SENATE RESOLUTION 404 - SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION TO ESTABLISH A SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE POLICY
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August 24, 2001
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14
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Publication Date:
September 17, 1974
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UNCLASSIefewed F(DeRign01/08/30 : CIA-RDP7N0011MODIUM0014-2 J SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
Legislative Counsel
7D43
EXTENSION
6121
NO.
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1 . i
Acting Director
7/kb
4-/
For your signature, the interim
reply to Chairman Stennis in
response to his request for our
comments on S. Res. 404,
introduced by Senator Mondale,
which would establish a select
committee in the Senate on
intelligence policy.
We are coordinating with OGC
to formulate an Agency position
on the bill.
eo ge L. Cary
Legislative Counsel
STATINTL
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S 16742 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE September 17, 1974
paid from the contingent fund of the Sen-
ate upon vouchers approved by the chair-
man of the select committee.
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I can
only describe as unbelievable the Presi-
dent's statements last night concerning
the role of the CIA in Chile. His state-
ment that the United States was spend-
ing $11 million for the purpose of pre-
serving the opposition democratic ele-
ments, including the newspapers and
electronic media, from being suppressed
by the Allende government was wholly
unconvincing. I can only conclude, with
great sadness, that after only a month in
office, President Ford is headed down the
same road toward a credibility gap that
has ruined the Presidency of too many
of his predecessors. ?
When will the leaders of the executive
branch of this Government realize that
the American people and the Congress
and the press will no longer tolerate hog-
wash as a response to legitimate ques-
tions about the behavior of the U.S.
Government, either at home or
abroad. There is nothing in the record
of the previous administration, nor of
the CIA, for that matter, which lends
credence to the cover story perpetrated
last night at the President's press con-
ference.
If we are so concerned about the exist-
ence of opposition elements and the pres-
ervation of democracy in Chile, do we
now have a program to help support the
democratic politicians and Journalists
who have now been muzzled, banned, and
jailed?
Has' the Forty Cominittee taken this
issue up? How many millions of dollars
are they now spending to "destabilize"
the military Junta in Chile?
Mr. President, I doubt that a dime is
being spent to restore democracy in
Chile; just as not a penny is being spent
to support the opposition elements in
Saigon, who might provide a viable al-
ternative to both the depredations of the
Vietcong and the oppression of the Thieu
regime.
Mr. President, we have been battling
for 2 years to restore public control over
secret operatives in the White House. It
is now clear that we also must restore
public control over foreign policy. Our
foreign relations can no longer be han-
dled by a handful of elitists in the Cen-
? tral. Intelligence Agency and the State
Department, who are no longer mindful
of the basic values and traditions of the
United States and whose main qualifi-
cation is that they hold an exotic secu-
rity clearance.
President Ford drew attention last
night to the fact that the Forty Commit-
tee has been in existence since 1948.
That may well be the most compelling
argument for it to be drastically over-
hauled.
In 1948, the United States and its
Western Allies were in the midst of the
Berlin Airlift; the Czechoslovakian Gov-
ernment had fallen to Communist sub-
version. The Communist were spending
. huge sums to win elections in Italy. There
was a clear and present need in the
United States to be able to respond to
the covert operations of the Soviet
Union.
We undertook those operations reluc-
tantly: not because we were anxious to
compete with the villany being per-
petrated at the time by the Stalinist re-
gime in the Soviet Union, but because we
held the basic values of democracy and
freedom to be worth fighting for against
Soviet tyranny.
Now, however, we find that these op-
erations have taken on a life of their
own; regardless of changes in the rela-
tions with the Soviet Union; of the de-
clining ideological attractiveness of So-
viet communism and of the painful
lesson that we are not the world's police-
man. The CIA's covert activities have not
declined. The number of operatives that
it employs does not seem to have di-
minished. Is it a mindless bureaucracy,
fulfilling itself by seeking out democratic
regimes to topple, undermine, subvert
and co-opt? Or is it an irresistible temp-
tation for Presidents and their advisors?
who, after all, bear the real respon-
sibility for covert operations?
There is a legitimate role for the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and even for
some select covert operations. There is a
requirement to gather intelligence on
threats directly affecting the physical
security of the United States. It is nec-
essary to protect our war plans, to con-
duct counterintelligence operations and
monitor arms control agreements. But
on the level of political action, the long
history of covert Operations, from the
Bay of Pigs through the Phoenix Assas-
sination program in Vietnam, in Chile
and in Greece, the record of America's
use of covert operations is a shameful
failure.
But the Central Intelligence Agency
must not become a scapegoat. It needs to
clean house, but the fact that it is di-
rected against democratic regimes can
only be rectified by house cleaning at a
higher level.
The real responsibility for the perver-
sion of the CIA and its functions must lie
with the political leadership that directs
It. Indeed, with the Forty Committee it-
self and its principals and, with the
President of the United States.
The issues that have been raised by
the revelation about Chile and Greece,
are whether our foreign policy reflects
and pursues the basic values of this Na-
tion; and whether these values are being
subverted by the way intelligence opera-
tions are managed and supervised.
The American people will no longer
tolerate violations of the Constitution in
regard to domestic affairs; it will not let
the fog of national security protect male-
factors and break ins, bugging and other
operations which are contrary tO what
this Nation stands for. It is now time that
we had a thorough examination of the
operation of our foreign intelligence
agencies, how they are controlled and co-
ordinated, how they support Govern-
ment decisionmaking. At the same time,
we have to expose the policies these op-
erations are designed to carry out. We
need to find a better way for Congress to
be involved in decisions relating to intel-
ligence activities, and to establish legal
and legislative safeguards in order that
the intelligence operations conducted
abroad do not disgrace us here at home.
For this reason, Mr. President, I gm,
today, submitting a proposal for a special
committee of the Senate which is de-
signed to examine these issues and return
within 24 months with proposals to the
Senate of the United States on possible
reforms in the organization, structure,
and political control of our overseas in- ,
ligence operations.
Many resolutions and proposals have
been submitted to the Senate on this
issue. Almost all of them propose certain
answers to the questions that I have
raised here today. I do not claim to have
these answers. All I know is that there
Is a very serious problem. Because of the
secrecy that surrounds these issues, it is
not even possible to tell whether the over-
sight function of Congress has, in fact,
been working well or poorly. The juris-
diction over the intelligence operations
is scattered among four separate com-
mittees dealing with Armed Services and
Appropriations in the House and Sen-
ate?but completely unresponsive to the
Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs
Committees of the Congress. Clearly,
what is required is a new special body,
with membership from both Armed Serv-
ices and Foreign Relations, as well as
membership outside of those bodies,
which can dig into the urgent issues of
what our overseas intelligence operations
are for, how they are managed, and how
they can really serve the American
people.
The Select Committee will not take on
the functions of the existing oversight
committees; they will continue to per-
form their present tasks. The purpose of
the Select Committee will be to prepare
a report so that Congress can act to make
necessary reforms and correct deficien-
cies and abuses.
Mr. President, in the earlier part of
this century, there was.. a Secretary of
State who abolished foreign intelligence
gathering operations with the smug re-
mark that "gentlemen don't read other
people's mail." Everyone can agree that
this remark is naive. But embarking on
vital intelligence-gathering activities
and, even some covert action, to counter
real threats to our security is a long way
from the kind of mindless hooliganism
and wholesale intervention that have re-
cently come to light. That only under-
mines necessary intelligence activities.
The time has arrived for the American
people, through their representatives
and in the context of necessary security
requirements, to pursue relentlessly the
truth of our overseas intelligence opera-
tions. Because of the nature of these
activities, we cannot simply spread
everything out on the public record. Peo-
ples, lives, literally, can be at stake. But
this does not mean that our representa-
tive form of government cannot deal with
these issues. Indeed, it is one reason for
representative form of government?so
that the people's elected officials can per-
form functions that would not be possible
by the people at large.
If we fail to take this step, if we fail
to bring our overseas intelligence opera-
tions and, indeed, our foreign policy
under domestic control, we will not only
be failing our trust, but we will become
party to undermining the basic values
or which this great country stands.
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eittber 17, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN
upli notification when he deter-
ter due notice and opportunity for
rig on the record, that the entity has
Into compliance with such criteria.
Whenever an ?facer or agency of the
Slatea receives notification from the
tnry that a federally recognized ap-
Ping entity fails to meet the criteria pre-
/bed by the Secretary, he shall, until such
lineation is rescinded, discontinue re-
ince on each entity's approval or accred!-
Alan of postsecondary educational institu-
fens or programs, but Institutions and pro-
trams wa ieh such an entity has approved
br a.ccredited prior to receipt of such noti-
ncation may (In the discretion of the de-
partment or agency) continue to be con-
sidered to be recognized through the end
of the cu :Tent enrollment period.
(a) During the period that subsection (b)
is applicahle to an approving entity, and
the Secreeary determines there in no other
nationally recognized approving entity quali-
fied to approve the institutions formerly
approved by such approving entity, he shall
appoint an advisory committee, composed
of persons specially qualified to evaluate
education provided by postsecondary insti-
tutions formerly approved by such entity,
wbich shall prescribe the standards of
content, scope, and quality which must be
met in order to qualify such institutions to
participate in programs in the area with
respect to which such approving entity
operated..
Sec. 8. :rf the Secretary determines, after
affording due notice and opportunity for a
heaxing, that (1) a student who is pursuing
a program of postsecondary education with
the assistance of a student loan which is
guaranteed by the United States has been
denied the primary educational benefits for
which the loan, was obtained by reason of
the insolvency of the institution or its
failure to provide the education or training
stipulated in an agreement between th
student and the institution, and (2) in t
case of a denial of such benefits by an in
tution eligible after the establishment
criteria under section 6, the Secretary
tertnines that such institution shoul ot
have been eligible under the standa of
the federally recognized approving My
which approved or accredited the titu-
tion, the United States shall (A) fo e the
student of any obligation to repay e loan
and loan ..nterest when the Uni States
is the holder of the roan, and ( pay any
other holder of the loan any ount due
on the loan if it releases the dent from
further obligation to repay loan, and
(C) pay to the student an a nt equal to
an payments he may have on the loann
This section shall apply ?cases of in--
solvency and in cases of ure to provide
stipulated education o training which'
occur less than live ye after enactment
of this Act.
SEC. 9. Section 553 o le 5, United States
Code, shall apply to romulgation of cri-
teria by the Secre , and sections 554
thrcrugh 553 of such. e shall apply to pro-
ceedings under sect 8.
SEC. 10. The ary shall publish bian-
nually in the Fed 1 Register a list showing
the following:
(1) The app ing entities which our-.
rently meet riteria established by the
Secretary pur: 'nt to section 6.
(2) The econdary educational insti-
tuticms whe e approved or accredited by
such appro entities including a particu-
larization y the departments or courses of
study wh are approved or accredited at
the instit oils.
(3) T institutions which have lost ap-
proval screditation and those whose ap-
plicati or approval or accreditation were
not
Sec. 11. IL is the sense of the Congress that
the several latatea should enact for th
approval or accreditation of p tseconda
educational institutions and thorizatio
to grant degrees. awn taws (.1 establ
standards for approving eat es that w
insure proper busineas pzoc within
industry and could utilize 1 legisIatio
plans and the wealth of cent study
drafting staaues for thin urpose.
FEDERAL CO OL
SEC. 12. Section 432 o General Educ
tion provisions Act is ended by inser
after "the Emergency hool Aid Act;"
following: "the Pori econdary Educe i
Consumer Protection ct of 1974;".
ADDITIONAL C PONSORS OF BILLS
A
Sep.
AND JOIN RESOLUTIONS
. 3234
f Mr. HUMPHREY, the
orida (Mr. CHILES) VMS
ponsor of S. 3234, a bill
vigorous Federal program
and development to assure
on of solar energy as a major
our national energy needs, to
r the development of suitable
s for rapid commercial use of
hnology and to establish an Of-
ar Energy Research in the U.S.
the request of Mr. Jonwsrow, the
tor from Hawaii (Mr. Fonc) was
d as a cosponsor of S. 3234, supra.
his own request, the Senator from
LTOna, (Mr. GOLDWATER) was added as
cosponsor of S. 3234, supra.
S. 3941
At the request of Mr. Domaxicr, the
Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER)
was added as a cosponsor of S. 3941, a
bill to authorize payment for one com-
prehensive physical examination per
year for each person enrolled in medi-
care.At the ram
Senator fro
added as a
to authoriz
of researc
the utiliz
source fs
provide
lucent
solo.
flee
Gov ment.
S. 3981
At the request of Mr. HELMS, the Sen-
ator from Mississippi (Mr. STEMS'S) was
added as a cosponsor of S. 3981, to limit
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
of the United States and of the district
courts to enter any judgment, decree,
or order, denying or restricting, as un-
constitutional, voluntary prayer in any
public school.
SENATE RESOLUTION 403?ORIGI-
NAL RESOLUTION REPORTED AU-
THORIZING SUPPLEMENTAL EX-
PENDITIMES BY 11-ini COMMIlenhei
ON THE JUDICIARY
(Referred to the Committee on Rules
and Administration.)
Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee
on the Judiciary, reported the following
resolution:
S. RES. 403
Resolved, That Senate Resolution 255, 93d
Congress, agreed to March 1, 1974, as amend-
ed by Senate Resolution 858 of that Con-
gress, agreed to August 22, 1974, Is further
amended as follows:
(1) In section 2, strike out "$4,085,500"
and insert in lieu thereof $4,141,600".
(2) In section 3, strike out "$377,800" and
insert In lieu thereof "$433,900." and "$5,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$433,900" and
"$25,000", respectively.
PILE
S 167
SENATE RESOLUTION 404?SUBMIS-
SION OF A RESOLUTION TO ES-
TABLISH A SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE POLICY
Referred to the, Committee on Armed
Seevices.)
Mr. MONDALE submitted the follow-
ing resolution:
S. RBS. 404
Whereas, revelations concerning the role
of foreign intelligence operations of the
United States Govermnent in undermining
the stability of democratically elected gov-
ernments have raised serious questions con-
cerning the management, policies and pur-
poses of United States intelligence opera-
tions and their compatibility with the au-
thority of the Congress and the values of the
American people: Now therefore be it
Resolved by the Senate. That?
:3E0=0H 1. There is hereby established. a
select committee of the Senate, which may
be called, for convenience of expression, the
Steect Committee on Intelligence Policy.
J3C. 2. The select committee created by
tins resolution shall consist of 15 Members
of the Senate, composed of three majority
and two minority members of the Commit-
tee on Armed Services, three majority and
teat minority members of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and three majority and
two minority Members of the Senate, to be
selected In the same manner as the Chair-
man and members of the Standing Commit-
tees of the Senate. For the purposes of para-
graph 6 rule XXV of the Standing Rules of
the Senate, service of a Senator as a member,
chairman, or vice-chairman of the select
committee shall not betaken into account.
SEC. 3. The select committee is authorized
and directed to examine past, present and
projected intelligence operations and policies
of the United States Government, and to de-
termine the role of such operations in sup-
porting the decision-making of the United
States Government, and the impact of such
operations on national security and the con-
duit of foreign policy. The select committee
shall melte an interim report to the appro-
priate committee of the Senate not later than
Jinn 30, 1975, and shall make final report
findings
not later than January 31, 19 Such finet
report shall contain the find of the Com-
mittee together with recommendations re-
specting the management of intelligence op-
erations within the Executive branch, the
appropriate role of Congress, the appropriate
function of varying types of intelligence ac-
tivities, and recommendations requesting any
appropriate legislative action.
SEC. 4. Ti) enable the select committee to
make the investigation and study authorized
and directed by this resolution, the Senate
hereby empowers the select committee as
an egency of the Senate to employ and fix
the compensatioh of such clerical, investiga-
tory, legal, technical, and other assistants
as It deems necessary or appropriate: to sit
and act at any time or place during sessions,
recessescand adjournment periods of the
Sen itei to hold hearings for taking testi-
mony on oath or to receive documentary or
phy ;real evidence (including classified infor-
mation respecting clandestine operations,
which shall be made available to the select
committee and senior staff designated by
the select committee) relating to the mat-
ters it is authorized to investigate and study;
and to expend to the extent it determines
necessary or appropriate any money made
available to it by the Senate to perform
the dunes and exercise the powers conferred
upon it by this resolution and to make the
inveatigation and study it is authorized by
this resolution to make.
Svc. 5. The expenses of the select commit-
tee under this resolution shall not exceed
$750,000 per annum. Such expenses shall be
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