DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION ACT, 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000700060017-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: August 21, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 21, 1974
the procedure. Does that state it sub-
stantially?
Mr. MUSKIE. That states it precisely,
may I say to the Senator. We have no
Interest in blocking the project. We a
just concerned with the particular aspe
of it that I have described.
Mr. McCLELLAN. If my distinguis
colleague, the Senator from North
kota (Mr. YOUNG), has no objectio
his side of the aisle, I see no object
the amendment, and I would be wil
accept it and take it to conferen
Mr. YOUNG. I have no objec
fact, I think the Senator fro
makes a good cage.
Mr. MUSKIE. May I expre
predation to both of my co
The PRESIDING OFFI
tion is on agreeing to the
the Senator from Maine.
The amendment was agr
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. Pr
gest the absence of a quor
The PRESIDING OFFI
will call the roll.
? The second assistant
proceeded to call the rol
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr
unanimous consent
the quorum call be res
The PRESIDING
objection, it is so orde
a-
on
to
g to
. In
Maine
my ap-
gues.
e ques-
dment of
to.
dent, I sug-
The cler
gislative cler
esident, I ask
the order for
ded.
CER. Without
DISTRICT OF CO MBIA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ACT s.ONFERENCE RE-
PORT
Mr. EAGLETO Mr. President, I
submit a report of e committee of con-
ference on S. 370 and ask for its imme-
diate considerati
The PRESIDI OFFICER. The re-
port will be stat by title.
The second a istant legislative clerk
read as follows:
The committe f conference on the dis-
agreeing votes the two Houses on the
amendment oft House to the bill (S. 3'703)
to authorize in he District of Columbia a
plan providing or the representation of
defendants wh ? are financially unable to
obtain an ade uate defense in criminal
cases in the co ts of the District of Colum-
bia, and for oth purposes, having met, after
full and free erence, have agreed to rec-
ommend and recommended to their re-
spective House this report, signed by a ma-
jority of the erees.
The PRE- 'ING OFFICER. Is there
objection to e consideration of the con-
ference rep ?
There bei g no objection, the Senate
proceeded e consider the report.
(The con rence report is printed in
the House roceedings of the CONGRES-
SIONAL RE D of August 15, 1974, at pp.
H8448-H84,0.)
Mr. EAG ETON. Mr. President, I move
the adopti s of the conference report on
S. 3703.
The PR IDING 0.10.1e10ER. The ques-
tion is on greeing to the motion of the
Senator f m Missouri.
The mi ion was agreed to.
MESSAO FROM THE PRESIDENT
A mess go from the President of the
United S ates was communicated to the
Senate b Mr. Marks, one of his secre-
taries.
EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED
As in executive session, the Acting
President pro tempore (Mr. Norm) laid
before the Senate a message from the
President of the United States submit-
ting the nomination of William R. Craw-
ford, Jr., of Pennsylvania, to be Ambas-
sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America to the
Republic of Cyprus, which was referred
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
NOTE
In yesterday's RECORD, at page 15354,
third column, a message from the Presi-
dent of the United States is shown as
having been referred to the Committee
on Appropriations. This reference is in-
correct. The message has now been re-
ferred to the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATION ACT, 1975
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill (H.R. 16243) mak-
ing appropriations for the Department of
Defense for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1975, and for other purposes.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, what
is the pending order of business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. HR.
16243.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I call
up my amendment No. 1836.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will state the amendment.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On page 50, between lines 20 and 21, insert
a new section as follows:
SEC. 848. No funds in excess of $81,000,-
000,000 may be appropriated pursuant to this
Act.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the distin-
guished junior Senator from Delaware
(Mr. BIDEN) be added as a cosponsor to
the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, the
amendment I propose today to the de-
fense appropriations bill is motivated by
two important considerations: First, that
waste and mismanagement due to several
years of overspending have diminished
rather than expanded the effectiveness
of our conventional forces; second, that
the severe inflation facing our economy
today and in the foreseeable future ne-
cessitates a real reduction in budgetary
outlays for fiscal year 1975 and beyond.
The distinguished chairman of the
Appropriations Committee knows that
I greatly admire the work he has done
on this bill. But despite the reductions
that have been made, the defense budget
continues to grow disproportionately
while the American people have less to
show for it.
Last year, General Brown, now chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned:
We are going to be out of business if we
don't find ways to cut costs.
But the $82.1 billion budget we con-
sider today is permeated with wasteful
programs which add nothing to the na-
tional security. And, as such, it is a dis-
incentive in the search for managerial
Innovation in the important areas of
weapons procurement and manpower
utilization.
Each year we hear the symptoms of
mismanagement?cost overruns, weap-
ons failures in combat, reductions in
quantities of arms due to excessive costs,
burgeoning headquarters personnel, and
excessive numbers of support forces. It
Is no longer possible to argue that more
money will give us a stronger national
defense. And there is no time more ap-
propriate than during this period of
rampant inflation to establish a budget
ceiling which will encourage change.
It is my firm belief that there is no
more intelligent and creative group in
these United States than the men and
women of our military services. When
you add the managers and employees of
the largest corporations in America, you
have a force which is indeed formidable.
But in recent years that force has been
misdirected by a budgetary process
which encourages deceit and punishes
innovation. And Congress must share the
blame.
During the 5 years I have served in
this body, I can think of only one de-
fense debate?excluding Vietnam?
which provided congressional and pub-
lic exposure of the issues equal to their
importance. That was the ABM debate.
Senator MCINTYRE'S excellent efforts on
Trident and counterforce notwithstand-
ing, we have generally failed in provid-
ing an adequate forum for debate on
some of the most crucial issues of our
time. And the defense bill has grown
heavy under the burden of unnecessary
weapons and programs.
We have also failed to scrutinize the
defense budget because too often such
spending is considered worthwhile in
"Grand Rapids" and a "wasteful boon-
doggle in Oklahoma," as it was so aptly
put by President Ford in a slightly dif-
ferent context.
But I am optimistic. I do not believe
that parochialism need doom Congress
to a perpetual inability to reduce or elim-
inate specific items in the defense budg-
et. Today, however, we must recognize
the obvious political reality and act ac-
cordingly. We must seek ways to con-
sider this budget on a national scale and
reduce it to its proper level.
Though there is always a measurable
limit to our economy's ability to support
both defense needs and consumer de-
mand, a strong defense and a healthy
economy are not mutually exclusive
goals. Both are vital to our national
well-being and both should entail na-
tional sacrifice. It is our job to find the
lines beyond which we cannot venture?
at the upper extremity lest we stimulate
more inflation?and at the lower, ex-
tremity lest we weaken our defense pos-
ture.
It is my firm conviction that an $81 bil-
lion ceiling on new budgetary authority
is more than adequate to maintain the
effectiveness of our military forces. My
only concern is that it may still be too
high to help in the battle against infla-
tion.
In that regard, it is important to un-
derstand that, due to the peculiar nature
of defense spending, any savings we can
effect in this budget will be particularly
helpful in countering inflation in the cur-
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P.IGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
ihroved For&
August 21,
has been investigating possiVe sites In
Maine r the radar systerx However,
until June 25 of Illis year?
passage of tlrie military
thorization be?that the
ced the se tion of a
tter site 1 western
er Site jn eastern
It was n
after Sen
procuremern
Air Force ann
"preferred" tra
Maine and a re
Maine.
The receiver site, in
of valuable farmland, h
most concern among Ma
land in question produces
Maine's total blueberry cro
estimated annual cash value
As a result, Maine citizens an
officials seek adequate appo ni
to point out to the Air Force e ad
economic impact of the ssle site
to solicit from the Air Force 1.9format1
as to the availability and cost pf alterna-
the tech-
ra.
Environ-
ve been
the Air
,000 acres
rated the
zens. The
ercent of
th an
7,000.
tate
tive sites which would still me
nical requirements of the sy
Public hearings on the bra
mental Impact Statement
scheduled for September a
Force has encouraged public_corrunent.
At the same time, however, tire are in-
dications that development the pro-
posed site is proceeding apape. There-
fore, the hearings may notM ovide an
it
adequate opportunity for a e citizens
to convince the Air Force of e impor-
tance of the land in question til our econ-
omy. The purchase of land tions on
some tracts involved in the s'stem are
scheduled to take place pr4ir to the
hearing. Also, potential cont4tors were
re quested on July 25 to sub detailed
proposals and cost estimate* on site
development.
This amendment is intende t =imply to
limit any further action on si Outs/-
tion and development of the ?prototype
receiver mitil additional inforration on
the matter of site selection 1.1 obtained.
It is not our intent to preys* the Air
Force from proceeding with d lopment
of the radar technology and ,other re-
search activities associated 'with t
0TH system. ,
I believe the delay I era urgtng is
sonable and will assure that:NI
of Congress and the cit17ens of
will have ample opportunity 30
the questions which have bee
We are currently holding
with the Air Force, and I
today's vote?evidence of th
of the Senate to the pr
the Proposed receiver site
system?will generate
erative spirit which we
order to resolve the pr
I ask unanimous
printed in the Ilse?
recent corresPOnde
the Air Force
There being
were ordered ti e
as follows:
Maj. Gen. M.
Director, Le
the
DEAR
Colonel
Admi
Over-
dar
cour
ne
olve
ed.
Ions
hopeful
nativity
ncerning
r the 0TH
na of coop-
ed to have in
ems.
onsent to have
t this Point some
I have had with
rning this Matter.
objection, the letters
printed in the RECORD,
AUGUST 13, 1974-
SpOBWELL,
ice Liaison, Department of
Force, Washington, b.c.
BRAM BOSWELL: On nugest 9,
ace Wood briefed my staff on the
ation's plans to build aprototype
e-Horizon-Backscatter (07H-B) ra-
em in the State of Mabee. In the
of the briefing, several queetions were
raised which Colonel Wood suggested would
S 15527
CONUS 0TH-B system is aircraft detection.
answered in writing for the record. The distinguishing chareeteristics of aa
Specifically, the following questions were 0TH-B radar is Its ability ? use the lose"-
raised abeut which I would like to know the sphere to reflect the high uency (BF)
Air Forces thinking: How does the orii-13 signals around the earth's'store, typi-
improve the current DEW lam? How likely eally on the order of dorneters. This
is it that an operational 0TH-B would be capability provides a lel to provide a
able to detect the kind of subsonic raleeiles quantum improvenae in the range at
that an adversary might employ? How does which aircraft Can etected, and at all
the planned development of an 07*-B aye- altitudes down to t earth's surface. It will
tern relate to the Executive projected re- 136 possible, th e, with an operational
(Motions in. the Air National Guard? What OTFI-B radar to t and provide warn ng
conedderation was given to the economic im- of an asive ircsraft before they Pe le-
-pact of constructing the 0TH-B on. the State trate to the neceeeary to launch their
of Maine and, specifically on Washington subsonic lea.
County? Finally, what criteria were used for 3. Q How does the planned de.
choosing the receiver site in 'Township 19, as velopm of an 0TH-B system relate to he
opposed to another nearby site with less ad- gneeu projected reductions in the kir
verse ecohornic impact? Nati Guard?
Since the Congress is currently considering
the yr '75 Military Procurement Appropria-
as BM, I would appreciate the favor of an
ly reply.
Sincerely,
Hon. En
U.S. Sena
DEAR SENA omit: This
to your letter ugust 12,
the Air Force On
seeming the
(0TH-B) Radar
Specific answers
contained in the a
copy of the
?Impact Statement
Environmental
forwarded for
tent to note
renter and
finalized un
cies sad th
to comm
Evian-Ns S. Musicie,
U.S. Senat
EPARTMENT OF THE Axe FOR
Wigton, D.C., August 2
S. Musson,
tY
inf
the 'coati
stations
atter Federal a
ic have had an
on the Draft Ste
may su t their comments to
As for Environmental
of the tary of the Air Force, or
of t. open hearings scheduled for
her ? 12, and 13. The deadline for
Is September 23.
all comments are considered, we
pare and issue a Final Environmental Im-
t Statement setting forth our decisions.
o action can be taken to implement the
decision until 30 days after release of the
Final Statement.
If we can be of further assistance in this
Matter, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
ROBERT B. TANG1TE,
Brigadier General, USAF, Dep. Dir.
Legislative Liaison..
OVER-THE-HORIZON BACKEDATIMS (0TH-B)
REDAR PROGRAM
1. Question: How does the 0TH-B im-
prove the current DEW Line?
Answer: The present Air Force program
and long-range plans call for two 0TH-B
radars, ORB sited in the Northeast in the
State of mtaine and one sited in the North-
west portion of the Continental United
States (at)Nms) . When operational these
'two sites will preclude an end run of the
DEW Line in the north. The initial phase
Is to design and develop a limited coverage
prototype and conduct a teat and evaluation
for one year for the purpose of validating
system concepts and dennitizing perform-
ance and costs before building the opera-
tional sites.
2. Question: How likely is it that an oper-
stiorml 0TH-B would be able to detect the
kind of subsonic missiles that an adversary
might employ?
Answer: Although it is possible for an
0TH-S radar to detect the missiles to which
you refer, the primary mission of the
974.
response
requesting
stineas con-
Bacicscatter
ur questions are
at. In addition. a
ft Environmental
the Connell on
ily 30, 1974, in
It is impor-
the trans-.
t become
ty
They
ecial
: The long-range surveillance and
warning which is possible with the
-B system is more vital than ever in
new of the projected reductions in the Air
National Guard Interceptor Force and our
ability to react And intercept potentially
hostile aircraft entering our novereign air-
space. The 0TH-B system will Significantly
increase the warning time available to alert
National Command Authorities such that
appropriate action can be token to deter-
mine the identity and purpcas of the ni-
t:ruder.
4. Question: What consideration was given
to the economic impact of constructing the
OTH-B on the State of Maine and, specifi-
cally, on Washington County?
Answer: Consideration of site locatic na
during the concept formulation phase was
based primarily on technical and operational
criteria. Once the State of Maine was ccn-
sidered optimum under these criteria, erten-
sive consideration of the economic Impact
In the local areas within the State was fac-
tored into the final site selection. Recoin-
rnendations were solicited and received frcm
the State of Maine Land Development of-
flatele on possible site locations, and the
preferred site takes into conakieration the
availability at land and the economic con-
ditions.
5. Question: What criteria were used for
choosing the receiver site in Township 19, as
opposed to another nearby site with lees ad-
verse economic impact?
Answer: The detailed criteria used for
lug the receiver site are contained in
vised Draft Environmental Statement
elude minimum Radio Frequency In-
ce (RPI distances), economic impact,
n densities, existing soil and foliage
dezisit topography, wad other neeeciatel
Impacts costs. The selected site in Town-
ship 19 onsidered optimum in this case.
Surveys ? areas around the Township 19
site dete that the topography was less
than technic desirable due to orientation
and size. Co tion in the possible sur-
rounding areas ld, therefore, necessitate
relocation and grading
ts and enviroranental
extensive land
with much high
impact.
Mr. MUSKIE. I eciate the pis -
tience of the disttngui ? floor manager
of the bill, the roes Arkansas
(Mr. MoCimizAa), in considers -
tion to this amendment.
Mr. McCI.ELLAN. Mr.
Senator will yiekl, as! u
are not taking the money out
we are simply providing for
ture until some of these Problem
further considered and hopefully
out.
Mr. MUSKIE. The Senator is co
Mr. McCLICLLAN. It is not killing
project, but it is trying to make an ac-
commodations? that there can be a spirit
of cooperation and good will as a part of
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Auguk 21, 1974. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
rent fiscal year and beyond. In the jargon
of the economist, defense spending is
"inherently inflationary" due to its "non-
productive demand generating nature."
In plain English, defense expenditures
translate into consumer demand, but for
every dollar that goes into defense pro-
duction, there is one less potential dollar
for the production of consumer goods.
The increase in consumer demand re-
sulting from defense spending and the
simultaneous reduction in supply create
a classic inflationary environment.
Furthermore, other than increasing
consumer demand, defense spending has
a limited impact on economic growth.
Private spending?or even nonmilitary
Public spending?can create capital
goods which can add to the total pro-
ductive capability of the economy and
also create more jobs. Goods produced for
military purposes have no such return.
It is not my intention to base my entire
case today on economic theory. I recog-
Pin that any theory has a countertheory,
especially in the field of economics. But I
do believe it is necessary to characterize
the nature of the Federal spending my
amendment seeks to reduce.
President Ford has reaffirmed his pred-
ecessor's goal of reducing outlays in fis-
cal 1975 below the $305 billion originally
requested. Congress, for its part, has also
resolved to cut the budget; $5 billion is
the goal most frequently cited, although
the Senate has twice gone on record as
favoring a $10 billion cut. But according
to the most recent budgetary scorekeep-
ing report, appropriations bills and other
legislative spending measures enacted as
of August 2 place us $1.1 billion over the
administration's request.
Of the $305 billion Federal budget,
only $84 billion are in the controllable
category; that is, items not already desig-
nated for payment by other legislative
measures. Of that $84 billion, $58 billion,
or 70 percent, is attributable to defense
spending. There, if we cannot establish
an $81 billion ceiling on this appropria-
tions bill, I think it will make it more
difficult for us to tell our constituents
that Congress is going to cut the Federal
budget.
I have heard no one proclaim that the
fight against inflation is a 1-year battle.
In this regard, a reduction in this budget
.will help in curbing budgetary outlays in
later years as well, since much .of the
Procurement and research money we will
appitopriate will not be spent in this fiscal
year.
As I said earlier, we have overspent
for defense in the recent past. There is
no better illustration of that assertion
than to examine the unexpended bal-
_ances on hand at the-end of the past 4
fiscal years. This amount has risen
steadily from $31 billion in fiscal 1972
to an estimated $44.1 billion at the end of
fiscal 1975.
This means that, increasingly, goods
and services for which the Defense De-
partment has contra&ed are being de-
livered at a slower, pace than appropri-
ated money is being poured into the sys-
tem. We are appropriating more money
than the delivery system can keep up
with. While there will always be unex-
pended balances, they should remain
steady or decrease, except in wartime.
The current trend is causing a serious
distortion which my amendment would
help rectify.
In his book, "The Politics of the Budg-
etary Process," Aaron Wildavsky said the
most successful tactic in assuring the
financial growth of a bureaucracy was
the technique of "incrementalism." In
other words, an agency should ask Con-
gress for just a little more than it wants
even while it wants a little more than
it needs. In the past 2 years the Defense
Department has probably caused Mr.
Wildavsky to want to rewrite his book.
Soon after the fiscal 1974 budget was
approved, DOD asked for a supplemental
appropriation of $6.2 billion. The very
day they asked for the $6.2 billion as
a supplemental the Pentagon submitted
its fiscal year 1975 request calling for
an $11.4 billion increase. But even that
request did not stand. Budget amend-
ments were received in the spring which
raised the fiscal year 1975 request to
$87.1 billion. Thus, if the fiscal year 1974
supplemental is included, the total in-
crease requested by the Defense Depart-
ment since the fiscal year 1974 budget
was enacted on December 20, 1973, is
$19 billion.
In action to date Congress has reduced
those requests by only $6.5 billion?this
includes a $1.5 billion reduction of the
fiscal year 1974 supplemental and the re-
duction of $5 billion approved by the
Senate Appropriations Committee. It
seems clear that the Defense Depart-
ment's mastery over the politics of the
budgetary process is unsurpassed.
Now, as we debate an amendment
which would allow an increase in the de-
fense budget of $6.8 billion over the
amount appropriated last year we hear
calls of alarm from those who would
rather ignore the total DOD request?
the supplementals, the budget amend-
ments, the special aid for the Middle East
war?and the admission that at least
$1.5 billion in outlays was put into the
budget for economic purposes rather
than defense purposes.
This budget is a model for the tech-
nique of "incrementalism." It is still
more than the Pentagon wants, to say
nothing of what it really needs.
Mr. President, as I said at the outset,
it is my hope than an $81 billion budget
would encourage positive managerial
change within the Defense Department.
This year I had the opportunity to ex-
amine one of the more current mana-
gerial innovations at Defense, the so-
called "design-to-cost" program. It was
adopted with great fanfare In 1969 at the
insistence of then Deputy Defense Secre-
tary David Packard.
On January 28, 1974, approximately 5
years after Mr. Packard made "design-
to-cost" an official DOD policy, I asked
about the current status of the program.
I wanted to know the cost goals that had
been set for each weapons system.
I was amazed to find that the vast ma-
jority of systems were not yet under the
program 5 years after David Packard
S 15529
for the first time to determine how and
whether weapons programs would come
under a "design-to-cost" requirement.
"Design-to-cost" is a good program,
but there is simply no incentive to care
about cost goals when there are so many
tax dollars to be spent.
David Packard posed a general cure for
the problems which afflict our Defense
Establishment when he said:
We are going to have to stop this problem
of people playing games with each other.
Games that will destroy us, if we do not
bring them to a halt.
The "game playing" to which Mr.
Packard referred is the most debilitating
symptom of our failure to bring efficiency
to defense. Unfortunately, the budgetary
process itself may inspire the most de-
structive tendencies.
For example, military planners under-
stand that the public seeks dramatic, not
marginal, improvements in the perform-
ance of a particular weapon. Imagina-
tions, therefore, work overtime in
establishing performance goals that are
frequently unattainable, often unneces-
sary and sometimes downright imprac-
tical.
Next, it is felt necessary to understate
costs. In this the military services have
ready allies. Contractors abound who are
willing to bid low to buy in. And when
the Pentagon comes before Congress to
certify the low cost of a new system, it
does so with the support of industry.
The military planner also understands
that it is difficult to sell long-range proj-
ects. Consequently, a schedule is drawn
up which shows quick progression from
milestone to milestone. Scarce margin
is left for error and the pressure to de-
liver often leaves little time for adequate
preproduction testing.
The direct consequence of this exces-
sive concurrency in weapons develop-
ment is the cost overrun. We have, all
heard the incredible toll these overruns
take. In 1972, according to GAO, 77
major systems had accumulated overruns
totaling $28.7 billion. This year a GAO
study of 55 major systems revealed over-
runs of $26.3 billion.
There is simply no getting around it,
from the contractor to the military proj-
ect officer to the Secretarys of Army,
Navy, and Air Force, the message is clear:
cutting costs is not the way to get ahead.
It is time that Congress sent a new mes-
sage to the decisionmakers at the De-
fense Department.
Mr. President, I have said repeatedly
today that the budget that we are con-
sidering contains waste?that $81 billion
Is more than adequate to maintain the
effectiveness of our forces. While I am
sure the vast majority of American peo-
ple would agree that the defense budget
does contain waste, I would not expect
any Member of this body to support a
ceiling on military expenditures that
could not be supported by specific sug-
gestions of areas where reductions can
be made. Congress has a constitutional
responsibility to assure that our military
forces are properly equipped to maintain
our security.
had put it into place. Indeed, my letter I would also concede that in enumerat-
forced the military services to sit down lng areas where further reductions could
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August .21, 197.e
be made, my judgment is not infallible.
I will, therefore, discus,s reductionAtotal-
ing twice as much as are necessary to
achieve the $81 billioneceiling. Certainly,
the defense experts onswhose recommen-
dations I will base my suggestions must
be correct at least half the time.
Mr. President, we will begin discussing
several duff event weapon systems and De-
fense Departmenteprograms, the sum ag-
gregate of which twill be close to double
what I am recommending insofar as a
cut in this year's budget is concerned.
In addition, I have attempted to steer
away from programs and systems which
I believe have been subjected to the de-
bate and decision of this body. Systems
such as the Trident submarine, the B-1
bomber, counterforce aeid programs such
as MASF aid to South Vietnam enost
certainly require our continued surveil-
lance, but they will not,be part of my list
of potential savings.
If I may, Mr. President, I will now go
Into an item-by-item analysis of where
I think substantial cuts can be made in
this budget.
MILITARY PERSVNNEL
Mr. President, I will begin my discus-
sion of potential reductions in the man-
power area.
The committee has made a note-
worthy step in dealing with the problem
of excess forces stationed overseas. A
withdrawal of 25,000 tropps is to be com-
pleted by March 31, 1975. This require-
ment combined with the reduction in
total end strength of 24,211 could mean
that the Department of Defense will
make major dollar savings from the over-
seas withdrawals.
On the other hand, the Senate Armed
Services Committee in their report on
the authorization bill outlined many
areas where additional personnel costs
could be saved, primarily in the area of
support functions. Altogether, they rec-
ommended a total reduction of 49,000,
some 25,000 more than the reduction now
before us, Since the Armed Services Com-
mittee emphasized cuts in support per-
sonnel and the APpropriations Commit-
tee dealt primarily with overseas forces,
I believe the work of both committees
could be combined to justify a larger sav-
ings to the taxpayer.
It is clear, for example that an addi-
tional 25,000 personnel could be deac-
tivated with no perceivable effect on na-
tional security. If one-half of the direct
costs?$12,500 per person?can be salred
this fiscal year, the net reduction would
be at least $156,250,000. With this addi-
tional reduction, the end strength level
would approximate that recommended
by the Senate Armed, Services Commit-
tee. I would add that the full potential of
such a reduction would he $300 million.
I will draw upon the report of the
Senate Armed Services Committee on the
authorization bill, S. 3000, which de-
scribed cuts totaling 31,560, to delineate
the 25,000 reduction I feel is feasible:
First. Reduce the active duty man-
power request for the Air Force an ad-
ditional 5,500. The Air Force has decided
that any increases in strategic airlift
manning?C-5A and C-141 aircraft?
should be achieved through Reserve com-
ponents. An earlier reduction of 2,810
for this purpose was mandated in the
fiscal year 1975 authorizing legislation
already enacted into law.
Second. Cut active duty levels by
10,850, to achieve a 7-percent reduction
In military personnel assigned to train-
ing functions. Overall, the proportion of
staffs, overhead and support personnel
compared to student load in the Depart-
ment of Defense ie extremely high. For
example, using both military and civilian
staff and overhead personnel, the Senate
Armed Services Committee found an un-
acceptable ratio of students per staff in
each of the services. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Armed Serv-
ices Committee study of this problem,
taken from the committee report on
S. 3000, be printed in the REcORD.
There being no objection, the study
was ordered to be peinted in the :Recoite,
as follows:
STUDENT PER STAFF Merios
Students per staff:
Army
Navy
Uarine Corps
Air Force_
Total DOD
1.6 to 1
1.5 to 1
L.8 to 1
1. 6 to 1
6 to 1
If training base support personnel -were
included in the above ratios, it would reduce
the overall Defense Department ratio to al-
most one instructor or staff man for every
student. That is much more than other
school systems in the country. For com-
parison, student to s;aff ratios for several
kinds of non-Defense schools are shown be-
low:
Students per staff:
Public high schools_ 18 9 to 1
Public post high school voca-
tional schools
From 1.6 to 2 to 70 4 to 1
Private post high school voca-
tional schools
From 286 to 6 to 123.7 to 1
Colleges 15.0 to 1
Local school system_ 15.0 to 1
Tie committee is aware of the fact that
military training diffeis substantially from
the training and education in the civilian
sector. It is also aware of the accounting dif-
ferences that make exact comparisons diffi-
cult. However, the difference in staffing is so
wide, the committee bel.eves that much more
can be done to tighten down on staffs and
overhead for training. As a minimum, the
committee feels that the following avenues
should be vigorously pursued to achieve
reductions in training manpower and ex-
pects a report on actions taken in each area
prior to the FY 1976 manpower request.
Reduction of the levels of staffing in
training activities.
Consolidation of schools and courses to
eliminate duplication within each service
and between Defense components.
Use of educational technology to sub-
stitute equipment for training personAel.
Use of improved systems for on-the-job
training instead of formai individual train-
ing.
Reduction in the scope of career develop-
ment education as opposed to Job related
skill development.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, i: am
Pleased to yield to the ,distinguished act-
ing majority leader, the Senator from
West Virginia.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi-
dent, I merely wish to ask whether or
not it would be agreeable to enter into a
time limitation on this amendment.
Mr, EAGLETON. I would propose the
following, Mr. President: I-do not think
I will use the time I am going to propose,
but I did talk to some other Senators
who want to speak on this subject. In
order to protect them, I would propose 4
hours to a side on this amendment. I
realize that I probably will not use that
much time and, knowing the Senator
from Arkansas, I am almost positive he
will not use that much.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, in
my earlier discussions with the Senator
from Missouri, I thought he meant 4
hours equally divided.
Mr. EAGLETON. No, sir, I did not.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Four hours to each
side?
Mr. EAGLETON. The problem is that
other Senators who are cosponsors want
to speak, and this would give me the
widest latitude in protecting them. I do
not think we will use that much time,
and I will be eager to yield back time.
Mr. 1VIcCLELLAN. isuggest, then, that
we do not have an agreement on time.
that we talk until we are through, and?
will expedite it on this side. I would like
to complete action on the bill today.
Mr. EAGLETON. I think we will, but?
am trying to consider Senators who are
not in the Chamber and who want to
speak on the subject.
Mr. MeCLELLAN. Eight hours from
now will be about 9 o'clock tonight. 1
hope we can do a little better than that.
Mr. EAGLETON. I plan to move ex-
peditiously, I say to the Senator
Mr. McCLELLAN I suggest that we
wait a while, to see how the debate
Progresses. I would like to dispose of the
bill late this afternoon.
I have no intention, I may say, of
speaking anywhere near 4 hours. I prob-
ably will speak 15 or 20 minutes myself,
and a few other Senators may wish to
speak. I think we could take an hour
on this side. I would be willing to accept
a 3-hour limitation and give 2 hours to
the Senator from Missouri and take 1
hour on our side. I ani just trying to
expedite the matter and shorten the
proceeding, and not deny anyone the
right to be heard.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. My question
was for the purpose of hoping to ex-
pedite the matter. If we entered into an
agreement that there would be 4 hours to
a side, Senators would not be obliged to
take that much time. They could yield
back such time as they wish, ar d that
would be an outside limitation. Without
an agreement, the debate could go on
throughout the day and into tomorrow.
Mr. McCLELLAN. I would like to vote
on it today.
Mr. EAGLETON. I can assure the Sen-
ator that this amendment will be voted
on today, well before sundown.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Will the Sen-
ators agree to this proposal: that the
Senator from Missouri have not to exceed
4 hours and that the Senator from Ar-
kansas have--
Mr. McCLELLAND. Not to exceed
2 hours.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. And the Sena-
tor from Arkansas have not to exc eed 2
hours on the amendment?
Mr. EAGLETON. That is fine with me.
Mr. McCLELLAN. I will agree to that.
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August 21, 19.4A1313 -S 15531
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
It is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I thank the
Senators.
Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the distin-
guished Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. President, I had completed item
2 of my discussion, and I shall continue.
Third. Cut 12,750 or 5 percent of the
255,000 active duty personnel requested
for base operating support. This support
Includes many varied functions involved
in operating bases for active duty and
reserve military and civilian personnel
and their dependents. It includes such
items as the operation of commissaries,
laundries, and theaters, the providing of
base transportation, supply and food
services, building and road maintenance
and construction, providing utilities, fire
and public services and running the base
headquarters and administrative actitvi-
ties.
Since fiscal year 1973, the Department
of Defense has announced 463 base clo-
sures or reallnement actions that have
eliminated 69,400 military and civilian
jobs. However, these reductions are not
reflected in the DOD manpower request
for base -support personnel. In fact, the
DOD request included an increase of
5,000 in military personnel above fiscal
year 1974 levels for base support.
Fourth. Cut 2,460 or 3 percent of the
82,000 military personnel requested for
medical support. According to the Armed
Services Committee report?
These personnel are for "fixed site" medi-
cal facilities such as hospitals and include
all the various kinds of people from doctors
to administrative clerks who operate these
facilities. This category does not include the
medical personnel and units that directly
support Army and Marine divisions. Navy
ships or Air Force direct support clinics and
dispensaries. Although the overall number
of military personnel has declined and the
Defense Department reported a decrease in
medical workload (i.e. patients), the DoD
request included an overall increase in the
number of medical support personnel and
in the ratio of medical support personnel
to military manpower.
The committee went on to make the
following recommendations:
The committee felt that the number and
proportion of medical support personnel in
the military services should not be increased.
The committee has no intention of decreas-
ing' medical care, but there are compelling
reasons to hold up increases in medical sup-
port personnel at this time.
First, a major study of Health Personnel
is underway with participation of Defense,
HEW and the Office of Management and
Budget. This study, which is to be com-
pleted in late 1974, will examine the require-
ments for medical personnel and is seeking
to find ways of /baking Defense health care
delivery more efficient. The reduction wOuld
hold medical support at current levels until
the study is completed.
Second, medical personnel are difficult to
recruit and retain in an all-volunteer situa-
tion. The reduction would deny increases in
medical support until the recruiting situa-
tion is clearer and there Is more experience
with the medical bonus.
Third, defense medical costs have been
increasing rapidly. "Fixed site" medical sup-
port costs, including, civilian salaries, totaled
$1.6 billion 1 FY 1960 compared with $2.8
billion In FY 1975. These medical costs on a
per man basis have risen from $470 per man
in FY 1970 to $1,280 per man in FY 1975?
up 2.7 times.
M.D. President, it is clear that the
Armed Services Committee has made re-
sponsible recommendations in this im-
portant area which, if adopted, will bring
considerable savings to the taxpayer.
Perhaps even more import the recom-
mendations will go far in trimming the
fat of excessive support personnel from
our conventional forces.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
Mr. President, another area of the
Defense budget with excellent potential
for substantial savings this year is in re-
ductions of Department of Defense
civilian personnel. I would propose reduc-
tions from the committee-approved level
of civilian manpower which would result
in a savings of approximately $153 mil-
lion.
The committee has approved funding
for 995,000 direct hire civilians who are
employed to perform military functions
administered by the Department of De-
fense. The Committee on Armed Services,
under the distinguished leadership of
Senator STENNIS, earlier proposed fund-
ing 982,727 civilian personnel. This would-
be a reduction of 12,273 below the Appro-
priations Committee level and 4 percent
under the Pentagon request.
I endorse Senator STENNIS' proposal,
the reduction proposed by the Armed
Services Committee, and feel that this
further trimming of civilian personnel
levels is easily justified by the inflation-
ary pressures on our economy. Further-
more, Mr. President, a reduction of an
additional 12,273 civilian personnel can
be accomplished without laying off a
single employee of the Defense Depart-
ment. In fact, the 4-percent cut in the
Pentagon request for civilian Manpower
was, as the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee report on the fiscal year 1975 au-
thorization bill stated, "largely a denial
of- increases of civilians in the Defense
Department request."
D015 employed 994,000 civilians on
January 1, 1974, according to the Armed
Services Committee report. That is
equivalent, I might say, to the popula-
tion of the two largest cities in my State,
St. Louis and Kansas City. That is how
many civilians the Department of De-
fense employed on January 1, 1974.
The Armed Services Committee, there-
if ore, simply rejected the increase of
33,000 civilians and recommended a
further 11,600 reduction from the Janu-
ary 1, 1974, level. This further reduc-
tion of 11,600 could be accomplished,
the Armed Services Committee report
went on, "by not filling new job vacancies
and by normal attrition, rather than by
any layoffs."
The report further stated:
The Defense Department reported that
about 215,000 new civilians would have to be
hired just to keep the number of civilians
in FY 1975 about equal to the number in
FY 1974. A reduction of less than 10 percent
of the new hires would more than accomplish
that part of the Committee reduction that
would reduce strength below actual on-
board levels.
Mr. President, civilian manpower is a
significant portion of the Pentagon's
annual budget that has been largely
overlooked. Yet 17.4 percent of total De-
fense Department outlays for fiscal year
1975 were slated for the civilian person-
nel payroll according to Defense Secre-
tary James Schlesinger's fiscal year 1975
posture statement. That meant that $14.9
billion in outlays was planned for civilian
pay alone.
This figure is incredible when it is con-
sidered that we are not talking about
paying for military personnel to fight in
combat, but rather another part of the
massive support elements needed, osten-
sibly to keep the troops prepared for
fighting. Senate and House Armed Serv-
ices and Appropriations committees have
commented at one time or another in the
last few years about the large combat-to-
support ratio which is such a costly
burden in the military budget. Yet the
support category referred to in this poor
teeth-to-tail ratio does not even include
almost one million civilians.
Indeed, while many point to the sky-
rocketing manpower costs in today's De-
fense Department budgets, which reach
about 55 percent of the Pentagon's
budget, it is frequently not realized that
17.4 percent of the 55.4 percent man-
power costs go for civilians. The stark
statistics are provided in Dr. Schles-
inger's posture statement. I ask unani-
mous consent that the table used in that
statement to show the pay costs for DOD
manpower categories be inserted in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the table
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ESTIMATED PAY COSTS FOR DOD MANPOWER IN FISCAL
YEAR 1975
Category
Fiscal year 1975
outlays
Percent of
DOD
outlays
Civilian personnel payroll
$14, 929, u00, 000
17.4
Militaiy personnel payroll
19, 030, 000, 000
22.2
Military special pay and allow-
ances
6,655, 000, 000
7.8
Family housing
878, 000, 000
1.0
Military retired pay
6, 011, 000, OJO
7.0
Total manpower outlays_
47, 504, 000, 000
55.4
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, it is
clear that DOD employs a massive num-
ber of employees costing a large amount
of money. In fact, while the Defense De-
partment employs almost a million civil-
ians, the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare, frequently cited as an
example of an overgrown bureaucracy,
employed 142,159 employees as of June
1974 or, I hasten to add, Mr. President,
about one-eighth as many civilian em-
ployees as DOD.
The Monthly Report on Federal Per-
sonnel and Pay of the Joint Committee
on Reduction of Federal Expenditures'
statistics as of June 1974, demonstrates
that, excluding the quasi-Federal Postal
Service, the Defense Department em-
ploys about as many civilians as do all
other Federal agencies combined.
The Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee report also pointed to Many cate-
gories of civilians which are not included
in the number authorized by that com-
mittee. They include:
First, employees performing civil func-
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S 15532- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 21, 1974
tions administered by DOD, the largest
of which is the Corps orEngineers tdvil
works activities. This category inclutes
about 29,000 employees' in fiscal year
1975.
Second, indirect-hire employees who
are hired by host nations in support of
U.S. troops stationed abtoad. There are
about 103,000 persons included in this
category.
Third, employees In gpecial employ-
ment programs for stuOnts and disad-
vantaged youth, such as the stay-in-
school campaign and the tempofarY
summer aid program. The number in this
program varies from abcint 22,000 at the
end of fiscal year 1913 taTa. summer peak
,
of 40,000 employees.
Fourth, employees of the National Se-
curity Agency who areeluded because
n
their employment statists are classified.
Fifth, schoolteachers the Depart-
ment of Defense Oversee School System
who are not included beeause they serve
on a 9-month basis anct are not on the
DOD payroll at the end ce the fiscal year.
There are approximately 8,000 schbol-
teachers in this category.
? Sixth, employees paid from nonappro-
priated funds?including those working
at base exchanges, coilimissaries, mid
clubs. There are an eetimated 15000
personnel in this categola
All these exceptions, some of which
have to be paid for by tile taxpayers and
some of whom are painor through in-
ternally generated funds, bring the total
worldwide Defense Department fon:* to
well over 1.3 million peOPle. A reduction
of a mere 12,273 seems insignificant in
..
comparison.
There are 1.3 million civilians working
worldwide for the Defense Department.
If memory serves me cdtrectly, this Is a
number of people greater than abottt 20
of the States of the Union.
I just added the name of the distin-
guished Senator from -Delaware !Mr.
BIDEN) BS a cosponsor'to this amend-
ment. I am not sure as to the precise
population of Delaware, but I suspect
that it is under a half million. I know
Delaware has one Hone 'Member. The
number of civilian personnel, worldwide,
for DOD is then greater, I think, than
the total of about 20 Stites in the Utdon.
Thus, in terms of what Senators repre-
sent in terms of States,/ should say that
DOD's work is alreacl so well repre-
sented here, they shouTd have about 30
Members of Congress assigned to them,
based on their populatioti.
, ?
The distinguished eimirman of the
Armed Services Coninittee, Senator
&imams, has more than once expressed
his dissatisfaction with the number of
civilians requested by the Pentagon. In
his opening comments lit the manpower
authorization hearing for fiscal year
1975 on March 21, 1974; Senator Smarms
said:
I am _concerned that the Defense requests
before us today include a substantial in-
crease in civilian personnil, some 30,090 and
a nearly stand-pat eituaion in the military
strengths requested. It looks as though the
taxpayer is not getting tioluh economic bene-
fit from any improvements in Defense ef-
ficiency. It seems to me he ought to get
Some.
Lest year the House Appropriations
Committee expressed a similar unhap-
piness with Defense Department civilian
manpower levels. In its report on the fis-
cal year 1974 Defense Department ap-
propriations bill, the committee, chaired
by Representative Maiton, stated:
For the past few years the Committee has
been concerned about ttse high number of
civilians being employed by the Defense De-
partment. It has been unsatisfied with the
extent of reductions.
The House Approplations Committee
repprt also gave several reasons why
civilians jobs should be cut:
1. The ceasefire in Vietnam and the with-
drawal of U.S. combat forces from Indochina.
2. The reduction in the number of military
personnel and equipmer
3. The proposed clos .ng of some military
installations.
4. New production te chniquee and mech-
anization which should take over some of
the civirtan workload.
That committee, the Mahon commit-
tee, called for action to bring about de-
creases in its report on the fiscal year
1975 appropriations bill when it pointed
out that for fiscal year 1974:
The Congress made a reduction of about
15,900 positions as an indication of its in-
terest to encourage the Department to care-
fully monitor and control its cltilian employ-
ment practices. The Department, however,
did not make the reductions recommended
but, in lieu thereof, submitted a supple-
mental budget request in civilian positions
of about 19,000. Thus the Department re-
quested about 35,000 more civilian positions
than the Congress approved.
In short, Mr. President, it is clear
that substantial reductions can be made
in the civilian personnel area. I am rec-
ommending a cut of only /2,273 person-
nel to the level approved by the Senate
Anned Services Committee with the at-
tendant savings of about $153 million.
Yet It is clear from the evidence pre-
sented by various congressional commit-
tees and distinguished military experts,
that we can make even further reduc-
tions from that which I propose. My pro-
posal will, I repeat, lead to no layoffs
nor will it harm U.S. security interests.
AW &CS
In the weapons system- area, I will
begin with a program I have followed
closely for almost 3 years?the atrborne
warning and control system?AWACS.
The savings I believe can be derived in
this area are typical of the subsequent
recommendations I will make. They are
savings designed to slow down the de-
velopment of a west:alms program to as-
sur that it is properly tested before it is
procured. As I will explain in detail, the
risk we take in moving ahead too fast on
the AWACS program is not simply that
the system may end up not working well.
It is that AWACS may not work at all
In performing Its primary mission.
AWACS, an overland look-down radar
and tracking system housed in a modi-
fied Boeing 707, was originally assigned
the primary task of strategic air defense.
In February 1970, a revision to a DOD
development concept paper added a sec-
ondary role?tactical command and con-
trol. But that secondary role was not
given serious consideration until August
1973, when Secretary Schlesinger as-
signed the tactical NATO role as the new
primary mission. At about the same time,
he deemphasized the air defense mis-
sion stating in his March 1974 posture
statement that:
A cONUS air defense system structure pri-
marily for peacetime surveillance (the cur-
rent air defense mission) would not require
an AWACS force.
In November 1913 the Defense Systems
Acquisition. Review Council met to decide
the future- course for the AWACS pro-
gram. A main concern of the participants
was the feet that the aircraft scheduled
for procurement with fiscal year 1975
funds were to be built in the strategic,
or r,ore, configuration?the configuration
suitable for the obsolete air defense role.
They were, in short, stuck with a con-
figuration that was to perform the func-
tion that no longer existed.
A letter from the Chairman of the Re-
view Council, Deputy Secretary William
Clements, to the Secretary of the Air
Force pointed out the need for major
changes to achieve a design capable of
performing the much more complicated
tactical Job?the job recently created for
AWACS.
It is evident that a more capable configure.-
tion than the core is essential to support
general purpose tactical forces. The effective
Integration of command and control in yarn
operations requires additional (Intelligence)
equipment . . identification (devices), com-
munications, data transfer, cosnmand and
coatzol and a measure of self defense.
Secretary Clements then directed the
Air Force to Conduct extensive tests to
determine what the tactical configure
-
tion should be. That configuration has yet
to be defined, and could not Possibly be
validated until operational tests have
been performed. This rather obvious
point was made In a highly critical GAO
report on AWACS seat to me in March
1974.
In testimony before the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, GAO defense analysts
even more explicitly described the prob-
lems of designing the new version ot
AWACS:
The change in the primary mission empha-
sis from strategic to tactical requires that
more and better equipment of all types.
computers, processors, displays, and par-
ticularly communications equipment, be on
board the aircraft. Thus, the question exists
as to whether all of the needed systems can
be installed in the aircraft, can be Integrated
so as to function properly togethe., can in-
terface with a large number of command an
control- systems now being operated ill
Europe by U.S. and NATO ally forces. and
whether the system will have tle needed
tracking and communication capacity ti
accomplish its mission.
The GAO went on to recommend that.
"defer funding for production
models of the AWACS until the Air Forcc
verifies and demonstrates through testF,
that a viable and useful tactical config-
uration can be developed." There is good
reason for that recommendation for cau-
tion, for there are grave doubts that
AWACS will ever be viable in the tac -
tical environment of Europe.
When a GAO technical consultant pre -
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August 21, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 15533
pared mathematical calculations show-
ing that AWACS could be completely
blacked out by ground-based jammers
from within 200 miles of the Iron Cur-
tain, the Air Force protested that the
calculations were based on a more lim-
ited capability than the AWACS radar
actually possessed. But these calculations
were based on the official specifications
for the radar given to the contractors.
Now, we have a study performed by
the Air Force itself which shows clearly
that AWACS can be jammed with inex-
pensive and unsophisticated jammers
which could virtually render the $80 mil-
lion plane useless.
In analyzing this Air Force study, the
GAO took the Air Force's "bombs-over-
target" effectiveness estimates for AWA
CS and concluded that because self-
screening jamming could be used against
the system, the unenhanced version?the
version we will buy with fiscal year 1975
dollars? contributed "nothing to the air
defense of Europe." The GAO did point
out that the Air Force has suggested two
techniques for at least minimizing the
Impact of the jamming threat, but also
states that:
Neither of the two techniques for over-
coming self-screening jamming has been
demonstrated in tests nor evaluated as to
effectiveness.
It is important to understand the dif-
ference between the mission originally
conceived for AWACS and its present
task. Whereas in the air defense role
AWACS would have only to detect and
track a wing of slow-moving turbo-prop
bombers flying toward the United States
over large expanses of ocean and waste-
land, in the tactical role AWACS will
confront literally thousands of tracks of
fast-moving fighter aircraft. These air-
craft will have to be detected and sorted
out by AWACS' computers and ?then
tracked as intercepts are attemped.
In the air defense role AWACS has no
ground?based jamming threat to consider
and there are no fighter aircraft to pose
a threat to its survivability. AWACS
would naturally be a high priority target
for the numerous enemy aircraft we will
confront in a European air battle and,
according to GAO, if these aircraft were
equipped with jamming devices, AWACS
would have a_ "nearly zero probability of
surviving,"
The principal mission for AWACS is In
the European theater, and yet our NATO
allies have not decided whether they will
purchase the system. NATO is currently
studying the question of whether to buy
AWACS and no decision will be made by
our allies until the end of the calendar
year 1975.
I will not speculate on the eventual
decision NATO might make but I do not
believe that we would be fulfilling our ob-
ligation to the taxpayer if we funded the
procurement of AWACS before we know
whether and how many systems NATO
will buy.
Perhaps, the most compelling reason to
delay procurement of AWACS in fiscal
1975 is the recommendation by the Sen-
ate Armed $erviceS Committee that an
independent grotup of radar experts study
whether AWACS will ever, be capable of
performing its primary mission against
ground-based jamming. This group will
provide the Secretary of Defense and
Congress with a full report on this most
vital question.
It seems obvious that no money should
be appropriated for procurement of
AWACS until we know whether NATO
feels AWACS is worth the invstement and
whether the system will ever be capable
of performing in Europe. It is clear that
a reduction of procurement funds would
help to avoid an excessive amount of con-
currency?and the resultant overruns in
later years?and, at the same time, save
$311.1 million approved by the committee
for procurement of 4 aircraft and initial
spares.
SITE DEFENSE
Now, Mr. President, I move on to the
next system I will use as an illustration
to prove wherein the budget can be pru-
dently, and safely cut without sacrificing
one iota of national security?site de-
fense.
One might have assumed that the ABM
issue died with the signing of the ABM
treaty.
Mr. President, General MacArthur said
"old soldiers never die, they just fade
away." Well, weapons systems, Mr. Presi-
dent, never die and, believe me, they
never fade away; no, sir. So we still have
an ABM kicking around, and it is called
site defense.
Site defense is being developed as an
upgrade for the Safeguard system around
our ICBM site at Grand Forks, N. Dak.
While it cannot be deployed, it is said
that it is needed as a "hedge" against
a possible Soviet abrogation of the ABM
Treaty.
But in July of this year that treaty
looked stronger than ever as the United
States and Russia agreed to protocol lim-
iting each side to only one ABM site.
I have to digress there, Mr. President,
and reminisce, if I may, about a former
colleague of ours in the Senate who, I
think, had as intriguing a way of put-
ting things as anybody I have ever
known. That was the former distin-
guished Senator from Minnesota, Gene
McCarthy. He was in the Senate the first
2 years I was here. I was here in 1969 and
1970, and he was completing his term in
the Senate at that time.
If the Members will recall, he took a
trip to the Soviet Union. He was not
only a Senator but had been a candi-
date for the Presidency of the United
States, so he went to Moscow and he
met with the Soviet leaders. I think he
met with Brezhnev and Kosygin.
He told me of the conversation that
he had with one of those Russian lead-
ers, I think I can share that conversa-
tion with the Senate. I do not think he
would mind.
He said that?let us assume it was
Breshnev?Breshnev asked him, "Why
are you people building the ABM?"
McCarthY, in that wonderful way of
his, arrswered very quickly, "We are
building it, Mr. Chairman, because it
does not work."
Now, the Russian, not being used to
the McCarthyesque, sense of humor,
said, "We do not understand. Why are
you building a system that you know
does not work?"
"Ah, ha," said McCarthy, "if we build
a system that? does not work you will
build a system that does not work be-
cause you want to be just as good as we
are, and both of us could keep very, very
busy building systems that do not work
In the public interest."
I just add that as an irrelevant foot-
note. But since it is so irrelevant, it is
a true testimonial to ABM, which is a
living irrelevancy; and it is a true testi-
monial to site defense which is an_irre-
levancy superimposed on top of an ini-
tial irrelevancy.
Even without that tangible reflection
of support for the strategic doctrine of
limiting defensive missiles, it is gener-
ally conceded that neither we nor the
Russians want to throw money down the
drain on defensive systems that are
generally obsolete when deployed due to
advances made in offensive weaponry?
the Gene McCarthy theory of planning
notwithstanding.
For the purpose of this discussion,
however, I will assume a worst case? ?
that we do need a "hedge" against the
rather remote possibility that the ABM
Treaty will one day be no more. What
should that "hedge" be comprised of?
Should we build a system which could
be made obsolete by the latest Soviet
technology? Or should we continue to
research in the area of defensive strate-
gies . . . to perfect the difficult task of
"hitting a bullet with a bullet?"
Until recently, the site defense pro-
gram called for the development of a
prototype demonstration model, which
would have been ready for deployment
under original plans, in 1977, when the
5-year ABM Treaty expires. According
to the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee report on the authorization bill, site
defense is composed of "a state-of-the
art phased array radar, a third genera-
tion commercial data processor and
related software, and a modified Safe-
guard Spring interceptor missile, called
Sprint II."
As is clear from that description, the
components of site defense are not uni-
que. But the program did have one uni-
que quality which distinguished it from
the other ABM programs in which we are
engaged. It was to have been a prototype
program. Site defense would tie the
various ABM components together for
testing. General Leber, the head of all
the Army's ABM progranis, described
the principal need for site defense this
way:
It is system technology. It is not compo-
nent technology. The component technology
is done over in the advanced technology pro-
gram.
But the conference report on the mili-
tary procurement bill completely trans-
formed the site defense program. That
report states that "the primary objec-
tive of the site defense program should
be development of subsystems and com-
ponents to advance the technology in
such elements as sensors, missiles, and
software." The report goes on to state
that site defense should no longer be
"directed toward a prototype demonstra-
tion. . . ." Site defense, in short, is now
the same component technology "done
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over in the advanced technology pro--
gram."
It is also now a totally redundant pro--
gram for which there to no further use.
The work on ABM conmajaent technology
is being done under the advanced blahs-
tic missile defense research program, for
which $91 million has been approved in
this budget. That is more than enough
to spend for a "hedge" against an un-
likely occurrence.
The Armed Services Committee have,
therefore, answered our question-2 is
not worthwhile to build a system which
could be obsolete when int is deployed. As
General Leber said in discussing the
rapid technological progress being made
In the ABM field:
Site Defense isn't the end of this tlibig.
Five years from now they will look back on
it and say that it is ancient.
Although I have attempted to avoid
recommending the elimination of pro-
grams, I believe site defense is an obvious
waste of title V R.. 8; D. funds. We do not
need a redundant program and we do
not need a system which, if built, would
be "ancient" when deployed. The demise
Of site deSense would represent a savings
to the taxpayer of appreximately $103
million, leaving $20 millbin for termina-
tion costs.
Moving on to yet another system, which
have discussed a bit already, Safeguard.
SMPEGUARD
If site defense would have been an-
cient 5 years hence, its ttitended prede-
cessor, the Safeguard syetem is already
In that category. Safeguard sits, uncom-
pleted, around our ICBM site at Grand
Forks, N. Dak.
It is limited, under the ekBai Treaty. to
100 missiles which are intended to protect
our ICBM's.
But recent studies, inebiding a claesi-
fied GAO analysis, show that our ICBM's
do not need protection. Soviet missile
accuracy is not sufficient now, nor will
it be in the future, to threaten our land-
based missiles. These missiles are, of
course, deployed in hardened silos.
If, in the future, the Soviets develop
their MIRV system, an, ABM system
comprised of only 100 notreseles would be
easily overwhelmed. Wlien the Soviet
MIRV becomes a reality?assuming that,
In the meantime, we do not reach a war-
head-limitation agreement?then we
should consider what rneaeures we should
take to protect our land-based deterrent.
If we decide at that time that an ABM
is needed?and I personally would oppose
such a choice?then we will be able, to
design a system to meet the current
threat.
But the most compelling reason of all
-to eliminate funds for Safeguard in this
year's budget, is the decision by the
Pentagon itself to mothball the system
soon after it becomes fully operational
later this year. That such a decision has
been made was recently confirmed by a
Defense Department spokesman.
Now, think of it, Mr. President, in the
Pentagon they want more money, a little
over $135 million, to complete a system
that they have already decided to moth-
ball.
Instead of allowing funds to complete
Safeguard and maintain it for a full
year, I would give the Army exactly
what it needs to put the system in moth-
balls. The savings heree therefore, would
be $80 million, leaving $55.1 million to
phase out the program.
I repeat for emphasis, Mr. President,
what I am doing with theme systems is
trying to show by adding the &Oar
amounts, that would be able to safely cut
the budget in excess of over $2 billion.
But I am-not even, as 1 said earlier, ask-
ing for $2 billion. I might be half wrong,
so I cut it in half to about $1 billion.
SAM. D
The SAM-I) program has received the
careful attention of Senator Ba.yli and
the General Accounting Office. Senator
BAYH has made a very responsible recom-
mendation to slow down this program to
keep it out of the engineering develop-
ment phase before it is tested. But the
token $11 million cue made in this bill
will not accomplish that purpose.
SAM-D, which is a medium altitude
surface-to-air missile system designed
to replace the Nike-Hercules and im-
proved Hawk for air defense purposes,
has experienced a unit cost growth of
almost 400 percent.
Mr. President, I emphasize, a unit cost
growth of almost 400 percent.
The program is at least 76 months be-
hind schedule and the unit cost is almost
eight times as much as that of the im-
proved Hawk, the system it is designed
to replace.
Prior to January 1974, the SAM-D
was a full-scale engineering development
program. The Defense Department had
overlooked its own fly-before-hue guide-
lines in allowing the program to proceed
to this stage even though cruciaa ele-
ments of the technology, most notably
the TVM?target via missile?guidance
system and the warhead fuse, had never
been adequately tested. Secretary Schles-
inger recognized this serious concurrence,
problem and on January 10, 1974, he
ordered that the program be reoriented
so that the testing would be completed
at an earlier stage. Although the Secre-
tary's decision was intended to reduce
the concurrency problem, the program
experienced no fundamental change ex-
cept in its scheduling. Fully half of the
fiscal year 1975 funds?$5&.5 million?
are to be spent for engineering develop-
ment of tactical versions of the system.
Thus, while a decision was made to re-
duce concurrency, that decision has not
been fully implemented.
The sole justification for -the SAM-D
as articulated by the Army and OSI) has
been its requirement to defend the 7th
Army forces stationed in Europe against
conventional attack by high-perform-
ance Soviet-built aircraft. Perhaps the
most telling comment on the cost-effec-
tiveness of SAM-i) has been the fiat re-
fusal of every NATO country?with the
exception of Germany?to even indicate
an interest in purchasing the system.
Although Germany has indicated a
potential interest in acquiring the sys-
tem once it is fully developed, there has
been no attempt to gain financial partic-
ipation on the part of that country in
the developmental stages. Just as in the
case of AWACS, our NATO allies are ap-
parently Willing to allow the Uaited
States to bear the expense of developing
a system designed to defend Europe.
A full-scale cost-effectiveiaess analysis
of SAM-fl was undertaken this past year
by OSI) in conjunction with the General
Accounting Office. This study was de-
livered to Congress on April 15, 1974. Its
major conclusion is that we are unnec-
essarily duplicating air defense weapons
systems at high cost. In its comments on
the study April 20, 1974, the GAC) noted.
Cost effectiveness of the SAM-I) or its
variants apparently commit be proven based
on realistic assumption . . It would appear
that even it the SAM-D technology works
and even if the threat rnaterialiees, the
SAM-D will probably not be necessary if
F-1S's are available.
It is important to note that a:though
the oat) study assumed that the tech-
nology testing progranewould be success-
ful and would not increase costs---an un-
likely assumption?it also concluded that
two wings of F-15's coukl reduce the suc-
cessful penetration by the eneme in the
NATO area to close to zero.
In recent developments, the Army has
programed $10 million out of fiscal year
1975 funds for research on a backup
guidance system. This most certainly
cannot be read as reflecting confidence
in the proposed TVM guidance system.
Furthermore, the $10 million will be
spent on exploring the feasibility of one
of the two types of guidance techniques
now employed in current?state- of-the-
art?systems. This would indicate that
the case for SAM-D superiority over
present systems?based on its TWA tech-
nology?is on most uncertain gro Ind.
It would appear that little more than
the Army's prestige in having a new
missile in development is keeping
SAM-D alive.
It is the same sad story, Mr. President,
of not letting a system die which should
have had a laudable death yeass aco.
Why cannot a weapon system go to the
grave with decency? Why must it linger
on and on, eternally, long after it has
outlived even an imagined useful role?
But SAM-i) goes on and on.
While I suspect this program will be
terminated or completely revised in the
near future, I will not make such a rec-
ommendation at this time. Instead. I
would propose to save $60 million above
the reduction recommended by the com-
mittee. This $60 Million is earmarked f er
continued engineering developmer t. This
action would return the program to the
advanced development stage until the
TVM guidance system Is tested, as Sen-
ator BAYH has so many times and so
wisely suggested.
WILIPEITILaING PROGRAMS.
Mr. President, as I leave pointed or it,
In each of the past 4 fiscal years the
Defense Department's unexpended bal-
ance at the end of Ihe year has ine eased,
indicating that the feeds being appro.-
Priated for the Defense Department are
beginning to exceed the Department's
ability to spend them. This is especially
true in the shipbuilding business where
orders for new ships have overwhelmed
the delivery system. In addition, the in-
flationary impact of these programs on
the economy is substantial. Both of these
conditions make it essential that we
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examine with great care several ship
construction programs.
The three major private shipyards are
Litton Industries in Pascagoula, Miss.,
Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock
in Newport News, Va., and the Electric
Boat Division of General Dynamics in
Groton, Conn. These "3 yards ..are
presently building 63 of the 136 ships
which the Navy has under construction
and they have all the work that they can
handle. Several factors contribute to this
situation. Private yards have experienced
-a large increase in commercial ship con-
struction and are presently working at
-a higher percentage of capacity than
they have experienced in several years.
Many yards also find commercial con-
tracts more attractive than Navy con-
tracts because the commercial specifica-
tions and quality standards are somewhat
lower than the Navy's. Commercial ships
, are easier to build, are being ordered in
large batches, leading to long profitable
production runs while Navy ships?
especially auxiliaries such as the de-
stroyer tender and fleet oiler requested in
the present budget?are built a few at
a time. As a result, they are less profitable
and less desirable from the point of view
-of the contractors. And as we all know,
dealing with the Government bureauc-
racy is somewhat more difficult than
dealing with private buyers, except when
you get to that thing called "bail out."
But we are not to that point yet with
ships.
Many ships now under construction
.are experiencing substantial delays. The
DI)--963 is one of those and appropriating
funds for seven more ships this year will
simply add to those delays.
It would be less inflationary if we ap-
propriated for three instead of seven of
these ships. By doing so some $264 mil-
lion could be saved this year. The appro-
priation for the four additional destroy-
ers could be deferred until next year.
Litton's Pascagoula yards have had
serious labor problems. Due to inade-
quate labor supply as well as technical
problems with a new yard and new meth-
ods, Litton's programs have experienced
delays and cost increases. At present,
according to the most recent figures
available, the last of the DD-63's will be
delayed some 18 months. The cost of
each ship has increased from $86 million
per unit to $108 million. By slowing the
rate of procurement we can ease the
pressures on Litton and give them time
to get the bugs out of their construction
techniques so that the remaining ships
built will be of higher quality.
- The impact of this proposal on the ca-
pabilities of the fleet would be minimal.
The U.S. Navy is already ahead of the
Soviet Navy in numbers of ocean es-
corts?destroyers, frigates, and other es-
corts?and will continue to be in 1980
even if we stretch out the procurement
of these destroyers. The Navy has some
191 destroyers, frigates, and escorts, com-
pared to 188 for the Soviets. In addition,
our destroyer-type ships are generally
larger than the Soviet's and some of ours
are nuclear powered while the Soviets
have nO nuclear powered surface ships.
The current budget also calls for ap-
propriating $502.5 million to build three
In a series of 36 SSN-688 Los Angeles
class nuclear attack submarines. How-
ever, it would be more prudent to appro-
priate funds for two instead of three this
year at a savings of some $167.5 million.
Again, the shipyard situation has a di-
rect bearing on this program. Five of
these submarines are being built at New-
port News and the other 18 at Groton,
Conn. Both of these yards are backed up
with considerable work. Newport News,
in addition to building the five SSN-688
submarines is also building two other
submarines of a different class, four nu-
clear frigates, and two CVAN's?nuclear
powered attack carriers. The first of
these two carriers will be delivered more
than 3 years late. This is partly the re-
sult of a severe manpower shortage
which will surely be made worse by mak-
ing further demands for additional ships.
This problem can be eased by slowing
the pace of procurement somewhat. As
Admiral Frank Price of the Chief of
--Naval Operations Office recently pointed
out, reducing the SSN construction rate
allows industry to "catch up on their
present contracts and to be able to pro-
' ceed with nuclear attack submarines and
Trident at tlte same time." If funds for
only two of these submarines are appro-
priated this year the United States will
have 90 attack submarines in 1981 rather
than 91. The difference in one submarine
will not have a significant impact on the
fleet's capabilities.
In considering this proposal, we should
take a close look at comparative United
States and Soviet capabilities in this
area. The United States at present has
61 nuclear attack submarines in com-
mission plus 27 under construction and
funded for a total of 88. The Soviets have
approximately 35 nuclear attack sub-
marines and 40 nuclear powered sub-
marines with cruise missiles. The Soviet's
overall submarine force has been de-
clining in recent years and will continue
to do so, despite the growth of its nu-
clear submarine force toward the maxi-
mum allowable under SALT.
A large part of the existing Soviet sub-
marine force consists of approximately
153 obsolescent diesel attack subs which
will very likely be retired in coming years.
In addition, experts such as Admiral
Rickover and Admiral Moorer have re-
peatedly told us that U.S. submarines
are qualitatively superior to their Soviet
counterparts. Admiral Moorer has
pointed out that the 688 class is both
quieter and has better sonar than the
best of the Soviet Union's attack sub-
marines.
It should be pointed out that the SSN-
688 is very large and displaces almost
7,000 tons. This is larger than many
World War II type cruisers presently in
the Soviet Navy. The Navy has said it
would be desirable to develop and build
a new class of smaller and less expensive
nuclear attack submarines than the 688
class, which presently costs about $200
million per ship. It might be wise, in
light of, current national economic prob-
lems, to build fewer 688-class submarines
and urge the Navy to move ahead more
quickly in developing a smaller and less
expensive submarine.
The Navy has requested some $81 mil-
S 15535
lion to build a fleet oiler?AO. This would
be the first of a class of 10 ships which
together with other support ships are
projected to cost a total of approximately
$2 billion. The purpose of these ships is
to deliver fuel to operating ships at sea.
Currently, the Navy has 27 fleet oilers,
or 1 for every 8 major surface combat-
ants. It is my view that these funds
should be deleted from this year's ap-
propriation and deferred for at least 1
year.
There are several considerations Which
I think justify this position. First, it
should be kept in mind that the oiler is
an auxiliary?not a combat ship. Thus,
while some of the existing oilers are old,
retaining them in sevice for 1 or 2 more
years will not reduce significantly the
combat efficiency of the fleet. At the
same time, many of the existing 2'7 oilers
are among the newest, largest, and most
modern replenishment ships in the world.
Furthermore, the new class that the
Navy wants to build will have about the
same capacity as present AO's. Thus,
they will not add significantly to the
Navy's capabilities. The Navy also has
nine oilers under construction in the
"build for charter" program.
We should also keep in mind, that the
role of the oilEr in providing fuel for
Navy ships is declining as more and more
ships become nuclear powered. For exam-
ple, the Navy will soon have 3 nuclear
powered aiferaft carriers in operation
and a total of 14 nuclear ships by 1980.
This, of course, reduces the need for
oilers.
Finally, the shipyard crunch is im-
portant here. Ships such as the bilers
seem to-be the least popular to build by
private shipyards. The Navy has two
submarine tenders and one destroyer
tender for which funds were appropri-
ated in prior years?fiscal year 1972,
1973?that are not yet under contract
because of lack of interest by the ship-
building industry.
The House Appropriations Committee
report should be paid special attention
in this regard. The committee concluded
that the request for funding an oiler was
premature by a year and urged that the
amount be denied without prejudice un-
til the Navy has determined the extent
of interest by the shipbuilding industry
In building this ship and at what cost.
We should keep in mind that if past
experience is any indication, even if we
appropriate funds for this ship for fiscal
year 1975, it may be 1 or 2 years
before a contractor is found to build it.
As was suggested by the House Appro-
priations Committee, the Navy should
first determine the interest in the ship-
building industry and then return for
funding.
Mr. President, the appropriations bill
calls for the funding of a new destroyer
tender?AD--at a cost of $116.7 million.
The initial Senate authorisation bill ex-
cluded all funds for the AD. The Senate"
Armed Services Committee report justi-
fied this action, stating that:
The Committee recommends denial of
$116.7 million for one destroyer tender. Three
tenders approved by Congress in FY 1972
and 1973 are not yet under contract, and
until such time as these ships are under con-
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tract and the costs and schedules are known,
authorization of additional tenders will not
be authorized.
The House prevailed, however, and the
tender was put back in by the conference
committee.
The purpose of a destroyer tender is to
provide minor repairs and services for
destroyer-type ships at forward bases.
The U.S. Navy has and plans to main-
tain about 200 destroyers and related
types of ships which are serviced by de-
stroyer tenders.
The Navy current& has 12 tenders, or
1 tender for every 16 destroyer-type
ships. The existing 12 tenders are more
than enough to provide foe those regu-
larly stationed overseas with the 6th and
7th Fleets. The majority of tenders are
stationed at naval bases here in the
United States.
A 1-year deferment in the tonstruction
of a new tender would not affect the read-
iness of the destroyer force. Minor re-
pairs or services required can be supplied
by the existing 12 tenders, augmented if
necessary by naval-shipyards and-shore-
based facilities.
Thus, Mr. President, the total savings
In the shipbuilding area?the area most
responsible for the rise in unexpended
military balances?would total $629.2
million. Again the slowdowns and the
delays I have recommended would en-
hance rather than hinder our military
effectiveness.
M6 0A1 TANK
Another reduction which le budgetarily
feasible and which will not undermine
national security, concerns._ the rate of
production of the M60A1 tank to the ori-
ginal rate of production planned by the
Department of Defense. In -hearings be-
fore the Senate Committee on Articled
Services this year, SecretarY Schlesinger
said that the Defense Department orig-
inally planned to increase the rate of
production of the M60A1 to 515per year
through fiscal 1976, but that "the lessons
learned from the recent Middle East
war" have made the Defense Department
increase the production of lat60A1's tc) 667
per year over the next few years.
Using the Middle East war for justifi-
cation of increased tank production is
very misleading. Tanks sent to Israel are
sold through MAP, which does not affect
the bill we are currently considering.
Also, Israel pays us back for the tanks it
purchases. In the fiscal 1974 supple-
mental, the Defense Department was
given the funds required for enabling at-
tainment of the planned buildup in pro-
duction rate. Thus, the fiscal year 1975
request will not affect in any way our aid
to Israel.
The Pentagon is using the Middle East
war as the reason for accelerating the
modernization of M60A1's or the Army
and the Marine Corps. in fact, the
Marine Corps plans to en their mod-
ernization program in fiscal 1976. The
Defense Department has given Congress
no real reason why these modernization
programs have been accelerated, and
why the original rate of production is no
longer feasible.
According to the House report on the
authorization bill "fiscal year 1975
M60A1 procurement requests have been
based on the maximum rates of produc-
tion that the assembly lines can deliver,
Particularly since there is only one
remaining willing supplier-subcon-
tractor of the traversing turret." I
do not believe it makes sense to approve
a maxlinum rate of production that orly
one supplier-subcontractor is willing to
produce, and might have trouble
meeting.
I propose that we restore the original
rate of production?a cutback of 150
tanks for fiscal 1975. We would not be
halting the production line; we would
not be cutting off new production lines;
and we would not be violating contracts.
We would simply be slowing down the
rate of production, which in turn would
guarantee that the rate of production is
met. The savings to the American tax-
payer would be $50 million in fiscal 1975.
This is a prudent reduction which does
not go beyond the original request of the
Department of Defense.
CH-47C, CARGO TRANSPOFT HELICOPTER
The Senate Committee on Appropria-
tions recommended restoration of $41.4
million for the procurement of 19 CH-
47C cargo transport helicopters. This
seems to be questionable funding item in
light of the fact that the House Appro-
priations Committee recommented
denial of these funds. This is what the
House committee said about the CH-
47C request:
The Army requested $51,400,000 for 19
CH-47C Chinook cargo helicopters. This
would represent a last buy of this helicon :er.
The Army has initiated a three-year research
and development prograrr. to improve the
maintainability, reliability, suririvability and
safety of the CH-47A/B models of this heli-
copter, while reducing operating costs. In
some respects, they will be, an improvemant
over the CH-47C model. The asset position
of these helicopters is such that these 19
CH-47C helicopters need not be bought. The
Committee recommends the funds be denied
and the Army wait until the CH-47A/B
helicopters are improved before buying addi-
tional ones, if this becomes necessary.
I very much agree with Chairman
MAHON'S statement. The need for the
CH-47C seems minimal, especially in
light of ongoing research to build a
better version. This purchase could
easily be eliminated without endangerng
national security and with substantial
savings for the Nation.
WAR RESERVE S TOCKS
On to yet another subject, -Mr. Presi-
dent. / shall not dwell too long on this,
because I believe that at a later point in
this debate, Senator KENNEDY of Massa-
chusetts may offer a specific amendment
on this point. But I should like to speak
very briefly to what are called war re-
serve stocks.
In 1973 the Department of Defe:ase
initiated a new program which was
called war reserve stocks for Allies;
$23 million was budgeted for these sto
in fiscal year 1973?which is not so terri-
bly much in 1973, and for the Pentagon,
$23 million is just about their daily paper
clip account. But that araount has grown
to the request we have before us today,
which is approximately $529.6 million.
It should be noted that this program is
not for our NATO allies, but was created
to help support certain Asian allies?
allies such as South Vietnam, Thailand,
and Cambodia. These stocks are in addi-
tion to our own inventory needs, but be-
cause they remain in U.S. inventories
unless and until they are needed by our
allies, the program was not considered a
military assistance program or a military
assistance service funded program. But
by .whatever name is contrived by the
Pentagon, it is clear that this is a back-
door military aid program.
The Senate passed an amendment of-
fered by Senator KENNE)YY on Jure 6,
1974, to the military procurement bill,
to bar the supply of stockpiled war ma-
terials or equipments to any Asian coun-
try unless specifically authorized by
Congress. Sadly, the amendment was
dropped in conference, but the Senate is
on record as disapproving the war re-
serve stock concept.
It is not easy to find thel appropriation
for the war reserve stock program in the
budget since the $529.6 million that has
been approved by the committee is hid-
den among various accounts in the pro-
curement section of the bill. In fact, the
committee has been able to ascertain
the exact amounts in each account only
after great effort. I think that the reason
for this is obvious: such a Program would
not survive an up or down vote in the
Congress. I hope we shall have a chance
to prove that with Senator KENNEDY'S
amendment.
Although I will personally vote to com-
pletely abolish this program, I will not
assign a savings of $529.6 million?the
total for War Reserve Stocks in the
budget?because a more conservative ap-
proach has been taken by certain mem-
bers 6f the House Committee on Ar pro-
priations. These members have sug-
gested deleting the ammtmition portion
of the stbcks which, because they have
a limited shelf life, would require con-
tinued replenishment. Stich a reciaire-
ment would involve an endless commit-
ment of money. I would therefore suggest
leaving $180 million in this program so
that certain obsolete tanks and aircraft
could be maintained. Thus, the potential
savings to the taxpayer would be at
least $350 million.
The most conservative saving that I
can point out to you would be $354) mil-
lion. If it were up to me, I would vote to
do away with the whole 1529, but I am
trying to come up with a very conserve -
tive estimate.
It should be obvious after this ler gthy
discussion?may I digress, Mr. President.
It has not been my plupose, it is net my
Purpose to debate this amendment at
undue length. We have already agreed
to a time limit. I am not a filibusterer,
either by talent or persuasion. But ( felt
it was necessary to discuss at some not
inordinate length certain facets of this
budget.
As I said at the outset, we purposely
omitted those matters that have been
discussed previously, whether it be the
Trident or the B-1. We tried to get down
to some programs that first, the Com-
mittee on Armed Servicei itself had al-
ready frowned upon or that the Eouse
Committee on Armed Services or the
House Committee on Appropriation f dis-
approved of, even programs that the
military itself was not too satisfied with.
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But I have only recommended two pro-
grams for elimination, the two that are
so patently redundant and unnecessary
that they should be eliminated; to wit,
site defense and Safeguard?and I have
left money in the budget for termination
costs. In the personnel category, wherein
I am supported very strongly by Senator
STENNIS and his committee, I have sim-
ply taken the recommendations of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, a
committee which I believe is eminently
qualified to discuss such matters. Like-
wise, the slowdown in SSN-688 procure-
ment and the delay of one year in pur-
chasing a tanker and a tender, are pro-
grams designated by the Senate Com-
mittee on Armed Services for the reduc-
tions I have suggested.
So I am really in'accord with Senator
STENNIS again on all of those.
The elimination of the last buy of
CH-47C helicopters was strongly recom-
mended by Chairman IVIAnox Of the
House Committee on Appropriations due
to the on-going development of a more
modern version. I feel that my sugges-
tions to slow down the AWACS and
SAM-D programs will help in eliminat-
ing excessive concurrency and assist in
avoiding cost overruns in later years.
The reserve stocks program is a form of
backdoor foreign aid which the Senate
has previously gone on record as op-
posing.
Therefore, we get to the bottom line,
Mr. President. The total savings to the
taxpayer in the areas I have discussed
up to now would come to just over $2
billion. This, of course, IS twice as much
as is necessary to bring the committee
bill down to the $81 billion level. If ply
colleagues cannot accept all of my sug-
gestions, I would hope that they could
accept half.
The cut I am recommending in my
amendment, joined by many distin-
guished cosponsors, is $1.1 billion. I feel
we have been able to demonstrate a $2.1
billion cut. ,
Well, perhaps they can say I am half
wrong. If I am half wrong in every item
that I have saved, then it still comes
down to just about my amendment, $1.1
billion. If I am half right, if you want to
appl'oach it from the viewpoint of the
positive, then it still comes down to $1.1
billion. So, half right or half wrong, the
figure that we recommend in this budget
is minimal.
Obviously, the list of suggested sav-
ings that I have put forth is not ex-
haustive. Such programs as Phalanx,
the surface effect ship, the sea control
ship, the heavy lift helicopter, the CH-
53E helicopter and the patrol frigate
have all been severely criticized by the
General Accounting Office in reports
sent to Congress. I am sure that a care-
ful examination of these programs would
find areas where immediate savings
could be made that would help us to avoid
cost overruns in the future.
As I stated at the outset. I have not
included programs such as the B-1, Tri-
dent and counterforce, which' have been
focused upon extensively by Congress.
Finally, it is important to note that
the Secretary of Defense need not ac-
cept ray suggestions if my amendment
Is enacted. He would haie the discretion
to reduce programs which he felt were of
low priority. I would venture a guess,
however, that many of the programs the
Secretary of Defense would choose would
be among those which have been dis-
cussed in my speech today.
Mr. President, for years Congress pro-
vided little or no check on the military
budget. But we have seen an important
reversal of that attitude of unquestion-
ing submissiveness. Much of the credit
for that important turnaround goes to
the distinguished chairman of the Ap-
propriations Committee (Mr. MCCLEL-
LAN). He has made the tough decisions
concerning this bill and he has made
them with courage and determination.
While I obviously feel strongly that fur-
ther reductions can be made, my sugges-
tions are based on the firm foundation
of Senator MCCLELLAN'S work.
Today we have more reason than ever
before to assure that there is no fat. . .
that there is no waste in this budget. In-
deed, we must assure that there is no
waste in the entire Federal budget, and
I have voted consistently to reduce that
budget to assure that it does not feed
the fires of inflation?to be sure that,
If belt-tightening is required within the
American economy, that the Federal
budget will be an example to all sectors.
The Defense Department cannot be ex-
chided from the general effort to reduce
the Federal budget?and it need not be
excluded. Reductions on the level I have
recommended today would not endanger
the security of the United States one
Iota.
Mr. President, I am hopeful that my
discussion today will not be interpreted
as "just another gratuitous slap at the
military." For it is not intended as such.
I have great admiration for the men and
women who are assigned the awesome
task of defending our Nation. Those De-
fense Department officials who have
urged Congress to reject my amend-
ment are doing so because they sincerely
believe that it is in the best interests of
the Nation.
But the Nation cannot continue down
the path toward internal economic de-
struction as it strives to defend itself
against external forces. Whether my
amendment is successful or not today, I
call upon the military and civilian em-
ployees of the Defense Department to
use their exceptional talent to effect
managerial change to cut costs. I urge
those individuals to respect the Ameri-
can tax dollar and to spend it only when
a tangible benefit to our national defense
can be derived.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. EMIT.PITON. I am pleased to yield
to the distinguished Senator from Min-
nesota.
Mr. HUMPEREY. Mr. President, I rise
for two purposes: First of all, to com-
mend the distinguished Senator from
Missouri for an exemplary statement, an
outstanding service in the area of de-
fense expenditures. I think it is possibly
one of the most thorough and well-docu-
mented statements that has ever been
presented in the Senate.
The Senator from Missouri was kind
enough to make his statement available
to Senators earlier so we had a chance to
see what he is going to say. I, for one, am
grateful for the monumental work he has
undertaken, and I would like him to
know that I should like to be associated
directly with his endeavors.
I think this is one of the more impor-
tant developments in the area of defense
expenditures during my long experience
in the Senate. I thank the Senator, and
commend him on behalf of the American
people, who know, that we have to make
some defense expenditure cuts that will
enable us to bring the budget under con-
trol, and at the same time not imperil
our security.
The Senator's statement was made
without malice, without being deroga-
tory, and without any effort to abuse the
military; and I think we are all indebted
to the Senator from Missouri.
Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent
that the name of the distinguished junior
Senator from Minnesota be added as a
cosponsor of the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. ,
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, we are
rapidly approaching the hour of 2:30.
May I ask the distinguished majority
leader what his wishes are? I yield to the
majority leader on my time.
QUORUM CALL
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous
consent that the order for the quorum
call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING 0.ev10ER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
APPOINTMENT OF A COMMITTEE TO
ESCORT THE PRESTnENT
Mr. MANSFIFT al. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Chair be au-
thorized in appoint a committee to escort
the President of the United States into
the Chamber.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WIL-
LIAM L. SCOTT). Without objection, it is
so ordered.
The Chair appoints the following
Members of the Senate to escort the
President of the United States into the
Chamber: Senators MANSFIELD, ROBERT
C. BYRD, MOSS, BIBLE, FULBRIGHT, ERVIN,
METZENBAUIVI, HUGHES, HUGH SCOTT, GRIF-
FIN, COTTON, BENNETT, TOWER, BROCK,
AIKEN, and GURNEY.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Orerer-for _
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
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ORDER FOR RECOGNITICiN OF SEN-
ATOR CURTIS, AND FO lt THE SEN-
ATE TO TAKE A RECESS AT 2:35
P.M.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask_ unanimous
consent that the Senator f;11 Nebraska
(me. Comas) be permitted: to proceecr
not beyond the hour of 2;35 p.m., at
which time the Senate vAll stand in
recess.
The PRESIDING OFFIC3ER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. The Senator
from Nebraska is recognized.
SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON
INFLATION
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, on Au-
gut 19 I addressed the following letters
to tile President of the United States:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The vait majority of
Americans approve of the plan to have a
Summit Conference on Inflation. It is _be-
lieved that the placing of fafts concerning
the various segments of our ecianomy out oft
the table will assist in arriving at sound
solutions.
No segment of our economy' has a greater
stake in retarding and ultimately stopping
inflation than does agriculturer We urge that
those in chrage of this suifirnit meeting
develop fully the case in reference to the
increased costs imposed upoir the farmers.
These relate to everything th! farmer must
have in order to carry on thekroduction of'
food and, fiber for our econo y. We would
mention such things as trptors, trucki,
other machinery, repair parti, tractor and
truck fuel, fertilizer, pesticida, land taxes,
payroll taxes, seed, the requeemente relat-
ing to safety, health, sanitattan and pollu-
tion, freight, labor, fencing, ad the Count-
less other items of cost whidh our farmere
face.
We are aware that all of our citizens are
experiencing the harsh treatment that in-
flation brings. We are awareof the public
sentiment against rising prices including
the protest that is voiced atinst the cost
of food in the marketplace. is important
and necessary that the full Tfacts be ade-
quately demonstrated to the &bile and that
misinformation be avoided and corrected, rf
this is not done, many well-inientioned citi-
zens will arrive at an erronedus decision in
reference to food costs. It is i open oppor-
tunity for the demagogue. It is the costs
added after the food leaves die farm which
make food expensive.
We call attention to the disitetrous, -unwise
and unfair policies of the government some
months back in placing a &fling on bed
without across-the-board ceilings and con-
trol on everything. This did not lead to a
mere loss of profits. It spelled disaster to
many people. It drove some ant of business.
It wiped out the assets of son*. It dislocated
the orderly production, feeding and market-
ing of cattle resulting in surpliises, shortages,
scarcity, disastrously low prices and, later,
higher prices to the consurnir. This action
was taken without any justiffable economic
reason. It was opposed by all *ho are knowl-
edgeable in agriculture. It *as stubbornly
kept on too long. We submit that unwise and
unfair actions which cannot lie justified ecO-
nornically should not be taken for political
purposes.
We suggest that those 'who select the par-
ticipants and plan the agenda for the Sum,-
mit Conference on Inflation see to it that al
the presented; that the full story
ven to the American consumers concern-
ing the non-farm cost that*Contributes to
the cost of food in the marketplace; that the
whole story in reference to the increase in
the costs that farmers must pay be vividly
placed before the American public; that the
facts in reference to the percentage of the
income of the American consumer which is
spent for food both historically and currently
be presented, and that these figures be com-
pared to the other nations of the world; and
that the facts in relation to the price in-
creases of non-food cost-of-living items be
fully developed and compared.
We believe that Americaa farmers have a
greater stake in the fight against- inflation
than any other segment of our economy be-
cause of agriculture's inability to pass on
added costs. American agriculture wants
knowledgeable people to chartea course for
fighting inflation?people who liese.the oa-
pacity Eoia the will to examine an facts and
the Courage to apply real solutions..
Mr. 11,0BM:it!'" C. BYRD. Mr. President,
may we have order in the Senate.
? Mr. CURTIS (continuing).
We commend you for the steps that you
are taking and we are sum that there are
many individuals in the field of agriculture
who can make a distinct contribution for the
good of our entire economy,
With kindest personal regards, I am
Itespectfully yours,
And it is signed by the junior Senator
from Nebraska.
Mr. President, I yield back the re-
mainder of my time.
RECESS
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
move that the Senate stand in recess
awaiting the call of the Chair.
The PRESIDING OraviCER. Without
objection, it is so ordered_
Thereupon, at 2:32 p.m., the Senate
took a recess.
The Senate reconvened at 2:38 p.m.
when called to order by the President pro
tempore.
VISIT TO THE SENATE BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE 'UNITED
STATES
At 2:39 p.m., the President of the
United States entered the Chamber ac-
companied by Senators MANSFIELD,
ROBERT C. BYRD, MOSS, BIBLE, FuLBRIC?HT,
BRVIN, METZENBAUM, HUGHES, HuGH
SCOTT, GRIFFIN, COTTON, BENNETT,
TOWER, BROCK, AIKEN, and GURNEY.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. It 'Is
my distinct pleasure and privilege, on
behalf of the Senate, to welcome the
President of the United States to the
Senate. The President will now address
the Senate.
[Applause.]
ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT FORD
The PRESIDENT. Mr. President, Sen-
ator MANSFIELD, Senator SCOTT, Members
of the United States Senate, I wanted to
step by today just to say hello to those
with whom I had an opportunity to get
better acquainted and to officially ir au-
gurate Pennsylvania Avenue as a two-
way street. [Applause.]
It is wonderful to be back in a Chamber
where so much of America's history for
almost 200 years has been written and, I
say without any hesitation, one of the
greatest experiences of my life was the
privilege of presiding here, though for
a relatively short period of time. [Ap-
plause.]
Although my tenure was quite short,
I think it was long enough to convince
me that the U.S. Senate is one of the
greatest legislative bodies in the history
of mankind. [Applause.]
I think in the days and months ahead
all of us must draw upon the great tradi-
tions of the Senate. Our job, both in the
legislative as well as in the executive
branch, is to restore the people's faith
In the history and tradition of our Amer-
ican Government. No single man and no
single woman can possibly do this all
alone. It is a job for all of us working
together to achieve.
As Governor Rockefeller said yester-
day, we must deal with some very :lard
and somewhat harsh realities. We are
not always going to be on the same side.
It would not be America if we were. I
do not think that really matters. It only
matters if we end Up by being on the
best side for America from one State to
another. [Applause.]
I would be very, very remiss if did
not express my appreciation for the Sen-
ate and the House going more than half-
way on several measures of major im-
portance in the last week Or SO.
I speak here specifically of the Cost
of Living Council proposal, some actions
taken on appropriation matters, the
action on housing, the action on pension
legislation, and the legislation affecting
education.
I think what has taken place and
transpired in these various proposals is
Indicative that we can march toward the
center in achieving some good results for
our country as a whole.
Now, I do riot intend to talk specif-
ically about any prospective legislation.
I think I would probably be out of order,
and I certainly shall respect the rules or
traditions of the Senate in that regard.
As we go ahead, we must look not only
at our problems at home, but also at our
problems abroad.
I believe we have a good'team in the
executive branch of the Government,
,and I can assure you that that team will
be working with this teasn, the House
and the Senate, in the months ahead.
Thank you very much.
[Applause, Senators rising.]
The PRESIDENT pro tempore
nounced that Senators would assemble,
to greet the President.
Thereupon, the President was greeted
by Senators in the well of the Senate
Chamber.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATION ACT, 1975
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill (H.R. 16243) mak-
ing appropriations for the Department
of Defense for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1975, and for other purposes.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
Senate Will come to order. Let us have
order.
The Senator from Missouri is recog-
nized.
Mr. EAGLETON. While Senators are
still on the floor, I ask for the yeas and
nays on the pending amendment.
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The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is
there a sufficient second? There is a suf-
ficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I will
momentarily yield the floor to Senators
JACKSON and BROOKE for a colloquy on a
related subject.
Before yielding, Mr. President, I must
confess my senatorial naivete. As I was
concluding my remarks and saw?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we
have order?
Mr. EAGLETON. I thank the Senator
from Mississippi.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
Senate will come to order. Senators will
take their seats.
Mr. EAGLETON. As I was concluding
my prepared remarks, I noticed that the
visitor galleries started to fill up and the
press galleries started to fill up. I
thought that the "word of wisdom" had
gone forth In this citadel of deliberative
intelligence and that the press and thou-
sands of people were coming to hear "the
word." [Laughter.]
My aide quickly corrected my errone-
ous judgment and whispered to me,
"President Ford is coming to speak to
the Senate."
In further explanation of my naivete,
I then thought that President Ford had
perhaps heard "the word" and was com-
ing to make a public endorsement of my
amendment. But, sadly, he did not.
As I marched down to shake hands
with our fine, new President, accompa-
nied by Senator HATHAWAY?and not too
far away was Senator NELSON?I mum-
bled to Senator HATHAWAY and said:
Is it too late too ask unanintoue consent to
rhange the vote that three of us made last
year?
But, since Senator LONG is on the floor
and he objects to all such unanimous-
consent requests, I shall make no such
request.
Yes, there were three who voted "No"
on the nomination of Gerald Ford to be
Vice President. We did so for such rea-
sons as each of us felt appropriate at
that time. I, as one of the three, pray to
God that my judgment passed at that
time was wrong. History will determine
the future course of this country. History
will determine the wisdom, or lack there-
of, of my vote.
I have been mightily impressed by
what I have seen of and heard from our
38th President.
If my judgment was wrong last year,
then so be It.
I think I speak the sentiments of all
Senators who are here today when I say
that we have been deeply touched not
only by what the President said to us,
but by the fact that he came to this
Chamber to say it to us, face to face.
I am an honored individual, indeed,
to have been here today.
I now yield to the Senator from Wash-
ington.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield
first to the distinguished Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. Bsocia) .
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, it is not
my intention to take a great deal of the
Senate's time in discussing the "stra-
tegic initiatives" advocated by Secretary
Schlesinger. At the initiative of the dis-
tinguished junior Senator from New
Hampshire the Senate, in closed session,
discussed this issue in some depth dur-
ing debate on the fiscal year 1975 defense
authorization bill.
Nor is it my intention to propose the
deletion of funding in this appropriation
bill for several strategic programs?the
terminally guided MARV, guidance im-
provements for Minuteman III and the
MARK 12A warhead and reentry ve-
hicle?which I believe to be premature
reactions to admittedly disturbing de-
velopments in Soviet strategic programs.
Given the evident belief by large major-
ities in both Houses that the United
States should proceed with research and
development in these areas, such an
amendment would be futile.
I term these funding proposals pre-
mature because I have yet to find con-
vincing reasons, either in deterrence
theory or by examination of the linkages
between technological possibilities and
our strategic policies, to believe that the
Initiatives proposed by Secretary Schle-
singer will result either now or in the fu-
ture in an enhancement of our national
security through increased stabilization
of the deterrent relationship between
ourselves and the Soviet Union. This ob-
jective must be the criterion by which
we judge any proposed alterations in our
strategic posture.
The most disturbing aspect of the pro-
posed "strategic initiatives" is the pos-
sibility that they foreshadow deployment
programs that will eventually undermine
the stability of the superpower deterrent
relationship. Such stability is predicated,
to a great extent, on the assumption that
neither side will have an incentive to
strike first in a crisis situation. However,
a marriage of significant accuracy im-
provements with increased yield that re-
sults in one or both sides achieving a
significant silo-busting capability will in-
evitably increase the incentives to strike
first in extreme crisis situations. As a
noted British strategist has written:
Especially at a moment of acute political
anxiety, the existence of that capability,
whatever the intention behind it, is bound
to force a nervous adversary to consider
whether he can afford not to strike first, lest
he allow himself to be at least partially
disarmed.
This would be especially true if one of
the adversaries maintained the major
portion of his strategic inventory in fixed
land-based missiles as is the case with
the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the
pressures on a power emphasizing the
sea-based deterrent, such as the United
States, will be less intense because less of
Its strategic inventory will be threatened
by an effective silo-busting capability.
Nevertheless, it too would likely experi-
ence increased pressures to consider a
first strike under certain conditions.
I am also troubled by the implicit as-
sumption in the Secretary's proposals
that nuclear war can be waged at various
levels of intensity and that escalation
from one level to another can be con-
trolled. Fortunately, we have no prac-
tical experience by which to judge
whether or not this is the case.
More importantly, I fear that deter-
S 15539
rence may be weakened by emphasis on
planning for war scenarios having escala-
tory nuclear exchanges as a prime focus.
This creates the impression that sooner
or later the nuclear threshold will be
breached arid it is only prudent to plan
for that eventuality. Such fatalism, un-
fortunately, may prove self-fulfilling to
the degree that it inspires alteratibns in
our strategic posture that decrease the
Inhibitions regarding use of nuclear
weapons. The "strategic initiatives" sug-
gested by Secretary Schlesinger threaten
to be such alterations.
The assumption that proposals to ex-
ploit technical possibilities in the ac-
curacy-yield combination will influence
the Soviet Union to adopt policies more
conducive to the U.S. position on a
permanent limitation on offensive strate-
gic systems is also open to question.
Many respected analysts of Soviet mili-
tary policy seriously question whether
Soviet planners will give much heed to
such a blunt signal. The more likely re-
action in the Kremlin will be to continue
development of MIRVed delivery ve-
hicles while stepping up efforts to achieve
a Soviet form of efficient accuracy-yield
combination. I seriously doubt that we
can substantially affect the tempo of
Soviet strategic developments through
Initiatives that appear to be a direct
challenge to the survivability of their
own strategic forces.
It is also disturbing that many readily
accept the view that research and de-
velopment on these "strategic programs"
Is only a first step in a process that can
easily be arrested at any time. In theory
this may be the case. However, past prac-
tice leads me to believe that the tempta-
tion to deploy such capabilities once they
are fully developed will likely prove ir-
resistible regardless of whether or not
world conditions or our own self-inter-
ests justify such deployment.
MIRV deployment is a -case in point.
Had a moratorium on MIRV testing been
achieved and had the United States
shown some unilateral restraint in MIRV
deployment, concern over the possible
evolving Soviet MIRV threat to our land-
based ICBM's would have been much less
today and there would be far less reason
to give serious attention to the initia-
tives advocated by Secretary Schlesinger.
The perceptual affect of these research
and development decisions may be far
more pervasive than is commonly
thought. Once the U.S. research and de-
velopment phase has been completed on
these programs, a prudent security plan-
ner in the Kremlin may feel compelled to
assume deployment will take place re-
gardless of congressional actions. One
can count missiles and staging platforms
but it is impossible to verify, short of
on-site inspection, whether or not yield
and accuracy improvements have been
deployed. Hence, the Soviet Union will
likely feel pressured to fashion its stra-
tegic policies and weapons to take ac-
count of assumed deployment of U.S.
silo-busting capabilities regardless of
whether or not such deployment actually
takes place. This, in turn, may stimulate
many of the destabilizing tendencies I
have already mentioned.
In pointing out the real or potential
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negative implications of these "strategic
initiatives," I do not mean to imply that
I am unconcerned about the threat Posed
to our security by the dtenatiaic nature a
ongoing Soviet strategic programs. tt
would be dangerous and injurious to U.S.
security and world stabilitylf we allowed
ourselves to become strategically inferior
in any significant respect to the Soviet
Union.
I share Secretary Schleeinger's view
that we must take the atm& necessary to
insure that this does not happen. How-
ever, I do not believe that the course at
action proposed by the Secretary is the
only or necessarily the be alternative
open to us.
Other strategic alternatives do exist.
Indeed, the United States has an active
strategic program, disregarding the
counterforce initiative% that will deny
the Soviet Union any unitary advantage
should it continue its strategic mtssile
buildup to a point where it threatene to
achieve a significant disarming capa-
bility against our fixed land-ba.sed strar
tegic forces. One needs only point to the
Trident or B?1 programs as well SA tilt
active investigation of various modes for
mobile ICBM's to substantiate this
assertion.
It is my belief that in the next few
years, as the debate over the U.S. stra-
tegic posture continues .the Congress and
the Executive should thoroughly explore
alternative strategic approach.es empha-
sizing the ability to der,v the Soviet
Union any benefits it might attempt to
achieve through seeking a disarming
capability vis-a-vis any of our strategic
forces. At the same time we should
eschew any similar attempt to deploy a
disarming capability against fixed land-
based missiles or other straiegic systems
of the U.S.S.R.
Through continued efforts to achieve
success in the SALT negotiations and
through a strategic policy that seeks to
avoid offensive first-strike threats to any
of the components of the Soviet ill:don";
deterrent forces while denying a similar
disarming capability to theKremlin vi-
a-vis any segments of our strategic Triad.
Nee can best hope for the tUtablishment
of greater security for ourselves and
others and for a lessening of the dangers
of the nuclear age. This should be our
overriding goal and should guide deci-
sions involving the modification or de-
velopment of U.S. strategic nuclear
weaponry.
Mr. President, the committee report
quotes Secretary Schlesinger to the effect
that a prineipal feature of U.S. strategic
Policy should be,
The avoidance of any ccanbination of
forces that could be taken saan. adort to
acquire the ability to execute a first-strike
disarming attack against the trssit.
Hopefully, we all support that view.
However, to talk of a "first-strike dis-
arming attack" in such Iertieral ten*
Ignores the possibility that one could
seek a disarming capability against a
certain portion of an adversary's zumlear
arsenal, silth as fixed, land-based mis-
siles, and still maintain that the "com-
bination of forces" sought for deploy-
ment would not give one the ability to
execute a drst-strike disarming attack
against the U.S.S.R?
In order to forestall any misconcep-
tions in this regard, the report also states
that the committee construes the Secre-
tary's statement to mean that the United
States will not seek to deploy a first-
strike disarming capabrity against fixed
land-based or other strategic systems of
the 'U.S.S.R. I interpret this to mean
that 4 should continue to be U.S. policy
to eschew any attempts to achieve an
accuracy-yield combination on our Mis-
siles that would provide us with an ef-
ficient silo-busting capability that could
be construed by a reasonable opponent
as an effort to achieve a disarming capa-
bility vis-a-vis his fixed land-based mis-
siles. Does the Senator from Vtashington
agree with my interpretation?
Mr. JACKSON. The question, as I
understand the matter posed by the
distinguished Senator from Massachu-
setts, essentially refers to the statement
in the report of the Committee on Armed
Services quoting Secretary Schlesir ger
as follows:
.& principal feature of United States strxte-
gic policy should be the avoidance of any
combination of forces that could be taken
as an effort to acquire the ability to execute
a frststrike disarming attack against the
U.S.S.R.
The Appropriations Committee goes
on to construe this to refer to "such a
deployed capability against fixed land-
based or other strategic systems of the
U.S.S.R."
I take it that the Senator's question
essentially is, Do I agree with this con-
struction of Secretary Schlesinger's re-
marks?
The answer is, "yes." It is not the stra-
tegic policy of the United States to de-
ploy systems that could execute a first
strike attack against land-based or other
strategic forces of the U.S.S.R. It should
be pointed out, however, that the stra-
tegic policy of the United States should
not be limited to the single option, of
attacking the civilian population of the
Soviet Union. The report of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, with which
the Appropriation Committee associated
itself, is clear on that point.
Taking both the growth of Soviet
forces and future developments at SALT
Into account, we should be working to de-
sign a strategic policy that will provide
for enhanced flexibility in our strategic
forces.
Continuing research and development
along the lines of the strategic initia-
tives advocated by Secretaries Schlesin-
ger and Kissinger is an essential part of
that effort, and I am glad that the Com-
mittee on Armed Services and the Com-
mittee on A,ppropriationa have recognized
that fact and supported those programs.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, in my
conversations with the Senator from
Washington he stated that the "strategic
initiatives" proposed by Secretary Schle-
singer were research and development
initiatives only. He stressed that a clear
distinction must be made between re-
search and development efforts and pro-
duction-deployment decisions. I fully
agree with this view. However, at some
21, 1974
point in the future pressures are Likely
to occur for deployment of the accuracy-
yield capabilities that are Pinkly to be
developed through the proposed 'Stra-
tegic initiatives" programs. In contem-
plation of these pressures, I wonder if the
Senator from Washington has any views
regarding what, if any, conditions would
justify deployment of an accuracy-yield
capability that would provide the United
States with an efficient silo-busting
"effigient" refendng to a 2-to-I
or 1-to-i ratio of warhead to silo de-
struction.
Mr. JACKSON. To state it another
way, as I understand the-Senator's clues-
tion, under 'what circumstances would I
favor moving from the research and de-
velopment of a missile with a significant
silo-killing capability to the actual de-
ployment of such a weapon?
First, let me say that there can be no
hard and fast answer to that question.
But I think it is useful to discuss the
factors that would go into any decision
to deploy missile systems capable cf de-
stroying Soviet silos on a one-to-one
basis. These factors. are, first, the future
growth of Soviet forces. lithe Soviets ex-
ploit their throw-weight advantage by
deploying a significant number of ac-
curate MIRVs or additional missiles, they
could acquire the capability to destroy
a large fraction of our land-betted iorces
utilizing only a small fraction of theirs.
This would place the United States at
an unacceptable disadvantage, and in
my judgment we would require acapabil-
ity to destroy their reserve forces as an
essential part of any American reline-
tory attack.
The second. factor relates to future de-.
velopznents a SALT.
We need to achieve a SALT II agree-
ment based on essential equivalence.
Such an agreementis unlikely to include
limitations on accuracy, since there is no
way to verify accuracy. X do not ladieve
that we could have a stable SALT II
agreement over the long rim if the tech-
noIogical quality of our forces were al-
lowed to deteriorate in comparison with
Soviet forces.
We must assume thatthe Soviets will
continue to improve their technology
and that we will, therefore, have to con-
tinue to improve dirs. With a SALT 31I
agreement that provides for reductions
to a level of equality, we might be able
to defer indefinitetz the deployment of
extremely high accuracy-high yield mis-
siles. Without such a SALT agreement,
we might not. It is simply too scon, I
think, at this point in history to come to
a final conclusion.
Mr. BROOKE. Then, as I understand
It, we are ha agreement on the distinc-
tion between, research and development
efforts and production and deployment
decisions? There seinns to be no question
of that point.
Mr. JACKSON. That is right. We have
made a clearcut distinction in this appro-
priation bill, together with the author-
ization bill, Mr. Ptesiderid, between re-
search and development on the one side
and actual deployment and produetion.
Mr. liROOICE. W'hat we are doing in
this appropriations bill is merely re-
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search and development, is that not
correct?
Mr. JACKSON. The Senator is correct.
Mr. BROOKE. And prior to any time
we move to production and deployment
decisions, we will again have to assess
the posture of the U.S.S.R. as far as its
strategic posture is concerned and deter-
mine what the proper course of action
should be to maintain our own security.
Mr. JACKSON. That is correct.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to place in the RECORD that section
of the report of the Committee on Armed
Services dealing with the authorization
bill, pertaining to aspects of the bill con-
cerning the strategic initiatives, research
and development. I do that, Mr. Presdent,
because we have, of course, the language
of the report of the appropriations bill
before us, but we do not have this item.
There being no objection, the section
of the report was ordered to be printed
In the RECORD, as follows:
ASPECTS OF BILL OF SPEC/AL INTEREST
STRATEGIC INITIATIVES?RESEARCH AND *
DEVELOPMENT
Defense Department proposal
Both in his testimony before the commit-
tee and his posture statement, Secretary
Schlesinger presented a thoughtful, com-
prehensive analysis of U.S. strategic policy.
One of Secretary Schlesinger's major themes
was the importance of strategic flexibility.
While pointing out the importance of the as-
sured destruction mission, Secretary Schle-
singer highlighted its limitations, stressing,
in particular, that the President must have
a full range of strategic options to cover a
variety of contingencies. The Secretary ar-
gued strongly that the United States must
not limit its strategic objectives to the threat
to destroy millions of innocent civilians as
the sole?or even the principal?response to
potential Soviet actions.
To provide for a necessary range of options,
Secretary Schlesinger announced a new em-
phasis in targeting policy. As outlined to the
committee, this emphasis in targeting doc-
trine does not represent a major departure
from past 'U.S. policy. Indeed it is consistent
with the committee's longstanding convic-
tion that the United States must have the
capability to destroy a variety of selected
targets, military and civilian, if and when
necessary.
In addition, several new R&D programs
have been proposed in an effort to develop
a broader range of strategic options. The fol-
lowing programs have been proposed:
Navy:
Submarine Launched Cruise Missile
Terminally Guided Maneuvering Reentry
Vehicle
Air Force:
Air Launched Cruise Missile
Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
Improved Yield for Minuteman
Improved Accuracy for Minuteman
Increased Number of Minuteman Reentry
Vehicles
According to Secretary Schlesinger, these
specific R&D programs in large measure rep-
resent hedges against the potential growth
and development of Soviet strategic forces
as well as the outcome of SALT II.
Finally, Secretary Schlesinger reported to
the committee on the relentless momentum
of Soviet strategic weapons development. As
Secretary Schlesinger declared in his pos-
ture statement, "In summary, the new So-
viet ICBM program represents a truly mas-
sive effort?four new missiles, new bus-type
dispensing -systems, new M1RVed payloads,
new guidance, new-type silos, new launch
techniques, and probably new warheads."
The breadth and depth of the new Soviet
missile development is both surprising and
disturbing.
- Committee action
In assessing the strategic initiatives pro-
posed by the Defense Department, the com-
mittee shares a fundamental commitment to
the principles of deterrence and to the main-
tenance of a U.S.?U.S.S.R. strategic balance
based upon parity. Although making some
minor dollar reductions, the committee felt
that the new strategic initiatives were neces-
sary to maintain and implement these prin-
ciples and should be supported.
By its action the committee seeks to in-
sure that the necessary resources are avail-
able to the United States in order to main-
tain its technological margin in the face of
Soviet strategic advancements. Under the
provisions of the interim agreement on stra-
tegic weapons, Soviet strategic missile forces
are numerically superior to our own. More-
over, they deploy three times the missle
throw weight of the comparable 'U.S. forces.
A vigorous program of research and develop-
ment on the part of the United States is es-
sential to our effort to maintain the stability
of the strategic balance.
The committee believes that the strategic
programs recommended to be authorized for
fiscal year 1975 are a particularly appropriate
means of maintaining the technological
margin of our strategic missile forces in a
period of rapid Soviet technological develop-
ment. The programs are not primarily de-
signed to make numerical additions to our
existing strategic forces. On the contrary, the
major thrust of these research and develop-
ment programs is to upgrade our existing
forces so as to enable them to be used with
greater discrimination and with less unin-
tended damage over a broader range of se-
lected options.
Finally, the committee wishes to reaffirm,
as it has in the past, its hope for a successful
and stabilizing follow-on agreement at the
SALT negotiations.
The nature and extent of the deployments
that these strategic initiatives will enable
us to make will inevitably reflect the out-
come of present and future negotiations at
SALT as well as the evolution of Soviet stra-
tegic forces. It is worth pointing out that the
new strategic programs now underway in the
Soviet Union, which have given rise to great
concern within the committee, have all come
to light since the conclusion of the ABM
treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offen-
sive Weapons. In authorizing these programs,
the committee intends to demonstrate, with
unmistakable fOrce and clarity, its resolve
never to allow the Soviets to obtain strategic
superiority. These new R&D programs create
the most compelling incentive for Soviet re-
straint in the technological exploitation of
its numerically superior strategic forces and
for a genuine effort to conclude a stabilizing
SALT II agreement.
The improved accuracy-yield issue
The primary focus in the deliberations on
strategic initiatives was on the issue of
whether it was in the best interests of the
United States to improve the accuracy and
yield of U.S. missiles. The $77 million re-
quest was as follows: Improved Guidance to
increase the accuracy of the Minuteman
force, Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV)
with terminal guidance for increased accu-
racy of the Trident missile, and Mark 12A to
increase the yield of the Minuteman force.
The committee voted to support the pro-
posed accuracy-yield program for a variety
of reasons. There were, however, as discussed
below, four principal points upon which a
broad consensus was achieved.
First, the committee has long been con-
cerned to sustain the technological excel-
lence of our strategic forces and, wherever
possible, to improve the efficiency of those
forces. Improving the accuracy of our stra-
tegic forces enables us to broaden the range
of options available to the President and to
minimize the collateral damage associated
with a retaliatory strike in the event that
deterrence fails. Moreover, improved accu-
racy enhances the values of our existing
strategic forces by permitting one strategic
launch vehicle to accomplish a strategic
mission that might, with less accurate weap-
ons, require several such weapons.
Given the growth and development of
Soviet strategic forces, a deterrent posture
based principally on the threat to retaliate
against Soviet civilians, knowing that such
a strike would almost certainly lead to the
destruction of millions of American civil-
ians, is less and less credible. Development
of the technology required for a range of
more discriminating?and more credible?
responses is, in the judgment of the commit-
tee, simple prudence.
Second, a purposeful failure to improve
the accuracy and yield of our strategic war-
heads would be a gratuitous self-constraint.
Since the growth of Soviet strategic forces,
especially that reported to the committee by
Secretary Schlesinger, appears to be accel-
erating such a unilateral constraint on our
part would give the Soviets the strategic
initiative.
Third, several members emphasized that
the development of these yield and accuracy
improvements would not be a commitment
to deployment. At a relatively modest cost,
these developments provide an important
hedge against future as well as developing
Soviet programs in ? addition to preserving
flexibility.
Fourth, the committee was extremely
sensitive to the importance of negotiating
from a position of strength in the complex
SALT deliberations. In reviewing SALT I it
was noted that favorable Congressional ac-
tion on the ABM program enabled us to do
precisely that. The Secretary of Defense will
advise the committee of any developments
affecting Soviet strategic capabilities, includ-
ing the conclusion of further agreements at
SALT, that may bear on the committee's
assessment of the strategic initiatives au-
thorized in this bill.
The committee would also like to stress
that these improvements are not intended to
provide the United States with a first-strike
capability. The committee agrees with Secre-
tary Schlesinger that a principal feature of
United States policy should be, "The avoid-
ance of any. combination of forces that could
be taken as an effort to acquire the ability
to execute a first-strike disarming attack
against the USSR."
Conclusion
In summary, the committee considers that
maintaining technological superiority in
strategic weapons, even more so than in
other areas of weaponry, is critical to the
future deterrent posture of the United
States. The line of demarcation between re-
search and development and production is
clearly defined. The Soviets have thus far
made it clear that research and development
is in no way constrained by the agreements
reached at SALT I. In fact, their own rate
of development nearly underlines this point.
Thus, the committee recommends supporting
the strategic initiatives proposed by the De-
fense Department.
Mr. EAGLETON. I ask the distin-
guished Senator from Washington how
long his colloquy with the junior Sen-
ator from Masachusetts will go on?
Mr. BROOKE. We have concluded
our colloquy. I wanted the opportunity
to discuss with the Senator from Wash-
ington his views as far as the question of
a first-strike capability is concerned.
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Presidential statements and those of the
Secretary of Defense confirin that it Is
U.S. policy not to seek sti first-strike
capability. I want to be. sure that
it is understood that in appropriating
this money for R. & D. on ifscreased ac-
curacy and yield, we are not ?hanging our
strategic doctrine. I think :the Senator
from Washington has agreed that 'this
does not represent a change in the stra-
tegic doctrine of the United_States.
Mr. JACKSON. The Seltor is cor-
rect. I want to complimeithe distin-
guished Senator from Massgehusetts for
his able assistance in our joint effort to
agree on report language in the bill which
is before the Senate. That Innguage does
have the informal concurrepce, as I
mi-
derstand it, of the Secretary of Defense,
speaking for the administration.
Likewise, the language in the report
in connection with the Defense authori-
zation bill for the current fiscal year,
which I previously referred to, reme-
seats, to my knowledge, a 'view that Is
concurred in by the Secraary of De-
fense, speaking for the administration.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I had the
Intent, first, of offering in-the Defense
Appropriations Subcommit*e and then,
failing there, in the Conn/dace on Ap-
propriation and, failing Mere, on the
'flOor of the Senate, an amendment whch
would have deleted the approximately
$77 million for R. & D. on accuracy and
field improvements. I feel strongly that
these programs may be interpreted as a
sign that we might be moving in a direc-
tion of seeking a first-strike capabiltly
at least aganst fixed land-based strategic
systems.
After discussion with the distinguished
chairman of the Senate qaminittee on
Appropriations and subsequently with
the distinguished junior Senator from
Washington, report lang- uage was
worked out which clearly indicates that
such is not the intent of tlie Committee
on Appropriations in recommending
these funds. Moreover, frot the quoted
remarks of the Secretary qf Defense, I
assume it is the intent of the administra-
tion not to seek a first-strIke capability
against either fixed land-based or other
strategic systems of the U.S.R. More-
over, I assume there Is no change be-
tween the intent of former President
Richard Nixon, and Preshient Gerald
Ford In this rd
am very grateful to the distinguished
Senator from Washington for Joining
this colloquy and for working together
with me on the report laliguage which
is provided in the report of their Com-
mittee on Appropriations. -
Mr. JACKSON. I thank the Senator.
Let me just conclude by repeating the
report laugUage, quoting Secreta17
Schlesinger:
A principal feature of United States stra-
tegic policy should be, "The ayoidance of any
cotablnation of forces that timid be taken
as an effort to acquire the ateinty to execute
a first-strike disarming sista& against the
USSR."
I think that speaks for itself, and I
believe that my distinguished colleague
from Mastaehusetts agrees that the
combination of the statement of the Sec-
retary of Defense, the statement of the
Committee on 'Appropriations, and the
statement of the Committee on Armed
Services, In the reports of tEutise hiffso
conforms to his understanding and my
understanding.
I thank the Senator for his very help-
ful dialog here.
Mr. 'BROOKE. I thank the Senator.
Mr. JACKSON. The dialog has been
one that I hope will dissipate the con-
fusion.
Mr.Presid.ent, / ask unanirrious con-
sent to. have printed at this point in the
Rncorui four articles pertaining to this
subject matter.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RED-
ORD, RS follows:
I From the Scientific American, May 1974]
NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
iBy Barry Carter)
"Should a President, in the event of a ]1U-
clear attack, be left with the single option
of ordering the mass destruction of enemy
civilian's, in the face of the certainty that
It would be followed by the mass slaughter of
Americans? Should the concept of assured
desk elation be narrowly defined and should
it be the only measure of cur ability to deter
the variety of threats we may face?"
The questions asked in the preceding quo-
tation, taken from President Nixon's first
foreign-policy report in 19'.4), have been cited
repeatedly in the past few months by Ad-
ministration spokesmen in an effort to ex-
plain and justify some significant changes
that are being made in U.S. policy regarding
its strategic military forces The new strategy,
spelled out Most clearly in Secretary of De-
fense 4amett R. Schlesinger's annual report
for the fiscal year 1975, release4 in March
seeks "to provide the President with a wider
set of much more selective targeting op-
tions," and hence greater "flexibility," in
. choosing an appropriate responds to "any
kind of nuclear attack."
As the opening quotation illustrates, much
of the , official rhetoric concerning this :Lew
development in U.S. strategic policy has teen
more misleading than illuminating. To criti-
cize the "aspired destruction" doctrine of the
past decade or so as planning only for MSS-.
stve retaliation against .Russian cities ignores
the fact (belatedly acknowledged by Scale-
singer) that U.S. strategic forces have for
years had, the capability, both in weapons
and in, planing, for a "flexible response."
More important, the broad hypothetical
issues `invoked by such public statements
have tended to obscure the more immediate
real issues presented by this Administration's
recent actions.
The mai issues are serious ones. The pri-
mary operational question at present ill
whether or not the U.S. should develop mis-
siles with an Improved capability for attack-
ing "hardened" targets It. the tte.s.n.. The
main rationale offered for developing such
an improved "counterforce" capability (so
called because it is aimed at an opponent's
military forces) is that it is "impermissible"
for the 'U.S. not to "match" certain Russian
ociunterforce developments. There is also the
suggestion that these minsiles would mini-
mize "Unintended collateral damage."
The nrededing question in turf raises the
subtler issue of how the active promotioa of
such programs for improved counterforce
capabilities affects the stability of the stra-
tegic nuclear deterent and hence the likeli-
hood that there will be a nuclear war. Be-
fore ohs oaf address these two issues one
must Imderstand why public debate should
propecy focus on each questions and not (at
this time anyway) on the kind of questiorul
posed in President Nixon's 1970 remarks.
In the late 1960's and early 1960's US.
strategic Policy went through a serips of
transformations. By 1962 American nal itary
planners recognized that the U.S. would have
many more miasiles than the U.S.S.R. could
have for several years and in fact many more
/Pigmies than were requinni to devastate
every major city in the US.S.R. A counter-
force strategy therefore held out the attrac-
tive option of limiting damage to U.S. cities
by destroying a substantial part of the Rus-
sian strategic force& In language that
sounds remarkably familiar today, Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara said in a
speech in Ann, Arbor, Mich.: "The United
States has come to the conclusion that, to
the extent feasible, basic gcnitary strategy
In a possible general nuclear war should be
approached in much the same way that more
conventional military operations have been
regarded in the past. That let to say, principal
military objectives, in the client of a nuclear
war stemming from a major attack on the
&inane% should be the destruction of the
enemy's military forces, not of his civilian
population."
The Russians, holwever. continued to
deploy land-based intercontinental ballistie
missiles (I(JBM's) and subniarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBans). As a result, even
If the U.S. sought to limit damage to itself
by the partial destruction of the Russian
strategic forces, there would still be more
than enough Russian fortes left to kill
tens of millions of Americans. Recognizing
this fact, McNamara increasingly emphealzed
by the mid-1960's the coneept at "assured
destruction," which be said in 1968 meant
the -ability, even after absorbing a well..
coordinated surprise first strike, to millet
unacceptable damage on the attacker.' ThEa
criterion he defined explicirty: "In the case
of the Soviet 'Union, I would judge that a.
capability on our part to destroy, say one-
fifth to one-fourth of her population and
one-half of her industrial capacity would
serve as an effective deterrent."
Pew concepts have been as maligned or
misunderstood as that of Assured elattrue-
tion. Critics label it genocide or use the
acronym of "mutual assured destruction" to
can it man nt fact, the concept seems well
designed to serve two purposes. First, by
planning the size of VB. forces on the basis
of the "worst case" scenario of an all-out
Russian surprise attack, it ensures that the
U.S. possesses the ultimate threat: to be able
to wipe out the U.S.S.R. or any attacker in
retaliation. Second, since the destructicn cri-
terion is reasonably precise, the concept pro-
vides a useful basis for limiting strategic..
weapons proourement and for evaluating
arms-control proposals.
While retaining the assured-destruction
concept, McNamara and his successsor, Clark
Clifford, supervised the development of the
wide array of weapons that constitutss to-
day's U.S. strategic arsenal. Both the num-
bers and the characteristics of many of these
weapons were consistent with the assured-de-
struction concept, partly because the U S.
possesses a 'triad" of strategic offensive
forces and partly because of the hedge
!against the "highest expected threat." The
triad approach seeke to maintain a major
retaliatory capability in each component of
our strategic offensive forces:: ICBM's, SLIIM's
and long-range bombers. Justified on the
grounds that each component presents a
different problem for an attacker, difficult
end costly problems for his defense Ind a
hedge against unexpected failures in one or
both of the other components, the rot re-
sult of the triad approach is to prov de in
the aggregate a high degree of confidence
that the assured-destructima mission could
be carried out.
The hedge against the highest expected
threat, as projected in the National Intel-
ligence Estimates, meant that weapons would
be developed and sometimes procured as a
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cushion against Russian developments that,
although not considered likely; were pos-
sible. The predictable result was that the
U.S. came to possess much more powerful
forces than were shown by subsequent events
to be required for -assured destruction. Il'or
example, one of the main justifications
offered for developing multiple independ-
ently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) was
to hedge against a greater-than-expected
Russian deployment of an anti-ballistic-mis-
sile (ABM) system on the theory that in-
creasing the number of incoming warheads
would enable the U.S. offense to penetrate
the Russian defense more easily.
Of course, some of the development and
procurement decisions also reflected inevita-
ble political and bureaucratic pressures. For
example, faced with pressures from the mili-
tary and from Congress, McNamara appar-
ently thought he could not ask for fewer
than 1,000 Minuteman ICBM's.
Finally, the Proponents of the assured-
destruction concept in the latter half of the
1960's quietly subscribed to secondary strate-
gic objectives, in particular the desire to
retain some ability to respond flexibly in the
ease of an actual attack. If the U.S. were
subjected to a "limited" nuclear attack?
possibly with a small number of missiles or
because of an accident launch?most
thought the President should have a range
of options from which to choose. This factor
helps to explain why, for example, the Min-
uteman II warhead, which was first deployed
in 1966, could be programed for up to eight
alternative targets, and why there was flexi-
bility in the actual targeting plans.
As a result the U.S. ended up with stra-
tegic-war capabilities considerably greater
than the assured-destruction concept re-
quired. That this situation was rarely ac-
knowledged publicly was a serious mistake,
the results of which we are now reaping in
public misunderstanding of the policies of
the past and, more important, in the some-
times surprising ignorance about the present
capabilities of the U.S. strategic forces. The
simple fact, which cannot be stressed too
strongly, is that the U.S. strategic forces are
now capable of carrying out a large array of
alternative missions, far in excess of assured
destruction.
To begin with, assured destruction does not
require many forces. Assuming zero or low
Russian ABM levels (a reasonable assumption
given the 1972 Moscow Treaty limiting ABM
systems), the delivered warheads of 220 Min-
uteman in ICBM's could kill about 21 per-
cent of the Russian population from imme-
diate effects alone and destroy about 72 per-
sent of the Russian industrial capacity. The
delivered warheads from 170 Poseidon mis-
siles (which is fewer than the total carried by
12 submarines) could cause a similar level of
damage [see illustration on page 24]. Projec-
tions of bomber survivability vary greatly,
but most experts would estimate that enough
B-52's could reach their targets to satisfy
easily the traditional assured-destruction
criterion. . .
The total of U.S. strategic forces is, of
course, much larger. There are at present
1,054 ICBM's, of which 1,000 are Minuteman
missiles and 54 are the older, larger Titans.
Of the Minuteman missiles 550 have been or
are in the process of being converted to the
Minuteman III, which can carry up to three
warheads. These MIRV's are estimated?to
have an accuraty of 1,500 feet or less (ex-
pressed in terms of "circular error probable,"
which means that 50 percent of the warheads
are expected to fall within a radius of 1,500
feet of the target). The explosive power, or
yield, of each warhead is equivalent to be-
tween 170 and 200 kilotons of TNT, or at least
11 times the size of the 15-kiloton bomb
dropped on Hiroshima. Rapid retargeting of
the Minuteman III will be possible soon with
tho advent of new computer-software sya-
tams, such as the Command Data Buffer sys-
tem. (All estimates of the numbers and char-
acteristics of U.S. forces used in this article
are taken from the statements of U.S. officials,
from publications of the International Insti-
tute of Strategic Studies and from other reli-
able publications.)
In addition the U.S. arsensal includes 656
SLEM's, 496 of Which are scheduled to be-
come Poseidon missiles. The Poseidon can
carry uP to 14 MIRV's, but it is usually de-
ployed with 10. Although accuracy might be
reduced by uncertainties about the subma-
rine's location, it still is probably less than
3,000 feet. Moreover, even though each war-
head is smaller than Minuteman's, there are
many more of them and each is still about
three times the size of the Hiroshima bomb.
Like the Minuteman III warheads, the Posei-
don warheads can be retargetell quickly.
Bombers are often viewed as the step-
child of the U.S. strategic triad. The ap-
proximately 400 B-52's and 65 FB 1.11.'s are
unaccountably ignored in many comparative
tables of American and Russian strategic
forces, notably in President Nixon's first
three foreign-policy reports. This Is surpris-
ing given the fact that an estimated 40 per-
cent of the U.S. budget for strategic offen-
sive forces is spent on bombers. Moreover,
from the standpoint of nuclear strikes the
per-sortie attrition rate of about 3 percent
suffered by the B-52's in their attacks on
heavily defended Hanoi demonstrated high
survivability. Indeed, most places in the
U.S.S.R. would not be as heavily defended
as Hanoi, the B-52's would not be making
the more vulnerable high-altitude attacks
they made there and the bombers would use
nuclear warheads to silence air-defense bat-
teries. Each B-52 carries between four and
24 nuclear weapons, the load being a vari-
able mix of gravity bombs and air-to-surface
missiles. The bombs can be in the megaton
range (that is, equal to 1,000 kilotons) and
can be delivered with very high accuracy.
(This accounting of the U.S. strategic
forces does not include the extensive U.S.
"tactical" nuclear forces, many of which
could attack targets in the U.S.S.R. In addi-
tion to the more than 7,000 tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe, many such weapons are
deployed in Asia and on forward-deployed
ships in the Atlantic and the Pacific.)
In short, the US. already has a considera-
ble potential for "limited" strategic strikes.
Exactly how much capability depends on the
critical assumption of who strikes first and
how, as well as on one's assumptions about
the nature of the Russian threat. In any
case three important factors should be
remembered about potential targets in the
U.S.S.R.:
1. There are Many nonmilitary, industrial
targets outside urban centers that would
require only one or two nuclear warheads
each; such targets include manufacturing
plants, power plants and the two construc-
tion yards for missile submarines.
2. Except for "hardened" targets, most
military targets could be destroyed by only
one or two warheads each; such targets in-
clude air-defense sites, military airfields,
major army bases and submarine bases.
3. Even for hard targets such as missile
silos, nuclear-weapons storage facilities and
command posts, the use of small numbers of
warheads will create a high probability of
destruction. For instance, three Minuteman
III warheads delivered against three Rus-
sian missile silos with a "hardness" about
the same as that of the U.S. silos when they
were first built would have approximately
an 80 percent chance of destroying one silo,
whereas seven Minuteman III warheads
would have a similar 80 percent probability
of knocking out one silo three times as hard.
Presumably many Russian missile silos have
a hardness in this range.
As a result, even with existing missiles a
S 15543
limited strike by the U.S. that employed 100
missiles or fewer could do substantial damage
to the 'U.S.S.R. and could knock out some
Russian ICBM's.
In calculating the sufficiency of our
strategic forces, one should not forget the
Chinese. For any conceivable "crisis scenario"
the total expenditure of U.S. warheads
against China could easily come from the
present surplus exceeding the weapons
needed for the assured-destruction mission
against the U.S.S.R. Not only could the U.S.
destroy most of the nascent Chinese nuclear
forces, but also it has been estimated that
a few warheads detonated over 50 Chinese
urban centers would destroy half of the urban
population (more than 50 million people),
more than half of the industrial capacity and
most of the key governmental, technical and
managerial personnel. 'Indeed, against fixed
targets such as cities the 'U.S. could use its
B-52's, which could return to their bases for
other missions.
Not only does the U.S. have this multi-
faceted capability but also its nuclear
strategy has always included plans for at-
tacks other than massive ones on Russian
cities. This conclusion is logically inescapa-
ble when one realizes that the U.S. has had
thousands of strategic warheads since the
mid-1960's, has abuot 7,500 now and is ex-
pected to have almost 10,000 by 1977. There
are only about 200 major cities in the U.S.S.R.
Either the 'U.S. has aimed a superfluously
large number of warheads at each major city
43r it has planned for other targets all along.
Any doubts on this score were resolved by
Secretary Schlesinger's statement in March
that "our war plans have always included
military targets."
President Nixon has made it very clear from
the early days of his Administration that he
wanted changes in U.S. strategic policy.
Neither he nor any other high official, includ-
ing Secretary Schlesinger, has ever rejected
the assured-destructioon concept. Rather
they have defined assured destruction nar-
rowly to mean only massive retaliation
against cities and have said that more options
are needed. To date the Nixon Administra-
tion has really presented two different sets
of what "more" is needed. First there were
the "sufficiency criteria," which were pub-
licized in the period from 1970 to 1972. This
past year has seen the emergence of a new
set of criteria.
The sufficiency criteria, which President
Nixon first hinted at in 1970, were spelled out
by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird in
1971. They are:
1. Maintaining an adequate second-strike
capability to deter an all-out surprise at-
tack on our strategic forces."
2. "Providing no incentive for the Soviet
Union to strike the United States first in a
crisis."
3. "Preventing the Soviet Union from
gaining the ability to cause considerably
greater urban/industrial destruction than
the United States could inflict on the Soviets
in a nuclear war."
4. "Defending against damage from small
attacks or accidental launches."
These four criteria have been explained
further, including the fact :that the deter-
rence is for the benefit of U.S. allies as well
as the U.S.
The publication of the sufficiency criteria
at least moved the public debate off the mis-
leading view that U.S. policies and forces
only envisioned massive retaliation against
cities, but beyond that there is little new in
the criteria. This is partly because they were
never clearly explained; accordingly they re-
mained more Delphic than definitive.
The first criterion is simply a basic state-
ment of the assured-destruction concept.
The third is a result of the assured-destruc-
tion assumption at meaningful levels of de-
struction; beyond the ability of either side
to inflict 75 million fatalities and between
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE August 21, 1974
50 and 75 percent industrial darnage?levels
that would finish either country as a viable
society?relative differences in ablity to
inflict urban or industrial dat
age seemIn-
significant. Besides, much h er levels of
destruction can only be achi d with con;
seierable difficulty, since either country soon
reaches a point of rapidly dtinishing re-
turns in terms of urban or dustrial de-
struction per additional warhead.
The fourth criterion was dopier justifica-
tion for the Safeguard A131.1 syiftem. Without
getting into the debate over %itch issues all
whether or not the advantages of damage
limitation against small Bata% or acciden-
tal launches outweighs the d dvantage of
the Russians' misinterpretinethe purposes
of any ABM deployment, suiSce it to say
that the Administration as swirly as May,
1971, was committed to insidelficant ABlvt
levels in the ongoing Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks (SALT). The fonrth criterion
thus became "Inoperative."
That leaves the second criteiton. It clearly
enunciates a desirable objective in strategic
policy: to avoid strategic fortes or actions
that would be destabilizing ite a crisis. Al-
though this objective was not explicit be-
fore, it was inherent in the astored-destruc-
tion objective of providing highly survivable
forces that would thereby redire the incen-
tive for a first strike. The seceted sufficiency
criterion fails to delineate what more, if any-.
thing, was needed. _
The criteria are silent about the kinds of
option other than assured de ruction that
the President was so concerne about. More,
over, should the U.S. react protect its
t
allies (still undefined) in the *me way that
It would to protect its own itory? And
what are U.S. strategic objee ves with re-
gard to China? In short, exce for the flir-
tation with the ABM possibil4ty, the suffi-
ciency criteria only hinted at new strategiC
policies rather than estalelislatag them.
Instead of trying to amend the sufficiency
criteria, the Administration desided about e
year ago simply to scrap the and to start
anew in redefining strategic bolicies. This
time Secretary Schlesinger Itas been the.
principal spokesman. After sow of his press
conferences late in 1973 and sarly in 1974
led to confusion among jodrnalists and
other observers as to what thi new policies
encompassed, the appearanceof Schles-
inger's annual repo in Marc clarified the
rt
issues considerably. At one Iace in that
report the 'Principal Features of the Pro-
posed Posture" (a posture, Schlesinger
clearly likes to refer to as "estential equiv-
alence") are listed:
1. "a capability sufficiently forge, diversi-
fied, and survivable so that it will provide
us at all times with high con ence of rid-
ing out even a massive surprete attack and
of penetrating enemy defensils, and with
the ability to withhold an asseired destruc-
tion reserve for an extended peeled of time."
2. "sufficient warning to ensure the sur-
vival of our heavy bombers tagether with
the bomb alarm systems and command-.
control capabilities required by our National
Corrimand Authorities to dixe4 the employ-
ment of the Strategic forces ine a controlled,
selective, and restrained fashisela"
3. "the forces to execute ade range of
options in response to potent 1 actions by
an enemy, including a capability for peeciee
attacks on both soft and hardiargets, while
at the same time minimizing unintended col-,
lateral damage." ,
4. "the avoidance of any cciribination of
forces that would be taken as an effort to
acquire the ability to execute a first-strike
disarming attack against the USSR."
6. "an offensive capability of such size and
composition that all will perceive it as in
overall balance with the strategic forces of
any potential opponent."
6. "effensive and defensive capabilities
and programs that conform with the pro-
visions of current arms control agreements
and at the same time facilitate the conclu-
sion of more permanent treaties to control
and, if I possible, reduce the main nuclear
arsenals."
These factors plus the accompanying text
in the report provide the best available in-
sight into the proposed new policies. The f.rst
factor, Combined with the second's require-
ment of bomber survivability, constitutes
essentially a restatement of the assured-
destruction concept. It needs no further
elaboration here except to note that as-
sured destruction does not require imme-
diate response; indeed, the emphasis on a
"second strike" capability and on the sur-
vivability of U.S. forces reflects the goal of
having ,time in' which to consider what the
appropriate response should be.
Skipping briefly to the fourth, fifth and
fectors, they raise a host of diverse Is-
sues?touching on all offensive and defen-
sive strategic programs. There is not suffi-
cient space to treat them comprehensively
here; instead the focus will be on their Im-
pact on the Administration's concepts of
strategic flexibility and limited nuclear war.
The third factor and the balance of the
second address the questions of flexibEity
and limited strategic war directly. The un-
derlying questions can best be summarized
as follows: (1) Should the U.S. have a num-
ber of response options? (2) Should the U.S.
develop, missiles with improved counterforce
capabilities? (3) Should the U.S. actively
promote the idea of improving counterforce
capabilities for fighting, if necessary, a lim-
ited nuclear war? Since the first question is
essentially nencontroversial, the remaining
two define the immediate issues.
Schlesinger reports that most of the tar-
geting options in the past have involved
"relatively massive responses." He wants to
provide the President with a "wider set of
ranch more selective targeting options."
There is general agreemene among strategic
analysts that the U.S. should have a variety
of response options other than massive re-
taliation against cities. These options could
be useful, for example, in deterring a lim-
ited strategic attack. As Paul C. Warnke, a
former Assistant Secretary of Defense, has
put it: "There can . be little objection to
the concept that our targeting plans shoald
be sufficiently flexible to provide the Presi-
dent with a variety of options in the event
of a nuclear attack." Wamke believes 'We
might be better positioned to deter a less
than all-out Soviet attack if we have the re-
finement of command and control to push
only one or a few buttons rather than -he
entire console . . . to respond with less than
our Sunday punch."
This broad consensus includes those op-
tions that draw on the capabilities of pres-
ent forces and those already well along in
development. As we have seen, our present
forces already have the accuracy-yield com-
binations to be used effebtively to destroy al-
-most anything except hard targets. Even
against such hard targets as ICBM silos these
forces could destroy large numbers of tar-
gets, but they would not do it "efficiently."
Schlesinger makes it clear, however, 'teat
he wants more than flexibility, that he wants
counterforce options that require new or
improved weapons. The incremental options
are ones "minimizing unintended collateral
damage" and providing a hard-target kill
capability that "matches" that of the Rus-
sians. To be able to achieve these options
Schlesinger seeks programs to develop mis-
siles with improved counterforce capabilites.
The proposed defense budget for the fiscal
year 1975 includes a number of such pro-
grams. The programs appear to fall into two
categories.
First, there are the short-term programs,
the ones that involve relatively minor
changes and for which initial deployment
might easily begin by the late 1970's The
major programs in this category include pro-
curement of more Minuteman III miesiles;
refinement of the existing guidance syst-mn of
the Minuteman III to increase accuracy
(probably from 1,500 feet down to 700 feet or
less); a higher-yield warhead for the Minute-
man III identical in configuration wit a the
existing warhead, and a general program to
improve and measure the accuracy of
SLBM's. The proposed budget also includes
funds to flight-test a Minuteman HI with a
larger number of smialler reentry vehicles.
Whether this program will increase counter-
force capabiltes or net depends on the ac-
curacy and yield of the new warheads.
Second, there are two major long-term
programs. Both will require considerable de-
velopment time, and initial deployment
would seem unlikely before 1980. Advanced
development will be Initiated for a termin-
ally guided "maneuverable reentry vehicle"
(MARV) for possible "retrofit" into both
ICBM's and SLBM's. Althatigh a MARV war-
head has been programmed for some time for
the advanced Trident I SLBM, it is not to
be terminally guided, being designed for
evasion of ABM interceptors rather than for
improved accuracy. A new terminally guided
MARV, however, will presumably have en ac-
curacy of a few hundred feet. This would
give even warheads the size of the Poseidon's
a very effective hard-target kill capability.
Further research and development is aeed-
ed to decide exactly how the new MARV will
work. By definition, after the MARX has
separated from the "bus," or postboost
vehicle, that holds all a missile's warheads, it
can maneuver almost up to impact in order
to correct its flight path. The corrections
could be accomplished in two ways. The most
likely development is the homing MARV,
what some call the true MARV. A sensor in
the warhead would acquire an image tin-
ages of the target or of prominent terrain
features nearby (or perhaps would simply
acquire an "altitude profile" of the terrain
along its flight path). An on-board matehing
device would match this information with
a map stored in its memory. The warbead's
flight path would then be corrected either
by gas jets or by aerodynamic vanes.
An alternative approach is to use ae in-
ertial guidance system in the warhead as
well as in the bus. Since the reentry vehicle
often separates from the bus early in Its
flight, an on-board guidance system would
allow much later changes in trajectory. The
information on position would come, how-
ever, from the system's gyroscopes, from
stars or even from satellites and not from
the target area itself. As a result this ap-
proach in theory would probably not De as
accurate as the homing approach.
The second long-term program is the de-
velopment of an entirely new ICBM for the
1980's. This missile, which may even be an
air-mobile missile, would include a new
guidance system (presumably a terminally
guided M.ARV), which Schlesinger says
would give it "a very good capability against
hard targets."
How reasonable or necessary is it to de-
velop missiles with improved counterforce
capabilities in order to minimize collateral
damage or to match the Russians' hard-
target kill capability?
It is particularly difficult to undentancl
how these missiles will minimize collateral
damage. The warheads Secretary Schlesinger
is proposing will probably have at least the
yield of the present Minuteman III and
Poseidon warheads. Such warheads would
cause extensive damage over a wide area.
For example, a "small" 100-kiloton bomb
exploding in the air over a target would
cause substantial fatalities and damage from
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Immediate effects alone over a circle with a
radius of 2.5 miles. Since the poSsible im-
provement in .accuracy for the Minuteman,
for example, is at most about 1,000 feet even
in the long run, the number of civilian fa-
talities will hardly be reduced significantly
if a warhead at least three to 11 times the
size of the Hiroshima bomb lands a feW
hundred feet closer to the intended target.
A substantially smaller warhead that still
nrovides an improved hard-target kill capa-
bility is unlikely to be ready for deployment
until the 1980's, since a very accurate termi-
nally guided MARV is needed to allow a
significant "trade-off" between lower yield
and higher accuracy. Furthermore, the value
of much smaller warheads In saving lives
must be put in perspective.
First, the way to minimize fatalities, if
nuclear weapons must be used, is careful tar-
get selection, in other words aiming at tar-
gets distant from urban centers. Air-defense
sites or air bases in the Arctic and isolated
army posts or industrial sites are good ex-
amples. For a very limited exchange the dif-
ferences in fatality levels from an attack on
such targets with warheads of, say, 50 kilo-
tons as against five kilotons would not be
significant.
Second, if there is a large-scale nuclear ex-
change, then there simply is no way of keep-
ing civilian damage at a low level. The ef-
fects not only of immediate blast but also
of radioactivtiy would kill millions.
Third, in an actual nuclear exchange the
successful continuation of a U.S. policy
aimed at miniminzing civilian casualties
depends in large part on what the Russians
do, and the Russians have never seemed
much attracted to this objective. Their stra-
tegic warheads have always been large. Even
though they necessarily reduced the size of
Individual warheads on their ICBM's in or-
der to deploy MIRV's on them, some if not
all of the warheads are still in the mega-
ton range.
Schlesinger's main justification for the
new counterforce programs Is that the U.S.
to match that of the U.S.S.R. This seems
a questionable refinement of the broader
theme of "essential equivalence." Schlesin-
ger has on occasion defined essential equiva-
lence to suggest overall balance. For exam-
ple, lie recently testified: "We do not have
to have a match for everything in their ar-
senal. They do not have to have a match for
everything in our arsenal."
Whether or not such an overall balance
exists today and for the foreseeable future
is a question that deserves public debate; a
good case can be made for the affirmative.
Most important, both the U.S. and the
:U.S.S.R. have a high-confidence ability to
carry out a wide variety of retaliatory op-
tions. In terms of static indicators the Rus-
sians do have more missiles and greater mis-
sile "throw weight." The US., however, has
more bombers, more warheads (now and for
the rest of the decade) and about equal
throw weight (if bombers are included in the
calculations). In terms of qualitative fac-
tors U.S. missile submarines are much
'quieter and hence harder to find than the
Russian ones, and U.S. bombers are more
modern. Finally, to maintain or even en-
hance some of its capabilities, the U.S. al-
ready has a number of strategic programs
well along: the conversion of older missiles
to larger Minuteman III and Poseidon mis-
siles, the B-1 bomber and the Trident sub-
marine with its advanced missiles.
Schlesinger, however, avoids the complex
.qUeStion of whether the general U.S.-U.S.S.R.
strategic picture is one of overall balance?
of essential equivalenee. Rather, he selec-
tively focuses on relative counterforce ca-
pabilities against ICBM silos (Selective vi-
sion is not exactly a new tactic in military
analysis. The 'missile gap" Of 1960 is a ohs-
etc case; the heated debate over the num-
ber of U.S. ICBM's compared with the num-
ber of Russian ICBM's ignored the massive
'U.S. bomber force. Schlesinger's selective vi-
sion is even blurred within its own field.
Although the Russians are clearly develop-
ing new missiles and NITRV's, they appar-
ently have not pursued the accuracy aspect
of a counterforce strategy. with much zeal.
As General George S. Brown, the chief of
staff of the Air Force, recently remarked
about the new Russian programs, "MIRVing
alone won't [take out the Minuteman force].
Accuracy is the other key element and we
haven't seen evidence of accuracy improve-
ment in their work which we would expect
to see."
Is there some reason why the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. should have essential equiva-
lence in the capability to destroy missile
silos? The arguments against this course of
action seem persuasive. There is no benefit
in terms of traditional strategic analysis in
being able to kill efficiently very large num-
bers of the other side's silos. As we have
established, the U.S. can already destroy
some silos, although at a cost of a few U.S.
missiles each. Inefficient, limited destruction
of silos should suffice for the war scenarios
That some envision, in which the 'U.S. feels
it necessary to destroy silos as a way of show-
ing its "resolve." Killing many more silos
would not minimize damage to the U.S.;
everyone agrees that the U.S. cannot expect
to destroy a large enough fraction of the
silos or other strategic offensive forces of the
U.S.S.R. to limit damage to this country in
any ,meaningful way.
Finally a critical assumption underlying
the preceding discussion is that the silos
will have missiles in them when they are
destroyed. In fact, the flight time of a Min-
uteman missile to the Russian missile fields
is about 30 minutes. If the Russians were
to deploy early-warning satellites, they could
detect almost instantaneously the launch of
U.S. missiles, which means that the U.S.S.R.
could probably have the option of launch-
ing many, if not all, of its missiles before
the U.S. warheads arrived. Using U.S. 'war-
heads against empty silos in empty fields
seems a particularly questionable policy.
The full cost of these new programs is
unclear. Much depends on the size of the
deployments and the extensiveness of the
modifications. A useful benchmark is the
Minuteman III program; tile conversion of
$50 older Minuteman missiles into Minute-
man III's will cost between $5 billion and
$6 billion. Although the costs of some of
the new counterforce programs might be
comparatively small, the total cost of all the
new programs would greatly exceed the Min-
uteman III costs.
Added to the questions about the ana-
lytical reason for the new counterforce pro-
grams and the inevitable costs must be the
distinct possibility that these programs will
be destabilizing and will make arms limita-
tions more difficult to negotiate.
Assuming a crisis situation, a substantial
U.S. counterforce capability against Russian
ICBM's is more likely to create an incentive
for the U.S.S.R. to adopt a hair-trigger,
launch-on-warning posture; the Russian
leadership would fear that the 'U.S. might
attack first in an attempt to limit damage
to itself. These fears would make it even
more likely for the U.S.S.R. to attack first
In a crisis in order to destroy some of the
U.S. ICBM's that had become more tempting
targets as a result of the new U.S. counter.,
force programs.
Schlesinger deplores this instability (as
In his fourth feature, cited above, of the
new posture), but he and other high officials
say that the new U.S. programs are not
extensive enough to create such Russian
fears. The conceivable accuracy and yield
improvements on 1,000 Minuteman missiles,
however, even without the terminally guided
MARV, could give the 'U.S. the capability, on
S 15545
paper at least, of destroying between 80
and 90 percent of the Russian ICBM force.
The deployment of the MARV or the use of
improved SLBM's against the Russian mis-
siles would push that percentage even
higher.
The Russian leadership, moreover, might
be more conservative than the U.S. leader-
ship in assessing Russian strengths and
weaknesses. This conservatism would be
based at least partly on the fact that, unlike
the balanced reliance in the U.S. on all three
- elements of the strategic triad, in the U.S.
S.R. ICBM's are the primary component of
the strategic offensive forces. The U.S.S.R.
is allowed up to 1,613 ICBM's under the
SALT I Interim Agreement (compared with
1,054 for the U.S.), and the Russians are
actively developing four new ICBM's. More-
over, these missiles are under the command
of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which since
it was created in about 1960 has been one
of the most important branches, if not the
most important one, of the RUSSian military.
Unlike the U.S. Air Force, which has respon-
sibility not only for. ICBM's but also for
bombers and many tactical forces,' the pri-
mary responsibility of the Strategic Rocket
Forces is the Russian ICBM force; conse-
quently this organization has every incen-
tive to enhance its role in strategic planning.
The Long Range Aviation command, which
has responsibility for the Russian bombers,
has never had the bureaucratic strength of
the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Russian
navy has responsibility for a number of
other forces besides missile submarines.
The strategic-planning emphases of the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. differ particularly on
the subject of bombers. At present the U.S.
has more than 450 intercontinental bombers,
about a fourth of which are kept on "ready
alert" at a large number of air bases (so that
they can avoid being destroyed even in case
of surprise attack). The Russians have about
140 long-range bombers. These are qualita-
tively inferior even to the B-36 bombers de-
ployed by the U.S. in the 1950's, are not
kept at at as high readiness and are located
at just a few air bases. Although a new
Russian bomber (named the Backfire by the
Pentagon) is just beginning production, it
seems primarily intended for targets on the
periphery of the U.S.S.R. In any ease it is
not certain how many Baekfires will be built,
and the plane appears to lack the critical
range and low-altitude capabilities of the
B-52's. _
As for SLBM's, the U.S.S.R. is building new
missile submarines and is allowed more boats
and SLBM's than the U.S 1 under the terms
of the SALT agreements. In contrast to the
active U.S. MIRV programs for both ICBM's
and SLBM's and the new Russian MIRV pro-
grams for ICBM's, however, the Russians
have not begun testing multiple warheads on
their new SLBM. The U.S.S.R., moreover,
usually keeps only five or six missile subma-
rines on patrol at any one time, compared
with 40 percent of the 41 U.S. boats. In sum,
the U.S.S.R. does not seem to give missile
submarines the same priority in strategic
planning as the U.S.
Schlesinger essentially hinges his denial
that first-strike fears by the U.S.S.R. would
be enhanced by the planned U.S. improve-
ment in its capabilities against ICBM'i on
the relative invulnerability of the Russian
missile submarines. Compared with the U.S.
missile submarines, however, the Russian
boats are noisier?an important qualitative
disadvantage?and must operate in ocean
areas where it is easier for the 'U.S. to locate
and detect them. In addition the U.S. has
under way a large, aggressive antisubmarine-
warfare program for tactical Iliad strategic
uses. It has been reliably estimated that U.S.
expenditures in the fiscal year 1972 for anti-
submarine warfare were $2.5 billion and that
by 1974 they would rise to more than $4 bil-
lion. The Russian leaders might well fear, at
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August 21, 1974
some future crisis point, that the U.S. had
developed a significant antifibmarine-war-
fare capability, snaking Salesinger's sug-
gested ultimate reliance on t*ir missile sub-
marines less than compIetelyyeassuring.
One "crisis scenario" that is often con-
cocted to show the danger 'elf the growing
Russian counterforce capability against Min-
uteman and to justify devegming improved
U.S. counterforce capabilities is an attack or
threat of attack by the 11.S.3R. against U.S.
ICBM's. The scenario envisions the following
chain of events: (1) a real or threatened
Russian attack against Mitgateman; (2) a
realization by the U.S. Ieadeiship that it is
left or will be left with no more than a capac-
ity to attack Russian cities; (3) major con-
cessions or even surrender 14 the U.S.
This scenario has an ob4ously fantastic
quality. Even if the internal logic of the
scenario were accepted, it still does not
justify improving U.S. counterforce capabili-
ties. It does not matter w4ether the 1:1-4.
missiles destroyed are highly accurate or not.
What matters is what other'As. forces can
do if these missiles are destroyed. Indeed, as
we have seen, by presenting an increased
threat to the U.S.S.R., U.S. gevelopment pf
highly accurate missiles might actually make
the Russians more likely to attack, thus
making the scenario less Implausible. ,
More important, the underlying logic of
the scenario Is simply wrong, as should be
evident to both the U.S. and the Russian
leadership. First, the Russiaps would have
to consider that Minutensien might be
launched against RIM/310,n targets in the 313-
minute warning time between the launch g
the Russian ICBM's and their arrival at the
Minuteman silos. Second, even if a surprised
or reasonably cautious U.S. 'leadership did
not launch on warning, a few Minutemen
would survive even the most -pareful attack.
Also surviving would be at least the bombers
on alert and most if not all or the U.S. mis-
sile submarines in the water, (If the attack
occurred after an initial est* period, more
bombers than usual would to on alert and
more submarines would be In the water.)
These combined forces would 'provide the U.S.
with the capacity to carry a* a number of
limited strikes while still retaining an as-
sured-destruction hedge.
Finally, some U.S. retaliation would seem
very likely to the Russian leadership since
tens of millions of Americans svould be killed
in any "Minuteman only" attack. In attacks
against silos the bombs are sect to explode as
close to the ground as possible, thereby pick-
ing up much dirt and debris. 'nee fallout from
the explosion of thousands g megatons of
nuclear weapons over the Minuteman fields
would be tremendous, and witnis would carry
the lethal contamination over many major
U.S. cities. Such calculation of fallout do
not even include the possibilitg of a few Rue-
sion warheads going off comae and directly
hitting populated areas, nor the collateral
damage by Russian attacks against other tar-
gets, such as bomber bases, Many of which
are near cities.
Even not assuming a crisis, the conse-
quence of these new U.S. counterforce devel-
opments might be to push the U.S.S.R. to-
ward accelerating or expanding programs, dr
starting new ones. The arms _race is not as
mechanically "action-reaction!' as some have
suggested, but a substantial new U.S. capa-
bility against the primary strategic offensive
force of the TJ.S.S.Rt will surely fuel justifi-
cations within the Russian bureaucracy for
some kind of reaction. This sheuld be partic-
ularly true when 11.8. antisubmarine-warfare
programs, noted above, are also considered.
If the U. counterforce programs are al-
lowed to co ue beyond the rhetoric of an-
nouncing them, these programs would oper-
ate to undercut any progress at SALT. Of
course, if announcing these programs is just
a short-term ploy designed to strengthen the
U.S. bargaining position for the impending
SALT H agreements, then little real :norm
will result. There Is no evidence, however,
that top Administration officials intend to
turn these programs off quickly. And even if
there are such intentions, new weapons pro-
grams tend to gain a momentum of their
own once they are announced. High-level offi-
cials become publicly committed to rationales
for them, rationales that include more than
the systems' just being "bargaining chips."
Bureaucracies are created with a vested in-
terest in the continuation and expansion of
these programs. Moreover, improvements in
accuracy and yield would be particularly dif-
ficult to limit explicitly in SALT, making it
harder to rationalize publicly any subsequent
termination of the prograin.
Accuracy improvements are generally ac-
depted as being among the most diiacult
weapons characteristics to limit in an arms-
control agreement, because of problems of
both definition and verification. Drafting a
workable, direct limit on accuragy seems im-
possible, since the counterforce potential of
a warhead depends on the accuracy-yield
combination. Moreover, a simple numerical
limit on accuracy would not be verifiable.
A photograph of a silo or even the missile
gives little clue to the kind of small but im-
portant differences in accuracy that are be-
ing, considered here. Closer examination
through on-site inspection, even if such in-
spection could be negotiated, would be in-
sufficient. On-site inspection could indicate
whether the warhead was a terminally guided
MARV, but this would not establish any par-
ticular accuracy. Moreover, on-site inspection
includes a heroic assumption that the latest
warheads are on the missile and not stored
nearby in an area excluded from the on-site
inspection provisions.
Surveillance of Russian missile-testing
may :eye some indication of accuracy. The
indicaffitn, however, is indirect erntil not con-
clusive. Test data tell one about the ballistic
coefficient (or pointedness) of the warhead,
its reentry speed and similar information,
all of which helps in estimating accuracy.
An outside observer, however, can never he
sure what the actual target is. Similarly,
course corrections by the warhead would in-
dicate a maneuvering capability but not nec-
essarily terminal guidance or particularly
high accuracies.
An Indirect way to limit or impede accu-
racy improvements through SALT would be
by placing a strict limit on the number of
missile tests. This would make it more diffi-
cult to develop advanced guidance tech-
niques and to test them often enough so
that the military would have confidence in
them. The low limits necessary seem non-
negotiable, however, since they represent a
direct challenge to all new strategic pro-
grams. Even without accuracy improvements
the Pentagon will want to do extensive re-
search and development and operational
testing of the new Trident missile and fur-
ther operational testing of the Minuteman
and Poseidon missiles. Similarly, the Rus-
sians will want to flight-test extensively
their four new ICBM's and their new SLBM
as well as their existing arsenal of missiles.
Limits in SALT on the yield of warheads
might be more possible, but they would be
of uncertain significance. The two sides could
limit yield by an agreement that warheads
not be larger than a given yield or a given
weight. The effect of any such limitation
could be circumvented, however, by in-
creasing the number of warheads and by in-
creasing their accuracy. Moreover, it would
be difficult to verify the exact yield of a war-
head. Even elaborate on-site inspection
would not ensure that "advanced" warheads
were not hidden nearby. Surveillance of fight
tests only gives an estimate of the size of
the warhead, and yield per pound of warhead
can be varied by warhead design and the
richness of the nuclear "fuel" used.
In short, the practical difficulties of ash-
toning limitations in SALT on the type of
counterforce improvements now planned by
the U.S. make such limitations unlikely and
will instead presumably Create strong pres-
sures in the U.S.S.R. to expand old programs
or to start new ones that either mach or
compensate for the U.S. programs. This in
turn can only work against other limitations
on strategic arms.
Allied concerns about the credibility of the
U.S. deterrent are another reason offered fiv
developing missiles with improved cc,unter-
force capabilities. Occasionally a specific
scenario?a Russian attack in central
Europe?is given as a justification for such
imprgvements. Neither the scenario nor the
more general invocation of allied claims is
persuasive.
The European scenario supposedly demon-
strates that the U.S. needs the ability to
respond with nuclear weapons in order to
show its resolve and to destroy some of the
attacking Russian forces. There are, however,
already sizable U.S. forces in Europe that
could accomplish both of those objectives,
Even if the U.S. decided to employ strategic
weapons, existing US. forces could carry out
a wide variety of selective attacks.
As for the broader claims of allied con-
cerns, Morton Halperin, an authority on nu-
clear strategy, has remarked: "The credi-
bility of the U.S. deterrent to an Ally is
primarily a result of the overall U.S.-Ally
relationship, which includes economic and
political considerations as well as military.
To the extent that Allied leaders evaluate
U.S. military capabilities, they look especial-
ly to the U.S. conventional and nucleat forces
in that particular theater of operations. Fine
distinctions in the U.S.-Soviet strategic bal-
ance or in U.S. strategic policy are unimpor-
tant to Allied leaders. Among those Allied
analysts who care, opinion is probably split
between those who favor the U.S. possessing
an efficient silo-kill capability and those who
do not."
Among the European strategic analysts
who oppose such deployments is Ian Smart,
formerly assistant director of the London-
based International Institute of Strategic
Studies. Smart writes: "Producing and de-
ploying much more accurate strategic mis-
siles . . . is to be regretted and even feared
since . . . it can only reduce the stability
of the strategic balance in any period of
acute tension." At least part of this European
concern can be attributed to the fact that,
in a strategic exchange, the industrialized
European countries are very likely taagete?
if only because of the U.S. forces deployed in
or near those countries.
Finally, evei assuming that the ail es (or
even the American people) accord consider-
able political significance to fine distinctions
in the "strategic balance," Schlesinger s pro-
posed counterface improvements are not very
helpful politics. The supposedly important
distinctions are usually visible ones such as
the number of delivery vehicles, the in-amber
of warheads or the throw weight. Schles-
inger's accuracy and yield improvements do
not affect these indicators, except possibly
in the counterproductive way of reducing
the number of warheads in order to allow
larger ones.
On balance, then, there seem to be strong
arguments against developing missile,. with
improved counterforce capabilities. Collat,
eral damage can best be minimized by shift-
ing targets, not improving accuracies by a
few hundred feet. The ability to destroy
efficiently large numbers of missile silos in
order to "match the Russians" seems not
only unnecessary and expensive but also de-
stabilizing. SALT might well be undercut,
and the supposed concerns of our allies about
the U.S. deterrent are not answered by such
programs.
As one gets caught up in considering nu-
clear-war scenarios and nuclear-weapons ca-
pabilities there is a dangerous tendency- to
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forget that the primary objective of nuclear
strategy is to avoid nuclear wars, not to fight
them.
Given the destructive power of nuclear
weapons and the world's lack of experience
in using them, crossing the "nuclear thresh-
old" would be a profoundly destabilizing
event. It is a delusion to believe one country
could employ nuclear weapons, even on a
limited scale, and have a high degree of con-
fidence that the response by another nuclear
power would be predictable and proportion-
ate. The particular first use might be esti-
mated by the opposing country's observers
to be greater than it actually was, or the use
might have created more damage than ex-
pected (for example through greater-than-
expected fallout). The opposing country
might not have readily available weapons of
the same yield or similar targeting options
and decide to escalate. The political reaction
in the opposing country might lead to escala-
tion. In short, the possible causes for mat-
ters getting out of hand are endless.
To make deterrence work, a country must
carefully consider its public attitude toward
nuclear war and cautiously select its retalia-
tory options. This does not mean that the
U.S. should have only the single strategic
option of massive retaliation against cities.
This country already has ample capabilities
for lesser options, and it seems appropriate
to have the flexibility, at a minimum, for
possible responses to accidental or limited
launches.
The Nixon Administration, however, is go-
ing beyond this. It is seeking the additional
capability to attack efficiently large numbers
of Russian missile silos. Not only might this
counterforce option be destabilizing in it-
self but also the Administration's promo-
tion of the option and its general public
advocacy of a counterforce strategy might
have a pervasive, if subtle, tendency to re-
duce the inhibitions against the use of nu-
clear weapons?in effect, to lower the "nu-
clear threshold." New bureaucracies, with
vested interests in the hardware and ration-
ales of a caunterforce strategy, are created.
In trying to gain public approval of new
policies and programs, leaders find them-
selves taking more simplistic positions than
the uncertainty of nuclear warfare war-
rants. In this climate some of the risks of
nuclear war are downplayed. Unrealistically
precise calculations suggest that limited nu-
clear war can be kept limited and even re-
sult in positive gains.
There are some disturbing parallels here
to the vogue of limited conventional war in
the early 1960's. In pushing for changes in
conventional strategy and new procurement,
advocates of limited conventional war ig-
nored some of the pitfalls and costs of such
a strategy. The searing national experience
of the war in Vietnam was needed to demon-
strate these oversights.
Exactly where the line should be drawn on
"selective targeting options" is not at all
clear. It seems most inadvisable, however,
to take the gamble of developing missiles
with improved counterforce capabilities,
whether this is to match a specific Russian
capability or for any other reason.
Opponents of U.S. counterforce improve-
ments, nonetheless, must recognize certain
'practical limits to their arguments. Even if
Congress declines to fund the new and ac-
celerated development programs Schlesinger
is pioposing, continued U.S. testing of stra-
tegic missiles and various researchand-devel-
opment efforts already under way inevitably
will lead to some improyements in missile ac-
curacy. (As Schlesinger has pointed out, some
refinements in existing guidance systems will
occur almost as a matter of course?through
better software programs, greater purity in
rocket fuel, better, measurement of the
earth's gravitational field and numerous oth-
er factors. The development of a terminally
guided MARV, something further beyond the
state of the art, requires more of a conscious
bureaucratic decision to proceed.) Besides
U.S. advances, moreover, Russian counter-
force improvements are Likely to continue,
raising serious questions about Russian in-
tentions.
Faced with these likely developments, the
solution is still not to follow the Schlesinger
approach. Rather, the solution should be to
seek actively to negotiate for limits on
MIRV's and for the reduction of vulnerable
strategic forces.
Limits on MIRV's would be designed to
slow the perceived threat to U.S. ICBM's, a
Russian threat that many consider destabil-
izing. In return for the U.S. slowing certain
of its strategic programs, for example, the
U.S.S.R. might agree to limits on the deploy-
ment of the SSX-18, the "fallow on" missile
to the large SS-9. This would push at least
a few years further into the future the time
when analysts would estimate that only a
particular level of Minuteman could survive
a Russian counterforce attack.
Negotiating missile reductions represents
another approach: to limit not only the
threatening forces but also the threatened
ones. This approach would essentially mean
bilateral reductions in ICBM's, presumably
In a way that would retire the more threaten-
ing ICBM's, so that the remaining ICBM's
would be less vulnerable. Some asymmetrical
reductions might also be considered. For in-
stance, the U.S. could reduce its ICBM's,
whereas the U.S.S.R. (having less to fear in
the short run about the vulnerability of its
ICBM's) could reduce some ICBM's plus oth-
er forces.
Reductions in the land-based missiles of
both sides would reduce the importance of
this strategic strike force. It would thereby
undercut the rationale for an expensive con-
test of matching counterforce improvements.
More important, it would reduce the great-
est potential source of instability in a
crisis. Both countries would have less incen-
tive to adopt an unstable, launch-on-warn-
ing posture or to launch an attack out of
fear of a preemptive strike.
The reductions approach has received sup-
port recently from such diverse sources as
the Federation of American Scientist's and
Fred C. Me, director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. It was even accorded
the status of a possibility in Schlesinger's
recent annual report.
Rather than focusing on how to match
the U.S.S.R. in a particular capability when
such matching does not bode well for either
country, the strategic debate in the U.S. in
the coming months should focus on MIRV
limits, force reductions and other measures
designed to minimize the chances of nuclear
war and to decelerate the arms race.
[From the F.A.S. Public Interest Report,
February 19741
COUNTERFORCE 10 YEARS LATER: PLUS CA
CHANGE
On January 10, 1974, Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger revealed a quiet change in U.S.
central war strategy. (See box, page 3). He
announced that, several months before, he
had begun the process of improving the ac-
curacy of U.S. missiles, that we were now
targeting Soviet military targets, and that
we were preparing to fight less than all-out
nuclear wars. This was a fundamental and
far-reaching decision reversing a position
which had previously been debated for more
than a decade under the heading of "deter-
rence" versus "counterforce".
Several questions arise. First, why was the
decision taken in secret when it is of such
importance, and when it seems to contradict
policy statements made by President Nixon,
Senator John Stennis and others, only a
few years ago.
S 15547
Second, the decision is partly justified on
grounds involving the SALT Agreements
limiting missile numbers, but the deci-
sion ts clearly not to be negotiable at SALT.
Third, will the decision encourage limited
nuclear war both by acknowledging that we
are prepared to fight a controlled nuclear
war if initiated by the other side, and by
making our own preparations for initiating
one? Thus, will the decision enhance or un-
dermine U.S. safety?
Fourth, will the decision make future
SALT agreements more or less difficult? In
what direction is the arms race now heading?
COVNTERFORCE VERSUS DETERRENCE ?
In the early fifties, the United States
thought of nuclear war as a prolonged (sixty
day) campaign of exhaustion. Both cities
and military targets were to be devastated.
Later, the United States gradually realized
that its preponderance of strategic weapons
should be aimed initially at the time-urgent
targets that could retaliate against us?a
counterforce strategy evolved. Still later,
during the missile gap period, the United
States was preoccupied with defending it-
self against counterforce threat-possibilities
to its bombers, threats that never material-
ized.
But by 1962, it was evident that the United
States would have far more missiles than
the Soviet Union for several years?and more
missiles than were necessary to strike Soviet
cities. The excess of missiles had been pur-
chased for esentially political reasons?Secre-
tary McNamara did not feel that he could
come into Congress with a request for fewer
than 1,000 although it was conceded, inside
the Administration, that 400 would do for
military reasons. (By 1965, the United
States had a four-to-one lead over the Rus-
sians at about 1,000 to 250, in land-based
missiles). In 1962, Secretary McNamara said,
in a famous speech at Ann Arbor:
"The U.S. has come to the conclusion that
to the extent feasible, basic military strategy
in a possible general nuclear war should be
approached in much the same way that more
conventional military operations have been
regarded in the past. That is to say, principal
military objectives, in the event of a nuclear
war stemming from a major attack on the
Alliance, should be the destruction of the
enemy's military forces, not of his civilian
population".
The rationale for this decision was not
particularly strong. If we were not going to
strike first, it was asked, would we not be
aiming at only empty holes? DOD said the
Soviets might have a "reload capacity". In
fact, DOD was assuming, as usual, that the
war would begin in Europe with a Soviet
aggressive act and that the United States
might well strike first on the nuclear level.
Underlying the arguments and the rhetoric
was an excess of missiles for which there
simply were not enough civilian targets.
Supply produced its own demand.
As the Soviet Union built submarines,
Secretary McNamara moved away from this
pronouncement. His rhetoric became that of
"deterrence" rather than "counterforce".
Undoubtedly, U.S. missiles remained targeted
upon Soviet missiles. But the Soviet missile
force was growing beyond the ability of the
U.S. force to keep up?at least on a missile
for missile basis. In the sixties, counterforce
became a generally discredited term.
In the research institutes, however, there
was a solution: MIRV. It could make each
missile count for several. Thus it could make
possible a continued economical effort to tar-
get many Soviet missiles. Secretary Mc-
Namara would not purchase MIRV for this
(counterforce) purpose. But he would, and
did, buy it to overwhelm any possible Soviet
ABM. In this regard, it was the perfect pene-
tration aid, requiring that each "decoy" be
destroyed because each was a warhead.
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This kept MIRV alive. And much was said
about it being defensive only. It was arffned
that the small (2-10 times Err ?shims) size
precluded use against enemy missile silos
only. For Preaident Nixon's assirtions in this
regard, see box above.
In fact, however. It was conaddered inevit-
able among the more sophisticeted observers
that the Defense Department'Could not be
prevented from putting iighj accuracy on
these small warheads. There re too many
temptations. At that point, Dc would have
a really potent counterforce treat.
We had the potential for 3,000 20a-kiloton
warheads on our 1,000 Minuteman missiles
(three such warheads on each), And we had
programmed 5,000 warheads in 31 Polaris
submarines (16 missiles with 10 warheada
each on each submarine a 50itiotons each.)
The warheads were relreavel small but, in
such calculations, accuracy 1$ Mach More
useful than yield. An eightfoll diminution
in yield (megatonnage, payload capability)
can be compensated for by a thsubling Of ac-
curacy. Thus a giant Soviet utsslle with 25
megatons and 1,4 mile accuracy is only as
effeative as a 'U.S. one-megatddi missile 'with
i/edth mile accuracy. The 'United States did
Indeed lead the Soviet Union accuracy by
a factor of two to three. And ttese accuracies
were getting to the point where even with
the smallest programmed ithoshima-type
bombs, hardened missile sloe could be
threatened.
Furthermore, as with SecrivaeV McNamara,
when there are too many ads to target
on civilian targets, what can one do or say to
prevent the Defense Departmpnt from tar-
geting military targets? And care this is con-
ceded, what can one do to Tawniest the missile
targeting from being done dith high ac-
curacy? Thus did cynics argue.
People did try. Senator Edward- W. Brooke
wrote a long series of letter t to 'President
Nixon and Secretary of renege Laird, The
responses were favorable in tone but equivo-
cal read literally. The heart of the often re-
peated response was:
"We have not developed anclare not devel-
oping a weapon system havrag, or which
eatild reasonably be construed, as having,
fITSC StTlite potential."
In addition, the President (nied that he
-was funding a specific prograla for improv-
ing accuracy to Which Air 'Pores General
Ryan had referred with pleste and an-
ticipation as ,providing "hard- get" .killers.
But this was all, The evident hiephole rrea-
sonably be construed") Ise now being
exploited.
Our own MERV was first teeiled in eugusC
1968. By 1970, it was being dqployed. It was
evident to -the same experietped observer!
that this deployment meant the begtnnin
of the vulneeability of our ogn land-based The Soviet Union w d never be
stopped from catching up. August 11,
197$ when the Soviet Union had finally and
belatedly tested a MIRV, five years late, Sec-
retary of Defense Schlesinger responded to
a question about the chances tor MIRV con-
trols by saying:
."11 think that the minimal point that one
can make is.thist the Scalets are unwaliag
not to derrianstrate a tenlincffogy that the
Americana heves demonStrateda The imagery
is semething,thit presiimgoly 4 not particu-
larly appealing ineldienuin7
If only weload argued this ja` y In 1968 we
might have tried harder to negotiate.
New that our own MIRV JR deployed, and
the ABM danger has evaporated in a emir
Agreement precluding ABM, the question
naturally and predictably arises in the De-
ferme Departthera of completing the process?
putting on the high accuracy.
'The rationale being need partly three
shadowed end partly new. In the fore-
shadow part, Secretary Schlesinger argues
that the strategic situation is now so stable
that a ceunterforce strategy cannot be con-
sidered a 'first-strike' potential. After all,
the lenisians have submarines.
FresUmably he does not argue that the
Soviet Union will like it 'es;ra Secretary
McNamara inside his speech, Mar&all Sotto-
lovskii ,said "MaNamara's statement shows
concrete and practical evidence of prepara-
tion of 'a preventive war" (Red Star, July 19,
1962). And When the Defense Department,
In 1969; projected similar Soviet capabilities
against our land-based force, Secretary Laird
said there was no question they were prepar-
ing a "first-strike" threat.
Secretary Schlesinger's new argument is
based on asserting that the Soviet Union
might, in 1980, have a counterforce capabilty
itself if it learns what we know NOW.
"If tie Soviets were able to develop these
lreprov d technologies presently available to
the Un ted States in the forms of guidance,
Mint's, warhead technology, at NOMA point
around 1980 or beyond they would be in a
position in which they had a major counter-
force option against the United States and
we would lack a similar option" (January 10,
1973).
He goes on to say that this capability might
be use t in a novel way. The counterforce
option e has in mind is selective or reason-
ably an-out, attacks on U.S. land Military
targets notwithstanding the existence of a
secure /sea-bated force. In erect, he fears that
the increasingly stable nuclear balance might
permit limited strategic attacks that avoided
cities. 'The U.S. might then be faced with
an ultimatum to avoid retaliation lest the
Soviet attacks further escalate to cities. Pre-
sumably, the Soviet purpose would be a show
of force.
These limited attack possibilities are not
only feared by Secretary Schlesinger. They
are also welcomed, as a way of solving a
Strategic dilemma in Buroae. In arguing for
flexibility before the Senate Armed Serv Les
Committee on June 18, 1973, Secretary
Schlesinger said, in support of the plausi-
bility et such attacks,
a. ? . or ter take another example, the
United States' pledge to come to the aid of
the NATO salience, which would mean that
we woald be forced if we had to rely ex-
clusively on the assured destruction options,
to destroy Soviet cities said in consequence
of this have destruction of American cities".
He would prefer limited strategic attacks
instead. Indeed, such demonstration at-
tacks on a very limited basis?are said to be
programmed already in the event of war in
Burope,
Tt seems evident that these apocalyptic
considerations are sufficiently important and
Interesting to the body politic that they
should have had much greater airing. As ate
as two years ago, Senator John Stennis,
Chairman of the Armed Services Committee,
was arguing in support of the Defense De-
partment against putting high accuracy on
our MIRVed warheads:
"DOD AND SENATOR STENNIS OPPOSED
COVNTEEPORCE IN 1971
-"On October 5, 1911, Senator James L.
Buckley (Conservative?Republican, N.Y.)
proposed amendment No. 448 to the Military
Procurement Authorization and asked that
"not lees than $12,000,000 shall be available
bray for the purpose of carrying out work
In connection with providing counterforce
capability for the Minuteman In system."
**Scattered excerpts from the debate follow:
**Senator Buckley: The amendments I have
offered will ncrt provide us with a first-strike
capability for two reasons.
"First of all, these are designed only to
modify the warheads within existing missiles.
We simply do not have enough missiles to
mount enough warheads. For a first-strike
effort, With the improved aecuracy, we should
need in excess of 12,000 warheads if we were
ever to try a first strike against the Soviet
Union . . . 'Editor's note: 8,000 are now pro-
grammed on missiles Slone].
"Second, it should be kept in mind that
there are innumerable situations where flex-
ibility is urgently desired. lakus assume that
either from the Soy* Union or tram some
other country there age indications that they
acquired the capability for a first strike ca-
pacity. Let us assume that their first ;strike
knocks most or all of aur siaategic weapons.
We would then have our .submarine and
additional weapons. We would then face the
choice of atrrana those at the civilian pepul-
ation of the enemy. thereby destroying tens
of millions of Inman. beinspi in the Soviet
Union or trying to desfend renselve.s by di-
recting our missiles at a second strike against
the remaining weapoats held by the enemy.
"Senator Stennis: The explanation or this
amendment includes_ the avord "Oct sitar-
force", Those familiar with these terms know
that essentially means a first-strike capabil-
ity. We have stayed within the terms of de-
terrence, deterrence, deterrence. That is what
we are talking` about at the SALT talks.
* *
"Here is what [the Defense Department
says] in their position paper on proposed
Amendmersts No. 448 and 440.
"'The Defense Department cannot support
the proposed amendments. It is the position
of the United States to not develop a weapon
system whose deployment meld reasonably be
construed by the Soviets ass having a rust-
strike capability. Such a deployment might
provide an incentive for the Soviets to strike
first.'
? *
al stand squarely on that ground. It is not
often that the Departanent et Defense comes
out against an amendment that would put
more money in a bill.
". . . we do not need this type of improve-
ments in payload and guidance now, the type
of improvements that are proposed, in order
to have the option of attacking military tar-
gets other than cities. Our accuracy is already
sufficiently good to enable us to attack any
kind of target we want, said to wrote eel-
lateral damage to cities. The only reason to
undertake the type of program the amend-
ment suggests Is to be able to destroy enemy
missiles in their silos before they are
launched. This means a U.S. strike first, un-
less the adversary should be so stupid as to
partially attack us, and leave many of his
ICBM's in their silos for us to attack in a
second strike." (See pages 515888, ? 5139],
15893 of Congressional Record, Senate, acto-
ber 5,1971).
VOITNTERPORCE AND SALT
The counterforce decision is put forward
by the Secretary as if it had much to do with
SALT?in fact, however, it is non-negotiable.
He does emphasize that we cannot permit
the other side to have a relatively credible
counterforce capability if we lack the same"
(January 10). And he empaaeizes that the
other side might have the capability by 1980
In the form of 1,009 ene-megaton. warl.eads.
(The -11(3. will soon have more than that
number of warheads, and, assnotect, with the
accuracies anticipate the will be quite
adequate for target-killing. Indeed., for lim-
ited strikes one wants less collateral damage;
a force of smaller warheads would be beater.)
But he notes that the tergeting strategy
change "has taken place" and that it is "quite
distinct" from our SALT position (January
10, 1974 backgrounder). In this sense, the
current furor ebout SALT end the Interim
Agreement is an irrelevant smokes( reel).
Even if the SALT Agreement had provided
for forces of quite eiwal size, the Secretary
would presumaloly have wanted this same
targeting doctrine and the same acceracy.
Why?
It is true that the Secretary puts great
emphasis, as do military men, on the pont-
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August 21, .1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE
cal consequences of letting the other side
get more than our side possesses in some di-
mension of armament. It is assumed in such
statements that the side with the most meg-
&tonnage might be able to frighten the other.
(Why the side with the most warheads or
accuracy?our side?might not be able to
gain the upper hand is never clear.)
Indeed, no measure is sufficient to make
much difference. The fact is, and the litera-
ture of "limited strategic attacks" reveals it,
that shows of force or resolve in a contest
where neither side can disarm the other
have to do with psychology rather than with
weaponry. If one is "chicken" no amount of
additional megatonnage will help. If one is
bold, and willing to take risks to coerce the
other side, no weapon inferiority need matter
as long as a secure retaliatory force is main-
tained.
These facts are much blurred in the dec-
larations of the Secretary of Defense, which
are further tied to SALT negotiating strategy.
He notes with repeated emphasis:
"We must maintain essential equivalence
between the forces available to the Soviet
Union and the forces available to the United
States. There should be no question in the
Minds of the Soviets as we negotiate with
them of our willingness to achieve that es-
sential equivalence" (January 10).
Even as SALT strategy, this can be ques-
tioned. Why should there be "no doubt"?
Might we not, just as well, argue that there
ehould be "no doubt" in Soviet minds that
the U.S. was not going to try to keep up with
the nuclear Jones mindlessly? Obviously,
much turns on the felt political relevance of
militarily irrelevant force imbalances. 'Un-
fortunately, on-going SALT negotiations
tend to exacerbate concern about imbalances
that would otherwise be seen to be politically
irrelevant as well.
svoztrrioN OF NIXON ADMINISTRATION DOCTRINE
The link between strategic weapons and
resolve has long preoccupied this Adminis-
tration. The link began to be emphasized in
the 1970 State of the World Message where
the Administration began to take pot-shots
at the existing strategic posture. It criticized
the theory of "assured destruction" RS one
which believed:
"Deterrence was guaranteed if we were sure
we could destroy a significant percentage of
Soviet population and industry after the
worst conceivable Soviet attack on our stra-
tegic forces".
It suggested that the previous Administra-
tion believed that, if this criterion were satis-
fied, "restraint in the build-up of strategic
weapons was indicated regardless of Soviet
actions."
The Administration called for "strategic
sufficiency" which, despite its -name, was de-
signed to require more weapons than "as-
sured destrnction" under a somewhat cooler
label than the discredited "strategic supe-
riority".
There was not?as there had been in the
late fifties?concern that the Soviet Union
might be able to disarm us. Significantly, the
1970 State of the World expressed concern
about the "Soviet threat to the sufficiency of
OUT deterrent; the 1971 statement talked of
the possibility that the Soviet Union might
seek forces that could destroy "vital elements
of our retaliatory capability" (italics added).
Indeed, the 1970 statement indicated that
the overriding purpose of our strategic pos-
ture was political: "to deny other countries
the ability to impose their will on the United
States and its allies under the weight of stra-
tegic military superiority".
Di both the 1970 and 1971 statements, the
Administration emphasized that it must not
,be "limited to the indiscriminate mass de-
struction of enemy civilians as the sole pos-
sible response to challenge" (1971) . (It also
mentioned, without much conviction, that
"sufficiency also means numbers, character-
istics and deployments of our forces which
the Soviet Union cannot reasonably inter-
pret as being intended to threaten a dis-
arming attack".)
In 1972, the President re-emphasized what
he had said in 1971:
"In its broadest political sense, sufficiency
means the maintenance of forces adequate to
prevent us and our allies from being coerced.
Thus the relationship between our strategic
forces and those of the Soviet Union must be
such that our ability and resolve to protect
our vital security interests will not be under-
etsimated" (italics added).
In short, the Administration had shifted
the standard for strategic forces from a
measurable strategic goal to a goal that was
open-ended, depending ultimately on its own
sense of psychological vulnerability. It was
concerned that its sense of "resolve not be
underestimated". But in a balance of terror,
as noted, no amount of additional weapons
can be certain of satisfying that criterion.
Thus, sufficiency, defined this way, was an
open ended invitation to weapons procure-
ment.
In short, the decision to change our central
war strategy was really quite independent of
SALT. It grew out of the Administration's
unwillingness to fall behind by any measure,
no matter how militarily irrelevant the meas-
ure. It grew out of the double standard with
which the Administration strategists can-
not help but measure what constitutes "es-
sential equivalence". And it grew out of the
excessive number of warheads which we have
programmed?an excessive number that
forces the Administration to targeting and
accuracy decisions for Parkinsonian reasons.
The problem is simple: weapons in Search of
a target.
COUNTERFORCE AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR
The United States is now legitimizing the
notion of limited strategic attacks. In pre-
paring for the possibility ourselves, and in
talking of the fear that the Soviet Union
might engage in this possibility, we are im-
proving the prospects for limited nuclear
war. This assertion can hardly be doubted.
It takes "two to play" controlled war and if
the other side is clearly not prepared, one
would be foolish to try. By advertising our
consciousness of the possibility, we are molt-
ing a giant step closer to having the Russians
try out the ultimatums that we previously
shrugged off as an impossible joke. This is
not good.
Furthermore, if we plan limited nuclear at-
tacks and talk about" it enough, to this ex-
tent, we might try such a strategy. This is
a dangerous course. The Russians are less
likely than we to have invested in, and to
be able to rely upon, the command and con-
trol that is necessary to play limited nuclear
war. They, more likely than we, would just
salvo their weapons or not fire at all. If
counterforce targeting means kidding our-
selves about these facts, then the security of
the United States will be undermined by it.
Finally, the Secretary does not plan to pur-
chase just the forces necessary to strike a
few Soviet targets as a show of force: this
ability we have already had for many years.
He plans to purchase high accuracy and in-
stall it on the Minuteman and Poseidon
MIRVs. The result will be an enormous boost
in the capability of our forces to attack all of
Soviet land-based missiles,
DOD thinks that by not specifying exactly
what military targets they are planning to
aim at, they can confuse the issue. But once
higher accuracy is purchased, it will provide
enough capability to attack all of the Soviet
retaliatory weapons?obviously these will
then be the ones aimed at. And high ac-
curacy is needed for nothing else.
SALT AND COUNTERFORCE
The Interim Agreement limits the number
of silos in which the two sides can place their
missiles, Thus it pins down the targets at
S 15549
which counterforce weapons would be aimed.
How long will the two sides be willing to abide
by the agreements limiting missile force
numbers if these forces become vulnerable?
Growth in missile forces is probably not
the answer to their dilemma, of course. New
forms of missile deployment would have to
be arranged. With each side gaining several
thousand target-killing warheads, multiply-
ing the existing forces in number will not
seem cost-effective. After all, it is cheaper to
buy an attacking new warhead than an en-
tirely new defensive missile.
One answer, of course, is the one FAS pro-
vides. Throw away the land-based missiles
and they will cease to be aimed at each other,
with the benefits described on pages 1 and 2.
It should be noted, however, that this solu-
tion will not prevent the targeting of other
less important military targets. Nor will it
prevent shows of force, limited nuclear war
(or limited strategic attacks) or whatever.
These could still be carried out by submarine
based missiles.
What our solution will provide, however,
is a very small difference between the results
of striking first and of striking second?in
this sense it will increase the stability of the
nuclear balance by providing the smallest
possible incentive to strike first in a major
way.
In the absence of such a solution, there
will presumably be land-based missiles in
other modes: mobile-based or based in silos
under mountains and so on. Nothing could
be more ridiculous at this stage of the arms
race. But in light of the history summarized
in this Report, no arms race procurement
possibility can be ruled out as too bizarre.
RISE AND FALL OF NUCLEAR SURPRISE ATTACIC
Consider the decline of the nuclear sur-
prise-attack scenario. It began in the late
fifties when exaggerated estimates of Soviet
missile production suggested the USSR would
have missiles while the U.S. still had only
bombers.
Scenario (1958-61): The USSR launches
large numbers of missiles at U.S. bombers on
their bomber bases, destroying the deterrent.
Problems: The attack is hard to effect be-
cause the bomber bases in question were all
over the world; to hit them at the same
Instant meant launching the attacking mis-
siles at different times, thereby providing
some warning. Also, U.S, had nuclear weap-
ons in Europe and on carriers. (Especially
important, the Soviets did not in fact ever
have the missiles on which the attack is
premised.)
But, at least, the USSR attack made sense
on paper and in concept.
By the mid-sixties the situation was much
different. The United States had 1,000 land-
based (Minuteman) intercontinental missiles
and a fleet of 41 ballistic-missile-firing
(Polaris) submarines, with 16 missiles each,
more than half on station at any one time.
The Soviet attack scenario became at least
ten times less plausible. Here it is.
Scenario: (mid to late sixties): The USSR
launches missiles attacking not only 'U.S.
bombers but 1,000 U.S. missiles as well. In
order to cope with the retaliatory strike from
our Polaris submarines, the USSR plans to
shoot down hundreds of such missiles with
an antiballistic missile system.
Problems: No sane military or civilian plan-
ner in any country would rely upon a ballistic
missile defense to shoot down hundreds of
missiles. For this reason, this attack did not
make sense, even on paper. (Further, the
Soviet Union did not have a ballistic missile
defense. Still further, the Soviet Union did
not have the capacity to destroy even the
U.S. land-based targets.)
Notice especially, how much harder this is
to believe than the earlier scenario. This plan
may make conceptual sense but it does not
make practical sense.
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In recent years the scenarid further dee
Surprise Attack Scenario: (T969-71):
Soviets launch large mamba* of missiles
against our land-based inessilerand bombers.
Problem: No Solution whatever is pro-
vided for neutralizing our seiPaased deter-
rent. The scenario is -badly WernPlete?
Notice that, by this time, the Sollet 'Onion
can not even be assumed to aye a ballistic
missile defense. By 1972, there W even a SALT
agreement precluding all but Wvo (strategic--
ally irrelevatt) missile defeats sites. As a
result, the surprise attack seintario for this
period is simply incomplete /an paper or in
concept. In short, by 1970, thee was no sur-
prise attack scenario based orehurrent Soviet
forces or any proclaimed ethrapolation Of
them!_
The result was a new politWal addition to
the scenario:
Surprsie Attack Scenario (1973?):; The
Soviet Union launches large Members of mis-
siles against U.S. land-based missiles and
then issues an untimatum *Must U.S. re-
sponses with sea-based ballistic missiles.
Problem:41 the attack on l'eur land-based
forces dame not significantlynhange the de-
terrent situation. Why then would the Sovi-
ets risk it?
Our sea-based forces cotaderespond against
any Soviet targeta they wisheissuing a min-
ter ultimatum?that full Melee attacks on
U.S. cities would result in &dull scale attack
on Soviet titles. -
Soviet attack on one Idettlebaseti fortes
Would inevitably cause widespread -fallout
and many millions of casteeties. No Soelet
planner conici assume that vie would carefully
arid restrainedly calculate after that. Nor
could he be sure that We muld distinguish
this attack from an all-out attack. Nor could
hs be sure that we coked destrain our sea-
based forces with sultablencommunications
Once the crisis began or our airborne bomb-
ers. e
The entire scenario is bizarre--enornieus
risks for no point. The edliany disarms his
land-based missiles in order to disarm our
land-based missiles (with the sole advantage
that they are disarmed serer our territory
rather than over his). Bath side retains a
deterrent as before, be.sed en sea-based Mis-
siles.
One can only imagine theff the Joint Chiefs
have been smoking pot. The most incisive
way to See the flaw in this scenario is to
Imagine that, some montlesebefore the attack,
the -United States had mdlaterally disman-
tled all of its land-bilged threes. What Would
be the significance then caddies scenario'? We
would have removed the xgets for the at-
tack but would have retalttied a totally ade-
quate strategic deterrent.
STATUS OF THE Femond Foust Cerrerree
In 1911, the Administeltion allowed' as ii
had four secret criteria far determining what
strategic forces it needed and how to negoti-
ate. For those who are insufficiently cynical
about such things, it is revealing to see how
little attention is paid to hem.
By 1072 and 1973, these criteria were pub-
lic. By now they seem to have been all but
abandoned. Of course, the first criterion is
still with us: "Maintaining an adequate sec-
ond-strike capability to eeter an all-out sur-
prise attack on our Strategic forced"
But the fourth efiterion eDealeandirig
against damage from small attack or acci-
dental launches" was given up when the
SALT agreement prohibiting a thin ABM
over the entire country Was reached.
The third criterion wee:
"Preventing the Sovbilt Union from gain-
ing the ability to causeeconsiderably greater
urbeneindustrial destruction than the
United States could treffict on the Soviets
in a nuclear war".
Without doubt the destructive Capabei-
ties of each side have reached the point
where any differences are irrelevant. But the
Administration itself signed an Interim
agreement at SALT which did provide the
Soviet 'Union with much greater payload Ca-
pability.
Finally, the last criterion is very muck at
issue today:
"Providing no incentive for the Soelet
-Union to strike the United States first
in a crisis".
The only method for doing this today is
to get rid of land-based missiles. Indeed, de-
struction of U.S. Minuteman -missiles?
whether dons unilaterally or as part of a bi-
lateral reduction?would dramatically re-
duce the difference between a U.S. retalia-
tory blow before or after a Soviet attack.
Thus it would precisely 11111111 the criterion
above by providing no Soviet incentive to
strike first.
1From Arms Control Today. January 11)741
PLEXIBI/ATY THE IMMINENT DETtATE
Ira his 1970 "State of the World" menage
President Nixon asked, "Should a Predlent,
in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with
the single option of ordering the mass de-
struction of enemy civil ens, in the face of
the certainty that it would be -followed by
the malls slaughter of Americana?" While it
was obvious that the President believed. that
-he needed greater flexibility in the ereploy-
ment of nuclear weapons, the ispecific impli-
cations of this remark for American nuclear
strategy and strategic weapon programs were
unclear at the time, and remained so for the
next four years. Now, it is expected that the
missing details at last will be welled out in
the President's 1974 netate of the World"
message and in Defense, Secretary Schlesin-
ger's defense budget report.
Congress and the American people would
do well to scrutinize these documents closely
because it is very likely -Amy will raise funda-
mental _questions for the nation concerning
what type of nuclear doctrine it should
adopt. Furthermore, the choice of nuclear
doctrines will have otereaus consequences for
American political relations, arms control
efforts, and weapon procurement
Most importantly, the issue will not be
whether the HS. should or should not adopt
greeter strategic flexibility in the employ-
ment of its nuclear weapons, as some would
imply, but rather what kinds of actions in
the name of strategic flexibility would most
contribute to American security?and what
kinds would moet detract from it.
While "strategic flexibility" is a concept
which does not lend itself readily to defini-
tion, Penner Defense Secretary Richardson
explained it last year in congressional testi-
mony as "having the plans, procedures,
forces, and command end-control capabilities
necessary to enable the United Slates to
select and carry out the response appropriate
to the nature and level of the provocation."
Even more recently, Defense Secretary
Schlesinger stated that a change in the "tar-
geting strategy'. of the American strategic
forces had taken place and therefore the
US. now has "targeting options which are
more selective and which do not necessarily
involve major mass destruction on the other
side."
These statements imply?erroneously---
that' the previous American doctrine of "as-
sured destruction" lacked the capacity for
flexibile options. The implication that new
types and numbers of strategic weapons are
required is similarly groundless. In a recent
article in Foreign Affairs 'Wolfgang It. H.
Paricdsky pointed out that there is no in-
herent technical reason that prevents exist-
ing American retaliatory forces from being
employed in a limited manner. Similarly, as
Schlesinger himself recently reaffirmed, the
VB. does have strategic weapons which could
be used in a "limited counter-force role."
Furthermore, the U.S. has rasintained such a
capability for some time: Alain O. Entlt oven
and K. Wayne Smith in their 19/1 work,
How Much Is Enough? noted that even with
the "assured destruction" doetrine, American
strategic weapons could be used to perform
'limited and controlled retaliation."
What neither the U. nor-the Soviet -Union
has today is an efficient cotuiterforce capa-
bility against hard targets or hardened mis-
sile silos. This type of tounterforce capability
would be comprised of a substantial nt reber
of nuclear weapons, each With a high prob-
ability of destroying a hardened missile silo.
POT example, the U.S. could presently de-
stroy some of the Soviet missile silos with a
high degree of confidence, but only "ineffi-
clently"?by means Of targeting 8 or 4 Min-
uteman missiles on each Soviet silo. With an
"efficient" counterforce capability the num-
ber of missiles:required to be tweeted at each
silo might be reduced to the more favorable
ratio of one or two Minuteman miss/ es per
Soviet missile silo.
In sum, the doctrine of mutual ensured de-
struction (MAD) characterized as ineeefele
by President Nixon and other critics IS not
inflexible at all.
Several events clueing the first term of the
Nixon Administration have fundamentally
increased the degree of Strategic flexibility
available to the U.S. and Would not, te over-
looked. For one thing, the ABM Treaty has
significantly enhanced the ability to respond
at a low level since every email attack does
not have to overwhelm the adversary's de-
fenses. In addition, noteworthy advances in
command and control capabilities can now
make available to the President an -unlim-
ited number of strategic targeting options
for the American missile forces. One exam-
ple of this is the-current deployment of e
computerized retargeting system which vastly
reduces the amount of time required to
change the target selections tel each missile.
Therefore, it is clear that not only did the
previous American forme contain a :41.1 bet an
degree of flexibility, but presen: Ameri-
can forces have acquired even male in re-
cent years. If the present nuclear force struc-
ture is already inherently flexible, then what
further capabilities could the President and
Defense Department desire? Although it is
likely that certain improvements could be
made in US. command and control capabili-
ties to increase flexibility, the only step which
remains to be taken in the area of counter-
force capabilities is the development cd an
efficient "silo-killing" oounterforoe capabil-
ity. While at the present time the Nixon Ad-
ministration has not explicitly stated that
the development of such a capability is an
American strategic objective, Secretary
Schlesinger in recent weeks hae implied
that the capability to destroy Soviet military
targets, including missile silos, would be one
way of enhancing American "strangle flex-
ibility." The forthcoming foreign policy mes-
sage and defense report are expected to pro-
vide the details.
In our view the development of such a
capability would be net only or warranted
but also dangerous. Moving to a counterforce
doctrine would also represent a major porky
shift since in the past President Nixon anct
other top officials have frequently assured
the Congress and American public that the
U.S. would neither develop a co-anterior:a
capability nor any weapons "which the So-
viets -could construe as having a first-strike
potential," While it is possible to argue that
"technically" a hard-target caunterforce ca-
pability does not cons-eft-etc a disa-ming Taft-
strike potential since both sides will main-
tain relatively invulnerable sea-based me-
siles and bombers, the fact renains tbet
both nations will peredive such a Impabili
as an attempt to achieve such is capability
and therefore highly provocative, regmdleas
of what is "technically" correct. It is difficult
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to believe that those Americans who for
years have been most concerned about the
vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force to a
Soviet MIRV attack will not be able to com-
prehend that even a "limited" U.S. counter-
force potential can generate uncertainties in
Soviet eyes about our intentions, create in-
stabilities in the strategic balance, and foster
suspicions between the two nations. What
are Soviets doing right now?
The acquisition of such counterforce capa-
bilities would increase the likelihood of nu-
clear war and the potential for crisis insta-
bility. The likelihood of nuclear war will
be increased since a counterforce doctrine
and related capabilities will make nuclear
weapons seem more "useable" in addition to
making their attractiveness as a viable policy
option superficially greater. Crisis stability
will be decreased since with hard-target
counterforce capabilities and vulnerable
land-based forces each side will perceive in
a crisis situation the incentive of even a
limited first-strike upon its adversary's mis-
sile force. The attractiveness of counterforce
targets in a second-strike attack could never
equal those of a first-strike attack. Conse-
quently, an incentive will exist for the side
which seizes the initiative to strike first. Yet,
any benefits gained from such a first-strike
attack would be only short-sighted and illu-
sory since each nation will still retain more
than enough nuclear weapons to ultimately
destroy the cities of the other. In addition,
the development of a hard-target counter-
force capability will only promote further
strategic arms competition between the U.S.
and Soviet Union, while impeding progress
in arms control efforts such as the SALT II
negotiations and the Comprehensive Test
Ban.
In light of the disadvantages of such a
capability, the United States should make
the basic choice to increase strategic flexi-
bility through further improvements in com-
mand and control capabilities rather than
by the development of a provocative hard-
target counterforce capability.
Finally, the ultimate solution to the prob-
lem of an increasingly vulnerable land-based
missile force will be found, not in the devel-
opment of more efficient "silo-killing" weap-
ons but rather in the negotiation of mutual
limitations on MIRV flight-testing and de-
ployment as a Preface to the eventual reduc-
tion of the land-based missiles on both
sides.?John C. Baker.
[From the Economist, Mar. 2, 1974]
THE SCHLESINGER GAMBLE
After the energy conference, Nato: Mr.
Kissinger has scored another point in Amer-
ica's relations with Europe. He has been
arguing that the United States and its Euro-
pean allies need a better method of regular
consultation. Now, from next month, the
political heads of 14 foreign ministries?
everybody in Nato, including France, except
Iceland?will meet frequently with the Nato
permanent council. This provides a new level
of consultation, between the twice-yearly
meetings of ministers and the stodgy gather-
ings of the permanent council meeting alone.
The change is needed: the recent publication
of the American defence budget is a vivid
reminder not only of the preeminence of the
United States in matters of defence but also
of the two-way dependence with its allies.
The new items in the American defence
budget, plus some major changes in em-
phasis, have set the United States off in a
fresh direction. This budget is very much
the creature of the new Secretary of Defence,
Mr. Schlesinger. The hallmark is flexibility.
He wants to have several possibilities for
response in any situation. Not only does he
want the power to fight a conventional war,
he wants a rich variety of nuclear options
as well, so that even nuclear action can be
tailored to the shape of any particular crisis.
There are three distinct results of this
budget; all are, or ought to be, highly con-
troversial, and not looked upon simply as this
year's ration for the American military es-
tablishment. First, the bad news for Ameri-
ca's European allies is that Mr. Schlesinger's
nuclear flexibility is apparently to be
achieved at the expense of some kinds of
conventional forces. Although widely billed
as America's biggest defencS budget since
the second world war, it is actually smaller
in real money terms than any since 1961. It
does not directly reduce the American forces
In Europe, but it does cut about 20,000 men
out of the armed services as a whole. If this
kind of budget becomes routine over the next
few years it will certainly generate pressures
of its own for reductions in Europe; a size-
able part of the Defence Department could
find itself allied with the isolationists in
Congress.
The second result of this budget will be to
make the current round of Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (Salt) much more difficult.
The negotiators are confronted with Amer-
ica's proposal to produce lots of different
new weapons. There are now not only bomb-
ers and land-based and submarine-carried
missiles (and numbers of warheads) to be
considered. There is a new quiet missile
submarine, smaller than the 24-missile Tri-
dent; there are missiles with maneuverable
warheads; there are also, in one of the sharp-
est budget increases, new cruise missiles
which can be launched from submarines or
aircraft. None of these new weapoins is here
yet; most are years away. But the American
defence budget, with its tradition of reveal-
ing nearly everything about American plans,
is itself a major instrument in arms politics.
And this one, with its bewildering array of
strategic possibilities, cannot fail to make
Salt-2 a. very complex operation indeed.
The third result of this budget may be a
sharp acceleration of the arms race. The
Americans' nuclear strategy has passed
through several distinct stages. There was
President Eisenhower's "more bang for the
buck", which was massive nuclear retalia-
tion for any attack by the Soviet army. This
was followed by flexible response, which has
never seemed entirely convincing because
Nato has never been willing to provide enough
troops to hold off a Soviet attack for more
than a few days. Then the advent of anti-
ballistic missiles (ABMs) threatened to break
the nuclear balance. The Salt-I agreement
tried to put the lid back on this box by lim-
iting the numbers of ABMs. But in retrospect
Salt-1 may have been a hollow triumph; cer-
tainly the tacit agreement by both sides to
deploy only one of their two allowed ABM
systems was due in large part to the realisa-
tion that offensive technology is moving
faster than defence. The new American
budget pushes this technology a stage fur-
ther with all its hints of new attacking
weapons to come. The nuclear arena is, once
again, the centre of the American-Russian
competition.
SEE WHAT WE CAN DO
Of course, the American budget is not the
only factor which threatens to destabilise
things. The Russians have built a lot more
missiles over the past few years than the
Americans have, and have lately tested sev-
eral new long-range missiles; they have also
developed multiple independently-targetable
re-entry vehicles before western intelligence
predicted they would. Mr. Schlesinger's an-
nouncement that some American warheads
are being re-targeted on to Russian missile
sites is part of the response to that. (It Is
also the result of the increased number of
Poseidon missiles in America's inventory.
With Poseidon's multiple warheads, there
are so many warheads available that they are
literally running out of city targets.) The
budget is another part.
So this year's American defense proposal?
which is all the budget is at this point?
may simply be a historical milestone in a
process that began several years ago. There
Is a strong argument that the nuclear flex-
ibility this budget represents can be used to
make war less likely. And if the budget brings
home to the Russians the breathtaking range
of possibilities available to the technological
power of the United States, Mr. Brezhnev
may decide to make Salt-2 the great break-
through to cooling off the cold war which
most of the world hopes it will be. But if
Salt-2 fails, 1974 will have introduced the
idea of a flexible nuclear response and could
be the beginning of an extremely expensive
round in the arms race.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I would
like to associate myself with the remarks
of my distinguished colleague from Mas-
sachusetts. I believe there is a strong case
against developing an increased capacity
to destroy Soviet land-based missiles.
First, it is an illusion to believe that
the United States can develop a capabil-
ity for limited nuclear war that will sig-
nificantly reduce casualties in a war with
the Soviet Union. Even if both sides di-
rezted highly accurate weapons against
exclusively military targets, the associ-
ated civilian damage would be immense,
both from direct blast effects and from
fallout. Casualties would still be in the
millions on both sides.
To be sure, it is important for the
United States to have many options in
its nuclear strategy. Yet we have had
these options for many years, including
the targetting of many of our weapons
against Soviet military sites. Having op-
tions might, indeed, increase the chances
of stopping a nuclear war--especially one
that started by accident. But we would
only fool ourselves if we believed that
these options?or the new programs we
are considering?would in a nuclear war
prevent death and destruction the like
of which has never been seen on this
planet.
Second, we must consider the risks
of destabilizing the balance of mutual
assured destruction between the two
superpowers. It may be that hard analy-
sis would indicate that even a U.S. abil-
ity to destroy the Soviet Union's land-
based missiles would not provoke them
to launch a preemptive attack against
us, and that we would not be provoked
to launch a preemptive attack if the
Soviet Union could destroy our Minute-
man and Titan missiles. There are simply
too many nuclear weapons on both sides
that would still get through?bombers,
weapons based at sea, and land-based
missiles not effectively destroyed?for
either power to escape massive destruc-
tion in any nuclear war. Such a war
would remain an act of insanity, and
would most likely end civilized life in
our two countries and elsewhere.
Yet even if the possibility of a success-
ful attack against land-based missiles
alone would be unlikely to provoke a nu-
clear war based on cold logic, we must
still consider the imponderables?the
psychological factors that so often gov-
ern men's actions. Any country whose
land-based missiles were vulnerable to
destruction in a first strike would be
likely to consider adopting a strategy of
"launch on warning," thus returning us
to the hair-trigger days of the 1950's. This
strategy might be adopted out of fear?
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wrongly in my judgment?even though
other weapons systems remained invul-
nerable. Yet no national leader?either
here or in the Soviet Union?should once
again be faced with the awful responsi-
imity of potentially deciding on nuclear
war in the few precious minutes between
the word of an impending attack and its
occurence. No leader should be placed
at the mercy of fallible machines to tell
hen whether or not an attack has actu-
ally been launched.
eete,b. superpower has gained from the
sure knowledge that a devastating nu-
clear response is possible, what ever the
other side does first. In no way should
we undermine that strategic and psy-
chological assurance?which underpins
the current relaxation of tensions be-
tween the superpowers. And we should
demand that the Soviet Union take no
action that would do likewise.
Third, I concur with Senator BROOKE
that it would be very difficult for the
Soviet Union to distinguish between de-
velopments we make in the yield, accu-
racy, and maneuverability of U.S. war-
heads, in order to destroy Soviet land-
based missiles; and the actual deploy-
ment of these weapons. Unlike deployed
missiles, themselves, these new warheads
cannot easily be counted?if at all.
Hence, once development is completed,
the Russians will never be entirely sure
that we have not deployed them. They
will very likely act as though we had
done so, just as our military planners
believe that later in the 1970's they will
have to count on a full deployment of
Soviet MIRV's, whether or not Moscow
actually decides to follow this course.
The time for restraint, therefore, is
now, before new doubts are raised in the
minds of Soviet planners about our in-
tentions, and before they use these
doubts to argue for the building of yet
more Soviet nuclear weapons.
Penally and most important. I believe
we must assess very carefully the effect
of these new developments on the pros-
pects for reaching a firm agreement at
the SALT II talks?an agreement in
the interests of both sides. To be sure.
we must be prepared to meet any Soviet
challenge to our ability to respond ef-
fectively to any Soviet nuclear attack. To
he sure, we must be mindful of the rein-
live balance of nuclear forces on both
sides for psychological reasons. We must
ecek a substantial overall equality, in
both quantitative and qualitative terms,
het ween the nuclear forces of both sides.
We must seek by every means to gain
eesviet restraint in the arms race?re-
straint particularly in the possible de-
looyment of new, large missiles which the
ll-ayiet Union has been testing.
?et it is important at this critical
stage of arms negotiations tor the United
S;tates to take no action that is likely to
nroulate further Soviet nuclear weapons
deployments. For if we do so, we will only
play into the hands of the Soviet mar-
Pals, against those officials of the Soviet
iiovernment who may genuinely seek an
end to the nuclear arms race.
Pollowing my trip to the Soviet Union
rot April, I am firmly convinced that it
is possible to reach an effective SALT II
agreement, provided teat both side:; are
prepared to exercise restraint. And I am
even more convinced that the time eo do
so is now. Secretary Kissinger himself
has stressed the problem of coping with
a rapidly-approaching nuclear env:son-
ment in which there are thousands and
thousands of nuclear weapons on botn
sides, of every conceivable type and char-
acteristic. It will not be easy to cope with
the growth of nuclear technology in any
event; but it will be immensely more diffi-
cult if either side goes forward with new
deployments or develops new capabilities
that are read by the other side as imply-
ing new deployments.
These new U.S. ha rd-targetting pro-
grams would take several years to de-
velop, and would not improve our ability
to survive a Soviet first strike and re-
spond effectively. But if that is true, then
we have nothing to lose and everything to
gain by waiting?waiting to see whether
a small measure of U.S. restraint will lead
to the Soviet restraint that we earnestly
seek in deployment of new, large missiles.
In light of the limited accomplishments
In arms control at the last summit?a
failure to make any substantial prog-
ress?and in light of the imperative
need to move forward at SALT II, I be-
lieve that we should not muddy the dip-
lomatic waters. We should hold off on
these programs, and c:eallenge the Soviet
Union to hold off on it; new deployments.
Mr. President, it is for these reasons
that I join with Senator BROOKE in op-
posing these new research and develop-
ment programs.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the pending
amendment, No. 1836, be temporarily laid
aside and that I be permitted to yie:.d the
floor to the distinguished Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. :KENNEDY) SO that
he may call up his amendment.
The PRESIDING 010.eaCER. Is there
objection?
The Chair hears none, and it is so
ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Will the Senator
yield briefly?
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the final vote
on the pending business occur at 4:45
this afternoon.
Mr. EAGLETON. Is that on the pend-
ing amendment?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The pending busi-
ness, the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
HELMS) . Does the Senator also ask that
rule XII be waived?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.
Mr. GRIFFIN. What about the vote
on the Eagleton amendment?
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is on con-
trolled time. I do not anticipate that the
opponents will consume anywhere near
the 2 hours that have been allotted.
Mr. KENNEDY. MT. President. reserv-
ing the right to object, I have an amend-
ment I would like to be able to oler. I
have discussed it briefly with the ,Sena-
tor from Arkansas. He has indicated a
willingness to take it to conference.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we
have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Seri-
ate will be in order.
Mr. KENNEDY. I want to make sure
that we will have an opportunity to con-
sider the amendment and discuss it
briefly. I am not interested in in ex-
tended period of debate.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President I was
not in the Chamber a moment ago What
is the request?
Mr. MANSFIELD. That the vote en
passage-occur at 4:45.
Mr. McCLELLAN. I have no objection,
I am perfectly willing.
What is the question of the Senator
from Massachusetts?
Mr. KENNEDY. It is with respect to
my amendment, which we discussed'. I
understood that we were going to hove
a brief exchange.
Mr. McCLELLAN. I indicated to the
Senator that I would be willing to take
the amendment to conference, so that
we would not unnecessarily take up a
lot of time arguing it and discussing it.
If the Senator is willing to do that, I
think we can proceed.
Mr. KENNEDY. The distinguished
senior Senator from Missouri has been
extremely interested in this matter, and
I am wondering whether I could lave an
opportunity to talk with him briefly,
and then if the majority leader would
propound such an agreement, I am sure
there would be no objection.
Mr. EAGLETON. I can say, on behalf
of my colleague, that he would be amen-
able to the unanimous-consent request.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator
want a quorum call?
Mr. KENNEDY. Yes,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum . I ask
unanimous consent that the time not be
charged to either side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With out
objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order tor
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President Iv ish
to repeat my earlier unanimous-consent
request that the vote on final passage
occur at the hour of 4:45 p.m, and that
rule XII be waived.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Witt: (nit
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT IONTIL
9 A.M. TOMORROW, AND FOR
SCHEDULE OF BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if
this bill is disposed of tonight, 1 ask
unanimous consent that the Senate con-
vene at 9 a.m. tomorrow: that there be
an appropriate period for the recognition
of special orders and the joint leat ersi lip,
with a brief morning hour; and t:aot the
vote on passage of the State, Justice, and
Commerce appropriation bill, which e
be the pending business, occur riot later
than 3 p.m. tomorrow, with rule XII
waived.
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The PRESIDING 0.1..riCER, Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so ordered.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATION ACT, 1975
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill (H.R. 16243) mak-
ing appropriations for the Department of
Defense for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1975, and for other purposes.
AMENDMENT NO. 1835
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I call
up my amendment No. 1835.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to read the amendment.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY'S amendment (No. 1835)
is as follows:
On page 50, line 21, insert a new section
as follows:
SEC. .(a) No funds appropriated for the
use of the Department of Defense by this or
any other Act in fiscal year 1975 may be used
for the purpose of stockpiling war materials
or equipment for use by any Asian country
except to the extent authorized by title VII
of this Act or by the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 or the Foreign Military Sales Act.
(b) Any materials or equipment stock-
piled by the Department of Defense on the
date of enactment of this Act for future use
by any Asian country may not be transferred
to any such country except to the extent
such transfer is specifically authorized by
law.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this is
an amendment that deals with the wax
reserve stocks for allies. The amendment
was initially accepted by the Senate last
June, as part of the Defense Authoriza-
tion bill, but it was dropped in confer-
ence because of the opposition of the
House conferees. Hopefully, they will
have a different attitude this time in
conference.
Specifically, Mr. President, this
amendment will prohibit $529 million
from being used for war reserve stocks
for allies. This ambiguous account is re-
portedly used to obtain weapons and
ammunition on a contingent basis for
the support of forces in the event of a
future war involving South Vietnam,
South Korea, or Thailand.
This new funding account, quietly
built up in the last 2 fiscal years, has
not gone through the authorizing com-
mittees of the Congress. It is a back-door
means of bolstering increased procure-
ments by the Defense Department.
When the disguised account was dis-
covered by Senator FULBRIGHT last
spring, the Defense Department ex-
plained it as being used for supporting
these three allies?South Vietnam,
South Korea, and Thailand. At the same
time, the Defense Department stated
that the equipment remained in stock-
piles controlled by the United States.
However, the Department would not
state that, in the event of hostilities, con-
gressional authorization was required be-
fore these weapons could be turned over
to other countries.
In fact, when the General Accounting
Office reported its findings to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee last month,
the Defense Department objected to the
GAO's use of the word "authorization" as
being required prior to the transfer of
stockpiled items to these Asian allies.
The Department argued instead that
only "consultation" with the Congress
was required.
I find this appropriation objectionable
on two counts. First, it could mean that
congressionally established ceilings?on
aid to Vietnam, for example?could be-
come meaningless if the Defense Depart-
ment can circumvent those ceilings by
comingling U.S. and allied reserve stock-
piles, and thereby escape congressional
control over their distribution. Second, it
means that we are being asked?at a
time of difficult economic circum-
stances?to boost our own Defense budg-
et for the purpose of meeting the future
military needs of South Vietnam, South
Korea, and Thailand. Clearly, this major
item should be considered as part of the
foreign aid request, not as a disguised
account in the DOD appropriations bill.
The Defense Department now argues
that much of the new equipment Pur-
chased by this account goes directly to
the U.S. active military forces and the
U.S. Reserves. If that is the purpose of
these funds, then they should not be cate-
gorized as "war reserve stacks for allies.*
Moreover, the GAO has informed me
that there is a circle at work: Even if
some of these weapons go to U.S. troops
In the field, the weapons that are re-
placed go to the Reserves and/or to the
stockpile. Then, once in the stockpile,
there is a clear tendency for the supplies
to be declared excess and turned over to
South Vietnam, South Korea, and Thai-
land. Thus, the will of Congress can be
thwarted by the backdoor.
The process is misleading in another
way. For example, in fiscal year 1973, the
Defense Department listed $24.3 million
in excess stocks as going to South Viet-
nam, $6.4 million as going to Thailand,
and $8.3 million as going to South Korea..
But those figures are what the DOD calls
actual value, not the acquisition cost of
the supplies. The GAO found that the
Department of Defense was listing those
weapons at 8.9 percent of their acquisi-
tion cost. Thus, the acquisition of wea-
pons declared excess and turned over to
those countries in fiscal year 1973 was
approximately $390 million. In fiscal year
1974, the acquisition cost of equipment
declared excess and turned over to those
three countries was approximately $620
million. And in fiscal year 1975, the De-
fense Department plans, according to
the GAO, to turn over to those three
countries weapons and equipment whose
acquisition cost is approximately $738
million.
I see no reason for the U.S. Congress
to approve $529 million in an account
listed as was reserves for allies and des-
ignated for South Vietnam, South Korea,
and Thailand, at the same time that the
Department of Defense contemplates
turning over excess items costing an
estimated $738 million to those countries.
If there are stockpile needs that are
not being met for U.S. active duty forces,
let the Defense Department ask specifi-
cally for that equipment as it usually does
in its normal procurement requests. If
this is a legitimate foreign military aid
request, then let it be properly con-
sidered under the foreign aid bill.
Mr. President, it is also important to
note what this amendment does not do:
First, it does not affect in aiirrarthe
Department's service-funded program of
aid to South Vietnam. The committee
has recommended $700 million for that
fund.
Second, it does not affect in any way
the level of assistance which may even-
tually be approved by the Congress under
the authority of the Foreign Assistance
Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act?
$300 million has been requested for
South Korea and Thailand under those
programs. This amendment is unrelated
to congressional approval or rejection of
those requests.
Finally this amendment does not affect
the approximately half-billion dollars
worth of stocks which have already been
set aside for these Asian allies in the
past 2 fiscal years. But it does put a halt
to adding another half-billion dollars
worth of weapons to that stockpile this
year, until the purposes of the stockpile
are more clearly explained to Congress,
and the implications of such foreign aid
have been properly deliberated.
Mr. President, I have grave doubts
whether such foreign aid should be au-
thorized at all. Certainly, it should not
be done without the consent of Con-
gress. But primarily, I wish to stress that
such foreign aid does not belong in this
bill. This is a budget bill to provide funds
for the operation and maintenance of
the Department of Defense. Foreign as-
sistance appropriations should not be
mixed with appropriations for the U.S.
armed services.
The only foreign assistance fund ap-
propriated along with funds for the serv-
ices in this bill is the assistance for South
Vietnam. All other foreign assistance is
authorized in the Foreign Aid bill, under
the military assistance program. This is
true even of the $2.2 billion in military
assistance authorized for Israel last year.
The Armed Services Committee report
on the Defense authorization bill strongly
emphasizes the same point:
As it did last year, the Committee is again
recommending reductions of the items in-
cluded for war reserves for allies. The Com-
mittee does not agree that these items should
be procured for storage for allies in a title
that is intended for the procurement of
items for U.S. forces.
In this year of the war powers bill and
economic belt-tightening, Congress can-
not avoid its responsibility to guarantee
that such programs are fully justified
in terms of foreign assistance, and that
there are proper controls over transfer-
ral of these weapons. We have had
enough of Presidential wars.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the recent study prepared on
this subject by the General Accounting
Office may be printed in the RECORD at
this point.
There being no objection, the study
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t- m- ordered to be printed 111 the RECORD.
Z-; f ollows
I /E.PARTMENT OF DEFENSE STOCKPILING OF WAlt
PT:SERVE MATERIALS FOR USE SY UNITED
ATES Ai ties
'oMPTROT I ER GENE RAT, OF THE
IINIFED STATES_
-iai ?vinglon, D.C.
J W FAILBRTGHT,
1,rman. Committee On Foreign. Relations.
U.S. Senate.
DP.AR MR. CHAIRMAN: This report Is in re-
aense, to a May 6, 1974, letter requesting in
on the stockpiling of war reserve
materials by the Department of Defense
SOD) for possible future use by Asian allies.
inr study concentrated on the scope of the
Program, the statutory authority being relied
,a,c by DOD for stockpiling these materials,
eaci the authority under which they could be
4. road over to any of the allied forces. Our
work was performed at DOD in Washington,
Hecause of the short time allowed to meet
the Committee's needs, we have been unable
to verify the information provided by DOD
or to obtain a legal analysis of the propriety
or the program. However, we have included
our views and interpretations and believe
this report will be helpful during the up-
coming foreign assistance authorization
bearings.
We have not submited the report to DOD
for its official position; however, we have dis-
cussed the observations with DOD officials
tied have considered their views.
SCOPE OF THE PROGR A NT
,'cording to a DOD directive, the total
quantity of a defense item authorized for
peacetime acquisition includes the quantity
estimated (1) to equip and sustain U.S
force levels in peacetime and in
wartime for periods specified in planning
documents, (2) to equip and sustain allied
forces by satisfying approved requirements
of the Military Assistance Program, the ap-
proved requirements of the Foreign Military
Sales Program, and approved wartime re-
quirements for those allies specified in cur-
rent program planning documents, and (3)
to provide support for other US. Government
departments and agencies. The term used to
describe the above procurement requirement
la approved force acquisition objective.
'Ibis objective includes a quantity to be
aleickpiled abroad and in the United States
or future national emergencies--war re-
aerves. These reserves are intended to sustain
operations until production can be expanded
ao match combat consumption.
ttl)l) believes that the war reserves are es-
feudal to rapidly deployable combat forces
so that the United States has. the future
eapaoility to respond and be supported in
combat for whatever period the national in-
-airest; requires.
We determined from DOD nlanning and
programing documents that the approved
iorce levels used to plan future requirements
ineluded the estimated number of allied
.orces that might need logistics support in
future Asian hostilities. F.stimated allied re-
imirements add to hut do not replace U.S
A colurements.
aap stocks of munitions end equipment
have traditionally been available for transfer
to allies pursuant to appropriate military as-
eistance legislation, as well as for use by
ii S. Forces. Specific identification of war re-
eerve stocks for possible future transfer to
-allies in DOD budget documentation plan-
eine began with the development of the fis-
eal year 1972 Defense program Some avail-
able assets were allocated for this ptIrpose in
1-seal year 1973. However, funds were not re-
eitested in budget submissions to the ('-on-
eress until fiscal year 1974
Items held in reserve that arc planned for
potential allied use are not secregated from
other reserve stocks, and almost all the same
kinds of items are also required as war re-
serves for U.S. Forces. If necessary, the war
reserves for allied forces could be nsed to
support U.S. Forces.
130D considers that war reserve stocks for
allies are not yet committed or authorized
for transfer to any nation. They are for "al-
lies" in theory only and, according to DOD
officials, will remain U.S, property until the
President, with appropriate congressional
consultation determincs that such stocks
should be released to a specific ally DOD
officials said that the portion of lbs total
war reserve stocks designated for future al-
lied use is based on an arbitrary decision and
it is the total (United States and allied) war
reserve requirement that has validity.
DOD planners for fiscal year 1973 allocated
$23 million of its reserve assets toward the
total allied requirement; for fiscal year 1974,
$494 million was allocated. For fiscal year
1975, $529 million of the total procurgment
request has been proposed for application
toward allied requirements, Some of each of
the follovving types of items are propo ted to
be procured from the fiscal year 1975 .'unds.
Armi
Small arms ammunitim.
Artillery ammunition.
Tank recovery vehicleiti
Portable radar sets?
Minor miscellaneous items.
Spares and repair parts.
Mortar ammunition.
Tanks.1
Machine guns.
Rocket launchers.,
Landing boats.1
Air Force
Air-to-ground muniticns.
Tanks, racks, adapters, and pylons.
.FOAL AUTHORITY CITED Br DOD FOR STC/CKPIL-
ING AND TRANSFERRING STOCKS
We were told by offic:.als of the oe ce of
General Counsel, DOD, that DOD's legal au-
thority to both stockpile war reserve assets
and transfer these assets to allies is con-
tained in:
The annual DOD authorization and appro-
priation acts;
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended; and
The Foreign Militaiy Sales Art, as
amended.
No specific sections of these acts were
cited.
AUTHOR/TY FOR STOCKPILING AND TRANSFERRING
STOCKS--0A0 VIEWS
Time did not permit us to perfoim a
search for all possible means available to
stockpile war reserves and to transfer
stocks. However, our brief look at the legis-
lation mentioned by DOI) disclosed thali the
general authority to procure U.S. deense
material is contained ir, the annual DOD
authorization and appropriation acts. This
authority does not provide for the procure-
ment of war reserves but rather for specific
defense items (for example, Procurement of
Ammunition, Army). Ne iertheless. through
backup data submitted with appropriation
requests and the testimony of witnesses the
congressional committees responsible for
DOD authorizations and appropriations were
aware of DOD's program of stockpiling for
All new procurement al' these items will
go directly to U.S. Army active and reserve
units. The older pieces .3f equipment dis-
placed by the new- procurement will go Into
the war reserve stockpile that could be used
to replace U.S. or (with proper atithotiza-
tion) allied combat losses in some fu :sire
conflict. Therefore, this procurement, al-
though labeled as allied reserve, modernizes
the U.S. Army Force struc lure while increas-
ing the total assets available as war reserves
; 4
possible future allied use. Thus, tie legis-
lative history of the annual DOD authoriza-
tion and appropriation acts suggests that the
pcoilminmg.ittees intended to authorize tints stck-
However, the congressional committees re-
sponsible for authorising military grant and
sales assistance to foreign allies apparsutly
were not aware of the stockpiling program.
We were informed that the Senate Pot sign
Relations Committee was unaware of the
planned stockpiling, even though lranefers
to allies (as well as the transfer of any de-
fense articles to foreign governments, except
Vietnam) would go through programs inicier
the jurisdiction of the Committee.
Authority to transfer procured defense
stocks is separate from the autlierity to
stockpile war reserves. Authorizations relat-
ing to transfers are contained in Various sec-
tions of the Foreign Assistance At of 1961,
as amended; the Foreign Military Sales Act,
as amended; the Foreign Military Sales Act
Amendments, 1971, as amended; and the an-
nual DOD authorization and appropriation
acts (Military Assistance Service Funded I.
Some of the pertinent sections of these acts
are discussed below. (See app. I through III.)
Foreign Assistance Act?Military assistance
Section 503(a) of the Foreign As;itilitnee
Act of 1961, as amended, gives the P 'cattiest
the authority to provide military as3istance
to friendly countries and international orga-
nizations. In fiscal year 1974, the C7ongress
authorized the President to spend either
through loans or grants up to $512.5 million
for this assistance, although actual appro-
priations amounted to $450 million.
Section 503(a) provided that, when defense
articles are loaned to foreign countries.or
international organizations, under section
503(a), the military assistance appropriation
will be charged only for out-of-pocket ex-
penses and depreciation. In our repor, to the
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
in March 1973,i we indicated that previously
DOD had leased defense articles on the biliSta
of different law (10 U.S.C. 2667).
This law authorizes leasing of nonexcesa
defense articles when it is in the public in-
terest or will promote national defense. How-
ever, the law has no relation to foreign assist-
ance and was enacted to authorize ti e leas-
ing of defense plants and production equip-
ment to private commercial Interests, In our
report, we specified that articles were leased
under law (10 U.S.C. 2667) at no cost to fur-
eign governments or international Greenlee-
tions and that it appeared the Use af this
provision circumvented the Foreign Assiet-
ance Act of 1961, as amended. Our view Wfti
that such loans or leases constituted military
assistance and should be subject to res trail II s
imposed by the act.
Additionally, under section 506(a t if the
President determines it is in the security in-
terests of the United States, he may order up
to $250 million in defense articles frern
stocks?in addition to the $450 million ap-
propriated?and reiMbursement will he pro-
vided in subsequent appropriations a v table
for military assistance. He exercised a Is u-
thority during fiscal year 1974 by authorizing
the transfer of up to $200 million in defense
articles to provide additional military teat-t-
ame to Cambodia.
Under section 614(a), the President al ii
ina.y authorize assistance, in an amount not
to exceed $250 million, without regard 'o an:v
provisions of the act. However, the Pre,ident
may only use funds already appropriated
under other sect-ions of the act. During fiscal
year 1974, the President exercised his author-
ity under section 614(a) five times he p11..
poses of military assistance. The total amount
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authorized by the President was $133.4 Mil-
lion.
These and other related sections of the act
are shown in appendix I.
Foreign Military Sales Act
Although the Congress placed a ceiling on
the total credit sales and guarantees under
sections 23 and 24 of the Foreign Military
Sales Act (see app. II), no similar restrictions
are placed on cash sales under sections 21 and
22 of the act. Thus, an unlimited quantity.of
defense stocks could be sold under seetions
21 and 22. During fiscal year 1974, DOD esti-
mates that credit sales will amount to $730
million, the authorized ceiling, and cash sales
will amount to approximately $7.2 billion.
Military assistance service funded authority
The provisions in annual DOD authoriza-
tion and appropriation acts (see app. III)
give DOD authority to use its appropriated
funds to transfer any defense articles, includ-
ing war reserve material, to support South
Vietnamese forces, subject to the $1.126 bil-
lion ceiling.
Foreign, Military Sales Act amendments?Ex-
cess Defense articles
Excess defense articles are items in excess
of DOD-approved force requirement level.
The authority to transfer excess defense ar-
ticles Is contained in section 8 of the For-
eign Military Sales Act Amendments, 1971, as
amended. (See app. II.)
In our report to your Committee in March
1973, we indicated that excess defense articles
were generated through modernizations of
forces and changes in authorizations of ar-
ticles to equip and sustain the approved
forces. The decision as to what portion of the
DOD inventory will constitute the approved
force requirement level and what assets may
be transferred as excess defense articles rests
entirely with DOD. Excess articles are con-
tinuously available in vast quantities and
have been used in military assistance pro-
grams since the inception of foreign aid. Use
of excess articles to supplement the regularly
funded military assistance program has in-
creased since 1968 because of reduced mili-
tary assistance appropriations.
At the time of our earlier review, "value"
was defined as not less than one-third of the
amount the United States paid when the
articles were acquired (acquisition cost).
Since then, the law has been changed and
value is now defined only as actual value
plus the cost of repairing, rehabilitating, or
modifying the article, which could range
from as low as salvage value to as high as
acquisition cost. A recent sampling by DOD
showed the actual value of excess articles
averaged only 8.9 percent of acquisition cost,
considerably less than the one-third mini-
mum required under previous legislation.
Orders for excess defense articles are to be
considered expenditures of military assist-
ance funds. However, - those articles gener-
ated abroad are charged to the appropriation
only if the aggregate actual value during any
fiscal year exceeds $150 million. Under the
old definition of value this would equal about
$450 million (3 x $150 million) in excess
articles, based on acquisition cost. Now, how-
ever, if DOD decides to use the 8.9 percent
(1/11) figure as actual value, approximately
$1.65 billion (11 x $150 million) in excess
articles, based on acquisition cost, could be
granted to foreign countries without charge
to the military assistance appropriation. This
is over three times more than the value of
excess defense articles granted through the
military assistance program during any sin-
gle previous year.
The proposed Foreign Assistance Act of
1974 would further liberalize the use of ex-
cess items. Our analysis of the proposed act
showed that the theoretical ceiling of $1.65
billion could be increased to $4.4 billion. We
believe that consideration should be given to
providing more congressional control over
excess defense articles.
The stockpiling of defense assets for po-
tential Use by allies adds another level to
the DOD procurement base. We previously
mentioned that new Army procurement
will modernize U.S. active and reserve
units and the older articles being re-
placed will make up the war reserve stock-
pile. It is conceivable that once these U.S.
Forces have been modernized, DOD will mod-
ernize the war reserve, and thus make large
quantities of defense assets excess and avail-
able for transfer to foreign governments, in-
cluding those for which the stockpile was
originally intended.
More importantly, however, is the fact
'that DOD has the authority to decide what
portion of the DOD inventory will make up
the approved force requirement level. Since
'the war reserve for allies represents a por-
tion of the total war reserve in excess of U.S.
'approved force requirements, DOD can now
stockpile older items that would immediately
become excess upon replacement. If a future
'emergency arises over seas, DOD could reduce
'the approved force requirement level and im-
mediately make the war reserve for allies
'available as excess for transfer to whichever
'country may need them. All this could be
'accomplished without adversely affecting the
'total U.S. approved force requirements.
'CONCLUSION
' In conclusion, we feel that the President
and DOD at the present time have consider-
able statutory authority to transfer reserve
'materials to allies if they are needed. It
Should be pointed out that the authority to
transfer U.S. defense stocks under these pro-
'visions applies to any defense item in the
'inventory, whether planned for future use by
allies or U.S. Forces.
' The broad authority is especially prevalent
'in the area of excess defense articles. Under
present authority DOD is permitted to trans-
fer vast quantities Of excess items to foreign
governments with little or no charge to any
?future increase in available excess items (1)
because of the modernization of forces and/or
the reduction in the approved force re-
'quirement level and (2) because of the pro-
posed liberalization of the no-cost transfer
ceiling, the Committee may wish to con-
sider tighter controls over the quantity of
ekcess articles that can be transferred to
foreign governments. This may include re-
taining section 8 of the Foreign Military
Sales Act Amendments of 1971, but modify-
ing it (1) to establish actual value at not
less than 331/3 percent of acquisition value
and (2) to require that excess programs be
'stated in congressional presentation docu-
ments in terms of acquisition cost.
We recognize that there is legislation pend-
ing on the DOD procurement authorization
bill that would forbid the stockpiling of
defense assets for possible future use by
allied forces. Although passage would elimi-
nate the war reserve for allies, it would not
strengthen control over excess defense
articles.
' We plan no further distribution of this
?report unless you agree or publicly announce
its contents.
? Sincerely yours,
ELMER B. STAATS,
Comtproller General of the United States.
EXCERPTS FROM FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF
1961, AS AMENDED
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Section 503?General Authority?(a) The
President is authorized to furnish military
assistance on such terms and conditions as
he may determine, to any friendly country
or international organization, the assisting of
which the President finds will strengthen the
security of the United States and promote
world peace and which is otherwise eligible
to receive such assistance, by?
(1) acquiring from any source and pro-
viding (by loan or grant) any defense article
or defense service; or
(2) assigning or detailing members of the
Armed Forces of the United States and other
personnel of the Department of Defense to
perform duties of a noncombatant nature.
(b) In addition to such other terms and
conditions as the President may determine
pursuant to subsection (a), defense articles
may be loaned thereunder only if?
(1) there is a bona fide reason, other than
the shortage of funds, for providing such
articles on a loan basis rather than on a grant
basis;
(2) there is a reasonable expectation that
such articles will be returned to the agency
making the loan at the end of the loan
period, unless the loan is then renewed;
(3) the loan period is of fixed duration not
exceeding five years, during which such
article may be recalled for any reason by the
United States;
(4) the agency making the loan is reim-
bursed for the loan based on the amount
charged to the appropriation for military
assistance under subsection (c) ; and
(5) arrangements are made with the
agency making the loan to be reimbursed in
the event such article is lost or destroyed
while on loan, such reimbursement being
made first out of any funds available to
carry out this chapter and based on the
depreciated value of the article at the time
of loss or destruction.
(c) (1) In the case of any loan of a defense
article or defense service made under this
section there shall be a charge to the appro-
priation for military assistance for any fiscal
year while the article or service is on loan
in an amount based on?
(A) the out-of-pocket expenses authorized
to be incurred in connection with such loan
during such fiscal year; and
(B) the depreciation which occurs during
such year while such article is on loan.
(2) The provisions of this subsection shall
not apply?
(A) to any particular defense article or
defense service which the United States
Government agreed prior to the date of en-
actment of this subsection to lend; and
(B) to any defense article or defense
service, or portion thereof acquired with
funds appropriated for military assistance
under this Act.
Section 504?Authorization?(a) There is
authorized to be appropriated to the Presi-
dent to carry out the purpose of this part
not to exceed $512,500,000 for the fiscal year
1974: Provided, That funds made available
for assistance under this chapter (other than
training in the United States) shall not be
used to furnish assistance to more than thir-
ty-one countries in any fiscal year: Pro-
vided further, That none of the funds ap-
propriated pursuant to this subsection shall
be used to furnish sophisticated weapons
systems, such as missile systems and jet
aircraft for military purposes, to? any un-
derdeveloped country, unless the President
determines that the furnishing of such weap-
ons systems is important to the national
security of the United States and reports
within thirty days each such determination
to. the Congress. Amounts appropriated un-
der this subsection are authorized to remain
available until expended. Amounts appro-
priated under this subsection shall be avail-
able for cost-sharing expenses of United
States particiaption in the military head-
quarters and related agencies program.
Section 506? Special Authority?(a) Dur-
ing the fiscal year 1974, the President may,
if he determines it to be in the security in-
terests of the United States, order defense
articles from the stocks of the Department
of Defense and defense services for the pur-
poses of part II [military assistancer, sub-
ject to subsequent reimbursement therefor
from subsequent appropriations available for
military assistance. The value of such orders
under this subsection in the fiscal year
1974 shall not exceed $250,000,000. (b) The j
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U US,. 1
_or.rtriient of Defense is authorized to in-
: or. in applicable appropriations, oblige-
joie; in anticipation of reimbursements in
enounis equivalent to the value of such
,i,t,r1.; under subsection (a) of? this section.
npria.Lions to the President of such sums
y be necessary to reimburse the ap-
mtble approoriation, fund, or account for
een meters are hereby authorieed.
,.11A PROVISIONS
7-;i1:11iurn 61(). 'Transfer Between Accounts.?
' tenenever the President determines it
Lieseessary for the purposes of this Act.
exceed 10 per cent urn of the funds
mem available for any provision of this
- (except funds made available pursuant
?it IV of chapter 2 of part I (Overseas
!vaiii Investment Corporation!) may be
ii rred to. and conscsidated with, the
.,.ons made available for any other provi-
ion et this Act, and may he used for any of
tire purposes for which such funds may be
esed, except that the total in the provision
en. the benefit of which the transfer is made
. min not be increased by more than 20 per
.nti,t1Dit of the amount of funds made avail-
? oe tor such provision. * * ?
nection 614. Special Authorities.?(a) The
emsectent may authorize in each fiscal year
ire use of funds made available for use un-
aar t,17,(,7 Act and the furnishing of assistance
mider section 606 in a total amount not to
:metal $250,000,000 and the use of not to ex-
,06 $100,000,000 of foreign currencies ac-,
? a under this Act or any other law with-
tett regard to the requirements of the Act,
y law relating to receipts and credits ac-
es-ding to the United States, any Act appro-
priating funds for use uncier this Act, or the
mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of
M51 (22 U.S.C. 1611 et seq.), in furtherance
;r. Any- of the purposes of such Acts, when the
nresident determines that such authoriza-
tion Is Important to the security of the
eoiled States. Not more than $50,000,000 of
the funds available under this subsection
may SE1 allocated to any one country in any
eseal year_ the limitation contained in the
preceding sentence shall not apply to any
rountry which is a victim of active Commu-
Diat or Communist-supported aggression.
(e) The President is authorized to use
amounts not to exceed $50.000,000 of the
ILTRIS made available under this Act pursu-
nnt to his certification that it is inadvis,
able to specify the nature of the use of such
tilinds, which certification shall be deemed
to be a sufficient voucher for such amounts,
s he president shall promptly and fully in-
tone. the Speaker of the House of Represent-
Aver and the chairman and ranking minor-
My member of the Committee on Foreign
e,selations of the Senate of each use of funds
ender this subsection.
Section 652, Limitation Upon Exercise of
tnseciai Authority.?The President shall not
exercise any special authority granted to
elm under section 506(e), 610(a), or 614(a)
this Act unless the President. prior to the
note Sie intends to exercise any such author-
e-,y, notifies the Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Committee on Foreign
nelations of the Senate in wrding of each
such intended exercise, the section of this
Act under which such autleori0; is to be ex-
:sect-led, and the justification for, and the
extent of, the exercise of such authority.
nection 653. Change in Allocation of For-
,tign Assistance.?(a) Not later than thirty
nays after the enactment of any law" appro-
eriatnig funds to carry out any provision of
Act (other than section 451 Contin-
cuter.' Fund or 637 [Administrative Ex-
a:rises Ii. the President shall notify the Con-
less of each foreign country and interna-
tional organization to which the United
nfates Government intends to provide any
portion of the funds under such law and of
tie amount of funds under the law, by cate-
gory of assistance. that the United States
Government intends to provide to each. Not-
withstanding any other provision of law, the
United States Government shall not proeide
to any foreign country or international orga-
nization any funds under that law which ex-
ceeds by 10 per centum the amount of mili-
tary grant assistance or security supporeing
assistance, as the case may be, -which the
President notified the Congress that the
.d States Government intended to pro-
eide that country or organization under that
Iftwe unless the President (I) determines
that it is in Hai security. interests of the
United States that such country or orgnni-
estimi receive funds in excess of the ammint
inemded in such notification for that ectim-
try or organization, and (2) reports to Con-
miens, at least ten days prior to the date on
which such excess funds are to be provided
to that country or organization, each such
determination. including the name of the
country or organization to receive funds in
excess of such per centum, the amount of
ennds in excess of the per centum which are
eo be provided, and the justification for :pro-
viding the additional assiatance.
(b) The provisions of this section shall
not apply in the case of any law making
continuing appropriations and may inn be
waived under the provisions of section CM
-of this Act.
APPENDIS II?E'