DIRECTOR'S MESSAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1971
• Content Type: BULL

25X1A
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CONFIDENTIAL
NEWS, VIEWS
and ISSUES
INTERNAL USE ONLY
This publication contains clippings from the
domestic and foreign press for YOUR
BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use
of selected items would rarely be advisable.
No. 27
22 JANUARY 1973
General Page 1
Far East Page 9
Eastern Europe. . 0 ? ? 0 OO Page 40
Western Europe ....... Page 42
Near East . . 0 0 6 .... ? Page 47
Africa Page 55
Western Hemisphere Page 56
Destroy after backgrounder
has served its purpose or within
60 days
CONFIDENTIAL
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2 Sep,-Oct. 1971 I BNDD Bulletin
Diirector's
PurJe-,',01e
It has become increasingly clear that BNDD's role
on foreign soil has changed considerably during the past
two years.
Experts both within BNDD and other agencies agree!
that the most effective way to diminish or stop the supply
.of illicit drugs into this country is to work as closely as
possible at the source of the drugs.
It is easier, for example, to identify and destroy an
Illegal opium poppy field than it is to stop a caravan of
several hundred horses and men. Or, it would be more
effective to immobilize a clandestine heroin processing,
laboratory than it would be to try to detect concealed;
heroin being smuggled' into the United States.
Striking at the heart of the traffic, namely the
source countries, poses many new challenges to BNDD
and dictates that we develop?and implement imaginative
and effective programs and participate as integral members
of numerous American foreign missions. This is what we
are doing.
During the past few weeks, I have set in motion the
mechanics of a major reorganization of BNDD's overseas
operation to meet new challenges and take advantage of
new opportunities that we never had before. My first step,
was to appoint George M. Belk, a veteran BNDD executive,!
to a new position. on my staff. Mr. Belk, reporting directly!
to. me, has sole planning and operational control over,
BNDD's overseas program.
Within the coming weeks, BNDD's overseas Special
iSep.-Oct. 1971 1 BNDD Bulletini
?
Agent staff?in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East,
and the Far East?will be increased to 123, or more than
double its present strength. We are also increasing the '
number of our offices in these four areas of the world
from 25 to 46. ?
At the heart of our reorganized overseas operation,
however, is how we carry .out our job. It is obvious that
our activity will vary, ji not from one country to another,
certainly among definOle geographical regions. With this
in mini, we will develop 'a specifidally designed program
and a manager to carry?it,out in each country or area. In
one country, it may mdan working for the elimination of
raw materials, in another, it may mean apprehension of
, processors Jrid distributors; and in other countries, dif-
ferent !programs.
To. carry out this wide variety of activities, we are
selecting management and Special Agent personnel for
these positions who are considered exceptionally com-
petent and versatile. They will be able to recognize when
and where training is needed, where foreign assistance
might be best tendered, the value of intelligence, the
necessity for and i processes of case-making or, when not
to resort to traditional enforcement measures.
I! think' this new initiative by BNDD will have 'a'
dramatitic impact at the most vulnerable part of the illicit
drug raffic?the source.
JOHN E
Olrocto
NCIERSOLL
BNDD Strengthe0s, Expands Overseas Mission Wit
I-differences," he said. "If wi are barred
George M. Belk
To Head
On August 14, BNDD Director John
E. Ingersoll announced the formation
of a new Office for International Af-
fairs. Appointed to head the Office,
as Program Manager, was George M.
Belk. The following story by Ron E.
Moxness, staff writer for the Interna-
tional Press Service, is based on an
interview with Mr. Belk subsequent to
the announcement. The story, which
was released through the United States
Informalion Agency, is an accurate re-
port on this important facet of BNDD's
total mission.
? (Wathington, Sep. 2) Last June 17
President Nixon announced an increase
in U.S. efforts to prevent illicit narco-
tics from reaching the United States
from otlfCr countries. i?
' "The drug problem crosses Ideologi-
cal boundd ?
ari cs an surmountsnational4
* tic D
Approved For Rel ase
in any Way in our .effort io deal with
? this miter, our efforts will be crip-
pled, an our will subject to question.
I intend to leave no room for other
nations o question our commitment
to this matter."
In an interview this week, a U.S.
? official outlined steps being taken to
, strengthen the investigative capacities
1 of the .S. Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerq s Drugs abroad. These will
include' he Bureau's ability "to assist
host goi,ernments in the hiring, train-
ing and deployment of petsonnel and
the prq urcment of necessary equip-
ment fo drug abuse cortkol."
The 'strengthening of the investiga-
tive capacities" of the Bureau has in-
volved the creation of a new office?
Program Manager for International Af-
fairs?under the direct supervision of
1 John E.,Ingersoll, Bureau Director and
,
l Chairm h of the U.S.Delegation to the
ations Commission on Nam*.
United
The new office is headed by George
M. Belk, a veteran of the U.S. war
against I the narcotics trafficker. He
served as Chief of the Criminal Investi-
gation Division of the Bureau before
his current assignment.
Mr. Belk participated in a meeting
of the International Criminal Police
Organization (Interpol) at Ottawa,Sep-
tember 7-13. At that meeting, as In
others -with his foreign counterparts,
Mr. Belk summed up, through a Bur-
eau memorandum, the U.S. official
view of drug abuse:
"The mood of the American people,
the Congress, the administration, and
the President is that the United States
. should and will take whatever actions
are necessary, both domestically and
internationally, to remove this blight
from our I society. Internationally
, these actions will include, if necessary,
a reassessment of our foreign policy
and economic relationships with those
countries which intentionally or inad-
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Mr. Belk does not view language
such as this as blunt because, as he
noted in the interview, "The people
we are working with are just as dedi-
cated, just as determined as we are to
put a halt to a traffic which, in the
United States alone, has produced
more than 300,000 heroin addicts and
In New York alone causes the deaths,1
annually, of more than 1,000 per-
sons?many of them teenagers."
At the outset, U.S. Special Agents
overseas worked from their own head- ,
quarters, often separated from the '
broad streams of diplomacy. Now, Mr.
Belk said, "This office will be respon-
sible for the coordination of the vari-
ous facets of our activities relating to
the foreign scene. It will also work
closely with the other major U.S.
agencies in foreign areas. Mr. Ingersoll
has now directed that Ave become a
part of the U.S. country teams to fight
the illicit traffic in narcotics?particu-
larly those destined for the United
States."
This job, Mr. Belk noted, is the
Bureau's primary missicli7to interdict
the flow of drugs illegally destined for
the United States and to reduce drasti-
cally the availability of narcotics in
the nation.
To accomplish this mission, the
number of Special U. S. Narcotics
Agents working overseas will be doub-
led during the fiscal year ending next
June 30, to a total of 123 men. They
will be posted in Europe, the Middle
East, Latin America and Asia.
The borders of what the Bureau
calls "control areas," have been shifted.
The present Paris Headquarters was
originally designed for a region made
up of Europe, the Middle East, South
Asia and North Africa. Because the
number of regional headquarters is
being increased, Paris now will have
under its jurisdiction Europe and North-
west Africa.
Ankara, Turkey will be the regional
headquarters for the Middle East and
Northeast Africa and South Asia.
Bangkok, Thailand will be head-
quarters for Southeast Asia. Tokyo
will be headquarters for operations in
Japan, Republic of Korea, Hong Kong,
the 'Philippines and points north of
Okinawa. Saigon, because of its em-
phasis on military channels, will con-
tinue to be an independent operation
reporting directly to Washington.
Mr. Belk said negotiations are under
way through the State Department to
broaden the number of Bureau posts
in Latin America, The Bureau has
offices in Mexico City and Guada-
lajara. New offices have been opened
at Hermosillo and Monterrey. An
office In Panama is responsible for
part of the northern and western
I coast regions of Latin America and
an office in Buenos Aires covers the
Eastern portions of the hemisphere.
The Bureau hopes to open new
offices in Caracas, Quito, Ascension,
Lima and Rio de Janeiro.
Mr. Belk pointed out that the new
offices "will greatly increase ?tic abil-
ity to work with the Latin American
countries on mutual problems."
South America is one of the world's
largest cultivators of the coca leaf,
from which cocaine is made. Peru
grows the coca leaf legally for the
production of medicinal cocaine but
It is not legal in other countries.
Mr. Belk explained Oat heroin
from Europe enters the United States
by various routes. Some of it is
shipped to smugglers along the East
Coast of South I America and moves
by various routes via Panama and Mex-
ico to the United States. It also moves
from illicit laboratories in France to
Canada, and thence to the United
States. And, of course, some is smug-
gled directly through U.S. ports from
Europe.
The Bureau has, had Special Agents,
in Montreal for a number of years.
Mr. Belk said the Bureau hopes to have,
more agents stationed in Toronto and'
in Vancouver, British Columbia.
He said the Bureau has a close and
harmonious working relationship with
the Royal Cardian Mounted Police,
a relationship which became official-
ly closer when Canada joined a Franco- I
American Joint Working Group in
November, 1970. The last meeting of
the working group was in Ottawa and
the next one is scheduled for 'Wash-
ington.
Concentration is on technical prob-
lems involved in the legalities and
machinery of narcotics operations. Mr.
Belk said cooperation is equally close
with the French Central National
Bureau, an arm of the Surete.
Similar close working relationships
exist between the United States and
Mexico, with the Attorney Generals
of both countries credited with crea-
tion of the Mexican-American work-
ing group. Meetings are alternately
held in Mexico City and Washington,
with the next meeting in Washington
in Octoirr.
Mr. Belk said that, while few prob-
lemstexist in Africa of direct relation
to the United States, the Bureau is
plahning to open an office in Rabat
because of the flow of hashish, the
strongest form of marihuana, from
Morocco to the United States.
A long-term need, in Mr. Belk's
view, is treaties with foreign nations
to ease extradition for prosecution
of third country nationals caught in
illegal narcotics activity.
This step, together with others ex-
pected to irri:n Narcotics, will help the United Nations
Commission
bring into being the framework of
I international controls sought by Pre-
sident Nixonra framework the Presi-
dent believes Will help all nations
participatidg.a
2
i 'NEW YORK TIMES
I 6 January 1973
What Other Countries Do
? A ,severely punitive approach to addiction is not un-'.
: known in other parts of the world, where traffickers are
occasionally shot.
? Since 1969, Iran, which has an estimated total of
'400,000 opium and heroin addicts, has been executing smug-
glers, who usually slip over the porous border with Afghan-'
.istan. About 150 smugglers, many of them simple Afghan.
'tribesmen, have been executed in Iran.
Thailand, which has a long history of official involved
ment in the opium business, has on occasion executed trait- .
? tickers. China has provisions for three-year to life sentences'
for drug dealers. Taiwan has a death penalty for trafficking,
..,even in marijuana.
4: The classic instance of a law enforcement crackdown,
on a drug epidemic was the Japanese response to the wide-.
spread abuse of amphetamine and methamphetamine after.
World War II.
By 1954, when the use peaked, two million Japanese
were estimated to be injecting amphetamines.
Under the Awakening Drug Control' Law in Japan,
mandatory prison sentences were meted out. Possession Of,
the drugs drew an automatic three-month sentence; traf-.
,fickers and underground manufacturers went to jail for,
as long as 10 years.
, In 1954, 55,664 persons were arrested. In following
? years, the arrests declined, down to a low of 271 in 1958.
The tough enforcement approach was universally cred-
ited with breaking the back of the use of the drugs, although
1. studies of it have emphasized the homogenous and disci-
plined nature of Japanese society, which generally supported
the Government's efforts.
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NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY: JANUARY 10, 197!
VVorldSurveyShowsNewsmenFaced
Growing Censorship Problems in 1972
?
' Also:fated Press
In the last year foreign corre-
Spondehts have faced growing
censorifhip problems around the
world,?mostly through arrest or
expulsion, the threat of expul-
sion or the denial of entry
visas.. 'they also encountered in-
creasitik refusal by officials to
provide; facts and were ham-
pered by state ? control or cen-
sorship:, of the local press on
which foreign reporters often
depend for news tips and back-
ground information.,
The Associated Press's annual
survey of the flow of news
across international boundaries
shows that formal censorship
as such?the government 'man
reading dispatches moving into
and out of a country?grew
only slightly.
This is the way Associated
Press correspondents overseas
describe ? the. current interna-
tional .censorship 'situation:
AFRICA
In September, 14 foreign re-
porters were arrested and jailed
In Uganda during an invasion
by foes of the Government of
President Idi Amin. Never told
why they were detained, they
surmised it was because they
Would not accept uncritically
the official pronouncements on
, the fighting. All eventually
were released and deported. ?A
form' of heavy-handed censor-
ship continues.
'There is no official censor-
ship in Nigeria, but fear of
arrest and detention without
trial inhibits press freedom in
black Africa's most populous
nation. Foreign correspondents
are free to report and comment
on Nigerian affairs without re-
itriction, but face possible de-
portation if officials do not like
what they see published.
Several other countries in
Western and southern Africa do
not exercise advance censor-
ship, but the threat of expulsion
Is widely, used against Foreign
newsmen.
Therd is no formal censor-
'ship of incoming or outgoing
news in South Africa, but resi-
dence permits' for foreign news. guerrillas in Northern Ireland,
patches was lifted Nov. 2, but times under the,catah-all law
correspondents were left with of security, but the courts
the new guidelines for Mass turned down most of the cases.
media. These guidelines, among While internal censorship M-
other things, forbade corre- mained strict under Brazil's
spondents to write anything military Government, foreign
"which , impurs, discredits, newsmen encountered little dif-
questions or criticizes any psi- ficulty sending neWs.out 'of the
tive' effort of the Government country. The lack of basic civil
itself or any of, its duly consti- rights for Brazilians and ??in-
tuted authorities." ; ternal censorship, however,
? On the . whole, foreign join-- Made it difficult for correSpond-
nalists .Were able to report ents.to obtain information, Lo-
events in South Vietnam pretty cal newspapers, a basic source
much las they saw them. There of information for foreign cor-
was ad widely held view, how- respondents in, Brazil, had to
ever, that this situation might contend with Government cen-
end with the final withdrawal sors lin their newsrooms.
of American troops. . ? Argentina's 'ruling 'military
The internal Vietnamese Junta formally restricted news
press was subject to a crack- coverage from Aug. 22, the day
down under a law granting guards at the Trelew marine
special powers to President base jail shot and killed 16
Nguyen Van Thieu for six leftist guerrillas who were said
months. He imposed financial to be trying to escape. The de-
requirements, that , put ?? more cree prohibits publication of
than . 5.0 'newsPapers ?Out: cof news ? or ? photos. "attributed or
busineSs. ? ' "" attribiltable..46 'illegal associa-
In South Korea, President tions or persons., or groups
Chung Hee Park imposed mar- notoriously dedicated to sub-
tial law, including strict press versive or terroristActivities."
censorship, late in 1972. This In the Caribbean, Cuba con-
censorship was lifted after two tinned to censor incoming find
months, and Seoul authorities outgoing news dispatches.
made almost no effort to censor Western newsmen deemed un-
outgoing dispatches formally, friendly by Premier Fidel Cas-
EUROPE ; ? tro's Government could not ob-
In Spain, the foreign press tam n entry visas. 'Entry was
was not subject to censorship denied two ChileAur newsmen
of outgoing news, except by the assigned by The. 'Associated
threat of expulsion. But no per- Press to. '?cover ;the. Chilean
manent correspondent has been President's 'visit to 'Cuba, ?
expelled in four years. Spanish MIDDLE EAST ,
news Media,..' however, con- '
tinued . to be. censorecL. In Lebanon, a free-wheeling
national press demanded*--and
Dispatches' of. , foreign cor-
usually grit?a lot of freedom.
respondents were not censored
In 'Greece, but the Government But,in,Septeniber,;the Lebanese
Government, imposed censor-
cOntrolled Athens News Agency
censored incoming news before ship , during Israeli attacks,
made in retaliation for the
distributing it. The agency de-
Olympic killings in Munich.
leted anything that might em-
barrass the Government. Censorship does not officially
exist in. Egypt,' but every for-
Britain is freer of censidrshr15
eign correspondent knows that
than most c6untries, but a Gov-
a censor is the first person to
ernment committee urged re-
forms of the Official Secrets Act read his story on its way out
that, would have the effect of of the country. A major prob-
lem for foreign correspondents
permitting more investigative
In Cairo is the lack of access
reporting similar to that done
in the United States. Though to officials. ??
the British army is battling In Israel, news concerning
military security, army, oil and
some stories of the occupation
of Arab territory remained on
the military censorship list. But I
were being relaxed.
there were signs that the rules1
SOVIET UNION
No American newsmen were
expelled from the Soviet Union
in 1972, perhaps an indication
of Government 'reluctance to
disturb the process of improv-
ing. Soviet-American relations.
A British correspondent was
expelled in May and a Japanese
newsman was told in. October
to, leave "voluntarily" or be ex-
pelled;He left.
News dispatches leaving the
Soviet Union were not cen-
sored. Photogra hs howeve
men are carefully controlled.
The Government is understood
to "be prepared, however, to
grant. more visas for visits by
newsmen. from publications
critical of the Country's policy
of racial segregation.
ASIA
The Imposition of martial law
In. the Philippines resulted In
the . banning of reports from
abroad that were critical of the
country, temporary censorship
of outgoing dispatches, the sus-
pension of about 10 major
Manila daily newspapers, 30
radib. stations , arid four teievi-
skin stations ? and' the arrest
without charges of 23 Jour-
nalists..
Censoithip' of outgoing
-? ??
no attempt was made to inv.
pose, censorship. ?
LATIN AMERICA-CARIBBEAN
Nevi's agencies and foreign
correspondents in Chile were
told that they would face un-
specified difficulties unless they
complied with a Government
order to submit copies of their
dispatches to the presidential
press office. Chilean authorities
also admitted to the monitor-
ing of correspondents' copy.
Chilean courts stood as prtection against many of th
moves taken against the media
within the country. In two
years in office, the administra-
tion of 'President Salvador Al-
lende ,1Gossens has sued orko-
EPP.613.r.,9 9,
NEW YORK TIMES
1 January 1973
PRESS INSTITUTE
? ; IS CRITICAL OF US
It Charges Courts Are Used
to Chip Away at Freedom
, Special to the Plew York nines
GENEVA, Dec. 31?The in.
temational Press Institute as.
serted today that the Nixon Ad.
Ministration was "attempting td
chip away at press freedom
through the courts and by the
threats of court action."
? In its annual world review of
'press freedom, the institute said
I that the Nixon Administration
apparently intended to make
, the "journalist timid In re-
search for the facts and the
public nervous when confront-
ed by a reporter asking for
them.
Nevertheless, the study by the
institute's French director, Er-
nest Meyer, found that in the
United States the "foundation
stone of freedom of speech and
the press edifice that has been
built on. it remains almost tin.
scathed." ? ? . ? :
The institute, ribngovern.
mental organization with head'
quarters in Zurich, is supported
by 1,700 editors and publishers
in 62 countries. ,
More Curbs Seen ,
Reviewing press develop-=
Ments over the last year, the
Institute said that the trend to
restrict press freedoni. was
stronger than In 1971. Barely
one-fifth of the 132 Members of
the United Nations "enjoy what
can genuinely be called free-
dom of information," it re-.
ported.
The survey also cited what it
termed the "continuing efforts
of governments to erode free-
dom of expression through in.
timidation of journalists and
manipulation of mass media.",
The aim, it said, is to "give
the impression that the inter-
ests of the country are neces.,
sarily Identical with those of
.the government in power."
, But the "true danger," thd
review continued, "lies in the,
fact that a ,growing number,
of governments,' parliamentary
,representatives, citizens and
even some members of the
press begin to accept that at-
tacks on freedom of expression
are legitimate and justifiable.".
Marcos Assailed
The most serious attack od
this freedom in the last year,
.according to the institute, was
the "silencing of the most cow-
rageous and frank press in
Asia, that of the Philippines."
' Actions by President Ferdi.
nand E. Marcos, following the
establishment of quasi-martial
rule in the Philippines, amount-
ed to a "deliberate dismantling
of the free mass media in his
?
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The review listed what it
;called the "notorious decision"
lof the United States Supreme
' COurt in the case of Earl Cald-
Iwel, a New York Times report-
ier, among last year's "threats
tto the freedom of the press."
( In the case the Supreme
1Court ruled that reporters did
snot have the right to withhold
1,from Federal grand juries the
sources of information given in
Confidence or to refuse to
testi-
WASHINGTON POST
fy. about criminal acts their had
been told about under a pledge
of secrecy.
The institute noted an in-
crease in press complaints of
government secrecy and eva.
sion by Government officials in
the United ,States. But it said
that there was also a growing
number of Government "se,
crete being given to the presi
by anonymous official sources.
JAPAN TIMES
27 December 1972
Arab Narcotics
iSmuggling Claimed.
TEL AVIV (AP) ? An Israeli
newspaper claimed Tuesday
Arab 'guerrill'a organizations
were smuggling opium and oth-
er dangerous .drugs for a Leba-
nese Cabinet Minister in ex-
change for political support.
The Jerusalem Poo, newspa-
per identified the Minister as'
Sabr: Hamatiphi Minister Of
,Public Works and 8-4tio
Foreign Relations' Secrets:
Less Reyealing Than Enriching
PROBABLY the loudest complainers
, about executive branch secrecy, pArtic-
li ularly in the area of foreign affairs,
w are members of the Senate who serve
on the Foreign Relations Committee. ,
/ Yet none have guarded 'mere sedu-
lously its own private documents than
those same committee members. Now,
at long last, a change is under way and
consequently a bouquet is appropriate,
?? small one at least.
/ Some years back Chairman Ful-
bright, himself a one pres-
ident, began what he calls educational
hearings by his committee which were
largely the product of his frustration
*, over executive branch policy on China
;t And Indochina. Many figures .of history
' past testified at these hearings and
t While much of what they said was use-
ful historically much of it was more
useful politically as a prod to the
r President of the day.
Fulbright and his committee, how-
1, ever, never opened their own files to
the public though they were dipped
, into from time to time for useful clues
(- for the hearings. Now, however, for the
first time the committee is printing for
public distribution some of its own
' closed-door hearings of years past. The
f first ones off the press cover the Tru-
man Doctrine and the Greek-Turkish
aid program of 1947. There are no star-
tling revelations but the words then of
Dean Acheson, James Forrestal, Rob- ,
ert Patterson, Vice Adm. Forrest Sher-
man and others and those of such sen-
ators as Arthur Vandenberg and Tom
Connally will enrich the history of
that crucial time.
THE BIGGEST skeptic on the com-
mittee about such publication has been
--the Senate's senior senator, George Al-
ken of Vermont who came to the Sen.
ate in 1941 but who did not become a
committee member until 1954. He fi-
nally agreed to publication provided
any living senator or ex-senator gave ,
his approval. In the instant case that
meant only former Sen. Henry Cabot
Lodge Jr. State Department clearance,
as well, was required.
It is Fulbright's hope to continue the
r publication of such hitherto secret tes-
timony. But the committee lacks the
1. funds to do the job adequately:\ for ex-
- I
ample, to publish testimony from ear-
lier years. If Aiken will permit it, pub-
lication of testimony from later years
,will gradually occur. Hopefully, the
full Senate will give the committee'
some more money to keep this highly
useful venture alive and to expedite it.
It was, of course, the row over Publi-
cation of the Pentagon Papers, and the .
attendant argument about over-classifi-
cation of executive branch documents,
that has sparked this Senate move.
The same row also has helped speed,
at least a bit, publication of the State,
Department's historical series of docu-
ments.
THE STATE SERIES began back in
1861 and, unbeReVable as it now seems,
the documents during the rest of the
19th century were published no later
than two years 'after they were writ-
ten, including a great many sensitive
papers. The first World War slowed
the process so that between the wars'
publication was about 15 years from
current. After World War II docu-
ments fell 20 and then 25 years behind.
Currently State is about to issue the
last of eight volumes covering the year
1947.
After the Pentagon Papers row Pres-
ident Nixon asked for and got more
money to speed declassification and
publication of State's series. William
Franklin, State's chief historian, says
that "we're desperately trying to gain
on chronology" and he hopes by 1976
to be exactly 20 years behind, a five
year 'gain.
Of course, State doesn't publish ev-
erything even from a quarter century
ago. Some documents are omitted be-
cause they deal with persons still in
power: the Shah of Iran, Chiang Kai-
shek, Franco, Mao and Chou En-lai and
some Latin leaders such as the SOMOZA
family. But the bulk of the material
does get published to the benefit of
history. Since 1861 some 200 volumes
have been printed.
FULBRIGHT'S COMMITTEE has
published several studies on Indochina
extracted chiefly from the Pentagon
Papers. These well annotated staff
Studies relate the raw evidence of the
Pentagon Papers to various memoirs
/4
porter of the guerrillas in the,
Lebanese Government.
The Post said it received its,
Information from an American!
writer, Ed Hymoff, who it said
was researching the - flow of'
drugs from the Middle East for
an American senator. ,
T h e guerrillas smuggled,
opium, morphine base and
hashish, into E. pt and several
the Post
rn
tieirtielO tetetireh
The Post said he ,was "known'
to have good connections", with'
t h e Ahlerican intelligence
,
agencies..
and
and other published material' to pro-
vide a well balanced perspective. One
staffer, Robert M. Blum, has even sue-7:,'
cecded in dredging up some interest-
ing old OSS documents of 1945-46
which are being published for the first
,time.
Whether the committee will have
the courage to permit publication of.,
Its own secret hearings dealing with
'Indochina in the Eisenhower-Kennedy-
Johnson years is an open question,
What seems to worry the reluctant
senators is not wifether, publication'
would embarrass the various executive
branch witnesses; who presumably.
were speaking with more candor in a
closed rather than.. an open session.''
The worry Is ,over how senators would
look today in the light of current views
and knowledge of the long American
inyolvement. Whether, in short, some
of them would look foolish.
' From the public record His obvious
that some senators, both the departed
and some still serving; indeed would
not look very good. Fulbright has
publicly recanted his earlier views and
Sen. Mansfield has come close to doing
so. But a claim of consistency is the
more usual senatorial posture.
IT IS OBVIOUS to arty student of
history, whether he is dealing with
In-
,dochlna or Europe or almost' any
other problem area, that the legisla-,
tive-executive relationship, plays an Im-
portant role, sometimes a key role.
The executive often bases its plans on
what it thinks will be the nature of the
congressional reception, 'first of all
that by the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee. And of course party political con-
siderations seldom are absent though
equally seldom conceded to be present.
In short the historical record is not
complete unless this interplay is also
made public, as far as it ever was put ,
down by a committee stenographer.
Committee hearings often are con-
fusing, usually disjointed, frequently
repetitive and frustratingly incomplete
? because the wrong questions were ,
asked or even when they were they,
Were not followed by further ques-
tions. Still, they are a very important
part of history. So we award that small
bouquet to Foreign Relations in hopes
? of awarding a big one biter on.
r .ty /11777,117,771
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WASHINGTON STAR
7 January 1973
Chinese rug5 u.gglers,
Tired to 'Dutch .C.Onnectioh`
FRANKFUR'I\, Germany
(AP) ? Two U.S. congress-
men said yesterday that
Chinese sailors have estab-
lished a "Dutch connection" at
the ports of Amsterdam and
Rotterdam for smuggling most
of the heroin peddled to U.S.
'servicemen stationed in West
Germany.
Reps. Morgan Murphy,
and Robert H. Steele,
R-Conn? blamed the Dutch
government for laxity in nar-
cotic enforcement resulting in
a "distinct Increase in heroin
availability and use among
'U.S. soldiers in West Germa-
ny." They said the heroin
' other Vietnam drug situation
' develop among our troops in
(West Germany."
Steele and Murphy said drug
use among U.S. soldiers in
West Germany increased from
about 1.3 percent of those test-
ed in December 1971 to be-
.tween 4.2 and 6.3 percent in
October 1972.
They classified 6,000 to 8,000
of the 195,000 army troops in
West Gexrmany as "users and
abusers" of narcotics, includ-
ing heroin? amphetamines
i
and barbituates. ?
.1
came from Hong Kong.
"We urgently need th'e coop-
eration of the Netherlands to ,
stem the flow of heroin origi-
nating in Southeast Asia," ,
Steele told a news conferefice.'.
"We cannot afford to let an- '
; Another 2,000 troops have
been identified as drug users
and are under treatment by
, Army authorities, said the
congressmen, who are mem-
'bars of the House Committee
;on Foreign Affairs.
Steele and Murphy said they
learned the extent of the
Dutch connection in heroin
smuggling during talks the
1 last three days with the West
German police and govern-
ment and with officials of the
I Central IntelligenceAgency
;land the Army's Criminal In-
vestigation Division. ,
Didn't Visit Holland
Although the congressmen
did not visit Holland, Murphy
I said American officials there
II told hini a year ago that the ,
country was becoming a ma-
, ' jor I transit point in heroin
smuggling following withdraw-
als of U.S. troops 'from Viett
nam. ?
Steele and Murphy gave this
pidture of the Dutch connec-
; Hon: Peasants in the remote
I and hard-to-police border re-
I glens of Laos, Burma and
I Thailand ? the ? su-called
i "golden triangle" ? harvest
poppy seeds under direction of
; "ethnic Chinese" warlords
I driven out of their CouMny by
I WASHINGTON POST
11 January 1973 t.
Response on Russia's Space technology.
In a report from Moscow (Dec. 13)
":Robert G. Kaiser writes that "despite
all its scientific achievements, the So-
viet Union is a second or even a third-
1 rate technological power." As proof, he
t. gives examples from cosmonautics, avi-
ation, automobile industry, computing
i'l techniques and even silrgery. Not be-
!.? ing so erudite and being a specialist
ionly in one of the listed fields, namely
?
t", In cosmonautics, I will take the liberty
c'. ? of dwelling on Mr. Kaiser's assertions
i concerned with this area.
The U.S. planned its first soft land- '
1. ling on Mars in 1976, that is, five years,
r later than the U.S.S.R., and its first
soft landing on Venus in 1977-or seven
.'s years after the U.S.S.R. What is more, ,
,
I; ,an authoritative report of several re- '
f, search divisions of the U.S. Library of
Congress (1971) says: "While American ;
!
space efforts continue winding down ...
, . the overall Soviet space program re- ,
t mains a strong and growing enter-
it: prise." For Mr. Kaiser, this document
f.. Is evidently not very authoritative. n
(As for manned flights which are in
the main considered by Mr. Kaiser;
1971 saw the creation of the world's,.
first manned orbital station Salyut
i that opened up a qualitatively new,
stage in cosmonautics. Does Mr. Kaiser
really believe that the death of the cos-
monauts upon their return in any way
belittles its importance? After all, the
death of American astronauts in 1967
did not call in question the Apollo pro-
gram that is a generally recognized
. .
achievement of the U.S.A. The
U.S.S.R.'s abandonment of manned
flights to the Moon cannot be consid:
ered, as Mr. Kaiser does, at evidence
of its lagging behind. Soviet specialists
Think it more expedient to explore the
moon by automatic devices, with the
present level of world technology. Be-.
_
sides, manned flights to the moon In..voive tremendobs? expenses. That Was .,
precisely the reason why the Apollo
'program had to be stopped at the
"most interesting place" when it began
acquiring not only Prestige and techni-
cal importanCei- but also great scien-
tific value. As fot the Soviet automatic
devices, they will be steadily improved
.as they continue their planned studies
of the moon, "as is evidenced from the
' recent launching of a craft towards the
moon last Monday.
Evidently In an attempt to *Mind
Seviet scientists, Mr. Kaiser ',Unites:-
the Communists.
The poppy seeds are sent to ;
Hong .Kong, where heroin is
',produced and smuggled
i aboard ships by Chinese sea-
men. Deliveries then are made
, tliroughout the world with the
, I help of Chinese living over-
seas.
4 Increasing amounts of the
IlAsian heroin if appearing in'
I the West Coast of the United
;States following crackdowns'
Hon the Turkish and French
supply routes. Heroin coming ,
, into Europe arrives "priming-
, ly through the ports of Am-,
'? sterdam and Rotterdam, al-
though some enters through
the Scandinavian countries."
r The 're resenetatives de.
scribed
I Scribed the European heroin
, ;traffic as a natural transfer
, market from Vietnam to,
'America's largest seeSeas
'garrison of troops in West
Germany?some 212,000 sol-
diers and airmen.
"Soviet spa'C'e scierltists are' deli ahted:
that they now have a'Chance to share ,
America's success through the. joint/
Soviet-U.S. space flight scheduled foH
1975." Dr. James Fletcher, NASA direc.
tor, has a different view. He thinks
that the experiment is important for .1
both countries. It will perMit the A
. U.S.A., among other things, to fill the A
gap in manned flights between 1973 1
,.and 1978, not to dismiss highly trained. 1
specialists and not to mothball the fa.:
cilities. James Fletcher also believes
Is possible to use a Soviet orbital sta-
tion and is in principle for a joint
tian expedition. (His interview with .1
,UPI, Nov. 26, 1972.)
Thus, contrary to Mr. Kaiser, the
NASA head considers it Worthwhile:,
for the U.S.A. to cooperate on an equal '..
footing with a "third-rate technical '
power." Or maybe for Mr. Kaiser the,i
opinion of Dr. Fletcher is also not au.:;
-thoritative enough? ?
? I do not doubt that Mr. Kaiser fat
equally "competent" in the other field':
of Soviet technology which he is NV,
boldly discussing in his article.
? ? YURY MARMOT,: ?
&knee Commectstor V cputrr mateli
,Novest.1 Press Mew.
Moscon. ,
,4-4, ?
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WASHINGTON POST
14 JANUARY 1973
,
Chalmers M. Roberts DL
Contro
A
A Bad Time
1317 ?
inii?
or Disarray,
,m,
ti IT NOW HAS been nearly 17 years
' since President Eisenhower appointed
Harold Stassen to the post of Special
Assistant to the President for Disarma-
ment, with Cabinet status. In 1961 the
i job was institutionalized with congrets.
sional creation, at President Kennedy's
,,.request, of the Arms Control-and Die-
armament Agency. William C. Foster
became head .of ACDA and the chief*
negotiator, as well, on arms .control
measures. In 1969 President Nixon
chose Gerard C. Smith to head ACDA,
t and later to be the chief negotiator for
(.; the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT). Now, as the second Nbton
term begins, Smith has departed by his
own choice and the President has tap-
ped U. Alexis Johnson to be the negoti-
ator. No one has been announced-as
Smith's successor to head ACDA,a
. quasi-independent agency housed and
? supported by the State Department
but with its own congressionally ap-
l? proved budget.
It is evident, in retrospect, that all
, the Major decisions ,in the arms COn-
i? trol field since the initial Bartich Plan .
In 1046 have been presidential deci-
Mons, but it also is evident that prest?
! dentin' choices have been circum-
scribed by the quality and extent ririf
t' the bureaucratic machinery which has
. examined the problems and possibili-
ties and thus, through various layer*
BALTIMORE SUN
j 10 January 1973
of the government, served up the/ Op-
tions. Stassen, Foster and Smith .aU
were effective, or ineffective, to t.iut
degree that they could establish an,inr
dependent input from an office or ,an
agency that was beholden neither ,to
the diplomatic views of State, the mill-
tary views of Defense, or the viewsrqf
the White House staff.
It is for such reasons as these that
the appointment of Alex Johnson 'hes
? done more than raise eyebrows among
those in and out of government, Who
concern themselves with arms control,
above all with the SALT II negotia-
tions which resume in Geneva for a
second session on Feb. 27. Johnson is
widely vie.wed as a temporary appoipp
ment. He suffered a heart attack It
while back and his doctors have
warned him against excessive work.
For that reason, it appears, he turned
down a Nixon offer to succeed Ambas-
sador Bunker in Saigon. The top cit-
,reer man it State, Johnson is now 64.
He has had only minimal acquaintance
with the complex arms control Issues.', '
THE ISSUES at SALT -11 are going
to be very tough to resolve. Henry KIS-
singer, the generalissimo of SALT "I
here in Washington, has had no finite
for the problem because of Indochina
and now his own continuation in the
,and
House is uncertain. By all 8?.
counts, then, the U.S. Is in a holding
pattern on arms control and thik
likely to last for some time. President
Nixon's separation of the two posts' Of
ACDA head and top negotiator adds
an additional uncertainty.
It was widely believed when SAL'
II began that there would be no pre*.
sure from either Washington or Mos-
cow for speedy new agreements.' The
interim pact on offensive weapon*
runs for five years and most people
felt that not until about the fourth
year would negotiations become int**,
sive. 13ut from what is now learneil
about the first go-round of SALT II.
this may not be necessarily true;
deed, a major opportunity for a Ain's/
new phase in arm* Control just 7711i1V
be present, if the U.S. is prepared 'to'
grasp it. ,
This is because at the recent Geneva '
talks, all behind closed doors, the So-
viet delegation expressed an interest 4
in the- control of multiple warhead !
1
MIRVs. This came as a surprise t i
Smith and his delegation but therel . '
no doubt that Moscow did indicate
such an interest. It is true, however, '
that the other anticipated problem
'notably the Moscow demand for limits '
on the American forward based *ye.
tems (FBS), in any new agreemeir) )
were put forward by the Soviet sid .
But the Soviet talk of MIRY contii4 '
added a new dimension to the meet, .i
Ings. At this first session neither
laid down any formal proposals.. I,"t '
Quite obviously tile Kremlin intere0
in MIRV control must sining from Oil,
enormous American lead in such wap
heads thOpgh the Soviets are ahead 1.4 .
, numbers of missile launchers and' 1
throw weight of warheads. It wail .
take some very difficult trade-offs ! to,
reach . any form of MIRV agreement, I
and monitoring of such an agreement; 1
beyond monitoring a ban on further
I tests, would be equally hard t&'
achieve.
?
I achieve. But if there is no agreements i
multiple warheads will be a major el.- ;
ment in both arsenals.
THUS IT APPEARS this is a very
',bad moment for the American arm*
control establishment to be in such a
state of disarray as the Johnson api ?
pointrnent, and the Kissinger situationt
indicate it to be. Only President Nixon
can change this state of affairs,' al.
though the Senate disarmament sub. ,
committee of Foreign Relations could ?
do some prodding.
The opporttielty to ebntrol MIRVii fii
judged, at best,?to be a long shot. %it
so were many other opportunities' hi ?
past years that finally reached fruititila I
through the perseverance of sudh m'eti
as Stamen, Foster and Smith. The US.1
can do no less than try?and there'll,
currently no sign it is ready to do that.1
Our Energy Needs: What Can Be Done?
News releases from the Maritime
*Administration have been empha-
sizing what has been recognized
generally for some time: The coun-
try's "demands for petroleum and
natural gas will progressively ex-
ceed domestic production capabili-
ties with each passing year," this
. under present conditions. The news
releases then point to the Mer-
'chant Marine Act of 1970 and un-
? derscore the steps which have been
taken under it to improve and ex-
pand that section' of the U.S. flag
fleet which transports "energy im-
ports." Reference is made to oil
' tankers, very large crude carriers
and ships to carry liquefied natural
gas. (which now carries the label
LNG). The impression is given that
the country's maritime interests,
backed by the federal government,
will provide the country's share of
the ships needed to transport oil
and LNG from abroad. All of which
Is reassuring but then in one news
release this paragraph catches the
eye:
. "Energy imports have very great
ramifications on the nation?in
terms of our national security and
the economy. There is an under-
standable concern about being
heavily dependent upon foreign
suppliers who could turn off the
spigot in the event political dis-
agreements arose between 6ur two
countries." -
?
6
As immediately noted in the
news release a presidential task ;
force is examining all aspects or ;)
the country's energy deficits and,:
considering various alternates to
alleviate shortages.
But the problems here seerh im-
measurable. On this score a Mari-
time Administration news release
reports that "even if substantial
increases of domestic energy sup-
lilies are brought In over the next
10 or 15 years their impact will be
blunted by the fact that domestic
consumption will have doubled
within that same time frame." '
Shall wonder then that some claim
that our only hope for a sufficient
d
energy supply is the run. ? ,
=r-aruarz-c-mr-mv,w.i.
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, NEW YORK: TIMES, SUNDAY, JANUARY 14, 1973 ? .
'Drug Panel Concludes 6-Nation Latin
? By MARVINE HOWE
I Speclel tom, New York lime*
alq DE JANEIRO, Jan. 13?
Vile 'Chairman of the United
States National Commission on
Marijuana and Drug Abuse saidl
here today that the war on,1
.drugs should be stepped Up on
three levels?education, reha-
bilitation and police action.
The, chairman, Raymond P.
Shafer, former Governor of
Pennsylvania, made his remarks
in response to qtiestions on
Governor Rockefeller's proposal
for increased narcotics penal-
ties in New York.
"I have not seen the original
Rockefeller recommendations'
and so am not prepared to say
whether mandatory sentences,
is the answer," Mr. Shafer told
a news conference in a down-
town hotel. "But I am in favor
of. increasing the war on driigs
On all three levels."
Report Due March 23
Mr. Shafer 'cited Latin-Amen.
lean and particularly 'Brazilian
cooperation "at the highest
level" in the drive on narcotics.
'the commission also visited
Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia,
Peru and Ecuador and talked
here yesterday with a drug
Tour; Asks Stepped Up Drive
expert from Argentina. of drugs and drug traffic, Mr. "from Prance and the, Middle
The commission, which con- Shafer said. East have used Brazil as a
eluded today a tour of six
Latin-American countries, will
deliver its final report on the
world drug scene to President
Nixon and Congress on March
23, Mr. Shafer said. Members
of the commission visited 36
nations, Brazil being the last
on the list?to study the con-
trol, misuse and abuse of drugs.
A major gap in the report
will be first-hand information
from the Communist countries.
The commission did not visit
the Soviet Union, China or any
other Communist country be-
cause it had been given to un-
derstand informally that it
would trot be welcome.
4'Officially, the Soviet Union
says it has no drug problem,
but unofficially our sources say
they do have w problem," Mt.
Shafer said, adding, "I would
assume they have the same
problem as all of us."
The new report will maiptain
the same general premises as
did the report in :March, 1972,
in which the commission tee-
'There should be a new pol-
icy in the United States to dis-
courage the use of drugs and
punish the traffickers, the mer-
cenaries who are profiting from
,the situation," he said.
1 The commission visited South
Vietnam in June and noted "a
'transshipment area and are
probably still trying to do so,
he said. He could not confirm
reports that there was a new
Latin-American connection from
,ASia but did not exclude that
'possibility. '
' "About 90 per cent of the
marked change for the better,"
world's cocaine comes from
In the attitude of United States
military there over the last BthoeliviAa,ndes Mountains?Peru,
Ecuador?where it is
two years, Mr. Shafer said.
"At one time, the use of legally, grown' and there is
nothing we den do about drugs caused dishonorable it?
charge;dis-
now, drugs users are except crop substitution in the
treated as people who need long run" Mr. Shafer Said. He
Help and are given. help," he said that the United States im-
ipo ? tries
coca from those court-,
said:
All the nations of Latin es for cola drinks, and that
America are awakening to the the local Indians ate coca'
leaves to help them to With-
fact that drug control is a new
stand the altitude, cold end
national problem and want help hunger.
in handling it, he said. He
added that some countries, haMr. Shafer concluded "There
however, we unable to co- in s definitely been an increase
re ,
operate in the effort because 1 wrsotht a of all
odtrucocgs_abinurtho,the
their internal structures were use oll marijuana is leveling'
not yet set up for the task, off and probably going dawn. ,
, He said that Latin America ------.?.--,-4----.?
was important both as?a drug
ommended that a distinction be, smuggling route and a source
made between the private use of drugs. Organized treffickeri
NEW YORK TIMES
1 10 January 1973
? ' SON7ereignty in the Skies
?
By Karl Loewenstein
? AMHERST, Mass.?Dontestic and in-
; ternational efforts to prevent air.
Piracy deal with the fait accompli
rather than with the crime in progress.1
So far the vast majority of hijackings
haVe succeeded because the demands
of the air pirates were not resisted,
4 whether for ransom money, safe con-
duct to a willing foreign country or*
'even the release of duly convicted
compatriots. In the face of the near-
ritualistic threat to blow up the air-
plane, humanitarian motivations to
save the lives of innocent passengers
, and crews are given priority. .;
I submit that something more im-
, portant than even human life is at
;stake. To put it bluntly: if a few
!armed terrorists can defy the might.'
;of the state in which the piracy is
;being committed, the state and its ?
:authorities forfeit their sovereignty,
?that priceless possession with which
i civilization as we know it stands and
falls. ,
- The only, effective answer to this
' deadly threat to human civilization' is
to fight fire with fire: Instead of
honoring the Sermon on the Mount the
society 'under attack must become
militant, and this even at the risk of
endangering the lives of innocent by-
, Astanders or the loss of airline property,'
(that is insured, anrkay).
, Are we totally incapable of learning
, from history? Once before the United ,
States had to face humiliation by Arab
terrorists. For more than thirty years,
from the Continental Congress to the
aftermath of the war of 1812, the,
"rascally potentates of the Barbary
States?Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli? 1
? had preyed on American merchant
shipping in the Mediterranean with
impunity. There was no protecting,
navy. They forced our Governent to
pay annual tribute, called "presents,"
and to ransom captured Americans.
,?
?
that in reality the dilemma is cons
siderabiy ,lessened. A terrorist who',`
demands ransom money and safe
, conduct abroad is hardly ever pre-.4.
'pared to die himself by blowing up the
: plane. He wants to live and enjoy? the
, loot. Hence the ground rules are: No
? ransom must be paid. The victimized.
.plane must not be flown abroad.
Neither our threat to declare war
' nor naval demonstrations proved ef-
fective until a naval expedition under
Commodore Decatur enforced. peace
'without tribute or ransom. ? t
To resist blackmail by force seems
a tremendously hard decision for all
Contented. However, experience shows
Far more difficult to deal with are
the piracies staged by the Arab terror-,1
ists and foreign associates, such as.
the Japanese kamikaze, who are prel
? pared and willing to die for' their -4 .
cause. But even in such case their
demands must be denied, particularly ,,i
if aimed at the release of convicted..
criminals of their own stripe. Since i
'no self-respecting state can be ex-1
1
pected to bend its neck to foreign :
blackmail, the humanitarian con-
siderations must be subordinated tW,
the higher end of the self-preservatibti i
of state and society. ? ?
Rarl Loeweniteitt Is Professor Ernerl-)
? otus of Jurisprudence at 'Amherst Col-,,1
, lege.
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SAIGON POST
1 December 1972
'Conduit Pinto Drpst'
ge Of Living Death'
There is nothing Impres-
sive about the bridge. It is
what It represents that
demands attention-this two.
lane bridge which j oinsth
border of Thailand and
Burma at Mae Sal district
and Tachilek.
It is called the Mae Nok
bridge. ?They Bridge of Liv-
ing Death* would be a more
appropriate name. For
through this bridge Opium,
heroin and Morphine are
transported from the nolo'rious (Golden Triangles
through Thailand to the
Underground markets of
Indochina, Hong,, Kong,
Eurupe and America.* , ?
As the cargo of death on
the shoulders of dozens of
*smiles Makes its way to
trucks parked nearby, a
? thirtyish, dapper man wat-
ches with seeming curio- ,
sity or unobstrusive '
inn ocence.
Lo Hsing-han carries ??
4ne-r,e opium today,* whis-
per men in a stupor as thoy
sit and look across the bank
of the river on the Bur-
mese side. There is glad-
nes, 'almost reverence, in
the toices of these heroin
addicts who speak cs1 the
man with the air of inno-
cence.
??
The others keep inhaling ?
heroin, awaiting flight of
the mind to the realm of
fantasy, They dd not know ?
'Lc, 11.ing.han nor his bro.
ther, Lo Hsing-min, heroin
*kings* of the Golden
Triangle, the til?bot dot-
NEW YORK TIMES
14 January 1973
Soviets on Disarmament
'to the Editor:
,
N. Loginov 'of the Soviet Mission to
the U.N. criticized (letter Jan. 7) your'
editorial for omitting "for some reason ?
or other one of the key items on the ;
-Assembly's agenda."
Mr. Loginov claims that this item?
:"nonuse of force in international rela-
tions and permanent prohibition of
the use of ? nuclear ? weapons"?was, ?
'adopted as a result of "vigorous and
constructive discussion." This item,
? and the two weeks of discussion in ;
November, was, in the words of Dutch ,
Ambassador Fack, "a nonstarter."
?? In the first four meetings (of eight),
,only eleven states talked, and of these
six were socialist. Whole meetings
were canceled for lack of speakers. 4
; When 'a revised resolution ' was
adopted, the vote wai 73 to 4, with
46 abstentions. This divided vote .
? scarcely fulfills Ambassador Malik's
I. prediction that the adoption of this
resolution will enable the 27th session ,
to "go down in history as the Assem- ;
-bly that liberated mankind from the
threat of nuclear war."
Of the five nuclear powers, only the,
:soviet Union 'voted in favor of the
f. resolution, with China voting against
L"and 'France, ? the U.K., and the U.S.
la?stbstainIng. Some of the nuclear pow-
ers might be expected to resist giving
'.up -use of their expensive nuclear
armory, but two states which have led
1, U.N. disarmament efforts?Sweden
, and Mexico?.also abstained. ,
?
area straddling Thailand,'
Laos and Burma. i
n A silent witness to the Le A
brothers' shipment of des- 9
traction is a boy not quits
. 10 years o:d. Near the
bridge on the Burmese 'Side ,
" he sits in the shade with
grownup addicts after par-
? ling at heroin cigarettes.
? One. looks at this boy
floating in a heady," giddy
world of dretims and
' wonders how long it will A
lake him to waste away in
body And mind.
One also wonders how.
many
many more like him are ?'
'doomed to painful, mean:1,i
ing:ess existence andl
eventual death wherever ;
the Lo brothers' dembnic
drugs find their way.
a
It is a tragedy that, 27 years 1nto'4
. the atomic ,era, the use of nuclear,,
'weapons still is not prohibited
= ternational law. However, there ap-
pears no easy route to this process
and negotiations must include all nu.
clear powers. An expanded Geneva =
.Disarmament Conference would seem
, the best forum. Two weeks of debate' in:,
a General Assembly ? cannot 'perform
: this task, for closely associated with
banning the use of nuclear weapons ?
S is a ban on their development, produc;
tion and stockpiling and the destruc-
tion of existing stockpiles. A 'second
forum might be current efforts to draft
additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva i
Conventions which would prohibit the
use of certain weaprms, ? ?? ? ? '
The Soviet Union bag .taken impore
? tont initiatives for disarmament in the."'
past. This item was not one, since it
? served no purpose except to isolate"
China on this issue, with the latter
' voting against the resolution with such.1,
'strange bedfellows as Portugal and.,
, South Africa. This Rein ?caused the;
Chinese at the end of ' the debate to,.
.aceuse the Russians of having "honey;i
on lipa and dagger in-heart," passing.;
''fish eyes for, oearls." After stimu-;'
sating this rhetoric, this resolution
is hardly, as Mr. Loginov suggests4;
? "a significant contribution of the
.t:ta the catise.of.further detente," ? ??.,
. . ? ? HOMER. A. JACK,111
Secretary Generafh
World Conference of.'i
: ? Religion for Pea*
' New, york, Nian. 81.1973v,
*. ?
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For East
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, london
January 1973
lt/TY Vietnam War notebooks date back to 1949
LU Piled in boxes in my study, they are filled
like the forgotten diaries of childhood, With
-faint' and gornetimes unintelligible writing but
'also with the tinder to fire old memories.
I have beeh going through them, trying' to find
'13'otne scene or incident that might in itself illumine
, ate the past and help to explain the present.
,Friends dimly remembered have stepped from the
pages, along with many of the events, credible and
Incredible, that went to make the war. ?
"I hope so," I have General Henri Navarre
aping in 1954 on the eve of the battle of Dien
Bien Phu .in answer to my question whether, he
thought the Viet Minh would attack. And at the
'?other 'end of the scale, ethe chilling remark of a
Young Viet Minh soldier whose name asked the
day the Communists took over in Hanoi. "Sir," he
replied, "I have no name. I am a soldier in the
reople's Liberation Army.",
'That was a day to remember'. No One who was
there is ever likely to forget 3. The victors came
in their sandshoes, trudging thrdugh the mud with
'their ammunition slung on bamboo poles, their nl sig. it t i I h i di
iI
t
?,if
It
On the eve of the new Iv ,4
'1 peace talks due to begin
r, in Paris tomorrow, a ,
I ? correspondent with uniquir
experjience of Vietnam
looks at the truth to be
? distilled from alniost '
25 years of reporting the
war there. The record, he
' finds, emphasises for him
, ? '?, a fundamental aspect:pf '
the savage tragedy:
itl
by Denis!
arner
s w e on r cyc es, t e r spatch. riders on ,
:pushbikes: The vanquished went in tanks and 'Vietnam,s,future rests",
?
armoured cars and half-tracks and trucks, trail-, finally in ? ?
their howitzers and other weapotis of convene' ?
tional war, humiliated And beaten by an enemy Vietnamese hands.
they never really did under-
,,stand.
The eOup that overthrew
'Diem.... Tet,.19613, and the ;
,iawful scene I saw with Sir
fl obert Thompson and' '
'Michael Charlton when,
.after. the curfew had closed ?
us in, we watched a police-
limn drive a naked and
'hysterical infant from the
teps of, the National
Assembly, building with a and dumped it far off among the rice-
lighted 'newspaper Bad operations fields, they had split k with trenches.
With ARVN (Army of the Republic or Troops could make their way along it
:Vietnam) . . . . Good operations with- with some difficulty, but it was impas-
ARVN, . . . Days of compassion among sable even for the most agile of jeeps,
, the refugees with that best of men, Dr: and unrepairable since quarries were
Pim ()liana Dan. . . Stories late at
night from defectors. . . .
There is no end to it, but nothing,
I find, so relevant to much of what has
happened since, than the first action
/ saw with theFrench in the Red River,
delta in the spring of 1952. On too
many occasions it ,was repeated in
South Vietnam, and every time it
helped the Viet Cong to find recruits
among the peasants.
?
, The death of General de I,attre de:
Tassigny had brought General Ra..il;
Salan. a veteran of too many years in ?
Indo-China, to command the French;
forces. His Tongking subordinate was
General Gonzales de Linares, who had '
established hts field headquarters in
the southern delta for an operation dee'
signed to throw the Viet Minh infiltra-
tors into the sea.
For the task de Linares had five
mobile groups, each a baby division of
about regimental strength, with ancil-
lary armour and artillery. The axis of
the advance was along a road headed
east to the coast from the town of Thai
Binh, where battered mud-and-plaster
houses, roughly thatched with rice
straw, clustered around an immense,
barn-like, Roman Catholic church.
The artillery was sited Mthin 'a
'stone's throw of de Linares's 'headquar-
ters, and at all hours of the night and
,day it pumped shells into the rice-fields
and villages ahead. The advance itself
was painfully slow. Where the Viet
Minh had not cut the road into sections
non-existent in the flat rice-plains o
the delta and the Viet Minh held the
hills beyond.
, The ,French crept. forward, .usirig,
the debris of villages knocked down in
,the advance and steel matting to makel
a new mad alongside the old. In the
course of one morning they demolished
a complete village, loaded it into lorries
and rolled everything from kitchen,
tt
utensils to iron bedsteads into the mu'
to make a path for the tanks and
;armoured cars.
ter to the story of delta despair.. It.Wat
one of hundreds of forts, differing in
no essential detail from all the others,'
which stretched like, pylons across the
delta. Frorp its brick tower the look-
out could. sec his neighbouring forts,'
the one hehind and the one in front,
and what remained of the road that
linked the two. Beyond these were'
,others and others again. \
The fort was commanded by a young
French officer who had completed his
two-year tour of duty in Indo-China and
was overdue to sail for France. Under
he had French and Vietnamese
,sergeants and Corporals, 'and, a total
garrison 'Strength, mostly Vietnamese,
of 35.
All around him the Viet Minh
dribbled in. His daytime patrols, link-
ing up with those from neighbouring
forts, were fired on by snipers, then by4
regular formations of Vie Minh troops.
At first the Viet Minh had just a few
guerrillas. Then they had sections,
platoons, companies, battalions and
finally regiments. They brought
bazookas and some 75-millimetre moun-
lta guns. They wanted rice, recruits
salt and the machines and consurrneij
,
goorls that the French (had to izrovide tO
Every now and then from the rice- maintain the economic life of the delta.,
fields a single shot hissed among the But above all they wanted to establi'shj
troops. Young lieutenants from St. Cyr bases in the enemy's rear and to exten
With their map cases and binoculars their political grasp,
'and badges of rank were the snipers' l The,fort commandor knew it woul
primary target. Occasionally a spotter i ?
he ever left
something of a mira
plane saw movement in a village ahead, on miracle if
and fighter-bombers and artilleralive. The telephone lines with hi
nt;
wo
Id begin work again, perhaps kill- .neighbouring forts were cut. He could
lag a few Viet Minh but doing nothing no longer travel 'by road to Thai DinIC
to win friends?among the local people, For a time he maintained communicae
who in this area were almost-all Roman tion with Ms neighbours by radio, bitt..
Catholics. - 'S that also ceased to function. A fort
. The relief of a French fort ten miles close to the east coast was the first to
Bi h added its own fall. The Viet Minh
,east of Thai n a own chap-. throughIptitsgtritts i211
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a bazooka. The walls crumbled and'
collapsed. With sub-machine-guns and
grenades, the Viet Minh followed up.
Next morning the red flag of the
Viet Minh replaced the Tricolour.
A week later another, nearer fort
fell. This time the Viet Minh used one
of their mountain guns. They wheeled'
it into position in the adjoining hamlet
mi and, over open sights and? at almost
zero ' range, blew a hole in the fort`
through which the assault party forced
its way. One by one the other forts felt
funtil only this one remained, an island,
in a hostile sea, a lonely outpost with'
zero life expectancy.
.1
;
:Each .night Viet
Minh closed in
The attack opened from a village
eight hundred yards to the south.
acihine-guns raked the fort and drew
eavy fire in return. The commander
thought .his fort was well designed, but
was no better, if no worse, than
Others whose fate he had seen ,ma
by smouldering piles of rubble.
1" It stood on an island in ti narrow'
stream, joined to the banks by two,
'bridges heavily protected by IGOOMS
and blocks. The rushing waters served
as a moat. On both banks and on the
island itself were rows of barbed wire
festooned with tin cans to give warning
of the intruder's approach. 'nig tower
was vulnerable. Its bricks were not
stout enough to withstand artillery or
:bazooka fire. But the 'thick bunkers
underneath were well provided with
ammunition and food. Each dawn the
.Tricolour waved defiantly from the
# ?I
,flower. Each night the Viet Minh came
closer. They fired at any sign of move-
ment, chipping the walls of the fort
with their bullets. The climax could
not be long delayed.
'
L!
But in March, 1952, the big French'
military convoys began to move to-
tward,s 'Thai Binh. The Viet Minh mined
'the main road, sniped at the forces
,moving by day and kept them off the,
road altogether at night
Operation Mercury pushed off from
'Thai Binh in the last week of March:'
16 infantry battalions with tank, artil-.
lery and air support, moving in a great
semi-circle extending from the swollen'
Red River to the coast. On its main axis'
of advance was the fort, its Tricolour'
Still flying.
The French relieved the fort on, the,
.third day of the advance. The bearded
, :commander, with bloodshot eyes,'.
, rushed to kiss the advancing infantry
captain on both cheeks. Everybody,'
shook hands with everybody, congratu-
lations, tears, stories, smiles. "I had
it boat to catch in January," the corn;
'mander kept saying. "I am very late."?
He left next morning end hits place
Was taken by another young lieutenant
." We shall pull down the tower and put,
'more concrete, much more concrete,
'round the sides," be told ane. "We have
cleared the delta before, you know.
Perhaps we shall have to do it again."
But the delta was never cleared, and.
'
by October of that year French reverses
'here and elsewhere had so changed the
military and political situation in Indo-
China that the shadow of defeat was
,everywhere. I cabled. The Daily
Telegraph: "Neither the French people
nor their Government will tolerate for
ever such losses as are now being
suffered in a war which holds out no
,promise Of victory and no prospect of
. 10
reward."
I had no idea that I would be writing
very much the same lines 15 years later
of a much greater power, the United
States.
At the beginning in 1946, when the
French bombarded Haiphong and Ho
Chi Minh took to the hills, the
Americans were ambivalent towards,
the war. Secretary of State George C.'
Marshall had scant regard for what he
regarded as France's "dangerously out-
,moded colonial concepts." At the same
time, he was not interested in "seeing'
colonial empire administrations repjaced
by a philosophy and political organisa-
tion directed from and controlled by the
Kremlin."
I doubt that anyone born after the
year 1940 will ever really understand the
Indo-China War or the Vietnam War, or
why the Americans moved in when the,
French retired in defeat. It is not easy
to explain in this era of disillusion and
d?nte that the generation which
fought and prevailed in the Second
World War against the Nazi tyranny had
no intention of surrendering to the
'tyranny of the paranoid Stalin. Indeed,
because of the rewriting of history that
is now going on ? America, things
have reached the ridiculous stage
where Marshall and Truman / and
Acheson are blamed for the Cold War.
This is, of course, preposterous
rubbish. No Tsarist leader could have
been more demanding, or more imperi-
alistic, than Stalin at Yalta. He wanted
the railways and the window to the east
at Port Arthur and Dalny that had so
blinded the vision of Nicholas II. He/
clamped down the iron curtain along
the 38th parallel in Korea. Two years
later a Russian sponsored conference,,
in Calcutta decided that the indigenous
Communist parties of South and South-
East Asia should attempt to seize power
by armed uprisings. They tried 'in
countries that were still' colonised and
in those that had won their ,indepen-
dence as well.
China was already aflame when Ho
Chi Minh launched his campaign
agairist the French. There were revolts
in Burma, in India, in the Philippines,
in Indonesia and, of course, in Malaya.
Then came the direct challenge in
Korea. This was the era of the Com-
munist utopia and a Communist mono-
lith seemed as attractive to the true
believers as it was terrifying to its
foes. Chins believed .in Stalin's Russia.
Ho Chi Minh was allied to both. Against
,its wishes, but to protect what it
regarded as its vital interests, the
'United States became involved, but not
before it had refused Frenth requests
for American planes and ships to
transport troops to Indo-China.
In the final 18 months of the Indo-
China War, however, when the need for
Communist containment seemed more
urgently necessary than the disband-
ment of colonial empires, the United
States delivered two million tons of
war material to the French at a cost
of more than 1,000 million dollars, and
came perilously close to intervening
when the entrenched camp at Dien
Bien Phu, wag seen to be on the point
of collapse. Thereafter, its aid to
whichever Government promised to
hold the line in South Vietnam was in-
evitable, and, in the context of the
times, desirable and necessary.
? I find it difficult even with hindsight
to decide whether the United States
was well or ill served by President Ngo
Dinh Diem, around whom American
? hopes centred for nine years. In many
ways Diem did perform miracles in the
'Smith, but that period of quiet that
lasted from 1954 until the end of 1959,
avqs not just his doing, but conscious
decision the rt of Hanoi The
second Indo-China War when it began,
showed only the tip of the iceberg.1,
Unseen was the vast programme of pub- s
teal preparation that had taken place.,
in both the Laotian and South Vietna-i
mese countryside, the organisation of,',
the cadre system and all the rest of the
detailed and careful planning that Ho,
,Chi Minh always insisted on.
Diem was dedicated, selfless and'
bard-working. No one, certainly not the
Americans, understood the nature of the',
Viet Cong political tactics better than'
he. Yet he was so narrow, so pessi-
mistic, so deeply suspicious of men of
goodwill that he surrounded himself
with his abominable family, Who were
driven on by the madness that led in
Aueust, 1963, to the attack on the"
Buddhist pagodas. A deep personal
regret Of this period is that I knew long
in advance of the detailed planning for,
the attacks, but because of the blandi
denials of Ngo Ilinh Nhu, Diem's bro71
'ther, I 'could persuade no one in thet
official American community to pay any,
.attention.
. Some of the things that happened int
those days would not be credible in
fiction. I arrived back in Saigon after
a brief absence to find that the firstt
.draft page of along article I had writ-
lien in the 'home of a senior Americati
official with whom I was staying 'had
been photocopied and found in thou-
sands in the Xa Loi pagoda, and reptc!7
thiced in the Times of Vietnam as evi?
dente of a foreign conspiracy, against
.Diem. ? It had been "borrowed," we
learned later, by my friend's servants,
who were 'running a Buddhist printing
press in one of his spare rooms.
? That Vietnam was headed for,
disaster at this time was apparent.
Nothing could -have stopped a coup or
a counter coup. But the American
involvmeilt, /one would haye expected,
would hive takCn note of What might"
happen after Diem and brother Nhui
.were removed from the scene. This
omission must go down as one of thel
Major 'blunders of the war. A was noti
a case of the king is dead, long live thei
king. The king was dead?and there
was no other.
With the whole apparatus of govern.
ment in ruins, it was no cause for sun,
prise that the situation fell to bits in,
1964, or that by the beginning of 1965
the war was all but lost. The Amen-'1
cans either had to opt out or to opt in,i
'They. opted in?and promptly com-I
'mated two more major blunders.
?
The Kennedy confrontation 'with?1,
Cuba had convinced many senior offie
cials in the State Department and the;
Pentagon that Vietnam could be
handled to the Cuba formula, "If we,
can show without an ounce of 'bluff that'
Vietnam is as important to us as Cuba:
,,and that we are prepared to risk a
major war in its defence, then we shall,
succeed," I was told,by U. Alexis John
son, who had gone to Saigon with Henry,
Cabot Lodge as deputy ambassador.
But the trouble was that Vietna
was not Cuba. What Washington
would appear as a full hand prov, AO
be a pair of twos. It was prepared to
abandon all restraint to prevent Cuba
from becoming a Russian missile base;
To the end it was restrained in Viet-
nam. Cuba was vital: Vietnam was not
ut in trying to bluff Hanoi, the)
United States S11130MINI in bl
itself, and this led to the &mond-
the major blUnders to which I have re;
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lerred?the tionviction that prevailed
until the Tet offensive in 1968 that the
(United States could shoulder aside the
,Vietnamese and successfully take on,
the war by itself. The idea thet it
.might not be successful was an almost
treasonable notion to the U.S. Army int
'those days.
Yet, after the sudden shock, caused'
,by the massive American intrusion of),
;forces, Hanoi showed remarkable con-i
.fidence in the outcome. Pham Van,
Dong, The North Vietnamese , Pri?me,
Minister, in a talk with a Japanese
'newspaper editor in April, 1967, said he
believed the Americans would lose'
because they had failed to achieve their1
two main objectives: the destruction of'
the National Liberation Front, and the
expansion of the pacified areas in;
,South Vietnam. '
As Hanoi saw it, 'Saigon had failed
:to achieve the strong rear that General
,Vo Nguyen Giap always regarded as
the decisive factor in a revolutionary
(war. Other things were going for them
the North Vietnamese reckoned: bet-
ter and more experienced leadership
and training for ..this type of war; the
'advantages of fighting on one's own
terrain among one's own people;
morale; the too rapid rotation of U.S.
forces and their lack of familiarity with
local and tropical conditions; political
and other problems encountered by
the Americans in pouring large nurn-
hers of troops into 'Vietnam; the strain
on the U.S. economy in supplying forces
'fighting thousands of miles, from the'
home base; and the excessive proper-
tion of reafr-line American troops.
General Nguyen Ohi Thanh., who
commanded the Oomrnimist 'forces in
the field until his death in 1967, set
out to force the Americans to split and
scatter' their forces and to fight in areas'
where there was no dlear-cut line and
no targets. He hoped to prevent them
from bringing their full combat effici-
ency into operation and to deny them
the opportunity to gain strategic advan-
tage. By the tactic of hitting the
!Americans in many places while keep;
Ing sufficient forces m reserve to mass
heavy fighting power in key areas, by
concentrating and dispersing quicklyi
by fighting big battles or combining
.big battles with small battles, and; by
avoiding at all cost the normal Set-
piece action, he believed that Victory
could be denied to the United States
,however large the force it committed,'
Until at last it tired of the war.
Then came the Tet offensive. It
shattered the indigenous Viet Cong
forces and their vital cadre system in
the hamlets, caused fearful casualties
among the North Vietnamese ranks,
:and dismayed Hanoi when the general
uprising failed to materialise. ? But it
also ? had the much-sought-after effect
of causing the war-weary Americans to
demand an end.
Everything that happened thereaftd
?the declaration of personal
surrender by President John-
son, the protracted halt in the
bombing, the Paris talks, the'
Guam Doctrine, Vietnamisa-
tion, and all the rest?repre-
sented the signal lowering of
-American sights, the abandon-
ment of American hopes of
winning u military victory and of ,
reinstating .South Vietnam as a
"pearl in the crown of the free:
world." to borrow one of the,
descriptions of the offi-1
dal American propagandists
in the late 1950s.
Despite all these unfortunate
consequences, however, Tet put
the 'emphasis, where it should
Approved
have been all the time?on the
Vietnamese people. If they could
not win the war themselves the
United States was no longer.
willing to try to do it for them.
Without ' American air sup-
port and the blockade of the'
North Vietnamese ports, it is
improbable that the South
could have held the Northern
blitzkreig that Giap launched
with his Easter offensive in
'1972. After a poor beginning,:
'ARVN, and especially the
elite marines, paratroopers and
Rangers, fought extremely'
' Whether it could do well,
enough to hold South Vietnam
;without American fire-power;
we may know only if a
ceasefire eventually collapses;
.and a third Indo-China war,
,emerges from the second as the
second emerged from the first.
,Certainly, nothing has yet been,
.decided. There will be no de-,
cision until one side or the
'other is in undisputed control
ibf Saigon.
; Whether the war has held
the line long enough for the rest
of South-EastAsia. to put its
fences in order also remains
to be shown. "If we all gear '
In with each other, we may get;
something akin to what has
happened in Western Europe
with the Marshall Plan," Lee
Kuan Yew said to me in Singe-.
pore in 1967. "Finally, you got'
there a Western Europe that.
:was so independent, as repre-
,seeted by de Gaulle, that it
could do without the Americans,
While we can't hope at this
stage to create that kind of non-
Communist Asia, that must be
the direction in which we have
'to go."
; That is the direction South-
'East Asia has been going. In
'assessing future prospects;
'changing times must also be
taken into account. The Vietnalli
'War began whea Russian and
'Chinese relations were close and
cordial. It ends?if the peace
talks are successful?with 44
'Russian divisions on China's
horthere btirders?and demon-
strably they, are not there
because of mutual trust and.
friendship.
Obliged to choose between al
non-Communist South-East Asig!
and continued tensions that the,
Russians would certainly attempt
to exploit there, Peking may be!
disposed to forget its evangelical
mission to help create new wars,
of national liberation. IL', hope-.
fully, this is the ease. ? the
Vietnam War will not have been
without positive value for those
who have lived so long in its
shadow. ,
WASHINGTON POST
16 JANUARY 1973
? A leading member
Amnesty International's Kat
rean section, the 'Rev.
Myung?ki, has been arrested
by South Korean authori--
ties, Amnesty International-
snnounged In London. ? 1
Forifkelease 2001/08/07
NEW YORK TIMES
14 January 1973
Vietnarni
Quest for Peace
?
A. World
? Waits?
In Hope
And Fear
Henry A. Kissinger, arriving in Peri*
aboard a special Air Force plane, said:1
'"President Nixon has 'sent me back
,to make one more major effort to,
conclude the negotiations,"
Le Due The, arriving from Hanoi'
by wa3/ of Peking and Moscow, sai4
"The decisive moment has come either'
; to sign the agreed-upon accord or
? continue the war."
Once again the White House advi:.*
and the Communist revolutionary,
plunged list week into the intricacies!
of the draft agreement that seemed last
, October. to offer the. United States 11,1
,way out of Vietnam. This time there
'was 'a sense that their new round of
meetings would either rescue the mil
cord and bring it to fruition or leacc'
Ito a final collapse.
As the talks, begun Monday, worei
on, the North Vietnamese Communist;
party newspaper Nhan Dan reportedi
"bad signs" of American intransigence.
But there was no real news, and few
clues, as to whit really was going o
behind the dosed doors in Paris. .
Yesterday ,evening Mr. Kissinger
flew back to report to President Nixon
at' the Florida White House at Key
Biscayne, amid indications that the
;talks had made at least some *ogress.
From Washington; Bernard Gwertzman
'of The New York Times supplied the
,following assessment:
'That's His Message'
One Republican Senator who at-
tended a White House breakfast meet.:
ing on the eve of the new round of
talks in Paris was impressed by Mr.,
Nixon's determination not to be de-
terred by Congressional or public critl-,
;clam in his pursuit of what he called
"the proper kind of settlement." "The;
'President obviously sees himself thrusts
into a critical moment in history," the
Senator said.' "He believes he is doing
the right thing and believes that his-,
tory will bear him out. That was his
message as I saw it."
Many thought, in fact, that the
.situation was producing for Mr. Nixon
another of the personal crises that
have been a feature of his political
life. Nothing would please him morel
'than to surprise the world once again',
?this time with a Vietnam settlement!
on the eve of his inauguration.; Not'i
only would such an announcemen0
clear the capital's streets of the war;
protesters who are gathering their,:
,forces for Jan. 20, but it would. purg?
the atmosphere of the poison that hay/
: CIA-RDP77-00431flikeiii fromr
ateppeared on the olitical scenLiti
i..71,71-177("1,;7:77.77r. ('I .'f1777?7717.7-777,
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esterday mean that Mr. Nixon wouldi
be able to offer some welcome newt.
on the eve of his inauguration? No harcP,
information was yet available, buti
-Ronald L. Ziegler, the White Hous61
press secretary, clearly Intended to
leave an optimistic impression when
he told newsmen early yesterday morn-
ing that the negotiations in Paris had:
been "serious."'
?
In the White House jargon, "serious",
has taken on a meaning of its own. It
has been used to signify progressl
When the White House has wanted td
signify the opposite, it has charged
Hanoi with a lack of "seriousness" at
the negotiating table. Moreover, the
Administration has said the bombing
raids north of the 20th parallel woul
`remain suspended as long as the neg
'Cations were conducted in a "serious"
manner.
? Mr. Kissinger, talking briefly wit
reporters at Orly airport before board ,
Ing his plane, said he had had "veryi
extensive and very useful negotiations'
with Mr. Tho. Hanoi's special envoy
will remain in Paris, Mr. Kissinger saidcj
and the two will keep in touch throug
diplomatic channels. The North Viet
names? delegation issued a brief state
,ment of itt own, saying the secre
'talks "have made progress."
Mr. Kissinger's remarks implied-that
the final decision was now President
Nixon's. He said he Will meet with
Mr. Nixon, and "the President willethen
decide what steps should be taken to
speed a peace of justice and concilivi
tion."
, What are the issues Mr: Nixon deems
enicial to that kind of accord?
Mr. Nixon, at the breakfast meeting,
, named three: the release of American'
prisoners, an effective cease-fire and?
the right of all South Vietnamese to
:decide their own future. These point
have been at the heart of the negotiat.
Ing,process ever since it began. ? .,
, PRISONERS ?On what terms should'
the American prisoners be returned?.
In return for the withdrawal of the
'remaining American forces, as sped.'
fled in the nine-point October accord,
'or in return for the release of all mill-
'tary and political prisoners held by
the Saigon Government, as suggested
subsequently by the North Vietnamese?
CEASE-FIRE Should the tease.
fire be limited to the two Vletnams4
as stated in the October accord, or
broadened, ? as sought now by the
United States, to include Laos and
Cambodia? Should the demilitarized
zone between North and South Viet-'?
nem be re-established, as urged by
Washington, even though Hanoi does
not want to recognize a permanent
division of the country? What kind of
International supervision? The 5,000-
man force wanted by Washington or
the small 250-man team proposed by
Hanoi? .
VIETMAN?No question has ?
proven more difficult to solve than
this One. What should be the scope of
, the Council for National Reconcilia-
tion provided for by the October?
accord? Should the agreement recog-
Anize the Vietcong's claims to being a
government in South Vietnam, or
recognize only the Saigon Govern-
ment, or both, or none? What about
? North Vietnam's troops in South Viet.,
? nom? Should they have legal status?
In Paris, observers could find little .
to go on about Just where matters
stood.. After six dayi cif talks, Flora,
Lewis of The New York Times had this':
to say:
'Squaring the Circle'
Still the negotiators raced across
Paris behind their motorcycle escorts
to and from their alternating meeting
,pltkces. Still the bombers dropped their,
loads on North Vietnam below the 20th
'parallel and Hanoi kept strengthening:
Its air defenses for the day when, per.),
haps, that line will, again be breached.i
Still officials spoke anonymously4
about the current "sticking point" ,
,which, with a little more effort, might
soon be hurdled with a compromise'
that would bring peace.
It was a repetitiOn, in many re- t
spects, of October and November and
December, when the tame people had
expressed the same hope for a cease-.;
fire?by Election Day, they thought.
at first, then by Thanksgiving, then by ;
Christmas, then before the opening of
Ithe new Congress. And the "sticking
point" has shifted from the presence
of North Vietnamese troops in the
South to the Saigon government*
sovereignty over all Sotlth Vietnam
to the precise definition of the
larized zone that cuts Vietnam in two.
These are different ways of defining:
the same Issue ? whether the peace'
accord is to divide the Vietnamese.
nation into two states with conflicting
? social systems or whether it is to per,
mit the South to be moved gradually,
into Hanoi's orbit and eventnally,
absorbed. That is the political issue
.over which the war has been fought.
from the beginning.
The permanent delegates of ? the
three, Vietnamese delegations?Hanoi.,
the Provisional Revolutionary Govern.,
meat (Vietcong) and Saigon?set aside,
all the lesser questions at the public'
meetings that continued last week/
parallel to the secret ,Kissinger-Tho
talks. All three delegations restated,
the central political issue--firrnlyi to?
make clear that their positions had not
changed. Only the American delegate,
urged "moderation" in language.
, Therein, experienced diplomatic ob.'
servers believe, has been the negotlat-'
lng problem. Mr. Kissinger has been
seeking language that would permit14
the United States to get (tut of the
war without appearing to have fought:
In vain and to have abandoned its ally
?language that each side can inter-
pret to its own satisfaction. He needs
Saigon's assent to get the' kind of
neatly packaged settlement he wants
from Hanoi. He needs concessions
from Hanoi to get Saigon's assent.
The October draft satisfied Hanoi
because it undermined Saigon's goal,
of art independent, insulated, anti-,
Communist South Vietnam. The nego.
Cations since then have been an at-
tempt to win equal satisfaction for.
Saigon. The formula for squaring the
circle has been the tough job confront..
frig the Paris negotiators."
?
If President Nixon does reach 'art
agreement with Hanoi, he will doubt-
,less try to obtain Saigon's acceptance'
.of its ternis, in line with his promisel
not to "impose" a settlement on the
South Vietnamese ally. And from Sai.'
? gon yesterday Craig R.. Whitney of
The New York Tittles reported on 4'
certain shift of attitude:
'President Nguyen Van Thien
concluded that he has won the most,
he could hope to get in the way of,1
;concessions from the Americans?and,1
,even .more important, that he won
three months' breathing -space by
stalling on the draft accord of last
October. That is the word now thong
Government officials close to the Pres.;
idential Palace. ?
' Mr. Thleu, according to these men,
Is. now confident enough of the Amer-
ican bargaining position to expect that
? anylinal agreement will include,guar-
anteet of a relatively leak-free demill.
? tarized zone between North and South
, Vietnam and a strong international
force to supervise the cease-fire and
? keep an eye on the 145,000 North,
'Vietnamese troops scattered about the
South.
" That, and a statement of some kind
:about the legitimacy of the Saigon
Government' below the 17th parallel,'
will probaby make it easier for hbni
to accept an agreement that does not
,call for the withdrawal' of the Corn.
Munist troops. The best estimate here
is that he/ will not raise new objec-i
:tions if Mr. kissinger obtains that kindi
of agreement from Hanoi.
_ Acceptance of Saigon as the legit1-1
mate government of the South, hoW4'1,
ever, looks from here like a confession(
'of 'defeat by the North Vietnamese,
and few realists belieVe the Commu-
E nists have been defeated. There's the41
.catch: Is a formula possible that will '..
satisfy both sides? Mr. Thlen's aides
apparently are dubious.
`. What it boils down to is that Pres17',;
deft Thieu now feels the Americans:
are not going to compromise his .`posi..
tion as drastically as they would have,
'if the October agreement had been4
signed, So he's resigned to a cease-fire(
?if the Americans can get it:
The Government, at any rate, W
preparing either'for suecess or failure
of the Paris talks.
If there is no peace fairly soon, Mr.
Thieu is afraid the United States Con-,1
grese may cut off all military and eco-;
.nomic aid to South Vietnam as a way:
of forcing President Nixon to with-1
draw from the War. That worries the
South Vietnamese leaders almost as
much as the possibility of an unfavor.:
able agreement. ?
It is for that reason that Mr. Thiel',
is sending 20 pro-Government legis-1
fators and official escorts to Wash-
ington to lay his pleas for continued'.'
support before individual America&
Senators and Congressmen. As one 'of4, ?
the envoys put it, "We will try to ei-
plain to them how complicated things
are in South Vietnam and why it isn't
that easy to end the war."
On the other hand,' if there Is a',
cease-fire, Mr. 'Mien will be up against'
stiff Communist political competition.'
The Government is laying plans to'
clap Communist sympathizers in,
prison, impose strict controls on the:
domestic press and foreign corre.'
spondents, and maintain a strong mili-
tary posture against any Communist,
violations of the cease-fire. The Gov..
eminent is even turning back bolts,
at blue and red cloth at the Saigon
docks because MO can be made Int?
VietcOng flags. ? ",
12
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WASHINGTON POST
I 16 JANUARY 1973
?
?
anot. Only Balk by U.S. or South Vietnam'
?
Could Halt Cease-Fire, Reports Say
By Murrey Marder
Waeliltitton Post Staff Writer
HANOI, Jan. 18 (Tuesday)--:-Even before
President Nixon announced the halt in ;
('offensive action against North Vietnam, '
f,this capital had begun churning out a
t sudden flood of reports apparently in-
tended to accelerate a full cease-fire
t :accord.
,) The message being put out here by
r 'various sources is that only a last minute
Itbalk by either the United States or the
f; Salg, government could once again
frustrate an agreement.'
Art Officially the North Vietnamese gov-
e
ernment has said nothing so far except
? that there has been "progress" ,in the
Paris talks, but that it is maintaining
Its "vigilance."
? With Gen. Alexander M. Haig's trip
to Saigon, North Vietnam's concern has
mounted that South Vietnamese Presi-
dent Nguyen Van Thieu may again seek
to block an accord unless world pressure '
is brought to bear on him
That pressure has been greatly stimu-
lated from here since Saturday, the day
U.S. envoy Henry A. Kissinger left Paris
to consult with President Nixon.
Three antiwar delegations now here
have issued statements appealing for a
peace accord. The visiting delegations
t They met with Hoing Tung,' talk of progress on both'
; editor of the party newspaper sides of the negotiations and
1 Nhan Dan, and reported that Kissinger's consultations in
he told them that in Paris Florida and President Nixon
'the United. States -and North re-echoed here only among
I'Vletnam "had been able to those with independent ac-
agree oh a draft treaty whigr' cess to the world outside.
(mainly was based on the prin- This includes North Viet-
', Oct. 20, 1972. , dios.
The group's statement said on, ciples and points elaborated, namese with short-wave ra-'
I I
1 But whatever hope or,
i
that Hoang Tung added "that skepticism the news aroused t
w'''
the agreement had been able to as kept invisible in this de-
eliminate some remaining
terminedly disciplined soci-
'
' doubts and ambiguities in the
, ety. To this moment, the
, previous , draft agreement.? North Vietnamese govern-
ment has held off telling Its'
The Stockholm group con- own people even what its ,
2. eluded: "It is our conviction own delegation spokesman,
; that the North Vietnamese said in Paris when talks re- '
aide Is serious when saying 3 d
'it is prepared to achieve peace , The response here today
on the principles of the agree- to all inquiries is, "It' is all
ment reached in Paris. There- up to Nixon.?
' fore, time has come for the- To a newly arrived visitor,
whole of world opinion to turn however, Hanoi outwardly ,
to the American side in urging appears more placid than
the American government to any capital would be ex- ?
make use of this opportunity,' pected to be after a genera-
'of peace unbroken." : tion of war.
' The whole thrust of the On this Sunday afternoon,
'North Vienamese position is the streets are lively with
i? that the decision is up to Presi- thousands of cyclists, the
? dent Nixon and North Vietnam markets are crowded, the ?
wants the world to know in ad-.I vegetables plump and ? the
; vance where it will place the meat, chicken and other
ri blame if there is another foodstuffs seem ample. The
t failure, people by no means look tin-
in a delayed dispatch , dernourished, and now that
sent from Hanoi Sunday, the bombing is suspended.
Marder reported the Jot- ? there are children rolling
, lowing: , hoops on the sidewalks.
Despite the halt in the ; pretty girls strolling and
? American bombing of the ; flower stands in the center
Hanoi- Haiphong regio n, t of the city.
4 throughout the nation a con- children rolling hoops on the
tinuing state of siege is main- o sidewalks, pretty girls stroll-
tamed regardless of day-to-. big and flower stands in the
14 day prospects for a cease-fire -4 center of the city.
accord.? There is also a remarks-
ble silence. It is punctuated
only by the rumble of army,
trucks, usually hauling road-
building supplies, or the oc-
casional horn of a car or ,
truck ? weavin
"We have had too many
bitter experiences to relax
our vigilance now," said a
North Vietnamese official..
"Our antiaircraft are con-.
stantlY prepared to shoot.
The news of U.S. negotia- through the omnipresent bi- *
tor Henry A. Kissinger's de- cyclists.
parture from Paris with new"Even the presently intro..
; represent the Stockholm Peace Confer.41
ence, the World Pence Council and a
Japan-Vietnam friendship association that
includes members of the Japanese Com- -
munist Party.
The Stockholm group said in a state-
ment last night that it was informed by
a member of the Central Committee of
' North, Vietnam's Workers (Communist);',
Party that the Paris talks are at "a new`4
crucial phase" that will produce peace or,i
intensified war. 4
The Swedish delegation is led
member of Sweden's Parliament, 13ertill.,
Zachrisson. The group also includee
another Swedish' parliamentarian, 041
Ullsten, and a Canadian member of Part-0
lianient, Andrew Brewin. ?
- ? h?4;
quent nterrup ion of an air-
alert warning produces no
break in the pattern. Be-
cause the announcement
, identified only a reconnais-
sance flight, no one even '
broke stride over it. The
people in the streets seem-
ingly have complete' confi-
dence in the ability of the
alert system to distinguish t
between a reconnaissance
flight and an attack. The ,
system is said to be refined
enough to advise if a recon-
naissance flight is hy a pi- ,
_ loted plane or a drone.
War has by no means scar- :
it
quickly see even while
red all of this city or even i
he major portion of it, one
awaiting a closer inspection
of the air raid damage. ,
Much of Hanoi's city cen-
ter is still lined with stately
trees in full foliage, al-
though the weather is gray
and chilly in this season.
'The bomb damage is in
pockets or strips where
American B-52s dropped an
unprecedented tonnage of
destruction on this capital
: between Dec. 18 and 29.
Nevertheless, the immedi-
ate impact on the arriving
visitor is a scene of devasta-
tion on landing at Gialam
Airport on the weekly Soviet
Aeroflot flight. For the Gia-
lam area in general, an the
east bank of the muddy Red
River opposite Hanoi, was a
prime target with its indus-
try, railroad repair yards
and k other installations,
some of them near or virtu-
ally surrounded by the poor-
est residential sections.
Here, casualties were report-
edly high.
Men and women workers
methodically, are picking
through the ruins of crum-
I bled buildings and resi-
dences on that side of the
river salvaging everything
possible, brick by brick.
Desolation continues to
Approvrg For Release 2 01/08/07"!tirkgbP911-01132K18001
: broken skeleton .of the fa-
. mous Longbien Bridge
(formerly the Paul Doumer
, Bridge) looms in the di-,
tance, once North Vietnam't ' ?
prized artery to tAc east and ,
'forth. 1 It withstood
"Johnson," the interpreter
wryly notes referring to the ?
war years of President John-
son. "But not Nixon. But we
'have many pontoons."
Soon you. are on the pon- .
. toon bridge after a line of,
trucks perhaps half a mile,.'
long allows your passenger. ,
car to squeeze through, zig-l:
, zaggipg perilously acrose ?
the remnants of a roadway. '
Improvised Bridge
, car, even if it is a punish& ::
across the Red River is a
hazard itself for a passenger:
The improvised bildge',
.11
hie Soviet-built Volga. No ,
longer straight under the :
jarring truck traffic, the ;
pontoon bridge, held by ca- f:
bles anchored to the river j
bed, presents an obstacle at
each joined section where ;
heavy planks tie it together.
The passenger car mounts %
each section as a new chal- ..,
lenge. 1
On the Hanoi side of the
river, the roadbed is still 4
i
pocked with craters being
filled with dirt and gravel.,
As the river area recedes, '2
however, so does the scene
of continuing bomb damage. t
Hanoi is officially display- ;
ing its wounds far more '
than it is cringing from ),
them. No outsides, eve- J
cially a non-Vietnamese , t
speaker, can know what the
Vietnamese people really
think about their war plight.
The official presentation
portrays the bomb scars as 1.
battle ribbons for heroismCi
under fire. The people act .,
as if they agree. Glancing I .
away from their roadbuild- .
ing, they look at the passing .-;
forellin visitor, unable to
igge6namis French. Ituto'i
. ?
?
I
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elan, Swedish, tast erman,
1 ?or a rarer American?with "whole country" means
[
" calmness
i 'rather than misery, as if
!I they were saying "Look,
' what we survived." All they
, . can read or hear in the offi-
',- chit media tells them they
, arc heroic.
By official invitation,
; peace delegations are now
, coming into North Vietnam
4 at an increased pace to in-
spect the American war
idamage, te deplore and con-
.4, demn the strategy that ,in-
flicted it and to extoll the
1, fortitude of those Who sur-
".?, vived.
p , Billboards . and banners
across Hanoi's wide, shaded
t streets hail "Victory" over,
[ the 12 days of American Ti
52 raids and exhort the pop-
ulation to "Sacrifice All, But
Never Submit" To "Amen-
can aggressors." ,
, North Vietnam's statist'.
cal,claims to victory in this
:period, about double the ac-
i: knowledged American
I; count, abound in signs and
!, posters ,across the city: '
;, "Planes down 81, including
1. 34 B-52s, 5 F.111s and 42 oth-
ers." '
i
Across the front of the city's closed theater a red,
i ,banner abbut 50 feet high
proclaims: "The people and
'army " of Hanoi have won
i'.,. great exploits to be worthy
t of the people of the heroic
' capital of the whole coun-
? aneScpression of
try!,
The reference to the
, North and South Vietnam,
the unity of which is of
course Hanoi's ultimate ob-
jective.
As Kissinger conferred
with President Nixon, one of
North Vietnam's leading ex-
ponents of national unity.
talked of the ability of
North Vietnam to persevere
in war or peace to achieve
the goal of unity. He was
Lutz Quy Ky, who bears the
disarming title of secretary
general of the Association
of Vietnamese Journalists.
Ky, among other things, is
the author of 16 books about
Vietnam.
The "secret of Vietnam,"
he said, is "how to endure."
Ky, a southerner by birth,
relished recounting the his-
tory of Vietnam's repulsion
of foreign invaders, during
two millenia. ,"We will not
talk optimism about the
Paris talks", he said. "But we
are optimistic about even-
tual victory. If you conceive
that to fight for freedom is
a happiness, then you can
fight for a very long time.
"How can we fight a na-
Von that can send men to
the moon *hen we are still
using buffalos to plow?" He
asked rhetorically. "We are
not producing one gram of ,
steel," he said, but "we win
victories because of our
courage and our. intelli-
gence. We have studied the
limits of 'human
'1 THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
9 January 1973
he said, and have practiced
?, it.
; During a two.and-a-half.
hour conversation Marxism
went unmentioned except ,
once indirectly in answer to
a question about outside aid
to Communist North Viet-
nam, which he zpaintained is
now adequately supplied by:
Its socialist allies.
Questions about North Vi-
etnam's extraordinary pro-
tests last summer that "big
powers" (meaning the So-
viet Union and China) were
succumbing to President
Nixon's attempt to make
them abandon the "National
Liberation Movement" were
met by the disclaimer today
that "Nixon has , been de-
feated" in that strategy.
, His thernes, Instead, were ,
nationalism, endurance, per-
leverance . and the convic-
tion that no one can deter-,
mine North Vietnam's des-
tiny for it.
tenacity. If there are skep-1,
tics or 'doubters, they were i
informed by today's official
government n ew spa perA
Nhan Dan that "all the.
? youths of Hanoi are very 4
happy to be chosen as sol-
, oilers. The leaders of theit :g
1 street councils encourage
them to join the army.
Many write letters to the
army common( expressing.
their willingness to fight." '
What has; been the toll for 1
the last generation of wall,'1
including what North Viet-1
,
nam calls 13 years of Contin-,'
war with the United
States? Ky gently replies
that , "We have not calm:,
lated this figore." ? '
, The population of North
l Vietnam, however, has nev-
ertheless increased, despite'
the toll from about 17 mild
,lion people in 1960 to an es7
1
timated 21 million today as
the result of a high birth
rate. . .,
' "We eagerly want peace,"
the assertion comes. "But
1 we also are prepared for in-
definite war if necessary."
The first glimpse of Uni1
t
underdeveloped, battered,),,
? but somehow still function.'
ing, country indicates that
this contention of endurance
?a vital ingredient in the
nation's psychological war-
fare, both for its own popu-
lation and for its bargaining,
in the world Outside-4a'
widely believed by the popu-
lace,, I
. ..
The population of metro-
politan Hanoi, normally
about 1.2 million, is still
Only a third of that size.
This is a result of the evacu-
ation of residents during the
B-52 bombardment.
But even though the bom-
bing halted two weeks ago,
North Vietnam is constantly
preparing for a possible re-
sumption.
The people see and hear
nothing but victorious war
claims or reports of world
acclaim for North Vietnam's
?
Is the bombing to return?
Dr Kissinger's "one more major effort" to
negotiate a settlement to the Vietnam war has
a ring of "or else "'about it. The terms in which
President Nixon finally talked to the.
Congressional leaders after apparently con.
suiting nobody. for some weeks ? suggests that
he has sent Dr Kissinger to negotiate along lines
predetermined in Washington. This must Increase
the chances that the talks will again fall
Obscurity clouds the reasons why the murderous
bombing Of Hanoi and Haiphong was stopped on
'December 30. For the sake of. face, President
Nixon has to believe publicly that the' Ms
:blasted the Vietnamese back to the negotiating
table. This in turn increases the temptation to
use the same tactics again. Statements from the
VVhite House suggest that renewed bembing
north of the twentieth parallel Is a certainty if
the talks fail. ?
The damage inflicted by the B52s has been
appalling. Their use is a lasting stain.on President
Nixon's record. Their devastating power may well
have forced the .North Vietnamese to call for a
,bteather, since there is a limit to the amount of
Materia) punishment that even they can absorb.
The frightening aspect Is that, if the 1152s are
used again, it could be from a greater height and
with, no cencern for the nature of the targets
below Some reports suggest that part of the
high loss rate came because the' 1352s. were.
1 3.4 flying lower to achieve (with tragically little
?
? l
success) accuracy in hitting strategic targets.
By- ordering a' mass evacuation of the city,
populations, ? the North Vietnamese. ' have.
Indicated that they are taking* this possibility
seriously. It shows too that, battered as they' are,
they will be unlikely to buckle to Ameriedn,
demands at the negotiating table for a settlement
which, to North Vietnamese .eyes, is meant; to
leave President Thieu inaccessibly in. place.. To
support this reasoning, they can invoke the
extraordinary conduct. of ,Mr Nixon during the
period of the bpmbing. 4
President Nixon's deliberate isolation from ;
the press. from all but a handful of his 'oWn4'
advisers and, until recently, from the leaders of
Congress lends weight to the belief that his order,
to unleash the B52s stemmed from tantrums of
disappointment when Dr Kissinger failed to brihg;
about a settlement. It is possible that his secrecyi
was a cover for truly 'secret talks with Hanot,''
but his behaviour encourages no confidence In!
that. It looks merely as if President Nbion
shutting himself off from both advice and;
criticism: As a ;result he appears increasingly, as
a man who has worked only to make the wart
acceptable ? at home by ? withdraWing ? a'
large number of US troops from the ground
still appears to think a victory can be salvaged.;
It Is a dangerously mistaken approach to delicate
talks. and it has hideous implications for What
may follow; if the talks fall ?
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THE ECONOMIST JANUARY 6, 1973
'Scandinavia
Northern lights
Sharp reactions to last month's resump-?
tion of tull-scale American bombing
df North Vietnam were widespread in
Scandinavia. Shortly after the new B-52
attacks began on December t8th, ,the
Danish prime minister, Mr Anker
joergensen, issued a strongly critical
comment and added that he might ,
press for a discussion in Nato of Mr.
Nixon's actions. The Finnish foreign
minister, Mr Ahti Karjalainen, declared
that the ease for the bombing raids was
"especially difficult ' to understand."
The Swedish foreign minister' Mr
Krister Wickman, condemned the
bombing as "blind and brutal." The
chairman of the 'Danish trade union
Ifederation, Mr Thomas Nielsen, called
1,for a Europe-wide boycott of American
i products. The Norwegian foreign
minister, Mr Dagfinn Vaarvik, 'served
warning that his government would
have to consider what action it should
take if the bombing bn. But it
was the ,emarks irkile on December
23rd 1-/ Mr Olo' Palme, the prime
tair;?ster of 5.;weden, that echoed
Lidest.
The fir press reports made Mr
Palme Rear to have directly likened
the /4.--nencan action to such notorious'
?
atrrjcities df the past as those linke
I the ?nrames of Guernicb,, Oradou
;'Lidice, BaAyi Yar, Katyn and SharpcL
ville The State Departoidnt Made
strong protest to the Swedish ambas-
sadort in "Washington, and, announced
that the 'charg?'affaires who nor
Iheads the American embassy in 'Stock-
holm i(there has been no ambassador,
there since 'August) would nOt, for the
present, return to his post from home
leave. Although fuller ,versions' of Mr
Palme's Words showed that hit-refd,
ences to past atrocities had been som
' what oblique, Washingt n follow
,through with the request, 4Icsctbed b
,Mr Wickman as astonish; g, that n
new Swedish ambassador should,
'sent there to succeed MIj Hubert d
Besche, who is due to rctirj on Janua
8th
' Mr Palme has a reputation for out-
spokenness, but, the bad feeling that
has now brought Washington and:
Stockholm close 'to a breach of diplc-;
,matic relations had set in before he
became prime minister three years agO,!
,and indeed before Mt Nixon became,l,
%President. The solidarity lof Swedish)
'feeling about Vietnam wai demonstra-!I
'ted on December 28th when an appeall
Tor an immediate bombing halt and 1,a
:peace settlement was issued jointly by
, the leaders of all the five parties rcpt.&
sented in the Riksdag ; two days late.
275,titio Swedes had added their Itignti-.
"tures t(1 this-appeal. tok signilar appeal
;was made on January and :I)P .the heads
.1of all Norway's political prunes.
NEW YORK TIMES
1 5 January 1973
'What Can We Do?'
. By V ercors
PARIS ? Where-rs the difference?
Between the devastation. of Guernica
by the planes of Hitler and the devas-
tation of Hanoi by those of Mr. Nixon,
where is the difference? Between the?
raids of terror over Hanoi to force the
Vietnamese to surrender and the raids
of terror over Warsaw to fdrce the
-Polish, over Rotterdam to force the
Dutch to surrender, over Coventry to
force the British (but Churchill did not
. surrender and the Vietnamese do not)
where is the difference? Between the
shredded infants of Spain and the
shredded infants of Hanoi? At the time
of Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam and,
Coventry what raised the world's con-
science with a sacred horror was the
recurrence, by the will of one man
and his military advisers, of the most
barbarous, the cruelest, the most hor-
rifying, the most homicidal means to
win a politiqal design. It was the
return to Sardanapalus and to Nero
,multiplied by ten, multiplied by a hun-
dred. The world fought five years
against that, against the incredible
return of forgotten practices, that
one thought had disappeared forever.
America was not the least fierce nor
? .the least sincere in that struggle to
establish between nations a minimum
of civilized relations. It was AMerlda
which by its initiative (the creation of
the U.N.) showed most visibly that
will of healing. And now it Is Ameriea
today that brings back Guernica, War-
saw,' Rotterdam?that brings ? us the
equivalent of Hiroshima. In order to
i make an adversary surrender and to
make a political design succeed.
, During more than'twent years, how
many have' not been able to return
, to Germany because they would not
!, know what hands would be offered
th re to grasp, if those that would be
, held out to shake would not be stained'
by the blood of the innocent. For a
whole people were silenced by Hitler,
hid submitted at first, then accepted
,and covered up his crimes. A. cour-
ageous resistance had Strtiggled there
)
in the 'beginning, a few months and
' then' there was no more resistance.
And that is recurring?this time in ,
: America! There have been without'
doubt a few beautiful and courageous ,
movements of protest, of opposition? 4
but now? One listens closely, but If
anything remains it is very weak, and,
In spite of the few brave ones still
left, they are obliterated in the soft :
silence of a consenting population.'
And will it happen that we will not
be able to shake the hand of one of
these Americans as we could no longer
shake the hand of a German not So
very long ago?
But ,if this is true for us what c rt.
we do? We weep and I weep, that
comforts. You will say to me what
else can we do? I don't know, I don't
know. Seeing that Russia doesn't
dare anything, that China can't, that
Europe doesn't virant to, Mr. Nixon
and his Pentagon feel themselves all
powerful, and this power intoxicates
them. They feel they are masters Of
the world. They know they can, if they
want, do ten times worse than Hitler
without risking the same fate, and
this .power intoxicates them. And we
know that at least for the near future,
they will do what they want without
anyone opposing it. For the momenti
they are content with transposing an
entire land' into a lunar landscape and;
an entire people Into deadmen from'i
out of the Stone Age. And perhaW
before having totally arrived to thatl
point, they will have in effect, byl
means of blood and suffering, Imposedl
their political design on Indochina, as
Hitler did on the Spanish, the Polish, l,
the Dutch. And if that ever happens
It will be more horrible. Because the
Nero-like shadow of Nixon will hover?
over all, of' us ..who will have done.
nothing tp have stopped him. And we ,
will believe we are free when* it will
no longer be but the surveillant free-
dom of vassals.
Vercors is a pen name for JeamBruller,'
author and engraver. *This originally.
appeared ' In the Frehch paper, U.;
Monde., ?. 3
NEW YORK TIMES
11 January 1973 ,
ffrriisi",7416s heston implied' bicOrriattiiitai:secrakiiy
isol State Rogers refused to invite Prancis Sayre, dean of the Washington dithe-
to. an official luncheon because the dean had led an antitvar , march to
i)he White Nouse. Mr. Rogers says he did not even know Dud Dean 4ayrit
1.parittitxtted
in audit it, demenikatton. *Mr, Reit,ott, regret the InTot.
is
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HINDUSTAN TIKES '
January 1973
'.The World. And Vietnam
flANOI has been in flame
from the nagitious4 bom-
bardment by .American air-
craft and death-dealing wea-
pons. There is no comparison
in all history for this kind ef Si
vagery in war. Even the eighteen
By S. Sharawadiy
called Socialist camp, the 'weak
kneed mumbling, of the once lou
and eloquent non-aligned and th
Afro-Asians, and the growing ir-
relevance of the United Nation
as an instrument of peace and jus
tics in the world, the little De-
-
- Vietnam. The Soviet Union ha
d ,rupported this move, but Pekin
? stood adamantly against the idea.
Not that the Soviet Union woul
a have embarked upon an adventu
- roue confrontation with Washing-
-ton over Vietnam, (that migh
have been welcomed by China)
But a minimura of Sino-Sovie
unity over Vietnam would have
rendered it impossible for Mr
Nixon to exploit the Peking-Mos-
cow conflict to the extent that he
is doing in 'Vietnam. Though Mr
? Brezluiev has spoken out a little
more strongly' than Mao or Mr
Chou Zn-lai in This crisis, there
has not been popular or govern-
mental reactions from the Soviet
? Union to fit the outrage that is be-
ing perpetrated on Vietnam.
Mesmerised Nations
Great powers are always moved
mainly power
The smaller ones need not be. That
was the value of the Asian-African
land non-aligned nations in the Oast
in international relations. Today,
however, even this vast interme-
diate group is not only amorphous
but divided by rivalries and jea-
lousies and dominated by paro-
chial issues so that they are un-
able to express theft protest in
unison against what is happening
In Vietnam. One recalls how
Nehru reacted in 1954 to the crisis
in Indo-China and put forward
proposals which found acceptance
In the Geneva agreem4nts,
Times have changed, of course,
but what are the other fathers of
non-alignment. if ows may use
such a phrase, doing in the pre;
sent crisis/ Have the non-aligned
nations been so mesmerised by
the fear of American might that
they have not so far concerted
any serious efforts to arouse and
organise world opinion over this
pre-eminent 'moral and political
issue of our times? Or, are some
or other of this group of nations
so pre-occupied with not embar-
rassing Washington or Moscow' or
Peking that they have considered
discretion to be the better part of
non-alignment and not audacity
which distinguished it in its effec-
tive days? Or, is it that some of
them find the diplomatic leverage
provided by the Sino-Soviet. rift
much too valuable In their na-
tional interests to do anything for
Vietnam that might upset that
happy state of affairs?
If the Asians, the Africans and
he non-aligned are not powerful-
ly stirred by the
? then it cannot be expected that
g other peoples and governments
will be. It concerns Ahem more
d vitally than the European and the
- American powers. What is involv-
ed is the principle of the right of
t a small nation to resist dictation
. and bullying by a super-power,
t
apart from the utterly hutnan as-
pects of the Vietnam situation.
Some of the smaller countries of
South East Asia who are Afraid of
Hanoi's expansionism and are
eagerly trying to play up to Pek-
ing or Moscow, or Washington
might remember that they have
more at stake in this principle than
/any other countries in the world.
( One most unfortunate feature of
world reaction to the Vietnam cri-
? sia is that Asia has not taken a
stand as Asia on this poignant and
predominantly Asian issue.
The nations of this continent
' have referred to be ruled b
mutualfears of their own wee
neighbours than of those Great
Powers who really pose the poten-
tial threat to, their freedoni and
" indepeedence. The absence of
Asian consultations on Vietnam is
conspicuous evidence of this. Aus-
tralia and New Zeeland under
their new Governments appear to
have done a little better in their
butspoken stand.e
World Opinion
The Vietnam lame has es fit
evaded the attention of that
august international forum, the
United Nations. Hitherto one could
have argued that intervention by
the United Nations would have
only complicated the problem
rather than helping to solve it
None of the parties concerned, in-
eluding the Democratic Republic,
of Vietnam, was in Savour of tak-.
tug the, matter to the United Ne-
tons. But had not the moment
come, when the world had no other
,c,hofce, fpr a simple and massive
demonstration of world public opi-
nion against the Amertcan bomb-
ings, spontaneously and powerful-
ly expressed in the forum -of the
UN General Assembly/
day annihilation of Carthage by
the Romans was done in a strug-
gle between equals and there
was perhaps more honour in that
carnage than in what has been
happening in Vietnam.
Salvage Operation
'the Vietnam war is one between
the elephant and the ant?between
the electro. dynamic -mechanical
might of a super-power and the
Indomitable will-power of a small
undeveloped nation. In the long
and dismal history of violent eon-
Bleb, it is the nearest one could
? get to the Gandhian type of con-
frontation between soul-force and
brute-force. And the war is not
over any great issue of power or
Ideology, but over the pride and
prestige of the President of the
greatest power on earth. Western
t writers have written so much on
;oriental face, ? but has there ever
been in history an example of
face-saving carried to such .nor-
mous and tragic proportions.
? The Americans first went Into
Vietnam in what they proclaimed
to be a glorious crusade against
Communism represented by the
Imonolithic Sino-Soviet bloc,
though at bottom it was really
even then, a dirty -pro-colonial
I salvage operation Later when
they found that the Soviet Union
wee interested in a peaceful set-
tlement in Vietnam, they said that
' the crusade was against Chinese
Communist expansionism. Later
still when they discovered that
the Chinese devils were only too
eager to parley and make peace
with them, they have Come to the
conclusion that what they have
been fighting against was Vietna-
mese Communism and its imperi-
alist urge to dominate Indo-China!
One may safely predict that soon,
and not too late, they will find
out that what they have been
and are up against is Vietnamese
nationalism, passionate and un-
conquerable.
There in Vietnam, political na-
tIonalism has been converted into
an incandescent spiritual force.
Nothing else can explain the
extraordinary fact that after all
this overmastering application of
military pressure, this callous 'sus-
pension of effective supporting
action by !ha divided and the so-
e am s
still fighting valiantly and is bound
to. come out of this cruel conflict
"bloody but unbowed."
World reaction to the resump-
tion of bombing of North Vietnam
I, a mirror of the temper. of our
times. A few years ago there
were massive demonstrations and
protest marches of youth all over
the United States which nearly
brought the administration to its
knees, at least psychologically.
Where are the protest marchers
and the flower-children of yes-
terday, when today even more
horrible and unjustifiable crimes
are committed against a heroic
people simply because they will
not surrender? No doubt the New
York Times has made an appeal
'to Americans "in the name of
conscience and country" to "speak
out for sanity in Washington and
peace in Indo-China." But the
sad fact of the matter is that
American public opinion is a weak
reed indeed to lean upon. Once
American boys are not ? dying in
the battlefields, but only Viebia-
opese are massacred from ,the air,
there is no swell of humanitarian
mass opinion in the United States
against the Vietnam war as be-
fore. One is forced to question
'fundamentally the liberal core in
American life and politics.
Supine China ?
The behaviour of the rest of the
world in this crisis is not very
admirable either. The Chinese
used to proclaim their unbreak-
able solidarity with their Vietna-
mese brethren. Their favourite
simile for solidarity was "the lip
and teeth" relationship between
the Chinese and the Vietnamese.
Some lip, some teeth!! Certainly,
Mao Tse-tung and his great wer-
riors of national liberation strug-
gles are today doing nothing
more than lip-service and even
that in a very subdued measure.
The root cause of Vietnam's
helplessness and the apparent tri-
umph of the bullying tactics of
President Nixon is the Sino-Soviet
conflict and the all-too-supine will.
Ingness of China to allow Wash-
ington to exploit this split. From
19e5 onwards Hanoi has been ad- t
vocating united Socialist action on
.Vietnam tragedy.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 January 1973
Canadian sadness
? The Canadian Parliament's unanimous
resolution deploring the bombing of
Hanoi and Haiphong was an expression of
national sadness over recent devel-
opments in Vietnam.
All parties in the House of Commons
supported the government-sponsored
resolution. ?
This mark of disapproval of American
policy does not constitute a precedent. In
1971 the Canadian House unanimously
adopted a resolution condemning the
American nuclear test at Amchitka ism
land in the Aleutians.
? None of the. Canadian parties has ,
16 supported the American administration
That might have provided that
extra little push necessary to make
the parties move on to the final
act of settlement in Vietnam, and
might also have had the effect of.
giving a shot in the arm to the
United Nations which ha i been
fast becoming a pedestrian debat-
ing society where pale bureaucrats
from all the corners Of the earth
come to perform as Pompotei
In-
ternational diplomats.
over the war in Vietnam, and the
Trudeau overnment has privately ex-
pressed its regret over continuation of
the war to Washington.
If the Parliament's Vietnam resolution
was no great surprise, its adoption as-
sumes greater impact when added to the
wave of denunciations of the bombing of
Hanoi coming from friends and allies of
the United States around the world, and
particularly from Europe, and from Aus-
tralia.and New Zealand. ?
It is part of a worldwide sadness at. 4:
seeing a great power like the United
States get caught up in a situation where
It finds it necessary to use its bombers
against civilian centers at a stage in the
war when peace seems within its grasp.
r? rtl r r IT)T7 IT "rTIr'll*"
ij"T o 7717' f
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WASHINGTON POST
14 JANUARY 1973
11;1
ce.t .111,1
By:George P. Kalumn
tirtint Ann; f AM SURE,' many besIdei .not; question thle fact: Otteition its tele..
;`? myself Who:aware of the Inadequacy :vanee; The world ha. no Thal Of truel end'
it,bi
unreaionable people.' It l
I' Own knowledge of rhat iii 'going oh; . e tioC out' tehle4'
to put them all in their place, noti Would it:
thei
:have remained silent thus;far in the face df '
, , be In our powets to ?Alo so And if the argn '
??
;the ireneareid:heavy bombln ' '
gs Iii ',Vietnate, ? ment *be that Uhreasoning cruelti 'on their
.;ho
I., ping that the Peesiciehti and. his advisees Port inatIfies the same on burs r It milt
, then ' -
i' had some
.. , hood reason, Invisible tolis, for; , be. asked: Since !when briiie o a IS kit;
eonduct been ..,defined d Intl; UM nbY ( our;
JtuPPosing '.that ' these ptheedures Would' '
t t tki ?ti ?
ihAe tit Ilik tittleis Of thlbgs littler i Menne .
t I; otiotilli stiiii ils wt ha4. :i'i ''', 11;1 '
,,1 4,1 l' ? '; ';
dense Of :011,ain ' 41
?.: I I' ' .
.iltiti .6,4111/4thi, Y,1-:bot: iii:.oftein!'.11&
':vant tt ptiblielY Nit presumably present
ii ''ntirilber . Of,; govkntrientol : minda, ? the
Or of betg atitised 4t:If "lcising" a war. On
?riders h w itinch real Meaning the terms
' vi, tory'', I tied 'defeat ' . have . in the face. of
' ertit'Oepo it lin contempotary pOlitl.
al deVelonie 'te. i' ere- pen be wars . so
i,
itt rorinsiak t at: the had better ,be "lost,"
CI, his Mier s ! termi ated,11 than eantihued
ti.the Vald Pu . tilt of somethingcalled "vie-
64" ;Gem ,tie Gaulle did not worry about
hOte Seniantic sYnibb)s when he wisely put
lend 10 the rem ' involvement in ,Algei-
' I '
I , I
it 1 .
1 .enk,ohly repe_t W tat I said setreti years
1
. . . 6 In he course of 'a Nil days? testimony
bring the 'war to an early Conclusion, Be-j
:iand traditionb,that?Otir Obligation lies?tiotibefoie A troubled Settate'Torelgn Relations
Yotid this, there wait little,. reason to exPeet. to theirs.: .1 -1., :Cointriiite: that dthere Is more reaped to
?
, , ? ? , .
1 that an administration so plainty nncon-; ., We must, It I? cialtnid,! beloyal hi Our 5? tvon,In tihe opinion bf this world by a rest,.
! earned for domeatitt opinion abont the war, Ines. What would the ',World think Of tis if W6 nit 'all etirageous 'liquidation of Unsound
'not to mention the opinion of friends and 'were not? One could, ;perhaps, tinswer thlii: iiositlo s than by the niost stubborn pursuit
Well-wisher In other .? parsts of the 'globe,' iwith another question:; What does the world OtextilaVahant or unpromising objectives."
would be Uppreelably moved by ? one more think of tit as it 10. 1 11..; ' .' '''I'i ' ; ' ,''' 'L ', : ' 01411164 ;ti great senie ofjutility in stating
C i ? ? I
'tritieal Voice, and particularly' that of 'a' pa. i ? But Moro eentral to our .PrObicin I? tile Such Views, One cannot hope, I reiterate, that
.litleally inactive 'person, from within thia: lad that our. South Vietnamese "allies!' have they Will effect Abe dispositions of a govern.
;.country, But there are times, and thia,would ialreadY had froth iiii Many titnes!over, all Ment to which solitany more important and
' seem to be 'one of them, When, pip ,has to that any -keiPernMent could rtaionably eal anthorilative critical voices (one need men-
make a view known, if for no other reasod .:pect from ..4 political: aasdelitt(' on the ether lion only the unanimous disapproval of the
than for the sake of clarity of the record.' ..' Ride of ,the globe; to which most hO added' hombinh by the Canadian House of Corn-
". The adverse effects of these bnirlings are ,the reflection that Waldo help can never be Mons) appear to tnean ad little: One ran
i.
,lObvious. A number of arguinents haVe been :effective beyond the, limits &tilled i byhe hope only that they i may serve to remind
I
'offered, or' suggested, for their pursuance; 'Vitality .and ? resolution and ,effectIVceess 0( sone of our frlends, In other Countries that
'None of theie argu th
ments strikes ina as even' 'e' regime to which it is' addressed: 'I?hh.;th se bomblns; f r, tolch the recent elec.
remotely petatiasIve. It Is said that only ,bY, world is well awar6' of what we' have BdtidiltIon! (+HAW did tiot give a mandate, are
'these means can' we bring our adversary ,to for the South, Vietiminest, ; tt, elnea not ie' notHprodendlrig without arousing the deep.
engage in serious' negotiation? ,and to accept Hove that aillancei' are an end - in tlierh', est isoti i of unhappiness, and even shame,
ti '1,'reasonable" . settlement, tiy which Is selves. Its main concerti, at thit point, Is tO , attiong thoughtful People in this cOuntry, and
Meant, mipmently, one which would commit; see OI8. dreary, slaughter brotight profin 03i ? that, there ;hi here; for the future if not for
Hanoi to the assormice Or the future. pothi- to a halt.1Vhat it' Would weleettie; onIntlir the hreaeift, Seinething more to build on than:
id
c ? seenrIty df the snigon regime. . Aside part is not tint continued blindOtirsuitoi IV jtIst' the . Official outlooks, ihd approithes
froth the fact that dome of us, Considering obligation 010tidY; aimily intlafled,but Itilli; that have IshaPid Lkmericnn policy, in Met;
the nature of Communist regimes generally, iii61.11116141tr.ithiriiilh 46; the lete.eittili! 01 j,ninti at fir 4rsiii ritige Iti rTriig; c;,
I as well as the customary twocesses of pond. I' ti(41,1 tot; urns
ale d' f '0190 II 0 140 lett I
g 6 .
cal change In that part of the World, have; pl e. an
'doubted from the start the feasibility of any
' such undertaking. It is hard to believe that
little sort of bombing Would In any ease be
!adequately conducive to Its achievement.
?, ? If anything has ever been amply,. demons
ignited in military experience, it Is the ex
treme Inefficiency and relative ineffective.
ness fit the strategic bombing weapon as a
Means of military and political pressure. If,
iii particular, one wishes to influence the be-
?-havior of an adversary at the negotiating till
,ble, the 'bombing of residential centers,
Aside frtitn being 'dreadfully offensive to:
World btditititi, stirely the most expensiVe
?
; reallY necessary or Us'to make war upon
66!
, and unpr.OmisIng way "t? dn. it: it Wittrel
North VlettuumekC, Which tnanY of ns OM.;
phatIcally dlSbeileic5 then we .allotild iItivC
the conviction :and ennsisten& to appli..a.
balanced emPloYttient 6t.nli ,branches Of, ?ut
conventional armed forces. In the Attempt to'
k; achieve -by this "single arm tht aim's' We
icon:earned:to. achleVe, there'is a fietlitiusifil
icorigrulty of Meana trdI- '4
I 11
:ITIS ARGUED that our opponents,. the.
Roiih Vietnamese, are not 'Mee
that they are cruel land iinitir841del FdlriRelease
Ant gitd tO t1teJ SInughie
Z.71,
; NEW YORK TIMES
9 January 1973
i,
,1120 Dutch Celebrities Ask
Recall of Envoy to the U.S.
is. .
AMSTERDAM, the Nether-
lands, Jan. 8 (AP)?one hun-
dred twenty prominent Dutch
scholars, artists, writers, jour-
nalists and broadcast person-
alities asked today that the
Dutch Ambassador In Wash-
ington be recalled if the United
States did not stbp its partici-
pation in'the war in Indochina.
In letters to Premier Barend
Biesheuvel and to ? the presi-
dents of the two chambers of
Parliament, they said:
? "As long as the United States,
carries on a war in Indochina
in which nothing and nobody'
Is spared," the, Netherlands
should not be represented in
Washington at the ambassa-
dorial level. ? "
, . . .
' LONDON 'I
, Jan.
group of American religious ? fAP)?A
I I
figures, appealed to lirtish,
churches and politicians t ay
to pres the United State for
peace .in Indochina.
The group,''. headed by0Dr.
Harvey Cox, a professor: of
theology at Harvard Univerity
is . touring Etitopean capkals,
including Rome, where it hitpes's
to see Pope Pout VI. Tcttlay,-,
rd
of
and
vek
t
the mission saw the fish
London, Dr. Rob rt Stop
and talked with 'a ritish C
cil of Churches representa
17
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WASHINGTON POST
15 JANUARY 1973
Australio-U.S. Viet Raids Rift
1 By H. D. S. Greenway ;
I. Wastifoston Post Staff Writer
Last week Australia's mark
time unions ended a 124ay;
boycott of American ship-,
ping, which had been im-
posed in protest of U.S.
Christmas bombing of list;i
and American long-,
rnhoremen ended their -
:counter boycott, which hati-1
tiled up some $20 million
Rvorth of Australian goods in.
{U.S. ports.
The renewed bombing
;Precipitated the closest
;thing to a crisis in Austra-
lian-American relations that
hilplomats could remember
!?but by last week boths
,aides were tying to restore,
the atmosphere of good will
,which the two countries
have so long enjoyed.
1 Three ministers in Austra-
Ha's new Labor government,
which came to power last
Month after 23 years in op-
position, had publicly criti--
Icized U.S. bombing policy.
1Tom Uren, .Australia's new
ttninister .for urban and re-
gional development, accused
President Nixon of "arro-
gance and hypocrisy."
I In the United States,'
where the Australians had
been hoping to get; in on a
' bonanza created by a tempo-
rary increase in the import'
quote for dried milk, it was
announced on Dec. 30 that
the increased imports would
be bought on a first-come- ,
&et-serve basis only until'
Feb. 15.
Since it 'takes about six .
weeks to ship goods from 4
Australia to the United j
States, the ruling seemed
tailor-made bY the Nixon ad-
ministration to shut the
Australians out.
The State Department,
however, went out of its way
to play down the difficulties.
;The State Department's of&
dal spokeman was in-
structed to express only .!
"concern," rather than pro-
test over the boycott, and he
iipoke of the long and I
"exceedingly close" relation-
Ships between Australia and
the United States that was
based on "respect and even !
itdmiration" between the,
two
two conntrles.
Last reek Australia's new
prime minister, Gough Whit.?
lam, also went out of his !
way to 'disassociate himself;
from personal attacks onj
President Nixon, and said
that had it not been for the
renewed bombing, "relations
between the present Austra-
lian government and the
:United States government
. would be better than they,
' have ever been since the
'Second World War."
Beyond the bombing and,
the boycott, there were
.clear indications that Aus-
trails was planning 'a new j
and more independent role,i
.in world affairs. ?
Since the Labor govern'?
snent came to power in De-
cember, Australia has ended',
, conscription', pulled torn-1
.pletely out of the Vietnam.,
war and cut off all military;
aid to both South Vietnam
find Cambodia. ?
Prime Minister Whitram
also said that the Austraii'aitj
'battalion of troops in Singe.
pore would not be replaced
*hen it becomes due for ro-
!teflon at the end of 1973.
The troops are there under,
a ,five-power defense agree?
ment between Great Britain,
Australia, New Zealand, Sin.'
gapore and Malaysia.
Whitlam left his optiona
open, however, and 'said's,
nothing about the Austra-
lian squadron of Mirage jets
,in Malaysia.
On the diplomatic front
the new government has
recognized China and ended:
relations with Taiwan, rec-
ognized East Germany and
taken a much tougher stand:
against Rhodesia in the
United Nations.
But when Australia's am-
bassador, Sir James Plim-
loll, returned here last week
from consultations with the:
new Australian government,
he told Secretary of State ,
William P. Rogers that the
"Anzus" defense treaty be-
tween Australia, New Zea-
land and the United States I
still remains the corner. ,
stone of Australia's defense
planning, and that the new
government had no immedi-
ate plans- for withdrawing'
from the now moribund
Southeast Asia Treaty Or-
ganization.
There have been two dis-
tinct periods in Australian'
foreign policy since the Aus-
tralian states were feder-
ated in 1901, and the coming
to power of the Labor Party
last month may signal the
beginning of a third.
The first dates from April
25, 1915 when Australian
and New Zealand forces'
landed on the Gallipoli pen-'
Insula of Turkey as part of
the allied Dardenelles cam-
paign in World War I. The
date, "Anzac Day," is a na-
tional holiday in Australia.
The campaign ended up a
disaster for the allies, but
,the Australians and New
Zealanders fought well and,
as in the case of the Light ?
Brigade in the Crimea and,
Dulikirk in World War II, ?
:plucky defeats are often. I
found more worthy of com-
memoration than /here vie.'
tory.
To Australians, participa-
tion in World War I meant
coming of age in world af-
fairs. But foreign policy was
still closely linked to Brillsh
policy.
Thus when World War ir
,broke out in Europe, Austra-
lia sent her divisions to 'the
iNorth African desert to
'fight alongside the British.
With the coming of thej
Pacific war and the fall of
Singapore, Australia found
'herself with her armies half!
j-a, world away and the
mill-
tary might of Japan sweep-,
j.Ing down upon her.
I' Against Winston Church.:
lira wishes, Australia or,
dered her troops home. The,
:Battle of the Coral Sea in'
!May, 1942, marked the be.'
:ginning of a new era in Aus-
tralian foreign policy.
In that battle, American
; naval air power turned back
the Japanese fleet off the
Queensland Coast, and Aus-
4tralia decided then and
there that her best defense
lay in the closest possible al-
liance with the United
States.
It 'hae been said that Pres-
"dent Lyndon B. Johnson -
collected on the Coral Sea
debt when he asked Austxa..
18
Eases
Ha to join in his Vietnam
enterprise. But at the time,
there was popular support'
Ifor the Vietnam war in Aug,'
tralia.
' In the early 1960s Austra-
lia had been watching the
'growing Communist influ.'
?ence in Indonesia?Austral
la's closest neighbor with 10
times her population. Thel
.Peking-Djakarta axis had;
Convinced Australia thatl
Asian communism was a d1-1
rect threat.
Mr. Johnson was a popue?
Pltir figure in Australia, and;
his visit in 1966 was greeted.
}with more' popular enthu.,
,arasm than most royal visits.,
' The most unpopular as-,
pect of the Vietnam war for
Australians was conscription.;
Until. Vietnam, Australia!
had never drafted soldiers,'
to fight overseas, not even
In both World Wars.
Ps J33, the mid '60s, horever,1
4115 Indonesian Communists
!bad been crushed by the In-
donesian army, and Indone.
ala has maintained a pro- ,
Western neutrality ever t
since.
; The dragon of monolithic'
communism that the
United States and Australia ;
thought so menacing is no
'longer apparent. The
Soviet split has replaced the
!Cold War as the dominant-
ibig,,poiver sonfrontation in
A
s
ia
In the 1970s Australian
foreign policy will no longer,
so closely follow Washing.,
ton's lead, but Australia's
new independence merely'
reflects new realities in
'Asia.
The measures that theft
new Labor government hasi
'taken so far are basically in
line with the Nixon Doctrine'
and new age of detente. :
The, 'renewed bombing Ot
Hanoi clearly 'offended pub-,
lic opinion in Australia, as it
did in malty ether countries.1
'But in the long haul Wash.:
ington hopes Australia 'will,
remain, as James Miehener
,wrote 20 years ego, "an ally',
that can be trusted, a Wen-
did people that can be eet
lied upon."
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 January ,1973
Ameriarts. aid for Hanoi
ihospital: unique'
By Trudy Rubin
? Staff writer of
The Christian Science Monitor ?
? Boston:
? The recently announced campaign by U.S,
antiwar activists to raise $3 million to rebuild
, the shattered Bach Mai Hospital in Hanoi is;
1? the latest and most dramatic episode in' a
' small but growing phenomenon:
Sending humanitarian aid by American
; organizations to a country with which the
: United States is engaged in battle.
Moreover, some of this aid has been
officially licensed by the United States.
Treasury Department with the approval of
f the State Department, Department of De-
fense, and the White House, creating a
Situation \vithout known precedent, accord-
; ing to Treasury and other government
1 sources. \ , 1,
, These sources make quite .clear that the
major purpose of granting the licenses is the
? hope of gaining information on prisoners of
war via the organizations transporting the
aid ? mainly medical supplies ? into North
yietnam.
890,000 in equipment
The Bach Mai campaign is being run by ,
i Medical Aid to Indo-China (MAI), A Cam-
, bridge, Mass,-based group formed about 18
months ago by a group of Boston doctors,
( \ health workers, and antiwar activists to send
medical supplies to the civilian health ser-1
vices of North Vietnam and the Communist.'
I controlled areas of South Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, and Laos.
MAI says it has sent nearly $90,000 of
? equipment *to these areas,' including pace-
' makers and electrocardiograph machines.
MAI requested information from the Trea-
sury Department on licenses, but never
, applied for them, and has sent its material ;
without them.
? This renders the group. liable for prose-'
cution under the 1917 Trading With the +
-Enemy Act. (There has been noindication of,
possible prosecution, but MAI sources say 1
the Department of Commerce has requested
specific details about two shipments of !
American-made medical supplies to North
Vietnam.)
$3 million sought
MAI hopes to raise $3 million to rebuild
Bach Mai, including more than $250,000
raised over the past two weeks. But the
. spokesmen also say no decision has been
? reached about applying for licenses for the
, Bach Mai materials.
The other principal group sending medical ,
supplies, however, has applied for, and been
granted, three licenses totaling $115,000 by
. the Treasury and Commerce Departments
* (one in 1969, two in 1971, and a renewal in
1972), after being refused a license in 1968.:
. (Treasury issues license8. for monetary re-
tnittaneee to hostile countries: ,Commerce.
issues them for American-made goods.)
The American Friends Service Committee?
(Quaker), with h tradition of humaitarian
giving on both sides of a conflict that includes,
the Spanish Civil War and the Chinese civil,
war, has delivered open-heart-surgery mate-
rials and electrocardiographs to the Viet Duo
hospital in Hanoi and to the North Vietnam-
ese Red Cross Society. (The AFSC also runs a
rehabilitation center in South Vietnam.)
Funneling via Geneva
In addition, the United Presbyterian '1
Church and the Episcopal Church of Amer-
ica have begun fund drives, starting in latil
1972, specifically aimed at medical aid for
Nprth Vietnam.
This money, in addition to funds raised by
the National Council of Churches, is funneled ,
through the Geneva-based World Council of
Churches, thus avoiding the need for U.S. ,)
licenses. The U.S. contribution since 1965 by
the National Council has amounted to $75,000;
the Presbyterians in their 1972 drive have so
? far raised $18,000; and the Episcopalians,
: $1,000 so far.
i?
A combination of striiigent U.S. regulations
and lack of access to Germany made humani-
tarian giving impossible during World War I
II, while North Korea, according to State
' Department sources, would not' grant access.
to U.S, voluntary agencies during the Korean
'war.
?
'Two conditions posed
Granting licenses during the current con-
, filet, however, is not without some ostrings,
? which MAI has so far declined to accept. j
According to Stanley Summerfield, acting ,!
director of the Foreign Assets Control Pro-
!,? gram of the Treasury Department, which ?
; licenses remittances to North Vietnam (with
specific time and dollar limits), the basic
requirements are two:
First licenses are issued on a "huma:nitar;
ian basis," he says, provided there is "satis-
factory assurance that an impartial observer '
will be able to witness the distribution" of the
supplies.
The second request (Mr. Summerfield says
that"requirement is not the correct word ?
;-'it might be a hope") is that "the shipment 1
will increase our information about the',
POWs." He adds' vigorously, "We're non
'interested in helping North Vietnam for the.
sake of helping North Vietnam. We want
something out of it."
Only AFSC has applied
; So far only the AFSC has applied for a;
North Vietnam license. Mr. Summerfield
declined to comment on whether a license
: might be granted if applied for to a group like
' MAI, which identifies itself more openly with
the North Vietnamese cause. "I would have
to look at the case," he said.
Until 1971 the Quakers carried letters for
POWs on their visits with the knowledge of
the State Department. But since the forma.'
tion of the New York-based Committee of.
Liaison, the antiwar group that is recognized
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by the North Vietnamese as the only U.S..
group dealing with POWs, they have ceithed
;. to carry mail.
L. Though some antiwar groups argue, as do
Some Quakers, that there should be no
cooperation with the U.S. Ooverninent
. sending humanitarian aid, Martin Teitel,
Asian program director of the AFSC, says,
"We think we can withstand being co-opted
by the State Department."
Attempting to witness deliveries has "
proved troublesome to some would-be donors
who say the North Vietnamese have been
reluctant to allow Americans to accompany
THIS ECONOMIST JANUARY 6, 1973
\
the donated supplies. According to Mr. Tel tel,
the Quakers were refused permission to .
'accompany their first ? unlicensed ? ship-
ment to. National Liberation Front territory.
' 9
? But since then they have insisted success:;
.fully ? as part of their emphasis on "a ?
concern for people" ? that they send Quaker.
representatives ?yith their medical supplies
to Hanoi.
North . Vietnamese Objections, he says,
centered on claims that it would be too '
dangerous' for ciVilians to accompany the
goods.
The cost of the bombing
They say that it takes between 50 and
6o of the Russian-made Sam-2 rockets
to hit one or the high-flying B-52
bombers that the Americans are still
sending from Guam and northern
'Thailand to attack North Vietnam. If
'so, Hanoi must now have better air
'defences than most other capitals, since
American losses during the raids north
of the 20th parallel, which were called
'off last Saturday, came as a shock to
the Pentagon. According to American
official figures, the North Vietnamese
knocked out 15 B-52s' and a further
six or seven are said to have been made
unflightworthy.
Whether these figures are entirely
? reliable is open to doubt; American
' spokesmen fumbled their statistics
several times after the bombing of
Hanoi began on December 18th. Hanoi
'radio claims that 81 American aircraft
/were brought down over Hanoi and
',Haiphong between December 18th and
December 29th, of which 34 were B-52s.
'Those figures should be taken with an
even bigger pinch of salt. But the
financial cost to the Americans is not
to be sneezed at, since the B-52s cost
about ?.3m apiece. And it has /now
been established that they are no longer
invulnerable in the skies over Indo-
china.
Nor, it seems, are they particularly
accurate. It is hard to gauge the effects
of the missions flown over Hanoi and
Haiphong, since Pentagon sources have
been reticent and the only reasonably
objective sources in Hanoi were the
reporters of the Agence France Presse.
But the B-52s were apparently not
'accurate enough to single out their
"strategic targets" (mostly, communi-
cations and supply centres such as
warehouses and port facilities) without
inflicting serious damage on residential
areas and civilian installations such as
the Bach-Mai hospital, which is repor-
ted to have been completely destroyed
during the attack on the neighbouring
airfield, or the embassies not far from
the main fuel depot, which was also
destroyed.
Instead of using the remote-control-
led "smart bombs,", the Americans
appear to have relied mainly on carpet.
pattern bombing. Under these condi-
tions, it was inevitable that many
NEW YORK TIMES
15 January 1973
While Thousands Weep.
.By Anthony Lewis
PARIS?In the Vietnamese way, his
voice remained soft and conversational
i despite the emotion of his thoughts.
"This time something has to change,"
Ihe said. "There has. been too much
suffering?now there must be recon-
ciliation. The people in Saigon see it,
the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment sees it, Hanoi sees it. They have
, . all. suffered. If the Vietnamese do not
, reconcile themselves, the Americans
? can do nothing for real peace no
, matter how long they stay."
, It was one of Paris' many Viet-
- ,namese poIlocat exiles speaking: Ho
iThong Minh, minister of defense In
Ngo Diem'S first Government, , way
back in 1954-55. He resigned because,
as he puts it, "I found that Diem was
a backward, reactiOnary man, and
saw no hope for Vietnam." He slipped
out of Saigon, past Diem's security
men, and came to Paris.
In his person Ho Thong reflects the
tragedy of his country and of Amer-
ica's involvement in it. His aim is the '
one that Vietnatnese political. figures '
of all views avow: an independent .
Vietnam, free of foreign control. But,
la a lifetime of working with this force,
And that he has not found the means
to the end.
. He was 19 years old, in 1939, when'
he first joined the struggle against the ,
colonial French. After World War Ft,
when the French returned, he was og.
civilian casualties would result, as
Pentagon spokesman conceded just
after Christmas. The only estimate of
total civilian casualties provided
so far 'came frort/ the director of a'
Hanoi hospital, who claimed that, on
average, 200 civilians had been killed
and ,200? injured during each day of.
the 'raids north of the 20th parallel.
The North Vietnamese also say that
during the 12 days, 1,318 people died
in Hanoi alone.
These raids were suspended on
December 3oth, and on New Year's
Day the North Vietnamese announced
that they were ready to return to high-
level peace talks with the Americans.
President Nixon's decision to suspend
the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong
was probably influenced both by the
protests from many prominent Euro-
peans and by the declaration from the
North Vietnamese that they would not
resume talks?even at a purely techni-
cal level?uniil the raids were stopped.
Mr Kissinger is expected to meet Le
Duc Tho in Paris next week.
The military effects of the Hanoi
raids will be tested only in the event of
a new communist offensive in the
south, but American official sources
have suggested privately that their
cumulative effect had been to set the
country back two years. On Tuesday
the communist daily Nhan Dan urged
the evacuation of the cities by all North
Vietnamese whose services were not
"essential to combat or production."
, But North Vietnam's arms and
ammunition, and an increasing propor?
lion of its food, are brought in from
Russia ? and China. So the destruction'
of local industry will count far less than
the American attempts to stop supplies''
being shipped in by planting m13re
mines in Haiphong' harbour, and to
stop supplies reaching the North
Vietnamesb troops. in,' South' Vietnath
by 'disrupting! land tommunic.aticmsg ? -
,
?
the general Oaf? of the resistance,
movement in the far south of Viet-
nam. But he found "the Communists
wanted to take all power for them-
selves," so .he left the movement for?
civilian life as an engineer.
Diem 'made him deputy defense.
minister In 1954. After a month, he,
says, "The Americans. urged Diem to:
I
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e7"put me in full charge; 'arid he did.",,' '
So there is special Ire* in what has 1 ?the Tee offensive started, he Was put-
, in jail and kept there untilhe went oni
'happened to his view of the United ? ?
' States. ': ? ' : . - - - ? -
? ? . ; : a hunger 'strike two months later. '
rr ' "In 1954,". Minh says, "I had greatl - - 1 ?
,',hope in America?a great anticolonial : ''';'? . Today, like so many of the exiles in:
country.' But as time went on, I saw, ' Paris, he is In the middle. He is one of
i'.that that was not so. j i ? the ?neutralists who might be serving .? ..
...
'..e
i. "In Washington in'1993 one of your j i. now with Saigon and P.R.G. members ... neutralist Vietnamese politiCiatis 'If
.. generals told me that all the ? Amer!- ' ,,,. in the Council of National Reconcilia- Paris. They are naturally appealing to
...
',? ?
'cans would be out of Vietnam by the: :, ition if President Nixon had carried out ? Americans, who mostly dislike the''
f ' -gbt
;end of 1965.. Then in 1965,,the day the t. the terms negotiated by Henry Kissin; extremist politics of ideology and
. ,
?',first American bombs fell : on. North , ger, last October. ? for the middle .of the road. But there', , .,
; !t. is no . middle . of the road in Vietnam .
il Vietnam, I heard that the Pentagon . '' "Certainly the people of South Viet-.
, - ?
noW. .? ,
f( said they would be on their knees in ? "'tam do- not want 'Communism," he
ei six
or eight weeks. But I knew that says, "but neither do they want an . .,... The American Government decided
I'long ago to oppose' any move toward
would not be so, then or ever. 'army dictatorship. Our way. of life has ;
'
'After that my confidence: in the. ,:., neutralism or political accommodation
drifted from our origins. We must' be -.
'
Americans went. I told my friends ..more -ourselves.. We cannot ' live an in South Vietnam, staking all on the:
,
that ,we, would have to do it, by our- '. 'American way- of. life..
:?. .. $ , survival of.Nguyen Van Thieu and his
"'autocracy.It id so not fon the sake of;
,
selves." ? . , ., ."It- all tells in ,our economic lin&
. the Vietnamese #but out of concern for,
'lib Thong Minh has made one ,visit military
d 'social . ... '
anstrength. The occi-? its own face. That is why the destruc=i
Ito Saigon Since 1955, in 1968` The ,'' ;dental eye looks at us now and says ? ?
, tion has hail to go on for so long,1
' thieu Government allowed him' 1h":' that' ? '
Saigon can stand lup against the
because his father had. died. But when! , North. But it is. a strength from out-
' side?artificial." ?,
?
! ' lie believes that only a "third-force
? t Government" led by neutrals can save
' South Vietnam from more suffering,
lie says, "The only way to have peace. peace there may be Is not likely WI
?
f in Southeast . Asia, is reconciliation `Create Ho 'Thong Minks vision *of til
: among the Vietnamese ?first in the ? reconciled Vietnitin, free 'cif, sufferInt
-. South, then between South and North.", at lat.. ,
AT HOME ABROAD
The 'way to peace
? ...?
is reconciliation
of the Vietnamese.
'DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
I5 January 1973 '
'PETER GILL, in Saigon,
'consequences of America's
?1311,ESpENT bombing:'
offensive against the Indus-
trial heartland of North
Vietnam rapidly achieved its dip-
Monistic purpose. When Hanoi last
Nteek signalled its willingness to
North and South. ? s
.? Now thd signs' that a cease-fire
may really be at hand. The decision isl
up to Richard. Nixon,, and this time the
approach, of Inauguration pay ,may,
concentrate his mind. Biit whatever
,return to the conference table in
:Paris, the United States was satis-
iltlieC1 that. this time the Vietnamese
,CtintrritiniSt leadership was in
earnest.
. What remains at issue after the ,
10-day air war over the Red River
Ideltd is.. whether the destruction
lhaN.inaterially altered the political 4
and Military balance between the
Communists and their opponents
in. Vietnam itself1., ?
' In, strict , military terms, the
:tobjective Of' the catnnaign was
;Clear.' From April to October last .
1Yeat',1 Aitierltari? ' fighter-bombers
qMpried with electrOnichlly guided
tombs' were 'sent into ?North Viet-,
main to destroy bridges, sever pipe-
lines and cut irailway, lines. On
,occasions. they, , took on larger
Itnilitary, Installations; .But when
Mr Nixon. ordered the resumption,:
Of ,; bombing north of the ? 20th
parallel ;on :.Pec. 18; ?? American
iebmmaiiders, in. Saigon Were told
,td",,? :deploy. ,. more than ? half
'America's ,entire strategic bomber
;Orce.againSt the intractable North
? ietnameSe. ;
. ? ?
was
a decision entirelyin keep-,
ing with a..long---some.,would say
igreatrrAmerican Presidential tradi-
tion.,.. President Truman ordered
the dropping of. the ,atom bomb _os?
Approved For R
? -
'It Is always iso gad to meet the ??
considers the political anil military
air raids on North Vietnam
Has the 13-52
41
bought .'peace?
.... ... the japan- , around the world 'Was itself ifonic.'1"
9
two. Japanese cities, and the Japan- '' There is strong evidence to indicate:,
pse 'Surrendered: President Eisen- that the campaign was in I face
hewer ordered intensified bombing. planned :from llit beginning to end ,
of 'North Korea 'to include the when it did because there was then I
dykes, ? and a, ' , ceasefire was: nothing else of military t. con-1
arranged: Mr Nixon' himself' sequence to hit.. , . , .. ,. i 'Ii
.
.. ,
ordered' the mining of NOrth.Viet- . - The' NOrth Vittnarriese leader-1
riamese harbours last May, and the ? ship reacted predictably -to the re-I
Communist spring offensive against, hewed bombing, as ?Well as to its1
the South was at least slowed down., ctssation. , They. fulminated against:.
This time, formetionS of green-:. American "terror.", They vowed-`i
'and-brown B-52 bombers, originally never to be bombed into submiSsion.1
bUilt to deliver the . atom bomb, and finally laid .claim to ".a? victory,,
flew against targets within a mile of strategicisignifiCance in forcingii,
'or so, of the centre of , Hanoi and , America to call off its boniberS for k
Oyer Haiphong and Other cities. . , fear of invitin?g'unacceptable losses.,'
They struck at *marshalling yards, ', Much of this can be dismissed as;
,docks, power plants, radio trans- propaganda, It is, for instance,it
ntitters barracks and airfields?the, certain that American commanders.i
'very vitals of an apparently already, i . . .
.Sagging War economy. '' anticipated considerable
losses in
! "To . witneSs a 1315Z raid," a re- the B-52 force, and that sending ,
cent 'American university 'study of ., more than 70 professional airmen:A
the Indo-China air war .coolly ob- ; _to their death or to internment in 1,
:served, " is to. WitneSs.,a: disaster ., Communist prisoner-of-war camps'
of major proportions."," '. ;1 '.was considered' a risk worth taking.:
When the bombing stopped lase' ,The real outcome of the bombing7
Saturday, morning, North Vietnam's i r-victory, 'defeat 'or continuing
industrial and conventional military, i. stalemate?will , be gauged. only .1
capacity .lay in ruins. The relief from the fine print of the document i ,
that finally emerr from he B i
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Itgain. on Monday. ? But it Is quit el
!possible that the North Vietnaraese !
!claim to be in the stronger bargain- :
4ng position will be vindicated. '\ ? ? '
1, The public stance of the Hairi
leadership continues to be that
!America should sign a peace agree- .
me pt on the terms?unfavourable ':
to the ? Saigon Government ? .!
,!ori inally worked' out last October.?
Washington now considers these :
:terms neither fair nor just, and..
? threatens that renewed persistence
;on, Hanoi's part will be met by
'renewed bombing of Hanoi and ,
Haiphong. But that threat appears-
Ancreasingly hollow; and, if imple-
'Inented, would certainly be difficult ..
'to., justify in military terms.
' The privately-stated view of the .
' American command in Saigon is :
;that the bombing over Christmas'
!,set North Vietnam back two years,
and that there is no chance of the'
?North mounting any major ? offen-
sive against the South for months.
1,
,..., Washington has stuck 'to,' the .
.view that bombing waa a military
!necessity and that the raids were
not punitive.
Facts of war
Mr Nixon is !also aware, ,of the
'huge civilian 'casualties involved
in sending heavy- bombers over
densely-populated areas. , That
Ithey are not intentional is a fact:
but they .are also inevitable. The
euphemisms employed. among
!American officers in- Saigon bear
leloquent testament to this. To
!kill civilians is unacceptable: but
!i, 4
collateral damage" ? or, in .''the
case of B-52s,?? "circular error
,probable," are facts of war. !
. So when Dr Kissinger sits dosVit
?on Monday in Paris with Mr,
ilDue Tho to settle, the remaining,,
issues preventing peace in Vietnam,
,he will not be. a victor facing the,
THE ECONOMIST DECEMBER 2, 1972
Camb odia
The new force
1.1tilesS Mr Nikon it't
indeed prepared to use yet more ?!
frightful' weapbris .of war to, force!
Cat settlernetit; and hid, action's? far
?is mild in' comparison 'with allied t'
enenty air -tactics in.* the"
'Second World War, ! America.' caitl
incite eaSily be cast in the role, ail
' the .enthained and impotent giant,,,,i
It is" this View 'of, things that is! r:
spPertnost in the ',Mind of saigta
Iiifficiala. President Thieu of. South
'?Vietnam was kept, closely informed
the' developing, ,air offensive!
against the North; but there. is little
evidence to suggest that he was
:particularly impressed by the likely:,
!political outcome..
r In his ,New Year messages to
diplomats in' Saigon 'and to
people, there' was no reference to
the bombing having, brought a
favourable peace any nearer. The
old objections remain: that the
North Vietnamese stould withdraw
their "300,000 troops" from the
South befOre an honourable peace
can be concluded and that a cease
? fire "in place," leaving the North
Vietnamese invaders in occupation.
of parts of the South,' can, at best
! be considered a temporary affair;'
A few weeks before the bomb.'
ing began over Hanoi ? and
Haiphong, the Americans com-
pleted a frantic programme tqi
ship fresh war supplieS to Saigon.1
They included .400 M-41 andi
M-48 tanks, 350,: warplanes'
and more than 30 Hrcules trans-,
? port aircraft, With an air force of
more than: 2,000 aireraft, Southl
Vietnam now has' the doubtful
?tinction of being. an Asian' super--
Power. p '
Then came the bombing. In 101
days of, air raids North . Vietnam's',
.'capacity tti wage' conventional War I
was destroyed. In Western terms,,,
:.and that is' the rub, ?Hanoi could.
FROM OUR INDOCHINA CORRESPONDENT
! Whatever the North Vietnamese have
-done, or failed to do, in South Viet-
nam this year, they have certainly
managed to organise a genuine local
insurgency in Cambodia. A year ago
the Cambodian government could
I argue with some justification that
! Cambodia's troubles would fade away
when the Vietnamese communists
withdrew from the country. It is now
accepted, however, that most of the
fighting on . the roads leading into
Phnom Penh since the late summer has
been the work of communist-led Cam-
bodian guerrillas.
The North Vietnamese seem to have
decided to build up the Khmer Rouge
forces, and help them to acquire more
territory, during the rainy season., in
the -summer and autumn of 1971. This
-may have been connected with the
'offensive they were planning in
!lin longer be consider?d '1 mI1itai
power. But the coming battles in4
7 South Vietnam will not be fought,
!!?in Western terms. A Communist'
assassin ? or his' Government
counterpart does not need the
backing of an industrialised Power
to do his work. Political indoot
trination teams?on both sides?'
need only, an ideology and: w1111',
power.. ? The Communists have
already demonstrated their greater,
strength in both fields.
If South Vietnam 'is' obliged -W
continue the ground war, its.
numerical superiority in the field
will count for little. Even a one-
million-man Army, supported, by its
. own armour and aiecraft, can, be
paralysed by a large and deter-.
mined ?giierrilla 'force. The
North Vietstamese aftd their Viet
Cong allies, in the South, who un-
r? wisely chose last March to launclt
a convehtional war, cart just
easily, revert, to the guerrilla'
tactics 'which have cost South Viet-
nam dear in the past. ' ' ; !' I
. A South Vietnam snider predOrniS!
nantly military,leadership remaing,
afraid of the consequences
peace?and snore wary Still? after)
the bombing,' of 'AmeriEa's
ness to impose al unfavourable'
' agreernent on her. ! ?
? ?
Thicu ,Beltictantly, Presidentf
',probahly follow his ? ally into' a
peace of Ameriean Manufacture:
"But he will know that the bombingl
,of the North 'and the' arms ?pJ
i:plies to the'Sotith have dont MU&
to shore up his regime.; 'They ikilV
haVe.' simply, and perhaps 'finally,
t, demonstrated two basiefattS about'
the current lphak of the Yitttiaiiii
.rwar: that 'America rernainsfor the
being :the moit' paroierful:
r.nation directly 'involved in the 'cetri:!1
flict ,and. that?she no longef Min&
'to be' a: party to it.
Vietnam for 1972, Which was -going
to use most of their own troops in
Cambodia. Anyway, by late this
summer intelligence reports put the
Khmer Rouge's strength at 40,000 men
?not all front-line soldiers, but
including 40 to 6o battalions of 200
or more men each, with Cambodian
commanders.
The big question is whether these
amount !to an organised movement.
Certainly the rebels in the maquis got
there by very different routes. The
majority are probably peasants
impressed by the North -Vietnamese as
coolies. Others are remnants of the
old anti-Sihanouk Khmer Rouges.
There are villagers who took to arms
after suffering at the hands of the
South Vietnamese army, and some
common or garden bandits. But the
available intelligence points to North
Vietnamese-trained communists as, the
chief force among the guerrillas.
Since Prince Sihanouk's overthrow in
1970 some 2,000-3,000 of these men
22'
?,??
have come back from North Vietnam,
where they went in 1954 or soon after.
wards. They and like-minded later
converts, including some intellectuals
who rebelled against Prince Sihanouk,
together with the North -Vietnamese,
have organised the aggressive Khmer
Rouge units that went into action this
summer.
It is hard to get a clear idea of how
much of the country they control.
Much of Cambodia is no man's land,
and has been for two years. But there
is evidence from some areas of well
organised villages with their own home
guard. The relationship between the
Cambodian guerrillas and the North
Vietnamese will be very important if
there is a ceasefire in Vietnam. Will
North Vietnam want the guerrillas to ?
stop fighting and try for a compromise,
political sdlution, with or. without
Sihanouk? They are a new factor in -
the situation, which the Cambodian
government cannot ignore.
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THE SUNDAY STAR' 'and DAILY NEWS
ysioshington, D. C., January 14, 1973
litzkrieg
in Southeast
By I. F. STONE
,1 election victory is still bright, President Nixon
has show n that he knows the opportunity Is
Almost everything Nixon has done since his thpro
ire-election, whether at home or abroad, in small
' ?
ways as well as large, fits the portrait of a crafty, new faces in what old agencies? The
suspicious and vindictive man: Isolated and dis-
trustful of those around him, and with that touch roller coaster, leading casualty of the Great
(of megalomania virtually inescapable when one ! Conglomerate Bubble of the Sixties, to ovemee
sits at the buttons which can unleash thermo- .through OMB (Office of ManageMent and the ,
:nuclear thunderbolts. Budget) the biggest conglomerate in the world."
The real probldm, as the coming weeks will t the U ?S ? government?
'Make clearer, is not just to ,disengage America The shift of Nixon's sharpest cost-cutter,
"Cap the Knife" Weinberger, 'to HEW, where he':
from Southeast Asia but from the increasingly can pare social welfare, and of the administra-
one-man rule of Richard N17(on. He can undo
t
with one plunge of his bombers months of slow ion's softest liberal patsy Richardson to the
progress toward detente. He can unite the world ,Pentagon, where he can front for the $4 billion
against us in hate and fear.. increase already announced in military expendi-
' tures?
? ? #
HOW RAPIDLY the scene has changed! It t The replacement at Commerce of the admin-,.
was only seven days before Nixon ordered the ,istration's ablest new figure Peterson by a non-'?
.B-52s over Hanoi?hut it seems a vanished age? entity out of Southern textiles? The packing of
when Sen. Edward Kennedy told a Los Angeles sub-Cabinet jobs with plastic men out of the',
'audience, "There is more good will in Congress. White House staff, all tried and true one-dimen-1
now toward Mr. Nixon than perhaps at any sionals?
- time in his career" and offered Democratic co- Neither in the reshufflings nor in Nixon's )
t operation "in launching a new and effective era rhetorical inanities about the Protestant work
of progress. . . ." ethic was 'anything visible but an effort to rein-
? A day later, six days before the bombing be- stitute for the Seventies a Coolidge-type govern",
gan, Sen. Humphrey told a Washington press. meat inadequ'ate even a half century, ago, as !
conference on his return from a 15-day trip to the stock market crash of 1929 proftd. "
Moscow, Warsaw, Bonn, and London that no; ,? How easily Nixon could have kepb the Demo-'
where had he been' asked a single question about crats quiet. If only he had proceeded softly, it
Vietnam?except by one stray American reporter. he hadn't?in his own favorite phrase?blown
? The . absence of questions even then indi- his cool and resumed the bombings of Hanoi and
cated an appalling absence of astuteness on the' ; Haiphong. Thanks to the B52s, that proved the
,part of Humphrey and his interlocutors. He had' shortest era of good feeling in American politics.;1
had three hours with Kosygin in Moscow, and ?
talked with Prime Minister Jaroszewicz in War- THE BOMBING ENDED with the strangest
, saw, Willy Brandt and his rival Barzel in Bonn," ' White House press conference of all time. What
and both Heath and Harold Wilson in London; the' newspapers failed to explain is that the
That none of them asked about Vietnam shows presidential announcement for which correspon-
'how easily taken in they were. So was Teddy Ken- dents were hurriedly summoned to the White,
?nedy with his lightheaded reference in his Los House Saturday morning, Dec. 30, never men- ,
Angeles speech, "Now that peace is near in Indo.' tioned the end of the bombing. This came out j
'china . . . America as a nation has a new hori- bnly in response to questions from startled cor-
zon of unparalleled opportunity." respondents. Only readers of the New York
Times, which ran the transcript, could realize:4
In a world that spends billions on intelligence,
these statesmen don't even seem to read the this. The announcement by Oerald Warren, the I
'newspapers. They had only to skim the Wash- deputy presidential press secretary, simply said:
ington dispatches of the past few months to see "The President has asked me to announce .1 ?
that the U.S. has been making long-term military this morning that negotiations between presi-
, and economic aid commitmeas to South Viet- Aleatial adviser Dr. Kissinger and special adviser
nam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, and that, Le Due Tho, and Minister Xuan Thuy, will be '1
American air and seapower were being repos', resumed in Paris on Jan. 8. Technical talks be-1
tioned for . intervention from Thal bases and by ? tween the experts of the two sides will be re.
the Seventh Fleet. Preparatons for a new and sumed on Jan. 2. That is the extent of the an-1-
'prolonged stage of Nixon Doctrine warfare were + ? ammcement."
already visible even before the renewed bomb- Nothing was said about any suspension of
the bombing. The very first question seemed to 4,
THE MYOPIA is not limited to foreign policy, assume that, since no stoppage had been an-
Kennedy's references to the domestic front in that nounced, it must be going on?
same Los Angeles speech were downright school- Q. "Senator Saxbe has said and been quoted
girl gushy. "We can find new directions for old quite widely that the President 'appears to have
approaches," he said, whatever that means. "Al- left his senses.' And he described the sort of
ready bringing' new faces into old agencies, at bombing going on in Hanoi as an act of 'arm
. time *hen the glow a his -almost Incredible,. gance and Irresponsibility.' Gerry, can you reply ,
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to that? Is there any eaction from the Presi--Z,1
' dent?"
A. "No, I wouldn't reply to that."
.It was only then that somebody though to ask
the 'question and drew these stingy responses? i)
Q. "Will there be a halt to the bombing of
? North Vietnam?"
A. "The President has ordered that all bomb-
ing will be discontinued above the 20th Parallel 1,
' as long as serious negotiations are underway."
`1 Q. "Effective when?"
A. "I can't discuss ,the timing of military
operations."
Q. "Are we bombing right now, this minute?" ,
A. "I really can't discuss military operations
from here."
The press was still in the dark, and tried a
f- new tack?
Q. "Did you say 'effective negotiations'?"
A. "No, 'serious negotiations.', "
Q. "You are implying then that it wouldn't
halt until they actually start and we decide that
); they are serious?"
, To, this' Mr. Warren finally replied, "No, aS
soon as it was clear that serious negotiations
could be resumed at both the technical level
and between the principals, the President ordered
that all bombing be discontinued above the 20th
Parallel." But the sparring continued, and after
t three more questions and answers we had this? r
rs Q. "Se the order has been made. In other
I words the bombing halt is in effect?"
A. "The order has been made."
?
* * * * ?
' Q. "Has the order taken effect?"
A. "I cannot discuss that."
. Q. "But it has gone out?"
" A. "That is correct. . . ."
And after 13 more questions, which still shed
r
no further light on what had happened, the brief-
ing ended with this?
; Q. "Gerry, since you won't discuss the mili-
tary aspects, is it possible the Pentagon can tell
us whether, like, from midnnight on, there was
no more bombing?
A. "It is possible. I just don't know."
With the whole world waiting and on edged
that is all the White House woulld say. The bare -
record seems to reflect an ?arrogant contempt
? for the press and for world opinion.
, GERALD WARREN did not claim that the
bombings had forced North Vietnam to the ne-
gotiating table. The North Vietnamese walked
out on the negotiations because of the bombing,
but said all along they woulld return when it .
stopped. On the other hand when it did stop,
, Vo Van Sung, their representative in Paris, de.'
dared that the result of the large-scale bombing
had been "a military and political defeat" -for
the United States and "a strategic victorY forlur
people." The bombing was undoubtedly a moral
? and military defeat for Nixon. He not only sue-,
ceeded in making the United States look like a
bully in the eyes of the world but a bully who
had suffered a well-deserved bloody nose.
Like so much else about this disgraceful epi-
sode in our national history, most of what led ;
up to the bombing is still secret. When the North
Vietnamese and the PRG delegations walked
out of the Paris talks on Dec. 21 to protest the
' bombings, they charged that ever since the talks
resumed in November the United States had
threatened "two or three times daily" to break
off talks and resume bombing north- of the 20th
Parallel.
The North Vietnamese spokesman, Nguyen
? Thant' Le, told a press conference that day, "The 1
241
snore good will we showed, the more the Nixon ,j?
(;Administration adopted an unreasonable attitude;
t: the more we proved our flexibility, the more it ,)
demanded fundamental modifications (of the
5 agreed text) and the more the Nixon Administra-
tion used military pressure to (try to) subjugate
If the other side's account is correct, these
threats explain North Vietnam's order of Dec. 3
, to begin evacuating all schoolchildren from Hanoi.'
The United States has hot denied that threats 3
, were made, but its propagandists have twisted ;
the evacuation order to prove that "as of bee.
3, Hanoi already was pimping to scuttle the ne- ;
r gotiation."
t This is on a par with Pentagon claims that
7 if civilians were hurt in Hanoi it must have been
their own fault because (a) Hanoi had shot down
American planes and the debris had hit icivillans
or (b) they were hit by debris from all those
t SAM missiles. As the mugger said, if the victim .1
hadn't resisted, he wouldnt have been hurt.
IT IS HARD to decide which is worse?the !
? vindictive cruelty of the air raids or the lies told,'
to excuse them. The most transparent of these
lies was that the attacks on Hanoi and Haiphongi
were needed to disrupt a new offensive. When g
Nixon suspended the bombing above 'the 20th
Parallel in October to express his satisfaction
(then) with the agreement disclosed October 26,
Aviation Week (October 30) carried a two-page
summary of the results. It said the seven
months of "Operation Linebacker," which Nixon
launched last May 'II, bad "proven more effective,
more crippling than the years of the Rolling
Thunder operation" that Lyndon Johnson ended
In October 1968.
"Even should the cease-fire effOrts fail,""
Aviation Week reported, "they (i.e., U.S. military
officials) believe the Communist supply. network
has been so severely crippled that it will requirel
months to repair." Similarly Michael Getlero
Pentagon correspondent of the Washington Post?
reported in that paper (Dec. 24), "Prior to the i
renewed bombing no U.S. military commanders ,
were expressing any fears of a new North Viet-
namese assault." Intelligence reported that the
other side was preparing for political rather than.,
.military action.
No doubt great suffering was imposed on the
civilian population and great damage on corn-
munications and transport as well as on remain.;
Ing industrial and power facilities. But the price,
was high enough to be humbling to the world's
strongest-military power.
To 'see the losses in perspective one mustt
recall that the-B-62s were intended for the nu-
clear bombardment of the Soviet Union. Air ?
Force sources said the average losses over Hanoi
were no greater than expected?from 2 to 3 per-
cent of the planes participating. But reporters :
could not find out whether this was the margin of '?
loss expected in all-out nuclear war or in conven-
tional bombardment over the heavily defended
Hanoi-Haiphong area.
In nuclear war, even if only 2 to 3 percent
get through the results would be terrible. One';
B-62 can carry enough nuclear weapons to wreck ,
a moderate-sized city. But in conventional war,
a 2 to '3 percent rate loss is high, particularly
when you are talking of a virtually irreplaceable
aircraft like the B-52. A 2 percent rate means
that in fifty days of concentrated bombing the
entire fleet would be lost; a 3 percent rate would
eat up a 11-83 fleet in 33 days or a llttle twee than
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.,0T ?
;.;f
fri month.
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IN THE 11 days of concentrated bombing
over Hanoi and Haiphong, he Air Force ad-
mitted to 15 B-52s shot down and later added that
six more B-52s made it back but landed as
wrecks. That is 10 percent of the 200 B-52s sup- i
posed to be assigned to the Far East theater and
20 percent of the 100 B52s supposed to have been
used daily. No definite and final official figures?
*, have been given. ?
The loss in pilots was worse. When Johnson
called off the air war in October 1968, the Penta-
gon said "more than" 450 airmen had been killed, j
I captured, or were missing since the air war be-
gad in 1961. In 11 days of bombing Nixon lost
93 airmen, or 20 percent as many in 11 days as
were lost in the first eight years.
It would. be most enlightening if a congres-
? sional committee could learn what exactly was
I gained in strictly military terms for all this ex-
penditure. A Saigon dispatch in the New York ,
: Times, Dec. 31, noted reports that a textile fac-
tory and a noodle factory in 'Hanoi had both been
heavily bombed in one of the final raids. The
complaint in the Korean war was that "we were ,
4. trading B-26s (the predecessor of the B-52) for
trucks in a most uneconomical manner." We t
! wonder bow many no9dles Nixon got per lost
, pilot.
WITH VS AMERICANS aerial bombardritent )
is more than tactical or strategic: it has become
i? a disease; it is downright maniacal, a compel-
sive twitch. The year-end compilation out of the
.. Pentagon says we have showered about 7 million
? tons of bombs and rockets on Southeast Asia :
since we set out to make it safe. for something
or other on Jan. 1, 1961. This is more than 2 mil-
lion tons greater than all the bombs we dropped ;
on Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific in World
! War II, and more than 10 times the-135,000, tons
dropped on Korea.
, If victory-by-airpower were more than. a
`delusion, Korea long ago would have been united
In desolation. We literally left nothing standing
above the 38th Parallel. We bad Overwhelming
? air superiority yet we were pushed back to. the
1 parallel and North Korea was re-established.
1. Bombing surveys after World War II showed that;
gn industrial countries output expanded and .4
' morale rose as the bombs fell. But delusions are:
not cured by rational demonstration.
In underdeveloped countries like Indochina's,
the cost of every peasant killed is by now many
- times his weight in gold, but life?and the war?
goes on. ?
NOW BOTH SIDES are back at the negotia-
ting table, but there is no sign that either has "
changed. My guess is that Nixon is more frus-
trated, Hanoi more determined. Nixon has shot
another bolt. He is unlikely soon again to risk '
B-52s over Hanoi, not with conventional weapons
at least. So far he has bought every military 4
recipe for victory-by-demolition except wholesale
destruction of the dikes?and "nukes." How much
f' more will our gambler gamble, and how muck,.
more can his new friends in Moscow and Peking
take before they begin to think their own security
endangered?
NIXON'S FRUSTRATION must be all the I
greater because be began calling in 1968 for the
g mining of Haiphong and the bombing of liana der -
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,./.."Sure ways "to win the war in Vietnam and to end
4 it," as he said on "Meet the Press" in December ?
of that year. We now know from the Pentagon j
, Papers that this was what the Air Force asked ,
,.,, for in March 1968, in a last attempt to stave off h
` the bombing halt that year by Lyndon Johns'.
Never was bdrbarity put forward more suav..,3
ly. Dr. Harold Brown, then Secretary of the Air,
Force, now the "liberal" member of our SALT
negotiating team, argued in a memorandum in,
March 1968, that intensified bombing of the "re-
maining important targets" (already few) around,
Hanoi and "neutralization of the pert of Haiphong
by bombing and mining" would "permit bomb-
ing of military targets without the present scru-
pulous concern for collateral civilian damage 'and',
casualties." And just in case anyone missed the
point so antiseptically suggested, or thought these
civilian casualties were merely tangential 'and!
accidental, Dr. Brown's concluding paragraph on:
the objective of this exercise began, "'The aims:
df this alternative' campaign would he to erode',
the will of the population by exposing a wider,
area of NVN to casualties and destruction. . .
"Erode the will"?what stylistic delicacies
are cultivated by these Pentagon Flauberts. Thisl
, erosion, plus the destruction of import and Iran-i
sit facilities, Dr. Brown argued, "would be ex-,,
' pected to bring NVN to negotiation of a compro- '
, muse settlement, or to abandonment of the ROCA
' in SYN." That's the blueprint Nixon has been fol..
, lowing for the last eight months, and in his final
? fierce spasm of terror%for-Christmas.
Just What happened to the earlier compro-
mise announced in October nobody, outside of an
ever smaller circle, knows. Nixon's is becoming,
?. government-by-soliloquy. In the two weeks before,
, the Christmas bombing, the visitors' record ati
the White House showed only three,persons who
had conferred with Nixon?Kissinger, Kissinier's'
- aide Haig, and the Republican Senate Majority,
4 Leader Scott, who later said he had been urging?
the White House for days to end the bombing.
Despite the momentous gambles Nixon hasp
been taking, there has not been a meeting of the)
, National Security Council since May 8, of the,
Cabinet since Nov. 8, no press conference at
." which he allowed questions since Oct. 5. He came
out of isolation only for the Truman funeral and
, to see the Redskins coach after their victory, an
event he seemed to consider earth-shaking. The'
, free press in the capital of the free world has
been largely dependent on Hanoi radio and
Thieu's personal newspaper in Saigon, Tin Song.,
for news of what's going on.
' 1
?
1)1
All we know is that on Oct. 26, Kissinger Said'
"peace is at hand" and that Nixon in a series of'
pre-election barnstorming speeches in various .
small towns around the country repeated Mei
same theme. At Huntington W. Va., Oct. 28, he -
spoke of "a significant breakthrough" in the'
peace talks.
In Ashland, Ky., the same day, he even com-
pared this with the Armistice in 1918. At Saginaw,
Mich., two days later, he said, "Vietnam being
over, we are proud of the fact that our trips to
Peking and to Moscow have paved the way not'
just for ending this war but for a generation of,
peace."
In a nationwide radio broadcast on Nov. 2, hel,
said the "major breakthrough" would "accern-'
plish the basic objectives" be set forth last May
8, when he ordered the mining and bombing.
These Were the return of all POWs, a ceasefire
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1 , 1
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throughout Indochina, and the right for South'
Vietnam to determine its own future "without
k having a Communist government or a coalition
? government" imposed upon it. No mention' of
4' course; of the one-man dictatorship we have been
helping Thieu to fasten on its 17 million people.t
Even on Dec. 16, the day Kissinger appeared
to let it be known, though as opaquely as possi-
ble, that peace was no longer at hand, Herbert:
G. Klein, Nixon's top PR man, released for pub-
lication a lengthy survey of "Nixon's Four Years
?Change That Works," which repeated the same'
1, theme that peace was at hand, except for a few'
final details. "Peace"---Nixon told Garnett Horr
ner of the Washington Star in an interview re-
leased just after the election?was near: "You
can bank on it."
If Kissinger's 'deliberately obscure' and one,'
sided presentation is read side by side with Xuan
Thuy's ? appearance on ABC's "agues and
swers" on Dec. 24, what has happened ,Seems I
, reasonably clear. Hanoi and the PRG were will-
ing to swallow a' bitter compromise in October
WASHINGTON STAR
7 January 1973
CROSBY S. NOYES '
Nixon Keeps' Us Guessing?and Maybe He Should,
wliich enabled Nixon to appear es a peace candl-'1
date.
!i The other side then accepted what until last ,
October it had always said was unacceptable?
the "two-track approach" by which Nixon would
get the POWs in return for a ceasefire, while
leaving Hanoi to .negotiate a political settlementi
ki with Thieu "on the other track." That track, ail
i, I have argued, is made for more collisions, not fore
U.S. disengagement.
But now, with the election over, Nixon Is
going for more. Now he wants a one-track settle-
ment, a cease-fire and a political Settlement in;
one package, which will force Hanoi to accept a
divided country permanently, under pain of re-?:
? newed US. bombing and shelling. This would:
mean that Many more years of involvement 1114
Indochina are "at hand."
'S s ? ?,
,I. P. Stone Is a contribidipg editor. o Thei
CI !few York Review of Books. ;
Copyright ty73. PIY2UFV.
r, ? '
My friends are all furious
about the way that democra-
cy is going to the dogs in this
country. A good many of
them are paid to know what's
going on. And when they can't
find out, it gets them very
. tipset about the people who
aren't telling them.
You really can't blame
them. A good many things
are obviously going on that
. people are interested in, and
President Nixon hasn't been
; willing to give them the time
, of day. Apart from George
Allen, the only . person he
seems to be talking to these
days is Henry Kissinger. And
Kissinger is a genius at talk-
Ing to people at great length
without telling them anything
, that they want to know.
Congress, apparently, feels
the same way?sort of left out
, of things.
; Naturally it makes people
1,frustrated and annoyed, and
there is a lot of talk going
around about how the system
Is being perverted by one-man
I rule.
The only trouble is, of
course that the presidency
i has been the dominant force
In the goverment for close
p to 200 years now and there
Isn't very much that Carl
Albert or anybody else is like-
13'to be able to do about it.
Nixon may be somewhat
more secretive than some of
our presidents in the past
_ and he doesn't seem to care
very much about his relations
with Capitol Dill, but he
hardly can be accused of in-
venting the idea of an inde-
pendent executive.
Come to think of it, quite a
lot of things have happened
that we weren't much con-
sulted about beforehand. I
don't recall ;icing asked, for
instance,,what I thought about
Invading Normandy, or drop-
ping an atomic bomb on Hir-
oshima, or sending troops to
Korea, or invading the Bay
of Pigs.
It could be that the notion
that this country normally op-
erates by a system of unre-
stricted information, consulta-
tion and consensus is some-
thing of a myth. Most of our
recent presidents, at any rate,
have had a way of acting first
and consulting afterward in
matters of primary impor-
tance to the country.
It may be that Nixon is
more susceptible to this use
?or abuse?of presidential
authority, being at the begin-
ning of his last term and
therefore less "accountable"
to the Congress and public
opinion for what he does. One
suspects, however, that this
supposed non-accountability
Is more impressive to the
anxious critics of Nixon's
policies than it is to the
President himself.
An y president, including
this one, is ultimately ac-
countable for everything that
he does. If his policies fail,
no amount of prior consulta-
tion and public relations will
redeem his reputation and
historical standing. If they
succeed, it will probably
intake very little difference
that the country was largely
in the dark about what he was
Up to at the time.
The people's much-asserted
"right to know," furthermore,
has never been fully sub-
scribed to by any government
that ever existed. What the ?
people don't know much of,
the time is a lot. And quite
often there are perfectly valid
reasons, aside from the nat-
ural furtiveness of chief ex-
ectives, that make it imper-
ative to leave them in igno-
,rance.
Something of the sort may
be the case today. What
everybody is so worked up
about, of course, are the ne-
gotiations on Vietnam and the
chances of reaching a settle-
ment of the war in the near
future. Among other things,
26
they want to know whether
and why it was necessary, to "I
bomb the hell out of Hanoi
awl Haiphong at such a high
cot in lives and public an- ?
guish. They are asking' what
or who it was that blocked ?
the settlement that Kissinger
said was at ?'hand and what.
the
the real prospects are today:
The questions are pertinent
and so, perhaps, are the rea-
sons for not answering them.
The most detailed knowledge
by the public and the Con-1
gress. on the state of the ne-i
gotiations probably would not
bring a settlement nearer.
And Indeed, it might foreclose
the possibility of arriving at I
any settlement at all.
It is hard to ask people to I
live with their frustrations
and their ignorahce, but for
the time being it may be nec-
essary. Because the simple
fact is that Nixon and Kissin-
ger are not negotiating with,.,
the White House press corps1
or, the Senate Foreign
Rela-
tions Committee but with the
North Vietnamese.'
Everything that has beehr
said and -left unsaid so far,4
is a part of that negotiation.,i
Until it is concluded, the,
President has the right?and;
perhaps the duty--to keep the,
country guessing.
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WASHINGTON POST
14 JANUARY 1973
. ? .,
'Fight. Till Death,!
?,
,, .3 ?
No Peace in Sight 14r Hamlet ,
?.. By Thomas W. Lippman
?. ? %Ireithineton Poet Foreign Ser4iice
I1AHA, 'South Vietnam? ? Ninhdiem to the district cap-1
i The struggle for control of ital of Ninhhoa and the resti
r this cheerless hamlet is a pf Khanhhoa Province Inter-
grim and vengeful feud that sects Highway 1, the coun-'
has been 'going on with spo- try's main North-South road?
radlc violence for over* a 'about five miles inland. At I,
, decade. As in so many of that intersection is the head-1
' South?Vietnam's rural back- 'quarters of South Korea'a 1
waters,. the conflict Seems Tiger Division, whose troops ,
t
? unlikely to be ended by any occupy firebases throughouti
International agreement. , the district. 1
- It was a Korean unit that .
captured. a? document 10
thonths ago that caught the i
eye of U.S. officials when it !
tas forwarded through
ahannela'to Saigon. i
: It bore names of 81 Ninh-1
diem residents identified as i
'puppet government .and )
&fitly officials," listing each4
af them by name, age, placej
'"And as for the VC?if they . of birth, occupation, social 1
. !eapture me, they will kill . alias, present position in the t
.ine.". . government, criminal acts'!
4. Life, has been like that for ,00Mmitted, and "measures
'a long time in Baha, one of trPosed." A typical exam-
the seven hamlets of .Ninh- P ewas the description off
diem Village, an isolated one Nguyen Van Co.: .Age '
:fishing and salt-producing , 35, born in Baha, tailor,'
,(community nestled against :petty bourgeois, special in-1
Lihe 'coati, of?the? South China telligence agent. .
,Sea 25 miles north of Nha- : Twenty-two of the names ,
i'triing. , :* ' . ' ? .., ? were from Baha. For 20 of ?
? Palm and pitie trees wave them, the entry under)
an', the cooling breezes, but *"measures proposed" was
,the sandy soil yields little "to be killed." For the other-7
and the villagers take their two, it was "to be submitted'
'living from the sea. The to long-term thought-re-
boat is to Ninhdiem what form." ,
?the water buffalo is to most ' Two of the 22 had already',
of the country, and the air is seen killed at the time the
?,iancid with The odor of tens list was captured. One more, i
.of thoussnds of tiny shrimp the hamlet chief, has beeni
.drying In the sun. assassinated since, as has
The entire village, which the wife of his successor,
and another on the list has.
).1tis 6,630 residents, was un- been wounded in an am-i
l.t9der Vietcong control in the bush. Six have fled to the
i'bfirly 1960s. Government district headquarters town.
? ,,troops fought their way into Three of those who stayed;
IA0 village in 1965, but the sleep elsewhere at night.
No argument in Vietnam ,
!Jaen' government and seen- is more threadbare than
1.1rity set up at gunpoint still that over whether there
/ appear to be tenuous at would or would not be mass ;
Ibest. . executions If the Vietcong 1
Vietcong. Propaganda . took over, and the bottom-4
t less well of "captured en-1
emy documents" is often:
scorned as a , source of ,
worthwhile Information. ,
For the people whose
names are on the Baha list,
however, or . at, least for;
those who could be found
for interviews,. those ques-
tions are irrelevant. The is-
sue for them is one of sur-,
viva', of an unending strug-
gle with "them," devoid of
ideology but no less threat- ,
ening to themselves and
their families.
The Saigon government,'
of course, has its own lists,
and ? thousands of ? persons ,
have been rounded up on:
.the Merest suspicion of dl-,
"'of ?
? it resembles a vendetta of
mountaln? clans more than
war, and has created a bit-
terness likely to linger long
1 after the mechanized divi-
sions have fought their last
big battle.
.. "I personally must fight
' against the Vietcong 'till
' death," one of the hamlet's
'prominent residents said.
Last. spring, during the
North Vietnamese offensive,
!Vietcong pamphleteers
.moved freely through Nin-
: hdiem, distributing propa-
ganda leaflets. Samples can
' still be seen at the village
office. ? ?
1 The ? two southernmost
,1 hamlets, at the foot of a for-,
!bidding chain of hills that
!intersect the beach, have
been all but abandoned un-.
fier continuing Vietcong has.'
:fitment. In the other five,
an American with years;
1.0f experience in the area
laid, "It only takes one in-2
clesion a month to keep up,
;the psychological pressure."
1.? The rough road that linkal
Approved For Release 2001/0
joyalty. In a place like Baha,1
'where neither side'is strong
enough to achieve complete,
,domination, ,the continuing
.?struggle breeds fear and re-
sentment on both sides.
, The first name on the V12
etcong's Baha list was that
of Nguyen Tot, who was:
hamlet chief for ? several,
fyears. He was slain list
'March. The man who holds,
that post is Nguyen Bon, a,i
sad-eyed man of 36 whoset
name was fourth on the lis0
A former Vietcong, he wag
deputy hamlet chief for se-
curity from 1967 to 1971.
Death of Bon's Wife
He said?and sources at
the district headquarters,
confirmed?that shortly af-
;ter he became hamlet chief
'last fall, his wife was killed
One night while he was out
-on gatrol with the local mili-
tia. 33on is a civilian but car-.
ries
ries a carbine even during
the day, and says he seldom
sleeps at home. He was left
with six children when is,
wife died; a sister cares for
them.
"Any time the Vietcong
/come into my hamlet they
',can kill anybody they like,":
'Bon said. "I don't know ev,
actly the people they'll at-
tempt to kill, but I am hap-
let official and a nationalist,
so I must take precautions
for myself."
Bon said he had not' seen
the Vietcong list previously,
and noted with surprise that;
It ,contained names of ,per
sons who he believed "live
in neutralism or are pro-
'Communist and supply food,
for the Vietcong. Thanks to,
that document you have
shown me," he said, "I think
I have a better understand-
ing of ? what needs to be
'done."
Bon was asked why the,
houses of Baha have neither
the pictures of President
'Thieu nor South Vietnamese
t
flags which are found in:
int* government-controlled'
areas.
"We only have enough to
distribute them to village
'cadres and officials," he
said. "But ? even if Ho had
.enough to give to each fam-;
,fly, I don't think it would be'
useful, because the hamlet ,
is insecure at night. A fewt
;days ago, the VC came in'
and tore down Thieu's
eture and some paper govern-4
ment flags. So we don't have
'any more."
Bon said that if there is ti"
i'cease-fire, "Vietcong who
understand government pol-
icy .and return to live in
f' peace" will be welcome, but
"the others, who do not
know or understand the pol-
icy, shotdd live separately.",
After that, he said, !a do my
job, the Vietcong do their
,b,"
8/0jo7 : CIA-RbP77-004320100060001-0
? A hundred yards away if;
'the house of Huynh
?ian unsmiling man of 50 det;
nounced on the Vietcong list;
as a "special 'secret security,
agent" who "opposes the ,
revolution."
As is accurately noted tm-,,
!ler "remarks," Phan is a:
'Cham, one of the few survi-1
ling descendants of the.
Cham Empire that ruled
much of what is now Viet-4
nam centuries ago. He fat
i-also a fomer go'vernmenti
lax collector. /1
' Phan said that he taket
his wife and the three of hial
lour daughters who live at
?home to one of the othert
hamlets at night.
"The VC have said theY
Would like to kill me," :lek
said. "In December they;
ea,me to gate of' my I
house, and when no one
swered they jumped the
fence and came into my
house. We were not thereo
but I know that means they:
wanted to kill me." ;
He knew from neighbore
that the Intruders were Viet-;
cong and not North Viet-
namese, he said, because;
they spoke with the familiar
local accent.
phan's wife was men-)
Honed by several local '
cials as a Vietcong sympa?
ithizer because she ha a pro-
.7vided burial services for
Communist soldiers.
"If they find anything to
'show my wife is on the
!other side;" Phan said, "I'll,
let them come in and take
have, and burn my
house. She is a kind woman.;
/She buries the corpses, the
'burns the incense over,
!them, she doesn't care,
whether the soldier is gov4
iernment or VC."
? Doan Hut is a 57-year-old
fisherman marked for death .
by the Vietcong because he
is believed to be a "specialf
security agent." A former
'village chief, he said that he
had been dodging the VC,
for years and finally fled tti
a nearby island after Tot.
was slain. ,4
Only the inability to make
enough money from fishing:
on'the island brought him
back, he said, and "I do not
stay at home at night."
Hut said his younges!
brother and three other rel-
atives had been killed by
the Vietcong, and "I don't
filare to live in this hamlet
iany more. I have to find /
some secure place to live." W.
Six Move Away
It is not easy for the ordi."
,nary Vietnamese peasant or:'
,fisherman to leave hit na-':
?tIve hamlet and move to a
?city, especially if he is not'
. an official refugee entitled
/ to some government assist.
ance. But six of those
named on the list have gone 4
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Approved For Release 2001,08/11117(3/oREDFIW0432R000100060001-0
12 January 1973
Brutal Politics of War
o Ninhhoa district town to'
ye. . ?
One of them is Nguyen'
In, the young deputy ham-1
et 'chief who was attackedi
y the Vietcong while out in
Is boat on Jan. 20, 1972.!
he date is clearly marked
on the )(trays he proudly ex-
hibits to show the bullets.
One of them Woke his
ight leg, and he is still bed-
ridden with a cast over the
break, but he acknowledged
ith a grin that the leg had
healed once, only to be re-
fractured when he fell off his
motorbike.
"I'm riding the back ot
the tiger," he said of hisi
dealings with the Vietcong.,
"I've served the govern-
ment, so I've no choice but:
to go on with it. If I can't do
the big jobs I'll have to do
the small ones."
Another who has moved
to Ninhhoa is Nguyen Tro,
the deputy hamlet chief of
Baba and government in-
formation officer.
"I still have those jobs,"
he said, "but I only go to
Baba from time to time. I
don't like to let the Viet-
cong know what time I'm
coming so they, can't set up
an ambush."
Tro said that he, like ham-;
let chief Bon, had been men-
tioned specifically on Viet-
cong leaflets that had been
circulated in the hamlet.' 1
"Their leaflet listed my,
tterrte,'my birthday, my num-
ber of children, and said I;
Was accused by the Revolu-'
tionary Committee because
support the government."
His opposition to the VC, he
paid, is not really political.
They kidnapped his wife
erlefly in 1965.
Tro was scornful of the
Methods by which the Viet-
cong select those they be-
lieve to he cooperating with
the government.
"Let me tell you how the
VC work," he said.
"Suppose you're a hamlet,
chief and ,I'm just a villager"
and you Come to my house.'
Of course I must receive:
you, but hi reality I'm very
reluctant 'to welcome you ,
into my home. If you only.
come once then nothing ha-' indeed North Vietnam's first real 'vic-
,
pens. But if you visit. me ;tory over the United States in the
more than three times, the ,Indochiati war, and that the American .
Vietcong will accuse me of I :bombing attack on Hanoi and Hal-:
working with you. The Viet-', phong in December, 1972, despite
cong are stupid ? innocent demonstrable Communist losses in
people will hate them." striking power, provided them a sec-
The district chief of NM- ,ond major triumph.
hhoa, a tennis-playing lieu- ,
tenant colonel named Do
Huu Nhan, said Baha writ
one of the places the Viet-
cong were planning to seize
when they were operating'
under an Oct. 31 deadline,
for cease-fire last year. .
Since then, according ?to
fAmerican sources in thei
province, the threat to the
little hamlet has been eased
by the death of five of the
local Communist troops who?
were caught in an ambush
In December. .
"What I think is going to
happen if there's ?a ceased
fire," said one American fa-,
miliar with the area, "is that
there will be a night of the
lent' knives," a phrase that
Is heard often in Saigon
these days. "It will be very
brief, and I think the gov-
ernment will win."
What will happen if the
period of bloodshed is not
brief, or if the Saigon 'goy-
erntnent does not win, is far.
from clear.
Authoritative U.S. soUrceS
in Saigon have made it clear
that 'the United States is
prepared to tolerate the oc-
casional assassinations of
hamlet officials after a
cease-fire, but it is not
known how the United
States will react if it goes
beyond that?or how ? North
Vietnam will react if Sai-
gon's forces try to Move
'against the Vietcong.
t By1 C. L. Sulzberger
. PARIS?It may prove historieally
correct that the Communist Tet of-
fensive of 1968, a military failure, was
Neither conjectural assessment can
"yet be regarded as conclusive, yet, in
'both 'cases, it is apparent that purely
"material aspects of strategic actions
turned out to be secondary in im-
portance to psychbiogical and political
aspects.
7 The Tet offensive was disastrous to
the Communists from a battlefield -
F viewpoint. After their initial successes
'and repression in the temporarily cap-
'lured South Vietnamese city of Hue,.
the Coirunist forces were defeated/
With immense casualties. Saigon's
'army and regime proved they could
:fight.
But incalculable damagi done in the .
' cial sector of U.S. public opinion
..cru
.and criticism of President Lyndon John-
son set in motion an intedse reaction..
that favored Hanoi, starting with in-
tellectuals and university students. This
ended', with Mr. Johnson's political
-.retirement.
President Nixon subsequently initi-
"ated U.S. bombing of the northern
centers after an original tough re-
'sponse to Hanoi's March,. 1972, offen-
sive and also after attacks on Commu-
nist positions in Cambodia and Laos
;which had kept alive the savage oppo- ? .
''sition of those who detested the war's .
4impact, on America itself.
The bombers struck following,' a'
:breakdown in Paris peace, negotia-
tions and during, a lapse. in Congres-
sional sessions. But, just as the defeat
'of Communist forces in' 1968 was
politically counter-productive, the
'December, 1972, air raids also were
politically counterproductive.
NEW YORK TIMES The American and West European
10 January 1973 press filled swiftly with stories about
"murder bombing" and "terror bomb.
helms 'Reported to Say China ing." Since most humans laudably
favor any underdog, within little time
emotional adversaries began to com-
pare Mr. Nixon with Hitler and the
'raids wth Nazi siaughtehouses.
Special tame New York Timm Hanoi's official figures, according
WASHINGTON, Jan. ? Senator Symington, Demo- to the North Vietnamese delegation in ,
' 9
Richard Helms, the director of waadt ir:?,efen Missouri, said IT Paris, say that 1,318 people were
Central Intelligence, has re- I believe is arPrbeitsteder word" toe' Killed in Hanoi by the December B-52
raids. Haiphong municipal authorities,
iportedly told Congress that learn from the Helms testimony ccording to Agence France Presse,
China may be approaching the "how close another power is
be_ to becoming a superpower." ay 305 were killed in Haiphong. Blood
status of a "superpower" Thurmond Also 'Surprised' cannot be measured; nor can the ex.
cause of advances in weapons
After the hearing today an. quisite and precious gift of life,.
other committee member, Sen-
ator Strom Thurmond, Republi-
can of South Carolina, told'
newsmen that the reference had
been to China. He said that
he, too, had been "surprised
that Red China is making prog-
ress as fast as they are" in the
development Of both nuclear
weapons and delivery systems.
According to Mr. Symington,
the disclosure by Mr. Helms
"reduces the practical effect
iltichardson as Secretary of Delof the strategic-arms limitation
!tense. negotiations between the Unit,.
Nears Status of 'Superpower'
technology.
His statement came to light
Alter a session of the Senate
Armed Services Committee to-
day. Senator Stuart Symington,
a committee member, when
speaking to newsmen, referred
to Mr. Helm's testimony yes-
terday.
The committee is considering
the nomination of Fillet L.
o?
ed-States and the Soviet Unioii.
Neither Senator would speci-
fy details of the briefing. Mr.
Helms declined to describe his
testimony afteethe hearing yes-
terday. ?
A Pentagon spokesman said.
that the Department of Defense, 'merit in a report to the House
_would not elaborate on the as-,, 209 Armed services Committee.
FOREIGN AFFAIR'S
Nevertheless, certan comparsons'
must be made. North Vietnam's' offi-
cial statistics of 1,623- persons killed'
in. the "murder bombing" ow Decem-
ber , compares with Saigon's official
statistics of 5,800 persons slaughtered,
principally by .throat-cutting or burtd
alve, dumg the Commurist occupation,
of the South Vietnamese city of Hue'
in February, 1968.
The second 'point in this Coldly:
dreadful numbers game is in terms of
comparison with other bombardments..
During World War II, 135,000 deaths
were caused by Allied bombing .of
Dresden on Feb. 14 and 16, 1945, and'
.83,000 in Tokyo on One firebomb raid
In March, 1945: This does not mention.
,the ghastly ,results of atomic attacks
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "
' There are certain dismal deductions
to be made. U.S. raids on North Viet-
-nam obviously avoided use of those
Incendiary bombs 'which so easily.
'destroy Asiatic cities like Tokyo?or
Hanoi., Secondly, ?although the aces'-
mous tonnage dropped by 5-52's
blatantly exceeded World War H
loads, they produced' relatively lesser,
reiults.? They certainly weren't aimed,
at North Vietnam's vulnerable dikes.;
These subjects have not been ade-
quately dis'cussed in the angry Western
press. One .has enormobs distaste for
quantifying pain. Yet the fact remains
that, in contrast, with spirited criticism
published, in democratic organs, the'
Soviet and Chinese expressions have
seemed relatively restrained.
All this having been Said, there isn't
'the' slightest doubt that the United.
Stites is edger to end' thin unfortunate
War,' so tarnishing to its image. It
seems doomed to the distasteful' choice,
between' accepting an unhappy come,
promise?even less palatable than that,
hoped for before the bombing started-'?,
or an, even unhappier fallback strategy, ?
The North Vietnamese have erne
ployed all kinds of devices such as
mistranslations of the Wird "mien" Or..
"zone" of Vietnam to obfuscate even
the implication of a South Vietnamese
authority in Saigon, in order to con-'
fuse. any agreement. ;
They have guilefully used 1.J.S. pris-
oners to blackmail Washington Into.
exercising pressure on Saigon?prefer-
ring to press for a United States role ;
of open hostility to President Thien
_rather than a mere U.S, withdrawal. ,
At this moment, the American people ,
seem stuck with an awful choice et
conditions. They possess Immense mill.
Lary power to Impose their national,.
policy, and they possess little politicalc
will or inpral desire to Use this poviet4
aertiOn yesterday by the 'out:
going Secretary of Defense,
Melvin R. Laird, that "the Chi-
nese are moving forward rapid-
ly" with development of liquid-
fueled missile systems.
Mr. Laird made the state-
.
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BALTIMORE SUN
16 January 1973
or eease
It Peace blueprin
has altered hill
over the Meaning of softie pro-
`visions. Each side accused the
I other of trying to modify
points already agreed upon.
President Nguyen Van Dieu
of South Vietnam bitterly op-
posed some features.
? Three long negotiating ses-
By JAMES S. KEAT
V , Washingtert Bureau of The. Sari. . sions and two weeks of inten-
sive bombing later, Dr. Kissin-
? Washington?If peace IS . ections. A Coiincil of National get and Mr. Tho, a member of
it
,again "at hand" in Vietnam, Conciliation and Concord, the North Vietnamese Poht-
its framework appears to be :consisting of representatives buro, again appeared to have
.In . most essentials the. ,from the Saigon government, negotiated the framework of
:aborted October draft agree- ' , the Viet Cong, and neutralists an agreement, subject perhaps
tnent. 1 ,,
4 . , will organize the elections, to acquiescence in Saigon and
5: The guardedly optimistic'' . and oversee the implementa- to some final tidying up _ in
reports from United States ;
,dicate that Henry A. Kissin- , i Hoes of the agreements. The Paris. '
!
Saigon regime and Viet Gong In one form or another, the
will discuss the formation of central dispute since the end of
land Vietnamese officials lti-'
similar councils at lower lay-
tger and Le Duc Tho have .4', October seems to have in-
worked out a tentative pact
ers of the governnient struc: volved the Crucial element of
)' .
'very much along the Same
? ture. the agreement?in fact, of the
,
A reduction in the size of whole tragic conflict: who will
illnes as the draft that raised',1 '
1, such high hopes little more , Vietnamese armed forces in retain how much political an-
than two months ago. , the South will be negotiated by thority in South Vietnam.
1 .
Not wholly clear , the two South Vietnamese par- The October .draft left the
political of the South a
1 ties. The two South Vietnam-
'. Precisely how the October ese parties will try to settle calculated ambiguity. It was to
Y draft has been changed in the country's internal affairs be resolved by the South Viet-
namese ? government and the
;. detail is not yet . wholly" 4within six months. Viet Cong's provisional revolu-
0:Clear. In at least one respect 5. The unification of Vietnam tionary government. This Mr.
i the very heart of the peace ? will be achievedf ll
peace u y. ,Thieu would pot accept. '
plan was involved... ,
6. Military committees, coin- ,
, . The October draft never -1 , Some support
posed of just the two South
,.was made public in full. The PI
North Vietnamese broadcast., Vietnamese parties in some While Dr. ki`ssinger contin-
?
cases and joined by U.S. and i ues to insist that the United
a nine-point summary of the ,
'long document October 26 North Vietnamese officers in ' States does not intend to settle
that the United States agreed ,other instances, will oversee the South's _political future in
-was essentially accurate. It
prompted Dr. Kissinger,
the cease-fire along with an the agreement, he has indi-
.
international supervisory body. cated softie snpport of objec-
:
',President' Nixon's national se-
. .
An international conference on lions by Mr. Thieu that under-
curity adviser, to announce: Vietnam will be convened in 30 lie that fundamental point.
Iti
!,that "peace is at hand." days. In his last news conference
i The nine points, In Hanoi's . 7. All patties will respect the December 16, when the, nego-
aummary, were: . . . . sovereignty of Laos and Cam- tiations seemed to have broken
t' .
.' 1, The United States recog-: bodia, as provided in the 1954 down, Dr. Kissinger said a
nizes the sovereignty, uni11-1 and 1962 Geneva agreements, major stutnbling block was
cation and territorial intev had pledge not to use their Hanoi's insistence on its right
t!,tity of Vietnam as provided territories for hostile activities to intervene in the South after
,in the 1954 Geneva agree-'1 against any other nation. All a cease-fire.. He said the
?ments that ended the . foreign forces will be with- United States wanted some
.4Prench-Indochinese war. . drawn from Cambodia and provision that the two Viet-
, Pullout within 60 days
;. 2. A cease-fire will be pro-
'claimed, and 24 hours later
the United States will end all.
, Military activities against
1.'North Vietnam. U.S. forces
. will be withdrawn from
1,
, South . Vietnam within 60 :
days. No advisers or war
materiel can be sent either,
; to government or to rebel
'forces in South Vietnam, ex-
cept for replacement of
.worn-out equipment on an
, equivalent basis. The United
States will not intervene. in
,South Vietnamese internal
, affairs. ?
3. All captured personnel
**will be returned while the
U.S. troops are leaving."
4. The South Vietnamese
;people will decide their own'
',political future through free,
Internationally supervised el-
LTh will be no further nams would live in pdace with
aos. er e
foreign interference there. each' other, eschewing the use
IL The end of the war will of force.
mark the beginning of a new This issue has surfaced in
relationship between the recent weeks in several forms.
United States and North Viet-
nam. The United States will
contribute to the rehabilitation
of North Vietnam and the
other Indochinese nations.
9. The agreement will be-
come effective after it is
signed...
: Although the draft quickly
became known as the nine-
point agreement, U.S. Officials
say the nine points are simply
Hanoi's summary of a text
that contains far more articles.
They also have remarked that
the summary is skewed a bit
to favor Hanoi's views.
Hardly had the draft been
completed about the middle of
October than differences arose
29
One has been the so-called
sovereignty issue, in which the
two sides are purported to be
arguing who is sovereign, five policing of the cease-fire
over what In the South. An-
other is the sanctity of the old
demilitarized zone along the
17th Parallel :and whether it
constitutes a permanent bound-
ary or a temporary demarca-
tion line.
? Goes blick,to 1954
These questions raise the
'Issue that first was posed in
? 1954, when the French agreed
? to -leave their colony and di- china and 1,339 missing and,
vide it temporarily into two finally, the uncciunted thou
zones, to be reunited two years
later after elections were held.
South Vietnamese leaders have
insisted from: the start that
their part of the old colony 19
distinct and independent, while
Hanoi has insisted that all
Vietnam is one, eventually .to
be re-unified.
If the demilitarized zone
re-established, Hanoi's ability
to intervene in the South would,
be severely limited and to
maintain its troops for very;
long impossible, regardless of
what agreements in principle
.are reached on these points. ?
If the line at the 17th Paral-
lel .is temporary, 'all Vietnam
is an entity, artificially
sundered. If the line is a per-
manent political boundary, all
Vietnam is divided in two
parts for as long as one can
foresee.
? , Other issues
Other issues have been iden-
tified as troublesome points,
but each loomed less large
,than the dispute over Vietnam'
as a polity. One is the nature
of the National Council of Rea
onciliation ahd Concord, wIileh
' Mr. Thleu feared would be-
come the coalition government
that he has vowed he will not
accept.
Will the couheil make politi-
cal decisions, or will it simply
be an administrative organ?
Will councils be set up at local
levels; giving the Viet Cong
political footholds in areas that
they do oot now control? What
freedom to move around in
government-controlled territory
will the Viet ,Cong 'officials
have? ??
? Another stumbling block, aci
cording to Dr. Kissinger, was
the size of the truce supervi-
sory force that will be provi-
ded by four nations?Canada,
Indonesia, Hungary and Pa
land. The United States wanted
5,000 men with' their own
means of traveling throughout
the country ? to investigate
truce violations. Hanoi report-
edly wanted only 250 men with
no independent facilities. Ob-
viously the 'real issue ?was
whether there would be effec-
or a bobtailed operation that
would be unable to cope with
widespread violations.
Hanoi's troops in the South
Intertwined at one point In
the negotiations were the fate
of North Vietnamese troops in
the South-125,000 of them by
U.S. count, 300,000 of them by
Saigon's reckoning?the 577
known U.S. prisoners in Indo-
sands of civilian prisoners in
South Vietnamese pile. ,
The October draft, according
to Dr. Kissinger, left the fate
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if Saigon's prisoners, mostly
Suspected Viet Cong agents but
,Including some non-Communist
'dissidents, to be worked out
with . the Viet Cang after a
cease-fire. The U.S. prisoners
were not linked to them.
l' When Dr. Kissinger returned
ii
i Paris in November with his
I, roposed revisions in the draft,
e apparently was met with a
refusal to free the U.S. prison-
ers conditional only on the
H WASHINGTON POST
1 10 JANUARY 1973
withdrawal of the g4;000' U.S.
troops remaining in South Viet-
nam. This may have been a
gambit to counter Saigon's de-
Maori for a reduction of North
Vietnamese power in the South
or to assuage Viet Cong anger
over the neglect of their
cadres in the October deal.
Finally, there *as another
calculated ambiguity? about the
fates of laoll and Cambodia.
While each .presents special
problems, essentially they are
side issues in the Vietnam con-
flict. The October draft did not
prcrvide, as far as is publicly
known, for a, cease-fire in
those two countries. All that
was required was the with-
drawal of foreign troops and
neutralisation of their territory
from outside interference. '?
Ilawever,, Mr. Nixon said in
late October that a cease-fire
must be effective throughout
/Indochina, which would include
Hanoi's indigenous allies in
Laos and Cambodia. Both
could continue fighting for a
while if deprived of outside
support, but not indefinitely.
The 'issue here would appear to,
be one of an eventual ceage.
fire in fact versus a proclaimed.
truce simultaneous with f.hii
liirger conflict. ;
Secretary Laird and th,e ,tar-News Are Right
Not a week has gone by since the President had a
Minion lash Congresa for daring to suggest that the
ttline to get out of the Vietnam war is now. And yet
1Melvin R. Laird, who, has been Mr. Nixon's own Defense
; Secretary the last four ytars, reports that the success of
'?,"Vietnamization" makes possible "today . . the corn-
. plete termination of American involvement in the war!!
;.Like those in Congress 'supporting a war-fund cutoff,
Mr. Laird adds only one condition: the safe return of
;American prisoners of war .and 'an accounting of the
missing.
Listening to Mr. Laird, House Armed Services chair-
man F. Edward Hebert, entirely an administration loyal.
'1st on the war, replied, "we have got to get that honor-
..able peace." And what is that? "The hbnorable peace,"
Chairman Hebert explained, "depends solely on the re-
turn of those POWs and an account of the missing and I
' think you share that opinion."
, "I do," answered Mr. Laird.
? , We have not heard the White House lash Mr. Laird
or .Mr. Hebert for undercutting the Paris talks by their
suggestion that, -as the Secretary put it, the United States
,has done "the 'most any 'ally could reasonably expect,
for no nation can provide to another the will and deter-
mination to survive." Nor do we expect to. (Mr. Laird's
? prepared remarks on Vietnam are excerpted elsewhere on
this page.)
Look elsewhere, at, for instance, -newspapers which
'have been sympathetic to Mr. Nixon on the war. Last
. Friday, the Wall Street Journal said that "the one thing
,the Americans ought to insist on" at Paris Is ""bare
minimum of good faith in Hanoi . . . In blunt terms,
the barest minimum of good faith means first .we .get
. the prisoners back, then, if they (Hanoi] like, they have
their offensive . . . By now the United States has done
everything that could reasonably be expected of an ally;
Saigon does not in fact survive the fault .clearly will
be, its own."
On Sunday the Washington Star-News declared: "we,
.'would urge that, if an acceptable and honorable political
iiettlement appears impossible, both parties tat Paris]
'aibandon the search and secure what is in. their power
,
to achieve: the end,. now and forever, of U.S. air and,
naval attacks against North Vietnam and the withdrawal,
of the remaining U.S. forces in South Vietnam in return'il
for repatriation of the American prisoners Of wars'
Is not the point clear that it is not simply policy critics
or political rivals,of the President, but friends and sup-,
porters who are urging on him a course he apparently;
resists. Consider the list: the Secretary of Defense, the
chairman of the 'House Armed Services CoMmittee, the,
Wall Street Journal, the Washington Star-NeWs? These
are not parties which can be easily accused of being
"Irresponsible," the designation put on Congressional
Democrats last Sunday by the President's communical
tions director, Herbert Klein. (That by his uncommuni-
cativeness, Mr. Nixon has earned italics for that title,
appears incontestable. Last Saturday, for instance, an!.4
other editorially friendly newspaper, the Chicago,
Tribune, said: "The situation cries for candor on thel
part of the President, and for explanations which have'
been lacking.")
Mr. Klein went on to 'claim that the President's 61
per cent victory in the November elections had given
him "a -very clear mandate to proceed the way he has
on Vietnam." It is a claim so flimsy and specious we '
question whether Mr. Nixon would dare make it for,
I
himself, should he deign to appear in public. For a good
deal more than a judgment on Mr. Nixon's Vietnam,
policy went into that 61 per cent. In so far as such al
judgment did enter in; the vote was in our view a man.;
date for the "peace" which the electorate has just been t
assured was "at hand." It was not a mandate to level'
downtown Hanoi, or to continue putting American blood
treasure and, yes, honor at risk to a questionable politi-
cal outcome in Saigon. Certainly it was not a mandate for
Mr. Nixon to heed 'again, as he evidently did last month,"
the pleas of the wily President Thieu and let go of the'l
agreement that his and Hanoi's negotiators had put within
his reach.
Mr. Nixon said last year that the war is no longer an
Issue among the American people. He Is right: they all'
want out. For ourselves, we'll stand with Secretary Laird,
and the Star-News and, this time around, we fervently'
hope Mr. Nixon will too.
30
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Use of airpower,
THE13140MIST jAtitiMiY 13, 197i , r
1! 11,A;
ii:11'1,1 '
?
1 il
' lifliii' ;) 1
,,,,.
The smoke over Hanoi should not Obscure the attemrit'io:Work out
li..
, rational rules for when bombing, is, and is nOt, justified , ' ?I 1 ., .
It 10016 aS if both PreSident Nixon and the people who : ,acquiescence,t and the point is that nobody who Would '
have been lambasting his bonibing policy may have to :, 'accept something as a legitimate target for artillery shells ,
take another look at the morality of air power. By Thurs., or mortar bombs can argue that the same place B out
day, the fittt fod days of the new round of Paris talks had : of bounds for attack from the air. It has also come zi
brought no clear sign '; of change in North Vietnam's be accepted that there is such a thing as excusable
negotiating position. No doubt the North Vietnamese , inaccuracy, when the airman is honestly trying to hit
.sant to make sue that any concession they do eventually the target but misses because his instruments let him
produce Will not look too obviously like the result of, the clown, or his finger prods the button a moment too soon,'
Or he is just
bombing of 'Hanoi and; Haiphong. But until, and unless ' too frightened by his own quite possibly
imminent death to get the calculations right. That applies.
they do produce a cbncession, Mr Nixon's main argument
in defence of the bombing will not be valid ; and the particularly when the targets lie withiq a populat.,7d area,
mond argument on which the Americans have now fallen as many of them do. It is 'not generally held that. the
m
back, that the boinbing has ? further damaged North a accidental killing of civilians'in such circumstances mi..Ires?
Viettiatri's war-Making capacity, will hold good only to i it wrong to have attempttd to hit the target at all.
So far as any line can be drawn in the fighting of a
the elcttrit that Mr Nixon 'can' persuade the Russians th,
g 1 k .
o SIOW With' aid' tO make' the damage goodV ' 4 ",
i 1
war, it is drawn for most people at the moment when
the killing of large numbers of civilians is done delibera-
, On the other hand, even if the bombing has I not Yet tely, or when ,the methods used make it inevitable. Of
'done what ,Mr Nixon probably hoped it would, it has course, not even that distinction would be accepted by
?SISo become clear that it wits .much less bloody thhti most , everybody, or even by all those who have condemned
people thought it wai while it was going 6n, aid than the bombing of Hanoi. It would have ruled out the Royal
pante of the wilder comparisons With the second wocld 'Air Force's whole 'area-bombing policy against Germany
War are still making it sound. Air' power remains alMoSt in the second world war, and although the Americans
the only means left to the United StateS to influence the did try to use prepision bombing in Germany it would:
; outcome of the Vietnam War. It is therefore Useful to also have ruled out what the United States did to Japan's),
:i'epeat a number of things about the ways in v171-4ch it cities, including the nuclear obliteration of two of them, '
ionship in 1944. and 194.5. It is by no means universally accepted
that those British and American . bombing campaigns',
bomb , Were unjqstifiable as a means of winning, or shortening,'
a guii., that war. And those people ,whb would say even today,
on tb that the bombing of Germany, and Japan was justifiable
; anH cannot now say the opposite about North Vicinam?:-?.
to fti unless they also say that they do not believe North
target, and likelier to be able to see it, than the longer- Vietnam's war aims 'to be worth opposing, which Means
range sort of artillery is. The fact that the gun is it is not only the bombing they should object to, or unless
stationary, and the plane is moving, makes people assume they are certain that the bombing has failed the effec-
the gun is more accurate ; but modern methods of aiming , tiveness test by doing nothing to shorten the war.
bombs have removed most of the , difference, and But for many people there is still a feeling that the
anyone who has worked with artillery knows that there bombing of Germany and Japan went too far; and it
is a fair amount of hit and miss before a gun can be is this feeling that has coloured most of the reactions to'
brought on. to its target. It is not reasonable to regard what Mr Nixon did at the end of the old year. The raids'
one as an acceptable instrument of war and not the , on Hanoi and Haiphong were compatible with most of
other. The questions that have to be asked about both the accepted rules of what can be ,done with air power.
guns and bombers are whether the target itself is a , There are legitimate targets in both cities ; the bombing'
legitimate one, and whether it can be attacked with an orders seem to have been confined to those targets; some
acceptable degree of precision.
; ii legitimate to use air ',ewer, and about the rela
between ends and means in such a war as this.'
, There is no difference In principle between
dropped from an aircraft and a shell fired from
'They are both methods of putting hip explosi
:it 'target to far. away to reach by other' mCaii
fact e4en 'higheSpflying bornber is diose
of the bombers were apparently even instructed to fly ,
,t lower than usual, and face a bigger risk ? of being shot
The dividing line down in order that they should be as accurate as possible. ?
It has come to be accepted by most people in the The real objection, for most people, lies in the fact that
twentieth century that a target is legitimate if it can be the attacking force included one particular kind of plane,
shown to have a direct bearing on a country's ability to the 13-52. The trouble with the B-52 is that even when
make war; that includes the harbours and railway it is being used with maximum care it flies so high and'
systems that bring in war supplies, and the factories that so fast that the bombs it drops fall in i long sprawling
directly or indirectly produce the materials of war, as line that spills over the edges of all but the biggest targets.
well as the men in uniform who use these things. The It is what this built-in overspill does in cities that has,'
eighteenth century did not see things that way, but then caused most of the criticism of Mr Nixon's decision to
the wars of. the eighteenth century did not involve any- attack Hanoi and Haiphong, .
thing like as much of a country's total economic capacity Even so, the number of casualties the B-525 caused
as today's wars do. It may be wrong that the range of does not seem to fit in with the widespread belief that
permissible targets has been allowed to grow as wide as this was just plain terror bombing. One of Hanoi's leading
. it has; but it has been allowed to, by pretty general doctors said on December 29th?the day before the raids
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encird?that about 2,000 peoplehad been killed in the
city: Other reports from Hanoi' since then put the total
at between 1,300 and 1,600 in the whole' fortnight of
bombing. For between a thousand and two thousand
people to die in great pain, or in sudden numbing horror,
is not something that can be shunted out of the mind
with the argument that worse things happen in war. But
it is worth remembering that the German air force killed
? almost as many in a single night in what now seems to
,be the relatively mild bombing of Britain in 1940 and
1941. The British themselves killed 20 and, 40
times as many in a single night's firestorm bombing of
. Hamburg and Dresden and other German cities. As
'it happens, the Hanoi death roll is smaller than the
number of civilians killed by the North Vietnamese in
their artillery bombardment of An Loc in April, or the
toll of refugees ambushed when trying to escape from
Quang Tri at the beginning of May. That is-what makes
the denunciations of Mr Nixon as another Hitler sound
so unreal. There are proportions to ' be kept, even in
;tallying the horrors of war. , '
, The issue that hasn't changed
Of course, a sense of proportion alone does not ansWer
NEW YORK TIMES
9 January 1973
,
One 'Man's War
all the questions. But even if Mr Nixon was wrong to uset
B-52s over Hanoi and Haiphong, because they were,
inevitably going to kill too many people, there is still ;
something that needs to be said about the relationship 1
between means and ends in the policy he is, trying to
follow. A mistake of this sort cannot be explained away'
by saying that the purpose it was intended to serve is a
good one: the end does not justify any and every means,
although it justifies a good many. But the argument works
the other way round too. The use of an unjustified McallS
does hataby itself invilid4e the did. That. seems to-havo
been , forgotten by :a ,. geod many peop16 who . do, not
believe either i that ,Nor.tqVietnam is in the right in 'this'
ver, .or i that' it' does' not matter 'whether it , is right or
Wrong. Fr those who do 316t?believe either of thosethings,!
it Is , fair to say' that .Mr Nixon.' ought not to, love. used'
this particular ,weapon in this. way. It is not fair to sat'. . .
i that, by .using it, he has destrined the reasons fin. believing',
Ithat . North , Vietnam should /leave the, pc:aides of 'Saudi
',Viethani. ii, the people of the south,. and, :.that it..thoul
. be constrained', to put.iti!arniy in the sodthUnder 'eget&
.,ittpetvi on,:. $t); .164 ? +4 'the'Paris.,,talksi.a0ii Ott!, 'tivetiti'..
'on, that' iiqstilt the i heart 444 the Matter: 41.1irt '141,fill1;16:; I
By Warren D. Manshel
Vietnam ha a become one man's war.
Whether it is his crusade to prove
that he, personally, cannot be "pushed
." around," or that our inevitable even-
tual departure is "honorable" does
not matter. What matters, aside from
the supreme consideration , of the
human losses' and suffering caused, is
that the President used the period of
Congressional adjournment and pre-
, occupation with the holiday season to
' intensify the war far above any pre-
11' vious level.
He has been able to do this without
the encumbrance of Congressional
' advice; he did not need to consult
, anyone outside of his own staff and
!: of the military.
The malaise begun during World
War II with the belief that politics
Should end at the water's edge, the
concept of bipartisanship in foreign
policy, has now reached its fever point
In the absolute power Of the President
to make total war. All the requisite
powers to do so were delegated long
ago. Now politics is not even involved:
neither party shares in the responsi-
bility of. this purely Presidential deci,
Sion.
,In four years in office, Mr. Nixon
has shown a persistent taste for per-
sonal diplomacy. Summit meetings
with the heaciS of the Communist
hierarchies in Peking and Moscow are
a central ingredient in his style and
sign of an overwhelming confidence
in his personal abilities and influence.
The Constitution assigns to the Presi-
dent predominance in the direction
and conduct of foreign policy and they
necessarily reflect his temperament
, and character as well as his view of
' our national interest. This is probably
; no more true of Mr. Nixon than of
either of his immediate predecessors
although he seems to have made fuller
use of his prerogatives for personal
initiative in the context of foreign
policy that did Mr. Johnson, and at
least as much as did Mr. Kennedy.
Control over foreign policy has been
concentrated in the White House p.
an extent probably unprecedented in
this century except during the Presi-
dency of John Kennedy and the war-
tittle days of Franklin Roosevelt. Only
a few members of Mr. Nixon's official
family appear in a position of full
Presidential confidence. It would be
hard to imagine the Nixon Cabinet as
a' forum fot a general discussion or
deliberation of the major Nixon initia-
tives relating to Vietnam: the "incur-
sions" into Laos and Cambbdia (decided
upon in the Rose Garden of the White
HOuse), the mining of North Vietnam-
ese waters (announced dramatically
by the President On TV), and the
bombing.
Mr. Nixon seems far too conscious
of his vast prerogatives and too
confident of his ability to discharge
them, to share them. He has taken
literally Truman's dictum that the
Oval Rooth -of the White House is
where the buck stops. Far from evad-
ing responsibility, he seems to enjoy
It and to glory in his reputation as a
man of tough fiber, a man who cannot
be pushed around, an unpredictable
man. And that is where the ultimate
?
danger rests: in the conflict between
restraint and unpredictability.
As a matter of constitutional princi-
ple, the management of foreign policy,
while largely a Presidential preroga,
jive, should at every point involve the
express or tacit approval of Congress
and the support of public opinion.
the conference table in Paris, evidently
decided to bomb North Vietnam into
submission, he timed his decision
shrewdly: with Congress adjourned,
he could not be hampered by possible
Congressional reaction. His decision to
send Henry Kissinger back to Paris
and stop his awesome bombing cam-
paign neatly undercut incipient moves
to legislate an end to the war. Although
, ? it is hard, after thesq many years and
the broad powerg'slready'delegated to
' the President by Congress in this con...
filet, to believe that Congress might
take some definitive action now to end
this war, that possibility is far more
' real today than before. U.S. military
activity in Vietnam no longer involves
ground troops, and the argument that
we should not cut off support of
American troops in the field conse-
quently holds much less meaning.
If legislative restrictions seem no
threat to the President's initiative in
- undertaking whatever military meas-
ures he wants in Vietnam, neither do
the normal requirements of practical
politics. Of course, neither Mr. Nixon ;
nor his two predecessors have felt ;
obliged in the course of this conflict
to keep domestic reaction to our Viet-
namese policy constantly in view. The
American people have never shared in ,
r the decisions that committed our na-
tion to war in Vietnam. To the con-
trary, it seems far more reasonable ,
to assume that the majority of those 3.
who voted for Mr. Nixon last Nov. 7
voted as much to end the war as did r.
those who voted against him. 13ut it
is now January and Mr. Nixon IS his
own man, and he cannot be held to ;
account for quite some time. In the
meantime, the bombing halt will con-
tinue, or it will be resumed, as Mr. ;
Nixon alone determines.
warren D. Manshet
When the President, dissatisfied with Foreign Policy.
the achievement$ of his negotiator at
32
is co-editor of
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Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100080001-0'
HE NEW YORK rags, MONDAY, JANUAAY 2, 1973 ?
if
OW.
Swedish Chilliness Toward U.S. Ls Limited to
ie
?
Hy ALVIN SHUSTER ?
, Special to Th. Nrw York Times
!, STOCKHOLM, Jan. 6 ?
'Swedes are out this weekend
'enjoying the mildest winter in
400 years and gathering signa-
tures on a petition backed by
all political parties calling Mr
an end to the Vietnam war.
There is rare January ? sun-
shine on Stockholm's rivers
and canals and no snow, and
the ski dealers are unhappy.
there is also an Unusual' dip-
Ihmatic chill in the air?
Swedish-American ? relations
have fallen, to a new low as
another casualty of the Viet-
'nom war. .
? As of Monday, neither
,tountry will be represented by
an ambassader. The Americans
,have not had one since August
and the Swedes have been told
'to hold back in sending a re
placement for their ? envoy,
who is departing this weekend
I This latest and most severe
strain in diplomatic relatidns
between Washington and Stock-
holm, long at odds over the
war, developed quickly after
the resumption of Americari
bombing of the Hanoi and
Haiphong areas, with 'the col.
;lapse of peace talks Nat month,
The reaction of the Swedes,
among the most vocal and ac'
'five opponents of the war
the West, was one of revulsion
land shock.
Sheeked by Hospital Damage
L Their anger intensified short-
ly, before Christmas, with the
news of the damage to a hos.
pltfil in Hanoi that had been
partly equipped by Sweden. And
that night, after 9P.M., with his
sons in ?bed upstairs, Premier
Olof Palme sat down at the
Aitchen table and wrote out it
'Statement that linked the
Arnerictin 'bombing , of Wirth,
Vietnam with Nazi massacres
in World War II. He set it
snide, reread it In the morning,'
consulted n few aSsociates?but
not his Foreign Ministry?and
then issued it to the press. The
result was a violent reaction
from Washington and a sharp
'diplomatic slap, ' ??
President Nixon heard of
,Mr. Palme's words just after
they moved on news agency
;wires .on Dec. 23 and ordered
diplomatic retaliation. The
Swedes were Add that .their
new Ambassador, 'irneve Mtg.
,ler, would not be welcome for
the present and that the
American charge d' Wakes,
John C. Guthrie, would not be
returning to Stockholm.
'Not en Instant Reaction'
Premier Palme reflected' on
the crisis in an interview in his
office as he smoked his favorite
American cigarettes. "It was
not an instant reaction." he
!mid. "It was building up inside
Of me' since the bombing re-
sumed. We had many discus-
dons on it over a period of five
days or so. And then, that even-
ng, I knew what I had to say
about it..
"I don't regret It because In
this world you have to speak
out fairly loud to make anyone
listen. I can't keep . site%
?
this issue and won't be pres-
turized into silence. ? ?
' "I would prefer if the United
States 'would recognize the
fact that one can have a deep-
seated difference of .'opinion
with Washington that balls for
arguments'. rather than diplo-
matic rebuffs. They., serve no
useful purpose. 1 ? ,
Mr.. Palme, who has not been
a favorite politician in Wash-
ington's eyes since he walked
with the North Vietnamese
envoy in an antiwar , demon-
stration here five years ago,
sought to remove some of the
sting from his controversial
statement, which called the
bombing a "form of torture"
reminiscent of atrocities corri-
mated at Katyn, Lidice and
Treblinka. _
, He said that the fist repre-
sented "symbols of meaningless
human suffering and violence"
and did not intend to imply
"literal comparison" between
the, bombing and thhse past
events ? and the politicians re.
sponsible. ? .
The 45-year-old Premier, who
traveled widely in the ' United
States as a student and attend-
ed Kenyon College in Ohio,
insisted in his excellent English
that Sweden was not anti-
American but anti-Vietnam War.
? In his view, close and friendly
ties Would be resumed once the
war, was over because Sweden
was "probably the most pro-
American country in Europe."
,Many Swedes, stopped on the'
Streets or in casual ..convers,a4
tion in bars 'and shops, Make
the same point. They 'talk of
three million. Swedes who emi-
treted to America, of the sim-
ilarity in life-styles, and of the
hetivy . injection of American
ft ulture ,into filieS, 'television,'
Musid'and other areas., ? ? '
1 But they are strong Appo-
stenta, of the American role in
Indochina, with the depth ,of
'feeling depending largely,. on
their age. The young here are
1 'active and vociferous, raise
Money for the "liberation
front" in South Vietnam and
applaud Mr. Palme'S positions.
'Many in the older generation
are more reserved, largely be-
cause of their memories. "
- "I think Palme was toe
strong, although 1 am- against
'the war," said Lars Hansson,
a 59-year-old who was strolling
'along the banks of one of the
many fingers of the Baltic Sea.
"I don't think we should be so
tough of the United ?States. I
remember what it did during
the Second World War, what it
did for Europe afterwards. It's
a good country."
Several Opposition politicians
took the view that Mr. Palme
had gone too far in the refer-
ence to Nazi atrocities, and his
Foreign Ministry . probably
agrees. But they- also feel. as
does Mr. Palme, that the Amer-
ican Jeaction -tb his criticisms
Went too far, as well.
All Parties Oppose Bombing
There, is. however, a gener-
ally unified. position on Viet-
nam within the politic!' parties.
All five parties from, the C,Ori-
oAtillio1414@1 P 2ovrtlft%
agreed to support the petition
,now circulating, calling on the
United States to stop all bomb-
ing in Vietnam and on "all par-
ties" in the conflict to sign a
peace agreement. Mr. Palme
hopes that two million of Swed-
en's eight million people will
?
sign the petition.
? One result of the present dis-
pute has been to .strengthen
Mr. Palme's political position.
His Social Democratic party, in
power for 40 years, is in some
trouble now because of infla.'
tion, ,running at up to 7 per
cent a year?coupled with vir-
tual economic stagnation, with
a growth rate last year:of
about 2 per cent,' one of the
lowest IC Europe.
The polls show that an dee-
'tion today?it is scheduled for
iSeptember?would oust the So.
,cial Democrats. Mr. Palme
needs all the- support he can
muster, and as a long-standing
critic' of United 'States war
policy, he clearly reflects what
Most Swedes !ed.., , ?
U.S. Helps Palme
"Most of us did feel that the
bombing was an outrage," said
,Lars Eric Thunholm, president'
'of the Scandinavian Private
Bank, One of the largest in
Europe. "Many also think that
Pelmets wording was too strong
in protest. But the United
States helps him by taking such
actions in return. He receives
sympathy from people "who
might not give it otherwise.
The United States should have
done nothing in response."
"The fact that the bombing
has stopped around Hanoi, and
that talks are about to resume
has little bearing," said Gunnar
Helen, the head ,of the Opposi-
Mon Liberal party, as' he sat in
,the futuristic new Parliament:
building. "Hundreds have:
changed their position from' tt
'sort of balanced silence to a'
'Clear outcry against the bomb-
ing. And 'that includes many o
'the older 'people who are now
'divorcing their memories of
postssar America from whati
going on now.". ? ,
' ;
A History of Tension ?
The recent' history of diplo-
matic relations between Wash-
ington and Stockholf has fre-
quently been marked by ,ten-
sion. Sweden was the first
Western country to give full
diplomatic recognition to North
Vietnam. She has' granted
asylum to more than 400 Amer-
ican deserters and has repeat-
edly attacked United States
war policy in a spirit that
Washington often regarded
as one-sided for a nation' that,
has professed neutrality for 150
years. ?
Moreover, Stockholm has
sent large-scale relief and aid
to North Vietnam. It does not
do the same for South Vietnam,
nor does it have a diplomat in
Saigon. 'We technically recog-
nize the Saigon regime as long
as it is in power,' Mr. Palme
said. "But It would not be ac-
ceptable to public opinion to'
have an ambassador there. We
never had one and it's too late
7 : CIA-RDP77-00432R0??1
r
now."
The repeated attacks on
United States' war policy by
Mr. ?Paltne hardly surprised,
Washington in recent months,,
and it probably would not have
reacted so severely had the
Premier not implied a compari-
son between', Mr, Nixon and
Hitler. In 1968, after Mr. Palme.
?then a Cabinet Minister?ape
peered at the antiwar rally with
the, North Vietnamese envoy,'
President. Johnson called home,
William Heath, then the Amer.
lean Ambassadot. The post was
not filled for a year, although'
Sweden maintained her envoy
In Washington.
' Tension began building again1
as the, war continued tied the
statements tly Swedish officialt
alspeared... to . grow stronger.'
Washington was particularly,
angered by a speech made' in:
May' 'by the Minister for, Edu-
?tation, Ingvar Carlsson, who
appeared at a demonstration.
,sponsored by, the active nem-.
:tion-front group here and the
Swedish 'Committee, on Vieti
,nam. ? ..
"The war is not the only
example, although the most
brutal . one, of the American
craving to dominate otherl
countries,",' he said before it!
'crowd.. of 5,000: "The samd
feature, economic and techtio.',
logical ,supremacy?which easi
ily turns to unmasked physical
violence?.-is' evidenced also;
within the American commun.,
ity in the relations between dif
ferent groups' of people."
As read by American offi-
ciaTt, the tpeech went clearly
beyond an antiwar speech and
represented strident anti-Amer-
ican sentiments. Mr. Palme has
denied that was the intention,
but Washington remains un-
convinced.
Moreover, there is unhappi.
hess about some Of the school
'workbooks distributed through-
out Sweden: The book on Brit-
ain features on the. cover a
double-decker bus and guards
at Buckingham Nike. The one
on the Soviet Union shows lit-
tle Russian dolls. The United
States cover has black children'
behind a fence,, suogeSting a
concentration camp. .
A Conservative party politl-,
cian disputes theSe American
objections. "I've ? always fol-
lowed the view that the Swedes.
were antiwar and not anti-
American," : he said.. "Rut
sometimes ? I do-worry about
the young genration. ? They,
may grow up in an atmosphere
where . they won't be. able to
make that distinction. But the'
sooner the war ends, the better
chance of heading off future
problems , with America'd
image." ? ,
As it is, Americans who have
long lived here- report that they.
never encounter unfriendly actit
from the Swedes. This Is easily.
confirmed :by visiting, Amer.,
icans.
. Meanwhile,' as the: SWedee'
geGomptue they Ali:their
7;1777 `71' 1 ' ' . f '111
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WASHINGTON STAR
14 January 1973
"kreen' winter," one 'of the un-
happiest men in town is Mr.
Moller, the Ambassador-desig-
nate to Washington. At 60, he
Was about to start a new career
after 25 years as the editor of
suburban ? Social Democratic
daily. He quit his Job, resigned
Ills seat in Parliament and
Worked this week in a fourth-
floor office Of the Foreign Min-
istry 'preparing for his neW as-
signment.
, "Fm a little disappointed,".
he said. "I had hoped to go to ?
Washington and improve rela-
tions. And I'm still looking
'forward ? to 'it. I hope to go,
soon." ? ,
' ? Another Ambassador did';
'leave this weekend. Jean Cris-
,tophe Oberg said good-by to
,his wife and children after his
,Christmas vacation. He ? re-.'
:turned to Hanoi.
WASHINGTON POST
11 January 1973
Hanoi Says
Thanks ;to
Bomb &ides',
?' 1 , Pratt% Nevis Dfirpatobot
1 The Hanel press yesterday
thanked the five Seandinavian'
countries for their criticism of ?
the U.S.' bombing of North Vi-
etnam' at 'the end of Decem-
laer. ,
. .
; A commentary. in Nhan Dan,
'the , Communist Party daily,
'singled out Sweden, Norway,
:Denmark, Finland and Ice-
land. , ;?
'? at said the Peoples and gov-
ernments of the ,fiVe countries
gave "tt :* brilliant example of
international solidarity, and of
the vigilance and determina-
tion of the 'peoples against
American Imperialism, man-
kind's most ferocious enemy."
-. Observers. In Hanoi noted
that the North Vietnamese so
far have not voiced their grati-
tude in this respect to any
other group of countries, not
'even those with Communist
'governments. ? ,1?
.1 In Bonn, meanwhile, West
Gernian churchmen sp..
:plauded five 'American reli-
'gious leaders touring Europe
to mobilize protests against
U.S. policy in Vietnain.. -
..; Dr. Harvey .Cox. of Harvard,
?leader of ..the group, asked 300
:delegates to a state synod of
'the Evangelical Lutheran
'Church to "tell our President
About the concern with which
this' war fills you." '
i 1 In an incident attributed to
pposition to American policy
in Veitnam, vandals broke into
ulthe 'America House 'library in
r?Erankfurt, West Germany, and
1 et it afire.:
In Lyons, Frinee,:a gran]) of
, nil-Vietnam war demonstre-
tors;invaded the U.S. consu-
, te,:f pulled down the :Stars
' *di Stripes,,, and 'raised a
..tlwastika ring. , '
# ,,, t ?
Americans' Leiters to Palme
Support S
By ROBERT SKOLE
Special to The Star?News
STOCKHOLM ? Americana
are giving Sweden's Prime'
Minister Olof Palme his
staunchest support in his criti-'
cism of the United States:
bombing of North Vietnam.
"I've never received so,
'much mail from abroad
particularly' from the United
States ? and letters are over-
whelmingly positive to the '
stand we have taken," says ;
Palme.
,To find out just what kind of'
snail he was getting, I,went to .
Government House, and there
looked through the Incoming
letters. In Sweden, this can be,
done: - all mail sent to a public
office, once it has been "regis-
tered" as having been re-.
celved, becomes a public docu-
ment. And public documents .
are readily available to the
press.
' Palme describes the mail he4,
Ins been receiving, comment-
ing on his sharp criticism. of
the Christmas bombings of,
, Hanoi and Haiphon g,
"deeply personal and emotion-
al."
"You'll see that they' are not
Just filled with slogans or
catch-phrases," he told me.
Frustration Expressed
He was right. I read through'
about 300 letters ? most' of'
,them from the United States.'
If there was any 'common
tone, it was one of deep frus-
tration and anger. And great,
respect for Palme's speaking.
out.
Indeed, many of the lettersI
made Palme's now well-known
speech ? comparing the Hanoi
!Christmas bombings to "deeds
of, horror" of World War Two
? appear mild. For ,,many
,years, Palme has said that He
and other Swedish opponents
to the U.S. war in Indochina
have gotten their main argu-
ments from American 'oppo-,
nents to the war. He says that
his first speeches attacking
the American war in Vietnam,
? delivered in the mid-1960's,
, were largely based on argu-
ments used by Sen.' William
Fulbright.
. Today, Palme need, simply
go up a flight of stairs from'
his office, and there in a
foot-high stack of mail, find
Inspiration.
Palme reads all mail, which,
will come as a surprise to '
many Americans who started
their letters with the words,
?"You will probably never get
to read this., '
' Common Theme
The letter on the top of the
stack I started through, ex-
.presd a common
wede's War Stance ?.,
iound in most letters: 'Thank ,whr. Keep on speaking out."1,1
you for speaking out on the ' Letters included a number'
.. i
subject of the barbaric bomb- from well-known a n t i -w a
ing of Vietnam by the United leaders. One was from Cyrusl
'States," wrote Mr. and Mrs.;; 'Eaton, the chairman of the,;
Philip Augerson of?Los Ange- 'Chesapeake and Ohio Railway.I
les. "We wish other world. Eaton sent his letter a week
leaders had the courage and 'after Palme's statement on.
the 'sympathy for humanity; the Christmas bombing, and'
that you have to express them.; urged him to present "a.
pelves as you had." , ? strong public statement of dis-:
Mrs. Lester Neuman of approval" which he said would,;
Washington wrote, "We wel- have "World-wide influence!
come expressions such as. and would be especially effec-
'yours, hoping they will be tive in Washington." '.
heeded Where we, who should : Another letter was from 1
, be, are not. In sorrow. . ." ' Robert S. Bilheimer, execu2,
' . A number of letters ex- tive director of the Nationat
pressed anger at the State De- :Council of Chtirches. of Christ.i
?partment's announcement that 'There was one from June Eis-i
Sweden's newly appointed am- ?
iley of Wilmington, Del., chair-;
'balsador to the United States, r
Yngve Moeller, was not wet; woman of Mothers United For
, Peace. Jack Baker, president:
'come at this timedJerome R.
of the student . association of:
Noss of Columbia, Md. called, the University of Minnesota, i
this "petty, dictatorial sent a cable in Swedish.
imacy.
A letter by Stanley R. Ro- ' ? A Mayor's Letter
senberg, a New York archi- One letter was from Eugene ,
tect, was typical of many ex- s, Daniell, jr,, mayor of'
pressing frustration: "I beg Franklin, N.H., and a member i
you to centinue to make pllblic. 'of the state legislature. Writ-1
these outrages against human- ing on mayor's office letter.:
ity, at the same time letting -head Daniell said, "It is sails)
the world know that there are ,fying that you should lead the
.many here, frustrated and civilized in the condemnation,
powerless, who deplore these, 'of the most misguided leader-
vicious actions." , : ship in the history of man-
Only about a dozen letters, kind. As a. very small person
were sent to Palme protesting: in this turbulent world, 1,
his statement. '(In 1969 and thank ypu, as I feel millions
1970, when relations between of my countrymen wish to.":
'Sweden and The United States
A number of letters were'
were' likewise strained over from people connected with
'the Vietnam war, most of the !
letters Palme received from universities. "Despite any-7
the U.S. were critical of the thing the State Department.
may say, you spoke for many
Swedish stand.) One letter, un-: ,
Americans in likening the
signed, among the "negative"
bombing of Vietnam to Bahl-
your Volvos to Hanoi." Anoth- Yar, Lidice and Kaytn," wrote.
'mail, simply said, "Go sell
er, signed by Mrs. R. O'Brien Prof. Bernard K. Johnpoll of.
of New York City, said: "In- the State University of New;
, stead of telling lies to the York at Albany. . 4
'world, why? don't you mind Peter Christian Hausewed-!
'your own business? You have en, who works with the Cornell
a rotten country. Why don't University Southeast Asia Pro-I
you use your time on doing ,gram, wrote : "I want to as-,
something for Sweden. You sure you .that your action 181
won't get any more tourists; well recognized and appreciat-:
ed here among friends and ac-
ademic colleagues and that we,
support you fully."
Nguyen Thai, central com-
mittee member of the Move-
ment for National Reconcilia-
tion in Washington wrote, "AS
a Vietnamese, I would like to
congratulate you. You have'
been a source of encourage-
ment to all of us."
from here."
?
'Not Itaditals'
? A number of letter writers
took special pains to let Palme
'know they are not "radicals."
"This is not a letter from a
-crack-pot radical as we may
be depicted by the administra-
tion?I am 53, and vice presi-
tient of a moderate-sized com-
pany," wrote Bernard R. Four. New Yorkers, Dr. and
Aronson of Minn e apoli s, Mrs. Joel Hartley and Saul
Minn., who added, "I am end Ruth Dancourt, asked if
ashamed to be an American their names could be added
these days." to the national Swedish pe-
Irving Schactman.? of Short. titlon condemning the bomb.
Hills, N.J., put it a little more ing, and taey added "we are
bluntly: "I am not a child. j four native-born, loyal U.S)
am 62, and operate a business 'citizens."
doing over s2 million in sales The national petitions haveit
annually. I am against alt 3460 far been signed by 500,0001
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Versone, as estimated at a'
`meeting of the five political,
party leaders.
Palme, in looking over the
pile of letters, said, "Evident-
ly, a small country must speak'.
Out very clearly and plainly in,
order to be heard. Actually,.
?when / made my stlitement on
the Christmas bombings, I
didn't realize the enormous ef..
? feet it would have. The re-
sponse from -so many Ameri-
cans supporting the condem-:
'nation clearly shows that ther
'point I raised was an enor..
ziloits human problem."
NEW YORK TIMES
18 January 1973
U.S. Exhibits Stoned in Sp sin
MADRID, Jan. 16 (Reuters)?
Youths stoned windows and
threw gasoline' bombs at two
'American automobile , shoW;?
rOoths here today in protest
,against the Vietnam war, police
I sources said. ?
BALTIMORE SUN
17 January 1973
Saigon's Politicial Prisoners
A reasonable guess is that .a new
iV etnant accord, if indeed one does
come, will amount in most of its
essentials to the agreement that
, went bad in October. Among these,
it is conjectured, may well be the
provision of a Council of National
Conciliation and Concord, consist.'
Ing of representatives from the
South Vietnamese government, the
Viet Cong and neutralists, who
' jointly would organize free, Inter-
nationally supervised elections, and
oversee the implementation of the
agreements. ,
Whatever the details, the central
Issue, as James S. Keat notes in
a dispatch to The Sun from Wash-
ington, is likely to remain in-rone
fohn or another the issue of "who
will retain how much political au-
thority" in' SOuth 'Vietnam. Dear-
ing importantly on this point, and
to be watched/ for sharply in any
agreement, is the question of the
civilians held as' political prisoners
by Saigon. ,
Mr. kept sOs they number 'un-
'counted thousands" Some esti-
'Mates put Iheni at 80,000, others at
200,099. Some are held as suspected
Viet Cong agents, and many. un-
doubtedly are. 'But others, them-
selves in the uncounted thousands,
are detained under law's-by-decree
by which,li.deelared unlawful, the'
practice of ? "communism or pro-
Cqmthunlst neutralism." the
government of,'Saigon equatesneu-
POST
? .1 ?7
WASHINGTON
12 JANUARY 19 7 3
Behind the- Rift With Sweden
The current diplomatic rift between the United States
and Sweden is disturbing in itself and even more disturb-
lag in what it portends for the leadership role which
Mr. Nixon would have this country take after , the war.
"Mr, Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister, has a long record
of vigorous open opposition to American policy in Viet-
nam. To protest one of his gestures, Mr. Nixon did not
replace the American ambassador who retired from
iStockholm last summer. In response ,to Mr. Palme's latest
outburst, an extravagant statement placing the Christmas
bombing of Hanoi among the century's worst "atrocities,"
the President responded even more sharply. There is no
:record that he attempted to explain to the Swedes the
purpose of the latest bombing, any more than he has to
'Americans. But he did tell Sweden not to replace its
retiring ambassador. "We aught as well face it," a State
Department official thoroughly caught up in the Nixon
spirit told Newsweek. "We are dealing here with an
Unfriendly country."
, This is, of course, nonsense. That an American diplo-
mat could apparently believe it suggests just how far
the Nixon administration has gotten out of touch with
the rest of the world. For Sweden, is anything but an
unfriendly country. It is, in the natural scheme of things,
a close friend sharing the deepest associations and values
with the United States. It is also, obviously, a country
whose leader, along with 'a substantial portion of its
citizenry, happens to disagree with a particular American
policy. But the way to cope with a friend's disagreement
Is, at the least, to get in closer touch, to try to explain,
not to react in pique and close off the symbolic channel
of communication between nations, the'exchange of am-
bassadors. Passing off political disagreement as an ex-
pression of calculated hostility is simply wrong-headed.
Here we introduce a point so obvious as to be almost
embarrassing to hive to make. It was not Olof Palme's
words that shot almost a score of B-52s out of the skies
of North Vietnam during the December raids: it was
I '
tralism per se with comrriunism,'1
:this inians that s great many
people whose sentiments are
tral, or who have spoken in favor );
of neutralism for Vietnam, are con-
fined In prison, along with others
.merely ..inspected, by. someone, of ..;
'harboring such sentiments.
A law of the. names are wed
known, belonging to men without'
,.whose participation a tripartite
council would have. little meaning:.
. Most by far are obscure, from ham-
lets and villages; but If these' ,!!'
'people also are to be held In prison
he chaticd of a, neutral Vietnaiii,
',which may be the best of the de"'',
cent, honorable chantes; have
been severely, vitiated.
?
?
II ?
missiles supplied to Hanoi by the Soviet Union. The
two million 'signattires Mr. Palme is trying to rally for '
an end-the-bombing petition are not killing South Viet-
namese: the bullets sent to the Vietcong by the Peoples
Republic of China are. Yet Mr. Nixon keeps his ambassa.,!
dor in Mescow, and Moscow's envoy stays in Washingtonl
As with the Russians, he contin6es efforts to 'broaden!
ties with the Chinese. How can the President countenance?
this measure' of illogic in his policy? ,
The Swedish attitude?which is, let it be noted, shared,
In some more or less considerable degree by practically;
?
eVery friend the 'United States has?expresses essentially;
we think, the bafflement with- which so many people'
everywhere view the extended and continuing America&
,involvement in Vietnam. The attitude may not arise so,
much out of compassion for the Vietnamese, or hostility,
` to Americans, as out of cold self-interest. Mr. Nixon
would like the American stand in Vietnam to be seen' .
by friend and foe as a testament' to the United States':
,devotion to an ally and to its dedication to the principle
of national self-determination. But many people in many
lands see the American stand as evidence that the, United
States has lost its balance and undermined its own pen.:
chant and capacity for a leading world role. Many4
foreigners?not all, to be sure?look at the United States.
and see a nation harshly divided within itself, one whose;
will and readiness to make good on other international
commitments have been put in shadow by its costly and
disproportionate involvement in Vietnam: From the view-
point of their own self-interest, they must necessarilyi
wonder if and how the United States has been changed'
by the war, and whether it is wise to count on the United',
States in years ahead.
This is to us the real issue involved in President'l
Nixon's reaction to Olof Palme. We cannot conceive how, ?
It is to the President's or the country's advantage for
.him to pursue his particular line of response.
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LOS ANGELES TIMES
12'1373
Viet Economy
Crisis Feared. if
U.S.. Cuts Aid
?IX CQUES LESLIE '
? ? Times Staff Writer
SATGON?While. Wash-
ington lawn-W.:ere threa-
ten to cut off military sup-
port for the war, another
prospect that Congress
will end or reduce eco-
?nomic aid to South Viet-
pam--is deeply worrying
allied officials here.
The economic. situation
In SOuth Vietnam is al-
ready so serious. that off i;
Claist say American. aid for
fiscal 1074 must be In-
creased substantially If
South Vietnam is to avoid
severe dislocations. if*U.f;l4
aid continues at the pre-
sent rate, a high-ranking.
American economist said,
"that would be short of to-
tal disaster but close to it."
The reason for immedi-
ate concern about econom-
ic aid is that Congress
must make a decision on it.
within two months, since
the present allocation ex-.
piree Feb. 'A Officials
fear that cong,resamen will
be facing the issue at a
time when their mood
Seems untisually antiwar,
and when the South Viet-
ameat economy is feeling
the impact of Atneritain
military withdrawals.
? The ? economic: is:atte ii
undoubtedly a major tea.-
son why President Nguyen Van Thieu has sent a
score of is misaa tie a 10
argue
Snu I. h Viet nam't
case in Waahiegton. The
government announced
Wednesday that a delega-
tion or tower-11011.4! (kiw-
i it's and one senatoravoubl
join five senators and two
former ambae;adora a t.
ready in Washington.
Officials tlyctilied
Some. American officiate
here ail? somewhat mysti-
fied becanae U.S. con-
grefsmen seem to he fo-
cusing on lagislation to
end the war when the.ofti-
dais Suggest by simply
withholding economic aid
they could probably
achieve a similar result.
While President Nixon
can veto any bill passed
by Corigree, he cannot au-
thorize funds net allocated
by Congress.
The officials are prepar-
ing for the visit to Saigon
next week of live *U.S. sen-
ators led by Daniel Inouye
CD-Itawaiie chairman of
the . appropriations sub-
committee on foreign
operations.
The officials %vitt explain
to the senators why they
want roughly SL")00 million
In economic aid for fiscal
15M, about S160 million
more than South Vietnam
will recek e this year if the
present. aid resolution. is
extended three months to
cover fiscal 1.97:.
It is po4sible that. offi-
cials are overstating the
gravity of the economic si-
tuation here to coax more
aid out of Congress..ritit if
that is so. they would be
flying in the face of the
iinofficial policy of opti-
mism which has long dom-
inated America it pro-
nouncementa on S o u t.h
Vietnam.
In addition. the facts cit-
ed by the officials seem.
con% hiding.
Withdrawal Blues .
T h e bigeest problem
now facing the South Viet-
pamese economy is how to
make up for the departure
of American troops, who
with civilians spent from
,00 million to .0f1
mil-
lion each year from IffiG to
1971. The influx of this,
money into the economy
enabled the South Viet-
naniese government to fi-
nance an equivalent
amount of vital imports.
But in 1972 the 14ntre
fell to million. and in
197: ii is expected to fall
Idelow MOO million. Thus
the government of Viet-
nam must quickly find a
new source or income to
conlinne importing at the
same level.
36
. One method would be to
enlarge exports. In fart.
South Vitnamese exports
doubled in 1.97:.! despite
the Communist offensivp.
but the amount ($24 mil-
lion) le still insignificant
('nm pared in Import e ($7:1
million). Economists are
hoping that within four
years 'exports will reach
$100 million, but even that
figure would still be
dwarfed by imports.
T.11 C other al) vious
source of funds is Ameri-
can economic aid. Of the
$340 million figure for fis-
cal 1073, $60 million is for
,programs administered by
the Agency for Interna-
tional Development and
fcitS0 million is for some-
thing called the Commodi-
ty Import Progrbm.
? Under the CIF, the U.S.
government pays Ameri-
can exporters to send pro-
ducts to South Vietnam.
But because of inflation
the same allocation buys
fewer and fewer American
products each year,
Inflation Aspect. ?
In, the last two years
prices of products %sent to
Vietnam under the CII' in-
creased 15'.; /a year. Offi-
,eials estimate ? that infla-
tion of these products will
drop to in 1073. but
that still means that a
Increase in CII' funils
would he required simply
to buy the same quantity
of goods.
To avoid inflation-ridden
American prOdUlai, offi-
cials here would like to
have more aid funds., With
no strings attached. One
American economist said
he hope.d that 8100 million
in mxt year's aid package
wont(' not he tied to pur-
chiises of American pro-
Olivia. Needless, to say,
such a measure would not
be popular in Congress,
since the aid than could
not be justified for its hut-
ireszing effect on the U.S.
economy. ?
? The only other alterna-
tive for South Vietnam is
to cut its imports. Ameri-
can economists say that at,
most$lOQmjj1jonin
nonessential imports -
'could( be cut. A large per-
centage of imports consists
of such necessities as fad- .
lizer and petroleum, the.
absence ? or which would ?
have an immediate ad-,
verse impact on the econo-
my.
In addit ion. banning ,
products might only in-
duce smuggling, a prob-
kin which recently has
been declining in signifi-
Vance.
'South Vietnamese peo-
ple are already suffering
economic woes. According '
to one economist, real per-
sonal income dropped 10!.; .
in 1972, as both unemploy-
ment and i inflation in-
et;ased. Unemployment in
I?
the Saigon area is above
? Exchange Rate
In addition, sins ? of the
economy's instability are
rtnppearing. For example,
the black market piaster
exchange rate, which sev-
eral months ago dropped
below the official rate.
(now 463 piasters per dol-
lar). has jumped back to
about 10c,i, above the offi-
cial rate. In Hong Kong
where speculation is more
Intense, one U.S. dollar
buys more than COO piast-
ers.
Asked what would hap-
peri'bif U.S: economic aid
continued at the same,
rate, one American officai
said:
. "You'll have a stagnant ?
economy with a lot of un-
'happy people in it. Prices
will go up sharply, invest-
ment will be very small,
real wages in the govern-
ment sector' will decline ?
and you'll have a harder
time managing the econo-
my. Problems that we've
already solved will reap-
pear."
"If imports fell front $700
million to S300 or $400
million, you'd have a grad-
ual decline in output and
an increase in unemploy-
ment, emoted with a huge
increaie in inflation," an-
other official said. 'With a
war going on, it's hard to
see any government sm.-
%lying under those condi-
: lions."
? Asked to assess the eco-
nomie situation if aid tvere
eliminated entirely, the Of-
ficial said, "Some filings
arc too horrible to think
about. We're still planning .
on getting the aid because:
. there's nothing elle ?wt.
? could do.*,
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' NEW YORK TIMES
7 January 1973
CIIIITESE POKETUIT
U.S. IN VIETNAM
Comics Ridicule Adviser, but
Understanding Is Evident
?Dispatch of The Times, LandOA
? PEKING, Jan. B?While the
Vietnam peace talks resume in
Paris, Chinese children ? are
reading a cartoon strip book-
let that portrays the Ameri-
cans in Vietnam as more pa-
thetic than fearsome. .?
At a Peking bookstore, ' a
Small Chinese ? girl, her chin
barely higher than the counter,
surveyed the range of children's
booklets and Said: ."What's
new?"
One item she could have
bought is called "Southern
Blaze of Wrath."
The chief villain in the books
yet,e published in September, is
an -American adviser called
Iones4 He wears the dress uni4
form of World War H, even
when sweatily inspeCting for./
tilled villages in South Viet.'
ham, and is perpetually har,,
assed by the demands of hia
tsuperior officers for betteri
results.
. The other villains are the;
. "puppet troops" of the Salgoq
Government. Jones prevents
them from massacring the in4
habitants of a village with
? Vietcong sympathies and says;
'''Hop't shoot up decent villag-
ers. If there are some prob-
lems we should sit down and
,discuss them in accordance
With our civilized American
custbm."
i Jones is portrayed as a ri-
diculous person, but there also
? seems to be an understanding
',of the American dilemma in
Vietnam.
' Meets Vietcong Heroine ,
Later Jones invites the. im-
prisoned Vietcong heroine for
an interview at which a sen
-
for' officer Of the, South Viet.!
namese Army is present.
Jones says; "We ,have corn
to your., honorable country to
promote mutual friendship and
security. The United States
Government would like to
xpend large sums of money to
help your country to develop
the MekontRiver.' ?
But the heroine tells him to
shut up and she is tortured in
,in electric chair. 'The torture
scene itself is not portrayed,
and she survives the experi-
ence, escapes and takes part
In a general offensive on
Jones's headquarters.
American Phantom jets are
shoWn being shot down by or-
dinary carbine fire, and a pi-
lot wearing an old-fashioned
leather helmet is captured
while he pathetically waves a
Bale-conduct leaflet.
Jones is last shown sitting
Contrite but unharmed amid a
group of sem and victorious
Vietcong.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 January 1973
Pentagon ban
,on Viet news
tit's press
By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington.
By explicitly declaring a "lid" on informa-'
lion on the bombing or non-bombing of North
Vietnam and the Paris peace talks, the
'Pentagon has raised some basic issues about
freedom of speech and the public's "right to
know."
The matter came to light Jan. 5 when
,Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, during an
awards ceremony, volpteered the informa-
tion that "those negotiations are so important
that we are not going to be placed An the
' position where information from this building
could in any way be blamed for the lick of
v success on the negotiating track."
Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim'
documented this policy on Jan. 9 by dis-
closing a directive he had issued on Dec. 30,
the day President Nixon ordered the end of
bombing 'of the Hanoi-Haiphong area of North,
, Vietnam and the 'resumption of the Paris
'peace talks. ,
The directive, which some correspondents
believe originated in the White House, was
`angry in tone. It ordered that "there must be
'no, repeat no, comment of any sorts from any ,
?Department of Defense personnel, civilian ,
and military, or whatever rank" concerning'
"the resumption of peace negotiations and a'
Suspension of some military activities in
:Southeast Asia."
"Thera is to be no comment, nor'
t. speculation, no elaboration and no dis-
? cussion on the subjects involved in the
White House announcement," the direc-
tive said.
It went on to direct all inquiries to the
:Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs.
, The directive was made public as
result of inquiries by Aryeh Neter, execu-
tive director of the American Civil
Liberties Union, who Wrote that he had
received complaints about it from De-
fense Department employees.
Mr. Neier's letter said that "if the
Department wishes to limit' office' 'pro-
nouncements to authorized spokesmen
that is certainly appropriate, but there,
can be no possible justification for sus-
pending the civil liberties of millions Of -
citizens who are employed by'the Depart.,
ment of Defense." ,
The Neier letter elicited an answer)1
from J. Fred Buzhardt, the department'S
chief legal counsel, who effusively,
thanked the ACLU official for recogniz-
ing the proper role of offical spokesmen, t
He said the department fully recognizes.
individual rights under the 1st Amend-
ment "and obviously the public affairal
guidance message did not apply tti;
4
unofficial expression of personal views. ,
Mr. Buzhardt asserted that similar;
restrictions had been imposed at the time
of the SALT I and the beginning of thei
SALT II negotiations, and previously,
during Middle East negotiations.
To this Mr. Neter replied whet, reached,
by telephone that he would like to 1.?,,e the'
department's recognition of 1st t. mend-1
ment rights disseminated to all rm.Otary,
commands in the same way as the,
original ban. on comment, ppeculativz,
elaboration and discussion.
, While this was going on Admiral Isaac
A. Kidd and Gordon W. Rule, former
Navy irrocurernent official, were appear-,
? ing before a Senate committee headed by!
Sena. William Proxmire. The admiral"
'angered Senator Proxmirety refusing to
testify about the reasons why he had),
',demoted Mr. Rule following his clticism
of President Nixon's appointment c Roy
L. Ash of Litton Industries as head of the,
,Office of Management and Budget.
Fulbright rebuffed
. Some days earlier, on the congre,\
sional scene, Secretary of State William
P. Rogers and presidential adviser.
Henry Kissinger, acting under White
House orders, had declined a summons'
from Sen. W. Fulbright, chairman of the"
'Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to'
explain policiis related to North Viet-
nam. Mr. Kiissinger also begged off from,
a commitment to brief Republican mem-,!
,bers of the House.
Finally Herbert G. Klein, liead of the,
White House Communications .Office,
? ,Jan. 7 got after critics of the admirds.:
tration in Congress. "Some of the more
Irresponsible members," he said, "have
been critical in a way which could slow
'down" peace negotiations.
Some newsmen discern a common',
thread running through these devel-,
opments, whether they apply to journal-
ists, Congress, or the bureaucracy.
While the administration, in the light of '
Mr. Buzhardt's explanation, undoubtedly I
did not intend to ban low-level, unin-
formed comment, the 'newsmen ditO
cerned an effort to dry Up high-level, ?
Informed information and critical conitl
Ment about much more than the adminin,
itration's Vietnam policies. 4
:.1.1
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WASHINGTON STAR
16 ,January 1973
Military Doubts Firm Peace
By ORR KELLY -*
Star?News Steil Writer
Peace now seems to be "at
hand" in Vietnam, but Penta-
gon officials are ftankly pes-
imistic that it will prove to be
a broad or lasting peace.
They expect an agreement
in the near future that will
,provide for the return of all
'American prisoners of war
and an accounting of those
'missing in action, withdrawal
of American military 'forces
from Vietnam within 60 days
following the signing and a
cease-fire. ?
But, despite the cease-fire,
they do not expect the South
Vietnamese and the North VI-
, etnamese to stop shooting at
'each other for long and they
ido not expect the contest for
icontrol of the southern portion
of the country to end.
This generally pessimistic
iassessment of the chances for
?Iasting peace in Indochina is
(given by officials who say they
!are not fully familiar with the
terms of agreement now under
consideration. But there is ev-
ery reason to believe that top
1Pentagon officials fully famil-
iar with the proposed agree-
ment also share this view.
Laird's Earlier Goal
Throughout the first Nixon
administration, the emphasis
at the Pentagon has been on
the Vietnarnization "track" as
an alternative to the negotiat-
ing "track". Defense Secre-
tary Melvin R. Laird, In con- ?
gr e salon al testimony last
week, emphasized that the
Vietnamization program had
been successfully completed
and that the United States
could "terminate" its involve-
ment in the war if the prison-
ers were returned.
Last night, during an
awards ceremony at the Pen-
tagon, Laird refused to specu- ?
late, on whether be would
reach his goal, set several
years ago. At that time he said
he would consider he had been
successful as defense secre-
tary if, when he left the office,
no American serviceman was
shooting at any one or being
shot at anywhere in the world.
He expects to leave office at.
noon on Saturday.
Despite his refusal to com-
ment on the negotiations, he
emphasized that the number
of Americans in South Viet-
nam -is still declining ? and is
now well below the number in
Korea, nearly two decades aft-
er the end of the Korean War.
Pentagon officials feel the
President's decision to halt all
mit and naval attacks on North
Vietnam Involves little mill.
-tory risk.
"This Is obviously not going,
to ? g.o on very long," one offi-
cial sari. "Either there is
going to be a deal or there is
not. If there is a deal, the
North Vietnamese are going to
begin rebuilding .their roads
and bridges so what difference
does it make if they get start-
ed a week earlier?"
If the bombing halts should'
continue for several weeks and
the planes then be sent against
the North again, there would
be some risks, according to
military officers. Any pause in '
aerial attacks gives the other ,?
side a chance to rebuild air
defenses and communications
lines. Thus, if the attacks
should be renewed, losses in
the. first few days to the reju-
venated defenses would be ex-
pected to be relatively high.
There is much less concern
abOut any "surge" of men or
material moving to the South
during a bombing pause. After
the beating North Vietnam has
taken in the last 'month, it is
assumed at the Pentagon that
the respite would be devoted
to reconstruction rather than
tn.qn all out effort to move
men and war material south.
As part of its "goodwill ges-
ture," the United States has
stopped low-level manned re-
connaissance flights, as well
as attacks over the north.
When RF4 photo planes have
been sent over the north, they
have normally been escorted
by armed fighters prepared to
respond with bombs, rockets
d machine gun bullets to
any attack on the recon plane.
No Land Grabs Seen
But the possibility of' such
"protective reaction strikes".
has been reduced by the deci-
sion to rely on information
gained by drones dropped
from C130 transport planes
and SR71 recon planes which
streak over Vietnam above the
range of anti-aircraft guns and
at more than 2,000 miles-
per-hour.
In the Laotian panhandle, in
Cambodia and in South Viet-
nam itself, the -Communist
forces are still under-continu-
ing -air attack. Pentagon offi-
cials say they see no sign at
this time of a major effort on
either side to_seize significant
chunks of territory in prepara-
tion for a cease-fire.
"What you see on both sides
Is an awful lot of I-don't-want-
to-be-the-last-one-to-4:11e," ,one
general at the Pentagon said.
If the fighting should-contin-
ue at some level in the future,
top Pentagon officials are con-
NEW YORK TIMES /
11 January 1973
vinced that the South Viet-
namese are now prepared to
defend themselves without any'
direct American military help,
including air power. But they
do say the South Vietnamese
will continue to require re-
placement military equipment
If the fighting goes on.
etin.. ins g..Wat- Crime
gressor would be a war crime ? ? a"
? view put forward and rejected, I be.
' lieve rightly, at Nuremberg. It would
also follow that the North Vietnamese..1
By Telford.Taylor
The North Vietnamese Government who on their assumption are not ag-
ihas consistently charged that Amen- gressors, would be legally justified In
can military operations in Vietnam bombing Saigon into bloody ruins:?
arc "wer crimes," and this accusation Their second and more substantial
plays a'very important part in the way response is that the laws of war can;
they describe the war, both to them-
selves and to others. In 1965 and 1966,
when American bombing in North
Vietnam began; their Government re-
peatedly threatened to try captured
American-airmen as war criminals, un-
der the Nuremberg precedents, but in
recent years this intention, if ever se-
riously, entertained, appears .to have
been abandoned.
However sincerely the North Viet-
namese today hold the belief ,that the
American bombing is "criminal," I
think it is clear that the, practical val-
ue of this concept for them is Primari-
ly for internal morale and external
propaganda putposes, and there is lit-
tle likelihood that the American pris-
not remain frozen at the Nuremberg
level, but must respond to the march
of events, and that by now the futility
and inhumanity of "strategic" bombing
has been so clearly demonstrated that
It must be outlawed, much as poison
gas was after the First World War.' To
this I can only, say amen, but objec-
tivity obliges the response that efforts
to formulate such a law have failed
for over half a century, and that the
demand for it has-come chiefly from
countries that do not have strategic
air power at their disposal. I am,
fear, too much of a legal traditionalist'
to accept this argument in its Nth
sweep. ? 7
But surely the bombing of Hanoi(
oners, will ever find themselves on does. raise eermus legal questions un-
trial before a North Vietnamese court der the principle 'of "proportionality"
While the North Vietnamese war-
crimes literature covers American mili-
etary operations in both North and
South Vietnam, in recent months, the
emphasis has been almost exclusively
on our aerial bombardments in the
North. ?
The Vietnamese case 'does not rest
exclusively on the antipersonnel
bombs, but rather embraces the en-
tire program of aerial bombardment,
with emphasis on the civilian casual-
ties. To assess this charge carries the
judge into highly controversial areas
?the rule, that there must be a reason.'
able relation between the military ob-:
jective and the. damage and suffering
which its attainment will entail. A'
single enemy soldier is a legitimate
target whether he is in the ,frontline'
or on home leave, but to level a city'
block to kill him at home is beyond
the bounds of proportionality.
It is under this principle that ourl
bombing operations at Hanoi appear,
most vulnerable ,toethe charge of crim-
inality. The military objectives, even'
as described by the Pentagon, seem so,
in which the "law" is far from clear, trivial, and so remote from our shores,-'
and requires that Hanoi and Haiphong that the death and destruction we
be considered hot in isolation, but in flict appear as wanton. This impres-
conjunction with other cities that have Mon is underlined by the. to me, Mei-
suffered the same or Worse fates? plicable use of B-52's, with their car-
Coventry, Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden, pet-bombing technique, to strike fit
Tokyo, Hiroshima and other memorials small targets in urban areas.
to the art of war.
The results of our bombing unde-
niably are horrible, but Hanoi is not
tthe only city that has undergone such
'horror. Immoral and senseless' 'this
.bombing may, well be, but where is the
? law under which to call it criminal?
When I put this question to the
North Vietnamese lawyers, they gave
two answers. The first was that our
!bombing is part of an aggressive war
,launched by the United 'States against
their country. Even assuming the truth,
'of the premise, this is not a satisfac-
-tory analysis, for if aggression alone
is the test of criminality. every
mili-
38 :toy operation carried out by the ag-
Confronted with the appalling 'con-
sequences, i legal approach to these
events is bound to provoke Impa.,,
tience. Whether or not Bach Mai and
Khan Thien are "crimes" is of small:
moment to the victims. Why are we:
doing -what we are doing? Both' at.
home and abroad millions are asking
that- question, and it is the gtave tr e
sponsibility of the American Chief Exe
ccutive to answer it. '
Telford Taylor, .professor of' law At,
Columbia and former chief U.S. prosi?n-
cutor at the Nur?eMberg war crime',
trials, was IN Hanoi during the rem&
?!
bombings?. ? c.,,,
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WASHINGTON POST
18 JANUARY 1973
routicat
Arrests
'Expected.
By Peter Osnos ?
' Washington Post Staff Writer ,
SAIGON, Jan. 17 '? Pres!-'
.dent Thieu has' given his prov- '
Once chiefs', 'wide latitude to.
oinake political ? arrests after
kthe' Coming cease-fire and hat'
t also empowered them - te
ii!'shoot troublemakers" on the
!spot, reliable South Vietnam.,
?en fources said tdday.
herever possible, Amert-'
!ifin sources added, those ar-
ireated are to be charged witliC
common crimes instead of. po-
Ilitical ones .because, it is RC- ? ;
knowledged, the prisoners are.
easier to deal with that way.
The. Communist demand for.)
release of all political prison:),
era has been a sticking point
in the Paris negotiations and a.
the government's intention,
hotirces said, is to keep the
Imbiber of prisoners down, at?
leant on paper. ,
Thicu's hard line Is in keep-
ing with his conviction that, f
after the cease-fire, his govern.
meat will remain fit war with -
the Communists by all means
short of big-unit firepower.
,"The Communists are prepay-
ingjo destroy the cease-fire,".' ,
a Thieu aide warned a gather-?
lag in Kientuong Province yes- -
4erday.
Government officials in the
provinces say they have been -
told the Communists will vio-
late the cease-fire with terror-,
Ism and assassinations and ?
they must be ready to protect,
themselves.. ?
.Thieu's response to this dan-';
.ger is evidently to harass and
intimidate known and sus-
.peeted Communist sympathiz-
ers, as they have been for
-years. ?
The. province chiefs have,
been instructed, South Viet-
namese sources said, that the
only condition of the arrests is
that local prosecutors be in-
formed within 24 hours. Once'
that is done, the sources said,
the suspects can be detained'
for as much as six months.
Because of the vagueness of
the way it is worded and the
nncertainty of how the situa-
tion after the cease-fire will
'develop, Smith Vietnamese of-
&leis have no clear idea of
low the authority to "shoot
'troublemakers" will be inter-
;1preted.
f, During- his one-man presi,i.
dential 'Campaign in 1971,
Thieu gave police officials per.
mission to shoot anyone caus-,'
ing a "disturbance," but thel
threat was never carried out.i
Recently, Thieu authorized po-t,
lice to shoot thieves caught in
the act, but that, too, Mai
never been done,.as far as is.
known.
The broad arrest powers,
given to province chiefs appar-
ently differ from past practice
,.n that there is to be no direct
coordination from Saigon, as,
whs the case, for example?
with the campaign of arrests'
after last spring's Communist'
offensive. Top-level Ainerican
officialr, who say, they are in-
formed even on the most sen-:
sitive aspects of Thieu's prepa-
rations for the period after
the post-cease-fire, insist that
there is no similar national
plan for widespread political
arrests. -
They did acknowledge, how-
ever, the existence of a plan
called F-6 that went into effect
after the start of North Viet-
nam's Easter offensive 'and'
was a.gdin carried out when a
cease-fire appeared imminent
in October. They said the plan
finally, expired just before
,Christmas.
The number of civilians ar-
rested in organized, military-
style sweeps was 26,000, ac-
pording to one senior U.S. in-
telligence source, of whom 14,-
000 have been released.
What set F-6 apart from rou-,
tinei political arrests was its
!scope and the change in the,
standing practice that had re-
,quireci three separate accusa-
tions of a suspek before he
was picked up. Under F-6, now
tended, only one accusation?a,
l'casual denunciation by an ag-:
ikrieved neighbor, for instance
a
e?was all that was needed for
an arrest.
9 Government critics havei
;charged that the arrests were
"often used as a means of ex:
ttortion by police, who then.
tsold the prisoners their free-
dom. There are also recurring,
substantiated reports of harsh!
interrogations and even- .tor-.
ture.
Phoenix. which was revisedi
by the central Intelligence,
Agency in 1967 and iS now un-
der the direction -of the Viet-'
namese police Special Branch,
will apparently ? continue un-'
changed after the cease-fire.
Ii is not known as yet
whether province chiefs will
again have to obtain three ac-
cusations of Communist links
before 'arresting civilians, but
Vietnamese sources believe,
there will be virtually no re-
strictions placed on what %
done In the name of politicil
security. . 1
The number of political Orli.'
be around 30,000, The Comme
oners at present is thought to
nista say there are sevettil
hundred thousand. ;
Tuesday, an 16, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST
Saigon Fears"
Post-Cease-Fire'
Deserter Surge
By Thomas W. Lippman
%Washington Post Foreign Service
SAIGON, Jan. 15?Some
South Vietnamese officials
fear that once a cease-fire is
signed the army 'could be so
, decimated by desertions. it
, would have difficulties help-
' ing the Saigon government
maintain control of the coun-
, Far from demobilizing,
South Vietnam is planning, to
keep.most of its armed forces
intact after a cease-fire and is
, counting on the army t9 play
a major role in running the
country. ,
; At the end of October, just
after U.S. negotiator Henry A.
' Kissinger said peace was at
hand, the "net desertion rate"
reached almost 27,000 men per
month?up from 15;000 to 20;
. 000 a month during most of
the summer, according to un-
official but *ell-informed
bources.
? The net desertion' rate is the
number of soldiers who leave
their Units and do not conte
'back, either, voluntarily or in
custody, and must be replaced
through recruitment and con-
scription to maintain the mili-
tary at 1.1 million men.
The upsurge in the autumn
desertions presumably stem-
med from expectations of
peace. Some Vietnamese be-
lieve the Communists actively
encouraged desertion after the
1954 Geneva accords were
signed _ and expect them to
launch a similar campaign af-
ter a new cease-fire.,
This is not to say the South
? Vietnamese army is melting
sway. By U.S. standards the
figures are staggering, but
they must be measured in the
Vietnamese context.This is a
tire& low-paid army of peas-
ants with strong ties to family
and home village, men to
whom going home is a natural
impulse. ,
The Monthly desertion rate,
which is at best an informed
estimate, has been in five fig-
ures for years. But it is a phei
itioinenott the cotentry .has' so
far been able to cope With.
Vietnamese, American and
,6ther Westelrri sources. agree
A
enough volunteer or are
drafted to keep the ranks full,
All but a handful the coun-
try's military units u.. 7,!: full
strength, despite the pouia?:-s
they took hist year.
"When the war is on," one
high-ranking military official
said, "we have to fight against
the Communists to protect our
lives and property, but when
the cease-fire is declared that
seems less important. The sol-
diers' first reaction is to take
a little rest."
A colonel, who' was a lieu-
tenant at the time of the 195,1
cease-fire, said his men left
their units, abandoned their'
weapons and went home to
their families, and "there wad
no way to prevent them,"
"There is no problem f1ztd4;
Ing enough soldiers so long at
the war goes on," one Westerni
analyst said, "but if there is a
cease-fire that is another mat-
ter."
He also said, however, that,
it Will be difficult to make any
assessment for some time be4
cause of the difficulty in get-,
ting 'accurate 'statistics. Some
deserters, for example, re-en-
lift under assumed names in
other units to obtain an enlist-
ment bonus. Others -are never
reported as deserters because
their commanders continue. to
draw their pay. ?.
In the absence of any ideo-
logical commitment to the
war; there is -a pertnisAlve
cial attitude toward deserters
and draft dodgers that, compli.
cates the government's ea,
forcement efforts.
At 'the moment, the 6t
seems to have -the upper hand
in the cat and mouse game
played by -the military pollee
and the reluctant warrlors?a
reported 40,000 deserters Were
seized in Saigon alone over
the past year?but what Would
happen if the shooting sto0.;
ped is another matter. ,
Once a cease-fire Ia signe0
family obligations trio tippe
more pressing than trtillta
duties?especially for OM
scripts assigned to units fn-'
from their homes,. .
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Eastern Europe
Gr Aleksandr SolthenItsyn has been ' 'of' a, pictUresque. river amidst white'
,
',deprived by Soviet authorities of all , birchs stripped of their green coats
, normal 'means of financial support. . by, cold.
,i He Is not permitted to publish in the - This' sturdy, two-storied building
' Soviet Union. Funds due from abroad with a garage and a garden can hardly ,
; may be transferred only through the ' be squeezed into the "modestly little;
1, Soviet State Bank which pockets a . house" definition. This building' is
; large per cent as "tax." Several Amen- Solzhenitsyn's property which he calls
, can writers who have large sums of Borzovka. The photographs of Bor- ,
r; rubles ? due 'them in Moscow have of- zovka were published in Paris Match
t,fered these funds to' Solzhenitsyn for and Stern, which, obviously; upset and
t Ms support. The following commentary, irritated its owner. i
j: ,by the official Soviet Novdsti agency, At a closer look; Solzhenitsyn's
, .,
p seeks to counter 'the facts- -of the "housing ? problem" disappears like nt
). Solzhenitsyn case, painting a picture soap bubble. If the writer gets bored':
ik of him living a life of ,"luxury and' ,with his white birch idyll he may leave
leisure." ,.Borzovka and go to the city of Ryazan
i ? 8 ' ?? lotated near- Moscow. There his first
By Semyon Vladituirov , :. wife, Natalya Reshetovskaya, is wait-4
ing 'for -him'In his two-'bedroom flat 3. ; which- he received from the state. But
? ; if he doesn't feel like staying far from
1 . mOscow?A Nobel' Prize winner
r ' ' .Moscow he may. get there in three
without a roof over his head or a.
hours and join his second wife, the j
. cent in his pocket?such is the pathetic .33-year old Natalya Svetleva, in the i
" portrait of the writer Aleksandr, ' comfortable four-bedroom flat in Gorky :
Solzhenitsynd by the American'
;--,Street, the main thoroughfare of the '
, writer Albert Maltz. In his letter, to
i The New York Times, Maltz. offers to
the allegedly starving author of "Au-
, city.
? .
However, Solzhenitsyn prefers to
?
: gust 1914" a lump sum of money, . live in other people's homes and con-.
? true, not from his own bank accounts $ tinue to persuade the world thfit he,?
' but from certain "Moscow fees" only 1?,, has "neither house nor home." ?
, he knows about. ti Having so many residences, Solzhe-
T, Solzhenitsyn promptly responded to j nitsyn, as it seems, must face. the
I the offer. In his statement published ,r . problem of transportation. But. he '
j in the West the "deeply touched"'writ-.. j, solves this problem with amazing suc-,j
vi er literally, makes his readers shed . ?'cess despite his "desperate" financial i
i tears over the gloomy picture of his; ,situation. The officers of the State '
;!.."desperate" financial situation. For hei ,Traffic Inspection showed me register
has neither roof over his head, nor- lairds for three Moskvich cars. One of'
personal car, nor any means to buy, ? them (License No. 11-10 RYAI) was
7 as he puts it, "only a modest little recently bought with his mqney at a 4
house." "1 am ready to borrow the foreign-currency shop by his first wife, ?
F, money [offered by Maltz] although it and the second one (License No. 98-19.:
r is most embarrassing for me," Solzhe, MKM)?by his mother-in-law. The
r '
,? nitsyn says at the end of his lamentful. wriler himself, who claims literary
! letter. , ' laurels equal to those of Leo Tolstoy,
Is it not the natural embarrassment does not ride Tolstoy's bicycle. True
' that a proud and deprived man must i to- his tactics of dressing up in rags
' feel? , ? and tatters of a poor man before the
':? "No, it isn't," say all those ivho I West, Solzhenitsyn pretended that he
,) happen to travel the Moscow highway had, sold his car (License No. 98-04
;. where,. near- the town of Narofominsk, ; RYA!). But, actually, he continues to
!the suddenly materialized dream of the drive this ear which now has the LI-
t' Odeprived" writer stands on the bank, cent(' No. 05-38 MICP. > ?
.. .
NEW YORK TIMES
8 January 1973
$01zhenii8"yri.: .A Financial. 'Staiemene
40
I This fact is most eloquent. Solzhe
nitsyn deliberately pretends to be de-s
prived. !caring' his "last shirt" for the
public in the West to see. I believe.,1
that a sharp fall of his scandalous ,
? popularity With the readers in the,
West makes him do it
On Dec. 18 the UPI press agency'
circulated 'the followieg information
from its Mos,eow correspondent: "West,
ern diplotnats who had a talk with the,
54-year-old author several days ago,,
feel skeptical about his complaints..,
More tAan once they met Solzhenitsyn
at the Moscow stores which sell goodai
for foreign currency." .
the diplomats did not mistake some-
'body else for Solzhenitsyn, ,It is easy
to explain why this allegedly impov-
erished writer often visits such stores.1
?As is. known, SolzhenitsYn's capital
-deposited at the Swiss banks exceeds
$1.5 million, according to Western
c$
pitess estimates. Those who would like
$
to have more precise information. may ?-?
address Fritz. Heeb, a' SWias 'lawyer
'who looks after his capital and sends1
? money orders to Moscow following the,i
'Instructions of the owner, You , may
? write to Fritz' Heeb at the followings
i address: Zurich, I Swperland, .8001, ;
'iBahnhof Str. 5iC. '
! It should be 'Sainted out that during 1
the divorce proeedure Solzhenitsyn :
declared to the court that he would '
. pay: Natalya ,Reshetovskaya it lump
sum of money he had at the Soviet'
, savings bank, by way of ?compensation-,:4
'.Later, as ReshetavskaYa's friends very-,
well know, he gave her several thou-
sand dollars fearing that she would '
demand half of his million-worth
? capital. .
In one of his articles devoted to'.jas
the writer's calling, Albert Maltz said:-
"Life is not a puppet pgrforrnanee,".,?
and spoke with indignation about the
superficial observers who studied thq,
reality through .thick window panes. .1
It is a pity that Albert Maltz. has been '
drawn into the puppet performance ino?
which a very poor Pierrot is the main,
character.'
Semyon Vladimirov is a commentator
jar the Novostl press 'agency. ,
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BALTIMORE
10 January 1973
President Tito's Tightrope
? President Tito of Yugoslavia is
said to feel that his current meth
Ods of trying to hold the country
together are misunderstood in the
, ?
West, and unfairly criticized In the
Western press as a partial rever-
sion. toward authoritarianism, with
An ,accompaniment of purge. Tito
himself insists that his purpose
'aver the past year or' sO, when he
has been quite Augh on Commu-
nist 'party. leaders In Croatia, Sb-
, venia and Serbia, and on editors
In Belgrade, is simply to turh the
party again into a "cohesive force"
within Yugoslavia's lively mix of
republics and nationalities.
'
The emphasis, It. has been said,
Is on a shifting from republican
regional autonomy to Interdeend-
ence, with an insistence that re-
sponsibility does not stop at re-
gional borders; and serious doubts
have been raised as to whether co-
hesid can be achieved in the
ways currently employed. ,
The fact of course is that Tito
is 'walking a tightrope; and viewing
him as a veteran tightrope walker
'It would be a bold vide who could
say at this moment that he is any
less steady than has been his-wont.
' Ile has, in the face Of %mat 'diffi-
culties, created a country, and so.
far has held its diverse elements
;
together.
fished, to a remarkable if alviay's
More than that, he has estab-
somewhat frail degree, a position 1
of International independence for
Yugoslavia, and .an atmosphere of )
comparative individual freedom un-,1
matched in any other Communist:
region. It is true that he now grows I
old, and 'that the factors that make ??
for ,division in Yugoslavia may
after his departure turn out to bel
unmanageable by anyone else. Buil
It is true also that he is tough, and
canny, and that this is not the first ,
'time his methods have come .Under'
question, only to have the 81!tiatioll
fail to fly apart after ,
?
.1
? DAILY 'IELEGRAPH, London
23 December 1972
HAIL fiONECKER ?
EAST GERMANY has now been recognised by Austria,
Sweden, Finland and SWitzerland, and several non- ,
Communist countries outside Europe had already taken this
step. Britain and the .ot,her Nato countries, after the,,
,signing of the East-West German treaty on Thursday, have
lost no time getting int0 touch with the previous diplomatic!
lepers in East Berlin with the Same objective. The actual
, exchange of Ambassadors will not take place until the
East-West German treaty has been "ratified, probably in .
April. But the actual recognitions ma' come considerably,
sooner, as there is pressure from those.who fear that delay
could have economic and. diplomatic disadvantages. Herr
HONECKER IS not only respectable but'courted!
, .
On the: other side of the globe. China, which is
approaching the completion of the process that East
Germany is now beginning, is scooping up the few remain-
ing laggards?among them Australia and New. Zealand,
yesterday. ? The biggest of all, America, must inevitably.
follow before long. But from the viewpoint of Western,'
; interests the recognition of China is a very different matter,1
from that of East Germany, although they are both
munist--yet of different kinds. ? . ? 02.
China's Communist dictatorship ,is at least exercised
by Chinese. In East Germany an utterly alien tyranny is ,
Imposed by Russia and maintained by 22 divisions of
Russiantroops. China is a welcome asset In the world
balance of power against Russia's military .superiority,
While, East Germany is Russia's main springboard. Russia
and East Germany ate in flagrant violation of agreements ,?
Over Germany and Berlin?the blood-stained Berlin Wall
and the illegal use of East Berlin as the East German capital
are,examples. Now the Nato countries will further. connive...
:in this by appointing Ambassadors to East'Berlin?instead.
of to,* Potsdam, ? Leipzig; Dresden; - or soma other East,
Gelman equivalent of, Bonn..
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Western Europe
NEW YORK TIMES
I 12 January 1973
FA Spanish Jesuit's Best Seller
L Hails Mar and Attacks Rome'
By PAUL HOFMANN
Special to The New York TIrnet
rrives, the books are snapped
alp by eager buyers, mostly
.priests.
s Although the volume A so
';far available only in Spanish,
there is a waiting list for it in
Nt.least one bbokstore here: An
,Italian translation is to be pub-.1
lished In a few weeks.
?-?
Father Diez-Alegrfa's book
does not carry the imprimatur,
:the prescribed church authori-
,tation for publications con-
$ ROME, Jan. 11?The current
',best. seller in ecclesiastical
ik bookstores here is a slim ? vol-
p ume by a Spanish Jesuit ' who
!teaches at the Pontifical Gre-
gorian University and praises
Karl Marx as a "prophet."
' The author, the Rev. Jose
,Marfa Diez-Alegrfa, also ac-
lcuses the Roman Catholic
Church of '"visceral antisocial-
ism," suggests that the Vatican
divest itself of its ,riches, and
arescribes priestly celibacy as, Verning faith and morals. The
" factory of madmen."' . ? ') ;author also did not submit his
Father Diez-Alegrfa, . 'whol manuscript to censorship by his
eaches sociology ht the :tinier, the Society of Jesus, be.
church's foremost institution .ore having it published. '?
of higher learning, has pub-
Vatican 'Establishment before :,?? Order's Leadership Worried
?
icly criticized the conservative ,
,, The Jesuit ordcr has not so
6 In March of 1970, he and
Mr reacted, although its leader-
;two other Jesuits of the Gre- t hip is reliably understood to;
orian University faculty, i in.ane worried about the, ithpres-;
newspaper interview, de-"?n that the book will make
ounce(' the Vatican's opposi-
'at the Vatican. The Right Rev.
ion to the divorce bill that redro Arrupe, the head of the,
l
was then before the Italian
:Jesuit order, who is a Spaniard '
;Parliament as undue meddling
In the country's domestic af-
fairs.
,
4 Long Close to Leftists
l' Father Diez-Alegrfa, who is
'01 years old, has long been
otiose to groups of left-wing
Catholics in Italy, Spain, West
iGermany and other countries.
0 His new book, entitled "Yo
1itreo en la Esperanza" ("I Be-
leve in Hope"), has been pub-
shed by Descice Brouwer, in
ilbao, Spain. The publisher
orannot send enough copies to
Rome; as soon as a new batch
end his assistants are known4
to have read and clisctissed
kfither Diez-Alegrfa's work.
"Our Curia knows that it is
bitting on a volcano," A Jesuit
naiolar said . today. "Father
pliez-Alegrfa's book is going to
standalize the Vatican even
rhore than Father Kling did."
e Rev. Hans Kling is a swiss
theologian who teaches at Til-
pingen University in West Ger-
many. In recent books, he has
Vestioned papal infallibility
apd other traditional church
doctrines.
Father Diez-Alegtlia, An his
'CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 January 1973
Stalin's ? final victory
By Laszlo T. Kiss
The Western press almost unanimously
welcomed Willy Brandt's success in gaining
the approval of the West German electorate
'fot his Ostpolitik. With the exception of C. L.
Sulzberger (the New York Times), who had
stated that Honecker won the peace "at no
price," most of the columnists and editorial
'writers from Paris, through London to New
York, were jubilant. Belying this happy mood
Is the actual fact that Stalin's dialectic-
historical will has prevailed in the heart of
Europe (Pankow deliberately chose his birth-
day, Dec. 21, for signing the treaty of
normalization), and that, therefore, these
free views and sentiments are neither wise
nor justified.
,1. A candid analysis of the conspicuously
, and defiantly totalitarian nature of the
German "Democratic Republic" ? with the
Wall as the scene of an open Brechtian
theater, constantly displaying the morbid
political reality from within ? should lead to
the conclusion that its full recognition will be
a severe, perhaps ultimate blow to the
book, says that he owes Much'
tt) Marx although he does not
subscribe to the materialistic
ythilosonhy of Marxism.
With Marx and Jesus
.,:"Marx has guided me to re-
discover, Jesus Christ and the
me- lining of His message," he
Orites. Aild, he contends that
tae Roman Catholic Church,
s it has existed in history,
pontains little that is Chris-
tian."
Father Diez-Alegrfa says that.
firistianity must not become
d political instrument of Marx-
ft socialism, "but neither must
itabecome a politital instrument
of anti-Communism, as it has
Pen."
a:According to the Jesuit.
"Acceptance of the Marxist
analysis of history, with Its
elements regarding the histori-
cal meaning of class struggle
and the necessary overtb,row of
private ownership of the means
of production, not in any
way opposed to faith and to the
Gospels."
Father Diez-Alegrfa adds: "In
the present world .situation, an
increasing number of Chris-
tians happen to reach the con-
viction that they must , make
common cause with all those
who commit themsefveS to the
revolutionary cause of social-
ism." ?
A Bourgeois Anti-Christianity
'The author charges the church
and its "apparatus" with "vis-
ceral antisocialism that is not
Christian but anti-Christian in
principle of self-determination in the under-
privileged half of Europe. (The precise and
profound metaphysical quality of the word
principle ? as opposed to utilitarian political
dealings ? must be stressed here.) This
dramatic regression has not, however, been a
sudden or exclusively German development.
It has become apparent during the '60's
that the legacy of FDR and Churchill ?the
fighting protagonists of "sovereign rights
and self-government" ? has been quietly
rejected by a new generation of sophisticated
political pragmatists, who rose to govern the
countries of the West. The new men at the top
have haughtily dismissed these grand states-
men's lofty political creed ? the Atlantic
Charter ? as "rhetorical," and while they
continued to pay lip service to the United
Nations Charter, evidently they have be-
come much too impressed by the Soviet
Union's might to go on protesting the subtly
permanent suppression of its satellites. ?
Primarily, this cold, calculated change of
Western hearts and minds in high places had
a bourgeois way." '
Speaking about the Vatican's
reputed wealth, Father Diez-
Alegrfa says that no one knows
the balance sheet, but referring
to estimates that the Holy See
has assets of $500-million to
$1-2 billion, the Jesuit remarks
that such riches in the hands
of the successor to the Apostlei
Peter, the Fisherman, is
pleasant and disquieting." '
,If the Pope reduced his ow
capital base to, say, $50.4on.
lion, "he surely would not?b ,e-,
tray either Christ or Peter," Wei
author observes. The present
Pope, Paul VI, Is never men4
tioned by name In the book'S
197 pages. ,
'A Certain Extrapolation' '
Discussing ,teachings of the
Pope's primacy and infallibility;
the Jesuit scholar remarks that
they are "founded on a certain
extrapolation from various,
'passages in the New Testa-
ment." Extrapolation means In-
ference, and is less than cer-
tainty. ?
In a chapter on priestly cell-
bacy, Father Diez-Alegrfa advo
cates making it voluntary rather
than mandatory, as it Is now.
For priests to whom chastityt
means Heroic effort and ascetic,
sacrifice, the Jesuit scholar
says, '"Celibacy for the realmi
of God becomes a factory of
madmen. and I advise all those
who find themselvps caught in
this trap to free themselves as
soon as possible of it." ?
in Eastern Europe and led to the German
anticlimax: the formal acceptance of the
Stalinist status quo.
(It would be a mistake or a false progress
sive illusion to assume that Brandt might
have made a "leftist" deal, i.e., between
Socialists and Communists, at the expense of
the historically notorious Prussians. The
Junkers are extinct; only the toilers are left
? dreaming probably of Hebei and Kautsky
and their visions about true socialism.)
A
2. The main argument on behalf of this
unequal treaty has been that the polemics of
the cold war have not brought about mean;
ingful change and that realism dictates a
new, more flexible course. However, this nevi
"realistic" approach (with some of its fea-,
tures calling Ftapallo to mind) has taken
place at the time when the exodus of the
Soviet troops to the Chinese frontiers- his
begun. Therefore, even with a moderate
amount of resolution and insight, Bonn and
prepared the way for an unbalanced detentr Its democratic allies could have achieved
42
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?Itnuch more than what Honecker and his
arbitrary backers have given.
There are ample indications that the
intensifying Sino-Soviet conflict will grow
Into the most colossal and mutually exhaus-
tive great power confrontation in the history
of the world. Despite this, the Russians were
ipermitted to clear their Western flank in
'return for banal concessions, and even
'Without being pressed to restore at least some
,Substantial elements of their satellites' sover-
eign rights. ji ?
? 8. Mr. Brandt was right when he said that
the acceptance of his Ostpolitik will mean the
end of the cold war. However, he failed to add
that the end has come with complete Soviet
triumph. Stalin's original intentions have
been finalized in the eastern half of Europe,!
and a quarter century of ardent dialectics ?*;
based on the implicit Stalinist rule that:
persistence plus might create unlimited
WASHINGTON PO S T
14 JANUARY 1973
By John M. Goshko
Wiinhimiten Pelt Forel,* Berrie*
ONN ? While East Germany's
r Ell long drive to win international
t recognition Is finally on the brink of
'Success, the Communist state is likely
to find that its new-found respectabil-
Ity carries With it an enormous price
'tag. ?
Among the Western countries lin.'
Ing up to begin negotiations on diplo-
matic relations with East Berlin,
,many will also be presenting sizable
bills for money they claim East Ger-
many owes them. So far, East Ger-
/many has tended to dismiss most of
these claims as unjustified. But the
signs are that the Western govern-
ments aren't buying this argument
, and that East Germany will have to
:make some kind of settlement as the
?price for widespread recognition.
The alleged debts fall into two
broad categories: claims for war dam-
' ages and crimes committed by the
'Nazis under the Third Reich, and
4. compensation for foreign-owned prop-
/'erty expropriated by the Communists
rafter the war.
The war-claims issue has long been
?onb of the thorniest legal problems
.:/of the Cold War era. Under the 1945
:Potsd:m Agreement, the Soviet Zone
rights ? have worn down the West's theta:
.rical commitment to freedom.
Since these matters seem remote to the
? average American, one would attempt to
bring them closer to home with the following
#conclusion: Western societies should not
;delude themselves, that (in hasty retreat
from the global totalitarian trend) they can
abandon their principles abroad without
,eventually paying the price of contradictions
at home. Terrorists, some of whom are
already active within, are thriving on cone
Itradictions, which herald a-state of Imtxuth
'and prepare the grounds for anarchy, or
,worse.
Laszlo Kiss is a Hungarian'who was a' ;
political prisoner in Hungary during the '
.1 '50's as a youth activist in the Democratic
.
People's Party. He is a candidate for a
doctoral degree in European histoty at
Porlham University in New Yore City.
A
Poland, while the Western sectors
(now West Germany) were to com-
pensate the countries of the West.
In 1953, after the breakdown of the
,Potsdam accords,: most Western na-
tions gave up their reparations claims
against West Germany, pending a fi-
nal peace settlement with Germany
as a whole. Nevertheless, Bonn dyer
the years has paid out approximately
;$12 billion in individual and other
;war-related, claims. ,
Payments to Moscow
'O ON THE OTHER SIDE, East Ger,
many made substantial repara-
tions payments to Moscow, the only
one of the four wartime powers to de-
mand payment from defeated Ger-
many. The &est Germans also paid
some compensation to Yugoslays used
as forced labor by the Nazis.
?Despite these precedents, East Ger-
many quickly adopted the position
that it is a totally new state rather
than a successor to Hitler's Reich.
Therefore, the East Germans argue,
they bear no responsibility for deeds
committed i1r Germany's name prior
to East Germany's creation in 1949.
Any war-related claims, they add,
should be directed to West Germany.
Unlike the East Germans, Bonn has
always regarded itself as the govern-
mental continuation of the German
4
. Now, the situation has been corn.?
plicated by the recent basic treaty
that provides for a new relationship'
between the two Germanys. It is the
,treaty, with its recognition that the I
two states are autonomous, that hasi
opened the way for recognition of
? East Germany by Bonn's allies in the4
, West
DU its acceptance of two separate
nations on German soil also implies
? that there are now two successor '
states to the Reich under interna-,..
lionar law. That, in the Western view,
establishes a basis for claims against 3
East Germany c.e.lating Ao the Nazi
era.
Finally, there Is the question, of
what happened after the war.;
The Communists seized substantial
amounts of property, businesses andit
bank accounts belonging to foreign tf
nationals and firma, and during then
two decades when the West held East
I Germany in diplomatic Isolation,
there was no way to press eompensal
tion claims. 4
The United States, for example, is:
not among those countries with the/
biggest bill to present, but some ex-
perts estimate that Washington has
potential claims against East Ger.:
many in excess of $50 million. U.S.;
officials so far will say only that the i
matter is "under study" and that no :
decisions have been made about pre-
cisely what Washington will* do, but
the expectation is that the United'
States eventually will ask for some!
kind of payment. ' ? t/
The Question of Israel "I
MOST OF THE POTENTIAL U.S.
claims involve postwar nation?
alization of American-owned bus!.
? nesses, factories and funds. However,,
there is also the question of property
compensation claims on behalf of
of Oc upation in Germany (later to nation and, until recently, claimed former German Jews who were forced
to flee Germany under the Nazis and
'become East Germany), was to pay that it was the only true German who later became American citizens.
!reparations to the Soviet Union and state. /Gibe
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Several countries that in prewar <
times Maintained their Berlin em-
hassles on then fashionable tinter
Den Linden (now locked securely
,t inside East Berlsin) and that theoret-?
Jeally still 'either own the property
?or, are due compensation for the
lost land and buildings. The United,
(States is not very likely to get the'',
old embassy site back, since it lit-I
,erally juts up against the Berlin
Wall. ?
Another potentially interesting
problem involves Israel, which will
be seeking compensation on behalf
of thousands of German and other
European Jews persecuted by the
dl The East Germans have curtly re- ?
jected the idea of reparations to ,
.Israel on the grounds that the Jew-
ish state didn't exist at the time of
. World War II and is therefore not '
:.entitled to speak on behalf of vier
Victims. In ,fact, East Germany's
ardent championing of the Arab
cause in the Middle East conflict
, Will almost certainly cause it to ,
apurh the idea of diplomatie rela-
tions with Israel.
? However, the Israelis have ma"de
clear that they won't be easily put '
off, Israeli experts are quietly try- ?
ing to assess the extent of the finan-
eial claims that Israel as a state'
:Might level against East Berlin and
' are also accumulating evidence
about former Nazis in East Ger- ,
county to 'refute the Honecker re- '
ghne's claim that it has totally
purged the country; of Fascist ele-
meats.
? ,
' The Israelis have also served now
? tice that they will ask approximately
20 "friendly" governments, which ?
'rare expected to have relations with)
?!, the East Germans in' the near fu-
'tine, to represent them in pressing
their claims.
A Joint German Stance?
OR DOES THE LIST of potenr
1. tial envoys with bills in their
I, briefcases end there. The Nether-
lands, one of three NATO countries
that have already extended recogT
ration, and Britain want to talk.
about
about payment for extensive twill.-
ties taken away from their jointly
awned Royal Dutch Shell and Uni-?1
IC?ver companies.
Switzerland* will demand more
than $25 million for 'property and
capital confiscated by the Nazis.
Finland is asking both Germanys
for an unspecified sum to cover ?
damage done by the German army
during the war.
In the case of Finland, the East,
Germans have offered to negotiate.'
' But here Bonn has demurred, plead-
ing that it is bound by the 1953 .
agreement to put off settlement of '
national reparations claims until
?.completion of a World War IT peace ;
treaty.
This attitude ?points up the inter-.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
6 January 1973
? ant "defends life'
she left behind in the
Soviet Union;
?
Distressed by West German politics, she says:
,
'It is better to have only one party, as in Russia'
By David R. Francis I they were discussing issues before the Mee,'
Staff correspondent of tion, also onitelevision'. That's not good. It is
The Christian Science Monieor much better to have only one party, as In
/
Russia.".
1
Bonn' Speaking in heavily accented 6erinan, she <
According to the usual stereotype, the pew told of Attending aa election rally Of Chane!
eniigre from the Soviet Union is panting or cellor Brandt.
freedom. "I was shocked at what I saw," she said.
Many probably are. But not all. "Brandt had to be guarded by four men. In
Take the case of Mrs. Strauss, who recently Russia the politicians can go freely on the:
moved from Estonia to West Germany.
Strauss is not her real name. But she did not
? want that used for fear of hurting her
brother's chances of getting an exit Visa from
Soviet officialt and joining her.
Mrs. Strauss watched and took part in the
, Nov. 19 election in West Germany, voting for
Chancellor Willy Brandt.
?
One party better
street."
Mrs. Strauss further held that after the
earlier postwar years, she felt free in
Ettonia. "We .said what we wanted," she
said.
"After the war," she added, "we had tO I
stiffer very much because we were Germans.
At that time we were suppressed. It was very '
- difficult, because Hitler caused the war." ?'
She says: "I think it is not good to have Work camps, prison
three big parties as you have here. I ka,vi how! Indeed, her husband spent years in prison
and work camps) ??
But under ttie present government, holds
eating fact that West Germany, for
Its part, is not exactly enthusiastic
about its friends in the West making'',
restitution claims against East Ger-
many. Bonn officials, fear that 114
could establish a precedent anC
prompt the Communist bloc coun-t
tries of Eastern Europe to make
Similar demands on West Germany..'1
Within recent days, there already
have been calls from Poland for
West German compensation to for-;
mer Polish prisoners of war and'l
resistance fighters. Now, with all
of the Western 'demands against
East Germany, Bonn is nervously,.
expecting increased pressure from ?
Nazi victims in the East.
? The West German government'
would like to reestablish the old
Potsdam principle that, in general,
claims by Western countries should
be handled by Bonn, and those from'
Eastern Europe addressed to East.
Germany. .
Some officials here even think
that Bonn and East Berlin should
actively cooperate in working out a
joint stance toward reparations
claims. If that happens, it would',
mark the first' instance in Europe's
postwar history where the two Ger- ?
manys found themselves on the
same side of an international argu-
ment. ?
1,4
Mrs. Strauss, everybody has a gtibd living.
, What they say here that the people in the
?k Soviet Union do not live well is not true. We
were having a good life. We had our own ,
house."
She also owned a television set, a radio, a
washing machine, and a refrigerator.
Mrs. Strauss's comments are a reminder
that even in a tightly controlled regime like
the Soviet Union, different individuals have
varied experiences.
It shows that those accustomed to one-
party politics do not necessarily find free.'
debate a pleasant, stimulating affair.
Possibly Mrs. Strauss also found annoying'
the exaggerations and half-truths that politi-
cians use man election campaign. Those who
have long lived in a democracy have become,:
somewhat immune to the hyperbole. But it I
may bother newcomers. .
Quality area
A Soviet expert further pointed out that
Mrs. 8trauss comes from the Soviet "repub-
lic" with the highest standard of living of all.'
Because of its history as an independent
nation, it also has a somewhat freer atmo- ?
sphere than some other areas within the .
Soviet Union.
What is more, the Strauss family Wei
entirely nonpolitical, she a bookkeeper, her
husband a building craftsman. The state. '
should have had nothing to fear from them; '
speaking openly with a feu; friends.
The Strauss family are five among OW
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?T,
:*ethnic German immigrants from the' Soviet
Onion to come to West Germany this year (up
to just before Christmas).
; It is customary to think of the United States
'and Canada as homes for migrants. But
perhaps it is not so well known just how many ?
"foreigners" now are living in West Eu- ?
, ropean countries.
Foreigners in Germany
? West Germany, for instance, has more than
2.2 million foreign workers, plus ,about 1
million of their dependents, mostly children.'
? The workers make up 10.3 percent of Ger-
many's total working population.
Then there are another 400,000 foreign self- '
employed individuals, ,pensioners, and stu-
dents here, giving a total foreign Population
, in the region of 3.6 million. ?
%. That total, it is estimated, could swell to 5
' million in a decade because more families
are joining their bread earners here. More of ;
,the foreign workers are putting their roots
down in Germany. In addition, the arrival of
new foreign workers continues.
Switzerland has? about 817,000 foreign
?Workers, comprising. about 28 'percent Of ,its
Itotal number of workers.
Comparative figures for France are
1,254,000 and 647 percent; for the 'United
Kingdom, 1,543,000 and 6 percent; for Swe-
den, 191,952 and 5 percent; , for Belgium
181,555 and 5 percent; and for the Nether-
lands, 83,500 and 2.2 percent.
:
Special classification
1' The Strauss family is not classified as
"foreign," but as returning Germans. But
' Mrs. Strauss, like probably many of the
returning Germans, does not really feel at
home here.
; She, like many of those classified as
foreigners, has a problem of loneliness. ?
Mrs. ? Strauss was born in the Ukraine,
came to Geiman territory ?during the war,
and then settled in Estonia. In the German
'community there, she spoke "our German"?
, as learned from her mother. It is an antique
German, dating back several generations to
the time when German settlers were invited
to the Ukraine to farm.
Mrs. Strauss finds modern German ? diffi-
, cult to use.
In Estonia her older boy had a German
lesson once a week at school. The family
spoke German at home. But Mrs. Strauss
wanted to come here "to live with the
? Germans and raise our children in Ger-
many."'
Others migrate
Besides the ethnic Germans coming from
the Soviet Union, 13,120 have migrated from ?
Poland, and 2,070 from other countries in
1972.
Altogether, Gerrnans returning from the
'"East" have totaled 18,484 this year as ;
compared with 28,828 in 1971. The main
reason for the decline is the drop in the
number getting permission to leave Poland.
, Poland has used administrative procedures ?:
to brake the number leaving. For instance,
those wanting to go must draw up a list of all
their property, indicating what they plan to
leaye, what they plan to take. The officials 4
now find more grounds for refusing per-.
tnission to leave. , 4!
Since the re-election of Mr. Brandt, the i
Soriets have slowed the flow) of German-
speaking emigrants. But at least those wile
do get an exit visa have more time to prepare
their move ? about six weeks instead of
approximately a week earlier.
Few belongings brought 1
Mrs. Strauss had to leave "from one day to
the other," as she put it. ''The family came
with only two suitcases each full of belong- ,
ings."
? But as the family 9f a Heimkehrer, a
:returned soldier, the Strauss family has
received considerable financial aSsistance
from the German Government. Not all of
those coming out of the Soviet Union receive
quite so handsome subsidies.
"I always weep when I am at the office for '
refugees," she says. "They are so god to ilk
and help us with anything we need."
Mrs. Strauss's remarks on religion may be
a little surprising to Westerners. -
"In the Soviet Union," she said, "only the 44
old people are going to church. We have
always heard that there is no Geld, so we have
believed it."
}laid to adapt ?
Since coming here, Mrs. Strauss has gone
to a church service once. She sends her boy to"
confirmation lessons.
"He was asked if he believed, in God and ,
replied 'no.' So he had some trouble. tiut he
can't 'adapt so easily and just say, 'now I
believe in God.' Just because he isn't in
Russia anymore. ' ' , ? ? ,
"We will also baptize our baby and send our :
girl to the Lutheran Church."
Evidently the tendency, for many people tO
conform to their society.-- free or not ? is
, Strong. .
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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
13 January 1973
Relations with Europe:
while Russia's opportu
By Joseph C. Harseh
1 Is 1973 to be the year of Russia's golden
opportunities rather than President Nixon's
"year of Europe"?
' Any appraisal based on today's pattern of
relationships among the Western powers and,
Itussia would have to conclude that never,
? since World War II has the United States been ?
so unpopular with its European friends and
allies and the opportunities for Russian;
diplomacy and trade with them so promising.,
It is almost as though the West European
? perception of its two great flanking neighbors
163.c1 been reversed,. ? ,
? Less than five years ago Russia had
? ravished Czechoslovakia andappeared in the
eyes of people to the west of that unfortunate
country to be the primal monster, red in tooth
and claw, ready to devour. West Europe was ?
, so shocked by the repetition in Czechoslo- ?
,valcia of what had ?previously been done to
Hungary that even Communists in France
and Italy were alienated, and the Italian
Communist Party publicly condemned what:
Moscow had done.
U.S. Ls in the doghouse' ?
nities appear ()right'
tion between Washington and Peking. At the
moment of of that reconciliation Moscow was in
danger of becoming the most isolated of the
great powers.
But the fact that Russia's benign posture of
the moment was won by Anierican eiplomacy
is obscured from West European eyes by the'
Sharp contrast fades
, At that time the United States was the ,
benevolent friend, ally, and protector whose
sturdy right arm held a bright, pure shield
:over the good peoples of Western Europe and
, kept the monster at bay.
? No Western artist would paint the neigh-
bors in such contrasting colors today. Not
since Czechoslovakia has Moscow done any-
thing . comparable to alarm or seriously"
worry the peoples of Western Europe.
On the contrary, Moscow has come to
terms with the West Germans, has accepted
the present enlargement of the European
? Common Market, has turned some of its
nuclear weapons and its divisions away from
.Europe and faced them instead against
China, and, just this past week, was treating
the 'President of France like an old family .
? friend. ?
By-product from Peking
Among sophisticated diplomats this benign
behavior in Moscow was recognized as a by-
product of an American act of initiative.
Moscow's "love Europe" posture dates from ,
Richard Nixon's visit to Peking.
Moscow has ever since been investing in a,
*est European insurance policy to balance
att the ,Implications of the great reconcilitt-
Pattern of diplomacy
continuation of the Vietnam war and the still '
vivid memory of the bombing of Hanoi. That
one ileed substantially equalized the pictures
Of America and Russia a% perceived in
'Europe.
? ' .41
The contrast between the ravenous mon-,:
ster and the good protector is forgotten. For ;
the moment at least Russia almost seems..
once more to be a European country withl
which the Europeans can deal on a friendly
and neighborly basis.
Where will all this lead? Can the 'men
Moscow capitalize on their opportunities?
They have had similar moments of oppor-,
tunity in the past, and soiled it by heavy-
handedness. They could blow this as they;
have blown so many Previous opportunities.
And there is no damage to the America-
European relationship which could not be'
repaired by a swift end to the war and a true'
turn of American interest back to Europe.'
Yet the ties that have bound the grilled
States to Western Europe have been coming
gradually unraveled. The process of weak.'
ening started way back. The. closeness of the
early "cold war" period was damaged by the
Suez crisis (1956) when Washington sided,
with Moscow against London and Paris. The
Old Anglo-American "special relationship"
never fully recovered from the shock of that :
event. 'And the American-French relationship
was hurt by the American refusal to come to
French aid in Vietnam at Dien Bien Phu.
The unraveling has continued of recent -
weeks and months. The process has reached
the point where something inconceivable a
year ago is conceivable today.
The Western alliance, essentially that close
relationship between. the United States and
Western Europe which is formalized in
NATO, is no longer to be taken for granted. It:
can be saved and revived if all concerned do
their part. Yet, it could also fall apart and ;
disappear into the pages of history. The year
1978 will probably see, which way it goes.
6
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Necir East
[VIE WASHINGTON 00ST
' &middy, Yon. 7, 1973 Pi edwarCi Luttwak
E
1 Luttwals is author Of "Dictionary of
I j 'eel: umbra:Li ;witteritetnctZe etUratniteedgieStas States,
? f Modern War." ,
Squaring
The Circle
1-??
EVEY HAVE DONE IT so many
times that the whole elaborate ma-?
rlietiver has become a well-practiced,!
!Tata*. At the United Nations,
talks with complaisant diplomats .And
Atsponslve journalists, Egyptian offi-.1:.
eta% are once again .unvelling' their'',
lans for the forthComing campaign.,
Oeason, Which invariably follows the.
Annual General Assembly debate. ort'
?(he Middle East. After quickly conced- ?
frig that Israel retains a crushing ?
tory superiority in all dimensions of,.
Military power, Egyptian spokesmen ?
go on to say that Arab patience is at ?
at:rend; they will go to war, and soon, ,
and 'in a big way?even though they
Oily expect defeat. "We will lose, but
"yott. (Europeans or Americans or
fIy, 'the West,' depending on the
i4udience) will also lose, since we will
i?
.0set the Middle East on fire, and your.
'interests will suffer in the conflagrit.,
Itjori." ? ,
Minor variants of thii rationality-of:
the-irrational strategy introduce ? the
well-worn theme of internal political,;;
,tfiressure: "We are reasonable and pru-
dent. but our soldiers are -straining at
!Cie leash. So far we have, managed to
ftlold them back but unless you force
lkra el to, . ." Dark hints that U.S. oil
companies will be expropriated are'
itiotttine, as are threats to .cut off the
.ow of oil.
.The typical news Story that carrieS
gie message invariably ends with the ,
Moral; The Arabs are about to go to
war (irrationally), and the only way we
can stop them is to extract some major
;concessions from those rational but
,stubborn Israelis. Caught as they are
On a multi-year leadership contest that
. makes an American presidential race
'1ook; like a brief picnic, the Israelis
obligingly supply all the wrong diplo-
.1inatic noises by allowing ministers
,.itich as Yigal Anon and Moshe Dayan
ito voice their competitive annexation-
,ist claims. For Israeli intransigence is
4 vital part of the Egyptian script. .
All things considered, Arabs and
,Jews have done very well in keeping
Western interest in the perpetual
(Middle East crisis, with help from the
media .men who manage to retell the
'same old stories with 'remarkable
, freshness year after year. Neverthe-
leka, behind the flow of words there
ire only more words; there is no
.nifictint action in sight. ?
1
Those who would have us believe
*that the Egyptians are eager to repeat
the, catastrophe of, 1967 in an even
more painful form assume or pretend
!that President Sadat and his followers
line fanatical desperadoes, totally irra-
ltional or just plain mad. In reality, the
Egyptian ruling elitt is as reasonable
!as any, entirely disillusioned and with-
.,out a spark of fanaticism. Every ar
since 1967 they have said that they
mere about to set the Middle East on
but even during the 1969-70 "war
of attrition" the Egyptians were in fact
? very careful to control their escalation
in order to avoid provoking an all-out
? Israeli resrionse. As for the sub-theme
? of "the soldiers straining at the leash,"
this Is, of course, a fabrication. Egyp-
tian soldiers have never yet exhibited ;
? any trace of the kamikaze spirit and ?
their officers are as prudent a group .
of men as one could hope to meet any-
where.
Replaying Suez
.IN
THE ABSEI4CE of a genuine
readiness to go to war, the war
scares orchestrated from Cairo, are a
vital ingredient of Egyptian diplomacy.
Its goal?to recoup the losses. of 1967
without either military success-or dip- ?
lomatic concessions?is unique in the
annals of diplomacy. Refusal to negoti-
ate with a hostile party is of course
quite common, but it does imply a re-
nunciation ,of all attempts to extract
/Concessions from that party, unless by
means of war or the threat of war. Such
a refusal is entirely inconsistent with ;$
the combination of diplomatic activism
and military weakness, and it is a
' great tribute to Egyptian diplomacy
that its attempts to square the circle
littve gained such wide credibility. ?
? t gyptian diplomatic strategy since
' 1967 has been to stage a reenactment of ,
the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis, '
when Israel surrendered her territorial
gains under diplomatic pressures from
third parties, including both the Soviet
Union and the United States. But since
1967 there has been no third party
with the will and leverage to replay
1956, although the 'Russians did their
very best in 1969-70, with valiant help
from Washington.
While the State Department played
its part by giving well-timed "back-
;grounders" to remind all con-
cerned that the DS, commitment lo
defend Israel did not extend to its oe
cupied territories: iik?e' Russians staged I
a classic threat maneuver, sending in
--air force squadrons complete with Ci
!' point defenses, air conditioning and
,four-star general.
The Israelis at first behaved as the
'Russians had expected. They, pulled ,
back their own air 'patrols as Russian?
air patrol coverage gradually ex.
panded towards the Suez Canal. But'
before the critical ,canal line was
'reached, the Israelis turned to. fight;
For the Missians It was their first air,
, battle inee May, 1945, and,1 as one','
, Egyptian aCcount put it, "Five of their
premibr Mig-21Js were shot down irt
' less than a minute."
For a while it seemed as if there was
real danger of Russian escalation, but'
within two weeks the bureaucrats Who
now run the Kremlin had Instead ae41
cepted the U.S.-sponsored cease-fire,A
and by Aug. 7, 1970, the canal was quiet ,
again, as it has been ever since.
1,
Israel Sits Tight,
1
FROM
THIS devaluation of Russian ,
military support in Arab eyes to
the erosion of Soviet influence in the
? Middle Eas and the Russians' expul-
sion from gypt, the path was down,
'hill all the way,?and a direct repetit
tion of the "eoliapse of the post-war.
Anglo-Arab alliance.
But the failure of the 1956 re-run did'',
have at least one significant effect: It 4
solidified Israeli resolve to see the cri-
sis through until the Egyptians finally
give up their strategy of avoiding a di-
rectly negotiated settlement.
Not too much should be made of the :1
annexationist claims voiced by Allon,
Dayan and whoever else is seeking
Mrs. Meir's job. The tough old men
and women who hold the reins of
power in Israel, whose entrenched posi-
tion in the party secretariat has no,1
parallel outside the Soviet Politburo,
have yet to make any formal
tonal claims except for East Jertt-
salem and the Golan Heights; if ordyi'l
for social reasons, they oppose thei
integration of Arab-inhabited areas. ,
Having lived through two genertt
lions of conflict, including the last five
years in which the cyclical nature of
American diplomatic support, the ;
short-sighted pragmatism of the Euro.,
peans and the ephemeral quality of ,
Russian military adventurism have all'
lieen exposed, the veteran politicians
who run Israel have become more de.
termined than ever to stick it out: in'
other words, no territorial concessions ?
without a settlement, and no Settle-4
ment without direct Arab-Israeli tiego-
tiat ion
47
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?
POSITION is not so oblivious'
I. of Western interests as it has
sometimes been made out to be. The
last five years have proved that the
threats of expropriation of U.S. oil in-
terests emanating from Cairo are hol-
low. The Algerians, Libyans and Iraqis
have indeed expropriated U.S. oil corn- ,
panics, and will do so again if the
move Is to their advantage, regardless
of what the U.S. secretary of state
Says, or does not say, about Arabs and
,Jews. When oil industry conditions are ,
such that expropriation is a poor bar-
gain, they will not expropriate.
For the Libyans, whose rate of inter-
est on discounted future income is
.only 4 to 5 per cent, it makes perfect
:sense to curtail oil production, since
,prices are expected to rise and their
reserves are not infinite. For the Alge-
rians It has also made sense to expro-
priate the pro-Arab French while sign- ?
ling a Major natural gas contract with
U.S. interests that includes solid and
tangible guarantees against any politi-
cally motivated interference.
As for the truly Important il pro- ,
ducers in the Persian Gulf, it is obvi-
ous that Egyptian influence on their j
policies has now declined to the point
where calls for retaliatory action '
against U.S. oil interests would Simply ,
be ignored. After all, an American oil
company has operated Egyptian oil
fields for a decade, enjoying the most ,
cordial relations with the Egyptians?
regardless of all the Anti-American
fulminations out of Cairo.
Difficult as it is to accept the fact,
after endless statements to the con-
trary, the inescapable truth is that
there is no linkage between the con-
/duct of foreign policy and the oil situa-
tion in the Middle East?though there
imay be reverse linkage.
The French were awfully popular '
with the Arabs after 1587, but they paid
$L40 per barrel of crude just like the
,unpopular Americans. De Gaulle
earned much Arab praise for having
ditched Israel, but French gains in the
oil sector have ben insignificant: alt
exploration permit for a part of Saudi
Arabia long since given up as dry by
the U.S. Arameo company and a eopro-
, duetion deal for a small Iraqi oil field,
which makes U.S. Savings Bonds look
, like a racy investment. As against this,
at the height of their popularity, the
French lost their valuable Algerian oil
concessions, as did U.S. oil companies,
which nonetheless received better
'compensation for their much smaller
investments.
? if there is no real linkage between
U.S. policy towards I Israel and the
fortunes of the oil industry, why is
it that U.S. oilmen regularly preach
the need for a more "evenhanded'?
policy? For one thing, some of them
? still retain a charmingly simple view
of the Soviet Union as bent on physi-
cal expansion; but perhaps the main
? reason is that on their next trip to Bei-
rut or Jidda their Arab friends will be
grateful.
? We all like to please our friends, and
we all want to be liked, but the fact
? remains that unless there is direct mili-
tary damage to the wells, pipelines and
tanker terminals?which is most im-
probable?the oil industry will remain
unaffected by the political situation in
the area?or even by a new war. If the
, Russians want to buy oil, they too will -
pay the going?and rising?price, and
; the oil business is too well organized to ?
allow deft, operators to make a idIlirig,. .
as the Russians ,did on the U.S. wheat
market.
A Ikaiwalsk
DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
3 January 1973
UPHILL WORK FOR SADAT
EGYPT began the New Year inauspiciously with further
signs of malaise and uncertainty. President SADAT'S
announcement of preparations for the final battle sounded
less convincing and fell flatter than ever before, which is
inevitable in view of excessive repetition and non-fulfilment.
Another familiar aspect of the depressing cycle of futility
is the demonstrations by frustrated war-eager students
which have been going on for the past few days. As before,
the police took vigorous action and made some scores of
artests, with the result that the students are now
deMonstrating for their colleagues' release?albeit in the
university precincts, which is safer than on the streets.
1 The rift caused by Mr SADAT'S expulsion of 20.000
PITS BEING SO, in the Middle Eatt 't
U.S. policy need only to pursue its
traditional goals: to preclude a recov-
ery in Russian influences in the region,
to guard the political flanks of NATO,
and to avoid entanglements in Israeli
military gambles or Arab ' political ;
maneuvers. The days when foreign
service officers set out to play politics
In the drawing rooms of Arab poten-
tates are over; it may be a pity that all
those desirable assignments to Bagh-
dad, Cairo and Damascus have been ;
lost, but it makes no concrete differ- '
ence to U.S. interests.
1' To play a straightforward and low-
risk balancing game, the U.S. already
has reliable allies, including Jordan
'and the mat efficient state in the area,,
Israel. Even if it had no stronger ethnic i
connection into domestic policies than 1,
Ruritania?American support for Israel,
would be still a worthwhile investmest.
The survival of the pro-Western Arab
regimes in the Middle East has ironi-
cally depended on Israeli military pow-
er; Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and 4.
the Persian Gulf states would have all
? been drawn into the anti-Western or,
obit' of Egyptian policy had Nasser won
even a qualified defensive victory in
1967. Similarly, in the absence of a
'powerful Israeli air force, the Russian
.adventure of 1970 could have been
successful, thus providing the basis'
for
for an inclusion of the area in the
Russian sphere of .influence.
In fact, U.S. policy toward Israel'
should be guided by the same hard-
headed coaideratiOns that have
guided U.S. Miley toward Turkey4nd
Iran. If so, genuine American interests
will be served, while Israel will receive:
its'due without having to undergo the ,!
,,electoral cycles in U.S. support that'
'were such an Undignified feature or
U.S. politica in 1968 and lea. ?
Russian military helpers last July is very far from healed.
The numbers that have since returned are altogether
smaller than was expected. Mr SADAT is still " shopping
around" for foreign arms and backers. It was announced
yesterday that during the next few weeks half a dozen
countries in Asia and South America will be sending theW*
Foreign Ministers to Cairo. The fact that China is among
them seems calculated to needle Russia, but she gives no
? sign of reacting. Much more important is the belief that
America will shortly start a fresh attempt to persuade
? the ,two sides to reach an agreement 'for the reopening
of the Suez Canal and a partial Israeli withdrawal in Sinai.
Mr SADAT, while rattling his somewhat rusting sabre, May,
well be scanning rather more eagerly the Western horlittittri
'for signs of President Nixon's emissaries. ?
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GUARDIAN/LE MONDE MELT
Manchester, 30 Dec..1972 ,
Sadat's .'indecisiVe year
,
ARAB WORLD by David Hirst
1 Last year, 1971, was to have
been President Sadat's "year of
? decision." By the end of it he was
1
to have settled the Middle East
crisis by military or diplomatic
means. It turned out to be another
, year of indecision and ? although,
- apart from an occasional "zero
hour", he has steered .clear of
setting more deadlines ? 1972 has
proved quite as indecisive too.
The taking of a real decision
implies a real measure of control
lover the political environment. In
I the Arab world only a ruler of
Egypt, as the local great power,
Icanin ,heevearreaaspai rse at, om wholeoul dNeavsesnetrs,
in spite of his immense prestige,.
I eventually lost his grip. Sadat
never really had one. Unquestion-
; ably the great event of 1972, and
ostensibly the great "decision",
I was Sadat's expulsion of 20,000
; Russian experts. As a result of it,
I he is no better off, diplchbatically,
: at the end of the year then he was
; at the beginning. Militarily, he is
i far worse off. The expulsion was
: largely triggered by the Russians'
; refusal to supply Egypt with the
"offensive" weapons which the
? army considered they needed and
? deserved. But it left Egypt ' not
only without offensive weapons
but without a reliable defensive
system which is the indispensable
prerequisite for a renewal el fight -
; ing across the Suez Canal.- ?
It was to be expected that such
1 a move ? one of the most dramatic
- changes of course in modern
' Egyptian history ? would have
, formed part of a grand design
meticulously planned, carried out
and followed up, and that the whole
ruling apparatus would have been
? geared to securing the maximum
? payoff. In forfeiting the military
support of the Russians Sadat
' should logically? have sought the
diplomatic ? the hopefully much
more effective diplomatic ? support
of the Americans and the West
Europeans. But this was not to be.
For it had not been so much a
bold decision, maturely thought? -
out, as a desperate gamble. It
turned out to be an another lurch
, on Sadat's zigzag course, another
? landmark on his slide into inco-
herence. Sadat rules from day to
day, gimmick to gimmick, promise
to false promise. He cannot decide
from strength; he only reacts
from growing weakness.
On this occasion the pressures
came from inside Egypt. They were
the natural consequence of his
failure to keep his "year of deci-
sion" pledge. Student riots in
January were the first of a series
Of internal convulsions. In July
getting rid of the Russians was
the only way to appease his army
commanders, openly chafing at
what they regarded as the Rus-
sians' contemptuous ways, or even
to head off an army coup. It did
buy him a certain popularity; but
he himself foresaw' that it would
+es
. .
not last long, for even as he basked? '
in a little meretricious glory, he
, passed his draconian "national
unity" law which was designed to
cow the regime's growing army of
critics.-
Of course he did try to give his
gamble' some kind of coherent
follow-up. He launched into a bid
' to win friends and influence in
Europe. But his European offensive
suffered a grave setback, not this
time from disruptive forces in Egypt
itself, but from a quarter which can
-always be counted upon to foil
others' ambitions even if they are
quite incapable of adfieving their
own ? the Palestinians. True 1972
saw a further decline of the Pales-
tinian guerrilla movement. Yasar
Arafat and the Fatah leadership
continue to dominate the Palestin-
ian scene. But, once hailed as a
break with the old Arab order,
he and his colleagues look and
behave more and more like just
another Arab regime. Arafat has
shown, like Sadat, that he is in-
capable of putting through the real
structural reforms that alone can
ultimately save him. In October
this year, after a number of rum-
blings through the year, he faced
what nearly became a full-scale
mutiny in the Fatah rank-and-file.
; But out of the decline of conven-
tional guerrilla action, Black Sept-,
ember, and its brand of pure,
anarchic terrorism, has arisen. The
, idea that the world is going to be
engulfed in an ever-expanding
wave of Arab ' terrorism can
be ruled out. In spite of all the
investigatory efforts, not much was
learned about the organisational '
identity of Balck September. In .
the nature of things, operations
like Munich ? which was just the
most "successful" of a series dur-
ing the year ? suffer from a law
of diminishing returns. However,
designed to achieve maximum ef -
feet with minimum resources, they
have so far managed to produce
an emotional backlash which amply
ensures that they fulfil their strictly
negative purpose: to ? foil the
peace-seeking efforts of Arab re-
gimes and the "liquidation" of the
Palestinian cause which they in-
evitably foreshadow. Sadat's Euro,
pean offensive would probably have
failed anyway, and his American
one never got off the ground, but
Munich pre -empted both.
It is not only the guerrillas, by,
definition outside the framework
of "official" inter-Arab relations,
who foil Sadat's purposes and
wreck his decisions. All of a
sudden, Syria, Egypt's partner
in the tri -party Federation of Arab
Republics, began in the second
part of the" year to take a dis-
ruptive, wilful course of its Own.
Partly it was the effect of Munich.
The Israeli retaliatory raids had
gone on regularly during the year,
but after Munich they turned into
? the more destructive "strike-first"
strategy. Hundreds of civilians
died in raids ostensibly aimed at ;
guerrillas in Syria and Lebanon.
President Asad came under strong
pressure to retaliate. Partly, too,
it was the effect of the Russians'
expulsion from Egypt. Asad began
to fear that Sadat will go it alone
in an American-sponsored partial
settlement which will leave him
high and ? dry without the return
of the Golan. Evidently with Rus-
sian encouragement, Asad sought
to demonstrate 'to Sadat that he
could not hope Or a settlement at
Syrian or Russian expense. After
; years of caution, Asad began to
? warm up the Syrian front with
Israel in a, way which reminded
people that it was the self-same
'Baathists who did so much to
trigger the war of 1967.
!, Jordan, the third Arab country;
' with territory to recover, continued
to seek its own salvation. King
Hussein, having apparently de-
cided that a "military solution" '
is out' of the question, bent over
backwards to prove himself Israel's
good neighbour. Alone among Arab
?leadership he denounced Black
September ? the work of "sick
minds." He continued his all-out
Opposition to the guerrillas. He
kept his army deployed against
?
Syria. He inaugurated -a three-
year development plan in which
.the Jordan valley, devastated in
'the guerrillas' heyday, will have ?
a key place.
Sadat has had little more suctess
in the rest of the Arab world.
King Faisal, leader of the conser-
vative Arab camp, has shown, in
, his quiet way, that there are de-
finite limits on what Sadat, who
, has tried so hard to cultivate
his good will, can expect of him.
Throughout the year Cairo con-
stantly returned to the old re-
frain ? an admission of military
weakness ? that the Arabs should
use their oil weapon against the
Western backers of Israel. But
the emergent American- energy
crisis offers Saudi Arabia, holder
of the world's largest oil reserves,.
an opportunity Faisal apparently
intends to-seize with both hands.
Oil Minister Ahmad Zaki Yarriani"
announced that his country was ,
planning to increase production
to a fantastic thousand million
tons a year by 1980, and he
urged the United States to offer
Saudi oil a "special place" in the
U.S. market. This would bind Saudi
Arabia to the United States, more
effectively than any Russian-style
"treaty of friendship and coopera -
tion", with indissoluble bonds of
economic and commercial self -
interest.
The Sudan, once a candidate for
membership of the Federation of
Arab Republics, has reasserted
its African identity; this has
brought the end of its long and
bitter civil war in the south, but
helped bring President Numeiri
Into open conflict with, Sadat and
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Colonel Gadafi who resent the
,"ingratitude" of the man they
rescued a year ago from the jaws.
of a Communist conspiracy. Num -
eiri has had the effrontery to re-
establish relations with the Ameri-
cans. So has North Yemen, another
country in which Egypt once had
a, powerful influence. Iraq, whose
Baathist rulers have more or less
turned their back on the Arab
world since 1970, continued to keep
very much to themselves, deeply
preoccupied with their partial na -
tionalisation of the Iraqi Petrol-
eum Company, their menacing
Iranian neightbour and their re-
newed troubles with the Kurds of
North Iraq.
Only Colonel Gadafi sticks faith-
fully by Sadat-- but. at the price
of .what promiset to be a diffi-
cult unien of relatively advanced;
populous Egypt zWith backward,
oil-rich Libya: This was Sadat's
only real success 'ofthe year But
THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER i
5 January 1973
Sadat adrift in the fog
how long will that last?
, In October, Sadat, driven from
pillar to post, was already going
, back on his great "decision", seek -
ing a new modus vivendi with the
Russians. As the year drew to a
I close, faced with growing internal
unrest 'and the newly militant
Syrians, he is in danger of having
to take the supreme "decision",,
the decision for war, 'just at a time
when, as a, result of earlier '"de4
cisions," he is least prepared to
wagelt. ?? t ,
As one year ago, Egypt Is troUbleci. Then
as now Cairo's stndents were demonstrating and.
being arrested. Then as now' the pressure of a
prolonged situation of no war and no peace in the
Middle East was having its divisive effects on
Egyptian society. A scurrilous placard carried in
last year's deMonstration asked, " What did you
,rio in the war, Father? I gOt lost in the fog."
The reference was to President Sadat's
Unfortunate explanation' why he had failed to
Make true his promise that ipm? would be the year
Of military or political decisioh. lie elaitned the
decision had been taken but had become lest in
the fog of the Indo-Pakistan War, The student
protests exemplify a widespread feeling that
foggy policies persist. ,
It Must be admitted that Presideht Sadat has
been operating on a narrow margin. thOhig 1971,
he went farther than his predecessor in his offers
or making peace with Israel, Israel brushed these
Sadat waS, ferther disappointed by the US
Overestimation of its ability to coax a more
flexible position out of Israel' over an interim
;settlement centred on the Snez Canal. f.3nt within
;these circumstances, Sadat forgot the hasic rules
of the gamesman under pressere7r-rthe fewer
errors the better. ?
The decision taken in July to expel the Soviet
advisers serving with the Egyptian armed forces
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
12 January 1973
:11
1
, in the short term took the wind out of opposition!
to Sadat. But?this largely personal decision (taken',
under pressure from General', Sadek, the War.,
Minister until his dismissal im October) whsi
ipeptly timed in relation top the US presidentialli
, elections and thus to the US ability to do anything
about the Middlp East. Egypt presumed tdo
that Europe would be able to take up even in
part the burden' of the Soviet arms or political I
support for Egypt. Its hope sank without trace':
under the repercussions of the killings at the',
? Munich Olympics. The only resort was for Egypt'
to somersault back to Moscow. In military terms,[
? the expulsion exercise had left Ekvel in a still'
weaker state facing Israel.
'Th-e student demonstrations by themselves do'
not constitute a direct challenge to Sadat's'
position. They ,essentially reflect divisions
induced in a society erratically governed and
under stress. These strains have shown elsewhere',
In the conflicts between Copts and Mosleins. But
the warning that others May follow the students ?
is there already. Journalists, lawyersn arid workers.
'are also reported to have been "arrested.,There't
have been student disturbances at Zagazig in thet.
Delta, and at the industrial centre in ifelWan,';
Yet others could take up the warning, aggravated)
, by the use of force against the students, that at
year adrift in a fog is enough. '
A
Afghanistan's war on 'poppies
By the Associated Press
Kabul, Afghanistan
?Afghanistan's new Prime Min-
ister, Mohammed Musa Shafiq,
says he wants a "crusade" to
stop the growing of opium pop-
pies and drug smuggling in this
land-locked kingdom.
Mr. Shafiq has declared he will
not let traditionally backward
power groups block changes de-
signed to bring the 20th century
to Afghanistan. Only eight years
? ago it began to experiment with
a system of representative gov-.
ernment.
Not a war
In referring to the power
groups, tribal leaders, land-
owners, and mullah ? Muslim
preachers with a grip on the
countryside ?2 Mr. Shafiq, him-
self the son of a mullah, ob-
serves: "But you do not have to
declare war on them."
Mr. Shafiq, a dapper diplomat
who affects long hair and wide,
mod ties, says about poppy culti-
vation and smuggling: "This is
something I consider our cru-
sade here."
He notes the United States,
West Germany, and the United
Nations have offered money to
help, but the amount can not be
determined until the ,govern-
ment, consulting with UN ex-
perts, can produce a blueprint.,
So
The United States and West,'
.Germany are working with At..,
ghan officials on checking the
flow of narcotics. A
Referring to the U.S. programs
to. buy the opium crop of Turkey,'
Mr. Shang said: "You just can-
not distrubute money to peasants
to ask them not to grow opium.
You have to make a program for
them."
Previous prime ministers have
avoided comment on the growing ;
drug trade in Afghanistan. Until
two years ago, the government
refused to admit that opium
poppies were even grown here.
Drug control experts believe
from 150 to 800 tons of opium .are
produced illegally here every
year.
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I WASHINGTON POST
11 January 1973
Pakistanis
See Chill in
U.S. Ties
? By Arnold Zeitlin ?
Aenoclated Press
RAWALPINDI?Pakistant
1President Zulfiqar Ali ?
Bhutto is showing anxiety
t, about an apparent chill in
."`, his country's relations with?
ir the United States, just aa
Washington and New Delhi 1,
teem to be preparing'to
, mend their relations.
4, In conversations with ?
American diplomats, he has
Iv questioned U.S. intentions .
I-, toward his hostile neighbor,
India, especially after Presi-
dent Nixon appointed his
former adviser, Harvard so-
ciologist Daniel Patrick
/ Moynihan, as ambassador to
New Delhi.
The appointment.,
1,, prompted one Pakistani offi-
cial to refer to a celebrated
- Moynihan recommendation
concerning American atti-
tudes toward blacks. "I hope `I
this does not mean we are
In for a period of benign
neglect," the Pakistani re-
marked.
r?, Bhutto has complained
about Nixon's delay in fill-.
Aug the U.S. ambassador's
post in Pakistan. There has
been no official American
envoy for six months, and
virtually no effective repre-
sentation since Bhutto took
office in December 1971.
fie also has complained',
publicly and privately about,
,1 the amount of American.
' economic assistance to Paid-.
Stall and the leek of Ameri.C,
resionse to requests fk.i
t the reaOmption of the supli
plY of military equipment.
.. According to authoritative/
il,American :sources, Bhutto,
has been told that they
United States regarded Ini$
die as the "pre-eminent";
Power on the SubcontInent;.
I And sought normal relitions::
with New Delhi, It was
American backing for Paid-
Stan in its war with India
zone year ago which cooled
Already strained U.S. rein-
.CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 January 1973
Mass trial in Turkey
draws concern in Europe
By a staff correspondent of ,
The Christian Science Monitor
Beirut, Lebanon
Europe and the Middle East observers are
; watching with anxiety the new mass trial that '
has just opened in Turkey.
It appears to be yet another sign of the
power of the Turkish armed forces in the
'nominally parliamentary regime.
Even before this latest millitary trial of ?
. .
scores of alleged leftists began Jan. 10, there
had been increasing criticism in the Council .!
of Europe of the repression of nonviolent ;
dissenters in both Greece and Turkey. Both
countries are members of NATO, and both
would like to exchange their present asaoci-
' ation with the European Common Market for
rn
full membership.
On the other side of the Turkish coin is the
frequent eruption of urban and rural guer-
' rilla violence. One example was a Jan. 3
incursion of guerrillas from Syria into Hatay
' Province.
. Hostages taken
Like other guerrillas active in Turkey since
1970, these may have been members .of the
, Turkish People's Liberation Army. This
group has taken hostages aitiong American,
British, and Canadian personnel serving in
Turkey and in 1971 killed ,the Israeli consul
general in Istanbul.
The concern in Western European opinion
about Turkey, however, stems not from
Turkish Army action against guerrillas but
? against what it regards as the arbitrary
arrests of nonviolent critics and the subordi-
nation of democratic rule to orders from the
military.
Lash month the Council of Europe's Nether-
lands delegate, Pieter ,Dankert, was invited
by the Ankara government to undertake an
? investigation in Turkey after Turkish For-
eign Minister Hayuk Bayulken denied pub-
lished charges of the frequent torture of
political prisoners.
'Unfavorable reaction possible
Stec? Mansholt, the outgoing chairman of
the Commission of the European Commu-
nities, said last month that the commission
might react unfavorably to Turkey's appli-
cation for EEC membership if Mr. Dankert's
time with the government it thitinates the region. ?
'of India's Prime Minister In-, The U.S. sources ,said the
' dira Gandhi. - .United States would not per-
, 1 The Americans assured,, mit itself to be "bit lc-
BhUtto that the United,: nailed" by /Attie `over an
, States did not regard India , eventual decision to give
as "dominant." This distinc-,. - economic or arms' aid to
tion was important because
Matto has said it would not Pakistan. But high Amer!-
' 4reePbjndian insigtence ?Alb grba0eigtOPRIftgatie Attl
findings back the charges of torture and other ;
arbitrary acts.
, For this latest mass trial in Ankara, 267
alleged members of the extreme leftist
Turkish Revolutionary Workers and Peas- '
ants Party were indicted. Some 185 of these
are reportedly expected to stand trial on 1
charges ranging from the capital offense of
seeking to overthrow i1 the government to,
merely insulting officials.
Since the Turkish armed forces moved into
a more active role behind President Cevdet '
Sunay in running the country in March, 1971,:
and imposed martial law in 11 provinces a '
month later, about 3,400 people accused of
terrorism, subversion, or "propagating Com-,i
munist ideology" have faced military courts.
Severe sentences given
Unusually severe prison sentences have
been imposed on many of the hundreds of
intellectuals, lawyers, writers, journalists,
ands students arrested.
Last month a mass trial in Ankara jailed 52
teachers for periods ranging up to eight years
for "transforming their union into a clandes-
tine Communist cell." , ?
Another conviction was that of Prof. Ugur ?
Alacakaptan, a respected Turkish jurist, who
was sentenced id six years and three months '
in prison and an additional 23 months' exile. .
Eight other defendants convicted with
Professor Alacakaptan had taken part in a
protest march in Ankara in June, 1970, after .
shooting between leftist and rightist univer-
sity students. Turkish liberals alleged gov-'i
ernment agents had provoked the trouble.
Examples reported
Professor Alacakaptan also was convicted
of "insulting military authorities" during his .
court defense of Prof. Mumtax Soysal, now' .
serving six years for having included eX.1
planations of Communist forms of govern-
ment in a standard text on constitutional law.
The book was used for three years in
universities before the military authorities '
filed charges.
Many newsmen have been arrested and at
least 10 imprisoned for their writings. Tinzj,
mass circulation Istanbul newspaper Hurri.;
yet was suspended for 10 days recently in two
southern provinces for describing a guerrilla ,
attack by infiltrators from Syria in which
three-persona were killed and nine wounded..1
dealing with -the PrOblenta
"between the United States
?and Pakistan" Would take
months and indicated that
these problems did not hove'
Immediate priority in Wash-
? ington.
Tile Pakistani an
? '
? xiety con-
&esti with the aisiassirtie
IA*7 aaCIAPRO
. 'Nifty:at sent 'the.tth Fleet to -
the Bay of Bengal as an ap-
parent wanting to India to !
halt the war.
1 -Bhutto said several times
l that aid year at - he Wanted'
? tp.make no deniands on the
' United States until after the
Novembe ? . ential elec.
2Rup; 1 iy:-. P -4,taia.d what
Si
T"71r11 t 77,177.7"- 1177"7"77,77177:
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lie had in mind when he
iisaid?partly joldrigly?that
he hoped to finance his
1,home reforms by "milking
,Uncle Sam." .
0, The lack of an ambassa-
Odor, since the departure of
'4..Toseph S. Farland for the
:Post in Iran last June has,
WASHINGTON STAR i
14 January 1973
rankled 'Bhutto, Now Mr.'
Mil:in has made a prestige
appointment to New Delhi
and even named asoambas-1
.sexior , to langlade-1, al.
thigh the appointment was 11
withdrawn because of the 1
Illness of the diplomat.
?
JAMES J. KILPATRICK
Raising the Double Standard Over Greece
7 A House subcommittee filed
bitchy little r porte two
, weeks ago, complaining pet-
ulantly of the Navy's decision
to homeport a part of the
Sixth Fleet in Greece. But
, the thrust of the report wasn't
directed at American admi-
rals; it was directed at Greek
, colonels instead.
The authors of this report
agreed that the United States
has legitimate military anti'
security interests in .Greece,
' relating both to NATO and to
the Middle East. They could,
not convincingly challenge
the Navy's choice of Athens
in terms of the city's hous-
? ing facilities and the like.
This was their point:
"The circumstances of that
' choice indicate that our gov-
ernment is more concerned
about obtaining the minor
? advantages and conveniences
of homeporting in Greece
, (instead of Italy, for exam-
ple) than about expressing
our opposition to the Greek
dictatorship through a policy
i of minimal and cool relations
until democracy is restored
. in that country. The world
looks to the United States to
'stand up for democratic prin-
BALTIMORE SUN
7 January 1973
ciples and if we shirk that
? responsibility, we are negat-
? ing the most important prin-
ciple on which this country
stands."
Members of the subcatn-
mittee,. headed by Benjamin
S. Rosenthal of New York,
? took a lugubrious view of the
present government in
Greece. It is not, they believe,
"stable." There may be some
short-term advantage in the
homeporting decision, but
"our long-term need is for a
stable Greek government
which will come through a
democratic restoration." The
Navy, they insist, should have
chosen Naples, Livorno or
Taranto instead.
The authors' conclusions,
viewed on their merits, have
no merit. Whatever else may,
be said of the government in
Greece, like it or not, it is
stable. The colonels have been
firmly in power for nearly
six years. Their oppositi6h is
divided, disorganized, and im-
potent. Restoration of what
is euphemistically, known as
"democratic rule" would in-
vite a return of the chaotic
conditions that obtained prior
to 1967. If forces of the ex-
Greek regime lacks
'fly STEPHEN 3. LYNTON
Sun Stoll Corre3pondent
'Athens ? A 'former politician
1, with a conservative rural con-
k StittlenCy, who bitterly detests
the military-backed regime,
'groped for a word in English
?t with appropriate Greek over
tones to describe his own pes-
simistic outlook., Finally, he
said he was a "fatalist,"
"It's a kind of a Greek
drama," he remarked. "What
we need is an anti-event that
iwould initiate catharsis. What
he _meant was that nothing on
(.the political horizon ? except
,perhaps an unforeseeable act
;of fate ? could remove the
&present rulers.from. power and
open the Way to parliamenta-
ry-styledemocracy. ? '
,From him and other oppo-
nents at well as from a gov-
ernment spokesman, from' a
man who quit the regime and
now criticizes it as well as
from a politician who once
opposed the regime but now
who supports it, from diplo-
mats and from journalists ?
from almost every political
direction ? there is one re-
frain: The regime will retain
power as long as it wants
because ,there- is, no -alterna-
tive. , ' -
:Critics say they expect no
free elections in Greece unless
Premier Oeorgq Papadopoules
treme left wing should gain
power, it could well mean a
swift end 'not only to demo-
cratic rule, but also to Greek's
participation in NATO.
By contrast, if; "stability" is
the desideratum; one may re-
call that Italy has had 34 gov-
ernments since World War H.
Never mind the merits.
,What is baffling to the ob-
server of foreign affairs is the
double standard one constant-
ly encounters. Indeed? when
it comes to our relations with
the rest of the world, we seem
to have double standards for
double standards. "
Surely this is true in the
matter of Communist re-
gimes. This past year saw the
President of the United States
toasting the Conununists of
China and Rbssia, and bomb-
ing the Communists of North
Vietnath. It is equally true of
dictatorships. Rosenthal and
his colleagues despise the
dictatorship in Greece. They
never cease to mourn the
absence of democracy in
Portugal, Rhodesia, and South
Africa. But you will not see
them standing up for demo-
cratic principles, in Zambia,
Tanzania, and the Sudan.
We see the same double '
?'itandard id the matter of
moral outrage. When U.S. '
bombs fall on Hanoi, it Is
barbarism; when Soviet mis-
sites fall on Quang Tri, it is
no more than the fortunes of
war. The history of the bloody
conflict in Vietnam is in part a
history of the torture, =tile-
tion and murder imposed by
terrorists from the North upon.
peasants of the South. This,
part of the history seems to
affect congressional liberals
not at all.
We ought to weep for the
dead of war, whoever they
are, however they die. And
when it comes to dealing with,
governments we find distaste-
ful, we ought in charity to
give some account to the,
taste ef others. '
lit some' millennium, all
nations will be as democratic
as the Eighth Congressional
District of New York; mean- ?
while we ought to work with
governments as they are. We
ought to tolerate Greek cola-
nets, Spanish generals, African
despots, and everyone else.
After all, they tolerate us?or'
most nations do?and that in ,
itself is no easy job.
effective opposition/
quits, dies or is overthrown' cisions .are often open to co
More detached observers say flicting interpretations ?
45.
that, in any case, there is no miniscule steps toward dem
evidence to suggest any will be racy or as Mere ploys to allay
held soon. A supporter of the criticism, as signs of weakness
regime predicted elections or of strength, ?as indications
might occur in two years, but that of,
will some day step
Byron Stamatopotilos, the gov- down or that he means to rule
ernMent's chief spokesman, for life. t . ???
t
would go no further, when In November, the' regime al-
pressed, than to say they lowed Students, to elect their
would take place within five leaders for.the first time since
years. , the .1967 coup. But critics and
t Mr. Papadopoulos, a retired More' heutral observers view
Army colonel Who led a mill- the polling as rigged anti say
Wry coup that seized power that .governnient supperte
April 21, 1967, remains in swept' the votes in, all the fee-
Many' respects an enigmatic ulties except for two the
ruler who seldom tips his only .,,two where invarti
hand. His occaiional._public de-
52
, ?
r , , T ,,TrrIrr
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? ,
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Judges watched the balloting.
Last month, Mr. Papadopou-
los announced the lifting of
martial law in the northern
district of Salonika. But his
' opponents and most observers,
say the shift means little se;
long as Athens itself remains
under martial law and they
add that, even if it were lifted
In Athens, the change would be
, slight since a military-sup-
ported regime rules the cotta-'
I In November, in what was
'viewed as a deliberate govern-
ment leak, the Athens newspa-
iier Acropolis reported that
Mr. Papadopoulos would an-
nounce limited elections for
!.1973 in a pronouncement either
I last month or next April. His
speech last month omitted any
such declaration and, although
:observers here now think he
May proclaim elections in a
t speech on the sixth anniver-
sary of the coup, the rumored
' elections are expected to be.
contrived to choose only gov-
ernment-approved candidates.
-,for a rubber-tamp Parliament.,
Intimidate critics
Mr. Papadopoulos is believed;
likely to make occasional pub-1
lic appearances in the rural
sections of the nation this year,
similar to his visit to Crete
last. month.. These apparently
would have the makings of a
preliminary political cam-
paign. His supporters say he
was warmly received in Crete
but opponents dispute this,
calling the response a facade.
Alide from such limited de-
velopments as these, the re-
gime has permitted little politi-
cal change. The former politi-
cal parties remain outlawed. A
constitution ratified ;in 1968 has
not been put into effect. news-
papers operate under a vague
press law designed to intimi-
date the government's critics.
The government acknowl;
edges holding about 250 politi-
cal prisoners ? although it:
objects to- describing them as
such ? as well as about 15
others imprisoned pending
trial. Observers here say, how-
ever, they know of at least 20
jailed without trial since Au-
gust. The government disputes
allegations that political pris-
oners are tortured. ? .
The Greek political opposi-
tion remains in disarray, and
the regime seems largely indif-
ferent to criticism from other
nations, such as the mild pres-
sure for moves toward democ-
racy from the Nixon adminis-
tration, sharper attacks from
two U.S. House of Represents-
' fives subcommittees last
month, Greece's forced with-
drawal from the Council of
Europe and its partly curtailed
, dealings with the European
Common Market. Both Euro-
pean organizations acted on
political grounds.
."Our course is not going to
be influenced by anything," Mr.
Stamatopolous, the undersecre-
tary of state for information
and the press, said hien inter-
view, calling outside pressure
"political blackmail." Mr. Pa-
padopoulos had also denounced
similar "blackmail" last
month in his most recent major
address.
The' regifne still rests its
claims to success on grounds
O? economic progress and in-
ternal security. The economy,
has grown at a hdalthy pace?
although inflation hasrecently
become a problem, some econ-
omists view the regime's cur-
rent economic policies as' mis-
guided and many attribute the
economic growth to Steps al-
ready begun, before the, mili-
tary takeover.
The consumer price index,
Which had been growing at a
rate of about 3 per cent pre-
tously, jumped to ,5.9 per cent.
in, November, ,and the more
sensitive, wholesale price index I
roit to 8.2 'Pei cent. Fresh
meat has been in short supply
and a form of .black market
has appeared for meat and
veegetables. ?
Inflation is a touchy issue
both with the regime and the
public, which remembers a'
drastic devaluation of the
drachma to half its Worth
1953. Some economists say no
cent government moves to,
curb inflation may actually eel'
i
celerate It. ?
Greece's internal security?'
though it has been accompanied'
by a curtailment of political'
freedom?has , helped attract!
foreign investment.
Despite the Nixon adminis-
tration's complaints about the
absence of democratic features
under the Greek regime, the
United States continues to pro-
vide about $70 million a year
In military grants and credit to
Greece as well as additional
excess weapons.
Stock American exports to
Greece are rising rapidly, U.S.
officials here are "targeting"
Greek markets for further
American exports, and they
say they expect considerable
U.S. investment in an airport
and subway that have been
proposed for Athens.
WASHINGTON POST
3 JANUARY 1973 ,
Turks Said to Torture Dissidents
, cided to make the Visit after
By Laurence Marks receiving written' assurance
? London observer . from the Turkish embassy
. ,t0NDON ? Amnesty Inter- in London that they would
national is convinced that poll. be permitted to visit prisons
Heal prisoners have been 'tor- and talk to 'prisoners: ,
hired in Turkey and that there , The day after they 'arrived
It no evidence that torture has in Ankara, they met with
ceased. , '1 Minister 'of Justice Fehmi?
: This announcement by the Alpaslan and other officials.
. International organization The mission handed over a'
' which , campaigns for' list of prisoners whom they
"prisoners of conscience" wished to interview. Alpas-
'contradicts the statement Ian said they could do so.
made by the Turkish foreign He also appeared to agree
Minister, Haluk. Bayulken, that they should receive a
to the Council of Europe in copy of the Turkish govern.
Paris that prisoners had not ' ment's own report of its in-
been tortured.,
quiry into torture .allega-
, A- mission from the . Brit-tions.
:,ish section of Amnesty In- ; Two days later, they'were
.ternational visited Turkey told by the Turkish foreign
In November to investigate ministry that all but me of
the prisoners on their list
allegations of torture. It was
were under the control of
i?
composed of Muir Hunter. a i
the Turkish general staff
prominent lawyer, and two , and that the ministry of jos-
magistrates, his wife Mrs. .i tice had no jurisdiction over
i. Williams. Muir 'Hunter and Sir, (1s- ' them. (Eleven provinees of
Mond
- " Turkey ' have been tinder
4, Htinter said thAtplitelevlardi cilt littileasibe26104408/01Zg 1A-RDP77-00432R000130trekri Itil 0 was quite cm*"
, martial law since the middle erat L_phraim blrom. and
1 refused access to these
pris-
oner,s.
.?At, Sagmalcilar Women's
; prison, the mission had a
two-hour interview with
Mrs. Ilkay Demir, 26, medi-
cal student at Istanbul Uni-
,,versity, the only prisoner on
the list now said to be under
. the ministry's jurisdiction.
. She corroborated a state-
ment made by her husband,
Necmi Demir, 28, an eco-
nomics student at, the uni-
versity accused, in May,
. 1971, of "trying to change
the Turkish constitution by
force." The statement had
been taken from the files of
the Third Extraordinary
Military. Court. It alleged
that he was beaten on the
soles of his feet for six
hours in a cell. in the Istan- trodes had been applied to:i
bul police headquarters on the head and body, includ- I
May 28, 1971. . '1 ing the genital organs, and
Mrs. Demir also signed a police truncheon trust into
copy of her own statement, I the vagina or anus, She he. ,
taken ftom the same court 4. ileved that it was because .4
files, that , she had been she alone had not been tor-
forced under threat of tor-tured that the Mission hat'
tore to accuse her husband been allowed to interview
falsely of having taken part her
in the. kidnaping and mur- , ivIem)iers of the mission
(ler of the !sae!' consul-gen- said that throughout the in-.' 7.
that she had seen her htu1,-1
' ban in police headquarters
on May 28, 1971, when he'
was carried out of the cell
In which he had been tor-
tured and laid on a desk.
The mission said 'she coni,
firmed that On this occasion
,the tended her 'husband's :
.
she tended
,feet and those of
another priSone r, Wan
.Ucar, 25, an engineering stu-
dent at the Technical ,Uni-
versity of Ankara, accused of
refusing to give inforination,
about a 'resistance organiza':'
tion. She said that the floor,,
of the eellin which they had -
been tortured was covered,
with blood.
She also told the mission
about tortures of other polite
Ica! prisoners. She said elec?C:1
? ? I-7 Tir7r
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100060001-0
?Posed, and' answered ques-
tions only, after considers-
!,! tion. If she had any doubt in
her mind, or if her knowl-'
1. edge was from, hearsay, she
said so, according to mission
methbers...
The,mission later tried to
bbtain permission to inter-
Mew the prisoners SRN to be
k.itrider Military control, but'
they were refused,. They
were told that, under a law
passed about six months I
ago, all these prisoners t
(although mostly , civilians
before' their arrest) are- no* ?,.
considered to. be soldierS;
The 'mission was unable to
obtain a copy of the Turkish.
government's own inquiry /
report.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
11 January 1973
?
U.S. and Greece sign port pact
Athens spokesman
says facilities on par
' with other NATO aids
By John K. Cooley
Staffkorrespondent of .
The Christian Science Monitor
Athens
United States and Greek naval officers '
'have signed a new "technical agreement" on ,
home port facilities used by the U.S. Sixth
Fleet here.
Byron Stamatopoulos, Greek under-
minister for the press, specified that Greece, ,
under arrangements already begun when six ,
destroyers of U.S. Destroyer Squadron 12'
arrived
arrived here last fall, "is granting the same 2,
4, kind of NATO facilities as France, Italy, and
' ohters grant to the United States. A ?
"The agreement has no other significance.
This will not be an operational base or a naval
arsenal," Mr. Stamatopoulos insisted.
' No ownership involved
Official U.S. sources here stresa that the.
United
United States is not acquiring ownership or
title to any facilities in Greece. The ships are
using existing anchorage and berthing facil-
ities. Later, a mobile naval pier may be
provided at Elevsis, about 10 miles west of !
Athens.
Procurement of food, fuel, and other
supplies and services is by local contract.
Some 1,700 officers and men of the de-
stroyer squadron, about 450 American fami-
lies in all, including some 1,000 dependents,
are already living in private houses and ?
apartments rented in the Athens area. This
number is expected to rise eventually to 6,000
military personnel and 3,100 dependents.
They are to be joined here later by an .1
aircraft carrier that will also use Piraeus, the
port of Athens, as home port. There it '
speculation here that the carrier and its
personnel ' may be covered bi the new
arement.
Press is eritioal
Last Oct. 14, the Greek alternate foreign
affairs minister, Phaedon Anninos-Kavalier-
atos, said negotiations beginning in January,
1972, led to signing of "minutes of under- 4
standihg" in August, 1972, covering the
, destroyer squadron.
1
The home porting adcord, signed Jan. 8, is ,1
"under fire in the Greek newspapers. Almost i
daily, they play up incidents between U.S.' 1
sailors and Greeks. bpposition columnists
take the U.S. to task for supporting the 1
, authoritarian, Army-backed regime of Prime '
Minister George Papadopoulos.
11
Two subcommittees of the U.S. House of
Representatives said in a joint report re-
leased in Washington Dec. 29,, that ,the'
' 'decision does "serious disservice ,to Amer-
' ican relations with the Greek people, our ties i
, to our 'NATO allies, and 'to our own demo-
cratic Institutions.' 'Six subcommittee mem- '
bers dissented from the majority and sup-
ported the accords.
I Danger seen
f,
A typical comment from the Greek opposi-
tion is that of John Pesmazoglu, a liberal, ,
' 'pro-Western economist and former governor.
!4 of the Bank of Greece. He was released last
s month after seven months of forced banish-
ment in a mountain village.
r In an interview here, he told this reporter:
i "It is an extremely dangerous and definitely
1 harmful action by the U.S. to discuss,
negotiate, and conclude such an, agreement i
with the present regime.
"The regime has no representative charac-
' ter in Greece. By all criteria and evidence it
is strongly opposed by the overwhelming
r majority, of the Greek people.
"The fact that the U.S. relies on making
such arrangements with non-representative
` rulers who exercise power in violation of
their own Greek legislation is an extremely
dlIngerous and inimical action."
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Africa
WASHINGTON POST
17 JANUARY 1973
I
Racial Collision: Rhodesia and Zambia
? ,? Guerrillas based next door in Zambia have now pro-
ifoked the uptight white minority government of Rho,
desia to partially close its border with Zambia; only
2ambian copper, on which Salisbury earns important
hard-currency revenues, is to be let through. But whether
these "sanctions in 'reverse'! will put enough' economic .
pressure on Zambia to make it alter ? its deep political
commitment to the guerrillas, and to leash them, is dubi-
(Sus. The examPle. of Rhodesia, which itself has managed
'to endure international sanctions for more than seven
.14
years?though. not without cost?would seem to be rele-
.
,President Kaunda' Of ' Zambia has given hospitality,
(raining grounds and sanctuary to the three main guer-
rilla groups operating in -Rhodesia. No doubt he once
hoped to postpone .11 full showdown with Rhodesia until
Completion (expected in 1975) of the railroad the Chi-
nese are building him to Tanzania's Dar es Salaam?this
'Is a project undertaken precisely to give land-locked
',Zambia a port outlet not dependent on White good will.
`t ven so, Mr. Kaunda says ie will stop using the Rhodesia
'rail link. The alternatives 'are limited but they exist.
Trucks already cartY Some Zambian copper to Dar es
'Salaam; other Zambian copper goes out by rail' to PorJ
(tiguese Angola's Atlantic port of Lobito. Rhodesia will
'Atirely press Portugal to join the blockade but Lisbon has
Its own reasons to equivocate and spin out its response.
The new collision is a prime example of racial tighten-
1rig in southern Africa. Though small in number and lit-
eral effect (their victims are counted only in twos end
threes), the guerrillas have forced' Rhodesia to a far-
NEW YORK TIMES ,
reaching step, Imposition of sanctions by Rhodesia has3
already stirred some public white doubts in the country.:
. Moreover, it mocks Salisbury's objections to the sanctions':
which the United Nations voted against it in 1965 when
? it .broke from Britain without offering -guarantees of
' 'eventual' Majority rule. Some Rhodesian whites even have,,?
, acknowledged that the guerrillas, far from being the out-,
Side, provocateurs portrayed In official Salisbury prone,
, ganda, have, been given aid and comfort by blacks in Rhol
desia. It has been one of the energizing myths of white ,0
minority rule that blacks liked it that way. Salisbury'sv
sanctioM, then, seem bound to,intensify the already pres-
, .sure-laden atmosphere in rhich the Salisbury govern-,1
. 1 ment is trying tO prolong and legitimize its rule..
Let it be clearly understood 'that it is the whites' con':.1
tinuing refusal to take gradual legal steps towards ma-
jority rule that has brought into being the guerrilla move-4
ment based outside Rhodesia in Zambia?and in Bot-t,
. ,swana, to the west, and Mozambique, to the east, now as
well. No other legal political avenuesv have been open.1
Indeed, recently the Smith regime in Salisbury began
introducing certain., "apartheid" measures. These .can:
hardly fail to stir further black opposition and to ensure;
. that such, opposition Is expressed in increasingly militant-
'. 'ways. So far the Urilted States has not been called upon
? . publicly to take. sides in the Rhodesian-Zambian collision. ?
But something like a Zambian request for trucks in I
which to carry out more copper to Dar es Salaam could 'I
force the issue. It would be interesting to se the Nixon)
administration's response.
17 January 1973
Churches Press Businesses on Africa
By ERNEST HQLSENDOLPFt
Six Protestant church organi-
zations are renewing a cam-
paign for full disclosure' and
close Scrutiny of American
corporate investments and,' ac-
tivities in southern Africa,', it
was announced yesterday..
The' organizations, all. Insti-
tutional investors, are trying
to exercise their privilege as
shareholders to compel 13 cor-
porations to disclose their deal-
ings in South Africa and other
couptries where what they con-
sider "oppressive conditions" ?
prevail for blacks. '
The groups, which include
theNational Council of
Churches. ? have filed stock,
holder resolutions 'to be in-
cluded in corporate proXy state-
Ments. ?
At a press 'conference Yester-
day at the Church Center for
the United Nations, 777 United
Nations Plaza, spokesmen stop-
ped short of threatening to
withdraw their investments in
the companies doing. business
In ' southern Africa, but said
they hoped to change company
policies' through public pres-
sure. ,
? ? ', 'Huge Profits' Are Seen
The 'United States companies
"ha-Ye made huge profits there
while paying their black work-
ers pitifully inadequate wages,"
the Rev. W. Sterling Cary, presi-
dent of the National Council
of Churches, said. ,
"They have provided prod.,
ucts for the white government
and military, thereby strength-
ening white control." Mr. Cary
said. "TheY,have helped create
a flourishing economy7 ? for
whites." . ' '
The religieus 'organizations;
described as "substantial insti-
tutional investors," include
boards and agencies of .the
American Baptist Churches, the
Protestant Episcopal Church in
the U.S.A., the United- Methb;
dist Church, the United Presby-
terian Church in the U.S.A. and
the Unitarian-Universalist , As-
sociation as well as The Nal
tional Council.
Burroughs Said to Agree
The targets of the groups are'
the Burroughs Corporation. the
'Caterpillar Tractor Company,
!the Chrysler Corporation. the
!Eastman Kodak Company. tivl
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First National City "Bank of
New York, the General Elec-
tric Company, the International
Business Machines Corporation,
'the International Telephone &
Telegraph Corporation, the
Minnesota Mining and Manu-
facturing Company, Texaco,
Inc., and the Xerox Corpo-
ration.
The Burroughs Corporation
has already agreed to supply
the information requested, a
spokesman said. Iti a separate
action the Unitarians have'
filed a resolution asking the
Exxon Corporation to set up a
special committee to investl-?
gate the implications of a pi-g-
oosed investment in the Portu-
guese ?African territory of An.
gola.? ' ?
. Suing Up Position, ;
Last Year a group of. re-1
ligious organizations made de-
mands for disclosure upon the
Gulf Oil Corporation, the Geed,'
year .Tit'e Rubber ,ComPany;
:the General Motors Corpora-
Ipternational Business Ma-
chines Corporation and the.
Mobil Oil Corporation.
Spokesmen yesterday claimedi
Icredit for clisclOsures .andi
"some policy,changes" by duff
and General Motors, but they
criticized Goodyear as having
flatly ref Used to cooperate. '
Summing up the chute
groups' arguments, Dr. Gene
Bartlett, president of the AmerP
can Baptist Churches, said: "If
our corporations make some of
the highest profits in the world
While doing business there, and
we as institutional investors
benefit from those profits, we
then directly profit froni
tpartheid. ? ?
? Spokesmen said they did not,
know the value of combined;
church, investment portfolios;
but . estimated that church.
organizations control less than
3 per cent of company shares.',
It is estimated that there are.
18.5 million members among
the six organizations in the,
campaign.
Appearing with Mr. Cary andi
Dr. Bartlett for ? the 'announce-
ment were the Rev. Stewart
MacColl, chairman of the Corn-'
mittee on Mission Responsibility
through Investment of the GenL
eral Assembly Mission CotinciV
and Miss Florence Little, treas.
urer of the Women's Division
of the United Methodist Church,j
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7;
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Western Hemisphere
NEW YORK TIKES
11 January 1973
mericart Th 1:lets 1
': fly Bolivia as A Gucrrilia
By DEMDRE CARMODY
, A former American min, ar- country until' 1902, when* she
was transferred to 'La Paz for
parish work.'
In
In .1967 she and another
Maryknoll Sister, -without 'dis-
closing their affiliation, took
Jobs in a factory in one of the
poorest areas of the city to try
to help people there. They lived
on $20 a week in a' small room
with no running. water, .elec-
tricity or heat.
Lost Her Factory Job ? /
rested in Bolivia for belonging
;10 a *subversive organization,
hat been held In jail or more
than five weeks because she
not reveal the identities
:of other members .of the clan-
destine group. . .
Ile 40-year-old woman, Mary
'larding of Fairhaven, Mass.,
,hitS admitted that she is a mem.
'her of the, Army of National
1Liberation, a guerrilla organi-
c,zatiori that grew out' of the
ilnoVement founded by Ernesto
Che Guevara in 1967, 'Accord-
ing to the State Department,
Miss Harding. told by the Boll-
' vian authorities that she would
;be released as soon as she
(gave information about mem-
;berg of the terrorist organiza-
tion, replied that she would
'never do so.
Triends of Miss 'Harding,
here from Bolivia te try to stir
c Interest in her case in the hope
that it will expedite her release,
say that she told 'a priest who
Visited her that she had been
4f beaten with a hard rubber mal-
Jet during -the first '72' hours
after her arrest on Dec. 5.
? AecOunt by a Visitor
1! '
i Juan Jos4 Loria, Minister
i Counselor of the Bolivian Em-
bassy in Washington, said in
,
an interview that reports that
: Miss Harding had been beaten
, Vete "clearly not true." He
i cianfirmed that she was being
, held "because she has to con-
: form to our laws as any citi-
* ze)i," but he said he 'had. no
information' on the possibility
other release.
t We have no information to
. stibstantiate that she was beat-
en'," said Jack 11. Binns, Bolivia
: dfsk officer in the State De-
pti)tment. "Our consular offi-
cer asked her if she had been
? nfistreated and she said she had
nOt."
' ,ACcording to a man who has
, ju,st arrived from La Paz and
. who does not want to give his
-Ilene for publication for fear
hwilt nbt be allowed to re,
,e ter Bolivia, Miss Harding is
b mg held in the city jail in a
small, damp room that has little
' other than a mattress on the
ifleor. She it visited about once
?,a "week by someone from the
'ertbassy. Two nuns were al-
lowed to see her on Christmas
and a few people have man.
t
1 aged to see her unofficially.
i ,114iss Harding went to Bolivia
41W' 1959 as a member of the
OVIlrylinoll order. She worked
ias; a teacher in the tropical
In 1970 Miss Harding left the
sisterhood, telling a friend, Gail
Kelley, 1that she ,had become
involved in political attivity
and "did not want the Mary-
knoll order Compromised."
Dater she lost her factory job
because , she had 'failed to
change her status on her pass-
port when she left the order
ahd ,was working illegally. She
then got a position as an Eng-
lish teacher in the American
Cultural Institute, -a United
States Government agency. ,
On her way to 'work on Dec.
5 she was arrested for being
a member of the liberation
army, which is known as E.LN.
'According to Dr. Loria, the
organization is "planning to
overthrow our Government
and is trying to create a Viet-
nam in South America." Sources
in the State Department de-,
scribe it as a terrorist organ4'
ization.
It has actively mounted
guerrilla campaigns-against the
three military Governments
Since then. According to the
State 'Department, it apparent-
ly switched its strategy from
rural insurgency 'to urban ter-
rorism about two years ago,
and recently officials uncov-
ered' an attempt to assassinate
President Hugo Banzer Suarez,
whose right-wing Government
has been in power since a coup
d'etat in August, 1971 ? the
181st coup in the turbulent
147-year history of Bolivia.
On Nov. 23 President Banzer
imposed a state of siege
throughout the country, assert-
ing that there was an open
conspiracy to overthrow his
Government. As a result cer-
tain individual rights were sus-
pended under the Constitution
and a modified form of martial
law is in effect for the popula-
tion of more than five million.
It is this that has complicat-
ed the Harding case. State De-
partment sources say that under the martial law both na
tionals and foreigners may b
held in "indefinite detention
itIrthetstem a,ection ,6f, ,the for ,Interrogation? if they,*
suspected of terrorist adtiVitiett.1
Charges do not have to be
filed. '
According to Miss Kelley;
also a former nun ,0 who lived
here now, more than 1,000
Bolivians are being held as
political prisoners in Viacha,
Achacalla and Coati. She said
that prisoners were being tor-
tured and others had been shot
"while trying to escape."
Miss Kelley said her informa-
tion came from a document
published in exile and another
document that had probably
been written by priests and was
'smuggled out of Bolivia.
Asked about political prison-
ers, Dr. Loria" said that he did
not have a figure but that , it
wass nothing like 1.000. Several'
hundred were freed last month,;
he added. He acknowledged,
that prisoners were ,being de-'
tamed in the areas , cited by
Miss Kelley.
In a letter to a friend here in
July, Miss Harding said the sit-
uation in Bolivia was "fear
everywhere?and there's reason
for fear everywhere." She spoke
Of -'arrests without authoriza-
WASHINGTON STAR
14 January 1973
TX-Nun Placed
rtion?,". surrptestion-''of.' MOW
'corpus, tortures?at least two
cases I know of personally: a
,man and a young woman have
died' under torture?and( how
many more there must be; in.
human conditions ?in the con,
jcentration camps where people
are held."
"Please, we are desperate,"
she wrote. "I try not to say toO
much in my letters home; but
I want my mother to be a littlei
prepared .psychologically 'just
in case."
Both . Miss ' Harding's friend
who is here from La Paz and
Miss ,Kelley sai4 they felt that
the United Stats Embassy had
net tried hard enough to win
Miss Harding's release.
'According to the State De-
partment, she has requested
neither deportation nor coun-
sel. During the weekly visit by
an American from the.ernbassy,
she is asked if anything can be
done .fOr her.
A State Department spokes4
man said that as \ far as he
,knew Miss Harding was the
only American being detained
as a political prisoner in Bolivia:
In U.S. Custody
LA PAZ? Bolivia (AP) ?
Mary 'Elizabeth Harding, a
former U.S. nun arrested last
month and accused of guer-
illa activities, was released
yesterday to the custody of
,the U.S. consul.
Interior Minister Col Mario
Adett Zamora said she would
remain in the custody of Don-
aid Mudd, the consul, until,
her expulsion. He did not say i
when she would be ousted. 2
Adett Zamora said Miss Han.)
dingo 40, from Worcester,'
Mass., had confessed to being
a member of the National:,
Liberation Army, a guerrilla':
group founded by the latei
Ernesto (Che) Guevara. Shei
was arrested Dec. 5 by thdt
political police.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 January 1973
tin America gaiyi
on ,U.S. envoy )
56
By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
the Christian Science Monitor
Latin Americans .are casting somewhat
" wary glances at Washington these days over
the imminent vacancy in the State Depart-
ment's top Latin-American post.
At a time when United States-Latin.'
American relations are none too warm, one ofi
the few bright spots in the relationships, as
far as Latin Americans are concerned, has
,been the role of Charles Appleton Meyer, who ,
currently occupies the post as assistant:
Secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs.
Mr. Meyer is held in warm esteein through-1
; out the hemisphere, in rather sharp contrast.,
with most of the post's previous occupants.
, A onetime Sean, Roebuck executive, Mr.
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' Meyer's resignation was not uhexpected. NEW YORK TIMES
, When he took the job in 1969, he did to with 10 January 1973 ?
the understanding ,that he would stay only.
1.
four years and then return to business. ;
'. Actually Mr. 'Meyer has held the post
. longer than anyone else since,it was created
? after World War II. For a long time, the .
? assistant secretary's job looked something
like a revolving door, with one occupant after,
another serving a few months and then ,
resigning. " - .
, The fact that Mr. Meyer remained in the ;
post as long as he did impressed' Latin .
:Americans. But it was his way of dealing with ;
thorn that impressed them the Most.
Fluent in Spanish, he has enjoyed the role
, of a personal diplomat ? which was impor-
tant in a period of "low profile" adopted by
President Nixon, who is personally not too
warmly received by Latin Americans. Many,
Latin Americans equate the, "low profile"
strategy as a euphemism for a do-nothing
Throughout the past four years, Mr. Meyer
was able to get across the message that he, at"
least, cared about Latin America ? and this /
proved of tremendous value in many hemi;
sphere conferences where he was able to tone
'down Latin-American criticism of United'
States policy. ? ? ?
Now the Latin Americans are wondering
just who will take over the post and what the
new occupant will do for relations between
the United States and thd rest of. the.
:hemisphere.
"We're none too hopeful, given the past.
, record of assistant secretaries and the lack of
interest President Nixon has shown for this
,part of the world," a leading Latin-American,
diplomat in Washington said. "But then we do
, have the record of Charlie 'Meyer ? and so
perhaps there is some reason for hope."
A number of names have been mentioned.
Joseph S. Farland, onetime ambassador to
Panama, and John M. Hennessy, an inter-.
national affairs , specialist at the Treasury
, Department, are most frequently suggested;
;as top candidates for the post.
But all indications suggest the White House,
has not made a decision and indeed, in the
Mew of several Latin Americans in Washing.:,
,ton, there is a feeling that the post could go:
vacant for some months before being filled, if
past performance is a criterion. Mr. Meyer, 1
for example, was not tapped for the job until:.
,Several months after Mr. Nixon's first in-
;auguration.
There will be other changes in the Latin- NEW yopg TIMES,
,American team at the State Department.
John Crimmins and Robert A. Hurwitch, the ?
razil Bans Sale of
Picasso's Erotic Prin
tion between the two." Miss
Soares saia.
Brazil's television programs,
she said, were much worse in
, their way but the censors neg-
By MARVINE HOWE
Special to The New York TImes
RIO DE JANEIRO, Jan. 9=--
Brazil has banned the sale of,
Picasso's erotic engravings in
what appears to be a new wave
of eultUral puritanism.
Brazilian intellectuals I ex-
pressed general dismay today
over the Government's action,
Which they felt would only tar-
nish this country's image
abroad.
There ihas been increasingi
concern here over official cen-
sorship of the arts. Rip de
'Janeiro's leading daily, .Jornal
do Brasil, published a devastat-
ing report Sunday .on culturall
censorship.
The ban on the Picasso prints
by the federal police follows
the seizure of the Christmas
Issue of Playboy and refusal to
authorize the sale of Playboy's
new magazine, Oui.
Bookstores Surprised
' The Picasso engravings are
'Contrary to public morals and
good behavior," according to
the Ministry of Justice.
This judgment came as sur-
prise to bookstores where the
$5 Picasso portfolios 'have been
on sale for three years.
"It's absurd and ridiculous
and 'quite incomprehensible,"
'said Dilze Soares, a leader` of
1Brazil's erotic-surrealist school
lof painting.
Miss Soares, who is known
as Zama, said that she had
had no trouble with the censors
'but-that. other members of het
school had' not been allowed to
, exhibit their works in Belo Hor-
izonte on the, ground that the
paintings were a threat to the
traditions of the family.
."The erotic is part of nature;
pornography is a human inter-
pretation and I make a distinc-
I lected "that kind of commercial
pornography that isn't even ar-
*tistic."
Movies have been hard hit by
censors, according to Jornal do
Brasil. New political films, par-
ticularly from Italy, pa well as
flims from the United States,
based, on sex and violence,
were threatened here.
, Recent banned films ?include
Stanley Kubrick's "A Clock-
work Orange," Michelangelb
Antonioni's "Zabriskie Point,"
Pier Paolo Pasolim's "Decam,ehr
on" and Ken Russell's "The
Devils." Other films have been
released after heavy cuts.
In 1971, censors prohibited
the showing of 35 films-13
Brazilian and 22 foreign?for
'containing "matter subversive
or contrary to public morals
and good behavior."
There has been an increase
in censorship in the theater,
according to a successful play-
wright and director, ? Flavio
Rangel.
"The censors want to reform
humanity and so they exert a
dual action, preventing any
analysis of 'the Bra'?iliari situa-
tion and exerting an excessive
control over morals," Mr. Ran-
gel said in an interview.
. The ban on the Picasso en-
gravings did not surprise Rio's
artistic community, which is
becoming accustomed to the
rigors of censorship, the play-
wright said. He said that last
year censors banned a poster
of a. painting by Michelangelo.
Book publishers also testify
fb new intimidation by censors.
Most publishers prefer not to
invest time and money in
works that run the risk of be-
ing seized for political or erot-
ic content.
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 1973
Iwo top aides to Mr. Meyer, are expected to
'receive ambassadorial appointments.
The new team members, headed by who-
ever is named to succeed Mr. Meyer, are, UNITED MATINS, N.Y., Jan.
Important. But Latin Americans also watch
16 ? The Security Council de-
with interest for signs of Latin America being.
cided today to hold a series of
' accorded a greater priority in the White ,meetings in Panama City begin-
House. Despite past promises that Latin , ning March 15 on matters con-
America is top on the White House list, most cerning Latin America.
hemisphere diplomats say that this has not The action was taken with-
proved to be the case, out a formal vote and despite
? Over the long pull, improved trade rela- , serious reservations expressed
lions and increased economic aid are, in the by the United States and Brit-
' View of Latin Americans, the key to better lain. Neither, however, was pre-
pared to exercise its veto to
relations between the United States and the block what was clearly the will
rest of the hemisphere. Still, they ate very "of the 15a. ember betty.
hecretary post. Approved i-or Kele5r 2attirdft.ocokbotop
Concerned about who occupies the asalstant
?IV? ounct o o to i
anama n
4 I By ROBERT ALDEN
. Special to The New York Times
said he did not feel it was wise
of the Council, in the event of
a sudden world emergency, to
be separated from its base, its
records, its communications and
other facilities unless (her were
, other overriding reasons.
These reasons do not exist
in the case of the proposed
meetings in Panama City, Sir
Colin said.
Strong support for the Pana-
manian proposal came from the
Soviet Union, France, China,
Guinea, Peru, India, Keny,i the
Sudan, Yugoslavia and Indone-
sia.
The United Staes was part.
WYMNYeigetittrimitf.
't7 ' I F7,1777177r777r71-77,77.7.7"TrPr1717T "
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Sion ordisapproval of the hold-
ing of the meetings in Panama
City, Since it will bring about
what is expected to be abra-
sive airing in a hostile atmo-
sphere , of the dispute between
Panama and the United States
over the matter of the Panama
Canal Zone.
Aquilino E. Boyd of Panama,
who extended the invitation
for the meetings in Panama,
said today that a "semi - co-
lonial" situation existed in all
Of Latin America and that it
existed in particular Via "the
so-called Panama Canal zone"
where "a colonial situation di-
vides Panama into two parts
preventing the political, eco-
nomic and social integra-
tion" of his country.
?Mr.' Boyd called the zone "a
hotbedt of international ten-
Mons, where a dangerous sit-
:nation, potentially explosive,
,exists."
"Panama claims effective
Sovereignty and exclusive jur-
isdiction over the area in-
valved," he said. "A power
,foreign to the territory of Pan-
ama occupies the area and the,
:Council is needed to eliminate'
Iconflict" regarding the canal.
Speaking for the United
States, George H. Bush replied
that it was essential for the
proper functioning of the
Council that? a meeting not be
conceived as a means for
bringing pressure on bilateral
Issues not currently before the
Council.
, "Ambassador Boyd," Mr.
Rush said, "has raised such
an issue in mentioning the Pan-
ama Canal, the status of which
Is under active bilateral nego-
tiations. With due reference to
the history of the area and
the issues, we, of course, do
not accept the contention that
the Canal Zone is an 'inner
colonialist enclave."
Mr. Bush recalled that mem-
bers of the Council had earlier
expressed concern about hold-
ing meetings where public opin-
ion could affect the work of
the Council.
"In this case, it is already
evident that the prospect of
this meeting is stimulating a
heated propaganda campaign In
Panama, which will not be con-
ducive to the kind of atmos-
phere needed for Security
iCouncil meetings or be helpful
for the future course of bilat-
eral negotiations," he said.
Meetings of the Security
Council away from United Na-
tions headquarters in New York
,have been rare. In 1948 and
,again in 1951 meetings were
held in Paris, concurrently with
the General Assembly, which
Was also in session there.
Early last year, the Council,
Met in Addis .Ababa to discuss
matters of concern to Africa
.as the result of an invitatioo
ifrom the Organization of ,Aft-i.
can Unity. .
LONDON OBSERVER
7 January 1.713
le run by computpr
tat
by NIGEL HAWKES, our Science Correspondent
;THE FIRST computer system puter's analysis. Any anomalies , Although the control room
designed to Control an entire can quickly be detected and was then incomplete, the Gov-
economy has been secretly
brought into operation in Chile.
The system has been designed
for Chile's Marxist Government
by a British management expert,
Mr Stafford Beer, a former Re-
search Director of the Inter-
' national Publishing Corporation
corrected by issuing instructions ernment was able to use the
to the industrial sector invelved, system to see clearly what was
Mr Beer was asked to hell; happening and to work out the
Chile by the young Minister of effects of possible anti-strike
measures. The computers also
Finance,. Sr Fernando Flores,
work. He. showed that there were more
an admirer of his
jumped at the chance of putting United States dollars floating
his ?ideas into practice, after about in the economy than there
, and president of the Operations . years of official neglect in s iou d have beeu?evldence of
Research-Society. For the past Britain. By June last year, he a still-flqurishing black market
'e in dollars.
year he has been commuting says, 60 ' per Cent of Chile's .
between London and Santiago economy was being monitored Although no public innounce-
, to advise the Chileans on the iby the system. i ment of the system has been
design of the system.' - The computers used are made, its existence was dis-
. This is the first time that American IBM 360 machines, closed last week by dn under-
'futuristic schemes for control- plus some French and British ground science newsletter,Lddies, published in London.
ling a country's economy by hardware. At its simplest level, Mr Beer, somewhat taken aback
computer have been put into the system provides up-to-date d
operation. The system has been information about how the at the isclosure, says he will
assembled in some secrecy so as Chilean economy is performing. be giving further details of the
to avoid opposition charges of ...Production figures are fed into system in a lecture in. Brighton
. I
Big Brother" tactics, the computer on a daily rota, next month.He is trying haid to avoid the
The system works by gather- so economic Ministers always charge that the system is elitist
fag information daily from have at their fingertip i rma-
nfo
. . . or technocratic by trying to
1 Y Y ? >
'Chile's. factories. ? and, Copper .the industrial data used by the
mines, and processing it in a' Treasury Treasury in making decisions
'central, ' control room ' hi
-- are eight months old/ -
Satniago. , The; inforniation . The system also . makes it
.reaching the central Vro ? om . is possible to test economic
processed through the 'computer policies by feeding them into
t6 work ' ' Out ' riutomaticaff i the computer and watching their
whether' production.: in I any T. effects on the screens. This has
sector of the economy has varied ..4 already paid off, Mr Beer says,
significantly from iire-Set nerres. in. the recent " bosses' strike,'
,Itt I the Iteintrial ' foorti; Chile'Cluriiett, Owners of lorries tried to
,bdinititniq Controllers watch. pro. I bring' the country to . a halt in
jectors and visual, displays ,that, protest against the Government's
show the Aiming' of - the VeaPt-- 'itolicies.
58
Approved For ReleaSe 2001108/07 : al
?
develop ways in which ordinary
people can use it. Whether it
will work is perhaps a more
valid criticism?similar systems
on a much V smaller scale in in-
dustry have varied enormously
in effectiveness, from highly
efficient to almost useless. And
Chile,Aespite the idealism of its
Government, is scarcely the
idyl laboratory for testing Dr
"Beer's ideas exposed as it is to
unfriendly influences from the
113S, the multinational corpora-
tions and the World Bank.
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