THE PRESENT AND FUTURE ROLE OF CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP76B00952R000100020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 224
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 25, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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25 August i965
A. At the outset in long range planning for the Central
Intelligence Agency it is necessa,:y to examine its present and future
responsibilities, bearing in mind that while the National Security Act
of 1947 which created the Agency describes certain functions for the
organization, the evolution of the intelligence community, the changing
roles and responsibilities of other departments and agencies and the
creation of new agencies have all served to affect the activities of the
CIA. It is equally important to CIA's planning that there be clear under-
standing within the U. S. Government of the Agency's responsibility and
authority. It is therefore believed essential that the Agency continue
and intensify efforts to brief selected Congressmen and Congressional
staff members, taking into account their continuing and special interests
and- including discussions of CIA's functions and responsibilities in
general. Such briefings should also be initiated for the Executive Branch
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of the Government, including particularly such policy groups as the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. While it is realized
that the DCI must carry the principal burden in briefing U. S. Govern-
anent officials, greater use of second echelon officers of CIA, as feasib':o,
would increase the scope of the Agency's efforts in this area without
increasing the Director's already heavy schedule.
11 War Planning
A. The role of the CIA in wartime is not fully understood or
accepted by the member agencies of the United States Intelligence Board
(USIB). In 1957, the National Security Council instructed the Director
of Central Pntelligence to proceed with the development of war plans for
the intelligence conununity. The Director took the position that it would
be necessary first to develop directives governing peacetime arrange-
ments. During the ensuing two years, various National Security Council
Intelligence Directives defining foreign intelligence responsibilities of
the USIB member agencies were published. In 1959 the Emergency
Planning Steering Committee (never formally constituted or recognized
by the USIB) initiated a study which was concerned largely with emergency
relocation-only one facet of war planning. The Committee ceased to
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function when the Board reached an impasse on the intelligence advisory
role of the DCI to the President during wartime.
B The CIA Act of 1947 makes no distinction between the
peacetime and the wartime roles of the DCX or the Agency. The At:t.
provides all of the authority needed by the A -envy for the pursuit of
wartime activities. Positive assertion of existing statutory authority
rare of a CIA war plan is needed. Subsequent planning should
integrate the wartime roles of the USIB member agencies.
C Paragraph 8 of National Security Council Intelligence
Directive 5 and the Command Relationships Agreement (between the
T)CI and the Secretary of Defense) place the Agency's forces operating
in or from an active theatre of war under the command of the Theatre
Commander. The Theatre Commander would be under the operational
control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
D. Relationships between CIA Headquarters and the military
command structure in time of war have not been defined. As matters
now stand, CIA would tend to lose its forces located in an active theatre
of war and would be without any plan of action for the wartime operation
of the remainder of the Agency. It is imperative that CIA clarify its
mission in war and its relations with the Department of Defense.
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The Agency is small in size as compared to the military.
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Its real worth is based upon qualitative characteristics and a quick
reaction capability. Being irregular and unorthodox by nature, its
activities and capabilities are understood little by the millary. Its
field components cannot operate effectively without the resources and
guidance of CIA Headquarters.
The DCI and Warning
A. As Chairman of USIB, the DCI is the senior intelligence
officer concerned with warning. The USIB's formal intelligence warning
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mechanism--the Watch Committee and its staff, the National Indications
Center--reports to USIB by the terms of DCID 1/5 and the Chairman of
the Watch Committee is designated by the PCI after consultation with
USIB We have dealt with early warning in a separate monograph else-
where in this plan.
IV Intelligence Production
A The Agency's role in the production of intelligence has
been quite well established in most areas, both by law and by directive,
as being charged with the production of national intelligence. In some
areas of intelligence production this is more specifically established
than in others, and therefore in planning It is important that it be.
firmly established in all areas where the Agency must make major
commitments. In this regard the National Security Act of 1947 states,
"(b) for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence
activities of the several Government departments and
agencies in the interest of national security, it shall be
the duty of the Agency, under the direction of 'the
National Security Council--(3) to correlate and evaluate
intelligence relating to the national security, and provide
for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence
within the Government using where apprppriate existing
agencies and facilities. ".
What this says in simpli?st modern-day terms is that the Agency is
charged with producing national intelligence.
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specifically Messrs Kirkpatrick and Cline for the Agency and
B The responsibility for the production of National Intel-
ligence Estimates has been clearly established by common practice over
the years and is spelled out in DCID 1/ 1. This is one of the most important
important responsibilities of the Agency and has created for the United
States Government a document of incalculable value in which the greatest
objectivity of the intelligence system provides the policymaker with the
top intelligence viewpoint. Its integrity should be preserved at all costs
in the interests of national security, most particularly the responsibility
of an independent agency for its production.
C. The responsibility for national current intelligence is
less clearly established by directive although it appears that there is a
clear understanding with DIA as to the division of responsibilities. In
the negotiations conducted in 1962 and 1963 between the Agency and DIA,
duced departmental current intelligence while CIA produced national
current intelligence. However, this has not been inscribed in any direc-
tive and this should be done at an early date in order to insure logical
for DIA, a clear understanding was reached that DIA pro-
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organizational development both within the Agency and the Department
of Defense that will implement the agreement,
D The Foreign Missiles and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC)
was established by the DCI as a means of meeting his statutory
responsibilities under the National Security,Act of 1947 to correlate.and
intelligence relating to national security and to provide appropriate
evaluate/dissemination of such intelligence within the Government.
Mr McCone expressed the view that his authority to form such an
organization was clear and he felt there was no need for supporting
documents--i. e., NSCIDs and DCID.s No additional action is believed
necessary at this time.
The production of -national economic intelligence on
specified areas of the world was established as a CIA responsibility by
letter from General Walter Bedell Smith to Secretary of State
Dean Acheson. This was formally, delineated. in DCID 3/1 which assigns
to CIA primary responsibility. for the production of economic intelligence
on the Communist countries. The DCI in March-of this year advisedthe
Secretary of State that he found it.necessary to develop within CIA a
limited capability for economic analysis on non-Communist countries as
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well. In the fields of military-economic intelligence CIA has also under-
taken to supplement intelligence produced elsewhere in order to provide
essential contributions to National Intelligence Estimates on military
questions and to provide the support required by the Director of Central
Intelligence in carrying out his responsibilities to the President.
Research relating to the cost and resource impact of foreign military
and space programs has been recognized by the Department of Defense
as a primary responsibility of CIA. Finally, the coordination of economic
intelligence is carried out through the Economic Intelligence Committee,
chaired by a representative of the Central Intelligence Agency in accord-
ance with DCID 3/ 1.
F The responsibility for the production of national basic
intelligence as typified by the National Intelligence Surveys is clearly
established and is specified in NSCID 3, paragraph la, b, dc, d, and e.
However, there is considerable duplication of effort in the broad area
of basic intelligence, since each community organization produces intel-
ligence for different purposes and can clearly establish that their product
is not identical with the National Intelligence Surveys and within the
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military area basic intelligence is often produced under contract from
non-intelligence components. Basic intelligence research and produc-
tion is therefore an area in which there is considerable uncor rolled and
uncoordinated effort. It is recommended that in planning for the future
the entire area of basic intelligence, not just the production of National
Intelligence Surveys, be subjected to intensive scrutiny and clearly
delineated responsibilities be established in order to insure orderly
progress. While this is being done--it may take a matter of years--the
CIA should continue to carry the responsibility for the production of the
National Intelligence Surveys.
G. Present and future demands on the Director emphasize
the importance of completing the Agency's strategic base in research
by extending it in political intelligence. This is an area as critical as
it is difficult. It is a major challenge, but must be met if intelligence
is to match its findings in hostile capabilities with correlative insight
into intentions. In recent years the State Department has more and
more withdrawn from this'field and devoted its limited resources to
quick support of policy. The Agency does not have a "charter" for
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for political research and does not ask for one. There are gaps here
which must be filled in the national interest and CIA m;?ans to fill them.
H. Responsibility for the Agency's production of finished
intelligence on all foreign scientific and technical activities rests with
the Office of Scientific Intelligence under the authority of National
Security Council Intelligence Directive 3 and Director of Central Intel-
ligence Directives 3/3 for atomic energy, 3/4 for guided missiles and
astronautics, and 315 for other scientific and technical intelligence.
The pertinent citations in 1~?SCID 3 are contained in paragraph 7c ("the
CIA shall produce., .. scientific and technical intelligence as a service
of common concern") and 7d on atomic energy intelligence. DCID 3/3
and 3/4 both state in paragraph 2 that the production of intelligence on
the responsibility of all departments and agencies
atomic energy and guided missiles and astronautics is/represented on
the USIB. Paragraph 2a of DCID 3/5 reiterates paragraph 7c of
NSCID 3 that the CIA shall product scientific and technical intelligence
as a service of common concern "and as required to fulfill the statutory
responsibilities of the DCI. " Thus OSI produces intelligence in nearly
every phase of foreign military research and development consistent
with its manpower capabilities and external research facilities.
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V. National Reference Services
A. Over the years CIA has developed certain national intel.
I!Zence reference services required for independent intelligence produc-
tion by the Agency in direct support of the DCI, to support assigned
intelligence- responsibilities and to provide services of common support
to the community. Likewise, the simultaneous development of
reference services by each of the USIB intelligence organizations would
be costly, duplicative, and unnecessary. This is an area where the
attention of the DCI is needed in order to reach agreement with the
military agencies and the Department of State as to the responsibility
for the development and maintenance of national intelligence reference
services of common concern. It is also clear that this Agency's ability
to cope with its own immediate needs for information handling, much
less to move toward a more centralized community effort, will depend
heavily, if not entirely, upon the use of automatic data processing tech-
niques, The Agency's future need for automatic d sta processing is,,
therefore, given special emphasis later on in this plan.
The Central Intelligence Agency now has firmly established
its responsibility for the maintenance of a national reference service in
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the field of biographic intelligence dealing with all foreign personalities
outside of the military field. This is an important service and should
be maintained. Its charter is DCID 1/9.
C. The CIA also has an established national intelligence
reference service responsibility in the field of the acquisition and
indexing of foreign documents. This is prescribed in DCID 2/4 and is one
D While CIA's library and substantive intelligence files
are at the present time used more extensively by other agencies than
by CIA--and this is as it should be-.this is nevertheless one area where
centralization and coordination can achieve savings for the intelligence
community. With substantive intelligence documents entering the
system at a rate in excess of a million a month, it is obviously waste-
ful for each agency to plan to file the identical documents. On the other
hand, each agency obviously has the right to be able to retrieve imme-
diately documents on any subject which it may need. It is therefore
important that the DCI insist on the clear delineation of responsibility
in the intelligence system for the storage and retrieval of substantive
documents .
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Intelligence Collection
25
B. The Central Intelligence Agency by intent of Congress is
responsible for the conduct of Federally directed espionage and counter-
espionage on a world-wide basis. This has been directed in NSCID 5
which also provides that the armed services may pe.rticipate in clandes-
tine operations for departmental purposes provided that their efforts
are coordinated with the designated. representatives of the DCI. This
requirea?especial attention to the necessity for the security implications
of clandestinity.
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U 11
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19 August 1965
The Present and Future Role of CIA
1. In preparing any long-range plan for the Central Intelligence Agency
it is necessary to examine its present and future responsibilities, bearing
in mind that the National Security Act of 1947 which created the Agency
describes certain functions for the organization, the evolution of the
intelligence community, the changing roles and responsibilities of other
departments and agencies and the creation of new agencies have all served
to affect the activities of the CIA. It is equally important to CIA's
planning that there be clear understanding within the U.S. Government
of the Agency's responsibility and authority. It is therefore believed
essential that the Agency continue and intensify efforts to brief selected
Congressmen and Congressional staff members, taking into account their
continuing and special interests and including discussions of CIA's functions
and responsibilities in general. Such briefings should also be initiated for
the Executive Branch of the Government, including particularly such policy
groups as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. While it is
realized that the DCI must carry the principal burden in briefing U.S. Govern-
ment officials, greater use of second echelon officers of CIA, as feasible,
would increase the scope of the Agency's efforts in this area without
increasing the Director's already heavy schedule.
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War Planning
2. The role of the CIA in wartime is not fully understood or accepted
by the member agencies of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).
In 1957, the National Security Council instructed the Director of Central
Intelligence to proceed with the development of war plans for the Intelligence
Community. The Director took the position that it would be necessary first
to develop directives governing peacetime arrangements. During the ensuing
two years, various National Security Council Intelligence Directives defining
foreign intelligence responsibilities of the USIB member agencies were published.
In 1959 the Emergency Planning Steering Committee (never formally constituted
or recognized by the USIB) initiated a study which was concerned largely with
emergency relocation -- only one facet of war planning. The Committee
ceased to function when the Board reached an impasse on the intelligence
advisory role of the DCI to the President during wartime. The CIA Act of
19+7 makes no distinction between the peacetime and the wartime roles of'the
DCI or the Agency. The Act provides all of the authority needed by the Agency
for the pursuit of wartime activities. Positive assertion of existing statutory
authority in the form of a CIA war plan is needed. Subsequent planning should
integrate the wartime roles of the USIB member agencies. Paragraph 8 of
National Security Council Intelligence Directive 5 and the Command Relationships
Agreement (between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense) place the Agency's
forces operating in or from an active theatre of war under the command of the
Theatre Commander. The Theatre Commander would be under the operational
control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Relationships between CIA Headquarters
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and the military command structure in time of war have not been defined. As
matters now stand, CIA would lose its forces located in an active theatre
of war, and would be without any plan of action for the wartime operation of
the remainder of the Agency. The Agency is small in size as compared
to the military. Its real worth is based upon qualitative characteristics
and a quick reaction capability. Being irregular and unorthodox by nature,
its activities and capabilities are understood little by the military. Its
field components cannot operate effectively without the resources and guidance
25X1 of CIA Headquarters.
The DCI and Warning 25X1
3. As Chairman of USIB, the DCI is the senior intelligence officer
concerned with warning. The USIB's formal intelligence warning mechanism --
the Watch Committee and its staff, the National Indications Center -- reports
to USIB by the terms of DCID 1/5 and the Chairman of the Watch Committee is
designated by the DCI after consultation with USIB.
Intelligence Production
1+. The Agency's role in the production of intelligence has been quite
well established in most areas, both by law and by directive, as being charged
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with the production of national intelligence. In some areas of intelligence
production this is more specifically established than in others, and therefore
in planning it is important that it be firmly established in all areas where
the Agency must make major commitments. In this regard the National Security
Act of 19+7 states, "(b) for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence
activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest
of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction
of the National Security Council -- (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence
relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination
of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing
agencies and facilities."
5. The responsibility for the production of National Intelligence
Estimates has been clearly established by common practice over the years
and is spelled out in DCID 1/1. This is one of the most important responsibili-
ties of the Agency and has created for the United States Government a document
of incalculable value in which the greatest objectivity of the intelligence
system provides the policymaker with the top intelligence viewpoint. Its
integrity should be preserved at all costs in the interests of national
security, most particularly the responsibility of an independent agency for
its production.
6. The responsibility for national current intelligence is less clearly
established by directive, although it appears that there is a clear under-
standing with DIA as to the division of responsibilities. In the negotiations
conducted in 1962 and 1963 between the Agency and DIA, specifically
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Messrs. Kirkpatrick and Cline for the Agency and
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DIA, a clear understanding was reached that DIA produced departmental current
intelligence while CIA produced national current intelligence. However,
this has not been inscribed in any directive and this should be done at an
early date in order to insure logical organizational development both
within the Agency and the Department-of Defense.
7. The production of national economic intelligence on specified areas
of the world was established as a CIA responsibility by letter from General
Walter Bedell Smith to Secretary of State Dean Acheson. This was formally
delineated in DCID 3/1 which assigns to CIA primary responsibility for the
production of economic intelligence on the Communist countries. The DCI
in March of this year advised the Secretary of State that he found it
necessary to develop within CIA a limited capability for economic analysis
on non-Communist countries as well. In the fields of military-economic
intelligence CIA has also undertaken to supplement intelligence produced
elsewhere. in order to provide essential contributions to National
Intelligence Estimates on military questions and to provide the support
required by the Director of Central Intelligence in carrying out his
responsibilities to the President. Research relating to the cost and
resource impact of foreign military and space programs has been recognized
by the Department of Defense as a primary responsibility of CIA. Finally,
the coordination of economic intelligence is carried out through the
Economic Intelligence Committee, chaired by a representative of the Central
Intelligence Agency in accordance with DCID 3/1.
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8. The responsibility for the production of basic intelligence as
typified by the National Intelligence Surveys is clearly established and is
specified in NSCID 3, paragraph la, b, c, d, and e. However, there is
considerable duplication of effort in the broad area of basic intelligence,
since each Community organization produces intelligence for different purposes
and can clearly establish that their product is not identical.with the
National Intelligence Surveys. Basic intelligence research and production is
therefore an area in which there is considerable uncontrolled and uncoordinated
effort. It is recommended that in planning for the future the entire area of
basic intelligence, not just the production of National Intelligence Surveys,
be subjected to intensive scrutiny and clearly delineated responsibilities
be established in order to insure orderly progress. While this is being
done -- it may take a matter of years -- the CIA should continue to carry the
responsibility for the production of the National Intelligence Surveys.
National Reference Services
9. Over the years CIA has developed certain national intelligence
reference services required for independent intelligence production by the
Agency in direct support of the DCI, to support assigned intelligence
responsibilities and to provide services of common support to the Community.
This has been an expensive area as far as money and manpower is concerned and
with the information explosion already upon us will,, without proper attention
in the near future, consume a very large portion of Agency resources. Likewise,
the simultaneous development of reference services by each of the USIB
intelligence organizations would be costly, duplicative and unnecessary.
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This is an area where the attention of the DCI is needed in order to reach
agreement with the military agencies and the Department of State as to the
responsibility for the development and maintenance of national intelligence
reference services of common concern. It is also clear that this Agency's
ability to cope with its own immediate needs for information handling, much
less to move toward a more centralized Community effort, will depend heavily,
if not entirely, upon the use of automatic data processing techniques. The
Agency's future need for automatic data processing is therefore given special
emphasis later on in this plan.
10. The Central Intelligence Agency now has firmly established its
responsibility for the maintenance of a national reference service in the
field of biographic intelligence dealing with all foreign personalities
outside of the military field. This is an important service and should
be maintained. Its charter is DCID 1/9.
11. The CIA also has an established national intelligence reference
service responsibility in the field of the acquisition and indexing of foreign
documents. This is prescribed in DCID 2/4.and is one of the better coordinated
efforts in the Federal Government.
12. While CIA's library and substantive intelligence files are at the
present time used more extensively by other agencies than by CIA -- and
this is as it should be -- this is nevertheless one area where centralization
and coordination can achieve savings. With substantive intelligence documents
entering the system at a rate in excess of a million a month, it is obviously
wasteful for each agency to plan to file the identical documents. On the
other hand, each agency obviously has the right to be able to retrieve
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immediately documents on any subject which it may need. It is therefore
important that the DCI insist on the clear delineation of responsibility in
the intelligence system for the storage and retrieval of substantive documents.
Intelligence Collection
1i+. The Central Intelligence Agency by intent of Congress is responsible
for the conduct of federally directed espionage and counterespionage on
a world-wide basis. This has been directed in NSCID 5 which also provides
that the services may participate in clandestine operations provided that
their efforts are coordinated with the designated representatives of the DCI.
This requires especial attention to the necessity for the security implica-
tions of clandestinity. It is one of the few Agency activities which has
its wartime charter in existence through the command relationship agreement
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provides that in times of war or
national emergency or when directed by the President, CIA assets in a theatre
of war or zone of military operations will be under the direction of the
theatre commander.
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ASSUMPTIONS--THE ROLE OF CIA
1. In preparing any long-range plan for the Central Intelligence
Agency it is necessary to make certain assumptions as to its future
responsibilities. While the National Security Act of 1947 which created
the Agency describes certain functions for the organization, the evolution
of the intelligence community, the changing roles and responsibilities of
other departments and agencies and the creation of new agencies have all
served to affect the activities of the CIA. We consider it important as a
basis for sound planning that there be clear understanding both within the
Agency and within the United States Government, including the Executive
Branch and the Congress, to what responsibilities rest with the CIA.
2. In a later section we deal with the subject of emergency and war
planning and note the necessity for action in these areas. However, we
would stress at this point the necessity for simply establishing an under-
standing in the Government as to the role of the CIA in the time of national
emergency or general war. It is essential that this be clarified before
any national emergency or general war creates a situation where national
assets can be lost through hasty action in time of stress. The Congress
has made no distinction between CIA's role in wartime and that in peacetime.
It is therefore assumed that, except where qualified by National Security
Council Directives or Presidential orders, the CIA will continue to perform.
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0, A. M. , '? sday, 17 August 65 25X
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the same functions in wartime that it does at present. Except for the command
relationship agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which establishes the
role of the CIA clandestine services overseas in the military command
structure, and for the few sentences in the National Military Command System
paper on the role of CIA, there is no statement of understanding as to what
the Agency will do in wartime. Views on this subject range all the way from
it becoming a completely subordinate unit to the Pentagon or being phased
completely out of existence--both of which are held in Pentagon circles--to
the position that its functions and responsibilities would not be materially
altered in wartime. These extremes are obviously both impractical and unwise,
and therefore we recommend that at the earliest possible moment the Agency take
the initiative in preparing and reaching an understanding with the Government
on its war role.
Intelligence Production
3. The Agency's role in the production of intelligence has been quite
well established in most areas, both by law and by directive, as being charged
with the production of national intelligence. In some areas of intelligence
production this is more specifically established than in others, and therefore
in planning it is important that it be firmly established in all areas where the
In. this regard the National
Security Act of 1947 states, "(b) for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence
activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest
of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of
the National Security Council--(3) to corollate and evaluate intelligence
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Agency is planning to make major commitments.
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relating to the national security, and' provide for the appropriate dissemination
of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing
agencies and facilities:''
4. The responsibility for the production of National Intelligence
Estimates has been clearly established by common practice over the years
and is spelled out in DCID 1 / 1 . This is one of the most important
responsibilities of the Agency and has created for the United States Govern-
ment a document of incalculable value in which the greatest objectivity of
the intelligence system provides the policy maker with the top intelligence
viewpoint. Its integrity should be preserved at all costs in the interests
of national security, most particularly the responsibility of an independent
agency for its production. There is at least some assurance of the
prevention of another Pearl Harbor through this vehicle of a coordinated
National Intelligence Estimate.
5. The responsibility for national current intelligence is less clearly
established by directive, although it appears that there is a clear under-
standing with DIA as to the division of responsibilities. In the negotiations
conducted in 1962 and 1963 between the Agency and DIA, specifically
Messrs. Kirkpatrick and Cline for the Agency and for
DIA, a clear understanding was reached that DIA produced departmental current
intelligence while CIA produced national current intelligence. However, this
has not been inscribed in any directive and this should be done at an early
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date in order to insure logical organizational development both within
the Agency and the Department of Defense.
6. The production of national economic intelligence on specified
areas of the world was established as a CIA responsibility by letter. from
General Walter Bedell Smith to Secretary of State Dean Acheson. This
is further delineated in DCID 3/ 1.
7. The responsibility for the production of basic intelligence as
typified by the National Intelligence Surveys is clearly established and is
paragraph la, b, c, d, and e.
specified in NSCID No. 3, / However, despite this clear understanding,
one of the areas where there is considerable duplication of effort is in the
broad area in the production of basic intelligence. This is a difficult region
to legislate because each organization produces intelligence for different
purposes and can clearly establish that their product is not identical with
the National Intelligence Surveys. On the other hand, it is patently clear,
and has been for years, that this area of basic intelligence research and
production is one in which there is considerable uncontrolled and uncoordinated
effort. It is recommended that in planning for the future the entire area of
basic intelligence, not just the production of National Intelligence Surveys,
be subjected to intensive scrutiny and clearly delineated responsibilities
be established in order to insure orderly progress. While this is being done--
it may take a matter of years--the CIA should continue to carry the responsi-
bility for the production of the National Intelligence Surveys.
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National Reference Services
8. While originally located in the Directorate for Intelligence, and
closely related to intelligence production, over the years the Agency has
been developing certain national intelligence reference services. This is
an expensive area as far as money and manpower is concerned and is one
in which there is considerable room for greater coordination and integration.
With the information explosion already upon us, it is vital that the U. S. and
National Intelligence System agree upon certain services of common
concern which can be performed in the reference field. The simultaneous
development of reference services by each of the intelligence organizations
will be costly, duplicative and unnecessary. This is another area where
the attention of the DCI is needed in order to reach agreement with the
military intelligence agencies and the Department of State as to the responsi-
bility for the development and maintenance of national intelligence reference
services.
9. The Central Intelligence Agency now has firmly established its
responsibility for the maintenance of a national reference service in the
field of biographic intelligence dealing with all foreign personalities outside
of the military field. This is an important service and should be maintained.
Its charter is DCID 1/9.
10. The CIA also has an established national intelligence reference
service responsibility in the field of the acquisition and indexing of foreign
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and is one of the better
coordinated efforts in the Federal Government.
While CIA'
library and substantive intelligence files are at the
present time used more extensively by other agencies than by CIA--and
this is as it should b
thisis nevertheless one area where centralization
and coordination can achieve tense savings.
documents entering the system
With substantive intelligence
at a rate in excess of a
is obviously absurd for each agency to plan to file the identical
other hand, each agency obviously has the right to
a month, it
documents.
be able to retrieve
immediately documents on any subject which it may need. It is therefore
important that the DCI insist on the clear delineation of responsibility in
the intelligence system for the storage and retrieval of substantive documents
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LONG RANGE PLAN
PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY
1, The major objectives in CIA's long range plan
for the production of intelligence are;
To strengthen the capability for assuring
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24-hour current and net tactical intelligence;
b. To strengthen the strategic base of research
in support of estimates economic, economic-military,
and scientific-technical and to complete the base
by extending it in political research.
These objectives must be realized concurrently,
2 Research and analysis against Communist China
must be more than doubled during the next five years 9
without relaxing effort against the USSR. By request
of the Secretary of Defense the Agency's work in military
costing must be expanded to include all Communist military
establishments, especially the Chinnesea It should be
noted that the sharp increase against Communist China
will mean a small e
relative decrease against the USSR. The effort against
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the Communist power as a whole, however, may increase
from 64 to 68% of the total production effort during
this period.
3. At the same time, care is necessary to prevent
a weakening of capability directed to the instability and
disorder which threaten from the underdeveloped countries
and regions of the world,
25
5, The intelligence required during the period of
this plan will be more and more natio: al in character, whether
it pertains to localized political turbulence in a less
developed or newly emerging nation- to the conflicting
interests of great powers in local nationalisms, racism,
or populism In the inciting crossfires of revolutionary
social and political movements; to the potential for
confrontation with Communist China and the USSR; or to
2
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Olympian conpetitio
s between the U.S., the USSR, and
possibly others such as China.
3
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1, Twenty-flour Hour Current Intelligence, From the
time of the Korean Wars when the Agency operated on a shoe
string, sending one or two analysts to the Pentagon each
morning to summarize the daily telecon for the President,
to the present war in Vietnam, there have been many alarms
and crises of widely differing kinds. The Agency knows
from experience that it must stay ahead of the changing
tempos in the development and progression of enduring
crises, and that it must not let new crises and untoward
events take our Government by surprise. In serving the
President it serves the entire foreign operations of the
Government, The degree of the President's involvement
in the direction of foreign operations has varied with
time, style, and situation. But over the years a rising
premium has attached to fast and ,accurate current intelli-
gence. The current intelligence front has increased in
importance, with corresponding demands upon the CIA Watch
system,
20 ?perati?nns Center and Current.InteIlligence Strength
For the duration of this plan the goal is maximu
prepar edne gs
for simultaneous crises of all kinds, from obscure and
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multifarious developments in the revolutionary world of
the backward, to the actions and reactions of the Communi
powers q both I
their internal and external policies and
a, The Operations Center,
it is an immediate objective to press
their relations to new and old opportunities and contests.
The perfecting of means foY alert involves not only the
ability to concentrate resources for quid response, but
also advanced readiness with the strength and quality of
analysis required.
on to a proper locus in which to co
centrate analytical
forces on critical situations, one equipped with the
best in supporting services and communications, especially
served by Clandestine Service reporting with proper
protection by the DDP of its operations and sources.
The Operations. Center must be a nerve center in fact
as well as in name o
bo Current Intelligence Strength
At the same time there is the objective of
strengthening the analytical roster for current
reporting by about 50% during the next five years,
2
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i.e., from a strength of
and should
subjected to co
GD-l6/3
This plan will
ssessment. As now seen the increase should provide
easure - needcad to sustain task forces and analytical
support of the Operations Center,
3. The planned Increase, however, will
watch bill such as would be required in, general war. To
plan now for a full watch bill of analysts would multiply
the projected increase by a factor of four. This would mean
to plan now for a war-time scale of operations by 1970,
without regard to the ambivalence of our position in
external affairs. It does not seem advisable to take this
full step in planning at this time, although with the
possibility clearly in mind, the measurement of on-duty.
and planned strength against the degrees of war should
be a continuing task of a permanent planning group.
4. The expansion of current intelligence should
t take place at the expense of or as a surrogate for the
completion and the manning of the Agency's strategic base
in research.
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5, Strategic Base in Research. The next major
concern, then, is the strategic base in research. It
is not second in time or priority. Research here means
research in support of estimates. It seeks painstakingly
for the most reliable answers which all of the information
will yield to- the critical questions of major import to
our national security. While the emphasis falls on
support of estimates of hostile capabilities and inten-
tions, the research is directly pertinent to the evalua-
tions needed in current intelligence. Without anchorage
in the depth of conclusions from relevant research, current
intelligence is always in danger of drifting with a tide,
imperceptible from one day to the next in the preoccupation
with the immediate and the immediately following. Further-
more, the kind of research whic
constitutes the strategic
base must be done within the Government by specialists in
their .several fields who bring to the peculiarities and
sensitivities of classified information a knowledge not
only equal to that of their colleagues outside of Govern-
ment but already shaped by experience to the practical
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questions which confront the Administration in Its
decisions of foreign policy,
6 There is an old controversy in the intelligence
community over CIA's role in research. Xt stemmed from
the question of jurisdictional responsibility and authority
for estimates. This in turn reflected the thesis that
each department preempted the responsibility for research
in the field of its own operational authority. In
research lay the authority of superior knowledge. Depart-
mental authority for estimates in the field of departmental
s and depart
ental jurisdiction in research
hired, against CIA's earliest efforts to do national
intelligence,
70 Following the reorganization of 195Cd51g CIA
as chartered to do research in economic int
loc only, and the charter came as
lligence o
uch bT- default
of State as by CIA's insistence on research in an area
which was then unknown territory. Research. in the
Soviet economy had to turn Its back on requests for
curront intelligence in order-first to' establish base
d norms. In time, the CIA became authoritative
in the field of Soviet economic capabilities and performance,
5
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S. From this base a by force Of circumstance - the
Irectog o s need in support of the Department of Defense
n d the President - the Agency moved into military
economics9 Military costing of the Soviet Military
establishment, research and development, production Gg
advanced weapons, and the allocation of resources o
9 it is planned to strengthen this bass to most the
requirement of the Secretary of Defense for military
costing of the Chinese a
An incre
satellite milit
se is necessary in any case
d the a
ry establishments.,
ticipated increase in volume of
information on Chinese
ilitarry capabilities9 in research
and development as well as in production and allocation,
loo In political research the problem is to strengthe
the small existing base
nd build from it to the end of
a diagnostic grasp and improved capability for prognosis
in the many problems of Communist political capabilities
and intentions as they relate to the practical dilemmas
of their domestic and foreign policies, The Agency has
secured a small base of research in special problems of
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political intellige
doctrine
The i
cea Sino-Soviet relations, Communist
ad practice, Chinese policy and leadership
tional base of political research should extend
beyond Sino=Soviet relations into the evolving relations
of the powers, both Communist and non-Communist,
llo In terns of dollars and positions relative to
other efforts this expansion is not costly. But it will
be well to m
ke haste slowly and therefore surelyo Th
analysts who can do the kind of work required must be
masters, not journeymen apprentices, and they are hard
to find - or hard to spare from other pressing duties.
12 As a unique subcategory, research in support of
clandestine operational needs requires emphasis and
recognition, $t is necessary to bri
specialists together for this effort, Long experience
and experimentation point to the conclusion that this
kind of support to the clandestine service must be carried
out in and by, or under the auspices
of plans because of the co
g a variety of
siderations of security and
the requirement for detailed knowledge of operations,
7
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This As toeatec especially In the clandestine services
section,
13 !abaffiCS of
projections for the Agency's long
~ ency ? s ~o ag
n about Zos~~?~
distribution of 008og a a The
~t~?ns and ~unn
review o2 initial
-range plan raises a
angs trends In tl e
dlso In pa ticu1a ' g thG
coTRs of analysts Be
relative to that In technical research and davzll
collllectiong Pgocessingg and support. Whe identification
and it wcstigati
Imbalances Its our cyst
an ns ipoTtaut Jpait 09 the work of the p anant planning
14. Organization for odunction, The presont
aimation 123 not nec?ssari1y the best because it has
.own tha way It has. It is obviously essential to have
functional as vall as ragios al specialists and a styoa
Z?O% ofd generalists. But there Is always the question of
the most effective way In which to relate these group
in order to keep $loxibility z,ithouat l
disc1plinsa The'a Is
as of organ1m
o unchanging answer to tlas ppacttcal
question of the right opganization g as between geoevaphic
ad a unnct ional g gor ~ S nJp1! n 0
to neod by task ko'ces
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will always be one of our organizational answersQ because
no rigid alignment will anticipate the overlapping com-
plemi pies of substantive probleRs as they change In
their particular fo auulat~ .oms with events.
15. The question of organization i
Coacerne It should
planni,
9 groulp C
In Pr
a vital Agency
on the agenda of the per
araticn, It i 'ecowenc
d that
the directorates review their organizatior In Bing or
projects
2or ppoducction9 and in collaboration with the
permanent Planning group submit th iz revi6~ and r(Bo
tione to the Director. The review should not be dono An
haste. lIt should presuppose tba 12dings of study g o P
assigned by directorates to reviee oue major substamtive
,pro le o
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RECOMMDATIONS
1 . Lp
long range
bj ctiv s fog the
pwodhotion o2 ntelligencce
ao To strengthan the Agency capability for
24 -hour current Intelligence and t development
o the Operations Center la connection therewitha
bo To strengthen t C NA stoat gicc base In
research and to extend It In political intell1gence;
cco To Increase CIA's analytical Stre
against Co AnI st Chin
at-rmngth.
2. taquest the peTmanant planing ggonp
ao To assess joaTiodicallly th@ on-duty
d planned strength against the ogwom of war
existing and sati atc d (with the apsistanoe
acrd 09 1ational Estimates); and
To identity and Investigate actual and
fennel iab 1anc In the distribution of positi
and Bends in the Agency.
gtb
uring the meat five yeaze
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2D August 1965
PRODUCTION OF INTEI-OLIGENCE
:?EC?OM.MENDATIONS
Approve the long range objectives for the production
of intelligence:
a. To strength ten the Agency capability
for 24-hour current intelligence and the develop-
ment of the Operations Center in connection therewith;
b, To strength the CIA. strategic base
In research. and to extend it in political intelligence;
c. To increase CIA's analytical strength;
against Communist China during the next five years
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in. the measure of
strength,
2.o Request the permanent planning group:
a. To assess periodically the on-duty
and planned strength against the degree of war existing
and estimated (with the assistance of the Board of
National Estimates), and
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b. To identify and investigate actual
and potential imbalances in the distribution of
positions and funds in the Agency.
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Toted was good enough to provide both, recommendations
which you have just read and the following t??-page summary. It is
suggested that the members in examining this paper consider whether
both are necessary for discussion when we reach this paper. )
2
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LONG RANGE PLAN
PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY
1. The major objectives in CIA's long range plan for the
producti ?. of intelligence are:
ao To strengthen thepability for assuring
;,.'4--hour current and net tactical intelligence-,
bo To strengthen the strategic base of
research in support of estimates economic, econoanic-
military, and scientific -technical and to complete
the base by extending it in political research,
These objectives must be realized concurrently,
2. Research and analysis against Communist China must be
more than doubled during the next five years, without relaxing effort
against
against the USSR. It should be noted that the sharp increase/Communist
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will mean a sma.l, relative decrease
against the USSR, even though thedfort against the Communist power as a
whole may increase
'During this period.
3. At the same time, care is necessary to prevent a weaken-
ing of capability directed to the instability and disorder which threaten
from the underdeveloped countries and regions of the world,
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5. The intelligence required during the period of this plan
will be more and more national in character, whether it pertains to
localized political turbulence in a less developed or newly emergir ,g
nation; to the conflicting interests of great powers in loca.t national-
isms, racism, or populism in the inciting crossfrres of 3e-rolutionary
social and political movements; to the potential for confrontation with
Communist China and the USSR; or to Olympian competitions between
the Uo S0D the USSR, and possibly others such as Chinas
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DISCUSSION
l o Twenty-four Hour Current Intelligence. From the
time of the' Korean War, when the Agency operated on a shoe string,
sending one or two analysts to the Pentagon each morning to summarize
the daily telecon for the President, to the present war in Vietnam, there
have been many alarms and crises of widely differing kindso The Agency
knows from experience that it must stay ahead of the changing tempos in
the development and progression of enduring crises, and that it must
not let new crises and untoward events take our Government by surprise.
In serving the President it ses:ves the entire foreign operations of the
Government, and in a way which makes the question of what is national
and what is departmental of academic interest, for all practical purposes,
The degree of the President's involvement in the direction of foreign operations
has varied with time, style, and situation. But over the years a rising
premium has attached to fast and accurate current intelligence. The
current intelligence front has increased in importance, with corresponding
demands upon the CIA Watch system.
2. Operations Center and Current In~ ielli ence Sts tho
For the duration of this plan the goal is maximum preparedness for
simultaneous crises of all kinds, from obscure and multifarious develop-
ments in the revolutionary world of the backward, to the actions and
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reactions of the Communist powers,, both in their internal and
external policies and their relations to new and old opportunities and
contests. The perfecting of means for alert involves not only the ability
to concentrate resources for quick response,, but also advanced readiness
Tfsh the strength and quality of analysis required,
ae The Operations Center.
it is an immediate objective to press
on to a proper locus in which to concentrate analytical
forces on critical situations, one equipped with the best
in supporting services and communications. A nerve
center in fact as well as in name.
b; Current Intelligence Strength.
At the same time there is the objective of
strengthening the analytical roster for current reporting
by
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(during the next five years,, io eo ,, from a
This plan will and should be
subjected to continuous review and reassessment. As
now seen the increase should provide the measure
needed to sustain task forces and analytical support
of the Operations Center.
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The planned increase, however, will not man a watch
hill. such as would be required in general war. To plan now for a full
watch bill of analysts would multiply the projected increase by a factor
of four. This woi mean to plan now for a war-time scale of operations
by 1970, without regard to the ambivalence of our position in external
affairs. It does not seem advisable to take this full step in planning
at this time, although with the possibility clearly in mine>., the n.easure'.
went of on-duty and planned strength against the degrees o1 war should
be a continuing task cf a: permanent planning group.
4. The expansion of current intelligence should not take
place at the expense of or as a surrogate for the completion and the
manning of the s geracy,s strategic base in research.
5. Strategic Base in Research. The next major concern;,
then, Is the es rategi.c base in. research. It is not second in time or
priority. Research here means research in support of estimates.
It seeks painstakingly for the most reliable answers which all of the
information will yield to the critical questions of major import to our
national security. While the emphasis falls on support of estimates of
hostile capabilities and intentionsa the research is directly pertinent
to the evaluations needed in current intelligence. Without anchorage
in the depth of conclusions from relevant research, current intelligence
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is always in danger of drifting with a tide, imperceptible from one
day to the next in the preoccupation with the immediate and the immediately
following. I= ur?thermore, the kind of research which constitutes the
strategic base must be done within the Government by specialists in
their several fields who bring to the peculiarities and sensitivities of
classified information a knowledge not only equal to that of their
colleagues outside of Government but already shaped by experience to
the practical questions which confront the Administration in its decisions
of foreign policy.
66. There is an old controversy in the.intelligence community.
over CIA's role in research. It stemmed from the question of juris-
dictional responsibility and authority for estimates. This in turn
reflected the thesis that each department preempted the responsibility
for research in the field of its own operational authority. In research lay
the authority of superior knowledge. Departmental authority for estimates
in the field of departmental operations and departmental jurisdiction in
research combined against CIA's earliest efforts to do national intelligence.
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70 Following the reorganization of 1950-51, CIA Was
chartered to do research in economic intelligence on the Bloc only,
and the charter came as much by default of State as by CI is insistence
on research in an area which was then unknown territory. Research
in the Soviet economy had to turn its back on requests for current
intelligence in order first to establish base lines and norms. In time,
the CIA became authoritative in the field of Soviet econoini.; capabilities
and performance.
80 From this base, by fo.s ce of circumstance u the Director's
need in support of the President - the Agency moved into military economics,
military costing of the Soviet military establishment, research and develop-
meat, production of advanced weapons, and the allocation of resources,
9. It is planned to strengthen this base to meet the require-
rent of the Secretary of Defense for military costing of the Chinese and
satellite military establishments, An increase is necessary in any case
and the anticipated increase in volume of
information on Chinese military capabilities, in research and development
as well as in production and allocation.
10. Present and future demands on the Director emphasize
the importance of completing the Agency's strategic base in research by
5
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extending it in political inteliagegace, This is an area as critical as it
is difficult. It is a major challenge, but must be met if intelligence is
to match its findings in hostile capabilities with correlati,Fe insight into
intentions. In recent years the State Department has more and more
withdrawn from this field and devoted its limited resources to quick
support of policy. The Agency does not have a "charter" for pol .tiical
research and does not ask for one. There are gaps here which must
be filled in the national interest and CIA means to fill them,
110 In political research the problem is to strengthen the
small existing base and build from it to the end of a diagnostic grasp
and improved capability for prognosis in the many problems ol Communist
political capabilities and intentions as they relate to the practical dileFnmas
of their domestic and foreign policies. The Agency has secured a small
base of research in special problems of political intelligence- Sino-
Soviet relations, Communist doctrine and practice, Chinese policy and
leadership. The international base of political research should extend
beyond Simms oviet relations into the evolving relations of the powers,
both Communist and non-Communis~
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In terms of dollars and positions relative to other efforts
this expansion is not costly. But it will be well to make haste slowly and
6
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and therefore surely. The analysts who can do the kind of work required
must be masters, not journeymen apprentices, and they are hard to find ->
or hard to spare from other pressing duties.
13. As a unique subcategory, research in support of clandestine
operational needs requires emphasis and recognition. It is necessary to
bring a variety of specialists together for this effort. Long experience and
experimentation point to the conclusion that this kind of support to the
clandestine service must be carried out In the Directorate of Plans because
of the considerations of security and the requirement for detailed knowledge
of operations. This is treated especially in the monograph on DDP,
14. Balance of Programs. The review of initial projections for
the. '.Agency's long mange plan raises a fundamental question about long-
range trends in the distribution of positions and funds, In particular, the
investment in the corps of analysts seems to diminish relative to that in
technical research and development, collection, processing and support.
The identification and investigation of imbalances in our system should be
an important part of the work of the permanent planning group,
150 Orgarnzation for Production. The present organization is
not necessarily the best because it has grown the way it has. It is obviously
essential to have functional as well as regional specialists and a strong
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group of generalists? But there is always the question of the most
effective way in which to relate these groups in order to keep flexibility
without loss of organization discipline, There is no unchanging answer
to the practical question of the right organization, as between geographic
and functional, for example. Response to need by task forces will always
be one of our organizational answers, because no rigid alignment will
anticipate the overlapping complexities of substantive problems ,;s they
change in their particular formulations with events.
160
The question of organization is a vital Agency concern.
It should be on the agenda of the permanent planning group, In preparation,
it is recommended that the directorates review their organization in being
or projected for production, and in collaboration with .the pe::; nanent
planning group submit their review and reco emendations to thR Director.
The review should not be done in haste. It should presuppose L1e findings
of study groups assigned by directorates to review our major suLstantive
problems.
8
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6!
Long Range Plan
Production of Intelligence
1. The major objectives in CIA's long range plan
for the production of intelligence are:
-a) to strengthen the capability for assuring
24-hour current and net tactical intelligence;
b) to strengthen the strategic base of
research in support of estimates - economic, economic-
military, and scientific-technical - and to complete
,the base by extending it in political research.
These objectives must be realized concurrently.
2. Research and analysis against Communist China
must be more than doubled during the next five years,
without relaxing effort against the USSR. It should be
noted that the sharp increase against Communist China
will mean a small, relative decrease
against the USSR, even though the effort against the
Communist power as a whole-may increase
during this period.
3. At the same time, care is necessary to prevent
a weakening of capability directed to the instability
and disorder which threaten from the underdeveloped
cr~i~P t
2 r? cxeiedaU Pr~~n anin;natie
i? a Cc'rnsr ,51n; and
n
di
c
dcc ; si{lc:
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6
countries and regions of the world.
25
5. The intelligence required during the period
of this plan will be more and more national in character,,
whether it pertains to localized political turbulence
in a less developed or newly emerging nation; to the
conflicting interests of great powers in local national-
isms, racism, or populism in the inciting crossfires
of revolutionary social and political movements; to the
potential for confrontation with Communist China and
the USSR; or to Olympian competitions between the US,
the USSR, and possibly others such as China.
?
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7. Twenty-four Hour Current Intelligence
From the time of the Korean War, when the
Agency operated on a shoe string, sending one or two
analysts to the Pentagon each morning to summarize the
daily telecon for the President, to the present war in
Viet Nam, there have been many alarms and crises of
widely differing kinds. The Agency knows from experience
that it must stay ahead of the changing tempos in the
development and progression of enduring crises, and
that it must not let new crises and untoward events take
our Government by surprise. In serving the President
it serves the entire foreign operations of the-Govern-
ment, and in a way which makes the question of what is
national and what is departmental of academic interest,
for all practical purposes. The degree of the President's
involvement in the direction of foreign operations has
varied with time, style, and situation. But over the
years a rising premium has-attached to fast and accurate
current intelligence. The current intelligence front
has increased in importance, with corresponding demands
upon the CIA Watch system.
C.+~ ~ u u esr~
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8. For the duration of.=this plan the goal is
maximum preparedness for simultaneous crises of all kinds,
from obscure and multifarious developments in the revolu-
tionary world of the backward, to the actions and reactions
of the Communist powers, both in their internal and
external policies and their relations to new and old
opportunities and contests. The perfecting of means
for alert involves not only the ability to concentrate
resources for quick response, but also advanced readiness
with the strength and quality of analysis required.
9.
a) The Operations Center.
? It is an immediate objective to press on
to a proper locus in which to concentrate analytical
forces on critical situations, one equipped with the
best in supporting services and communications. A
nerve center in fact as well as in name.
b) Current intelligence strength.
At the same time there is the objective of
strengthening the analytical roster for current
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reporting by during the next five years,
i.e. from a strength of This plan will 25X1
? _ osa
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and should be subjected-to continuous review
and reassessment. As now seen the increase should
provide the measure needed to sustain task forces
and analytical support of the Operations Center.
10. The planned increase, however, will not man
a watch bill such as would be required in general war.
To plan now for a full watch bill of analysts would
multiply the projected increase by a factor of four.
This would mean to plan now for a war-time scale of
operations by 1970, without regard to the ambivalence
of our position in external affairs. It does not seem
advisable to take this full step in planning at this time,
although with the possibility clearly in mind, the
measurement of on-duty and planned strength against the
degrees of war should be continuing task of a permanent
planning group.
11. The expansion of current intelligence should
not take place at the expense of or as a surrogate for the
completion and the manning of the Agency's strategic
base in research.
12. The next major concern, then, is the strategic
base in research. It is not-second in time or priority.
Research here means research in support of estimates.
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It seeks painstakingly for the most reliable answers
which all of the information will yield to the critical
questions of major import to our national security.
While the emphasis falls on support of estimates of
hostile capabilities and intentions, the research is
directly pertinent to the evaluations needed in current
intelligence. Without anchorage in the depth of con-
clusions from relevant research, current intelligence
is always in danger of drifting with a tide, imperceptible
from one day to the next in the preoccupation with the
immediate and the immediately following. Furthermore,
the kind of research which constitutes the strategic base
must be done within the Government by specialists in their
several fields who bring tb.:the peculiarities and
sensitivities of classified information a knowledge not
only equal to that of their colleagues outside of
Government but already shaped by experience to the practical
community over CIA's role in research. It stemmed from
of foreign policy.
13. There is an old controversy in the intelligence
questions which confront the Administration in its decisions
for estimates. This in-turn-reflected the thesis that
the question of jurisdictional responsibility and authority
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each department preempted the responsibility for .
research in the field of its own operational authority.
In research lay the authority of superior knowledge.
Departmental authority for estimates in the field of
departmental operations and departmental jurisdiction
in research combined against CIA's earliest efforts to
do national intelligence.
14. Following the reorganization of 1950-51, CIA
was chartered to do research in economic intelligence
on the Bloc only, and the charter came as much by default
of State as by the fact that CIA insisted on research
in an area which was then unknown territory. Research
in the Soviet economy had to turn its back to requests
for current intelligence in order first to establish
base lines and norms. In time, the CIA established
itself as authoritative in the field of Soviet economic
capabilities and performance.
15. From this base, by force of circumstance - the
Director's need in support of the President - the Agency
moved into military economics, military costing of the
Soviet military establishment, research and development,
production of advanced weapons, and the allocation of
resources.
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?
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16. It is planned to strengthen this base to meet
the Secretary of Defense's requirement for military
costing of the Chinese and Satellite military establish-
ments. An increase is necessary in any case
- and the anticipated increase in volume
ofinformation on Chinese military capabilities, in
research and development as well as in production and
allocation.
17. Present and future demands on the Director
emphasize the importance of completing the Agency's
strategic base in research by extending it in political
intelligence. This is an area as critical as it is
? difficult. It is a major challenge, but must be met if
intelligence is to match its findings in hostile capa-
bilities with correlative insight into intentions. In
recent years the State Department has more and more
withdrawn from this field and devoted its limited
resources to quick support of policy. The Agency does
not have a "charter" for political research and does
not ask for one. There are gaps here which must be filled
in the national interest and CIA means to fill them.
18. Political research in support of estimates
cannot count on increasing volumes of information to
provide improved quality. And it cannot count on
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breakthroughs into intentions, or on kind of assistance
which computers can give to subjects which lend them-
selves to quantitative measurement and visual data.
19. The Agency has secured a small base in special
problems of political intelligence: Sino-Soviet relations,
Communist doctrine and practice, Chinese policy and
leadership. The problem now is to strengthen this base
and build from it to the end of a diagnostic grasp and
improved capability for prognosis in the many problems of
-Communist political capabilities and intentions as they
relate to the practical dilemmas of their domestic and
foreign policies. The field of specialized research
should extend beyond Sino-Soviet relations into the
evolving relations of the powers, both Communist and
non-Communist
20. In terms of dollars and positions relative to
other efforts this expansion is not costly. But it will
be well?to make haste slowly and therefore surely. The
analysts who can do the kind of work required must be
masters, not journeymen apprentices, and they are hard
to find - or hard to spare from other pressing duties.
-9-
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21. As a unique subcategory, research in support
of clandestine operational needs requires emphasis and
recognition. It is necessary to bring a variety of
specialists together for this effort. Long'~experience
and experimentation point to the conclusion that this
kind of support to the clandestine service must be
carried out in the Directorate of Plans because of the
considerations of security and the requirement for
detailed knowledge of operations.
.42. The review of initial projections for the
Agency's long range plan raises a fundamental question
about long range trends in the distribution of positions
? and funds. In particular, the investment in the corps
of analysts seems to diminish relative to that in technical
research and development, collection, processing and
support. The identification and investigation of
imbalances in our system should be an important part
of the work of the permanent planning group.
23. Organization for Production
The present organization is not necessarily the
best because it has grown the way it has. It is obviously
essential to have functional as well as regional specialists
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and a strong group of generalists. But there is
always the question of the most effective way in which
to relate these groups in order to keep flexibility
without loss of organizational discipline. There is
no unchanging answer to the practical question of the
right organization, as between geographic and functional,
for example. Response to need by task forces will
always be one of our organizational answers, because no
rigid alignment will anticipate the overlapping complexities
of substantive problems as they change in their particular
formulations with events.
24. The question of organization is a vital Agency
concern. It should be on the agenda of the permanent
planning group. In preparation, it is recommended that
the Directorates review their organizations in being or
projected for production, and in collaboration with the.
permanent planning group submit their review and
recommendations to the Director. The review should not
be done in haste. It should presuppose the findings
of study groups assigned by directorates to review our
major substantive problems.
?
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SE~~ET
12 August 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: Planning Group
SUBJECT: Twenty-four Hour Current Intelligence
1. The difference between a 24-hour watch and
24 hour current intelligence is one of degree. At
one extreme you have a message center and an operator
who has instructions to call people according to a
list of requirements; at the other extreme, analysts
on duty who evaluate information as it comes in, report
their findings promptly on matters of critical import
and maintain a continuous summary of critical situations.
The degree of 24 hour. current intelligence, in terms
of depth and breadth of regional/functional coverage,
depends on
a) the nature and condition of our affairs
abroad;
b) the flow of information pertinent to them;
c) the kind of command structure served, (i.e.
how directly the command involves itself in
the tactical direction of operations); and
d) the number of analysts qualified and
trained for quick evaluation.
Excluded fram autamtia
downgrading a,14
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2. An illustration of the two extremes may be
useful. It is taken from experience during the last
great war, when one became an intelligence officer
before he could dissociate the term intelligence from
academic usage. An intelligence unit at headquarters
worked frantically, coming in early and leaving late,
but its night watch consisted of one man. Every
member of the unit took his turn as watch officer.
His function was to keep the office open - for telephone
calls, the possible receipt of information, etc. The
condition of our affairs abroad was very grim indeed,
but the unit had no current information bearing on
the particular form and front of warfare to which it
was assigned and therefore could not assist the combat
intelligence command to which it was subordinated.
As soon however as the unit began to receive current
information - fortunately it was soon - it converted
at once into a 24 hour intelligence "production" watch
with the necessary number of officers assigned to it
to make up a full complement for each watch. As a
point of interest, the command combat intelligence
unit (very few officers) did not itself go to a watch
bill. These officers rested on the assurance that they
would be wakened at any hour of the night when there
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was intelligence which could not await the opening
of business. And the intelligence officers on watch,
in return for agonies of judgment, had the assurance
that they would get their own share of sleep - unlike
the situation which existed when they were working to
obtain current information.
3. One could elaborate at great length on conditions
a), b) and c) above as they apply to our present and
to the future we anticipate, but it would be unnecessary,
at least as far as our Director is concerned. For
purposes of contrast, however, one might recall our
situation in the Agency during the Korean War. We had
no current intelligence watch, But then the President
was not in tactical command, and it never occurred to
anyone that he should be. As for CIA, at least some
were confused about what CIA'.s role was - until the
White House informed the Director that the President
wished to have summaries of the situation from CIA.
We sent one or two officers to the Pentagon early each
morning to read the daily telecon report, which we
then summarized and sent to the President.
4. Since the mid-50's our current intelligence
has developed toward a 24 hour operation, subject to
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the changes in conditions a), b), and c) above and
limited by d), the number of analysts. When a), b),
and c) came together in a certain combination the
limitation of d) had to be overcome, by extending the
analysts.
5. If the tempo of events. has not accelerated,
our Government's reactions have. By now the Agency
has probably tried every expedient which could provide
24 hour current intelligence without going to a regular
watch bill - SIDO's, every current analyst at one time
or another on prolonged duty (overtime), staggered duty
hours, task forces to divide the hours, stay behinds,
and special forces for early morning duty. And now,
to the information about the rising events themselves,
has been added information about U.S. tactical operations.
We have an Operations Center.
6. As the strategic seriousness of our situations
and engagements abroad deepens and as no diminution
can be foreseen of extraordinary calls for faster,
more continuous and better current and tactical
intelligence, there is no sensible way to face the
future except to plan now for a regular, instead of an
irregular, 24-hour current intelligence service.
~r
r- ~ ~
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7. It is true that what we have experienced and
what we foresee are several crises at the same time -
of unequal degrees and kinds of seriousness. One can
argue that our irregular system is regular enough, and
flexible enough, to continue giving us adequate coverage
of the things that need to be covered at any hour of
need. To begin planning now for a complete 24-hour
current intelligence service, net, tactical and all,
may seem to accept a premise that we prepare for war.
We are at war in Viet Nam, but it is a limited war and
it is our policy to keep it limited. To declare a
state of national emergency would in itself tend to
raise the limit and contribute to a process of escalation.
The same might be said in relation to an escalation
of current intelligence.
8. The Operations Center plans a capability to
handle from 2 to 3 crises simultaneously. But why 2 to
3? Two is Viet Nam plus the Dominican Republic. Three
allows for one more. More than that would saturate the
system and relegate the surplus to lower orders of
priority - if one can always make so clear a distinction
between one crisis and another. A crisis may be one
n r.
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large and long affair evoking, provoking others which
it then absorbs and subordinates. Inherent in our
present situation in Viet Nam are the continuing
preoccupations with reactions and actions in Communist
China and the Soviet Union, and with repercussions
throughout South East Asia and the rest of the Far East.
From an epicenter waves go out, extending far beyond.,
disturbing areas which previously appeared calm, and
agitating others already disturbed. This. is not to
estimate the progression and outcome of the war in
Viet Nam, but it is to say that when tensions rise and
concern increases, we must be prepared to keep an
accurate and quick account of change - and must not
let untoward events take us by surprise, whether they
are directly related to the locus of power engagement
or not.
9. The degree of 24 hour current intelligence at
any given time will be determined by the conditions
stated in para. one. The degree may continue to rise,
may fall, or may have its ups and downs in between.
But the degree should not be determined after the
event or events. The purpose of planning is to lead
the events. It is a matter for judgment when to shift
to a stronger watch - to prevent a crisis from heading
.
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up, if that be possible by action, or, if not, to be
geared and ready when it comes.
10. We cannot foresee how many crises, of what
kinds and interrelations, we shall face in any coming
year. Fe can say however that a long range plan, as
of August 1965, should provide for a current intelligence
strength that can cover the world with order and dispatch
at all hours - and do so without weakening our strategic
base in research.
11. It remains to be said that 24 hour collection
and transmission of information, as foretold by research
and development, will generate its own pressure toward
24 hour analysis, if the future is at all so tense
and turbulent as to warrant the increase in collection.
And if warranted, the same improvement in communications
will have its own effect on the command center in
Washington, which must and will be served.
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p G?D'l 5/3
PERSONNEL AND TRAINING
I Introduction
A. In the years ahead the Agency must undertake news diverse, and
dietinct y more demanding reeponeibilitiaa if it is to serve ad-? quately the
increasingly critical eecurity interesto of the U. S, How~well it Will be
able to reepond to these challenges depends in large part on homer wall we,
manage our human rosourcaso In planning for the future, thereforen the
CIA should recognize that its most, valaable asset is its trained pro-
fessional cadre of career personnels These people provide the cutting
edge for everything we do, Evolved o rer times and conditioned by
exposure to the disciplines and presr u>s es of a. demanding environment,
they represent a unique body of talent. It behooves us to make certain
that we sustain it and conserve its
11 Discussion
A0 We can be proud of the cadre of career personnel that
conducts the business of this Agency todz,y0 Aa no senior Bu Beau of the
Budget officer zeceantl
ut it
' tl~e CIA h
th
l
p
0
aG
e
argest reservoir of
highly trained and competent personnel in the Government,, " Key elements
of this cadre began their professional careers during and after World War X1
netitute the "first generation" of CIA personnel, Others of this
Appro
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cadre were developed over later years with considerable efforts by top
management, the career service boards, and the Office of Personnel and
Training. We have been particularly successful in the recruftme It of
young people for CIA. The establishment in 1951 of a Junior Officer
Trainee (JOT) program has assured a regular input of highly qualified
junior officers, Many of these young officers have fulfilled their high
promise and form an increasingly large percentage of those officers
selected for the mid-career training; program. this program has been
recognized as one of the finest of its type in the Uo S Government, It
25X1 currently producesraduates each year as of September 1965. This
output should be expanded if we are to meet our needs in the yeG.i s just
ahead. Its program content likewise must be continually reviewed to
assess possible changes for improvement,
B. The middcareor program has been used as a vehicle for
identifying those with a potential to become senior executives and for
providing further training for them. This program has worked well but
now needs increased emphasis and closer attention,
C. While at the senior levels the Agency has made creditable
PG-D-45/3
attempts to improve its managerial capacities, including executive
training programs, this will not suffice for the future. The Agency
should therefore plan also for the early creation of an executive career
service and a senior training program to sustain it,
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D. in osdsr do pbeser'sre the top-7iight quality of its personnel
cache well into the "'Second genaxation" am e 'err au::t_1' a vital continuity
of leadership, we must, in addition to ui_? t#: t i .g a :#;egular input of young
officers through the C ?'ee ? ranee Program JOT), on
we have largely' depended for ox rcer 're;~.ruitmant s4n~c ' 957 ale
encourage lateral entry aric w l vr,'d~.l`i of ~~ iahste ae e ?" sts
1hi ifl practice would. provide the new idoi , and new blood that the Agency
needs, A program of lateral entry c .>nnot be haphazard but rn'i st
schoduled on a regular b2. is wit-.C' stated goals ai:.d objective,. We must
aloe recognize that certain needed discipli.nao and skills` -w.111 remain in
short supply. We should., fo our ow a ~'ac ;c~ titerpreter
if none can be recruited from market,
It must also be recognized t;hzL t).-ke acouisi'tien of n-iany of
the skills that the Agency require:; nee-', not involve longg-term car "~ea;
employment, This is part,icu rlytrue oe the '('.echnical and scientific
field where the is moving so quickly and `inhere, after
several years, the scientist or technic mnn hired on short term arrange..
menu by the Agency does wall to return to his particuli,e discipline in
order to main .in h-s p:,Pe crr.Aonal credentials and.
star Y?.cig ..:~ is
~ 1 ,, o G::~G''s
than resist the efforts of :pog-vt s with rare ob-31l E) t;o 'e' Ldemic
or scientific discipline, the Ageacy should, where ap ~r op~ iate, accomrrbo.-
date it. In those cYrcTm-stances where the Agency reels its int r4'st are
3
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best served by re raining people vvitla skills on a long .tern-i career
basis who are desirous of remainingloya:l to a- -ad retaining status in their
particular disciplines, thhen it must take steps in the future to help them
to do so, Specifically, tha Agency must adopt a mox?.,, fle:~dble policy
than it now has, in which acaden le "ab 3c":.ei.U~il , e:;.ts:rnal training,
acceptance of grants, and publication of works iv not just allowed, but
actually encouraged,
Fo The Agency, in order to sustain the continued input of high
caliber personnel, must plan for a more aggressi - recruitment program
and make use of the considerable latitude of its Gaut hirities to insure that
CIA remains competitive in the increasingly tight pro! ssional labor
market, The Agency should more clearly enunciate di fact that it is
policy to encourage the use of qualified senior personnel the various
directorates to assist directly and on a- continuous basis ii, identifying
and recruiting individuals of the same skills and discipl.:ine a , Managers
of operating components should therefore take greater i.nitiu?:ive to
provide opportunities for them to do so, underwriting r_c cesnary travel
and arranging work schedules to accommodate it. We &.