THE PRESIDENT'S TURN IN PANAMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP76-00593R000100050008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 10, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

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SUNDAY, AUG1. ST .10, 1975
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Parade of Visclosures
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LAWS
LAWS
AN INDEPENDENT - NEWSPAPER
The President's Turn in Panama
IVHE PRESIDENT'S delay in moving to consummate
I negotiations for a new Panama Canal treaty`
threatens to produce at least three kinds of damage.
First, despite the Panamanian government's efforts to
maintain control, it may be impossible to prevent riots
or sabotage that would deny the United States and
other nations the continued, efficient use of this
major international waterway. Second, failure to negoti-
ate a treaty would inflame American relations not only
with Panama but also with all other Latin American
nations that are united on this issue as on no other-
in both philosophy and diplomatic position. American
failure to set aside the "big stick" with which Teddy
I,sevelt acquired -the Canal Zone, and to move into
a new association respecting Panama's sovereignty,
would be condemned everywhere. Finally, Mr. Ford,
by having created a messy and unnecessary crisis on
the U.S. doorstep, would project the image of a Presi-
dent unable to handle foreign affairs-an image that
can only hurt his prospects for re-election next year.
With these negative prospects so unmistakable, why
then is Mr. Ford dragging his feet on a new treaty? It
been 18 months, after all, since his Secretary of
State promised, in Panama: "In the President's name,
I -hereby commit the United States to complete this
negotiation successfully and as quickly as possible."
And it has been more than four months since negotia-
tions with Panama were effectively suspended. The
reason for the suspension was a disagreement between
the Defense Department and the State Department
over how the U.S. relationship with Panama ought
to be changed.
The Pentagon's attitude is perhaps best conveyed by
the fact that, though seaplanes went out of use years
ago; the Navy has wished to retain a seaplane ramp site
in Panama, for "contingency planning." With just such
inflated and over-anxious conceptions of its own de-
fense responsibilities, the Pentagon has resisted efforts
to return control of the Canal Zone and canal to Pan-
ama. The period of return contemplated in a new
treaty, by the way-a period in which the United
States would retain major rights-stretches out over
several decades. It is not as though the American flag
were to be hauled down tomorrow. And it, is not as
'though, once the Panamanian flag alone were flying
in the Zone, that the United States would allow itself
to be shut out of the canal. On that point surely the
Panamanians have no illusions: Unrestricted' transit
will remain a vital interest that the United States can
be expected, at almost any cost, and by almost any
means, to protect.
r... ';no P1,1
The State Department, on the other hand, has argued
-persuasively, in our view-that the best way to en-
sure continued American use of the canal is to make
a new treaty that will drain off the nationalist bitter-
ness that the Panamanians feel about the old one. Teddy
Roosevelt's Secretary of State conceded, at the time,
that the 1903 treaty was "vastly advantageous to the
United States, and we must cpnfess, not so advantageous
to Panama." What hurt the Panamanians most was
the treaty provision granting the United States control
over its most vital resource-a swath cutting the
country in half-"in perpetuity." No modern nation
can be expected to tolerate such a legacy of imperialism.
And since riots or sabotage are the only likely threat
to the canal, it makes all the more sense to take a
diplomatic step-a new -treaty-that will at least re-
duce if not eliminate the possibility that the threat will
become a reality. Not making the new treaty, in our
view, very nearly guarantees that this threat will in
fact materialize, and under conditions that promise
no sympathy for the United States from the rest of
the hemisphere.
Mr. Ford, however, so far has not chosen to break
the bureaucratic impasse that preparation of an Ameri-
can negotiating position has reached. The apparent
reason is that he fears a political backlash from the
rightwing conservative elements that are tightly organ-
ized to maintain the status quo. Some of his political
advisers have been telling him that it would be "politi-
cal suicide" on the eve of an election year to hand to
the likes of Ronald Reagan the ammunition that an
enlightened treaty stance might provide. We submit,
however, that Mr. Ford ought' not to allow himself to
be intimidated by the'specter of a backlash on this
,issue. Just before Congress went on holiday, for in-
stance, more than 60 senators agreed to oppose an anti-
treaty resolution being prepared by Sen. Harry Byrd
(I-Va.)-an impressive display of pro-treaty strength.
If the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to swing publicly be-
hind a reasonable negotiating position, then the op-
position in Congress and the country would surely be
reduced to a manageable hard core.
President Ford, then, has no good reason that we
can see for allowing questionable political and bureau-
cratic considerations to stand in the path of an action
that the national interest plainly requires. He should
stop following a course-delay-that could provoke
canal-closing riots and that could cost the United States
heavily in its international relations, especially in Latin
America. He should move promptly to complete nego-
?tiations on a new treaty with Panama.
Approved For Release 2005/06/29
F
73
AND
COURT-RULINGS
ARE FOR THE
COMMON PEOPLE
David S. Broder
ei~
&975,'
Other Voices
Helsinki Summit
Not since the Congress of Vienna in
1814-15 has there been such a gather-
ing of European heads of government
as . . . the Helsinki Summit.... Then
as now there were those who hoped
the. Congress ... would advance the
cause of peace.... With all its faults
the Vienna Congress did introduce a
period of relative peace and stability.
. The Helsinki declaration is shot
through with expediency and oppor-
tunism..... But there will be some
slight loosening of the barriers that
hampered the free movement of in-
formation. ideas, and people... .
-The Globe and Mail, Toronto
(independent).
Greater human freedom was a ,West-
ern, u'"