THE CASE AGAINST RICHARD NIXON: A CATALOGUE OF CHARGES AND HIS REPLIES

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9
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• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 9, 1974
• Content Type: NSPR

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No. 11
9 AUGUST 1974
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THE NEW YORK TIME
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"RIDAY: AUGUST 9, 7974
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?-ainst
ichard Nixon: A
ar s and?His Replies
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By PAUL L. MONTGOMERY pa ted
During the three summers and two winters of what
clearly has been the biggest- political scandal in the history
of the United States, Richard M. Nixon was investigated
more heavily and charged with wrongdoing more frequently
than any of his 36 predecessors.
From the time of the arrest of the Watergate burglars
early on the morning of June /7, 1972, the allegations
against the President and his aides built to a tidal wave
that ? 26 months later ? overwhelmed him.
The burglary and its subsequent cover-up were always
the center of the wilderness of investigations but
as time.
went on and evidence accumulated the inquiry seeped over
Into at least 13 separate areas of .Presidential activity aside
trom Watergate.
Millions of words of testimony and thousands of
dtscuments and transcripts were amassed by the Watergate
grand fury and special prosecutor, the Senate Select.Com-
mittee on Watergate and the plethora of subsidiary bodies.
For Mr. Nixon, the ultimate forum was the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, authorized on Feb. 6, 1974, by a
vote of 410-4 to conduct an impeachment inquiry.
In six months of examining the evidence Of the other
investigations, and opening new lines itself, the staff of the
committee made a massive synthesis of the charges against
the President and the facts to support them. At the end, the
committee voted to recommend impeachment of the Presi-
dent for hil conduct in the Watergate matter and for.
involvement in the three other unrelated activities. .
The first article chargedthat Mr. Nixon, "using the
powers of his high office, engaged personally and through
his subordinates and agents in a course of conduct or plan
-designated to delay, impede, and obstruct the Mil- estiga-
tion" of the Watergate burglary and "to cover up, conceal
and protect those responsible." The second article said the
residerit "has repeatedly engaged in conduct violating the
Constitutional rights of citizens" and "impairing the due
and proper administration of justice." The third article
charged him with having "willfully disobeyed" the com-
mittee's subpoenas for tapes and documents. Two other
articles, dealing with the secret bombing of Cambodia and
Mr. Nixon's income taxes and persona/ finances, were not.-
approved by the committee.
What follows is an accounting of the charges against
Mr. Nixon?based on the Judiciary Committee's documents
and proceedings, supplemented by statements that post-
dated he committee's deliberations?and of his responses
to them?ba.sed on statements by Mr. Nixon, his lawyers
and other defenders.
Watergate
On May 27, 1972, and again on June 17, agents of the
Committee for the. Re-election of the President broke into
the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the
Watergate in Washington to install wiretaps and collect
other political information. Basically, Mr. Nixon was
charged with having used the office of the Presidency over
at least the next two years to conceal the responsibility Of,
the White House and the re-election committee for the
burglaries.
NO direct evidence has been introduced that Mr. Nixon
knew in advance of the burglaries. But the committee cited
evidence that the plan underlying the burglaries had been
approved by John N. Mitchell, the tainpaign director, 'and
H. R. Haldeman, the President's chief of Staff in the White
House. The first article of impeachment approved by the
House committee charges, however, that Mr. Nixon partici-
1
e y in t wafting investigations of the crime and
covering up the responsibility of his aides in it.
John M. Doer, the committee's special counsel, wrote
that the evidence "strongly/suggests" that Mr. Nixon de-
cided shortly after the arresf of the burglars on June 17 to,
pursue a policy of concealment and containment. He further
said that in late March, 1973, Mr. Nixon took over personal
direction of the cover-up.
The committeet?in its vote, made no direct correlation
between the overt acts by the President and the general-
ized charges in the first article of impeachment It was
clear, however, that the majority accepted Mr. Doer's sum-
mation of the specific charges. These broke down roughly
into eight areas:
GENERAL PLAN AND POLICY. After the committee
hearings, Mr. Nixon admitted that on June 23, 1972, he had
instructed Mr. Haldeman to stop the Federal Bureau of
Investigation inquiry into the sources of funds for the
Watergate burglars (the funds had come from campaign
contributions). The President said his aides, to thwart the
F.B.I., should use the excuse that the investigation would
endanger operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Despite C.I.A. assurances that this was not so, the aides
pursued that course and succeeded on June 28 in "topping
the F.B.I. effort to trace the money.
The summation of evidence for the committee also
cited- numerous instances in transcripts of Presidential
conversations 'in which Mr. Nixon had indicated that he
acquiesced in the cover-up. To Mr. Mitchell on June 30,
1972: "Well, I'd cut the loss fast. I'd cut it fast." To John
W. Dean 3d, his counsel, on Sept. 15, 1972: "So you jUst
try to button it up as well as you can . To Mr. Dean
on March 21, 1973: "It's better just to fight it out, and not
-let people testify, so forth and so on." To Mr. Michell on
March 22, 1973: "I want you all to stonewall it, let them
plead tile Fifth Amendment, cover-up or anything else, if
it'll save it?save the plan."
?
Critics also cited amoral insensitivity in Mr. Nixon's
conversations that could indicate his approval of the cover-
up. On March 21, 1973, for example, in recorded personal
reminiscences, . Mr. Nixon gave contrasting assessment of
two aides,----Jeb Stuart Magruder, who had decided to tell
the truth to investigators, and Gordon Strachan, who the
President described as "in a straight position of perjury."
He called Mr. Magruder "a rather weak man who had all
the appearance of character but who really lacks it when
the, uh, chips are down," while he found Mr. Strachan "a
real, uh, courageous fellow through all this."
Mr. Nixon has never made an . attempt to rebut
charges involving each overt act of which he was accused.
The Judiciary Committee staff made a summation of 243
incidents or series of incidents, and the reply of the
President's lawyer, James D. St. Clair, dealt only with 34
incidents with no correlation with the staff summation:
Mr. St. Clair's final statement was, "The Preside;A
had no knowledge of an attempt by the White House to
cover up involvement in the Watergate affair."
In his last account of Watergate, on Aug. 5, when he
admitted that he had previously concealed bhis order on
June 23, 1972, to stop the F.B.I. investigation, Mr. Nixon
said it was a ."serious act of omission for which I take full
responsibility and which I deeply regret." He said he had
not told Mr. St. Clair of the incident when his lawyer
was defending him.
"I was aware of the advantages this course of action
would have with respect to limiting possible public
exposure of involvement by persons connected with the
re-election committee," the President said.
Mr. Nixon, however, reiterated that if the evidence
was looked at in its entirety, rather than as isolated
incriminating statements, it would show he had made
mistakes but had committed no impeachable offense. This
was a theme that ran through his defense as the tapes of
his conversations were made public.
In the Aug. 5 statement,- Mil Nixon said that "the
basic truth remains that?when all the facts were brought
to, mr, attention I insisted on a full investigation and
prosecution of those guilty." He did not mention that, as
a result of the investigation, he was named by the Water-
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gate grand jury as a co-conspirator in the cover-up,
though no indictment was voted because of his office.
INTERFERING WITH INVESTIGATIONS. Aside from
the attempted use of the C.I.A. against the F.B.I., the House
conimittee staff found a number of occasions when Mr.
Nixon tried to thwart or divert duly authorized investiga-
tions into Watergate.
Among the instances cited were his repeated refusal
to honor subpoenas of evidence, his attempts to influence
members of Congressional committees, his efforts to get
special treatment for aides before the Watergate prosecu-
tors, and his dismissal of the special prosecutor, Archibald
Cox, when Mr. Cox insisted on having, tapes of White
House conversations. .
Mr. Nixon's relations with Henry Petersen, the Justice
Department official originally charged with prosecutint the
Watergate burglars, also drew criticism. The President re-
peatedly quizzed the Assistant Attorney General about the
'progress of the investigation, and then passed the informa-
tion on to subordinates who were suspects. "I've got Peter-
sen on a short leash," he told John D. Ehrlichman, his
chief doniestic aide, at one point.
In a telephone conversation with Mr. Petersen on the
evening of April 16, 1973, Mr. Nixon elicited the informa-
tion that Frederick C. LaRue, a campaign aide who helped
pass money to the burglars, was talking to the prosecutors.
"Anything you tell me, as I think I told you earlier, will not,
be passed on," Mr. Nixon told Mr. Petersen. Yet, the next
morning, the President instructed Mr. Haldeman to tell,
Herbert W. Kalmbach, another suspect in the money-
passing, that Mr. LaRue was talking. _ - '
In his defense, the President insisted he had pressed
for a full investigation as soon as he was made aware of
incriminating facts. In testimony before the Judiciary Com-
mittee, Mr. Petersen said he saw nothing improper in Mr.
Nixon's relations with him since the President is the na-
tion's chief law-enforcefnent officer.
ALTERING OR DESTROYING EVIDENCE. Mr. Doar
cited the apparently deliberate erasure of an 181/2-minute
portion of a tape recording conversation between Mr. Nixon
and Mr. Haldeman on June 20, -1972 ? three days after the
break-in. Mr. Haldeman's notes indicated the conversation
was aboufWatergate, and that the President instructed him
to be "on the attack for diversion." The ?tape was in the
possession of Mr. Nixon's personal secretary, Rose Mary
Woods, when the erasure occurred.
The staff also cited many material discrepancies be;
-tween transcripts of tapes prepared under Mr. Nixon's
direction and transcripts of the same tapes made by the
committee. In some cases, potentially compromising state-
ments by the President were omitted entirely.
For example, on Feb. 28, 1973, Mr. Nixon expressed
worry about evidence pointing to Mr. Kalmbach because
"It'll be hard for him, he ? 'cause it'll, it'll get out about
Hunt." The statement did not appear' in the White House
transcript of the conversation. The reference is apparently
to Mr. Kalmbach's help in sending money to E. Howard
Hunt Jr., one of the burglars; Mr. Nixon had Maintained
steadfastly that he did not learn of payments to Mr. Hunt
until March 21, 1973.
In a March' 22, 1973, conversation, the White House
transcripts had Mr. Nixon #aying he needed flexibility "in
order to get off the cover-up line." The committee transcript
made the phrase "in order to get on with the cover-up plan."
The President and his defenders said they did not know
how the 181/2-minute gap in the key tape had occurred, but
left open the implication that it could have been a mechan-
ical fault in Miss Woods's tape recorder- rather than a
deliberate erasure. Miss Woods said she had accidentally
erased a part of the tape when she answered the, telephone
while transcribing it, but could not account for the entire
erasure.
Regarding the discrepancies between the White House
and committee transcripts, Mr. St. Clair described them as
honest differences in interpretation of tapes of poor quality
that did not have material bearing on the matters stated.
HUSH MONEY. Beginning on June 29, 1972?twelve
days after the break-in?and continuing for nearly a year,
a total of nearly $450,000 was paid by aides of Mr. Nixon
to those accused in the butglary. The money came from
contributions to his campaign, and much of it was routed
through his personal attorney, Mr. Kalmbach.
On March 21, 1973, the President talked with Mr.
Dean about payments to Mr. Hunt. He, contended it was
the first time he was ihformed of the payments, yet in the
conversation he made no protest, showed no surprise and
indicated familiarity with some details of the pay-off
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scheme,
Mr. Dean said Mr. Hunt Might consume a million
dollars in the next' two years. "What I meant is, you
could, you get a million dollars," Mr. Nixon said. "And
you could get it in cash. I, I know where it could be
gotten." The same day Mr. Nixon told Mr. Haldeman
that Mr. Hunt might "blow the whistle" and that "his
price is ,pretty high, but at least, uh, we should, wes
'should buy the time on that, uh, as I, as I pointed out
to John." That night, $75,000 in cash was delivered to
Mr. Hunt's lawyer. ?
Under persistent questioning before the Watergate
grand jury, Mr. Hunt stated unequivocally that when he-
was demanding money. from the White House he was
threatening to reveal "seamy things" he had done for the
Administration if the money was not paid.
, Mr. Nixon's defenders at one point said the President
was "joking" in his discussion of $1-million with Mr. Dean.
At all points, the President said, the money paid to the
burglars was for legal expenses and support of their fam-
ilies, and not to buy their silence. ;
Mr. Nixon denied repeatedly that the money for Mr.
Hunt was "hush money." I:is lawyer quoted a passage
from an unreleased tape in which Mr. Nixon said, "I don't
mean to be blackmailed by Hunt?that goes too far."
? EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY. On at least three occasions
recorded in the transcripts, Mr. Nixon discussed with aides
the possibility and political wisdom of giving executive
clemency to Watergate defendants after their presumed
conviction. The first- discussion, with Mr. Ehrlichman on
July 8, 1972, came two months before the burglars were
indicted and six months before they were tried.
On March 21, 1973, talking with Mr. Dean about when
clemency could be granted, Mr. Nixon said, "You can't do
it till after the '74 elections, that's for sure. But even then
: . . Your point is that even then you couldn't do it"
On April 14, 1973, Mr. Nixon spoke with Mr. Ehrlich-
Man about how he could give signals to Mr. Magruder that
leniency could be expected. The President suggested he ?
mention "lovely wife and all the rest" and how painful it
was to deliver the message.
"Also, I would first put that in so that he knows I
have personal affection," said Mr. Nixon. "That's the way
the so-called clemency's got to be handled. Do you see,
John?"
Mr. Nixon's response to the charge was that, hr any
discussion of clemency, he was acting out of motives of
compassion rather than trying to win favor with the
defendants. He pointed out, for example, that Mr. Hunt's
wife- had been killed in an airplane crash shortly before
his trial and that any consideration of clemency would
be on that basis.
The President cited a point in a conversation about
clemency for Mr. 'Hunt in which he said "It would be
wrong." However, in the context of the conversation, the
statement appears to refer to the political feasibility
rather than the morality of granting clemency.
SUBORNING PERJURY. The staff cited a number of
statements by the President in which he advised potential
witnesses to lie or give incomplete answers, and .others in
which he coached Witnesses to give answers that would
match the testimony of those who had gone before.
On March 21, 1973, he gave this advice to Mr. Dean.
about talking with prosecutors: -
"Just be damned sure you say I don't ... remember.
I can't recall, I can't give any honest, an answer to that,
that I can recall. But that's it."
On April 14, 1973, Mr. Nixon directed Mt. Ehrlichman
to coach Mr. Strachan on his forthcoming testimony so
that he could cover the same points that :qr. Magruder
made to the prosecutors. On April 17, Mr. Nixon discussed
with Mr. Ehrlichman what he could say to investigators
that would corroborate what Mr. Kalmbach had told them
and impugn what Mr. Dean had said.
Mr. Nixon's defenders, discussing these passages,
said it should be remembered that the President ard his
aides were discuseing the range of options on how to
act, and not recommending a specific course of conduct.
Mr. Ziegler said that, in the transcripts, Mr. Nixon eeuld
often be found playing the "devil's advocate"?that is,
eliciting statements by taking a position without really
advocating it. His defenders also pointed out that on
numerous other occasions Mr. Nixon had urged aides to
tell the truth.
FAILURE TO ACT. Some of the major charges that
Mr. Nixon failed to see that the laws. were faithfully
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executed were based on his failure to report wrpngdoing
tc the authorities when he learned of it.
As early as July 6, 1972, L. Patrick Gray 3d, then
head of the F.B.I., says he warned the President that his
staff was giving him a "mortal wound" through inter-
ference in the Watergate matter. Mr.' Gray said the
President never questioned him about the statement.
On March 21, 1973, by Mr. Nixon's admission, Mr.
Dean told him of the extent of the cover-up. His counsel
also charged that Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr.
Mitchell were implicated in the obstruction of justice.
Mr. Nixon did not inform any authority of the charges,
though he spoke at least three times in the next ten days
with Attorney General Richard q: K1 ie ndierist about the
Watergate case.
The President's response to the charge was that as
soon' as he learned . of the cover-up he had immediately
"personally ordered those conducting the investigation to
get all the facts and to report them directly to me." (All
major witnesses deny receiving such instructions.) Mr.
Nixon said he "felt it was my responsibility to conduct
my own investigation" and the White House asserted
that the President himself was a "civil authority" em-
powered to receive reports, of wrongdoing.
. MISLEADING THE PUBLIC. The Judiciary Committee
staff produced massive evidence, based on the tapes and
Mr. Nixon's public statements, that the President had lied
repeatedly in speeches and news conferences about the
extent of his knowledge of the complicity of his aides.
Immediately after the break-in, Mr. Mitchell and
'Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary; issued
statements that fleither the re-election committee nor the
White . House was involved. On June 22, Mr. Nixon
affirmed those statements and repeated them for the next
.10 months, though, the staff said, he had no basis. for
believing, they were true, and probably knew they were
false.
Several times, Mr. Nixon cited `:reports" or "investi-
gations" leY his aides that, he declared, cleared. the White
House. there is no evidence that such reports were ever
prepared. On March 21, '1973, when Mr. Dean was talking
about making such a report, Mr. Nixon said "Understand
(iaughs) .1 don't want to gdt all that goddamned specific."
That' day, Mr. Dean had told him that at least three of
his aides had committed perjury in questioning by the
prosecutors.
Mr. Nixon's contention in response to the charges
was that his aides had misled him, or that he had told
the truth as far as he was aware of it at the time. After
the cover-up fell apart in 4pril, 1973, the President's
statements denied much that he had said before. Each
'major speech involved retraction of previous assertions.
Abuse of Power
?? In addition to the article of impeachment dealing
with Watergate, and an article condemning the President
for refusing committee subpenas in connection with it,
the Judiciary Committee voted for impeachment on four
other specific matters:
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. The committee staff
collected evidence that Mr. Haldeman and other aides
had put pressure on the I.R.S. to punish Mr. Nixon's
opponents by auditing their tax returns and to reward
friends by not auditing. There was testimony from both
of Mr. Nixon's first two Commissioners of Internal Reve-
nue that they had offered their resignations in the face
of pressures from the White House to take improper'
actions.
According to the evidence, a prineipal target for audit-
ing was Lawrence F. O'Brien, the Democratic National
Chairman in 1972. There was also a charge that Mr. Nixon's
aides obtained tax information on Gov. George C. Wallace
of Alabama and leaked it to the press. Regarding favors,
it was alleged that the I.R.S. yielded to pressure not to
audit the returns of the President's friend, C. G. Rebozo, in
1968 and 1969.
Mr. Nixon made no direct response to the specific
charges but stated generally that he had not misused the
government agency. The White House acknowledged it kept ?
a list of "enemies" but asserted the list was Co make sure
that opponents received no favors, and not to subject them
to persecution by arms of the Government.
WIRETAPS. Between May, 1969, and February, 1971,
the President authorized F.B.I. wiretap t on four newsmen
and 13 Government officials in an effort to stop leaks
ot confidential material to the press. The wiretaps were
placed without a court order. Two of the subjects of the
wiretaps went to work for Senator Edmund S. Muskie,
a potential opponent of the President's in 1972, and three
others were White tHouse staff members. The committee
staff found evidence that information from the wiretaps
went to the President, that it did not lead to the discovery
of any leaks, that some. of the wiretaps were installed
for political purposes, and that the White House tried
later to have the F.B.I. destroy records of the taps.
Mr. Nixon has said the wiretaps were installed to'
prevent dissemination of national security information
that would damage the nation if revealed. He said it was
his right to take such action. Mr. St. Clair said that, at
the time the action was taken, court approval was not
required.
PLUMEERS. In 1971, Mie Nixon authorized creation
of a special investigation unit within the White House
called the "Plumbers." The unit was assigned to plug
leaks of classified information. Facilities of the Central ?
Intelligence Agency, prohibited by law from domestic
a0vities, were used for several of the unit's operations.
In *several cases, members of tht.. unit acted to quell
potentially embarrassing situations for Mr. Nixon. On
Sept. 3, 1971, agents of the unit broke into the Beverly.
Hills, Calif., office of Dr. Lewis J. Fielding in an effort
to get psychiatric' information about Daniel Ellsberg.
Mr. Nixon said the unit was created because of
threats to national security. He said he had not approved
the burglary of Dr. Fielding, and did not learn of it until
March 17, 1973. He did not relay the ? information to
judicial authorities until April 25.
KLEINDIENST NOMINATION. In 1969, the Justice
.Department brought three,antitrust suits against the In-
ternational Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. On
April 19, Mr. Nixon telephoned Deputy Attorney General
Richard G. Kleindienst and ordered him to drop an
appeal in one of the suits with the words "The order
is to' leave the goddamned thing alone." In March, 1972,
Mr. Kleindienst was undergoing Senate approval of his
appointment as Attorney General, and he testified under
oath that he had never received ny White House direc,
stives about the I.T.T. case. Mr. Nixon took no action in
regard to the perjury.
Mr. St. Clair, in his brief for Mr. Nixon, said
there was 'no reason why the President should have
.known of Mr. Kleindienst's statement under oath, and
that there was no legal duty to respond to the testimony.
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BALTIMORE SUN
9 August 1974
gate, but the spectacle- of an
o- deal ma American president going. to
N-
jail really distresses me."
The grand jury had wanted
to indict President Nixon last
prosecution
. ,, , ormer aides, including John
May on charges similar to
o
. fthose brought against his
aa. ? - ? N. Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman
awor' ski .s4s.
this action on ground that an
? . , aalr. Jaworski re.portedly dis-,
'
suaded the grand jury from
. . - ;and -John D. Ehrlichman. '
. a . incumbent president could not
BY STEPHEN E.. NORDLINGER.
Washinytcrn Bureau of The Sun
, Washington?Leon Jaworski, the Watergate spe-
cial' prosecutor, said- last' there has. been "no-
'agree:mentor understandiug..,- of any sort" between his
office and President Nixon.;., ?
Mr.. Jaworski, as the.mah in charge of the Water-
gate criminal prosecutions,presluriably. would, play a
,Aajor-role in deciding whether to press- criminal
'charges against Mr. ?Nixon, for' Richard M. Nixon. .
his involvement in The Viatet-- "Resolved by the Senate (the
'gate scandal. ? ' .? . ,_? , ,
Despite the uncertainties
overthis question, it. appeared
likely to legal experts yester-
day that as a private citizen
Mr.'. Nixon will be summoned
to appear as a witness at the
trial of his former aides in the
Watergate coverina 'se achede:
uled to open -next-?montlia'',- "
.. Senator Edward W. Brooke
'(R., Mass.). said last?night he'
will drop his move in Congress
to get immunity for the Presi- ?
dent-nriless?Mr:NECOlfmakes a,
?.1u11.? ? donfession" of :hiss' ine
.volvement in. Watergate'-and-
related scandals.:
' "I believe that the President
Owes it to the AmericaraPeople-
to melte full' disclosure of'his-
'personal involvement in,Watere
;Ate and related sincidents,'-"?
said Mr., Brooke;' who -earlier
yesterday had introdaced a re-
solution, calling for .1 immatnityra
. , "There has been- no agree-
ment or understanding of any
!sora between the President or
representatives and the
speciala prosecutor relating in
'any way to the President's
iresignation.' Mr. Jaworski
,said in the statement- tele-
Iphoned to the press following
the Nixon resignation 'speech.
s "The- special .. prosecutor's
office ? was not asked for any
such agreement or understand-
ing and offered none. Although
I was informed of the Presi-
dent's decision this afternoon..
my office did not participate in ,
any way in the President's
'decision to resign."
Mr. Jawoeski's statement ap-
parently was aimed at killing
one popular bit of speculation
?that Mr. Jaworski might
agree not to prosecute the Pres-
ident-in return for a presiden-
tial promise to resign:
The Brooke resolution staled:
"Expressing the: -sense ..ofI
Congress with respect to pro-
ceedingg against President
House of Representatives con-
curring) that it is the sense of
Congress that if President Rich-
ard M. Nixon should resign,
constitutionally be indicted.
However, with Mr. Nixon out
of office, the grand jury would
be free to indict him for ob-
struction of justice in the Wat-
ergate coverup, a charge to
;which he virtually admitted
Iguilt in his statement Monday.
1 Penalties severe
According to knowledgeable
!criminal lawyers, if Mr. Nixon
!should be indicted, he would
face criminal penalties that
could reach a total of 30 to 60
years in prison and $57,500 in
fines.
T
no officer or employee of the he experts based their esti-
United States, including the at- mates on the specifications in
looney general and the special' the articles of impeachment
prosecutor, and no officer or approved by the House Judi-
employee of any state,' tern-. dory Committee. The sections
tory or local government of the criminal code that were
should bring, conduct or con- said to apply forbid attempts
tinue criminal or civil proceed- to influence or impede wit-
nesses, obstruct criminal pro-
ceedings or cause nusrepresen-
tation of facts in criminal
cases.
Brooke announced his intention , On Watergate matters, Mr.
Jaworski was given the sole
to withdraw it. Senator Mike
Mansfield (D., Mont.), the ma-
discretion in terms of plea-bar-
. gaining and prosecution. His
jority leader, said it raised a;
grave constitutional question jurisdiction ?cannot be limited
"
Of the separation of powers," without the approval of the
and Senator Robert C. Byrd ( majority and minority leaders
D.,
W. Va.), the assistant majority of the House and Senate and,
leader, said it would "set a! the chairman and ranking mi-
bad precedent." nority members of the House
In any case; the resolution
would lack binding power on
either Mr. Jaworski or the
Watergate grand jury and, as
a matter of fact, on local and :for pursuing a criminal case
state prosecutors. :against President Nixon. The
The House Republican: .
leader, Representative John J. congressmen probably would
Rhodes (Ariz.),. said that al-
though there were moral rea-
sons for such a resolution, "it
wasn't worth the paper it was
written on.
"I have never felt Congress
had the constitutional authority cannot be dismissed "except
to grant immunity to anybody ;for extraordinary improprie-
for anything," Mr. Rhodes had
said earlier at a news confer- Therefore, Mr. Jaworski and
ence Tuesday. the Watergate grand jury ap-
Such a resolution could.' how- pear free to indict Mr. Nixon
ever, exert influence on the if they wish. ?
Watergate grand jury and Mr. Most observers here believe,
Jaworski against pursuing cri- however, that before acting he
minal action against Mr. would consult with the leader-
Nixon. In discussing the reso- ship of Congress. which has
lution during a televised inter- the sole 6r:tit to remove a
view, Senator Brooke said. "t president from office, as well
think that the American public as with the new President and
has the right to know exactly
'what has gone on in Water-
ings against him."
The likelihood that the reso-
lution would be approved seem-
ed doubtful ever before Senator
and Senate Judiciary Commit-
ees.
It also appears doubtful that
William B. Saxbe, the Attorney
General, would discharge him
not approve such an action.
Mr. Jaworski's charter. that
!developed after the first storm
; caused by the firing of his
predecessor, Archibald Cox,
!last October, states that he
4
Mr. Saxbe.
In this sense, a congressional,
resolution might influence
Jaworski. As Mr. Saxbe said
earlier this week about a con- ,
gressional move to immunize
Mr. Nixon: "The only people'
who can interpret what the .
American people want is the
'Congress. I think they're
aware of this and if it were
handled in that manner, it.
would not be a legal question."
Power to pardon .
Under his constitutional'
power "to grant reprieves and
pardons for offenses against i
the United States," Mr. Ford
could pardon Mr. Nixon for his:
alleged crimes. This decision;
would be made largely on hu-
manitarian and political I
grounds, the anticipated public
reaction.
Asked last November?in his
confirmation hearings at thel
Senate Rules Committee on his
nomination for vice president!
?whether he would pardon
Mr. Nixon should he become
president, Mr. Ford said:
"I don't think the public'
would stand for it."
Sentiments change, however.1
and there is no public outcry;
in Washington to deny Mr.
Nixon immunity and a pardon.!
if necessary. Senator Brooke
seems to have expressed the;
dominant mood here.
z
"It's pretty tough to picture
a former President of the lin-
ited States in jail," Represen-
tative Charles E. Wiggins (R.,
Calif.), Mr. Nixon's most elo-1
quent' defender on the House;
Judiciary Committee, told re-
porters at breakfast yesterday.!
Senator Robert P. Griffin i
(R., Mich.). the assistant Re-'
publican leader of the Senate,
said earlier this week . that
President Nixon's alleged of-
fenses were not so serious that
people wanted to see him in
jail.
' However, the feeling in the
'nation might not run entirely
that way.
The California Poll, operated
'by Mervin D. Field in Presi-
dent Nixon's home state,
'showed this week that 51 per
cent of those asked felt that
Mr. Nixon should not be
granted immunity from prose-
cution and 34 per cent said he
;should be granted immunity.
i Even if Mr. Nixon is given
!full immunity from federal ac-
tion, he could still face other
I
1legal problems as a private
I citizen. There would be no bar
to subpoenaing him to testify
in court, an expected move in
the coming Watergate coverup
case. He could also be indicted
by state and local prosecutors i
land he could be sued in civil
cases. 1
Mr. Nixon might also be dis-1
barred because of his alleged
misconduct.
A committee of the Newt
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9
-CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 August 1974
\n7-1
411
kz.4)
()a b\z5v
861
Before new disclosures, President assured U.S. that FBI was
'conducting a full field investigation'; pledged no cover-up
By a staff writer of
The Christian Science Monitor
Many of President Nixon's state-
ments on the fullness of White
House-ordered investigations into
Watergate from 1972 onward now
contrast sharply with his latest
statement ? that he ordered the FBI
to limit its investigation into the
Watergate break-in six days after
the break-in occurred ? June 23,
1972.
Excerpts from those statements
follow:
Press conference ? Aug. 29, 1972
". . . The FBI is conducting a full
field investigation. . . . The other
point I should make is that these
investigations ? the investigations
by the GAO (General Accounting
Office), the investigation by the
FBI, by the Department of Justice ?
have, at my direction, had the total
cooperation of the ? not only the
White House but also all agencies of
government.
". . What really hurts is if you
try to cover it up. . ."
' TV address ? April 30, 1913
"Last June 17 while I was ? in
Florida . . . I first learned from
news reports of the Watergate
break-in. . . . I immediately or-
dered an investigation by appro-
priate government authorities. . . .
"I again ordered that all persons
In the government, or at the re-
election committee, should cooper-
ate fully with the FBI, the prose-
cutors, and the grand jury. . .
There can be no whitewash at the
White House.
Press statement ? May 22, 1973
"The burglary and bugging of the
York city bar association re-i
portedly has been investigating'
Mr. Nixon in proceedings that,
could lead to disbarment. The
state bar of California is also
conducting a disbarment inves-
tigation.
The California Poll asked if
Mr. Nixon should be allowed to
continue to practice law after
being removed from the presi-
dency. Fifty per cent said he ,
should not and 31 per cent said
he should be allowed to prac-
tice.
There appeared to be little
Democratic National Committee
headquarters came as a complete
surprise to me. . . . My immediate
reaction was that those guilty should
be brought to justice and, with the
five burglars themselves already in
custody, I assumed that they would
be.
"Within a few days, however, I
was advised that there was a possi-
bility of CIA involvement In some
way.
"It did seem to me possible that,
because of the involvement of for-
mer CIA personnel, and because of
some of their apparent associations,
the investigation could lead to the
uncovering of covert CIA operations
totally unrelated to the Watergate
break-in. . . . It was certainly not
my intent, nor my wish, that the
investigation of the Watergate
break-in or of related acts be im-
peded in any way. . . ."
Written statement ? Aug. 15, 1973
"In the summer of 1972, I had
given orders for the Justice Depart-
ment and the FBI to conduct a
thorough and aggressive in-
vestigation of the Watergate break-
in . . . my only concern about the
scope of the investigation was that it
might lead into CIA or other national
security operations of a sensitive
nature. Mr. Gray, the acting direc-
tor of the FBI, told me by telephone
on July 6 that he had met with
General Walters, that General Wal-
ters had told him the CIA was not
involved, and that CIA activities
would not be compromised by the
FBI investigation. As a result, any
problems that Mr. Gray may have
had in coordinating with the CIA
support in Congress yesterday
to continue the impeachment
proceedings in light of the:
Nixon resignation. but Senator
Frank E. Moss fD.. Utah) said
Mr. Nixon Should be impeached
if he resigns without acknow-
ledging guilt.
"We all feel that whatever
abuses of power were commit-
ted ought somehow to he lnid
out on the public record," said'
Senator Byrd, who indicated
that the final filing of the
tfouse Judiciary Committee's
impeachment report might
serve that purposed.
were moot. I concluded by instruct-
ing him to press forward vigorously
with his own investigation. .
"Attorney General Kleindienst
. . . informed us that it had been the
most intensive investigation since
the assassination of President Ken-
nedy, and that it had been estab-
lished that no one at the White
House, and no higher-ups in the
campaign committee, were in-
volved. . .
"Not only was I unaware of any
cover-up, but at that time [Sept. 15]
and until March 21, I was unaware
that there was anything to cover up
. . .
"My consistent position from the
beginning has been to get out the
facts about Watergate, not to cover
them up. . . .
Nov. 20, 19'73
At a private appearance before,
Republican governors in Memphis,
President Nixon said that no "other
bombs" of Watergate information
Were about to explode. On Nov. 21,
the 18%-minute tape gap was dis-
closed to Judge Sirica and made
public.
TV speech ? April Z9, 1974
(Release of tape transcripts of
presidential conversations) "will at
last, once and for all, show that what
I knew and what I did with regard to
the Watergate break-in and cover-up
were just as I have described them
to you from the very beginning. . . .
"As far as what the President
personally knew and did with regard
to Watergate and the cover-up is
concerned, these materials ? to-
gether with those already made
available ? will tell it all."
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9
THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1974
White House Transcripts of 3 Nixon
-
Haldeman Conversations on
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Aug. 5?Following.
are transcripts released by the White
House today of three conversations
between President Nixon and H. R.
Haldeman on June 23, 1972. The
White House said the transcripts were
as complete as the quality of the tape
recordings would permit.
FIRST TRANSCRIPT.
Meeting: The President
and Haldeman, Oval Of-
fice, June 23, 1972 (10:04-"
-11:39 A.M.)
(Unintelligible)
P (Unintelligible) . . they've got a
magnificent place.
H No, they don't. See, that was all
hand-held camera without lighting?
lousy place. It's good in content,. it's
terrible in film quality.
P (Unintelligible) Rose, she ought to
be in here.
? H No, well let her in if you want to;.
Sure?
P That's right. Got so goddamned
much (scratching noises) ..
H Goddamned. , .
P I understand, I just thought (unin-
telligible). If I do, I just buzz.
H Yeah. Ah?
P Good, that's a very ?good paper
at least (unintelligible) The one?thing -
they haven't got in there is the thing
we mentioned with regard to the armed
services.
H I covered that with Ehrlichman
who says that can be done and he's
moving. Not only armed services, but
the whole Government.
P GSA? All government?
H All government procurement, yeah
and, I talked to John about that and he
thought that was a good idea. So, Henry
gets back at 3:45.
P I told Haig today that I'd see Rogers
at 4:30.
H Oh, good, O.K.
P Well, if he gets back at 3:45, he
Won't be here until 4:00 or 4:30.
H It'll be a little after 4:00 (untelligi-
ble) 5:00.
. Trip to Camp David
P Well, I have to, I'm supposed to go
to Camp David. Rogers doesn't need a
lot of time, does he?
H No sir.
P Just a picture?
H That's all. He called me about it
yesterday afternoon and said I don't
want to be in the meeting with Henry,
I understand that but there may be a
couple of points Henry wants me to be
aware of.
P Sure.
P (Unintelligible) Call him and tell him
we'll call him as soon as Henry gets.
here, between 4:30 and 5:00 (unintelligi-
ble) Good.
H O.K., that's fine.
H Now, on the investigation, you
know the Democratic break-in thing,
we're back in the problem area because
the F.B.I. is not under control, because
Gray doesn't exactly know how to con-
trol it and they have?their investiga-
tion is now leading into some produc-
tive areas?because they've been able
to trace the money?not through 'the
money itself?but through the bank
sources?the banker. 'And, and it goes
in some directions we don't want it to
go. Ah, also there have been some
things?like an informant came in off
the street to the F.B.I. in Miami who
was a photographer or has a friend who
is a photographer who developed some
films through this Guy Barker and the
films had pictures of Democratic Na-
tional Committee letterhead documents
and things. So it's things like that that
are filtering in. Mitchell came up' with
yesterday, and John Dean analyzed very
carefully last night and concludes; con-
curs now with Mitchell's recommenda-
tion that the only way ta solve this,
and we're set up beautifully to do it,
ah, in that and that?the only network
that paid any attention to it last night
was NBC?they did a massive story
story on the Cuban thing.
P That's right.
, H That the way to handle this now
is for us to have Walters call Pat Gray
and just say, "stay to hell out of this
?this is ah, business here we don't
want you to go any further on it."
That's not an unusual development, and
ah, that would take care of it.
P What about Pat Gray?you mean.
Pat Gray doesn't want to?
H Pat does want to. He doesn't know
how to, and he doesn't have, he doesn't
have any basis for doing it, Given this,
he will then have the basis. He'll call
Mark Felt in, and ?the two of them?
and Mark Felt wants to cooperate be-
cause he's ambitious? ? ?
,P Yeah.
What Would Be Said
H He'll call him in and say, "we've
got the signal from across the river to
put the hold on this." And that will fit.
rather well because the FBI agents who
are working the case, at this point, feel
that's what it is.
P This is CIA? They've traced the
money? Who'd they trace it to?
H Well they've traced it to a name,
but they haven't gotten to the guy yet.
P Would it be somebody here?
H Ken Dahlberg,
P Who the hell is Ken Dahlberg?
H He gave $25,000 in Minnesota and,
ah, the check went directly to this guy
Barker.
P It isn't from the committee though,
from Stens?
H Yeah'. It is. It's directly traceable
and there's some more through some
Texas people that went to the Mexican
Bank which can also be traced to the
Mexican Bank?They'll get their names
today.
H?and (pause)
P Well, I mean, there's no way?I'm
just thinking if they don't cooperate,
what do they say? That they were
approached by the Cubans. That's what
Dahlberg has to say, the Texans too,
that they?
H Well, if they will, But then we're
relying on more and more people all
the time. That's the problem and they'll
stop if we could take this other- route.
P All right.
II And you seem to think the thing
to do is get them to stop?
?P Right, fine.
-It They say. the only way to do that
ise'from White House instructions. And
it' S got to be to Helms and to ?ah,
what's his name?? Walters.
P Walters.
/ '6
June 23, 1972
H And the proposal would be that
Ehrlichman and I call them in, and say,
ah
P All right, fine. How do you call him
in--1 mean you just?well, we pro-
Jected Helms from one hell of a lot of
things.
H That's what Ehrlichman says.
P Of course, this Hunt, that will un-
cover a lot of things. You open that
scab there's a hell of a lot of things
and we just feet that it would be very
detrimental to have this thing go any;
further. This involves these Cubans,
Hunt and a lot of hanky-panky that we
have nothing to do with ourselves. Well
?
what the hell, did Mitchell know about,
this?
I: I think so. I don't think he knew
the details, but I think he knew.
P He didn't know how it was going
to -he handled though?with Dahlberg
and the Texans and so forth? Well who
was the 'asshole that did? Is it Liddy?
Is that the fellow? He must be a little?
nuts.
H He is.
P I mean he just isn't well screwed
on is he? Is that the problem?
H No, but' he was under pressure,
apparently, to get more information,
and as he got more pressure, he pushed
the people harder to move harder?
P Pressure from Mitchell?
H Apparently.
P Oh, Mitchell. Mitchell' was, at the
point (unintelligible). ?
H Yea.
P All right, fine, I understand it all.
We won't second-guess Mitchell and the
Test. Thank God it wasn't Colson.
Colson Interviewed
H The F.B.I. interviewed Colson yes-
terday. They determined that would be
a good thing to do. To have him take
an interrogation, which he did, and
that?the F.B.I. guys working the case
concluded that there were one or two
possibilities?one, that this is a White
House?they don't think that there is
anything at the election committee?.
they think it was either a White House
operation and they had some obscure
reasons for it?nonpolitical, or it was
a Cuban and the C.I.A. And after their
interrogation of Colson yesterday, they
concluded it was not the White House,
but are now convinced it is a C.I.A.
thing, so the C.I.A. turnoff would?
P Well, not sure of their analysis,
I'm not going to get that involved. I'm
. H No, sir, we don't want you to.
P You call them Ia.
H Good deal. ?
P Play it tough. That's the way they
play it and that's the way we are going
to play it.
H O.K.
P When I saw that news summary, I
questioned whether it's a bunch of crap,
I thought, er, well it's good to have
them off us awhile, because when they
start bugging us, which they have, our
little boys will not know how to handle
it. I hope they will though.
H You never know.
P Good
H Mosbacher has resigned.
P Oh yeah?
H As we expected he would.
P Yeah.
H lie's going back to private life (un-
intelligible). Do you want to sign this
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or should I send it to Rose?
P (scratching poise).
H Do you want to release it?
P O.K. Great. Good job, Bob.
H Kissinger?
P Huh? That's a joke.
H Is it?
P Whenever Mosbacher came for din-
ners, you see he'd have to he out escort-.
log the petson in and when they came'
through the receiving line, Henry was
always with Mrs. Mosbacher and she'd
turn and they would say this is Mr.
Kissinger. He made a little joke.
H I see. Very good. O.K.
A Meeting With Mills
H (unintelligible) Congressional guid-
ance to get into the Mills thing at all..
It was reported that somebody?Church .
met with Mills.
P Big deal (unintelligible).
H Well, what happened there is?
that's true?Church went uh?
? P Is it pay as you go or not?
H Well, Church say S it is, our people
don't believe it is. Church told Mills that
he had Long's support on adding Social
Security and Wilbur equivocated on the
question when Johnny Burns talked to
?him about whether he would support
the Long/Church amendment, but Long
and Church telling him that it is fully
funded?and our people are afraid Mills
is going to go along if they put the heat
on him as a partisan Democrat to say :
that this would be damned helpful just
before our convention to stick this to the
White House. Ah, Johnny Burns, he
talked to Wilbur about it afterwards
and this has been changed, so don't be
concerned about it?you should call
Mansfield and you should tell Mansfield
that Burns is going to fight this in con-
ference and that 'he will demand that
it go to Rules and he will demand a
three-day lay-over, which means he will
carry the conference over until July 7,
which would be?and then before they
even start the action, so it will mean ?
they have to stay in?they can't?
P All right.
H (Unintelligible).
? P Go ahead.
'A Dangerous Game'
H Clark made the point that he
should handle this, not you, and is
doing this through Scott .to Byrd, who
is acting (unintelligible) still in the
hospital. And ah, Clark's effort is going
to be to kill the Church/Long amend-
i lent. They got another tactic which is
playing a dangerous game, but they are
thinking about, which is, if they put
social security on (unintelligible) that
they will put revenue sharing and H. R.
in it and really screw it up.
P I would. Not dangerous at all.
Buck up.
H They're playing with it?they un-
derstand. Clark is going off with the
mission to kill it.
P Revenue sharing won't kill it. But
H. R. I would.
H So that's what he is off to.
?
P But, boy if the debt ceiling isn't
passed start firing (expletive deleted)
government workers. Really mean it
cut them off. They can't do this?they've
got to give us that debt ceiling. Mills
has said that he didn't (unintelligible)
of-the debt ceiling earlier. Well, it's o.k.
It's o.k.
H. Well. Burns says that he is justify-
ing it on the basis that they have told
him that it's finance. Ehrlichman met
with them the Republicans on Senate
Finance yesterday and explained the
whole thing to them. They hadn't
understood the first six-months financ-
ing and they are with it now and all
ready to go and hanging on that de-
fense. He feels, and they very much
want, a meeting with you before the
recess, Finance Republicans.
P. All right. Certainly.
"British Floated the Pound!"
H So, we'll do that next week. Did
you get the report that the British
floated the pound?
P No, I don't think so,
H They did.
P That's devaluation?
1-1 Yeah. Vianigan's got a report on it
here.
P I don't care about it. Nothing we
can do about it.
H You want 'a run-down?
P No, I don't.
H He argues it shows the wisdom of
our refusal to consider convertability
until we get a new monetary system.
P Good. I think he's right. It's too
complicated for me to get into. (unintel-
ligible) I understand.
? H Burns expects a 5-day percent de-
valuation against the dollar.
? P Yeah. O.K. Fine.
H Burns is Concerned about specula-
tion about the lira.
P Well, I don't give a (expletive de-
leted) about the lira. (Unintelligible)
H That's the substance of that.
P How are the House guys (unintelli-
gible) Boggs (unintelligible)
H All our people are, they think it's
a great?a great ah?
P There ain't a vote in it. Only George
Shultz and people like that that think
it's great (unintelligible) There's no
votes in it, Bob.
P Or do you think there is?
H No, (unintelligible) I think it's?it
looks like a Nixon victory (shuffling)
major piece of legislation (unintelligible)
P (unntelligible)
H Not til July. 1 mean, our guys anal-
ysis is that it will?not going to get
screwed up. The Senate will tack a little
?
bit of amendment on it, but not enough
to matter, and it can be easily resolved
'in Conference.
P Well, what the hell, why not ac-
.complish one thing while we're here.
H Maybe we will.
P?Yep. Not bad.
H?In spite of ourselves.
P-0.K. What else have you got that's
amusing today?
H?That's it.
P?How's your (unintelligible) (Voices
fade) coverage?
'Good Newspaper Play'
H?Good newspaper play?lousy tele-
vision?and they covered all the items,
but didn't (unintelligible) you gotta (un-
intelligible) but maximum few minutes
(unintelligible).
P?(unintelligible).
H?Sure. One thing, if you decide to
do more in-office ones?Remember, I, I
--when I came in I asked Alex, but ap-
parently we don't have people in charge.
I said I understood, that you had told
me that the scheme was to let them
come in and take a picture?an 011ie
picture?but (expletive deleted), what
good does an 011ie picture do?
H?Doesn't do any good.
P?Don't know what it was but ap-
parently he didn't get the word.
H?Well, I think we ought to try that
next time. If you want to see if it does
us any good, and it might, let them.
p?Well, why wasn't it done this time?
H?I don't know.
P?It wasn't raised?
H I don't know. You said it---
P Because I know you said?and 011ie
sat back there and (unintelligible) and
I said (unintelligible) But, (expletive
deleted) 011ie's pictures hang there and
nobody sees them except us.
H Now what you've got to?it's really
not the stills that do us any good on
that. We've got to let them come in with
the lights.
P Well in the future, will you ma!- -
a note. Alex, Ron or whoever it is?
Steve. 1 have no objection to them com-
ing in, and taking a picture with stills,
I mean with the camera, I couldn't agree
more. I don't give a (expletive deleted)
about the newspapers.
11 You're going to get newspaper
coverage anyway.
P What (unintelligible) good objective
play?
H Oh, yeah. .
P ?In terms of the way it was?
H Of in the news.
P Needless ?to say, they sunk the
bussing thing, but there was very, very
little on that. (unintelligible) Detroit
(unintelligible)
H Two networks covered it. .
P We'll see what Detroit does. ? We
hope to Christ the question
P (unintelligible) SOB. If necessary:
Hit it again. Somebody (unintilligible)
bussing thing back up again.
H What's happened on the bussing
thing? We going to get one or not? Well,
no we're out of time. No. After.
P I guess it is sort of impossible to
gtt to the research people that when
you say 100 words, you mean. 100
words.
H Well, I'm surprised because this is
Buchanan, and I didn't say time on this
one, I said 100 words and Pat usually
takes that seriously, but that one?I
have a feeling 'maybe what happened
is that he may. have started short and
he may have gotten int6 the editing?
you know the people?the clearance
process?who say you have to say such
and such, although I. know what's hap-
pened. -
P I don't know?maybe it isn't worth
going out and (unintelligible) Maybe it
is.
Ehrliehman Mentioned
H Well, it's a close call. Ah, Ehrlich-
man thought you probably?
P What?
I-1 Well, he said you probably didn't
need it. He didn't think you should, not
at all. He said he felt fine doing it.
H Well, it's a close call. Ehrlichman
thought you probably?
p What?
. H Well he said you probably didn't
need it. He didn't think you should ?
not at all. He said he felt fine doing it.
P He did? The question, the point,
is does he think everybody is going to
understand the bussing? .
H That's right.
P And, ah, well (unintelligible) says
no.
H Well, the fact is Somewhere in be-
tween. I think, because I think that
unintelligible) is missing some.
P Well, if the fact is somewhere in
between, we better do it. .
H Yoah, I think Mitchell says, "Hell
yes. Anything, we can hit on at any-
time we get the chance ? and we've
got a reason for doing it ? do it."
P When you get in -- when you get
in (unintelligible) people, say, "Look
the problem is that this will open the
whole, the whole Bay of Pigs thing,
and the President just feels that ah,
without going into the details ? don't,
don't lie to them to the extent to say
no involvement, but just say this is a
comedy of errors, without getting into
it, 'the President believes that it is go-
ing to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing
up again. And, ah, because these people
are plugging for (unintelligible) and
that they should call the F.B.I. in and
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(unintelligible) don'tViViCirviWePrnBel
this case period!
P (Inaudible) our cause ?
H Get more done for our cause by
the opposition than by us.
P Well, can you get it done?
H I think so.
P (unintelligible) moves (unintelligi-
ble) election (unintelligible)
H They're all?that's the whole thing.
The Washington Post said it in its lead
editorial today. Another "McGovern's
got to change his position." That that
would be a good thing, that's construc-
tive. Ah, the white wash for change.
P (unintelligible) urging him to do so
?say that is perfectly all right?
`Maye He's Right'
H Cause then they are saying?on the
other hand?that he were not so smart.
We have to admire the progress he's
made on teh basis of the position he's
taken and maybe he's right and we're
. .
wrong.
P (Inaudible) I just, ha ha
H Sitting in Miami (unintelligible) our
hand a little bit. They eliminated their
law prohibiting male (unintelligible) from
wearing female clothes?now the boys
can all put on their dresses?so the bgay
. lib is going to turn out 6,000 (unintelli-'
gible).
P .(unintelligible)
H I think
P They sure test the effect of the
writing press. I think, I think it was
still good to have it in the papers, but,.
but, let's ? perfectly ? from another
standpoint, let's just say look, "Because
(unintelligible) people trying and any
other damned reason, I just don't want
to go out there (unintelligible) what
better way to s. end my time than to
take off two afternoons or whatever
it was to prepare for an in-office press
conference." Don't you agree?
H That's, that's?
P (unintelligible) I spend an hour?
whatever it was-45 Minutes or so with
television executives (unintelligible) all
in and outs (unintelligible). "Look, we
. have no right to ask the President any-
thing (unintelligible) biased." (unintelli-
gible) says I'm going to raise hell with
the networks. And look, you've just not
got to let Klein ever set up a meeting
again. He just doesn't have his head
screwed on. You know what I mean..
He just opens it up and sits there with
eggs on his face. He's just not our guy
at all is he?
H No. ?
P Absolutely, totally, unorganized.
H He's a very nice guy. '
P People love him, but damn is he
unorganized.
H?That's right, he's not.
P?But don't you agree that (unintelli-
ble) worth doing and that it's kind of
satisfying.
H?Sure. And as you point out there's
soem fringe benefits with?going
through the things is a good exercise
for you?
P?Tha t's right.
H?In the sense of getting caught up
on certain items?
P?Right.
H?It's a good exercise for the troops
in having to figure out. what the prob-
lems are and what the answers are to
them.
P?Three or four things. Ah?Pat
raised the point last night that probably
she and the gils ottghtto stay in a hotel
on Miami Beach. First she says the
moment they get the helicopter and get
off and so forth, it destroys their hair
and so forth. And of course, that is true
?even though you turn them off and
turn them on so on. The second point
Is?
easei20.1e1,1
/MI6 PWRDP77-00432R000/1gpan992-9
P?Well, the point is, I want to check
to be sure what the?driving
driving time with traffic
up to an hour?
with Dean
time is. If the
is going to be
H?Oh no.
P With the traffic?
H But
they have an escort.
P How long would it take?
'Girls on Television
H Half an hour. Less than, half an
hour. YOu can make it easy in a half
hour without an escort, and they would
?they should, have an, escort. They
' should arrive with?and they may not
like it?it may bother them a little, but
that's what people expect ? and you
know at the Conventions?every county
?she ha S :another point though which
I think will please everybody concerned:
She says,. "Now, look. You go there?
she says as far as she was concerned
she would be delighted?the girls would
be delighted to very reception?every-
thing that they have there." They want
to ?be busy. They want to do things
and they want to be useful. Of course,
as you know, our primary aim is to see
that' they are on -television (unintelligi-
ble) coming into the ball (unintelligible)
shooting the hall (unintelligible) plan on
television. My point is, I think it would
be really great if they did the delega-
tions of the bit states. Just to stop in
you know. Each girl and so forth
can do? -
?
. H Sure. 1-
P The second thing is?just go by
and say hello, and they'll
P They'll do the handshakers (unin-
telligible) you know (unintelligible).
H Well, the big point is, there's,
there's several major functions that they
may want to tie that into.
P Yeah. Yeah.. -
H There's?a strong view on the part
of some of our strategists that we should
be danmed-careful not to over use them
,and cheapen them. That they should?
there is a celebrity 'value you can lose.
- I-1 By rubbing on them -too much?
P I couldn't agree more.
H And -so, we have to?their eager-
ness to participate should not go?
P California delegation (unintelligible)
think I'm here. I mean we're going to
have (unintelligible)
P You understand?they're
Have them do things?do the impor-
tant things, and so forth, and so on.
H There's the question. Like Sunday
night they have the (unintelligible)
whether they should go to that?now
at least the girls should go. I think I
ought to go too! -
P Yep.
Plan for Arrivals
H You know, whether Pat ? one
thought that was raised was that the-
girls and their husbands go down on
Sunday and Pat wait and come -down
with you on Tuesday. I think Pat should
go down and should be there cause
they'll have the Salute?
P (Inaudible)
H She should arrive separately. ? I
think she should arrive with the girls.
Another thought was to have the girls
arrive Sunday, Pat arrive Monday and
you arrive Tuesday. I think you're over-
doing your arrivals.
P No, no, no. She arrives with the
girls and they?they should go. I agree.
H But, I don't think you have to be
there until Tuesday.
P I don't want to go near the damned
place until Tuesday. I don't want to be
near it. I've got the arrival planned (un-
intelligible) my arrival of, ah?
H Now we're going to do, unless you
have some objection, we should do your
arrival at Miami International not at,
P Yes, I agree
H Ah, we can crank up a hell of an
arrival thing.
P Allright
P (unintelligible) is for you, ah, an
perhaps Colson probably. (inaudible).
? H I was thumbing through the, ah
.last chapters of (unintelligible) las
night, and I also read the (unintdlligible
chapters (unintelligible). Warm up to it
and it makes, ah, fascinating reading?
Also reminds you of a hell of a lot of ??
things that happened in the campaign
press you know, election coverage, the
(unintelligble) etc., etc. ?
H Yeah
P So on and so on. I want you to re--
read it, adn I want Colson to read it,
and anybody, else.
11 O.K. -
P And anybody else .in the campaign.
Get copies of the book and give it to
'each of them. Say I want them to read
it and have it in mind. Give it to Who-
ever you can. O.K.? ?
H Sure will..
P Actually, the book reads 'awfully
well-T.-have to look at history. I want to
talk to you more about that later in
terms of what it tells us about how our
campaign should be run,' O.K.?
H O.K. In other words, (unintellig-
ible) the media and so forth. '
P TAo a great extent, is responsible
to what happened- to Humphrey back
in '68. If that's true, it did not apply in
1960. The media was just as bad (unin-
telligible) two weeks. In 1960 we ran?
H It was a dead heat.
'How Much Television' /
P All the way through the campaign
and it never changed, clearly. It may
be?it may be that our?as you read
this on how (unintelligible) our cam-,
paign was. . . how much television, you
know. We didn't have (unintelligible) at,
all. It may be that our '60 campaign-
(unintelligible) was extremely much.,
more effective and it may be too, that.
we misjudged the (uninteligible).. You-.
read it through and (unintelligible) see
what I mean. I mean, it's it's?even.
realize that '68 Nlias much better organ-
ized. It may be we did a better job in.
'60. It just may be. It.may tell us some-
thing.' Anyway would you 'check it over?
H Yep.
P (unintelligible) check another?
thing?gets back? Convention? ,
H He was, I'm not sure if he still is,
P Cbuld find out from him what chap-
ters Of the book he worked on. Ah, I
don't want coverage of the heart attack
thing. I did most of the dictating on the
last two but I've been curious (unintel-
ligible). But could you find out which,
chapters he worked on. Also find out
where Moscow is?what's ,become of
him?what's he's doing ten years. Say
hello to him (unintelligible) might find
it useful (unintelligible) future, despite
the (unintelligible). You'll find this ex-
tremely interesting. Read (unintelligi-
ble).
H Read that a number of times (un-
intelligible) different context?
P Ah, I would say another thing?.
Bud Brown (unintelligible) did you read
it? (Unintelligible) candidates. I don't
know who all y,pu discussed that with.
Maybe it's net 'been handled at a high
enough level. Who did you discuss that
'with? (Unintelligible)
H MacGregor and Mitchell. MacGreg-
or and Mitchell, that's all.
? , Pictures With Democrats
P Yep. (Unintelligible) I don't mind
the time?the problem that I have with
it is that I do not want to have picturc:.
with candidates athat are running with
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,
? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100S300029
Democrats?or against ? Democrats. that
ma yeihtey be (unintelligible) or might
be for us. On the other hand, all sophis-
ticated Democratic candidates you un-
derstand?the damned candidates (un-
intelligible) they gotta get a nidturo
with the President. The way to have the
pictures with the candidates?this
would be a very clever thing?is to
call both Democrats?the good South-
ern Democrats and those few
like
(unintelligible), who did have a picture
with me, see, and then call them up
and say look (unintelligible) came ors
and they took a picture and maybe
(unintelligible) president. Wants you to
know that If you would like a picture,
if you would like to come down to the
office, you know, you can have a ptc-
ture taken that you are welcome to
.use. How does that sound to you as at
(unintelligible)? Let me say this. I'm no
rrot?I think* that getting to the -
cardidates out there that are very busy
and so forth may help us a bit. If the
candidates' run too far behind you, it
drags you too much.
H Yeah. That's right:
F On the, on the other side, I don't
think it's, going to hurt you particularly
if you always (unintelligible) there's
some quality ?
H 0 yeah, but they aren't going to
(inaudible)
? (Unintelligible) quite candid with
you ? I think when I ran in '46, re-
member, I would have gotten on my
hands and knees for a picture . with
Harold Stassen and (unintelligible)
whole story. We (unintelligible) to do
what we can (unintelligible) in. the
house and the Senate ? as well as
we can.
H (Unintelligible) have our loyalists
feel that we're? .
- P That's right. (Unintelligible) and
I'll he .glad to do it next week, and I
think on that basis we can handle the
Democrats. Say, "Look they had a
picture," and then call each one. I
mean they'll have to check this list.
Check each one (unintelligible) and say,
look (unintelligible) if you'd like a
picture with him?not on a bisis of
support?one?
P Yeah.
P (Unintelligible) not going to make
any statement?not going to make any
s!ntement. (Unintelligible) have a nic-
he?, he'd be glad to have a picture'
ttuentelligible).
II Picture of the?
P That's right. Be glad to if you like,
but it's up to you and so forth.. '
? You did the Democrats in here.
Would you do a, would you do the
Republicans? Do a different picture
(unintelligible) full shot.
P Yeah. Another point I was going
to mention to you. Bob, is the situation
with regard to the girls. I was talking
to Pat last night. Tricia and I were
talking, and she mentioned?Tricia said
that apparently when she was in Allen-
town htere were 20 or 30 thugs?labor
thugs out hoeing.
H Hinmm.
P And when she went to Boston to
present some art?her Chinese things to
the art e.aliery there?two the (unintelli-
gible) from the press were pretty vicious.
What I mean is they came throught the
line and one refused to shake. One was
not with the press. Refused to shake
hands, so forth and so on. Tricia (unin-
telligible) very' personal point, (unintelli-
gible) good brain in that head. She said
first she couldn't believe that the event
that they do locally (unintelligible)
understand. You know she does the
Boys' Club, the Art Gallery. (unintelligi-
ble). She says the important thing is to
find this type of (unintelligible) to go
into the damn town (unintelligible) do
television, which of course, they do.
(Unintelligible) she says why (intelligi-
ble) control tehe place. She says in other
words, go in do the Republican group.
Now, sure isn't (unintelligible) to say
you did the Republican group, as it is
the Allentown Bullies Club? But, that's
the paper story. The point is, I think
Parker has to eet a little more thinking
in depth, or is 1 Codus now who will
do this?
II They are both working on it.
PWhat's your off-hand reaction on
that, Bob. I do not want them, though,
to go in and get the hell kicked (un-
intelligible).
He?There's no question, and we've
really got to work at that.
P?Yep. (unintelligible).
H?Ya, but in think?I'm not sure?
if you can't get the controlled non-
political event, then I think it is better
to do a political event (unintelligible).
P?For example?now the worse thing
(unintelligible) is to go to anything that
has to do with the Arts.
H?Ya, see that?it was (unintelligi-
ble) Julie giving that time in the Mu-
seum in Jacksonville.
P?The Arts you know?they're Jews,
they're left wing?in other words, stay
away.
P?Make a point.
H?Sure.
P?Middle America?put that word
out? Middle America-type of people
(unintelligible), auxiliary, (unintelligi-
ble). Why the . hell doesn't Parker get
that kind of think going? Most of his
things are elite groups except, I mean,
do the cancer thing?maybe nice for
Tricia to go up?ride a bus for 2 hours
?do some of that park in Oklahoma?.
but my view is, Bob, relate it to Middle
-America and not the elitist (unintelli-
gible). Dou you agree?
P I'm not complaining. I think they
are doing a hell of a job. The kids are
willing?
H They really are, but she can im-
prove.
P There again, Tricia had a very good
thought on this, but let's do Middle-
America.
H Yep.
P (Unintelligible).
Secret Service Reception
P I don't know whether Alex told you
or not, hut I want a Secret Service re-
ception some time next week. I just
gotta know who these guys are. (Unin-
telligible). Don't you think so? I really
feel they're there?that ah, I see new
guys around?and Jesus Christ they
look so young.
H Well, they change them?that's
one (unintelligible) any reception now
would be totally different (unintelligi-
ble).
P Get 100 then?so it's 200 and I
shake their hands and thank them and
you look (unintelligible) too?(unintel-
ligible). They have a hell of a lot of
fellas, let's face it, (unintelligible)
friends (unintelligible), but I just think
it's a nite?
H They all?you have such?that's
why it's a god thing t?o do, cause they
are friends?and they have, such over-.
riding respect for y6u and your family
?that a
P I wouldn't want the whole group?
something like unintelligible). Third
point?I would like a good telephone
call list for California, but not a huge
? book, and' the kind is?This would be
a good time where (unintelligible) and
just give thanks to people for their sup-,
I, Colson' had me call
port. For example,
(unintelligible) the other day?(unintel-
ligible) thing to do, but, here you could
take the key guys that work?I
wouldn't mind calling a very few con-
tributors?maybe, but we're talking
about magnitude of ten?very key ten.
II Ten?you mean ten people?
. P Ya.
H Oh, I thought you meant $10,000.
P No, ten. Ten. I was thinking of very
key (unintelligible), people like?that
worked their ass off collecting money,'
just to say that?people that?the peo-
ple that are doing the work?very key
political (unintelligible) just to pat them
on the back. I mean that means a helluva
lot?very key political VIPs, you know,
by political VIPs ?ah (unintelligible)
just get the South get a, better (unintel-
ligible). Our problem is that there are
only two men in this place that really
give us names?that's Rose?the other
is Colson, and we just aren't getting
them. But I mean ah, and then editors
?by editors and television people?like
a (unintelligible) cal, but a few key edi-
tors-who are just busting their ass for
us where there's something to do. But
give me a good telephone list, and Rose
should give me a few personal things?
likeb
I do a lot of things, but I called
(unintelligible) here today some (unin-
telligible) and things of that sort. But I
I never mind doing it you know when
" I've got an hour to put my feet up and
.make a few calls?don't you agree?
H Yep.
P I think of tthe campaign?that's
going to be a hell of a (unintelligible).
I think sometimes when we're here in
Washington, you know, supposedly
doing the business of the government,
that I can call heople around the coun-
try?people that will come out for us?
and so forth?like (unintelligible) for
example, Democrats come out for us.
Theyr'e (unintelligible) right across the
board?Democrat or labor union. (unin-
?telligible)
H Ya.
Care Is Urged
P Religious leaders (unintelligible) say
something. You gotta he careful some
ass over in (unintelligible) checked on
(unintelligible) that's why you can't
have Klein (unintelligible). He just
doesn't really have his head screwed on
Bob. I could see it in that meeting yes-
terday. He does not.
H That's right.
P He just doesn't know. He just sort
'of blubbers around. I don't know how
he does TV so well.
H Well, he's a sensation on that?
.that goes to the (unintelligible) meaning
of the thing, you know. What's his
drawback. is really an asset.
P Ya. If you would do this. Pat, and
tell Codus, (unintelligible), but I will go
to Camp David (unintelligible) haif hour.
Key Biscayne?she might want to stay
there if she can go in less than a half
hour with an escort. Do you think you
can? Frankly, Miami Beach (unintelligi-
ble) but we can arrange it either way?
Leave it to her choice.
H It wouldn't take as long.
P Leave it to her choice?she'd?
it's.?
H She'd?it's so misorable. If she's
at Miami Beach she'll be a prisoner in
that hotel. -
P Yoa'n. Tell her?tell her that's
fine. But it's up to her.
H Fair enough!
P I'll be anxious in (unintelligible)
sign that stuff (unintelligible). I sup-
pose most of our staff (unintelligible)
but that Six Crises is a damned good
book, and the (unintelligible) story
reads like a novel?the Hiss case?
Caracas was fascinating. The campaign

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of ("purse for anybody in politics should
be a must because it had a lot in there
of how politicians are like (unintelligi-
ble) elections, and how you do things,
(unintelligible) as of that time. I think
part of the problem as an example, for
example, I'm just thinking?research
people something they really missed
(unintelligible) Burns. Pat and I, she
said (unintelligible) no, she had re-
membered .She remembered (unintelli-
-gible) and Jimmy Burns said well (un-
intelligible) hard for me to come, but
I.just want you to know (unintelligible)
but because (unintelligible) want you
to know you are still my friend (unin-
telligible). Wonderful item to put in.
H Is that in the book?
P It's in the book. Hell yes. It's in
the book.
P (Unintelligible) Why don't you re-
read it?
Z [Ronald L. Ziegler, the press secre-
tary] We're delaying our briefing until
noon for the higher education (unin-
telligible) and so forth. But I thought,
if you agree, that I would not press
purposes, but just sit on the side for
this economic thing.
P Sure. How many of them are there?
Z Well there's the entire cabinet of
economic advisers. I mean Council of
Economic Advisers, plus Shultz?fairly
big group.
P Shultz
Z Well.
H (Unintelligible)
P See what I mean?
H Sure.
'Should Be Must Reading' -
P It's the kind of thing that I get in
toasts and that sort of thing, but, but
you see. I don't think our guys do that
kind of?that should be must reading?
that book is crammed full?crammed
full?see. It would be helpful for those
to get it. O.K. Oh, can we take another
second? I mean, on that thing on the
All Time Baseball greats?I would like
to do that and, if you could ,if you could
get it.
Unidentified Voice. There's already a
story at random?
P I saw it.
UV Indicating that you were going to
P If you would get that?if you would
get three of four. I don't want the?I'm
only speaking of the All Times Greats.
UV Right.
P And then, and then get me a couple
of other people (unintelligible) very
badly (unintelligible) and I'll go down
through the?quietly (unintelligible)
? UV So do you want names from me
or just a list of others you have picked?
H No, just the names that have been
picked (unintelligible) various people.
UV Right.
P (Unintelligible)
UV Right, I got it.
P O.K.
UV Yes Sir. (Unintelligible)
H You did, huh,
Z Yeah. Incidentally,' in the news
summary (unintelligible) preferred tele-
vision. Did you see that?( unintelligible)
I talked to
If We may (unintelligible) we may
not.
Z No, the point I'm making?
P I know Ron, but let me say?but
think?apparently, the TODAY Show
this morning (unintelligible) two mM-
utes of teelvision?.
Z?I though he got good play. Par-
ticularly in tight of the fact that ah,
helluva a lot of other (unintelligible)
would take place in the nation.
P?Right.
H?We have an overriding?
P?What, weren't, how, about the
guys that were there? They were pleased
with the?
Z?(unintelligible) and then (unintel-
ligible),
P?Huh?
P?Cause I didn't think they would?
Z?But they always are?
P?Helluva a lot of news and?
H?Well that snaps all our own ma-
chinery, into motion too.
Z?(unintelligible) damn. Feel it?
P?(unintelligible) that's good, warm?
Z?Right. They came tome and then
said (unintelligible). ?
P?(unintelligible) should have some
more
Z?And, they liked the color. , They
made the point about?you know. How
relaxed you were, and at the end, sitting
down and talking about the baseball
thing after the whole thing?after it
was over. You know, you just chipped
those things off with such ease and so
forth.' It was so good.
SECOND .
TRANSCRIPT'
Meeting: .The President
and Haldeman, Oval Of-
fice, June 23, 1972 (1:04-
1:13.P.M.)
P-0.K., just postpone (scratching
noises) (unintelligible) just say (unintel-
ligible) very bad to have this fellow
Hunt, ah, he knows too damned much,
if he was involved?you happen to
know that? If it gets out that this is all
involved, the Cuba thing it would be a
fiasco. It would make the CIA look bad,
it's going to make Hunt look bad, and
it is likely to blow the whole Bay of
Pigs thing which we think would be
very unfortunate?both for CIA, and for
the country, at this time, and for Ameri-
can foreign policy. Just tell him to lay
off. Don't you?
H?Yep. That's the basis to do it on.
Just leave it at that.
P?I don't know if he'll get any ideas
for doing it because our concern po-
litical (unintelligible). Helms is not one
to (unintelligible)?I would just say,
lookit, because of the Hunt involvement,
whole cover basically this
H?Yep. Good move.
P?Well, they've got some pretty good
ideas on this Meany thing. Shultz did a
good paper. I read it all (voices fade).
THIRD TRANSCRIPT
Meeting: The President.
and Haldeman, EOB Of-
fice, June 23, 1972. (2:20-
2:45 P.M.)
H?No problem
P?(Unintelligible)
H?Well, it was kind of interest. Wal-
ters made the point and I didn't mention
Hunt, I just said that the thing was lead-
ing into directions that were going to
create potential problems because they
were exploring leads that led back into
areas that would be harmful to the CIA
and harmful to the government (unintel-
ligible) didn't have anything to do (un-
intelligible).
(Telephone)
P?Chuck? I wonder if you would give
John Connally a call he's on his trip-
1 don't want him to read it in the paper
before Monday about this quota thing
and say?Look, we're going to do this,
but that I checked I asked you about the
situation (unintelligible) had an under-i 10
standing it was only temporary and ah ,
(unintelligible) O.K.? I just don't want/
him to read it in the papers. Cond. Rm.\
H--(Unintelligible) I think Helms did
to (unintelligible) said, l've had no?
P God (unintelligible)
H Gray called and said, yesterday,
and said that he thought?
P Who did? Gray?
H Gray called Helms and said I think
we've run right into the middle of a
CIA covert operation.
.P Gray said that?
H Yeah. And (unintelligible) said
nothing we've done at this point and ah
(unintelligible) says well it sure looks
to me like it is (unintelligible) and ah,;
that was the end of that conversaton
(unintelligible) the problem is it tracks
back to the Bay of Pigs and it tracks
back to some other the leads run out
to people who had no involvement in
this, except by contacts and connection,
but it gets to areas that are liable to
be raised? The whole problem (unintelli-
gible) hunt. So at that point he kind
of got the picture. He said, he said we'll
be very happy to be helpful (unintelligi-
ble) handle anything you want. I would
like to know the reason for being help-
ful, and I made it clear to him he
hasn't going to get explicit (unintelli-
gible) generality, and he said fine. And
Walters (unintelligible). Walters is go-
ing to make a call to Gray. That's the
way we put it and that's the way it
was left.
P How does that work though, how,
they've got to (unintelligible) somebody
from the Miami bank.
Bureau's Inquiry
H Unintelligible). The point John
makes?the bureau is going on this be-
cause they don't know what they are
uncovering (unintelligible) continue to
pursue it. They don't need to because
they already have their case as far as
the charges against these men (unintel-
ligible) and ah, as they pursue it (un-
intelligible) exactly, but we didn't in
any way say we (unintelligible). One
thing Helms did arise. He said, Gray?
he asked Gray why they thought they
had run into a C.I.A. thing and Gray
said because of the characters involved
and the amount of money involved, a
lot of dough. (unintelligible) and ah,'
(unintelligible). \
P (unintelligible)
H Well, I think they will.
P If it runs (unintelligible) what the
hell who knows (unintelligible) con-
tributed C.I.A.
H Ya, it's money CIA gets money (un-
'intelligible) I mean their money moves
in a lot of different ways, too.
P Ya. How are (unintelligible)?a lot
of good
H (unintelligible)
P Well you remember what the SOB
did on my book? When I brought out
the fact, you know
H Ya.
P That he knew all about Dulles? (ex-
pletive deleted) Dulles knew. Dulles told
me. I know, I mean (unintelligible) had
the telephone call. Remember had a call
put in?Dulles just blandly said and
knew why.
H Ya
P Now, what the hell!-Who told him
to do it? Thi President? (unintelligible)
H Dulles was no more Kennedy's man
than (unintelligible) was your, man (un-
intelligible)
,P (Unintelligible) covert operation?
do anything else (unintelligible)
H The Democratic nominee, we're
going to, have to brief him.
The remainder of the transcripts was
not available for this edition. The full
text will appear in later editions.
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WASHINGTON POST
7 August 1974
CIA Gets
WaterEate
Vindication
By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer
The newest installment of
White House .transcripts
strongly 'indicates the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency in
its long standing denials of.
?.any direct involvement in
the Watergate break-in.
The transcripts of the
Jape recordings reveal ? in
-the President's own utter-
ances ? that the CIA was
injected into the Watergate
case by Mr. Nixon and his
top aides. Their efforts de- .
layed for nearly two weeks
? the FBI investigation of the
first major evidentiary link .
between the Watergate bur-
glars and the 1972 Nixon
campaign organization.
But the strategy ulti-.
mately failed when former
CIA Director .Richard . M.
Helms persistently refused
to give a written declaration
to former acting FBI Direc-
tor L. Patrick Gray III that
.the bureau's investigation
threatened to expc?3e covert
.CIA activities in Mexico.
. The plan concocted in the,
White House by the Presi-
dent and his chief of. staff,
H. R. (Bob) Haldeman. was
to direct the CIA to tell the
_FBI to "stay the hell out of"
(Haldeman's words) the in-
vestigation of Nixon funds
which were laundered
through a Mexico City bank
account and ended up in the
pockets of the Watergate
burglars.
The new evidence wholly
undermines the President's
repeated claims that he was
ni.,aLed by national secu-
rity considerations in impli-
cat:eig the CIA. Mr. Nixon
said on May 22, 1973, that
his initial suspicions of CIA
involvement were incorrect.
But he did not concede, un-
til the release of the latest
bombshells of evidence, that
the concern was to cover up
Watergate-White House con-
nections.
True to its institutional
ways, the CIA had no com-
ment yesterday on the latest
developments. But there is
little doubt that the tape
disclosures provided a cer-
tain joy in Langley in the
aftermath of the hammering
the CIA has taken through-
Out the unfolding Watergate
scandal.
There was one fleeting
and cryptic presidential
comment in the new tran-
scripts relating to Helms on
which no informed officials
could shed light. It was the
President's remark that
"well, we protected Helms
from one hell of a lot."
. Previous testimony in the
CIA-Watergate affair has re-
vealed that the White HOuse
acted through the CIA's
deputy director, Gen. Ver-
non Walters, a former mili-
tary aide to Mr. Nixon in his .
vice presidential days, to
carry the message to the
FBI.
, Walters initally complied
with the White House direc-
tive that he tell Gray the
FBI investigation in Mexico
endangered covert CIA op-
erations. But he reversed
himself in the face of the in-
sistence of his boss, Helms,
that there was no basis for
such a stand by the agency.
Helms, who had a reputa-
tion as an adroit maneu-
verer in Washington's bu-
reaucratic minefields, was
pursuing a strategy of
"distancing" the agency
from the scandal.
'Despite the confirmatory,
'revelations of the new tapes,.
the CIA does not emerge
from the episode with its
skirts in spotless condition.
Item. The agency did, in
1971, agree to provide?at,
high-level White House di-
rection?spy paraphernalia
to White house "plumbers"
E. Howard Hunt and G. Gor- ?
don Liddy which was used
in the Daniel Ellsberg
.break-in. The CIA's defense
was that it did not know
what the equipment would
be used for.
Items. In testimony to the
the initial assistance . to
Hunt in August, 1971, when
it became suspicious of h,is
activities, it once again re-
sumed dealings with him in
connection with the White
House - requested psychiatric
profile of Pentagon Papers
.defendant Ellsberg.
Item. After turning off
Senate Foreign Relations
ComMittee early in 1973
Helms testified that the
CIA had no dealings with
Hunt or any of the other
Watergate break-in figures
subsequent to their retire-
ment from the agency. It
was Helms' successor, James
G. Schlesinger, who broke
the story of the 1971 assist-
ance to Hunt to investigat-
ing congressional. commit-
tees. .
Item. Helms also denied
in testimony to the Senate
Foreign Relations Commit-
tee that the CIA was in-
volved in an interagency
White House domestic intel-
ligence program launched in
1970. Subsequent publica-
tion of the so-called "Huston
Plan" (drafted by former
White House aide Tom
Charles Huston) confirmed
that Helms personally par-
ticipated in the White House
program. The CIA is prohib-
ited by its congressional
charter from becoming in-
NEW YORK TIMES
7 August 1974
FREIE PANEL
CLEARS KISSINGER
ON WIRETAP ROLE
By BERNARD GWERTZIVIAN
speeiai to The Tieis York Times
WASHINGTON, Aug. 6?The
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee voted unanimously today
,to clear Secretary of State Kis-
singer of allegations. that he
had misled the committee about
his role in the wiretapping of 17
officials and newsmen from
1969 to 1971.
In a report approved, this
morning, the committee "con-
cludes that there are no con-
tradictions between what Dr.
Kissinger told the committees
.
last year and the totality of the
new information available."
The favorable report, first
made known by Senator J. W.
Fulbright, Democrat of Arkans-
as, the committee chairman, to
newsmen, removed the possi-
bility of Mr. Kissinger's resign-
ing because of doubts 'raised;
in the press about his credibil-
ity; ?
Kissinger 'Gratified'
The State Department, late
this afternoon, said that Mr.
Kissinger had been "gratified"
by the report and "no longer
sees any reason for resigna-
tion."
. "Therefore, he does not in-
tend to resign," Robert Ander-
son, department spokesman,
said. .
On June 11, in a news con-
ference in Salzburg, Austria,
Mr. Kissinker had threatened
to quit unless his reputation
was cleared of allegations that
he had lied to the committee
last fall.
Mr. Kissinger had noted news
reports at the time based on
Federal Bureau of Investigation
documents that raised doubts
as to whether he had been com-
pletely candid in discussing his
wiretapping role before the
committee last September when
he was up for confirmation.
Asserting that he could not?
continue to conduct foreignI
volved in internal security
enforcement matters.
But on the crucial ques-
tion ,of CIA involvement in
Watergate, the White House-
instigated effort to suspend
the FBI's investigation of the
re-election committee cash,
Helms stood firm against
what must then have
seemed awesome presiden-
tial pressures.
The new tapes gave some
measure of how prowerful
those pressures must have
been.
policy if his honesty was ques-
tioned, Mr. Kissinger asked the
committee to make a new in-
quiry into his role in the wire-
tapping that involved 13 Gov-
ernment officials, several of
them former and present Kis-
singer aides, and four news-
men.
"The committee reaffirms its
position of last ? year that his
role in the wiretapping 'did not
constitute grounds to bar his
confirmation as Secretary of
State.'" the report said. It
added: ?
"If the committee knew then
what it knows now it 'would
have nonetheless reported the
nomination favorably to the
'Senate."
; Committee members were
unanimous in their statements
to newsmen about their sup-
port for Mr. Kissinger.
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey,
Democrat of Minnesota, said
."the committee made a very
exhaustive study."
"We found nothing in those
documents or hearings of any
significance to cause us to
change our minds," he said.
"The decision made at Dr. Kis-
singer's nomination hearings
still stands."
Mr. Humphrey added that he
hoped Mr. Kissinger would re-
main as Secretary, even if
President Nixon was forced to
leave office.
"He is needed," Mr. Humph-
rey said. "His role is good. He's
a tremendout national asset."
The committee held six
closed-door hearings in the cur-
rent inquiry, with Mr. Kissinger
testifying as well as Attorney
General William B. Saxbe, Clar-
ence M. Kelley, F.B.I. director,
and Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr.,
the White House chief of staff,
who at the time of the taps
was Mr. Kissinger's deputy on
the National Security Council
staff.
The report made clear that
the committee's purpose "was
not to investigate the wiretap
operation per se."
? It said that the inquiry did
not make definitive findings on
each allegation about Mr. Kis-
singer's role, "but we believe it
should lay to rest the major
questions raised about Secre-
tary Kissinger's role."
The committee said that it
was not ruling on the legality
of the wiretap program, initi-
ated, according to President
Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, to
stem leaks of national security
information to the press.
Noting that "discrepancies"
remained between the F.B.I.
documents and the testimony
of 'participants, the report said,
"Probably it will never be pos-
sible to determine exactly what
took place."
It said that since it was im-
possible to resolve "every ques-
tion about the wiretap program
and Secretary Kissinger's role
in it," the committee set "a
more modest and realistic ob-
jective."
I It said that it had tried to
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answer two questions: inconsistencies" between Mr.
"1. Is there a basis in ascer- Kissinger's testimony last fall
tamable fact to conclude that and the new evidence?pri-1
Dr. ,(issinger misrepresented marily the F.B.I. material'.
his role in the wiretapping dur-
ing his testimony.last year?
"2. Would the committee,
With all of the information it
now has concerning the wire-
tapping program, reach the
same conclusion it did last Sep-
tember that `Dr. Kissinger's
role in the wiretapping of 17
Government officials and news-
men did not constitute grounds
to bar his confirmation as Sec-
retary of State.'"
Answer Is 'Yes'
The report said that "after
considering all of the testimony
and relevant materials, the
committee has concluded that
the answer to the second is
`Yes.'"
In its inquiry, the committee
failed to find 'any significant
It noted that one "incon-
sistency" was the fact that the
President's decision to order
wiretaps was made on April 25,
1969, and not May 9, 1969, as
Mr: Kissinger had first testi-
fied. But it concluded that "it'
matters little" wehn the deci-
sion was taken.
"None of the discrepancies:
that has emerged pierce the!
heart of the issue here: Is there
solid reason to doubt that Dr.
Kissinger was truthful last year
in describing his role?" the re-
port said.
.The major question raised in
the press about Mr. Kissinger's
role was- that in the F.B.I.
documents, including memo-
randums written by the
NEW YORK TIMES
7 August 1974
Text of Report
Special to The hteiv York Times
WASHINGTON, Aug.. 6--
Following is the text of the
observations and conclusions
of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee report on its
most recent inquiry into
Secretary of State Kissinger's
role in the White House wire-
tap program:
? The purpose of the com-
mittee's inquiry was not to
investigate the wiretap oper-
ation per se. Nor does the
committee consider it neces-
sary to make definitive find-
ings of fact on each of the
allegations that have been
made concerning Dr. Kis-
singer's role in the wiretap-
ping. In fact, this new record
may raise additional ques-
tions about certain aspects
of the wiretap program. But,
we believe it should lay to
rest the major questions
raised about Secretary Kis-
singer's role.
The committee had no illu-
sions about the difficulty of
establishing precisely what
took place in the wiretap
program. There are some dis-
crepancies between the F.B.I.
documents and the testimony
of participants in the pro-
gram. Probably it will never
be possible to determine
exactly what took place.
More than five years have
passed since the wiretaps.
were iniated an dtime has
taken its toll in life, memory,
health, and records.
IgSome questions can be
answered only by President
Nixon.
SlOthers could be answered
only by the late J. Edgar
Hoover.
cSome inconsistencies be-
tween the testimony and the
F.B.I. documents can be re-
solved only by Mr. William
C. Sullivan, who is physically
unable to testify.
cOther aspects will remain
a mystery due to apparent
gaps in the F.B.I. documents.
Recollections of partici-
pants have become hazy and
uncertain with the lapse of
time.
12
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9
bureau's late director, J. Edgar
Hoover, Mr. Kissinger was de-
scribed as "initiating" same of
the wiretaps.?
Kissinger's Contention
. Mr. Kissinger, in his prior
testimony, and in public state-
ments had insisted that he had
only participated in the pro-
gram by supplying names of
those who had access to in-
formation that had been leaked
to the press, or whose files had
derogatory information, - or'
whose names arose in the
course of the investigation.
The committee said that "to
be sure there are inconsistencies
between the F.B.I. documents
and the testimony."
As. an example, it said that
there was a letter from William
C. Sullivan, .a former top F.B.I.
official, to Mr. Hoover, dated
May 20, 1969, asserting that
Mr. Kissinger came to Mr. Sul-
on Kissinger's Role
Realizing the impossibility
Of laying to rest every ques-
tion about the wiretap pro-
gram and Secretary Kissing-
er's role in it, the committee
set a more modest and re-
.alistic objective. The commit-
tee approached this inquiry
with two questions in mind:
[1]
Is there a basis in .ascer-
tainable fact to conclude that
Dr. Kissinger misrepresented
his role in the wiretapping
during his testimony last
year?
[2]
Would the committee, with
all of the information it now
has concerning the wiretap-.
' ping program, reach the same
conclusion it did last Septem-
ber that"...Dr. Kissinger's
role in the Wiretapping of 17
Government officials and
newsmen did not constitute
grounds to bar his confirma-
tion as Secretary of State?"
After considering all of the
testimony and relevant mate-
rials, the committee has con-
cluded that the answer to the
first is "no," and the answer
to the second is "yes."
In making this inquiry the
committee has not addressed
itself to the legality of the
wiretaps involved.' It is
neither passing judgment on
the constitutionality of war-
rantless wiretaps for foreigu
policy/national security pur-
poses nor on whether these
'individual wiretaps . were
properly justified if, in fact,
warrantless wiretaps for such
purposes were legal at the
time:. These are matters for
the courts to decide.
But it should be noted that
Dr. Kissinger's participation
in the wiretapping came after
assurances by the Attorney
General that such wiretaps
were lawful and by Mr.
Hoover that similar wiretaps
were carried out under pre-
vious administrations. It is
highly unlikely that anyone
with Dr. Kissinger's back-
ground, largely within the
academic world, would ques-
tion assurances of legality
and precedents from the na-
tion's chief law enforcement
officers. In carrying out his
orders from the President, Dr.
Kissinger was acting on the
assumption, backed by At-
torney General Mitchell and
F.B.I. director Hoover, that,
the wiretaps were perfectly
legal.
The committee has not
found any significant incon-
sistencies between Dr. Kis,'
singer's testimony of last
.year as to his role in wire-
tapping and the new evidence
now available. It matters lit-
tle whether the President's
decision to use wiretaps in
an effort to trace the source
of leaks was made in April
25, 1969, as now appears to
be the case, or May 9, 1969,
as Dr. Kissinger had thought
when he testified last year.
None of the discrepancies
that has emerged pierce the
heart of the issue here: Is
there solid reason to doubt
that Dr. Kissinger was truth-
ful last year in describing
his role?
Te be sure, there are in-
consistencies between the
F.8.1. documents and the
testimony'. For example, in
the documents, there is a let-
ter from Mr. Sullivan to Mr.
Hoover dated May 20, 1969,
which states that Dr. Kis-
singer came to Mr. Sullivan's
'office that morning and "
read all the logs." Dr. Kis-
singer cannot recall such a
visit, and Mr. Sullivan as-
sured the committee that he
neither saw nor talked to Dr.
Kissinger during the entire
time the wiretap program
was in operation.
Much of the recent con-
troversy over Dr. Kissinger's
role seems to be a question
of semantics, particularly
over the meaning of the
words "initiate" and "re-
quest" in relation to his par-
ticipation in the wiretapping.
Words in F.B.I. documents or
on Presidential tape cannot
be considered as definitive
statements either of what
transpired or of Dr. Kissin-
ger's part in the over-all pro-
gram. They should be con-
livan's office that morning and
"read all the logs."
Mr. Kissinger told the com-
mittee that he "cannot recall
such a visit," the report said,
and Mr. Sullivan "assured the
committee that he neither saw
nor talked to Mr. Kissinger dur-I
ing the entire time the wiretap
was in operation."
program
report noted that Mr.(
am
!Nixon in a letter to the com-:
mittee on July .12 reaffirmed.
his own responsibility for the!
wiretap program. 'It said that:
Mr. Kissinger had told the corn-:
mittee that "I did not initiate;
the program, I did not recom-
mend the program, and I had
nothing to do with its estab-
lishment."
"I then participated in the;
program, once it was estab-
lished, according to criteria
Pthc had been laid down in the
resident's office," he said. I
in Wiretaps
sidered only in relation to
the framework of the over-
all policy ordered ' by the
President and the total evi-
dence now available.
Did Dr. Kissinger initiate
the wiretap program by urg-
ing it on the President? Or,
did he. merely participate in,
the wiretapping, carrying out
a program ordered by the
President, as he testified last
year?
. Assertion by Nixon
In a letter to the commit-
tee dated July 12, 1974, in
response to a committee re-
quest for additional informa-
tion, the President wrote:
. "I ordered the use of the
most effective investigative
procedures possible, including
wiretaps, to deal with cer-
tain critically important na-
tional security problems.
Where _supporting evidence
was available, I personally
directed the surveillance, in-
cluding wiretapping, of cer-
tain specific individuals.
I am familiar with the
testimony given by Secretary
Kissinger before your com-
mittee to the effect that he
performed the function, at
my request, of furnishing
information about individuals
within investigative cate-
gories that I established so
that an appropriate and ef-
fective investigation could be
conducted in each case. This
testimony is entirely correct:
and I wish to affirm categori-
cally that Secretary Kissinger
and others involved in var-
ious aspects of this investi-
gation were operating under
my specific authority and
were carrying out my express
order."
the committee, "I did not
initiate the program, I did
not recommend the program,
and I had nothing to do with
its establishment. I then par-
ticipated, according to cri-
teria that had been laid
down in the President's
office." The President stated ?
that he initiated the program.
D. Kissinger's role, as he
described it last year and
again this year, was that of
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assisting in implementing a
program ordered and direct- -
ed by the president. The
committee has received no
new information which con-
tradicts that description of
his role.
Semantic problems arise
again in the question of ?
whether or not Dr. Kissinger
-"initiated" individual wire-
taps. Secretary Kissinger
testified last year that he
supplied names to the F.B.I.
of those fitting the criteria
agreed upon in the meeting
with the President but that
"in supplying the names we
did not specifically request a
tap, although we knew, of -
course, that thi. -could be,
was a probable outcome." In
testimony this year he ex-
palmed that: "Insofar as the
submission of a name trig-
gered a series of events which
resulted in a wiretap, it could
be said that the submission
'initiated' the tap.
? Contradictions Noted
There are unexplained con-,
?tradictions between the testi-
mony arid the documents re-
lative to the wording of in-
dividual wiretap requests.
Documents concerning "re-
quests" for wiretaps were
generally prepared without
the benefit of personal con-
tact between the drafter and
,the "requester," whose real
identity is sometimes doubt-
ful. Upbn ques'i.oning, Mr.
Bernard Wells,' the F.B.I.
agent who handled the prep-
aration of most of the papers
relative to the program stated
that the wording on the in-
dividual request forms could
not be taken literally.
The committee was unable
to settle to its satisfaction
some questions about the ini-
tiation and termination of
'certain wiretaps. But it did
establish to its satisfaction
that Secretary Kissinger's
role in the program was es-
sentially as he described it in
testimony last year.
In summary, the commit-
tce is of the opinion that it
has appropriately inquired
into Dr. Kissinger's role in
the wiretapping, pursuant to
his request following the re-
cent controversy, and the
committee now concludes
that there are no contradic-
tions between what Dr. Kiss-
inger told the committee last
year and the totality of the
new information available.
The committee reaffirms its
"position of last year that Is
role in the wiretapping . . .
"Did not constitute grounds
to bar his confirmation as
Secretary of State." If the
committee knew then what
it knows now it would have
nomination favorably to the
Senate.
BALI 4 I14 0 j-ft
UELIIE;94.7S4AME R I
CAII
oaers.
THE. CIA: and- the -.-Cult...6!; :and .eriteirp- rise: the,Their.-message 'to the .press ?
leadei-s-,_of.;:ourgovemment:-. anc1.7the?people is that the.
t,che and, , John has-lchanged. its ways in,
:Alfred A Knopf,S93 j themselves. -,;,thilEin office* by -.1 keeping
. ? -ith? - .the .changing
-11"tevievied by tirnes.i'In,.an 'era of 'detente....
'..THOMAS B;.R.;SS the people.';S:fiuiness; ?:.the.CDA is said to be -cancer - ?
c.????? trating,;-:-Ort:;?intelligence-gath-
Upo- ? leay.2 .n.d no-. longer - rned- -
-; ? ?. . .? . .
ing in the,-affairs .:of. other ?
i s -_pri bl -sell'i f govern rne?n - ?
-is for cy.if to :saw. often; for; rth.e.'%_ti and. Marl's
Marchettt is former ion s of dol lars in a:pasiagethat was origin-
ranking CI k official -and. the -'1intml M a r c h e't t i--and ally
censored,v. estimate -ithat
first to devoting two--
:71thogi zed b.Ook7AbOut:...Otir. from' the money-- and man
tibilli ondollattspy,-Organi.-1ZaFed.?
On Marks' is..a;:former. State- ;H:e-rt'...-"..Evert .risow.-it..is ? noC-Sure.?:: The, authors:, b aroue.,'_that e
V
..pepartmenoificial ',and *Seri.-.'7.fthat- th-eY'liafre spending'is almosttoaily
:-waste1ul.?4E---.'they ...credit7the
--case-to the So CIA ith having reciited
-,gence..rn a t ? :-.- only ,ona,,...an.at.a -high leyel.
to t'Ytnion..and
degree the State Department -' sions indicated by - blantt?maintairt..th_a..(The :was-actilal-:
censor -this book,:':-::.--?,.--Spices`.--.-1;They':::-are:,':rnar:ked- 1.,Over by B'itish
, . . ..? ? ?..?.....
arguing 'th'dt
the
pa rti cularly".::Marchetti,ti?hid tive '-.-involvecf'are';those Of ir- - The.-'bulk of intelligence
in effect,.,waived ,their CIA officials..Conternpla theY,-ay;',...,i.s.'now collectedty
i*Am-endineribriblits--,4hY
variouS.-...,Secrecy?-?agre-e-'...:-SpaceS-:will be filled.-in 'after.;;the-skirSatelliteS-and the. Eke
'during-..their-.-'0overri-:-.:-the :;'Supreme ..agent is
in en t'employ The- courts' at ? .F dOwn its ru I ng. . bold-
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Prepared Statement on H.R. 15845
by
William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence
22 July 1974
NY. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify today on
H.R. 15845 introduced by you and NY. Bray. The amendments proposed
in this bill would be the first changes in the charter of the
Central Intelligence Agency, found in the National Security Act of
1947. In conformity with our American constitutional structure,
the existence of the Central Intelligence Agency stems from an
Act of Congress. This is a unique contrast to the tradition and
practice of most intelligence services, but it is a necessary
reflection of our free society. The result, I believe makes us a
stronger nation, whose citizens live in a freedom envied by most
of the world.
The amendments would add the word "foreign" before the word
"intelligence" whenever it refers to the activities authorized to be
undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency. I fully support this
change.. While I believe the word "intelligence" alone in the original
Act was generally understood to refer only to foreign intelligence,
I concur that this limitation of the Agency's role to foreign
intelligence should be made crystal clear to its own employees and to
the public. I hope this amendment will reassure any of our fellow
citizens as to the Agency's true and only purpose.
Section (3) of the bill reenforces the charge in the original
Act that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible
for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure." The amendment states that pursuant to this responsibility,
the Director shall develop appropriate plans, policies and regulations
but such responsibility shall not be construed to authorize the
Agency to engage in any police, subpoena, law enforcement or internal
security activities, and that any information indicating a violation
of the Director's plans, policies and regulations, should be reported
to the Attorney General for appropriate action.
This amendment conforms to my own understanding of the meaning
of the original statutory language. As I said in my confirmation
hearing, I believe that the original Act gives the Director a charge
but does not give him commensurate authority. Under existing law,
the Director is responsible for developing such internal administrative
controls as are possible and appropriate to protect against unauthorized
disclosure, but if such a disclosure is identified, his only recourse
beyond internal disciplinary action, including termination of an
employee, would be to report the matter to appropriate authorities
for examination of possible legal action. As you are aware, NY.
Chairman, the Government did take legal action with respect to one
of our ex-employees who declined to abide by the agreement he made when
he joined CIA to protect the confidential information to which he would
be exposed.
NY. Chairman, I fully agree with this clarification of the precise
nature of the charge on the Director to protect intelligence sources
and methods against unauthorized disclosure. As you know, I am of the
personal opinion that additional legislation is required on this subject
to improve our ability to protect intelligence sources and methods
against unauthorized disclosure. The contract theory on which the
previously mentioned litigation is based is indeed a very slender
reed upon which to rely in all cases. My views on this subject became
known publicly as a result of that case and the specifics of my
recommendations on this subject are still under active consideration
within the Executive Branch, so that an appropriate Executive Branch
recommendation can be made to the Congress.
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The bill would also require that the Agency report to the Congress
"in accordance with such procedures as the Congress may establish" on
those "other functions and duties related to [foreign] intelligence
affecting the national security as the National Security Council may
from time to time direct." The National Security Act authorized the
National Security Council to direct the Agency to conduct a number of
foreign intelligence activities which by their nature must remain
secret. The Act made clear, however, that these functions and duties
could only stem from a specific direction by the National Security
Council rather than being determined by the Agency itself. The
amendments do not change this situation but add the requirement of
reporting to Congress.
Mt. Chairman, at present the Agency reports to the Congress about
its activities in a number of ways. On certain matters the Agency
reports publicly, such as in this hearing and in my own confirmation
hearings. The Agency further identifies for public release a number of
matters affecting it or resulting from its efforts. A recent example
was the publication of testimony on the economies of the Soviet Union
and China provided to the Joint Economic Committee and published on
July 19th with only a few deletions which related to intelligence
sources and methods.
The second area in which the Agency reports to Congress is in its
assessments of foreign situations. The Agency briefs appropriate
committees of the Congress in executive session, using the most
sensitive material available, thus providing the Congress the fruits
of the intelligence investment made by the United States. I believe
this type of reporting is particularly important, as I hope to make
our intelligence of maximum service to the nation as a whole, and this
can only take place if it can assist those in the Congress who share
in the American decision-making process under our Constitution. The
Appropriations Committees, the Armed Services Committees, the Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, and others have been the recipients of this kind of
material. Again, to the extent possible, information provided and
discussed in these executive sessions is later screened for publication.
In many cases the sensitivity of the sources and methods involved
does not permit such publication, but the classified transcript of
the briefing can be made available to the meMbers of Congress.
The third area in which the Agency reports to Congress concerns
its operations. Pursuant to long-established procedures of the Congress,
reports on these matters, including the most sensitive details, are
provided only to the Intelligence Subcommittees of the Armed Services
and Appropriations Committees of each House. MY. Chairman, there are
literally no secrets withheld from these Subcommittees. In fact, I
believe I have more than a duty to respond to them; I must undertake
the positive obligation to volunteer to these Subcommittees all
matters of possible interest to the Congress. As you know, these
reports cover our annual budget, the details of our activities, and
problems which may have arisen in some regard or other.
The procedures established by the Congress for this reporting have
worked well. Large numbers of highly sensitive matters have been
revealed to these Subcommittees over the years, and their classification
has been respected. I am also aware of the sense of responsibility
of the members of the Congress as a whole with respect to matters
which must remain highly classified because of their sensitivity.
Thus, I. am confident that congressional procedures in the future will be
as effective as those of the past and I welcome the codification of
this relationship in the proposed amendment which requires the Agency
to report to the Congress.
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Mr. Chairman, the bill also reenforces the proscription in the
original Act against police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or
internal security functions. I wish I could say that this clarification
was not necessary but as you know, MY. Chairman, I have frankly admitted
that the Agency did make some mistakes in recent years in this area.
Your own report of the investigations of this Subcommittee dealt with
those incidents. The Congress has, in Public Law 93-83 of August 6, 1973,
made clear that the CIA may not provide help to the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration in assisting local police and law enforcement
agencies of the states and municipalities. The language of the bill
would go further in this regard and prohibit the Agency from engaging
directly or indirectly in the above type of activities within the
United States either on its own or in cooperation or conjunction with
any other department, agency, organization or individual. This would
restrict our collaboration with the FBI to the field of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence. It may also limit the degree of
assistance the Agency could provide to the Secret Service, under the
Secret Service Act, which authorizes it to call upon the assistance
of any other agency of the Government to assist it in its mission
(Public Law 90-331). While this amendment might restrict certain of
our activities of the past which were not in any way reprehensible, I
believe that its enactment at this time would be an appropriate way of
clarifying the purpose of the Agency as related only to foreign
intelligence.
I do note that the bill contains a proviso in this area which I
believe is both appropriate and essential to the proper functioning
of the Agency. This makes it clear that nothing in the Act shall be
construed to prohibit the Agency from conducting certain necessary
and appropriate activities in the United States directly related to
its foreign intelligence responsibilities. I welcome this proviso
not only for its content but aiso for its clarification of the
propriety of some of the long-standing activities of the Agency which
are essential to its foreign intelligence mission. These include:
a. Recruiting, screening, training and investigating
employees, applicants and others granted access to sensitive Agency
information;
b. Contracting for supplies;
c. Interviewing U.S. citizens who voluntarily share
with their Government their knowledge of foreign subjects;
d. Collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners in the
United States;
e. Establishing and maintaining support structures essential
to CIA's foreign intelligence operations; and
f. Processing, evaluating and disseminating foreign
intelligence information to appropriate recipients within the United
States.
These matters were publicly reported by me in my confirmation hearing
last summer, and I believe that there is general understanding of their
necessity and propriety. The proviso in the amendment, however, would
make this explicit.
The bill also adds a new subsection to the Act to prohibit
transactions between the Agency and former employees except for
purely official matters. I fully subscribe to the purpose of this
provision, to assure that former employees not take advantage of their
prior associations to utilize the Agency's assistance or resources or
to have an undue influence on the Agency's activities. This is
particularly directed at the possible use of the Agency's assets for
"nonofficial" assistance outside the Agency's charter. I would like to
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say that such a provision is not necessary, but again I must admit
that errors have been made. While I do not believe there were any
instances of major import, I accept the desirability of making the
limitations on the Agency's unique authorities quite clear.
The normal legal proscriptions against improper influence on
Federal employees apply, of course, to the Agency. In addition, a
regulation has been developed within the Agency, which is brought
to the attention of each employee each year, that any CIA employee
who believes that he has received instructions which in any way appear
inconsistent with the CIA legislative charter will inform the Director
immediately. I might point out that in those cases which presented
questions concerning the Agency overstepping its bounds, the
propriety and dedication to American traditions of our own employees
caused them to object to possible Agency activities outside its
charter. In my confirmation hearing I stated that I am quite prepared
to leave my post if I should receive an order which appeared to be
illegal and if my objections were not respected.
Thus we in the Agency are fully in accord with the purpose of
this amendment. At the same time, I confess concern over some
possible interpretations of the language of this subsection. I assume
that "purely official matters" would include our normal relationships
with our retirees or others who left the Agency. I would assume it
would also enable us to maintain normal official relationships with
individuals who left the Agency to go on to other Governmental
activities so long as the "official matters" fall within the scope
of CIA's legitimate charter and there is no undue influence involved.
I do wonder, however, whether certain activities might be included
under this provision as official which neither the Congress nor the
Agency would want to countenance, and on the other hand whether the
phrase might interfere with a contact with an ex-employee volunteering
important information to the Agency.
Since the Agency has certain unique authorities under the National
Security Act and the CIA Act of 1949 and since much of its work does
involve highly classified activity, I would think it appropriate that the
Congress add to the Agency's legislative charter some special
recognition of the high degree of responsibility imposed on the Agency
and its employees as a result of the grant of these unique authorities.
This could require the Director to develop and promulgate a code of
conduct for CIA employees at a higher standard than that expected of
Federal employees generally. Thereby, the intelligence profession
would become one of those with special standards such as the medical
or legal professions. The Director's unique authority to terminate
employees in his discretion when necessary or advisable in the interests
of the United States, pursuant to the National Security-Act of 1947,
would provide a sanction for the application of such high standards.
Regular congressional review would provide an assurance that such a
code of conduct was adequate and that it was being promulgated, applied,
and adhered to.
Mr. Chairman, it has been a pleasure to have had this opportunity
to conunent on H.R. 15845. With the few reservations I have noted above,
I fully support the bill. Most of all, I fully support the purpose of
the legislation in clarifying the mission of the Central Intelligence
Agency only to conduct foreign intelligence activities. At the same
time, I am pleased that the modifications proposed to the CIA charter
would not adversely affect its authority or capability to carry out the
challenging task of collecting, processing and disseminating foreign
intelligence in the world today. I believe these amendments would
mark an important milestone in eliminating any apparent conflict
between our ideal of an open American society and the minimum require-
ments of secrecy in the intelligence apparatus necessary to protect
this free nation.
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LOS ANGETS
21l- July 1971I-
VITE BOOK' ittPORT
robing the CIA's
? BY ROBERT KIRSCH/ -
Time Book critic .
?
A dilatation from :Mal-
colm Muggeridge provides
the lieadnote for, the final,
chapter of The CIA and
the Cult of Intelligence'
(Knopf: $8.95) by Victor
Marchetti and John ? P..
Marks. it: is worth quating
in full: 7 . ?
"In the eyes' of. posterity
. it will inevitably ? seem
that, in safegtiardiiig our.
freedom, we. destroyed it; ?
. that the vast ClarideStine
apparatus we built Up to
probe our enemies re- -
sources and intentions
only served in the end to.
'confuse our own purposes;
? that'the practice of deceiv-
ing others for the, good of
the state led, infallibly .to:
our deceiving 'ourselves::
? and that the vast army of.
intelligence, personnel
? built up to execute these
? purposes were soon caught
up in the web of their.own
? sick fantiasies; disas-!,?
trous consequences to
them and us." ? '
? prescient Words
Muggericlge wrote these:
words in -.1966. How pee-.
'Scient, they are remains in
be seen, but, there is hint,
- enough nowadays 'to ..sug-
gest, their ominous rete-...
? vance. .
?The CIA and the Cult or.
Intelligence" has already
been much in the news;
Marchetti, a -veteran of
CIA service, resigned in
3969 after 14 years with
; the agency: He began the'
writing of this book in col'
Jaboration with. John
`Cult of Secrecy
ty, and . . ..is Vital to.thei
conduct of foreign -affairs."
. They continue: "The,
proven benefits of intel-
lio-bence.are not in question:
'Rather, it is the illegal and
unethical clandestine
*operations Carried out tin;
.der the guise of ? intel-
ligence that are questiona-.
ble .? both on moral.:
igrounds and in 'terms of
.,practical benefit to the na-,
They Call for legislation'
limiting. the' CIA's' role to
its original ? functions o(
coordinating and evaluat?
ing intelligence .and
? that the minimal clandes
tine functions be. assumed.
by appropriate ? govern-.
ment ? departments with
counter espionage func-
tions taken 'overby the FBI.i
. Ironically, in one passage
that remains ? intact, after:
the CIA reading, they re-,
port on "the most impor-1
tant of the' CIA's .private.:
literary projects . . the
'massive secret history ? of?
the agency that has been'
in preparation since 1967."..
This ."encyclopedic
sum-
mary of -the CIA's 'past,",'
which might answer some,
of their claims. they, say,.
will never be published ex-?
.eept for the benefit of.
those few . who ."have al
.clear.need tb know." That:
-is the dilemma of 'secrecy,
.?for We, the public, alsO'
have a need to. know. The
deletions of matter in
these pages are a.constant
reminder of. that .depriva-
tion.
.1
Marks. in 3972. Shortly,
thereafter he .was servedf
with a ?court ? order ob-
tained by, the governinents
enjoining hirn from
closing in any manner
any information 'relating
.to .intelligence . activities,
(2) any information con-
cerning
sources and methods,: ?
(3) any intelligence. ..infer-.
rnation." lit art introduc7:
tion to the book, Melvin :
Wulf, legal director. Of the:
American Civil Liberties'
Union, which assisted in
Marchetti's defense,
scribes .the litigation..
in the -end, the doctrine:,
.,against prior 'restraint ml
publication was. over
turned in the case because
as a CIA employe Marchet4
ti had, ? the courts held,'
signed several secrecy
agreements with the agen-
,
cy, .and this made theCase
."a contract action" rather
than.a ,First Amendment
issue. ? '
In the course onegal
lion, .and under protest,
the authors delivered the
manuscript . to the CIA.
The agency designated 339.
?deletions ranging from one'
word. to whole pages. By ?
this year, when 'another
action brought by the au-
thors went to trial, the de-
letions had - been reduced
'to 168. The trial , judge'.
'found that only 27 of these:
deletions were
The- CIA appealed and so
did the authors. .
? For the authors this his-
tone c'elisorshiP is.
evidence of the basic point:i
ithey:. seek to that
LONDON TIMES
9 July 1974
Vatican denies
'CIA cash link'
with the Pope
From Our Correspondent
Rome, July 8
The Vatican newspaper
rOsservatore Ron iano today
denied a magazine report that.
the Pope received money from
the United States Central
telligence Agency (CIA) when
he was Archbishop of Milan.
An interview with a former
CIA agent in Panorama last
May said the Pope had received
CIA funds for use in orphan-
ages but may not have known
where the money came front.
Today rOsservatore Romano
said in a brief statement: " His
Holiness Pope Paul VI has
never received financial 'con-
tributions from the CIA or any
other unknown source."
,the CIA ?'has gone beyond':
?,its- original pin-pose "as a
.coordinating agency re-
sPonsible for gathering;
evaluating and preparing
foreign. intelligence" to be.-
come "an-operational arm,
independent .and unac
countable, the secret.- in-
strument .of the; Presiden
cy and a handfill of poi,ver-?
?flit men whose purpose iS
interference ,in the domes-
tie affairs of. other na-.
. tiOns." ... ? ? ?
This last, phrase'is posed
in the-form of a rhetorical,
Aluestion, but there is no',
doubt .that the authors irie
,tend an affirmative, answer.
That, indeed, is the' burden
of the remaining text of the
. book. ' ?
The strongest point
made by- the book is in its
attack on the clandestine'
'mentality,- the "cult .of se-
crecy'. which the authors
say has pursued policies to
make th,e ?service immune
from public scrutiny. This
Mythologizing of the clan,
,destine shields the failures
Of the CIA, fosters. a
reliance on covert ac-
tivities,?minimizes.accomv:
tability and injects inter
foreign policy and, to some'.
-degree, . domestic Policy
'operations which have the,
possibility of. subverting!
.the democratic process. .
. "VitallFonctio.re
Marchetti and Marks do
not deny, "that the gather.::
? ing of intelligence is a ne-
cessary . function , of-
. modern government .
Makes a significant contri-i
..b.gtion.. to,. riationar,.securi-:,
WASHINGTON POST
2 August 1974
Colby Agamst
Declassfying
Speedup
' 'Associated Prete
CIA chief William E. Colby
yesterday said congressional
efforts to speed the declassifi-
cation of government docu-
ments would endanger, the
country's intelligence opera-
tions.
"I would find it very diffi-
cult ... to urge a foreign Intel-
ligence service or a gtrate
gically placed individual in a
foreign government or a for-
eign country to cooperate with
this agency and to provide in'.
formation in confidence if the
law of this country required
that such information be made
available to. the public two
years later," Colby told a
House Government Opera.
tionssubcommittee.
, The subcommittee is consid-
ering amendments to the Free-
.
dom of Information Act that
would require all documentS
labeled secret and confidential
to be declassified within two
years.
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JAPAN TIMES
6 July 1974
WASHINGTON (AP) ? A
new book about the Central
intelligeney Agency (CIA)
says a series of American
presidents encouraged and as-
sisted the agency to shift
from its original mission of
gathering Intelligence to one
primarily devoted to covert
operations..
While conceding the agency
a number of successes, the
book says the agency has be-
come "a secret instrument of
BALTIMORE SUN
28 July 1974
Man Criticizes Agency in ook
the presidency and a handful
of powerful men, wholly inde-
pendent of public account-
ability."
The CIA's chief purpose is
interference in the domeelie
affairs of other nations (and
perhaps our own) by means
of penetration agents, propa-
ganda, covert paramilitary in-
terventions and an array of
other -dirty tricks," the book
says. -
The authors of "The CIA
The caat e - of
(ITC'
ruirtid spies
_The CIA and the. 'Cult of
Intelligence. By Victor Mar-,
chetli and John D. Marks.:
? 398 pages. $8.95. Knopf.
' To the great joy of its
:.publisher ?and authors this
thick volume, in the
.brassy tradition ? of the old-
style expose, has reaped a
.rippling harvest of advance
?;_publicity. This .is because,
-according to its dust jacket,
:the book is "the first in
American history to be sub-
lected to prior government
"censorship," on the ground
that it reveals government
?secrets normally held within
the confines of "classified"
information. 'Nevertheles
Ili e authors?Marchetti is a
esignee from the Central In-
telligence Agency, Marks
from the Department of !
State?persisted clamo-
:musty; and the upshot of the
legal skirmishing is a tome.
pockmarked With restored'
deleetions, indicated by
bold-face type, and with
deletions per se in the form
of blank areas approximat-
ing the length of the. exci-
sion. If nothing .else, the
work is a bibliographical cu-
riosity. Is it anything else?
Seamlessly written
To take its good points, the
volume is, considering the
dual authorship, seamlessly
written. It has a good index.
There are two charts, on the
CIA's internal structure and
on the components of the
"intelligence community" in
Washington. On the minus
side the book has no bibliog-
raphy, no illustrations and
no annotation. The few
sources cited in the text tend
to steer toward such twin-
kling examples of objective
journalism as Boss and
Wise's "The Invisible Gov-
ernment" (1964) or Ram-
parts magazine.
? -What of the alleged revela-
tions that have caused such
a clacking of media type-
writers? These constitute a
running diatribe against the
"cult," or obsessive venera-
tion, of intelligence gather-
ing; detailed descriptions. of
:the various branches of the
CIA, viewed as the focus of
that activity; and a conclud-
ing section that seeks to.ana-
lyze "the clandestine mental-
ity" ? and show why it ought
.to be eradicated_ Through-
out certain theses recur.
The covert (secret or hid-
den) branch of CIA controls
the agency, to the detri-
ment of ,its less exception-
able information-assembling
branches. Anywhere in the
world such secret services
exist ptirnarily for the fun
and games to be derived at
public expense. The CIA "in-
tervenes" in the affairs of
other -nations, and this is
criminal; it maintains some
of its background machinery
in this country, and that is
almost as beastly. Despite
its machinations the agency
'has not placed a spy in the
Kremlin since Oleg Penkov-
sky, and the British he,nded
him to us to begin with.
The problem ihumpingly
presented by the appearance
of this polemic is the nature
of a government's right to
protect its valid secrets.
Should it have ony secrets?
If so who is to determine
and the Cult of Intelligence"
are Victor Marchetti, a CIA
man- for 14 years who rose to
he executive assistant to the
deputy director, and John D.
Marks, a former State De-
partment official. '
The book, just published,
has been, a subject of litiga-
tion for years. The CIA ob-
tained an injunction barring
Marchetti from publishing
any secrets he learned while
he was in CIA employ. ?
When the Manuscript was
submitted last fall, the CIA
ordered 339 deletions, ranging
from single words to entire
pages, but it later yielded on
all but 168. A federal judge
ruled that only 27 of them
were justified. Pending ap-
peals, however, the book has
been, published with blank
spaces representing the 168
passages. '
The CIA has not com-
mented on specific portions of
the book, but says it does not
endorse it nor agree with its
conclusions.
The ? authors note that Presi-
den,t Harry Truman, during
whose administration the CIA.
was established, said in 1963
he was disturbed that it had
NEW YORK TIMES
3 August 1974
Mexico to Probe Charges
Officials Are C.U. Agents
MEXICO CITY; Aug. I (Reu-
ters) ? President Luis Eche-
verria Alvarez today ordered
the Attorney General's depart-
ment to investigate whether
there are agents of the United
States Central Intelligence
Agency in the Government, a
spokesman said.
The investigation follows a
their just extent? Marchetti
and Marks are of course
entitled to their opinions. But
then so are the "faceless,
desk-bound bureaucrats",
they sneer at?and even
Presidents. To take another
tack: the manner of both
authors' departure from
their jobs is not spelled out,
but it is well known that Mr.
Marchetti is violating the
sworn oath of secrecy re-
quired of any CIA employee.
(Presumably a similar re-
euirement obtained for Mr.
Marks.) If a man so grandi-
loquently abandons an honor-
able contract, what does this
'say about his honor? More
specifically, what does it say
about his accuracy in repor-
tage?
. Make no mistake: There is
been diverted from its origi-
nal assignment and become
"an operational and at times
a policy-making arm of the
Government."
"In no instanc'e?has a presi-
dent of the United States ever
made a serious attempt to re-
view or revamp the covert
practices of the CIA," March-
etti and Marks write. "And
this is not. surprising: presi-
dents like the CIA. It does
their dirty work ? work that
might' not otherwise be do-
able. When the agency fails-
or blunders, all the president
need do is to deny, scold or
threaten."
In a passage that the agen-
cy first ordered deleted, the
authors say the CIA employs
16,500 persons ? not counting
tens of thousands of agents
mostly overseas who work
under contract ? and has an
annual budget of $750 million,
p 1 u s hundreds of millions
more from the Pentagon.
Even so, Marchetti and
Marks say, that is less than
15 per cent of the total of
150.000 persons and annual
funds of over $6,000 million
spent for intelligence by the
Government.
statement last month in Britain
iby Philip Agee, an American
who claimed to have worked
for the C.I.A. in Mexico and
other Latin-American countries,
that there were at least 50
people paid by the agency in
the Mexican Government.
Since then there has been a
rash of charges among political
1 parties here that the other
'Igroups are harboring C.I.A.
agents.
. much here .for concerned
citizens to ponder. These au- .
thors are too knowledgable
to he put down as just an-
other pair of Peck's Bad
Boys., (Mr. Marchetti con-
fesses that he was probably
the country's "leading ex-
,pert.? on certain aspects of
Soviet affairs.) But neither
are they so wise as to quali-
fy just yet .for Wunderkind
status. In sum, it seems fair
to afririn that a citizen woudl
do well to weigh many an-.
other piece of evidence on
this topic rather than rely on
the unconfirmed allegations
leveled by these rather grimy
Galahads.
CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS
Mr. Davis served with the
CIA's Office of Specific (fpr-
ations a long time ago.
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NEW YORK TIMES
26 July 1974
Assessing the Strategic-Arms
By Paul?Nitze
WASHINGTON ? For those who
have seriously hoped for long-term,
balanced and effective limits on offen-
sive strategic nuclear arms, the Mos-
cow. summit talks may turn out to
have been a decisive, negative turning
point.
There are three considerations: what
was agreed, what was not achieved, and
what President Nixon and Secretary
of State Kissinger have said about the
strategic-arms part of the talks.
The agreements covered three mat-
ters: a treaty prohibiting underground
weapons tests exceeding 150 kilotons;
amendments to the antiballistic-mis-
sile treaty under which both sides
would be limited to one rather than
two ABM sites; and an agreement that
the delegations of the two sides will
meet promptly to begin negotiation of
an interim agreement on limiting offen-
siye nuclear arms extending through
1985. The first two would appear to
accomplish little of strategic impor-
tance and the third would appear to
acknowledge a serious setback to pre-
vious hopes.
What was,not achieved was a per-
manent agreement to replace the first
interim agreement on offensive arms,
an objective that the two sides at the
ltast summit meeting, in Washington in
1973, had set themselves to accom-
plish this year. Nor was it possible to
secure agreement on an equitable par-
tial measure limiting deployment of
the new family of Soviet offensive
strategic-weapons systems.
The President in his television ap-
pearance on his return from Moscow
said that new patterns were emerging
between the United States and the So-
viet Union "that hold out to the world
the brightest hopes in a generation for
a just and lasting peace that all can
enjoy." The accomplishments at Mos-
cow would appear to warrant a more
modest appraisal.
The proposed treaty to prohibit un-
derground tests?it requires Senate
ratification?undoubtedly has? positiye
political aspects. There was, however,
inadequate time in Moscow to work
out agreed criteria to distinguish be-
tween nuclear-weapons tests and
peaceful nuclear explosions, and agreed
measures to assure adequate means of
verifying such a distinction. This task
remains to be accomplished. ,
Furthermore,, the strategic value of
an agreement not to test after March
15, 1976, weapons of a yield greater
than 350 kilotons--the equivalent of
150,000 tons of TNT?is doubtful. The
Russians have tested, or will have
tested by the starting date of the ban,
warheads they need for their new fam-
ily of offensive weapons.
What would be cut off would be
subsequent weapons tests above that
threshold. A principal purpose of such
tests would ,appear to be further im-
egotiations in Moscow
Paul Nitze recently resigned from the
United States strategic-arms delega-
tion in Geneva.
provefnents in the ratio of the explo-
sive power of a warhead to its weight.
The strategic significance of such
improved ratios for a force having the
large throw-weight potential of the So-
viet missile force is not readily appar-
ent, while such improved ratios could'
be significant for a force with smaller
throw-weight. (Throw-weight is the
weight a missie can carry to a target.)
As for the proposed amendments to
the ABM treaty, there are again cer-
tain positive'aspects: One ABM site on
each side would appear to be better
than two. However, the defense either,
of a nation's capital or of an intercon-
tinental ballistic missile silo field lim-
ited to 100 ABM interceptors is not of
major strategic significance. The risk
in the ABM treaty is rather the diffi-
culty of distinguishing between an
ABM interceptor and a modern sur-
face-to-air-missile (SAM) interceptor.'
From that standpoint, the radar com-
plexes around Moscow have a greater
strategic potential than do those at
Grand Forks, N. D.
What gives greater grounds for con-
cern, however, is the summit decision
that the delegations of both sides will
now direct their efforts not toward ne-
gotiating a permanent agreement limit-
ing offensive nuclear systems to re-
place the interim agreement but toward"
negotiating a limited agreement cover-
ing the period to 1985.
This decision would appear to un-
dercut the positions taken by the
United States delegation at Geneva
under Presidential instruction and to
favor the Soviet positions. ,
In essence, the United States sought
in Geneva a permanent agreement
based on the concept of equality, or
essential equivalence, in basic yeti-
fiable limitations on those offensive
weapon systems whose principal role
is strategic; with a provision not to
circumvent the agreement through the
deployment of other nuclear systems
not specifically limited. To avoid the
necessity of the United States building
up to Soviet levels to achieve essential
equivalence, the United States delega-
tion proposed phased reductions to
lower levels.
I believe the Soviet strategy is to
deal with i each segment of the problem
piecemeal, nailing down one piece
after another in a manner favorable
20
to Soviet interests and using all effec-
tive measures--diplomatic, propagan-
distic and through enhanced military
capabilities?to bring pressure on the
United States to settle for such piece-
meal agreemers.
Among the issues the Soviet side
consider, already settled are the in-
equalities in numbers of launchers and
silo dimensions provided by the in-
terim agreement and their right to put
multiple warheads on a substantial
proportion of their more numerous and
larger missiles.
Their current interest in a threshold
nuclear-test ban (the treaty involving
underground tests), agreement to fore-
go a second ABM site, and a lim-
ited agreement to cover the period to
1985 is consistent with such a piece-
meal strategy and with inhibiting a
United States response to the immi-
nent deployment of the Soviet Union's
new and much more effective family
of offensive strategic systems.
In the absence of any agreement by
the Soviet side to substantially alter
its past positions?and there have
been no indications of such a change
?I ,see small prospect of the con-
tinuing Geneva talks on limiting stra-
tegic arms making progress toward a
bal ced and substantially helpful out-
come.
In his news conference in Moscow,
Mr. Kissinger implied that the respon-
sibility for lack of greater progress
rested equally on both sides, which
"have to convince their military Es-
tablishments of the benefits of re-
straint."
During the thirty years since I first
became associated with the interface
between foreign policy and defense
policy, I recall no instance when a'
Secretary of Defense or the Joint
Chiefs of Staff failed to respond to a
valid Presidential order.
Any implication that the specialized
advice of those legally charged with
giving it cannot be overridden by Pres-
idential or Congressional decision
based on their broader range of re-
sponsibilities, that it should be molded
to fit the views of higher authority or
should be withheld from those en-
titled to it, I would find novel and
contrary to our theory of government.
Furthermore, it is my judgment that
the United States defense Establish-
ment, because of its particular nation-
al security responsibility, has been
more deeply concerned that there be
balanced and effective arms-control-
measures than other parts of the Gov-
ernment.
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NEW YORK TIMES
14 July 1974
of: to.
lutoriu for Peace, Maybe
. By Paul 14: Leventhal
. .
. .
. WASHINGTON?Peaceful plutonium
can be the death of us all?not will be
necessarily-but. can he. The present
course of the United States and France
to step up the exporting of nuclear-
power technology to nations willing to
pa Y the cost is a form of insanity that
may irSvertake the ? world before its
awesome dimensions are realized.
-Consider this: The nuclear power
plants that the 'President wants to sell
to Egypt are each. capable of produc-
ing 150 kilograms (352 pounds) of
plutonium as a by-product every year.
After, reprocessing, this plutonium will
amount to more than 700 pounds of
. weapons-grade material? suitable for
the fashioning rof dozens of bombs of
? the 'size of the:one:dropped on Naga-
.saki. ?
?
Consider this also: The Atomic En-
ergyCommission plans to license over
the next quarter-century 1,000 ,nu-
clear-power plants in the United States,
which will produce 60 per' cent of our
electricity and also 660,000 pounds of
plutonium a year by the year 2000.
? Worldwide projections for that date
are for 2,000 reactors, including our
? own, generating 40 per cent of elec-
trical needs and also more than two
million pounds of plutonium a -year.
These projections are based on the de-
velopment of the so-called "breeder"
reactor, which will generate more plu-
tonium than it consumes.
All this, of course, is to be done un-
der adequate?the industry does not
like the term "strict"?safeguards. .
A recent study by a team 'of outside
-consultants for the Atomie Energy
Commission, which was released in
May by Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff
after he obtained it from the A.E.C.,
reported that current regulations are
"entirely inadequate" to protect wean-
'ems-grade nuclear-materials in the pri-
-trate sector from theft and subsequent
fashioning into terrorist bomb's. Most
commercial reactors today do hot use
weapons-grade uranium or plutonium.
? If safeguards are so poor?and danger-
ous?now, what will the ?situation be
like after 1980, when the A.E.C. pre-
dicts that commercial power reactors
will be producing and using more plu-
tonium than will the ? Government
weapons program?
And also consider this: The A.E.C.
' conducted a secret study to determine
whether two physicists With doctor-
ates, fresh out of graduate school,
could design an atomic bomb from
current, public literature, assuming.
they could obtain the necessary .plu-
tonium or highly enriched uranium. -
'
?It, has since been disclosed that the
young physicists succeeded in design-
ing a fission device that A.E.C. ex-
perts determined would explode with
a force within 10' per cent of the yield
predicted by ? the.. would-be bomb-.
makers:.
And, finally, consider this: Pluto-
nium is the most toxic Substance
known to man.. One thirty-millionth of
an ounce?less than a .pollen grain?
if inhaled or ,swallowed ,will, cause
cancer. Thus, even if a crudely fash-
ioned bomb fails' to explode, partial
detonation will conVert it into a ter-
ribly poisonous dispersion device.Also,'
the radioactive half-life of plutonium-
is 23,640 years, which means it retains
its. toxicity for at least ? 100,000 years..
These facts lead to three basic con-
clusions. .
I Ei
First, the nuclear-power industry
generates the world's most explosive
and poisonous element.
Second, this element can be fash-
ioned by skilled, determined individ-
uals into atomic bombs or deadly dis-
persion devices.
Third, present efforts to safeguard
this element from outside -theft or in--
ternal diversion have been found to be
entirely inadequate. in the world's
most sophisticated nuclear nation, the
United States.
What, then, are we in for if we and
our peaceful nuclear competitors like
France continue to view the exporting
of this technology as a solution to our
balance-of-payments problems?'
At best, we, are in for a period of
uncertainty. It is an uncertainty built
on the sure knowledge that even en-
ergy-rich nations like Iran and Saudi
Arabia are only too-ready to pay the
price for the stuff that international
dreams are made of: ultimate power.
In that sense, plutonium-producing
power plants are international dream
machines. Plutonium has become the
world's most valuable and coveted
substance. India has recently. demon-
strated what one country can do with.
21
plutonium from foreign-built reactors
on its own soil?for "peaceful pur-
poses," of course.
Even if the industry proves to.oper-
ate as safely as the A.E.C. and other
advocates say it will, there is still the
problem of safeguarding nuclear ma-
terials from theft and nuclear facilities
from sabotage.
At present, international safeguards
is administered by the International
Atamie Energy Agency cover only in-
ternal accounting systems (comparable ,
to a bank audit), not physical security
(comparable to a bank guard). How-
ever, while a bank audit involves ac-
countability down to the penny, a nu-
clear audit is considered tight if it-can
account for 99 per cent of weapons-
grade materials.
TA
-? Materials ? unaccounted for already
amount to thousands of pounds of plu-
tonium and highly enriched uranium
that the A.E.C. assumes?and can only
assume?have been lost in the indus-
trial process, not stolen.
Nevertheless, the A.E.C. does not
require tests of the commercial-safe-
guards system?so-called adversary
testing?to determine whether sneak-
thefts of small amuurits of weapons-
grade nuclear materials are possible.
, The nuclear power debate has been
subjected to much sound and fury,
mostly over, the safety issue. This has
benefited the industry because it has
diverted attention from the most basic
issue of, all: safeguards.
The bottom line of ? the nuclear-
power -industry is the exporting and
the common use of plutonium. Can the
world whose commerce will soon have
to accommodate more than two mil-
lion pounds of plutonium a year sur-
vive? Even if legitimate governments
agree to safeguard the industry from
threats, thefts and sabotage, what of
nationalizations, revolutions and ter-
i'orist attacks?
The trend toward nuclear power
may be inevitable. But we, and the
rest of the world, ought to know now
what we are letting ourselves in for.
Paul L. Leventhal is special counsel to
the Senate Subcommittee on Reorgan-
ization. Research and International Or,
ganizations, which reported to the
Senate the origina/ version of a pend-
ing bill to reorganize the Atomic En-
ergy Commission.
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NEW YORK TIMES
7 August 1974
ealing
Experts
lit
oscow. Fasp.West
w- lue a.nd Risks
Last month, following the summit meeting be-
tween President. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev,
the Soviet leader, Secietary of State Kissinger said
that he expected a national debate on the meaning
of security in the nuclear age and on the value
and risks of closer ties with the Soviet Union.
Tomorrow, that debate in effect begins when Mr.
Kissinger testifies before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. In advance of that discussion,
The New York Times invited four public figures
with interests in East-West relations to its Wash-
.ington Bureau last Friday to consider some of the
issues.
The discussion preceded President Nixon's,
-
latest Watergate disclosures Monday, but the par-
ticiapnts 'already had assumed that the impeach-
ment inquiry might result in Mr. Nixon's depar-
Mr. DANIEL: It seems' to suppose they might say the
me that when we begin talk- same thing of us. I believe it
mg about security in the is important that the agree-
nuclear age, to us Secretary . ments that we do have with
Kissinger's phraseology, we the Soviets are mutually ben-
eventually coma down to one ' eficial so that they can be
question, and that question.. implemented and carried out
is can we trust the Russians? to the satisfaction of both
countries.
MR. BRZEZINSKI: If you
ask whether we can trust
the Russians, it sort of begs
the question. Trust them
about what? I think we can
trust the Russians to pro-
mote their national interests
as they best see fit, as I think
we try to do also.
What bothers me about the
problem of American-Soviet
relations is that I see in the
Soviet attitude the curious
combination of ideological
residue and recently awaken-
ed great-power nationalism,
the combination of which
may -make the Soviet Union
an insufficiently constructive
partner in dealing with the
new global problems that are
becoming central.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I
never like to put it as trust-.
ing people. It is a matter of
recognizing and adjusting.
the interests of the two
countries. Where their inter-
ests are in variance with
ours, I don't think you can
trust them or other govern-
ments. The only possibility of'
making progress is to discov-
er, if possible, areas of mu-.
tual interest on which they
can agree.
To take a simple example,
we have had treaties with
.them in the Antarctic, for ex-
ample, which it was in our
mutual interest to make and
they respected them.
Lack of Mutual Interest
Now if we take the other
example, where we attempt
to make them abide by our
ideas of morality, or ideology
and so on, there is no mutual
interest there and you can't
trust them to do. something
in reformation of their own
society that they don't want,
to do.
Problems are Gobal
Indeed, in some respects, I
consider the debate about
detente a bit anachronistic
because it focuses on a
power relationship which is
important and critical but
which, in many ways, deals
SENATOR JACKSON: I with the very traditional
think it boils down to the aspects of international poll-
simple fact that if you are tics. We are very rapidly be-
to have an agreement with ing thrust into a world in
the Soviets, it must be one which, for the first time,
that is not based on faith as global problems are becom-
such. I think agreements to Mg central.
be meaningful must be init. What makes me uneasy
tually self-enforcing. If one about the Soviet attitude is
presupposes that we can en- that the Soviet Union, in
ter into an agreement with many ways, much less than
the Soviets in which we are the United S,tates, does not
going to rely on their word have a global perspective. It
or their interpretauon I has a rather narrow vision
think this is an illusion. .I of its interests. There is
lure from office. They also discussed what implica-
United States policy.
The participants were Zbigniew Brzezinski, di-
rector of the Trilateral Commission, a nongovern-
mental group focusing on coranon problems of the
United States, Japan and Europe, and professor of
government at Columbia University; McGeorge
Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation and for-
mer adviser on national security to Presidents Ken-
nedy and Johnson; Senator J. W. Fulbright, Demo-
crat of Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, and Senator Henry M. Jackson,
Democrat of aWshington, a frequent critic of the
Adimnistration.
Clifton Daniel, Washington Bureau chief of The
'Time ,moderated, assisted by David Binder and
Bernard Gwertzman? of the bureau. ?
much less of a willingness to
respond to the new global
problemS that impose them-
selves on 'Us.
The longer-range threat is
not Soviet domination, be-
cause I don't think the 'So-
viets are strong enough to
impose it on anyone.,... but
world chaos to which the
Soviets would be able to'
make a very major contri-
bution.
MR. DANIEL: Since you
mentioned detente?it was
bound to come up very early
in the discussion because the
d?nte revolves a great deal
around the word?you have
said, that there is no alterna-
tive to d?nte. What do you
mean by "d?nte?"
MR. BRZEZINSICI: When I
said there was nd alternative
to detente, I mean as a mat-
ter of deliberate policy there
is no alternative but for both
sides to try to stabilize the
relationship, to try to upset .
the competitive aspects of
their relations with more co-
operative aspects. But within
that context, there are dif-
ferent kinds of detents that
we can have.
Compartmentalized Concept
My criticism of the Nixon.
Kissinger detente is that it is
a highly compartmentalized,
highly limited, very conserva-
tive concept of d?nte that
happens to suit the Soviet
leadership as well. It is not a
detente which is compatible
with these global problems
that are surfacing and which.
require a much broader so-
cial, political, even cultural
accommodation among the
advanced countries. In that
sense, it is an anachronistic
and, in some respects, even
a very dangerous detente.
22
?MR..BUNDY: The idea, pur--
pose, in American for-
eign po?cy goes back long
.before the present Adminis-
tration. The first efforts in
that direction, I think, can be
associated with the later
years of the Eisenhower Ad-.
ministration. They were an
element, a strong element in
the policy of both President
Kennedy and President John-
son.
There were some results;
as Senator Fulbrig'nt has sug-
gested. I am inclined to be-
lieve, however, that d?nte
-is not a state of peace among
friends, and cannot be, that
there is this persistent ambi-
guity between our common
interests and our adversary
relationship, and that we
have to expect that to cone
tinue. So when you ask the
question, "Can we trust the
Russians?" I agree that we
can trust them to pursue
their own interests. .
In my judgment, the over-
riding common interest is
survival in the nuclear age.
One of the great things that
we have achieved over the
last 15 years is some in-
crease in common under.'
standing of that reality. The
disappointments we have
had along the way are not
trivial; the disappointment
with Moscow this spring
and summer. is serious.
I would think, nonethe-
less, that we have no altern-
ative but to continue to try
to have the most effective
communication with this
complex, secretive, self-
serving, ideologically primi-
tive state and, in that sense,
I Would agree with Mr. /3rz-
ezinsIti that we need more
and not less effort at effec-
tive communication and, if
possible. agreement with
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the Soviet Union.
MR. DANIEL: Why do you
think it was the Nixon Ad-
ministration that was able
to achieve this degree of de-
tente, rather than. the earlier
administrations, two of which
you served?
MR. BUNDY: These things
build on each other. You
can't have a SALT I except
in the context of your ear-.
her efforts over nuclear- -
lest bans and nuclear nonpro-
liferation. I don't blame the
Nixon Administration par-
ticularly for talking as if
detente began in 1969. Most
administrations have a hal).
it of talking . as if foreign
policy began on the inaugura-
tion.
A. National Objective
It is the ? fact that any
large-scale policy of this
and not all of the arange-
ments that have been made,'
I would have to say, seem to
me to have been well calcu-
lated Or carefully connected
in spite of the Administra-
tion's belief in linkage.
. I would not believe, to
wind up quickly here, that
d?nte is irreversible. I
think it has been a national
? objective, not a single Ad-
'ministration's objective, and
that it should continue to
be so.
?? MR. BINDER: What makes'
it- not rreversible? ,
MR. BUNDY: Czechoslo-
?vakia is a kind of example.
Vietnam sometimes was an
example of an action which,
could impede or make diffi-
cult communications. ? We
could have that kind of
breakdown or understanding
in the Middle East. We could
have it, I regret to say, on
the next stage of the arms.
balance, because there are
very serious differences evi-
dently now between the con-
.cepts of Moscow and those,
of Washington is . to what
makes an acceptable agreed
po,-ition for strategic weap-
ons in the next five to ten'
yea Ts.
MR. DANIEL: Could you
offer some reasons why d6-.,
tente is unstable or reversi-
ble? ? ?
MR. BRZEZ1NSKI: The.
first is ? the potential for'
leadership change in both
systems. We may be getting
a very significant leadership
change in this country and it
is conceivable that the new
leadership in some respect is
going to be more cautious in
foreign affairs, more con-
servative.
We know that the Soviet.
leadershhip is aged, quite?
aged. It is one of the oldest
leaderships in the world. We
do know in the past at least
that. leadership changes in
the Soviet Union produce
periods of instability and
rather dramatic shifts in for-
eign policy as well.
The second reason is more
basic and worth considering
in the general context of
what is meant by -national
security. I think we are on
the eve of a very major crisis
of international- systems as'a
whole. , ?
\Ye may have national,
bankruptcies of a number of,
America's allies. The whole.
international situation is be-
coming unstuck. In that con-
text, I think it is ? only rea?
sonable to expect the Soviet?
Government to 'reassess 'its'
own stake in a detente rela-
tionship which is predicated
to some extent on stability.
SENATOR JACKSON: I do?
not think it is a question of-
whether we should or should
not have a d?nte. Everyone
wants peace. The question is
what kind of detente. You
can have a good detente; you
can have a ? had detente. It
-seems to me that it boils
down to the basic question
of how should we conduct
American foreign policy.
I thing first that we should
engage in bard bargaining ?
with the Soviets, just as the'
'Soviets do on' every- trans-'
action. If you only .put for-
ward the proposal S that you
-know in advance' are accept-
able to the Soviets, you end
up. negotiating on Soviet
terms. ?
Second, each agreement
'that we enter into. should
'reflect reciprocity, a two-way
street. f ?
The, grain deal is the clas-
sic ekample ? of a one-way
street. . The ' Administration
announced it as being part
Of detente. The official, po-
sition now is that it was
never a part of detente. That
change came after the ine
vestigatien of the grain deal
was completed. ,
-,I would point out,' too,
that in this area of reciproc-
ity there is a lot to be done
? in improving the accessibility
of the American press in
Moscow to their citizens as
,the Russian press moves
freely in this town. Somehow
we are reluctant to insist on
reciprocal terms.-
I think the whole . world
had a chance to see how
reciprocity is handled when
the Soviets cut off the inter-
views in the middle of the
summit conference, over the
three great networks.
Another key point here is
the need for early progress in
the critical area of mutual
arms reduction.
To the man in the street,
I suspect, and it has been my
own experience in talking
with audiences that . if lie
would see some ? movement
toward a mutual reduction in
arms leading to 'disarmament,
this more than anything else
would give credibility to a
better relationship with the
Soviet Union.
The same applies in the
area of progress in human
rights. That is why I intro-
duced my amendment on the
right and opportunity to emi-
grate that is being debated
too in this context.
There is also the need to.
promote genuine trade not
economic subsidies disguised'
as trade.
Let me just illustrate how
Approved Aer 260176b/o8
a+me
wandered in the handling -of
trade, in the handling of ex-
ports. We are sending a lot
of phosphates to the Soviet,
Union. The bulk of the phos-
phates come from Florida.
We are sending so much now
that we are being required
to open up an important en-
vironmental area, one of the
national forests in Florida,
to mine phosphates because
we are going to be short of
phosphates for our own
needs.
? I do believe that we should
have the kind of trade -with
the Soviet Union that is a
two-way street. Now the
facts are that the Soviets
have very little to offer us
in the way ? of goods and
services, unless we are will-
ing to spend billions of dol-
lars in capital investment in
the Soviet Union.
I would be willing to make
some special concessions in
commerce and trade, recog-
nizing that our trade with.
the Soviet Union will not
inure directly -to our com-
-mercial benefit if we can
work out satisfactory ? ar-
rangements in other fields
with them,.
I -think another element in
a genuine detent that is of
critical importance is the re-
straint on the part of .both
countries ? it has not been
exercised by the Russians of
late -- in the delivery of
sophisticated ? weapons to
:areas- of tension. The Middle
East is a classic example of
this. ??
.Better relations 'with the
'Soviets requires less empha-
'sis. by the Soviets on the
.ideological ,struggle.
MR. DANIEL Do any of
you feel that d?nte with
the SovietTnion depends on
-the personal relationship be-
tween President Nixon and
Mr. Brezhnev to the extent
that Mr. Nixon indicates?
Secondly, is d?nte a parti-
san matter in your view, as
between Republicans and
Democrats? -
SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I
don't think it is partisan. I
do think the personal rela-
tions can have a great ef-
'feet. You asked a moment
ago why Mr. Nixon could
do this. I think one of the
reasons is the fact that he
has such- a reputation for be-
ing anti-Communist.
If the Democrats did the
same, they would be accused
by the Republicans of being
subversive.
I think much of it has
to do with' our ancient feel-
ing about the-Russians being
atheistic Communists and
bad people.
MR. BUNDY: I would just
Say that I don't think Presi-
dent Johnson felt inhibited
on the Soviet side. I do
-think Senator Fulbright's
remark about [Nixon's] spe-
cial advantage is important
in the -context of China.
SENATOR JACKSON: I
might make one observation.
I think Communist states
tend to speak in terms of
top personalities of other
governments. I have found
this generally to be true,
23
that. However, that the de-
parture of a top representa-
tive of any of the states will
in itself cause a change in
relations.
I think this points up the
ned to institutionalize our
relationships more effective-
ly between the United States
and the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China.
MR. BRZEZINSKI: It seems
to me that the central ques-
tion about d?nte is whether
our policies are reinforcing
the worst tendencies in the
Soviet system or are they
encouraging the hest. It
seems to me that a meaning-
ful detente, one which offers
real prospects for the future,
is obviously the one which
engages the Soviet Union in
more extensive, more col-
laborative effort in regard
to all, of the central issues
the are now becoming im-
portant.
Tt is this kind of detente
which I believe this Adminis-
tration has not been-success-
ful in mounting.
. The fact of the matter is
that the economic relation-
ship today amounts to nothing
less than a fairly sizable
Americanized science-tech-
nology transfer to the Soviet
Union. This I think is, the
kind of d?nte which does
not encourage the best and
which is some -respects re-
inforces the worst because
it d-lays internal reform in
the Soviet Union. It makes'
it impossible for the Soviet
system to maintain a highly
centralized economic system
on the basis of a highly cen-
tralized political system. It
impedes the kind of pressures
from within the economy
which in time will spill over
into the political realm. In?
deed it even encourages a
certain measure of domestic
repression when external
costs are not too high.
MR. BUNDY: Are you sug-
gesting that not to have eco-
nomic relations would lead
to an increased diversity in
the Soviet economic system?
MR. BRZEZINSKI: What I
am suggesting is that the
economic relationship ought
to be calibrated very closely
to the development of other
relationships and should not
outpace it on the basis of
one-sided arrangements. -
SENATOR JACKSON: I
will break in here by saying
:that this is where hard bar-
gaining comes in. The So-
viets have a serious need for
our science, our technology,
our . business - management
technicians and a vast amount
of our agriculture and agri-
cultural know-how. All I am
suggesting is that in light
of this situation we should
in our bargaining relate this
to a reordering of priorities
in both countries.
I don't see why we should
subsidize their military-indus-,
trial complex. I would he
willing to make some eco-
liOrtliC and some technological
concessions if I cou;c1 see a
movement away from the
tErk-koliblViektavo2koe01oofS61562-
r?ls build-up to an
arms reduction.
MR. DANIEL: Senator Ful-
bright, a short while ago,
Senator Jackson outlined
what might be described as
a negotiating posture toward
the Soviet Union. Do you
agree with that attitude and
posture?
SENATOR FULBRIGHT: No.
Just two incidents I want to
remark on. When he says
that the grain deal was part
of detente, I never conceived
that it was part of detente.
It was part of the elections
of 1972 to create an image of
tremendous effectiveness on
the part of President Nixon
to get rid of a surplus.
What was wrong with it
was selling it at such a cheap
priee. We had had a policy
for 2 years of helping our
farmers by getting rid of our
surpluses to ? the extent of
giving it away under P. L.
[public law] na0. What was
wrong with that is the price.
If we had gotten $2.50 a
bushel, it would have been a
good grain deal. Giving it to
them at $1.65 was stupidity,
but it was our stupidity. We
didn't have to give it at $1.65.
Now, if you come down to
attitude, I think the attitude
is basic to it in the matter of
arms. The overriding, single
most important one is the
control of strategic arms. I
can't see where we have been
very. forthcoming. The Secre-
tary of State says we have
three times as many nuclear
warheads as the Russians to-
day.
We have the forward bases,
we have the aircraft carriers,
all with nuclear weapons. We
our nuclear weapons on the
borders of Russia, all the way
from Turkey, Germany, and
all around their periphery ex-
cept, I guess, on the Arctic
Circle.
I think they have taken the
position that we meant it,
when we said "parity" and
they have not achieved parity.
I don't think they are going :
to be satisfied in agreeing to
a permanent inferiority which -
they believe they have.
Now, you get into all kinds
of minute descriptions of
"throw weight" and so on
In this argument, but I just,
sum it up by saying the Sec-
retary believes that we have
?I think he said we have
36 warheads for each 218
cities in the Soviet Union.
We could, if they were per-
fect in their delivery system,
that many on each city.
We have, all along, een
ahead of them, back to the
missile gap of the Kennedy
era, when President Kennedy
alleged there was a missile
gap. There was a missile gap
but it was in reverse. We
had about 1,000 weapons
and they had about 80,
whereas he made the coun-
thy believe that we had 80
and they had 1,000. It just
was not so. But the public
believes that 'We are behind.-
We have had Admiral
Moorer and Admiral Zum-
walt going about recently?
of course, this always hap-
pens: this is an annual ritual
just before appropriations
time?saying we are sudden-
ly inferior, our fleets are in-
Approved For Release 2001/08/08
ferior, everything is inferior,
we are in terrible shape mili-
tarily, and therefore we need
more money.
I think when it comes to
the nitty-gritty of doing
something, we are never
quite willing to do it. We
began MIRV. we have ad-
vanced the Trident, which is
twice as large as their big-
gest submarine. We are
going into the B-1, which
they have nothing compa-
rable to.
SENATOR JACKSON: May
I just make a brief comment
to my colleagues. I think we
should all agree that reduc-
tion of arms to a new and
lower lever of equality
should be our main objec-
tive. What is being said is
that there is too much arma-
ment on both sides.. My an-
swer is very simple. Let us
start reducing on both' sides.
MR. DANIEL: Although you
make that suggestion, it
seems that the military on
both sides are opposed .to
this. Both Washington and
Moscow, think they must
approach detente from a
strong military position. How
are we going to deal with
that problem?
SENATOR JACKSON: This
is not correct on the Amer-
ican side. I have seen the
official papers. The Secretary.
of Defense supports?and I
am advised the Joint Chiefs
join in that? a mutual re-
duction of strategic arms
based upon the amendment
adopted by the Senate and
:the House two years ago for
equality.
Certainly we will always
have the problem within the
military services of one serv-
ice wanting to keep bombers
or missiles and aonther serv-
ice wanting to keep ships.
You will always have that.
But the official position of
:he Department of Derense is
ar a mutual reduction in.
sLrategic arms.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I
suggest there is a great difr
ference between the official
position and what they do.
That is all I suggest.
SENATOR JACKSON: That
is their -negotiating position.
I stand on that statement.
MR. BRZEZINSKI: I think
of the major factors of
strategic instability in the
American-Soviet relationship
is the ambiguity and uncer-
tainty surrounding Soviet
planning, development, and
deployment.
However, one judges the
scale of the American effort
and however critical one may
be of its scale, the fact is
that our rival knows pretty
:much what we intende to do
in the strategic realm.
We have absolutely no
knowledge of long-term So-
viet strategic planning. We
have no idea whether it is
geared to permanent relation-
ship of party, whether it is
geared to something which
might he called political-mili-
tary superiority.
Our knowledge becomes
reasonably extensive, though
not foolproof, only on the
level of deployment.
: CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9
I should think that one
Major contribution which
could be made to strategic
stability would be for the
Soviets, in the context of%
something which now ap-
proximates parity, to begin
to indicate more explicitly
and overtly what their strate.-
gic planning is, what their
long-term development pro-
posals and plans are.
Senator Fulbright might
feel that we exaggerate the
Soviet threat, and we might
well be doing so. We cer-
tainly have done so in the
past. He is absolutely right
when he said theat we exag-
gerated it in the early sixties.
The reason we exaggerated
the Soviet threat in the early
sixties is not because every
man in the United States was
running around . howling
about the missile gap. The
fact is that the Soviets went
out of their way in 1960 to
claim that they had missile
superiority, to operate as if
they had it, and even to en-
gage in a little bit of deliber-
ate deception to pretend they
had it. It was a miscalcula-
tion for Which they paid in
Cuba.
MR. BUNDY: I agree with
Senator Jackson that, if we
can get balanced reduction,
substantive reduction, in
numbers of ,warheads, "throw
weight," any measure yeti
want, that would he excel-
lent. I think that is a long
way away. ?
None of the agreements
that we have made at any
time with the Soviet Union
in this area has involved their
giving up something they al-
ready had that they still
really wanted. I think it will
be quite a while before the
Soviet military will agree to
the dismantling of a "Grade
A" force. The most we can
expect them to do on the
basis of past experience is
not to deploy things that they
have come to believe are not
really valuable, like the ABM,
or to agree to an eventual
implied scrapping of obsoles-
cent or obsolete forces.
This is really our own posi-
tion, too. I know of no readi-
ness really in our military to
give up the prospect of de-
veloping and deploying forces
which they regard as of first-
class strategic importance.
It is one reason for being
patient about the progress of
Salt' II and one reason for
being skeptical about the
speed which the Administra-
tion has tried to put behind
this phase of the bargaining.
I really think it just takes
longer. This is a harder thing
than any defensive or ineffec-
tive systems.
I also think that it is go-
ing to be a long time?I
suspect Profesor Brzezinski
will agree?before the Sovi-
ets engage in the kind of rel-
atively open discussion of
their defense planning or de-
fense development and re-
search that we have been ac-
customed to in some measure
here.
So it does seem to me that
we need to be very patient
about strategic-arms limita-
tion and we need to look to
24
the question of the way in
which our own behavior,
which is within our control,
and does and does not Con-
tribute toward increased, un-
derstanding and eventual lim-
itation.
And here I would have to
say I am seriously disturbed
by the intermixing of target-
ing doctrine with SALT nego-
tiations which has been a
consequence of the Pentagon
position and secretary Schle-
singer's otherwise extremely
intelligent and helpful contri-
butions to the discussion.
I think he is right that
American strategic targeting
'needs to have something'
other than a doomsday plot
to it. I think that has, in fact,
been a problem for 15 years
anyway. I think it is also
right that we should be very
careful about assuming that
there could never be a use a
nuclear power to try to affect
political results. -
But I think it is very dan-
gerous to connect those ques-
tions to the potential devel-
opment of a wholly new stra-
tegic system which could be
:perceived as a counterforce
system, which, in that con-
nection, in spite of the Sec-
retary's disclaimers, does ex-
ist.
That perception, I believe,
has been seized upon in Mos-*
cow and has seriously im-
pedec' the discussions of
SALT II, and it is this kind
of question, it seems to me,
that needs clarification. I be-
lieve that is not the cost of
strategic weapons that is so
serious. The danger of nu-
clear war, if it ever came, is
so massive that insurance
policies should not be meas-
ured by the kind of cost that
is now associated with our
strategic-weapons system, a
cost which is lower than it
was a decade ago.
ilORE
But I think the character
and make-up of those
courses, the doctrine which
justifies them and the things
we do and do not seem to
be planning to do on our
own are potentially very de-
stabilizing, and I do not my-
self believe that there is any
urgent need for major change
at any early time in the cur-
rent strategic posture of the
United States.
MR. DANIEL: When you
speak of patience and time,
what sort of time frame do
you have in mind?
MR. BUNDY: I should be
.inclined to agree with Jerry
Smith, who was the principal
negotiator under the Presi-
dent and Kissinger in SALT
I, and his last suggestion is
that it may take at least as
long to do SALT II as it did
SALT I. That would go to
another two or three years
and perhaps longer because
this is much harder.
MR. DANIEL: Has interna-
tional stability and security
been enhanced by what we
have agreed upon?
MR. BUNDY: I think the
agreement on ABM was a
very stabilizing agreement. I
think, as Senator Fulbright
Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9
'Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9'
said, it did give treaty recog-
nition to the proposition that
there is no such thig as pro-
tection between superpowers
in the event of major nuclear
war.
SENATOR JACKSON: I
think the significance of the
ABM agreement lies in the
fact that they have recog-
nized equality, and that is:
each side is to have one
site. I think that is the di-
rection we should be moving.
. I would just like to make
a point in response to Mr.
Bundy's comment about the
new targeting doctrine. First,
let us remember that this is
only a research-and-develop-
ment effort. It is an option
that we can examine later
on. This move, I think, was
made in a restrained and re-
sponsible way.
What we have said is that
no American President should
be allowed to have only the
inhuniarie option of killing
all human beings in the So-
viet Union. The doctrine of
assured destruction may have
had some validity when we
had overwhelming superiori-
ty but I don't think it has
validity in the context in
which we now face the Sovi-
et Union.
Finally, I think the point
needs to be made that
the Administration has not
pushed arms reduction. I
want to emphasize that very
strongly. The President has
not gone to the country and
-to the world and said our ob-
jective is to reduce arms to
new and lower levels of
equivalence.
I disagree with the Admin-
istration in their whole nego-
tiating approach.
If you only put forward
proposals that you know in
advance the Soviets are go-
ing to accept, you wind up
negotiating on their terms. I
disagree on this basic issue.
I think it is a central issue in
the whole negotiation proc-
ess.
MR. DANIEL: Are you sug-
gesting that the President is
&Mg this sort of thing in
ol der to enhance his own
image as a peacemaker, as
a success in international re-
lations?
SENATOR JACKSON: I
long ago have given up deter-
mining the intent of the
White House in many differ-
ent areas.
MR. BRZEZINSKI: One of
the purposes of these ar-
rangements is to not only
reach specific agreement but
also to set in motion a pro-
longed process of mutual edi-
fication. I think one of the
great importances and even
accomplishments of SALT
was that it did result in bet-
ter mutual understtanding of
the relative strategic politi-
cal positions of both sides.
In, this connection I would
like to make a very modest
proposal. We have now had
more than a decade at differ-
ent stages of American-Soviet
talks. Perhaps the time must
come for both sides by joint
agreement to begin to release
to the public the protocols of
at least some of the talks.
The fact of the matter is
that they have been conVt,
pproved
A Glossary
ZUMWALT, Adm. Elmo R.
?Recently retired Chief of
Naval Operations.
MOORER, Adm. Thomas H.?
Recently retired chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
GRECHKO, Marshal Andrei
A. Soviet Defense Minister
and alternate member of
the Politburo of the Soviet.
Communist party.
THROW-WEIGHT, a term for
the weight, usualy in kilo-
tons or megatons, of war-.
. heads caPable of being car-
ried to targets by missiles.
FORWARD BASES, military
usage for submarines
armed with nuclear mis-
sies and intermediate
range ballistc missiles lo-
cated close to opponent
frontiers, as in. West Ger-
many. ?
B-1, a new nuclear-bomb-
carrying plane to be the
main Air Force bomber,
replacing the aging B-52
series.
ABM, anti-ballistic missile,
that is, mssiles designed to
knock down other missiles.
ed in great secrecy. I think
this secrecy is first of all in
the long run incompatible
with the nature of our soci-
ety. We are entitled to know
more about the nature of
some of these discussions.
-In the longer run, I think
public knowledge would con-
tribute also to greater Soviet
understanding of the issues
involved. I am aware of the
fact that you cannot conduct
sensitive ongoing negotia-
tions if you expect them to
be published quickly. Renee
I would- not recommend that
anything that transpired re-
cently be made part of the
public record.
MR. DANIEL: What about
the possibility of that?
SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I
don't think there is much
possibility on it on both
sides.
MR. BUNDY: I must say I
would be strongly in favor of
it.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I
would too.
SENATOR JACKSON: A
condition precedent to that,
however, gentlemen, is the
need to get the Administra-
tion voluntarily to make pub-
lic the understandings en-
tered into in connection with
SALT I which were kept
secret from the chief of
SALT negotiations for our
Government from July 24,
1972, until June 20, 1973,
kept secret from Secretary of
State Rogers and the Secre-
tary of Defense. I refer to
two important documents
that the Congress knew noth-
ing about.
I hope that the one that
was agreed to in Moscow
that -modified the July 24,
1972, agreement will volun-
tarily be made public. .This
'business of entering into
agreements with the Soviets
and keeping them secret
astounds me. I can't for the
life of me understand what
useful purpose the Admin-
istration hopes to further by
that kind of procedure.
? .
For Release 2001/08/08:
I would agree, I think al
of us can agree, that a
bilateral agreement to re
lease the discussions in
the areas that Professo
Brezezinski has referred ?to
would be useful. I think it is
some way down the road yet
MR. BUNDY: I really do
think that this Administra-
tion is not unique in this--
that administrations tend to
underestimate the value of
the precise expositions of
what they themselves are
thinking.
When the Secretary of
State called for a debate, it
seemed to me one of his first
addressees should have been
the Secretary of State. I
think it is very fortunate that
he is going to be the lead-off
witness in Senator Ful-
bright's hearings because it
is inescapable that the tem-
per of argument is set by
what the Executive Branch
says, and at the moment
based on what the Executive
Brtnch has said and said
most clearly by the Secre-
tary of Defense, I would still
have to sustain the position
that that could be read as
very threatening in Moscow.
SENATOR JACKSON: I
would add, that we don't
really know the role of the
military in the decision-
making process in the So-
viet Union. Marshal Grechko
is now a member of the
Politburo.
We do know what the role
of the military is in our own
decision-making process. The
President and the Secretary
of State really make the final
decisions. I think you can
find that for the most part
in connection with Salt I
and Salt II decisions the mil-
itary has played a relatively
less important role than the
civilians, contrary to a lot
of statements that are being
made.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT:
That is contrary to my state-
ment. I don't agree with it
at all. I think the military
and its allies have muc:h in-
fluence here. In our case,
even if the President does
not like it, the military can
go to Congress and override
the President. They do it on
their appropriations time and
time again, year a'fter year.
It has been going on and
there is no power that can
restrict the military in our
political system.
The Russians don't have
the organization behind them
that you have here. You have
Mr. Meany and 13 million of
his people, ?all the labor or-
ganizations. There is very
little counterforce against
the power of the military.
Look at the votes in the
Senate on any effort to re-
duce in a substantial way
anything the military wants.
everybody knows what
happens year after year. We
have never won a ' single
showdown with the military.
MR. BUNDY: It does ap-
pear to me that it really is
true that the Soviet military
arms are very strong and if
you make available all ob-
jective measures, percentages
of gross national product,
those soldiers seem to do
CIA-RW77-00432R000
'better than our soldiers.
At the same time I would
have to say that I think it
is simplistic to say that the
President and Secretary or
State are in charge and what
they say goes. I think there
has been a very pronounced
weakening over the last
several years, both inside the
Executive Branch and in the
country as a whole, of the
capability to countermilitary
arguments in knowledgable
and sophisticated terms.
Many of us think?al-
though I am open to correc-
tion on this?that as a con-
sequence of the bargaining
in the Senate, the arms con-
trol agency was stripped of
many of its most capable -
staff officers. Since Henry
Kissinger moved from the
White House to the Depart-
ment of State, there is evi-
dence that the White House
capability and influence at
staff level in these matters
has declined. It is very diffi-
cult, although it is not im-
possible, for members of the
Legislative Branch and their
staffs 'and for informed and
interested members of the
public to participate effec-
tively in the kind of debate'
that is being asked for, if the
debate does not exist already
in some measure inside the
Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment.
SENATOR JACKSON: I
would disagree with that
Contrary to some public
statements, I think there has
been a real debate between
Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Schles-
inger. There has been a com-
ing together, allegedly In
more recent weeks, on some
of these points. I think it is
fair to say There have been
some strong differences of
opinion. ?
I can say very candidly I
think the failure of the re-
cent Moscow summit stems
from the fact that neither
Dr. Kissinger nor the Presi-
dent of the United States
could accept what was being
proposed by the Russians at
the summit. Those are the
facts. It has nothing to do
with the U.S. military or any
evil spirit that I know of.
MR. DANIELS: This new
MR. DANIELS: This new
American committee on U.S.-
Soviet relations that was
formed recently put out a list
of seven positive accomplish-
ments in interunational rela-
tions that they thought cid-
tente had so far achieved,
including, incidentally, help
dealing with the problems of
peace in the Middle East.
How do you feel about the
contributions to date of dd.
tente?
SENATOR JACKSON: It is
incredible to cite the Middle
East as an example of help-
ful progress.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT:
The Secretary did.
SENATOR JACKSON: Let
me give a bil of particulars.
Was it helpful for the Sovi-
ets to bring the two countries
to the brink almost again,
the first time since Cuba?
Was it helpful during the
course of that Yom Kippur
war for the Soviets to urge
1 OOSISOOtil2t9Arab countries to
Approved fOiCtiOge10408/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9
join in the fight against Is-
rael? Was it helpful to en-
courage maintaining the oil
embargo? Was it helpful to
the economies of the Western
world when the Russians day
after day Urged the Arab
countries to increase the
price of oil? ?
I would say that what Dr.
Kissinger was able to do in
Egypt to separate Egypt from
the more militant Arab states
was one of the singular ac-
complishments of this Ad-
ministration, that and open-
ing travel to China.
Finally, I would Say that
what is going on right now
in Syria on the part of the
Soviet Union does not por-
tend well for the months
Ahead. The Soviets have
moved more arms, mostly
sophisticated arms, arms that
are not even available in the
Warsaw Pact countries, into
Syria.
SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I
don't know wh it seems to
be that we view these ques-
tions in directly the opposite
way. I have heard the Secre=
tary several times. I don't see
any evidence that the Rus-
sians urged an increase in the
price of oil. If you want to
pick on one man, it is the
Shah of Iran.
To attribute everything
that goes wrong, or wrong
from our point of view, to
the Russians I think is
fn-
realistic and not true. .Not
that they don't enjoy it and
take advantage of it. But. I
think the Middle East grew
out of a conflict which had
its origins long ago and thet
was not Russian-inspired. Ob-
viously when something
which discomforts us hap-
pens, they, enjoy it.
I think to treat it as we
did at the time gave mueh
more significance to the alert
than was justified. I don't
think there was any great
threat. To put it bluntly, the
Secretary has said that with-
out their acquiescence and
cooperation, nothing could
have been achieved. It would
have been very easy to pre-
vent an agreement with
Syria or to make it impossi-
ble to have any agreement
at- all.
The Russians?I don't pro-
tend they are out to help us,
I regret that they are not
more cooperative. The Sec-
retary stated?and I have n`p
reason not to agree with him
?that they are so interested
in bringing about detente
they have been very Fe-
strained during this whole
period in several areas where
they could have been ex-
tremely difficult. Now they
are becoming impatient, par-
ticularly as to holdup of the
trade bill.
Above all, they do have
the capacity to reduce the
tensions politically. That
comes right back to Professor
Brezezinski's central idea: '1
we don't move in this direce
tion, we are really threatened
with international chaose--
certainly, if not worldwid4
chaos, a worldwide depresv
don.
? Ugly strains
of RI 2,1-lonalism that lie below
the Soviet surface
tf nationalIsin were not the
strongest acid attacking the So:
viet regime's iron, speculation
about its fresh strength would
smack of White ?gr? cafe
plans for returning upon the
Bolshevik clique's fall.
But in fact, national
feeling?among Ukrainians.
Estonians, Cossacks, Tadjiks
and many other minorities?
bubbles and hails in the Soviet
"family of nations ". Just as
the rouble's price in Moscow
black-market currency transac-
tions fluctuates in tight step
with the quotations of Zurich
banks, the aspirations and re-
sentments . of the Soviet
empire's non-Russian peoples
have swelled in rough propor-
tion to those of Third World
Nations. ?
The Curtain, that is to say,
is porous to these calculations
and emotions. Scorching winds
of native patriotism blown up
since the Second World War
rage through it. But perhaps
such metaphors are misleading,
for on that side, love of
country?not of the union of
socialist republics forcibly
formed in 1924 and enlarged
by subsequent aggression, but
of ancient homelands?needed ?
no outside encouragement. All
the conditions that have made
old fashioned nationalism,
among the most powerful of
modern forces, operate in high
gear there. The much more se-
vere penalties fdr expressing
such instincts only increases the
commitment, bitterness and
?potential for explosion.
But, as in other aspects of
Soviet life, repression not only
stimulates noble ideals and
heroic deeds in its finest
victims, it also provokes what
can only be called the worst
elements to think and mutter
their unlovely thoughts.
From New Printing House
Square, minority nationalism is
the most promising agent for
the empire's disintegration.
. But. in the Soviet Union
itself, nationalism is often
startlingly different: evil jokes.
drunken obscenities of one race
0. .../V0.,0.?
cursing another, raised rancour
and fists. A Georgian entre-
preneur reviling an Armenian
engineer, a Latvian lorry
driver scorning the Ukrainian
khakhli, huddled Uzbeks pro-
nouncing their superiority over
lesser Central Asian tribes?and
Tartars theirs over the Uzbeks.
A reservoir of bigotry and mis-
directed grievances.
This is why. Mr Bei-bard
Levin's description of nationa-
list sentiment as "heartening "
and "salutary", let alone his
gratification that the problem
may soon become more impor-
tant than America's racial one.
is perniciously misleading, for
all his admirable intention.
Months before the publica-
tion pf Andrei Amalrik's Will
The Soviet Union Survive, the
most politically perceptive
Muscovite I knew also spoke
of the real danger of war with
China. Defeat or difficulties
might be the spark to ignite
the magazines of non-Russian
nationalism, he said?but in his
prediction, this would lead to
nothing beneficial, but to a
grisly new time of troubles.
Thirty major peoples will be
at each others' throats, " and
all will beat the Jews, meaning
anyone not 'one of us '". Two-
hundred-and-fifty million
people lashing out after re-
lease from their totalitarian
swaddling will produce a
"huge, ugly, vicious riot?a
nightmare. . . . The prospect
is horrible, terrible, unimagin-
able".
This is mere supposition of
course, but it raises questions
that deserve consideration be-
fore tossing flowers at disrup-
tive forces?even disruptive of
Soviet rule. However odious
the tyranny, potentially uglier
strains of obscurantism and
hatred lurk below its surface.
However uncomfortable 'the
notion, some of the progressive
and civilizing influences in
Soviet lite, as well as many of
the savage, abominable ones,
come from the centre. Not all
the restraints are sinister.
And this leaves out Great
26
Russian nationalism. Almost by
definition, patriotic sentiment
among the minorities incor-
porates deep resentment, some-
times loathing, of the Moscow
colonizers. If free expression
of this were encouraged, one
Pictures not only whipped-up
hooligans mistreating Russian
residents in cities from Riga to
Tbilisi, but also a violent back-
lash in Mother -Russia against
the foreigners ".
Many decent Russians feel
t'iat they bear disproportionate
sacrifices for the sake of back-
ward Soviet peoples. Many less
decent ones simply hate
foreigners and Jews, in the
spirit of Black Hundred preju-
dice and pogroms.
? No way out of a dictatorship
is easy when its citizens can be
as easily confused, swayed by
demagoguery and goaded to
violence as the Soviet peoples.
But even to suggest a remedy
of nationalism, here so com-
ingled with virulent chau-
vanism and jingoism, without
warning of its possible side
effects is an act of some irres-
ponsibility.
As the British press's most
eloquent prosecutor of Soviet
crimes, Mr Levin bears a spe-
cial responsibility in any case.
He who never tires of re-
minding the West of its duty
in helping bring down the dic-
tatorship might spare some
thought to his own obligation to
picture Russia after the fall.
Otherwise, his sense of outrage
at Kremlin evil, however justi-
fiedin itself, is too much like I
the radicals' call for capita- I
lism's downfall, which pretends
that some shining substitute
system will sprout by itself
from the ruins.
So many well-intended mis-
takes in our prescriptions for
Russia, so many exhortations
to correct injustices with what
turn out to be greater ones !
One would think Western com-
mentators had developed some
caution. But propagandists
keep shouting.
George Feifer
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Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0001003300024
WASHINGTON POST
2 August 1974
Stephen S. Rosenfeld
live
a .ons'
And Detente
"Captive Nations Week" came and
went without much fuss last week. The
particular kind of ethnic anti-Commu-
nism which the "captive nations"
concept represents?the "captives"
being the nations and nationality
groups incorporated within the Soviet
Union plus the East European States
dominated by Moscow?has been
pretty much eclipsed by detente.
Mr. Nixon has indicated firmly that
it is not possible to try to improve re-
lations with the Soviet government
while at the same time trying openly
to cultivate the nationalistic and even
secessionist impulses of Moscow's
constituent parts and allies.
Typically, the Urtted States' annual
ritual appeals for the "self determina-
tion" of the Baltic States, incorporated
by Moscow as World War II began,-
ended as soon as President Nixon be-
came a regular summiteer. At the last
summit, Mr. Nixon, agreed to establish
a U.S. consulate in Kiev?a step re-
garded by the Kremlin and by Ukrain-
ian Nationalists alike as a symbolic
denial . of Ukrainian nationhood.
The two American radio stations
broadcasting specifically to the
"captive nations," Radio Liberty and
Radio Free Europe, constantly wonder
if they will survive the next summit.
Mr. Nixon's own "Captive Nation
Proclamation" has become the faintest
shatmw of the original growling anti-
Russian, anti-communist resolution
pa sed by Congress in 059.
Yet the underlying issues do not eas-
ily go away. The "nations" themselves
?some more, some less?remain Un-
digested parts of the Soviet polity and
the Soviet block. No sober analysis of
the Soviet scene can ignore the tugs
and pulls of, say, the Ukrainians and
the Poles. Certainly the Kremlin takes
these into the closest account in devel-
oping its own basic policies, from
where it invests its money to where it
stations its troops.
On the face of it, there is no appar-
ent reason?except politics?why, say,
Palestinians deeerve a state .of their
own, as Moscow asserts, while a num..
her of Soviet nationality groups,
larger and with equal national creden-
tials, are denied even the lesser goal
al a genuine nationality group exist-
ence.
The connection of "human rights" to
detente has been widely accepted in
recent years, mostly in respect to
Jews, intellectuals and dissenters in-
side the Soviet Union. And they pose
no territorial challenge to the Kremlin.
Their causes are certainly legitimate.
But it is plain that at least part of the
NEW YORK TIMES
20 July 1974
Se Curbs Export of Police Equipment
By ,BERNARD GWERTZMAN
. 'ssessea to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 19 The?
Nixcin Administration bowed to
Congressional pressure and is-
sued regulations todAy to dis-
courage American companies
from selling sophisticated law
enforcement equipment at a
Moscow trade fair next month.
The effect of the new rules,
industry and Government sourc-
es said makes it extremely un-
likely that any American com-
pany would exhibit or try to
sell its products to Sciviet au-
thorities.
Commerce Secretary Fred-
erick B. Dent announced that
specific licenses would be re-
quired for the sale to the Soviet
Union . and other Communist.
countries of "any instruments
and equipment particularly use-
ful :in crime control and
detection." .
Mr, Dent said that the newi
controls were being impo.sed
as the result of consultation
with-- the .State Department,
which suggested to the Com-
merce Department earlier in
the week that steps be taken
to close a loophole by which
most, law enforcement equip-
ment could be sold without
licenses.
In a statement, Mr. Dent
saicr-.that the new rules were
being imposed under the provi-
sions of the Export Adminis-
tration Act, which allows such
moves for "foreign policy" con-
sideration.
He said the 'Government was
concerned "with potential uses
to such equipment could
be put, and had a continuing
interest in the welfare of per-
sons who seek to exercise their,
fundamental rights." Mr. Dent
said .that the decision had the
approval of Secretary of State
Kiseinger.
The controversy arose twol
!weeks ago when representative
Charles A. Vanik, Democrat of
Ohio, disclosed on the House
floor that a number of Ameri-
can firms were planning to
show and sell their wares- at
a. Moscow fair in August,
dedicated to modern means of
law enforcement.
He and several other mem-
bers of Congress, including
Senator Henry -M. Jackson,
Democrat of Washington, ar-
gued that equipment such as
voice-identification devices and
lie detectors would logically
end up being purchased by
the Soviet secret police for use
against Jewish- and other dis-
sidents.
Although Mr. Vanik's office
said on Wednesday that be-
tween 15 and 30 firms had
shown interest in exhibiting at
the fair, a check by The New:
reason why their plight has become.
politicized is that each of these groups
(they overlap) has a recognizable con-
stituency within the United States. -
In abstract terms, the cultural or na-
tional aspirations of the "captive na-
tions" are hardly less legitimate. Yet
their American spokesmen do not have
the same political leverage.
The realities of American politics,
then, have an effect on which people
or peoples controlled by Moscow win
active American concern. The realities
of geopolitics also have an effect. Suc-
cessive American Presidents have cul-
tivated local nationalism in, first, Yu-
goslavia and, then Romania?Commu-
nist states whch for their own reasons
have chosen to assert a measure of in-
dependence from the Kremlin. The
White House has done this for the pur-
pose of strengthening the American
hand in dealing with. the Russians. -
Like Yugoslavia, however Romania,
which sits off in the southwest corner
of the Soviet Union, has by virtue of
geography a degree of political maneu-
verability which is simply unavailable
to a country like Czechoslovakia which
directly connects the Soviet Union
with Germany. This in turn affects the
degree of encouragement which any
responsible American President can
York Times produced no more'
than six, most of which said
today that they had already
decided, because of the adverse
Congressional reaction, not to
exhibit.
Mr. Dent, in speaking to
newsmen before testifying in
closed session before Senator
Jackson's Permanent Investiga-
tions Subcommittee, said that
the new rules do not prohibit
exhibiting at the Moscow fair,
but do require licenses before
sales can be made. He said such
sales would be scrutinized very
stringently before permission
Would be granted.
Mrs. - Johanna Welt, vice
president of Welt International
of Chicago, which had been
commissioned by two . Ameri-
can companies to represent
them at Moscow, said by phone
today that she did not think
any company would now ex-
hibit because it would probably
be impossible to secure licenses
in time for the fair. She said
no company would go to the
fair without expecting to make
sales.
?
Technology Sale Criticized
- WASHINGTON, July 19 (AP)
An American manufacturer
urged today that the United
States refrain from selling tech-
nology to the Soviet Union and
other Communist nations.
.proffer.
The fact remains that the United
States has no comprehensive strategy
to free "captive nations." On the con-
trary, detente and the discipline neces-
sarily imposed by the nuclear responsi-
bility of a great power rule out much
more than tentative efforts to remove
certain symptoms of their plight. This
is painful; some small part of the pain
could perhaps be relieved if the rest of
us looked with more sympathy at the
-very human emotions which touch
many Americans whose kinsmen lived
hard lives under Communist rule, but
it is unavoidable.
Hero it is useful to recall the time
when the 'U.S. did have such a compre-
hensive strategy. According to a credi-
ble, though officially denied account
in "Operation Splinter Factor," a new
book by British journalist Stewart
Steven, Allen Dulles set out to lib-
erate East 14;urope by destroying lib-
eral nationalistic Communists in those
countries, thus provoking a Stalinist
repression that would ignite a success-
ful popular revolt. This fantastic oper-
ation called "Splinter Factor," may in-
deed have contributed to Stalinist re-
pression. It certainly did not free East
Europe. A more cynical and disastrous
policy is hard to imagine. Its lessons
linger.
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THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
25 July 1974
Torus
rivals
'pai
by CIA'
From 'BELLA PICK
Washington, July 24 ?
? Both Nikos Sampson and
Archbishop Makarios had been
receiving CIA funds, "as part
of the agency's standard policy
of supporting both sides in a
dispute," . according to the !
Washington columnist Jack ?I?
. Anderson.
Quoting CIA sources he said
that Makarios was "simply
blackmailing the CIA. If the
. agency . wanted to ? keep its
NEW YORK TIMES
2 August 1974
extensive facilities in Cyprus,
Makarios allegedly told them,
they had to pay for the privi-
lege."
According to Anderson,
Sampson had been receiving
CIA money for many years. It
was channelled to him through
Savas Konstantopoulos, pub-
lisher - of the Athens Free
World. Konstantopoulos, say
Anderson sources, had long
been on the CIA payroll.
Anderson also claims that
President Nixon and Dr Kis-?
singer were the last to maintain
free-world support for the
Greek military junta. He
believes that even the CIA had
given them up, and was
" secretly pulling out its facili-
ties from Athens" and trans-
ferring them to Tehran. ?
The Administration today
hastened to put itself on the
side of the angels, and wel-
comed the return of Greece to
civilian rule. Dr Kissinger said
this morning that we expect
to have close and friendly rela-
tions with the new Greek
Government, which is composed'
of old friends of ours," ? ?
U.S. Said to er
Tr Curtail Role in Grcece
?
. By DAVID BINDER
Special to "Me New York Times
i WASHINGTON, Aug. 1?The 'coup, but also with his suc-
Central Intelligence Agency hasIcessor, Brig. Gen. Demetrios
reportedly been instructed by lIoannides.
top officials of the Nixon Ad- Mr. Papadopoulos, who was
ministration not to interfere in deposed last November, was
the internal affairs of Greece among many Greek , political
nor to play favorites among' and military figures who re-
Greek politicians. Iceived personal subsidies over
These orders, according to many years from the intelli-
well-placed officials, reelect the gence agency, two United States
current thinking of Secretary officials said. Another source
of State Kissinger and of the said Mr. Papadopoulos had
Director of Central Intelligence, received money from the
William E. Colby?that Amer-t agency since 1952.
leans should keep out of the The C.I.A. stopped its sub-
'politics of other countries as sidies for Greek political fig.
much as possible. The. C.I.A. urea about two years ago, a
is said to have been deeply in- high American official said.
yolved in Greek politics for 25
years.
Until the last few weeks of the
Athens military junta, accord-
ing to high American officials
and to Greek sources, American
operatives remained quite close
to the men in power in Greece.
A United States specialist on
Greece said that the C.I.A.
continued to maintain about 60
full-time operatives in Greece
and that sonic had been there
15 years Or longer.
The agency, the specialist
said, had close contact not only r.pAtotspoi?ivca )ss. listed as a
with George Papadopoulos, the
political officer in the American
Greek colonel who led the 1967 Embassy. He served earlier in;
The operative. closest to Gen-
eral Ioannides was said to have
been Peter Koromilas, a Greek-
American who also went by
the name of Korom. An Amer-
ican official said Mr. Koromi-i
las had been sent to Athens to
confer with General Ioannides
shortly before the July 15 coup
in Cyprus, which was headed
by Greek officers.
`Papadopoulos is My Boy'
James M. Potts, the agency's
station_ chief in Athens from
1968 to 1972, was described as
having been on close terms
throughout his stay there with'
a
The United States -ha long
been severely criticised for sup.
porting the Greek junta, but Dr
Kissinger. said that he did not
believe this would cause
difficulties with the new Greek
Prime Minister, Mr Karamanlis:
- The Administration's fore-
most concern in its relations
with Greece has always been to
safeguard its military bases
there, as part of NATO's vital
southern flank. In spite of
warnings from NATO, the
Secretary for Defence, Mr
-James Schlesinger, told the
Senate as recently as June 2n
that " as far as the military
side of the alliance is con-
cerned, Greece remained an
effective member."
However, there have been
Indications during the last .few
days that even the Pentagons
arid certainly the State Depart-
ment, realised at the time of
the coup against Cyprus that
they must recognise the weak-
ness of the Greek military
junta.
From that moment its fate
was .sealed, probably even in
the Administration's .eyes, ad
it still remains to be seen pi-ed-
gels what role US officials
played in bringing civilian
leaders back to power in
Greece.
However, Jack Anderson
claims that NATO had given
up the Greek ;military junta
well before the Administration
did, and that it had sent
repeated warnings of the
junta's unreliability to
Washington. He quotes from
one confidential paper which
a-gues that "the European
allies were eager to hasten the
transfer of power from unso-
phisticated and parochial min-
tary men . . . to a political
Government enjoying the
confidence of the people,"
According to Anderson, the
advice from NATO head-
quarters was that "there are,
growing doubts about the'
extent to which the Greek
armed forces as a whole, die-
united as they are, and dissi-
pated by police and supervisory
functions, are capable of play-
ing their part in NATO defence
strategy." ?
. .
Athens from 1960 to 1964 as teen-sixties, a former Greek
deputy station chief of the, official said.
I "In the beginning, say abouti
intelligence agency.
A State Department official 1962 or '63, the C.I.A. used,
said that when Mr. Potts left :Andreas as an agent, as a re-
Athens in August, 1972, his 'source and supported him,"
farewell party was attended by the Greek said. "His buddy was
virtually every member of the !Campbell," he added, referring!
military junta. The American no Laughlin A. Campbell, thei
Ambassador, Henry J. Tasca 'C.I.A. station chief from 1959i
seeing who was present, turned ;to 1962.
and walked out, the source said, !Agent Reassigned After Protest
after which he sent a cablegram
; In his 1970 book, "Democ-
to Washington protesting Mr.: , racy at Gunpoint," Andreas Pa-
Potts's action. ''pandreou describes a scene in
Mr. Tasca had adopted a
1961 in which he had an alter-
chilly attitude toward the
cation with Mr. Campbell.
Athens junta and was appalled
Now retired-' and living in
that the C.I.A. station chief
i
would give a party that con-
Washington, Mr, Campbell de-
tradicted the position the j
I dined to talk with a reporter:
,
about his Greek service.
American Ambassador had;
A knowledgeable Greek said
-taken.
that
State Department officials! at Stavis Milton, an opera-,
1 tive who objected to the "cozy"1
who, have served in Greece, relationship between the agency,
commented in background. in-!
terviews on what they de- and the junta leaders over the
1,last seven years, was moved!
'scribed as a negative role played
in the past by the Central Intel- out of Greece and sent to Iran'
ligence Agency in Greek affairs. ;and later to the Far East.
, One of them mentioned John; Mr. Milton was described as
'M. Maury, the agency's sta- !one of numerous Greek-Amer-
tion chief in Athens from 1962 icans recruited by the agency'
to 1968. in the early days of its opera-
"Maury worked on behalf of tions in Greece. Another was.
the palace in 1965," the offi- said to be Thomas H, Karames-1
cial said. sines, a 57-year-old Newt
"He helped King Constantine! Yorker who served in Athens'
buy Center Union Deputies so from 1947 to 1948, during thei
that the George Papandreou! Greek struggle against Com-i
Government was toppled." munist insurgents, then again;
Mr. Maury, 61, left the agency as station chief from 1951 toi
somewhat more than a year ago 1953.
and is now Assistant Secre- Mr. Karamessines rose to be;
nary of Defense for Corigres- head of the agency's clandese
:sional Relations,
Although generally leaning itiilneent,serrveciecnetslyb.efore his retire-1
to Greek conservative politi- ; The Central Intelligence
!clans, the, agency flirted briefly ;Agency also used enterprises of
with the Variant in Greek poli- ;Thomas A. Pappas, the 75-year-
tics offered by George Papan- ?old Greek-Amencan industrial-
dreou and his Harvard-educated ist, as a cover for its ope-a-
son, Andreas, in the early nine. ! tions in Greece according to
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'28
- Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100a3000219
the Greek source.
A spokesmen at the head-
quarters of the agency, in
Langley, Va., said he had no
general comment on the allega-
WASHINGTON POST
25 July 1974
tions. He did say, however, that
C.I.A. agents follow orders ap-
proved at the highest level in
Washington,
^ t
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak
And: Sisco's Shuttle
Full-scale war between Turkey and
Greece was averted and the 7-year-old
military dictatorship in Athens toppled
when Washington belatedly abandoned
permissiveness and laid down the law
to the Greek junta. ? ?
There is little doubt Greece would
haVe responded to Turkey's invasion. of
Cyprus wi.4k, its own invasion of Tur-
key were it not for Undersecretary of
State Joseph Sisco's backstage pres-
sure in Athens. In most undiplomatic
language, Sisco told the Greek gener-
al S that the U.S. would abandon them
tti'inevitable destruction if they at-
tacked Turkey. Jolted by this unex-
Pected threat, the military dictatorship
backed down and thereby guaranteed
itS own fall on Tuesday. .
But there is no room for American..
self-congratulation here. The generals
held tyrannical power so long because
of Washington's coddling. The Cyprus
crisis which has shaken the NATO alli-
ance should have been averted by the
United States. What's more, this men-
acing question remains: will bitterness
by 'Ordinary Greeks toward Washing-
ton for wet-nursing the dictatorship
eventually propel their nation out of
the Western alliance?
U.S. follies toward Athens date back
to'the Johnson administration, which
embraced the Greek military coup of
April 1967. U.S. diplomats in Athens
felt the obscure colonels mastermind-
ing the coup would have collapsed at a
single word from Washington, but that
wOrd never came. This policy was per-
petuated by the Nixon administration,
freezing tyranny in Greece. -
'Despite a growing coolness toward
Athens recently, the U.S. has rigidly
refused to 'pressure the military dicta-
torship. The current junta, dominated
by Brig. Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides,
seemed puzzled that Washington de-
manded so little for friendship and
military aid.
Noting American permissiveness co-
inciding with increased opposition
from the Greek people, Ioannides ? de-
cided on the ancient expedient of fal-
tering regimes: a foreign adventure.
Athen's plot to take over Cyprus
should have been foreseen and pre-
vented by Washington. Instead, as the
junta expected, there was no U.S. in-
terference.
Moreover, working-level State De-
partment officials who wanted to con-
demn Athens for the Cyprus plot after
it occurred were overruled by Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger, heeding
Pentagon fears of losing Greece as
sNATO's anchor. Had Kissinger instead
aligned himself with the British
against the coup, congressional critics
iplomacy
believe, the Turks might have been
dissuaded from invading Cyprus?a
contention bitterly disputed by admin-.
istration policymakers.
By the time Sisco left Washington at
11 p.m. July 17 for his try at shuttle
diplomacy, the administration was re-
signed to a Greek-Turkish war which
would shatter the West's strategic posi-
tion against Moscow and threaten the
NATO alliance. Thankfully, at that be-
lated hour, Sisal:, talked tough to the _
Greeks.
When Sisco arrived in Athens Friday
morning, July 19, the generals in-
formed him they Would respond to
Turkish invasion of Cyprus by invad-
ing Turkey. Sisco's hardboiled reply:
except for the U.S., you have no
friends in NATO?or the world. You
. can expect nothing from the Commu-
nist world. In the Third World, you are
pariahs. And if you attack Turkey, you
will lose the U.S. and be totally iso-
lated. ' . _
Flying to -Ankara that night, Sisco
told the Turks that the U.S.' would
work with Turkey and Great Britain to
undo Greek meddling in Cyprus. But
the Turks seemed determined to teach
Athens a lesson. At 5:43 a.m. Saturday,
Sisco was informed of the Turkish in-
vasion of Cyprus to begin 15 minutes
later. He left Ankara for Athens at
6:30 a.m. -
In Athens, the Greeks reiterated .
their ? intention. to ? counterattack
against Turkey. Again, Sisco recited
his tough line. Stunned that Washing-
ton finally meant business, the gener-
als backed down. When Sisco left for -
Washington last Monday night after
negotiating the shaky cease-fire, it was
clear the Ioannides regime could not
survive.
Luckily, it was replaced not by na-
tionalistic young colonels vowing a re-
demptive war against Turkey but by a
civilian government headed by old con-
servative Constantine Karamanlis. But
the United States has not escaped the
consequences of its follies. The har-
vest from anti-American seed sown in
Greece since 1967 by Washington's pro-
junta policies has yet to be revealed.
We reported from Athens in June
1969 that the U.S. embrace of the junta
?because 'of military requirements in
the Eastern Mediterranean?posed
"immense danger to long-range stabil-
ity" in the region. That prediction was
fully realized by the Cyprus crisis.
Whether Sisco's belated badgering of
the Greeks can forestall the predic-
tion's full consequences will require
undeserved but eagerly welcomed
good fortune.
et. 1974. Meld Enterprises, Inc.
NEW YORK TIMES
3 August 1974
ARTICLE ON C.I.A.
IN CREECE ATTACKED
Andreas Papandreou, a for-
mer Greek Cabinet Minister
and an exiled leader of the
Greek political left, released a
statement yesterday charging
The New York Times with an
attempt to "damage [his] po-
litical reputation" 'in an article
published in yesterday's edi-
tions.
The article by David Binder
of The Times Washington Bu-
reau reported a move by top'
officials of the Nixon Adminis-
tration instructing the Central
Intelligence Agency not to in-
terfer in Greek internal affairs.
The article quoted, a former
Greek official as saying that
the agency in 1962 or 1963 had
supported Mr. Papandreou and
used him "as an agent."
"The American establish-
ment, using newspaper corres-
pondent David Binder and The
New York Times, is attempting
to damage the political reputa-
tion of Andreas Papandreou,
leader of the Panhellenic Lib-
eration Movement and leading
political figure in Greece, argu-
ing among other things that he
has had support from the
C.I.A.," the statement from his
political office said.
"We charge David Binder and
The New York Times with be-
ing parties to attempted politi-
cal sabotage in the internal
affairs of our country, Greece,"
the statement said.
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WASHINGTON POST
4 August 1974
Jack Anderson
Vietnam
ar: Th
Ten years ago, the Gulf of Tonkin incident led to
massive U.S. involvement in an unwanted war in
Vietnam. Did the Central Intelligence Agency play
a hidden role in that incident?
We have now pieced together part of the story,
together with other CIA exploits in Vietnam, from
intelligence memos and old Vietnam hands, including
an ex-CIA officer, John Kelly, who has agreed to
break his long silence. It is a fascinating story, some-
times hilarious, sometimes deadly grim.
At the time of Tonkin, the CIA was already deeply
inVolved in a vast undercover operation known
mysteriously as Op-34-A. Memos show that the CIA, '
working secretly with the Saigon government and
U.S. armed forces, kidnaped North Vietnamese fisher-
men to recruit them as spies, landed rubber-boat
crews on the North Vietnamese coast to blow up
bridges, parachuted agents into the Communist back-
country and engaged in other clandestine activities.
Although U.S. forces weren't supposed to partici-
pate An open combat, a favorite Op-34-A sport was
to send dark-painted U.S. patrol boats to bombard
Communist-held islands off the Vietnam coast. This?
sometimes?led to shootouts between U.S. and North
Vietnamese gunboats. The incidents, according to
one Pentagon memo, were regarded as acceptable
risks
The public wasn't told about these naval engage-
ments until the late President Lyndon Johnson chose
to make an issue of the August 2, 1964, attack on
U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. There is some
indication that the destroyers may have been pre-
paring to draw North Vietnamese gunboats away
from an Op34-A operation when the celebrated in-
cident occurred.
After the United States was drawn openly into
the War, the? CIA brass settled into a handsome
? dwelling next to the Italian embassy in Saigon. In-
stead of CIA, one of its units adopted the intials
SOG?short for "Special Operations Group."
In long interviews with my associate Les Whitten,
the irreverent John Kelly, now an investigative
reporter for CBS News in New York City, remem-
bers the SOG as a sort of "Catch 22" outfit forever
goofing up but occasionally achieving a triumph.
The ?SOG, of course, was obsessed with secrecy.
It operated fleets of black-paint-6d planes, jeeps,
trucks and PT boats. Even the SOG's gates were
sometimes painted black. It didn't take the Vietna-
mese, South and North alike, long to identify black as
the CIA-SOG color. The black gates, therefore, may as
well have been emblazoned with the CIA seal. .
On one occasion, the CIA's secret identification
Was found scribbled on a latrine wall in a Saigon
bar. Among the obscene inscriptions, a horrified
CIA officer saw the equation, "CAS equals SOG
equals CIA." CAS means "Controlled American
Source," a euphemism for a CIA agent. In great
alarm, the CIA officer dispatched two majors and
a team of enlisted men to comb the men's rooms of
Saigon in search of similar security violations hidden
amid the graffiti.
The CIA brass went to such lengths to maintain
secrecy that they held their most important confer-
ences in a huge transparent box, constructed of
Role of the CIA
inch-thick clear plastic walls resting on plastic beams,
with a transparent plastic door, at the U.S. embassy.
One day, a CIA officer, peeping at the Italian
embassy across the way, discovered the Italians
peeping back. He spotted a telescope lens aimed
at secret maps on the CIA walls. With all the drama
of a TV slapstick spy episode ?iis superior ordered
the windows boarded up. This had scarcely been
completed before another agent, missing the sun-
light, tore down the boards.
Meanwhile, a terse security directive was issued
by Washington after CIA agents in Nigeria were
almost killed during a rebellion because their auto-
mobile was a "Rebel," a 1967 American Motors
model. The CIA urgently ordered agents around
the world to remove the "Rebel" insignia from their
cars, Kelly was told. ,
When Kelly first arrived in Saigon under super-
secret orders, he was greeted at Tansonhut airport
by. a Eurasian, with a uniquely brawny build and, a
mouthful of flashing gold teeth. He turned out to
be the official CIA greeter, who would have been
hard to miss by the Vietcong agents lurking around
the airport.
At. SOG headquarters. Kelly found the CIA brass
in a tizzy. One of his superiors had just been identi-
fied by French and West German intelligence as
the naked American on vacation at the famous L'Ile
du Levant nudist camp off the coast of France. The
CIA officer's girl friend had divulged his identity
?the moment he left the nudist camp for Saigon.
One of the CIA's great objectives was to get the
North Vietnamese to listen to a CIA radio transmit-
ter, which was disguised as a militant Vietnamese
nationalist underground station. To increase its
Hooper rating, the CIA dropped tens of thousands
of, plastic transistor radios in styrofoam boxes on
North Vietnam. The radios were locked upon a
single frequency, so those who retrieved the radios
could listen only to the CIA station.
To reach the Vietcong, whose jungle hiding places
were difficult to locate for parachute droppings,
the CIA strategists planned to bait the styrofoam
? radio boxes with food and float them down the
Mekong River network. The hungry guerillas, it was
suggested, would fish the food-laden radios out of
the river. The plan was finally abandoned, however,
because the CIA could find no foolproof flow harts
for the Mekong. At last report, there were still two
warehouses full of the little black radios:
? The CIA, however, had its occasional successes.
It was able to determine, for example, that 33,000
Saigon officials, from clerks to cabinet officers,
were active Vietcong agents or Vietcong sympathiz-
ers. More dramatically, the .SOG units equipped
South Vietnamese troops with Vietcong-style black
pajamas. The disguised troops were able to crash
into a North Vietnamese encampment, firing machine
guns and tossing grenades.
But the notorious Phoenix program, an assassina-
tion scheme run by present CIA director William
Colby, was less effetive. A report to the U.S. em-
bassy revealed that the program was only one per
cent effective.
1974. United Feature Synd cote
30
--?
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Approved For Releae 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9 ?
NEW YORK TIMES
6 August 1974
SENATE ANS HIT
EMBASSY1
un
11
'Selective' Reports Adhere!
to South Vietnam's Line I
Too Closely; Study Says
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
'Special to Tbe New Y,:rk Times
WASHINGTON, Aug. 6?A
staff report issued today by the
Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee criticizes the United
States Embassy in Saigon for
reports that were described as
adhering too closely to the of-
ficial line of the Saigon Gov-
ernment. ,
"Over the years, the-Ameri-i
,can Embassy in Saigon has ac-i
'quired a reputation, among both
official and unofficial observ-
ers, for close identification with!
the pc4icies of the South Viet-
namese Government and for
;selective reporting," the study.
said. "These same tendencies
are apparent today."
The 47-page report was pre-
pared by Richard M. Moose and
1Charles F. Meissner, staff mem-
bers, after a mission to Indo-
!china from May 12 to June 4.
The report on Vietnam said he did when he testified before
that unless the big powers ap- the Foreign Relations Commit-
ply strong pressure, the South tee two weeks ago?the allega-
Vietnamese 'Government and tions that the Embassy had
distorted its reporting to Wash-
ington on the situation in South
Vietnam.
He said he had given the
strongest orders that reports
should be objective and fair,
but he added that sometimes
messages to the State Depart-
ment did not convey what was
already included in Pentagon or
Central Intelligence Agency
cables.
. The report said that in com-
paring reports submitted to Sai-
gon by foreign service officers
in the field with reports unti-
mately sent by the Eaigon Em-
bassy to Washington "one con-
sistent pattern emerges." It
said the Embassy had a ten-
dency "to play down or to ig-
nore obvious cease-fire viola-
tions by the South iVetnamese
armed forces."
"The Embassy, both in brief-
ings provided to us and in its
reporting to Washington, close-
ly folloWed the public line of
the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment in justifying the South
Vietnamese measures which
precipitated the temporary
breakdown in May 1974 of the
talks in Paris and Saigon," be-
tween the South Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong, the staff
members reported.
The report cited the case of
the fall of Tong Le Chan as an
example. That small outpost on
the Cambodian border had been
under siege for more than a
year. On April. 12. the Saigon
the Communists will fail to
reach a political settlement.
"The present military con-
frontation seems likely to con-
tinue," the report said, "with
the South Vietnamese unable
to expel the North Vietnamese
from their country, and the
Communists unable to acquire
"the decisive edge required to
defeat the south militarily."
On specific points, the report
doubted whether the Adminis-
tration's economic aid request
of S750-million for this fiscal
year would accomplish what
Ambassador Graham A. Martin
has predicted?a "takeoff" by
the South Vietnamese economy,
and an eventual American ex-
trication from Saigon.
"It is difficult to reach any
other conclusion that that the
fiscal year 1975 program is, in
reality: a continuation of the
past aid strategy of supporting
the Vietnamese economy with
massive flows of outside re-
sources in order to fill fiscal
and trade deficits," it said.
Mr. Martin, who has been in
Washington urging support of
the aid request, said again in an
interview the other day th- t a
large appropriation was needed
to spur the South Vietnamese
economy and thus accelerate an
end to American involvement.
Mr. Martin -has rejected ?as
WASHINGTON POST NEW YORK TIMES
7 August 1974 4 August 1974
State tellies U.S. Eirav ' y in Camb dia
,
Distortions Said to Give Arms Advice
From Sail;-on
Associated Press
The State Department reaf-
firmed its confidence -yester-
day in the reporting of U.S.
Ambassador Graham Martin
and the embassy in South Vi-
etnam to the department.
A Senate Foreign Relations
Connnittee saff report re-
leased this week said the em-
bassy was distorting its dis-
patches in favor of the Saigon
government.
Robert Anderson, depart-
ment spokesman, said that
some of the reporting from
consuls in South Vietnam to
Saigon was not included in in-
formation that the embassy
sent in to Washington.
He added, "If significant re-
ports are left out, it is because
of an effort to avoid duplicat-
ing information."
Anderson said the 'totality
of the reporting" from Saigon
has had no significant omis-
sions. This would include the
Department of Defense and
Central Intelligence Agency !
reports as well as those of the _
State Department. Approveld
? By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times
'
WASHINGTON, -Aug. 3 ? iforms," the report said. It was
John G. Dean, the United Statesiprepared by John J. Brady and
Ambassador in Cambodia, reg-hJohn H. Sullivan, who visited
ularly gives military advice to;l!the area from April 15 to May
President Lon Nol and other,110.
Cambodian officials despite The report said that, con-
Congressional injunctions, ac- trary to some press reports
,cording to a report issued today that American military person-
by ' the House of Representa- nel were actively advising Cam-
tives' Foreign Affairs Commit- ,bodian military units, "the staff
tee.
The report, _which covered
all of Indochina, noted that five
separate acts of Congress pro-
hibit the United States "from
acting, in a military advisory
capacity in Cambodia."
But- the study, prepared by
two committee consultants, said
that Mr. Dean, "by his own ad-
mission does not hesitate to
give strategic military advice
to Lon Nol or tactical advice
Ito subordinate military com-
manders."
"It is his interpretation of
existing laws that Congress did
not mean to preclude 'advising' "It is clear, however, that
:survey team could find no evi-
dence that Americans are act-
ing as combat unit advisers."
Members of the defense at-
taches office regularly go into
the field to gather information,!
the report continued, and while
there their actions "or even;
their questions may have some
impact on the actions of Cam-i
bodian field commanders."
"There is no indication, how-
ever, that this practice has'
been systematized or is being
used by defense attach?ffice:
personnel with the intent of,
violating the law," it added. I
at the level at which lie Ler-
or Release 2001/08/U8 :
' Government- announced that a
"massive" North Vietnamese at-
tack using tanks had overrun
the entire garrison.
Within a few days, today's
report noted, it was widely
known in Saigon?and report-
ed in the American press?that
the government had withdrawn
voluntarily without losing al
man. The Communists also
said no battle had been fought,
? According to the report, the
Embassy in Saigon was re-
porting to -Washington as late
as April 24 on the "bombard-
ment and fall" of Tong Le
Chan.
The report said that many
diplomats in Saigon believed
that the Tong Le Chan incident
and others were "part of a
deliberate effort by the Saigon
Government, assisted by the
United States Embassy, to im-
press the United States Con-
gress of the necessity to au-
thorize additional military as-
sistance for Sbuth Vietnam."
The report said that in the
months between October, 1972,
and January, 1973, when the
Paris accord on Vietnam was
signed, the United States sup-
plied Saigon with equipment
worth $753.3-million. This was
the first time this figure was
.made known.
jj It said most of the equip-
ment has not been well util-
ized, and one "knowledgeable
t:official" was quoted as saying
it was "sitting around rusting."
heiitated to give the Cambodi-I
ans advice on military matters!
ranging from command struc-
ture and training to manage-
ment and logistics," it said.
Broad Help by Americana
In detail, the report said:
- "In order to insure proper
end use of equipment, the
United States has found it
necessary to help the Cambo-
dians to develop ports to re-
ceive the equipment, repair
roads and bridges on which to
move it, train personnel to
operate it, build housing for
trainees, establish supply sys-.
tems for efficient distribution
and reorder, create facilities
for maintenance and repair,
and educate them to run the
logistics and other systems."
"This has resulted in con-
stant, wide-ranging communi-
cation between Americans and
Cambodians, with the Ameri-
cans telling Cambodians what
to do."
The study said that American
officials -hoped that the Com-
munist forces in Cambodia
would acknowledge a stalemate
in and agree to a Laotian-style
coalition Government through
negotiations. But the insurgents'
successes in the dry season
just ended, may encourage them
o continue the fight.
Moreover, a possibility that
the Lon Nol Government would
be replaced at the United Na-
tters General Assembly session
this fall by a Communist dele-
gation would probably also rule
thaptifil5b3431Ft17061)6 Ca80002+fitotiations, thc study;
said.
LOS ANGELEsAilerard For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330002-9
1 August 1974
Laos War Still
Real for Meo
Tribal Leader
" CIA Aid Gone, Mountain
,General in Lonely Fight
for Threatened Homeland
? BY GEORGE Me11.11THUlt.
, Times Staff Writer
LONG CHENG, Laos?The most
effective general produced by the
government side in three decades of
war- in Lao, Lt. GUI. Vang Pao, sits
today in his once-secret mountain
fortress, his maps still showing
North. Vietnamese troops -looking
down his throat, and shrugs "La
guerre, c'est fini (the war is over)."
Then, gesturing toward his big,
wall map, the Men tribal leader who
:began his personal war as a French
army second lieutenant in the early
'50s, .adds:
"But we,wilI never have peace as
'long as the North ?Vietnamese are
here."
These are difficult times for the
46-year-old soldier, lifted from rela-
tive obscurity by the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency 15 years ago.
The reason then was simple: Unlike
kis Laotian -counterparts Yang Pao
tvaS energetic. The tribal mountain
people, unlike the lowland Laotians,
-were willing to fight and unafraid of
The Vietnamese. With CIA money,
-Yang Pao led the army that carried
the brunt of the fighting.
Now, a coalition' government in-
cluding the Communists is installed
'in the capital of Vientiane and a de .
facto partitioning of Laos has been.
accepted?with most of the Meo
homeland given up to control of e
North Vietnam and the local Pathet
Lao movement. As was the case.,
with the war itself, the Meo and oth-
er tribal people have had little voice
in the so-called peace. ?
Still, even Yang Pao now thinks
mainly of reconstruction.
"We lost too Much," he. said. "Our
homes, our women, our cattle?al-
most everything."
But demobilizing some of his sol-
diers and sending them back to non-
'existent homes is proving difficult..
With CIA support gone, it is also dif-
ficult to keep the remaining men up
to past standards: And the attitude
of the Americans is disturbing?
c,pough yang Pao remains unaliec-
ledly pro-American, a portrait, of
tichard Nixon on his wall and his
eldest son off to West Point as a ca-
(let.
It is a sign of the times that the
-
'Americans are planting grass at
Long Cheng, Vang Pao's mountain
base which was virtually destroyed
three times during the war. The
kase was once so full of CIA secrets
'Its very existence was denied and
extra labor in those days was used to
dig holes and build bunkers.
? Nestled below a cloud-topped gra-
litte peak called Skyline Ridge, its
short airstrip shuttling' off bomb-la-
den 'warplanes, often under shell'
Jire, the base held much of the
.world's attention in 1972. With terri-
ble bloodshed and vast American air '
support it survived by a hair?at
1 one time North Vietnamese soldiers
reached the ground floor of yang
Pao's stone home but were shot
down by tribal soldiers on the -sec- ?
ond floor.
In those days, Long Cheng was the
virtual symbol of the war in Laos.
e The price was almost total
. destruction: But there
? are those Nvho say that bat-
tle Was a necessary pre-
lude to the ' peace talks
?that followed.
: Now rebuilt, Long Cheng ?-
? bas muted the trappings
:of war.., Around the air-
:Strip is a hodg,e podge tri-
:-bal community in wood.
,and t? sheet'- metal homes.
,-Streetside Stalls sell harm-
nag, coconuts-and lowland
luxuries, including canned
'American soft -drinks.
IThere ? is a movie. house
and .a brightly painted
temple. In -the 'immediate
'area-there are 12,000 civil-
= tans, mostly the families of
;Yang Pao's -prolific sol-
diers.
- On- the airstrip are' a
dozen single-engined
-the ancient propel-
lor-driven trainers . which ?
.avere..con,yeked into bomb-
:ers' for the hastily trained
.-Meo pilots. Their boinb
'racks are emty and nowa-
days- -they seldom make -
even, training flights. The
-raffish Air America pilots -
:and CIA men of the past
-are gone (though who can
say what a CIA man looks
_like). Only four Americans
',:stay in Lona Cheng regu-
ar I y, working in new
Concrete block buildings,
_labeled United States
',Agency for International
:Development.
? Where newsmen were
ence ? arrested on sight,
:they now get an affable
greeting: Yang Pao him-
self is likely to put a silver
-Ting on your finger and
with the cheery politic-
. ness- of mountain people,-
, insist on your return. .
Yet the sprouting radio
aerials, the bomha stacked
by the runway, the swag-
- ger of tribal soldiers on
.the streets attest that
.Long Cheng retains some
muscle and mystery. Even
getting there is an ,ad yen-
ture. From Vientiane' it is
six hours of bumping and
grinding on a pc'rilous dirt
road cut through jungles
and mountains. The ap-
proach by air. through
peaks often shrouded by
? clouds, resembles the end.
of a roller-coaster ride.
? The surrounding jungle is
sparsely dotted with the
stilt-houses of the tribal .
people and sometimes ele-
? phants are seen working .
fields and pulling out trees
-though they are rare. to- ?
day. ?
.In thW fortress valley,
ml d w a y between Vien-
tiane and the riain of Jars
which t-1.-te Communist
:forces have occupied for
four years, Yang Pao holds
.sway as Something of a
.-warlord?though hardly in :
the old tradition.
Only a handful 'of guards.
stand around the two-'"i
story stone building which.,
is his headquarters and
home (only part of his
family is with him. He has .
had 28 children by his six
wives). He: strolls about
casually, wearing a base- '
ball cap and a non-regula-
tion bush jacket adorned ?
with red shoulder tabs and..
.his three-star insignia. In
the casual manner probab-
ly. picked up from the.
Americans, many of his "
men Simply call him Vee-
Pee.
He is a husky man with.
a. ready laugh. While he
complains that he is get-
ting old he also volunteers.
that his latest child is just
three months. Asked
about his good health, he
. grins:- --
"I don't smoke. But- I .
drink a little 'oft."
In title, Yang Pao is
simply commander of Mil- a
itary Region II. But in fact
he is the leader of 200,000'
people who make up the
Meo tribes.
There is little that Yang
.Pao can now do to regain ?
the Men homeland around
the fabled Plain of jars.
Negotiators in Vientiane
are now attempting to
draw some kind of line be- 1
tween Yang Pao's forces ;
and the Communists on.
facing hilltop s. Mean-
while, he accuses them of
attempting to nibble off ,
the dwindling land hold-
ings he has left though he
admits that actual shoot-
ing incidents have been
feW since the country's
third coalition gover n-
ment was formed April 5.
He dismisses any idea
that the North Vietnamese
will ever pull Fait the Plain
of Jars and turn over the
32
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administration to Pathet
Lao forces?who %\ mild be
acceptable to the tribal
people.
Pointing to the map
at.14n, Yang Pao pointed
to a valley about GO miles
to the north. From there,
he said, a North Vietnam-
ese brigadier general, with
radios and supplies tucked
in h u n he vs and caves,
commands "the Plain of
Jars operational front." It
is One of three North Viet-
namese military com-
mands in Laos, all report-
ing directly hack to Flanoi
?and bypassing the Pathet
Lao political headquarters
zit Sam iNeua ruled over by
Red Prince Souphanou-
vong who commutes to his
eahinet post in Vientiane
aboard an ancient Russian
biplane.
WASHINGTON STAR
6 August 1974
fITT
(73\ 711?
(f!)
While Yang Pao admits ?'
I he North Vietnamese
show no present sign of at-
tacking, he notes the pre-
sence of four veteran re-
giments in the plain prob-
a b 1 y numbering 10,000
men.
These are combat troops.
The number of support
troops and Pathet Lao
forces could double that? ,
possibly more. ?
Yang Pao claims. the
North Vietnamese now
have two good highways
going , into the Plain of
Jars. One cuts almost due
east to the panhandle of
North Vietnam and is
sometimes not passable in
-the rainy season. The oth-.
or is an all-weather route
leading northeast from the
plain to the North _Viet,
namese border. ,
0
Ply Oald ..Valmsoza
Star-News Staff Writer ?
Despite calculated offi-
cial optimism, South Viet-
nam .18 months after the
cease-fire is economically,
politically and militarily in
peril and could continue to
be a burden to the United
States for years to come.
This gloomy assessment
emerges from a Senate For-
eign Relations Committee
report which charges the
Nixon administration with -a
policy of aimless drift and
specifically faults the U.S.
embassy in Saigon for
deliberately misrepresent-
ing the gravity of the situa-
tion.
In addition, the report re-
veals for the first time the
staggering cost in military
equipment transferred from
U.S. stockpiles to South
Vietnam between October
1972, (when peace was "at
hand"), and January 1973,
when the cease-fire was
agreed. That arms bill was
$753.3 million ? a figure
which nevee appeared in
any budget and was never
approved by any congres-
sional action.
EXCEPT FOR the de-
tails, the report, by commit-
tee staff aides Richard M.
Moose and Charles F.
Meissner, could have been
written 10 years ago, when
the United States was first
sliding into the Vietnam
quagmire. In a particularly
c A
Embassy so committed to
the Saigon regime that facts
adverse to South Viet-
namese policy are deleted
from embassy reports to
Washington.
The report charged that
embassy reports to Wash-
ington either distorted or
deleted information on
deliberate cease-fire viola-
tions by the South Viet-
namese army, on deterio-
rating security and poor
performance by South Viet-
namese troops; and on the
actual course of some mili-
tary actions.
U.S. Ambassador
Graham A. Martin answer-
ed the :charges during a
committee hearing by say-
ing deletions were made be-
cause he did not believe it
necessary to report some
actions more than once, and
that military information
was reaching Washington
through Pentagon channels.
A separate report on the
House side written by John
J. Brady and John H. Sulli-
van, charged that the U.S.
ambassador in Cambodia,
Jelin G. Dean, has system-
atically violated congres-
sional restrictions on the
size of his embassy staff
and had given military ad-
vice, to the Phnom Penh
government in the face of a
congressional ban.
THE HOUSE report
charged that Dean has been
boosting the size of his mis-
poignant echo fr levy e difterbReletMalle0f/?03Y98
II I t
past, it describes t 22 military and civilians
Defeetors and agents in
the Plain of Jars report,
Yang Pao said, that about
50 trucks a day go be-
tween the plain and North
Vietnam. They bring in
food ?and ammunition and
take out timber, hides,
scrap metal and an aSsort- ,
ment of things that
amazes Yang Pao.
"They are taking out all
kinds of things, broken
bottles and animal bones
for example. I don't know
what they do with it."
Just to keep yang Pao
edgy, the North Vietnam-
ese keep a handful of
tanks just north of Long ?
Cheng and also have the
base within range of a bat-
tery of Soviet-built 130mm
guns.
Where he once com-
manded perhaps i-24,000
above the 200-man limit im-
posed by Congress.
To do so, it said, Dean has
been flying personnel into
Cambodia in the morning
and out again at night so
that no more than 200 are
actually present when
counts are taken.
In addition, it said, Dean
"by his own admission. . .
does not hesitate to give...
military advice" to the
Cambodian government,
but maintains that Congress
did not intend to preclude
advising "at the level at
which he performs."
In a lengthy exposition of
South Vietnam's faltering
post-war economy, the Sen-
ate report argues that the
country's top-heavy mili-
tary establishment and
excessive reliance on a
U.S.-fostered artificial
economy of expensive im-
ports will make South Viet-
nam incapable of self-suffi-
ciency for at least another
10 years.
LN THE FACE of this, the
report notes, the Agency for
International Development
establishment in Saigon is
aiming for an economic
"takeoff" in five years at
the latest. AID officials
base that projection in part
on a reduction in South
Vietnamese military expen-
ditures which, the report.
notes, Martin and other
embassy officials oppose.
Martin is currently in
Washington to sell the
administration's aid plans
to a reluctant and preoccu-
pied Congress. He has been
arguing for a two-year pro-
gram of massive doses of
economic aid (
750 to 5800 million a year) in
addition to the 51.45 billion
in military aid the adminis-
tration has requested. (The
rt(DtAt-RBR71714:10401215t000
et and Chinese aid to North
men, including son* 4,000
now departed Thai merce-
naries,- Yanc, Pao is now
down to 6,70 men. He will
lose even more by the end
of the year -when the over-?
all Lao army will drop to
50,000 men from its, peak
of 78,000.
There is grumbling
among the men who are
being sent home ? some
having became virtually
professional soldiers with.
up to 15 years service. ?
and more grumbling over
pay and, severance allow-
ances. The pay of the tri-?
hal soldiers?once about
$60 monthly?was cut in
half when they were in-
corporated into the Royal
Army and lost their CIA
subsidies. -
Vietnam in 1973 is estimat-
ed by U.S. intelligence-ex-
perts to be no more than
$713 million ? of which $425
million was estimated as
economic aid and only $290
million military aid. This
was exactly the reverse of
the prevailihg 2-to-1
military-to-economic ratio'
of U.S. aid to South Viet-
nam.)
THE STATED theory of
Martin's proposed massive
aid jolt is that it would push
the South Vietnamese
economy over the takeoff
point in two years, after
which it would rapidly be-
come self-sufficient. But
Martin's own subordinates
in AID see five years neces-
sary before this could hap-
pen and other economists
cited in the report expect
this process to take 10 to 15
years. Accordingly, Mar-
tin's rationale is rejected as
totally unfounded.
In a carefully understated
conclusion to the report,
Moose and Meissner made
this assessment of the poli-
cy Martin is responsible for
administering:
"What we saw and heard
. suggested to us that our
present policy toward Viet-
nam is directed toward the
maintenace of the status
quo at a time when Wash-
ington's attention is direct-
ed elsewhere."
The Report said that "the
present military confronta-
tion seems likely to contin-
ue," with the South Viet-
namese unable to expel the
North Vietnamese, and the
Communists unable to ac-
quire "the decisive edge re-
quired to defeat the South
A critic of administration
policy with access to coin-
rnittee materials pointed
100330002u9e two-year Peri-
od would expire iu 1976.
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NEW YORK TIMES
22 July 1974
Spreading Trials in Korea
Devastate Political Activity
Students, Press and Clergy Are Silent
s as President Park Uses the Courts
to Eradicate Rising Opposition
By FOX BUTTERFIELD "
Special to The New York Times
SEOUL, South Korea, July 20
The wife of a man sen-
tenced to be executed in one
of' Korea's spreading political
trials stared ateier hands and
said, almost imperceptibly, "If
I tell you he was innocent, they
will send me to jail too." .
It is a measure of the dev-
astating effect of the trials,
ordered by President Park
Cbung Hee to exterminate
growing opposition to his Gov-
ernment, that even the families
of the accused dare not talk
about them.
?
Students have stopped- dis-
cussing politics, the clergy are
giving circumspect sermons, the
press prints only the official
version of the trials, and busi-
nessmen mutter that stability is
lgood for the economy.
The impact ' of the trials,
which began last winter after
ia series of small demonstra-
itions against Mr. Park's auto-
cratic 13-year rule, was sudden:,
lly intensified in the last week
with a new wave of arrests,
indictments and convictions.
In the last eight days, 55 per-
sons have been convicted be-
fore secret courts-martial. Four-
teen were sentenced to death,
'including South Korea's best
known young poet, Kim Chi Ha,
end six students.
Today, however, the death
sentences of the poet and four
other men convicted of an anti-
Government plot were com-
muted to life terms after De-
fense Minister Suh Jong Chul
reviewed their sentences.
A respected 77-year-old for-
mer President of the country,
Yun Po Sun, was taken before
another military tribunal this
week, and a prominent Catholic
bishop, the Most Rev. Daniel
Chi, was ordered to stand trial
next week, under emergency
decrees proclaimed by Presi-
dent Park. Both men face a:
death sentence.
Moreover, it appears that the
THE ECONOMIST JULY 20, 1974
Korea
trials will continue to spread.
An American-educated lawyer
who had defended several
students and the poet, Mr. Kim,
was arrested this week by.the
Korean Central Intelligence
Agency after he bitterly ob-
jected in Court to the death sen-
tences given his clients.
Also, 150 Koreans, including
clergymen, professors' and
students, are being held in jail
awaiting trial, well-informed
diplomats say.
Among the few Koreans still
willing to talk, although in fur-
tive whispers, there is a feel-
ing that the austere, aloof Mrs.,
Park has gone too far. "He isl
mad, mad, there is no other,
explanation," said One opposi-
tion politician.
But some other ,officials with
access to the PreSident ? and
there are very few these days
?insist that he is still under
control. "Cold, calculating and
self-confident," one diplomat
said. s -
According to associates, Mr.
Park, who first came to power
in the military coup of 1961 as
a general, is the product of
three related and rigorous tra-
ditions. One is Korea's bor-
rowed heritage of Confucian-
ism, with its stress on paternal
government by stern- leaders..
Another is the bleak, often vio-
lent w6rld Of the Korean peas-
ant, and the third sterns from
Mr. Park's highly disciplined
training in the imperial Japa-
nese Army, where subordinates
Vere expected to follow orders.
"Park is only doing what his
instinct and training" have,
taught him to do: use force and
terror to enforce his leader-
ship," said one Westerner with
long experience here. "It would
be easier if we just recognized
this is a dictatorship."
Among Korean officials Mr.
Park's crackdown is explained
as "an unfortunate necessity"
Look-alikes
Opposition is treason. This simple
equation, which has served dictators
from time immemorial, was formally
proclaimed the law of the land in South
Korea three months ago when the death
penalty was introduced for pretty well
any expression of dissent. Last week
the first lot of prisoners was convicted
under this emergency decree: 14 people,
including the country's leading satirical
poet and several student leaders, were
34
caused by the constant threat
of North Korea, as Chung 11
Kwon, the Speaker of the Na-
tional Assembly, said in an in-
terview.
? Mr. :Chung, whd was com-
mander of the Korean Army
at the outbreak of the Korean
war, a former Premier and
close friend of President Park
said, "Our American friends
must understand our special
situation and traditions. North'
Korea may invade any day, se
we cannot afford the luxury of
democracy as you can." ,
'Anyone who creates unrest
is really helping the Commu-
nists," Mr. Chung added. Tht
interview was conducted in
Mr. Chung's new hilltop house.
in a wood-paneled "QOM deco-
rated with a tiger's head, a
carved elephant tusk and a lac-
quered table from Vietnam.
The last two were gifts froma
President Nguyen Van Thin
and former President Nguyen
Cao Ky of South Vietnam.
Since the current crackdown
began last January with the
first of Mr. Park's emergency
decrees, the Seoal Government
has repeatedly stressed the im-
minence of an invasion from
the north. ?
Officials here point o sev-
eral signs: two small neW air-
fields the Communists have
built close to the demilitarized
zone, a new na val base on the
'have no real ties to the peas-
west coast not far north ot
Seoul, and several attacks this
year by the north on southern
fis'ling boats and patrol ships.
Yesterday the Government
said North Korean antiaircraft
gunners had fired on a Korean
Airlines civilian jetliner as it P
approached Kimpo Interna-
tional Airport at Seoul, though a
no bullet holes were found. 5
However, the American in. a
telligence community here
takes issue with the Govern- o
ment's analysis of the Commu- s
nists' hostile actions and inten-
tions at almost every point. 'I
economists here forecast a 12
per cent growth rate this year,
down from last year's phenom-
enal 17 per cent but still
excellent. '
Inflation has become a svri-
ous concern, with wholesale
prices up 30 per cent from last
year and consumer prices 16
per cent by, official estimate.
But to offset the effects of in-
flation, the Government re-
cently approved a 30 per cent
raise for civil servants.
Both the 600,000-man army
and the large Korean intelli-
gence agency, Mr. Park's main
es)wer bases, remain loyal to
?him, as far_ as can be deter,
mined, knowledgeable diplo-
mats say. The President has
made a practice of regulaAy
transferring the top army coin-
manders to. prevent any officer
from accumulating power.
. Thus ?Mr. Park's opponents
who have been arrested and
tried in recent weeks remain
largely an isolated minority,
like the liberals in China who
were squeezed between Chiang
Kai-shek and the Communists
and the elusive third force in
Vietnam caught between Presi-
dent Thieu and the Vietcong.
The dissidents are almost all,
urban, middle class and well
educated, and many are mem-
bers of South Korea's 12 per
cent Christian minority. They
antry that still forms the back-
bone of the population, and
they have only strictly con-
trolled links to the growing
working class.
But the 1960 coup that too-
led President Syngman Rhee
vas begun by students in Seoul,
nd there is still a feeling that
omeday the students can do it
gain.
And despite the current wave
f repression, there are still
ome surprising acts of cour-
ge. Bishop Chi, the Catholic
eader 'under indictment, came
ack from a European trip even
hough he knew what would
appen to him.
"We cannot allow ourselves
o become just the same as
orth Korea," said Mr. Yun,
ie former President now on
rial. "I admit I gave money to
he students to demonstrate,"
vlr. Yun related in an inter-
iew. "I would do it again if
would help."
There is a prevalent belief that
Mr. Park has been using the
threat more for his own domes-
tic purposes.
Mr. Park's control Over the
Government and the population'
has no doubt been helped byl
the continued growth of the
Korean economy. -Despite dis-
locations caused by the oil
ti
crisis last winter ? South v
Korea must import all its oil?i it
condemned to death, 15 were given life
terms and 26, among them-two Japanese,
were sentenced to 15-20 years in jail.
This week a former president of the
country went on trial along with a pro-
fessor of history, the dean of a theo-
logical college and the minister of a
Seoul church. Another 200 students,
teachers and churchmen are said to be
under arrest and awaiting their turn
in the military courts.
The prosecution claim is that all
these defendants were involved in a
student-led conspiracy to overthrow
the Park regime. The main evidence
of such a conspiracy seems to be the fact
that large numbers of students throughout
the country defied police orders and
joined anti-government demonstrations
in early April. The group which led
the demonstrations, the National Federa-
tion of Democratic Youth and Students,
has since been declared a North Korean
front and banned, along with the leading
student Christian organisation. Any
connection with these student federations
is now defined as subversion: the former
president, Yun Po Sun, is being tried
for donating $1,000 to student funds.
The red smear is familiar enough
in South Korea, where it has lonct been
used to discredit anyone who falls out of
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favour with the Park regime. But a witch-
hunt on the present scale is not standard,
nor is the provocative tone of current
anti-communist propaganda (President
Park declared on Tuesday that relations
with North Korea were approaching a
state of war). The partial American
withdrawal from the Asian mainland
has made many Asian leaders take
drastic action to protect their govern-
ments from the communist challenge. But
President Park seems to be approaching
a state of mind very little different from
that of his rival in Pyongyang.
Thursday, August 8, 1974 THE WASHENGTON POST
. . .
a
By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Foreign Service
SEOUL--"It has been
most difficult to control my-
self during this past year. I
had to try hard to keep from
bursting out, to keep seren-
ity in my own mind. 1 think
I know ? how Solzhenitsyn
and some of the other Rus-
sian dissenters felt. I'm not
surprised that some of them
were placed in mental hospi-
tals:'
Kim Dae Jung was sitting
In the living room of his
closely watched house, chat-
ting with visitors over
steaming cups of Korea's fa-
mous ginseng (herb root)
tea. A black secret-police se-
dan was parked up the
street near the "real estate
office" 'where lights burn all
night despite tly3 city's strict
midnight curfew.
Three years ago Kim was
the opposition party's unsuc-
cessful candidate for presi-
dent against incumbent
Park Chung Hee. A little
over a year ago he was shut-
tling between the United
States and Japan as the
most articultate outside
critic of President Park's
seizure of unlimited power
under martial law.
Then on Aug. 8, 1973, Kim
was abducted in broad day-
light from a Tokyo hotel,
spirited out of Japan in a
fast boat and taken, bound
and gagged, to the doorstep
of his Seoul home. There he
has remained ever since,
first under house arrest and
then under heavy surveil-
lance, while international
controversy has continued
about his case.
One year after his kidnap-
ing?Ia.panese newspapers
and television are giving
coverage to reviews of de-
velopments in Japan-Korea
relations since the sensa-
tional. incident. The Japa-
nese Foreign Ministry has
reiterated its unhappiness ?
that Kim is not free to
travel abroad and instead is
being tried by a Korean
court on old charges stem-
ming from his unsuccessful
presidential campaign.
The South Korean govern-
ment has ignored repeated
appeals from Prof. Edwin 0.
Reischauer, former U.S. am-
bassador to Japan, and oth-
ers that Kim be released to
accept a previously offered
fellowship at Harvard Uni-
versity. A House Foreign
Affairs subcommittee has
asked for Kim's appearance
in Washington as a witness
in a study of human rights
in Korea?but there's no
sign the request will be
granted.
Until a few days ago Kim
was virtually a nonperson in
Seoul, with little news of
him and none of his opin-
ions permitted in the con-
trolled Korean press. Then
an Associated Press corre-
spondent reported Kim's
opinion that U.S. military
assistance to South Korea
should not be reduced or
terminated, and stories
about this viewpoint blos-
somed forth on the front
pages here.
It has been his long-held
and consistent view that ces-
sation of American support
would spell the doom of
South Korea. "I think Amer-
ican military aid and the
stationing of American
troops here is still necessary
in principle?but I think the
U.S. should check any
abuses . . . to make sure
your military aid is used for
defense, and not used
against the Korean people,"
he said in an interview.
He added, as in the past,
his protest against reduction
of political freedoms in the
southern half of the divided
peninsula. "We are the same
race as the North Korean
people, with the same lan-
guage, the same blood. The
same cultural heritage.
There is no reason to fight
against North Korea except
for freedom. If we lose our
freedoms, we nave no rea-
son to resist," he main-
tained.
Whatever the condition of
his countrymen, Kim him-
self has very little freedom
in a practical everyday
sense; His suburban house is
surrounded by agents, who
follow him conspicuously
anytime he leaves his, small
walled compound.
His telephone is tapped.
Any Korean who comes to
see him is likely to be
pulled in .for police interro-
gation. For security reasons
and to avoid difficulty to his
friends, he leaves home only
to attend Catholic Mass on
Sunday and to attend ses-
sions of the district criminal
court where he is being
tried on the old election
charges.
Kim's kidnaping has been
nearly universally attrib-
uted to the Park regime's
ubiquitous CIA, the secret
police-intelligence-thought
control agency. His sus-
pected kidnapers are living
better than their victim.
Former KCIA Director
Lee Hu-rak, who was drop-
ped from his high office last
December in a bow to Japa-
nese and Korean indigna-
tion about the case, slipped
out of the country for a
time but was persuaded to
return. He is reported alter-
nately living in a resort ho-
tel in seaside Chung Mu and
on the grounds of a Bud-
dhist temple near Seoul.
Kim Dong-woon, the em-
bassy first secretary in Ja-
pan whose fingerprints were
found at the hotel abduction'
site, fled home to Korea and
disappeared from view. Ex-
ile sources say he is living
comfortably on the grounds
of the Walker Hill resort in
Seoul.
Lee Sang-ho, the former
KCIA chief in Washington
who is reported to have
been the task force director
of the kidnap group, is back
in Seoul. Korean exile
sources say he has been pro-
moted to a high-ranking po-
sition in KCIA headquar-
ters under his real name,
which is Yang Doo-won.
Other members of the
KCIA team that allegedly
abducted Kim Dae Jung are
said .to have been scattered
throughout the world-74o
Canada, Mexico, Chile, Los
Angeles and other posts. So -
far nobody has come for-
ward to tell the full story of
the kidnaping last Aug. 8.
Officially it is still an un-
solved crime.
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sl:
5 August 1974
Seelig
77-7
By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Foreign Service
SEOUL, Aug. 4?Pres-
sures are mounting for Pres-
ident Park Chung Hee to
roll back the wave of inter- i
nal repression1. before irre-
parable dareage is done to
his leadeiship at home and ?
his country's standing
abroad: ? '
Despite resolute talk in
. public, nearly all the second-
echelon figures of the Ko-
rean government are re-
ported to be privately dis-
mayed by the reaction to
the recent series of arrests,
closed military trials and
harsh sentences, and to be
? pretty well convinced that
Park has gone too far. The
problem is that there's no
sign yet that the president
agrees. It would a bold aide
indeed who -risked displea-
sure by being the first to sug-
gest a .change in direction.
A former general in the
government? camp recalls
that he and several others
successfully faced down the
president in the 1950s when
Park wanted to take a par- ,
ticular ruthless and unac-
ceptable action. Today
Park's one-time -military
peers have died or been
*downgraded; and nobody is
in position to tell him "no"
and make it-stick.
"Until two or three years
ago I was able to go in and ?
discuss things with him,"
said a man known for his
close connection with the,
president and who is per-
forming major jobs for -the
regime: "I can't get to him ;
anymore," Park's old friend
said.
The isolation of the man
in power, which is a serious
problem in many lands and
political systems, seems to
have ? grown apace since
Park seized total control un-
der martial law 22 months
ago.
For the past 10 days, the
Korean chief of state has
been vacationing at the offi-?
cial summer resort at Chin
Hae, near Pusan, and thus is
more removed ? than usual
.from the workaday worries
.of the capital. U.S. Ambassa-
dor Philipliabib, soon to deo
, part for Washington to be- ?
come assistant secretary of
state for East Asian affairs,
has been sending American
press, reports and other mes-
sages to the beachside re-
treat-e-presumably to warn
Park about the growing re-
action in Congress and else-
where against his crack-
down on political opponents.
Two. subcommittees of the
U.S. House Foreign Affairs
'Committee held public hear-
ings last Tuesday on human
rights in Korea, and another
day of hearings is scheduled
for this week. The chairmen
pfsboth subcomthittees, Rep.
Donald Fraser (11)-Mine.) and
Rep. Robert Nix (D-Pa.)
urged cuts in U.S. military
aid to Koree to show disap-
- proval of what is taking
place. ,
? Another, sign of, Coiligres-
ional opinion was the For-
eign Affairs Committee's ac-
tion?approved by the 'full,
House last week ? denying
funds to the U.S. Informa-
tion Agency for relocating
powerful Voice of America
transmitters to Korea from
Okinawa. At Japan's insist-
ence, the United States has
? agreed to remove the trans-
mitters from Japanese terri-
tory by 1977, and Korea was
considered the prime reloca-
tion site.
While such a relocation
may be justified on techni-
cal grounds, the committee
is of the opinion that present
conditions in that country
(Korea) do not make it the
most desirable alternative,"
said the congressional re-
port denying the funds.
For a state that owes its
very existence to the United
THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, August 8,1974
rean Le
- 0
By Edward Schumacher
Special to The Washington Post
SEOUL, Aug. 7?An opposi-
tion lawmaker attacked the
emergency measures of Presi-
dent Park Chung Hee in the
National Assembly today, the
first public challenge from the
opposition since criticism of
the measures was forbidden
eight months ago.
Rep. Kim Won Man, 53, in
statements harsher than those
for which many dissenters are
now in jail declared "You I
can't secure political stability :
with oppression and suppres-
ercv
States and continues to tie-
pond heavily on U.S. military,
economic and diplomatic
support, such disaffection
could be . extremely serious
-in the long run.
In an interview with
foreign corespondents, Park's
second-in-command, Premier
Kim John Pil, suggested last
week that international
opinion has emboldened "a
handful of disgruntled peo-
ple" at home to act as if ine
whole world were behind
them. Whether for this rea-
son or from sheer despera-
tion, there is no doubt that
opposition is beginning to
surface again despite the de-
crees that " make it . punieh-
able .by long prison terms or
death sentences.
The thin line of resistance
is ? centered in the churches,,
,both Catholic and Protes-
tant. Despite concerted 'gov-
ernment maneuvers to si-
lence them, church leaders
are increasingly engaged in
defending dissidents against
complete suppression. ?
In the ' Catholic cliurch,
the issue' was: joined by
Bishop. Daniel Chi. 'whose
court-martial on charges of
aiding antigovernment ? stu-
debt demonstrators . began
Thursday. Chi had , many
chances to avoid arrest and
trial, but he rebuffed every
one and headed into a con-
frontation with the-state.
The government's reac-
tion has been to charge the
bishop with urging "violent
revolution" , and. to call. him
"a liar" for denying the
charge, and to work behind
the scenes to cut off Chi's
Catholic support.
Secret-police agent's have
visited Korea's Stephen Car-
dinal Kim and senior bish-
ops to ask them not to sup-
port Chi. Delegations of
sion."
Premier Kim Jong PH told
the assembly, in its first day
of debate on any issue in
seven months, that the govern-
ment will not perpetuate the
emergency measures taken to
quell dissent and that trials of
persons accused of plotting to
overthrow the government
would end soon.
"I understand even Presi-
dent Park himself considers
these measures to be only
temporary in nature," he said.
Informed sources said the
premier also told a group of
0 r;
Catholic generals and Cath-
olic assemblymen froni the
government party were also
sent to ask church leaders.
to stay aloof. Despite the
pressure, Catholic sentiment
in Korea appears to be
strongly behind the bishop.
' The Protestant hierarchy,
whish had remained pub-
41y passive despite arrest
and court-martial of many
Christian ministers and lay
leaders this'year, has begun
to show signs of fighting
back.
Nine senior leaders affili-
ated ? with -the Anglican
Church, Evangelical Church.
-Jesus Presbyterian Church,
Methodist Church. Presbyte-
rian Church of the Republic
of Korea and the Salvation
Army have asked to see
Park or Premier Kim to ask
for repeal of "emergency de-
crees" and release of per-
sons arrested or convicted
under them. If no satisfae-.
tion is forthcoming, they
. plan a public rally Aug. II
'despite the strict ban on an-
tigovernment expressions.
Some of the previously
cautious churchmen appear
to have been affected by re-
Cent trips !outside the count
try, which exposed them td
the international condemna-
tion of the Park regime.,
Others were affected by the
allegations of torture and
other abuses -inflicted on
recently convicted stuqents
and intellectuals:
In an effort to ? identify
leaks from the closed courts-
martial, 'police have called ?
in , and, grilled relatives of
the defendants. The wife of
a prominent church leader
was interrogated, placed un-
der heavy surveillance and
limited in her movements.
Protestant leaders at a meet-
ing two days ago that some of
the measures might be re-
laxed. Because of that and the
!premier's meeting with Ameri-
can Ambassador Philip Habib
yesterday, the Protestants can-
celed a demonstration planned
for Sunday. It was unclear
what the ambassador said or the arguments of the lawyer,
Kan' g4 Shin Ok, constituted
contempt of judges and a vio-
lation of emergency decrees.
Kim -Chi Ha is serving a life
sentence for allegedly aiding a-
dissident. student group.
eereesi
was secretly put back on trial
today, and the announcement.
by Justice Minister Lee Pong
Sung that the lawyer who de-
fended poet Kim Chi Ha at his
recent court-martial has been
arrested.
Lee told the assembly that
who requested the meeting.
These events increased spec-
ulation that Park might back
off. Counterbalancing them.
however, were a report from
an informed source that Cath-
?tic Bishop Daniel Chi, who is , The Denfense 'Ministry said
being tried by court-martial,i today that Bishop Chi has'
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'pleaded guilty, hut it did not'
specify to what offenses.
The Catholic Church con-
tinued to press its support of!
the bishop, which could lead
to a showdown with the gov-
ernment. steering commit-
tee of four bishops, ho ap-
parently represent all 13 Ko-
rean bishops plus Korea's Ste-
phen Cardinal Kim, yesterday
sent the country's 700 parishes
a statement which in effect de-
nied the government's claims
against Bishop Chi.
The harshness of the Na-
tional Assembly speech by
Rep. Kim startled meniherg
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 August 1974
r-1 rA-N
of the ruling party. They tried
to shout him down, but the
lawmaker from Seoul, a city
which voted ainst Park in
the last election in 1972, per-
sisted.
"People are uneasy," he
said. "Foreign investors are
uneasy. The number of tour-
Roman Catholic bishop tried under
tightest secrecy; curbs to continue
By Elizabeth Pond
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Tokyo
President Park's authoritarian re-
gime has taken yet further steps
against the Christian churches and
democratic freedom in Korea.
The latest move is against Roman
Catholic Bishop Daniel Chi, who was
put on trial Aug. 1 in an especially
secret court martial in Seoul on
charges of giving money to and
Inciting anti-government students
who were allegedly trying to over-
throw the South Korean Government
by violence.
Ata luncheon the same day, Korean
Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil told
reporters that curbs on democratic
freedom in South Korea would con-
tinue until the achievement of eco-
nomic affluence.
This phase would probably extend
until 1981, "by which time we hope to
have achieved our objective of $1,000
per capita gross national product and
$10 billion annual exports," he said.
Neither freedom nor democracy
can be ensured without money, Mr.
Kim explained. "The same is true
with national security. If we do not
have money. . . we will be overrun by
[Communist North Korean leader]
Kim Il sung."
The Prime Minister appealed for
International understanding, espe-
cially from the United States, which
has recently charged South Korea
with increasingly harsh repression.
Some of the U.S. concern centers on
a series of South Korean military
court sessions that have recently
sentenced 55 students and other dis-
sidents to death, life imprisonment, or
15- to 20-year prison terms. All have
been closed sessions. But some notice
of the trial dates has usually been
given to prisoners' familes and, at
least in theory, one member of the
Immediate family has been allowed to
be present at each of these trials.
Criticism outlawed
In the case of Bishop Chi, however,
no outsider other than his lawyer was
Informed of the trial, and no witness
friendly to Mr. Chi was present.
Catholic sources in Tokyo were not
even sure if Mr. Chi's lawyer was
present at the trial.
Military courts have been trying the
cases of students who demonstrated
against the government under presi-
dential decrees of January and April
outlawing criticism of South Korea's
strongman constitution and support
for anti-government student demon-
strators.
Among other prominent Christians
on trial or in jail for supporting the
students are the former president of
South Korea, a well-known Presby-
terian minister, the dean of the
Yonsei University School of Theology,
and almost the entire leadership of
the Korean Student Christian Feder-
ation.
1
Nonclerical clothes
The only news about Bishop Chi's
trial and present detention has come
from a Japanese reporter who saw
Mr. Chi being taken out of a hospital
behind Korean CIA (secret police)
THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, AUGUST 8, .1974
60 More Al re Put on Trial Secretly
By FOX BUTITAFIELD
Speciai to The New York Times
SEOUL, South Korea, Aug.
7?In a major intensification
of the recent series of politi-
cal' trials here, 60 more per-
sons have been taken secretly
before military courts in the
last week.
Many are believed to be
students, including several
under 20 years of age at
- one group of 8 students from
Sogang, they were not noti-
fied that the trials had begun
and discovered it only after
visiting Westgate Prison in
Seoul to bring the prisoners
fresh clothing.
The disclosure that 60 addi-
tional defendants were on
trial was .made by Lee Yang
Woo, the chief legal adviser
to the Ministry of National
Sogang University, a Catholic Defense, which is conducting,
olersin
scho Seoul. Accgriiiiiii0Uhcep"rc.5161kAiikihgrOgr
memb of the falfiffir.s - 31" Yi
ists has dropped by half. Peo-
ple with means are emigrat-
ing."
Referring to the Japanese
occupation that ended in 1945,
he added, "Even imperialistic,
colonialistic Japanese had not
so much abused emergency
measures."
headquarters at 8 o'clock Thursday
morning. The journalist reported that
four guards put Mr. Chi, who was
wearing ordinary nonclerial clothes,
Into a car and took him away.
Late in the day a Defense Ministry
spokesman said that in the trial Mr.
Chi admitted giving financial support
to a student movement to overthrow
the Park Chung Hee government.
In a public statement on July 23 Mr.
Chi announced that he would never go
to a court martial trial voluntarily. He
also warned the public not to believe
any words attributed to him in the
censored Korean media.
In the statement Mr. Chi acknowl-
edged that he gave funds in support of
"oppressed Christian-minded stu-
dents," but added that he was being
"falsely accused by forged documen-
tation of instigating a revolt."
The extra secrecy in Mr. Chi's case
Is apparently occa-ioned by his der-
ing in making public calls for restora-
tion of democracy in South Korea ?
and by South Korean Government
concern over the possible reaction to
Mr. Chi's stand among South Korea's
800,000 Catholics.
The South Korean Catholic Church
Is basically conservative, ready to
support any restrictive measures the
government says are necessary to
fight against communism. Since Mr.
Chi, an outspoken social activist and
critic of government repression, was
arrested a month ago, however, the
Catholic Church has rallied behind
him, holding nationwide masses for
him.
Mr. Chi was originally scheduled to
go on trial July 23, but the trial was
postponed, apparently because of the
wave of international protests to his
arrest.
More recently, the South Korean
dragnet was extended to include two
Irish priests who are associates of
Bishop Chi resident in South Korea.
They, too, were interrogated over-
night by secret police and were
reported exhausted after the ordeal.
as Seoul Intensifies
Political Crackdown!
that the new trials had beem)ganization outlawed by Presi-____
going on for 10 days and some !dent Park Chung Ree's emer-
gency degree.
Ninety-one persons, including
two Japanese, have been con-
victed so far in the spreading
series of political trials. Five
more, including Yun Po Sun,
the 77-year-old former Presi-
. dent of South Korea, are cur-
were over. In that 10-day peri-
od, his office denied repeatedly
that such trials were going on.
Outlawed League Cited
Mr. Lee, who is a former
naval officer, said that the
CO were "suspecter of partici-
patation in treason led by the
I 745' iibti 003 4.0I.
a P t0002
leglit es, a243.1?nt or-li The sudden step-up, at a time
37 ?
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iwhen President Park is Involved
In a controversy with South
Korea's Protestants and Boman
Catholics over detention of
Christian clergymen, apparent-
ly took many Government of-
ficials by surprise.
Premier Hints of Letup
Some diplomats here, citing
the Government's sensitivity to
trials and their international
implications, believe that policy'
related to the crackdown is
being made by a tiny group in,
the national leadership and is
not too well coordinated.
There were also these devel-
opments today:
41Premier Kim Jong Pil, In an
address to the National As-
sembly, hinted that the Govern-
ment might lift the emergency
decrees, ?which Mr. Park pro-
claimed last winter and spring
and which provide the legal
basis for the courts-martial.
Mr. Kim said, "I understand
President Park himself consid-
ers these measures to be only
temporary in nature."
IllAlso in a speech to the legis-
lature, a member of the oppo-
sition, Kim Won Man of the
New. Democratic party, de-
nounced the decrees, saying,
"You can't secure political sta-
bility with oppression and sup-
pression." Under Decree No. 4,
such criticism is punishable by
death, but Mr. Kim was not)
prevented from speaking.
(Mishap Daniel Chi Bak;
Soun, an outspoken Catholic
prelate who is charged with
subversion, was taken before
a military court today for the
second time. According to Mr.
Lee of the Ministry of National
Defense, Bishop Chi testified
that his trial was being con-
ducted "fairly" and that if the
court showed leniency, "in the
future I will devote myself only
to religious activities." Another
spokesman said today's pro-
cedures concluded the taking
of testimony and that the pros-
ecution would make known its
demands for punishment at the
next session.
gThe steering committee of
the Council of Catholic Bishops
in Korea issued a statement
suggesting that in view of the
Government's account of the
Bishop's arrest and trial as
made public in the press here,
"the faithful will not accept
the face value of the news-
paper articles." No Catholic
leader, not even Stephen Car-
dinal Kim, has been permitted
;to attend the Bishop's trial.
? WASHINGTON STAR
6 August 1974
There were fresh accounts of
police abuse of political op-
ponents of the Park Govern-
ment.
The mothers of two defend-
ants already convicted were
said to have been knocked un-
conscious by policemen seeking
to find out who had provided
foreign newsmen with, stories
of torture of the prisoners.
- The 26-year-old wife of an-
other defendant, An Chae Ung,
has reportdly told friends that
she was interrogated for three
straight days without sleep by
a team of 10 policemen from a
Seoul district police station. As
a result, she is said to have
related, she suffered from
nervous ? exhaustion and her
arms and hands became immo-
bilized.
Asked today to comment u?n
the charges, Mr. Lee suggested
that the women "should appeal
to the authorities concerned, or
even report them to me."
None Sentenced, He Says
The ministry's legal offices
said of the 60 new defendants,
that they had been divided
into five groups, "according to
school or profession." Mr. Lee
asserted that some of the 60
were not students, but when
Koveart Ergsan4
The wholesale attack on political
dissent in South Korea has reached
such ridiculous proportions as to raise
doubts about the Seoul leadership's
grasp of international realities. Presi-
dent Chung Hee Park and his associ-
ates in tyranny have shown no under-
standing of how their indiscriminate
crackdown on domestic critics has
devastated the image of their regime,
hurting rather than helping South
Korea's prospects for national surviv-
al and economic development.
Park's obsession, about maintaining
his absolute power has led him to ap-
palling excesses, in decreeing the
death penalty for virtually any dissent
and in using the police and military
power with the grossest lack of judg-
ment. A recent count indicated that 55
students and other dissidents, includ-
ing the country's leading poet, have
been sentenced to death, life imprison-
ment or 15-to-20-year terms. Hundreds
more await secret military trials.
Defendants include Catholic Bishop
Daniel Chi, on trial for his life for giv-
ing money for student protests, and
former President Yun Po Sun, 76, ar-
rested on a similar charge. The Chris-
tian churches have provided many
targets besides the bishop: five priests
and a nun, a Presbyterian minister, a
theology-school dean and the leaders
of the Korean Student Christian
Federation. The National Council of
Churches, representing more than 2
tasked to describe what, jobsi
they held, he remarked, "I can't
remember."
He also stated that "a part
of the trials may have con-
cluded," but said no prisoners
had been sentenced. Asked
what sentences the prosecution
had demanded, Mr. Lee said
that It had not asked the death
penalty.
As for why his office had
repeatedly denied during the
past 10 days that trials were
being held Mr. Lee insisted that
there had been "no effort at
deception" and that it was not
a regular practice for the
Government to announce every
court-martial session. In the, ?
earlier 91 cases, most sessions
were announced.
Catholics contacted today
said they doubted seriously
whether Bishop Chi would re-
pent in any form or promise
to cease his activities against
President Park. The Govern-
ment has often cited a prison-
er's reported repentence as a
ground for a pardon or for re-
ducing a sentence.
It was speculated in some
circles that the Government
,might do that in the bishop's
case.
million South Korean Protestants,
threatens a mass protest _Sunday if
Park's repressive emergency decrees
are not withdrawn. The very letter an-
nouncing the rally is illegal. The cur-
rent uproar is rife with charges of tor-
ture and other abuses attributed to
Park's police forces.
Nothing is more illustrative of
Seoul's lack of insight than the laugh-
able defense voiced by Premier Kim
Jong Pil. Applying a sort of reverse
means test, he said Koreans are too
poor to be allowed more democracy.
When per capita annual income has
doubled to $1,000, in 1981, it will be
possible to ease up.
There is nothing funny about the
loss of freedom that many Koreans
would endure in the meantime, or
about the larger tragedy that could re-
sult from Seoul's alienation from the
democratic world. South Korea is
heavily dependant on American sup-
port for security from the aggressive
Communist regime of North Korea.
Now there are congressional calls to
cut or suspend South Korea's $241.5-
million military-aid allocation this fis-
cal year, and there will be new pres-
sure to withdraw the 38,000 American
troops remaining on the truce line
since the 1950-53 war. The administra-
tion wants to stand pat despite the
beating democracy is taking from our
ally, but Park seems bent on eroding
even that amoral position.
38
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 July 1974
Korea and U.S. policy
It is time for the American
Government to declare publicly
and forcefully its concern about
the wave of political arrests and
trials which is still sweeping
, through South Korea.
The attention of South Korean
President Park Chung Hee should
be drawn specifically to Section 32
of the current U.S. Foreign Aid
Act:
"It is the sense of Congress that
? the President should deny any
economic or military assistance to
the government of any foreign
country which practices the in-
ternment or imprisonment of that
country's citizens for political
purposes."
Nearly 100 South Korean citi-
zens so far have been jailed for
long terms, or sentenced to death,
on charges that amount to little
more than being publicly critical
of the Park government's increas-
ingly authoritarian rulership.
More recent arrests and trials
have incluc: -(1 South Korea's only
living former president, Yun Po
Sun, and a prominent bishop.
Although some of the death sen-
tences have been commuted to life
imprisonment, this was expected,
and is no indication that the gov-
ernment is reconsidering its poli-
cies.
What must be brought home to
the Park regime is the danger it is
bringing to itself, to South Korea
and the delicate international bal-
ance of the whole region by its
attempt to repress all political
dissent.
Lesser provocation has already
produced one popular uprising in
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 July 1974
plea for reason in Korea
The Government of South Korea
has pushed to its ultimate the
policy of labeling political dis-
sidents as "enemies" who endan-
ger "national security."
A three-man military tribunal
set up under emergency decrees
has sentenced 14 South Korean
citizens to death, and 39 others to
long prison terms, some for life.
Another 200 are under court mar-
tial and face similar treatment.
Among the 14 receiving death
sentences are five students from
Seoul National University and the
poet Kim Chi Ha who has been
called the Solzhenitsyn of Korea.
The severity of the sentences
seems obviously intended to
frighten away any further politi-
cal opposition to the rule of Park
Chung Hee.
That opposition, suppressed un-
der martial law since 1972, finally
boiled to the surface in the spring
of last ,year with student protest
demonstrations involving thou-
-sands of students in almost every
major university.
President Park yielded momen-
tarily, pulling back somewhat the
Korean CIA's domestic surveil-
lance operations and replacing its
unpopular chief. But that tempo-
rary tactic was soon followed by
the extraordinary decrees that
recent South Korean history,
bringing down the government of
Syngman Rhee. Today the possi-
bilities for chaos are even greater.
But the American troops in Korea
did not attempt to bail out Mr.
Rhee then, and they cannot be
expected to intervene for Mr.
Park now, should another rebel-
lion take place in the South.
Such a disturbance could even
Invite intervention by the North,
confronting the U.S. with more
warfare.
It should be made clear to Presi-
dent Park that Congress and the
American people would not toler-
ate further involvement in Asia
under such circumstances. And
that if he does not reverse his
course, Washington may be forced
to reassess its policy of military
and economic support.
made virtually any whisper of
dissent punishable in the extreme.
Mr. Park's excuse is the need
for vigilance against the North.
But South Korea has never been
stronger economically and mili-
tarily. There is less reason now for
authoritarianism than ever and,
indeed, every condition exists for
the country tO adopt more demo- '
cratic practices.
Kim Chi Ha's "crime" was that
he gave some money (about $450)
to one group of student protesters.
Previously, the well-known poet
had been jailed a number of times
and once committed to a sanato-
rium ? in a move similar to the
Soviet Union's treatment of
prominent dissidents ? because of
poetry satirical of government
policies.
Inevitably, one compares the
Soviets' final disposition of Mr.
Solzhenitsyn with the Park re-
gime's "solution" to Kim Chi Ha.
To the extent that world protest
helped to obtain the release of
Solzhenitsyn to exile, might it now
obtain more lenient and reason-
able treatment for Kim Chi Ha
and his fellow South Korean dis-
senters? -
It is possible, and there is time.
Here is one such protest.
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Friday, 4 agust 2,1974 THE V.A.S111NOTON POST
k1
0
67
By Joseph 2siovitski
, Speolal to Tho Washington Post
SANTIAGO The Chi-
lean military junta, after
governing f or 10 Months
with improvised policies and
structures, has settled down
for a long stay in power.
The junta, which replaced
President Salvador Allende
after the coup in which he
died last September, began
its tenth month by reorder-
ing the country's govern-
ment, burning the national
voter registry and breaking
off relations with Chile's
largest political party, the
Christian Democrats. It all
added up to a declaration
that the military plans ? to
gpern for an indefinite ,
snan, without elections or
organized civilian political
support.
ClOvernment spokesmen,
when asked how long mili-
tary rule may last, answer, .
?We have 'plans, not dead-
lies."
'-The plans are for the long
tc*rrt and on a large scale.
we don't do big, last-
ing things, we might as well
go home now," an adviser to
the junta said recently.
'Thus far, in what it calls
"the second stage," the
jtinta has made known its
intention to rebuild the
economy, to make it grow
with the help of foreign in-
vestment, to reduce and re-
organize the government bu-
reaucracy and to enforce a
total ban on civilian politi-
cal activity by continuing
the detentions and military-
court. trials that have been
the rule since last Septem-
ber.
The first step of govern-
ment reorganization came
late in June, when the
armed forces agreed to shift
_
from a four-man junta to a
.one-man presidency. Since
the military overthrew Al-
lende and uprooted his
Marxist-oriented goveimment,
the commanders of the
army, the navy, the air
force and the carabineros,
Chile's national police force,
had exercised the powers of
the presidency. They also
took over the law-making
power Of the Congress, which
was 'closed last year.
Now, Gen. Augusto Pino-
chet, commander-in-chief of
the army and leader of the
junta, has been named presi-
dent for an indefinite term
with the formal title of "su-
preme chief of the nation."
The point of the change,
government sources said,
was efficiency. The four-
man junta had been slower
in reaching decisions than
one man would be, they said.
The commanders of the.
army, navy, air force and
police have retained the role
of drawing up laws for prom-
ulgation by decree.
Pinochet's rise also repre-
sents the ascendency of the
Chilean army ?over the navy,
air force and ponce. Some
civilian observers, believing
that the army officers in
-government had - shown
more moderation than air
force and navy officers,
thought this might mean an
easing of repression. This
has not yet been the case.
Chilean families report
that men and women are
still disappearing for days
and sometimes -weeks. A
businessman told friends re-
cently he had been arrested,
held for four days alone in a
tiny cell and then released
without charges.
While Gen. Pinochet was
Christian Science Monitor
29 July 197/4
mocro
imns
forming a neW Cabinet of 14
military men and 3 civilians,
two ot' them technocrats
with international reputa-
tions, the government
.burned the national voter
registration records. A gov-
ernment spokesman ex-
plained that the lists of 4
million voters . were
"notoriously fraudulent." No
plans were announced for
making new lists or reregis-
tering voters.
The remote expectation
that the junta might call
eleetions to carry out its an-
nounced aim of restoring
Chilean -democracy disap-
peared , with the electoral
records. There remained an-
other possibility, suggested
to the junta by leaders of
the Christian Democratic
Party. The party leadership,
who opposed Allende and
publicly accepted the coup '
as a necessary evil, had
hoped for a return tb civil-
ian government within three
to five years.
That hope, according to
Christian Democrats famil-
iar with party affairs, disap-
peared when the junta pub- -
hely broke off .its semipublic
relations with the party in
July. Formally, there has
been no political party activ-
ity in Chile since the -junta
outlawed the country's
Marxist parties and declared
the others, including the
Christian Democrats, in re-
cess.
During the recess, Chris-
tian Democratic leaders con-
tinued to meet privately.
Last January they presented
a memorandum to the gov-
ernment that criticized the
military's treatment of pris-
oners and its disregard for.
legal ? and human rights.
?
litciarts regret
.
rt of mlll tary junta
By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Chile's Christian Democratic Party
has come to lament its early support ,
of the military government now run-
ning the South American nation.
The extent of the party's dis-
enchantment became apparent re-
cently with the release of a sharply
worded exchange of letters between
Also in January, former
Sen. Patricia Aylwin, recog-
nizci by ?the junta as the
president, suggested
privately to a military minis-
ter that Christian Demo-
crats saw no need for more
than five years of military
dictatorship in Chile.
It was not Christian Dem-
ocratic political opinions,,
but censorship imposed on a
Santiago radio station
owned by the party that
caused the party's complete
break with the junta.
After an exchange of let-
ters. the gevernment called ?
the party an "instrument of
international Marxism" and -
told Aylwin bluntly to keep
a respec ful tongue in his
head when he spoke to the
military government.
Christian Democrats said
the government's, move
looked like a signal from
the army that its contacts
with Christian Democrats
were at an end.
Some party leaders said
the break helped the party
overcome the reputation of
having helped in the couri..
Even former President
Eduardo Frei, the grand old
man of Chilean Christian
Democracy who had gone,
with other former presi-
dents, to - a thanksgiving
Mass with the junta last
year, was reliably reported_
to be critical of the military
'government now.
? "In the end it's probably
better this way," said a
Christian Democratic law-
yer. "They tell us to shut up
and- we stop arguing. It
shows everyone that this is '
a dictatorship and that's
that."
the party's president and one of the
nation's top military commanders.
The two men involved, Party chief-
tain Patricia Aylwin Azocar and De-
fense Minister Oscar Bonilla Bra-
danovic, once enjoyed a friendly
relationship, but the tone of the letters
suggests that this is no longer the
case.
Mr. Aylwin wrote: "History shows
that no stable or just order can be
built on a foundation of unilateral
Imposition of the will of those who
govern." 40
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Approved For Release 2001I-0148: CIA-RDP77-00432R00010033'0002-9-
The Ay'win letter, which was under-
stood to reflect the views of top
Christian Democratic leaders in-
cluding former President Eduardo
Frei Montalva, was in response to a
harsh letter by General Bonilla.
Exchange began in June
The exchange originally got under
way in June when the military junta
Imposed stiff censorship on Radio
Baimaceda in Santiago, the flagship
station of the Christian Democratic
Party. Mr. Aylwin wrote to General
Bonilla, then Interior Minister, pro-
testing the action.
In response, General Bonilla wrote
Mr. Aylwin in a tone that implied the
political leader had no business criti-
cizing the military.
"Please. do not write to me in any
terms that are not those of an admin-
istrative authority of a recessed party
respectfully addressing the govern-
ment of the nation," General 13bnilla
wrote.
The Christian Democratic Party
was declared "in recess" soon after
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 July 1974
? the Military takeover last September,
as were other political parties. Marx-
ist-oriented parties that supported the
deposed government of Salvador Al-
lende Gossens were "outlawed for-
ever" by the military. ' ,
? Repetition charged
Mr. Aylwin's latest letter accused
the government of trying to impose its
' will unilaterally, thus "repeating the
error" of the Allende government.
He also protested the junta's treat-
ment of the Christian Democrats,
which he said amounted to "system-
atic distrust,"
"Our patriotic efforts to tell the
government what we believe to' be
true and good for Chile," he wrote,
"have received no other response
than repeated signs of hostility."
The Aylwin letter was the sharpest
public criticism yet of the military
leaders ruling Chile since the take-
over last September 11.
Christian ' Democrats had been
smarting under the restrictions
overtures to Cuba?.
renewe
les in,t e win
?:'-'",!!"'?????.;
By Aiwa Adams SehMid.i
? :
? Staff correspondent of
IlikChristian Science Monitor
LWa..shington
grOiring nuMber 'of." signs point.
towardrevision",of re the , 10-year-old-
diplomatic quarantine of Cuba. EVen.7.
-the- U.S. State Departnient,' where
.th& Official -signals read-t'stop,""i:
there are suggestionaof :approaching.:
Ehange.
The', latest ?--o- f: these, is .the..visit to
:Ctiba'ot Pat'M". Holt; " staftdireetor
the Senate ? Foreign -Relations- Com-
mittee.- Mr. Holt interviewed Fidel
- Castro, First Deputy Premier-Carlos:
? Rafael Rodriguez, and leading mem-
.ber of the Communist Party-secretar-,
iat;ineluding Blas
Molt - has just
froin his trip, ;which. began
-213,.--and has yet: to :--rnake any'.
--public reporton his findings?-?:1-' -'?
.9The; visit Is being hailed) ,however,:
:among 'analysts -of- LatinLAmericair
'.:0.ffairs as an oblique American over-
;lure to the Castro regime with which
the U.S. Government broke relations
? in January, 1961. -Although Secretary
of State Henry-A. Kissinger approved.
onlyreluctantly the visa for Mr. Holt,
for which_ he had been waiting since
1966, the fact that he. did. so was
significant.
Mr. Molt's trip to Cuba coincided
with evidence that the reason for
which the United States in 1 2 led the
. Organization of American States to
exclude Cuba from inter-American
affairs, and in 1964 to cut diplomatic
and trade ties, no longer applies and
that Latin American states are begin-
ning to move toward a resumption of
ties with Cuba. ? ?
?
? ,
The reason was that Cuba was
Identified as the center of a Commu-
nist revolutionary movement that
sought to export revolution to the rest
of the hemisphere. Most analysts
think that Dr. Castro has almost
entirely halted this kind of activity,
but State Department officials are not
yet ready to concede the point.
According to a department spokes-
man there has admittedly been a
decline in such activity, but the
department holds that it continues.
Official position
The department's official position is
that the meeting of Latin American
foreign ministers in April decided to
leave it up to Argentina to report to
the next meeting, at Buenos Aires in
March of next year, as to whether
there are grounds for making con-
cessions to Cuba, and the U.S. is
willing to wait for that report.
But the rest of the continent does
not appear willing to wait. Peru,
Argentina, and four Caribbean coun-
tries have joined Mexico, which never
did break off relations, in restoring
diplomatic ties with Cuba.
Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Vene-
zuela are expected soon to follow suit,
to be followed by Panama, Colombia,
Guatemala, and Honduras.
Anxious Castro
The President of Mexico, Luis Ech-
everria Alvarez, furthermore, is tour-
ing seven Latin American countries
with the avowed purpose of seeking a
lifting of the restrictions on trade and
diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Although the State Department off 1-
placed on them by the military long
before the censorship of 'Radio Bal-
maceda. They argue that they have
been played false by the military
whom they originally supported.
Support anticipated
They also felt that they had a friend
In General Bonilla, who as a colonel
was a military aide to Mr. Frei during
his presidency from 1964 to 1970.
Indeed, in initial reaction to the
members of the military government
last September, General Bonilla was
regarded as one of those supporting
the concept of civilian, constitutional
government.
"We may be wrong about that," a
christiarl Democratic official said
last :larch when commenting on
earlier actions taken by General
Bonilla. But some Christian Demo-
crats, at the time, still held out the
view that General Bonilla would favor
them.
The exchange of letters appears to
dash that hope.
cially scoffs at the idea, many an-
alysts see the U.S. becoming increas-
ingly isolated in its Cuban policy.
From Cuba there are reports,
meanwhile, that Dr. Castro is anxious
to encourage the trend because he is
weary of Cuba's dependence on the
Soviet Union from which he receives a
subsidy of about $1 million a day,
much of which is spent under the
direction of about 7,000 Soviet tech-
nicians and advisers..
41
NEW YORK TIMES
6 August 1974
World Council of Churches
Says Chile Violates Rights
GENEVA, Aug. 5 (Reuters)
? The World Council of
Churches alleged today that
citizens' rights were being sys-
tematically violated in Chile
and appealed to churches
throughout the world to do
everything to help restore the
rule of law there.
i A statement by the council's
commission on international af-
fairs said that at least 6,000
people were in prison or con-
centration camps in Chile and
that: there had been an alarm-
ing new wave of arrests.
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