OPINION ON BEING CENSORED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1974
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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25X1A
CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No, 9
1 JULY 1974
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
1
GENERAL
20
EASTERN EUROPE
29
WESTERN EUROPE
31
NEAR EAST
32
AFRICA
35
FAR EAST
37
Destroy after backgrounder
has served its purpose or
within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Foreign Policy
Number 15, Summer 1974
Opinion ?
ON BEING CENSORED
by John Marks
In places like Santo Domingo and Saigon,
the local authorities on Occasion object
to the publicationof certain news stories and,
as a result, papers roll off the presses
With gaping blank spaces. Americans abroad
seem to react to this phenomenon in two
I ways: They smile knowingly at the
foolishness of trying to suppress the truth,
I and they say that such heavy-handed
I censorship could never occur back home.
I 'Yet in June, a critical book which Victor
Marchetti and I have written about the
ICentfal Intelligence Agency will be published
I With blank spaces scattered throughout its
.400-odd pages. While the United States still
maintains higher standards of press freedom
than a banana or domino republic, it was ?
the U.S. government?acting on behalf:
of the CIA?that demanded that these
deletions be made, and so far at least two
Federal courts have upheld the
government's right to censor, although one
. judge?ruling essentially on technical
grounds?refused to allow 85 percent
of the government-requested deletions.
There seems to be a tendency in the
foreign affairs community to discount our
case as being of little import to others.
But if the government succeeds in muzzling
? us, then a legal precedent will be established
that the government has the right to rule on
the acceptability of writing done by
virtually all former officials. The public,
as a result, may well be deprived of one
of its principal sources of information about
American foreign policy. Also, aspiring
bureaucrats may become reluctant even to
enter government service when they realize
that their prospective employer can
assert lifetime control over their work.
The same legal action taken against
Marchetti, as a former CIA official, and
taken against me, as an ex-State
Department officer, could be used to
force a future George Kennan to submit his
Memoirs to State for prior approval.
Jr could even require Leslie Gelb, a former
Defense official now with the New York
Times Washington Bureau, to send all his
copy to the Pentagon before giving it
to his editors. Those prospects should be
disturbing even for people who
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' disagree with our premise? that if there is
ever to be meaningful reform of the CIA and
the rest of the intelligence community, then
the public and the Congress must have
a better idea of what these clandestine
agencies are?and are not?doing.
Carefully Nurtured Myths
Marchetti and I strongly believe that our
First Amendment rights have been violated
and that the only possible justification for ?
government-mandated cuts in our book
would be strict adherence to the standard set-
forth by Justice Stewart in the Pentagon
Papers case, namely that disclosure would
"surely result in direct, immediate and
irreparable damage to the Nation or its
people." However, we believe that there
is no daMuging material of that sort in the
book, although we do acknowledge that
publication might puncture a few carefully
? nurtured myths about the CIA; might
embarrass some Agency officials;
might cut down the frequency of cer-
tain ongoing "reconnaissance" activities
every bit as provocative aid as dangeroui ?
as the ill-fated U-2 Rights over the Soviet
Union; and might even put some pressure
on Congress to exercise a degree of control
over American intelligence.
The CIA has a different view of the
case. What is at stake, according to the
government lawyers, is the sanctity of
contracts entered into by all officials
authorized to handle classified information
and, beyond that, the ability of the .
-
government to keep secrets.
High officials of the CIA have attached
extraordinary importance to the book,
devoting, by their own admission. thousands
of Agency man-hours to deciding what
should be censored. Their absolute control
over their .employees?both past and
present?seems threatened, and they claim
that if this control is weakened, the
"national security" will be also. But this
argument confuses national interests
? with bureaucratic interests.
Marchetti and I are both ex-bureaucrats,
and when we joined, respectively, CIA and
State, we signed so-called secrecy agreements
in which we pledged not to "reveal" any
"classified information" without the
permission of our chiefs. The government
maintains that these agreements bind us
to silence for the rest of our lives. Yet, until
our case arose, most government lawyers.
?and indeed the CIA's own Office of
the General Counsel?did not believe that
the agreements were enforceable in the
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eOurts.1 In fact, no legal action was taken
to hold Daniel Ellsberg to his agreement even
after the government received advance ?
intelligence that he was trying to release
the Pentagon Papers; nor, of course, was.
any action ever taken against Lyndon
Johnson,' George Ball, John Kenneth
Galbraith, Roger Hilsman, or any other
of the many former officials who have made
unauthorized use of classified material in
their post-government employment writing.
But after the Supreme Court ruled in :
June 1971, in the Pentagon Papers case,
ithat newspapers could not be blocked
from printing documents on the Vietnam
j war that the government claimed were
. classified, the Nixon Administration sought
I new ways to prevent unauthorized
j disclosure. In its effort to tighten the lid,
:the White House created the infamous
Plumbers. Other government depart-
ments devised their own strategies.
! It was the CIA, in April 1972,
, that came up with the most original
"legal" approach: the idea of applying
judicial prior restraint against a potential
' discloser of information, Victor Marchetti.
The CIA knew Marchetti was planning
to write a book, according to a sworn
affidavit from a CIA man named Robert
R. B. Lohmann "assigned to the Agency's
offices in New York City," because it had
received a copy of Marchetti's outline, along
with a draft magazine article by him,
!"from a confidential source, who has
!provided reliable information in the past."
(Unless the CIA was lying and actually
stole the outline and the article, that
"confidential source" had to be connected
with one of the six New York publishers
to which Marchetti submitted the
material, since no other copies existed
,outside his possession. That the CIA, which
is legally forbidden from domestic
;operations, apparently has spies inside
1New York publishing houses is one
of the most disquieting but least noticed
;aspects of the case.)
Carefully avoiding the civil libertarian-
inclined bench in Washington, D.C., the
? CIA went into an Alexandria, Virginia
Federal District Court, seeking a permanent
injunction against Marchetti, which would
require him to submit all his future writing
In a classified document, CIA's Assistant General
Counsel John D. Morrison, Jr. wrote in 1966: ?The
problem of protecting official government secrets
and related material, in our free society deadloched
Cs it is on the Constitution with its attendant
Bill of Rights, has long plagued the intelligence com-
munity. Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides ample
legal sanction following acts of espionage, sabotage
and unlawful disclosure of classified information;
however, with the exception of the injunctive powers
granted the Atomic Energy Commission under Title 42
USC 2280, there is currently no truly effective legal
weapon, in use, whereby CIA or the intelligence com-
munity can protect classified or related information -
from disclosure front withan. even given informa-
tion to the effect that s_ __.crch a cfsclowhis tont
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?
?"factual, fiction, or otherwise"?about
,the CIA or intelligence in general to that
Agency for advance approval. Former
Director Richard Helms swore that
Marchetti's unabridged work "will cause
igrave and irreparable harm to the national
defense interest of the United States . .."
The heart of the CIA's position, however,
was contained in another affidavit, stamped
"Secret" and submitted by Thomas H.
Karamessines, the head of the Agency's
Clandestine Services.
, The effeet of this classified filing?
which while part of the r:krrt's records
still cannot be revealel?was initially to
prevent even Marchetti's lawyers, from
the American Civil Liberties Union, from
viewing the most important document
the CIA was using against their client?a
seemingly clear infringement of his right-
to counsel. The government waited until
four days before the case was scheduled
for trial?a week after the original papers
:Were served?before giving security
clearance to the ACLU lawyers. Furthermore,
' it insisted that any expert witnesses for
Marchetti wo'uld have to be cleared before
:they could become involved in disputing
the "Secret" aspects of the case. When a
list of experts, was submitted, the
. government refused to approve two:
'Richard Barnet of the Institute for
Policy Studies and Princeton University
Professor Richard Falk. Barnet chose
not to dispute the matter, but Falk ?
demanded that the presiding judge, Albert
V. Bryan, Jr., order him to be cleared.
The government resisted, on the grounds
that Falk had recently visited North
Vietnam and also because he had told
an FBI agent that he agreed with
Ellsberg's release of the Pentagon Papers.
The government was, in effect, trying
,to disqualify Falk as a witness for the defense
because he actively opposed Administration
policies: Even Judge Bryan found this
unreasonable," and he ruled that Falk
should receive a clearance.
Finding and clearing expert witnesses
' was a lengthy process for- Marchetti's
law yers?aprocess not made any easier
by the reluctance of most of the best and
the brightest of the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations, several of whom had
used classified documents in writing their
own memoirs, to take the stand in support
of Marchetti. Some, after being apprised of
what was wanted, did not return phone calls
to Melvin Wulf, the Legal Director of
the national ACLU. Others said that they
were reluctant to become involved, and
still others reported that they believed the
government did have the right to censor
Marchetti's work. Those willing to challenge
the government on the issue_ismidition
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ere Ab niChages, who had been
usk.'s S te Department Legal-
dXsor; Mc;#iton Halperin, ex-Deputy
Assistant S,LEretary of Defense;
and Paul/13lackstock, a professor and
; former/intelligence official. ?
Just' A Contract
O? t May 15, 1972, a one-day trial was
held in Judge Bryan's court to determine
whether Marchetti 'should be put under
? permanent injunction. Despite the efforts
of the ACLU lawyers and their expert
witnesses to introduce First Amendment
arguments, Judge Bryan, in essence,
accepted the government's premise that the
only issue to be discussed was the
enforcement of a contract. He ruled out
testimony on matters such as the public's
right to know what its government
is doing, the constant leaking of classified
,information by government officials,
the legality and the misuses of the whole
classification system, and the selective
Iprosecution ,of Marchetti.
' Furthermore, since the bulk of the
:government's case was classified, the public
?including Marchetti's family and
friends?was barred from most of the
proceedings. .1.s -a result of these closed
sessions and the "Secret" affidavits, media
coverage was very limited. At the
preliminary hearings and the trial itself,
reporters were reluctant to wait outside
in the corridors to try to learn what was
happening, especially since all participants
were forbidden from discussing the key
elements of the case.
White every American does not have the
inherent right to have news reporting of
his or her legal difficulties, the decision to
cover a trial should belong to the press, not
the government. Ideally, the glare of the
media should have no effect on judicial
proceedings, but in our less-than-perfect
world?in case after case involving
civil liberties?public attention can make
a significant difference in both the
government's tactics and the judge's reactions.
In any event, the government carried
the day with Judge Bryan, who put
? Marchetti under permanent injunction.
At the appellate level later that spring,
- Judge Clement Haynsworth affirmed the
CIA's right to censor Marchetti. but added
the following qualifications: only "classified"
? information could be excluded; information
already in the public domain-could not
be excluded; nor could facts learned by
Marchetti after he left the CIA be excluded..
In December 1972. the Supreme Court.
by a 6-to-3 vote, refused to consider the case
?possibly because the majority agreed
with the lower courts' decisions or because
1ST
the case was not "ripe," since Marchetti
had not yet written his book.
It was shortly before the Supreme Court
announced that it would not review the.
case that I became involved in the.book.
Faced with the government's legal :
pressure and other problems, Marchetti
asked me to co-author the work. We spent
the next nine months writing. With his
injunction hanging over our heads, we were
barred from discussing our progress with
,Daniel Okrent, the editor assigned to us by,
our publisher, Alfred A. Knopf.
In July 1973, about a month before we
Inished the first draft, I received a letter
"from Charles N. Brower, the State
Department's Acting Legal Advisor, which
indicated that State had "received
information" about my involvement and
was thereby issuing a "formal request"
!that I provide my work to State for prior
!clearance. On the advice of counsel at the
IACLU, 1 ignored Brotver's letter, knowing
ifull well that Marchetti would have
Ito sub-mit the same manuscript to the CIA,
from which State could get a copy.
The CIA received our draft on August 27,
1973, and, within the terms of the
!injunction, had 30 days to review it. At the
end of that period, Acting CIA General
Counsel John S. Warner wrote, "The
iUnited States government has determined
? that proper classification of the manuscript
; is TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE," and said
'that the book could only be published if We
deleted 339 items,. 15 to 20 percent
;of the book.
Shocked and somewhat dejected by the
CIA's wholesale hatchet job, Marchetti
,and I spent four hours late on a September
afternbon sitting in an ACLU conference
'room along with our chief lawyer, Melvin
Wulf, cutting up our own manuscript
with x-acto knives. Some of the CIA-cleared
pages wound up looking like pieces of
:Swiss cheese; others had huge holes in them
through which one could peer out. The
easiest pages to eliminate ;were the 17 on
which the CIA claimed that every last ?
word endangered "national security." As
painful as the task was, we had little
choice but to do the CIA's actual scissors
work for it, since the only way we could
legally show the work to the publisher
was to first make the deletions ourselves.
Then, as on numerous other occasions,
we were forced to follow the extremely
restrictive rules laid down by the government
and largely enforced by. Judge Bryan.
Secretaries had to receive security clearances
before they could type our legal briefs.
At times, our lawyers could not retain ?
possession of various "Secret" legal
documents related to the case but had to read
3 them while the papers were still in the
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physical possession of the CIA. Depositions
on the most routine matters were -
classified and thus required special handling.
We had to ignore the great number of
loutside experts who might have been
:consulted informally because such people
still had tb be approved by the government.
We did have one small glimmer of hope
when the CIA made its demand for the 339
? deletions, as a result of an accompanying
offer to talk the case over. In early October,
Marchetti and Wulf sat down with CIA
and Justice Department lawyers to see
. what the government had in mind:
, (I did not attend because we did
not want to acknowledge that the CIA
? had any jurisdiction over my work.) At that
:meeting, the government lawyers largely
;remained quiet while Marchetti and Wulf
listed reasons why certain deletions
were particularly outrageous?in some cases
pointing to books or newspaper articles
in Which the alleged classified material was
; printed; in others, explaining how
Marchetti could not possibly have learned
the informtition while he was in the
CIA, 'since the events occurred after his
1969 resignation.
Shortly after this session, the CIA granted
,us permission to print 114 of the original
319 deletions, and in the following months,
the Agency twice authorized publication of
! large chunks from other offending passages.
By the end of February 1974, the CIA had
i"voluntarily" cut back its list of deletions
i to 1687?less than 50 percent of the number
with which it started.
Once-Forbidden Passages
While the CIA's reduced demands might
be thought, in some quarters, to show
reasonableness, a look at the restored material
, indicates that much of what was originally
censored was so un-secret as to be ludicrous.
A few examples of the once-forbidden but
now acceptable passages illustrate the point:
> A statement that former Director Helms
had mispronounced the name "Malagasy"
at a National Security Council meeting.
(Ironically, the CIA did not choose to
censor the fact that at .the same session
President Nixon called the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff "Admiral Mormon.")
.> All reference to CIA ownership
; of Air America, even though this connection
has been widely written about for years.
>A chart showing the size and budget
of the CIA and the rest of the intelligence
community?data which Senator
, William Proxmire had read into the
Congressional Record in similar form.. .
> Two references to the Tom Charles
Huston domestic surveillance plan, approved
and then Supposedly rescinded by President
in 1970. This document was printed
14
in its entirety in the New York Times
and it was from that newspaper
that we learned of these particular
domestic spying efforts.
While admittedly there is other censored
information in the book which is Of greater
substance than the passages cited above,
these examples would seem to indicate that
.at a minimum the CIA overreacted to our
-work. In our case, at least, the? Agency's
sensors have proved to be arbitrary and
.capricious Savonarolas, whose constantly
_changing definition of what will damage the
; "national security" would be laughable if it
did not do violence to the First Amendment.
In any event, despite the CIA's alleged
charity, we decided, in October 1973, to go
back into court to challenge the remaining
deletions, both on a practical item-by-item
basis and on broader constitutional
grounds. Significantly, Knopf joined us in
this new legal action, thets making a
final (and very expensive) commitment
to publication 6f the book. In the view
of the ACLU, the inclusion of the publisher
in the suit (called Knopf. Marchetti, and
Marks v. Colby and Kissinger) strengthened
our claim that the, government was not
so much enforcing a contract as interfering
with the publication of a book.
The Oovernment's initial reaction to the
suit was to file a countersuit asking Judge
Bryan to-put me under a permanent
injunction identical to Marchetti's. Thus
the club of prior _restraint was to be
extended beyond the CIA to yet another
government agency, the State Department.
As the new suit progressed, again in
Judge Bryan's court, the government, if
anything, was more unreasonable than
in the.first case. It refused to clear any expert
witnesses for our side, claiming they were
not needed by us, since the injunction against
Marchetti left to the CIA, not to the courts,
the power to say what was classified
and hence must be deleted. Similarly, the
government refused to submit any evidence
showing that the 168 deletions were
indeed classified because, in its view, the
simple say-so of the four CIA Deputy
Directors?men all authorized under the
executive order governing classification
to be "classifying officers"?was suffcient
proof, even though the government
admitted that the decisions on what was
actually classified were questions of
"judgment." Judge Bryan did not agree
with the government on either issue
and ordered it to clear witnesses and show
documentary evidence.
The prospect of again bringing a few
experts into the case so alarmed the
' The State Department's suit against me was satted
in March by a torment agreement th..:t joined me to
Marchetti's Injunction for the purpo.us of this book
but which does not bind me in the future.
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CIA that Director Colby offered to make a
personal appearance before the judge?in
camera, of course?to explain why giving
"Secret" details to these additional
people would endanger the national security.
Bryan rebuffed Co/by's personal plea and
let stand his order that the experts be cleared.
In February, the government appealed
? this decision, thus threatening to put off
the trial, which was scheduled for the
end of the month, and further postponing
our publication date, which had already
been stalled for over six months. Obviously,
at that point, time was not on our-side,
so we finally accepted a compromise under
which the government agreed to clear
one?and only one?witness, Morton
Halperin, and we dropped our insistence
on having others. Even more effectively
than in the first case, the government
, had succeeded in limiting the scope of our
i position in court by controlling the
number of witnesses we could use.
During this same pretrial period, the
government moved to have Marchetti
and me puein contempt of court, alleging
that certain information censored from
:the manuscript had later appeared in the
,media. , Five examples were cited in a
"Top-Secret" letter addressed to Judge Bryan,
, including interviews the two of us had
taped with Canadian TV, news stories from
the Washington Post. and the New
. York Times, and an article in Harper's.
Judge Bryan decided, after looking at the
material sent to him by the government,
that he did not believe that the injunction
,had been violated and that he was "not
inclined" to take action.
The Key Questions
The trial opened on February 28,-1974.,
and lasted for three days. Judge Bryan
would not accept testimony on the
'constitutionality of the so-called secrecy
, agreements, nor would he listen to
First Amendment arguments, although
we managed to preserve both these
issues for futare appeal. Thus, the three
questions we were allowed to dispute were:
(I) 'Whether we had learned of any
of the deleted material after we had left
government service. Although perhaps
25 percent of the deletions fell into this
category, we had great difficulty proving
it without naming our sources, which we
refused to do and which Judge Bryan
insisted we do to back up our claim.
Consequently, in most cases the Judge
lumped together the fruits of our
post-governnient employment independent
research with the material we had learned
at our respective agencies.
(2) Whether any of the deletions were
already in the public domain. On this ?
question, the JAilifreffeeiftiotifteWner201:6Y08104 :
contention that even if information has
already been revealed in the media, it may
remain classified until it has officially
been put on the record by the government.
In an interesting commentary on the
limited civil rights of former official,s,.
Bryan admitted that his ruling puts -
"Marchetti and Marks in a position of
being unable to write about matters
that everyone else has written about. But
they are different from 'everyone else'
because Of their former employment and
employment agreements." Bryan went
on to say that with our "former employment
status as an added credential." our
discussing classified information is "quite
,different" from a news reporter's or a
congressman's doing so.3
(3) Whether any of the 162 deletions were
in fact classified (not whether they had
been legally and properly classified in the
'first place). Throughout the trial, the
government contended that the simple say-so
of the four CIA.Deputy Directors was
sufficient proof that material was classified.
.Judge Bryan disagreed, ruling "the ipse
dixit of the Deputy Directors.. . is not
sufficient, and cannot suffice if the First
Amendment rights of these plaintiffs or
others like them are to survive. If the
reasonableness of classification is not to be
subjected to judicial review, then adoption of
such a standard would leave plaintiffs'
First Amendment rights unprotected and
,subject to the whim of the reviewing
official." While Bryan's pretrial ruling that
the government must show our lawyers
documentary proof of classification indicated
how he felt on this issue, in his words, "It
was only after the plaintiffs' expert Halperin
I testified that his examination of the
'govont-nent's documents revealed only
,12-13 instances where the documents
supported the classification determination,
that the documents were offered in evidence."
? On the whole, Bryan found that the
document's proved nothing. The CIA?as
ever, obsessed with secrecy?pruned and
? mashed these papers to such a degree
that Bryan found Most of them lacked .
"specificity" and some were "so thoroughly
excised as to be meaningless as evidence."
? Apparently, the CIA was so concerned that
additional secrets would be introduced into
the closed proceedings that it held back proof
even when additional information would
have supported its case. Thus, the Judge
ruled that we could publish 140 of the 168
deletions on the grounds that no evidence of
classification had been provided.
? Judge Bryan was not the only person to speak about
our credibility. Under cross-examination, William
Nelson, the head of the CIA's Clc:n,lestine Services.
? conceded that only the truth can be cici.sified;
falsehoods cannot be and thus could not be deleted
from the book. While Nelson surely had no
such intention, we were gratified to be his testimony
in support of our accuracy.
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Naturally, we were pleased that Bryan
was allowing us tq print so much of the
deleted material. Yet, we were still disturbed
that the government's right to censor its
former employees remained intact. While we
won on an essentially technical question of.
,evidence, the next time the government
tries to block a former employee's book, if
should be smart enough to bring in sufficient
documentation. Moreover, we anticipate
that the government will now institute new
procedures for handling documents to
provide the "specificity" on what is or is
' not classified that Judge Bryan found
lacking. For example, bureaucrats will
probably be required to classify material
;.on a paragraph-by-paragraph .or even a tine-
by-line basis so that every fact deemed
sensitive will be individually noted.
! " There is such a thing as an authentic
? "secret." Marchetti and I do not dispute this
point. We completely reject, however, the
notion advanced by government lawyers that
anything the executive branch decrees
is classified?and now, with Judge Bryan's
modification, that can be shown to be so
marked?can be excluded, without any
appeal to Justice Stewart's standard, from
our book or any similar one. Giving
such editorial control to an agency like the
CIA allows it to cut not only material which
is already on the public record but also
information that might publicly embarrass
and hence politically weaken it. To give
a specific instance, one of the passages in our
book that the CIA insisted on dereting
concerns some dubious financial practices in
the sale of an ostensibly private research
THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
11 June 1974
THE APARTMENT building
is ordinary and, inside, all
:the:cloors look alike. Behind
t.rotie lives a lawyer; behind ?
:another, a secretary; behind the
another is a secret school for-
from
spey Washington
think-tank owned by the Agency. If this
kind of possible conflict of interests is
worthy of censorship, then it is not too ,
difficult to accept the fact that 'burglarizing
a political party's headquarters can be
justifiied to. protect the "national .security-"
We are appealing the case on First
Amendment grounds, and the government is
appealing the specifics of Judge Bryan's
ruling. .Considering the length of time that
will be involved, however, Marchetti and
I decided?and Knopf agreed?to bring the
book out in June with actual blank spaces
to indicate where the deletions are. There
will be only 27 blanks rem...ming if higher
'courts can clear the material restored by -
Judge Bryan in time, and we are optimistic
that this can be done, since his decision
hinged on a question of fact (insufficient
evidence) rather than on a vastly more
complicated question of law. Hopefully,
later editions will include all of the deleted
material, but waiting any longer would
only hurt the book's timeliness and further
serve one of the CIA's original purposes:
blocking publication. Readers should see
, more than enough, even in the censored
version, to accePt or reject what we have to
say. And white authors might be reluctant to
admit it, blank spaces can often read
more eloquently than actual words.
After all, one of the book's main themes ,
is that the CIA as an institution is both
repressive and inept. We believe that the
censored book will give living proof to our
argument. With no apologies to McLuhan,
the book has become the message, and the
message is the book.
MARTIN SCHRAM,
visitor. It is not neces-
sary. The trainer is blessed
.* with a rich, clear voice. It can
ispies. ? ? . ? .. be heard while lounging casu-
?
On a sunny spring day,
three men in business suits
.enter the building, take the
.lift to the fourth floor sand
:.step into the apartment. They
are. carrying attach?ases.
.The routine is regular. They
.come during daylight, stay a
efew hours-and leave. Always*
the same apartment. The
apartment is rented in the-
,name of a husband and wife
?but nobody seems ever to
have seen the wife and the
husband doesn't spend his
,nights there.
? A visitor takes note of this,
and one day, while walking
along the fourth floor corn--
'dor. he hears a man's voice
coming from inside the apart-
:went.
? . . microdot . .1'
". . . KGB . ..7 ,
The voice, It becomes
apparent, belongs to the
trainer. No electronic* eaves-
dropping equipment or any ,
.other device is ever used 1)), 6
ally in the hallway against
the. wall opposite the apart-
ment door. If can be heard
even better in the laundry
room, across ,the way, where
the cement-block walls create
an echo-chamber effect.
. Usually background music
plays in the apartment, per-
haps as, a precaution against
being overheard. The trainer's
voice carries above the music.
hut the voices of the students
do not. .They speak more
soitly?their comments come
in a decided foreign accent.
One day' the trainer is
lecturing on how a spy can
avoid being followed. "Go to
three or four locations in a
city?like a wide-open square.
Go to the first one and look
around. See who's there.
Then go to -a second place
far removed. Look around.
If you see any of the
same faces, you're being fol-
lowed." Then class is overfor
the day. When the spies-in-
training 1'eye ? they walk
several blocks and enter
another apartment" building
where they seem to feel very
much at home. They emerge?
a short time later on a corner
balcony several storeys above
the street and proceed to take
in the afternoon' sun.,
It is easy to follow the
trainer. He takes the lift
down to the basement garage
and drives out .in a blue
sedan. The car has Virginia
licence tags and an Arling-
ton. Virginia inspection
sticker. A check of the sticker
registration reveals the
trainer's true identity.
On occasion, the school for
spies has another visitor who
drives a Volkswagen. On a
rainy day, he gives a couple
of the other students a ride.
His car has Maryland licence
tags. A registration check
.reveals his identify as well.
? A Newsday reporter tele-
phones the Rockville., Mary-
land, home of the man with
the Volkswagen. A relative
answers. "He's not here." the
relative says. "He's at work."
In response to questions, the
? I r - .
relative adds: "I don't know
his phone number at work
... he works for the Govern-
ment . I don't know which
agency or which branch of
the Government . . . He.
doesn't tell me anything.
_....That's the way they are
and I don't ask."
It seems a good time to
call the CIA.
A Newsday reporter tele-
phones an official at the CIA,
headquarters. The reporter
identifies himself and says he
wants to try, to verify the
employMent of three men. He
gives the names of the man,
in the blue sedan, the man.
with the Volkswagen.
The official, explains that
such requests cannot usually
, be fulfilled. Maybe this time,
the reporter says, adding that
'he is concerned because:
" If they are not ours, then
they are probably theirs.'
The CIA official checks and.
cane back with the answer.
"Thee are our guys," be
says. "You've come across
something that is quite useful
and legitimate. It's a training
exercise. There is training
going on at various times and
-various places.
"This is all rather ember-
?rassing."--Newsday.
?,?\PProvetivoriqe:rea-re-M1-1113/0 / CIA-RDP77-0043R000100330b0477
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
WASHINGTON POST
23 June 1974
THE CM AND THE CULT OF INTEL-
LIGENCE. By Victor Marchetti and
John D. Marks. Knopf. 398 pg. $8.95
By LAURENCE STERN
through blackmail, terrorism, murder,
sabotage and "psywar." We are talking
about programs of disinformation (a term
of the art for counter-propaganda) di-
rected against United States audiences,
as well as manipulation of the news the-
dia.
The Watergate scandal has shown us
that the CIA, for all its vaunted acumen at
THERE WAS A PERIOD last year when the intelligence game, was played for a
the timing seemed right, when Congress patsy (and that is the charitable view) by.
finally had political grounds to conduct the White House to help stage a disinfor-
that long-overdue examination of the op- illation and espionage operation against
erations of the Central Intelligence Daniel Ellsberg at a time when he was
Agency. campaigning against the resumption .of.
High-ranking CIA officials were troop- bombing of North Vietnam.
Ing up to Capitol Hill in frequency and The presumption of innocence on the
numbers approaching the level of high part of the CiA. shrinks considering the'
school seniors at Easter recess. Agency behavior of CIA Director William E.
men who not long ago would have rather Colby in the fall of 1972 upon being ques-
swallowed the pill than be caught within tioned by former Watergate Prosecutor
sight of still cameras were suddenly pi- Earl J. Silbert about the identity of the
rouetting before four separate congres_ White House official who first requeited
sional committees. ? . CIA assistance for E.,Howard Hunt. Col-
The men from tile agency came with by's response, at first, was evasive. He
their impassive faces and sharply circum- "danced around- the room for ten min-
scribed testimony designed mainly to utes," by his own admission, before Sia;
."distance" their place of employment bert finally pinned him to the wall with a
from the political crimes of Watergate. direct question. The answer was John D.
But as soon as senatorial questioning be- Ehrlichman. Colby explained afterwards
ganhlundering into the CIA's own busi- that he was reluctant to inject a name so
controversial as Elnlichman's into the
ness the answers trailed- off into calcu-
lated obscurity, as a visiting homicide case.
squad detective might be rebuffed for In doing so, he camp within a hairline
asking the price of the house.
of obstruction of justice. Had it not been
What was the extent of the CIA's role in for Silbert's persistence?and perhaps
the Chilean coup? Was it involved in the the feet that Silbert knew the answer to
junta's take-over in Greece? Is there any his own question?Colby might have sue-
prospect of more large-scale CIA opera- eeeded in willfully concealing informa-
tions such as the war in Laos? What is the tion from a government prosecutor in a
extent of the agency's domestic Pending criminal case. .
operations? Watergate must indeed have brought a
The answers came back, engraved with special anguish to the CIA. For the White
politeness, but ungiving: "To the best of House, in trying to put the Watergate
my knowledge, Senator, no." "I, would be monkey on the agency's back, used some
happy, Senator, to go into that a little of the same techniques that have been
more in closed session." "We have no evi- employed by the CIA in its own opera-
deuce of that, sir." ' ' tions. There 'was the diffuse charter of
And yet these questions were all symp- "national security" through. which the
tomatic of the need for a serious and com- White House operatives sought to stall
prehensive oversight job on what the CIA the FBI investigation of Nixon campaign
is up to, what iort of checkreins there are funds through Mexico, to arrange for co-
to its covert operations targeted within vert payoffs of the .Watergate suspects, to
the United States as well as abroad. The disseminate a cover story that the Water-
need has existed. The political opportu- gate burglary was a CIA operation, and so
nities are rare. ' . forth. .
This is not to question the legitimacy of The agency was, in effect, being tar-
intelligence gathering or the need for. geted as a decoy by the president's office
forms of state security in the American which was dipping into the classic black
government, cOnsistent with what we con- bag of dirty tricks.
aider to be the base price that must be Hunt and his Cuban proteges, then in
p :3 id f1:0: m - -1-1illg pn c,.n ser;,,. Ti:e the pay of the Committee for the Re-Elec-
-0-11:i r , ' , ? 7 - : ),- ro 7 ? ,, ,.: . 1-, _ ' : ,,,.? - .1 ti on of Ihe President (CREEP) were so in-
gently to the operational programs of the grained in the ways of their alma mater'
CIA's clandestine services which are con- at Langley, the Clandestine Services,
ducted beyond the that they seemed to be genuinely incapa-
pale of public assent to serve often ques. ble of drawing the distinction between
tionable interests in achieving dubious serving the United States government
goals by illicit means. . and carrying out the sleazy schemes of
What we are talking about is United the White House-CREEP Politburo.
States financial manipulation of foreign As an example of what they call the
elections and domestic political proc- "clandestine mentality" John Mark; and
esses, the mounting of coups, toppling of Victor Marchetti cite this exchange be-
governments, bribery of nubile officials, fore a federal grand jury between Hunt
clandestine programs of 19Pf64IPl REgindstagnalliagiSaAtebilaiRI3RUPOCSIB.
bert has asked whether Hunt was .a
that he had participated in "what migh
'commonly be referred to as illegal activi
ties."
HUNT: I have no recollection of any,
no, sir."
SILBERT: What about clandestine
activities?
HUNT: Yes, sir.
SILBERT: All right. What about that?
HUNT: I'm not quibbling, but there's
quite a difference between some-
thing that's illegal and something
that's clandestine.
SILBERT: Well, in your terminology,
would the entry into Dr. Fielding's
(Daniel Ells berg's psychiatrist) office
have been clandestine, illegal, nei-
' ther or both?
HUNT: I would simply call it an entry
operation conducted under the aus-
pices of competent authority.
These are the values Of the appar-
atchik, which had become pervasive
among the sad young men of the Nixon
White House. It is the moral code of the
black side of most espionage services as
well as, we must reluctantly conclude, the
top side of the CIA.
Congress has had the chance to bite at
the apple and run the risk of corrupting
its own innocence. But no one was willing
to take on a confrontation with executive
authority. No one even was able to formu-
late the right questions other than those
bearing on the extrication of the CIA
, from Watergate.
1 And so the function of oversight contin-
ues to be abdicated to daily journalists
and writers of books. It is not an alto-
gether fruitful alternative. Books rarely
generate legislation. Daily journalists
are not equipped to penetrate the- rein-
forced armor of secrecy by which CIA is
shielded from public scrutiny.
Leaks from within are self-serving.
What passes for candor by top CIA offi-
cials in the congressional hearing room is
the frankness of the schoolboy standing
before the brained canary and denying
.all, with his sling shot in his back pocket.
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence is a
welcome addition to the body of litera-
ture which constitutes the only form of
genuine oversight being currently prac-
ticed. Both Marchetti and Marks are for-
mer practitioners 'of the intelligence
trade and were privy to some of its se-
crets. There is the inevitable bias of the
analyst against the dirty tricks boys.
John Kennedy learned the dismal las-
son in the Bay of Pigs 13 years ago that
Clandestine Services tends to operate
within its own narrow world of assump-
tions and political theology. The atmos-
phere of the clandestine shop is conspira-
torial, paranoic and action-prone. It
reeks with suspicion of social and politi-
cal change on the left.
Marks and Marchetti take us through
the sometimes familiar, sometimes new;
sometimes deleted catalogue of covert in-
terventions and patterns of secret propri-
etorships and domestic activities which
have flourished in a vacuum of resound-
ing public indifference since the agency
2 Fietrome 30004171strumen.t.of executive
7
(
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
THE ITN REPUBLIC
22 JUNE 1974
py. Story
power in the early 1950s.
The book represents a triumph of de-
termination by its authors, the publishing
house of Knopf and the American Civil
Liberties Union, which defended the
manuscript against a partially successful
effort to censor it. Melvin L. Wulf, legal
director of the ACLU, notes in the intro-
duction that co-author Marchetti was the
first American writer to be served with an
official censorship order issued by a
United States court.
His case, along with that of Marks,
raises two interesting constitutional
issues: (1) the power of the government to
abridge by a contractual oath of secrecy,
the First Amendment rights of govern-
ment employes; and (2) the authority of an
executive agency to classify information
by mere post facto declarations that it
is classified. In the battle of the book
.?the CIA was able to produce no proof that
much of the material it wanted to excise
was in fact classified.
At this point in the still-pending appel-
late court fight the government has pre-
vailed on the first question and the au-
thors prevailed on the second issue.
One of the consequences of the Mar-
chetti-Marks case is that William Colby
has asked for new authority to bring crim-.
inal charges against any government em-
? ployee authorized to receive classified
'information. The proposed legislation
.also would empower the CIA director to
.define what is classified?thereby cir-
cumventing the district court's ruling in
the matter of Marchetti and Marks.
An indicator of the quality of that judg-
ment is that when the CIA's original 339
*deletions in the manuscript were submit-
ted to a test of classification they were
reduced to 168 by negotiation and then to
27 by judicial review. Unfortunately the
book went to press before the judge's fi-
nal decision and so The Cult of Intelli-
gence is adorned throughout with that tal-
ismanic word of our time?(deleted)--to
tantalize the curious and bolster the
sales. -
If tile Colby proposal were in effect at
the time Marchetti and Marks had under-
taken publication of their manuscript
this review would never have been writ-
ten. Both would probably be ipjaiL O
8 -
Approved
The CIA and the
Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti
,and John D. Marks
(Knopf; $8.95) .
Diplomacy at its best is chess rather
than poker, a game played with visible
pieces rather than hidden cards. Thus
the function of a peacetime espionage
service is to provide the information
with which diplomats can bargain with
their adversaries. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency lias performed that job
admirably over the years. In 1962, using
data obtained from electronic devices,
its experts were able to detect the build-
up of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and that
knowledge served President Kennedy's
successful effort to compel the Kremlin
to retreat. Nor would the interim agree-
ment with the Russians on the limita-
tion of strategic arms have been possi-
sble unless the US negotiators had,
possessed dettils on Soviet weapons
deployments. ? _
But such valuable services represent
the smaller portion of the CIA's activi-
ties. Its predominant role has been to
pursue an assortment of unsavory clan-
destine political and paramilitary oper-
ations, and these suggest that our lead-
ers have subsidized and 'encouraged an
organization that is not only dedicated
to illicit actions abroad, but also, as the
Watergate scandals have revealed4 has
cooperated in criminal conduct at home.
Victor Marchetti, a former CIA em-
ployee, and John D. Marks, who once
worked for the State Department, have
written a study of the agency's doings
that has .obviously'touched raw nerves.
In an attempt to suppress their work,
the *CIA has dragged them through the
courts, and the case is not yet over. The
unfinished legal hassle prompted the
authors to go into print with a volume
in which more than 140 passages have
been deleted. Yet its Swiss cheese qual-
ity curiously reinforces rather than di-
minishes the book's credibility, which
is further strengthened by its sober, al-
most dull literary style. One is tempted
to speculate that it might have eluded
public notice had not the CIA chosen to
fight its publication, and so the agency
'merits a nod of gratitude for having un-
wittingly launched it in the direction of
the best-seller list. The book deserves
wide readership because it illustrates
the extent to which, despite our rhetori-
.cal devotion to self-determination of
nations, we have been violating the
sovereignty of foreign states.
Marchetti and Marks correctly empha-
For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
'size that the CIA is not an autonomous
monster, but a White House tool acting
under orders. This is doubly alarming
in my opinion, since it underlines the
fact that the agency's egregious covert.
operations have not been aberrations,:
but were carried out in the pursuit c;,f
high policy shaped by our most distin-
guished officials. The authors recall
such familiar clandestine maneuvers as
the CIA's successful putsch against
-Iranian Premier Mohammed Mossadegh
in 1953 and its abortive attempt five
years later to overthrow 'Indonesian
President Sukarno by Supporting insur-
gent for....:s on the islan,d of Sumatra,
'They describe the agency's programs for
training Tibetan rebels to fight against
the takeover of Tibet by the Communist
Chinese, and they hint althe possibility
that the CIA raids against North Viet-
nam in 1964 may have provoked a. North
Vietnathese..- reaction against US de-
stroyers in the . Tonkin Gulf, thereby
handing Lyndon Johnson the pretext to
;win congressional. authorization: for
large-scale American involvement ,
Indochina. - -
Highlighting the degree to which we.
permit ends to justify. means, the auth-
ors relate-a 1969 episode in which :CIA:.
Operatives acting with top Washington
approval permitted.a group of Brazilian:
radicals to. hijack-an airplane aricLert-
danger the lives_ of,its.49 passengers so
that Brazil's security forces could break-.
Op -that country's principal ,revolution.'-.
ary .faction_. pitting:the. _CulturaLReyor
rution in Chirii4O-?:616. mici,-1900.;;;;:the,-
book discloses,,CIA: operativecio;.-tai-
. .
wan transmittedphOny broadcastSCot
rtrived- to reseinble.i.Official CO*41t1Ili.SE
c.ratements. The broadcasts contribtited,-.
the chaos roiling7.China:at-:the;tirne--?
_77...Out they a1sd.misled . thei..agerky's,.
-[1:iwn analysts.- at ..ttOme?. who.-Werernt:x?
ciutd into the.. so-called .!'disinforma;, -
_lion"' effort, 4-
.t.The most interesting section, of' the
-.hook deals with the CIA's proprietorr
?
mpanies. The agency owns one of the-
_ _ .
World's - biggest - fleets Of _aircraft that
'Variously operate-Under 'the. names of
America, Rocky' Mountain .Air and
.Southern Air Transport. Such finis are
.:Indispensable to, outfit engaged .in
,covert activities like moving irregular
iroops and transporting supplies; espe-.
;day in Southeast, Asia. But these coy-
-Vorations have not been held accounts-
Ale. Although theY are theotetically
? ' ? ? _
responsible to the ptiblic, their records
:are classified -and 'even their financial
sbalance _sheets are a:, Secret,--and. that
:raises the question of whether they may
have contributed to the private fortunes
..;of occult business interests:-
.For that matter, though,. to whom is
the CIA itself accountable? The agency
is technically supposed to be supervised
by four different, congressional over-
sight committees, but these groups
'
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
rarely meet, and, when they do, it is
mainly as rubber stamps. Legislative
attempts to reform the oversight system
chronically go nowhere, and they are
likely to remain blocked as long as men
like John Stennis, who runs one of the
Senate committees, believes that "you
have to. . . shut your eyes" to the agen-
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
26 June 1974
cy's activities. The principal casualty in
all this, then, is truth, a rare commodity
these days made even rarer by Presi-
dent Nixon's assertion of a couple of
weeks ago that "we cannot gear our for-
eign policy to the transformation of
other societies." He was, quite clearly,
not referring to Guatemala, Cuba, Chile,
Peru, Brazil, Iran, Vietnam, Laos, Cam-
The uncloakin
The CIA and the Cult of In-
telligence, by Victor Marchetti
and John D. Marks. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf. $8.95.
By David K. Willis
The value of this controversial
book about the Central In-
telligence Agency is not so much
the James Bond-style secrets it
reveals ? though there are some
of those. It is the questions it
forces Americans to ask about the
role of a secret agency in an open
society that make it significant.
Along with so many other in-
stitutions, the CIA has come un-
der searching scrutiny in recent
years, intensified by Watergate
and the agency's role in helping
the White House "plumbers" in
their work against Daniel Ells-
berg. -
This book is perhaps the most
detailed yet to appear on how the
CIA works, but its publication is
also ' a symptom of the post-
Vietnamese disillusion at home
with America's attempt to make
the world over into its own anti-
Communist image.
The authors ? a 14-year CIA
veteran and a former foreign
service officer who has seen in-
telligence operations from the
State Department end ? have
produced a sustained, 400-page
attack on CIA covert activities
abroad ? and at home.
Victor Marchetti and John
Marks believe the secret agency
should be more open, more ac-
countable to Congress, less con-
cerned with overthrowing foreign
governments and more with col-
lecting intelligence about the So-
viet Union, mainland China, and
other nations abroad.
But it is virtually impossible for
the average reader to judge the
veracity of much of the book. The
CIA steadfastly refused to con-
firm (or deny) its contents. Its
two-year fight to block publica-
tion has been waged in a closed
courtroom, amid warnings that
the national interest will be en-
dangered if the proceedings ? or
the book ? reaches the public.
Now the book is well and truly
out ? but does not, to this non-007
eye at least ? appear to rock the
boat of national securikip WSW d Fataekeattp,20
bodia, Indonesia, China or the Congo,
to mention a few places in which the
CIA, under instructions from him or his
predecessors, has intervened in do-
mestic affairs that were none of our
business. .;,
Stanley Karnow
of the CIA
paper readers and close followers
of various other reports already
know that during the cultural
revolution the CIA had sent bal-
loons carrying propaganda sheets
floating from Taiwan across to
mainland China.
They already know that the CIA
had trained the Dalai Lama's
troops after the Chinese had
driven him from Tibet ? though
they may not be aware that
frustrated CIA operatives, des-
pairing that the troops would ever
be unleashed against the Chinese
and retake Tibet, turned to Tibe-
tan prayer wheels for solace.
They already know that CIA B-
26 bombers flew against Sukarno
troops in the late 1950's.
But they did not know that the
CIA set up a "miniature Fort
Bragg" training school deep in
the Peruvian jungles to help Pres-
ident Fernando Belaunde Terry
defeat local rebels.
Nor may they have heard ru-
mors of one particularly exotic
plan in which a CIA agent would
penetrate mainland China's
strategic missile complex carry-
ing two oversized suitcases. The
suitcases would contain an entire,
If small, aeroplane. Mission ac-
complished, the operative would
open the cases, assemble his
aircraft, and fly to safety. The
plan was vetoed by senior CIA
hands....
Again, we meet the Nungs pos-
sibly for the first time. They are a
minority group of Chinese hill
people in South Vietnam, whom
the CIA used to spy on North
Vietnamese troop movements
down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Since
the Nungs were illiterate, the CIA
equipped their radio transmitters
with buttons adorned with pic-
tures of tanks, anti-aircraft guns,
and other weapons.
When a Nung saw such a'
weapon, he would press the ap-
propriate button and if he 'saw
another, he would press it again.
The signals were received at a
base station or by spotter planes
circling above and directing air
strikes accordingly.
If we can assume the authors
know whereof they speak, then we
learn now that an agent can
authorize a covert field operation Monitor's
to the tune of $10,000. Anything
anything over $100,000 must have
the stamp of the director himself.
- We are told that the CIA has an
official strength of 16,500 and an
official budget of $750,000 ? but
that both figures are much higher
when all operatives, merce-
naries, and hangers-on are
counted.
? The authors plead for tighter
congressional scrutiny. Their
main object, however, is to strip
the agency of some of its secrecy,
and to urge that it stick to
collecting and evaluating in-i
telligence.
The CIA has tried to stop publi--
cation of their book ? first by
arguing that Mr. Marchetti is
violating the contract he signed
when he Joined the agency ?
promising not to reveal its meth- "
ods or secrets ? and then by -
invoking national security and the
sanctity of classified material.
At first the agency won an
injunction against Marchetti, and
deleted 339 passages out of the 400
pages, or about 20 percent of the
text. Mr. Marchetti, Mr. Marks,
publisher Knopf, and the Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) fought back and the
agency restored all but 168 pas- ?
sages.
Then the judge upheld the au-
thors' right to restore all but 27.
A CIA appeal on this ruling has
yet to be decided. Until it is, and
all appeals have been exhausted,'
only the first set of restorations ?
appear in this edition (they are
printed in bold type). Blanks -
appear where deletions have been
made.
The reader is left to ask: Can
the U.S. really dispense with all
"dirty tricks" in a world where
opponents of 'the U.S. and what it
stands for do not hesitate to use ?
such tricks against it? Should the '
CIA concentrate more on eval-
uating and on leading the overall
U.S. intelligence community?
Answers to these questions, in- i
volving a redefinition of the CIA's
role, and ways to prevent it from
embarking on another Watergate
adventure, are worth searching
for. This book's value lies in how
much it helps the discovery of
such answers.
David Willis is the
American news editor.
more expensive re
11.1/
uires a nod
1418-: Calk-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
9
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VIRGINIA GAztalE
21 JUN 1974
"New book _Uocurn.eilts\
ai'FeaiV uverations
-
A-NWLY PUBLISHED book examining
le Central Intelligence Agency and its
?orldi.vide operations- contains detailed
escriptions of the CIA's activities at Camp
eary.
The book, "The CIA and the Cult of in-
elligence," (Alfred A. Knopf) was written by
ictor L. Marchetti, former executive
ssistant to the CIA's deputy director, and
ohn L. Marks, a former intelligence analyst
ith the State Department.
1
Marchetti and Marks recount in detail!
arious paramilitary and "intelligence!
tradecraft" courses offered to CIA recruits at!
amp Peary, as well as the !training and;
afeguarding. of foreign nationals who have!
igned on with the agency.
'Camp Peary is used by the authors as an
xample of "the agency's orientation:
march covert action" as early as the mid-!
1950s when the base was acquried by the CIA.:
he 10,000-acre facility, known to CIA em-:
loyees as "the farm," is "the agency's West!
oint . operated under the cover of a!
ilitary base...." ? [
"The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"j
orroborates previous accounts of the CIA's'
nvolvement at Camp Peary given by other!
fanner agency employees. The book also,
xpancis upon allegations made to The
Virginia Gaz6t.te last year by Marchetti:
imself regarding the training of local police!
epartments at the base during 1967-71. i
Training facilities, at. the base ineludei
weapons' ranges, a simulated "closed brder
of a mythical communist country,"1
parachute training towers,- and other!
facilities used for planning special'
operations, the authors wrote.
CIA recruits graduate from the basic
paramilitary courses at Camp Peary and are
sent to a North Carolina CIA base to learn
courses in heavy weapons and explosives.
They also undergo jung!e v.-at-fare instrnetion
at a CIA base in the Canal Zone.
Marchetti and Marks included in their
degcription of CIA-clandestine operations the
account of a former CIA clandestine
operator's training in weap,onry first
published in Ramparts magazine: "The
array of outlawed weaponry with which we
were familiarized included bullets that ex-I,
plode on impact, silencer-equipped machine
l
guns, home-made explosives and self-mad
napalm. We were shown a quick method o
saturating a confined area with flour o
fertilizer, causing an explosion like in a
dustbin or granary.
"The CIA professional ... is involved in
the creative challenge of plotting and or-
chestrating a clandestine campaign without
resorting to violence," the authors wrote.
"The SOD (Special Operations Division, the
agency's 'armed forces') man wages war,
albeit on a small and secret level."
LEVEL."
Marchetti and Marks said in the book
that their intention is to "demysticize" the
workings of the CIA and th,e American in
telligence coriiiiiimity, especially the:-
agency's fixation with covert operations.
"There can be no doubt that the
gathering of intelligence is a necessary
function of modern government," the authors
stated. But then they asked of the CIA,
"should it be permitted to function . . . as an
operational arm, a secret instrument of the
presidency?"
When Marchetti began work on the book
in 1972, he was served with a federal court
injunction prohibiting him from publishing
anything about the CIA without first sub-
mitting the manuscript to the agency for
review. The injunction was based on a
secrecy agreement signed by all CIA em-
ployees upon hiring;
The CIA originally deleted 339 passages
from the book, but relented on 171 of them.
The reinstated passages, which include most
of the Camp Peary allegations, were printed
in boldface type.
A statement issued by the CIA last
Wednesday said the agency "identified for
deletion those portions of the manuscript
which were classified, were learned during
Mr. Marchetti's employment with the CIA,
and had not been placed in the public domain
by the U.S. Government."
Marchetti said in a telephone interview
Monday that the censored manuscript por-
tions relating to Camp Peary were reinstated
by the CIA as a !result of prior newspaper
accounts or the base.
10
roved-Ear-Release.2111111.0,81
WASHINGTON IOST
26 June 1974
CIA Seeks
r New' Power to
Halt Leaks
By "Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer
Legislation that would sig-
nificantly broaden the govern-
ment's power to bring crimi-
nal sanctions against employ-
ees or government contrac-
tirs for disclosure of intelli-
gence secrets is being circu-
lated within the Nixon admin-
.
istration. ?
The measure, proposed by
Central Intelligence Agency
Director William E. Colby,
could also empower him to
seek injunctions against news
media to prevent them from
publishing material he consid-
ers harmful to the protection
of intelligence sources and
methods.
Colby's draft would give the
CIA director more statutory
muscle to define national se-
curity secrets and punish
transgressors than ever be-
fore.
Its appearance comes against
a background of court battles
on national security secrecy is-
sues ranging from the Ells-
berg case to the book, "CIA
and the Cult of Intelligence,"
written by former government
intelligence officers Victor
Marchetti and John Marks.
The book, the first to be pub-
lished in the United States af-
ter pre-publication censorship
by the federal government,
went on sale yesterday.
Had Colby's proposal been
law a year -earlier the book
might well have never seen
the light of day and the two
authors would have been sub-
ject to 10-year prison sen-
tences and $10,000 fines.
Under existing law, how-
ever, the best the CIA was
able to do was invoke the se-
crecy oaths signed by both
men as grounds for a civil ac-
tion requiring them to submit
their manuscripts in advance
for government clearance.
The government won the
first round in the courts when
the binding nature of the se-
crecy oaths was upheld. But
Marks and Marchetti chal-
lenged the CIA's demand, on
grounds of classification, for
some 350 deletions in the man-
uscript. After adjudication of
their countersuit before U.S.
District Court Judge Albert V.
Bryan Jr., in Alexandria, the
number of deletions was re-
&iced to 27.
Bryan required the agency
to go beyond the more asser-
tion by Colby and tour CIA
deputy directors that material
In the book was classified. He
asked the CIA to demonstrate
P77-00432R000100330004-7
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In each instance the basis for
classification. Much of the
trial was held in a closed
courtroom.
Under Colby's proposed
amendment to the National
Security Act of 1947, the CIA.
director 'would be empowered
to determine the ground rules
for classification under a gen-
eral grant of responsibility for
protecting "intelligence
sources and methods."
The Colby proposal would
exempt news media from the
criminal provisions of the law.
But the draft language could,-
according to informed offi-
cials, enable the CIA director
to trigger injunctive action by
the Attorney General against
"any person" ? presumably
including journalists ? before
or after an act of disclosure.
In the Pentagon Papers
case, several Supreme Court
justices, particularly Thur-
good Marshall, cited the ab-
sence of any statutes to sup-
port the government's effort
to prevent publication of the
Vietnam documents. Colby's
proposal would strengthen the
government's hand in this re-
spect.
'Colby submitted the draft
measure to the Office of Man-
agement and Budget to circu-
late through the bureaucracy
for comment before it is intro-
duced in Congress. In a trans-
mittal letter to OMB Director.
Roy L. Ash. Colby observed
that in "recent times, seri-
ouf damage to our foreign
intelligence effort has re-
sulted from unauthorized dis-
closure of information related
to intelligence sources ,and
methods."
? He did not specify what that
'damage was.
LOS ANGELES TIMES
19 June 1974
$6 Billion a Year Spent
on Spying, Authors Say.
Much of Funds Wasted by Supersecret
'Intelligence Cult,' Book on CIA Contends
WASHINGTON RI?The
authors of a contested
book about the CIA con-
tend the federal govern-
ment is spending about $6
billion a year on intel-
ligence and covert activi-
ties, and that much of it is
,wasted.
The Central Intelligence
Agency itself, they say,
has an authorized strength
of 16,500 but employs tens
of thousands more as
mercenaries, agents, con-
sultants and so on. And
they say its authorized
budget of $750 Million
yearly does not include
hundreds of millions more
provided by the Pentagon.
Their book, "CIA and
the Cult of Intelligence,"
argues that a cult, which it
calls a secret fraternity of
t h e American political
aristocracy, seeks to furth-
er foreign policies by
covert and usually illegal
means.
The book was written,
after litigation going back
more than two years, by
Victor Marchetti, a former
executive assistant to the
CIA's deputy director, and
John D. Marks, a former
State Department official.
Marchetti has been or-
dered by -the federal
courts to publish nothing..
-of a 'Classified nature that.:
I. he learned as a CIA em-' ?
; ploye. - ?
When he Submitted his
manuscript to the agency
. for approval last October,
it ordered that 339 pas-
sages, ranging from single
words to entire pages, be
'deleted..
.2 After extended discus-
sions with the authors and
their attorneys, the CIA
agreed to reinstatement of
all but 168 of the deletions.
An additional 140 passages
'were cleared for publica-
'tion hy a federal judge,
but appeals to higher
'courts have held up their
publication.
. Alfred A. Knopf is pub-
lishing the book with
blank spaces. indicating
,the deletions and with the
reinstated passages set in
bold face type. Among the
latter are the references to
the CIA's !manpower and
budget.
? The CIA last week
?
contest major parts of the.
manuscript "does not con-
stitute an endorsement of
the book book or agreement-
-with its conclusions."
, A major conclusion of
the book is that the intel-
ligence Community is,
dominated by a clandes-
tine mentality that thrives
on secrecy and deception,
preventing Congress and
the public from knowing
what is being done in their
names.
? "It encourages profes-
sional amorality?the be-
lief, that righteous goals
can be achieved through
? the use of unprincipled
and normally unaccepta--
ble means," Marchetti and
Marks write.
"Thus, the cult's leaders
must tenaciously guard
their official actions from
public view. . . With the
cooperation of an acquies-
cent, ill-informed Con-
' gress, and the encourage?
ment and assistance of a,
series of Presidents, the,
cult.' has built a wall of
laws and executive orders_
around the CIA and itself,
a wall that has blocked ef-
fective public scrutiny."
They say that the desire
for secrecy has led.high of-.
rficials? to lie about CIA
volvement in such things
'as- the Bay .of Pigs inva-
sion and-. the U-2 spy,. -
flights over the Soviet
Union. They say lies were
told also about the CIA
role in an abortive attempt
to overthrow President
Sukarno of Indonesia in,
1958 and about its role in
the Congo in the early-,
1960s. ?
"Contrary to denials by
President Eisenhower and
Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles, the CIA ?
gave direct assistance to
rebel groups located on
the island of Sumatra,"
the authors say of the Su- '
karno incident.
"Agency B-26s even car-
red out bombing missions-,
in support of the insur-
gents . . . ?
"The agency-also became
deeply involved ? in the
chaotic- struggle whic h,
broke out in the Congo in
the early 1960s. Clandes-
tine service operators re-
gularly 'bought and sold.
? ?
IP,46t4Tik?
Approvedtig6leR44128871irio
that its aecision not o Pile a
'eY' and arMS 'to the suppor-
ters of Cyril Adoula and'
Joseph Mobutu," the book
says.
-
The agency was created
in 1950 to gather intel--
ligence and-to coordinate
:the intelligence activities
of other -federal depart-
ments, but, the book says,
it now devotes about two-.
thirds of ' its funds and
manpower for covert oper-
ations and their support?
a ratio relatively constant
for the last 10 years.
"The CIA's primary: task
is not to coordinate the ef-
forts of U.S. intelligence or,
'even to produce finished
national intelligence for
--
-the policy- makers," thW.,
authors say. "Its job is, for.i
better or worse, to conduct'
the government's covert.
foreign policy."
The CIA has refused to
comment on specific parts,
of the book other than toi
say it "did not correct or 1
contest the publication of
factual errors in the "man=
uscript." 4
It said it had reviewed,a%
number of book manu-
scripts by former em--
ployes a.:,d that "in no case
has the agency attempted
to- suggest editorial
.Changes of the authors'.
opinions or conclusions,"
000100330004-7 11
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(
WASHINGTON POST
24 June 1974
Colson: Nixon Suspected C
- ? By Rudy Maxa
, Washington Post Staff Writer
In the days before he
walked into a federal court-
'room to enter a guilty plea
4.
,early this month, Charles W.
Colson made a startling series
of allegations about President
Nixon's fears of a Central In-
telligence .Agency involvement
In the Watergate scandal. -
Colson, once among the
President's most trusted
White House aides, gave his
account during two . bizarre
evening confessionals with
Washington private investiga-
tor Richard L. East at Bast's
home in McLean, Va.
In the course of the conver-
sation Colson told Bast that
President Nixon confided to
him in January that he was on
the verge of dismissing Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Di-
rector William E. Colby be-
cause of suspicions that the
agency was deeply implicated
in Watergate. .
He also told Bast that. the
President was finally dis-
suaded from launching a full-
scale investigation of the intel-
ligence community by Secre-
tary of State Henry A. Kis-
singer and White House chief
of staff Alexander M. Haig Jr. -
Colson portrayed the Presi-
dent as a virtual captive in the
Oval Office of suspected high-
ranking conspirators in the in-
telligence circles against
Whom he dared not act for
fear of international and do-
mestic political repercussions.
1 -- The former White House
aide told Bast of a January ,
phone-- call from President 1
Nixon after which Colson I
characterized Mr. Nixon as' be-
ing "out of his mind over the
CIA and Pentagon? roles" in.
Watergate.
Colson's underlying suspi-
don, as expressed to Bast, was
that the CIA planned the
break-ins at Watergate and the
office of Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist. The motive: to
discredit the President's inner
circle of advisers.
Colson indicated that the
CIA was concerned that it was
being bypassed on policy mat-
ters and channels of informa-
tion-bearing on national secu-
rity.
This could well be the main I
[line of Colson's forthcoming
testimony to the House Judici-
ary Committee and the Water-*
gate special prosecutor al-
though he has yet to substanti-
ate it with specific evidence.
Colson first went to Bast on
May 13. on' the recommenda-
tion of mutual acquaintances
to discuss the possibility of a'
private
private investigation of the
CIA's role in Watergate. He
returned for another sessinn
, .
beside Bast's lushly landscaped
swimming pool on May 31?
three days before he went be-
fore U.S. District Court Judge
Gerhard.A. Gesell to 'deliver
his guilty ?lea to a charge of
obstructing justice.'
Bast, who has largely re-
tired from private investiga,.
Lions to conduct.a highly spec-
ulative commodity futures,
'fund, and other business inter-'
ests, disclosed the substance
of the'conversations on the ba-
sis of his records and an un-
derstanding 'with Colson that
Bast would be free to speak,
about it after Colsgn was sen-
tenced.
Colson 'was sentenced last'
-Friday to a one-.to three-year
jail term and $5,000 fine.
1 Watergate investigators said
that Colson had told them
about some of the same allega-
tions he made to Bast. Some
of those charges, they said,
are being looked into.
. Haig and Kissinger declined
through. spokesmen to com-
ment on the Colson account.
'One of the most detailed as-
sertions Colson made to Bast
concerned a March 1, 1973,
memorandum by a high-rank-
ing CIA official dealing with
the agency's relationship to
the. Washington 'public rela-
tions firm of Robert R. Mullen
& Co.
Mullen is the firm which
employed Watergate conspira-
tor E. Howard Hunt Jr. after
he left the CIA and before he
was hired as a member of the
White House "plumbers" unit.
Colson said he was allowed
to read the 25-page memoran-
dum drafted by Eric W. Eisen-
stadt, chief of the central
cover staff of CIA's clandes-
tine directorate, last ,Decem-
ber at the home .of Sen. IIow-
ard Baker (R-Tenn.); vice
chairman pf the Senate Water-
gate committee.. ,
The existence of the classi-
fied memorandum -has been
confirmed by Watergate inves-
tigators. Colson summarized
the contents of the Eisenstadt
memo for Bast as follows:
? Robert Mullen, founder of
the public relations firm, com-
plained that former CIA Di-
rector Richard M. Helms
"twisted my arm hard" to hire
Hunt.
? Former CT 1 Director
James R. Schlesinger, who
succeeded Helms, now De-
fense Secretary, endorsed a
suggestion by Eisenstadt that
Mullen and Robert Bennett,
an associate in Mullen's firm,1
be permitted to read FBI and i
CIA memoranda on witnesses!
who should not be interviewed
in the Watergate case. The
Mullen firm was directed to
"lie if necessary" in denying
any association with the CIA,
Bast said he was told.
? The Senate Watergate
committee was informed of
the times and places of at,
'least 300 break-ins conducted'
convicted Watergate bur-
.glar Eugenio Martinez.
? Bennett, the son of - Sen.
Wallace Bennett (R-Utah),
bragged to the CIA of favora-
ble news treatment in the na-
tional media, including News-
week and The Washington
Post, for stories he plan,ted to
discredit the President's top
White House advisers. _
A prominent Charlotte,
N.C., lawyer with CIA connec-
tions reported after a, plane
ride NVith Sen. Sam J. Ervin
Jr. (D-N. C.), chairman of the
Senate Watergate -committee,
that Ervin would steer clear of
CIA involvement in Water-
gate.
(The lawyer named by Col-
son told The Washington Post
he was indeed a friend of Er-
vin but denied either suggest-
ing or receiving assurances de-
scribed by Colson.)
? Bennett reported to the
CIA that "through his father,
Senator Wallace Bennett, he
could handle the Ervin com-
mittee if the CIA could handle
E. Howard Hunt? (Robert
Bennett denies having told
that to the CIA.)
Colson told Bast that he
made the unusual approach to
the private investigator in or-
der to get proof of the extent
of CIA's Watergate role on be-
half of himself and H. R. (Bob)
Haldeman, John D. Ehrlich-
man, John N. Mitchell, Robert
C. Mardian, Gordon Strachan
and Kenneth Parkinson, de-
fendants in the Watergate
cover-up conspiracy case.
He also told the detective he
.wanted information on who
was "financing" John W. Dean
III and also a closer look at
the circumstances or the plane
crasli which took the life of
Hunt's wife, Dorothy, in De;
cember, 1972.
In explaining his motives in
seeking the investigation, Bast
related, Colson said: "I'm in-
terested in getting out of my
problems but I'm more inter-
ested in straightening out
what's going on in the country
right now."
The former White House
aide who has recently pro-
claimed himself a witness for
Christ spoke with high emo-
tion of his concern over the
CIA. "If this happens with us,
it could happen to any Presi-
dent," he told Bast.
But Colson acknowledged
that "what is exculpatory for
me is if I am able to expose
the fact that there was a ma-
jor plot by the CIA and they
were responsible for the
,eover-ups throughout the' in-'
yestigation."!
In the early days of the
'Watergate scandal President
,Nixon,. through Haldeman and
Ehrlichman, sought to delay
the FBI's investigation of
_Nixon campaign donations
-funds funnelled through Mex-
ico' on grounds that it might
-expose covert CIA activity and
? itiperil national security. The
President later acknowledged
that his fears were groundless
as far as the Mexican funds
were concerned.
Bast said he would, under
certain conditions, consider
unaertaking an investigation
of alleged illegal CIA influ-
ence directed at the White
House. r
Those conditions, he said,
Included the authorization of
grand jury subpoena power,
full presidential backing and
the appointment of an addi-
tional special prosecutor. But
!Colson found no takers at the
; White House, as far as could
be determined, though Colson
told Bast the President was
"enthusiastic" about the idea.
i During his two conversa-
tions, Bast said Colson por-
trayed the CIA as a "frigh-
?tening" power operating with'
no congressional or execu-
tive branch control.
He disparaged the chairmen-1
of the House and Senate CIA
oversight subcommittees and
told Bast that "almost every-
where you turn" the CIA has
its "tentacles." Colson indi-
cated his belief in the perva-
siveness of the CIA- encour-
aged him to ask acquaintances
to recommend an incorrupti-
ble investigator.
Bast, 41, a child of Washing-
ton's Southeast blue-collar dis-
trict, developed a reputation
for flamboyance, toughness
and blunt talk during his
climb into diversified business
activity from the ranks of pri-
vate investigators. ("My fees
start at $100 an hour, I accept
one case a year only if I find
it interesting," he told
Colson). Bast told Colson . at
the start' of 'their conversa-
tions that the Nixon adminis-
tration "tore the Costitution
to shreds." .
"I'm not saying that's not
true," he quoted Colson as re-
plying. "But I'm not sure that
the guys who are going after
us now aren't doing more dis-
service to the country," Colson
was quoted.
Bast said he told Colson
that "perhaps your whole crew
maybe belongs in jail" but not
if "they (the special prosecu-
tor's staff) violated your con-
stitutional rights."
"They've been violated sev-
eral times," Colson replied
glumly. He offered no speci-
fics but commented on the
overwhelming strength of
Watergate Special Prosecutor
Leon Jaworski's prosecutorial
staff against an individual de-
12
.-APP4P-14.194/9,8.1?C,WRQP77,-00432R000100330004-7
Approved For Releate 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
fendant.
"You know how strongly I
feel, about all this?" - Colson
asked Bast three days before
pleading guilty. "You're ,going
to think I belong in an asylum
when I tell you this: I've
thought about walking into
that courtroom Monday [June
3] before Gesell and saying 'I
want to plead guilty? "
# "I told him in that case? '
he'd have to go to jail," past
said.
WASHINGTON POST
25 June 197j,_.
Allegation.
Is Denied
By Colson
Former White House aide
Charles W. ?Colson denied yes-
'terday' any knowledge of an
' allegation attributed to him
that President Nixon was con-
sidering firing Central Intelli-
gence Agency Director
Hain E. Colby.
? Colson was responding to
published assertions by Wash-
ington: private investigator
Richard L. Bast growing out
of two lengthy conversations
between the two men at Bast's
home last month.
In the course of those dis?
cussions, according to ?Bast,
Colson claimed the President
had told him he was consider-
ing firing Colby .because of a
suspected CIA involvement in
the Watergate break-in and
cover-up.
The former White House
aide acknowledged that he
'had met with Bast "in confi-
dence in an effort to explore a
passible professional relation-
ship." He said that "none of
the statements I made to Mr.
Bast were intended for public
'consumption."
. Bast, in response to Colson's
statement last night,- said,
"Mr. Colson was either lying
when he talked to me last
month or he was lying in his
press release" on the subject
of the President's alleged
statement about Colby.
"I will swear under penalty
of law to my veracity," Bast
said. "After. hearing his state-
ment this evening, I doubt
that.. Mr. Colson will do the
same." The investigator said
the former Nixon ' adviser
agreed to release him from
"any 'bond of confidentiality"
after Colson's sentencing in
-U.S. District Court.
Colson said he talked to
Bast "in a very offhand fash-
ion, largely exploring theckiviti,
LOS ANGELES TIMES
26 June 1974
High Court Rejects Suirto Force
Public Disclosure of CIA Budget
BY RUDY A.BRAIIISON ',class' to .liti e. these numerous teder al
Time4 Staff Writer
WASHINGTON? Thel'
Supreme Court l'uesdayl
rejected a Pennsylvania.,
'man's ? 'suit to force .;the;
Centraf Intelligence Agen-
cy-. to Make public- its'I
,budget, Which is now hid-1
t-den in appropriations for]
other federalogencies4;
? The 5-4 decision, reveiV;
ing art opinion by the'rdi
Circuit" Court of Appealst
.in Philadelphia; held that.'
William B, Richardson-.
had .no 'standineto Sfileiin
;federal courts for clisao-?'
sure of the secret bildget:',.
Chief Justice Warrerr,E.
k, Burger, Spea" ling for
?Majority, said ?a taxpayer,
could not -Use the'courts to
air. a` '-gene.ral grievance.'
about' the e On duct Of'
govertunent: . ,
"In a VerY:real sense," he:
"
said," the absence of any
particular individual or
for many of which I had been
unable to obtain factual sup-
port." ? : ?
- Rep. Lucien Nedzi (D-Mich.),
chairman of the House Armed
Services Intelligence Subcom-
mittee, said his panel has had
for many months a 25-page
CIA document which Colson
-described in 'his conversations
.with Bast. Nedzi said the
memo, written by Eric W. Ei-
senstadt, chief of the CIA's
central cover staff, produced
no conclusive evidence of an
? undisclosed implication of the
agency in the Watergate scan-
dal. ?
The document, said Nedzi,
summarizes relationships be-
tween the CfA and the Was%-
ington public relations firm
.of Robert R. Mullen & Co.
The Mullen company em-
ployed convicted Watergate
conspirator, E. Howard Hunt
Jr. after he retired from the
CIA. It also provided a pH-
:vote cover for CIA operative5
at two of its overse-is offices,
according ? to intoned aft.
cials. .??
Senate Watergate commit-
tee sources also denied an
allegation attributed by Bast
to Colson that the commitee
had been told of 300 break-ins
by Watergate conspirator
Eugenio Martinez.
? .In his statement. Colson
said yesterday that he would
"explain my views and what-
0 tgiVAMV2VPIre ell
claims gives support to the
, argurnent that the subject
matter is committed to the
5 surveillance of Congress,i
E and ultimately to the po-
litical process.
"Any other conclusion;
w ou I Cmean th a t the;
founding, fathers intended
to set. UP Something in the;
nature of.-"; an .-?Atheniam
;
democracy or "aNew Eng:
?land town nye e t in g to
oversee the condttct of the;
national government by.
means of lawsuits in feder-
al courts."
? It is generally estimated
that the CIA ;has: an? an-,
nual budget of $7PO
lion, part of an Overall fed-
eral outlay of $6 billion a:
year for intelligence. The,
actual CIA figure, as welii
as the total budget, is di-;
vulged only to key mem-
bers of Congress.. -
Officials have defended
secreay .of the total budg,,
ets, not to Mention de-?.
tailed breakdoWns; on the
g r . that--disclosure
wouldhe of great valtie to
potential enemie'S Of the
United States. .
The Richardson s u I
seeking public disclosure
of CIA expenditures,: had'
been dismissed in a- fed
eral district court irt Penrv..i
,sylvania. But in July 1972?:
the appeals court 'ordered;
the case tried.
The Justice Department:
argued that a decision re-
quiring disclosure would.,
set off a flood of' -citizen
challenges in the courts to
cgrams, ; ,
f. Binger waS joined in tli&
majority by justices Byron
R.- White, .I-Iarry Black-.
amn4 Lewis; F. Powell and
William H.F? Rehnquist.,
In concluding that a tax-:
payer has no standing to
air in ;het courts:a general.:.
1,z grievancq, against govern.: t
ment conduct or allocation
' of power; Burger noted:.
.that this "does not impair;
;the right to assert his
views in the political for-
_ .
r'uni or at the polls."
-"Slow, cumbersome and:
responsive though the tra.
rditional electoral process
rnay be 'thought at times,"
)he Said, "our system pro-
ides" for changing mem-'?
'ihers of the political
,branches when dissatis-
'lied citizens convince a
'sufficient number of their
,fellow- electors that elected
representatives: are cletin,
quent in Performing du-
ties committed to them." .
' In dissent, Justice Wil-
liam 0. Douglas argued
that Richardson was not
*making "generalized com-
plaints." . : ? -
:- "They do hot even chal=
lenge the constitutionality
of the Central Intelligence
-Agency acts," he said:
-"They only want to know
the amount, of 'tax. money
exacted from them that
goes into CIA activities.'
'Secrecy of government ac-
quires new sanctity when
their claim is denied."., ?
8 : CIA-RDP77-004321W0100330004-7
THE WASHINGTON POST ? " 'Sunday, funs 23,1974.
estions Abound Forgery
of,ThiiIL Death Cable
By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sometime during the
Christmas week of 1972,
then-acting FBI Director L.
Patrick Gray III took a
sheaf of classified docu-
ments from his Stonington,
Conn., house and burned
them with assorted paper,
ribbons and -bows collected
during the seasonal gift-giy-
ing. ?
? According to later -testi-
mony by Gray, he glanced at
one of the documents before
burning it and was shaken
by what he read. "I do not
recall 'the - exact language,
Gray testified later, "but the
text of the cable implicated
officials of the Kennedy ad-
ministration in the assassi-
.nation of President Diem of
South Vietnam."
? The cable was a forgery,
latbr, admitted to by Water-
gate conspirator and some-
time .White House,. "plumb-
er" E. Howard Hunt
and the full sotry ? of its'.
? fabrication and purpose has
been slow in unfolding. ?
Now, information in pa-
pers, bled in U.S. District
-Court here last week by at-
Aorneys for former.
;White House aide John D.
?Ehrlichman has created i-a,
juxtaposition of events that. ?
leaves unclear what, if any,.
?relationships 'may exist
ttveen presidential actions
and the Hunt forgery.
? The story goes back to a
'remark made by President
Nixon during a press confer-
ence he held on Sept. 16,
1971, when South Vietnam
was preparing to hold an?
'election with incumbent
President Nguyen Van
Thief' running unopposed.
Mr. Nixon was asked what
he thought ,about using
"leverage" to "redeem the
situation."
In response, Mr.' Nixon'll
said, among other things,
that if the suggestion was
that "the United - States
should use its leverage now
to overthrow Thieu, I would
remind all concerned that,:
the way we got into Viet-
nam was through overthrow-
ing (President Ngo 'Dinh)
Diem and the complicity in
the murder of Diem...." ?
President Nixon's state-
ment about United States
"complicity" in the assassi-
nation of Diem did not
bring any follow-up ques-
tions from reporters or cre-
ate any stir among them af-
ter the press conference. Ac-
cording to one participant in,
the press conference, the
charge of American complic-
ity in Diem's death was com-
mon enough in Washington
circles that it might easily
go unremarked by reporters.
President Nixon may still
have been interested two
days later, however,. in the.
coup that overthrew Diem
and took his life. ccording
to a brief filed in ti.s. Dis-
trict Court here last Thurs-
day by lawyers for Ehrlich-
man, "discussions on Sept..
,18, 1971, reflect the Presi-
,dent requesting that Ehrl-
ichman have Room 16 em-
ployees obtain documents
on the Diem coup to pre-
pare for-an upcoming press
conference."
Room 16, located in the
Executive Office Building.
was the headquarters of the
special White House investi-
sgative unit know as "the
plumbers."
Two days later, orL_Sept,
20, 1971, according to the;
U.S. State Department,
White House aide David
Young, later revealed to be
one of the plumbers, phoned
the State Department and
asked that -Howard Hunt be
:given access to cable traffic'.
to and from Saigon for
p?
m-idd of April 1 through Nov.,.
30, 1963?a period that
in-
eluded the coup.
? According to State De-,
partment spokesman Char..t
les?..?.W. Bray, Hunt ob-
tained copies of 240 cables
from the State Department.
It is -not clear Whether:
Hunt has - access ,to doeu-
ments in the State Depart-
ment piior to the Sept. 20
call from Young. According
to Hunt, whose sworn testi-
mony before a federal grand
jury in April 1973 was made
public, he discoveped while
examining State Depart-fl cables that "a number
of cables were missing."
Among the cables missing,
,Hunt testified, were some
immediately before and af-
ter the Diem coup and assas-
sination. Hunt said he
checked with the Central In-
telligence Agency, which re-
ceived the same cables, to
see it that agency could fill
in the gaps. Hunt said he
was told that 'the CIA did
not keep cables back to
1963. He said he was told
much the same thing at the
Pentagon.
"And there came a time
when T mentioned this to
Mr. Colson, who I had been'
directing my researches into
the?at the particular period
?the Vietnamese war, and
told him that, in MY opinion,
a lot if stuff that should
have been there had been
extracted," Hunt testified.
"He (Colson) said, 'How
do you account for that?'
And I said, 'Well, some of
the cables that they still
have on hand at the Depart-
ment of State have been-?
roved For Release 2601/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R06M8N1004-7
sent, with date stamps, say-
ing photographed or dupli-
cated for the John F. Ken-
nedy Memorial Library'.
"So I said, Well obvi-
ously, anybody Who had
been given access to the De-
partment of State file for
the purposes of incorporat-
ing them into material held
by the J.F.K. Library would
also have had opportunity to
remove any cables that
could have been embarrass-
ing to the Kennedy legatees.
? "And he (Colson) said,
'Well, what kind-of material
have you dug up on the-files
that would indicate! Ken-
nedy complicity?' , And, I
showed him three ?Or four
cables that indicated that
they had pretty close to
pulled the trigger against
Premier (sic) Diem's head,
but it didn't say so in so
many words. Inferentially,.
one could say there was a.
high degree of -administra-
tion complicity in the actual
assassination of: Diem and
his brother.
"And, he said, 'Well, this
isn't good enough. Do you
think that: you could im-
prove on them?'"
Hunt testified that he re.-.
plied he.could, but not with-
out "technical assistance."
But, Hunt testified, Colson
_
replied, "'Well, we won't be
able to give you any techni-
cal help. This is too hot. See
what you ,can do on your
own.' " . ?
Colson initially denied
giving Hunt any such order
when the story of the forged
cable was first made public.
Colson later altered his posi-
tion to ) say that Hunt may
have acted on the basis of
A misunderstanding.
Hunt produced two cables
that did . not satisfy. him,
but he showed them to Col-:
son anyway, Hunt told the
grand jury. Colson "seemed
to like" the cables, Hunt tes-
tified, so he told Colson.
." 'These will never stand
Any kind of scrutiny. Let's
:be very sure about that.' "
In any event, sometinie
during this same period,
William Lambert, a reporter
for Life Magazine asked
Colson about President Nix-
on's comment about "com-
plicity" in tile murder of:
Diem.
According to Lambert, his
conversation with Colson oc-
curred in early October.
Lambert said Colson told
Aim that materials showing
additional complicity in the
Diem murder on the part of
contatt Lambert and Lam-
bert recalled that he talked -
to Hunt on the phone
shortly after.
Lambert said he and Hunt
spoke first at Lambert's ho-
tel and then again at Hunt's
office at the, Robert R. Mul-
'len Cd., the public relations
:firm where Hunt worked at,
ter leaving the CIA_
Hunt took some photocb-
pies of cables from a manila
envelope on his desk and.
showed them to him, Lam-
bert said. "I started going,
through them and 'they
didn't mean anything to
me," Lambert recalled. "I
told Hunt, 'I don't know,
what you're driving at here.
Hunt fished through 'them"
and pulled out one_ and said,
'Here's your story.' And that
turned out to be the docu-
--ment that was faked. I was'
shocked.' What he saw, Lam-
bert said, amounted to a,
"death warrant" for Diem. ,
Follow;ng these meetings
with Hunt, Lambert said,?he
Went through several,
months after protracted ne-
gotiations with Hunt- in an
effort to get .a photocopy of
the cable. At the same time,
Lambert said, he was trying
to contact Colson. but
couldn't get to him." .
Ultimately, nothing came'
'of Lambert's efforts and the,
matter lapsed until late
April, 1973, when Hunt's at-
tempt to forge the cable was
'revealed publicly. ? ,4
. ? Among a number of qtzes-
-tons that remain unan-:
swered are: Why did Presi-
dent Nixon bring up the,
: Diem assassination in his
Sept. 16, 1971, press
conference? Why' may ,he.
;have asked Ehrlichman, as.
Ehrlichman's lawyers now
Allege, to obtain documents
-on the Diem coup "for an
upcoming press confer-
ence"? For exec:fly what
purpose was Hunt directed
to prepare the forged cables
Implicating President Ken-
nedy in the Diem assassina-
tion?
Mystery also still sur-
,rounds the Diem assassina-
tion itself. No definitive offi-
cial. ,history of what toole
place has yet been made
public, although President
Johnson. according to Wash-
ington Post White House
comspondent Carroll Kil-
patrick told reporters dui.--
mg a discussion or
,riam in August, 1967, "On in-'
structions of ours- we assas,
sinated Diem and then, by
the Kennedy White House God, I walked into it. It was
had been- located. Colson too late and we went.
through one government at.
said he would have someone
14.
c' Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : GIA-RDP77-00432R0001003300044
WASHINGTON POST
21 June 1974
Behi
Assess
By Laurence Stern
"tia.Ainaton Post Staff Writer
At firsi glance :the intet"
nor of the reorn! on the
fourth floor of the Van' Ness,
Shopping Center office
building looks like the many
'dozens of private consulting
,firms scattered in their
smartly appointed quarters
. throughout Washington. r
The neat lettering on the
door says:: "Psychological
,Assessments Associates
,Inc." Admission is gained by
pushing a buzzer and wait-
ing for someone to unlock'.
the door from the inside.
But Walter. P..P,asternak,,
the operating head of psy-,
chological Assessments,'
not anxious to see unsche-1
duled visitors. "We Jhave
thing to say," he told a visit-,1
ing reporter in terse and an-
gry tones, moving immedi-;
? ately toward, the door.
The reason for Pester,.
nak's reticence is that Psy-
chological Assessments, is,
unlike -mut.-- other busi-,
nesses. From tile time of its
incorporation in 1965, its '
principal source of funding
has been the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, which is what
Pasternak does not want to
talk about.
`11.Ve could never have ex;
iited without this support,"
acknowledges the firm's re-
'tiring president, John W.
Gittinger, who . founded it
With two other former CIA
'psycholOgists after they left
full-time employment with
.the agency.
Winger is less reluctant*
' to' talk because he is disasso-
elating ? himself from Psy-
thological Assessments on
-.Tilly 1 and is'proud of the
work it,.has done as well as
his long years of service to
the CIA, to which he is still
personally under contract as
a consultant.
The company won an ob-
7.6
et:
syc ologteal
?
ents' Door, A
scure and perhaps unjusti-
fied mention in the case of
former White House special
counsel Charles Colson, who
pleaded guilty on June 6 to
an obstruction of juct_7:...ta
charge growing out of his
role in the Daniel Ellsbeig
break-in case.
Colson had asked the of-
fice of the. Watergate special
prosecutor to provide "docu-
ments or records concerning
the psychological profile of
Dr: Ellsberg compiled by
Psychological Assessments,
Inc., for the CIA.",
Gittinger heatedly, flenies
any association with the
Ellsberg profile or, indeed,
any involvement with -the'
White House on Watergate
or national security matters.
"It's an absolute, positive
lie," said the 57-year-old psy-
chologist of Colson's impli-
cation of the company's in-
volvement - in the 1971
"plumbers' break-in of Dr.
; Lewis Fielding's office Inc
Los Angeles. Fielding was
Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
A CIA spokesman said
yesterday the agency will
not comment on whether if,:
has financial or operational'
relationships with Psycho-
logical Assessments. The
CIA has a policy 'of saying
nothing about, its links with
U.S. domestic concerns.
Gittinger acknowledges-
that the company oehind
the undbtrusive door at 4301
Connenticut Ave. NW has
conducted training pro-
grams for CIA operatives
abroad and performed psy-:
chologioal evaluations for
overseas employees or
American firms with for-
eign-based offices or subsidi-
aries. ?
The :ruble of "psychological
assessments " covers a variety
of services which both the
firm and Gittinger, in his
private coosoling role, have
provided the CIA.
It covers the study of bra-
inwashing technioues by for:
eigrt: intelligence organize::
lions that was carried out
by a New York-hased prede-;
cesSor organization to PAA:
called the Human Ecology
Fund.
It also provides training
to CIA employees for asess-
ing the credibility of foreign
intelligence informants. "It's
a question of trying to unr:
derStand whether someone
is lying or telling the truth
when he comes through the
,door and says be' wants to"
give you information," Git-;
tinger explained:, ?
The beginning of the psy-'
cholog,ical assessmekt :pro-
gram, Gittinger related;',
goes back to the early 1950s
when former CIA Director:
Allen*W. Dulles sought neu-
rosurgical treatment for his
son, Allen M., who was seri-
ously injured in Korea, from;
a New York .neurologist,D.'j
Harold G. Wolfe. .
Dulles became interested
in Wolfe's research- into Chi-
nese indoctrination Of':cap-
tured-American pilots dur-
,
ing the Korean war. CIA be-
gan.
financing ? the .research
work through first the Soci-
ety for the Investigation of
Human Ecology, with which
Wolfe was associated, and
then the Human' Ecology
Fund, according 'to
Git-
-tinger. ?
Both 'operated a 'private
research Organization with
headquarters in New York
and with branches overseas.
."This whole project was
' Allen ?Dulles' baby," Git-
tinger explained. "It grew
? out of his son's injury in Ko-
rea." ? . _
Be6use. of the growing
controversy 'over CIA fi-
nancing of private organiza-
tions in the mid-1960s, the
Human Ecology Fund was
abandoned. The controversy
;was touched off .by .disclo-
. .
0 n /'
ercth on
'sure that the agency was
fiwciing. activities.. of.
baled: Olden jaw:.
nalistic and cultural organ-
izatiOns.- - 4--
The Hyman Ecology! Blind
was Spared public- mention
during "thern furor 'over' ":
destine CIA financing. - It.
;folded- quietly. after Git-
tinger moved to Washington,
1 to start Psychological_ As-
;sessmenti Associates Inc:.
Current ,t programe"'by-
PAA, said Gittinger,-' are
strong& pointed toward SE-
.vietChinese and ?Arab-cul-
tural training:: He declined
to discuss ; the. , specific :na,
?.ture of,. ,the - programs -or
whether; PAA.,carried, out
;such programs ..for '-foreign
infelli gene& secuzity or
ganizations.: ?-; '
. :The commercial side of
PAA's activities?screemng
'foreign employees of Ameri-
can firms?has shrunk in.re-
cent years making making the ccniz,
pany almost wholly depeind-
eat on its CIA contracts:i-
emphasized that he
company has never taken; a.
:government or, private-ion;
tract.', which .:involved*.he
;"asSeisinentof- in Allier. i?
cah- citizeii.-i-/We do- abso-
, lutely no domestic' advis--
t ing,"; ,no
said: ."..We
have never been asked tch";
Evaluate an American."'
Gittinger ?and-,,the-k.:-twis4
other ? ex-CLk, : founders
PAA, Robert E. Goodnow-7
-and Samuel -It Lyerly, haver'
'Ended their ? active associa?
:Hon - with .the;?company:-.,Iti
was, understood that fthelt
new operating group is seek-
:ing.,to divest. itself of thet.;
CIA financial sponsorship. r
."I am. very proud of what::
I have done for the agency-,
Oyer along period of time ink,
the assessments field," said;
Gittinger. "There is nothing.
I am ashamed of; nothing .17
have to hide.".:. ? ,
15
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
THE NEW REPUBLIC
29 JUN 19714
An Odd Bit o
Hidden History: De Gaulle's CIA Aide
Charles de Gaulle is reputed to haye been an ultrana-
tionalist who was almost paranoically suspicious of any
foreign intrusion into France's internal affairs. Yet for
several years prior to his return to power in 1958 he
knowingly maintained regular contact with a covert-
' US Central Intelligence Agency operative; partly be-
cause he wanted to preserve a link with America and,
partly because lie was personally attached to the Amer-
ican assigned to keep tabs on. him _ But although the
CIA was able with his own cooperation to Watch de:
,
? Gaulle closely, it failed to perceive that he W?tild.
re-
gain authoritr *and at One stagf.-.ev-en tried_to'bloCk': "?;:
him by financing his opponents; la fact that'Certainly:
did not elude him and may have contributes:1"-th"his
later wariness .of Washington:.:
I encountered this historical footnote the: other day
in the perscinbf John F. HaSey, :the forrner. CIA agent
- attached to de Gaulle. A-slight; easygoing man in his,
-mid-50s, Hasey .compensates for the prosaic pace of his.-
,
I needed you." -
Dedicated as they were to a united Europe under.US
auspices, CIA policymakers during this period feared
that de Gaulle would, if he carne back to power, wreck
? the Atlantic alliance then in its embryonic phase.
Hasey was under instructions to report any moves that
de Gaulle might mi.-ke in. that direction. De Gaulle re-
assured him that heli-ad no intention of toppling the
ieeble-fourth Republic...- Nevertheless Hasey sensed__
that the general would eventually reemerge, and he
so?gHt _to convince the 'CIA of the Wisdom. of cultiVat-
? ingt.:46:aulle;..thui!building u15 ."goodwill"
future He proposed, ; for example,;-:_that the-agency-
..
quietly bring the general to the US for aii.operation:to
. .
rremOyecatara'etS from his eyes..ThZide.awas spurried..;-
Hasey:,Was,perMitted'td provide' with un-
classified for memoirs he was then writing,-.
buti-reC6rrimendation: that the be authPriied -
to receive confidential US analyses Of World affairs Was
rejected According- .t6"Hasey, the US ambassador in.
: Paris at the time, Douglas Dillon, was reluctant to visit-
de Gaulle and only agreed to do so after it was learned:-
. .
that the Soviet envoy was seeing the general regularlY.
;
? At meetings between de Gaulle and Hasey, which
took place about once a month,' the two men remit
nisced or speculated on global inatters:One theme that-
de Gaulle often emphasized, Hasey--reeplls, was,that
? .
the US and the Soviet -Union were countries too large
to govern and would ultimately fragment. That notion
suggested to Hasey that de Gaulle WaS thinking that-
the residual French empire would also break up and
that ":independence. for. Algeria,' a burning issue r in
France -at that time,-was inevitable.' Hasey stresses,
however, .that nobody really knew what Was going .6n
in .de Gaulle's mind Even after he was propelled into
power by the uprising in Algiers in 1953 Hasey
re-
present retireinent by recalling past experiences,- and '
'he told me of his' years with de,Gaulle as we. chatted in
?
the living roorn:Pf his home outside Washington He ? ?
-
had gone to France as a student in the 1930s,
but in-
stead of studying he landed a job in Paris with Car--
, ? ? ?
. tier's, the jeweler. After Prance fell to the Germans,..he?
met de Gaulle in England at a friend's dinner table and
was so impressed by the Free French cause that 1e en-.
listed in the?foreign legion.. Some months later, fight- " ?
ing against the Vichy forces in Syria, a burst of machine
gun fire shattered his face. His exploits earneci him .
.'.:nerribership in the Ordre de la Liberation, an exclusive
fraternity created by de Gaulle. to honor his supporters.
Only three other Americans were similarly hondreci,
? among them Dwight Eisenhower. ? " ?
Hasey went to work for Cartier's in New York after
*World War II but hankered for something more: excit
ing, and when Eisenhower WaS :appointed commander.
Of the Allied armies in EuroPe in late 1950, .Hasey
asked to join him. Ike forwarded the request to the
CIA,
? .
, CIA, and not-long afterward" Hasey was in Paris- per- .
forming various agency duties.. He organized a clan-
destine surveillance team composed of former foreign
legionnaires. He persuaded .a young Laotian captain "
by the name of Phoumi Nosavan, then at the Ecole de
Guerre, to become a paid CIA protege. His chief task,
.however, was to stick close to de Gaulle, Who was then
in the political wilderness_ As Hasey tells it, he went to
see de Gaulle at the general's shabby office in-the Rue
de Solferino and announced that he represented CIA
Director Allen Dulles. De Gaulle remembered Hasey
from wartime days and said: "My door is open any
time you need me because you rallied to my side when
? calls, 'a member_ of the Gaullist inner circle; Gen. Pierre
Koenig, told hirri- know that de Gaulle will never let
. Algeria go, and you report that to Washington."
If the CIA did little to court de Gaulle's goodwill
during the late 1950s; its efforts to mobilize his adver-
saries against" him failed. When theAlgeriart eruption
opened the way for de_Gaulle's return to power, for in-
stance, a CIA agent in Paris delivered a black bag con-:. '
taming $75,000 to former Premier Guy Mollet in a
last-ditch effort to help the Socialist party leader stop
the general. Mollet riot only did nothing to halt de
Gaulle; but in a.curious turnabout, joined the Gaullist
government and lent it legitimacy. _The CIA, inciden-
tally, never again saw the $75,000. .
Stanley Karnow
16
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o'n^r*OrPgAir.1".-non..?.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033000417
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRFR
16 JUN 107h
COlb
utba(c
1
_?? ? ,
. ? WASHINGTOI?f .)
f
THERE'S A NEW, more open style at the hush-hush
'
Central Intelligence Agency. . .
Director Willianf E. Colby, often tagged the na-
tion's "chief spook," doesn't hide in the woodwork.
. His_ home telephone is listed, he goes sailing with
neighbors, is a pillar of the Little Flower Catholic Church
and sometimes dines with journalists. ? .
His 1ife, Barbara, has been known to invite an unex-
pected visitor in for coffee and a chat ebout family mat-
ters. .
' And a Colby aide at CIA headquarters even introduced
himself wryly recently as the agency's "spooksman."
For years CIA has been trying to scrub up its image as
: an insidious "invisible government" abroad and, more re-.
cently, an alleged ally of Watergate burglars at home.
Congress has tried to get a "handle" on CIA's contro-
versial covert operations ? or "dirty tricks" ? which re-
portedly have overthrown governments and funded foreign'
guerillas, U. S. foundations and even assassinations.
; Now reliable Capitol Hill sources sair the "cloak-and-
dagger" doings have dwindled to? less than 10 percent of
the agency's activity. '.? ? ?
The trend began before Colby was named to the job
about a year ago, but he has encouraged it. For a long
time the super-secret agency was identified on an access
road off a major highway with a deceptive sign. Now it's
plainly marked "CIA." . . . ', ?, 1 , '
.- Colby's crucial, delicate role Makes him President Nix-
on's principal intelligence adviser , and participant. in Na-'
tional Security Council meetings..?..where confidentiality is..
a "must." ? ? , -
1 , . But Colby claims he "comesclean!' with subCommit-'.
tees of Congress.
, "I'll tell them anything. There are no secrets. It's good
for bureaucras, to be under surveillance," he said at a
rare interview at the fortress-like CIA Building in Langley,
Va.' where all ground-floor windows are screened in chain-
link, '
VERA GLASER
Washington Wfbeat
?1
-
0 'REACH HIS SANCTUM, one rides to the seventh
floor in a privaterelevator, waits briefly in an iso-
lated reception cubicle, then is ushered' into a spec-
teenier glass-walled office with a stunning view of the lush
,
spring landscape.'
? The soft-spoken, 54-year-old CIA boss, in his horn-
rimmed glasses, muted plaid suit and dark tie, looks more
like an accountant than a spy.' . '?
? The graying hair is neatly slicked down, the blue eyes
are cool and seemingly indifferent. He uses the same cas-
ual tone to speak of the Soviet Union and China as he does
to chat about the crabgrass on his lawn..
Colby's job is managerial now, but he knows every-
"dirty trick" in the book after a lifetime .in Intelligence
and the "operations" end of CIA. During World War II, he
parachuted behind enemy lines, worked with the French
resistance, and was dropped into Norway to blow up a Ger-
man rail line.
Now he rides herd on 'an agency whose size and budget
are top secret. Outside authorities have estimated that
CIA employs upwards of 20,000 people around the world
and spends about $750 million a year. It is actually a small
part of the U. S. international Intelligence network. ? format Ian_
911 hard 10 'PP what's going on
A barrage of critiNapnovediffwaRelknalinigfteeclie8/08rplA-RDP7. _ 0 2 0 - -
ge l's
cutback in covert action. In recent weeks, for example, the
last of a, CIA-trained "secret army" was withdrawn from
,Laos: At one time it was said to have reached 30,000 men;
at a Cost of more thanS300 million eyear. ? ,
? "We're kind: of a bid word in a lot of places in the:
world, unforttnately," -Colby conceded. "Some of this is -
sensationalilm and not .well-founded. Some we deserve."
RS. COLBY, a lively, knowledgeable helpmate, who.
stays up until 2 A. M. reading newspapers so as
"not to miss anything," claims her husband has
done much -"to wipe out the cult ,of secrecy-for-secrecy's-
sake at the CIA." " - "t . ?
SOurces on Capitol Hill agree: ' '
' Last July Colby became the first CIA Director to tes-, ,
,tify in open Senate confirmation. hearings.
' He conceded CIA may have overstepped by engaging'
.in domestic actions and that the Laos war probably ex-..
ceeded the agency's legal authority.
?? He admits frankly it was a mistake for the CIA to.equip
r. White House. operatives with disguises for their illegal
break-in in California?and in the next breath chitekleethat
CIA's .experts were insulted by persistent press. reports
that 'a red wig furnished to Watergate burglar. Howard.
Hunt was "ill-fitting." .
Colby has made a good impression on Sen. 'John Sten-
nis. and Rep. Lucien Nedzi, the Democrats who. head
Armed Services sub-committees which tide herd on. the
'"1 don't think we've tripped him hi any way," Nedzi
said. "He has never flinched in responding to us."
But Sea. William Proxmire worries that,"a real liossi-
bility exists of using this enormous apparatus to unscrupu-
lous orille.gal ends here at home." ?
'He 'wants covert operations entirely wiped out, and his
amendment fo a pending military procurement bill would
more- tightly limit CIA to international activity and extend
Congress' powers of scrutiny, . . _ :? ? ?
Later this summer a Stennis subcommittee will review
:ih.depth the"1947 National Security Act which created CIA.
' Nevertheless Nedzi believes- the agency is "moving in
the right direction, with less Meddling in other people's
business." He calls it "the finest Intelligence apparatus in
. the world.", ?:- - ? ?: ?
? ? ? ?
OLBY CONSTANTLY' emphasizes 4at "the real na-
ture of intelligence today is the intellectual process of
_ /gathering bits and pieces of information and making
over-all assessments from them.' ' ?
Covert operations, he says, ."contribute a small and
sometimes critical part to 0 total picture. I would not favor
abandoning 'them. We have .had foreign envoys who have
lied to our President about something critichl. It can be
very important to ,the country to know .when they're lying
and when they're telling the truth." I
In a recent speech Colby said the CIA would "continue
to need Americans and friendly foreigners willing to under-
take' Clandestine Intelligence missions." - ? .
The toughest parts of his S42,500 job, he says, are "the
longer-term projections or what's going to happen to the
world, and what the major threats to the U.S. are going to
be. Some important countries are fairly close with their in-
there."
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
:Colby was born in St. Paul6Len., the ion of an Army
officer. He spent three boyhood years in Tientsin, China..
? He. was "pacification chief" in Vietnam, with the per-
sonal rank of ambassador, in 1969 and' 1970; wa4 'named
deputy director ot CIA in March 1973, and shortly after-
ward appointed to the to job. '
Colby describes himself as "patiimonious about time."
He works a 12-hour day, often on Saturdays, and has a safe
at home for secret papers. He is in touch by "beeper" even
NEWS, Buffalo, N.Y.
25 May 1971t
71 ' 3 1
1 1
,,..-:
1 ;`.?, t .
' 1.--
ii,U,.1,'-
when sailing?a' pastime so cherished that Colby hopes to
spend a year on a boat when he retires at some indefinite
future time: ?
Colby keeps a good luck charm on the window sill of
his modernistic office, a large green cerarnic dragon. He
explains it's a Vietnamese temple:artifact designed to
ward off evil spirits. ?
. ,"Dees it work?" he was asked.'
"We haven't done too badly," Colby smiled, an assess-
ment whicti even'his critics would confirm.
By LUCIAN WAIMEN
News Wczhington Bureau.
?
WASHINGTON ? It's an ill wind that doesn't blow somebody some
good, and that's the cliche that fits exactly what Watergate did to the
; CIA.. ? ?
. The Central Intelligence Agency did have to squirm for awhile
the revelations showed how the CIA became ensnared in the Howard',
Hunt machinations. -In a way, though, the CIA has been a help in ferret-
,ting out the truth about Watergate. ?
,
The CIA was able to supply to the!
appropriate authorities t h e datel intelligencegathering operations:,
- (July 7 ,1971) an substance of a call alarm bells would almost literally
from John Ehrlichman to Lt. Gen. ring all over the pace.
Robert E. Cushman, Jr., then. CIA I Th..e- CIA has changed in other
director, in which the CIA was askedj ays, too, not as a :result of Water-
to help Hunt, former CIA emPloye,1
:?in an -intelligence operation. nate problems, but a result of the
changes climate -of East-West rela-
? It has provided the transcript of at tions. The old covert operation, the
subsequent conversation between!! paramilitary adventures that railed
Cushman and Hunt on July 27, 1971,1 in Cuba but largely succeeded in
when the nature .oiethe help needed; Laos, is now a small part of the
was outlined. At that time Multi CIA's activity.
asked modestly only for a wig and The machinery is, of C011;f3-3, still I -
tape recording equipment for a pea- I there, waiting to be used if the Na-
time only operation he didn't explain. I tional Security Council orders.
The CIA has no idea what he i But even when used, it is not
used the equipment for ? possibly 1 something the CIA suddenly decides ,
the famous Dita Beard interview on on its own wouldrbe in the national !
-
the ITT matter. , Interest to launch. It has to have 0.11
?sr 7. okay from the National 'Security
it does Itnow that Hunt came I Council and the Preside.nt:
; beck to the CIA for more and more 1 . .
. material until finally the agency The National Security Council, an
realized it was being used for a organization of top officials from a
domestic political intelligence opera- number of government agencies
tion for which it had neither moral which used to be run by Henry Kiss-
' nor legal authority. It then blew the inger, has some 44 committees which
whistle on Hunt. . review the nation's needs in defense
Hunt, by the way, apparently per- and intelligence operations. The CIA
! formed his duties satisfactorily when performs from directives from _the'
ha was a ? CIA employe, but it's NSC.
rumored that his old associate.s were
Pretty shocked when they ? found.
Hunt was used for an illegal entry
operation (Watergate) as this was
.! 'not his field of expertise in CIA.
A3 A RIE,SULT of getting its Zin-
gers burned by the Hunt operations,
the CIA under Director William
Colby has been subjected to a
overhaul. Colby apparently has done
a thorough housecleaning job and
, nailed down the operating procedure
for the CIA in a set of unroistalmn;
directiv:?.3 to the organization.
If some new Hunt tried anything
similar on the C.T.1,, which by law
must confine itself to foreign
---APPrAugg
* ? *-
TFIERE IS ANOTHER check on
the CIA, performed even more zeal-
ously in the post-Watergate period.
Director Colby or one of his top offi-
cials meet once in every two or three
e.,eeks with Rep. Lucien' N. Nedzi
(D., Mich.), chairman of the
gence subcommittee of t1;ee House
Armed Services CornratiteZe
Nedzi bores in herd.l.vith ques-
tions about what thd CIA is doing
and by whose uuthccity: "fhe?re. is a
similar CIA contact with e, Senate
subcommittee. There's apparently
very little these trusted members of
Congress don't. know aboet CIA
operations.
2
o??
.
. ?,
4
. $1 CZ?.7:3;4
;
?
b;a)
A 7
. ?
And so the CIA has quietly, it
would seem, reformed itself and set
about the main business for which it
was intended ? find out what friends
and enemies are planning to do that
might affect t b e - security of the
United States..
Even with reform, it doesn't?
always bat 1.000. .No iateingerice-
gathering organization ever does.
It most conspicious recent failure
was in not predicting the October
war between Israel and the Arabs.
The CIA candidly acknowledges that
it placed ,.00 much emphasis on
? mdi-
cator; there wouldn't he a war, and
not enough on those sagasting there
would.
' But the CIA apparently is supply_
hg sitalie pretty good material
days to our government on such. guz?
jects a t h e uphea?..al. in Chin.t.
.Russ:an-Chinese hotiLti:,-.,s and tee
future of the sophisLicaied missiies
in the Soviet Union.
in China, there is some turb,i-
leeee over a Mao-directed campaiz_a
to shiike up-the bureaucrats in lin::
with his philosoplty of a ?-perpetual
revolution.
En-:al. even noegh bowing
out
foreign can:menial ftinc-
Lims, believed Lo be in charge
? ofeee??ene -.11:e country.
.? The ?:_A appeat*3 to ...ave
?any direct 'outbreak or
hnstiitios between C1,:nn and 7.'?le:
Scviet Leien along t-..ie_er -noeciers, al-
theteeh Caren still have large rces
facing each other.
* .
'RUSSIA NOW has the eap.ability of
deploying Muftiple incieeend.ent!y
Targeted Vericie. ts'7,1?IleV)
. hut there is no evidence it is ensacei
in a massive deployment. effort and
apparently i'rer.ds to phese them in
e.!'edually over t e peers. IF !:,
ceenees ire; mind en the policy
woeld sec n become 14..ne?en here.
It is in the tearennttel of such
facts as tiese.,, anir; they are
accurate, the the CI.e. tItitifies its
existence. No majc?r can af-
ford to be without an azenr:-_, if
-
it is k.,11 run andthe acr.cy knov.s
cnoti.,eh p,ofit. by 70 1
-13D.P777994,0_00199.i30,99.4;L
'a
Approved For Release 2001/08/08: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
NATION
22 JUNE 1974
The State 02:the Department *1
:'-??? Flying .at close to the speed of sound and setting new
endurance records ha:: the annals - of diplomacy, Henry!
Kissinger has achieved Egyptian and Syrian cease-fire
:agreements and raised the possibility?no more than that
?of a future stabilization of relations between Israel andl
its Arab neighbors. ? ? ? ? ?
But; giving all credit to the Secretary of State, what
? Of the State Department? Some commentators argue that ,
.rnodern communications have made jet diplomacy fea-
sible, with negligible, drawbacks. Writing on "How .Kis-
singer Runs State by Remote Control" in The Christiani
Science Monitor, Benjamin Welles suggests that elec-
tronics has made location immaterial. :From whatever
runl;vay Dr. Kissinger's plane lifts off, he is linked to)
:Washington via the White House global communications
system. When he is on the ground he works through
.Embassies: and diplomatic mission code rooms. En-
coded, a priority message from Damascus to Washington
May travel by overland circuits, submarine cable and
microwave in less than four minutes. From the State
Department's communications center in the White House,
it goes to the Pentagon and the CIA at speeds of thou-
sands of words a minute. Welles reports that by tele-
printer, which accounts for most of Dr. Kissinger's traf-
fic,- during his ,thirty-four-day absence he sent seventy
?flash" "messages and received forty-five; he sent 633
immediate priority messages and received 1,075; etc.
That sort of thing makes ? good journalism in the!
popular science, "gee-whiz" genre, but politically it makes
no sense. Diplomacy by jet and electronics comes at a
high- cost. It is the stuff of which drama is made and
the press naturally loves it, but many people in the
State Department and the White House, including some
who have worked with Kissinger, complain. Back at the!
State. Department, Richard Dudman of the St. Louis;
Post-Dispatch writes that praise for Kissinger's tour de!
force in the Middle East is mixed with "concern ap-
proaching desperation over the state of the department."
It is in something of a mess. .
Kissinger did .not create the mess; it goes far back.
Since the Presidency of Herbert Hoover, there have been
perhaps half a sdozen task force reports on the need to
reorganize and reform -the State;?Department. Secretary
Rogers set up the Macomber group;)'which in 1970 issued
a 600-page program of reform for. thedepartment. About
500 changes were proposed. The department continued as
before; if anything, it became more chaotic. ? -7 ?
Kissinger knew the department's' failings and 'promised
to cure them.. That commitment,:iii, effect, was a condi-
tion of his confirmation as Secretary* of State,:but while
setting himself up as a 1970s"John Foster Dulles---
more intelligent- but, also niore;:peripatetic--ICissinger
seems to have: forgotten the pledge he made to "institu-
tionalize" foreign policy,. - ?
:;"The consequences "could .be-disastrous in some: future
emergency; which -the StateDePartinent may :create by
its own disorganization-. and::Managerial disarray.:7-?Con-
sider-only . the-. foreigt servicei:-;dtisp one of ? the- divisions
that; with more than 12,000 emPlOYees in all, makeup
the department; Our June- 15th issue' we-ran 'a, piece
by Barry Rubin-.itemizing some of the odd -characters
who represent: US-: various '.part.St' of the 'world. Aside
from the time-hbnored spoils :,-syStem, - under. -which' a
Walter Annenberg?by no -.:means: the worst' :example?.
can buy himselL the ambassadorship Greaf:Britain:
with a campaign.-...contribution ibf.--:.$250,000,::mote than;
1,500 CIA personnel are currently:"-carried on the". State
Department tolls:: Some Of these peOple are highly
nant?ex-coup-makers and the like. One reason' that
that
Washington seems to have suchload relations :t
-the
"outs" in Greece; for example, or:in Portugal before- the
de Spinola-switchover, is that weSend obsessed rightists to,
such trouble spots. Surely, even'with a crippled Admin-
istration, we can come up with- more reasonable foreiv21,
service officers than irrational :"freedom fighters.".
But basic reforms of this .1cindall for more. concen-
trated attention._ than "Kissinger. :cart: give his department '
when most of his colleagues see-l_him only on :TV. 'And'
an even more* disquieting possibility arises.- Kissinger's
skills as a foreign negotiator -are:Universally recognized,
but Is' he the- prima donna type?:,,-;11e- has -just lost, his
deputy secretary,: Kenneth Rush; Who has gone:Over: to,
the White House:- as the President's chief economic ad-
viser.- Three of-the five 'top post.?in State areTreported
to be vacant.; Itis a reasonable.fsuspicion that Kissinger
wants to do it:all himself, that. betemperameritally lacks
the basic managerial attribute of delegating responsibility.'
He should allay :this suspicion before it is too_latej
THE CIVIL LIBERTIES REVIEW
WINTER/SPRING 19/4
esources For Civil Libertarians=
COUNTER-SPY
A new quarterly, 75 to 100 pages
long, slated for publication May 15
by the Organizing Committee for a
Fifth Estate, which was formed by the
recent merger of the Committee for
Action/Research on the Intelligence
Community (CARIC) and The Fifth
Estate, founded and funded largely
by Norman Mailer and friends. The
Organizing Committee's purpose is
"to investigate United States
intelligence and secret government
operations and to resist techno-
fascism." Counter-Spy supersedes a
publication of the same name put out
quarterly by CARIC. Some recent
articles discussed lawsuits to force the
CIA to release budget information,
secret U.S. operations in Cambodia,
the use of government infiltrators in
the Gainesville Eight trial of 1973, and
the exposure of anti-war activist
"Crazy Annie" as an intelligence
officer of the Washington, D.C., police
department. ?
Subscription: S6 (institutions
S10). Write: Organizing Committee
for a Fifth Estate, P.O. Box 647-,
Ben Franklin Station, Washington,
D.C. 20044.
Approved For Release 2001/08/0a.9CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
GENERAL
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, ,
Tuesday,' June 18, 1974
Maritime Muddle,
Tide of Pessimism Is
High as Talks on Law
Of Sea Near Opening
Formidable Agenda Awaits
? UN Meeting in Caracas:
Fishing, Mining, Pollution
A Plethora of Positions
By BARRY NEWMAN .
; Staff Reporter of TELE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Over the protests of the State Depart-
ment and a threatened presidential veto,
Congress recellitly passed a law declaring
once and for all that a lobster isn't a fish.
? State Department emissaries argued at
hearings that lobsters jump up and down
when they get mad and swim a few feet,
showing that they are more like fish than,
say, clams are. But that didn't hold up in
the face of scientific testimony that lobsters
make whoopie on the sea floor, demonstrat-
_ing that they don't swim much at all.
? With the law on the books lobsters now
are considered "creatures of the sea floor"
and, unlike fish, are off limits to foreign
-fishermen. The whole lobster question still
gives State Department diplomats heart-
burn. .They might not actually care very
much if a lobster is classified with fish or
not. What really upsets them is that the new
lobster law is another in a long list of pushy
unilateral actions by the U.S. and other
countries rustling rights to the oceans be.
e the United Nations has a chance to de-
cide peaceably on an international law of
the sea.........
That chance will come this week. On
Thursday, in Caracas Venezuela, the IJN
will convene a big Law of the Sea Confer-
ence for 70 days of dickering. Debate over
the lobster's swimming ability will be just
one niggling point of friction among thou-
sands at what promises to be the biggest in-
ternational gathering in history?and quite
possibly the most confusing.
Hangers-On and Calligraphers
There will lie about 150 countries attend-
ing; that's about 70 more than even existed
at a previous Law of the Sea Conference
In 1958. Delegates, advisory committees, in-
terest groups and assorted hangers-on will
number close to 5,000. And the UN is send-
ing 89 translators, 38 revisers and another
89 typists and calligraphers?plus a contin-
gent of executives to r th
To house this mob, the Venezuelan gov-
ernment has reserved every inch of first-
class hotel space in Caracas and has taken
over a just-finished luxury housing jzoject,
turning a 43-story tower into delegates'
quarters and converting a movie theater
into,a plenary meeting hall equipped for si-
multaneous translating into five languages.
The cost to the host government was $16.5
million.
What all these people are going to try
doing in Caracas is to boil down six fat vol-
times of turgidly composed proposals into
one neat document that would:
?Put a uniform world-wide limit on how
far out to sea a coastal state can claim soy-
lereign authority.
?Create an intermediate zone where a
' coastal state retains power but where other
states have ?rights to navigate and exploit
resources.
?Impose international law over the deep
sea beyond national jurisdiction, especially
over the mineral wealth at the bottom.
?Establish authority transcending na-
tional end international bounds to control
pollution and encourage scientific research.
The complications are phenomenal. "It
is fair to say," one expert asserts in all
seriousness, "that mankind hasP probably
never before attempted such a difficult
task." (
The Conflicting Interests
All the traditional alliances have come
unstuck in a negotiation awash in conflicting
interests dictated simultaneously by mili-
tary, economic and geographical distinc-
tions. Delegations are themselves divided
into interest groups, and factions are war-
ring within factions.
?
;, Coastal states want as much power as
far out to sea as possible; landlocked states
want to share that power. Advanced states
want to exploit the sea; developing states
fear exploitation. Maritime states want free-
dom of navigation for their vessels; straits
states want to control shipping. States with
concave shorelines worry about- being
squeezed by states with convex shorelines.
States without islands are nervous about
being pushed back by states with islands,
There are combinations and permuta-
tions: coastal states that are maritime pow-
ers vs. coastal states that aren't; developing
states with rich, seabed mineral resources
vs. developing states without them. Oil in-
terests within any one delegation may be
pushing for freedom to drill while fishing in-
terests want to prevent pollution. The oil in-
terests may themselves be split between
shippers wanting freedom to navigate and
operators who don't want foreigners com-
peting in coastal waters. And the fishing in-
terests can be split just as often between
those who want to chase the tuna anywhere
on' earth and others who. want to protect
coastal banks, against poachers.
No wonder pessimism is riding high.
"Most people just don't think we're going to
get out of this thing with a treaty the United
States Senate will ratify," a congressional
observer says. "Our only hope is that every-
body else will turn out to be more screwed
up than we are."
There is, however, one strong incentive
for diplomats to find a workable treaty, and
that is the thought of what might happen if
they don't. There is too much of value in the
oceans for the traditional "freedom" of the
seas to persist. Without a treaty, the world
is likely to see a wave of unilateral claims
to vast ocean area s,--putting map makers to
work drawing boundary lines over the blue.
Louis B. Sohn, a Harvard professor, sees
such a free-for-all leading "to a division of
the oceans among a few major powers along
the lines of the division of Africa in the 19th
Century; and such neocolonialist competi-
tion might easily degenerate into a new er
of imperialist wars."
Some nations, impatient with the lack of
legal framework for exploitation, are taking
?
the law into their own hands. Years ago sev-
eral Latin American nations extended their
territorial claims 200 miles out to sea, and
Peru has harassed scores of U.S. fishing
boats that venture too near.
More recently, Canada declared a 100-
mile "pollution zone," and Iceland extended
Its territorial sea to 50 miles, touching off a
"cod war" with Great Britain, its ally in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization; that
conflict rearlled the shooting stage last
year. (Britain and Iceland signed an agree-
ment on the issue last November, but it will
only be in force for two years?presumably
enough time for the UN to act.)
In recent weeks, two more NATO mem-
bers, Greece and Turkey, have been edging
toward a military confrontation over Tur-
key's exploration for oil in the eastern wa-
ters of the Aegean Sea. The area is only a
few, miles from Turkey's coast, but it is dot-f
ted with small islands owned by Greece.
Turkey claims the floor of the sea, Greek is-
lands or no Greek islands. Greece dis-
agrees, and the international law applying
to such questions is very muddy.
? There are , four international treaties,
:adopted at the 1958 Law of the Sea Confer-
ence, but they have some deficiencies that
are getting worse as technology for exploit-
tug the oceans improves and the number of
countries in the world increases. The
treaties, for one thing, never clearly defined
"territorial sea." For another, an average
of only 40 nations ever bothered to ratify
them.
By 1970 it was obvious that something
more was needed, so the United Nations de-
cided to throw another conference. A 91-na-
tion committee was set up to decide What to
talk about, and without a single dissent, the
General Assembly declared that the guiding
principle of the meeting would be the pres-
ervation of the sea as "the common heri-
tage of mankind."
This inspirational declaration lost some
, of its high tones when the countries sat
down to hash out the issues. "The seabed is
the heritage of 'mankind,'" says Louis Hen-
kin, a Columbia University professor, "but
there has been no agreement as to who is or
represents mankind or how mankind should
enjoy that heritage."
A Mountain of Conflicts
The 91 countries that were supposed to
spend four years arriving at a basic treaty
text for 150 countries to ponder have instead
dumped in Caracas a mountain of conflict-
ing proposals. The six volumes don't include
a single set of draft articles. The report of
one of the three subcommittees has no
fewer than 50 separate proposals, and ap-
pended to them are hundreds of anonymous
"variants." Another massive section is writ-
ten with alternatives that aren't accepted by
one or more delegations enclosed in brack-
ets?and there are even brackets within the
brackets. The "press kit" for the conference
consists of sheets of paper several square
feet in area, on which the plethora of posi-
tions are separated into little boxes.
If the issues sound complicated, consider
that the conference still has to decide on a
system for voting on the issues, In another
grand gesture, the General Assembly
reached a "gentleman's agreement" that
decisions would be made by "consensus."
But nobody knows what consensus means,
except that it definitely means more than a
two-thirds vote. The assembly has ordered
the conference to clarify the rules in the
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(
first week of the meeting. The conference
could vote to rescind that order. But it
would naturally first have to decide how
many votes would be needed to decide
whether to reconsider the decision that ev-
erything should be decided by consensus.
An International Authority
Absurd as this seems, parliamentary
procedure becomes deadly serious to states
trying to line up alliances and predict how
the conference will vote on a number of cru-
cial points of conflict. "The business of the
conference involves such concrete issues
and interests that nobody wants to wind up
in the minority," one UN official says.
One key confrontation will involve the
creation of an unprecedented international
authority to govern the exploitation of the
deep seabed beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. This would have been an eso-
teric topic a few years ago, but now several
major mining companies, mostly from the
U.S., are ready to take huge tonnages of
minerals from the ocean floor at depths as
great as 20,000 feet.
Some developing countries, landlocked
countries and countries not enamored of
free enterprise want to share the wealth
through an international authority that will
operate the mines or at least form joint ven-
tures. Advanced countries, namely the U.S.,
want an international body that will mainly
grant mining licenses. Developed countries
are worried about minerals shortages and
expropriation threats; developing countries
with rich resources don't want markets de-
stroyed for minerals they mine on land.
There isn't much room for compromise.
Just as contentious is the question of what
to do about the sea under national jurisdic-
tion. There is general agreement that
coastal states will get absolute sovereignty
12 miles from their shores. But beyond that,
about 200 miles to the edge of the continen-
tal shelves, there is a problem: how to re-
tain national jurisdiction while giving the in-
ternational community some rights in the
area. This issue, says John Stevenson, the
U.S. ambassador to the talks, "involves
more interests of more states than any
WASHINGTON POST
17 June 1974
Fish
9
d ee
olities
1
By George' C. Wilson
, ? Washington Post Staff Writer
ABOARD THE SHARON-AND-NO-
? BEEN?The fishermen in the fo'c'sle
of this dragger bucking through the At-
lantic swells had a message for the
United Nations delegates who will open
the biggest international meeting in
history on Thurcd:Iy.
Neither the fishermen nor the fish,
the men said angrily, can wait much
longer for the U.N. or anybody else to
bring some law and order to the ex-
ploitation of the seas. Otherwise, it will
be every country for itself.
The 5,000 delegates from 151 na-
tions who will gather at Caracas,
Venezuela, for the U.N.'s third Law
(if the Sea Conference know the fish-
ermen are right. But it is improbable,
despite the acknowledged urgency,
that the delegates will succeed in
writing an acceptablAppftittattbfaivR
other problem in the law-of-the-sea negotia-
tions."
Some Latin American coastal states will
argue for complete control of everything 200
miles out. A few of their neighbors will sup-
port a 200-mile "patrimonial sea" where
other states can navigate but can't mine or
drill without permission. On the other hand,
the U.S.?as well as some states with re-
sources but without the wherewithal to get
them?wants coastal states to relinquish
some jurisdiction and in return to share in
the revenue of investments Made off their
shores.
Fish and Pollution ,
Living resources are another kettle of
fish. There are countries that hook most of
their catch off their coasts; they want to
keep foreigners out. Other countries have
fishermen who travel long distances after
their quarry; they want access to foreign
waters. And still other countries, the U.S.
included, have both kinds of fishermen, and
they want the law to apply differently to dif-
ferent kinds of fish.
Even further from resolution is the pollu-
tion problem. Ideally, ocean pollution could
be controlled by an international body with
power in national and international waters.
Because a lot of ocean pollution starts, out
on land, this authority might even have
some influence on the kind of garbage al-
lowed in the oceans to begin with.
But that sort of rule would infringe on
coastal-state sovereignty. As a result, the
language of all the pollution proposals is
high-minded but purposefully vague. Inter-
national standards for land-based pollution
are undoubtedly out the window. Some
states want pollution standards that can be
relaxed if their economic situation is bad.
Others want the right to Impose stricter
standards if they choose. Any such ideas are
anathema to maritime countries worried
about their ships having to meet one stan-
dard in one port and another standard in an-
other port.
There is one area on which the U.S. and
?
other big powers aren't likely to compro-
mise. These nations want freedom to pass
; through narrow straits, regardless of how
&fling two-thirds of the -earth's sur-
face ? the seas.
The realities of ocean p o Li ties
threaten to polarize the conference,
with the biggest "have" countries ?
the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion ? lined up against the "have not"
countries backed by China.
For the law of the sea no longer
means merely agreeing on who can
sail where. Today ? in a world run-
ning short of food, fuel and minerals
? it Means agreeing on who can tap
what part of the ocean for resources
that are running out on land.
"We may see a national race for the
control of open oceans and seabeds com-
parable to the race for the control of
land areas of the past three centuries,"
former Secretary of State Dean Rusk
has warned in urging world leaders to
update the law of the sea before man-
kind goes through the "sheer insanity"
of another race for riches.
The. New England fishermen aboard
the Sharon-and-Noreen out of New Bed-
ford, Mass., do not know much about
the Law of the Sea Conference; nor
the ';have vs. have-not" problem, n or
Dean Risk. But they do know a lot
about Ash and fishing and the ocean
politics offshore.
And, in making their case during a
three-day sail from Washington to New
B
ei eitab (Oat 141
much the conference extends a nation's ter-
ritorial limits. The major powers want their
;nuclear submarines to pass through the
straits unimpeded and underwater.
Some U.S. groups .are concerned that
under Pentagon pressure to win on this
Issue, the U.S. delegation might bargain
away all other points. One congressional
aide says that the Pentagon "would trade
every damn thing there is lying around?
fish, oil and everything else?to be able to
go through the straits of the world with their
atomic subs under water."
The Question of Time
Various groups are also worried about
how long it might take to put into effect any
international law that might come out of the
conference. Another conference session
seems almost certain next year, but any
final agreement it might produce could lan-
guish as long as a decade before wide ratifi-
cation.
Congress is already considering a hill
that would permit ocean miners to go ahead
and mine if the conference doesn't come up
with a pact by next year. Another bill,
which has a good chance of being passed
this summer although it would probably be
vetoed by President Nixon, would extend
U.S. control over foreign fishermen to 200
miles from the current 12 miles. Rep. Gary
Studds of Massachusetts, a principal spon-
sor of the bill, says, "If we wait, the ques-
-tion will be academic. There won't be any
fish."
Mr. Studds was also instrumental in get-
ting the law passed that declared the lobster
not a fish. He says he did it because he
didn't think the lobster could wait for an in-
ternational law of ne. sea either. .
The State Department didn't agree with
Mr. Studds on that, but there is in all this at
least one point of almost universal agree-
ment?clams. The State Department, Mr.
Studds and almost everybody else seem to
concur that a clam isn't a fish and is there-
fore under national jurisdiction. "Clams are
sedentary," U.S. Ambassador Stevenson
says. "There lino problem with clams.".
the U.N. delegates and their govirn-
ments all during the Law of the Sea
Conference from June 20 to Aug. 29.
"If our oil guys have the right to
-drill up to 200 miles off our shores,
why shouldn't we fishermen have the
same right?" asked Edward E. Longo,
skipper of the Sharon-and-Noreen. He
sailed the dragger from New Bedford
to Washington to lobby for a 200-mile-
wide American-controlled fishing zone
around the United States.
"If the Russians drilled oil
right of four shores like
they trawl for fish right
now, you'd see something
done," Longo said in the
Sharon-and-Noreen fo'c'sle.
He felt no better when
told that Secretary of Inter!-
nor Rogers C. B. Morton said
recently that it was "a hell
of a good question" what
the United States would do
if the Soviet Union suddenly'
decided to drill for oil in the
International waters off
Maryland.
?A farmer?he can plant
more nest year if he did not
raise enough stuff this
year," said John C. Botelho,
SI, skipper-owner of two
2R00 MOlit 4taggers--also
21
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(
salted trawlers. "But you
can't do that with fishing
once you take too many fish.
They can't repllenish them-
selves, then." ?
Haddock have been virtu-
ally wiped out by overfish-
ing by foreign fleets off
New England, Botelho said.
The yellowtail flounder will
be gone within three years
unless the United States im-
poses controls for every-
body, he added.
Why, Botelho asked in a
voice heavy with frustration
and pain, is the U.S. govern-
ment standing by while for-
eign fleets ruin fishing for
all time for everybody off
the American coast. The
government should appoint
Itself game warden and post
rules for every country to
obey when fishing within
200 miles of the U.S. shore-
line, he argued.
"You've seen these fine
mesh nets these foreign fish-
ing boats use," complained
Edward W. DeCosta, 34, en-
gineer on the Sharon-and
Noreen. "How is it fair for
our government to tell us to
'use only a certain size net
and then other governments
go ahead and use stuff so
small it SCOOPS up every-
thing."
"We're getting desperate,"
? Longo said "In two years I
don't think there will be any
of the good fish left the
way things are going."
Botelho?who has fished
the waters off New Bedford
for 31 years and reveres the
sea to the point that "every
trip is a lifetime"?agreed
that fishermen are fed ,up
with waiting. "We used to
? act like babies with pacifiers
, when people promised us
things," he said. "But no
more."
New England fishermen
allied with a federation of
interests. called Save the
American Fisheries already
are lobbying for passage of
a bill sponsored by Sen.
Warren G. Magnuson (D.-
Wash.) and Rep. Gerry E.
Studds (D-Mass.) to give the
United States control of
fishing up to 200 miles off
Its coast until an interna-
tional agreement is reached.
The bill faces an uncertain
CHRIST IAN SCIENCE
17 June 1974
Mideast A-pacts:
hazards debated
future because 'the Nixon
administration contends
that going? it alone at this
point would undermine the
' Law of the Sea Conference.
Beyond lobbying ,one
plats up rumors that -some
fishermen go to sea armed
In case. the competition be-.
tween American and foreign
fleets should escalate to.gun
fire.
At the moment, the U.S.
clai ins a- three-mile-wide
band of territorial waters
plus nine miles beyond it as
an AmeriCan fishing zone?
or a total limit of 12 miles..
The U.S. delegation at Cara-
cas will agree to extending
the territorial limit from
three to 12 miles but oppose ?
designating 188 miles more
as an American-controlled
economic zone.
iThe fishermen would seem
to be correct in assuming
the Soviet Union could drill
for oil as well as fish any-
where beyond that 12-mile
limit. But there are some
other ? American claims to
the riches of the sea?claims
that the Law of the Sea
Conference will argue about
in Caracas. ? -
On Sept. 28, 1945, Presi-
dent Truman proclaimed
that the .U.S. continental
shelf from the beach to a
depth of 600 feet was Ameri-
can territory. He said the
same day that the United
States also reserved the
right to establish American-
controlled "conservation
zones" for fishing, but did
not define them. ?
,
In 1958, the U.N. General
Assembly ;went further than
the Truman proclamation by
defining the shelf as "the
seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas adjacent to
?
the coast but outside the
area of territorial sea, to a
depth of 200 meters or, be-
yond that limit, to where
the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploi-
tation of the natural re:
sources of the said areas.
? ? ?
In other words, the Gen.-
eral Assembly said, any-
thing a nation can reach, it
MONITOR
By Da;vid F. Sallsburyjf;-,:
- ,- ? Staff writeisof ? ? ?-? ?
? The Christian Science Monitor.-
. . ?
The effectiveness of _ inter-
national nuclear safeguards is
under new scrutiny following
.President Nixon's agreement to
provide Egypt with nuclear
energy.
In particular, there is a danger
that fissionable material used in a
can take.- That is one sense
of the "admits of the explor-
ation of the natural re-
sources" language.
In faulting that loose lan-
guage, George A. Doumani,
in his book, "Ocean Wealth:
Policy and Potential," said,
"It is evident that the de-
pendence of the delineation
of the continental shelf on
the technological feasibility
of exploiting it can be used
as license for encroachment.
It has already led to confu-
sion and may well lead to
grievances among the na-
tions of the world. Contin-
ued encroachment would
weaken the effectiveness of
international law."
Small wonder, then, that
underdeveloped nations meet-
ing at Caracas will try to put
a fence around their coastal-
waters so they can keep the
oil and fish for themselves.
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru,
for example, want to pre-
serve the riches along their
Pacific coasts to 200 miles
out, with the proviso that
foreign ships, submarines
and airplanes could still
navigate within 12 miles of-
their shores.
The 33 nations with little
or no coastline want vast
riches of the "common herit-
age" oceans divided up
among all the nations of the
world. They would like to ?
see national claims limited
to no more than 40 miles
and apply- share-the-wealth
philosophy to rest of the
seas.
One proposal to imple-
ment that objective is to es-
tablish an international li-
censing body to control sea
mining beyond national ju-
rfsdictions. That is, out in
deep sea.
Here again competing eco-
nomic interests and interna-
tional ocean politics make it,
difficult for the world to
agree on a set of rules.
American sea mining com-
panies, for example, do not
want to have to compete for
licenses before an interna-
tional body connected with
the U.N. They fear they
would come off second-best
power plant in Egypt might be
stolen by terrorist groups and
used for blackmail.
In the last few months, two
Independent studies have found
even United States nuclear
safeguards, the tightest in the
world, to be inadequate to prevent
the theft of nuclear materials by
armed terrorist groups. .
U.S. officials insist that the
nuclear power program for Egypt
will be under strict examination
from the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) in
Vienna. This involves regular on-
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because the "have-not" na-
tions outnumber and out-
? vote the "have". nations In-
the General Assembly.
Instead; the mining com-
panies are seeking congres-
sional authority to stake,
claims to big portions of the
seabed.
- Because of the complexi-
ties and billions of dollars at
stake, law of the sea special-
ists predict the conference.
will fail to agree on a final
treaty at Caracas but will
instead settle -for refining
an agenda for voting next -
winter in Geneva.
- However ? and this is fin--
portant to New England
fishermen ? the same spe-
cialists predict ? the confer-
ence majority will express
itself in favor of a 200-mile
"economic zone" where indi-
vidual countries .would Con-
trol the fishing, drilling for
oil and seabed mining.
The State Department is
resigned to such an eco-
nomic zone and realizes the
Senate is unlikely to ap-
prove a Law of the Sea.
Treaty which does not pro-
vide for one. Even the State,
'Department will continue to
press at Caracas for appor-
tioning jurisdiction over
fishing in the basis of :
where fish live and travel?
the "species approach"
which critics contend would
be too complicated and diffi- ?
cult to enforce.
The Defense Department
Is uneasy about 200-mile eco- ?
nomic zones, even if territo-
rial waters remain at 12
miles at the outset. Under
the "creeping jurisdiction"
argument, defense officials
fear countries would at-
tempt to extend territorial
waters seaward toward the
? limits of the economic zone
?perhaps posing problems?
for U.S. reconnaissance sub-
marines and aircraft as well
as warships.
At the minimum, the De-
/ fense Department is insist..."
ing as the right of transit
? through international straits
even if overlapping territo4'
rial jurisdictions theoreti-:
oily closed them off.
site inspection.
The U.S. now has cooperative
agreements under similar condi-
tions with 2.5 nations.
The Indian plant from which
basic fissionable material was
generated for India's first atomic
blast recently was not under
IAEA supervision. It was set up
with the help of Canada, which
has since ended its assistance in
protest against the Indian detona-
tion.
, U.S. `atoinib energy officials Must"
also consider the possibility that the
Egyptians could use the plutonium
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????
generated by the U.S.-provided nu-
clear power plant to produce a nu-
clear weapon themselves.
Presently, the fuel rods that go into
commercial nuclear reactors cannot
be made easily into a nuclear bomb.
However, in the core of the reactor
some of the uranium transmuted into
plutonium can be separated chem-
ically and made into an explosive.
Separation difficult
Because the spent fuel is highly
radioactive, this separation must be
done remotely, behind heavy lead
shielding. The process is very ex-
pensive.
But by the 1980's, when Egypt's first
commercial reactor is to be com-
pleted, present plans of the nuclear
Industry call for enriching fuel with
plutonium. This will make it easier
for any country with a stockpile of
fuel rods to divert materials and
fabricate a bomb within days or
weeks after they decide to do so, arms
control experts concede.
According to information supplied
to the congressional Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, Egypt has agreed
that it will not use any of the
fissionable materials for even
? "peaceful" nuclear explosives, as the
Indians have moved to do.
However, Republican Sen. Jacob
Javits of New York, among others in
Congress, is not so sure about relying
on such promises. In a recent press
conference, he recalled Egypt's viola-
tions of agreements made after 1956
and said, "We must be extremely
wary about the possibility of in-
troducing nuclear weapons into the
Middle East tinderbox."
Congress has veto
Agreements providing nuclear as- ?
sistance are subject to congressional
veto. They take affect unless dis-
approved by both houses within 60
days after being submitted to them.
Some members of the congressional
Joint Committee say they would
watch closely any proposed
safeguards.
A member of the committee, Sen.
Henry Jackson (D) of Washington,
said he is considering introducing a
resolution to make the Middle East a
nuclear-free zone. He said this would
have an effect of prohibiting the
supply of nuclear equipment and fuel
Into the region.
The Washington Senator called the
' plan absurd to send reactors and
atomic fuel into a region which has a
huge pool of the world's oil and
natural gas resources and also is
prone to terrorism.
Sen. Frank Church (D) of Idaho, a
senior member: on.the,Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, says he will in-
troduce legislation prohibiting all
American-foreign aid to Egypt until
the Cairo government signs the inter-
national treaty on the nonprolifeea-
tion of nuclear weapons.
At the same time, it is the concern ;
of some that Palestinian or other
terrorists might be able to steal
?
generated plutonium and use it for ;
international blackmail.
Mr. Nixon is expected to sign a
similar nuclear agreement with Is-
? rael. The Israelis have operated a
French research reactor since the
1950's. Experts feel the Israelis have
enough plutonium stockpiled to make
at least 10 atomic bombs. This is in
contrast with Egypt, which has oper-
ated two small Soviet reactors but not:
long enough to generate much pluto-
nium. .
Dangers described
.THE WASECINGTON POST siidiy,Jnvai7,1974 ?
EtWaorAzaVs21Z 4TIola,Coutaell.
4pon:W.
Meg Frairried
By Jack Anderson
On his way to Moscow, Presi-
dent Nixon stopped off in Brus-
sels to sign a NATO charter and
to smile for the cameras. But be-
hind the show of cordiality, our
NATO friends are 'secretly wor-
ried that the President will give
more than he will gain .at the
Moscow summit meeting.
This nagging concern appears
in confidential ? draft repott3
prepar:d for Atlantic
assembly, which gathered in
Washington earlier this month.
The reports reveal that some
NATO leaders believe the Pres-
ident has already signed away
the Western military advantage.
The result "could give the So-
viet Union tremendous superi-
ority in numbers of warheads
and total 'throw-weight," warns
one report.
NATOleaderi are frankly sus-
picious of detente. "Detente in
Soviet eyes," states another re-
port, "is clearly to achieve rec-
ognition by the West of the polit-
ical situation in Eastern Europe
and to secure for the East as
much economic and technologi-
cal benefit as can be gained."
Unfortunately, adds- the re-
port, the political softening has
been accompanied by a military
eektening throughout the Su-j
it Lloc. `11:ice the price of
detente in the political sphere,"
the report warns, "is increased
readiness and vigilance in the
military sphere."
A report on "Atlantic Political
Problems" takes blunt notice of
the "domestic problems" beset-
ting President Nixon, These, ac-
cording to the report, "threaten,
to severely handicap his ... au-
thority."
, - ? at
A long-time crusader for increased-
nuclear safeguards and co-author of,
one of the studies which found U.S.
safeguards inadequate, Dr. Theodore
13. Taylor has told how.easy it would!
be for terrorists. to steal nuclear.
materials and fabricate them into an
explosive.
Both IAEA and U.S. Atomic Energy:
Commission (AEC) safeguards rely
heavily on accounting methods,
elaborate methods of weighing and
measuring that are designed to detect
theft of nuclear materials after the;
fact.
"A terrorist group would not care If-
their theft is detected," reasons Drat
Taylor. "In many eases they even
want the publicity. So such a system
does not serve as an effective deter-.f
rent."
s -
Effectiveness doubted
In addition, Dr. Taylor's study andy
another panel commissioned by the0
AEC, both conclude that such at
system is inadequate to keep track of
the large amounts of nuclear mate-
rials that will be flowing throughout
the U.S. and the world in the fore-
seeable future.
Instead, Dr. Taylor has been push-
ing for a system stressing armed
guards and electronic surveillance to
protect against theft. In the U.S. he is I
optimistic that such a system can be
implemented fol. a few percent of the
total cost of nuclear energy. Inter-
nationally, he is less optimistic.
"There has been an increasing
amount of talk within the IAEA of
strengthening safeguards, but not
much action," he says.
In addition to the present IAEA!'
safeguards, the U.S. is reportedly
Insisting that Egypt use special procekei
dures to protect against theft and
sabotage.
scow Summit
Declares the confidentiall
?document: "Most people would
now acknowledge that above
all, the President needs a major
foreign policy initiative to
counter the domestic issues that
threaten to engulf him.
"This in turn increases the'
suspicion of his critics that he
will seek a major agreement
with the Soviet Union that will
have more todo with domestic
prestige than the long-terra for-
eign policy interests of the
country."
In one report, the latest U.S.
doctrine that "nuclear attack
would be met by whatever scale
of launch the circumstances de-
manded" is described as a "dan-
gerous development."
This permits "a theoretical
approach to nuclear weapons
which is out of touch with politi-
cal reality," the document
charges. "It implies the possi-
bility of waging limited nuclear
war and the expression of such
a possibility is a regressive' .
step."
Not only do NATO leaders
look with apprehension on the
edge which President Nixon has
already given the Soviet Union
lin missile numbers and pay-
load, but the NATO partners are.
also concerned about the bal-
ance of troops and equipment in
Europe.
The Soviet satellites, accord-
ing to one report, could unleash
a force of 925,000 men, 15,500
tanks and 2,800 aircraft "with
very little warning." As a de-
fense, the NATO nations have
only '770,000 men, 8,000 tanks
and 2,700 aircraft,
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 June 1974
U.S. arms talks critics
suspect hastiness
Soviet advantage
.seen in accord
By Richard Burt
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington
The resignation last week of the
Pentagon's top strategic arms-control
adviser, Paul H. Nitze, has fueled a
growing controversy within United
States Government circles which is
likely to influence the outcome of
President Nixon's talks with Soviet
leaders in Moscow later this month.
Mr. Nitze's departure has brought
to light a major split within the arms-
-control community over the advis-
ability of signing an underground
nuclear test-ban agreement with the
Soviets. And experts here argue that
regardless of the form it would take a
testing accord will be subjected to
substantial criticism from either lib-
erals or hard-liners. ?
The circumstmces behind Mr.
Nitze's resignation, meanwhile, pro-
vide a rare glimpse into the bureau-
cratic maneuvering that consistently
has characterized the formulation of
U.S. policy concerning the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks ( SALT) .
Mr. Nitze long has been a promi-
nent member of the U.S. defense
establishment, who has served in a
variety of high-lev_el jobs including_
Secretary of the Navy in the Kennedy
.era.
Potential superiority
During the first round of the SALT
talks in 1969, he acted as a top-level
negotiator with the U.S. delegation
and is said to have been responsible
for working out many of the under-
standings that resulted in the U.S.-
Soviet decision to restrict the deploy-
ment of antiballistic missiles. ,
Mr. Nitze reportedly was unhappy,
however, with the other major accord
reached at the first round of SALT,
the interim agreement, which gave
the Soviet Union a potential 50 percent
superiority in numbers of land-based
and submarine-launched offensive
strategic missiles.
According to former associates,
Mr. Nitze believed the agreement was
too hastily arrived at and was, in part,
designed to provide Mr. Nixon with
what appeared to be a substantial
foreign-policy success during his trip
to the Soviet Union in May, 1972.
Mr. Nitze's dissatisfaction with the
outcome of the SALT I was aggra-
vated, officials report, by the publica-
tion of books and articles following
the conclusion of the talks which gave
Mr. Nixon and Secretary of State
' Henry A. Kissinger the major credit
for negotiating the first-round ac-
cords.
Owing to the secrecy that sur-
rounded the negotiations, many of the
LONDON TIMES
18 June 1974.
America's policy
of detente: Realpolitik or
?
4
President Nixon's rpeech last
week at Annapolis, in prepare-
tion for his forthcoming visit to
Moscow, was a classic statement
of the Nixon-Kissinger position
on detente. It argued with
amenity and ability the case
againit critics of that position.
All the same it largely misrepre-
sented or misunderstood what it ;
is that is widely felt to be wrong
with the current American
approach.
One would not wish to deni-
grate the skill with which the
President and his Secretary of
State have handled many issues:
but, however serious in their
own way, these issues are minor
ifl comparison with the great
central problem of world poli-
tics, the relationship with the
Soviet Union. And no minor suc-
cesses can conceivably compen-
sate if a disastrous error is made'
over that.
9
?
The burden of the Annapolis
speech was that relations be-
tween states should not be con-
ducted on a purely idealistic
basis, and that they should in-
volve no interference with the
domestic affairs of other coun-
tries. In a general sense, such
a view will not be disputed. But
in the context of relations with
the Soviet Union as they are at
present, it contains major falla-
cies.
First is the implication that
Senator Jackson (with his cele-
brated amendment, overwhelm-
ingly supported in the Congress,
which snakes the granting of
Most Favoured Nation treat-
ment dependent upon freedom
of emigration), and those Euro-
pean statesmen who have stood
tor the free movement of ideas
and people as essential to any
detente, are motivated merely
by an impractical idealism. The
contrary is true. The attempt
to represent Senator Jackson as
a sort of hick Woodrow Wilson
is anyhow absurd. He is cer-
tainly the American statesman
contributions made by. Mr. Nitze and
other negotiators, particularly for-
mer delegation chief Gerard Smith,
have yet to be publicly reported.
Soviet momentum
During SALT II, which began late in
1972, a number of former and present
SALT participants privately voiced
the fear that the inequalities ex-
pressed in the first-round interim
agreement would not be adequately
addressed. These fears have been
reinforced, in the minds of some
observers, by the continued momen?
tum in Soviet missile and warhead'
development and the Nixon adminis-
tration's need, in the wake of Water-
gate, to score another foreign-policy
victory in Moscow.
Last summer, when Soviet party
chief Leonid Brezhnev and Mr.
Nixon announced in Washington their
intention to limit the deployment of
multiple warheads on U.S. and Soviet
missiles, some analysts expressed
concern that if such an agreement.
were tied to number of missile launch-
ers and not payload, the Soviets,
possessing larger rockets, would be
given the ability to deliver a large
number of warheads.
This fear vanished, however, when
it became apparent during Dr. Kis-
singer's visit to Moscow in the spring
that the two sides were still far apart
on the means of controlling multiple-
warhead deployment,
But concern now is directed toward
the possibility that an accord limiting
underground testing will be signed
during Mr. Nixon's Moscow visit.
with the profoundest knowledge
and grasp of international and
defence affairs?as was indeed
shown when he was approached
in turn to serve as Secretary
of State and of Defence. He
and the European leaders, who
- have included Herr Brandt and
; such moderates as the Danish
and Dutch representatives in
recent negotiations, are moved
precisely by a more pragmatic
and more profound understand-
ing of the Soviet Union than the
American administration has
?and ot world
?
There is, of course, a sense in
which the demand for free emi-
gration and for the free move-
ment of people and ideas can be
represented as interference in
domestic Soviet affairs. Not that
the Russians themselves have
any right to complain. Suslov or
Ponomarev appear at the con-
gresses of Western Communist
Parties. Soviet political works,
printed in English in Moscow,
are sold freely in our countries.
And, on a different tack, Soviet
arms (shipped via Prague) turn
up in the Bogside.
But in any case, such
" internal " changes as are ne-
cessary in the USSR if d?nte
is to mean anything are not con-
cerned with the political or
social system as such. They are
concerned with the fact?un-
avoidably affecting international
relations?that the Soviet Union
is a siege polity and a siege \
economy. The right to emigra-
tion is by common consent an in-
ternational one, since it is
guaranteed by the United
Nations Declaration on Human
Rights. And it might, incident-
ally, be held relevant to Russia's
reliability in honouring its sig-
nature on international docu-
ments that it has subscribed to
but not observed these provi-
sions.
But the issue goes deeper
I even than that. Soviet-United
I States d?nte on present terms
involves inside the Soviet Union
not merely the thorough repres-
sion of all Western-style ideas,
but a powerful campaign of
indoctrination with hatred for
all that the West stands for.
It is another major element
of Kissingerite doctrine that
trade will ease international
relations. There is no historical
warrant for this. The highest
levels of Russian-German trade,
for example, were reached in
1913 and 1940 respectively. And
in fact, the whole Russian tradi-
tion, since Peter the Great and
through Stalin, has been to
import the technology of the
West with the aim of strengthen-
ing the military, despotic and
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general anti-Western system of
rule. In present circumstances,
moreover, an even greater
absurdity arises. The Russian
economy needs Western grain
and other products precisely
because it is enormously dis-
torted in favour of the war
industries?supporting a bigger
defence effort than that of the
United States with about half the
gross national product. With a,
reasonable allocation of re-
sources, Russia could master her
own economic problems. As it
Is, Western imports are merely
a form of subsidizing the
weaponry massed against us.
And this is to say nothing of the
sale on the cheap of, for
example, recent computer ad-
vances?that is, of making the
results of Western research and
development available to the
Soviet Ministry of Defence.
At Helsinki, the Russians
were granted a fair margin of
arms superiority over the
United States. It was then held
that American superiority in
technique would compensate.
More recent Soviet (Western-
assisted) arms development has,
for the time being at least, made
nonsense of this. Nor can the
huge lead in conventional
weapons deployed in Europe be
taken as particularly sweet
fruit of the detente.
And then, of course, there is
the Chinese issue. To put it
mildly, there has been no
detente on that long Asian
-
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
25 June 1974
frontier. Yet detente is (as we
were told peace was) indivisible.
If the Soviet Union were really
able to negotiate a disengage-
ment, however temporary, in the
West, and gain a free hand for '
dealing with China, one can only
say that any such easing of the
pressures on our flank would be
about as much of a contribution
to peace as the Nazi-Soviet pact..
Meanwhile, it is worth noting'
that almost all serious students
of the Soviet Union, together
with most observers of and par-
ticipants in the international
scene, are in general agreement
with Senator Jackson's position.
A detente in the sense of a truce
may be achieved with a state
which refuses to enter into the
Lovestone retiring from key position
End of an era for U.S. labor
normal comity of nations,
maintains an armed might far in
excess of its true economic capa-
city, and continuues to inflame
its population against all non-
Soviet systems and ideas. But
such a truce cannot in any way
be thought of as reliable?par-
ticularly if the Russians are en-
couraged to use it to modernize
and re-equip themselves, while
making no concessions in ex-
change. A true detente must in-
volve at least a lesser degree of
intolerance towards the move-
ment of people and ideas. Only
in that direction are there any
serious prospects of a really last-
ing peace.
Robert Conquest
Times Newspapers Ltd, 1974
? s-
? By Ed Townsend
Labor correspondent of ? ?
Po?-?.., The Christian Science Monitor
New York
An important and controversial era
-in American Labor is ending. . ?
``r. Jay Lovestone, director of the 'AFL-
'CIO's International Department and
the "gray eminence" of the feder-
ation's strong anti-Communist for-
aign policy, is retiring June 30..-a -
' There Is general agreement among
:Observers that not many in American
labor havebeen as broadly influential
at home and abroad in shaping not
' only union philosophies, but also war-
time and postwar social and political
structures. . ? . ?
t?-?- Mr. Love-stone has been one of a
-small group of AFL-C10 "cloak and
"dagger" operatives -4. more out in the
'open now --who were highly effective
In plots and counterplots throughout
..the world to oppose Communist global
..aspirations to infiltrate labor move-
ments. ? .r.,??? ? '
. f .
?Meany still boss ,
.But despite Mr. Lovestone's retire-
-ment, the AFL-CIO's international
position will remain the same for
some time to come, observers say.
For no matter who holds the labor
body's top international affairs .'st,
It is George Meany, president of the
AFL-CIO, who is the final arbiter of
policies ? and there is not a More
hard-line, implacable anti-Commu-
nist in U.S. labor. -
"Labor and the free world owe him
[Mr. Lovestone] a deep debt of grat-
itude," said Mr. Meany recently of his
friend and long-time adviser. Then
recognizing Mr. Lovestone's con-
troversial position, he noted that his
foreign policy aide also has long been
"the target of all who would pervert
-democracy and -destroy democratic-
institutions.' " ? ?
t ? Many in AFL-CIO share in varying
degrees Mr. Meany's regard for Mr.
Lovestone, onetime U.S. Communist
leader who renounced communism to
become a dedicated and highly effec-
tive foe of its ideology and tactics not
only in the U.S. but throughout the
free world. ' ? _
Mr. Lovestone is still denounced
regularly in the U.S. Communist
press and by extreme leftists as a
traitor and a "fascist." Those in labor
who favor more flexibility in relations
with unions abroad, often_ criticize
him as too rigid in his beliefs and too
responsive to old ideological posi-
tions. ? '
. ,
Party f tander in 1916
Mr. Lovestone helped organize the
American Communist Party in 1918
and became its general secretary in
the late 1920's, until he broke with
Russian communism and was purged ,
from the party by Joseph- Stalin. A
pragmatist, he had protested orders
from Moscow to implement a worker
and -farmer action program during
the depression as impractical. He
then reorganized the Communist
Party, U.S.A., along lines he and
other American leaders considered
best suited for the country and its
workers.
At the same time, in the 1930's, he
futilely sought to develop . a strong
backing for communism within ra-
pidly expanding American unions ?
at one time with a particular empha-
sis on the struggling, young United
Auto Workers. But in a dramatic
philosophical reversal in the late
1930's, Mr. Lovestone renounced com-
munism and became an effective
antagonist. He first began working
with the International Ladies' Gar-
ment Workers' Union in 1943, then
later became active wit the old AFL
and later the AFL-CIO. - -
Significantly, Mr. Lovestone was
decorated fortis activities in Europe
by former West German Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer.
The AFL-CIO staff official helped
form the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions and to maintain
it for years as a counter to Communisi.
unionism.
Although known particularly for
foreign affairs, he also was a trusted
aide to Mr. Meany in domestic and
union matters. He was an inter-
mediary ? unsuccessful ? between
Mr. Meany, then secretary-treasurer
Of the old AFL, and John L. Lewis of
the United Mine Workers during ef-
forts in the mid-1930's to avoid the
Industrial unions breakaway that led
to formation of the CIO.
' ? After World War U, he worked-
strenuously to shore up Europe's
democratic unions and governments
? with AFL-CIO's funds reportedly
supplemented b a still-unconfirmed $2
million a year from the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency. A former top
aide of Allen Dulles, then Director of
the CIA, is a source for reports that
Mr. Lovestone's vastly informed la-
bor intelligence operation was used to
-funnel CIA funds to groups fighting to
strengthen democracy in Europe.
Mr. Lovestone is to be succeeded by
Ernest S. Lee, his assistant since 1964
and Mr. Meany's son-in-law. A gradu-
ate of Georgetown University's
School of Foreign Service and one-
time Marine Corps major. Mr. Lee's
views usually are parallel to those Of
Mr. Lovestone ? and of Mr. Meany ?
but they are less scarred by decades
of ideological infighting.
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ove
or
VirS}111,16TON POST
21 JUN 1974
Food Su
hitelligen
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-'1.- By Nancy L. Ross
.? Washintt.na Post St-$:1 Writer .
Two former presidential
candidates and a former :presi-
dential economic adviser yes-
terday urged creation of an
agicultural "intelligence" sys-
tem , to help . alleviate the
world food
? On the seconddai 'of hear-
ings before the Senate Select
Committee on Nutrition and
Human Needs, Sens. Hubert
H. Humphrey ,.(D-Minn.j.: and
George. McGovern AD-S.D.)
and Arthur Okun, who headed
President Johnson's COuncil
of Economic Advisers', said ad-
vance.knowledge .of. countries'
BALTIMORE SUN
25 June 1974
Ernest B. Furourson
ed
political attitudes,- ? on food-
stuffs can help prevent prob-
lamS such as those Caused by
the 1972 Soviet . grain . deal.
: "We have to know if it's a :one-
or a two-alarm fire," said
Okun. ..?
i Agricultural ? intelligence
woulthgo beyond harvest esti-
'. mateS 'and 'food _demands pro-
Jected4from 'expected Popular
tion increases. It would seek,
'for example, to anticipate
i whether :a .7coUntry would
i tighten. its belt during a:time
of shortage .or import large
quantities .. of. food, and
WALL STREET JOURNAL
26 Jun, 1974
i?;-:?AM proposal to blacklist the Soviet Union
as a violator of the convention abolishing
slave labor was rejected by delegates,to-an
International Labor Organization -confer-
ence in Geneva. A conference committee
voted last week to cite the Soviets, the first
time in the ILO's 55-year history that a
major power, has been proposed for the
"spectial list."
_
...-ence'in Rome next November.
port surpluses.
whether it would store or, :et- i"Rightnow.we have 60 differ-
Humphrey deplored the, fact'
?
ent food 'prices and policies::
e ? are extemporaneous
that there despite an agreement -
I
changes in production and wi!..11 Moscow signed . a year consuniption., -We. can't -read
ago; the U.S. is still not receiv,
z
sag information on Soviet ag-
Goldberg-was chairman of a
ricultural priorities.' He said panel on nutrition and food
, he. had asked President Nixon availability. - ?
The committee 'also sug-
gested establishment of inter-
national futures markets, es-
pecially in developing ? coun-
. trieS, so that.' producers would
be able to make,-their plans
par: of our crop; it - should ;
; free: of the burden -Of having
keep the internaqpnal commu- ? e
tn ir creditors determining
nity advise of its grain priori- ? the market prices of their
ties. And we should keep them
advised of the availability of crops..
Lead here." - ? -?
:Other. proposals were for..de-,
?
velopment - of new food tech-
Ray A. Goldberg, professor nologies, new sources- i)f pro-
tein, aquaciature (`farming";
the waters and seas), and cen-
tralized kitchens-to cut down
labor costs - in school lune
Aural intelligence be U.S. pol-
icy at the, world food, confer- program
the-minds of the leaders."
to do something about it dur-
ing /his Moscow visit next
week.
McGovern said: "If the -So-
viet Union is going to. come
and ask us for a substantial
'agriculture, at -':IHarvard
Scho.ol oti Business Adminis-
tration, ..irged that agricul-
How Much is a Gooa Multitude Worth?
. Washington.
The word among our tradition-
al allies in Western Europe is
that Mr. Nixon's scouts have
been asking about the reception
he might get if he visited there,
too, during the weeks when his
case is before Congress and the
courts. But in Moscow he never
needed to put out feelers to our
traditional adversaries; Brezh-
nev sent him an eager message
way back, making him welcome
again. All of which brings up
the question of whether foreign
excursions whose domestic po-
litical uses are so blatant can
possibly produce anything bene-
ficial to the rest of us Americans.
? ?
That judgment cannot be based
on the size and telegenic enthu-
siasm of the hordes trucked in
to line the boulevards of Mos-
cow. Minsk and wherever else
the President travels, any more
than .an accurate assessment of
his Middle Eastern trip can be
taken from the White House's
crowd estimates between Cairo
and Alexandria. .
Some may suspect I go too far,
In saying the cheering throngs
will be trucked in. Unless the
increased output of motor ve-
hicles in the Soviet Union allows
them now to be bused in instead,
that is exactly what happens.
Many times while awaiting the
arrival of one or another great
man at the Moscow or Sofia or
East Berlin airport or train sta-
tion, I have come early enough
to watch the spontaneous crowds
being organized. This is not a
procedure peculiar to Communist
countries, as any Nixon advance
man can tell you, but those coun-
tries are more skilled at it.
? ? ?
They already have each apart-
ment house, block, assembly line
and factory organized, with lead-
ers assigned right down to squad
level. So on a special occasion,
when the order is issued that the
workers of Red Banner Synthetic
Fiber Factory No. 12 in the name
of Vladimir Ilyich will have a
holiday from work, and that they
will show up at their assembly
point at 8 A.M. sharp, dressed
in their proletarian best, they
show up. ;
Their group leaders check
them off like a marine sergeant
preparing his troops for Satur-
day morning inspection. They
board their trucks and when they
arrive at the airport or their
designated spot along the motor-
cade route they are issued tiny
flags of the visiting dignitary's
country, .to wave for him and
the cameras as he passes by.
And then they wait several hours,
do their jobs, and the press re-
ports that the visitor got an over-
whelming reception that bodes
well 'for the important economic
and military negotiations that are
to follow.
? ? ?
In 1972, the scale of the pre-
cisely controlled Moscow recep-
tion for Mr. Nixon surprised
many students of East-West at-
mospherics. The agreements
reached and communiques issued
as the President departed were
not of earth-shaking moment.
But things have become clearer
in retrospect, since for example
the giant grain deal of that fall,
after which the prices of gro-
ceries .for American consumers
have never been the same.
Even as he departs on the cur-
rent trip. Dr. Kissinger is having
to deny that he made a special
side agreement on the previous
'one, allowing the Russians more
'nuclear missiles aboard submar-
ines than was stated in the for-
mal SALT communiques signed
two years ago.
Should this smack of cynicism
from one exposed too long to
what is happening in Washing-
ton, consider the view of a west-
:26
ern European specialist in these
affairs, Pierre Hassner of the
Centre d'Etudes des Relations
Internationales in Paris, writing
in Potomac Associates' new book:
"A Nation Observed":
"If one judges the grain deal
or other economic agreements
with the Soviet Union as political
bargains, one may wonder wheth-
er the value of Soviet conces-
sions was not limited to face-sav-
ing for the Nixon administration
in circumstances that it had un-
necessarily, brought upon itself,
and whether the administration's
heralded diplomatic successes
have not led primarily to a dis-
creet but steady increase in the
power of the Soviet Union. As
an' Albanian newspaper put it,
Moscow might be able to have
its civilian economy financed by
the West and thus be in a posi-
tion to concentrate more heavily
on military development."
? ? ?
Which is not n'ecessarily to dis-
count in adtance any agreements
formalized in Moscow this week.
It is, however, to remind that
all the quid pro quo will not be
typed out in the communiques.
The most substantive thing Mr.
Nixon gets may well be the
crowds turned out for the Ameri-
can cameras accompanying him.
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WASHINGTON POST
25 June 1974
George- F Will
The Reoliferation of Plutonium
More than by a scarcity of food or
energy or clean air or living space, civ-
ilization is threatened by an exotic sur-
plus. It is threatened by the prolifera-
tion of plutonium.
, Bear this in mind as the govern-
Ment, floundering along miles behind
events, debates the wisdom of giving
.Egypt a nuclear reactor. The problem
Is a lot bigger than that reactor.
Plutonium is the crucial?the explo-
sive?component in nuclear weapons.
It is a man-made element. Slightly
? more than three decades ago all the
world's plutonium was in a cigar box
in a U.S. laboratory.
. But the rapid growth of the nuclear
power industry, which is just begin-
ning, will produce a terrifying amount
? of plutonium. Plutonium is a by-prod-
uct? of the fissioning of the fuel
(enriched uranium) in the nuclear re-
actors that are used increasingly to
? generate electricity.
The process of 'enrichinguranium is
, still very complex, secret, and expen-
sive. But most nations can build (and,
if necessary, conceal) a reprocessing
plant for extracting plutonium from
used reactor fuel.
And a determined group or nation
can get plutonium even if it has nei-
ther a reactor nor a reprocessing
plant. It can steal it.
Once one has weapons-grade pluto-
nium, construction of a bomb is a man-
ageable task for a few competent phys-
icists. If they need some tips they can
send $4 to the U.S. Commerce Depart-
ment for a book (declassiDed in 1961)
that , describes the technic,s1 problems
involved in building the -first atomic
bombs. ?
The cover of the book says the gov-
ernment does not assume "any- liabili-
ties with respect to the use of, or for
damages resulting from the use of, any
information, apparatus, method, or
process disclosed in this report."
(Cultural note: People were out-
raged in the mid-1960s when the cover
of the New York Review of Books con-
. tamed a sketch showing how to con-
struct a Molotov cocktail.)
Looking ahead to the proliferation
of electricity-generating reactors in
the U.S., an expert says:
Private companies will soon own
more plutonium than exists in all the
bombs of NATO. With the predict-
able growth and expansion of the- ,
nuclear industry, power companies 0
will make a cumulative total of 10
million kilograms of plutonium with-
in the last quarter of the twentieth
century . . . Enough plutonium to
make 'a weapon could be carried in a
paper bag.
A small group of determined per-
sons could steal that much from pri-
vate industry here or from public or
private installations abroad. Indeed,
that already may have happened. We ?
can not know for sure.
We protect plutonium no more rigo-
rously than we protect currency. And
keeping track of plutonium as it is
processed and used involves a signifi-
cant margin of inaccuracy.
This is called MUF?material unac-
counted for. Today, skillful pilfering of
THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
15 June 1974
weapons-building amounts of pinto- -
nium MUF could go undetected here
and around the world.
Nations or groups that do not have
the patience for embezzling plutonium -
might try instead a bolder form of
stealing, such as hijacking. By the end
of this century a million kilograms of
plutonium will be shipped annually by
planes, trains, ships, and trucks be-
tween thousands of nuclear plants in
more than 50 countries.
Brazil and Libya, perhaps with the
help of India or France, soon may join
the nuclear weapons club, which soon
may be the least exclusive club in the
world. According to some sober physi-
cists, most nations could join.
It is possible that, say, Uganda could - .
"go nuclear" in a fee, years. Getting
the necessary physicists would be
. harder (but not all that much harder)
' than getting the necessary plutonium.
Imagine how stimulating life will be
when a blithe spirit like Uganda's Gen- ?
eral Amin adds the tang of nuclear
blackmail to his already frolicsome
politics. But that thought, gruesome
t though it is,? is not the grimmest
, thought one must consider.
The other day a terrorist bomb made
a mess of Westminster Hall in London.
It may not be long before the more so-
phisticated terrorist organizations will
have bombs that can make a crater out
of central London?or any other city.
Imagine the Irish Republic Army or
El Fatah as a nuclear power. Someone
once described the Nazi s aS
"Neanderthals in airplanes." Neander-
thals with nuclear weapons may be the
ultimate 20th-century terror.
Fr nch bona is Germany-bound?
; THE French nuclear strike ,
force is directed against Ger-
many and not Russia, accord-
ing to . a version of a lunch-
, time conversation between
the late President Pompidou
and the recently dismissed
'Reform Minister, Jean-
_ Jacques Servan-Schreiber.
? In an interview with the
German magazine Die Welt,
M. Servan-Sehrei her d isciosed
that in loe8 President Pom-
pidou, then Prime Minister
under General de Gaulle, told
him the true target of the
French Force de Frappe.
, Seeing his guest's astonish-
ment. at -the suggestion, M.
Pompidou went on "But
From JAMES MacMANUS, Paris, June 14
what do you expect? In ten
years the Germans will he so
strong economically that they
will demand the bomb. ? What
Would France do if she was
deprived of it? ".
M. Servan - Schreiber did
not record his answer to the
question which, however, did
little to dampen his campaign
against the French nuclear
ea ponry.
There Is naturally enough
no information about the
scheduled destination of the
missiles in the 18 silos near
Marseilles or the atomic
bombs carried by the 36
Mirage fighters which are
split into four squadrons-
around France. . ?
The French President, who
share's the secret with a hand-
ful of senior Ministers and
military officials, reviews the
targets every year. The mis-
siles have to be given definite
targets, and, once given, the
targets cannot easily be
changed since the missile's
computer system has to be
fed with fresh information to
gear it to a new target.
It Would be ironic if the
missiles on the bleak Plateau
d'Alhion, in the South of
France, do carry the names'
of German cities. For in the
early 'sixties General de
Gaulle expended considerable
diplomatic effort .urging
Chancellor Adenauer to par-
take in a jointly manned
Franco-German nuclear
bomber.
The idea was to lure the
Germans from under the
American nuclear umbrella
and strike, so the General
thought. a deadly blow at the
Americans' domination of
Europe. ? The Chancellor
clearly did not trust the
French and their fledgling
bomb and Germany remained
firmly under American
shelter.
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BALTIMORE SUN
23 June 1974
A an its ognia:
e Brazil Connection',
By HARRY SYLVESTER
Washington.
,., Virtually all significant revolutionary
movements have their rubric. What is
'known ? about the young people who
gathered to form the Symbionese Liber-
ation Army indicates that they were
;drawn to the writings of Ernesto (Che)
Guevara, Regis Debray and Carlos
Marighela.
Almost everyone knows something
about Guevara and Debray, both of
?
them distinguished for their romanti-
--:-. cismi, their impracticality and their long
histories of failure?while Marighela is
- known mainly to professionals on both
sides of the ;aw, and was respected and
feared by them. Marighela, who knew
more about the political use of violence
than Guevara and Debray together, died
In a police stakeout on a November
night in 1969 in Brazil's giant industrial
city of Sao Paulo. He was 58 years old
'and had been an effective terrorist for
about 40 years.
, That the SLA has lasted as long as It
has, and had at least some success
according to its standards, may be a
tribute to Marighela. Unlike Guevara or
Debray, Marighela was orderly, rea-
soned in his dictums, psychologically
sound in judgments and, paradoxically
'enough, prudent. In his "Minimanual of
the Urban Guerrilla," he gives detailed
Instructions for effective terrorism, sup-
ports these with surprising insights, and
delineates which social categories are
most effective for such activity. ("Stu-
dents are noted for being politically
crude, and coarse and thus they break
? all the taboos . . . Churchmen . . . repre-
sent a sector that has special ability to
communicate with the people, particu-
larly with workers, peasants, and the
Brazilian women." His strictures on stu-
dents appear to apply to some SLA
' mistakes.
Long before the kidnaping of Patricia
? Hearst, Marighela wrote: "The kidnap-
Mr. Sylvester is a Washington-based
journalist and former specialist on Latin
' America with the State Department and
the United States Information Agency.
. .
Ing Of personalities who are known
? artists,- or are outstanding in some other
field, but who have evidenced no politi-
cal interest, can be a useful form of
propaganda ... provided it occurs
under special circumstances, and the
kidnaping is handled so that the public
sympathizes with it and accepts it."
With the same sophistication Marighela
lists the seven deadly sins of the urban
guerrilla, including in them vanity,
boastfulness and impatience.
Marighela appears to have written his
An.structions over a 20-year period, but
did not bring them together into the
Minimanual, written in his native Portu-
guese, until June, 1969. Five months
later he was dead. Not surprisingly his
death gave impetus to the spread of the
manual. ,As a memorial of sorts, the
, Havana-based Organization of Solidarity
of The peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin
America reprinted the manual in a 1970
issue of its magazine Tricontinental.
Typed copies of the English-language
version found their way to the United
States and became required reading
among_ the Weatherman and similar
groups. It is known that some members
of the SLA read it before that group was
organized.
Some of these might be called intellec-
tuals and Marighela lists the special
virtues of intellectuals for terrorism just
as he does those of the clergy and the
military. But he knew most terrorists
are not of great intellectual capacity
and accordingly reduced some of his
formulas for violence to acronyms that
could be easily recalled. (Whether SLA
represents this is anyone's guess.)
.. There .appears to be a lack of an
ideology among urban guerrillas, includ-
ing the SLA. Political anarchism is not
incompatible with their activity and it
appears both they and the SLA slipped
into this much as did Marighela himself
?out of internal and personal reasons
rather than for external political ones.
For years Marighela was a leader in the
orthodox Brazilian Communist party
(PCB). When the Moscow line changed
in 1962 to one of "peaceful coexistence,"
the Brazilian party split, With leaders
such as Mauricio Crabois and Joao
Amazonas forming the dissident Com-
munist Party of grazil (using the same
initials as the orthodox party). Four
years later a wave of terrorist activity,
,
28
. ' ?
, J,?,-.1-! !????v..:
uncharacteristic for Brazilians, began. It.
appears to ha.. e been directed by the
splinter group although Marighela did
not leave the orthodox party openly until -
1967. The time was a confused one
following the overthrow of the left-wing
Goulart government in 1964, and rightist
groups and student ones were also en-
gaged in terrorism.
The rigid political stance of the Bra-
zilian splinter party had not attracted
many followers. Its ideological differ-
ences with the orthodox one could be
reduced to whether violence should be
stopped, as Moscow directed, or contin-
ued within the Brazilian context. The
latter course suited the temperament uf
some of the dissident leaders. The opeR-
ational document of the group becante
Marighela's manual or rather its conipo-
nents before these were compiled into
book form. Kidnapings were far less
common then than now, but killings by
gunfire?some political, some apparently
at random?bank holdups to fund terror-
ist activity, sabotage and abortive at-
tempts to subvert the military all could
be traced in time to Marighela's system-
atic direction. ? ? -
Yet within the historic context, the
violence of that time appears mindless
at best. That violence has been a major..
factor in the acceptance of most Brazil:'
l.
?ans of a succession of military govern-'?
ments as something to be feared les'
than the terrorists. It also widened the.,
split with Moscow, so that the dissidents'
found they had to turn to China and
Cuba in hope of logistical and moral
support. Both Mao and Castro, by what
seems more than coincidence, had mani-
fested an anarchic bent at some time in,.
their careers. (Castro proclaimed 14'
allegiance to anarchy early, in my he-::
lief, when he chose the traditional redo
and-black anarchist colors as those-6t
his 26th of July Movement.) -v
It is this anarchic violence, rational- -
ized as a form of protest, that the SIX'
appears to have inherited from Marir
hela, however, unconsciously on their
part and unintentionally on his. He dis
liked what he called "the penetration aiidv,
domination of United States imperialism
in our country," but it is most unlikelS,"
that he thought of his manual as figur?
ing in an assault on the social fabric .of
the United States.
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NEW YORK TIMES
17 June 1974
Nor Iron
By Grace Paley
While in Moscow as members of
a delegation to the World Peace Con-
gress, the Rev. Paul Mayer and I were
-fortunate to be able to speak to a few
Russian dissidents and were surprised
by their ignorance of American polit-
ical and economic life. They simply
?didn't know. Some wanted never to
know. (Perhaps they thought if heaven
doesn't exist, how are they to get out
of hell?) Others like the Galiches and
? Sakharovs kindly listened to our
, views and extended their courage with
? new sadness.
.Certainly in his last couple of ad-
dresses to, or interviews with, West-
ern reporters, the views of Aleksandr
I. Solzhenitsyn seem opinionated and
, uninformed. A couple of other state-
ments by Andrei D. Sakharov are more
responsive to the painful concerns
of ?Western radicals, and are humane
and attentive?though both men and
their families have suffered similar
'persecutions.
The Soviet Government, which tries
to keep news of American ease, afflu-
ence and electoral politics from all
Russian citizens, has prevented Rus-
sian dissidents at least from believing
the information about American in-
.ternal fear and American methods of
exporting terror with cash.
The Russian dissidents' families
know from personal experience that
the Soviet Union maintains prison
camps, but they have not wanted to
know, as Americans do not want to
know, that the United States apart
from its large penal system forces
?thousands of young Americans to live
in exile in Canada and Sweden, keeps
most of its prisoners in other parts of
the world and has trained an 6lite
police for South America in techniques
sometimes called counterinsurgent
but basically antidissident.
Every morning's paper brings news
about that worldwide community of
wardens and silencers. For instance,
several weeks ago, I read the following
three stories:
On Page 1, that fearful knock on the
..idoor was described?the one that pre-
ceded the forcible removal of Tor.
Solzhenitsyn from his home and fam-
ily. On Page 18, there was an article
about the reinvestigation of a case in
,which two Americans were murdered
ars a Cage
in their beds by Chicago policemen.
who didn't knock but shot 82 to '99
rounds of bullets into the room, there-
by removing them forcibly from life
itself. Then on Page 11, a two-inch
story: 130 political prisoners of the
South Vietnamese had been freed.
The Russian, as we all know, is a
world-famous writer, a brave man,'
now in exile from his country and his
language. This can be terrible for a
writer, worse sometimes than prison
among one's own people. He will live
in free exile; he can't help but remem-
ber the thousands of political prisoners
in Soviet prison camps. ,
The dead Americans were Fred
Hampton and Mark Clark, two Black'
Panthers. They were fingered by their
own security chief, a Federal Bureau
of Investigation informer who had
stocked and maintained the Panther:
arsenal. The grand jury thought the
dead men were in the wrong. The
police were acquitted. Family action
and citizen concern have reopened the ?
case.
The 130 Vietnamese were the first
part of a group of 256 whose release,
and exchange had been planned; 100,-
000 to 200,000 others, nearly forgotten,
remain in cages and prison camps paid,
for by the United States, guarded by
police whose money comes from the
United States. They are in effect pris--
oners of the United States.
Although these Vietnamese, the
black Americans and. the Russians
have had an ideological and exemplary
importance throughout the world,
they've all been powerless to live free
lives in their own countries. Some of
us have asked: How can there not be'
understanding among all these people
whose door the state has knocked on
in rage, or broken open without knock-
ing, shooting bullets?
As they emigrate toward our West,
writing articles and giving interviews,
the Russian dissidents must begin to
include the pain of these other dis-
sents, imprisonments, oppressions with
their own. If they are unable to do
this, they will have exchanged the
condition of prisoner for the status of
warden; they will have escaped the
persecutions of one huge armored
state for protection and employment
in another.
Grace Paley, short-story writer, is
author of "Enormous Changes at the
Last Minute."
NEW YORK TIMES
17 June 1974
rt
Politics
s,
By Anthony Lewis r733
3
LONDON, June I6?Lenin liked
Beethoven piano music, especially the
' Appassionata Sonata. He told Maxim:
Gorky that it made him think "what ,
marvelous things human beings can,
, do." But then he added: "I can't listen
to music too often. It affects your'
nerves, makes you want to say stupid
nice things and stroke the heads of:
, people who .could create such beauty
?while living in this vile hell. And now,
-you mustn't stroke anyone's head?
you might get your hand bitten off.
You have to hit them on the head
without any mercy...."
, Those words are brought to life in a'
.remarkable play by Torn Stoppard,
"Travesties," that has just opened in
London. It is a play about, among
many other things, attitudes toward
, art. In the character of \Lenin, using
.his actual words, Stoppard traces how
the idea of artistic and intellectual"
freedom becomes corrupted in the
totalitarian mind to that of art as the
servant ea the state?and of artists as
, expendable "snivelers" and "whiners."
Soviet attitudes toward art and free-
dom are a subject much on the mind-
of London just now. The Bolshoi Bal.
let, here on a visit, opened with a
lifeless production of "Swan Lake:"
.vulgar. mechanical down to the obli-
'gatery Zovlet happy ending, with an
Odette wno was on:Y an imitation.
swan, not a bewitched girl suffering
human emotions. It was a reminder
of what fifty years of Leninism have
done to Russian a'rtistic creativity.
The Bolshoi visit is the occasion
for debate here about what we in the
West can do to help the victims of
'Soviet repression. Outside the theater,
demonstrators protest the treatment
of Soviet Jews. Many in official and
artistic circles sympathize with the
protesters. Others think it is wrong
to annoy the Bolshoi troupe and argue.
that private representations work
better than public .protest.
In this instance there is convincing
evidence for the first view, for public
pressure on behalf of the oppressed.
For it would have been very difficult
LONDON
to
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_ 4127 were made me-
'Galina Panov and let those two dan- .
'ce.rs go to Israel.
just before the opening, relented
all if the Soviet authorities had not,:
in
their two-year torment of Valery anC
what moved the U.S.S.R. off some
course. In the case of the Panovs,
It is always hard to know exactly'
go ,oinwwssisthotwIthe Bolshoi season at.
. Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330004-7
'Henry Kissinger took thicase'up with
. .
the Soviets last year. But there is
reason to think that the intensity of
the public campaign on their behalf
had become a real embarrassment ?
- especially in this country, threatening
disruption of the Bolshoi, a Soviet
prestige symbol,.
Some of the great names in British
theater and music and dance wrote to
The Times of London about the Panovs
just before the Bolshoi opening: Lord
Olivier, Sir Frederick Ashton, Raymond
Leppard, Dame Marie Rambert, Dame
Peggy ? Ashcroft, Sir John Gielgud,
Harold Pinter among others. Lord
Harewood, head of the National Opera
and a cousin of the Queen, spoke with
the Soviet Ambassador and Prime
Minister Wilson wrote to Soviet-
Premier Kosygin, a private letter at
first, then made public.
? Is it an absurdly anachronistic idea,
that the expression of freedom's ideals
can help the victims of tyranny? For
individuals, that seems to me an easy
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
20 June 1974
question. The relatively few of us who
live in freedom, and it is few, have no
choice but to try to help?each in his
own way, however feeble it may
appear. Opinion just could matter: A
letter, a raised voice, a political gesture.
For governments the question is
harder: They simply must treat with
regimes- of which they disapprove.
President Nixon was plainly right, at
Annapolis the other week, when he
said that d?nte will have its value.
if it lessens the chance of war between
nations without affecting ideologies.
? The danger is that in seeking po-
litical arrangements with authoritari-
an powers, democratic governments
will seem to condone their cruelties.
That is no abstraction when it--comes
to the Soviet Union. Those in the
U.S.S.R. who suffer for their beliefs
or their religion deeply fear that the ,
Nixon-Brezhnev variety of d?nte will
add legitimacy to the tyranny.
The fact is, for example, that Moscow ?
has been cutting Jewish emigration?
from an average of 3,000 a month last
year t6 about I;225 now--end. has
been intensifying the harassment of
.those who dare to apply. If that trend
continues after the Nixon visit, the
United States will have made it that
:much more' politically respectable.-
'" Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, of
_Columbia University has said that we '
used to think of d?nte as bringing
-."an increasing sense of shared ideals,
with many in the Communist coun-.
tries looking to us for inspiration. De-
.tente today, instead, is a conservativo
balance-of-power arrangement, devoid
-of any moral content."
Ideals: Yes, but we can only press
them on others if we live them our-
selves. We can hardly expect Mr.
Brezhnev to listen very seriously to 1
talk about the rule' of law from an
American Government that commits
burglaries and wiretaps its own offi-
cials. The answer to Lenin is that, in
art and life, we are for the human
spirit, not the state.
.0 4
Boeing and Soviet Union may conclude
world's largest contract for aircraft
By Paul Wohl
Written for
The Christian Science Monitor
Tass announced recently in seven
lines what may turn out to be the
biggest commercial deal in the his-
tory of air transport.
According to Tass, a "cooperation
agreement" has been signed with
Boeing covering the design and devel-
opment of a new passenger aircraft
and possible construction of a Boeing
plant in the Soviet Union.
The agreement also covers helicop-
? ter development, and may therefore
Involve at least dne of the major
'United' States "chopper" manufac-
turers. ?
- - The outcome of the agreement may
be production of the first wide-bodied
aircraft in the U.S.S.R. based on
Boeing design, ."which will probably
prove to be a Soviet version of the
American 747 Jumbo Jet," writes
English economist Richard Rocking-
ham Gill, retired from Radio Free
Europe, in his latest news letter.
Whether or not a Boeing factory will
be built in Russia, this would be a
transaction as spectacular as the big
oil and gas projects sponsored last
year. Moscow's cooperation agree-
ment with Boeing is certain to come
up in President Nixon's talks next
week with the Soviet leaders.
Nothing similar to 747
The Soviets lack anything similar to
the American 747. Their only plane of
a comparable class is the Antonov-22
air bus and freighter which was in
series production before the Boeing
747, but the latter is more modern in
design,.
Series production of the ANT-2
cannot have been very satisfactory
?
because last year the Soviet Air Force
had only 15 of the mammoth aircraft.
The Soviets hr.ve another very large
supersonic plane, the Tupolev-144, but
of these only four carry out route-
proving mail flights inside the coun-
try. One TU-144 crashed disastrously
at the Paris air show last year. The
plane's structural flaws are said to
have been corrected, but its econom-
ics are still open to doubt. The target
date for passenger service by the TU-
144 now is 1975.
Another. Soviet-built and designed
wide-bodied aircraft, the Ilyushin-86
is not yet in service; it has only half
the maximum payload and less than
half the maximum range of the
Boeing 747, of which more than 200
are flying all over the world. ,
Tests set for -1975
The IL-86 is scheduled to be ready
for test flying next year. Another
Ilyushin plane, the IL-62 was kept on
test flights for more than four years
and reached the air routes only in
1967. Judging by this precedent, the
IL-86 may be ready for work in 1979.
This shows how important it would
be for the U.S.S.R. to secure a plane of
the type of the Boeing-747 which could
be delivered at much the same time,
if built under license. Aeroflot, the
Soviet air line, would be the gainer in
view of the Boeing's superior perfor-
mance and proven design.
In the short term, the sale of
Boeing's 747 to Aeroflot would be an
economic advantage for the United
States.
The advantage in the long range is
not certain.. If Aeroflot starts to
operate planes of this type on its
extensive international routes, which
are believed to be the lopgest in the
world, this would cut into United
States earings from international air
transportation, an important factor in
the U.S. balance of payments.
'There also are political doubts
about the wisdom of supplying big
turbofan technology to the U.S.S.R.
Engine question arises
Should the cooperation agreement
announced by Tass lead to a deal, the
question of the engine contracts
comes up because Soviet engine de-
signers have been notoriously poor on
fuel consumption. The engine con-
tracts also may go to the West, says
Mr. Gill. The most likely prospects
would seem to be Rolls-Royce and
Pratt & Whitney.
The latter firm, reports Mr. Gill,
"already has sewn up part of the
Chinese market by making the en-
gines for the Boeing 707 which were
sold to Peking, and so have Rolls-
Royce by building the Spey engines
for Chinese Tridents."
"If the Russians select either Pratt
& Whitney or Rolls-Royce engines,
the company concerned will have
pulled off the once improbable feat of
selling to the U.S.S.R., to China, and
the United States, truly a multinatto7
nal performance."
These are conjectures, of course,
but the wording and timing of the
Tass communique about Aeroflot's
cooperation agreement with Boeing,
covering the design and development
of a new passenger aircraft and the
possible construction of a Boeing
plant in the U.S.S.R., undoubtedly
were carefully planned.
The Soviets may hope that by
announcing the deal shortly before
President Nixon's visit, it may come
off in the wave of bonhomie and trade
enthusiasm which is likely to result.
30
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IVA YORK nus
14 JUN 1974
The Land of the Free
By Tom Wicker
LISBON?While planning the coup
that overthrew Portugal's 48-year-old
dictatorship on April 25, the young
army officers primarily responsible
had no intention of letting the United
States have the faintest inkling of
what was afoot. They were convinced
that if the Central Intelligence Agency
knew a coup was even being talked
of, the agency would promptly inform
the D.G.S., Portugal's secret police,
with which the C.I.A. had close and
cordial ties. ?
Yet, in Spain, which now eyes free
Portugal both uneasily and hopefully
?according to one's political outlook
?across their common border, a long-
experienced former diplomat recently
delivered himself of the opinion that
the United States must have given its
approval in advance for the Portu-
guese coup. Otherwise, he said con-
fidently, the United States never
? would have permitted the dictatorial
..Caetano regime to be overthrown.
There was a lesson in that for
Spain, he continued. If there was to
be genuine change toward a demo-
cratic regime after the death of Fran-
cisco Franco, or movement toward
such a regime. before Franco's death,
the United States would have to be
convinced that such a development in
Spain was in the best American inter-
est. Washington simply would not
permit democracy in .Spain unless
that point was made in advance.
A younger Spaniard, deeply in-
volved in clandestine activities for a
more democratic regime, took a dark-
er view. Citing what "everybody
knows," that the C.I.A. had over-
BALTIMORE SUN
26 June 1974
thrown the Allende Government in
Chile, he remarked gloomily, that the_
?
United States probably would never,
allow Spain to have democracy. .
This kind of thing is deeply disturb-
ing, even shocking, to an American
who would like to think of his court?
try as the champion of -democracy
and freedom everywhere. -
The point is not whether the C.I.A.?
really did overthrow Allende, or
whether the agency would in . fact
have betrayed the Portuguese coup to
the D.G.S.; and explanations that the
United States ought logically to wel-.
come more democratic regimes in
both Spain and Portugal, since that ?
would ease the domestic political burl:,
den of alliances with, these countries:
do not alter the case. The fact is that..
manypeople abroad believe the
United States is the enemy of freedom,
and that it uses the C.I.A. relentlessly'
and efficiently to oppose democratic- -
movements everywhere.
' It is a sort of instant or ready-made
paranoia. When the American Ambas-
sador to Portugal, Stuart N. Scott,
paid the first diplomatic call on Gen.
Antemio de Spinola after the coup in
Lisbon, and again paid the first call
on the general after he was named
Provisional President, the United
States did not get all the expected
credit for welcoming the advent of --
democracy in Portugal. Instead, Com-
munists and others spread the word to?
willing listeners that the calls had-
been to protest the coup; and this was
widely believed. ? -
To a great extent, the United States-
has no one to blame but itself for this
state of affairs. The wheel has come
full circle from the kind of. American
lea er5
with internal ur
thinking that, in the, fifties and six-
ties,. suspected a Communist plot be-
hind every political development in
the world. From the Iran of Mossa-
degh twenty years ago to the Chile
of Allende in 1973, there have been
ample facts and plausible reports of
C.I.A. involvement in the overthrow
of governments and the propping up
of dictators?all 'augmented by the
implacable set of American policy in
Southeast Asia. for- the last fifteen .
years ---to account for the world's
paranoia. ? ? : ? ???? - -
Just recently, Mario Soares, Portu-
gal's animated -new. Foreign Minister,
was telling funny stories about his
fruitless,- efforts,:as leader of the out?-%.
lawed Socialist party during the Sala-
: zar' and Caetano -regimes, to make
'some kind of contact with the Amer-
ican -TState Department. "Never got
higher ,than a third secretary," he re-
called. When one young American
Foreign Service officer made an en-
gagement for dinner with Mr. Soares's
family in Lisbon:a few years ago, the
American had to call and report with
embarrassment that the American Am-
bassador of the da?,..had forbidden him-
to keep the date.. ? ???? '
So when Mr. SoarE.bs,. became _For-
eign Minister a few ? weeks ago, he
did not even try to approach the State,
Department directly; he. asked his
friends, Harold Wilson of Britain and
Willy Brandt of West Germany, to put
him in touch. They did, and no doubt.
Mr. Soares will soon be getting red-
carpet treatment in Washington; but .
he has not forgotten?and probably
won't?the years when no one but
third secretaries paid attention to him.
cciipied
) ems
ruler of One of the world's
? By GILBERT A. LEWTHWAITE the next 25 years of NATO on major.. energy. exporting na-
. Sun Staff Correspondent 'their minds. ' tions, to make the 40-minute
Brussels ? The smiles and _Harold Wilson, the British
congratulations to be exchang- Labor party leader, has suf-
ed between President Nixon and' fered a series of parliamentary
other NATO govcriunent lead- , defeats p
over his vernment..s
, Chirac, his premier, who left a and political problems will be
ers during the si-zUng .a i' Pl'nz? a lel" nation shocked by ,the news at the kernel of the series of
new Atlantic declaration here 'private discussions the NATO
today mask the real worries of leaders are to hold. .
the alliance members. But so complex are they,
President Nixon; escaping that it seems likely that the
? briefly' from the woes of Wat- most that such brief encoun-
-ergate, is not alone in having
ters can do is foster the spirit
? serious preoccupations.
of international cooperation
? Most of the major leaders he
will meet today at the official that will be needed to enable
ceremony and in a series of
-flight here from Paris for the
ceremony._ ??
Instead he sent " Jacques
His difficultji is to ritalti--
tain the performance despite
the difficulties of his neigh-
bors. He has offered to help'
those ". who help themselves,
and is now waiting to See on
which deserving cases to act.
All this means that while the
signing of the anniversary dec-
laration will be the ceremonial
highlight of President Nixon's
stopover here en route to Mos-
cow, the immediate economic'
wing revolt within his own
party over the latest British
nuclear test, and the dilemma
tat' the energy crisis has
forced its two largest private
Car manufacturers-to merge to
1. of when to call the next gen-. combat cost increases and fall-
eral election in an effort to ing sales.
'increase his razor-edge plural- Helmut Schmidt, the -West
lay in Parliament., German chancellor, faces the
'
Courting the shah problem of controlling the only
'
major western European econ-
President Valery Giscard d' ,orny which has avoided a loss ' the Atlantic alliance to solve
;bilateral get-togethers have Estaing of France was too in its trade balance, and Which its economic problems so that
?'more than the last 25 years or busy courting the .shah of Iran, iseThaps even showing a sur- it 'can finance its defense
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East
THE NEW YORK TIMES,.TUESDAY,,.JUNE 25, 1974
A Case Study in Disillusion: U.S. Aid Effort
? ..By JOSEPH LELYVELD
Special to The New York 'limes
14,1EW DELHI?If there is
such it thing as a historic anti-
climax, then one occurred here
early, this year when Ambas-
sador Daniel P. Moynihan con-
ferred his blessing and that ofe
the United States on an Indian
national piety . and 'aspiration
known as "zero net aid." .
BY definition net aid is what
Is left over after repayments
on aid debts. Zetn net aid,
therefore, is not Zero aid ,buf;.
whatever it takes to,:keen Atli?
with the debt. In the- Indian',
hovVever, it has come to"
!j Stand; badly for self-reliance
? This is the third in a series
of articies on the United States
in Southern. Asia.
-
?the end of demeaning de-'
pendence on foreigr 'assistance
that the donors persist in re-
garding as handouts. "
That, Ambassador Moynihan
said' in: a lecture, "seems to
the very.much in line with
national interests.and offers the
base ,for a'strong and viable
relation With Other countries
such as the United States."' He
3 added: "We" are pleased that
India has reached a. stage, of
development at which such. a
decision is possible and proud
1.to have been of some help."
'
Period of Disengagement
,
The valedictory tone was not
inappropriate, for -if there was
any country from which the
United States had clearly
engaged at the end of a trau-
matic decade' in Asia, it was
India,: and if there was any
field, it was foreign aid.
Of all Western nations, only
Italy. Spends a emaller fraction
of gross national product on
foreign aid -than the. United
States. American aid accounted
for nearly two-thirds of the as-
sistance funneled to the poor
nations before the major troop
build-up in Vietnam: now it is
barely one-third. On the fact
of it, foreign aid seems a war.
casualty.
Thai moo' i nvolvosi
a Vietnam hang() er i ueillon-,
strated by. .the long-standingl
disillusion among Indians, thei
major recipients of American'
development assistance.
The standard indictment ofi
aid in Washington used to he.
that it failed to buy influencet
and gratitude. The Indians com-
plained that aid was an attempt
to buy influence and gratitude
and, besides, that it saddled
them .with a monumental debt
without appreciably relieving}
their huge, .burden of poverty.i
Those very complaints be-1
' came part a the American
arguments against aid in gen-
eral and aid to India in par-,
'titular. Last year, after having
failed to enact any aid appro-
priations., for two consecutive
sessions, Congress passed a
bill that virtually wrote the
Indian critique into American
law. It said development as;
sistance should be spent only
on programs that "affect the
lives of the majority of the
people in the developing coun-
tries," especially those "that
directly improve the lives of
-the poorest of their people."
1, The language 'was conspicu-
ously more far-reaching than
!the appropriation. About 60
f per cent of the economic as-
tsistance designated for Asia
was reserved for what was
,euphemistically called "Indo-
china postwar reconstruction."
.In the main it was for neither
lreconstructien nor develop-
ment but for outright support
lof the Thieu Government in
South Vietnam and the Lon
Nol Government in Cambodia,
plus that portion of Laos not
under Pathet Lao control; only
in Laos was it possible to
imagine any immediate appli-
cation for the term "postwar."
That left' less than $350-mil-
lion in development assistance
for the rest of Asia. .India,
whose millions of "poorest"
outnumber those of any other
country, had been known tO
get that much in a single year.
Now, with an annual obliga-
tion to the United. States of
;$60-million on a hard-currency
'debt of $3.4-billion, India
stood an outside chance 'for
$75-million.
In fact, the fiscal year is
ending without any new aid
agreement. As far as the Unit-.
ed States is concerned, zero,
net aid has virtually been:
achieved and minus zero is
looming as a distinct possibili-
ty. "They are becoming self-
reliant in spite of themselves,"
a Western development expert
said. . 1
The numbers tell only a bit
of the story, but they are
striking.
In 1968 the lid Mission in
India was bulging with 260
Americans and 98 Indians. An
established part of the Delhi
cenrs. the Americans were
rr;gis-
trit.:S, Wilere?apprciaLed or not.
?their advice carried weight.
carried weight.
By the start of this year
there were eight Americans
and 75 Indians left to super-
vise the dwindling disburse-
ments on loans made before
American aid was suspended
at the time of the war over
Bangladesh in 1971. Only rare-
ly did the Americans see the
inside of an Indian office.
American aid was now half
what hard-pressed Britain was
; giving and even lege than Can-,
?
ada's If there had not been
a debt rescheduling of $30-mil-
1 lion, it would have been pos-
sible to tally the numbers in
such a way as to .show that
'Aid tolndia
fin millions miitions of dollars,
yaars,which begin
8 ?
V
Military
,
QeicMopmetfl

The HOW York Times/June 25, 1974
U.S. also provided $848-
million in aid through the
World Bank in 1964-73.'
the dollar'swere.4ctually flow-!
'ing from India to the United'
States. ?
Aid figures are notoriously
deceptive and', in fact, India
had been receiving a Substan-
.tial dollar inflow in a disguised
form-through the International
Development Association, the
easy-money side of the World
Bank. The association, which
has depended on the United
'for ,40 per cent of its funds,
more than doubled its loans to
lIndia to make up for the slump
in American help.
t, In January, however,' the
'House of Representatives voted
'down the latest "replenish-
ment" of the Development As-
sociation. Whether it will be
revived is still much in doubt:
If it is not, there is a real possi-
bility, even though a bilateral
aid program is being resumed,
that debt repayments in the
r or two will surpass
Years ago, in speeches neith-
er side would care to remem-
ber now, American aid to In-
dia was portrayed as a aoble
effort to justify democracy in
Asia. The climax would come
when "the world's largest de-
mocracy" ? words that seem
to be repeated only in mockery
now-was self-sustaining, eco-
nomically and politically. Few
onlookers would say that of
the India of 1974.
For all. the talk of self-reli-
32
AnTrii la;
u
;ittice;. a 'combination -of natural;
and man-made disasters ?--;
:drought and economic misman-:
,agement-7--, has put India 14
oiverse circumstances than, any!
ahe' has experienced Since. the
-famine of '1966-67, when,Ainer-
"iCan development and food -aid
.reached its highest level, $877-i
.million in, dne year.,
There were 490 million
In-
dians then; 90 million fewer
than. now.' India, having fallen
.short of goals for fertilizer pro-
duction in the last five-yeari
,plan- by more than 60 per
cent, was staggered when the
oil crisis produced ,an inter-
national shortage. of fertilizer.
Now, inevitably, cutbakcs in
fertilizer and crude-oil imports
darken the outlook, for in-
creased food output.--
A failure , of domestic ptte
curement as much as' lagging
production will force India to
spend precious hard currency
this year not only on oil and
"fertilizer but, it is estimated,
on three million tons of Amer-
ican wheat. That is self-reli-
ance with a vengeance,' bid not
what Indian planners had in
mind when they defined the
goal. In fact, according to-esti-
mates prepared by the 'World
, Bank, aid needs . this year
'amount to a .record $1.4-billion.
'- The ,prospects for assistance
at that level may have been
blasted by another Indian ges-
ture toward self-reliance?the
.explosion of a nuclear device
-beneath the Rajasthan Desert
in May.
Reins Put in Other Hands. -
On the level of economic
planning, the basic Indian crit-
icism of foreign aid was that
It allowed donors to define
development priorities. Their
priorities, it -.was said, were
not India's, for the, efforts that
had relied on aid had left the
mass poverty virtually un-
touched; it was even possible
to argue that it had worsened.
And so?not just in India,
but among development ex-
perts generally?the old as-
sumption that a high econom-
ic growth rate was synonymous
with development came under
critical review. What was de-
velopment, anyway? How was
it to be measured? In tons of
steel and kilowatt-hours of
electric power? Or was there
another index, involving in-
come .distribution, the spread
of eniployment, literacy, pro-
tein in the diet?
"We should not speak of
development as having .taken
place," a British economist,
Paul P. Streeten, writes, "in
circumstances,where poverty
has not, eithe directly Or in-
'directly, been relieved.'
''The theme has been taken
up by Robert .S. McNamara in
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Ills Capacity as president e
the World Bank. Sounding less
like a banker and more like
an evangelist with every speech
Mr. McNamara keeps return-
ing to a single statistic?that
40 per cent of the two billion
:people in the so-called devel-
oping countries live in condi-
tions of "absolute poverty."
As it happens, that figure
was first used by an Indian
economist to describe condi-
tions in his own country,
where more than 230 million
people live on less than $60
a year On the basis of that
calculation, India promised to
make an attack on rural pov-
-erty the "main thrust" of her
fifth plan and thereby fulfill
a.. campaign pledge by Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi to abol-
ish poverty.
'When similar themes were
.Written into American aid leg-
:Iglation, there was no hint that
the proponents of the new look
in aid were thinking of India.
"For all the talk," an experi-
enced Westerner in the aid
-latisiness here commented,
;"concern about poor people is
,pretty far down the list of,
what determines ail policies."
, "There is no way an ? aid
program here can reach the
bottom' 40 per cent," a hard-
boiled American declared.
"That's just McNamara and his
'Vietnam guilt complex."
An official at the Tndian Fi-
nance Ministry seems to agree.?
"We can always take a bun-
dle of money and say, 'Let's
paint the stars and stripes on
it,'" he " said, "but it's really'
. very hard to identify a spe-
cific bundle with a specific
project." The point was that
India needed dollars to buy
*fertilizer and oil, not advice.
Even in making the case for
India's continued need, the of-
ficial felt constrained to point
out that word "aid" is a mis-
nomer. It is an old Indian argu-'
ment: that the terms of aid
are so disadvantageous to the
recipient country as to make
any suggestion of philanthropy
unseemly. "External capital in-
flow" would be a better name
for it, the official said.
.The splitting of hairs pro-
.vides the key to the basic In-
dian attitude. Having declared
,that foreign assistance was an
evil, India had now compro-
I mised her position to the extent
,of conceding that it might be
a necessary evil. This wariness,
.American officials say, is hard-
ly calculated to make aid , to
India a popular cause.
More Modest U.S. Stance
?. In any case, it is apparent
that there is little disposition
on the American We to offer
unwanted a I% ice or re,
major ;
Irony of all is that the Ameri-
cans have accepted the Indian
criticisms of the old relation-
ship.
"The United States was nev-
er in a position to run India,"
an American said. "We have
become very much more mod-
est."
For an American returning
to New Delhi after an absence
of four years, the real proof
of an American disengagement
there is not in the low aid level
ler the shrunken 'mission but
in the changed attitudes and
perceptions. ?
In some . ways the mission
Ambassador Moynihan heads
is a negative image of the one
over which Chester Bowles
presided throughout the John-
son Administration. In those
days every Congressional vote
on an aid bill was felt to have
a crucial bearing on the future
of Indian democracy and
American Interests in Asia. It
was a basic premise that the
United States had sound prac:
tical and moral reasons to be
.intimately involved in India's
economic planning. . . -..
? Indians tend to remembeel
those days with mixed emo-,!
tions ? resentment over the
pressures to which they were,
,subjected tinged with nostal-,
gia for the concern. Most.
American officials speak of thel
period with unalloyed horror.,
? Who Cares.?
! "We were masochists then,"
one said. A moment later, he
asked abruptly: "Say India goes
i'fascist. Who cares?'
i It was an atypically harsh
'expression of a view held even
by those who said they would
feel a deep sense of loss if,
India's ramshackle democracy,
collapsed: that whatever thei
'United States can do for India!
will be only of incidental val-
ue at best; that whatever sen-
timents and values the two na-
tions share, the United States
has few vital interests here.
Again, this is acceptance of
an argument Indians have
made: that India's future rests
on her ability to marshal her
own resources, clear up' the
cancerous mismanagement that
afflicts her government and in-
dustry, and grapple with the
problems of rural landlessness.
"The real government' here
Is the large landlords," said
an American who works for
an international agency. "To
say the Government lacks the
Will for a program of agrarian
reform misses the point. It's
the same as saying they lack
the will for self-denial. The
truth is they've got the will
to do just the opposite."
In this view, the arguments
for aid to India reduce them-
selves to the one that is most
offensive to Indian pride?that
the country is so desperately
needy. ,
No Santa Claus Role
The countries that are Most
successful now in attracting
American assistance have al-
ways assumed what the Indi-
ans have always said but never
'quite' managed to believe ?
,that the United States coolly
calculates its interests.
The Indonesian Minister of
alieraa Molirr---u:'d Sadli, said
"v ? ,r) -!'t- --?;11 idea
Luat, you come in nere as Santa
Clauses." The American aid
Program in Indonesia has risen
to $100-million a year during
a period in which, coinciden-
tally or not, American mining
and oil companies have been
making major investments. The
program is the largest ad-
ministered by the Agency
for International Development
outside Indochina, a gtriking
reversal.
; Ten years ago, when Sukar-
!rip was President, he called
Approved by Reteasco120%11.08
'Aid to Indonesia
(In millIons of dollars in tlsal
years which beg,n July ) :
?I I I V f I 1.2
1964 6S 68 70 72 73
The New York Times/June 2$, 1974
States Embassy in. Jakarta and
shouted, "To hell with your
raid!" Indonesia got $8-million
,that year, while India was get-
ting $337-million, not counting
;food. ? , ? .
i? Despite 'the Change now, the
effort to focus development as-
'sistance on problems of rural
poverty and social inequality
has received strikingly mixed
reviews in Indonesia, where
poverty and inequality are
smoldering political issues.
Until recently aid officials
seeking programs to support
what could conceivably be said
to involve "the poorest of their
people" found that the Gov-
ernment had not really been
thinking along those lines at
all. The aid agency scrapped
plans to .back a program for
new power stations in west
and central Java on the ground
? that only 5 per cent of Indo-
nesians have access to elec-
tric power. Since electricity is
for the privileged, it was rea-
soned,.a power program should
sustain itself by making them
pay higher rates.
^ Paving Rural Roads
I, The agency 'also shelved
plans to finance part of a four-
lane trans-Java highway at a
'cost of almost $1-million a
!mile:-'for the same money, it
:was calculated, Z000 miles of
deteriorating rural roads coule
be upgraded. Despite obvious
risks of graft, labor-intensive
rural public works were, seen
as another likely field for sup-
port.
"Equity is now a major con-
sideration," an American offi-
cial declared.
The United States was also
planning to get back into ma-
laria-eradication programs in
Indonesia. To older officials
this suggested the cyclical na-
ture both of Asian problems
and oi fashions in aid:, An
American-backed antimalaria
program in Indonesia nearly
two decades ago reduced tha
number of malaria cases on
Java and Bali to 40,000. The
latest count was two million.
a, Some Indonesian leaders
tfound the emphasis on social
itisPetf. Mr: Saillf it)
ed President Suharto : as rel
marking: "This may be the'
new form of imperialism. :If
the West contributes onlytri
small-scale grassroots projecti,',
our plight' may . be. somewhat.
alleviated but we will never
?
grow.
. For major capital 'projects,
the. Minister went' on, the poor
countries would be forced to
turn to the cbmmercial banks:
of the aid-giving countries and
pay' high interest rates.
The Indian left is' alreadf
voicing the same suspicion. A
political' weekly called Fron-
tier, which is influential among'
Calcutta's intellectuals, conf-i
eluded: "Mr. McNamara is try."
ing to prescribe a course which:,
-while keeping up neo-colonial.
exploitation, will bring down
the danger of revolution in the',
starved countryside of the ?
third world."
. ,
Art Advantage Discerned
.An economist named?Houdhi,
ayan Chattopadhyay who
shared ? this view said he saw
one major advantage in the?
slump in aid. "In the past we'
could always excuse ourselves
by blaming the foreigners for;
their bad advice," he explained,
in a conversation. "Now we,
know that only we are to
blame for what is happening:
to this country." ?
The conversation was less
abstract than the usual discus.
Sion of Asian poverty in an
office, study or cocktail lounge,
for Mr. Chattopadhyay's mid-:
die-class dwelling stands at the,
very edge of one of Calcutta's.
worst ? slums. Twenty yard
away Moslem women .,were
burning a fuel made Of coal-
dust and cow dung to cools
their. one daily -meal; the ac-'
rid 'smoke, wafted into the:,
economist's sitting room. and
settled. ? .
Was he saying,, he was
asked, that the rich nation'..
should stand aside in the hope
that the ensuing upheaval:
would prove benign? The ques-:',
tion seemed to deepen his,.
gloom. Almost wistfully he,
spoke of the idealism he often':
found in young Americans lid;
met?how rarely it shows up',
amortg young Indians he rel.;
marked?but he noted that: So
few of those Americans seemed_
to count India among their'
concerns.
He had long, been convinced
that American am wouin nevet.
,he a pOsitive tactor in inata,
but now he was beginning to
get a' feeling that India no
longer figured in the Ameri-
can world view, and it made'
him uncomfortable. .
It is a feeling, a number Of
Indians and Americans here
mention. In Mr. Chattopadh-,7,
yay's acase, it came- when he-.
read a collection of essays "bY.::
radical American scholars.
called i'America's Asia," ,which..,
mentioned India only in pass-.
ing. "Asia without India,' he
mused. "It's a funny kind of,i
Asia."
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
25 June 1974
tic's vate f
critic's w 0.U.S.-Arab
By a Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Cairo
The man who until a few months
o was the most influential journal-
ist is. tic Arab world and the confidant
of Egyptian presidents takes a criti-
cal view of President Nixon's recent
Visit to the Middle East and of U.S.-
Arab rapprochement.
He is Mohammed Hassanein Hey.
al, until last February editor of the
Important Cairo newspaper, Al-Ah-
ram. He was always close to the late
President Nasser. (Some said he
could explain Mr. Nasser's thoughts
better than Mr. Nasser himself.) And
Initially he continued in a role close to
the seat of power under Mr. Nasser's
successor, President Sadat. But he
fell out with Mr. Sadat early this year
because he insisted on the right to
differ with the government in the
columns of his newspaper. Mr. Sadat
then dismissed hith from his editorial
post, which he was able to do since all
Egyptian newspapers are govern-.
ment-run.
Another round?
But he has not become in any sense
and "unperson." He is not under any
constraint. He continues to express
admiration for Mr. Sadat and agree-
ment with 'much of what he is doing
for Egypt. But he speaks freely.
Rocking back and forth on a white_
garden chair in the middle of a
spacious lawn on his farm deep in the
Nile delta, he said: "I fear the worst. I
wonder whether the Israelis can
really learn the lessons of October 6
before there is another round. I think
another round will be inevitable."
His argument was that the Israelis
had learned to respect the Arab
soldier and that the disengagement
agreement became possible as a
result. But he doubted that the Is-
raelis had learned to respect the
Palestinian guerrilla fighters, ? the
young men who are willing to sacri-
fice their lives in attacks on Israeli
settlements.
Concessions impossible?
"While the Israelis might be ready
to deal with Egypt," he said, "I doubt
they can appreciate and are ready to
deal with the new Palestinians."
Mr. Heykal did not think the Rabin
Government in Israel would last long.
"If a worse one ? namely a more
hard-line one came into office ? I
don't see where we can go in Gen-
eva." He meant that he did not see
how Israel could then make the
concessions necessary for a settle-
ment.
He observed that in his opinion the
,Palestinians have come a long way
toward adopting a tine that would
make settlement possible, no longer
insisting on a secular state in the
entire area of the old Palestine,
,including Israel. They agreed at their,
national council meeting in Cairo
earlier this mOnth to accept formation
of a Palestinian national authority .on
nerated part a Palestine,
the West Bank of the Jordan River._
Freedom of movement
Personally Mr. Heykal did not think
this would work. In the end, he
thought, there would have to be either
a secular state or a return to the 1947
partition border.
, The reasoning behind this view is
that some arrangement is required by
the Arab world to avoid a land barrier
between Egypt and the rest of the
eastern Arab world, or more gener-
ally between the Arabs in Asia and the
Arabs in Africa. Contact could be
established either according to the
1947 partition plan ? which would
bring a Palestinian Arab state to the
banks of the Gulf of Aqaba ? or a
secular state through which there
THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
21 June 1974
Suez on
the red
horizon
By DAVID FAIRHALL
Speculation that the Soviet
Navy has been invited to join
the Americans and British in
clearing the Suez Canal has
'grown after reports that a
?
flotilla -Of five 'Soviet mine-
sweepers passed through the
Malacca Strait into the Indian
Ocean yesterday. The ships
then ? headed . west with
'supporting vessels.
Their destination is unknown,
hut it could be the .Tubal Strait
in the Red Sea. The strait is
believed mined?probably with
Russian mines that the Soviet
Navy would best know how to
sweep?and will have to be
declared safe before shipping
can begin using the Suez route
again.
It is also possible that another
move by the Soviet Navy
concerns a minesweeping
operation. This move. _under
relations
would be freedom of movement.
Unless there is progress on one of
these schemes, Mr. Heykal predicted,
"We'll be dragged into a system of
closed borders at best, or no-war, no-
peace at worst.
On President Nixon, Mr. Heykal
said: "I think he made a mistake
corning here and talking so much
about economic factors, promising us
$250 million. So what? A week ago
Abu Dhabi, one of the smaller gulf oil
producers, gave us $1.2 billion, not as
a loan but as a gift. The Sauaiz a Illue
;!7r:t::. save us another $200 million.
We got $150 million from Kuwait and
$80 million from Algeria. Money is not
the problem in the Arab world. The
Saudis this year will get $19 billion of
which they can absorb only a portion,
even if they take all the American
gadgets, including Phantom and de-
fense systems."
Mr. Heykal thought it striking that
whereas President Nixon in his
speeches kept talking about econom-
ics, President Sadat kept responding
In terms of the Palestinian political
problem. "That was President
Nixon's mistake," he said.
Great crowds
He thought Mr. Nixon did not
understand that the great crowds that
welcomed him meant not that the
Arab world was asking him for eco-
nomic aid but was receiving him on a
political note ? the demand for
American support in solving the Pal-
estinian problem.
"So here comes the tragedy of the
thing," the former editor concluded,
"the question whether Nixon can
respond positively, given his prob-
lems at home. The Soviet Union may
welcome a weak American president
? but we would have preferred an
Eisenhower."
scrutiny by Western Intelli-
gence services, is the passage
of the helicopter cruiser Lenin-
grad through the Bosphorus
and into the Mediterranean.
The Leningrad carries two
big helicopters. She. too, may
be heading for the Red Sea to
act as a kind of mother ship.
Egypt's invitation to the US
Navy and the Royal Navy to
clear mines and other explo-
sives from the Canal was a
major political coup for the
West. The Soviet vessels may
be positioning themselves to be
on hand if their help is
requested?or they may have
received an undisclosed invita-
tion.
34
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F R ICA TALKS '.:5:TYIVI 1 ED
? 67,73
NATIONAL GUARDIAN
\ 26 JUN 1974
: t?-
?
By.-WILFREP BURCHE11
!Guardian -staff correspondent
i-..Recent speeches by.Gen.:.SPinola have poured icy. waters
-on hopes for an early end to the African wars.:andEtingently.
:needed-sOcial, reforms in POrtukal. itself -
;:????;- The atmosphere in Lisbon by mid-June -WaS that of a.
. - .
:race for time between those who.wanted to consolidate the
..gains made' since. the .Aptil 2.5..antifascist
.and those who wanted to turn the clock: back-,
? Activists among the-leftist'-parties in ? theprOVisional
government are working daY :and night to;preseiverithe
alliance between the, peopleand4he young offiCers,Of-the.i
,r?Armed :Forces :Movernent:Ifind- -to demolish -the:fascist .;
;institutions:; before. :the right wing backlash sets -in
-Top-ranking-U.S. CIA officials,-on the other hand,:rhaVel
been. Working-to head off.a.-4-decolonization? moves ;that .1
-Would *affect U.S. .bases and interests in Africa .or,.._--theA
interests. of the. roast regime. of Rhodesia and ..South
Africa and to bring about the sort of economic chaos which
preceded the end of the .Allende regime in
As an extra measure of "insurance," the multinational..
'monopolies. in 'Lisbon have had U.S. systems. analysts
prepare computer scenarioi.fot-all options necessary to
head off workers' .demands for structural reforms bf. the
economy. Some -of the young officers, meanwhile; are-!
already muttering doubts as to their-choice of Spinola as a I
leader and wondering whether they might not have to do it
-1
? Spinola's speech of June 11. in which he set forth his !
impossible neocolonialist plans for the African territories, -
only - confirms that Foreign Minister Mario Soares'!
handshaltes and embraces with the heads of The PAIGC:
and ?Frelimo .delegations in .London -.and lusaka!
respectively had nothing to do with his negotiating;
position. . The terms for settlement were the cold!
neocolonialist pattern chosen by Spinola. As revealed in!
the latter's June 11 speech. they are almost a replica of the'
absurd terms Washington offered at the beginning of the!
Paris.. talks on Vietnam. It took four and a half years of
negotiations and sonic of the bloodiest fighting of the wan
to bring them to reason.
: This is what Spinola is "offering" the liberation:
movements of Guinea-Bissau. Angola and Mozarnbique.?
?A ceasefire, equivalent to asking the resistance
fighters to lay down their arms and disclose their;
whereabouts.
?Accelerated economic reconstruction. The same wasi
offered by the .U.S. government for Vietnam. But where is;
it?
1
- ? ?Political settlement after ? the ceasefire." What
happened:in?Vietnam?. Exactly-as with the French -in 1954.:
the U.S. in 1973 fulfilled that part of the military terms ?
which suited it. The U.S. got its POWs back ? and its
demoralized army safely home?and then repudiated the
political clauses. Is anyone foolish enough to think that '
African freedom vac"41:45t (wed tilab raRelea4e 1400M8/08
all over again.
Imperialists and colonialists honor their pledges? ;
?Broad democratic organizations, political freedoms,
etc.- Where. have- we heard this ?song before?- The;
Vietnamese people have been -waiting 18 years for those!
freedoms and elections promised them both in the 1954
agreements with .the French and the 1973 agreements'
with the-U.S.
:1
ROLE OF THE CIA ?
:-Did the CIA agents bring this revamped draft of the!
Paris Agreement with them to Lisbon when they arrived in!
force a month after the' coup? ?
-The-landing.Of mercenaries in -Guinea-Bissau while!
negotiations were in progress is an .exact parallel to the;
landing of CIA-armed and financed mercenaries?headed;
by CIA officers?in North Vietnam while the 1954 Geneva!
conference was going .on. It is described 'in detail in thei
Pentagon Papers. Of course this maneuver has sabotaged!
the talks' between Guinea-Bissau and ?Lisbon. After!
resuming briefly in Algiers June 13-14, they broke up in an
angry mob(' without a. resumption date. - r , - -
-. It was not for -this type of trickery that the -captains:
carried out the April 25 coup. To understand how they felt
about all this; I spent-the better part of two eveningsi
discussing with one of them how the men who made the!
coup saw their role. For reasons best known to themselves,!
the members of the Armed Forces Movement seem to I
have agreed to remain as anonymous as possibled
especially with the press. The captain with whom I spoke
consented to the discussion only on condition I not ask his!
name. He said only that he commanded an artillery unit
and played an active role in the preparation and execution
of the coup.
"You must understand," he said. "that there were
several attempts in the past at military coups. But these
were always headed by some officer who had his own ideas
and hoped for mass support afterwards-. Now, for the first
time, a group which was formed, developed a program and
later chose a leader. It is a much more solid affair to have a
movement based on the ideas of many instead of one
-
,...ANTI-FASCIST OFFICERS .?
,
As .to-_the background of the ,coupc.: . ?
We the---younger, --officers, ? did :not- agree with the
. . ? . ? - . ? - ?
government"s-African1policy or the fascist regime at home.
,Wecould see that the Afric-aapolicy-would lead to another
Goa,, thedisgrice of ihe.armAespecially to'the officer
corps. There Were .3000 troops. in Goa when thelndians
launched-the-invasion in :December 1961 -by air, -sea and
land with 30,000 troops. (Farmer dictator) Salazar ordered
our troops to defend 'to the last man.' They had not even a
single anti-aircraft dun. The-officers on: the spot refused to
obey . Salazar After initial resistance-,- they surrendered.
Apart from one-or two they were all kicked out of the army.
Ever since, the armed force S has been the scapegoat for all
that is wronfin Portugal, including the impossible military;
situation in _Africa and the, lowered living standards at
home because -of the failures- in :Africa. ?
"The class composition of the officer corps had also .
changed.--The Military Academy -was -no longer -stuffed
? with the sons of the rich upper class; but by the sons of the
lower Middle class and even the, working class. Soldiering
had become a dangerous :and low prestige profession.
What . ". with battlefield losses, desertions ? - and
-draft-dodging. the army had-to-take into the junior officer
corps Whoever it could get. *i there developed a big class -
difference between officer-up -'to captains, and even ,
majors: and .the colonels and-generals? . " - ?. ?
The artillery captain dealt in some detail with various
sources of dissatisfaction in the army which was capped. in
September, 1973, when Prime-Minister Caetano offered
anyone who had graduated :from university a. six months
:39A44.6pfMbiatiFf68risqobtAiadoillif
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have commissions above the.,,heads ot jUniorsofficers with;
at least four ?years' active service.--- ? ? ? ? .?
.The first meeting of whaelater. becarnezthe. Armedi
i; Forces -Movement was that cif :about-150 officers--except
? for three majors. all of them Captains?on Sept. 12.1973 to!
'discuss the situation. Those taking part sVere mostly those
-affected by the new law on rapid promotions of youngsters!
with .no: military experience -It was the captains, asi
company commanders, who Suffered the greatest combat;
josses in Africa apart from the ordinary soldiers?and nowl
they were to be humiliated as-well! The Sept: 12 meeting!
elected a commission with offieers from.the -Army, Navy'
and Air Force: to look into .the- whole situation. .
AGAINST MILITARY DICTATORSHIP 7 -
? "The commission was to work secretly and recommend
: a course .of action." the . artillery captain...continued.
"There was no question of' a vino at that time. There was
.. no unified political Viewpoint.-.We were very conscious of
tlie danger of a Spanish-type civil war and. Wioted to do
everything possible to avoid thii. We did not want a Chile
- or any other.Latin American-type putsch. At all costs we
wanted. to avoid anything that-could lead to'a military
dictatorship. The strategy that;the commission worked out
? was to bring pressure to bear on the government to change
-its policy-to- repeal the offensive law on ranid promotions
to safeguard the prestige of the career officers?and to
Clarify the situation.'
In December 1973 there were changes at the Ministry of
Defense, a civilian was put in charge and some increases
' in .pay to the ranks -and junior officers were allowed.
"The government changed personnel but not policies."
the account continued. "It was at this -point, in January
.1974. that we realized that the only possibility of change
-was by a coup el'etat. Our aim was still to avoid civil ?var
., and any division within the armed forces. A new, much
smaller comrnisSion was ?elected.-By this time everyone
knew everybody else and the new -committee had the
absolute confidence of everyone in what had now become
? the Armed Forces Movement. Planning for the coup
started." ?-? . . .
- "Why did you. decide later to invite Genera! Spinola io
'take-Ott :top. post after the coup?"- I ?asked.
t'Because w considered" him honest, courageous.
patriotic.. 'a; good :officer, just ,and impartial: who
maintained close personal relations with his officers and.
men. He was an officer of great prestige.?Tr.e book which
.he wrote, demanding a political instead of military solution
in Africa, was as 2 result of his contacts with officers of thel
Armed Forces Movement. One of his merits was that hel
dared to oppose -the official line." ? .
"Is there not still a danger Of a Chile-type coup?a
fascist comeback?" was one of the last questions I posed.
is a Chile fascist-type regime that we have over-
thrown after nearly 50 years," he replied. "And it is we.i
the Armed Forces Movement. that 'did this. We are still
around. The battalions move when we tell them to move.
Our movement remains as united as ever. We still oppose
any deviations in the application of our program?even if
we have to stage another coup."
"What if the people vote in a communist-socialist
popular front type government in next year's elections?" I
asked. - . ?
? "Our role is to give erre Portuguese people a free choice
-under democratic conditions," the captain replied. ."If
they choose Such a government--and that is up to
them-7-there will be no interference from our side."
SPINOLA'S LINE-- -
But this is not necesSarily the perspective of Gen.
Spinola, his recent speeches have made- plain. While
aiming his attacks ostensibly at "cotinter-revolution" and
vanarchy"-an4. foreseeing the day when the armed
forces might "obliged to .-?reply....to violence by
force"?Spinola's rhetoric has been understood by many
as a do.ible-edged sword. One can easily read between its
lines Spi tola's -.growing nervousness' at the strength of.
popular feeling for an immediate end to the African wars,
at the spread of the-movement to oust fascists from trade
union and peasant -associations -and at the growing
influence of the leftist parties in the provisional cabinet.
Spinola's important June 11 statement on the -colonial!
question seems-- to bring Portugal to a hazardous!
crossroads. Either the left consolidates its position in the-
provisional cabinet and dictates policy for speedy
decolonization or the liberation struggles in Africa will be
stepped up. with those inevitable consequences that the
captain's coup was intended to avoid. One of the most ,
crucial of these consequences was the possibility of civil',
war. in Portugal. ?
With Spinola's speeches so clearly revealing the reason:
-why- the . peace talks with the African independence
movements are bogged down, people in Lisbon were;
beginning to ask whether springtime had moved straight!
into winter without-the summer season for which people
been ? so ardently waiting. r.r.-77. ' I
36
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NATI 011At GUARDIAN
26 JUN '1974
cf.a0 tr;zazicts EDI?).
lJy VILFRED BURCHEM
Guardian stall correi?or-denf
Paris
In the two months since the formation of the Laotian coalitiorrl
government, the Pathet Lao has become the real leadership of the;
. , ?
country. .? ?
.. ? - ? ? .
.This is a testimonial to the remarkable struggle waged these past
20 years by the Lao patriots against seemingly impossible odds.:
Under the leadership of Prince Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao:
have overcome numerous U.S.-directed plots, coups and attempted
coups, assassinations, invasions and aggressions by -South
Vietnamese, Thai and Meo tribal, mercenaries financed and led by!
the CIA, capped by a merciless air war waged by the U.S. which
exceeded the barbarous records established elsewhere in Indochina!
for tons of .bombs dropped per head of population.
....The story of what happened in the?Very .early stages of
intervention sets the pattern for all that has happened since. ..t
At .the time of the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina,- the
Pathet Lao forces under Prince Souphanouvong, which had wrested',
power from the Japanese in August 1945 . and waged armed
resistance against French attempts .to restore its colonial rule,
controlled about half the territory of Laos., .? with bases in all that.
country's 12 provinces. _ . -.. ? - ,
As was the ease with Vietnam, it was agre,ed.at Geneva that, in
return for nationwide elections and to facilitate the separation of
combatants, there would be a regroupment of each side's military
forces. The French expeditionary force withdrew in full-security..
The Pathet Lao, troops likewise regrouped, as was stipulated,in the.
two northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. This meant
abandoning old resistance bases in the South, especially those: in
the strategic Bolovens Plateau and .other bases in Attnpeu and
Saravane provinces. But as in Vietnam, it was felt that a temporary
withdrawal was an acceptable price to pay for the independence
guaranteed by the Geneva agreements and that free elections would
result in an overwhelming.victory for supporters of the resistance
forces. John Foster Dulles, then the U.S. Secretary of State,: had
? .
other ideas, however. .
. -
DEFENSE MINISTER MURDERED ?
Less than two months after the Geneva agreements were signed,
the prime minister who had inherited the French-appointed
government in Vientiane, Prince Souvanna Phouma, met, him
half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong in the Plain of Jars.. They;
agreed on the date, site and agenda for political talks to arrange the,
nationwide elections. Nine days later, ' however,,Souvanna
Phounia's Minister of Defense. Lou Voravong, who had arranged
the Plain of Jars meeting, was assassinated. A bullet was fired into,
his back through a window, at which the minister had been.
?onveniently 'placed by his host..
.. . I
A few days previous to the assassination, Kou Voravong had told,
he National Assembly that his co-delegate at the Geneva
conference. Phoui Sananikone, had accepted a U.S. bribe of Si
'million not to sign the Geneva agreement on Laos. U.S. interventioi.
? in Laotian affairs can be 'dated from .the time of that bribe. Kou
Voravon,,,'however, signed for Laos and prevented a breakdown of
the conference.
Kou Voravong had also publicly denounced a scheme to attaCk.
and wipe out the, Pathet Lao troops as soon as the withdraWal was.
completed. The 'person .who placed Kou Voravong in the window
seat to receive the -assassin's bullet was none other. than Phoui
Sananikone himself, who had invited his victim to dinner ,.'to talk
things over."
In the-scandal which erupted after the assassination. Souvanna
Phouma resigned as prime minister, to be replaced by Katay Don
Smith, a reactionary who had attracted the attention of Dulles with
his book: ."Laos?The Meal Cornerstone in the Anti-Communist
Struggle in Southeast Asia." Until he died somewhat' my. steriously
just five years later. Katay remained one of the mOst faithful
instruments of U.S. interventionist policies in Laos. ? . ?
On Dec. 30. 1954. the Pathet Lao delegates turned up on time at
the site for th6.' political negotiations agreed on over three nionths
previously. They were put under house arrest by Katay's forces and
told the conference site had "been changed." In the meantime
commando troops had been.dropped from U.S. planes behind the
Pathet Lao lines, with orders to set up bases for further incursions.
The Pathet Lao delegates agreed to change the conference site and
insisted on the political talks proceeding.?
In late March 1955. Dulles dropped in at Vientiane for a brief
conference with Katay. In a sequence strongly reminiscent of what
happened after he inspected South Korean troops along the 38th
parallel in June .1950,. _within .a few days of the Dulles visit to :?
Vientiane, the first full-scale attack i were launched against Pathet,
Lao bases in the two northern provinces. -
What has happened ever since has been a replay, on an
ever-increasing scale, of American:backed attempts to wipe out the
Pathet Lao. Negotiations were used exclusively to play for time to
build up the right-wing forces for ever bigger efforts.?
During that first year of negotiation, Katay's side interrupted thel
talks, once tlicy finally got started, seven times, by simply walking'
out and not fixing a date for a resumption. His delegates returned
only after serious battlefield setbacks. The Pathet Lao delegates!
remained at the conference site under house arrest,: waiting'
patiently for the next round until Katay completely broke off the:
talks in November 1955. By that time?despite an agreement signed:
directly between Souphanouvong and Katay in Rangoon the:
previous month?Katay had moved over half the right-wing army
into the Pathet Lao territory, launching an all out offensive in',
November-December 1955. But despite the presence of U.S.;
military "advisors," the offensive ended in disaster. Katay had to
resign, and Souvanna Phouma again became prime minister.. i
VOTE FAVORS PATHET LAO ?
In July 1956,- the twohalf brothers met again?this time. ini
Vientiane?and real negotiations got under way. During the months
that followed, there was no fighting and on Dec. 28, 1956, it was
announced that full agreement had been reached on setting "up a
government of National Union, with Pathet Lao participation. It was;
the first of a series of coalition governments preceding the one'l
established in April of this year. None of the earlier ones worked 1,
due to U.S. tenacity in opposing anything that smacked of "national!
union." The U.S. embassy launched a tremendous campaign:
against the 1956 agreements. Embassy personnel visited every!
member of the National Assembly in an attempt to buy up enough
votes to prevent ratification of the agreement. I was there at the :
time, personally witnessed the bribery campaign, and was expelledi
from Vientiane, all within 24 hours of my arrival. The threat was
used that all U.S. "aid" would be halted if "Communists" entered
the government, and supplies coming in via Thailand were halted as
a warning. By such means formation of the government was held up
until August 1957. Partial elections were held, in which the Pathet
Lao presented 10 candidates?nine of whom were elected. The ally
of the Pathet Lao, the Peace and Neutrality party, won three of four
seats contested. Only four of Katay's 26 candidates were .elected
and none at all of Sananikone's, the leader of the other right-wing '
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who knew they would be duplicated in any nationwide electoral ;
contest.
Then a new American "strong man," General Phoumi Nosavan,
appeared on the scene as head of a fascist-type "Committee for the !
; Defense of National Interests." With bribes of $100,000 a vote to
; National Assembly deputies, the Souvanna Phouma government
was finally brought down on July 22, 1958, and a new one was ;
formed under Sananikone, with eight of the 12 cabinet posts in the i
hands of Nosavan's men?who had not a single seat in the;
Assembly. Katay was made Minister of Defense and Interior. He:
immediately launched an extermination campaign against all Patheti
Lao personnel. Pathet Lao bureaus had been opened in every,
province as a result of the 1956 agreements. Those staffing them!
were wiped out to a man in many provinces. Their decapitated
heads were stuck up on posts to "prove" that the Pathet ? Lao not
longer existed. The killings went on throughout the last. months of!
1958 and the beginning of 1959. This was a prelude to the final blow!
being prepared by the rightists.
-
According, to the December 1956 agreements.- the Pathet Lao
reduced its armed forces to two:battalions and these were to be
integrated into the royal (Vientiane) army, under the command of
the High Military Council. They obeyed Vientiane orders to be.
tranferred to positions in the Plain of Jars and near the royal,
capital of Luang Prabang, respectively, and prepare for
"integration," which was to take place on May 11, 1959. On that
date, each Pathet Lao battalion was surrounded by three Vientiane.
battalions, with tanks and artillery pieces pointed at their barracks.
k week later an ultimatum was issued to both battalions:
"Surrender within 24 hours or be wiped out!" That night they broke
out of their encirelsment. The first battalion near Luang Prabang
lost almost half its personnel in a fighting retreat back to the old
I base area. The second managed to escape virtually intact.
SOUPHANOUVONG JAILED, ESCAPES
'; ? Souphanouvong :end 15 other Pathet Lao leaders, under, house
_
; WASHINGTON POST
17 June 1974
? ?
Leftist Leader Says CIA
Plots Sabotage in Laos
By John Burgess
Washington Post
? VIENTIANE ; June 16 entiane peace agreement
"Rumors" circulating in and help the two Laotian
parties "dress the Wounds of
war and build up independ-
ence and true peace [in
Leos]."'
He also Said that "these
repeated promises have ,
made Lao patriots, very
happy."
Phoumi made repeated
references to "rumors" that
the C.I.A. had "exhorted cer-
tain people of the extreme
right-wing cif - Vientiane to.
demonstrate dissatisfaction
with the agreements."
AS plenipotentiary repre-
Sentative of Pathet Lao
leader Prince ,Souphanou-
vong, Phoiiini negotiated
much of the settlement that
led to the formation on
April 5 of Labs' third coali-
tion government. He is the.
ranking Pathet Lao member
of the government. Soupha-
houvong. heads the Political
? Laos pay that -the U.S. Cen: .
tral Intelligence Agency. is ,
conspiring with 'Laotian ,
rightists to sabotage the ?
new coalition government,
according to Phoumi
Vongvichit, vice premier of .
the new government and
senior Central Committee
member of the leftist Pathet
Lao. .
? In written answers to 10
questions submitted on May
27, Phoumi said that
? "meetings have taken place
'in southern and northern
Laos to prepare subversion
against the Provisional Gov-
ernment of National Union:'
The 65-year-old vice pre-
mier, who is also foreign
? minister of the new govern._
ment, said that U.S. officials
of all ranks had, repeatedly
pledged that the :United
States would respect the Vi-
38
?
arrest In Vientiane, were flung into prison, and in the months that
followed Sannanikone tried to find a judge who would sentence
them to death, but without success. ?
"Fr guards," Souphanouvong told me later, "we had the most
reactionary -.military police unit?trained, equipped and paid
directly -by, the Americans. ,They had been hand-picked and
especially indoctrinated: . .They were forbidden to exchange a
single word with us. . ." But at least they were Laotians. The
Pathet Lao leaders were in solitary confinement. Souphanouvong
took Upon himself the infinitely slaw and patient work of winning
the guards over by appealing to their patriotism.
"In May 1960," he told me, "we were tipped off that there would
be no trial. The authorities knew we would use the courtroom as a
forum - to denounce their rotten policies. We were to be 'shot
attempting to escape' while being transferred to another prison. We
challenged the prison authorities with this and told them to shoot us
on the spot?they could spare themselves the farce of an esape.
attempt. This stopped them for a while, but soon after we learned
that a date had definitely been set for the trial, the result of which;
would be we would all die 'legally.' We decided the time had -come
to flee." ??
By .that time Souphanouvong's persuasion had worked so well
that an hour after midnight on May 23, 1960. the 16 Pathet Lao
leaders and all 10 guards on duty that night, marched out of the
Vientiane prison, all armed and in MP uniforms, past the quarters
of 90 more MP's and their U.S. advisors, on their way to a "Long
March" back to,the old Sam Neua bases. The greatest manhunt in;
. the history of Laos was mobilized. to catch them but the prey,1
desperately weak as they were after 10 months in prison, were
always a step or two ahead of the hunters.
From this leadership and the one and a half battalions that had ,
. escaped the extermination attempt was built up the fighting force
which today controls a good 80 percent of the territory of Laos and
over half the population, and which again shares power in
Vi (in r, .
-
NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE.24, 1974
Secret Study -on Laos Aid Says
Almost All Goes to One Factio
'Consultative Council, an ad-
visory body independent of
the government.
. ? Asked whether he thought
the coalition was in danger,
and if so from what sector,
the vice premier said, the
. government "is only in clan-
ger so far as the C.I.A. sup,
,ports the supreme right-
. wing clique to plot trouble
against the nation. Without
that, the government is free
ofall further danger." '
Phoumi said that the- neW
government would behave
amicably toward all, coun,
? tries and would accept
"unconditional assistance
from'all countries that want
to help Laos, regardless of
-their political systems::
Laos would seek to tle.
velop a new orientation to,.
ward international politics,
he said. '
By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times.
" WASHINGTON, June 23-1
Senator Edward M. Kennedy
expressed concern today that
the United States, through eco-
nomic and military aid to one
; Laotian faction, might be per-
petuating political divisions in
Vaos despite the formation of a
new coalition Government.
In support of his concern,
the Massachusetts Democrat, as
ilhairman of the Senate Judici-
ary subcommittee on refugees,
made public a summary of a
secret Geheral Accounting Of-'
lice report on the economic aid
program in Laos. The report,
classified secret at the insist-,
ence of the Administration,:
shows that the economic aid
was going almost entirely for.
refugees and villages in areas
controlled by the former Royal
Lao Government.
State and Defense Depart-
ment officials said the same
held true for United States
military aid, which they said
'went exclusively to Royal Lao-
tian military units.
No Fundamental Changes
As an outgrowth of the 1973
cease-fire agreement, the Royal
Lao Government, which was
Supported by the United States,
formed this spring a provision-
1 government of national
'anion with the Pathet Lao fac-
ion, which was supported by
North Vietnam. Despite the
formation of a coalition Gov-
ernment, officials acknowl-
Nged that there had been no
iundamental changes yet in the
Direction of, United States aid
proveThrmerease-2otritoftiee- :-CIA-RDP77-00432R0404,043,31:10g44_,_
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ruograms, which continue to
pport military forces and
geographical areas still con-
rolled by the Royal Lao fac-
ion. .
'-' For the coming fiscal year,
which begins July 1. the Ad-
inistration has asked Con-
gress for $55.2-million in eco-
omic aid and $86.1-million in
ilitary aid for Laos. While Ad-
ministration testimony has
proadly discussed aid to main-
tain a neutral Lao, officials
!acknowledge that according to
,:esent plans most of this aid
ould go to the Royal Laotian
!side.
1! The explanation offered by
state Department officials was
ithat economic aid was going
into Royal Laotian areas be-
'cause the United States was
Continuing existing programs.
' At the same time, officials said
the United States was not's fixed
in this. policy and had informed
the new Government that it
was willing to give aid to the
provisional government that
might be channeled into Pathet
Lao areas.
"We are quite willing to shift
it, if they ask us," one State
Department official said. But
thus far, he said, there had been
no direct request from the
Pathet Lao faction for economic
aid for its zones:
There are indications, how-
ever, that such a shift in policy
would be resisted in certain
State Department circles that
are opposed to any United
States aid going into Commu-'
inist-controlled areas of Indo-
china, including humanitarian
aid provided through United
'Nations agencies or -the Inter-
national Committee of the Red
Earlier this month, according
to officials, Graham A. Martin,
the United States Ambassador
to South Vietnam, sent a cable-
gram to the State Department
NEW, YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JUNE 24, 1974
rof iteers in Cambodia?
Find Food Is Now Gold
, .
By DAVID K. SHIPLER
,? ? Special to The New YorIc Titnes
PHNOM PENH, Cambodia
'?With ? her major cities be-
: sieged by Communist-led in-
, Cambodia has be-
? . -
.come a,paradise for a new
:kind of profiteering?not in
? gold or opium, but in food.
It ,takes half an hour for a
? load of fresh fish to triple in
value as it is flown the 50
miles from the. city of Kom-
Peng Chhnang to the belea-
guered capital of Phnom
Penh. Over that distance,
beef prices 'nearly double,
and sugar rises 50 percent.
Merchants who are brand
-hew to the food business are
reported making profits' of
$10,000 a. day simply by fly-
; ing the scarce staples from
, the country's agricultural
. areas, over insurgent - held
territory and into Phnom
Penh, where many families,
spend their entire .incomes
just to feed themselves.
, In an economy stagnated
by war, this is one of the
only booming segments. Six-
teen private airlines are
operating their 30-year-old
DC - 3's lamming Phnom
Penh's Pochentoir.. Airport,
turning the tarmac into a
'busy truck terminal and mar-
ketplace.
American and Taiwanese
pilots have flocked to Cam-
bodia. A man selling planes
arrived last week. Two huge
new aircraft engines stood
on a flatbed trailer outside
an airline office in the center
of town.
The frenzied commerce has
run like a fever through
were an old western mining
town whose plentiful gold
might run out at any mo-
ment.
The prospect of fast money
is so intoxicating, and the
poverty of most working
Cambodians so acute, that
suffering and greed have
been blended into a cor-
rosive mixture that produces
ingenious systems of cheat-
id and corruption.
Pilots and airline officials
report that merchants try to
overload planes by tamper-
ing with scales or by paying
off pilots to carry an extra
few hundred pounds.
Sugar Hidden on Planes
Laborers, soldiers and offi-
dals who work at outlying
airports try to cash in on the
trade by hiding 22-pound
bags of sugar on planes to
be Picked up by their col-
laborators later at the air-
port in Phnom Penh, pilots
say.
"A couple of weeks ago
they hid 200 kilos [440
pounds] of sugar in the tail
section of a DC-3," one air-
craft owner declared. "The
pilot couldn't move the con-
trols, so they opened up the
tail section and found the
sugar."
In another instance, he
said, workers and military
men took advantage of a
moment when a plane, ready
to take off for Phnom Penh,
had lowered its flaps, re-
vealing long hollow spaces ,
in the wings.
"They were stuffing 10-
kilo bags of sugar into the
holes in the wings," the
owner exclaimed. "Fortu-
nately, one of our ground
people saw it and warned
the pilot." Otherwise, he
Phnom Penh, as if the city said titer the plane was air-
' urging that no money be put
into Red Cross operations in
Indochina so long as the infer-
national Red Cross committee
"kicks USG around," "USG"
standing for United States Gov-
ernment. He suggested the com-
mittee was courting the Com-
munist side.
On military aid, officials said
continued support of the Royal
Laotian forces was necessary
to "maintain a balance" with
the Pathet Lao forces, which
they said were still being sup-
lied by North Vietnam.
Statement by Senator
Vice Adm. Ray Peet, the Pen-
tagon director of the military
assistance program, told the
House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee last week that the United
States "security objectives" in
Laos were "to support a bal-
anced force which is of suffi-
cient size and strength to main-
tain the survival of the polit-
ically neutral Royal Laotian
borne the pilot would have
raised the flaps and jammed
them.
One recent morning, on the
dirt airstrip that serves
Kompong Chhnang, a Cam-
bodian Air Force pilot took
off in an American-made
T-28 propeller-driven plane.
No bombs were slung be-
.
neath the wings, however,
and no co-pilot was in the
back seat. Instead, the seat
was piled high with bags of
sugar.
The sugar comes from
Thailand, shipped by road to
Battarnbang or Kompong
Chhnang, where women
crowd along the airstrip
selling 22-pound bags for
2,500 riels, about $6 at the
official exchange rate.
Beyond Kompong Chhnang
the road is controlled by in-
surgents, arid so, in Phnom
Penh, other women clamor
to buy the bags for $9 each
from the crewmen, soldiers
and military policemen who
take _them off the planes.
? Big Profit to Be Made
By selling just three bags
a day, a laborer at the air--
port can make six times his
daily wage of about $1.50
and a plane's crewman can
double his day's pay by
simply carrying one bag on a
30-minute flight from Kom-
pong Chhnang to Phnom
Penh.
But the big money is in
tons, not pounds. The food
merchants are almost all
ethnic Chinese, and their
use of the shortages to drive
up prices has stirred the
latent anti-Chinese bigotry
that pervades Indochina.
The merchants buy fresh
fish for about 34 cents a
pound in Kompong Chhnang
and sell it for about $1 in
Phnom Penh.
The cost of airlifting It to
the capital runs only 10 cents
a pound, so that even with
that expense, the bribery and
W-613`fft-P0a0d4 thikd 01041
Approved or elease 2001/08/0! ?
9
Government and the independ-
ence of the people and to en-
courage pursuit by Laos of .ob-
jectives compatible with United
States interests."
The admiral did not spell out
in his statement that "a bal-
anced force" meant giving mili-
tary aid exclusively' to Royal
Laotian forces.
in expressing concern over
the course of United States
policy in Laos, Senator Ken-
nedy said in a statement: ,
' "Despite our country's gen-
eral public support for the
cease-fire agreement and the
new Government, several indi-
cators suggest that the intent
'of some of our remaining pres-
ence in Laos can only help to
[perpetrate old relationships and
i the divisions of that country.
And this poses a threat of re-
newed conflict in several areas."
and truck drivers, business- ,
men estimate that merchants
make at least 55 cents -profit,
I a pound. * ?
A DC-3 carries 7,000 pounds
and generally flies two to,
three trips a day. That adds ,
up to a daily profit of $7,700
to $11,550.
The airlift has been, made'
possible by the United States,
which buys all the aviation .
fuel with dollars, sells it to
private distributors for riels.
and turns the riels over to
the Government.
One official said ? that'
Washington had agreed to in-,
crease fuel shipments on the
condition that they would
not be sold on the black
market and that the airlines
would fly only within Cam-
bodia transporting only food.
"We do not want them
flying drugs in from Laos,"
one American remarked.
A Planeload of Hennessy
There is no evidence that-,
they fly drugs, but pilots say
they sometimes fly smuggled
luxury goods. "I've come out
of Kompong Som with a corn-I
plete planeload of Hennessy,"
one pilot declared.
The fuel comes up the "
Mekong River by convoy, ,
along with American rice,
which is then flown from
Phnom ? Penh to other en-
circled cities.
These flights are often
forced on private airlines by
the Government, which never
pays, airline executives com-
plain. Pilots say they are also
required to use private planes
to ferry troops and ammu-
nition around the country. ,
free of charge.
"We pay the [control] tow-I
er a few thousand riels so
we don't have to fly these
every day," one pilot as-
serted, and they say, 'O.K.? ?
tomorrow'."
One airline executive pul-
led out a notebook listing 12
00330004-7
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different agencies and 6ffi-
ciais who had to be bribed
' in a provincial airport, In-
chiding the military chief
who allegedly receives 5,000
riels, or about $12.50 each
time a plane lands.
' In Phnom Penh, a pilot
- said, "We pay the security
police 100,000 riels a month
for not stealing fuel."
1,500 Gallons Stolen
"They hit me one night for
over 1,500 gallons," one air-
? .Monday, June 17,1974
craft owner complained.
"I figure it would have
taken three trucks, ten
people, five siphons and at
least eight hours worth of
work to siphon off that much
fuel. The plane was sitting
right on the apron in front ?
of the control tower, but no-
body knew anything."
Pilots have also found
security policemen trying to
sell them spare parts ?that
were stolen the night before.
"They steal your fuel, they
THE WASHINGTON POST
0
eric n
steal your oil; they steal your
hydraulic fluid ? anything
they can sell," one pilot said.
"You pay the guy who
pumps ' gasoline into your
plane, you pay the tower op-
erators, the customs police
?even truck drivers get paid
off. You know why? Because
. otherwise when he backs his
truck up to your plane he'll
bump it."
If the corruption were only
better organized, the pilot
mused. The trouble is that
every man is out for him-1
self. "You could live with it i
if it were controlled," he ex-
plained. "If' you knew that
10 per dent of what you '
made went to corruption,
then you could plan."
But Cambodia cannot plan
these days. It is a country
scrambling to live from day
to day amid a war and its
profiteers. "Khmers used .to
be soft, very soft," a young
Cambodian observed sadly.
"But not now."
Is Protest
Say Cambodian Military Commandeers Planes
duties once performed by
fleets of trucks. -
Bryant and Shipman said
they both demand cash be-
lore they fly.
"The Americans need us
to run this country," said
Bryant, "but they won't give ,
us protection from the mili-
tary."
Shipman arrived in Cam-
bodia last April and Bryant
has lived here for more than
three years. Both say they
cooperate with the military
when they fly out to the
provinces, but the military
rarely returns these favors.
"We carry whatever they
like when we have the extra
room," said Shipman.
'Wounded soldiers, wives
with their sugar to sell in
Phnom Penh?we have to do
it in these situations. But
they don't give us reliable
information on enemy Posi-
tions and then they com-
mandeer the airplanes."
The pilots plan to make
renewed complaints to the
embassy until they receive
assurance that they will not
be coerced into flying mili-
tary missions.
"We are an embittered
lot; we've worked in an
around the government and
know what the Americans
can do. We aren't on high
salaries like Air America.
We're paid less than U.S.
mercenaries in China in
1948," said Shipman. "I
think flying military mis-
sions is illegal and I don't
want to be shot up for_noth-
By Elizabeth Becker
Special to The Washington Post
PHNOM PENH?Americap,
commercial pilots have
.asked the U.S. embassy in
Phnom Penh to forbid the
Cambodian military from
commandering their private
American-registered planes
?dor military missions, but
the embassy refused the re-
quest
? "I went to the embassy a
few days ago to ask about
this because I thought the
embassy had to protect its
citizens," . said earl Ship-
man, a 50-year-old Ameri-
can-licensed pilot for Heng
Meas commercial airlines,
"but the air attache told us
the ambassador could not in-
terfere in Cambodian gov-
ernment affairs."
Shipman had refused to
transport Khmer Republic
troops to Kompong Chem
and the military subse-
quently threatened to cut
off all aviation gasoline to
, his company if he did not
comply. Since aviation gaso-
line is provided by Ameri-
can aid and its distribution
controlled by the American
embassy, Shipman felt the
embassy could forbid the
Cambodians from comman-
deering his plane.
"The attache said he
would write a letter to the
air force asking them not to
take American registered
planes to Kompong Cham,
?
but we need more protec-
tion than that," said Ship-
man.
Shipman is worried about
the risk involved in flying
military missions to endan-
gered areas and the illegal-
ity of his participation in a
foreign war. Other Ameri-
can pilots have been threat-
ened and sometimes forced
to fly military missions and
two have complained, along
with Shipman.
"Active participation in
this war effort jeopardizes
our American citizenship,"
Skip Bryant, another pilot,
said.
"I was forced to fly troops
to Kampot and I know that
on the back of my passport
it says I can lose my citizen-
ship by serving in the armed
forces of another country,"
Bryant said.
The pilots feel the em-
bassy is not guarding their
rights as American citizens
and they don't believe the
embassy is powerless.
"The Americans change
the rules of their poker
game daily," said Shipman.
One recent change is a
mandatory utilization report
for aviation gasoline issued
by the U.S. embassy to all
private airline companies.
Each day these companies
must make a report to the
embassy stating the amount
of aviation gas used, the
type and tonnage of cargo
shipped, the destination of
the cargo, and the names of
passengers aboard.
Well-informed diplomatic
sources say the embassy
hopes to control in-country
airshipment of essential sup-
plies between Phhom Penh
and the provinces.
The United States appar-
ently hopes to cut down in-
flation by supervising do-
mestic cargo, flights and
thereby limiting the role of
middlethen.
Shipman knows about
these new measures, but he
says things nave not
changed.
"The Cambodian govern-
ment still commandeers any
airline to do what they say,"
he said.
The Cambodian air force
has planes to get in and out
of tight places but the mili-
tary often uses its cargo
lanes for paying passen-
gers, Shipman said, adding,
!'then they put the squeeze
on us to bring the troops
"I know none of Us was
dragged 'here in the first
place, but I have flown for
AID in Africa and the
agency (CIA) in Laos, and I
have never had trouble like
this before.
His private company owns
only one plane, like many of
the more than 30 airline
companies suddenly startec.
operating this year when all
inland roads were rut by the
Khmer Rouge. Most compa-
nies run on a very small
budget, transporting essen-
tial goods in and out of
Phnom Penh, taking up the
40
ine
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