THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP76-00183R000500100001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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September 1968
THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION
General Kelly, General Davis,
Gentlemen:
Any child can tell you that if you talk about
the wish you make when you blow out the candles,
it won't come true. A bit later in life, we learn
that any mention of the fact that a pitcher is working
on a no-hit game is likely to ruin his chances.
Those are superstitions, but it happens to be
a fact that an intelligence service tends to lose
some of its security every time it is talked about.
In public, an intelligence service simply does not
crow about its successes, alibi its failures, respond
to criticism, or discuss its business to satisfy pub-
lic curiosity.
Senator Saltonstall, who knows a great deal about
U.S. intelligence operations, once explained to his
constituents that in an open society like ours, it
is impossible to inform the public without informing
our enemies, who make it a practice to read our
newspapers very carefully.
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That is why I welcome opportunities like this
to speak in private, particularly on the relation-
ship between intelligence and policy formulation.
Our critics are neither restricted by se-
curity regulations, nor restrained by the prospect
that we will refute them with facts. As a result,
they have put forth some weird and mischievous ver-
sions of the role and the nature of U.S. intelligence
activities. As far as our public image is concerned,
this is unfortunate, but it is not fatal and we just
have to live with it. Within the government, how-
ever, it is vital that we all have a clear and com-
prehensive understanding of the exact relationship
between intelligence and the rest of the governmental
apparatus--specifically, how intelligence supports
the policy-maker, and how the policy maker controls
intelligence activities.
The
courses,
fact that you are here, attending these
identifies you as men who are going to be
doing a considerable amount of joint staff and joint
committee work in your future career assignments.
A substantial portion of that work is going to involve
special task forces and inter-agency committees, where
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you will be working with--possibly for--the intelli-
gence community.
Accordingly, I think it will be helpful to you,
to your services, and to the intelligence community
itself, for you to be familiar with the concept, the
organization, and the functions of the various ele-
ments in our government which work together to pro-
duce national intelligence.
First, I am going to discuss what we call the
intelligence community! With all the attention that
intelligence has been receiving from the information
media, it is surprising that there is still a good
deal of confusion about the precise meaning of the
phrase, "intelligence community."
This is simply a handy way of referring to all
elements of the Government which are concerned with
obtaining, analyzing, and disseminating foreign in-
telligence. It is a framework within which they
can work together.
The National Security Act of 1947 did not create
the intelligence activities of the U.S. Government.
We had intelligence agents--and good ones, too--in
the Revolutionary War, Before CIA was established,
our Government was obtaining intelligence from the
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Army and the Navy, the Department of State, and the
FBI, and these same organizations are still providing
it.
The National Security Act of 1947 was written
against the backdrop of Pearl Harbor. All investiga-
tions of that black day showed that the intelligence
was there. It had been gathered. But the failure
was that all of the bits and pieces in the hands of
various elements of the Government had not been brought
together in one place?the significant sifted out
from the insignificant?and a unified, coordinated
warning provided time to the people who could act
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on it.
The obvious remedy was to insure that our in-
telligence agencies work together, exchange and com-
pare information, and provide the decision-makers
with the best combined, _aiLt.e_g_. intelligence that is
available. In a nutshell, this is the concept of
the Intelligence Community. The National Security
Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency
for this purpose: to ensure that all of the intelli-
gence in government hands would be assembled,
evaluated, and disseminated as finished intelligence
to those who need to have it.
There are at least two definitions of "national"
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intelligence. You may be more familiar with the dis-
tinction between national intelligence--information
of interest to the entire government?and departmental
intelligence, which serves the needs or falls within
the competence of one particular service,department?
or agency. For the purposes of my discussion, however,
national intelligence is "all intelligence which is
required for the formulation of national security
policy....and which transcends the exclusive competence
of any one department or agency." Put more simply,
it is the information which national leaders need
to make strategic policy.
It follows that finished national intelligence,
as we understand it, must provide the President and
his advisors with the gist of all information avail-
ble from any source and service, and an agreed evalua-
tion of that intelligence and its significance. This
is why it is so important to talk in terms of the
intelligence community, and not the Central Intelli-
gence Agency alone.
If the services, and the State Department, and
CIA, and the FBI are all engaged in gathering in-
formation, any good bureaucrat can tell you that
there are two great dangers:
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The first and the greatest danger is that some
vital assignment will fall between the stools--that
each agency will think somebody else has the
responsibility.
The other danger is duplication of effort--and
this is not merely a question of extravagance. In
intelligence, uncoordinated efforts in the same field
can lead to disasters.
To cope with both these pitfalls--to ensure
enough coordination so that there will be no important
gaps and no undesirable duplication--the National
Security Act of 1947 and subsequent Presidential
instructions gave the Director of Central Intelli-
gence two responsibilities. He is by law the head
of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has the
statutory function of producing coordinated national
intelligence. He is also, by Presidential directive,
the principal or senior Intelligence Officer of the
Government. He guides and coordinates all intel-
ligence activities--anywhere in the Government--re-
lating to the National Security interests of the
United States, and he acts as principal intelligence
advisor to the President.
Let's take a look at the composition of the
intelligence community.
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The first element most people think of in this
context, of course, is the Central Intelligence Agency.
Second, there is the Defense Intelligence Agency,
which reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and through
the Joint Chiefs, to the Secretary of Defense. The
DIA is responsible for intelligence essential to the
discharge of the responsibilities of the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the Unified and Service
commands, and the military departments.
The intelligence units of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force continue to serve the particular missions
of each one of the services. Within the DoD, the
three services components are closely coordinated by
the Director of DIA.
An intelligence component in the State Depart-
ment serves the Secretary of State and the policy
planners. All of our diplomatic personnel are in-
telligence gatherers in a sense. In addition, how-
ever, there is also a requirement for men who apply
themselves professionally to the analysis of that
information, and its bearing on present and future
implications for U.S. foreign policy.
There is an intelligence component in the Atomic
Energy Commission, with a specialized charter devoted
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to the vital field of intelligence on nuclear energy
developments.
The primary functions of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation are concerned with internal security,
but you can easily imagine the connections between
foreign intelligence and internal security. So the
FBI, too, is a member of the intelligence community.
The FBI and the CIA work closely together, because
they are both combatting an opponent whose operations
and agents move back and forth between the U.S. and
foreign countries.
Those, then, except for the NSA which is in a
unique category, are the individual members of the
intelligence community?CIA, State, DIA and the
service components, AEC, and FBI.
Rounding out the picture of the community, there
are a number of a,..LtLona..1,intell42e assets--activities,
which do not serve any particular department or agency,
but serve the entire Government. One agency may man-
age them, and even provide most of the personnel and
equipment, but they actually operate directly for the
entire intelligence community.
The largest of these is the National Security
Agency, which is also a member of the intelligence
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community. Its collection components, scattered
all over the world, are provided by the armed
services.
Another national intelligence asset is the Na-
tional Photographic Interpretation Center, which
deals with intelligence acquired by photographic
means, examining the films in detail, and interpreting
what is to be seen.
I need only mention the detection of the Soviet
medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba in October
1962, to show how essential NPIC is to our intelli-
gence effort.r
A fourth such national intelligence asset is
the Board of National Estimates, which I will discuss
a bit later.
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Now, these intelligence agencies and organiza-
tions I have just enumerated are tied together, for
guidance purposes, by the United States Intelligence
Board, which we often refer to as USIB.
The Director of Central Intelligence, by
Presidential designation, is the Chairman of USIB--
and this, by the way, is one place where the Director's
two jobs--or his "two hats"--are very carefully dif-
ferentiated. When he chairs the U.S. Intelligence
Board, he is there as the President's principal in-
telligence officer, not as the head of CIA. USIB
acts on and approves the agreed, coordinated judgments
of the entire intelligence community, and it would
not be proper or effective for the Director simultane-
ously to chair the meeting and to present the views
of the Central Intelligence Agency. For this reason,
CIA has separate representation on the Board in the
person of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
The other principals are:
The State Department Director of Intelligence
and Research;
The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency;
The Director of the National Security Agency;
The Assistant General Manager of the AEC; and
The Assistant to the Director of the FBI
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Since the consolidation of intelligence under
DIA in the Pentagon, the intelligence chiefs of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force attend and participate,
but as observers rather than as official members of
USIB. They retain the right, and in fact the duty,
to express any dissent they may have on matters under
discussion. If you have seen the National Intelligence
Estimates, with their footnotes, you know that this
is a right they do not hesitate to exercise.
USIB meets regularly once a week--sometimes
more often. USIB is concerned with a wide variety
of matters, but I think it is important to emphasize
that USIB operates as an advisory body to the Director
of Central Intelligence.
USIB has three principal functions.
First, the USIB establishes--and periodically
reviews--the national priorities for the guidance of
the intelligence community in choosing intelligence
targets and in recommending assignment of assets to
cover those targets.
Second, the USIB continuously reviews our for-
eign intelligence activities to determine whether
they are in accord with those priorities, and to
make sure that we are doing everything possible to
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close important gaps, and to avoid unnecessary dup-
lication. Please note that I have modified the
word "duplication" each time I have used it. When
we are trying to get hold of the other fellow's
secrets in the interests of our national security,
a certain amount of duplication is not only desirable,
but even mandatory for the sake of confirmation.
Third, the USIB reviews in draft form and in
great detail the National Intelligence Estimates which
the Director of Central Intelligence submits to the
President.
The actual work of drafting and re-working these
papers is generally done in the Office of National
Estimates, which is a part of CIA, but the final
product is a National Intelligence Estimate, and
must, therefore, reflect the considered judgment of
the entire intelligence community. This is ensured
through the participation of all appropriate elements
of the community/ through the contribution of facts
and judgments, in the revising of the papers in draft,
and by the USIB review of the final product. The
objective of each estimate is a careful and thought-
ful set of judgments which will be of the greatest
possible assistance to the policy maker.
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I want to stress that the men engaged in arriving
at an estimate are not striving for unanimity per
se. It would be possible to achieve unanimity by
overriding the dissenting minority, or by watering
down the estimate to the least common denominator--
a narrow area of complete agreement by the entire
intelligence community. Such unanimity, however,
would be a disservice to the policy maker and the
planner.
What is asked is that the dissents shall be
based on honest differences of opinion over how the
available facts are to be evaluated and interpreted--
not on personal convictions, hunches, or parochial
interests. Within this frame of reference, it is
policy to encourage well-founded dissents.
The Board of National Estimates, which I referred
to a bit earlier, deserves special mention. Until
the British recently moved to set up a similar group,
the Board of National Estimates was the only institu-
tion of its kind in any intelligence service in the
world. As established by General Bedell Smith when he
was Director of Central Intelligence in 1950, it is
a body of senior, knowledgeable men of varied exper-
ience, who have no other duty than to study and seek
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answers to the fundamental questions of national
security. The Board is 'composed of about fifteen
men with extensive backgrounds in the military,
diplomatic, legal, academic, and intelligence pro-
fessions. Their sole function is to hear and con-
sider evidence and argument from the entire intelli-
gence community. These judgments are then presented
to the Director and to USIB, and normally have great
weight in the estimates the Director submits to the
President and his advisors on matters of critical
importance to national security.
A word about the National Estimates themselves.
More than 1,000 Estimates have been prepared in the
last 18 years. They include the standard papers on
such topics as, "The Outlook on Country A, or Area
B," which look ahead two or three years, and deal
with broad trends and expected lines of policy by
the country or in the area in question.
There are the more specialized estimates on
the Soviet military establishment. These papers
are built on a solid base of hard evidence; they
go into greater detail and look further ahead--
usually five years. They focus on such subjects
as the Soviet strategic attack forces, or the gen-
eral purpose forces. The production of these papers
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is timed to assist planning of Defense force levels
and budgets.
A third type, the Special National Intelligence
Estimate, SNIE, includes ad hoc papers on important
questions of the moment, such as the expected re-
action to some proposed course of action by the U.S.
Therefore, the SNIE's may get into some pretty
sensitive areas.
There is a related series of papers, called Na-
tional Intelligence Planning Projections, which are
not very well known. These projections are written
by CIA with the assistance of DIA for the use of the
long-range planners in the Department of Defense.
In these Projections, hard figures are set down on
just how many Polaris-type submarines, or anti-ballistic
missile sites, or a certain type of ballistic missile,
the Soviet Union could have under certain conditions
in, say, October 1976 or June 1978. Projections this
far into the future leave the current base of evidence
quite far behind and are, in effect, a setting forth
of detailed plans for the Soviet Defense establishment
several years before the responsible Russians have to
formulate such plans. I might add that these Pro-
jections have been well received.
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Other activities of the U.S. Intelligence Board
are carried on by committees with specialized functions.
Some of them are regular standing committees, such as
the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, which
follows nuclear developments in the Soviet Union,
France, Communist China, and other countries with
the potential of becoming nuclear powers. A similar
committee, the Guided Missile and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee, concentrates on Soviet Space
and Missile Activity.
Then there are a number of ad hoc committees to
deal with specific crises or recurrent headaches--a
Berlin committee, an Arab-Israeli committee, a Taiwan
Strait committee, to give you some examples out of
the past.
The Watch Committee of the United States Intel-
ligence Board concentrates on the highly specialized
field that we call indications intelligence. The
National Indications Center, located in the Pentagon,
is staffed jointly by the intelligence community. It
keeps track of indicators which might give us early
warning of hostile intentions against the United States
or its allies. This Center and the intelligence
agencies report to the Watch Committee on indications
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which may be significant--or on the absence of any
significant indicators. The Watch Committee has a
regular weekly meeting, timed so that the conclusions
will be ready for the weekly USIB meeting, but in
times of crisis the Watch Committee may meet one or
more times a day.
Against this background, I would like to describe
how the intelligence community makes its contribution
to the decision-makers in our Government.
Let me say first of all that when it comes to
decision-making, it is a firmly established rule
that the only role of intelligence is to supply ob-
jective, substantive intelligence. It may be hard
fact. It may be an intelligence appreciation--the
best judgment of the situation; or it may be estima-
tive--again, a considered judgment of how the situa-
tion is likely to develop. But the important quality
this intelligence must possess is objectivity. It
must not be warped by policy interests, budgetary
concerns, or departmental parochialism.
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The ancient Greek policy makers used toAtheir
estimative intelligence from the Delphic Oracle.
Some of these estimates have been preserved for us
by the historians and playwrights of the time, and
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they offer a tempting pattern. They were so worded
that no matter what happened, the Oracle could later
claim to have been right. The gimmick, of course,
was that each prediction permitted at least two
diametrically opposite interpretations.
The Oracle had, however, discovered the basic
essential for an intelligence service: credibility.
An intelligence service has no value, no purpose,
and no future, if it is not believed by those it
serves.
This is what dictates that an intelligence ser-
vice shall only support, not participate in, policy
making.
The President and his advisers face a choice
between Course A and Course B. Intelligence will
only provide the facts--and the whole range of known
facts--relevant to the choice. Intelligence will
not recommend one course or
that intelligence begins to
proponents of Course B are
believe--that intelligence
the other. The moment
advocate Course A, the
going to suspect--if not
has rigged its reporting
to support that advocacy. Credibility goes out the
window.
The estimative function, of course, includes
contingency papers. These are answers to questions,
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posed by the policy makers, as to the probable con-
sequences or reactions to specific proposed courses
of action by the United States. This is indeed thin
ice for the intelligence community, and I must admit
that it comes close to policy recommendation to con-
clude that such-and-such a course of action would
probably be considered a casus belli by Power X or
Power Y. These papers are undertaken, however, at
the specific request of the policy maker. The con-
clusions are based on a review and analysis of all
the facts available. And if there are rival advocates
among the policy makers, they can always check with
their own intelligence representatives to determine
whether the question has been given objective and
impartial review in the estimative process.
My point is that if there is controversy over
what the U.S. policy or course of action should be,
the opposing advocates must have an impartial source
of objective information which all can trust. The
intelligence community can furnish that objective
foundation, and command the necessary credibility
only if it never engages in advocacy.
I have been talking mainly about estimative
intelligence, but support for the policy maker is
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not limited to telling him what is going to happen,
or likely to happen, in the-future.
The intelligence community also provides basic
intelligence--the type of bread-and-butter facts
you find in the National Intelligence Surveys. This
is the best and most comprehensive information we can
gather about a country: its sociological and demo-
graphic makeup, the railroad system, the ports,
rivers, communications, laws, police, economy, mili-
tary forces.
It is designed to tell the reader more than he
may think he will ever want to know about a country,
about countries with which he may feel he will never
be concerned, from every source available to our
intelligence services. It is in effect a giant
world almanac, which already comprises more than 10
times the volume of information in the Encyclopedia
Britannica, and is still growing.
In this day and age, the currency of intelligence
is not a question of this week's information, or
today's information--it comes down to a question of
hours, and even minutes. A report which is current
at the close of business is likely to be well out of
date by daybreak. The first publication the President
reads in the morning, the President's Daily Brief, is
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updated at CIA Headquarters little more than an hour
before he receives it.
Accordingly, current intelligence has to be a
responsibility 24 hours a day, seven days a week,
drawing on every available and every conceivable source
of information--what we call the all-source basis. It
is handled by instantaneous but secure communications
which link the operations centers or duty offices of
all of the intelligence elements with the operations
centers or situation rooms of all of the principal
policy makers. And current intelligence must rely on
the fastest possible passage of critical information,
from the field, into Washington for the essential
evaluation process, and then onward to alert govern-
ment leaders to emergencies, crises, and other signi-
ficant developments on a real-time basis. In essence,
the ultimate deadline for currency in intelligence re-
porting today is the half-hour or so it takes an ICBM
to arch half-way around the world.
Much of what I have said so far about our intel-
ligence production was intended to dispel the idea that
the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Intelligence
Community, somehow "makes" U.S. policy. Now let me
turn to the allegation that CIA operates without any
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controls, that it makes and implements its own policy,
sometimes in contravention of the professed policy of
the United States.
This is the other side of the relationship be-
tween intelligence and policy: the controls which
the policy makers, the elected authorities of the
U.S. government, have and exercise over even the
most secret of our intelligence activities.
Essentially, we are now talking about functions
which, within the intelligence community, are peculiar
to CIA. I want to discuss briefly where we get our
charter for these activities, and how they are gen-
erated, planned, organized, and controlled.
The National Security Act of 1947 gave CIA five
functions:
One, To advise the National Security Council--
and of course the President--on intelligence matters
relating to national security;
Two, To support and advise the National Security
Council in the coordination of all foreign intelli-
gence activities of our government;
Three, To produce and disseminate finished
national intelligence within the government;
Four, To provide those services of common
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concern for intelligence which can best be undertaken
centrally; and
Five, To perform such other services as the
National Security Council may direct.
Four presidents and 21 years later, the language
of the statute requires a couple of brief footnotes;
For one thing, it is often stated that the CIA
was created to coordinate the intelligence activities
of the government. Strictly speaking, this is not
correct. The Act of 1947 directed the CIA to make
recommendations to the National, Security Council on
coordination; the CIA recommended, and the NSC ordered,
that this coordination would be effected by the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence as the President's
principal intelligence officer. This the Director
does, to a large extent through the USIB machinery.
To deal with another aspect of coordination, I have
recently established a three-man National Intelli-
gence Resources Board, chaired by my Deputy and in-
cluding the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State. In a period when intelligence
requirements appear to be growing and the resources
to deal with them shrinking at about the same pace,
this board has the unenviable task of matching
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responsibilities with assets. Their recommendations
help me to determine, along with the proper authori-
ties at Defense and State, the most desirable and
economical methods of intelligence collection.
Finally, I have a senior intelligence officer
with a small but experienced staff within CIA, as-
signed to continuing review and evaluation of the
major programs encompassing the activities of the
intelligence community. So much for the machinery
of coordination.
The second footnote concerns statutory theory
and practice. The National Security Act of 1947
ties the CIA in directly under the supervision of
the National Security Council. The National Security
Council was created by statute; it is listed in
the government organization manuals; and a succession
of statutes has specified its membership. The Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, by statute, attends
as an advisor.
The fact of the matter is that successive
presidents have differed in their use of the NSC--
differed from each other, and even changed concepts
within a presidential term.
Lest anyone should argue that the CIA is there-
fore controlled by a sometimes inactive or dormant
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body, let me state that whether the statutory NSC
was meeting hourly, daily, weekly, or infrequently,
under any given administration, each President has
had continuing machinery within his cabinet or his
White House staff to deal with NSC questions, and
these questions have included continuing control over
the Central Intelligence Agency.
With those two footnotes, I think we can pass
over the first four functions assigned to CIA, and
concentrate on the crux of the problem, the fifth
assignment: to perform such other services as the
National Security Council may direct.
This is our charter for covert actions. I
propose to tell you why they are necessary, and
how they are controlled. I will leave it up to
you, if you wish, to consider whether there is, or
should be, or could be, some other agency of the
government where these responsibilities might better
be assigned.
In the "Cold War," which has existed longer
than there has been a CIA, we face an enemy adept
at conspiracy and subversion, with worldwide
clandestine assets, skilled agents, and no com-
punction about undermining or overthrowing any
Government which resists the spread of Communism.
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There are apt to be occasions when it is import-
ant for the United States, in order to counter these
Communist efforts, to have its own capability to
respond by covert or clandestine operations. This
is not necessarily because the United States would
be ashamed of either the objectives or the methods.
It is primarily because it sometimes takes clandestine
methods to beat clandestine methods--just as a killer
submarine is one of the best weapons to use against
another submarine.
This is the shadowy, twilight zone of Government
operations that Congress had in mind when it directed
CIA to perform "such other services" as the National
Security Council might direct.
Whenever the CIA carries out a covert operation
overseas, it is with the prior approval of a special
committee of the National Security Council. This
committee is chaired by the President's Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs, representing
the President. He meets once a week--or more often
if necessary--with the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and representatives of the Secretaries of State
and Defense--normally the Deputy Secretary of Defense
and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs.
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Covert operations which the Agency proposes to
conduct overseas, and which are of major importance
or carry with them significant risk of exposure or
embarrassment, are presented to this committee. These
may be political, psychological, economic, or para-
military operations. Whatever their nature, they either
win the approval of the committee, or they do not take
place.
When covert operations are approved in advance
by representatives of the President, The Secretary
of State, and the Secretary of Defense, it is obvious
that these operations are not going to be contrary
to--or outside of--the guidelines established by
United States Government policy.
Our undertakings must also have the approval
of the Bureau of the Budget. Certain officials
of that Bureau have been given full clearance to
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inquire into all of the activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency in detail--and believe me,
they make full use of that authority.
In addition to such prior approvals, there
are other elements of the executive branch which
have the same full clearance to monitor our con-
tinuing operations, and conduct post-mortems on
those which have been completed.
Some of these have been ad hoc groups--such
as the Clark Committee, the Doolittle Committee,
and the Hoover Commission task forces.
On a permanent basis, all of the intelligence
operations of the U.S. Government are under the
continuing scrutiny of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board. This board was
formed in January 1956, under Dr. James Killian
of M.I.T. It is now headed by General Maxwell
Taylor, who succeeeded Clark Clifford when Mr.
Clifford became Secretary of Defense. It is an
assemblage of distinguished private citizens, ap-
pointed by and reporting to the President. It
meets for a couple of days every two months to
examine--in depth and in detail--the work, the
progress, and the problems of the entire U.S. in-
telligence program. Between regular meetings,
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subcommittees carry on continuing investigations of
our successes and failures in intelligence.
The present Board includes--former high
Government officials such as Ambassador Robert
Murphy, former Under Secretary of State; Mr. Frank
Pace, Jr., former Secretary of the Army and Director
of the Budget; and Mr. Gordon Gray, who was Presi-
dent Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs;
--former military men, General Taylor and Admiral
John Sides;
--men from the academic world like Professor William
Langer of Harvard; and
--prominent leaders in business and technology,
such as Dr. William 0. Baker of Bell Telephone
Laboratories, and Dr. Edwin Land, Head of Polaroid.
We are not only under effective control by
the Executive Branch--whatever you may have read
to the contrary--we are also under the continuing
scrutiny of the Legislative Branch.
Ever since CIA was first established, the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence has been authorized by
the President, and in fact instructed, to make complete
disclosure of CIA activities to special subcommittees
in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
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The Congress has created subcommittees of the
Armed Services Committees in both the House and
Senate to hear these reports.
Also, as you may have surmised from my refer-
ences to the Bureau of the Budget, our operations
require money. Our headquarters are in Langley,
Virginia, not at Fort Knox, and our appropriations
requests are discussed in full with special subcom-
mittees of Senate and House Appropriations.
Some of the confusion over CIA's relations with
Congress arises from the fact that these four special
subcommittees, and only, these--about 30 legislators
in all--have been cleared by the President to inquire
in detail into our activities and operations.
We will, of course, brief any congressional com-
mittee having a jurisdictional interest in our sub-
stantive intelligence from all over the world. In
the course of a year, there may be 20 or 30 such
committee hearings--and some of them run as long as
three full days. We also brief individual congress-
men frequently at their request.
But discussion of CIA activities, methods, and
sources is another matter. It involves the lives of
people who work with us, and the efficacy of our
methods. These matters are discussed only with the
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special subcommittees designated for these purposes.
This is not arbitrary or bureaucratic; it is simply
recognition that the risk of inadvertent disclosure
rises with the number of people who have access to
sensitive information of this type.
Where disclosure is authorized, it is complete.
With the special subcommittees, I discuss covert op-
erational matters and other intelligence aspects
which are so sensitive that even within CIA only a
small percentage of our personnel are authorized to
be informed.
I am happy to say that the members of these sub-
committees, over the years, have established an en-
viable security record, and have repaid our candor
with constructive and welcome support. Accordingly,
I can perceive no cause for terror in the suggestion
that I should report to what the press likes to call
a "joint watchdog committee." I already do.
The Director of Central Intelligence is required
by statute to safeguard the security of U.S. intel-
ligence sources and methods, but the laws and Presi-
dential directive have also provided that the Direc-
tor shall report to authorized representatives of the
Congress. The question of who shall hear that report
is a matter for the leadership of Congress to decide.
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My only objection to the demands for a watchdog com-
mittee is the completely erroneous implication that
there is no such machinery at present.
So much, then, for the charge that CIA is under
no controls, and that nobody in Washington is told
what CIA is doing.
Finally, if I may, I want to devote a few
moments to the types of people who work for the CIA.
The fact of the matter is that James Bond and
his colleagues of the spy movies and novels do not
convey an accurate picture of intelligence work in
this era.
A commentary in the London Economist makes my
point pretty well with this summary: "Modern in-
telligence has to do with the painstaking collection
and analysis of fact, the exercise of judgment, and
clear and quick presentation. It is not simply what
serious journalists would always produce if they had
time; it is something more rigorous, continuous, and
above all operational--that is to say, related to
something that somebody wants to do or may be forced
to do."
The CIA employee is a much more academic man
than the public realizes. We may have a few men with
the debonair aplomb of Napoleon Solo, but we have
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more than 800 senior professionals with 20 years or
more of intelligence background. Three quarters of
our officers speak at least one foreign language.
About 15 percent have graduate degrees. Six out of
every 10 of the analysts who have direct responsi-
bility at Headquarters for analysis of a foreign
area had lived, worked, or traveled abroad in that
area even before they came to CIA.
When you combine all of the years required for
graduate study, foreign experience, and then add
10 to 15 years of intelligence work, it amounts to
an impressive depth of knowledge, competence, and
expertise at the service of our Government.
We could easily and adequately staff the
faculty of a small university with our experts.
I have discussed with you how the Central Intelligence
Agency serves the Government, how it is controlled,
and briefly, what manner of man works there. I have
left to the end one final question: "Why?"
For the answer, let me quote a couple of outside
witnesses:
Secretary of State Rusk in December 1965, told
a public meeting of the White House Conference on
International Cooperation:
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"I would emphasize to you that CIA is not en-
gaged in activities not known to the senior policy
officers of the Government. But you should also
bear in mind that beneath the level of public discus-
sion, there is a tough struggle going on in the back
alleys all over the world. It is a tough one, it's
unpleasant,
field which
and
can
And so, once in
no one likes it, but that is not a
be left entirely to the other side.
a while, some disagreeable things
happen, and I can tell you that there is a good deal
of gallantry and a high degree of competence in those
who have to help us deal with that part of the strug-
gle for freedom."
In April 1965, President Johnson put it this
way: "We have committed our lives, our property,
our resources and our sacred honor to the freedom
and peace of other men, indeed, to the freedom and
peace of all mankind. We would dishonor that com-
mitment, we would disgrace all the sacrifices Ameri-
cans have made, if we were not every hour of every
day vigilant against every threat to peace and
freedom. That is why we have the Central Intelli-
gence Agency."
To sum up, the intelligence community of the
United States Government comprises all of the
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intelligence components of the various agencies and
departments, operating under the advice and guidance
of the United States Intelligence Board, and the
Director of Central Intelligence as the principal
intelligence officer of the President.
Its principal function is to provide the intel-
ligence appreciations which the decision-makers need
in order to formulate policy, and to give them timely
warning and expert analysis of developments bearing
on the national security of the United States. In-
telligence supports policy--it does not formulate it.
The authority for intelligence, covert and
clandestine activities comes from the President and
the National Security Council, and these activities
are subject to approval and review by appropriate
bodies of both the executive and legislative branches.
Authors writing about the Central Intelligence
Agency have often been fascinated by the scriptural
quotation in the lobby of the CIA Headquarters
building: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth
shall make you free."
In the present day, maybe the outsiders would
have more understanding for the role of intelligence
in the free world if the quotation said:
"The truth shall keep you free."
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