Anierican.*helicopter
transportation!is nolonger
I present.. ? ? ?
All this means detailed
knowledge of the fighting..
Is now known to fewer.
and fewer people who are
inori and m'ore.40iict4rit
to speak. candidly. . ?? '
An eAamPle of this to*
place daily this month
when the' South Vietnam-
ese announced the fall of
flak Pek, *a Central
lands outpost once inha-
bitcd by 'American Green
B e r e, t s:
? 'Th ?,ahnOtince-
ment said Stiniething 'like
' 13,13,90? l'Orth'',..)iieLnatifeSe ?
with tank' siipp.?irt had
iiVerfun.'th0.17tht!Bord'pr,
)1a nOr battalidnqoldlni
,Otter
officers 1 A?t-e'r hdinitted,
however,, that the Rangers
had plraeti6iillk -Walked off
ak P, Nid!ht.ut; a fight? '
:this' despite t'denl. supply
?
built u0
thec?'ivl:liiiiorehn
a .month's ii:ply of foods.
aid ammulli (0--!:-most of;
which Is rld'Il rt the hOids;
of '
' The trOditt,,, .'!;?-who.'abbn-?.
dtuied oth-
er cainpS ,Y which the
fighllng has jt:!in less than
Orbited .were renamed
?
Erder Baii g e'r s when,
'thly weie ? "incOrtiOrted
Into th Sotitt!.Vielfiainete
tippy.more:thAn;two;years'
ago. Before,that, they.werp
'officially .called,
Tor Civilian's .i::?iFgulaitfieL,
gorcf.i67..,139Plilarly
thy were'called inef&ria-
./rii:?s and.' Witie.'"; almost all'.:
't c CirobOdidnS or?
,Ii&intagnbrd tribesmen re-
cruited the .Old da YS by
the IIS. Ce r t ?r a I ?Int01-
. ligence Agency (they pre-
Jet?red .Aincri(4an leader-
?
ship .ard pay to South
Vietnam's draft)..' .
Such.fethnic '1,rooPs
;been disproportioA-
'ate 4asjalties '
'months though Saigon
gives no breakdowns ?
and have 1 s ?anit.leSs
's,torn.ch for. defending
questionable outpoSts...
Similarly, South:Viet:la-
? mesa Regional and Popidar.
'Force rillitia hae .prdb- ?
ably' beim taking most:a
the casualties in the isolat:
'ed skirmiShes I haChave,a1-
?ways marked the Vietnimi
conflict (overall casualties
about' 6,000 ni on Lii I y)'...
Jar', as the' ?;cominu-
'iniquesx.and.-the.....reported'
fighting reflect :.?the situa- ?
' .ton, the high:. command ?
;'appeara to have ,lieen say
.ing? the' regular' troops. in
..e)c 'e ti .of .s.? ? ?
'it,ghting. later; On- 'the
oth-
'Cr hand some major.OPera-,.,
'.gone
n?reported, particularly
an aggressive sweep in the'.
?swamps and nipa..patches '
?:of the .western! , Mekong
Delta where South Viet.- ,
? namese troops are credit-:
?cd by Ainctican 'Observers
with' having inflicted.' de-
hilitating losses' .,. on? the
once : Crack North Viet-
namese 1st Division. .? ?
t, American 'strategists be-
? lieve 'Hanoi's'generals give
.the South .Vietnamese sol-
.dierihigher mars'.han he
1often gets in. Western eir-
?That?is ?glyent as one
? reason 'Hanoi 'continues to
prefer salaini.slices rather
? than the big'. bite?which
? may still come later.
WASHINGTON POST
25 May 1974
China Tells
U.S. Marine
Unit to Leave
By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer
The United States will with-
draw the six-man Marine
guard unit from the American
liaison Office in Peking at the
insistence of China, the State
Department acknowledged yes-
terday.
State Department officials
sought to minimize the with-
drawal of the U.S. Marines as
a minor matter: Other China
specialists, however, saw the
-demand. for the Marines' re.'
'call as the most mien, but st.ill
subtle, sign of Chinese dis-
pleasure with the United
States since the two nations
ended a generation of hostility
with President Nixon's visit to
Peking in February 1972.
China complained that the
Marines were "the only meo'
nizable foreign military unit,
in the People's 'Republic of
China," St ate Depart merit
spokesman John F, King said.1
The six Marines are to be re-
placed by t be end of May
with four Slate Department. ci-
vilian security men.
''This is a subject we have'
discussed with the Chinese on
several occasions during the
past year," since the liaison of-
fice in Peking was opened by
Ambassador David K. E.
havo. been . estimated at Bruce. the spokesman said.
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330006-5
,"Several weeks ago," King
said, China made a specific re-
quest to Bruce to withdraw
the Marines and we are ac-
quiescing to their wishes,"
?The spokesman said he un-
derstood that the Marines ini-
tially were assigned to China
"as a pro forma matter," be-
cause the Marines tradition-
ally are used as guards at
many American diplomatic
missions overseas. The Marine
guards wore civilian clothes
rather than uniforms, except
on rare ceremonial occasions.
King said the United States
considers the present state of
.its relations with China to be
"satisfactory" and unaffected
by the Marine issue.
Other sources acknowl-
edged, however, that when the
Marines were dispatched to
Peking some American spe-
cialists on China questioned
the propriety of the assign-
ment, noting that U.S. Ma-
rines in China, especially in
NEW YORK TIMES
25 May 1974
the eyes of Communists, evoke
bitter memories of foreign in-
fringement on the country's
sovereignty.
The controlling viewpoint
inside the Nixon administra-
tion was said to be that the
new U.S.-Chinese relationship
would transcend such recollec.
tions of the past.
China, however, is experi-
encing a continuing ferment
of reaction against all symbols
. of foreign And pre-revolution-
ary influences.
One of the questions puz-
zling foreign specialists ig
whether Premier Chou En-Lai,
China's architect of detente
with the United States. is him-
self a target in this campaign.
One independent American
specialist on China said yes-
terday that he interprets the
ouster ,of the U.S. Marine
guards as the latest example
of Peking's "little pinpricks in-
dicating a lack of complete
satisfaction with its relation-
Thailand's Role in Asia
To Improve Relations With Neighbors
Bangkok May Loosen Its Ties With U.S.
By JAMES M. MARKHAM
Special to The New York Times
BANGKOK, Thailand, Mayr In fact, he continued, the
24 ? A far-reaching foreign-i bases are an impediment to im-
policy debate here is question- .Proved relations with China
ing some fundamental assump- and, particularly, North Viet-
tions. At issue is Thailand's; nam?which, in theory, could
future place in Asia. In keeping
with a long and successful
tradition- of self-
interest, few of
News the Thais involved
Analysis in the debate are
suggesting bold
opening moves.
But with a full-blown demo-
cratic order expected toward
the. end of this year. the dis-
cussion is likely to leave the
tranquil corridors of the For-
eign Office and enter the
streets.
A central figure in the
debate is Thanat Khoman, a
controversial former Foreign
Minister who presided over the
'American build-up in Thailand
in the nineteen-sixties but who
now wants the Americans out.
"In the past," argued Mr.
Thanat, sitting on the veranda
of his pleasant residence re-
cently, "there were pluses for
us from the U.S. military asso-
ciation. But now the minuses
are beginning to show up."
Mr. Thanat maintains that the"
experience of the Vietnam war
And recent Congressional as-
sertiveness rule out the chance
that the American air bases
'here would ever be used to
defend Thailand from invasion.
U.S. Interests Only
"So the bases serve only
American national interests,
not Thailand's interests," he without creating a void that a
said. AppsyvettisFISr IReteasit12001108/08
again be pounded by Thai-
based B-52's if Hanoi launched
an all-out offensive in South
Vietnam.
In pursuit of better relations
with China and North Vietnam,
Mr. Thanat is tempted by the
notion of somehow trading off
the bases for an end to Com-
munist support of the spread-
ing Thai insurgencies.
Mr. Thanat, who is a member
of the interim National Assem-
bly and an adviser to Premier
Sanya Dharmasakti, does not
represent the Thai establish-
ment, which tends to be more
cautious in its conclusions if
not in its analysis.
But his thinking aloud
reaches well beyond his veran-
da and finds receptive listeners
in academic arid professional
circles and among younger
members of the Foreign Office
?who all have gained in im-
portance since the ouster of
the military regime of Field
Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn
in October.
King's Tactics Recalled
Ultimately, this younger gen-
eration would like to protect
Thailand's national interests
in the fashion of the 19th-cen-
tury and early 20th-century
kings?balancing off the super-
powers against each other.
The problem is how to ease
the Americans out of Thailand
ship with the United States."
Other experts on China
have listed as examples of Pe-
king's displeasure the recent
assignment of a prominent
U.S. diplomat, Leonard Unger,
as new U.S. ambassador to
Taiwan; the opening of addi-
tional consulates for Taiwan
in the United States, and the
slowness of the withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Taiwan.
Peking officials are reported
to have indicated to foreign
visitors that they are disap-
pointed that the expectations
raised by the American-Chi-
nese communique that cli-
maxed President Nixon's 1972
visit have not been fulfilled.
U.S.-China trade has soared to
the $1 billion level, but the
.pac of generally expanding
relations has been slackening
recently.
The six-man Marine guard
unit in Peking was described
as highly popular with West-
erners there, and evidently
. too much in evidence to please
Peking's austere officials.
Some months ago, at Chinese
request, the Marines closed
down their most celebrated at-
traction, a lounge in the Ma-
rines' quarters known as "The
Red Ass Saloon."
Spokesman King said at his
news briefing that "as far as
we are concerned, the conduct.
a the Marines throughout has.
been above reproach. I never
heard of the Red Ass Saloon."
There is no U.S. intention
whatever, the spokesman said,
to ask for any equivalent
changes in the personnel or
procedure at the Chinese Liai-
son Office in Washington, be-
cause of the recall of the Ma-
rines. The United States has
about 30 personnel at its mis-
sion in Peking. China has 27
officials and 30 support per-
sonnel in Washington.
?
The current Government po- iGeneral Chatichai calls "our
sition, as expressed by Deputy Chinese friends in Peking ?
Foreign Minister , Chatichai possibly to distinguish them
Choonhavan in an interview, is from the Chinese in Taiwand
that American forces will be with whom Thailand has fulli
withdrawn from Thailand in diplomatic relations.
'keeping with the over-all situa- The customary Ping-Pong andl
tion in Indochina. badminton teams have been ex-'
General Chatichai noted that changed and fairly short the
North Vietnamese troops were Thai National Assembly is, ex-.
still , stationed in neighboring pected to agree to revoke a
Laos and Cambodia. He did not long-standing decree that bans
mention South Vietnam, imply- Itrade with Peking. The decree
Ing that Bangkok was far more has already heen partly'
concerned about her own bor- 'breached by a Chinese agree-
ders than about the Vietnamese ;ment. to sell badly needed diesel,
!fuel to Thailand.
I Although the powerful
"I met with Kissinger," Gen- ;Chinese community here is well
assimilated by Southeast Asian
era! Chatichai said, "and Kis-
,standards, some Thais remain
singer told me it was up to suspicious of its ultimate loyal-
Thailand-1f you want us to ties, which makes the question
stay, we stay; if you want us of diplomatic relations a dis-'
to go, we gci." tant one.
Already, Washington and Bangkok has 'diplomatic ties
Bangkok have announced plans With Moscow, which have be-
to reduce the number of Amen- gun to warm with discussions
of cultural exchanges. Recently,
Thailand and Mongolia estab-
lished diplomatic relations;
Interest in Hanoi Talks
civil war.
Assurance of Kissinger
can troops here from the
34,500 level to about 27,000
by December. At the peak "of
the American build-up, in 1969,
there ' were 48,000 American
troops here. Reflecting the changed da-.
The Government states that mestic and international cit-
eventually all American troops mate, the Government. also has
and planes will be withdrawn, been calling for a dialogue with
but neither the Thais nor the North Vietnam. Last month, 'a
Americans seem eager to start North Korean trade delegation;
talking about a date. was entertained in Bangkok.
For one thing, the bases This was widely read as a
pump about $175-million a year signal to Hanoi that Thailand
into the 'Thai economy. While had no qualms about dealing
this is not a critical factor in with the Communists parts of
the booming gross national divided nations.
product?$7.5-billion?the eco- Then, after Thailand and
nomies of several provincial South Vietnam became em-
.towns would be shaken by an broiled in a controversy over
'abrupt pullout, fishing rights, Hanoi tentatively
The Thais, who were once responded to Bangkok's re-
convinced that the United ipeated appeals for a dialogue.
States would "win" in Vietnam, A lengthy commentary in the
are now talking about "de- :North Vietnamese party news-
!emphasizing" the military side paper Nhan Dan was softer
of their relationship with Wash- than the usual attacks on the
ington. Thai Government. It said that
In the meantime, Bangkok if Bangkok "really wishes for
has been moving_ steadily_ _to knotetipris" it must "stop
ithPiheRDieggrrPQ0g9 -.vith the United
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States in opposing the Viet-
namese people.
In the past, North Vietnam
had made the removal of
American air bases the precon-
dition for starting a dialogue.
;The Nhan Dan article, while
routinely denouncing the bases,
did not lay down this specific
condition.
Bangkok welcomed the Nhan
Dan overture, but it remains
to be seen where the dialogue
can go from here.
Some Thais Skeptical
Not a few Thais are skeptical
about Mr. Thanat's notion of
trading off the bases for with-
drawal of Hanoi's support for
the insurgencies that smolder
in North, northeast and south-
ern Thailand. "I don't 'think
it would work," said one well-
placed official.. "Do you?"
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
22 May 1974
"Regardless of how or why
it started," observed one dip-
lomat who follows the issue,
"the insurgency has grown from
a small Sino-Thai-based move-
ment to one having 7,000 people
under arms, and even more
cadres running around. This
sort of thing just can't be
turned off."
But, having watched Presi-
dent Nixon go to Peking, the
Thais are expected to keep
South Korea's new troubles
By Elizabeth Pond
Seoul
South Korea's unhappy history is
repeating itself in the view of some
Westerners with 'long experience in
East Asia.
These observers see South Korea
President Park as making the same
mistake as the rigid autocrat Syng-
man Rhee ? whom South Korean
students toppled in 1960. And they see
Mr. Park as reliving the Japanese
imperial authoritarianism of the '30's.
This is a tragedy, they say, that could
fatally weaken South Korea's defense
against the North and ultimately
threaten stability on the Korean pen-
insula.
The Westerners who hold this view
ask not to be identified. And they
voice their view with reluctance. Over
many years they have believed in the
Koreans, and they have believed that
America's sacrifice of blood and
treasure in the Korean war for the
sake of freedom in the South was
worth the cost.
Now these men point to several
bitter ironies in Mr. Park's present
position.
One irony is that the President ?
who received his training from the
Japanese and was an officer in the
Japanese Imperial Army ?still has
the old Japanese military mentality.
Yet today's Japanese have left this
approach so far behind them that they
no longer understand Mr. Park. They
are bewildered by his repeated will-
ingness to strain Korean-Japanese
relations just for the sake of suppress-
ing domestic dissent.
A second irony is that President
Park, who stands as South Korea's
champion against communism, was
himself condemned to death by the
South Korean government in 1948 for
taking part in a pro-Communist offi-
cers' revolt. His brother actually was
executed by the government as a
Communist. And his own life was
saved only by the intervention of the
Americans, who were trying desper-
ately to keep their ally Mr. Rhe from
killing off his opponents and driving
the moderate middle class into the
arms of the Communists. Americans
familiar with the incident confirm
that Mr. Park did in fact take part in
the pro-Communist uprising.
Yet now President Park ? with no
appreciation of his own reprieve ?
"calls anyone who opposes the gov-
ernment a Communist," according to
one Western observer here. He has
Approved For
even decreed a possible death sen-
tence for students demonstrating
against his administration.
This labeling of dissidents as Com-
munists leads to some curious results.
The director of the Korean CIA has
publicly charged that Christian stu-
dents who demonstrated against the
government a month ago were Com-
munist led. And privately in-
vestigators have indicated to some
Christian clergy now in jail that they
too would be charged with pro-Com-
munist activity.
Such a charge is totally discounted
by both American and Japanese ob-
servers in the case of Korean Chris-
tians. When Korea was divided hun-
dreds of thousands of Christians fled
the North to escape communism, and
for a quarter of a century the Chris-
tian church has been a bulwark of
anticommunism in the South.
In fact, those Christians who have
been protesting Mr. Park's strong-
man-rule consider themselves the
true defenders of the nation against ,
communism. They argue that South
Koreans will rally to protect their
country against any new attack from
the North only so long as there is
freedom in the South, and a lifestyle
that is worth fighting for. They view
Mr. Park's present political repres-
sion as helping the Communists by
establishing the same kind of dicta-
torship in the South that exists in the
North ? thus blurring the choice
between the two.
Recently a number of 'South Ko-
reans have begun asking what the
difference is between left total-
itarianism and right totalitarianism.
"This is a big topic of conversation
now," one Western observer noted.
Some South Koreans have even
begun recalling the 1948 officers'
revolt and asking ? sotto voce ? if
Mr. Park really is in league with the
Communists and is doing what will
help them the most. Similarly, some
are asking why North Korea was so
helpful to Mr. Park in sinking one
South Korean fishing boat and seizing
another just when Mr. Park was
claiming a North Korean threat as the
justification for jailing political dis-
sidents in the South.
American observers do not credit
any linkage between Mr. Park and the
North. But they point out that some
South Koreans are beginning to ask
questions about such a linkage ? and
pressing for openings to neigh-
bors once considered irrecon-
cilable enemies. And, if the
new civilian order in Bangkok
is not abruptly replaced by a
Military one, "Thailand's search
for a more comfortable, place
in Sthitheast Asia?without
heavy American protection?
will probably continue apace.
to ask Americans what good it did.
them to save Mr. Park's life 26 years
ago. Westerners point out too the
analogy of the Japanese occupation of
China in the 1930's. That 'occupation
took place in the name of fighting
communism ? but it was the one
thing that turned the Chinese people
to communism.
Western Observers do see one ray of
hope for stability on the peninsula
(though not for democracy in the
South). They say North Korea has
repeatedly conducted such a bellicose
policy, that it has always been so
bellicose, that it has ensured that
Southerners would hate and fear
Pyongyang more than the Seoul gov-
ernment. Westerners therefore hope
that Pyongyang will again bungle its
new opportunity in the South.
Miss Pond is the Monitor's staff
'correspondent in Tokyo.
WASHINGTON POST
24 May 1974 ?
Last 'Mfg
5thliers
Leave Lass
VIENTIANE ? Thailand
has withdrawn its last re-
maining mercenary troops
from Laos, ending more
than 10 years of direct That
military involvement in this
cOuntry, diplomatic 'sources
said yesterday.
The Thai soldiers were
flown out Wednesday from
the former CIA-supported
base at Long Cheng in
northern Laos, the sources ,
said.
At the height of the fight-
ing in Laos several yenta
ago, there were about 22,000
Thai soldiers here fighting
on behalf of the royal Lao
government.
The pullout came as the
Laotian coalition govern-
ment warned foreign na-
tions with troops still on-
Laotian soil to respect the
June 4 deadline set for their
withdrawal in the country's
recent peace accords.
[American pilots and mili-
tary advisers are scheduled
to leave Laos by June 3,
Pentagon sources said. The
number departing was not
immediately available, they
said.]
North Vietnam is reported
to have more than 40,000
troops on Laotian soil,
32 mostly along the Ho Chi
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 May 1974
Many OAS nations ready to
By the Associated Press
Buenos Aires
Cuba's long political and economic
exclusion from the Latin-American
family of nations may be coming to an
end.
An Associated Press sampling has
found that a majority of the members
of the Organization of American
States (OAS) might welcome the
Communist island nation back into
the fold.
Cuba was expelled from the OAS in
1962, and a series of economic and
political sanctions were applied
against Fidel Castro's government,
then in power for three years.
"Cuba's isolation is inadmissable
and contrary to the best interest of the
hemisphere," Argentine Foreign Min-
ister Alberto J. Vignes said recently
in Washington.
Other leaders, no longer afraid of
Cuban-backed guerrillas or possible
retaliation from the United States,
are voicing similar feelings.
Ties strengthened
For years, Mr. Castro branded the
OAS "an American puppet" and ex-
pressed no interest in rejoining the
group. But recently Cuba has in-
creased its bilateral ties with Latin-
American nations.
Argentina pressed an intensive
trade campaign with Cuba, extending
a $1.2 billion credit and then selling
Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors
cars produced in Argentina to Cuba.
There is still considerable opposi-
tion, especially from military-backed
anti-Communist governments, to re-
moiring the political and economic
sanctions against Cuba.
But the AP survey showed that 13
countries were inclined to review the
sanction policy. Nine opposed a re-
view but for considerably differing
reasons.
, Dialogue maintained
Favoring the review, Mexico, for
example, has always held open a
dialogue with Havana and has politely
disregarded suggestions that it
shouldn't. Argentina and Peru are
ardent champions of a new look at
Castro. English-speaking Caribbean
nations are hoping to open new trade
lanes. All these governments ? with
welcome Cuba
the exception of Peru ? have freely
elected regimes.
?
The strongest opponents of lifting
the political and economic blockade
are the right-wing, military-con-
trolled regimes.
Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, and Para-
guay are reluctant to forget Mr.
Castro's attempts to foment terrorist
revolution in South America. Bolivia
still recalls how the late Argentine-
Cuban Ernesto (Che) Guevara at-
tempted to topple its government in
1967. It took months of jungle fighting
to stop him.
Chile, now firmest in its opposition
to Cuba, claims Mr. Castro sent some
2,000 Cubans ? to Chile during the
regime headed by Marxist President
Salvador Allende.
The military junta which overthrew
President Allende eight months ago
says Cuba has not stopped exporting
terrorism. It claims that some 14,000
antijunta radicals are waiting in
Argentina to cross the Andes for the
"counterrevolution." One of the
Junta's first acts was to break rela-
tions with Cuba.
At a recent Washington meeting of
foreign ministers of the Americas,
Argentina's Mr. Vignes was asked to
conduct a survey of hemispheric'
positions on the Cuban question.
The results will be submitted to the
,next foreign ministers' meeting
scheduled to be held in Buenos Aires
next March. Local diplomatic sources
say that the consultations have not yet
begun.
Here is how some Latin-American
countries stand on Cuba:
Leftist activities cited
Argentina ? Favors lifting the
blockade and has unilaterally broken
it. Argentina sent 240 top business-
men, diplomats, and economists to
Havana last March and has con-
tracted $600 million in business over
three years.
Bolivia ? Gen. Hugo Banzer's mili-
tary government is opposed to Cuba's
reentrance to the OAS. "Cuba has not
ceased encouraging extreme leftist
activities against Bolivia," said a
senior government spokesman.
Brazil ? President Ernesto Gainers
military-supported government is op-
posed. Brazil has been a prominent
leader of the opposition, and its
position is to be "among the first of
the last to relax any sanctions,"
according to a high government
source.
Chile ? Gen. Augusto Pinochet's
military junta ? moving from Salva-
dor Allende's open friendship with
Mr. Castro to open hostility ? is
opposed, being convinced that Ha-
vana is still trying Co export revolu-
tion.
Trend seen
Colombia ? Left-of-center Presi-
dent-Elect Alfonso Lopez Michelen
will be inaugurated in August and is
on record as saying that the present
trend will result in the lifting of
economic sanctions. He has not said
specifically he would reestablish rela-
tions with Cuba, but the implication is
that he is in favor of it.
Peru ? the Peruvian military gov-
ernment wants normalization of rela-
tions with Cuba and strongly favors
the presence of Cuban speakers at the
coming Buenos Aires meeting. Cuba
and Peru now are embarking on
several large fLshmeal and shipping
construction projects.
Opposition voiced
Paraguay ? President Alfredo
Stroessner's anti-CommunLst regime
Is strongly opposed to lifting sanctions
against Cuba.
Uruguay ? the military-backed
regime of President Juan M. Borda-
berry is opposed to lifting restric-
tions.
Venezuela ? Both outgoing Presi-
dent Rafael Caldera and incoming
President Carlos Andres Perez have
stated their willingness to help put an
end to the sanctions.
Mexico ? the only Latin-American
country which refused to sever rela-
tions with Cuba. It is favorable to
inviting Castro to the Buenos Aires
meeting.
Approved For Release 2001/08/0P CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330006-5
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330006-5
LOS ANGELES TIME,S
23 May 1974
Chile:
oral and Political Blindness
Because of the Chilean military establishment's
tradition of staying out of politics, the world was
disappointed when its generals staged a violent
coup last September. The Marxist government had
proved an abysmal failure; the economy was in a
state of near collapse; the people were so fed up
With shortages and a 1,000% inflation rate that
they almost certainly would have voted the Com-
munist-Socialist coalition out in the next national
election.
- Inside and outside Chile, however, there was a
Widespread expectation that, because of their non-
political tradition, the military men would behave
honorably and, before long, restore the normal
democratic process.
It isn't happening. The cruel reality is reflected in
the statement, issued by the Roman Catholic
Church in Chile, accusing the four-man military
junta of creating a "climate of insecurity and fear"
through torture, arbitrarx arrest and detention,
and dismissal of workers for political reasons.
The Committee of Cooperation for Peace in
Chile, an interchurch group sponsored by the Cath-
olic and Protestant churches and by the Jewish
community, has compiled reports of hundreds of
cases of torture Since the junta took over. A three-
member mission of the International Commission
cif Jurists also reported, after a visit to Chile, that
political prisoners had been subjected to "various
forms of ill treatment, sometimes amounting to
severe torture."
Spokesmen for the generals call such reports
"distortions," but large numbers of Chileans know
otherwise. Almost anyone can be , denounced
anonymously and disappear, and relatives have no
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
29 May 1974
idea as to where. Estimates or the number of politi-
cal prisoners range up to (3,000. Some :38,000 people
are said to have been fired from their jobs on the
Teal or imagined ground that they supported the
former Marxist government.
In some cases, those fired are people who actually
%upported the coup at the time it occurred; their
mistake lies in criticizing the junta since then.
? There is n6 evidence that the suspension of civil
liberties is a temporary aberration that will end.
when the last Marxist guerrillas are rooted out.
? The generals didn't stop with outlawing the
Marxist parties. They suspended activity by all the
political parties, including the Christian Demo-
crats. Gen. Augusto Pinochet, junta president, re
cently told a gathering to "erase from your minds
the idea of elections."
Christian Democratic leaders fear that their par-
ty is being put to death as a political force, that
when the generals finally decide to return Chile to
civilian rule, they will not call free elections but
hand power over to the right-wing National Move-
ment.
This is a horrifying situation in a country that
for years had a functioning democracy, a substan-
tial middle class, a comparatively good educational
system?and no recent history of Brazilian-style
military coups or political repression.
Ironically, through moral and political blindness
the junta is not only creating a tragedy for the
Chilean people but is also making the Marxists
look better in retrospect than they have any right
to lo*. By doing so, the generals may be paving
the way for the very thing they are trying to
avoid: the ultimate ascension to power of a revo-
lutionary Marxist government.
U.S.-Latin trade warning
Latin America is troubled anew
by Washington's seeming incon-
sistencies on trade policy. At the
very moment Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger was recently
promising Latin-American for-
eign ministers easier access to
? United States markets, Treasury
agents were in Brazil and Co-
lombia looking into allegations
that exports from those countries
receive government subsidies.
If the agents do indeed find that
certain exports are so subsidized,
"countervailing" duties, equiva-
lent to the subsidy, will likely be
Imposed on those exports. In pro-
ceeding with its probe: Treasury
'has dusted off an obscure law,
seldom invoked in the past appar-
ently because the Secretary of the
Treasury, using his broad dis-
cretionary powers in such mat-
ters, had decided against it. Just
why the law is being invoked now
is open to speculation.
What is not open to speculation,
however, is Latin-America's bit-
Approved For
terness over the whole matter.
The immediate focus of Trea-
sury's probe is fairly narrow:
Brazil's annual export of $81 mil-
lion worth of footwear to the U.S.
and Colombia's $8 million sale of
cut flowers. But there is concern
throughout the hemisphere that
the whole affair will widen. As if
to confirm this view, there are
new reports from both Washington
and Buenos Aires that Treasury is
about to launch a similar in-
vestigation into Argentina's $60
million a year footwear export
trade to the U.S.
The Latin Americans point out,
with reason, that all nations, in-
cluding the U.S., use various overt
and hidden subsidies to stimulate
their foreign trade. Why, they ask,
should they be penalized for doing
so? In the first place, if there is a
special relationship between the
U.S. and the nations of Latin
America, as Dr. Kissinger said,
why single out Latin America on
the subsidy issue?
Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-R0P477-00432R000100330006-5
In answer to one U.S. spokes-
man's unofficial comment that the
subsidy probes are being initiated
because of balance df payments
problems, Latin America points'
out that these problems have noth-
ing to do with Latin America.
Actually, the U.S. has a solid $700
million trade surplus with the
area.
It all seems a sorry com-
mentary on the current state of
Latin American-United States re-
lations. Perhaps Dr. Kissinger
will be able to use some of his
persuasive powers on Treasury
and other branches of the adminis-
tration ? once he frees himself
from his preoccupation with the
Mideast ? to get this knotty prob-
lem solved. It ought not to be too
difficult to solve ? to everyone's
satisfaction. But if something
isn't done soon by Washington
to get a mutually satisfactory
compromise, Latin America will
have every reason to doubt Wash-
ington's sincerity in the trade
arena and on the whole gamut of
Latin Afnerica-United States rela-
tions.
^