PRESS RELEASE OF 12 JUNE 1974

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 12, 1974
• Content Type: PREL

25X1A
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NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 10
12 JULY 1974
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
1
GENERAL
24
EASTERN EUROPE
36
FAR EAST
38
Destroy after backgrounder
has served its purpose or
within 60 days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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PRESS RELEASE OF 12 June 1974
In connection with the publication of a book entitled The CIA and the Cult
of Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency makes the following statement:
The Central Intelligence Agency received a manuscript entitled
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence from its co-authors, Victor
Marchetti and John Marks, pursuant to the provisions of a permanent
injunction ordered by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, enforcing the Secrecy Agreement made by Mr.
Victor Marchetti in connection with his employment by CIA and con-
sequent access to sensitive intelligence matters.
In accordance with that injunctionl- the Central Intelligence
Agency identified for deletion those portions of the manuscript
which were classified, were learned during Mr. Marchetti's employment
with the Central Intelligence Agency, and had not been placed in
the public domain by the U.S. Government. The CIA made a sub-
sequent decision not to contest the publication of certain of these
portions, in order to place full emphasis on the sensitive items
remaining. The CIA also indicated its willingness not to contest
certain portions if they could be rephrased to omit certain names
or other specific references to classified material, but this offer
was not accepted.
The Central Intelligence Agency did not correct or contest
the publication of factual errors in the manuscript. The Agency's
decision not to contest the major portions of the manuscript does
not constitute an endorsement of the book or agreement with its
conclusions.
A,publisher's note at the beginning of the book states, "Bold
face type is used to indicate passages first deleted and later
reinstated." Certain passages in bold face type were not identified
for deletion by the Central Intelligence Agency to the authors.
The Central Intelligence Agency has reviewed manuscripts of
books of a number of former employees who had signed secrecy agreements
as a condition of employment at the Agency. In all cases, the
Agency's role has been solely to identify classified information
learned by the ex-employee-during his employment. In no case has
the Agency attempted to suggest editorial changes of the author%s
opinions or conclusions. The Agency has not attempted to suggest
changes in material that was not true.
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Legislative Note
During the first week of June the Senate debated several
amendments to the Defense Procurement Authorization bill (S.3000)
that are of concern to the Intelligence Community.
An amendment offered by Senator Proxmire would have required
the Director of Central Intelligence to submit an unclassified
report each year to the Congress disclosing the total national
intelligence program budget. The amendment was defeated by a
vote of 55 to 33.
--Opposing this amendment were a number of senators,
including the Chairmen of the Community's Oversight Committees
in the Senate. Their opposition was based on the belief that
such a disclosure would only stimulate requests for additional
detail on the foreign intelligence effort. They also argued
that disclosing the total budget figure over the years would
reveal trends in intelligence spending that would prove helpful
to our adversaries.
--The Senators emphasized that the ?four Congressional
Committees responsible for oversight of the Intelligence
Community are fully conversant with the details and programs
of the foreign intelligence budget and that they inquire
deeply into these matters. They assured the Senate that they
would provide information on the total figures, on a classified
basis, to any Senator who wished to know.
Other amendments to the bill, affecting the CIA section cf the
National Security Act of 1947, and Tupported by the Director of
Central Intelligence, were passed by the Senate. The changes are
as follows:
--Emphasize that CIA is concerned only with foreign
intelligence by inserting the word "foreign" as a modifier
throughout the section of the law setting forth the Agency's
,
1 responsibilities.
1
--Require that functions and duties related to foreign
intelligence performed by CIA at the direction of the National
Security Council shall be reported to the Congress. This
provision establishes in statute a procedure followed for a
number of years with the Agency's four oversight committees.
--Clarify the current statutory prohibition concerning
law enforcement, police, or internal security matters by
providing that CIA shall not carry out on its own or assist
other agencies of Government in carrying out law enforcement
or police-type operations. The amendment specifically authorizes
the Agency to protect its installations, conduct investigations
of those granted access to sensitive Agency information, and
provide information resulting from foreign intelligence activities
to other appropriate departments and agencies.
The Senate passed the Defense Procurement Authorization bill
on June 11 by a vote of 84 to 6. The bill will now go to conference
with the House and will require final passage by both houses before
being sent to the President for signature.
2
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EDITOR & PUBLISHER
29 June 1974
CIA seeks
power to
stop 'leaks'
The Washington Post reported this week
that legislation that would significantly
broaden the government's power to bring
criminal sanctions against employees. for
disclose:re of intelligence secrets is being
circulated with the Nixon administration.
The Post said the measure, proposed by
Central Intelligence Agency director
William E. Colby, could also empower him
to seek injunctions against news media to
prevent them from publishing material he
considers harmful to the protection of in-
telligence sources and methods.
Under Colby's proposed amendment to
the National Security Act of 1947, the
CIA, director would be empowered to de-
termine the ground rules for classification
under a general grant of responsibility for
protec:ing "intelligence sources and meth-
ods."
The Colby proposal would exempt news
media from the criminal provisions of the
law. But the draft language could, ac-
cording to informed officials, enable the
CIA director to trigger injunctive action
by the Attorney General against "any per-
son"?presumably including journalists?.
before or after an act of disclosure.
Leaks of confidential. information and
supposedly secret documents from "in-
formed sources" have become the stock in
trade of investigative reporters delving
into the complexities of Watergate. Wide-
NEWSWEEK
1 JULY 19711.
Dangerous Deletions
THE CIA AND THE CULT OF iNTELLI-
CENCE. By Victor Marchetti and John
D. Marks. 398 pages. Knopf. $8.95.
The legal hassle began before the
book was ever written. On the basis of
an outline submitted to New York pub-
lishers in the spring of 1972, the Central
Intelligence Agency obtained a blanket
injunction prohibiting Victor Marchetti
from "disclosing in any manner ... any
intelligence information" on the ground
that his proposed book would "result in
grave and irreparable injury to the in-
terests of the United States. ?
When Marchetti, a CIA officer for four-
teen years before his resignation in.1969,
and co-author John D. Marks, a former
State . Department intelligence . analyst,
presented their completed manuscript,
the CIA. required 339 national-security
uts, of which 171 Were restored before
e case came to court. A Federal judge
led in March that no more than 27 cuts
vere necessary. But that decision is still
eina appealed. The book now appears
vith?168 blanks, varying in length from
few words to whole paragraphs; the
71 restored passages are printed in
oldface for ready identification. Two
eeks before publication, the CIA went
o the trouble of issuing a press release?
ne of the few in its 27-year history?in
last-ditch effort to discredit the book.
spread use of leaks in news stories and by
the electronic media has begun to irritate
some legislative and administrative officials
and especially the White House.
. Target of the most outspoken criticism
? is the House Judiciary Committee which is
. considering charges of impeachment of
President Nixon.
Gerald L. Warren, deputy White House
press secretary, said Thursday at his news
conference that Chairman Peter L. Bodino
and other members of the House commit-
tee, should take some action to stop leaks
of "prejudicial and one-sided information"
emanating from unidentified sources re-
portedly familiar with all phases of the
impeachment inquiry. "Selective leaking of
prejudicial information from the commit-
tee," Warren said, "is a violation of due
process and creates a deplorable situa-
tion."
The situation could be corrected, War-
ren thought, by throwing open committee
meetings to the public.
Warren's criticism followed earlier as-
sertions by Ken W. Clawson, White House
Communications Director, and Patrick J.
Buchanan, a presidential assistant, that
leaks from the Judiciary Committee and
other congressional sources constituted a
"sy:sternatic campaign to tear down the
reputation of the President and his associ-
ates:
The sharpest attack on disclosure of
confiriential information by the media was
mad,_?. by Senator Barry Goldwater, Ari-
zena Republican. In a Senate speech he
sIggeste..d that. the Attorney General
fmil grounds "to institute criminal
prosecutions against the Washington
Post." ?
The Arizona Senator placed in the Rec-
"The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
was worth the CIA's moves to suppress it.
The "irreparable damage" it inflicts is to
the agency's image of omnipotence and
indispensability. Founded in 1947 as a
cold-war extension of the wartime OSS,
exempted from the normal Congression-
al reviewing process, the CIA is here
portrayed as having gown "old, fat, and
bureaucratic"?a flop at its appointed
task of penetrating the secrets of the
U.S.S.R. and Communist China. Classi-
cal espionage has been rendered obso-
lete by satellite surveillance, and U.S.
intelligence has been unable for fifteen
years to break the high-grade cipher sys-
tems and codes of its most powerful
adversaries; boxcars and warehouses of
incomprehensible Soviet and Chinese
tapes await a hoped-for breakthrough.
Fresh: Balked in its intelligence func-
tion, the CIA began during the 1950s
to deploy its Clandestine Services branch
in paramilitary adventures in the Third
World, where easier results could be
achieved and the agency's existence jus-
tified. Marchetti and Marks provide fresh
details on such interventions as the spon-
soring of the uprising against Indonesia's
Sukarno, the floating of balloons full of
propaganda leaflets over China during
the cultural revolution, the building of a
miniature Fort Bragg in the Peruvian
Jungle in the mid-'60s. The CIA per-
mitted publication (in boldface, mean-
ing it was censored earlier) of a plan to
?
ord a 38-page legal memo he said was
prepared by J. Terry Emerson, his staff
legal counsel. The memo listed these spe-
cial provisions of the U.S. code as the basis
for prosecution:
"Communicating documents relating to
the national defense; retaining national
defense documents (presumably the Pen-
tagon papers and others): conversion of
property of the United States; conspiracy
to commit an offense against the United
States; conspiracy to impair, obstruct or
defeat the lawful functions of the United
States and the Secretary of State."
"The possible criminality of the Post's
activities lies not only in its disclosure and
retention of top-secret documents," Sena-
tor Goldwater said, "but also in the use to
which these documents were put, which
was to challenge the credibility of the
Secretary of State at a time when the
country is engaged in negotiations of a
monumental nature."
Last week, Senator Goldwater charged
the Post with "treason" in printing secret
FBI documents. He withdrew the charge
after his legal advisors told him that the
"act I am complaining about would not
come under this (treason) term."
Some syndicated columnists, among
them Richard 'Wilson of the Des Moines
Register Tribune, have commented that
Watergate, and by inference the prosecu-
tors and investigators, have gone too far
and it is time now to close the books and
either drop the impeachment proceedings
or get them over with. Senator Mansfield
said he was "disturbed and in a sense
depressed by the delay" in the impeach-
ment proceedings, and by the leaks. ,
create a one-man airplane that could
theoretically have been carried into
China in two large suitcases, assembled
when the agent's mission was completed
and fice.vn to the nearest friendly border.
This wondrous project died on the draw-
ing boards, Marchetti and Marks report;1
, their description of it is followed by two i
blank half-pages stamped DELETED, de-;
priving us of who-knows-what scheme.
too hot (or too foolish) to be revealed.
Marchetti arid Marks suggest that se.:
crecy for secrecy's sake has become the
besetting sin of an agency that has so:
bewitched legislators that the House has
never even had a recorded vote on 150
bills introduced since 1947 to increase
Congressional surveillance. "I'll just tell .
them a few war stories," said Allen Dul- :
les, setting off for an annual budget pres-
entation in the 1950s. Covert action in
countries that pose no threat to U.S. se-
curity, the book argues, is a liability for
this country on practical as well as moral
grounds, and the $6 billion yearly cost of.
American intelligence is largely wasted. ?
Since Watergate, "national security"
has become an odorous slogan. Marchet-
ti and Marks, delayed nearly two years in
publishing their book, may have suc-
ceeded where earlier CIA exposes have
failed?in voicing an idea whose time has
come. Even in this mutilated form, their
presentation is crisp, _finely detailed and
devastating.
?WALTER CLEMONS:
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I RAMPARTS Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8
I July 1974 -
1 ? - -- ---- -,...
? 1 Inside- the
4tt.
Ten years ago, the CIA was an organization whose opera-
dons seemed awesome in their secrecy and their scope, its
agents all the more formidable for theiranonymity. When
someone like the legendary Col. Edward G. Landsdale did
become known, the fact that he slipped romantically be-
tween the intrigue-ridden back alleys of Saigon and the
. palace of the Diems? setting up programs for the South
Vietnamese peasants and channeling millions of dollars of
:CIA .money into clandestine operations against the PILE,
only made his employer seem more potent and glamorous.
By the late 1960s .the Agency's aura had begun to,
fade. Beginning with RA.N1PARTS 1967 revelations that the
National Student Association and other supposedly in-
dependent domestic institutions were iii fact fronts for the
, CIA, the Agency was. dragged more and more into the pub-
' lie view;.- Its-stature diminished with each new cause cel.bre
? until, far from being a collection of James Bonds, it seemed._
.more a haven for Keystone Kops, unable to pull off theiu.o,
assignments without. stumbling over one iinothere.-
?. This is not to underestimate the CIA .'s.capacity for tere;
ror and destruction.eYee_it is evident that -much of the.
Agency's.impact has depended on the illusion of prowess it':
has been able to create.:-This illusion, plus an obsession with
secrecy; have been the.- pillars, on which its reputation was.
-
built.. And this is why it has gone all out to censor .Victor..
Marchetti, to stop the publication of The CIA and the Cult
of Intelligence.
by Victor Marchetti and John Marks
I* ? * ?
Marchetti joined the:. Agency- in 1955 after graduating-
with a degree in Russian history and culture from Perm
State. Like others of his generation, he believed the myths
? of the Cold War, and for 15 years was a Willing soldier in its.
battles. He eventually became one of the leading CIA ana-
lysts on Soviet military capacity and aid to the Third
.World, and worked from 1966 until 1969 in the Office of
the Director, Central Intelligence. ??-?
Increasingly disillusioned with the CIA's practices and
attitudes. Marchetti resigned in 1969. For the next couple
of years he moved around Washington, finding others who
had dropped out of the intelligence community, listening to
their experiences and comparing them to his own. He de-
cided then to write a book that would penetrate the myth-
on which the op. eration of the CIA was based.
-
Yet before he had written the first sentence of the first.
chapter, the Agency knew of it. One of its agents in New
York had managed .to obtain a copy of the book outline
Marchetti had submitted to several New York publishers. In
April 1972 the CIA filed for an injunction to prohibit him.
from publishing anything about the Agency; then-Director
Richard Helms swore in an affidavit that such a book would
"cause grave and irreparable harm to the national defense
interest of the United States and will seriously disrupt the
conduct Of the country's foreign relations." The heart of
the Agency's position, however, was filed in an affidavit by
the head of Clandestine Services, a document which was
itself classified as "secret" and jbthidden even to Mar-
chetti's A a U attorneys until four days before the trial.
? Marchetti 's legal team, including ACLU head
1:41f realized that this case had serious implications and
? assembled a series, of expert witnesses including Princeton
. Professor Richard Falk and former Kissinger aide Morton
. Halperin. They were prepared to contest government allega-
dons that the book Marahetti had not yet written was a
threat to security. Yet when they c2Pre o court on May 15,
- 1972 they lbw& that the issue was to be fought on the
narrow ground of contract enforcement-the feet that
Marchetti, like all who /ciq the Agency, had signed a piece
' of paper agreeing never to talk about his work. The court
ruled against Merchetti. Sir months Leer the Supreme
Court-which had recently decided against censorship in the
Pentagon Papers case-refused by a 6-3 rote to consider
Marchetti's appeal.
' Yet Marchetti went ahead and wrote the book anyway,
in collaboration with John Marks, a young foreign service
officer who: had worked LI the State Department from
1966 until Ri vrote a pessimistic memo at the time of the
1970 Cambodia invasion. It took them nine months to
complete the job, the difficulty of their labor compounded
by the fact that they were enjoined from seeking editorial
help fromtheir publisher; Alfred A. Knopf
. ?.
?
_
.In August 1973, "Ware/teed sent a-draft of the manuscript
:to the CL4, which marked it TOP SECRET-SENSITI VE,..
: read it, and agreed that it could be published-after some
339 cuts- had. been made, or roughly 20 percent of the
entire book. In the negotiations whicn'. followed between
Marchetti and his attorneys and the CIA, the Agency was
forced to admit that -many of the censored items were-
either in. the public domain or so minor as to be ludicrous.
? . By February 1974 the CIA had reduced its demand to
168 cuts.' Meanwhile,. the matter had returned to court as
ICnopf,. Marchetti and Marks vs. Colby and Kissinger, and
.the CYA was finally hoisted on its own petard when it re-
fused to bring in evidence to support the TO? SECRET
classification, it had attached to the 163 deletions. So ob-
sessed with secrecy was the Agency that it refiuse.d to give
the evidence that would back up hs claims; and in the end
the fudge ruled that only 28 of the 168 cuts might be
considered classified. . .
The trial is not over. Marchetti, et at have appealed the
decision that the CIA has any right whatsoever to censor
the manuscript. But While that lengthy process is taking
place, the decision was made to go ahead and publish the
work with its 28 deletions, which are every bit as telling,
and in the same spirit, as the 183.-mirzu re-gap in a White-
House tape. ?
Even before its publication, The CIA and .the Cult of
Intelligence has accomplished much of what it started to
do, showing that the malevolence and imperiousness of the
CIA is well tempered by bureaucratic ineptitude. Like-all
bullies its success is dependent on an inflated reputation.
The Agency that has toppled governments cannot stop
the publication of a book. Doubtless some will see this as
another sign of the vitality of the American system, a sign
of the long-range medicinel powers of the Constitution.
Actually the les con is shnpler and more fir:elemental:
Organizations like the CIA flourish in the .dark and lose
their powers when they .are forced to operate in ihe day-
light, 1i:hen their true nariure-ced their banality-become
overpoweringly clear. .We owe thanks to Victor Marchetti,
not least of all because Jt? the lutes.' voice to protest that
the emperor has no clothes. --The Editors
Copyright 0 1974 by Victor L. Marchetti and John D. Marks. From
The'CI.1 and the Cult of Intelligence to be publi;hed by Knopf.
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few years ago Newsweek magazine described the
CIA as the most secretive and tightly knit organi-
zation (with the possible exception of the Mafia)
in American society. The characterization is
something of an overstatement, but it contains more than a
kernel of truth. In its golden era, during the height of the
Cold War, the agency did possess a rare elan; it had a staff
of imaginative and daring officers at all levels and in all
directorates. But over the years the CIA has grown old, fat,
and bureaucratic. The esprit de corps and devotion to duty
its staff once had, setting the agency apart from other gov-
ernment departments, has faded, and to a great degree it
has been replaced by an outmoded, doctrinaire approach to
its missions andftinctions. The true purpose of secrecy?to
; keep the opposition in the dark about agency policies and
operations?has been lost sight of. Today the CIA often
practices secrecy for secrecy's sake?and to prevent- the
American public from learning of its activities. And the true
purpose of intelligence collection?to monitor efficiently
the moves of international adversaries?has, been distorted
by the need to nourish a collective clandestine ego. .
, After the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970, a few
:hundred CIA employees (mostly younger officers from the
Intelligence and Science and Technology directorates, not
,the Clandestine Services) signed a petition objecting to
American policies in Indochina. Director Richard Helms
, was so concerned about the prospect of widespread unrest
:in the agency's ranks, and the chance that word of it might
leak out to the public, that he summoned all the protestors
to the main auditorium and lectured them on the need to
separate their personal views from their professional duties.
At the same time, similar demonstrations on the Cambo-
dian issue were mounted at the State Department and other
government agencies. Nearly every newspaper in the coun-
try carried articles about the incipient rebellion brewing in
the ranks of the federal bureaucracy. The happenings at the
CIA, which were- potentially the most newsworthy of all,
were, however, never discovered by the press. In keeping
*with the agency's clandestine traditions, CIA employees
had conducted a secret protest.
To agency personnel who had had the need for secrecy
drilled into them from their moment of recruitment, there
, was nothing strange about keeping their demonstration hid-
den from public view. Secrecy is an absolute way of life at
the agency, and while outsiders might consider some of the
resulting practices comical in the extreme, the subject is
treated with great seriousness in the CIA. Training officers
lecture new personnel for hours on end about "security
consciousness," and these sessions are augmented during
far employee's entire career by refresher courses, warning
, posters, and even the semi-annual requirement for each em-
ployee. to .review the agency's security rules and to sign a
copy, as an indication it has been read. As a matter of
course, outsiders should be told absolutely nothing about
the CIA and fellow employees should be given only that
information for which they have an actual "need io know."
(The penchant for secrecy sometimes takes on an air of
ludicrousness. Secret medals are awarded for outstanding
performance, but they cannot be worn or shown outside
the agency. Even athletic trophies?for intramural bowling,
softball, and so on?cannot be displayed except within the
guarded sanctuary of the headquarters building.)
CIA personnel become so accustomed to the rigorous
security precautions (some of which are indeed justified)
that they easily accept them all, and seldom are caught in
violations. Nothing could be More natural than to work
with a telephone book marked SECRET, an intentionally
incomplete telephone book which lists no one working in
the Clandestine Services and which in each semi-annually
revised edition leaves. oat the names of many of the people
?employed by the overt directorates, so if the book ever falls
into unauthorized hands, no enterprising foreign agent or
reporter will be able to figure out how many people work
at CIA headquarterora even, Ilow raiAssegyji/ONRY8
roveo Tor me
clandestine jobs. ThSsid. temporaruy ?nail-Rican ook tor-
ward to having their names appear in the next edition of
the directory, at which time others are selected for tele-
phonic limbo. Added to this confusion is the fact that most
agency phone numbers are regularly changed for sectFity
reasons. Most employees manage. to keep track of com-
monly called numbers by listing them in their own personal
desk directories, although they have to be careful to lock
these in their safes at. night?or else risk being charged with a
security violation. For a first violation the employee is
given a reprimand and usually assigned to several weeks of
security- inspection in his or her office. Successive violations
lead to forced vacation without pay for periods up to sev-
eral weeks, or to outright dismissal.
Along with the phone books, all other classified ma-terial
(including typewriter ribbons and scrap paper) is placed in
_office safes whenever the office is unoccupied. Security
guards patrol every part of the agency at roughly half-hour
intervals in the evening and on weekends to see that no
secret documents have been left out, that no safes have
been left unlocked, and that no spies are lurking in the
halls: If a guard finds -any classified material unsecured,
both the person who failed to put it away-and the person
within the office who was assigned to double-check the
premises have security violations entered in their personnel
files. ? -? - -
These- security precautions all take place inside a head-
quarters building that is surrounded by a twelve-foot fence
topped with barbed wire,. patrolled by armed guards and
police dogs, and sealed off by a security check system that
guarantees that no one can enter either the outer perimeter
or the building itself without the proper identificatiori.
Each CIA employee is issued a laminated plastic badge with
his picture on it, and these must not only be presented to
the guards on entry, but be kept constantly in view within
the building. Around the edges of the badge are twenty or
so little boxes which may or may not be filled with red
letters. Each letter signifies a special security clearance held
by the owner. Certain offices at the CIA are designated as
restricted, and only persons holding the proper clearance, as
marked on their badges, can gain entry. These areas are
usually guarded by an agency policeman sitting inside a
glass cage, from which he controls a turnstile that forbids
passage to unauthorized personnel. Particularly sensitive of-
are protected, in addition to the guarded turnstile, by
a combination or cipher lock which must be opened by the
individual after the badge is inspected.
Even a charwoman at the 'CIA-must gain security clear-
ance ? in order to qualify for .the badge that she, too, must
v..ear at all times; then she must be accompanied by an
armed guard while she cleans offices (where all classified
material has presumably been locked up). Some rooms at
the agency are considered so secret that the charwoman and
her guard must also be watched by someone who works in
the office..
The pervasive secrecy extends everywhere. Cards placed
on agency bulletin boards offering items for sale conclude:
"Call Bill, extension 6464." Neither clandestine nor overt
CIA employees are permitted to have their last names ex-
posed to the Scrutiny of their colleagues, and it was only in
1973 that employees were allowed. to answer their phones
with any. words other than those signifying_ the four-digit
extension number. _
Also until recent years all CIA personnel were required
to identify themselves to non-agency people as employees
of the State or Defense Department or some other outside
organization.. Now the analysts and technicians are per-
mitted to say they work for the agency, although the,'
cannot reveal their particular office.. Clandestine Service
employees. are easily spotted. around Washington because
they almost always claim to be employed by Defense or
State, butausually are extremely ? vague on the details and
imaHe to furnish an office address. They do sometimes give.
out a phone number which corresponds to the correct ex-
: CIAARDP07-00482R0001011-a300443,-Sut these extensions,
5
Virginia.
Approve
ming, ring at CIA headquarters in
.... ?
[THE ACENCY:S EMPIRE] ,
?
he headquarters building, located on a partially
wooded 125-acre tract eight miles from downtown
Washington, is a modernistic fortress-like structure.
Until the spring of 1973 one of the two roads lead-
ing 'at? the secluded compound was totally unmarked, and
the other featured a sign identifying the installation as the
Bureau of Public Roads, which maintains the. Fairbanks
Hihway Research Station adjacent to the agency.. ? -
Until 1961 the CIA had been located in a score of build-
ings scattered all over ?Washington. One of the princrpal
justifications for the S46 million headquarters in the sub-
urbs was that considerable expense would be saved by rnov-
ina all employees under ona roof. But in keeping with the
best-leid bureaucratic plans, the headquarters building,
from the day it was completed, proved too smaU for all the
CIA's Washington activities. The agency never vacated some
-of its old headquarters buildings hidden behind a naval
:medical facility on 23rd Street .Northwest in Washington,
and its National Photo Inte.rpretation Center shares pert of
the Nevrs facilities in Southeast Washington. Other large
CIA offices located downtown include the Domestic Opera-
tions D:eision, .on Pennsylvania Avenue near the White
House.
.In Washington's Virginia suburbs there are even more
. CIA buildings outside the headquarters complex. An agency!
. training facility is located in the Broyhill Building in Arling-I
ton, and the CIA occupies considerable other office space;
in that county's Rosslyn section. Also at least half a dozen
CIA components.are located in the Tyson's Corner area of,
:northern Virginia, which has become something of a mini-
intelligence community for technical work due to the pres-
ence there of numerous electronics and research companies
: that do work for the agency and the Pentagon.
(Of course the list of 'CIA facilities would be much
longer if it included covert sites across the U.S.?a para--
Military base in North Carolina, secret air bases in Nevada.
and Arizona, scores of "dummy" commercial organizations
and airlines, operational offices in more than twenty major;
cities, a huge antis warehouse in the Midwest, and "safe
ouses" for rendezvous in Washington and other cities.)
?;._The rapid expansion of CIA office space in the last ten :
ears did not happen as a result of any appreciable increase
n personnel. Rather, the technological explosion, coupled
vith inevitable bureaucratic lust for new frcintiers, has been
e cause. As Director, Richard Helms paid little attention
the diffusion of his agency until one day in 1968 when a
IA official mentioned to him that yet one more technical
mponent was moving to Tyson's Corner. For some reason
is aroused Heirris',ire, and he ordered a study prepared to
d out just how much of the agency was located outside
headquarters. The completed report told him what most
sington-area real-estatehgents already knew, that a sub-
tle' percentage of CIA employees had vacated the build-
originally justified. to Congress as necessary to put all
sonnet under- one roof. Helms decreed that all future
es would require his personal approval, but his action
ed the exodus only temporarily.
Vhert the CIA headquarters building was being con-
cted during the late 1950s, the subcontractor respon-
for putting in the heating and air-conditioning system
d the agency how many 'people the structure was in-
ed to accomodate. For security reasons, the agency
ed to tell him, and he was forced to make his own
ate based on the building's size. The resulting heating
worked reasonably well, while the air-conditioning
uite uneven. After initial complaints in 1961, the con-
r installed an individual thermostat in each office, but
any agency employees were continually readjusting.
6
?
7-00432R000100330003-8
their thermostats that the system got worse. The M ?
Directorate then decreed that the thermostats could n
longer be used, and each one was sealed up. However, th
M&S experts had not considered That the CIA was a clan
:destine agency, and that many of its personnel had taken a
,"locks and picks" course while in training. Most of the
thermostats were soon unlocked and back in operation.
At this point the CIA took the subcontractor to court to
force him to make improvements. His defense was that he .
had installed the best system he could without a clear indi-
cation of how many people. would occupy the building. The ?
.CIA could not counter this reasoning and lost the decision.!
Another unusual feature of the CIA headquarters is the a
cafeteria. It is partitioned into a secret and an open section, I,
.the larger part being only for agency employees, who must
show their badges to the armed guards before entering, and
the smaller being for visitors as well as people who work at
the CIA. Although the only outsiders ever to enter the
:small, dismal section .are moloyees of other U.S. govern-
ment agencies, representatives of a few friendly govern-
merits; and CIA families, the partition ensures that no
visitor will see the face of any clandestine operator eating
? lunch.
The CIA's "supergrades" (civilian equivalents of gen-
erals) have -their own private dining room in the executive
suite, however. There they are provided higher-quality food
at lower prices than in the cafeteria, served on fine china
with fresh linens by black waiters in immaculate white
coats. These waiters and the executive cooks are regular
CIA employees, in contrast to the cafeteria personnel, who
work for a contcactor. On several occasions the Office of
Management aid Budget has questioned the high cost of
? this private dining room, but the agency has always been
able to fend off the attacks, as it fends off. virtually all
? attacks on its:, activities; . by: citing "national-security"
_ -
reasons as the major justification ?
et-41;E... -1:-:AS'T':':13'AltS"-T
uestions .of social class and Snobbery have: always
been very important in the CIA. With its roots in
the :wartime Office of Strategic Services (the let-.
?eee? ters- OSS were said, .only 'half-jokingly,- to stand
for "Oh So Social"), the agency has long been known for
its Concentration of Eastern Establishment, Ivy .League
types. Allen Dulles, a former American diplomat and Wall
Street lawyer- with impeccable connections and credentials,
set the -tone- for an agency full of Roosevelts,- Bundys,
Cleveland Amory's brother Robert, and other scions of
? America's leading families. There haae been exceptions, to
be sure, but most of the CIA's top leaders have been white,
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and graduates of the right Eastern
schools. While changing times and ideas have diffused the
influence -of the Eastern elite throughout the government as
a whole, the CIA remains perhaps the last bastion in official
Washington of WASP power, or at least the slowest to
adopt the principle of equal opportunity.
It was no accident that former Clandestine Services chief
Richard Bissell (Groton, Yale, A.B., Ph.D., London School
_of Economics, A.B.) was talking to a Council on Foreign
Relations discussion group in 1968 when he made his "con-
fidential" speech on covert action. For the influential but
private Council, composed of several hundred of the coun-
try's top political, military, business, and academic leaders,
has long been the CIA's principal "constituency" in the
American public. When the agency has needed prominent
citizens to front for its proprietary companies or for other
special assistance, it has often turned to Council members. :
Bissell knew that night in 1968 that he could talk freely
and openly about extremely sensitive subjects because he
was among "friends." His words leaked out not because of
the indiscretion of any of the'participants, but because of
student upheavals at Harvard in 1971.
It may well have been the' sons of CFR members or CIA
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officials who ransacked the office housing the minutes of
? Bissell's speech, and therein lies the changing nature of the
CIA (and the Eastern Establishment, for that matter). Over
the last decade the attitudes of the young people, who in
` earlier times would have followed their fathers or their
;
? fathers' college roommates into the CIA, have, changed dras-
tically. With the Vietnam War as a catalyst, the agency has
become, to a large extent, discredited in the traditional
Eastern schools and bolleges. And consequently the CIA has
? been forced to alter its recruiting base. No longer do liar-.
; yard, Yale, Princeton, and a few other Eastern schools pro-
vide the bulk of the agency's professional recruits, or even a
, substantial number.
For the most part, Ivy Leaguers do not want to join the
' agency, and the CIA now does its most fruitful recruiting at
the universities of ,middle America and in the armed forces.
While the shift unquestionably reflects increasing democ-
ratization in American government, . the CIA made the
change not so much voluntarily as because it had no other
choice .if it. wished to fill its ranks. If the "old boy" net-
work cannot be replenished, some officials believe, it will
,be much more. difficult to'enlist the aid of American cor-
porations and generally to make use of influential "friends".
in the private and public, sectors. - ?
;Despite: the Comparatively recent ,broadening of the
CIA's 'recruiting base, the. agency is not now and has never
I been an equal-opportunity employer...The:agency has one
of the smallest percentages?if not the smallest?of blacks of
any federal department.. The CIA's top. management had
this forcefully called to their attention in, 1967 when a local
!civil-rights .activist wrote to tlie agency- td complain about
minority hiring practices. A study was ordered at that time,
and the CIA's highest-ranking black was found to be a
1GS-13 (the rough equivalent of an Army major). Alto-
gether, there were less than twenty blacks among the CIA's
approximately 12,000* non-clerical employees, and even
the proportion of black secretaries, clerks, and other non-
professionals was considerably below that of most
Washington-area government agencies. One might attribute
this latter fact to the agency's suburban location, but blacks
were notably well represented in the guard and char forces.
' Top officials seemed surprised by the results of the 1967
? study because they did not consider themselves prejudiced
men. They ordered increased efforts to hire more blacks,
but these were not particularly successful. Young black col--
lege graduates in recent years have shied away from joining
the agency, some on political grounds and others because of
' the more promising opportunities available in the private
.sector. Furthermore, the CIA recruiting system could not
easily be changed to bring in minorities. Most of the "spot-
ting'!- of 'potential employees is done by individual college
professors who are either friends or consultants of the
agency, and they are located on predominantly white cam- -
puses where each year they hand-pick a few carefully
.selected students for the CIA.
The paucity of minority groups in the CIA goes well
beyond blacks, however. In 1964 the agency's Inspector
General did a routine study of the Office of National Esti- -
mates (ONE). The Inspector found no black, Jewish, or
women professionals, and only a few Catholics. ONE im-
mediately .took steps to bring in .minorities.o0ne _woman,
professioni. was hired on?raPrObition-
cry basis: and one black secretary V/13'
brottc.,h(in.Nyhen the professional had
finished her :probation, . was en-
couraged to .find Work elsewhere,. and
the, black secretary was given duties
away 'from .the main ONE offices?out
of sight. n the reproduction. center.
ONE did bend:somewhat by' hiring a
? Tins figure is in boldface to indicate one of 339 items tlie CIA
attempted to censor before Publicacr.
Intelligence (see page 24p prove Ferf Rheiecaten/01:11708708
few Jews. and some additional.Catho-
. lies.
? There are-,eXtremely.few,WoMen in
high-ranking positions in the CIA; but,.
of course;7' the.- agency does- 'employ
wornen. as',secretaries ? and.' fbno..pther
non-professional duties. As is true- with'-
, all large- organilations, thereAs...a high:
-*turnover in: these jobs, and the agency.
: each 'year ? hires a thousand. of.. more
new applicants_ In a search for suitable
candidates,...CIA recruiters concentrate
. on recent high-school graduates from
the mostly- white small. towns. and
cities of Virginia and the neighboring
:states, Maryland, West Virginia, and'
Pennsylvania.. Washington; . with. its
'overwhelming black majority, supplies
comparatively few. of the CIA's secre-
taries.: Over- the years ? the recruiters
have. established good contacts with
:high-school guidance counselors and.
;principals in the -nearby .states, and
when.they make their annual tour in'
search Of candidates, interested girls
are: Steered their- way, with several
from the same class often being hired
- at the same time. When the new sect&
'taries...come to CIA headquarters out-
side. of Washington, they are encour-
agect;to? live 'in agency-selected apart-
:merits.. in the Virginia suburbs, build-
ings In.:which virtually all ? the tenants,
F.are CIA employees...,-...- - ? ....:
--*--?!Security consideration? play a large
-part-iriT.the agency's lack of attention-
:to:urban-areas in its secretarial recruit-.
. .
age.ncYernployees must receive'
c'es.:1b,e..fore -.they
start.; wOrk..- This -is a. very expensive
process, and-women. from small town,
areeasier;!.- and cheaper :to 4:l'ietigate..:_
Moieover;. the CIA:see:Ms. actu011yto
prefer:?'.secretarieS.7.-_?tvi ths-.7.? the All
American image whO:,:ioiless.likely
hase been 'corrupted or ? `.?pplin---
.Cized". than their urbanized siSters..:-.,
[NEW RECIWTSI:
.? ...?
?army se.cretaries, -.as :Well as -"ail
other, personnel, must pass-lie-.
detector tests' as -a condition of
einplaYment. Then they periodically?.?
:usually at five-year- intervals or when.
they.return from. overseas assignments-
..*:rntist submit themselves again to the-
.1)1Ock. box." The CIA,- 'Unlike' most,
employers, finds out nearly everything
'imaginable about the private lives of
its personnel . through these polygraph
tests.- Questions about. sex, drugs, and
? Personal honesty are routinely asked
?along' with security-related matters
,.such as possible contacts with foreign:-
agents: .The plunger secretaries invari-
'ably .rester a negative reading on the
'machine when asked the standard:*
-."Have- you ever stolen government
'property?" The polygraph . experts
usually have to add the.. qualifying
CI-R11)1277,4i0413itg000/11031341a0043, or
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'minor clerical items."
Once CIA recruits have passed their
security investigations and lie-detector.
tests, they are given tlaining by the
agency.. Most of the secretaries receive
instruction in the ? Washington area,
such instruction focusing on the need
for secrecy in all aspects of the work.
Women going overseas to type and file
for their CIA bosses are tven
courses in espionage tradecrafr. A
former secretary reported that the-
most notable part of her field trailing
, in the late -1960s WaS to trail an in-
structor in and out of Washington
department - stores. (This i.vornan's
? training Proved useful, however, when
in he first post abroad, oste.nsibly as
.an embassy secretary, she was tven.
.. the mission of surveilling an apartment
. building in -disguise as - an _Arab
? woman.) ., ? ..."- , ?
The agency's professionals, most of
'.thern (until the 1967 National Student
,,Association disclosures)- recruited
-
..through. 'friendly"-lcollege professors,'
;..reteive? much More extensive- instruc--,
tioa when they enter-the CIA as career.
.1trainees (CTs). For two years they are::
On a'. probationary status, the first year
in 'formal training prograrris and the
,second with on-the:job instruction..i
The CTs take introdtictory courses at a
CIA fadiity ("The Farm") in .Arling--:
in -subjects such as secu-1
,;rity,zahe..organization of the. agency:
--and the-test of the intelligence corn--;
munity, and the. 'nature of in ternatfon-
.21..communism: -Allen Dulles,. in his
days as DireCtor, liked to talk to'these;
...classes and tell-them how, as an Arne.ri-;
. can . diplomat -in_ Switzerland duringr
_World War.I,- he-received a telephone:
-call froth a Russian late on a Saturday ;
morning. -The Russian wanted .to talk
? to' government representative
immediatelyi.- but ...Dulles had a .date.?
with a young ladY? sci he declined thel
offer. The Russian turned out to be..
Nikolai Lenin, and 'Dulles used the
incident to urge Cae. young CTs always
to -be alert to the possible. importance
of people they meet in their work.
The. Farm, disguised as a Pentagon
iesearch-and-testing facility, indeed
resembles. a large military reser/v.1?n-
: Barracks, offices, 'classrooms, .and an
, officers' club. are grouped around a
,.central point.. Scattered over its 480
*mostly wooded acres are weapons
ranges, jump towers, :Ind a simulated
? closed border of a my:hi:al cornmu-.
. nist country. . 'Away from these facili-
ties are heavily guarded and off-limits
sites, locations used for super-secret
projects such as debriefing a recent
defector, planning a special operation,
or training an important .foreign ceent
who will be , returning to his native
country to spy for the CIA.
All the CTs receive some light.
weapons training, ..and those destined
. for paramilitary duties receive a
'course which includes instructio
explosives and demolition, parac
jumps, air and sea operations, and
finery training. This paramilitary tr
ing is also .taken -by the contract
diers (who greatly resent being cal
"mercenaries") who have been- s
.rately recruited for special operati
They join- the CTs for some of
other courses,-but generally-. tend
avoid the younger and less experiezi
recent college 'graduates who make
. the bulk of.the. CT ranks; Many
these mercenaries:and a few Of the.
.'continue on form- advanced tours
? explosives and heavy weapons given
? a CIA training-facility in North. c.
Postgraduate-.1,:;'trainingirr::.:'Pa
military operatiOriS' . is 'conducted
Fort Bragg Irk North CarOlina -arid at
Fort. Gulick in the. ,Panama, Canal
full merits:. --
.. -. .,72,,,,,,i-.... .--::-.: - ?
n in -; '.! For banking ac tes;CIA emplo-Y-
hute ,ees.are'enCouraged to use the-agency's.ar-.. Town-credit -union, which is located in
am- . the. headquarters . buil ding..:,?.The union
sol- . is expert, MT_ giving loans to Clandestine-
led operators Under cover, who-Se Personal:-
epa- - backgroUnd "statements. 'are by-defud--
ons. i tionfalse..In the rare-instance when an
j_he . -employee forfeits- On a loan,' the .credit
to - Union..seldorn_ prOseciites:.talget back
ced .the':n1-0.tlirl. that conld'heebreach Of.
. _ . ..
- up- security.. There is .also ; a_special -"fund;
, of supported _-..-hy' ;annual- .contributiOns-.
CTs from agency _ . -officers,-. to.. heli_fellow-
e in
. . emPloyees :Who accidentlly.....get *into-
. .
at financial - ,
, trouble- -
arb_. - ? --The cradit union also Makes .various.
la; kinds of insurance =available. to.. CIA
. .
.'4t - ?employees. Since the ageacy_does not
wish to give outsiders any- biographical
-information on its personnel ,-..the CIA
provides the insutor with hone Of that
.dalta7that insurance coniPanies normal-
ly demand, except _age -and size-of
policy .;,:The - agency .certifies-Sthat all
facts.-:are -_true?even -that .'a :Particular-
-Zone.
[FRINGE BENEFITSI1.?
-
tthoUgh agency personnel hold. llie
the--
-same:ratings . and receive
same: Salaries as oth.er :gave
merit employees,: they do no t.faIL u
?der Civil ?Service jurisdiction4TI
Director has the authority -to hire-.
fire an employee -without any rega
-
to normal 'governmental fegulation
and there is no legal appeal. to his de
sions. In general, however, :it: is.. th
CIA's practice. to' take extrerneligo
care of the people who remain loyal
the organization. There is a strong fe
ing among !agenCy management; of
that theymust concenthe.
selves welfare 1:-rif
personnel,: and this feeling goes. we
.
beyond the-: normal employe
employee relationship in the: gOvern
ment or in private industry. To:a Ce
tam n extent;_security consideration
dictate this attitude on the ptar. o
management,..:since an unhappy;-a
? financially insecure employee can be
come a potential target for- a forei
espionage agent. But there- is more-it
it than that. Nearly everyone seemst
believe: We're all in this together an
anyone who's on the team should b
taken care of decently. The employee
: probably feel a higher loyalty 'to the
CIA than members of almost any
other agency feel for their organiza-
tion. Again., this is good for 'security,
but that makes the sentiments no less
real. .
If a CIA employee dies, an agency
security officer immediately goes to
his or her house to see that everything
is in order for the survivors (and, not
incidentally, to make sure, no CIA
documents have been taken home
from the office). If the individual has
been living under a cover identity, the
security officer insures that the. cover
does not fall.apart with: the death.
Often the. security man will even help
th th
with. the funeral and. burial. arrange-
in-. employee-has died:--without offering:
n-any procif:: Blue Cross,.i.vhich originally:
had the ;; agency's _health-insurance
or ? palicy,Aemanded- too much- inforrna-,
rd tion for the- agency's liking,..and in the
1950s -:the CIA Switched its ac---
ci- . count to:the. more tolerant Mutual, of
e Omaha. ..Agency employees: are. even'.
Od instruCtednot to use the airplane-crash,
to insurance machines available at air-..
el- ports, but to purchase such insurance .
from the credit union. . -
m--... Attempts are made even to regulate
all the extracurricular activities of agency
11: employees?to reinforce. their- attach-.
meat -to the organization ? and, of:
course, for security reasons.' An *em-
ployee-activity association (incorpo--
s rated for legal purpOses) sponsors
f: programs in everything from sports
r ? and art to slimnastics and karate. The
? association also runs a recreational
travel service; a sports and theater
0 ticket service, and a discount sales
store. The CIA runs its own training
programs for reserve military officers,
too. And it has arranged with local
s universities to have its own officers
teach college-level and graduate
courses for credit to its employees in
the security of its headquarters build-
\8'.
The CIA calf be enga_tngly paternal
in-other ways, too. On-the whole, it is
:quite_ tolerant : of sexual dalliance
.:among its employees, as long .as the
relationships. are-heterosexual and.not
with enemy_ spies: 'In fact, the CIA's
:Medical "office In .Saigon , was known
'during the late 1960s for its no-ques-
'tions-asked ictires."-of -venereal disease,
Lvvhile State :Deiartment officers." in
-that.--CitY.'avoided the embassy clinic
for z the'sam- e :malady . because they
:feared the. consequences to their ca-
-reersz-orhaving YD listed ron their Per--
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other" ways the CIA keeps
Cloie watch over-its employees', health'..
If a CIA-officer gets sick, he. can go to
doctor or a: "cleared" out-
Sidee:physician.,If he. undergoes sur-
gery,tlie frequently - is accompanied
into '..the Operating room ? by a CIA
, ? ?
:security 'man who-makes sure that no
fscrets - are revealed --_under. Sodium:
pentOthol anesthesia: If .he
'mental breakdown, he is required ? to;
..bel:treated by -_arragency psychiatrist.
cleared contact on the :otitside)
an extreme case, to beadmitted
, - ?
107,;.a CIA-sanctiOrted, sanitarium: 'Al-
though no statistics _available;
breakdowni seem more corn--
anon in the 'raaency's.i.teriSion-laden
"atmosphere than in the population as-a
:whole, and the ? CIA :tends to have- a
-imore tolerant attitude than the general.
ublic toward mental-health problems,
.:apd psychiatric' therapy. In the _Clan-:
'destine Services,' breakdowns are' con-
sidered virtually normal work 107ards,
'and employees,:, are- encouraged:to;
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
30 June 1974
.1The CIA rind The Culla of I1iPelliy6-ncer
_return to work after..they have com-
pleted treatment. Usually no stigma is.
attached to illness of this type; in fact,!
:Richard Helms suffered a breakdown
when he was still with the Clandestine;
Services during the 1950s and it clear-
ly did not hurt his career. Ex-Clandes-
tine Services chief Frank Wisner had a-
similar
illess, and he later returned to
work as the CIA station chief. in-
London. .
i\iany agency, officials. are known
for their heavy drinking?which also
seems to be looked upon as an occupa-
tional hazard. Again; the CIA is more
sympathetic to drinking problems than
outside organizations. Drag .use, how7
ever, remains absolutelY.taboO.
While_ the. personnel:. policies and
benefits: e_xtended: by: the CIA to its.
employees -:can. be. Justified .? on_ the.
gounds of 'national. security' and. the
need to develop organizational loyalty,
these tend to have something of a per-
ion-al debilitating effect on the career
'officers. The agency is unconsciously
1.1 ?
r-./ ?
? ? 4:0?1,,
viewed as an omniscient, omnipotent
institution?one that c an even be con-
sidered infallible. Devotion to duty
'grows to fanaticism; questioning the
decisions of the authorities is tanta-
'mount to-. relious blasphemy. Such
.circumstances. encourage bureaucratic
,insulation and introversion. (especially
...Under strong pressures from the &h-
:side), and they even' promote:a
'iceise,_* defensive % attitude which -?
stricts the individual from keeping
pace with sigiiticant social events oc-
curring in. one's own nation?to say
' nothing of those evolving abroad. In-
stead of continuing to develop vision
and sensitivity with regard 'to their
professional activities, the career of-
ficers become unthinking bureaucrats
concerned only with their own com-
fort and security, which they achieve
by catering to the demands_ of the
existing political and institutional lead-
erships?those groups which are able to
prthide.- the me.arts :for such personal
ends.
Aithcygh the CIA is generally thought of in terms of fight-lipped \
cloak-and-dagg;.,r operatives conspiring in exotic, far.-away lands;
the secrecy-shrouded agency is active in this' coUntry
as vieil cis oVerseal. In '!The Ctfel and the Cult of Intelligence,"
authors Victor. Marchetti and John D. Marls disclose' some
of the domestic operations that brought the CIA-
unwanted publicity?and criticism. ?
: '?.
?
By ifICTOR. LIARCHETT1 and J6NN.D. MARKS
. ?
" ' ..fieerz, all told, from 'a total of about-
. - Second of two pod; "
:. , .a dozen city nndecounty police forcesii
- ?
THE DOMESTIC Operations Divi- have reeeiveibsome sort of?ageney b. rief-'1
gin!' (DOW of the CIA, with a lag within the past. two }ears." ,
. But the CIA police training, whiCh!
staff of 'a few hundred .persons and
an a Consisted of much more than a ?"brief-
is,
. annual budget of up to ' $10 . million, ing," had been going on for r. well-established part of the consider-
--Glandes-
tine Sen'ices.ably more than the two years cited ?byl
: ? '-:' ,
DOD is surrounded by extreme the CIA ? at least since. 1937 Nvhen
-The I Chicago police . received...instruction . at:
secrecy, even by CIA standards, 'and its; the rigeiley's headquarters and at "Thel
.itctual functions are shrouded in niy-, Farm," a training installation in south.:
4ry. Tile extent of the agency's unwili-i irginiii. v .
ingness to discuss the Dom 0,,,...,t,i.,, Domestic Division;
coutd.Le seen when 'the CIA officer
CIA training of local police depart-
pa ?
pre-; rnents may seem like a relatively.harm-;
ring' the agency's annual budget TC- less a_tivitv,? but it does raise ? several:
to
'quest to Congress in 1968 was pointedly 'questions. Why did the 'agency at first
told by the Executive Director not to. try to cover, and then mislead' Con;:
include anything about the 1)01) in the
secret briefing to be given to the Sen- Fress and the press and the public about:
tte, V. by the sante train-:
ate'. tied House appropriations commit-
:tees. in, not have .been given by time FDI?,
? . ?. And su
why have bseqe
unt CIA directors
Training or Cops., ? James Schlesinger and Williain,Cohby
Li Dec.,,,ther I972.%'Tcw yell not specifically -ruled out' any future po?
Times revealed that the CIA' had 'secret-) lice training, even after the press and
ly provided training to PI New York l ,,,Cong:ress .have raised the questions.
City policemen. After persistent queries ! luega"tY and impropriety? ?
by Representative Edward Koch, th e': A few months after Watergate,: the ?
CIA's legislative counsel, John Maury,' Press would discover that..Q.1.1e)pie
ie
admitted 'that "less thalApproVed Rdderalle120011/118fOgianOlhakil-tq
..043 R
? 9 do
? ? ?
ative and helpful" (in rhe worCliof?Whie?
House aide Toni If-Liston) in helping to
organize top-secret White House plans;
for domestic surveillance and.. intelli7
genee? collection; that the CIA. had pro,.
Acted "technical" aSsistanee to the White.
House. plumber in their 1971 burglary
of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psy-
chiatrist; that -.the agency maintained.
."safe houses" in the heart of Washing-
'ton where E. Howard hunt was clandes-
?tinely 'provided with CIA-ratinufactured
false documents, a disguise, a speech-
altering device, and a camera fitted into
a tobacco pouch; that five of the seven
Watergate burglars were ex-CIA em-
?ployees, and one was stilt on the payroll
and regularly repocting to an agency
ease officer; and, perhaps most signifi-
cantly, that top Ca. officials remained
silent, even in secret testimony before
Congressional committees, about the
place.tcel. activities they -knew had taken
? t
To the inistrustfel minds of the Clan:.
destine Services, the prvbiems caused
by dissidents, civil-riehts activists, and
anti-war protesters conjured Up the
specter of ?foreign influences. And as
.Direetur Colby mentivned at his confir-
mation hearinies: the nieeney can right-
fully siee on Americans -involved' with
foreign institutioi:s."
?
Pentagon Blunders
? -
- the late ?1960s and early 1970,
the Johnson !White House gave the ma.-
or 'responsibility ior penetrating the.
anti-Near movement to the Pentagon. But
Army intelligence blundered and its:
domestic sm.veillance programs were ex-
posed in January, 1970 by ex-agent ,
Christopher.Pylee-During the following,
ar time o rliight"se,rvices were forced
0 CI' 1o Unlatisive attack against
mestie dissidents; the field was once
Approved Fo
again )eft to the FBI and CIA.
?
This. situation resulted in ''an ? o)
break between ? the agency. and ?
bureau. Sant- Papich, ? the Fill's offi
in charge of, liaieon with the CIA, a
a 'member of J. Edgar Hoover's int!)
(Nato. steff, was dismissed by the
reauechief. And only. weeks later, -
head of the FBI's. Division of Inten
Security, the FBPs'representative on'
? U.. S. Intelligence Board, Was locked o
;Of his office and fired by?Hoover.
In the aftermath of the troubles
the FBI, the press carried a series
?
reports of Hoover's and the ? burea
.incoMpetence. Some comments,' attr
.uted. to ?ttautlioritative -.sources" -clea
priginited ? svith; ? Or ..were ? inspired
the
: f'PUblie ;aware- of...
the' time;. :was' ? that ? since' 1970 ?-;L-. lo
before,the -.Open CIA-FBI Split t
White House had been planning to e
?pand 'domestic intelligence . operatio
:And :while the . CIA had encouraged t
!secret?-:policy,;:the ? FBI 'had resisted
3vaS, hi fact,'.1100yerpersonal refu
'al'?to'.support the ne,w,:-policy r
;stilted in the collapse of the White Ilou
plan- ? : ? .-? ? ? -
r Release 2001108/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8
? The . CIA's best-known proprietaries
)C71 ;were Radio'Free Europe and..Radio, Lib-
the , ?erty. The corporate structures .of .these
rev two stationa; served as prototypes. for
ad . other agency. proprietaries.: Each func-
tioned under the Over provided: by a
bit- board of directots maclenp 'Of prominent
the. .Americans. But CIA officers in key man-
lot segment 'positions made all . the _ impor-
. tant decisions: ? ?? ? ? ' : ???', ', ,? ...., l-;. :.
the '-?. Direct CIA ownership of Radio. Free'
ut
? Europe, 'Radio' Liberty andAnterarruco.
(a private arms-sales company) is large-
st' ly 'history. Nevertheless, the agency is
of ' still very much involved in the proprie-
u 5. Lary business, especially to support its
paramilitary operations.
rly, ; " ncter ible as It may seem, the C
by, is the owner: of one of the' bigge
fleets of ? "commercial" airplanes in, t
at, world. Agency proPrietaries irieltide?.A
ng? America, Air Asia, Civil Air Trinspo
he: 'Intermountain Aviation, Southern A
x..? Transport and several other air chart
as companies? around the world.
he: . . Air America was r:et up in the In
it. 19503 b necemmoclate.the agency's re
? illynerowinge number - of operations
e-n . Southeast % Asia. ? By i 971, . the ? Agen
se for Itn:ernational Development -: (AID
Dominican Republic?where the agency
had been called on'hy the, White IfouSe
to take action against existing politica/
trends.' ? ?- ? ?
.d.a.m. . Up ?With ?
? t
?
It proved to be itersuasive?netrategy.
as the director peraonallyn approved
Doole's request, and Southern re:en-zed
its several million dollars for jets;
? So if the U.S. decidei interrene
covertly in the internal affairs of a Latin
American. coontry, Nolen planci will
be 'available to support the operation.
These CIA airlines eland ready to
'drop.' their leeeitintate charter basinesn.
IA quietly and assume the role . they were
St established for: the transport of .arms;
he . and mercenaries for the agency's- special.
tr.- operations. . ? ,
The guns will come from the CIA's
ir own stockpiles and from the warehouses.
Cr of Interarmco and other arms. dealers..
The -mercenaries will, be furnished by
te the agency's Special Operations Division,
P- and, like the air -proprietaries, their eon-,
in ncetion with .the agency will be "p1aus--
ey ibly deniable" to the. American public
) and the world,' . ? ? -
it i ? A few Years ri.go, .the CIA vias de-
.. . .
Student Subsidization ' .-?
?
?
? ?
:-Another domestic area .in which t
:CIA has 'been. involved. came . to lig
Yin 196T after Ramparts .0,itga t ne revea
..ed?the- Clksulesidizationeof the.Nation
'Student Asiociatioii.::?'.'?:J.4::':-?;;;;::-;`,-: ? :2
Clandestine. Servieei at times h
used ? umversities to provide cover and
even assist in a covert Operation over-
seas. From 1955 to 4959, for ineeeneen
the CIA paid $25 million to Michigan'
State 'University to run A covert pelice-n
training program in South Vietnam..
The ? linkage: betWeen the CIA and:
research? institutions on cninptr; :and ia
th&peivete eeetee .)enatne 's:tancinee't
? ???
Lice,- just .as it 'did for the. Pe' ntagon.
But whereas the 'Pentagon's procedures
could to. some 'extent 'be monitored by
the Congress and 'the public, CIA
set up und subsidized its own !Think
tanks" under a complete veil of s?erecy.
? The compika-s of a 1967 study on
A. ties to-, the ucadenrie commenit
found that the Clandestine Services ha
their own research' links with ,universi
ties for the purposes of developing Let
ter espionage tools.. Butthe uniyereitie
also represented fertile terrt:ory for en-
rolling foreign students,. especially those
front emerging countries, many of whom
Were (and are) destined to hold high po-
.sitions itt their homelands. . .
Enlist ? Professors . .
. .
To evaluate these student, the Clan.:
*destine ? Servicei Maintained a contrae-
Anal relationship with key professors on
numerous campuses. When a professor
had picked out a likely candidate, h
notified his contact .at the CIA and
On oecasionn participated in. the .actua
recruitment attempt. -
When a.CIA study :An ?.the .agency's
ties with American universities wee pre
Sented to the: then. director,: Richert
Heinle, only one cop- - was made, becaus
o, its sensitivity. Helms reviewed it an
agreed with its conclusion: that all Cl.
campus activities were valuable to th
agency and should be centinued. In th
end, there was a selective pruning o
these programs-but essentially the. CIA'
activities with and ? at the universities
continued as they had before the NSA
scandal broke. ? , ? '??? ?
They do so today. ? ? :
"Proprietary corporations,", or, more
simply, "proprietaries, are ? ? ostensibly
private Institutions and businesses Which
are in fact; financed and, controlled by
The CIA. ?? ? ? ?,' : ;
..',..From behind ' th'eir commercial 'and
sotnetinies non-profit covers, the agency
is nWe to carry out a multitude of clan-
destine' nctivilies?usually covert.
aIo!e had pai, Air Atne'rtca more the ?
..::?:;' tnillion for charter services-In 1st:
i -;_kir America:. was - able to.- generate'
, . .
he:much businesi:,ig Southeast :Apia-11
eventually other American airlines -.to
ht ?
note of the profits to be made. ? e n -?
1.-: .
at . ?? ' One private.: company, Continen
?- Airlines, made a successful move in
mid-1960s to take Some of the Marl
as away front Air America. Pierre Senn' ?
. who became an officer of Continen
after his years ? as. President Kenned
' press secretary, led Continental's fig
to gain its share of the lucrative' Sout
east Asian business.- :
? Rather than - face the possibility
unwanted publicity, the CIA permitt
Continental to move into Laos, whet
since the late 1960s, it has flown chart
flights worth millions of :dollars nun
allY. And Continental's best custom
. is the CIA itself.
t, 1 scribed as the most secretive and tightly
So knit organization (with the possible ex-
mat ception of the Mafia) 'in American so-
ok .ciety. In its golden era, during the height:
of the. Cold War, the agency did pos-!
tel sess a rare elan; it had _a staff- of imag=,
the ?inative and daring officers at all levels.
cet and all. directorates. ? ;
But over . the years the . CIA. has,
tot!: grown old and fat: and bureaucratic. The
true: purpose of , secrecy?to keep the
ht
It- opposition.in the dark about agency poli-
.eica and. operations?has been lost sight.
Today_ the. CIA' often' practices see-
of ,reey for secreey's?sake-.-and to prevent
ed ;the American 'public ;from learning of
?e, its activities.* .1 ?
er ? ? .
Purpose!Dzsforted'
? -
The
er- true purpose of intelligence col-.
? ? ?
.lection-i--to monitor efficiently.the threat-'
ening moves of international adversaries:
Although the boards of directors o
the air proprietaries arc studded wit
the names of eminently respectable hue
ness leaders and financiers, several o
the companies' operations .were actuall
d_ long in thehands of one ratheresimen
"lar Man, George- Doole Jr. Doole.'s, offi
cial titles, until: his retirement 1971
? were president., of, the Pacific. COrpo ea
tion and c executive Officer:ea...Ai
America and.Air Asia. ? .; -
enif n.te
?-?7-has been distorted by the need to nour-
ish a collective clandestine ego.: .
Secrets, is. an -absolute, way of life
Y.: at .the:ageney, and while. outsiders might.
consider ?.some - of the resulting practices:
.comical.? in the .extreme, the subject is ?
treated-...With great :seriousness in.-the .
r l?i?- ? *.;-- 7Trajnin :7
officersleeture new person-
nel' for hours on endabout "security
? ,consciousness," ? augmenting these 'ses-
3 eions ;with refreshen courses, warning
posters and semi-annual .reviews of se- .
? curity rules. ?
As a matter of course, outsiders
should be told absolutely nothing about
the CIA: and fellow eniployes should be
? given ? only -that information for, which
r they .have. an 'actual "need to know."
CIA Personnel become so necu:.ztotned
Mon of .Talent
Doole was knoWn, to his ...Colleague
in the agency: as a superb. businessmaU
He had d talent for ?expandingliii 'Air
lines and for ;.Making: them intonProfit
making concerns': In fact, his.proprietar
ies proveel Soniething of 'an, embarrass
went to the agency_ becaneen ts,f; 'thei
? 'profitability. - ? ?
. .; ;
In 1908, the_CIA's,Executive,Commit-
e--. lee for ;Air ,iinet; ;ter,deat with.nsAequest
from. Doole fon- several ?million::dollarS
to. "modernize" Southern Air Transport,
Doole's justitic'ation for the money ? was
e that every major airline- iii 'the world
was using jets, and that Southern needed.
to follow suit if it were to continue
? toe"live its Cover."
o ? At the meeting; Doole Wae-eiked ? if.
he thought .expanding Southern's. cape-
s Hates for future- interventions in: Latin
Ameriee, conformed iyith e?..isqpg..- esti,
-iaates. .????'? ? .c ? ? ? ?;,??
?'' Doole. ieniained Silent but
tine. Services ' officer working': in "nera-
military affair's ?replicd that the estimate
might well have been'a correetnippraiel
of. the Latin. Ametscan situation,: !).
that nen-intervention- not'- tieeeit-
; ;sadly become :Official An-it:rind Policr,
The Clandestine Services man poS4ied
nut that over the years there had been
other developMents in T.,ritin
itt countries midi as Guatemala and the
? n
to the: rigorous Security precautions
(sorno of which are indeed justified)
that they easily accept them all. Nothing
could. be more natural than to work
. -with a telephone boo', marked SECRET,
.an intentionally incomplete book which
)jStflno ono in the Clandestine Services
and 'which, in each semi-an:really reeiseel
- of the people emploYed by the overt .di-
editic,n, leaves out the rrcinIcs or mein-
rnetorates. ? .?..? ? ? ?
?\ Thus, if the book ever falls into nneu-
thorized hands, ho. one will be able to -
figure out how many people work at
CIA headquarters. Those temporarily
omitted can look forward to haying their
names appear in the next edition, at
nwhich time others are selected. for. tele.-
phonic lim- :Along with bo ? n. ?? 7.
the .phone books, all other
. . .
classified material (including typewriter
ribbons and Scrap paper) is placed in
safes whenever an office is 'unoccupied.
Security guards petrel every part of'
A
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the agency at roughly half-hour inter-,
vela in . the evenings and on, Weekends.;
Even a charwoman at CIA Must gain'
security. clearance to qualify for the
badge she must wear at all times; then
she Must be 'accompanied by an armed
guard -.While She 'cleans offices (where
alt classified 'material has already been
'locked up).- Some rooms . at the agency
are 'Considered So secret that- the char-
woman and eller .:guard must also be
watched by someone who works in the
office.? ? ; ? . -
? The .penchant for secrecy Sometimes
takes on an .air of. ludicrousness. Secret
medals are.awarded fonoutstanding per-
?formance,ebut. they' cannot be worn or
shoWri 'outside' the, sig,ency. Even athletic
-trophiei?for intramural sports?cannot
be displayed except within the guarded
sanctuary of the headquarters building.
? Questions' of ? SOW ? class and snob-
bery have ..alwaYS .been. very important
in the , ?
The ageneY1MS long been known for'
its concentration. of Eastern Establish
meat, Ivy League types.There have been
exceptions, to be 'sure, but most of the
CIA's top leaders . have been white,
Anglo-Saxon,- Protestant and graduates
of the "right". Eastern schools. While
changing times and ideas have difiatesed
the.: influende of . the Eastern elite
. throughout the 'government as. a whole, ?
. the CIA remains perhaps the last bastion
:in Official Washington of WASP: power,:
cni at least the .slowest to adopt the prin-:
ciple of equal.opportunity. . .?
The Home Is'Chonged -
. The num who masterminded and
oversaw the CIA's clandestine operations
?
in Indochina .durine much of the 1960a
was William-Colby, the current CIA di-
rector. He . is. a ' trime,,wellesreemed
.Princeton and Celeinbia Law Sehool
,graduate. Etarting during .1.7orld War
II with the Office of Strategic Services,.
he showed a remarkable talent for clane:
destine work, and in 1962 he was named
head. of the Par East Division of the -
Clandestine Services. ??
In 1965, Colby oversaw the founding.
in Vietnam of the agency's" Counter Ter-:
ror (CT)-program. In 1966, the agency::
became wary of adverse publicity. sure
?rounding -the 'use of the word "terror?
iand changed the name of the CT teams,
to the Provincial Reconnaissance Units
THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
1 July 1974
ii!Ze-
-.?: Wayne . Cooper, ? a former ? foreign
service officer who 'spent almost 18
months as an advisor to South Vietna-
mese internal security operations, de-
seribed? the 'operation ? ?"a' unilateral:
'American program, never recognized- by
. the South Vietnamese. government. CIA
,representatiyes recruited,'., organized,
-supplied : and directly paid CT ?teams,
whose function . was to. use ? Viet Cong
technique of terror ? assassination,
,abuses, kidnapings and intimidation_
against the Viet Cong.leadership."
Admits Some Abuses
1967; Colby's office devised 'a Pro-
gram, Called Phoenix, to coordinate an
? attack against the Viet Cong infrastruc-
ture., CIA., money was .the ?catalyst. Ac- ?
cording to Colby's own testimony, 20,587.
suspected Viet Cong were killed under
Phoenix in its first two-and-a-half years.
? Even'. Colby ? admitted that serious
abuses were Corimiitted -under Phoenix:
:Former. intelligence off icera before. .
Con-
gressional- committees have' described re-
. .
Peated examples of torture: and. Other
?repugnarit. practices used by Phoenix op-
eratives. ? . -s ? ?
. Deeply embedded within the clandes-
tine mentality is the belief that human
ethics and social laws have no bearing
on Covert operations. The intelligence
profession, because of its lofty "national
security" goals, is free from all moral
restrictions. There i no need to wrestle
.With technical legalisms or judgments
as to whether something is right. or
:wrong. The determining faders' in secret
'.operations are purely pragmatic: Does
the job need to be done? Can it be
done? And can secrecy (or plausible
denial) be maintained? -
Thus a William Colby can devise and
direct 'terror tactics, secret wets and
the like, .all in the name of democracy.
This is the clandestine mentality; a
separation, of personal morality and-con-
duct from netione, leattee how de-
tv.ken nerre
the government' and, morn-Specifically,
the Central Intelligence Agency.
- Although Harry Truman wrote In
190 that ."I never had any thought when
I set up the CIA that it would be injected
into peacetime cloak-and-deg-eel. operas
From simoN WINCHESTER, Washington, June 30
find their way into print. Even-
tually the agency agreed : they
A remarkable book published
here -this week is being billed
as "The first book the US
Government ever went to court.
to censor before publication."
Called 4The CIA and the
Cult of Intelligence," it is the
work of Victor Marchetti and
John Marks, respectively
'former CIA official and State
:Department intelligence expert,
who joined forces three years
ago to expose what they
?believed to he the shortcomings
of the CIA and the growing
" theology of intelligence."
The CIA took them to court,
. saying that, no material gained
while the pair were civil ser-
vents could he published, So
Ntarchetti and Marks wrote the
manuscript under a .court order
to hand it over to CIA censors
, when it was finished. This they
edid, and the CIA cut no fewer
than 339 " offensive " passages.
So the authors went back to
reduced the number of dele-
tions from 339 to 168: .
T Ii e publishers, Alfred
Knopf,- of New York, went
ahead on this basis, and for
$3.93 (about. ?3.75) one can
now buy the resulting book.
The 168 continuing CIA dele-
tions appear as blanks, some of
them two pages long. The 171
which the. Government allowed
after the fight appear in. bold
type : and a future edition will
contain, probably, all but about
30 of the deleted passages in
full, because the judge in Vir-
ginia has recently declared
(though he has permitted the
CIA to appeal) that the public,
at large should be allowed to
read them.
The reader's attention is
naturally drawn to all the pas-
sages in .the book that appeal-
in bold print, some of which
tions,'', he he ? and each President 'after
? him.. willingly employed the agency
'to .carry: out clandestine scspionage And
covert intervention the 'internal af-
fairs of other countries. r. ? ? ?
',. From its beginning, the CIA's actual
functions ;were couched in deceptiOn and
secrecy. - s ? ? .
Charter. Revised
es Former . Clandestine Services:: Chief
'Richard Dissell told. the Council on Per--
eign 'Relations in' 1968 that the "CIA's
:fUll 'charter' has been frequently revised,
"!butit has been, and must remain, secret.
?The absence of a public charter leads
, people to search for the charter and
? to question -the ? agency's authority to
. undertake various 'activities. The prob-
lem .of a. secret 'charter' .. remains, as a
, curse; ;but. the needefor secrecy.. would
appear to preclude a sellition." '
One?-eXecutis'e Organization set up to
7cOntrol' the CIA is the 40 Committee.
The committee is supposed. to meet Once
-A week, .but its members have so many
responsibilities in. their ? own departments
that'itsSneetings are frequently Canceled.
..e,Nor? is the .40 Committee: an effec-
tive. Watchdog when it does Meet.
Ac-
'cording to 'one-veteran intelligence offi-
l'elal;',queted -in: the :Washington Post,
!the Committee ? "was like: a. bunch
".of ? schoolboys.. They would listen and
their eyes would bug out."
He continued: "I always used- to say
nthat 'could get '$5 million out:.of the
.40.. Committee , for, a. covert operation
'faster than. I could. get meney ? for a
typewriter, out of the .ordinary bureauc-
racy." : -? ?
. Even as the 40 Committee to
keep. a close Watch on secret reconnais-
: same activities, is. ineffective- in. racini-
toning ethe CIA's covert operationS and
i-is totally in the dark on espionage-opera-
.: tione, -President Nixon and especially
'Henry_ . are *unquestionably
. aware .of its shortcomings and have done
, little to change things.
It is the President and Kissinger who
:ultimately determine how the CIA oper-
ates; and if they do net want to impose
closer contra!, then the form of any
control mechanism is meaningless.
Actankci frcnt Ihn boo+ "ilut CIA r-ke. t!t.r., Cult
.lctyt
0, f,t17s,,r,. Vicl,r
(1. varls.s. ty
s fol
era
can intelligence community.
The CIA staff, we learn for
example, is 16,500 strong. It has
an annual -budget of about $730
millions. The otal intelligence.
costs in the US every year are
a staggering $6,300 millions
(with the National Security
Agency, which listens to all
embassy radio traffic and tapes
all transatlantic telephone and
telex conversations, taking
$1,200 millions). The, cost of
the CIA's direct espionage and
counter-espionage programme
is $440-millions a year.
The way this money is spent,
might occasionally appear- a
little ridiculous. There was
once a plan, a bold face passage
in the book says, to give all
agents operating in hostile ter-
ritories an aeroplane that could.
quite literally be folded up into
a suitcase.
court in Virginia and tried to drawn at random from the .The idea was igaglig,
ersuade the CIA to a11930-01PettfcrevRgieAseii2004./0614:18 :afliget-EtiDlant)0
feast some of the deletion de ai c po reit of the Amen- walk to the nearest - border,
11
11,R,
in
lanes
unpack- his plane, and fly off to
freedom. Little other than ini-
tial funds were spent on this
device, to the taxpayers' relief.
The CIA also spends a lot.of.
money looking after the
security of all US embassy- com-
munications rooms, taking ela-
borate precautions to prevent
the Russians frcem eavesdrop.
ping.
"The rooms themselves are
encased in lead and rest on
huge springs to reduce internal
noises. Resembling large camp-
ing trailers, the coda rooms are
normally located deep in .the
Concrete basements of embassy
buildings."
There are occasional revela-
tions that do not' so *much
embarrass the CIA as they do
other wings of' the American
Government, In 1970 for exam-
ple, a State Department' official
34030.141 an Arab diplomat in
tffetton about current
peace negotiations ? in the
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I Midi/le East.
cabled a report on the conversa-
tion ,to his own Government.'
The CIA-NSA , network inter-
cepted his cable and found to '
their Surprise that the State
?Departinent man .had not told
The Arabs the proper facts, or,
.else the Arab had grossly mis-
.understood them. The dollar
spent on uncovering slip-ups of
diplomacy like that may well be
NEW YORK TIMES
4 July 1974
.worthrirhite-In
FOr?the first time since .its',
creation' in 1947', the agency ,
that has sent shivers down the
necks ? of. Governments as far.
away as Chile and Ireland- has
now lifted its %,itirts a tiny.
amount to reveaa tantalising ?
amount of clandestine- ankle. It
is up to the courts in Washin
fon to decide whether we shall
ever, see tbe whele- body. ?
C.I.A. Agent Said to Give
Secrets to Russian in 1972
Report Drunken American Disclosed to
Soviet Aide What Ile Knew Emerges
as Result of Watergate Inquiry
c? By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The
WASHINGTON, July 3?A
tale of a drunken and despond
ent C.I.A. agent who apparently
'sat down with a Soviet K.G.B
operative somewhere in Latin
America and told him what he
knew has emerged as a result
of a Senate Watergate commit-
tee. inquiry into the activities
of ? the Central Intelligence
Agency. ,, ?
The K.G.B., the Soviet Com-
mittee of State Security, com-
bines internal security and for-
eign intelligence functions:
A 'report issued by the Water-
gate committee yesterday eon-
tains a cryptic mention of .a
"W H? flap" that highly reliable
sources said today resulted
from the conversation and its
ensuing effect on many of the
agency's clandestine operations.
The 'initials "W H" are 'C.I.A.
parlance for the Western Hemi-
sphere.'.
The agent clearly provided
information Of value to the
Russians,. because the C.I.A.'s
deputy director for plans later
told the Watergate committee,
according to its 'report, that
the affair "threatened to com-
promise Western Hemisphere
operations."
The C.I.A. man, believed to
have been stationed somewhere
in Latin America, 'was de-
scribed by sources as "despond-
ent," "disgruntled" with the
agency ,and "in his cups" at
the time of his brief, and per-
haps unprecedented, contact
with the Rusians a little more
than .two years ago.
It could not be learned what
specific information the Ameri-
can imparted, but the sources
said today that the matter was
still considered extremely sen-
sitive.
One of the lesser agency se-
Icrets compromised in the con-
krersation, 'however, .was the
New York Times ,
fact that a Washington public
- relations' concern, Robert R.
,
iMullen .& Co., had for years
? ibeen providing "cover" -for
'C.I.A. agents stationed abroad.
According to the Senate re-
'port, prepared by the Water-
gate committee's minority staff
and released yesterday, the
Mullen ' concern "has main-
tained a relationship with. the
Central Intelligence Agency
since its incorporation in 1959."
At the time of the Watergate
break-in, on June 17, 1972, one
C.I.A. agent in Singapore and
another in Amsterdam were
said to be representing them-
selves as "overseas employes"
of the Mullen company.
, A number of other American
multinational companies with
intere?st in Western Europe or
the Far East have traditionally
furnished such "covee for
C.I.A. operations, according to
intelligence sources. '- -
At the time of the Watergate
break-in, the Mullen Company
employed E. Howard Hunt Jr.,
a retired C.I.A. operative who
later pleaded guilty to having
conspired to tap telephones at
the Democratic party's national
headquarters here.
Although the company's
president, Robert F. Bennett,
has said that the Mullen com-
pany was not serving as . a
cover organization for Mr.
Hunt, the committee report,
says that-"Hunt's covert securi-
ty clearance was extended by
the C.I.A." when he left the
agency to join the company in
1970. -
Mr. Bennett, the son of Sc
ator Wallace F. Bennett, Re-
publican of Utah, has headed
the Mullen organization since
1971. The company handled
publicity for President Nixon's
1968 campaign and reportedly
helped -to set up and administer
Republican campaign finance
committees that received $232,-
500 from dairy industry repre-
sentatives in 1971 and $100,000
from Howard R. Hughes in
/972.
?
A July 10, 1972, memo from
12
Martin Lukasky, Mr. Bennett's
"case officer" at the C.I.A.,
re-
'fers to the "W H flap," accord-
ing to the committee rport, and
"States that if the Mullen
[company] cover is terminated,
the Watergate could not be
used as an excuse." ?
The agency's reluctance to
tell Mr. Bennett outright that
the company's cover had been
brached, according to one
source, stemmed from its desire
to conceal . from .the Russians
its knowledge of the clandes-
tine contact between the Rus-
sian agent and the C.I.A. man,
who has since retired from the
agency. '
This source said that he had
been told that the C.I.A. had
learned of the Matter from an-
other individual within the
"Soviet apparatus," who appar-
ently been privy to the K.G.B.
man's account of-the affair and
whom the C.I.A. wished to pro-
tect.
Another source, however,
said that that was "absolutely
not" the manner in which the
information about the talkative
American agent had reached
.C.I.A.- headquarters in Langley,
I A spokesman for the C.I.A.
said that -the "W H flap" was
still a highly sensitive matter.
He declined to comment fur-
ther, except to say that addi-
tional information had been
provided to the Watergate panel
and other Congressional com-
mittees: ? ?
The Watergate committee's
minority staff received a num-
ber of classified documents
from the C.I.A. in connection
with its inquiry, including :the
July 10 memo from Mr. Lukasky
land a follow-up report from
him two weeks 'later.
Although the first memo sug-
gested, according to the corn-,
mittee report, that "the agency
might have to level with [Mr.
Bennett] about the 'W H Flap,'"
the C.I.A. apparently decided on
a course of deception instead.j
The second Lukasky memo,
the report said, "shows that
the C.I.A. -convinced Robert
Mullen of the need to withdraw
its Far East [Singapore] cover
through an 'agree.d upon scena-
rio' which included a falsified
Watergate publicity crisis."
? The report also said that,
while the C.I.A. had explained
the."W H flap" in general terms
to Senate investigators, it had
not given "sufficient reason to
withhold such information from
Mullen nor explained the sig-
nificance of some to Watergate
developments."
The connection to Water-
gate, according to a well-placed
source, was more imagined than
real. Mr. Bennett was report-
edly told that an individual in
Singapore, an island city at the
tip of the Malaysian peninsula,
had previously accused the
Mullen representative there of
being associated with the
C.I.A. The agent denied his af-
filiation, the source said.
? Some time between June 17
an July 24, 1972, Mr. Bennett
was allegedly told, this same
Individual had approached the
I.A. man bearing a copy of
le International Herald Tri-
which is published in
Paris, that contained an article
on Mr. Hunt's erstwhile em-
ployment at the Mullen head-
quarters in Washington.
The accuser cited the article
as proof that the Singapore
agent's connection with Mullen
indicated his affiliation with
the C.I.A., Mr. Bennett was al-
legedly told, and the cover
would therefore have to be dis
carded, which it was. ?
But, the source said,' it was
subsequently established that
the entire incident in Singa-
pore never took place,
WASHINGTON POST
7 July 1974
?
Ex-Agent
Identified
In 'Flap'
- By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer
A veteran Central Intelli-
gence Agency covert agent,
who resigned in 1969 in
protest to U.S. policies in
Latin America, figured
centrally in the closing of a
Mexico City CIA "cover"
operation run by the Wash-
ington-based public r e I a-
tions firm, Robert R. Mul-
len & Co.
The ex-agent, Philip B. F.
Agee, was the unidentified
subject of a cryptic reference
to a "WH flap" in the recently
released Watergate report of
Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.).
Agee served in the Western
Hemisphere (WH) Division of
the CIA's clandestine services
in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexi-
co from 1960 to 1969, when he
resigned from the agency, ac-
cording to informed nongov-
ernmental sources.
Since leaving the CIA, it
was further learned, Agee,
who now is living abroad,
made several trips to Cuba
where, according to one ac-
quaintance, he was enga..eed
in research." An earlier ptb-
lished report that a former
CIA official?now known to
have been an allusion to Agee
?had passed information on
to Soviet intelligence officials
was termed?"nonsense" yester-
day by informed sources.
The CIA terminated the pre-
viously undisclosed Mullen
company cover operation in
Mexico City after becoming
fearful that Agee might pub-
licly disclose its secret intelli-
gence role. The Washington-
Post previously reported that
Mullen operated cover offices'
for CIA operatives in Singa-
pore and Amsterdam which
, have since been closed. A
ihnirth Mullen company cover
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Operation Was con-ducted
Stockholm, according to in-;.
formed sources, but was tranS-:
ferred to Amsterdam.
Baker for months has beer;
pursuing the possibility of a:
CIA involvement in the.
Watergate scandal. President,
Nixon, too, justified the inter-
vention of top White House-
aides in the July, 1972, FBI in-
vestigation of Nixon re-elec-
tion funds being "laundered".
through Mexico City banks on
grounds that an FBI probe
might expose covert CIA ac-.:
tivities.
? CIA Director William E.:
Colby, in a written response to
Baker's report last week, said
that "the 'Western Hemisphere
flap' . . . had no relationship
to Watergate."
This was presumably a re-
sponse to the observation in
'the Baker report that the CIA
had failed to explain the
"significance" of the flap "to
Watergate developments."
The CIA acknowledged to
Baker's investigators that the
"Western Hemisphere Flap"
threatened to "compromise
Western Hemisphere (CIA) op-
erations." And without specifi-
cally alluding to the Agee-Mul-
len episode. the CIA further
told Baker that its efforts to
"terminate projects and move
_ assets [cover operations] sub-
4,ject to compromise . . . were
closely held even within the
agency in order to protect
these efforts." ,
The first reference to a
"WIT flap" was made in a
July 10, 1972, memorandum
by CIA official Martin J.
Lukasky, summarizing the
agency's relationship with the
Mullen public relations firm.
It was cited in the Baker re-
?port as one of the aspects of
the case that required further
investigation. Lukasky was the
De CIA "case officer? for
Robert r. Bennett, president
of Mullen, and son of Sen.1
Wallace Bennett (R-Utah).
CIA officials refused to ?
,comment yesterday on any as-
pect, of the Agee resignation
or the circumstances of the
closing of the Mullen office in
Mexico City.
Nor would any government
spokesman comment on
whether the episode was the
'basis for President Nixon's.
publicly, stated concern early
in the Watergate case over ex-
posure of covert CIA opera-
tions in Mexico.
Within six days of the
Watergate break-in on June
,17, 1972, the President di-
rected his two 'chief aides
then, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman
and John D. Ehrlichman, to
"ensure that the investigation
of the (Watergate) break-in
not expose either an unrelated
,covert operation of the CIA or
the activities of the White
House investigations unit ...,"
,as Mr. Nixon recalled it on
May 22, 1973.
? ApprOV
Then CIA Director Richire
M. Helms and his deputy, Gen.
Vernon Walters, repeatedly as-
serted to White House offi-
cials and to then acting FBI
Director L. Patrick Gray III
that the FBI investigation of
Watergate money laundered
through Mexico would not ex-
pose covert CIA activities.
Colby's comments last week
reaffirmed the Helms position
of last year. But Baker per-
sisted last week in keeping the
question open and said that
the agency's explanation of
the Mullen-CIA incident "is
clouded by conflicting evi-
dence." '
Agee, the disaffected ex-CIA
agent who has not previously
been identified publicly in the
complex Mexican connection
scenario, is understood to be a
continuing source of concern
to government officials be-
cause of his extensive knowl-
edge of CIA activities in Latin
America.
It was understood that when
Agee resigned in 1969 his CIA
superiors had no idea of the
extent of his disaffection with
his own mission or the general
pattern of covert U.S. activi-
ties in the countries where he
worked. ?
An . acquaintance in the
United States with whom
Agee has been correspondieg
said the former CIA officer
acknowledged that he had
functioned as an undercover
agent in the American Insti-
tute for Free Labor Develop-
ment, an affiliate of ,the AFL-
CIO. The institute, v;ihich was
headed by veteran AFL-CIO
organizer Jay Lovestone, has
conducted extensive programs
with Latin-American labor or-
ganizations.
Agee wrote his American
correspondent recently that
he now regards the CIA as a
"police force" which in his
view assists in imposing U.S.
"economic exploitation" -on
Latin American countries.
I "He's obviously become
quite radicalized," said Agee's
correspondent, who has also
been associated with intelli-
gence activities. "But this guy
was an operative for 14 years
and he knows names and
places. There are people in
Washington who are scared s?
of this guy."
Agee is understood to have
entered into negotiations with a
foreign publisher for a manu-
script, which totals some 250,000
words. ?
He was described by his
American acquaintance as a
graduate of Notre Dame ? "a
good Catholic boy who was fi-
nally fed up to the teeth with
hypocrisy and deception. Like
some Catholic priests who
have gone down there he be-
came freaked out with poverty
and repression an what our
government was doing."
eqi F?taTeRe I setae g2801148/63-:
dren are in the United States.
The couple is separated.
CIA witnesses named Agee
in secret testimony to four
congressional subcommittees
looking into the agency's rela-
tionship with the Watergate
case. These include the Senate
and House intelligence over-
sight subcommittees as well
as the Senate Watergate com-
mittee.
It was understood that Bak-
er was the only investigating
senator who concluded that
Agee's resignation from the
agency and the feared expos-
ure of the Mullen 'cover in
Mexico City was of possible
? significance in linking the
agency to the Watergate scan-
dal. ?
Bennett and the Mullen com-
pany have figured in a series
of relationships not only with
the CIA but also the Nixon re-
election campaign.
During 1971 Bennett ,drew up
the names of dummy commit-
,tees set up tO funnel secretly
more than $300,000 in contri-
butions from the milk pro-
ducers into the Nixon re-elec-
tion campaign. The Mullen
company was also identified as
the source of blank checks trans-
mitted from Howard Hughes'
interests to the Committee for
the Reelection. of the President
during the 1972 campaign.
Bennett ' according to the
Baker report, also served, as a
"point of contact" between con-
victed Watergate conspirator
and ex-CIA operative E. Howard
Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy,
Hunt's co-conspirator, during
the two weeks after the Water-
gate break-in.
, Hunt, too, went to work for
the Mullen firm after retiring
from the CIA in 1970 and con-
tinued to work for the public
relations firm for a period of
'time while working as a con-
sultant-to the White House in
the special investigative unit
that became known as "the
plumbers."
A CIA official, Frank 0'.
Malley, recommended Hunt for
employment with Mullen, ac-
cording to officials of the firm.
It was understood that one of
O'Malley's responsibilities at
the agency was finding retire-
ment employment for CIA em-
iployees.
The CIA has regular "cover-
age" arrangements with private
companies f o r operatives
abroad, according to knowledge-
able oficials. It was recently
, acknowledged that some 200
operatives abroad function
under such private', corporate
'covers. Mullen & Co. was one
such corporate host.,
LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 July 1974
Officials See-
CIA_Pait: in -Scandal
.WASHINGTO.;:.( UPI)
:Two -members-0, Congress
-who-participated Tin, hear-:
eingseintO-:-LeosSible crx -in-.
;Tthe:,?--Water.-:.1!
kate-.,bariglary -Or.;'*COverup:.:
::_.'sahle--..5tindaye they had-'?7!
-found no7?eYidence that the
agencY's-Abia
.. nothing.
that ?hinie.-is NViong from
the,._.standpoint.i of -what
. 'they ..hive-,been doing"
? Sen. Stuart Symington
-Mo.) ? s'aid-ipf-i-the Central
Intelligence Agency direc.- ?
tors.at.the.thne of the bur-. .
--glary-and ?
Nedzi
(D-Mich), chairman of a
:House armed.services sub-
'committee ?it:intelligence,
; said: I. dortT believe- that
you're going.-to .see any-
thing substantive with re-
"spect 'to CIA involvement
in'the Watergate affair."
Both men were ques-
tioned: in.':.braadcast. inter-..
.
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NEW YORK TIMES
6 July 1974
EiAployp--6fC 2rers .A'
By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG
, Special to The Nipr York Times
SINGAPORE, July iS?A man
who gave his name as Arthur
H. Hochberg left Singapore
hurriedly about two years ago,
and has not been heard from
since. He left in such a rush
that he did not even tell his
office landlord that he was pull-
ing out and closing down his
small office.
His two local employes were
puzzled; as was the landlord,
but they were not angry, for,
he had been a congenial em-
ployer who had paid his rent
several months in advance. The
landlord did have one small
complaint, however?Mr. Hoch-
berg had put a special lock-on
this private,inner office and the
landlord had to bring in lock-
smiths to open it after, Mr.
Hochberg vanished.
All of this would not be very
unusual in Singapore, which is,
after all, an international com-
mercial center where foreign
businessmen come and go in
large numbers, except that a
couple of days ago, a report by
the minority staff of the Senate
Watergate committee revealed
that the company Mr. Hochberg
worked for has for many years
been providing "cover". for
Central Intelligence Agency
loperatives stationed abroad.
public relations concern. The
Mullen & Co., a Washington
The company is Robert R.
NEW YORK TIMES
Senate committee came up with
the information about Mullen
as a by-product of its inquiry
into the role played by the
C.I.A. in the Watergate scandal.
An article in The New York
Times about the Senate report
was reprinted in this morning's
Straits Times, Singapore's-main
English-language daily.
The apparent reason for Mr.
Hochberg's sudden departure
from Singapore, according to
the tenon, was . that a short
time earlier, a C.I.A. agent in
Latin America, while drunk And
despondent, had given away
several agency secrets to a Rus-
sian intelligence agent, includ-
ing the C.I.A. function of the
Mullen Company.
Murky.Conneetion
The Senate report said that
the president of the Mullen
Company, Robert F. Bennett,
son of Senator Wallace F. Ben-
nett, Republican of Utah, had
not been told that The secret
was out and that this was the
real reason for having to close
down the Singapore operation,
but was instead given a cooked-
up "scenario which inclutled a
falsified Watergate publicity
crisis." ?
The connection ? between the
Singapore episode and Water-
gate is extremely murky. The
only possibly connective facts
that are publicly known are
that E. Howard Hunt Jr., a
former C.I.A. agent who plead-
ed guilty and was convicted
for his role in the Watergate
break-in, was employed by the
Mullen Company at the time
of the break-in on June 17,
1972, while- at the same time
retaining his C.I.A. "covert se-
curity clearance." ?-
Also, the Senate report said
that at the time of the break-in,
a CI A. agent in Singapore and
another in Amsterdam were
said to be representing them-
eslves as 'overseas employes"
of the Mullen Company.
Mr. Hochberg was the only
known Mullen representative in
Singapore at the time.
A very limited picture? of
his activities here emerged to-
day from conversationsorith his
office landlord and one of his
former employes.
'A Very Fair Employer' .
The employe, a secretary, de-
scribed Mr. Hochberg as an
American in his mid-30's who
wore horn-rimmed ,glasses and
had tight, curly hair. She said
he was "a very fair employer"
and a "cheerful" man. She pre-
sumed him to be a bachelor
because he had no family with
him in Singapore. She also had
the impression that he did not
lead an active social life here
and kept fairly much to him-
self.
She said Mr. Hochberg re-
signed from the company when
11 July 1974
Ex-C.I.A.Age7rii 'Denies He Gave
Information . to the Russians
? Special to The New York Times
LONDON, July 10?Philip give .a detailed picture of the
B. F. Agee, a former employe
of the Central Intelligence
:Agency who has written a
book about the agency's opera-
tion in Latin America, denied
today that he had ever disclosed
information about the agency
to the K.G.B., the Soviet intel-
ligence agency.
Last week, reliable sources in
Washington were reported in
an article in The New York
Times as having :said that the
C.I.A. had been obliged ,to re-
organize its. Western Hemis-
phere operations because one
of its agents, when drunk, had
revealed aspects of the organi-
zation, to a K.G.B. agent.
These sources did not name
Mr. Agee, who resigned from
the agency in 1969, subsequent-
ly spent time in Mexico, France'
and Cuba, and now is living in
Britain. It was later reported,
however, that the intelligence
agency's reorganization was a
result of its concern that Mr.
Agee would reveal information
about the agency's work in
Latin America., .
Mr. Agee said today that his
book, which is to be published
nett year by Penguin Book
Publishers of London, would
C.I.A.'s work in Ecuador, Uru-
guay and Mexico during the
years he was stationed in those
countries.
"It is only a small window
on the C.I.A. as a whole," he
said. "But I think that it can
be taken as giving a clear idea;
of how the agency operates."
"I did not at any time give
information about the C.I.A. to
members of the k.B.G.," he
said. "That is a complete fabri-
cation and I can only think it
is part of an effort to discredit
the book in advance. What I
have to say about the C.I.A.,
I am saying in my book." -
Mr. Agee also denied a re-
port in a New York Times dis-
patch that the book contained
allegations that C.I.A. agents
had upon occasion assassinated
;temporary employes of the
agency in Latin America. He
said that although in training
courses he had taken after join-
ing the agency such action was
not excluded, he knew of no
instances in which assassina-
tion had been resorted to.
No Comment by C.I.A. '
Special to The New York Times '
WASHINGTON, July 10?The
Central Intelligence Agency 40
comment today on the de-
nial by Mr. Agee that he had
compromised the ? agency's
Latin-American operations:
_ Official sources had said
earlier that they could not
deny, that the, former agent had
met; with the Soviet intelligence
service. ,
Subsequently, official sources
said that although Mr.' Agee
had traveled to Cuba on three
occasions after resigning from
the C.I.A., there was no indi-
cation that he had spoken with
Soviet agents there or any-
where else.
The New York Thies dis-
patch last week said that a tale
of a "drunken and despondent"
C.I.A. agent who had sat down
with a Soviet intelligence oper-
ative "somewhere in Latin
America" had emerged as a re-
sult of a Senate Watergate C
mittee inquiry into the activi-
ties of the intelligence agency.
"Information of value; to the
Russians" clearly was provided,
the dispatch said, because the
Watergate Committee's report
quoted a high C.I.A. official as
having said that the affair
"threatened to compromise
Western Hemisphere opera-
tions." ?
An informed source, speak-
ing of Mr. Agee today, said
that the matter of "what con-
tacts he had, with whom he
had them, what he may have
passed and what damage has
been don is still a very serious
counterintelligence problem." '
he left and was' not m
being transferred to ano
IMullen job.
She had not read the s
about the C.I.A. and the M
company in 'this morni
newspaper, .but when
about it and asked if she
ever noticed anything ou
the ordinary during the year
she worked far Mr. Hoch
she answered in the nega
She described her work as
tine business corresponde
about public relations matt
She recalled letters 'to s
banking houses and to a
container company.
A Modern Office
She said Mr. Hochberg
"his own small typewriter'
his private office. The o
was in Suite 306 of the Ca
Building, which also house
movie theater. It is a mod
office, with wall-to-wall ca
ing and Scandinavian-style
fice furniture. A Swedish s
ping company now has
spate once occupied by Mul
The former employe said t
Mr. Hochberg opened the of
and hired her in the summe
1971 and left Singapore a .1.
later in August, 1972. Be
taking, the office, she s
Mr. Hochberg had appar
worked alone out of his ho
the address of which she co
not remember.
She expressed puzzlem
not only over the haste of
Hochberg's departure but
over the circumstances of
event ?she said the Mul
Company wanted the office
remain open, but that Mr. Ho
berg's resignation forced
shut-down.
Closing Was Forced
"His decision to res
caused the company to clos
she said. "It was not the c
pany asking him to lea
Which we found odd, beca
the company did ,not want
close' but it had to because
resigned."
A spokesman for the Uni
States Embassy here, 'asked
comment, said: "We never h
any comment on alleged C.I
activities."
The landlord of the Cath
Building, who earlier in the d
had talked freely about
Hochberg's advance rent p
ments and about the sub
quent trouble with his off
locks, and who had invited
newsman to phone him la
for mpre information?beca
silent when the newsm
called back.
It could not be detertnin
if ? Singapore or 'American a
thOrities had spoken to him.
-
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NEW YORK TIMES
9 July 1974
Ex-Agent Said to Assert
C.I.A. Killed Some Aides
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to 'The New York Times
and elsewhere, including an of-
o5ce in Mexico City, and the
Watergate investigations.
' President Nixon has publicly-,
WASHINGTON, July 8 ? A:
former undercover agent for
the Central Intelligence Agency
in Latin America has written
what his associates describe as
a major expose of the agency's
Latin-American activities in the
1960's, including an assertion
that the agency participated in
the murder of some of its em-
ployes.
The new book, sources said,
was recently completed in Lon-
don by the former agent, Philip
B. F. Agee, who served from
1956 until 1969 with the C.I.A.
in, among other places, Ecua-
dor, Mexico and Uruguay.
The as yet unnamed book by
Mr. Agee is expected to be pub-
lished by Penguin Book Publish-
ers of London this fall. Mr.
Agee, now seeking an American
publisher for the. 220,000-word
manuscript, has retained Mel-
vin L. Wulf, legal director of
the American Civil Liberties
Union, in anticipation of pro-
tests by the C.I.A.
Mr. Wulf, who represented
Victor M'archetti, former
C.I.A., official, in his recent dish
,pute , with the agency, con-
firmed in a telephone interview
that the A.C.L.U., "if' needed,
will certainly come to Mr.
Agee's defense." '
? ? Mr. Agee's decision to pub-
lish his book, said to be in
diary form, and the fact that
he made' three trips to Cuba
since 1971 have been of in-
tense concern to the C.I.A. That
concern, in turn, sources said,
was the cryptic "WH flap"
mentioned in the Watergate-
C.I.A. report released last week
by Senaor Howard H. Baker Jr.,
Rep,..blican of Tennessee.
Mr. Baker, vice chairman of
the Senate Watergate commit-
tee, has been known to be deep-
ly suspicious of the agency's
possible advance knowledge of
both the 1971 "plumbers" bur-
glary of the office of Dr. Daniel
Ellsberg's former psychiatrist
and the 1972 Watergate break-
in at the offices of the Demo-
cratic National Committee.
Both operations involved E.
Howard Hunt Jr., a former
C.I.A. official who joined a
,Washington-based public rela-
tions firm, Robert R. Mullen &
Company, after his retirement
in 1971.
Mr. Baker's report officially
disclosed that overseas offices
of the Mullen Company had
.been serving as "cover" offices
for C.I.A. employes. The report
also noted that a Mullen office
in the Far East had been shut
down by the C.I.A. in fear that
Mr. Agee might have compro-
mised that and other "cover"
operations during his Cuba
-visits.
Agency officials have denied
said he asked his top White
House aides, John D. Ehrlich-
man and H. R. Haldeman, to
intervene in a - Federal Bureau
of Investigation inquiry into,
"money-laundering" operations
in Mexico City after the Water-
gate break-in because of his
concern that the F.B.I. might
inadvetently expose covert
C.I.A. operations in Mexico.
One well-informed legislator,
who said he had received full
briefings on the Agee affair,
emphatically declared .today
that there was no evidence
linking Mr. Nixon's concern
about the F.B.L inquiry in Mex-
ico to Mr. Agee.
? The legislator also said that
he believed the C.I.A. was
overreacting to- the dangers
posed by M. Agee's revela-
tions.
"The whole operation is so
compartmentalized that ? I per-
sonally don't think any single
person can compromise it that
badly," he said, adding: "He
went sour and so ,they've
shuffled things about."
1 An informed source ack-
nowledged today that the C.I.A.
had been unable to learn how
much if anything?Mr. Agee
'told the Cuban Government
during his visits, although there
was an official "presumption"
that he "was very forthcoming
in Havana and Havana was very
forthcorning with Moscow."
Because of Mr. Agee's ack-
nowledged threat to "cover"
offices and methods of 'opera=
tion throughout Latin America,
the official added, sonic opera-
tions were terminated and
others modified. Throughout
part of his clandestine Latin-
American career, Mr. Agee's of-
ficial cover was as an employe
of the American Institute for
Free Labor Development, an
arm of the American Federation
of Labor and Congress of
dustrial Organizations. -
A spokesman for the insti-
tute, a nonprofit organization
set up in 1962 to work with
Latin-American labor organiza-
tions, said records there showed
no indication that Mr. Agee had
ever been carried on its payroll.
High agency officials, said
they would have no comment
on Mr. Agee's decision to pub-
lish in, his book, although they
did confirm that he had served
in Latin America for the agency.
The State Department's For-
eign Service List for 1968 lists
Mr. Agee as a staff aide in the
executive section of the United
States. Embassy in Mexico City.
The official biographical reg-
ister for the State Department
shows that he was born in 1935
in Maryland, was a 1956 gradu-
a
that there was any connection ate of Notre Dame University,
between the
Mullen offices dosing Far East AppiS044, FNilkklOWOCtilitl8i08
a e epart-
, in the
rtnent 'Official for the neit 12
irears, one of his cover assign-
ments, as listed in the register,.
was, as a "laundry manager"
for the Air Force in 1956-57.
In an interview today with
The Associate Press, Mr. Agee,.
on vacation in Cornwall, Eng-,
land, said his book would tell'
"what we did in Latin Amer-
ica, why we did it, why'I quit
and why I decided to write
about it.'
? He added, according to The
Associated Press, that "what
we did in Latin America and
what we do in so many other
countries of the third world is
similar to what the United
States did in Vietnam." The re-
sult, he was quoted as saying,
is the strengthening of minor-
ity governments "which perpet-
uate great wealth for a few and
widespread poverty."
'Mr. Agee, whose wife and
children are now living in Flor-
ida, has told associates that he
has firsthand knowledge of'
WASHINGTON STAR
28 June 1974
Inany previously unrev'eale4
C.I.A. operations?some of.
them against Cuba?and that
he also was involved in the as-c
sassination of locally employed:
C.I.A. agents, known in the
agency as contract employes. '
Highly reliable sources said
that in discussions with friends,
he has declared that the assas-
sinations were not official pol-
icy of the C.I.A., but instead
were local options taken in the
field.
At.least one such killing, Mr:
Agee is known to have related,
involved the use of a truck to
run over a recently utilized lo-
cal C.I.A. operative whose mis-
sion had been completed. .
Such allegations about the
C.I.A.'s operations in Latin
America and elsewhere have
been widely rumored for years,
but?pending Mr. Agee's to-be-
published -account, there has
been no firsthand description
of such incidents.
I Is Acc
Associated Press
The Central Intelligence
Agency requested last year
that a public relations firm
which had employed one of
the original Watergate con-
spirators not?disclose that it
provided cover for CIA
agents abroad, according to
an informed official source.
On Feb. 28;1973, then-CIA
director James R. Schles-
inger met with a represen-
tative of Robert R. Mullen
& Co., an international pub-
lic relations firm, the
source said last night.
"Schlesinger told them to
keep' their mouths shut
about their relation with the
,CIA, because several peo-
ple overseas as Mullen
representatives were CIA
people," the source said.
THE MULLEN firm em-
ployed E. Howard Hunt Jr.,
the convicted Watergate
break-in conspirator, after
he left the CIA and at least
parttime while he was 'a
member of the White House
special investigations ? or
plumbers ? unit. -
? Earlier this week, private
investigator Richard L.
Bast said that former White
sed
ir
House special counsel
Charles W. Colson had told
him that the Mullen firm
was a CIA front and that
the Mullen firm was direct-
ed to lie if necessary' in
denying any, CIA associa-
tion.
Meanwhile, ABC News
reported last night that
documents in possession of
the Senate Watergate com-
mittee show that Schlesing-
er ordered information in
agency files turned over to
the Mullen firm for use in
planting cover stories.
ABC said the Mullen firth
planted an erroneous story
in the March 5 edition of
Newsweek magazine as-
serting that Colson was in
charge of political dirty
tricks during the 1972 presi-
dential campaign. It was
learned that the CIA was
prepared to deny having
had any hand in the New-
sweek story.
THE CIA's purpose in.
planting stories, ABC said,
was to divert newsmen
from discovery of its rela-
tionship to the Mullen firm
and to a law firm, which
ABC also said was under
contract to provide cover for
CIA agents. , ,
A major concern was that
newsmen would trace CIA
connection to Paul L. O'Bri-
en, a counsel to the Commit-
tee for the Re-election of
the President, ABC said.
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THE WASHINGTON POST ada% Jub; 1974
Ex-Spy to Give Detailed Account
of
? By'Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer
LONDON, July_ 10?Philip B. F.
Agee is an ex-spy who is coming out of
the cold with what is likely to be the
most detailed account of covert Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency operations
ever compiled by an American intelli-
gence officer.
The 39-year-old former CIA case offi-
cer, who hopes to remain in seclusion
in a remote stretch of English country-
side until his book is published, has
finished a 200,000-word manuscript at
which he has labored since he resigned
from the CIA in 1969.
Agee's credentials as an officer in
the clandestine ("dirty tricks") service
of the CIA\ have been confirmed by au-
thoritative sources in Washington. The
CIA itself refuses to comment on any
aspect of the case but officials are re-
ported to be deeply concerned about
Agee's prospective revelations.
In the course of an afternoon-long
Interview at his modest seaside hidea-
way Agee spoke guardedly of his eight _
years of covert , operations against
"unfriendly" governments and insur-
gent political forces. It was a world of
manipulation of agents, news media,
public officials, and military establish-
ments through the classic espionage
techniques of bribery, blackmail and
mass propaganda.
In agreeing to talk to a reporter for
The Washington Post, Agee withheld
specific details that are in his manu-
script which he felt might jeopardize
his physical security before the book
makes its appearance sometime within
the next year. He did, however, make
these points:
? During a brief assignment at CIA
headquarters in Langley in 1966 he set
up the Mexico City "cover" operation
for the CIA, conducted under the front
of the Robert Mullen company, a
Washington-based public relations firm
that has figured prominently in the
Watergate case. It was his involvement
In the Mullen cover, established for a
CIA operative engaged in anti-Soviet
operations, which led last week to the
surfacing of Agee's identity. CIA fears
that Agee would publicly disclose the
Mullen arrangement in 1972 led to its
closing by the CIA and the "Western
Hemisphere flap" alluded to in the re-
port last week of Sen. Howard Baker'
(R-Tenn.).
In Mexico, Agee's cover was as the
Olympics staff assistant to then-Am-
bassador, Holton Freeman. In his
Olympics role, Agee's covert mission
during 1967 and 1968 was to "meet all
kinds of people" in order to extend the
Mexican CIA station's network of ?
agents.
? While serving in the CIA's Ecua-
dor station in 1962 Agee participated
in the launching of a pressure cam-
paign against the Arosemena govern-
ment to end diplomatic ties with Cuba.
"President Arosemena didn't want to
break relations but we forced him,",
Agee related. "We promoted the Corn-1
munist issue and especially Commu-
nist penetration of the government."
Eventually Arosemena fell and was re-
placed by a military junta.
? Agee personally served in 1964 as
a conduit for funneling $200,000 in Chil-
ean currency from a major New York
City bank into covert election support
activities for Christian Democrat
Eduardo Frei. Frei won. Agee handled
the cashing of the check in Montevi-
deo, where he was then assigned to the
CIA station, and conversion into Chil-
ean currency which was then sent on
by diplomatic pounch into Santiago, he
related. There was In 1964 a major co-
vert program on Frei's behalf. Agee
said that the United States also poured
an estimated $20 million into the 1962
Brazilian election in support of several
hundred candidates for gubernatorial,
congressional, state and municipal of-
fices. ?
The CIA operates in close coordi-
nation with an international network
of trade union confederations and na-
tional labor groups which Agee said
have proven to be effective instru-
ments of political influence in Latin
America. In Ecuador, Agee said, he
served as a CIA case officer for a local
branch of the American Institute for
Free Labor Development (AIFLD),
which was founded in the early 1960s
as an affiliate of the AFL-CIO. He
cited AIFLD, the International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions, its
Latin American subsidiary, ORIT, the
Public Service International
(comprised of government employee
unions) and the various international
trade secretariats as having given
strong support to CIA-directed covert
political programs.
The trade union organizations as
well as other mass groups coordinate
with the CIA chiefly through the inter-
national organizations division, which
was in the center of the controversy
over CIA funding of student, labor and
cultural organizations seven years ago.
- Agee last week was mentioned in
press reports as having told his secrets
to the KGB in a fit of drunken despon-
dency. The Washington source respon-
sible for the story later denied its au-
thenticity. ,
Agee insists that he has never talked
to the KGB, although he acknowledges
that he intends to demonstrate in his
book that the CIA has served as "the
secret police force of American capi-
talism."
The former agent said he had made
three trips to Cuba since 1971 to con-
duct research for his book and, as he
put it, to witness the results of a
"successful socialist revolution."
The Cuban trips were arranged by a
Paris publisher who first contracted to
publish Agee's book. One of the terms
on which he went to Cuba, Agee said,
was that he did not want to be de-
briefed by the KGB.
Agee's ideological break with the
CIA and U.S. policy in Latin America
started during his 1963-1966 assign-
ment to Uruguay where his official,
mission was to direct operations
against the Cubans and build up local
security forces.
16
It was in Uruguay, which was an ad-
vanced welfare state by Latin Ameri-
can standards, that Agee said he lost
his faith in the possibility of solving
the region's problems through piece-
meal reform.
Agee, who is under contract at pres-
ent with British Penguin book publish-
ers, said that his account, written in di-
ary form, names numerous case offi-
cers, agents arid particular episodes
gathered from firsthand experience in
the field. Such a narrative has never
been published on the American clan-
destine services and Agee is apprehen-
sive about the possibility of injunction
action against him such as was taken
against Victor Marchetti on his book,
co-authored with John Marks, "The
CIA and the Cult of Intelligence." , . -
In 1971 when he had embarked on
the book project and was living from
hand-to-mouth at a secret location in
Paris, Agee said he came under sur-
veillance by a pair of Americans who
befriended him and advanced him
small amounts of money. Agee said he
determined to his certainty that they
were retained by the CIA to fipd out,
the contents of his book.
The CIA, he said, rirst became aware
of his intentions to publish the critical
book after he wrote a letter to a Uru-
guayan political journal suggesting
that the 1971 election there would be
subject to CIA infiltration. In Decem-
ber of that year he received a visit
from a former CIA colleague who
tracked him down in Paris through
French police cOnnections.
Within several months, Agee said, he
was in regular contact with the two
Americans who professed an interest
in the book and a desire to see the
manuscript. It was to his new-found
"friends" that Agee confided, after the
first burst of Watergate .publicity in
the newspapers, that the Mullen organ-
ization was providing cover for the
CIA in Mexico. The Washington public
relations company Was identified in.
early stories as an employer of Water-
gate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr...
Agee's "friends" in turn sent word to
the CIA, as he reconstructs the events,
that he might disclose the Mullen
Cover in his book. This was the origin
of the "WH flap" alluded to in Baker's
report.
Agee found himself in the remarka-
ble position of having created the Mul-
len cover and having been responsible
for "blowing" it five years later by di-
vulging his awareness of it to agents?
as he firmly believes today?of the
CIA.
The CIA admitted in writing to
Baker that as a result of the "WH
flap" (the initials stand for Western
Hemisphere division of CIA) it had to
shift assets and personnel in Mexico as
well as other posts in which Agee
served to minimize the damage of his
possible revelations. ?
It is Agee's opinion that the Mullen
cover arrangement in Mexico is
"completely, irrelevant" to Watergate.
Nonetheless it was President Nixon's
stated concern ,over exposing covert
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CIA operations in Mexico .that?
prompted him to issue instructions re-
sulting in the FBI's delay for nearly
three weeks in June and July 1972 of
its investigation of the "laundering,"
of Nixon re-election money through a
Mexico City bank account.
' The President said, however, on May
22, 1973, that he had learned there was
no basis for having worried about ex-
posing covert CIA activities in Mexico.
Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms
was providing repeated assurances of
this.
The tortuous path that has brought
Agee to his current position of self-ex-
ile?started in a conventionally middle-
class home in Tampa, Fla. His father
was a businessman and the atmos-
phere was politically "reactionary?no,
.say conventional."
' He attended a Jesuit high school and-Agees are divorced. .
went to Notre Dame, where Agee was
first aproached by CIA recruiters In
1956. He joined the following year and
took three years of military training
under the agency's auspices.
"It didn't take long to develop en-
thusiasm and decide to stay in. There
was a combination of things, the aura
of intrigue, the sense of patriotism and
public service. It was intellectually
stimulating and challenging work," as
Agee saw it in the early period.
Now he sees the clandestine service
and the agency generally as an instru-
ment of political repression.
Agee manages to live on a series, of
meager advances while the book .is be-
ing prepared for publication. His two
young sons recently joined him from
Falls Church, Va., where they had
been living with their mother. The
WASHINGTON STAR
28 June 1974
.SmfitEn lienipstone:
111?163?11.211.00,
On the face of it, former
White House aide Charles W.
Colson's charge that virtually
the entire Watergate scandal
was a Central Intelligence Ag-
ency plot designed to black-
mail President Nixon so that
the cloak-and-dagger boys
could get What they wanted
out of the Oval Office is
preposterous. ,
? This is not to say that it
cannot be true: We here in
Gomorrah East have learned
over the past two years that the
unthinkable is, indeed, think-
able.
Nor does it mean that Broth-
er Chuck, born anew in Christ
prior to drawing one-to-three
years in stir and a $5,000 fine
after pleading guilty to ob-
struction of justice last week,
does not believe the fantastic
tale he told former private
inves1 i gator Richard L. Bast,
a Washington man seldom de-
scribed as one of nature's
noblemen: Colson has a tend-
ency to see life through a
glass, darkly.
IT COULD BE true; it may
be true. But there emanates
from the whole bizarre story
an odor oddly reminiscent of
that fish called a red herring.
According to the public
record to date, the CIA was in-
deed involved in Watergate in
a peripheral fashion. The
agency, largely through the
good offices of its then-deputy
director, Gen. Robert Cush-
man, a former aide to Presi-
dent Nixon when he was vice
. ?
president and no comman-
dant of the Marine Corps, did
provide former CIA agent E.
Howard Hunt Jr., one of the
White House plumbers, with
that famous ill-fitting red wig
(indignant CIA staffers main-
tain that the.wig was auburn
and a perfect fit), a voice-
modifier and a miniature C7/21-
era.
But the public testimony to
date indicates that former CIA
Director Richard M. klelms,
now ambassador to Iran,
terminated the arrangement
with extreme prejudice (as the
Green Berets used to say) as
soon as he heard about it.
Nor is there anything in the
White House transcripts
dumped on the House Judici-
ary Committee to indicate, as
Colson implies in the notes
recorded by-Bast at two long
conversations on May 13 and
May 31, that Mr. Nixon re-
garded himself as a pawn of
the CIA.
OF COURSE, one would be
in a better position to make
a judgment of the thinking of
Mr. Nixon and Colson (al-
-though not necessarily of the
veracity of their allegations, if
any) if the tape ? if there is
one ? of the "two or three
hours" of conversation that
Colson said he had with the,
President on a Sunday in
January were available. But
Mr. Nixon -to date has reso-
lutely refused to release the
tapes of any of his conversa-,
tuck and the CIA
tions with Brother Chuck,
theological or otherwise.
It is true that Sen. Howard
H. Baker, the Tennessee
Republican, ranking minority
member on the Ervin Commit-
tee and a sensible man, has
long been of the view that the
CIA has been, shall we say,
something less than candid
about its role in the Watergate
mess. But if, as Colson alleges,
Senator Sam is sitting on a 35-'
page report detailing the
spooks' chicanery, then surely
this should be made public, de-
spite the CIA's alleged objec-
tions to its declassification. .
Ultimately, in the absence of
specific knowledge about the
incident in question, one can
only draw on one's own experi-
ence. Having spent 13 years
working abroad, where the
CIA's writ does run, and hav-
ing known perhaps 100 em-
ployes of the agency, some
intimately, some casually, this
observer finds it hard to credit
the Colson implication of a
CIA plot against the Presi-
dent.
IN THE first place, most
CIA employes are essentially
bureaucrats, different only, in
degree from the striped-pants
boys at the State Department
or, indeed, the paper-shufflers
at Health, Education and Wel--
fare.
There are, to be sure, cow-
boys among them, deep-cover
operatives whose deeds cannot
stand close scrutiny. But the
mass of them are analysts,
statisticians, academics, lin-
guists, computer experts and
communications specialists
who wouldn't know a cloak?let
alone a dagger?from a port-
manteau.
They are men and women
who serve their government ?
in the main well ? and retire
like other government em-
ployes to sun and shuffle-
board. They may occasionally
assist in the overthrow of a
troublesome foreign govern-
ment. But ni:essing about in
domestic politics simply has
not been their bag, and there
is no real reason to think it has
become so.
The point has been made
that all of those directly in-
volved in the Watergate and
Ellsberg break-ins, with the
exception of G._ Gordon Liddy
(who had an FBI back-
ground), had been associated,
either directly or indirectly,
with the CIA. But since they
were hired by Hunt, this is
perhaps not unnatural, and
hardly in itself justifies Col-
son's description of the CIA as
a 'frightening" power "with
tentacles everywhere."
And ultimately one returns
to a simple question: Who
hired Hunt? Answer: Colson,
who has himself now come in
from the cold.
CIA's role in Watergate, in
short. deserves further scruti-
ny. But at least at this writing,
the Colson-Bast scenario
lacks, as they say, credibility.
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WASHINGTON ?
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MP'
28 June 1974
29 June 1974
.Break-ins
;iFor CIA
By Richard M. Cohen
? Washington Post Staff Writer
the lawyer for Watergate
Conspirators Bernard Barker
and Eugenio Martinez re-
vealed yesterday that the two
had previously engaged in* a
Series of 'illegal activities for
The Central Intelligence
Agency, including a
."penetration" of the Radio
City Music Hall by Barker in
the mid-1960s.
The Radio City Music Hall
entry, the lawyer said, was ap-
parently a "CIA "training ses-
sion" to see if Barker could ac-
complish his mission satsfac-
torily. Other missions, the law-
yer said, included the burglary;
of the Miami. home of a boat!
crew member who was making
trips for the CIA to Cuba and,
a similar break-in of a Miami ,
business office.
The lawyer", Daniel Schultz,
revealed some of Br-Icer's and
Martinez' past CIA escapades.
during during opening arguments for
their trial, along with former
top presidential aide John DA
Ehrlichman and Watergate
conspirator G. Gordon Liddy,
on charges stemming from the
1971 break-in of Daniel Ells-
berg's psychiatrist's office.
- A CIA spokesman said yes-
terday the agency would not
comment on Schultz's state-
ment because the matter is
now before the court. "Our le-
gal guys are very concerned
about the propriety of this,"
the spokesman said.
' By the 1947 act of Congress
that created it, the CIA is
forbidden to engage in do-
mestic intelligence operations.
However, the agency, is per-
mitted to conduct domestic
operations to protect its for:-
eign activities ? a loophole
that could cover the alleged
Miami break-ins by Barker.
Those break-ins and those
at the Watergate and at the
office of Ellsberg's psychia-
trist are just a few to have
gained public attention. Some,
such as the illegal entry into
Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office,
involved the use of CIA equip-
ment and facilities. Others,
such as the break-ins at Chile-
an government offices here
and New York in 1971 and
1972 remain unexplained and
.no agency role has ever been
proven.
In addition, antiwar groups
have frequently complained
of ' break-ins, somtimes alleg-
ing government attempts to
obtain information. None of,
these claims has been sub-
stantiated."
18
Carl T. Rowan:
'Hook the Spooks' Theory
Once again, in banner headlines, we
are slapped with the theory that the
Watergate burglary and the Ellsberg
,break-in were part of a plot conceived
and executed by the cloak-and-dagger
boys of the Central Intelligence Agency.
This time we get a really wild fourth-
hand version, -where reporters are told
by a former private eye, Richard L. -
Bast, who allegedly was told by former
White House aide Charles Colson, that
President Nixon felt the CIA was even
scheming to "get something" on the
White House.
This "hook the spooks" theorizing
may be swallowed whole by some of
those Americans who believe that the
CIA is a government unto itself, with
far-flung agents who Murder unfriendly
politicians, organize coups, rig foreign
elections and topple democratic re-
gimes in favor of dictatorships ? all
without the President, the secretary al
State or other American officials either
approving or knowing anything about it.
The CIA has engaged in all the activi-
ties mentioned above, but you can
wager that the overall CIA actions had
the sanction of whomever was Presi-
dent ? or of top officials giving approv-
al in the President's behalf.
LOOKING AT ALL the Watergate evi-
dence, I became convinced months ago
that the CIA was more deeply involved
than the public or the Congress knew. In
my column of May 11, 1973, I told of a
conversation in which formet CIA d
,Director Richard Helms casually men-
tioned to me that minutes after the bur-
glars were seized inside the Watergate
someone at CIA awakened him to tell
him of the arrests.
I raised the question of why anyone at
CIA would awaken the director in the
wee hours just to inform of what at the
the Watergate and Ellsberg burglaries
had previously been involved in. numer-
ous CIA ventures. We know-that the CIA
was still providing disguises and other
help to E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a leader of
the Watergate burglary and accused of
being a principal in the Ellsberg break-
in. But we have testimony that CIA
cooperation was requested by the White
House, and this seems to shoot- holes in
the theory that the CIA was out to sub-
vert the President and make the White
House bend to its will.
COLSON HS denied telling Bast that
President Nixon thought of firing cur-
rent CIA Director William E. Colby be-
cause of the President's suspicion that
CIA was up to some dirt in the Water-
gate and Ellsberg matters.
It wouldn't have made sense anyhow.
Helms, not Colby, was CIA boss at the
time of, and long after, the Watergate
burglary.
During four and a half years in gov
ernment I got to know Richard Helms
pretty well. I found him to be a profes-
sional whose integrity I never saw
cause to question.
I can conceive of Helms agreeing,
under pressure from the White House,
o cooperate with Hunt and his crew, or
with the White House plumbers, out of a
belief that they really might be uncover-
ng information vital to national seeml-
y. I can't believe that 'Helms would
knowingly make CIA part of burglaries
esigned simply to serve the partisan
olitical interest of the party in power.
I find it beyond either acceptance or
peculation that Helms would use the
IA, or let it be used, to undermine the
resident and his White House staff.
time seemed to be "a third-rate bur-
glary" ? unless the caller knew of
potential serious embarrassment to
CIA.
AS far, as I can determine, none of the f
investigating units has bothered to ask a
,Helms who telephoned him. Or why any- ,n
one would feel compelled to awaken the w
CIA director because of that burglary.
We now know that the men involved in
Either Colson got suckered by the
resident, or Bast got suckered by Col-
on, or the press got taken in by all of
hem.
There is reason to ask a lot more
uestions about the CIA's involvement,
or it appears that the CIA was used and
bused in a shocking way. But-there is
o evidence of any substance that the
hole dirty business was a CIA plot,
ith Richard Nixon targeted as a major
ictim.
Schultz refused to expand
upon his courtroom remarks
other than to say that addi-
tional details would 1)e made
public as the trial pro-
gressed.
Nevertheless, it was the sec-
ond time in a week that a re-
port of a CIA role in the
Watergate affair has come to
public attention. ?
Earlier this week, a Wash-
ington-based former private
oetective, Richard Bast,, said
former presidential aide
Charles Colson suspected that
the CIA planned both the
Watergate break-in, and the
entry of Ellsberg's psychia-
trist's office, and , that Presi-
dent Nixon, to an extent,
I shared Colson's suspicions of
the agency. ,
Bast said .,he, IntervieWecl
Colson on two occasions be-
fore Colson was sentenced a
week ago to a one-to-three-year
jail term and a $5,000 fine for
attempting to influence the
outcome of the Ellsberg trial
by leaking derogatory informa-
tion about Ellsberg to the
press.
Colson, according to Bast,
also said that Senate Water-
gate committee investigators
were informed of the times,
and places of at least 300
other break-ins conducted by
Martinez. Senate committee
sources have denied they have
such information.
Neither Barker nor Marti-
nez has made any secret of
their past work for the CIA,
which the two have said was
limited to operations against
the regime of Fidel Castro in
'Cuba. Barker and Martinez
also were among five men ar-
rested in the Watergate of-
fices of the Democratic Na-
tional Committee and were
subsequently convicted of bur-
glary.
Barker, a bespectacled un-
dercover operative, was born
in Havana and grew up both
in the United States and Cuba.
He' was a captain in World
War II in the Army Air Corps
and was shot down over Ger;
many where he was held pris-
oner for 17 months. In the late
1950s, he joined the Castro'
guerilla :moveme-nt but he be-
came disillusioned andiled toi
Miami in 1959. :
Thereafter*, Barker worked-
against Castro and is said to'
have been one of the organiz-
ers of the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion. From that 'time, until
1966. ;Barker. worked for, the
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CIA. Until Iis atrest 'at: 'the
Watergate, he ran a real,: eS?
tate agency in Miami.
Like Barker, Martinez origi-
nally ?worked ?for .Castro but.
later turned against him. He,
too, participated in the Bay, of
Pigs invasion, later, worked for
the CIA and joined Barker's
real estate firm as a salesman.
According to an informed
source, Barker and Martinez
met during the planning and
execution of the Bay of Pigs.
invasion and later worked for
the CIA in operations directed
against the Castro regime.
Martinez, according to the
source, was the cal-tam n of a
WASHINGTON STAR
29 June 1974
boat used by the CIA to ferry
supplies and personnel to
Cuba and to take refugees
back to Florida. Martinez, ac-
eroding to this source, partici-
pated in occasional raids
against the Castro regime.
In these capacities, the
source said, Martinez engaged
in the activities that Schultz
mentioned in court yesterday
?destrucion of foreign prop-
erty, possession, and distribu-
tion of firearms, and falsifica-
tion of income tax returns to
hide the CIA as a source_ of in-
come.
As for Barker, his entry into
the Radio City Music Hall, the
;source said, was a CIA-test to
see if he could accomplish the
mission successfully and re-
tain details of what he had
peen. The break-in site was the
theater's "monitoring office",
which contained closed-circuit
? television cameras. When
Barker returned from his mis-
sion, he was debriefed to see
If he had actually- been in the
-room.
The source close to Barker
,said that-Barker presumed the
Radio City Music Hall break-
in was a training operation be-
'cause of the- nature of the
'questioning he underwent
:upon his return.
The source said the illegal
:entry into the Miami home of.
a crew member of a boat usicf
in forays against Cuba was or-
dered because the man was
suspected of talking about the
Cuban operations?"not keep-
ing security.' The other Mi-
ami break-in Schultz men-
tioned yesterday was also con
.nected to the CIA's Cuban op-
erations, the source said.
Barker, for one, has ac-
knowledged his participation
'in anti-Castro activities, main-
taining before the Senate
Watergate Committee that he
believed the Watergate break-
in was ordered to determine if
the Democrats were receiving
money from the Castro re-
gime.
By Dan Thomasson
Scripps-Howard News Service
'A secret Senate report
states that the Central
Intelligence Agency knew
inside details of the Water-
gate ,break-in less than a
month after it occurred but
never passed them on to ,
federal investigators.
Sources familiar with the
report say it also states that
the CIA knew of plans to
break into the presidential
campaign headquarters of
Sen. George S. McGovern, -
D-S.D.
The report ? written by
minority staff members of
the Senate Watergate com-
mittee ? is undergoing CIA
"declassification" in prepa-
ration for its release to the
public.
The report was instigated
by committee Vice Chair-
man Howard H. Baker Jr.,
R-Tt.nn., who long has con-
tended privately that CIA-
involvement in the entire:
Watergate affair was con-
siderably more than the
agency has admitted.
BUT ALTHOUGH the re-
port contains documented
information supporting this
,theory, it does not, the
sources said, add much sup-
port to contentions the CIA?
had advance knowledge of
- the Watergate break-in or
that it deliberately assisted
in the break-in of the office
of Dr. Lewis Fielding, a
psychiatrist who had been
treating Dr. Daniel Ells-
berg, who leaked Pentagon
documents to the press.
And the sources said the
report, which apparently
reaches no conclusions, ap-
pears to raise more ques-
tions about the CIA involve-
ment than it answers.
The report was due for re-
lease several days ago, but,
the CIA now is negotiating
with the committee staff to
delete portions which would
expose agency "cover"
operations, the sources
said.
The report, in its present
state, documents an exten-.
sive relationship between
the CIA and two Washing-
ton firms involved in Water-
gate ? Robert R. Mullen &
Co., a public relations firm
where Watergate conspira-
tor E. Howard Hunt Jr. was
employed, and the law firm
of paul L. O'Brien, who was
counsel to the Committee
for the re-election of the
President.
THE REPORT states, ac-
cording to the sources, that
the Mullen Co. and its presi-
dent, Robert Bennett, son of
Sen. Wallace Bennett, R--
Utah, long have provided
cover for CIA operations, a
fact the CIA has admitted.
But the report outlines
Bennett's role as a CIA
front man and details his ef-
forts to mask the agency's
involvement in the Water-
gate, including leaking
information to Washington
reporters and withholding
information from the FBI.
The sources said the re-
port states that on July 10,
1972, Bennett relayed to his
CIA "case officer" some of
the details of the June 17,
1972, Watergate burglary.
He presumably had gotten
the details from Hunt.
Bennett's report was
channeled to Richard
Helms, former CIA director
who is now ambassador to
Iran. Helms never passed
on the information to
Watergate investigators,
the committee staff docu-,
nient states.
According to the sources,
the report also states that
Bennett:
? Knew of efforts to get
Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., D-N.
C., chairman of the Senate
Watergate committee, to
keep the Mullen firm out of
the Watergate investiga-
tion.
_11) Planted phony stories
with the neweS media whicli-
would lead investigators
away from CIA involve-
ment.
The report also suggests
a connection between the
CIA and O'Brien, whose
role an adviser to poten-
Iial Watergate witnesses in
the early days of the inves-
tigation and his talk with
Hunt about legal expenses
'has made him a possible
witness in the House Judici-
ary Committee's impeach-
ment inquiry.
O'Brien said in an inter-
view that he was employed
by the CIA for one year in
1952. But he said he has had
nothing to do with the agen-
cy since.
' O'Brien did say he has
learned of a "connection"
between his law firm and
the CIA, but added that he
has had nothing to do with
it. O'Brien is a senior part-
ner.
He refused to detail the
connection, but sources said
the law firm has had a con-
tract to provide cover for
CIA agents. One source said
publication of this is an
important part of the ne-
gotiations between the com-
mittee staff and the CIA,
which is concerned that
some of its agents will be
exposed.
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WASHINGTON POST
1 JUL 1974
046 la Laments Lesson Loss
By Lee Byrd
Associated Press
-The greatest peril of Water-
gate, says prison-bound
Charles Wendell Colson, is
that, "We'll purge a few peo-
ple and then we'll says, `Now
all the rest of us are saved.'"
"Well.., all the rest of the
country isn't saved by just ex-
- ilin.g a few Nixon men," he de-
clared. .
Once one of the closest of
the Nixon men, Colson faces,
by his terminology, the long-
est exile yet decreed. He re-
flected upon Watergate and
other issues in an interview
just a week before he is to
surrender _himself for at least
a year's imprisonment for ob-
structing justice.
"We've got to have several
things happen out of Water-
gate if the county is to be
better for it," Colson said. One
has to be getting rid of the an-
ger and hatred and divisive-
ness that Watergate has -cre-
ated ... ?
"The second thing is we
need some serious structural
reforms in the political proc-
ess and in the governmental
process . . . change that will
result in the future in people
?
being less tempted to abuse
their public trust."
Foremost in that area, he
said, is "the need for public fi-
nancing of polit.icalcam-
paigns. I mean I think it's just
ludicrous ... you know, so
many abuses have been re-
vealed that if we continue just
to apply Band-Aids the Pa-
tient's gonna the, the country's
gona hemorrhage,r for this.
We've got to get rid of the sys-
tem: of private finance?'..
Along with public financing
of campaigns, said Colson, an-
other prime objective should
be greater congressional and
executive oversight of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
He confirmed that he had
raised the issue of the CIA's
involvement in the Watergate
and Ellsberg break-ins with
private detective; Richard L.
Bast,
But Colsen complained that
several rather sensational as-
sertions attributed to him by
Bast were taken out of context
from a discussion aimed
merely at exploring "every
possible theory." He said :le
did not, for example, mean to
create the impression?as
Bast's version of his remarks
suggested?that President
WASHINGTON POST
2 July 1974
Bilker to Say
CIA Helped
Ilunt Get Job
By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer
?' Testimony indicating that a Central:
:Intelligence Agency official recom-,
mended the employment of Watergate
conspirator E. Howard Hunt ,Jr. by. a ?
Washington 'public relations. :firm .
-which has sbrved as a CIA "COver"
he released today by Sen. Howard IL:
Baker: Jr. (R-Tenn.).
. The public relations firm'. is Robert,
Mullen & Co., whose relationship with'
flie' CIA form a central theme bf the'
Baker report cleared by, the CIA for
release last Weekend.
- Hunt was recommended 'to the Mul.
len.firm at the time of his retirement
from the agency in 1970 by a CIA offi-
cial identified as Frank O'Malley:
There have been unsubstantiated alle-
gations in the case that Hunt was re-
commended to Mullen by former CIA
Director Richard M. Helms.
Both- the CIA and officials of the..
Mullen company have acknowledged
their mutual ties, which included pro-
viding a corporate cover for CIA oper-
Nixon felt 'imprisoned or.
threatened by CIA sympathi-
.
ers at the
te House.
"What I was saying," Colson
explained, "is that I think a
lot of people around the Presi-
dent were people with ties
into the military and the intel-
ligence establishment." .
Colson said the CIA was
"much more deeply involved
in a lot of things than the pub-
lic thus-far knows. I'm gonna
be doing a lot of testifying
about this, I suspect, and I'd
rather save it ler that." Mean-
while, he said, a report on the
subject being readied by. Sen.
Howard H. Baker Jr.. (It-
Tenn.) "is going to raise an
awful lot of questions?'
Colson, as yet, does not
know where he will be con-
fined. He likely will be kept
near the capital for. some time,
however, since he will be a
witness at the"plumbers" trial
of John- D. . Ehrlichman and
others and almost surely will
appear before the House im-
peachment panel.
Many have viewed him as
potentially star witness No. 2
against ? the. President?the.
first being John W. Dean III.
That prospect was spurred by
?
atives in Mullen & Co. offices in Singa-
pore and Amsterdam.
Sources who have examined the re-,
port say it provides no conclusive links
between the CIA and the original
Watergate break-in such as have been
hinted by former White House aide
Charles Colson'and by Baker.
However, *it includes documentation
in the form of three CIA memoranda
Which point to covert efforts by offi-
cials of the agency to minimize its in-
volvement in the Watergate investiga-
tion.
there is also some 'evidence that
Robert F. Bennett, president of Mullen
'and on of Sen. Wallace F. Bennet (R-
Utah), was tipped off prior to the
Watergate burglary that a White
'House break-in team was targeting Mc-
Govern campaign headquarters for a
politiCal intelligence raid.
Bennett has privately acknowledged
that he was given advance knowledge
of the operations of the burglary team.
But it was unknown whether he passed
this information on to the CIA. -
The memos upon which Baker drew
in the preparation of his report were
drafted by Eric W. Eisenstadt, chief of
the' central cover staff for the CIA's
clandestine directorate; Martin J. Lu-
kasky, Bennett's "case officer" within
the agency, and subordinates of former
CIA security director Howard Osborn,
who recently took an early, retirement
from the CIA.
20
his surprise courtroom state-
ment that his felonious attempt
to smear Daniel Ellsberg was
urged repeatedly by Mr.
Nixon.
Some
Some of Mr. Nixon's adver!
saries see Colson as a far;
more impressive witness than;
Dean, partly because he, was
closer to Mr. Nixon and also
because he did not barter-his
testimony for immunity.
According to Colson, a law-i
yet now disbarred, his plea was
a first in legal annals ? and
was made on his own initia4
tive. ? _ ? .
"I have always told the- pro-
secutors that I have been part
of an effort to discredit Ellsi
berg," he said.- "As I said tot
the court . that was some-;
thing I, could in -conscience
plead to and that I felt was a;
useful plea!?
Colson said it was he who
"came up with the idea of ap-!
plying this particular set of
facts to the obstruction of jus-
tice statute and hopefullyl
making a principle of it?thatl
in the future anyone who tries'
to interfere with the rights of;
the defendants is going to vio-1
late a criminal law. There had
never been a prosecution for
this."
?
The Eisenstadt and Lukasky memos
recount the CIA's relationships with
Mullen & Co. and recount claims by
Bennett that he planted unfavorable
stories in Newsweek and The Washing-
ton Post dealing with White House
aides, including Colson. The object of
these stories, the Baker report will in-
dicate, was to draw attention away
from CIA involvement in the Water-
gate case.
The Osborn material, as presented
by Baker, suggests that the former
CIA security director provided Mis-
leading information to the FBI on the
identity of a former federal investiga-
tor who helped Watergate burglar
James W. McCord Jr.'s wife destroy.
CIA records at their home immedi-
ately after her husband's arrest in the
Watergate break-in case.
Osborn's retirement, according to
one official familiar with the handling
of the case, was an outgrowth of the
Internal memorandum prepared in
Osborn's office which resulted in the
transmission of misleading informa-
tion to the FBI.
Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), who
has reviewed a draft of the P aker re-
port, said Sunday on the CBS pro-
gram "Face the Nation" (WTOP) that
it contained "no bombshells." Nedzi,
chairman of the House 'Armed Service
Intelligence Subcommittee, has taken
testimony from CIA officials on a
number of allegations made in the
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draft version of Baker' S report. '
The Michigan Democrat is said to
be in contact with the CIA's con-.
gressional liaison office on an almost
day-to-day basis as new allegations
have arisen suggesting new involve-
ments by the agency in the Water-,
gate scandal.
Some of Baker's colleagues on the
Senate Watergate committee, of which
be served as co-chairman, have
WASHINGTON POST
3 July 1974
eport
Critical
Of CIA
Baker Hints
Agency Knew
. Of Break-in
By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post St..:f Writer
The Central Intelligence
Agency may have known in
,advance of plans for break-
ins at the offices of Daniel
Ellsberg's psychiatrist and
'the Democratic National
Committee's Watergate
headquarters, a report re-
leased yesterday by Sen.
Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-
Tenn.) suggests.
Baker's report, accompanied
by CIA comments and denials,
'provides a rare, if incomplete,'
glimpse into the activities of
the CIA that are, by design,
normally secret.
Among other things, the re-
port describes how the CIA
used a Washington public rela-
tions firm as a cover for
agents operating abroad, as-
serts that the CIA destroyed
its own records in direct con-
flict with a Senate request to
keep them' intact, asserts that
a CIA operative may have
been a -"domestic agent" in vi-
olation of the agency's charter
and recounts how one CIA ern-
ployee fought within the
agency against withholding in-
formation from the Senate
committee .and other congres-
sional committees.
The report recites several
instances in which it says CIA
personnel whom the commit-
tee staff sought to interview
were not made available by
the CIA. In addition, the re-
port lists several other in-
stances in which it says the
CIA either ignored, resisted or
refused requests for infor
Charged that Baker has sought to hu-,
plicate the CIA in the scandal to di-
vert attention from the White House
role in the break-in and ensuing cover-
up.
The report also questions why photo-
graphs found in the CIA file taken by
members of the White House "plumb-
ers" team during the Ellsberg break-in
were not turned ever to the FBI, even
,
tion and -documents by ale
committee.
Although the repor.t raises,
."questions" about the involve-'
tment of the CIA in the Water-
? gate and Ellsberg break-ins,-
Baker said in a letter to pres-;
.ent CIA Director William E
. Colby that was also released
:yesterday, "Neither the select
committee's decision to make
this report a part of our pub-
lic record nor the contents of
'the report should be viewed as
Any indication that either the
committee or I have reached
conclusions in this area of in-
vestigation." "
? The report by Baker, vice
chairman of the Senate select
Watergate committee, is the
long-awaited product of sev-
eral months of investigation
}conducted primarily by the
;Republican minority staff of
the Senate Watergate commit-
ee.
Although the report is im-
plicitly critical of the CIA; it
noes not radically alter what
is already known about the
general outlines of the plan-
ning and implementation of
the Ellsberg and Watergate
break-ins. Remarks by the CIA
'accompanying the 43-page re-
port reject the suggestion that
the agency knew in advance
about either of the two burg-
laries.
The CIA also disagrees with
a number of allegations in the
report that it has not made in-
formation available to the
committee. In addition, the re-
port contains numerous dele-
tions of names and descrip-
tions, made at the request of
the CIA on the grounds of na-
tional security.
One of the central figures ,
who is named in the report is'
convicted Watergate conspira-
tor E. Howard Hunt Jr., a for-,
mer CIA agent who continued I
to seek assistance from the
CIA even after he left the
agency in 1970. . ?.-
In three of the ' six areas1
that the report. -discusses,:
Hunt' emerges as a principal
actor. These areas include the:
activities of Robert R. Mullen
and Co., a Washington public '
relations firm; the provid-
ing of . technical services by
the CIA that Hunt used for,
'the Ellsberg break-in; and the ,
activities of Watergate con-,
Pgittd*oiiiieleasevi2ditE68/
though agency officials were aware of
their evidentiary significance.
By and large, the Baker report
reaches no definite conclusions but it
suggests continued investigation of the
relationships between the CIA and
Watergate and names prospective wit-
nesses to be examined.
The Senate Watergate committee
has gone out of existence' but will issue
its final report next week.
wlio'was recruited by Hunt for'
the - Ellsberg and Watergate
break-ins. .,
? In introducing the section
on Hunt and his "receipt .of
technical support frem the
CIA in connection with the
Ellsberg break-in, the report
states, "In light of the facts
and circumstances developed
through the documents and
conflicting testimony of CIA
personnel adduced by this
committee ... the question ar-
ises as to whether the CIA
had advance knowledge of the
Fielding (Ellsberg's psychiat-
?.rist) break-in.
The report asserts that the
committee gathered "a wealth
of conflicting' testimony
among CIA officials" when it
investigated. the Ellsberg
break-in.
Much of what the report
cites about the Ellsberg break-
in and Hunt's approaches to
the CIA in that connection are
already known. ?
At the request of the White
House and with the permis-
sion of CIA Director Richard
M, Helms, Hunt was supplied
with a wig, voice alteration de-
vices, fake glasses, falsified
identification, a miniature
camera and other gear._
The report recalls that be-
fore the Ellsberg break-in, the
CIA developed photographs
for Hunt that he had made
outside the' Beverly Hills,
Calif., offices of Dr. Lewis
Fielding, Ellsberg's psychia-
trist.
"Not only was the film de-
veloped, however, but it was
reviewed by CIA supervisory
officials before it was re-
-turned to Hunt," the report
states. "One CIA official who
, reviewed the film admitted
Ithat he found the photographs
'intriguing' and recognized
!them to be of 'Southern Cali-
fornia.' He then ordered one
of the photographs blown up.
The blowup revealed Dr.
Fielding's name in the park-
ing lot next to his office. An-
other CIA official has testis
lied that he speculated that
they w ere 'casing' photo-
graphs." -
According to the report,
'recent testimony" showed
that the CIA official who re-
viewed the photographs
'immediately" reported their
ootents to Deputy CIA Direc-
Syr. OPPRBIRM74104a12RNII 1
23.
assistant. The report says I
Cushman and his assistant de-
nied ever having been told ofl
the photographs by anyone.
The report asserts, and the
CIA denies, that it was only
when these photographs were
developed that assistance to
Hunt by the agency was termi-
nated. According to the CIA,
"The decision to cut off sup-
port to Hunt was made in the
_face of escalating demands
and was not based upon the
development of the photo-
graphs." ,
The report also challenges
"previous public CIA testi-
mony" that claimed that the
CIA had no contact with Hunt
at all after Aug. 31, 1971. The
Ellsberg break-in occurred
Sept. 3, 1971.
According to the report,
"recent testimony and secret
documents indicate that Hunt
had extensive contact with the
CIA after" Aug. 31, 1971, that
Hunt played a "large role" in
the preparation of a psycho-
logical profile of Ellsberg that
was completed in November,
1971, and that Hunt had other
contacts with the CIA.
According to the report,
Hunt and his fellow Watergate
conspirator, G. Gordon Liddy,
who is now on trial on federal
charges arising from the Ells-
berg break-in, told a CIA psy-
chiatrist that they wanted to
" 'try Ellsberg in public, rend-
er him `the object of pity as a
bro'ken man' and be. able to
refer to Ellsberg's 'Oedipal
complex.' "
The report says Hunt asked
the CIA psychiatrist not to re-
veal Hunt's discussion of the
profile to anyone else at the
CIA. But the psychiatrist, ac-
cording to the report, was
"extremely concerned about
Hunt's presence and remarks"
and reported' them to his CIA,
superiors. The report says the
committee has asked to see
memorandums of the psychia-
trist and his superiors, but the
request was refused.
In addition, the repoi t
states, the psychiatrist "also
was given the name of Dr.
Fielding as Ellsberg's psychia-
trist . . ."
, "While Director Helms has
I denied that he was ever told
that Hunt was involved in the
CIA's Ellsberg profile pro-
omb rgport asserts, "it is
,not significance that
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8
the?tribe- Period during which
the CIA psychiatrist was brief-
ing his superiors of his con-
cerns regarding Hunt wes I
circa Aug. 20, 1971 ? a week'
prior to the developing of I
Hunt's film of 'intriguing'
photographs of medical offices :
in Southern California which ,
impressed at least one CIA of. .
ficial as 'casing' photographs."
The CIA responded to the
report that at the time it de-
veloped the photographs for
Hunt, Fielding's name had no
meaning to the agency person-
nel involved. In addition, the'
CIA stated, "Ambassador e
Helms (Helms is now ambassa-
dor to Iran) has testified that
he had no knowledge of E.
Howard Hunt's role in the pro- s
files. The former director of
security for CIA has testified s
Iii
he was recruiting; Cubans to'
,
assist in the Watergate breake
in," the report states. .
In response, the CIA as-
serts, "There is ,no evidence
within CIA that the agency;
possessed any .knowledge of
Hunt's recruitment of individe
uals to assist in the Watergate:
or any other break-in." -
The report also discusses
the destruction of records by,
the CIA about one week after
the agency received 0 letter
from Senate Majority Leader'
Mike Masnlield (D-Mont.) in
January, 1973, asking that
`evidentiary materials" be re-;
ained. ? .
HelmS,- the report asserts,
ordered that tapes of conver-
ations held within offices at
CIA headquarters be de-
troyed, In addition, the re-
ort states, "on,. Helms' in-
trnction, nis secretary de;-
troyecl .his transcriptions of
oth telephone. and room eon;
ersations" that may have in-
luded conversations with"
resident Nixon, White House
hief of staff 'H.R. % (Bob)
aldeman, ton Presidential
omestic adviser John D. Ehrk.
chman and other White
ouse officials.
Helms and his secretary
have testified that the conver-
sations did 'not pertain to
Watergate, the report _states,
adding, "Unfortunately, any
means of corroboration is no
longer available."
Two facts about the destruc-
tion are "clear," aEr.:Orrling to
e report. "First; the only
her destruction for which
e CIA has any. record was
n Jan: 21, 1972, when tapes
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
3 JUL 1974
r7-77:1
Jtj, Lp-? 4iit -War! f?: t.t74
"1 ? a sj gi!.1 h
.1) ? 1 I-70
b.&
By JAMES WIEGIIART
Washington, July 2 (News
Bureou) -- Sen. Howard Baker's
Wate: gate committee report de-
tailinv the role of the CIA with the
burglyry team financed by Presi-
dent ',7ixon's campaign committee
takes is full circle as we head into
the th'rd summer of the nation's
worst ?olitical scandal.
In t e immediate aftermath of the .
June 1-, . 1972, break-in and bugging
of Denu cratic National Headquarters,
there w re ? strong signals from the
White 1-14 use that the Watergate black-
bag job was the work of a bunch of
right-wing Cubans, led by a pair of ex-
CIA spooks, who were convinced that
? the 3IcGovernized Democratic ? Party
would lead the. country straight into
the embrace of 'Red . dictator Fidel
Castro. Just a bunch of well-meaning,
but misguided, patriots, that's all. ? ?
The early stories emphasized E. How-
ard Hunt Jr.'s CIA role in ? the B a y
of Pigs disaster a decade before and
the fact that the Cubans had also taken,
par- in that abortive adventure.-- PreSi.-:7
dent Nixon.: has disclosed. .that, ewas.
re nceMed abotit..
that within a week after Watergate he
directed his two top aides. H.R. Halde-
man and John D. Ehrlichman, to see
that the FBI investigation into the
break-in didn't uncover CIA operations.?
But alas for the administration, the
sensational nationally televised Water-.
gate hearings last summer showed that:
Watergate was not planned and ap-
proved out in some .dark room at sp
headquarters in Langley, Va., but in th
office of then Attorney General Joh
WASHINGTON STAR
2 JUL 1974
Vie GoEd:
,
k,1te Laiiest:CL4 tf
r7;)
a 17 zi
t:?
ArpnT i.
F
?
. Mitchell, Nixon's campaign chief. '
And the hundreds of thousands of
dollars that financed the Watergate and
Ellsberg, burglaries, along- with a good
many other -illegal activities, .and the
subsequent coverup did not come from
the CIA's well-fiiled coffers but from
cash-filled safes at the Committee for
the Reelection of the President
' -The? CIA- theory gradually collapsed
under the weight of last summer's evi-
dence, as did other spurious, speculations,
such .as..the. White :House7advanced.:no,,
that.:Nixon;:had: to iturn, over .the,-
TEllsbeig-hiVestigatiop.to) his -own merry, -
::,panst, 7.14.14114.1.)ei*: _ I L. Di-
rector J. Edgar Hoover was too chummy
with Ellsberg's father-in-law. " - -?
However, as summer - .1974 rolls
around, the. CIA connection. pops up
again, like crab grass.--Former Special
White House Counsel Charles- W. Colson ;
has spent the last several weeks hinting'I
to reporters that the CIA_: not.? only!
planned Watergate, but later used it
cleverly in an aim to destroy the Nixon"!
administration. Never _mind that Colson,1
who will begin serving one-to-three in
the federal pen next week for obstruct-
ing justice in the Ellsberg case, .was?
a college classmate of Hunt and was
the one responsible for getting -the re-
tired spy ? his . White House plumber's
-
So now conies Baker, .the- Tennessee'
senator who'. looks like Johnny Carson
and who delighted TV audiences during
last summer's Watergate. hearings by
drawling that. what he wanted to know
was "what the President knew and when
he keew it," with his own. contribution-
to the CIA myth- ? -
? -
Former White House aide Charles W.
Colson has developed a derailed theory
? which he says is generally shared by
President Nixon ? that the Central
Intelligence Agency is implicated in the
Watergate. scandals to a far greater ex-
tent than has ever been disclosed. ?
News report
Jim Garrison, Mark Lane, Norm
Mailer: where are you now, when your .
President needs you? ? .. ? -. ?
All you true believers in the omni-ma-
levolence of.the Central Intelligence Ag-
ency ? are you ready for another Con-
spiracy Theory? Good, because this one
is wild. Almost as wild as the one Norm
was?handing out last year about the
mystery of Marilyn Monroe's death.
. Yes, indee-c1;. there's a fresh-CIA plot
just waiting' to be stirred. One that cries
out for experienced hands. :You've all
been the-route, from 'How-the-CIA;
Killed-John-Kennedy' to How-the-CIA.:
Caused-Hurricane-Agnes. So it figures
that if Chuck Colson and Howard Baker
are going anywhere with their theory of
How-the-CIA-Is-Responsible-for-Water-
gate, they could use your help. - . ?._
THAT'S SEN. How44el3f9A9iFFir
In ? Pf ,."!,71)
71:1'111 1
to
ui=1 t';11-:i-jk
17 r
La:a) ts ?
;
It's all there in Baker's report: Howl
the CIA furnished Hunt with a false
ID, a wig, a camera, a speech-altering
device and -other spy stuff; how the-,
CIA. worlted_up. a psychiatric -profile of-1
Pentagon:Papers?lea,ter?Daniel Ellsbergf
how, most..of'.the--Watergate..teanrhad
ties with the.; CIA;...ancl:!_isetr the -CIA
! was less than forthcerning with FBI in-
vestigators after Watergate.
Baker's report is, of course, all true
as far as it goes. But left unsaid was
how the CIA got conned into providing
materials and the psychiatric profile on
direct orders of the White House, trans-
mitted by Nixon's top aides in the Presi-
dent's name.
. Damage to the Bureaucracy
The central point here is that one
of the great tragedies of Watergate is
the damage that has been done to the
federal bureaucracy, particularly the in-
telligence and law-enforcement agencies.
Not only the CIA, but the FBI, whose
agents- were sent on wild-goose chases
by the White House and whose former
acting director actnally?was called on,
to and did destroy Watergate evidence. --.
" Ditto for the- Justice Department,
with: its reputation_ blackened . by the
conviction of former- Attorney General
Kleindienst and the still-pending Water-"
gate coverup indictment of Mitchell. The
image of the Internal Revenue Service,,
called on to punish the administration's
-"Enemies" with audits and reward the
administration's friends"- by going easy
on their tax problems: has -suffered as
!weIL :But why: gO'cine.? point :ikthat
-crimeS? of --Watergate wei
performed-'by'indivrdnnis, not' insti-tu-,_
1,ioris like --th e CIA: FBI` Of I
course, who was Sam Ervin's -sidekick
last summer during the Senate Wat6r-
gate hearings. Baker has been trying to
sell his CIA's-the-One line around Wash-
ington for the past six months, but with
no success. He says it's because the CIA
won't cooperate. If you ask me, though,
Jim/Mark/Norm, it's because the Ten-
nessee senator keeps talking in para-
bles. Stuff about "animals crashing
around in the forest," and the like. --
Now, Jim, you !mow, from your ex-
perience gulling the voters of New Or-
leans (until they finally tired of your
act), that talking in parables isn't the
way to get a good conspiracy theory
going. No, to-sell a CIA scenario that
people will listen to, a man's got to lay it
-on .the line. The way Colson did last
week..
And let me tell you, gentlemen, when
Chuck Colson runs a CIA conspiracy
theory up his greased flagpole, folks
stop, look up and listen. Because Chuck
was right there with the President him-
self. And the way he tells it, the Old
Man was fairly quaking over the possi-
bility that the CIA might succeed in a
RellitiigeP1200/013101111e:007.4A4ZOR7110.0043
. operations.
; 23
--
-NIXON, said Colson, is "convinced
the CIA is in this up to their eyeballs."
Sound familiar, Jim/Mark/Norm? Why,
it's-practically a line taken straight
from one of your left-wing texts about
the John F. Kennedy assassination. Ex-
cept,_Mark, whereas you titled your
book on that subject "Rush to Judg-
ment," I, think what we have here is
more -like *".Rush Away from Judg-
- 7 It's. as'i.f.-theY -sat 'around the White
-
House-one afternoon, -the Old Man and
Chuck, and thought: The liberal media
want a scapegoat -for Watergate. O.K.,
give 'em the CIA. But what could .the
CIA have in mind, getting "up to their
eyeballs" in this sort of mess?
Well, says Colson, the President's
theory is "they were coming in --to
spy and they wanted to get enough on
the White House so they could get what
they wanted."
And what do they want? That's where
we're counting on you, Jim/Mark/
Norm. Because, you see, Chuck can
only go so far elaborating on a CIA con-
spiracy. Beyond a certain point, he
lacks your experience filling in outland-
ish details about such things. That is, in
explaining to the American people that
what the CIA really wants ? in league
with its allies, the FBI, the Pentagon,
those Texas oil millionaires, Burt Lan-
caster, lurk Douglas and the rest of the
2rufieSgforplaYs in May" ? is
at sof u er power. o- 'rig less,
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8
WASHINGTON POST
8 July 1974
),
eace rrornises
xemi telligence
?
I3y Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer
, In the aftermath of the
Moscow summit, a leading
analyst of Soviet affairs has
" expressed concern that the
? preMise of ?"a generation of
" peace" is being oversold to
the American people as an -
? -accomplishinent rather than
- a hope. ?
/ .The Soviet Union, mean-
maintains its goals of
expanding its economic and
? political power in the world,
he.said.
' The Soviets, according 'to:
Ray S. Cline, the former di- ,
rector of intelligence and re-
search at the State Depart-
nlent, - "use the circus and
-theater of summitry in their
own world strategy of peace-
ful coexistence. Richard
Nixon appears to be using it
to make domestic political
gains. I
"The administration is
" '? confusing the American peo-
?, pie because it is talking
. about the prolonged reduc-
tion of international tension
? and a generation, of peace.
In thd American view this ,
means an absence of con-
flict, but in the Soviet view
it. means only no nuclear
k'war while the 'class strng-, ?
? ' gle' continues econonlically
'and politically ,around the
. world.",
The Soviet Union, Cline
, said, believes that the
"correlation -of forces" in
the world?especially the
, weakening of the United
States as a result, of its in-
ternal economic and politi-
cal problems?will inevi-
tably lead to the victory of
Soviet power. -
Cline 'Was the chief of the
analytical- staffs on the So-
viet Union and China in the ?
Central Intelligence Agency
and later deputy director of
the CIA before he went to
the State Department.
? He is now director of stud-
ies at the Georgetown Uni-
versity Center for Strategic
. Studies. ? ?
Cline said the experts in ,
government are well aware
of iwhat is happening, and
are reporting fully on the
Soviet policy and attitudes...
Numerous outstanding So-,:
vietologists have been mak-
'. inglhe.sarne points in schol!
Sayffici?
'I think the cautionary. aspects of this ex-
pe'riment in the diplomatic approach to-
ward the Soviet Union. . . may have been
submerged in the need for domestic political
triumph.'
any journals, books and ,
. congressional testimony. -
."But," Cline said, "I think'
the cautionary' ' aspects of
this experiment in the diplo-
matic approach toward the
Soviet Union?and toward
China?may have been sub-:,
merged in the need for do-
mestic political triumph."'
These
These were strong words
. coming from Cline, who has
refused to let himself he
quoted on government pol-
icy since he resigned from
the State Department nine
months ago. At that time it
was clear that he was con-
cerned that the problems of
'Watergate were interfering
In the orderly process of
conducting foreign policy.
Cline admitted that there
was some irony in the fact
that Mr. Nixon was no'w us-
ing cooperation with the So-
viets when he had built his
early'political career in the
1940s and 1950s on Cold War
rhetoric and virulent' anti-
cemmunism: ?
Summit' conferences like.
,the= one just completed, ?
, Cline said, 'tend to create an
atmosphere of improved, re-
lations, but they also create
the illusion that the Soviet
Union and the United States
share the same goals in
seeking detente.
Actually, Cline said, what ?
the Soviet Union, in an ef-
fort to obtain Western tech-
nology and consumer goods,
is seeking, is peaceful coex-
Istence--in Moscow's lexi-
con the avoidance of war,
the support of world revolu-
tionary forces, the shrinking
ef ,capitalist resources and
the "class struggle." ?
."Detente," according to
Cline, ."is defined by most
Americans as peace, stabil-
ity, . international coopera-
tion; tolerance and conver-
gence.
' "One of the " things that
'bothers me," he said, "is
that we've got ourselves
pretty well convinced that
basic formulations of na-
tional purpose don't mean
anything. Obviously ideolog-?
ical statements are not sim-
ple blueprints for future ac-
tion, but they- mean some-
thing." '
He said, "This problem
has been around ? a long,
time. I believe we tend to ig-
nore ideology completely,
just as we refused to believe
what Hitler said about Ger-
many in the 1930s." ?
Cline made his rather pes-
simistic remarks during a
lengthy interview in his of-
fice in the quiet of a fourth
of July weekend.
The paradox, he Said, "is
that if detente were really
to succeed in our sense of
the world , of opening mean-
ingful contacts inside Soviet
society, the Soviet internal
control system would feel so
threatened it would destroy
those contacts. Therefore
our concept of detente, Can
continue only so long as it
doesn't succeed.".
President Nixon's descrip-
tion of a web of relation-
ships drawing the Soviet
Union into a detente that is
irreversible, in Cline's view,
is thus probably not in the
cards. t ?
'"The kind of. peaceful
Coexistence and detente
which we do in fact have, a
strong, mutual interest -in -
avoiding nuclear war. was
established not by Richard
Nixon .and Henry 'Kissinger
but .by Jack Kennedy as a
result of the education in inv
ternational affairs he gave
Nikita Khruslichcy during
the Cuban missile crisis in ,
1962," Cline said.
..The basic outlines of pres-
lent Soviet strategy. Cline
said, was decided at that
time. A very high Soviet
? leader came to the United
States shortly after that ? cri-
. sis and told an American of-
. ficial that there would never
again be a conflict on those
unequal terms. The Soviet
leaders decided then to have
?
no more ,missile gaps, on
It was then that
--
Moscow started investing in
'1t5 big, missile build-up. to- z
ward a parity of forces with
the United States.
''What we've had since,
t but without the hoopla sur-1:
!"rounding detente," Cline
Said; "is the successful de-
terrence of nuclear war. Ev-
eryone has struggled since
then on how to translate
this into international coop-..
eration and understanding?
our concept of detente as
distinct from the Soviet vi-
sion of continued, bitter
'struggle based on class and
the need to support world
revolutionary forces wher-
ever they are."
At this point Cline pulled
out a recent article from the
influential Soviet journal
Problems of Peace and' .So-
cialism to make his point. It
said: "Peaceful coexistence
is a specific international
form of class confrontation,
linked to the peoples' strug-
gle not only for peace but
also for the revolutionary
transformation of society, to
the strengthening of the so- '
cialist community and to
mass actions against imperi-
alism."
It is Cline's view that the
American people ? must be
educated about tlie Soviet
perception of what is hap-
pening. Cline quoted from a"
recent monograph by for- ?
mer U.S. Ambassador to the' ;
Soviet Union Foy Kohler .
and others.
He noted that after the
-1972 Moscow summit meet-.
ing Soviet spokesmen said.
the Soviet Union 'does not
view the U.S. policy of de-
tente as reflecting a change
of heart but as a policy
forced upon it by what the
Soviets call "the social, eco-
nomic and ultimately,
tary power of the Soviet Un-
ion and the socialist coun-
tries."
? The quote continue's': "The
standard Soviet line h.as
been; and continues to be,
that 'the real alignment of
forces in the world arena' ,
has shifted against the ,
United States."
Exaggerated hopes from
summitry. Cline said,
"create an illusion that'
tends to divide and confuse
and produce apathy, not
only at home but among our
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A0proved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8
allies."
In Europe, be said, there
is "fear that a new Soviet-
American relationship will
lead to a diminution of the
U.S. commitment to NATO,
that there will be a with-,
drawal of U.S., forces and a
,lessening Of economic coop-
.,eratioti, and hence increas-
ing pressure on them to en-
ter into long-term under-
standings with the Soviet
Union which, in time, would
,neutralize them politically
and strategically and, even
sooner, provide opportuni-
ties for united front 'govern-
_merits, getting Communist
oarties into power through
the 'parliamentary road to
socialism'."
Cline noted that this 'al-
most happened in France
and 'could very 'likely occur
in. Italywithin the year.
? Thus the Soviet Union,
Cline said, is using the at-
?mosplieries of summitry for
Its own ends; "Just as the
Chinese saw the Peking
summit of 1972 in the same
terms as a thousand years
ago they saw the .arrival of
NEW YORK TIMES
11 July 1974
'delegations from tributary
states to bear gifts to the
emperor?first kowtowing
nine times?the Russians,
with a different psychology,
out of their sense of insecu-
rity, take pride that Nixon
was coming to seek a modus
vivendi with their now pow-
erful state?and that .when
problems build up in the
Middle East they can sum-
mon Kissinger to Moscow."
Soviet Communist Party
chief Leonid I. Brezhnev is
using summitry for his own
purposes. He has, Cline said,
"identified himself with
peaceful coexistence of a
kind which will permit the
gradual growth of what he
calls the socialist world,
without serious danger of
war with the United States,
the only adversary the Rus-
sians fear." .
. ,
, Cline's concern is, first of
all, that the American peo-
ple be made aware of what
is going on. "There is a need
for what these days we, call
'consciousness raising'," he
said. ? ..?.,
, They should be urged, he
said, "to focus on the eco-
nomic and political conflict
which continues, and not be
misled by diplomatie spec-
taculars."
The Soviets he stressed,
"have shown no interest in
creating any web of rela-
tionships because they fear
the penetration of Soviet society by hostile 'Western ide-
ology." Instead, he said,
they point to this desire for
a "web of relationships" as
demonstrating 'American
weakness. ?
Cline's prescription for
? dealing with the Soviets en-
tails first of all understand-
ing what we are about. The
United States, he said,
should remain strong mili-
tarily, preserving. its deter-
rent "whatever it costs." _
It should trade with the
Soviet Union, but on non-
concessional terms. He has
no objection to granting
most-favored-nation status,
which would only put the
Soviets on a par with other
nations. But he thinks cred-
rms, After Moscow
By Herbeit Scoville Jr.
? McLEAN, Va.?Although. no proof
was probably needed, the agreements
negotiated at the Moscow summit con-
ference have demonstrated beyond a
shadow of doubt that United States
- arms control goals have become hos-
tage to impeachment politics.
No longer can President Nixon assert
that his continuance in office is essen-
tial to bringing the arms race under
' control and making the world less vul-
nerable:to a nuclear conflagration.
? Quite the contrary. It is now clear
that as long as Mr. Nixon remains in
' office we are doomed to, increase
nuclear competition, with all the
dan-
gers and costs it entails. His political
, survival rests on the appeasement of
the conservative pro-military clique in
Congress.
The summit meeting not only failed
to mark any significant progress to-
ward reducing the threat of nuclear
war, it actually took us several steps
backward.
The hopes that a broad permanent
limitation on offensive weapons might
'be achieved have long been dim, but
there remained a faint glimmer that
some restraint might be placed on
MIRV's?or multiple independently tar-
getable re-entry, vehicles?those dan-
gerous multiple-missile warheads that
provide incentives for initiating a nu-
clear strike. But now these hopes have
been dashed, and the large programs
to, procure new and more-threatening
MIRV's will soon have progressed be- "
. yond the point of no return in both
i countries.
Secretary of State Kissinger was un-
willing to bite the MIRV bullet, as it
were, in the first round of talks on
limiting strategic arms,A0pritvtadulaor
1
? Its should be limited only
those deals that would be:
economically beneficial to
the United States.
' "We should take care not
? to export our most advanced
technology but to trade the 7
products of that technology ;
for Soviet raw materials," .1
Cline said.
Finally, "we should Make
no large, long-term invest-
ments in capital unless
there is no other opportu-
nity for the development of ;
those ? same resources," he ;
said. This would mean that !
we should avoid investments
in developing things such as
Siberian oil and natural gas
because of the uncertainties 1
of long-term access to the
'Products.
"We , should nffer conces-
sions in limited fields," ,?;
Cline said, "if and when, 1
through quiet diplomacy, we '
an make progresS in open-
ing Soviet society to foreign
contacts, which is, after all,
what we have advertised de-
tente diplomacy is all
about."
have bee
n relatively and technology in easy to stifle these search
of 'superior-
programs in their infancy, and now ity, which he indicated is meaningless
when he was willing to face up to- since both sides already have thou-
this issue his efforts were sabotaged sands of warheads.
by Secretary of Defense James R. But the. most damaging agreement -
Schlesinger, the military and the Con- ; negotiated at Moscow was that re:.
gressional hawks led by Senator Henry lated to underground nuclear testing,
M. Jackson and assisted by the re- and for this the President ,alone must '
cently resigned strategic-arms-negotia- take full responsibility.
tor Paul Nitze.
Soviet leaders had made it abun-
A year from now the MIRV Pan- dandy clear that they were prepared
dora's box will be wide open and to sign immediately a treaty stopping
both countries will have MIRV's that all underground tests. In the United
'will have the technical capability of States, 37 Senators have cosponsored
threatening,the other's land-based-mis- a resolution supporting the negotia-
tion of such a ban; only 'the most con-
firmed hard-liners were reluctant.
sue deterrent. A major new rung in
the arms race will have been climbed.
A year ago at the much-touted
Washington summit talks, Mr. Nixon
and Leonid I. Brezhnev pledged to seek
to achieve a comprehensive, perma-
nent agreement on offensive 'weapons
by the end of 1974. Now a year later
the goal of a permanent treaty has
? disappeared, and they are instead seek-
ing the prolongation of an interim
agreement to run until 1985.
This hardly seems like progress
along the road to peace, of which
President Nixon boasted on his return
to the United States on 'July 3.
This retrogression was mandated by
the need to allow the military in both
countries to proceed with their colos-
sally expensive new weapons pro-
grams, such as the Trident submarine
and its Soviet counterpart, the new
counterforce MIRV intercontinental
ballistic missiles, and the supersonic
bombers.
These are all bargaining chips for
negotiations that will now continue for -
eleven years, and are hedges in case
no permanent treaty is ever achieved.
As Mr, Kissinger stated in his Mos-
cow news conference, this will mean
Yet the Administration opposed a
threshold treaty that would halt
explosions only above a certain power.,
To make matters worse at Moscow,
this limit was set at greater than 150
kilotons of explosive power?ten times
the power of the bomb used over Hiro-
shima in 1945?so as to have almost
no effect on any current weapons de- ,
velopment.
Such a threshold ban at this time in i
history would be worse than no ban
at all. It would almost certainly pre-
vent the achievement of a total ban for
many years. However, the crowning'
act of superpower cynicism was to put
off for two years?until March 31,
1976?the date when even this incon-
sequential restriction would take ef-
fect.
A primary objective of limiting nu-
clear tests is to inhibit the further
spread of nuclear weapons to new na-
tions. Under the Nonproliferation .
Treaty, effective in 1969, the United
States and the Soviet 'Union 'under-
took to negotiate seriously toward a
complete ban on nuclear testing.
RVIeNg4q0Eii#3810EkrePAYROPP7-0Q102600400
25
?
1.1 I
?
tileRrecent In-
.1n1 the pro-
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posed transfer Of nuclear technology
to the Middle East the problem of
'weapons proliferation should be given
a high priority.
Yet the Moscow treaty?which must
be ratified by the Senate?can only
be viewed by potential nonnuclear
',countries as proof that the superpow-
ers have no intention of exercising re-
straint or of fulfilling their obligations
LOS ANGELES TIMES
30 June 1974
011
taken in exchange for the nonnuclear
countries' giving up their option to
acquire nuclear weapons.
Those countries will now undoubt-
edly feel free to confine the 'Nonpro-
liferation Treaty to the scrap heap at
next year's review conference and to?
make their own way into the nuclear-
weapons jungle. The risk that we will
all be incinerated in 'a nuclear holo-
caust has been immeasurably increased
by the Moscow underground-test
treaty.
Herbert Scoville Jr, Secretary of the
Arms Control Association, was former-
ly assistant director of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency and
deputy director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
.. ? ,;
BY ALBERT?PARRY'
In certain high-level circles in
Washington and Houston there is'
talk going around that the joint US.-
Soviet space flight planned for 1975
is little more than a "wheat-deal in
the, sky? The reason is clear: The
Russians need it far more than we
do. -
The Nixon Administration is
pushing it for political reasons?as a ?
prop for the faltering US.-Soviet de-
. ? Albert Parry, professor emeritus of
Russian civilization and language at
Colgate University, is a Russian-
born. U.S. citizen who is the author
of "Russian Cavalcade: A Military
Record,." "Russia's Rockets and Mis-
siles, and "The Russian Scientist.":
tente (which President Nixon is
snaking additional efforts to pre-
serve during his current visit to
Moscow).
The scientific-engineering wisdom
Of the joint space flight is doubtful
and is growing more so all the time.
Indeed, we must ask: Is this trip nes
cessary? For America, that is.
Knowledgeable men ? in Washing.'
fon and Houston talk about their
doubts informally, but they refuse to
be identified. After all, their careers
must be safeguarded. These are
some of the point's brought up in,
quiet conversations: , i?
?Why go ahead with the Apollo:
Son= flight? And why now? En-
gineers had discussed the possibility
of a joint U.S.-Soviet manned space
mission ever since 1966, but it was
not until it assumed political signifi?
cance that it was approved in both
Washington and Moscow. .
?If the flight is really to be a
symbol of meaningful space coopera-
tion, why so few other signs of
cooperation? Those there have been
were of paltry significance (ex- .
? change of weather satellite photos,
of moon rock samples, of scientific
papers the Russians would have got-
ten their hands on anyway).
Keeping close watch in London on
scientific developments in the Soviet
*Union is Leonid Vladimirov, former-
ly a science writer-editor in the So-
viet Union who defected during a
trip to England in 1966. ?
Not long ago, he told me, "Only the
Soviet side will gain from.this (A p01-
lo-Soyuz) project. True, your Ameri-
can experts may gather some more
-of an idea about the general level of
Moscow's space achievements. But
even without this project your spe-
cialists have, in the last half-decade,
learned much about the Soviet kos-
faosavtika. There will be no other
results for America?except, that is,
for some questionable political di-
vidends for the White House.' .
1--asked Ifladimirov: "Precisely.
what will the Soviets gain, and what:
might we lose, from' the Apollo-Soy-
us project?" . ?
-He replied, "They will learn more
about ?the? latest :American technolos ,
gy while trying to conceal their own
lag. In the process they hope to
charm a few 'more American experts'
and businessmen with' those vodka-'
and-caviar parties.. And . whatever
.new the Soviets find out from the
Americans, they will use (it) for
,military purposes., . ?
"Then there is the Soviet propa.-
ganda aim. Here is what they .will
_ stress 'in their domestic, and, later,
foreign propaganda: ?
? "First: 'Without us Soviets,' the
Americans could not develop their
space technology any further, even
if they did achieve their landings on
the moon and, their Skylab success.
To make their next giant steps they'
simply had to have our Soviet tech-
nology. and the help of. our cosmo-
nauts.' ? ?
? "Second: 'An . the. disrupting cries -
:by Andrei Sakharov and other
sidents could not, will not, prevent
the. American scientists and en-
gineers?in.addition to businessmen
r--from cooperating with us.'
"Third: 'All the .world can see for
itself that the US.S.R. is a peaceful
nation and stands for naught but a
most complete collaboration be-
tween nations, 'Including disarm-
ament'?with, I must add, no real
control over the Soviet side."
Some facts about the Apollo-Soyuz
mission are publicly known, but. the
Russians are giving the Americans
as little information as possible,
U.S. astronauts will be allowed to
visit the Soviet launch center at:
Tyuratam to check out some Ameri-
can-made equipment. that will be in-
stalled in the Soviet spaceship. But
the Americans will be flown to the
airport at the Soviet base, will be
taken.to the assembly building in a
blacked-out Soviet limousine, will
check the equipment ? and will
leave the same day, not being per-
mitted to .stay until the Soyuz
launch.
:26
American astronauts confirm
dimirov's opinion that. they already
have learned enough about the Soy-
uz to have misgivings about its pri- ?
rnitive systems and the lack of real
control by the pilot. One member of
' the U.S. link-up crew was heard to
say about the Soyuz: "You'll never
get me up in one of those." -
The American side began Apollo-
Soyuz flight planning with consider-
able enthusiasm. This was fostered
'by the initial belief that the Rus-
sians, with a dozen or more manned
space flights to their credit since
1967, had compiled a record approxi-.
mately equivalent to that of the U.S.
Apollo program.
, But as. the 1975 link-up began to be
studied in depth, as the Americans
dipped into the available Soviet
documentation of the Soyuz and start- .
ed practicing in Soyuz ground
simulators, the consensus emerged
that---in terms of onboard
capabilities and design?the Soyuz
does not compare even with the ?
American Gemini capsule of 10 years
ago..
Some disquieting specifics: Soviet ?
cosmonauts have little flight-plan-
ning flexibility, few malfunction in-
dicators or controls, and minimal
flight instruments. There is no on-
board inertial platform or program-
mable computer.
? Already, though, the Russians are
trying to claim more than their pro-
per share of credit for the project.
The Apollo is larger than the Soy-
uz (more than twice the weight and
nearly twice the length of the Soy-
uz), but the official drawing used in
the Soviet press shows the two
spaceships as being of equal size.
, The docking module is American-
made, and it is the Apollo attitude
control system that will keep both
vehicles stabilized during the link-
up?but not a word of such impor-
tant facts can be found in Soviet
publications.
Finally, the Soyuz systems will
run out. first, and the cosmonauts
will have to land after five days in
space. The Apollo would be able to
stay aloft for another week or mores
but the sensitive Russians insist that
both crews must land the same day.
No wonder the Russians want this
'project! As an American astronaut
mused, "While they were ahead,
there was no chance of their joining
with us. They played their space
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? lead for all ifwas 'Worth. Now -that
we've pulled way in front with Apol-
lo and Skylab, they are very eager to
cooperate in any manner we'll let
them:'
As for the US. side?leaving out
the lure of detente?there is One via-
ble reason for the project. Says an
American expert: ?
"Until this link-up tame up, we
had no plans for manned space
flights for the period between the
end of the Skylab project in early
.1974 and the start of flight-testing
the Space Shuttle in 1978. Our exper-
ienced astronauts and our trained,
professional ground support person-
NEW YORK TIMES
2 July 1974
nel?who are among this' nation'S
greatest space assets?would have
had to spend more than four years
practicing without the real thing.
That is why we need this link-up
with Soyuz."
Still, the political reason domin-
ates. The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration is under pres-
sure' from the highest levels of
government to carry out this mis-
sion without trouble. Why is the
project so important?
Even President Nixon's severest
critics admit that his foreign policy
moves have been commendable. As
the morass of Watergate infects the.
national politiCal scene, and as rising':
prices and possible renewed energy
shortages threaten, foreign policy ?
spectaculars remain the last ace-in-,
the-We for Mr.Nixon. ?
Detente is very popular now?as-
long as one does not think too much
about the concessions the United ?
States was forced to make at the
Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks?and what better symbol of
detente could there be than a Rus-
sian-American space mission? ?
The symbol is all the more iinpor-
tant as the reality becomes less
pleasant to contemplate. .
ower and Saintly Purity
By
..?
By Peregrine VVorsthorne
' LONDON?Any public man who has
ever succeeded in doing anything must
be aware of how vulnerable his con-
duct is to moral judgment. Every
biography of a great statesman bears
?this out. There are always skeletons
in the cupboard; always incidents
where even the most illustrious and
heroic figure behaved with less than
total honesty or truthfulness.
Such a statement is certainly not
'intended to be provocative or con-
troversial. It is, of course, the merest
truism. The exercise of power cannot
be combined with saintly purity, since
?nee a Man assumes responsibility for
public affairs, the moral simplicities
within which it is just possible, with
luck, to be able to lead a private life
are soon hideously complicated to an
extent that precludes all clear? dis-
tinctions between right and wrong.
A healthy public opinion undet-
stands this, and judges its public men
accordingly, allowing them some lati-
tude. It is always a question of apply-
ing a sense of proportion of turning
a judiciously blind eye, of having a
feel for what is excusable and what
is not. Mass opinion sometimes needs
guidance in these matters, which is
what a properly functioning "Estab-
lishment," or governing order, should
be able to supply.
What is so disturging about the Kis-
singer affair is that it demonstrates a
total failure by the American liberal
Establishment to do precisely that;
worse, on an almost hysterical deter-
mination to do precisely the opposite. . ?
? By any standards of common sense
it is ridiculous that the Secretary of
State should be . so unnecessarily in-
.
WASHINGTON STAR milt
8 July 1974
volved in a major row threatening his
moral credibility. Yet the quality press,
whose job it ought to be to get these
matters right, to articulate the Estab-
lishment voice of worldly wisdom, has
taken the lead in getting them wrong
and articulating the voice of unworldly
stupidity.
It maytwell he that Henry A. Kis-
singer was rather less than frank in
his Senate evidence about the part he
played in the telephone tapping of
his colleagues, -Ind of certain members
of the? press. Possibly the documents
will show that he did more than as-
sent to it, and positively encouraged
and even ordered it.
More likely it will show nothing
wholly conclusive either way. But this
surely is not the point. The point is
that the question is not terribly impor-
tant; certainly not important enough
to risk endangering the American na-
tional interest by discrediting a highly
successful Secretary of State.
To some extent this can obviously
be explained by Watergate, which has
shown the dangers-of excessive cyni-
cism. But an attitude to the exercise
of power which contains too little
cynicism is quite as dangerous as one
which contains too much. And in the
aftermath of Watergate, this second
danger may be the one that needs ,
watching most. ?
What is new today in all advanced
societies is the extent to which in-
tellectuals determine the climate of
Establishment opinion because, with .
the dependence of almost all forms of
large organization on specialized ,
knowledge, academics have become so
much more an integral and highly
influential part of the power structure
than ever they were- before. But they
do not feel at home in it.- Theirs is
En It/Borst:
?scow
By diplomatic standards, Richard
Nixon's trip to Moscow must be judged
a disaster. Presidents of the United
States aren't supposed to go to the sum-
mit, exchange a few smiles, sign a
vapid communique and return home Dr
empty-handed. Approved For ReleaSei
the world of theory, of concepts, of
ideals, or talking rather than doing.
For the first time, in short, the new
power structures include an element
of growing influence?based on brain
power?which finds the moral ambiv-
alence inherent in the exercise of
power alien, not to say shocking, to
its own values.
That this development 'should
cide with Watergate is distinctly un-
fortunate for the United States, since
everything about the Nixon Adminis-
tration has seethed to justify and
deepen this resistance to a proper
understanding of the painful and ugly
realities of power. But the absurd ,
Kissinger affair surely underlines how
dangerous it is if public opinion comes
to be dominated by influences con-
stitutionally incapable of understand-
ing these realities. ' ?
Nothing would be gained if, in es-
caping from the nightmare world of
Richard Nixon and Watergate, the
United States took refuge in the
dream world of The New York Times
and The Washington Post.
Peregrine Worsthorne is a columnist
for The Sunday Telegraph of London.
This is adapted from that newspaper.
But diplomatic standards, in these
times, are secondary. These are im-
peachment times, which I presume will
not characterize the future indefinitely.
Understandably, Nixon measures the
trip in impeachment terms ? and he
JON 32470fra-s94u0
a,
SIP
27
assume greater blame for the failure to
reach a disarmament agreement. Secre-
tary Henry Kissinger's strange state-
ment put the onus equally on Nixon and
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, neither.
able to control his military establish-
ment. It was further evidence of an in-
creasingly angry man.
KfSSINGER SURELY recognized
1101,0083001)34thout impeachment,
might have been willing to make con-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8
cessions, to take risks in-the interests of
disarmament. An impeachable Nixon,
cannot afford to take such risks and
alienate the pro-military right wing in
the country, his last body of unflinching
support.
So the Moscow visit was pure cere-
mony, which is not necessarily bad. In
1972, Nixon went to Moscow and, after
the long years of confrontation over the
Vietnam war, his presence there con-
veyed the symbolism of a new relation-
ship
A decade or so ago, during the transi-
tional era between Eisenhower and
Kennedy, the very principles of summi-
try (what purpose did it serve?) were a
.regular topic of conversation in diplo-
matic circles and the press.
It was accepted then 'that summit
meetings which have no positive results
tend, by their nature, to have negative
results. Such meetings tend to solidify
disagreements, in having them sancti-
fied by heads of state, and to signal
these disagreements to the entire world.
Nixon's visit, I suspect, achieved just
that result. Although Nixon insists pub-
licly that the momentum toward disar-
mament has been accelerated, I suspect,
it's been stopped dead in its tracks.
NIXON AND BREZHNEV tell us that
the low-keyed talks will resume, and we
all might as well hope for the best ? but
there is little doubt what the failure of
this summit will mean in other countries..
It is foolish to imagine that middle-
? LOS ANGELES TIMES
4 July 1974
Rosy Theme-Startles
tlesiltgtiators in Geneva
Optimistic Tone of Moscow Communique
Surprises Delegates Locked in Dispute
I3Y: JOE ALEX MORRIS JR.
Times staff Writer
highest level."
. GENEVA?Western and
neutral delegates to', the
.:European security confer-
ence expressed surprise at
the ?relatively 'optimistic
tone of the U.S.-Soviet
communique issued in
Moscow Wednesday on the
subject of .the conference ,
-
Delegates from the 35-
--
nation' at the conference
-are 'still locked in a tough
dispute. over whether to
?icall a break in flle Confer-
ence 'for the rest of the ?
summer. Both.. West Eu-
ropean 'partners in the
NATO alliance and.Europ-
? eati neutrals are dissatis-
fied with the lack of Soviet ?
concessions on key issues,
such as greater freedom of
:movement 'of - both ideas
and peoples. ? .
-. The Moscow commu-
nique 'did not reflect this. ?
'Instead it referred to "sub-.'
stantial ? progress" being
.made here at Geneva, -
'called for a windup of the
? conference "at an early
:date," and assumed that
'.the results of current ne-
gotiations would permit
i thin to take place., "at the
? This is, delegates Point-
:: ed out, pretty much what
Soviet Communist Party
leader Leonid I. Brezhnev
? wants from the Security
? conference. It is also what
he signally ? failed- get
from the late French Pres-
ident Georges Pompidou
during his Soviet visit:
shortly before his death:
Taken together, it raised
suspicions in many minds,
here that President Nixon..
. did' not take into account`'
the serious reservations .
the Europeans have about
winding up the- security
conference soon. These
may come into clearer fo-
cus Friday when.the plen-
um meets here for the sec-.
ond time to try to decide
whether to call a summer
? recess.
The Russians are vigor-
ously opposing the idea,
and want instead to try to
break the deadlock by ele-
vating the level of delega-
tions here. In informal:
conversations they have,
suggested taising it to de-
puty foreign minister lev-
el.
Several Western nation's .
,have countered that.
' sized powers around the world will no
be influenced by the example which th
big powers have set in Moscow. The
reasoning of the middle-sized power
goes like this: If you guys, who have
this fantastic capacity for overkill,
can't keep yourselves under control,
then why should we?
The latest count on countries with the
unrealized potential for nuclear weap-
onry has, according to American ex
perts, soared to 24. Thanks to India,
Pakistan will be next. Why not, one day.
Costa Rica or Tanzania?
Americans have largely convinced
themselves, right or wrong, that the big
powers have too much good sense to fire
these weapons. But what about the
other 24? That question, alas, is the
heritage of the Moscow summit.
'present pioblems h a V e.
nothing to do with the lev-
el 'of leadership, but con-
cern substantive issues.
This was emphasized
June 11 when the nine
Common Market foreign
-ministers issued an unu-
sual statement after their
Meeting in Bonn, in which
. they expressed their "suf.-
,prise" at the lack of pro-
gess at Geneva: This
stands in contrast to the
.Nixon-Brezhnev claim of
"substantial progress" be-
ing made on "many signi-
ficant questions."
Delegates here empha-
sized that they could not
see that any "substantial
progress" had been made
between the foreign minis-
ters' statement and the
Nixon-BrezhneV commu-
nique.
The soviets hate shown
? some indications they may
be ready to make conces-
sions on questions of acces
information,, family reun-
ions across the iron cur-
tain, and on advance noti-
fication and sending ob-
servers to each other's mil-
itary maneuvers. This' has
been less specific than tan-
talizing, sources here say,*
but it will probably contri-
bute towards extending
the current session be-
yond the original July
12th planned cutoff date:
At .the same time, dele-
gates expressed hopes that
earlier signs of American
anxiousness to speed up.'
the whole process of nego-,
28
1-" -tiation disappear. '3
One also drew attention
to an" apparent contradic;
tion in American policy.
' Secretary of State Henry
' A. Kissinger, in a. press'
-conference held in Bad;
Reichenall last month, re-.
luctantly agreed with the:
Common Market state-
ment on the lack of pr,o- ?
gress at Geneva. .
, It was noted at the time
; that the. endorsement ap-
peared to be drawn out of ?
Kissinger- more or less
'against his will. The Mos-
Icow communique ap-
peared likely to increase
European fears that the,
United States will not join
In ,a tough stand on the ,
windup of the security
conference ? a suspicion
some Europeans had even
before Mr. Nixon went to
Moscow. :_
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WASHINGTON POST
8 July 1974
Summits and Human Rights
UNLESS MR. NIXON and Mr. Brezhnev, address "the
problems of humanity and the basic rights of man,"
Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov said in a letter to the
two leaders on the eve of the summit, their meeting will
be "condemned to failure." But, one gathers, aside from
game practical talk about emigration as it relates .to
trade, there is no evidence?certainly not in the com-
,
untnique--that this appeal was heeded. Mr. Sakharov
himself spent the summit week conducting a hunger
,Strike to dramatize the plight of Soviet political pris-
oners.
? '''Three summits have only sharpened, not resolved,
the broad issue he raised. It proceeds from the outrage
Which all decent people must feel at the continuing
Soviet record on human rights. Earlier, Western liberals
had hoped that contact with the West and the onset
of detente would liberalize or "mellow" Soviet society,
blit Kremlin authorities responded instead by tighten-
ing controls. Others felt that the very process of in-
dustrialization would make Soviet ways- and values
"converge" with Western ones, but this prospect has
been blocked by Russian tradition and Kremlin ideology
?
alike. Soviet propagandists and well-meaning Americans
cultivate the view that underneath, as people,' we're all
the same. In fact, underneath we're different in funda-
mental values: we have one view of the relationship
between the individual and the state and the Russians
have another. This is nothing to get excited or defiant
,about, but it cannot be ignored. ? -
0? Two Political strategies have arisen for relating this
(apt to detente. By the first, these differences in values "
ore accepted, and diplomacy moves onto make the best
govertunent-to-government agreements possible, with
.the hope that a kind of political' suction will carry
Some human rights causes along. This is the adminis-
tration's strategy. Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have
been extremely sensitive to Soviet threats to break off :
Other diplomatic avenues if the United States expressed
more than perfunctory concern for Soviet intellectuals,
'dissenters, Jews, constituent nationalities; and so on.
Sen. Henry Jackson's (D-Wash.) contrary strategy
holds that internal Soviet liberalization is not just a
welcome byproduct but an essential precondition of any
real and enduring detente. Until the Kremlin is tamed
by the political need to consider the wishes of the
'Soviet people, he feels, 'it will be free to act in arbi-
trary and hostile ways in foreign affairs. Mr. Jackson
believes that the Soviet government, desperate for
rade, is more vulnerable to American pressure on
human rights than the administration has perceived.
The terms of this debate do not allow any single'
categorical resolution. But enough experience has been
gathered under detente to support certain judgments.
First, a detente policy will not win the strong popular
NEW YORK TIMES, SUIVDAY, JUNE 30, 1974
?
support it needs to be effective ih other areas if it :
does not evince a serious concern for. Soviet human
rights. Not only do Soviet writers, dissenters, Jews,
Ukrainians, and others have their American constitu-
encies, but as a people Americans have shown that they.
demand that American values be reflected in American
foreign policy. This is all the more so now that it is
becoming generally clear that detente in its other as---t
pects, such as arms control, is. sticky and slow. '?
Second,- different Soviet human rights issues cut '
, different ways. The Kremlin's principal thrust iS to
maintain its control at home. Thus it is particularly ,
open to pressures whose aim or result is to get certain
people?Jews, writers?out of the country. But pres-
sures meant to soften the situation within Soviet society
touch domestic politics directly more and encounter
tougher going. This produces an unhappy paradox; for- -
eign pressures, if they succeed, may leave the Soviet'
Union a more illiberal place because they draw out of
the country many individuals who might be pushing to
liberalize it if theSr remained. ?
Third, it is not possible, or necessary, to. avoid argu-
ment over how to press Moscow on human rights. That
Mr. Jackson -blew better than Dr. -Kissinger over the
last three years that the Kremlin would "give" on
emigration to get trade, does not prove there is no
effective limit on how hard the West can push. Indeed,
the emigration-trade link may dissolve if Congress de-
? cides that, on economic grounds alo trade with the
Soviet Union should not keep reeeiving Ex-lin Bank
subsidies. Pressures might then switch to political is-
sues, such as relations in Europe. If the Russians want a
full-dress European summit, for instance, -why should
they not first accept Western proposals on the exchange -
of information and people? Pressures should not be ap-
plied, however, unless the, United States is prepared
to have its bluff called. Each case must be thought
out. Stalemates and reverses can't be excluded. They -
will produce, in the Westf, feelings of anger and guilt.
Finally, there is no justification to walk on tiptoe
and to avoid speaking plainly and unprovocatively on
appropriate occasions about human rights out of fear
that Russian' sensitivities and politics will be upset. The
Russians are tougher than that. There is no need to be
abusive but no need to paint pictures either. Russians
routinely spout ,false and vicious stuff about Americans.'
The least Americans can do is offer the truth. Soviet
officials often contend that they do not demand internal
'American changes as the 'condition of political, agree- -
ments. But that is not out of delicacy; it is out of an '
absolute indifference to human rights on the part of
the Soviet political establishment. Nothing illustrates
more sharply and 'sadly this basic obstacle to an au- -;
thentic Soviet-American detente.
D?nte, ith Caution
By Robert Taft Jr.
WASHINGTON?President Nixon is
In Moscow to further the cause of
detente. There should be no one in
Washington who does not wish him
success. But at the same time that
we work for the lessening of ten-
sions between the United States
and the Soviet Union, we must con-
tinue to watch i r o not, just the sIrtor he ie14e2otiti018108eY etieostfiliwoo
Approveu
but also the realities of United States-
Soviet relations.
Foremost among these realities is
the discrepancy between the Soviet
public endorsement of detente and
the quiet but constant build-up of
Soviet military power.
In strategic arms, the Russians are
preparing to deploy four powerful
new intercontinental ballistic missiles
plus a new strategic bomber. ? ?.
29
nullify the United States acceptance
of the first agreement on the limita-
tion of strategic arms, by adopting
their own system of MIRV's, or war-
heads with multiple missiles.
In conventional armaments, their
naval expansion is proceeding rapidly
and includes the buildinr, of aircraft
carriers. They are embarked on a
major program to strengthen their
conventional land forces in Europe,
advanced,
VeMapons.
'
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? Nor do the private statements of
Soviet leaders offer assurance. It is
no secret that at the Prague confer-
ence of Eastern European party chiefs,
Le mid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party ,
leader, described detente not as a goal
but as a tactic with limited duration. 1
D?nte is justified within the party
on the grounds that it is acceptable to
bargain with the devil as long as you
cheat him in the end.
? As long as these Soviet policies and
attitudes persist we must base our
. diplomacy not on pro forma d?nte,
but on diplomatic and military reali-
ties. The foremost of these realities
" is our need for a strong and independ-
ent China to act as a counterweight
to the Soviet Union.
? In our ? recent concern with the ,
Middle East and with improving rela-
tions with Moscow, we have diverted
our attention from Peking, with unfor-
? tunate results. The Chinese leadership
has been increasingly open about its
? disappointment with the United States
- and its feeling that China has received
WASHINGTON POST
?9 July 1974
?Victor Zorza
little American assistance in reducing
the Soviet threat. ?
It is clear that an important element
in the current Chinese power struggle
is the argument of the old Lin Piao
faction that the understanding with
the United States has failed and that
the only way to reduce the Soviet
threat is through a new alliance with
the Soviet Union.
If we are to maintain China's cur-
rent position as a counterbalance to
Soviet power, we must take forceful
measures to strengthen the United
States-Chinese relationship. Secretary
of State Kissinger in la recent but
unfortunately little noticed address did
re-emphasize the United States interest
in a strong and independent China.
But the American effort must be in
concrete terms. Specifically, we must
make it clear that we would expect to
give active diplomatic and material
support to China in the event of a
confrontation with the Soviet Union.
We should carefully examine inclusion,
of China under the 'Nixon Doctrine,
? Kissinger's
Strategic
Challenges
At the end of last week's summit
talks Dr. Kissinger issued an emo-
tional challenge to his adversaries in
both Washington and Moscow. The two
.most quoted remarks to emerge from
his Moscow press conference set the
stage for the next phase of the politi-
cal struggle in both capitals. He said:
"One of the questions we have to ask
- ourselves as a country is: what in the
name of God is strategic superiority?
- . What do you do with it?" What he
had observed?in both capitals?led
r him to believe that "both sides have to
convince their military establishments
of the benefits of restraint, and that is
not a thought that comes naturally to
military people on either side."
The thought that came naturally to
Secretary of Defense James Schles-
inger was that this was an attack on
him, and he retorted angrily that "we
have firm civilian control in this coun-
try," that "there is no problem with
the military." How Soviet defense min-
ister Marshal Andrei Grechko re-
sponded is not on record, but an arti-
cle he published just before the sum-
mit led CIA analysts to conclude that
he too had gone out of his way to
stress his submissiveness to the pond-
, cal leadership.
Kissinger evidently does not accept
this picture of the realities of power,
in either capital. In urging the Ki-em-
providing her with an -opportunity to
acquire the material she needs to
defend herself against aggression.
Exchanges of ballet troupes and
orchestras are all very well, but Peking
Is aware, if some here are not, that
antitank weapons are rather more
effective in deterring potential Soviet
aggression.
This does not mean that we should
fail to seek detente with Moscow. A
real d?nte would, by definition,
include a reduction of the Soviet inili-
tary threat to all powers.
But as long as the current discrep-
ancy exists between Soviet public pro-
nouncements and Soviet military prep-
arations, we cannot afford to abandon
the traditional practice of counting
the divisions.
In the currer: world balance of
power, it is imperative that the divi-
sions of China's Army continue to be
stationed on the Soviet frontier.
Robert Taft Jr. is Republican Senator
froM Ohio.
?lin to "convince" its military establish-
' ment of the benefits of restraint, he is
in effect -telling Brezhnev to bring to a
conclusion the power struggle with
? Grechko over the making of strategic
policy which has proceeded fitfully in ,
Moscow for the past few years. In re-
? turn, be has undertaken to engage in a
similar policy struggle with Schles-
inger?and even, if need be, with
; Nixon.
This is evident from his remark, just
? before the summit, that if the Presi-
dent were faced with differences be-
tween his top officials, "then it is his
duty to move ahead in the direction
which he believes to be in the national
interest, keeping In mind the views of
? all of his senior advisers, but, if neces-
sary, choosing among them . ." It
was the duty of the President, "which
I do not doubt he will exercise," to re-
solve disagreements.
He was not pushing Mr. Nixon?not
yet?but serving notice on him that
the time might come when the Presi-
dent would have to choose between the
Schlesinger defense policy and the
Kissinger foreign policy. Lest Mr.
Nixon should feel inclined to shirk his
duty, Kissinger pointed out that he
must realize that "in the present cli-
mate" a fundamental debate was inevi-
table.
The "present climate" includes not
only the strategic debate, but Water-
gate as well. The Kremlin's Washing-
tonologists examine Kissinger's utter-
. % ances word by word and comma by
comma, in much the same way that
Western Kremlinologists study Soviet
statements. His remark may suggest to
them that Kissinger's post-summit
press conference began to pose for Mr.
Nixon the choice which Kissinger had
previously adumbrated.
Kissinger's earlier resignation threat
over allegations that he was involved
in wiretapping would, if carried out,
do more damage to Mr. Nixon than to
anyone else. Without Kissinger, Nixon
?30
could not convincingly persist with the ?
argument that he must stay in power'
to complete the "structure of peace."
Vice President Gerald Ford, on the
other hand, has already said that if he
became President he would retain Kis-
singer?and that he would drop Schles-
inger. Ford has made his choice, but
Nixon has still to make it. A Soviet an-
alyst trying to determine which way
Mr. Nixon will turn might well con-
clude that the President has no choice,
that the resignation or dismissal of ei-
ther Kissinger or Schlesinger would
bring the administration down.
.The Kremlin makes no secret of its
belief that Schlesinger is responsible
for the persistence of cold war tenden-
cies in the administration. Schlesinger
?as the Soviet press says?insists on
retaining the "superiority" which Kis-
singer has denounced with such feel-
ing. In the Kremlin's view, therefore,
the retention of Schlesinger for the re-
mainder of Mr. Nixon's tenure would
mean that no progress could be made
in strategic talks. -
One conclusion the Kremlin may
draw from this analysis is that, even if
Mr. Nixon remains in power, he will be
politically too weak to trade conces-
sions with Moscow. Yet without' mu-
tual concessions, without imposing on
the military of both sides the
"restraint" which Kissinger demands,
a strategic arms agreement will be
unattainable.
But if Mr. Nixon is in no position to
meet the Kremlin half-way, then Kis-
singer's advice to Brezhnev to take on
Grechko in a full-scale power struggle
is unlikely to be heeded in the Krem-
lin. Why should the Kremlin risk a ma
jor leadership crisis if the Nixon ad'
ministration is committed to strater.le
"superiority" in any case? The admin-
istration's spokesmen, of course, call it
"parity," but that is not how Grechko
sees it, as his statements make quite
clear.
0 19/4. Vidor Zona
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WASHINGTON POST Joseph Kraft
7 July 1974
A New Weakness in Our
MOSCOW?The Moscow summit
meetings last week provided a fore-
taste of the rough going the United
States is apt to encounter in the inter-
national arena as long as President
Nixon clings to office, The talks here
showed plainly that Mr. Nixon has lost
his clout in the most important of for-
eign affairs.
Moreover, the President's weakness
is now beginning to rub off on his Sec-
retary of State. Dr. Kissinger can no
longer wield the club of a strong presi-
dency to line up the American bu-
reaucracy in the style required by his
special kind of diplomacy, _
Unmistakable evidence of the Presi-
denVs weakness abroad arose from his
efforts to make the summit talks a per-
sonal victory, He repeatedly and pub-
licly declared that the talks and their
success depended upon "personal di-
plomacy" between himself and Secre-
tary General Leonid Brezhnev.
But the Russians did not rise to that
bait, On one occasion, which referred
to the future, Pravda struck the term
"personal" from the text of a presiden-
tial toast,
At the final banquet, Mr. Brezhnev
Made rejoinder to the President's
stress on personal diplomacy by point-
edly alluding to the American people
, and the American Congress. The Rus-
sians have come to understand that
their future with the United States re-
quires a thick diet of relations with all
elements in American life. It says
something of Moscow's changing view
that a documentary film of Sen. Ed-
ward Kennedy's recent visit to Russia
WASHINGTON POST,
Frida). July 5, 1974-
opened here last week,
Neither were the Russians prepared
to oblige the President on the main
matter of substance in the summit
talks here. The big item on the agenda
turned around proposals for a limita-
tion on multi-headed missiles, or
MIRVs.,
The Russians clearly sensed that
they had Mr. Nixon on the defensive.
, Secretary General Brezhnev presented
proposals which would have allowed
the Russians to catch up with the
United States and perhaps achieve a
decisive edge in 1980. The Politburo
spurned more restrictive numbers put
forward by Mr. Nixon.
Not only did the Russians feel able
to hang tough, but it seems clear that
thelPresident could not have bought a
slightly softer Russian position. Mr.
Nixon depends on conservative votes
In the Senate to overcome impeach-
ment, The last thing he can afford is a
nuclear agreement that would alienate
such hawks as Barry Goldwater,
? Congressional opposition was the
more certain because the administra-
tion position on MIRV limitation has
not been unanimous. Defense Secre-
tary James Schlesinger actually
wanted more restrictive limits on So-
viet deployment than those set forth in
the U.S. proposal which the Russians
rejected. Had a deal been struck there
would have been some murderous in-
fighting within the administration.
For, relations among the chief fig-
ures inside Mr. Nixon's government.
have been recently altered. Dr. Kis-
-
singer used ? by invoking the Presi-
dent's authority and by playing a close,
Global Relations
Inside game ? to force his own posi-
tions on the rest of Washington.
But the presidency which he once
brandished as a club has turned into a
banana. Independent-minded men, -
such as Dr. Schlesinger, can and do
take positions which differ from those
, of the Secretary of State. Dr. .Kis-
singer now has to make treaties with
the Washington opposition instead of
overcoming it by main force.
? It says a good deal that during the
Moscow visit various Russians ex-
pressed a keen interest in a visit from
the Defense Secretary, It also says -
something that Dr, Kissinger hung
back in the negotiations, and once, not
entirely in jest, said, "Nobody tells me
anything. I -just follow ten paces be- ?
hind." _ ? _ _
What was achieved at the Moscow
summit, in these conditions, is not\ to
be disparaged. The condition called de-
tente was maintained. Some accords
which' provide for further cooperation -
were signed, A. truly bad deal was
avoided,
I .
No doubt it is unfortunate that more
was not achieved. But no one should
be in any doubt as to why the accom-
plishment was so meager. ?
The central fact is that the United
States has a President crushed by the
problems which have brought an lm
peachment process down upon his.
head. Even if he were a man of pure
motive and unblemished conscience,
he could not possibly separate out his
own interest from the national inter-
est. So long as he remains in office,
the country will limp along in its most
important international business.
1074, field EnterPrifics, Inc
An Epitaph for Detente
rytHE PREMIER diplomatic project of the Nixon pres1-
1- dency, to negotiate Meaningful checks on the stra-
tegic arms race, is stalemated. The point of all previous
arms control agreements was to build up political
momentum to tackle the problem of strategic offensive
nuclear arms. As recently as, the last summit, that
was the goal for this one. In Moscow, however, Mr.
Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev evidently could not come near
finding a mutually acceptable basis to put permanent
controls on offensive arms or temporary stopgap con-
trols on the development and deployment of the multiple-
warhead missiles cal/ed MIRVs, technologically and po-
litically the hottest brand of strategic weaponry. They
could only agree to send their negotiators back to
Geneva to negotiate a "new agreement," to follow the
interim offensive-arms limitation expiring in 1977, to
cover the decade ending in 1985.
Not everyone, of course, agrees that the summit re-
flects such a great disappointment. Mr. Nixon, as his
TV audience Wednesday night could plainly see, has .his
own domestic political reasons to portray his diplomacy
as fruitful and forward-looking ("the process of peace
is going steadily forward"): this is his principal bulwark
against impeachment. Mr. Schlesinger, the Secretary of
Defense, having long worried of the possibility of ill-
considered arms control agreements, at once offered the
stoical view that the BclaVg1394 ibikekkattd21001108/
have Its dialogue with 1 meow sustained. Certainly those
who professed to fear that Mr. Nixon would give away
the nation's security to compensate for his Watergate
Weakness have been proven wrong.
$efore he left Moscow, however, Secretary of State
Kissinger uttered what struck us as an apt remark. "Both
sides have to convince their military establishments of
the benefits of restraint," he said, "and that is not a
thought that comes naturally to military people on
either side." As a statement or allegation about the
Soviet government, these words?spoken in Moscow,
no less?are startling enough. As a statement or report
about the American government, they are even more
startling, 'suggesting as they do that President Nixon
has not convinced the Pentagon and its political allies
of those "benefits of restraint".
Recall the uncontested fact that Mr. Nixon' went to
Moscow without having resolved strong differences
among his advisers on how to proceed on arms control.
No one can say flatly what alterations in its position
the Kremlin might have made but it is evident that
President Nixon did not resolve the differences he
brought to Moscow in a way making substantial progress
possible. Certainly the American "military establish-
ment" cannot be faulted for offering the President its
best judgment of what the national security requires.
The APripidgedgyili J,410 klyndlitammtp3As to make
66ffiligifig judgments. In
31
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the circumstances, it is hard to avoid suspecting that
'Mr. Nixon negotiated as he did not merely because he
may have been swayed by the Pentagon's strategic
arguments but because he wished to protect his domestic
political position against attack from the right. In other
words, considerations of political survival influenced
his determination of the requirements of national se-
?curity. Here is Watergate at work in the most dispirit-
ing and Insidious way.
This is not to dismiss the particular accomplishments
of this summit. The agreement not to build a second ABM
site is reassuring, and perhaps not entirely the foregone
conclusion that many people had thought it to be. The
threshhold test ban, which will limit underground tests of
warheads larger than 150 kilotons starting in 1976, will
strike many observers as late, weak and incomplete but
it will evidently put a stop, two years from-now, to cer-
tain arms work that both sides might otherwise have
carried forward, and it sets some useful technical prece-
dents?exchanging test-site geological data, for instance.
Then, it is good neles, if not exactly worth house-top
!broadcast, that Moscow and Washington will work on
'agreements to prevent the waging of war by modifying
the weather, and to take a "first step" to control the
."most dangerous, lethal" kinds of chemical warfare.
" The political results of the summit, furthermore, are
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8
'not to be dierniesed. "Detente," we are all learning, can
provide a framework for orderly discussion of difficult
problems like the Mideast and Europe, even when solu-
tions are remote. This fact is registered in the final com-
munique. On trade, Mr. Nixon?wisely?seems to have
Made no promises which will precipitate a battle with
Congress. The word he brings back on Soviet emigration
policies will be especially important in this regard. The
apparently common Soviet-American desire to make new
bilateral agreements symbolizing progress in detente is
leading to some pretty rarified areas, such as?this time
?"artificial heart research." Mr. Brezhnev is to come to
the United States next year. This is well and good. The
more that summits become routine, the more they can
perhaps be isolated?though of course there is a limit?
from 'political tugs and pulls in both countries.
For all of this, the bottom line is that the dangerous
arms build-up has not yet been checked. Both countries
are now moving ahead to what Dr. Kissinger calls "astro-
nomical" numbers of warheads. "What in the name of
God," he declared to newsmen in Moscow, "is strategic
superiority at these levels?" Barring a measure of mu-
tual restraint in the next few years in the absence of a
formal agreement, this just might be?at least in respect
, to the arms race?an epitaph for detente.,.
THE
4
THE NEW YORK TIMES SATURDAY, JUNE 29, 1974
Power in the World Economic Arena
By O. Edmund Clubb
" -PALENVILLE, N. Y.--:-The World is
experiencing *a :massive power shift.
There 'is talk of military budgets,
multiple-warhead missiles,' strategic.
'
arms talks and ?counterforce strategy.
But the real issues lie in the inter-
national. economic arena. There, the
United States and its, allies battle
among themselves, while the Soviet
-Union, a sometime 'enemy, is rapidly
.gaining ground.
- The Nixon Administration's strategic
oiiCepts and tactical Maneuvers are
seriously flawed. In' July, 1971, the
President forecast that future world
confrontations would 'be among the
United States, the European Economic
- Community, Japan, the Soviet Union,
and China. Confrontations promptly
ensued, but they were primarily among
the United States, the Common Market
and Japan, and not with the Commu-
nist powers that the -so-called free
world had been organized to combat'.
Later, ? Henry A. Kissinger' hailed
:1973 as "the Year of Europe" (with
. a role provided for Japan) but disputea
'persisted within the projected partner- ?
;ship .and were aggravated by the ?
Arab-Israeli war.
Though-the full impact Of The energy
crisis on the international trade -struc-
ture ,and .monetary 'system is still to
be felt, commercial patterns are being
distorted, inflation . magnified, and
Protectionism spurred in the capitalist
world. Also, internal political weak-
nessesiii the West will be aggravated
by the growing economic nationalism
of Third World countries, who threat-
en to have' greater control over their
valuable raw materials.. The United
States; Japan and Western Europe
must share the limited supplies, or
compete for them. The' free enterprise
system is not designed for sharing
with competitors, ' and the United
States Produces an agricultural surplus
With which it can pay some of the
increased costs of oil imports. -
The North Atlantic Treaty *Organ=
ization. referred in its June 19 declara-
tion to' 'sources of conflict between'
their economic policies'," reflecting the
actuality. Mr. Nixon's Moscow visit
is to be viewed In that light."
,The Soviet _Union also faces indus-
trial and agricultural problems. But it
has not been involved in the capitalist
world's economic feuding and has
thus been' spared major economic dif-
ficulties: Its gross national product
climbs, its foreign .trade is expanding,
the ruble is stable. And the Soviet
Union 'is More richly endowed with
natural resources than even the United
States. Possessing vast reserves of oil
and natural gas, and over one-half of
the world's coal, it is self-sufficient in
energy, and in 1973 exported 118
million metric tons of petroleum and
4.9 billion cubic meters of natural gas.
It also exports such goods as nickel,
chromium and platinum-group metals
?which other industrialized countries
have to import.
The Soviet Union Is in a position to
produce substantial . surpluses of.
32
?energy mat&ials and metals for export
? at a time when .the E.E.C., Japan and
the United States face major deficit's
of thbse goods. ?
Soviet trade with the West was up
40 per cent in 1973. Trade with the
United States doubled over that of
?the year before, but West Germany
iwas still the Soviet Union's chief capi-
talist trading partner. The present urge
of E.E.C. countries and Japan in partic-
ular to exchange? industrial equipment
? and technology for needed raw ma-
terials is only a fraction of what it
promises to be in a short time. Just
as the Europeans dealt directly with
the Arab countries in 1973 despite
American displeasure, so will they deal
increasingly in the future with both.
the Third World and the Soviet Union.
The Nixon Doctrine disrupted our
major alliances and was counterpro-
ductive. The Administration's attempts
-to assert American domination over ?
the capitalist sector of the global econ-
omy has failed. World influence is .
now destined to flow not to those
commanding the biggest nuclear war-
heads but to those wielding economic ?
power. A fundamental adjustment of
American foreign policy, relating it
more effectively to a radically altered
,global economic situation, should be
the order of the day.
0. Edmund Ciubb was former director
of the State Department's Office of:
Chinese Affairs..
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? LONDON T I ME5
5 July 1974
The poppy
crop that could cost
Turkey, dear
A Bill to cut off all US
aid to Turkey
if poppy'cultivation were
If
resumed, is going
?rough Congress rapidly now
The Turkish Government is
risking a major crisis in its
relations with the United
States after its decision to up-
hold an electoral pledge and
lift the ban on the cultivation
-of the opium poppy, the source
of morphine and heroin.
The American Government
which regards Turkey as. the
origin of ' as much as 80 per
cent of all the heroin smuggled
into the United States, had
made it "vigorously clear" to
Ankara that to rescind the
poppy ban would, cause irre-
parable damage in their rela-
tions, if not a definite breach.
Uniler the current law in Tur-
key, the Government -had to
produce a decree by July 1 list-
ing the districts where the ban
must continue. This is in-
tended to give farmers timely
warning to switch to other, less
lucrative, crops. This year's
decree names all but six or
seven of the main districts in
the poppy-growing plains of
south-western Anatolia.
The Americans accuse the
Etevit Government of choosing
this issue, so vital to their drive
against hard-drug addiction in.
the. United States merely in .
order -to display " virility " in
their external relations. They
forecast that Congress - would
ut off all United States eco-
omic and military aid to Tur-
key in retaliation.
Turkish Government ieaders
hrug off the threats as out
ageons. . They insist that their
THE ECONOMIST JUNE 29, 1974
Nuclear tests
All in secret
e'
motive is the economic well
being of about one million
Turks who live off this crop.
They give solemn pledges that
the product will be controlled
so effectively that? none of it
will be diverted from the medi-
cinal purposes ,for which it is
intended.
United States -? officials
asserted that the popy ban in
Turkey, imposed in 1971 under
strong American pressure, has
had spectacular results in their
campaign .to check the spread
of drug addiction in the United
States. They said that a major
heroin shortage in the United
States in --the -past two years
had forced many . addicts to
seek medical treatment. They
attributed this to the ban, as
well, as the fact that the -price
of heroin in the streets of New
York had risen from 18p to
63p a milligram by mid-1973,
while its purity at street leyel
had decreased considerably.
The United States Drug En.
fprcement Administration
noticed a sharp decline in the
total haul of heroin-intercepted
in the United States from 705 .
kilograms in 1971 to 219 kilo.
grams in 1973?only 63 -
per
cent of it white (therefore pre-.
sumably kish) against 92
per cent in mid-1972.
The grave implications that a
lifting of the poppy ban would ?
have on United States-Turkish
relations were recently. con-
veyed by the American Ambas-
sador, Mr William Macomber,
jar, personally .to the: Prime ;
It is a measure of present British politics
that the angriest public debate on defence
policy in years should have been initiated
by a speculative report in a daily news-
paper. At the weekend Labour's left
wing was up in arms because it thought
Britain was about to test a nuclear
weapon underground in Nevada; on
Monday it discovered from Mr Wilson
that the test. had._ already taken... place
some weeks ago. The metire. riv&witiFIbr
Mr Wilson tried to pers ae-the left
33
Minigter,- ? Mr. ?Billent ? Ecevit
whose Republican ? People's
Party is the senior partner in
the ruling coalition. -
The Turkish leader was told
of resentment in Congress where
poppy growing in Turkey .and
the rate of drug-addiction in the
United Sfates were dramatic-
ally linked in a direct cause-and-
effect relationship. Lester
Wolff, Chairman of the House
of Representatives Special Nar-
cotics Subcommittee, stated
recentiy : "If Turkey rescinds
the ban . . . we may expect to
lose an additional 250,000 young
Americans to the ravishes of
drug addiction."
-A Bill to cut off all United
States aid to Turkey if poppy
cultivation were resumed, it
; "going through- Congress rapidly
now. American officials said if
the bill went through as it is,
it would end United States mi-ti-
tary and economic aid to Turkey
worth some $200m annually.
? "If they go ahead with it ",
one American diplomat set
"relations between the two
countries will never be the ,same
again. To cut off aid will be
felt here not so _much as a
financial loss as an insult from
the United States."
The United States-Turkish
opium controversy has gained
nationalist overtones which
reflect the Ecevit Government's
eagerness to show?at home and
abroad?that the days of unquesz
tioning conformism in Turkey's
relations with the West are over
and gone.
Beyond this there is the
awareness that the United States
might ill be able to afford, ail
this Phase in East-West rela-
tions, the removal of United"
States bases in Turkey.
To ensure effective control
the authorities are expected to
limit poppy-growing to areas
totalling 50,000 acres in the six_
cultivation of other crops in
these districts will be banned so.
that aerial inspection would be,
possible. - ,
The poppies would not be
incised to drain the opium gum,
but the plant will be sur-
rendered as a whole to the state
agents. The price is to be raised
substantially to discourage illicit
that it had nothing to complain about
cast more light on Mr Wilson's habitual
politicking than on anything else. But it
is a measure of the international self-
confidence of the present government
that it saw fit to-keep secret as long as
possible a smallish, non-polluting and
wholly legal nuclear test conducted in
strict accordance with Britain's inter-
national undertakings.
The real issue and one that merited
serious public concern early last year
but did not get much of it, was whether
Britain should install new tubes in its
Frelisithap 21311111013/0goic bek.FEHur
Polaris submarines to take the lailarlyo
independently-targetable re-entry vehicles
sales, seeing that in any event
-only a fraction of the price even-
tually fetched by smuggled nar-
cotics reaches the farmer.
The Americans are accusing
Turkey of violating an arrange-
ment made in 1971 whereby the
US budgeted a programme
worth $35.7m for the payment-
of compensation to farmers for
three years, as well as to firi-
ance crop substitution pro-
grammes. The Turkish Govern-
ment denies the arrangement
was binding. They have serious'
doubts that any form of control.
could be effective, especially
after the discovery of a heroin-
laboratory in Turkey for the
first time in 12 years last May-.i
A leading Turkish parlia-
mentarian whose opinions in--
fluence the Government poli
cies; said : "We know that this
is one of the dirtiest businesses
in the 'world. It does not give
us joy to deal with opium, nor
is it a question of challenge or
prestige. But we must ensure
"the livelihood of about one mu-
-lion peasants before we ban the-
crop on which they made a hi--
, ing for centuries."
-The US crop substitution pro.
gran-...ne was quite inadequate
and although he was aware that
the Americans were willing to
pay a much higher price to
keen the ban, nothing could be
done this year:
Turkish officials and private-
individuals react sharply when
the poppy dispute is treated as
a problem of morality or
ethics : "Why should Turkey
be ' the only poppy-growine
country which is being pressed
to ban it. Just because the drug
is not consumed locally as jr
other countries ? ", asked an
influential Turkish journalist.
Mr Semih Akbil, the Govern-
ment spokesman, raised a dif-
ferent objection : "The Ameri-
cans manufture guns and
sell them
freely ", he said.
"Each year about 100,000 guns
are smuggled into Turkey. Do
we ask the Americans to stop
manufacturing guns? .No, no.
We just tighten our controls
against smugglers."
Mario Modiano
(lvflivs), or build new warheads for the
American-produced missile bodies it
already has. There are many factors
involved: whether the United States will
continue to supply spare parts for Polaris
missiles that its own forces are now
giving up; how much extra protection
the submarines would get from Poseidon's
longer range, which enables them to
operate farther away from Russia; and
whether it is really necessary to have a
lot of Mirvs to get through Russia's anti-
missile defences.
' But the time for debating these things
401%tritish test means
cision as been made: to
design new warheads for the present
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missiles. The actual installation could
begin within a year: This is very likely
the correct decision, and no British
government should have hesitated to
explain it, or to let the Soviet Union
know about it. After all, secret deterrents
do not deter. ? ?
It is the cheaper decision, by millions
of pounds, compared with putting new
? tubes in the submarines to take Poseidon
missiles. The money saved is money
Britain badly needs to spend on its
conventional forces. The extra range of
the Poseidon, which is of immense value
to the Americans, is not so valuable to
Britain. Poseidon's Miry warheads-
1 0- 14 per missile, compared with 3
cluster-type in Polaris?are primarily
of use in avoiding and confusing a
wide anti-ballistic missile defence of a
sort that does not yet exist in Russia,
and probably will never be built. Even
if it is, a smaller number of warheads
would probably still deter an attack
on Britain.
-So Britain's missiles are to be modern-
ised,. but-not replaced. The Nevada test
does not add to the number of nucl
powers, as India's did last month;
?
unlike France's tests in the Pacifi
produces no fall-out; The aim of th
who-attack it is thatBritain should ce
to be one- of the five accepted nucl
countries. There was never any ques
that Britain could pay the price or mus
the. technological -shit to stay in
business. There was; and still is, as
great nuclear non-debate of 1974 sho
a serious question whether British poll
is up to coping with the nuclear age. -
BALTIMORE SUN
11 July 1974
'To i ?
I L inamed for not agreemg to complete
Fay MICHAEL PARKS ' i China,- making it 'appear that'
I trying to force an end to the n.ticlear ban.
' Moscow Bureau of The Sun the two superpowers were I
Chinese nuclear weapons pro-
gram. .
Mr. Zamyatin did not go into
the background of the negotia-
tions on the new nuclear test
}ban, which bars underground
[nuclear weapons tests equiva-
lent to more than 150,000 tons
of TNT 'starting April 1, 1976,
and his critical remarks sug-
gested that Moscow wants to
shift more of the blame for a
lackluster, even disappointing
summit onto Washington.
Mr. Zamyr.tin also attacked
pessimistic Western assess-
ments of the summit, which
Soviet commentators see as
modestly successful, as deli-
berate attempts to 'undermine
public faith in detente itself.
In particulai; he said that
Western suggestions ? which
in fact originated with the ana-
lysis made by Dr. Kissinger ?
that the two superpowers were
, far apart on a new overall
agreement to limit strategic
arms is wrong. .
"Skeptics who doubt that
agreement are wrong," he said
} of the decision to seek a 10-
year pact lasting until '1985.
' There was "a big positive
advance toward solving that
problem" of limiting long-
range missiles with their mul-
tiple nuclear warheads during-
. the summit, Mr. Zamyatin
maintained.
' The failure to 'reach a per-
Moscow?The chief Soviet
}government spokesman
blamed the United States last
night for the failure during the
,Soviet-American summit meet-
ing to agree to a full ban on
underground nuclear tests.
Lleonid N. Zamyatin, the
director general of the govern-
ment news agency ? 'a parti-
cipant in the summit talks,
said the Soviet Union had
N nnted and still wants a flat
prohibition against any under-
ground testing of nuclear wea-
pons.
The reason that President
Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev,
the Soviet Communist party's
general secretary, failed to
reach such an agreement,
Zamyatin said, was "the posi-
tion of the United States."
"Our position is still," he
continued, "that the Soviet
Union stands for a complete
end of underground tests of
nuclear weapons."
American officials' have
openly said that they did in-
deed reject a complete prohibi-
tion at this time.
Henry A. Kissinger, the
United States Secretary of State,
told a press conference here at
the }end of the summit last
week that Washington had op-
posed a complete ban because
Moscow's conditions would
}make it impossible to verify
, and enforce and because, he
liraplied, it was directed at
manent limitation and the Out-
right declaration that both this
type of agreement and even a
short-term one are now impos-
sible are the chief reasons for
the pessimistic assessments
made by Western commenta-
tors.
The discussion in which Mr.
Zamyatin participated was ap-.
parently directed at answering
these questions for the nation-
wide Soviet television audience
and viewers in Eastern Eu-
rope, where the 40-minute pro-
gram was also broadcast'
Mr. Zamyatin's carefully
prepared comments were }
meant not only to innoculate
these listeners against the
Western assessments but also
to ansWer Dr. Kissinger's con-
tinuing discussion of the sum-
mit's secret negotiations,
sources here said.
The Kremlim has been parti-
cularly annoyed, the sources
said, by Dr. Kissinger's disclo-
sures to newsmen traveling
with him in Western Europe of
summit negotiation details.
Some of the information he has
given, the sources said,
amounted to a serious breach
of confidence.
The moderator of the televi-
sion program, Valentin Zorin,
a political commentator, took
the occasion to attack Senator
Henry M. Jackson, the Wash-
34
ington Democrat and, in the
Soviet view, chief opponent of
improved relations between
Moscow and Washington. -
"One must be very naive,"
Mr. Zorin said, "to believe
that [Senator Jackson's trip to
I Peking during the Moscow
summit] was ' an aecidental
coincidence."
American sources here prov-
ided additional background on
the negotiations on the test-
ban agreement, which supple-
ments a 1963 treaty banning all
nuclear tests in the atmos-
There, outer space or in the
sea.
I The United States originally
wanted a ban on anything
above 150 kilotons, the agreed
limit, but had wanted it to
include peaceful nuclear explo-
sions that in the end were
excluded at Soviet insistence.
The American position itself
was a compromise reached by
various American government
agencies and took into account
a military desire to test new
missile warheads for which a
200 kiloton limit would be low
and thecclesire of arms-control
} experts to limit any under-
ground explosions to less than
} 30 kilotons, which they said
} could be easily distinguished
now from natural seismic dis-
turbances.
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
7 July 1.974 ---
India's
TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW SETS STAGE
? ? ?
1,"7:?? lit-VVILLIAM DRUMMOND
*NE* DELHI?The Canadian govern-
ment over the last 20 years gave India
plentiful technical and financial assis-
tance to develop nuclear energy for peace-
ful purposes.
Times staff writer William .Drummond
is based in New Delhi.
Ottawa recognized too late that this
? assistance had opened the way for New
ljelhi to make an atomic bomb.
,..-Although Prime Minister Pierre Elliot
Trudeau tried by negotiations and even-
tually threats to head off India's steps to-.
Ward. building an explosive device, he
zooid not.
? .
Of all the reactions to India's May
.18 atomic test, Ottawa's has been the
. bitterest, because the Canadians feel
?the"), were betrayed.
The history of the Canada-India nuclear
collaboration, pieced together from inter-
views and docume:.ts, including previous-
ly .unpublished correspondence between
Trudeau and Prime Minister Indira Gand-
hi; holds particular significance for the
United States.
? Washington wants to sell Egypt a nu-
clear reactor for the peaceful purpose of
generating electrical power.
Critics of the proposal say it will provide
Egypt with the wherewithal to make a
,nuclear bomb and lead to proliferation in
.the Middle East.
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's.
response to these fears were expressed in
a June 19 press conference:
". ? We see no possibility that Egypt
can develop nuclear weapons by means of
the reactor that we have agreed to sell; it
will take six to eight years to install or.
build, and will be subject to safeguards
which we consider substantially foolproof
? . .
? The Canadians look at Kissinger'S
? statements with skepticism. Their ex-
perience with India taught them one major,
unforgettable lesson:
Safeguards and inspections, however
"foolproof," can at best delay, prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons. They cannot stop
it.
This is not because evasion is inevitable,
\ but because evasion may not be necessary
for long.
"Does- the American plan for Egypt in-
volve a transfer of technology?" asked an
Informed Canadian source. _"That should
o b a Warning
be the main consideration. PrOteeting the
source of plutonium is predicated on safe
guards, but the inevitable element of risk
is the transfer of technology, not safe
guarding the reactor."
(Plutonium is the byproduct of the
burning of uranium fuel in any nuclear
reactor. The plutonium, after reprocess-
ing, becomes the raw material for atomic
explosive devices).
-"Once a country acquires the technology
to Operate a nuclear power plant," the
Canadian said, "it can then move on to
building its own unsafeguarded nuclear
power plants. It can then have access to
unsafeguarded plutonium. ?
"As for acquiring explosion technology;
the Indians got it on their own," the
sources said. ?
The debate on the Egyptian reactor sale
according to these sources, should not fo-
cus on safeguards on plutonium, but on
whether America should give Egypt's
technical elite a boost in a direction that
would take many years for them to attain
without external. aid.
In this'respect, Canada's nuclear aid to
India was of crucial importance..
By October, 1971, Canada had brought
263 Indians to Canada for training in nu-
clear technology.
In addition, Canada had put up $10.8
million, about half the total cost, to build
the Canada-India nuclear reactor called
CIRUS at the B.haba Atomic Research
Center, Bombay.
Another $89 million in credits was ex-
.tended by Ottawa to buy equipment for
the Rajasthan atomic power project near.
.Kota.
Against this background, Trudeau
wrote to Mrs. Gandhi on Oct. 1,1.971:
"You ? will remember in our talks (the
_
previous January) I referred to the se-
rious concern of the Canadian govern-
ment regarding any further proliferation
of nuclear explosive devices. The position
of my government on nuclear explosions
has been stated on a number of occasions
and you will no doubt be well aware of it.
"The use of Canadian supplied
material, equipment and facilities in
India, that is, at CIRUS, at Rajas-
than, or fissile material from these
reactors, for the development of a
nuclear explosive device would ine-
vitably call on our part for a reas-
sessment of our nuclear operation
arrangements with India . ."
Mrs. Gandhi's response was cordial
but noncommittal:
"The obligations undertaken by
for U.S.
our t`Wo ? governments are mutual
and they.cannot be unilaterally va-
ried. In these circumstances, it
should not be necessary, now in our
view, to interpret these agreements
in a particular way based on the
development of a hypothetical con-
tingency."
The contingency was anything but
hypothetical, as India's atomic blast.
last May 18 proved.
How had India gotten the plutoni-
, urn?. ? ? - . -
It carne from the CIRUS reactor, as
New Delhi later informed Ottawa..
' But the plutonium was not of
- Canadian origin. India had put its
own uranium in CIRUS, and made
weapons-grade plutonium.
India used know-how that was
largely a spinoff from the many:
years of Canadian and, to a lesser de-
gree, American technical assistance.
Under the CIRUS agreement, Can-
ada had the right to inspect any
Canadian uranium fuel in the reac-
tor. However, CIRUS had not used:
Canadian fuel for several years.
India said the Canadian -fuel had
."corroded" in the reactor and as a
'result, Indian uranium fuel was sub-'
stitu ted.
As the Canadians- point out, the
,agreements for safeguarding CIR.VS
were worked out in 1956, 14 Years
before the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty took effect.
Canada signed the treaty, but India
neser has.
It 'was impossible for Ottawa to.;
.impose inspection under the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency.
Thus what Canada had to settle for
was a limited inspection access, that
is, permission to inspect only Cana- -
dian fuel. ?
This inspection was ineffective
when India substituted its own ura-
nium fuel. While reactors can be
sealed off and inspected, knowl-
edge cannot.
The CIRUS and Rajasthan reac-
tors have made such a major contri-
bution to India's know-how that
New Delhi is .now building wholly
indigenous reactors, which will in
turn become sources of unsafeguard-
ed plutonium.
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35
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EasterivEurop
- BALTIMORE SUN
8 July 1974
Reasoner became delivery boy when
Harry Reasoner became Even after an official
ery boy last week.
the world's highest paid deliv-o censorship an ogydTuesday
a pledge that Russians pulled plu
Soviet apol for 's
The $250,000-a-year Al3C
wou dn t happen again, ; 'Moscow privately feel that to us in China?' - ?
News anchorman, angered Russian technicians Wednes- the White House didn't want
by Soviet censorship of day night again refused to TV reports on Soviet Jews,'
American TV news reports transmit an interview with intellectual dissidents or hun-
from the Soviet Union, per- Sakharov by a CBS news- ger strikes any more than.
sonally escorted a can of man, Murray Fromson. Russian leaders did.
news film on a flight fronr "They pulled the plug on ' The newsmen believe the
IMfinoas1cIoywwtoasLoanbldeonto, wfeheedrethhe spokesman said. e
'
us again," a CBS News ',Nixon administration there-
': fore applied little or no diplo-
film via satellite to the ' "The Russian engineers matic pressure on the Soviet
United States in time for his told Murray they thought his hierarchy to give American
network's Wednesday news- film was anti-Soviet and that TV reporters freedom to
cast. .? they wouldn't transmit it. transmit their choice of news
'The report, an interview. And they didn't. They, just stories during the Nixon,-
by Russell Jones with Andrei walked out and refused to Brezhnev meetings.
Sakharov, the dissident Rus-' rack up the film." ; Sources at the networks
sian physicist, was one of six 'The CBS White House cor-; said the Soviet technicians
news - stories abruptly- respondent, Dan Rather, who cut off the satellite re-
blacked out Tuesday evening? meantime, placed partial re- ports were supervisory per-
when Soviet technicians sponsibility for the censor; sonnel and not rank-and-file
"pulled the plug" on CBS, ship on the Nixon adminis- workers as the Soviet gov-
NBC, and ABC. - tration. ? ' ernment claimed. The low-
All three networks telecast ' "As far as can be deter- er-echelon workers were
the abbrieviated and garbled mined," Rather, charged, deeply embarrassed by the
reports?blackouts and all? "White House officials did situation, the sources said.
and explained to American -nothing to prevent the Soviets Rather said there were no
viewers exactly what had from making good on their shouting matches or taunts
taken place.
?1
1 threat [to censor)." exhanged between American
Pressing Reasoner into Rather and several other. newsmen and Soviet TV em-
emergency duty as a flying U.S. network newsmen ,who ployees when the blackout
messenger proved to 'be a accompanied President occurred. Instead, he ex-
wise move by ABC- , , Nixon on his summit trip,to plained, there was quiet in
the studio.
' Finally, one American
!broadcaster called out to an-
i
,other, "Did they ever do this
'THE WASHINGTON Pair- Friday, July 5,1974
, ? ? R . _
"No, they didn't," another
answered from the opposite
side of the room.
The Soviet technicians said
nothing, and the blackout
continued.
Bill Sheehan, senior vice
president of ABC News, said
both the Secretary of State,'
Henry A. Kissinger, and the
White House press secretary,
Ronald L. Ziegler, "indicated.
they Were very upset" by the.
Soviet censorship, and that
they would register a formal'.
protest if the networks re-
quested it.
"It's really just an exten-:
sion of the difficulty we a!-
ways have in Russia with:
filth cameras,"
said.
"You have to hire: your:
film cameras from the Rus-?
sians and you have to tell;
them what story you want to
do- And if they don't like the
story, then there's no film
camera- available to you.
"But it was surprising that
It could happen during this:
Nixon visit, in such a cordial
atmosphere of diplomacy.")
? .
Xnlight News Service
Censorship' and Sthnn"titry-
?
yt was only a week after the United States Supreme
Court had affirmed the principle that a free society
can only remain free if the government keeps it hands
off the news. Tuesday night, the Russian technicians
who operated the "satellite feed" that brought pictures
from the Moscow, summit showed what happens when
governments take into their own hands the right to
censor public expression. Each time American broad-
cast correspondents tried to get out the stork of what
was happening to Soviet dissidents?with particular
respect to the repressive precautions taken during Mr.
Nixon's visit?the technicians cut them off in mid-
sentence. It was a story the Russian authorities did not
wish to have told while the summit was in progress, so
they cut it off?just by pulling the plug.
It has never been easy for Western correspondents
to get stories out of the Soviet Union that the govern-
ment didn't want told. And it is certainly, true that the
'Soviet Union is not the only government in the world
that resorts to censoring what it dislikes to bear. Yet,
the heavy fashion in which the Russians behaved on
?
?
just this one occasion tells us all we need to know about ,
the value of a free press and the price that is paid when
an overbearing government intervenes. The story the
Americans were attempting to tell concerned the general
problem of the lives of dissidents in the Soviet Union,
and especially their treatment while President Nixon
was in town. The story of the way that Mr. Nixon's
presence resulted in the Russian authorities rounding
up their local critics and jailing them was of more than
passing interest to the American people.
And yet Mr. Nixon's aides were conspicuously-silent
on the subject, declining to lodge any forceful formal
protest, saying merely to 'Whomever might be listening
that the American broadcasters should have the right
to cover and report whatever they pleased. It is some-
what disappointing that no one in the President's party
was willing to defend, if only for the record, the eleznen-
i tary principles, so central to a free system of govern-
ment, of a free press. Ironically, it was left to the Rus-
sians, by their abrupt interruption of the American
broadcasters, to drive the lesson home.
36
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WASHINGTON POST
9 July 1974
"George F. Will -
?r4 0171r,
??
Moscow: Censorship and Persecution
- In Moscow, Mr. Nixon embarrassing.'
ly 'and almost 'pathetically referred to
detente as largely the product of his
"personal relationship" with Leonid
'Brezhnev., ??
? -
It might seem odd that a President,
even one fighting impeachment and
trying to convince an understandably
skeptical public that he is indispensa-
ble to peace, should solicit public en-
thusiasm for his "personal relation-
ship" with the-commandant of the Gu-
lag Archipelago. But these are odd
times, as the summit demonstrated
even before it started.
As Mr. Nixon prepared to fly to Mos.
cow there were numerous reports that
Brezhnev was preparing for Mr. Nix-
on's arrival by ordering wholesale ar-
rests of the most conspicuously brave
Jewish dissenters. Mr. Nixon gave no
sign that he thought that anything un-
toward was happening.
-Here was' the leader of the free
world placidly packing his toothbrush
for a. trip that he knew already was
producing as its first (and, as it turned
out, its most important) result ,the
.wholesale persecution of people whose
only crime is 'adherence to principles
of freedom. :.
It would have been an act of simple
,
decency, and a useful political and dip-'
lomatic stroke, for Mr. Nixon to have
made' use of his "personal relation-
ship" with Brezhnev by explaining to
him that the arrests must stop or the,
summit would stop.
?
. .
This would have demonstrated to an
understandably skeptical American
public that Mr. Nixon is not dead to all
feelings of disgust about the bullying
use of state power. And it would have
demonstrated to an understandably
skeptical Brezhnev that there is some
Soviet behavior too gross for Mr.
Nixon to tolerate in the name of de-
But Mr. Nixon either did not dare or
did not care to use his personal rela-
tionship with Brezhnev to stop the ar-
rests that his own trip was causing
Aside from Mr. Nixon's nonresponse
to the persecution of the Jews, the
most interesting aspect of the summit
was the brutal Soviet censorship of all
U.S. television broadcasts from Moscow
concerning the persecution.
One reason Brezhnev arrested the
Jews was to try to keep them away
from American journalists. One reason
Brezhnev censored the broadcasts to
America is that he knew that he could
do it without provoking a protest from
Mr. Nixon, whose opinion of the press
is no secret to Brezhnev.
The U.S. television correspondents
should have insisted that the Moscow
authorities transmit the stories about
the dissidents before transmitting all
those stories about Mr. Nixon and
Brezhnev drinking toasts to detente.
The correspondents would have given
the Soviet government a choice?ei-
ther all the news from Moscow, or
none of the news. Both Brezhnev and
Mr. Nixon care very much about tele-
vising those carefully staged events
where they, sign the documents pro,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
8 July 19714
;U.S. FIRMS T
-SHOW SPY GEAR'
0,.; ?
'IN MOSCOW
? ??;-:t
' By' Our' New York Staff
Fears that some American
!secret- intelligence systems may
compromised "have been,
:raised by the Chicago D'ibune,
ivitich 'reported -yesterday- that-
many and foreign,
firms making police equipment
are being urged to take part in
:a 'Moscow exhibition on crime:
? detection next month.
At" least two American com-
panies making the latest elec-
:trohic detection gear
which can also be used to gather'
political intelligence, have,.
Agreed to' exhibit. A Middle
West' firm gpecialisiiig in trade
with linssiao Welt Internatiotial
CorPoration, is, trying to drurit
interest. ; ? ?
A 'Chicago manufacturer ,who
...says rlo'Ps not: Plan to' ex!
4iibit, said: " It seems mighty;
strange that a country which
maintains its has little or nO'
crime would want -our goods."'
Department: of ' Commerce',
Officials emphasised that there
are! ,00 regulations banning the.
n PlpfirdVitr FtAuPteltittstP200
eN
alLISS . ? ? 1 4
? ? ? 5
cV1-6
claiming detente. . ?
? -?
We have no evidence or reason to
.believe that Mr. Nixon uttered even a
private protest to Brezhnev about
ei-
ther the arrests or the censorship. But
if the arrests "and the censorship 'oc-
; cured in spite- of what Mr. Nixon, likes
; to call his quiet diplomacy, that is
more evidence that the quiet diplo-
' macy is as unavailing as the personal
relationship.
It is interesting that Brezhnev's con-'
? trolled press, in translating Mr. Nix-
on's remarks about the importance of.
the "personal relationship," gave Mr.
Nixon a taste of censorship. The Soviet
. press dropped the word "personal" so.
'that Mr. Nixon's remark would be read
as just a reference to the relationship
-between two .nations.
Marxism insists -that politics (and
hence politicians) are ephiphenomena
?that history is a dialectic of vast im-
personal forces moving ineluctably to
; a predictable climax. So a proper.
'Marxist like Brezhnev rejects the no-
tion that any "personal relationship" is
really important in history.
?? , .
Unfortunately; the tattered doetrine
of detente rests-on the blind hope that"
the "Soviet leaders are not serious
, about their Marxist ideology. But they
obviously do ,take Marxism seriously.,
It conditions their approach to de--
tente., It assures them of the inevitable_
enfeeblement and eventual collapse
of nations like ours.,
NEW
NEW YORK TIMES
5 July 1974
'AMERICAN IN SOVIET
'SAYS U.S. BARS HIM
MOSCOW, July 4?An Amer-
ican Communist who settled in
the Soviet Union 17 years ago
said today that the Soviet au-
thorities had given him permis-
sion to go home but that the
United States Government had
blocked his return.
Dean Hoxsley, who is 47
years old, reported that the
consular office of the American
Embassy here had notified him
by letter that his request to be
recognized as an American citi-
zen had been rejected because
he accepted a Soviet passport
in 1957, thus surrendering his
American citizenship.
? He said that his application
to visit the United States as an
alien had also been refused be-
cause he had been a member
of the American Communist
party and because he did not in-
end to return to the Soviet
Union.
But American consular offi-
.
?cials have invited him to the
embassy tomorrow for a further
discussion of his case, Mr. Rox-
1/08/06's:ebrs4413.P.77-004.321300 s 00330003-8
37
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Fiair4..EaSt
WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1974
Food for Peace?Is It Really for
Cambodia Seen Shifting Funds
I
By Philip
? Washington P
PHNOM PENH ? Congres-
sional efforts to prevent mili-
tary use of funds generated
, by the Food for Peace pro-
gram apparently are being
, frustrated by some ingenious
bookkeeping in Cambodia and
South Vietnam.
Food for Peace is the
American assistance program
which for years has shipped
massive amounts of foodstuffs
to countries around the,world
rincluding millions of dollars
in goods yearly to Cambodia
and, Vietnam.
The proceeds from the sale
of this food has consistently
, been used to support the war
? effort in 'both countries and
it is this practice which Con-
gress set out to stop with
legislation last year.
r ? Despite the legislation, how-
"ever, it appears the Cam-
bodian government may be
able to circumvent the intent
,.-
, of Congress by simply allow-
ing the funds to pile up un-
used in a bank account and
then printing an equal
; amount of new money to pay
soldiers.
A. McCombs ' , ,
ost Foreign Service . .
" national Development (AID) a
an administrative matter an
required no specific Congres
sional authorization.
? A' Senate Foreign Relation
Committee report on the Sen
ate version of the December
legislation said, "It will keep
Congress and the American
, people better informed about
this particular aspect of the
'foreign ad program."
The legislation will, the re-
port 'said, "enable Congress to I
approve, disapprove, or amend
agreements" for any future
possible military use of funds
,,generated by .the Food for
Peace, program.
' "In a larger context," the re-
port said, "this (legislation) is
simply another step forward,
in the committee's efforts to
help Congress redress the in
balance between the executive
and legislative branches in the
field of foreign polcy."
Aid officials here and in Sai-
gon conceded that it was pos-
.sible for them to appear be-
fore Congress to request
"specific authorization" to use
Food for Peace-generated,
funds for military purposes as
contemplated in the December
legislation. " ? -
However, they said this was
not likely to happen because
such appearances would im-
pose an unbearable adminis-
trative burden on' them.
"It's . scary?just the time
that would be involved in
bringing the U.S ' Congress
into day-to-day dcisions."
Thomas F. Olmsted, AID di-,
rector here, also said it is un-
likely that AID officials will
go back to Congress with spe-
cific requests.
However, both Olmsted and
Yaeger said they are planning
trips to Washington in the
near future to consult with
higher AID officials who will
make the final decisions on
this and other problems raised
by the December legislation.
In addition, the officials will
discuss other legislation now
under consideration in Con-
gress that would impose strict
new limits on Foodf Peace
pending in any one country 1
nd thus bring to an abrupt 1
mi the massive programs in s
nclochina. .
I In Saigon, it also appears
; possible that funds generated,
by the program could be
channeled into other non-mili-
tary areas of the economy,
freeing up equal amounts- of
1. money for military use and
thus again frustrating Con- '
gress' efforts at control.
- In the 1974 fiscal year end;
ing today, $182 million in I
; Peace commodities were j
i- shipped to Cambodia and
$268 million to South Viet-
nam. In each country, the
food was sold for local cur-
rency.
Much of this currency was
? then given by . the United
States to the government of
t Cambodia and South Vietman
m pay soidiers' salaries and
.other military costs.
It was this type of practice
which many congresme.n con-
sidered to be hidden and uncon-
trolled war. spending by. the
administration and which led
to legislation this past Decem-
J3er to bring it to a halt.
The Congressional ban pro- a
hibils any military use of funds e
generated by the Food for Peacel I
program "unless such [use] is
'specifically authorized by legis-
lation." The ban goes into
effect today.
1
'Previously grants were I
made.1
Iby the U.S. Agency for Anter-1
!that now seems Possible.
! In the case of Cambodi
where the Food for Peace pr
? gram plays a far more impo
tent role in the tiny, staggc
s ing wartime economy than i
d does in Vietnam, the admini
. tration presumably woul
j have to launch an immediat
s appeal to Congress for addi
tional AID funds to keep Ca
entire American effort her
from collapsing.
the Cambodian officials have
a,I any idea how these debts?be-
o-1 ginning with the healthy inter-
r- est payment that comes due
r- next year?can ever be repaid
t to the United States.
S - He also said the change in
d status will place enormous
e pressure on the government to
" raise the price of rice because
e under the previous grant sys-
e tem, the government heavily
subSidized rice.
? Although the Food for
d Peace funds will now belong
t to the Cambodian government,
d Olmsted said, they still cannot
o be used directly for military
0 Purposes under Public Law
480 and the administrative
procedures of AID.
_ AID procedures require that
the funds be used for eco-
nomic development projects
approved by AID, he said.'
However, he, added, Cambo-
dia is in such a state of eco-
nomic distress and general
turmoil that there' are no con-
ceivable, projects that could
quOalilmfys.ted said the money will
simply build up in the national
bank and not be used.
On the other h9nd, the gov-
ernment can then turn around
and print an equal amount of
money that can be used to pay
soldiers just as the Food for
Peace funds have been used in
the past, Olmsted said. '
, This can be done without
generating the massive infla-
tion that usually results when
a government prints money,
he said. Cambodia already suf-
fers from tremendous infla-
With respect to the Decem
ber legislation, both. Olmste
and Yaeger emphasized tha
no Food for Peace-generate
funds will be channeled t
military uses after the June 3
mandatory cutoff.
They both said that the ulti
, mate use of the funds will be
strictly legal and- in no _way
designed to frustrate the ob-
jectives of Congress.
He said that Food-for Peace
funds _can only be grauted to
the government to the extent
that there is a designated use
for them under the provisions
of Public Law 480.
. The money can no longer go
for military purposes, he said,
and the other uses under the
law, which include things like
funds for painting the U.S.
Embassy or acquiring books
j for the Library of Congress
are not sufficient to use the
vast amounts of money in-
Volved.
Therefore, said Olmsted, un-
der the law the funds revert
to an entirely different status.
Instead of belonging to the
U.S. government, he said, they
will now automatically belong
to the Cambodian government,
but in the form of a soft loan
that must be repaid in dollars
in 40 years.
' The payments must begin
after 10 years, said Olmsted,
with interest of 2 per cent dur-
ing the next 10 years and 3
per cent after that.
Olmsted said that Cambo-
dian officials were "shocked"
when they learned that the ef-
fect of the December legisla-
tion was to halt the free
grants of funds that they had
been receiving and to substi-
tute for them obligations that
must eventually be repaid in
dollars.
He said the officials were
urther shocked when they I
earned that roughly $110 mil-I
ion that has built, up unusedi
o far in their Food for Peace
ccount will, instead of being '
ranted to them free, also be-
ome a dollar obligation.
here has not been such a
uildup in Vietnam.
Olmsted said neither he nor
a
Passage of such legislation
resumably would end the c
ossibility of bookkeeping
flanges being used to circum- b
ern) the December legislation
at least on the large scale,
38
?
Olmsted said that, in real
economic terms, when the
United States sends large
quantities of rice and other
foodstuffs to a county like
Cambodia hovering on the
edge of bankruptcy and mili-
tary disaster, this aid is, in
fact,- military aid no matter
what one calls
Cambodia's domestically
generated government reve-
nues from taxes in fiscal 1974
amounted to $54 million?not
nearly enough to cover its
$109 million military and $60
million civilian budgets.
The $115 million difference
was made up roughly by $50
million in Food for Peace
funds, $50 million in local
funds generated by the Com-
mercial Import Program, and
$15 million in deficit financ-
ing.
The . Commercial Import
Program, which works like the
Food for Peace program ex-
cept that it involves commodi-
ties other than food, is author-
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ized under the Foreign Assist-
ance Act and has not been as
strongly criticized as the Food
for Peace program as a hiding
place for military aid.
The Cambodian military
budget goes mostly for pay
and benefits. U.S. military as-
sistance to Cambodia is not in-
cluded in this budget figure.
Under the old Food for
W./6%11MM POST
30 June 19714
I Peace system, Olmsted's office
i maintained strict control over
the military uses to which the
granted funds were put
For example, he said, AID
was able to get the Cambodi-
ans to institute a computer-
ized pay system in the army
that substantially reduced the
number of -ghost" soldiers?
troops that did not exist but
whose officers received their
pay.
Under the ? new system,
Olmsted said this control will
be lessened.
In Saigon, Yaeger said that
the December legislation will
also mean a change in status
in the Food for Peace program
that will probably impose a
similar 40-year soft loan on
the-government ? '
" However, he' said, 'govern-
ment officials were very diss
turbed when they learned of
the change and it is not yet
clear if they will continue to
accept Food for, Peace under
the condition that they 'must
pay for it in dollars.
iniiochin?ood Aid Program Under Ftre
? -
By Dan Morgan
;
Washington Post Staff Writer
"These decisions are made Congressional battle lines '
ss are drawn between security-,
y, -minded supporters of the
de -Nixon doctrine of giving aid
priority to U.S. military
a- clients, and ? "doves" who,
e-
feel the many-faceted aid to
Saigon is only delaying an
'
- eventual political accommo-
dation between the regime
and the Cemmunists.
However, officials who
p.
o .) have followed the evolution
al? of the Food for Peace pro- -
ic gram over the years say
a_ broader principles are in-
Or volved.
Secretary of State-, Henry
A. Kissinger has called for a t
t world food conference to be
n held,in Rome in November. . t
e_ The plight of hungry na-
? tions, and the response of y
n wealthy countries to it, is t
i. high on the agenda.
e - In the background are ri-
d valries involving half a t
? dozen government agencies, t
? which have differed in the o
0 / Past two years over the allo- a
o- cation of the United States' A
limited food aid resources.
These rivalries have some- a
times pitted representatives t
of Kissinger against those of
Agriculture Secretary Earl
L. Butz, with Butz often G
emerging the loser.
Sources said, that in the
interagency board that allo-
cates food resources, Kis-
singer's aides on the Na-
tional Security Council con-
sistently pressed for massive
shipments to Indochina?the
downtown by a facele
group, an interagency hod
it is called, and it is ma
up of representatives fro
OMB, Treasury, AID, N
tional Security, National D
fense and Agriculture . .
What it amounts to is
? $435-million slush fund."
. With those words on ti
House floor June 21, Re
James P. Johnson (R-Col
opened a congression
. drive to force a drast
shake-up of the administr
tion's food aid program?f
years the least questione
.form of foreign assistance.
A Johnson amendmen
which the House passed o
a 61-to-51 vote would pr
vent the administratio
from allocating more tha
10 per cent of the appropr
ated funds to any singl
country. The effect woul
be to put a $42.5 milli?
1974 ceiling on farm corn
modifies transferred t
South Vietnam and Camb
dia under concessiona
loans.
Advocates of a radic
-reordering of food aid prio
ities charge that the admin
istration has systematicall
used the 20-year-old Publi
Law 480 to circumvent con
gressional limits on milifer
and economic aid to Ind
china. In the fiscal year jus
ending, nearly half of al
food aid loans were allo
cated to South Vietnam an
Cambodia.
Johnson's amendment, at
tached to the admin
istra
tion's agricultural spending
bill, is now before a Senat
Appropriations subcommit
tee which is reported fairly
evenly divided on the issue
Public Law 480, which es-
tablished the food aid pro-
grams of the 1950s and
1960s, was set up to make
use of surplus U.S. food pro-
duction, develop overseas
markets, combat hunger and
"promote in other ways the
foreign policy of the United
States."
Some critics claim that
the latter has increasingly
become the central rationale
for American food largesse,
with less and less emphasis
given to humanitarian con-
siderations or feeding_ the
world's hungry.
The United States halted
food aid loans to India after
hat country's war with
Pakistan in 1971, and plans
o resume such loans to
Chiletheg fiscal
ear, in the aftermath of
he ouster of the Marxist
egime of the late Salvador
Allende. The Agency for In-
ernational Development es-
imates that $35 million out ,
f the total $50 million food
ssistance loans t South
merica will be allocated to
hile. Food aid loans are at
n average 2.2 per cent in-,
erest for a period averag-
ng 33 years
A report issued by the
eneral Accounting Office
this year stopped just short
f calling a 1971 American
ledge to increase by $275
illion food aid commit-
ents to South Korea a po-
itical quid pro quo for
eoul's agreement to limit
extile exports to the United
tates.
Subsequently, however,
e United States sharply
educed its 'food aid to Ko-
ea. The United States re-
ponded to Korean corn-
taints by saying the corn
odities were not available.
ut some congressional offi-
als assert that the reason
as the heavy diversion of
od products to South Viet-
am.
In the coming fiscal year,
owever, food loan ship-
ents to the Seoul regime
ill be increased from $10
illion to an estimated $150
illion AID says.
The adniinistration pre- ,
cts a slight v decline
n the value of food aid
ipments in the coming i
ar: $891.7 million corn- .
4VIVIC)91-1I
Senate sources said that
Sen. George McGovern (D-
S.D.), barked by a number
/ of Senate liberals and some
Republicans, would make a
floor fight for the food aid
. restrictions if the amend-
_ merit is deleted in the sub-
committee.
"The issue here is the
prostitution of the American
Food for Peace program,"
said a Senate source last
"Something has got to be
done about food aid," an ad-
serted.
ministration officialAppo
1
so-called "supporting assist- S
ance."
Butz argued for giving the , th
priority to countries such as r
Indonesia and South Korea r
because of their potential as s
future commercial markets.
In this debate, pleas for a , m
bigger share for some 90 B
other poor countries that re- pi
ceivcd little or no food aid w
.have gone mainly unheeded. fn
In the House floor discus- n
sion last week, Rep. James
D. Symington (D-Mo.), ? h
asked: "Why should 1 per m
cent of the world's popula- w
tion, the peoples of Cambo- , mm
dia and South Vietnam, re-
ceive nearly half of the di
scarce funds available under i
Title I? It does not seem sh
proper, yet it happened in ye
1974, to our surprise and dis-
vetlaFOr Release 2001/A8/08
on Hill
It wants Congress to. ap-
propriate $425 million in
new money for the program
of concessional sales of farm
commodities, called Title I,
and $353.2 million for the -
food giveaway ? program,
called Title II.
According to AID, South
Vietnam and Cambodia re-'
ceived just under half the -
world total of food aid in
the fiscal year .just ending.
In defense of this prepon-
derance, officials say: "All
the rice was eaten." They ,
- also assert that last year, be-
cause of quadrupled U.S.
rice prices, only 600,000
tons, rather than the 1 mil- -
lion tons sent in fiscal year
1973, was shipped to" Indo-
china.
-Congressional critics re- ?
7
tort that the aid was nothing
but a thinly disguised budg-
etary subsidy for Saigon's
war economy.
Administration officials
have conceeded that much
of the proceeds from the
Saigon government's sale of
Public Law 480 food on the
local economy went to mili-
tary or defense 'purposes,
with U.S. approval.
Rep. Joseph P. Addabbo
(D-N.Y.) Charged on the.
House floor:
"These funds 'all were
used, or could -be used, un
der aid for common defense,
so as we cut the military aid
' they came' in through the
back door with Public Law
480 aid and reversed the
fandate of Congress."
Under the 1973 Foreign
Assistance Act, proceeds
,from the sale of the PL-480
commodities cannot be used
for military purposes after .
July 1, unless specifically
authorized by Congress.
However, some ambiguity
apparently remained as re-
cently as Jan. 21, when
South Vietnamese Foreign
Minister Vuong Van Bac
signed a $55.2 million agree-
ment for the delivery of,
rice, soybean, corn and pea-
nut seeds under Public Law.
480. In that, it was stated
that the government of Viet-
nam understood that the
foreign aid act restriction ?
iyaBrgiplys,n8 the effect of
pro I ding the use of for-
39 ;
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? eign currencies for-common
defense purposes. U.S. offi-
cials said last week that am-
biguities have been cleared
) up.
AID Director Daniel Par-
ker told a Senate Agricul-
ture Committee panel in
April: "Unequivocally . . .
we are not going to continue
to use these funds for de-
fense budgets."
. Rep. Johnson's amend-
: ment providing country ceil-
-. Ings on future food aid ship-
merits was opposed by Rep.
lamie L. Whitten (D-Miss.),
? c hairman of the Agriculture
? Subcommittee of the House
: Appropriations Committee,
and by Rep. Otto Passman
, (DLa.). Both are from rice-
growing states.
Passman's home state is
the country's leading rice
producer. The domestic mar-
WASHINc-TON POST
Sunday, June 30,1974
? Covert unit
,
Disdosed to
Australians
Manchester Guardian
CANBERRA ? Liberal for-
mer Prime Minister William
McMahon has revealed the.cryp-
tic title of a top-secret security
organization, MO-9, previously
unknown to Australians. -
;McMahon referred to the or-
rganization three times during a
television interview but refused
to discuss its operations.
The revelation seems certain
to escalate the ruling Labor
Party's growing demands for a
full examination of security and
intelligence operations. It was
only 18 months ago that the ex-
istence of ASIS, the Australian
Secret- Intelligence Service,
calm to light.
? ! The right-wing news maga-
zine, the Bulletin, recently pub-
lished a long report on a 1971
security assessment of Jim
Cairns, the deputy prime minis-
-ter, from the files of ASIO, the
'Australian Security Intelligence
Organization.
? The fourth known member of
.the security family is JI0; the
-Joint Intelligence Organization
within the defense department,
deals in strategic assessments
and information. ASIO is sup-
posed to be limited to domestic
intelligence connected with pos-
sible subversive activity.
The government refuses to
talk about ASIS, but it ap-.
itet uses only. 35: to 40 per',
cent of the rice produced in
the United States. The rest
is exported, much of it to
Asia.
The. rice industry has I
been a major beneficiary of
the Public Law 480 program,''
which has accounted for
about half of all U.S.. rice
exports in recent years. Rice
Is not consumed in many
poor parts of the world.
Therefore, the Asian 'food
aid program, rice industry
officials say, is important.
"This (congressional
amendment)- will definitely
be .a blow, if it meant losing
that export market," said J.
P. Gaines, executive presi-
dent of the Rice Millers As-
sociation.
Public Law 480 still en-
joys , a broad following
among farmers and their
pears to be primarily 'and per-
haps solely concerned with
gathering intelligence overseas_
It's existence became known
when the precipitate withdrawal
of Australian troops from Singa-
pore last year uncovered a se-
cret signals unit whose job was
to monitor military and diplo-
matic radio traffic in the region
for NO and ASIS assessment.
There is a marked reluctance
among officials even to confirm
the existence of MO-9. But it,
too, maintains a network of op-
eratives outside Australia, as-
cording to the little information
available. .
It is said to deal in "purely
factual" information about any
country in which Australia has
an interest. MO-9 agents are
briefed to gather industrial, po-
litical and some military intel-
ligence as the basis for long-
term assessments, but not to
attempt to influence events.
Prime Minister Gough Whit-
lam already has instituted an
inquiry into ASIO to be eon-
ductedt by a Supreme Court
judge. This was started late last
year. There are now suggestions
that the inquiry be widened to
cover the entire intelligence es-
tablishment.
The dossier on Deputy
'Prime Minister Cairns leaked to
the press was prepared during
McMahon's term, but he dis-
claimed any knowledge of it. '
"If I had known that the ac-
tivities of a member of Parlia-
ment were under scrutiny by
ASIO I would have immediately
taken action to see that it
stopped, and that what records
there were, were destroyed," he.
said.
, -
Liberal Party Sen. ? Ivor
Greenwood, who was attorney
general at the time was re-
sponsible for ASIO, has also
disclaimed knowledge of the
file but defended it as a legiti-
mate activity of the organiza-
representatives; on Capitol
Hill. Although world food
demand outstripped supply
last year, some farmers feel
that bumper U.S. corn and
wheat crops this year could
reverse the trend. There-
fore, Public Law 480 is seen
as the best guarantee that
the government will still be
around to help move- sur-
pluses abroad, if foreign de-
mand slackens.
The food aid debate
marks a questioning of the
allocation procedure, rather ?
than the program itself.
Critics point out that only
$4.1 million in food givea-
ways is currenly planned
for the drought-stricken Sa-
hel region in Africa?one,
fortieth of the South Viet-
nam estimate.
40
-...House and. Senate critics
claim' that the food aid op' -
propriations, as handled in
the past, give the adminis-
tration a blank check. '
The interagency board
which decides how he
funds are spent can shift the'
allocations from one-coun-
try to another without con-
gressional approval. It also
has at its disposal some $300
million in annual loan re-
payments.
, There are other loopholes
as well, Johnson and others
maintain.
"If they're determined to
'keep-the aid to South Viet-
nam at the present high
level, they can do it one way
or another," said one offi-
cial. "The question is how
long they -are prepared to
hold the whole program hos-
tage to Vietnam."
THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
26 June 1974
Cambodia's' rotteii ? fru
Prince Sihanouk once boasted that he, had
only to wait until Phnom Penh fell to him like
an overripe fruit. By Most standards, the' govern-
ment of Marshal Lon Nol and the area under his
control have gone rotten on the branch. But even
Without the support of *American bombing, it:
steadfastly refuses to drop., The ,capacity of this
lame government for hanging on has often been
underestimated. With the dry: season coming to
an end; it looks as if the weather will contribute
to .extending..its life.
Lon Nol is in trouble from many directions.
His Prime Minister, Long Boret, who has proved
no more competent than his predecessors, formed
his most recent cabinet against a background of
inter-party bickering. His previous government
-had been brought down by student demonstrations
;which- culminated at the beginning of this month
in, the murder of the Minister of Education. Their."
-complaints ? against a cost of living rising at the
rate of 300 per cent a year, against the draft,
and against corruption in government ? are 7
shared by many: But although the population is ?
demoralised and overcrowded in the capital and
the republican spirit of 1970 has evaporated, .its
patience is not at an end. The military situation '
is poor, with the main roads from the capital to
the ports and agricultural areas cut .off.
The anti-Lon Nol forces; the Khmer ,Rouge;
have their problems. They have shown some
indecision -in changing their tactics from an
assault on Phnom Penh to an assault on provincial
Capitals. - Prince Sihanouk appears to be lOsing '
political support from Peking and Hanoi to the.:
Deputy Prime Minister, Khieu Samphan. A vital
'factor in the longevity of Lon Nol's regime is the'
US economic support, running at ?240 millions a
year. Both sides are in fact victims of Cambodia's .
long-standing tragedy of being everyone's puppet.
. North Vietnam's priority is success in South Viet-
;..nam. Both China and the-US appear to be keeping
their clients- armed and equipped up to a certain
? level. This produces an indecisive situation 'in
, which both sides grind on without either looking
? likely for some time either to gain victory or to ,
suffer defeat.
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330003-8