HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON S. 3000

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 320
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: February 5, 1974
• Content Type: REGULATION

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FISCAL YEAR 1975 AUTHORIZATION FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT, AND ACTIVE
DUTY, SELECTED RESERVE AND CIVIL-
IAN PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND) SESSION
ON
S. 3000
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS DURING THE FISCAL YEAR
1875 FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, NAVAL
VESSELS, TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, TORPEDOES, AND
OTHER WEAPONS, AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND
EVALUATION FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND TO PRESCRIBE
THE AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL STRENGTH FOR EACH ACTIVE
DUTY COMPONENT AND OF THE SELECTED RESERVE OF EACH
RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES AND OF CIVIL-
IAN PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND TO
AUTHORIZE TIIE MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
PART 1
Authorizations
FEBRUARY 5, 1974
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FISCAL YEAR 1975 AUTHORIZATION FOR
MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT, AND ACTIVE
DUTY, SELECTED RESERVEAND CIVIL-
IAN PERSONNEL STRENGTHS
HEARINGS
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 3000
TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS DURING THE FISCAL YEAR
1975 FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, NAVAL
VESSELS, TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, TORPEDOES, AND
OTHER WEAPONS, AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND
EVALUATION FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND TO PRESCRIBE
THE AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL STRENGTH FOR EACH ACTIVE
DUTY COMPONENT AND OF THE SELECTED RESERVE OF EACH
RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES AND OF CIVIL-
IAN PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND TO
AUTHORIZE THE MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
PART 1
Authorizations
FEBRUARY 5, 1974
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
29-464 WASHINGTON : 1974
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN C. STENNIS, Miss".ssippi, Chairman
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
SAM J. ERVIN, In., North Carolina
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire
HARRY F. BYRD, In., Virginia
HAROLD E. HUGHES, Iowa
SAM NUNN, Georgia
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOHN TOWER, Texas
PEIER H. DOMINICK, Colorado
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia
ROBERT TAFT, Js.., Ohio
T. EDWARD BRASWELL, Jr., Chief Counsel and Staff Director
JOHN T. TILER, C;'lief Clerk
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MILITARY PROCUREMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1975v
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVIOES,
Washington, D.C:.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 1114,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).
Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, Cannon, Mc-
Intyre, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Hughes, Thurmond, Tower, Dominick,
and Taft.
Also present : T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff direc-
tor; W. Clark McFadden II, counsel; John T. Ticer, chief clerk;
Hyman Fine, Don L. Lynch, John A. Goldsmith, George Foster,
Charles H. Cromwell, Edward B. Kenney, Robert Q. Old, profes-
sional staff members ; and Christine E. Cowart, clerical assistant.
[A copy of S. 3000 follows:]
IS. 3000 93d Cong., 2d soss.]
A BILL To authorize appropriations (luring the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of
aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weap-
ons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to
prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of
the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian
personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student
loads, and for other purposes
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE I-PROCUREMENT
SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal
year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement
of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other
weapons as authorized by law, in amounts as follows :
AIRCRAFT
For aircraft : for the Army, $339,500,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps,
$2,960,600,000; for the Air Force, $3,496,600,000.
MISSILES
For missiles : for the Army, $459,200,000; for the Navy, $620,600,000;. for the
Marine Corps, $76,000,000; for the Air Force, $1,610,800,000.
NAVAL VESSELS
For naval vessels : for the Navy, $3,562,600,000.
TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES
For tracked combat vehicles : for the Army, $331,900,000; for the Marine Corps,
$80,100,000.
(1)
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2
ToaPEDoEs
For torpedoes and related support equipment ; for the Navy, $187,700,000.
OT$Ea WEAPONS
For other weapons: for the Army, $53,400,000; for the Navy, $25,600,000; for
the Marine Corps, $500,000.
TITLE II-RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION
SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal
year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, devel-
opment, test and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows :
For the Army, $1,985,976,000;
For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), $3,264,503,000;
For the Air Force, $3,518,860,000; and
For the Defense Agencies, $555,700,000, of which $27,000,000 is authorized for
the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
TITLE III-ACTIVE FORCES
SEC. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and -ending June 30, 1.975,
each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an end strength for active duty
personnel as follows :
(1) The Army, 785,000;
(2) The Navy, 540,380;
(3) The Marine Corps, 196,398;
(4) The Air Force, 030,345.
TITLE IV-RESERVE FORCES
SEC. 401. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975,
the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces will be
programed to attain an average strength of not less than the following:
(1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 379,848;
(2) The Army Reserve, 215,842;
(3) The Naval Reserve, 107,526;
(4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 36,703;
(5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 89,128;
(6) The Air Force Reserve, 51,319;
(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,700.
SEC. 402. The average strength prescribed by section 401 of this! title for the
Selected Reserve of any Reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by
(1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the
Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for
training) at any time during the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of indi-
vidual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve
of such component who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatis-
factory participation in training) without their consent at any time during the
fiscal year. Whenever such units or such individual members are released from
active duty during any fiscal year, the average strength for such fiscal year for
the Selected Reserve of such Reserve component shall be proportionately increased
by the total authorized strength of such units and by the total number of such
individual members.
TITLE V-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
SEC. 501. (a) For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30,
1975, the Department of Defense is authorized an end strength for civilian
personnel as follows :
(1) The Department of the Army, 358,717;
(2) The Department of the Navy, including the Marine Corps, 323,529;
(3) The Department of the Air Force, 269,709;
(4) Activities and agencies of the Department of Defense (other than the
military departments), 75,372.
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(b) In computing the authorized end strength for civilian personnel there shall
be included all direct-hire civilian personnel employed to performed military
functions administered by the Department of Defense (other than those per-
formed by the National Security Agency) whether in permanent or temporary
positions and whether employed on a full-time, part-time, or intermittent basis,
but excluding special employment categories for students and disadvantaged
youth such as the stay-in-school campaign, the temporary summer aid program
and the Federal junior fellowship program and personnel participating in the
worker-trainee opportunity program: Provided, That whenever the Secretary of
the military department concerned or the Secretary of Defense determines that
the direct substitution of civilian personnel for military personnel will result
in economy without adverse effect upon national defense, such substitution may
be accomplished without regard to the numbers of civilian personnel authorized
by this section : Provided further, That when a function, power, or duty or
activity is transferred or assigned to a department or agency of the Department
of Defense from a department or agency outside of the Department of Defense
or from a department or agency within the Department of Defense, the civilian
personnel end strength authorized for such departments or agencies of the De-
partment of Defense affected shall be adjusted to reflect any increases or de-
creases in civilian personnel required as a result of such transfer or assignment.
Sac. 502. When the Secretary of Defense determines that such action is neces-
sary in the national interest, he may authorize the employment of civilian per-
sonnel in excess of the number authorized by section 501: Provided, That the
number of additional personnel authorized to be employed pursuant to the
authority of this section shall not exceed 1 per centum of the total number of
civilian personnel authorized for the Department of Defense by section 501:
Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the Con-
gress of any authorization to increase civilian personnel strength pursuant to
this authority.
TITLE VI-MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS
SEa. 601. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975,
each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an average military training
student load as follows :
(1) The Army, 97,638;
(2) The Navy, 71,279;
(3) The Marine Corps, 26,262;
(4) The Air Force, 52,900;
(5) The Army National Guard of the United States, 12,111;
(6) The Army Reserve, 6,673;,
(7) The Naval Reserve, 2,536;
(8) The Marine Corps Reserve, 3,403;
(9) The Air National Guard of the United States, 2,359; and
(10) The Air Force Reserve, 1,126.
TITLE VII-GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sac. 701. Subsection (a) (1) of section 401 of Public Law 89-367, approved
March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"(a) (1) Not to exceed $1,600,000,000 of the funds authorized for appropriation
for the use of Armed Forces of the United States under this or any other Act
are authorized to be made available for their stated purposes to support Vietnam-
ese military forces on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense
may determine : Provided, That nothing contained in this section shall be con-
strued as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese military
forces in activities designed to provide military support and assistance to the
Government of Cambodia or Laos.".
This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Appropriation Author-
ization Act, 1975".
COMMITTEE PROCEDURE
The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, it is obvious that this is an
open hearing. I state that so that it will be in the record.
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Members of the committee, I invited the press, television., and radio
to come here this morning. This is very important testimony. Dr.
Schlesinger is asking for almost $100 billion, and J; know he is going
to have a strong statement to justify it.
Mr. Secretary, on behalf o~ the entire committee, I welcome you and
.Admiral Moorer as we begin the initial presentation of the bepart-
ment of Defense program for this year. Although the President's
budget, which arrived just yesterday, is 2 weeks late, the. committee
aloes appreciate your willingness to appear immediately, in. order that
we can proceed promptly with these hearings.
Members of the committee, I feel at this first sitting on the posture
hearings that it is the Secretary of Defense's day, and he is entitled to
a chance to present his case. We won't restrict you in any way.
Admiral Moorer, we won't restrict you in any way either. You may
put your statement in the record, and then emphasize such points as
you wish. You may for emphasis pick out certain subject matters. Just
present it in your own good way. You are entitled to your chance to do
that under favorable circumstances.
When you have completed that, then we will have some questions.
We will rotate the. questions.
You are a member of the Cabinet, Mr. Secretary. We look to you
for facts and for some guidance and information freely given, whether
it is favorable or unfavorable to you and the Department of Defense.
Admiral Moorer, you were formerly Chief of Naval Operations,
and now you are Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest
ranking military officer in all the Government. You have been very
valuable to us in giving information and opinions. I know I have been
in some tight places and sent for you and always received a forth-
right, frank, and helpful statement. It has been helpful to me, and I
am sure others have had the same experience.
Prior to your testimony, the chair would like to snake a few prelim-
inary observations.
The funding request for the Department of Defense, which the
President made yesterday as a part of his overall budget, is in two
forms: First, there is a supplemental fiscal year 1974 request totaling
$6.2 billion; and second, a fiscal year 1975 Department of Defense
request for budget authority totaling 592.9 billion. The sum of these
two requests is $99.1 billion. This sum compares to $80.2 billion, in-
cluding the military assistance program, which was appropriated for
the Department of Defense last year for fiscal year 1974.
In terms of budget authority these two requests are the largest ever
requested in 1 year except for 1942, for which the total was $99.5
billion. The fiscal year 1975 estimated outlays, totaling $85.8 billion,
constitute the largest over for the Department of Defense. I am fully
aware of the effects of inflation, the constant dollar argument, and
other factors-all of which have some merit-and I wish to make clear
that I shall continue to support a strong and adequate national de-
fense. I think that these requests for a record peacetime budget require
a most stringent review and adequate justification in the Congress;
and whenever possible savings and reductions should be made.
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We are all aware of the soaring manpower costs in Defense, with
the fiscal year 1975 civilian payroll alone being $14.9 billion-up $2.1
billion from. fiscal year 1974. This is more than the entire procurement
portion of the authorization for most years. The military payroll alone
for fiscal year 1975 totals $19 billion-up $3 billion from fiscal year
1974. Total pay and related manpower costs for fiscal year 1975 will be
about $47.9 billion.
I was surprised, Mr. Secretary, that the Department plans to in-
crease its civilian employment by 30,800 between December 1973 and
June 30, 1974, bringing it to a level of 1,028,800 alone. That is the way
we figured it up, and we think that is substantially correct. This pro-
posed increase seems to be inconsistent with the announced intent of
the Department to achieve greater manpower efficiences.
You and your predecessors have made reductions in the last few
years of these civilian employees. I don't overlook that. But you are
asking for this increase.
Throughout the entire departmental testimony there is the concept
that there has been little modernization in the forces during the
course of the Vietnam war. Let me emphasize that we can never stand
still and must constantly modernize to be prepared. But I think the
record should reflect that there was a considerable degree of moderni-
zation during the Vietnam years in terms of new programs and weap-
ons. For example, the Army helicopters have increased from about
4,000 in 1965 to well over 8,000 by 1970. The early model F-4s have
been replaced with much improved later models; the A-7 fleet has
been added to the Navy and Air Force; a new class of SSN--688 at-
tack submarine has been funded, as well as two nuclear aircraft car-
riers. The Poseidon conversion program is well underway to comple-
tion as well as the Minuteman III program. There are also other
examples.
The chair Would like to note that Senator Symington, in response
to my request, has agreed to chair the full committee in its considera-
tion of the fiscal year 1974 supplemental request. Certain high points
of this request may be covered today. The -details, however, will be
considered in later separate hearings, and you need not hesitate in
covering that today. But the rest of it will be in separate hearings
later, and you can come back, of course, on that, Mr. Secretary. We
might consider putting some of those items into the fiscal year 1975.
I have already made a statement on the floor of the Senate-I didn't
tell Senator Symington I was going to do it-I made a statement
thanking him and emphasizing his fine services to the committee last
year as acting chairman and other ways. I won't repeat those senti-
ments here for this record, Senator. But I thank you very much per
sonally and officially for the fine job that you did.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will the chairman yield?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. I didn't know about that statement until yes-
terday; and I do thank you for it.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
The chair would emphasize that hearings will be expedited on the
entire Defense program this year by attempting to avoid the waste
of time consumed in the past describing rather than justifying the
various programs. All witnesses may place in the record statements
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of any desired length. Their verbal testimony, however, should be
straight to the point of supporting the programs, unless you want to
modify the programs. The committee will thereafter weigh all the
evidence in deciding whether the many items are ;justified.
Without taking more time I emphasize that you gentlemen are wel-
come here. We are glad to have those attending with you.
Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
Secretary SOTTL SINGER. Mr. Chairman, I endorse your opening re-
marks. I present here the first postwar, posthostilities budget of the
Department of Defense. We expect that our budget will be subject to
the most stringent review. We expect also, if past history is any guide,
that there will be items in the budget that will be questioned and that
the Congress will remove. And we are quite prepared for that, Mr.
Chairman because we recognize that any budget of so great a size will
have unevenness in it, and that it is the duty of the Congress to exam-
ine it closely.
We hope to justify, by and large, the requests that we are making
to you, however. And if, in view of America's responsibilities in the
world, you discover that in your judgment our requests are unduly
modest, we will expect that you will add additional funds in those
programs. -
Mr. Chairman, I am talking today about both the fiscal year 1975
defense budget and the fiscal year 19'._'4 supplemental budget request.
Your earlier reference was to a $6.2 billion supplemental request. If I
may modify your statement, Mr. Chairman, $3.4 billion of that request
was discussed at length both with this committee and with the Appro-
priations Committees last year in our original fiscal year 1974 budget
proposal. It is due to a change in administrative procedures that this
$3.4 billion supplemental for pay, is included again at this time. So we
are really dealing today with a $2.8 billion readiness supplemental
request that reflects what we regard as our lessons learned from the
recent Middle Eastern conflict, as well as our fiscal year 1975 request
of $92.6 billion.
The President's request for fiscal year 1974 was $85 billion. In addi-
tion, he later requested $2.4 billion for security assistance related to
Israel and Cambodia. As compared to the President's request of last
January, therefore, the fiscal year 1975 budget is up approximately $7.6
billion. As compared to the total requests by the President for fiscal
year 1974, including the supplemental requests, the fiscal year 1975
budget is up approximately $5.4 billion over fiscal year 1974. We do
have some program expansion in fiscal year 1975, and we will discuss
those matters with you in greater detail.
GENERAL OUTLINE
1. Perspective on worldwide role
II. Strategic forces
III. General purpose forces
A. NATO
B. Naval
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IV. Budget overview
V. Management of resources
A. Manpower
B. Readiness
C. R. & D.
D. Procurement & aging
Mr. Chairman, I have indicated on this chart at the right some of
the questions that I should like to discuss with the committee this
morning in keeping with your advice to me. We have not submitted
a lengthy posture statement, although this will follow at a later date.
We will try to keep this as informal as we possibly can, because I
think that that will lead to a far better exchange and afar better
illumination of the issues.
Let me begin by talking about the worldwide role of the United
States.
Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. Are you reading
from your statement?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir. I have submitted a brief statement
for the record. If the committee wishes I can read the statement into
the record.
Senator SYMINGTON. No. I just wanted to try to follow you.
The CHAIRMAN. May I say for the benefit of those who came in,
since I covered it before, that the Secretary and I talked about this,
and I told him that we thought this was his day and he could take
this up in any way he saw fit and pick out the points he wanted to
particularly present, in an informal way if he wanted to, and then we
will have questions later.
We will put the full statement in the record.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, I should like to start by
presenting some perspective on the U.S. role in the world, because
that is what drives our budget considerations. There will be diver-
gences in judgment among American citizens about the appropriate
role for the United States in the world, and such divergences will be
reflected in different estimates as to what the Department of Defense
should spend.
The psalmist tells us, Mr. Chairman, that where there is no vision
the people perish. Consequently, I should like to outline at the outset
the vision that I have-with which some people and some members of
this committee may of course disagree-with regard to the U.S. role in
the world.
The United States now, unlike the period before 1939 or even be-
fore 1945, bears the principal burden of maintaining the worldwide
military equilibrium that underlies the survival and the security of
the free world. This is not a role that we have welcomed, Mr. Chair-
man, but it is a role that historical necessity has thrust upon us. For
a variety of reasons, the burden of responsibility falls on the United
States. There is nobody else to pick up the torch if the United States
fails to carry it.
In fulfilling this responsibility, Mr. Chairman, we recognize that
we are dealing in a world which is militarily dominated by two
states, ours and the Soviet Union. There is no other military capabil-
ity that is comparable, or even nearly comparable, to these two states.
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Consequently, in judging the military balance, we must look at the
Soviet Union and we must recognize that military force comparisons
are based upon military capabilities which are spread around the
world. This does not suggest that we are not hopeful with regard to
the future peaceful evolution of world politics. But we must look
realistically, whatever- our hopes, at tie evolution of our policies and
those of the Soviet Union with regard to these military forces.
We recognize that we and our allies are at the present time discuss-
ing mutual and balanced force reductions in central Europe with the
Soviet Union, and we, ourselves, are negotiating bilaterally with the
Soviets with regard to strategic arms limitations. We are hopeful
about possible developments in both of these negotiations. But while
we pursue negotiations about the reduction of arms in furtherance
of detente, it is my judgment that we must maintain a worldwide
military equilibrium. Short of that, we create the possibility of vacu-
ums and temptations that, in my judgment, would not be consistent
with the military equilibrium which undergirds detente and the pros-
pect of future improvements in our political relations with the Soviet
Union.
The Soviet Union has historically been a relatively prudent and
sober power, and I trust that it will continue to be prudent and sober.
I hope that as a result of its recognition, which we share, that there
is no alternative to peaceful cooperation, that we shall gradually
achieve a world in which security is based on something more than
a balance of arms. But until such a time arrives, we must recognize
what the relation of military forces around the world really is.
We do not discuss the military posture of Chad, Nigeria or Guate-
mala. However, we are very much concerned about the military pos-
ture of the Soviet Union. This is not to imply that we regard the
Soviet Union in some sense as having a political stance that is threat-
ening. That is not our intention, Mr. Chairman. But we must recognize
the military capabilities, and the Soviet Union has these in abundance.
We are deeply interested in the progress of detente. But sometimes
we are asked, Mr. Chairman, why do we need to maintain such large
defense forces as long as we have detente and are pursuing detente?
The answer is that there is no inconsistency between the maintenance
of our military strength and the hope for detente.. As members of the
committee well know, our country historically has been symbolized by
the eagle, which holds in one talon a clutch of arrows and in the
other talon an olive branch. That symbol has reflected the policies of
the United States from its inception. We certainly hope for peaceful
evolution, but we must stay prepared for the alternative.
Mr. Chairman, I will talk today about some changes with regard
to strategic forces. But I should like to emphasize first, that strategic
forces establish a framework for deterrence. It is the objective of
the TTnited States to see to it that we will not have early recourse
to the use of nuclear weapons. It is the preference of the United
that today will be on the need for the maintenance and strengthening
of our general purpose forces.
Much has been said, Mr. Chairman, about strategic forces. They
are, of course, important and somehow glamorous. But my emphasis
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that today will be on the need for the maintenance and strengthening
of our general purpose forces.
Mr. Chairman, if I may turn to a second subject, which is the
strategic forces themselves, let me mention a number of items at the
outset. First, let me recall the campaign of 1960 and the attitude Presi-
dent Kennedy took at that time. For a period of time prior to 1960 the
United States had a virtual nuclear monopoly. At about that time
it was perceived that our monopoly advantage would ebb; and, in fact,
it not only began to ebb, but by 1966-67 the Soviets had a very sub-
stantial intercontinental counter deterrent. During the early 1960's it
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y can
ate
ennedy and then by President
Kennedy-and also by a large majority of Americans in both parties-
that the United States needed alternatives other than suicide or sur-
render; that it needed options which did not imply immediate escala-
tion to major nuclear war. If anything, Mr. Chairman, the need for
options other than suicide or surrender, other than escalation to all out
nuclear war., is more important for us today than it was in 1960, be-
cause of the growth in the capabilities possessed by other powers.
What we are now doing, both on the strategic forces side and on the
general purposes forces side, is intended to strengthen those options in.
between suicide and surrender.
A second point that I should make in the strategic forces area, Mr.
Chairman, is that we see no possibility during the next 15 years at
least, if ever, of developing any active defense capability to limit dam-
age significantly to the United States from a well-coordinated nuclear
attack. That is' beyond the technological capabilities of the United
States, and our budget reflects that reality in a number of ways.
On the one hand, we are reducing our active air defenses and are
changing our air defense mission in ways I shall describe later. We
are also holding out to the Soviet Union the prospect of restraining
ourselves to but one AIIM site, rather than going ahead with the sec-
and site that is permitted under the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.
Once again, we hope for restraint on both sides.
With regard to air defenses, we must recognize that at the present
time the Soviet Union can target any city in the United States that
it desires; that there is no protection in nuclear war provided by air
defenses so long as the Soviets depend primarily upon ballistic mis-
siles: and that, as long as there is no prospect of a ballistic missile
defense, we must have a complementarity between our air defenses
and our missile defenses. As a consequence, we are eliminating those
components of the air defense systems which are designed to protect
American cities against bomber'
omber attack in nuclear warfare. We will
retain those elements of the air defense systems which are designed
to give the United States control of its air spaces in a general way,
and also air defenses to protect against conventional attacks, particu-
larly the possibility of attacks in the southeastern United States.
We must recognize, Mr. Chairman, that there is no protection for
American cities against a coordinated strike by the strategic forces
of the Soviet Union. And cruel as it is, we are acknowledging that
reality. This conies, I think, as a surprise to some members of the
public, but it is something that must be understood.
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In order to protect the cities of the United States we rely, there-
fore, upon deterrence. In order to protect the United States and its
allies generally we rely upon deterrence, and the basis of the changes
we are making in our force structure this year are to shore up deter-
rence across the board, across the entire spectrum of risk.
We expect that by improving deterrence across the board, we will
reduce even lower the probability of a nuclear clash between ourselves
and other major powers. However, if a nuclear clash should occur-
and we fervently believe that it will not-in order to protect Amer-
ican cities and the cities of our allies (luring the wartime period, we
shall continue to rely on reserving our assured destruction force and,
through intrawar deterrence, to perst.ade any potential foe not to
attack cities. It is our objective to prevent massive destruction even
in the cataclysmic circumstances of nuclear war. There is no pur-
pose to be served by massive destruction, which would eliminate the
urban-industrial base of our own society, the society of the Soviet
Union, and other societies. For that reason we have altered our target-
ing strategy, and we have discussed this at some length, in public.
I should like to emphasize that the alterations in our targeting
strategy, which we believe make sense, are not so novel as perhaps
has been advertised, because this has been discussed at least from the
days of Secretary McNamara's Athens statement in 1962. The need
for flexibility and selectivity has been alluded to ir. the posture state-
ments of Secretary McNamara, Secretary Cliffo:rd, and Secretary
Laird. We are, however, placing far greater emphasis than heretofore
on options other than massive strikes at the cities of potential foes.
And we hope that this would mean that even in the cataclysmic event
of nuclear war, worldwide devastation could be avoided.
The assured destruction motion, Mr. Chairman, was not initially
a strategy, and I am not sure it ever became a strategy. It was sim-
ply an analytical method of testing our own forces against a coun-
terforce strike and a potential intercept by Soviet ABM capabili-
ities during a period of time when the United States maintained
paramountcy-overall numerical superiority-vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union. These circumstances have now changed. And what may have
been a reasonable way of testing and sizing our nuclear forces in the
1960's is now obsolescent. Therefore, we must design better ways of
sizing our nuclear forces. At the same time, we must make clearer
the way in which strategic nuclear forces would be employed in the
event of a nuclear attack on the national interests of the United
States. Such an attack would be so catastrophic that the President
of the United States would make the agonizing decision to bring our
strategic nuclear forces into play.
Let me stress, Mr. Chairman, that this would be the most agonizing
decision that any President of the United States would ever have to
make. We trust that no President will ever be forced to make such
a decision. And one should understand that this is a decision that
would not be lightly entered into by any man.
We recognize the cataclysmic effects of arecourse to nuclear weap-
ons. We believe the Soviet Union also recognizes this, as would any
future nuclear power of similar magnitude. Consequently, as long as
we can rely upon the rationality of national leaders of all nations,
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there is no danger, in my judgment, that that decision would be made
lightly.
I have spoken, Mr. Chairman, of the targeting changes. With re-
gard to the sizing of our nuclear forces, the existence of SALT gives
us cause for hope. The U.S..Government strongly adheres to the pro-
tocol of the 1972 Moscow agreements, that neither side would attempt
to achieve strategic advantage relative to the other side. We are hope-
ful that as a result of SALT II, which is now going on., we can have
reductions in the strategic capabilities of both sides.
The sizing issue is one that has to be separated from the targeting
issue. The targeting issue bears upon the effectiveness of our deter-
rent across the entire spectrum of risk. The sizing issue refers to the
need for the United States to maintain essential equivalence in rela-
tion to the strategic forces of the other paramount power in the world.
We must have that essential equivalence, Mr. Chairman. Not only
must we have a physical capability equivalent to that of the other
superpower, but this equivalence must also be perceived by all par-
ties around the world-not only by us because of what this perception
does to our own will ; not only to the Soviets as they perceive the
military-political environment ; but also to the Europeans, to the Japa-
nese, to the Chinese, and to all other audiences who are vitally inter-
ested in the evolution of the worldwide military balance.
In the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Mr. Chairman, we and the Soviet
Union pledged to help protect all countries around the world from
nuclear war. This was done to encourage them to refrain from the
acquisition of nuclear weapons. But if the U.S. strategic umbrella is
perceived by audiences around the world to contain holes, then the
temptation of other countries to acquire nuclear weapons will increase.
As long as the United States maintains a strategic capability which
is the equivalent of that of the Soviet Union, we think that it is rea-
sonable for the Europeans, the Japanese and others to see that the
United States offers adequate protection, thereby avoiding a scramble
for additional nuclear weapons, which in the next century would have
major unfavorable impacts on the security of the world.
In a classified session, Mr. Chairman, I shall go into recent devel-
opments with regard to the Soviet strategic forces. In this open ses-
sion I can only say that the Soviet strategic program, insofar as its
R. & D. activities are concerned, has had a depth and breadth that has
been surprising to us. Its pace has been somewhat slower than we
might have anticipated. Some would have anticipated the develop-
ment of MIRVing capability by the Soviet Union prior to the sum-
mer of 1973. However, the Soviets do have in development four new
ICBM's of very enhanced throw weight. And, they have in produc-
tion now a new, long-range, submarine-launched ballistic missile. They
also have a new submarine program in operation. We want to avoid
undue alarm about these developments, Mr. Chairman, but we want
to view them prudently. We cannot say where the Soviets will be going
with these programs. We are not clairvoyant. But we do recognize
that these programs, associated as they are with the numbers and
throw weight implicit in SALT I, provide the Soviets with the po-
tentiality of achieving strategic superiority vis-a-vis the United States
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12
if we fail to take the necessary actions. We hope that the Soviets and
ourselves will exhibit the approriate degree of restraint and that limi-
tations can be achieved through SALT IT. But we cannot count on
that. And for that reason we have a number of options in our pro-
gram which enhance our R. & D. menu, options that the United States
may embrace in the event the Soviet Union fails to exhibit the degree
of restraint we hope for in the months a lead.
Mr. Chairman, in the long run, the critical variable with regard to
ICBM's, is throw weight. Technological differences arise over time.
Consequently, we have been concerned about the potentiality in the
future-in the 1980's in particular-of the Soviets achieving major
throw weight advantages. We have been satisfied with the numerical
and throw weight handicaps of the United States under SALT I be-
cause we have had technological advantages. But the events of last
summer indicate that those relative technological advantages are wan-
ing, and we must be prepared to offset any attempt by the Soviets to
achieve real or apparent strategic advantages over the United States
in the future.
In the past, Mr. Chairman, we have been concerned primarily about
the throw weig ht embodied in the Soviet SS-9 ICBM and its fol-
low-on, the SS 18. The throw weight in the SS :L8 will be approxi-
mately 20 to 30 percent larger than that of the SS-9. We thought in
the past that if we could deal with the throw weight embodied in the
SS-9 and the SS--18 follow-on, we would have a handle through nego-
tiations on the throw weight issue. We also thought that it was un-
wise for the Soviet Union to concentrate something on the order of
40 to 50 percent of their throw weight at a limited number of launch
sites. In our view, this was destabilizing, not only :For us but for them,
and we thought that they would see the disadvantages in th is. The situ-
ation has changed, however, as a result of the strategic programs of
the Soviet Union, which have now become clear to us.
The SS-11 ICBM has been the mainstay of their force in the past.
There are two follow-on missiles to the SS-11, the SS--17 and the
SS-19. We are not surprised that they are planning to MIRV these
new vehicles-we expected that. We are not surprised that they would
have improved guidance as represented by on-board computers-we ex-
pect that. But what has been of special surprise is that these two
follow-ons to a lightweight missile have throw weights which are
two to three times the size of that of the SS-11. Consequently, we can
no longer be confident that we can deal with the issue of throw weight
simply by dealing with the SS-9 and the SS-18. We must now deal
with the throw weight issue as a whole.
Mr. Chairman, I noticed during the President's state of the Union
address to the Congress last week that his statement that the United
States must never be the second best power in the world was the state-
ment most enthusiastically applauded by the Congress. And, we shall
be obligated to take the steps necessary to avoid circumstances in which
the United States does become second best. That means grappling
with the issue of throw weight, because the Soviet follow-on ICBM's
could give them throw weight advantages in their ICBM force of
approximately 5 to 1. This is a matter of concern to us in the Depart-
ment, and I am sure it is a matter of concern to this committee.
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13
As I have indicated, we are prepared to adhere to the objectives
and the constraints as we see them, of the Moscow protocol of 1972.
We are, therefore, introducing a number of options of our own that
are lower cost and more constrained in a number of ways than some
of our previous options. In particular, I should note that we are
investigating a new SSBN using the propulsion system principle of
the Narwhal attack submarine. We believe this would be a lower cost,
16-tube submarine that could be associated with the larger Trident in
a mix to assure our future SLBM capabilities. We are prepared to go
J in either direction with our SSBN forces. Hopefully, the Soviet Union
will show restraint with regard to some of these issues-throw weight
in particular-and that as a consequence, it will not be necessary for
the United States to go ahead with a vast Trident submarine pro-
gram. Rather, it could be a more measured program.
However, if the Soviet Union fails to exercise restraint in Salt II,
then our replacement programs for the entire Poseidon fleet will be in
the direction of the large number of tubes, the large missiles and the
heavy throw weight represented by the Trident class submarine. By
contrast, we are prepared to replace the Poseidon fleet in part with the
Narwhal class, with its lesser number of smaller tubes and smaller
throw weight. There are advantages on both sides, but we must be pre-
pared to maintain essential equivalence and this gives us the option of
going in either direction. This is one option in a set of options that pro-
vide reassurance, I think, for those who are concerned about the per-
ceived trend and the potentiality in Soviet weapons development. And
it is a set of options that provide reassurance also to those who are con-
cerned about both the growth in cost of our own strategic program and
the desire for restraint.
We are prepared to follow in any direction. And, therefore, since
arms control is a two-way street, we must recognize that at this stage
of the game it will be the pace set by the Soviet Union that determines
the size and composition of our strategic forces.
Mr. Chairman, as I have emphasized, the strategic forces provide
a framework. We trust that we need not have recourse to the strategic
forces and that the general purpose forces will be the ones of
importance.
I know that there is disagreement with me in this committee with
regard to our NATO commitments, and I can understand that. There
is a restlessness, I think, with what is perceived to be a failure of
the Europeans to do their share. And there is some basis for that
restlessness.
But at the present time the Europeans do put up 80 percent of the
ready forces of NATO, and this is one of the most important part of
the worldwide balance. In our review of the commitments that the
United States has entered into since 1945, we must be discriminating. I
know there are many who feel that the United States entered indis-
criminately into commitments after 1945, and that it is time for a re-
view of those commitments. I agree that we must review our commit-
ments discriminately. But, Mr. Chairman, the worst thing of all would
be if the United States in reviewing commitments that some now per-
ceive to have been entered into indiscriminately in the period after
1915, were to abandon commitments indiscriminately. This is so be-
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cause many of those commitments are vital to the place and role of the
United States in the world today.
We can retreat to the North American Continent and we can survive
in the North American continent, but it would be a changed world,
one in which many of the better aspects of the American society would
be subject to strain. NATO is perhaps our most :important commit-
ment. The Europeans are doing more--I shall be happy to review this
with the committee-and they should be doing more. But we must
maintain a deterrent in Europe-particularly in Central Europe--
that never allows temptation to the forces arrayed to the east of the
Elbe River. I do not wish to ascribe motives, but as long as we have a
balance nobody will be tempted.
I have discussed with our NATO friends what I call the NATO
triad, which is different in concept from our strategic triad. It is
based upon strategic forces primarily provided by the United States,
tactical nuclear forces that would be available in the event that West-
ern Europe started to be overrun, and a stalwart conventional capa-
bility. I believe that the Europeans now are more interested in that
stalwart conventional capability than they have been since the incep-
tion of NATO in 1949. And that is vitally important, because the de-
cision to use nuclear weapons will be an agonizing decision, not lightly
entered into by anybody nor lightly concurred in by the NATO coun-
tries. In my judgment, we must, therefore, have a conventional capa-
bility in Central Europe to deter that component of the spectrum of
risk.
We are moving in that direction. The European allies are strength-
ening their forces. There is much still to be done.. But, if we are to
deter effectively across the entire spectrum of risk and to provide
Western Europe with the feeling that they have a stalwart capability,
then the United States must continue to participate in European
defense.
There are two motives for American forces being in Europe. One is
the American presence. I believe that we will have to maintain an
American presence. But a question that is quite rightly asked by mem-
bers of this committee and by Members of Congress is, do we need 41/s
divisions and 300,000 men in Europe in order to provide that Ameri-
can presence? It is quite correct to raise that question. If our purpose
is only to keep an American presence in Europe, we can do it with
less. But at the present time we have a rough balance between the
conventional capabilities in the NATO guidelines area, between the
NATO forces west of the Elbe and the Warsaw Pact forces east of
the Elbe. Substantial reductions in the American contribution to that
conventional capability would upset that balance. I recognize that
there will be disagreement with this judgment, Mr. Chairman. But I
believe that it is strongly in the American interest to continue to make
that contribution as long as the allies do their share. And their share
will be an increasing share.
Collaboration in this area is a two-way street. Just as we have to
collaborate with the Soviets in regard to SALT and MBFR-we can-
not unilaterally determine the outcome-so we must continue to col-
laborate with our European allies. We cannot do it alone. In the past,
NATO, could rest its security on American nuclear superiority. That
option is not open to us today. In the past, the United States repre-
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sented 50 percent of the economic resources available in the world.
We are down to something on the order of 30 percent today. The
American public is not inclined to pick up the world burden unilater-
ally. We must have the collaboration of our allies, Mr. Chairman,
and I believe we shall have that.
I invite you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Armed. Services
and Appropriations Committees, to visit NATO this summer during
the recess. NATO is so important an aspect of American foreign
policy, as buttressed by American military capabilities, that we can-
not, in my judgment, change our commitments there without a very
careful review. Congress wishes to make a careful review, and I
encourage all members of this committee to go to Europe and see
for themselves what the Europeans are doing, and also to see the im-
provement of our own forces in Europe as compared to the heights-
or the depths-of the Vietnamese war period.
We recognize also that this is a period in which the morale of the
Western societies is not at its peak. And, therefore, it behooves us
all to see what we can do to maintain that morale worldwide.
I have talked about the strategic balance and about the overall
balance in NATO. I should now like to say a word about the naval
balance, which also is relatively easy to quantify.
What has been, and what I think still should be called the. Free
World, is an ocean world. It depends upon the sea lanes for com-
munication. We are asymetrically dependent upon the oceans. And,
in order to maintain a naval balance, we must have the assurance that
commerce can reasonably travel the seas. We have, in the course. of the
last 4 budgetary years, reduced our naval forces from 979 ships to
526 ships today. During this same period of time, the Soviets have
introduced a number of improved vessels into their navy. They have
about 25 vessels with surface-to-surface missiles aboard which have
powerful antiship capabilities. In addition, the Soviets are acquiring
something of a blue-water navy. This is something of a change com-
pared to the past, when the U.S. Navy was truly paramount on the
world's oceans. I do not want to exaggerate the Soviet naval threat,
nor do I subscribe to alarmist statements about the current superior-
ity of the Soviet fleet. I simply want to lay the facts before you. One
fact is that we must indeed retain a suitable naval balance. There are
circumstances and there are places in the world where the U.S. Navy
cannot go today with a high confidence of success. I think that this
was built into the cards. We continue to have some edge in naval capa-
bility, but we should adjust our naval strength so as to maintain a
worldwide balance with high confidence for the nations of the Free
World, which are in a sense maritime states.
Mr. Chairman, I will now review briefly for you the major char-
acteristics of the proposed Defense budget. We are up about $7.6 billion
in comparison to the President's initial request of last year. Allowing
for the Israeli supplemental, it is up about $5 billion. Or, compared to
our current fiscal year 1974 request including the readiness supple-
mental, it is up about $5.5 billion.
I offer, Mr. Chairman, no apologies for the size of our budget. It is
less than 6 percent of our GNP. It is a shrinking share of our national
expenditures. But $92.6 billion of appropriations still is a sizable
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16
amount. And we in the Department feel that we must justify that 6
percent to the American public. Unless we are able to justify it in
terms of both the vision of America's role in the world--America's
responsibilities-as well as in terms of the details of our force struc-
ture, you will be quite right to question it, Mr. Chairman.
I believe that this sum is necessary if the United States is to con-
tinue to fulfill its world responsibilities. I think that the budget is
about right. I do not suggest for a moment that there is not some pro-
gram that cannot be cut, nor that the budget is perfectly balanced. I
am suggesting that the budget is of the right magnitude for this period
of time.
TOA SUMMARY
FY 1974 & FY 1975
,BILLIONS `
FY 1974 FY 1975
ORIGINAL ESTIMATE
85.0 92.6
ISRAELI SUPPLEMENTAL
2.2 -
ADDED PAY COSTS. ETC.
4 -
ADJUSTED REQUEST
87.6 92.6
CONGRESSIONAL CUT - 3
STATUS AFTER CUT 84.3
READINESS SUPPLEMENTAL 2.8
CURRENT REQUEST 871
INCLUDES S3 4 81',' ION FOR ANT:C;PATED PAY ,NCREASE
N,.JPES $2 88 ION GORAN ',rIPAT ED PAY ,N:kc4sE.
Mr. Chairman, this is the change that has occurred between fiscal
year 1974 and 1975. And you note, the Congress cut about $3.3 billion.
The status after the cut and prior to the readiness supplemental that
wtiwe are proposing was about $84 billion, With that readiness supple-
mental it amounts to $87 billion. The readiness supplemental for 1974
is less than the cut that the Congress imposed. We are prepared to
live with that cut, but we did recognize that there were lessons that
had been learned in the Middle Eastern war.
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Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
Mr. Secretary, how about the other supplements? How about the
$3.4 billion in pay, for example?
Secretary SCh LESINGER. The $3.4 billion for anticipated pay in-
creases was presented to this committee last year. That was included
in the $85 billion presented at that time by the Department of De-
fense. Due to a change of Office of Management and Budget proce-
dures, rather than sending up those details and the detailed requests
last year, it was sent up this year. I don't say whether that decision
was right or wrong. But that $3.4 billion in pay supplemental was
given to this committee at that time, and it was printed, Senator Sym-
ington, in the President's budget. I shall be happy to provide that
page of the 1974 budget for the record.
[The information follows:]
Increase or
1972 enacted 1973 estimate 1974 estimate . decrease (-)
REVOLVING AND MANAGEMENT FUNDS
Federal funds
Intragovernmental funds:
______051
Army management fund
0 1,300 ---------- -------------------------------
__________
Navy management fund__--------------- 051
0 6,299 940
7, 97 6 7, 036
Air Force management fund ------------- 051
0 -357 5, 000
620 -4, 380
Total Federal funds revolving and manage-
-223, 370 -707,915
-605,565 102, 350
ment funds.
ALLOWANCES
Federal funds
General and special funds:
Civilian and military pay raises ---------- 051
BA -------------- 1 780, 000
710
000
r 2,885,000 2, 165, 000
970
000
r 2
000 1
680
All-volunteer force_____________________051
,
BA ----------------------------
,
,
,
,
2 150, 000 150, 000
0 ----------------------------
2 140,000 140,000
Military retirement systems reform ------- 051
BA ----------------------------
- 390, 000 390, 000
0
------------ ---------- --
' 370, 000. 370,000
--------------
BA --------------
780,000
3,425,000 2,645,000
0
710,000
3,190,000 2,480,000
TRUST FUNDS
Miscellaneous trust funds: Permanent, indefinite
BA
6, 621
6, 730
6, 643 -87
051
0
7, 181
6, 515
6, 465 -50
Miscellaneous trust revolving funds ------ _--_051
0
-1, 538
3,000
1,300 -1,700
Total trust funds________________________
BA
6,621
6, 730
6,643 -87
0
5,643
9,515
7,765 -1,750
SUMMARY
Federal funds:
(Asshowaindetail above) -----------------
A
75,190,584
77,9D8,647
83,575,623 5,666,976
-
O
7
5,257,744
74,301,585
778,293,635 3,992,050
----------- 051
receipts from the public ----
0
---------------------------
Total Federal funds -----------------
BA
75,083,988
77,803,847
83,480,523 5,676,676
0
75, 151, 148
74, 196, 785
78, 198, 535 4,001, 750
I Proposed for later transmittal under existing legislation.
2 Proposed for later transmittal under proposed legislation.
The CTTAIIMAN. Proceed, if you will.
Secretary SOJELESTNGER. I think that Senator Symington would like
to come back to that either now or later.
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Purpose
Force readiness :
[In millions of dollars]
Fuel price increase ------------------------------------------------
480
Middle east payback -----------------------------------------------
231
Augmented force readiness ------------------------------------------ 1,
397
Increased airlift capability -----------------------------------------
169
Accelerated modernization ---------------------------------------
516
Strategic program changes -----------------------------------------
25
Total -------------------------------------------- --------------
2,818
Military and civilian pay increases :
Jan. 1, 1973-----------------------------------------------------
1,495
Oct. 1, 1973 -- ----- --------- --------- --~?--- --- ------ --
1,060
Total ---- --------------------------------------- ---------------
2,55:1
Retired pay cost of living increase :
July 1,1973--------------------------------------------------------
287
Jan. 1,1974------------------------------------------------------
182
Total ---------------------------------------------------------
469
Wage board pay increases--------------------------------------------
236
Basic allowance for subsistence----------------------------------------
107
Postal costs----------------------------------------------------------
48
Title
Military personnel----------------------------------------------------
2,000
Retired pay-----------------------------------------------------------
469
Operation and maintenance --------------------------------------------
1,742
Procurement ---------------------------------------------------------
1,772
Research, dev., test and evaluation -------------------------------------
217
Military construction --------------------------------------------------
29
Family housing -------------------------------------------------------
4
Component
Army ----------------------------------------------------------------
1,872
Navy ---------------------------------------------------------------
1,866
Air Force----------------------------------?--------------------------
1,918
Defense agencies-------------------------------------------------------
104
Defense-wide ------------------------------?--------------------------
473
Total -----------------------------------------------------------
6,233
Secretary SCHL,ESrNGFR. Mr. Chairman, the readiness supplemental
to which we have referred for some period of time is indicated at the
top of this chart, and amounts to $2.8 billion approximately. As I
have underscored, this represents, in large part, the lessons that we
believe we have learned from the Middle East war. The first item, I
would say, is a consequence. We have noted that fuel has gone up in
price substantially, and that even with our reduced level of fuel con-
sumption we cannot live with the budget that we received last year
for this year. We need to have relief with regard to the new costs of
fuel. And, depending on how fuel prices settle out, there is some uncer-
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tainty in what is the ideal sum in that area. That is relief that we will
need to have without question in fiscal year 1974.
In regard to the Middle East "payback," as I have mentioned to you
before, Mr. Chairman, and to other members of this committee, the
Department of Defense supplied armaments to Israel in accordance
with the purchase price of those armaments. We have taken them out
of inventory, which we have drawn down substantially. We are now
in the position of having to replace those items in the inventories. We
have discovered that the acquisition price today is substantially greater
than the acquisition price at which these items were initially acquired,
and that "payback" item represents the difference between the replace-
ment cost to us now and the price that the U.S. Government charged
to Israel for these equipments.
That "payback," Mr. Chairman, is another short term item which
we need to order these equipments for inventory replacement. I think
if we go over these equipments in detail you will see that they are
required in our inventories and that this is an immediately necessary
and desirable item.
The third item of about $1.4 billion represents the true lessons, as
it were, of the Middle East conflict. We have discovered that our
inventories were low in certain categories of weapons, in particular
in those classes of modern munitions that were most effective during
the Middle East war-Maverick, Tow, Hobo, and Shrike, for example.
These are munitions that were highly effective, and we learned more
about their effectiveness during the course of the war. We also recog-
nized how low our inventories were. I shall discuss that with you in
more detail in a classified session.
These are items that are necessary for the readiness posture of the
U.S. We must have them now, and I would be reluctant to see the
committee postpone this item until fiscal year 1975.
Overall as a nation, we have been inclined to pay more attention
to force structure, base structure and support structure, and even to
modernization, than we have to the readiness of forces. But we must
have more than forces with a large and perhaps even generous base
structure to support the shrunken force structure of today. Our forces
must also be ready. And that means that their inventories must be
filled and ready for combat. Munitions must be available and the
forces must be equipped. During the Middle East war, we discovered
major weaknesses in our inventories of tanks, modern munitions, and
some of our more traditional munitions. These are items, Mr. Chair-
man, that are essential for any modern defense establishment. If I
may summarize with regard to the fiscal year 1974 supplemental and
the fiscal year 1975 budget, we have not asked, save in this one area,
for any increase in force structure. And, as I have indicated, we are
phasing out our air defense capabilities, save those necessary to con-
trol the air space of the United States in a conventional role.
We do believe, Mr. Chairman, that our force structure should be
ready to fight, and that its inventory should be filled. Except for one-
third of a division for the Army, we have not asked for any increase
in force structure. In fact, our manpower request has shrunk some-
what. I shall get into that. But we must have appropriate readiness
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if American policymakers are to have real options. Therefore, we
must balance our forces so that their readiness reflects their inherent
capabilities.
To the extent that we have increases in our budget above the normal
pay and inflation. factors, they fall in the area of readiness and in the
area of R&D options. Aside from that, by and large, this budget
simply is a continuation of the trend that existed previously.
You will also be interested in the management of the resources of
this Department. As I said before, I have no apology to make with
regard to the size of this budget. However, we can manage our re-
sources more effectively: and we are attempting to do so. To the extent
that we are successful, we can take this 'wither in the form of improved
capability or in the form of reduced expenditures in constant dollars.
It is my judgment, Mr. Chairman, that we are now at the moment
on the general purpose forces side when we must maintain those op-
tions other than suicide or surrender, and part o:'r our management
task is to convert, not swords into plowshares, but fat into swords.
And we are proceeding to do so. We are having some important head-
quarters changes and reductions in the Army, which is taking the
lead in this area.
You have written to us, Mr. Chairman, about the reduction of our
headquarters and command structure. Senator Symington reviewed
our budget for fiscal year 1974, and in the report that he carried to the
floor, he included objections to the existing headquarters and con'-
mand structure. We do not necessarily agree, Senator Symington,
in detail with every objection that you raised, but we agree with the
overall thrust of that report, which wis that we need to review our
headquarters and command structure. We are in the process of review-
ing it, and. we expect to have some major changes by next summer.
As I have indicated, the Army is making changes in this area. We
plan to take the resources in the Army that result from a reduction
in headquarters and convert them into additional combat capability,
which is the direction that this committee would like us to follow. We
are taking the reduction in the Army component of our air defense
capabilities and converting these resources into additional general
purpose capability.
U.S. Army, Alaska.
U.S. Army Forces, Southern Command.
U.S. Army, Pacific.
Tasrom, Europe.
En;ineer Command, Europe.
ARADCOM.
U.S. Army Intelligence Command.
You have been briefed, Mr. Chairman, and the committee will be
briefed later, by General Abrams with regard to changes that the
Army is planning with respect to a reduction in command headquar-
ters. This will include the telescoping of several commands, the
elimination of six command structures, and a shrinkage of their head-
quarters here in Washington from 9,000 people to approximately 6,000
people. This is an area in which this committee has expressed partieu-
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Jar interest. And I am happy to say.we are going to be particularly
responsive in that area.
But in view of the overall thinness of our general purpose forces,
we must, I think, Mr. Chairman, be prepared to transform the re-
sources saved as a result of these adjustments into the additional com-
bat capability that is necessary
The only place in our budget that we have indicated an increase in
the force structure is the increase in the Army from 13 to 131%3 divi-
sions. We are hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that by the end of the forth-
coming fiscal year we will have 14 divisions through a further realloo-
cation of resources. And, looking farther out into the future, we are
hopeful that we will begin to increase even further both the number
and the combat capability of those divisions. This is the direction that
the Congress and this committee have been urging upon the Depart-
ment for many years, and the Department is delighted to respond to
the suggestion.
We recognize however, that our manpower strength is going to be
circumscribed. We are down 20,000 men on a one-for-one basis be-
tween officers and enlisted personnel. We are prepared to go even
further with regard to the reduction of officer strength if the Congress
will give us the necessary legislation. But there is an end to the road
in the process that we have been following in recent years, which is to
dum out reservists-good reservists frequently-in order to retain
regulars who are not as capable as are the reservists on active duty.
In equity to these people, they must have appropriate compensation
as they depart from the service; and in addition, we must have the
tools by which we can reduce appropriately the officer-enlisted ratio..
This committee has expressed its views in that area. We agree with
the committee. But we ask, will the committee and the Congress help
us with regard to the necessary tools for the further adjustment of
the officer-enlisted ratio?
I have already spoken about readiness and the importance of having
a balanced force. I have spoken to some extent about R. & I). And I will
say further that I do not regard the start of a R. & D. project as in any
way implying that that R. & D. project must be carried through to ac-
quisition and deployment.
We are further emphasizing the milestone approach in our R. & D.
Even a successful technological development does not necessarily mean
that we should procure it for the force structure.
R. & D. provides a menu of options that enables the United States to.
respond in the event that the strategic environment changes in a way
that we cannot predict with high confidence in advance. But if the
strategic environment does not require it, then we ought not to acquire
some or all of these options for the force structure. What we seek to,
obtain is austere, low-cost developments which provide us with a menu
of options which may or may not be deployed.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, as you have observed in your opening state
ment, there was major modernization during the Vietnamese War
period, and we are enjoying the fruits of that modernization today.
But it does imply block obsolescence around 1980 of some of our
forces-the F-4s, for example, that we acquired in the later sixites. The,
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22
Air Force and the Navy are facing block obsolescence in some of those
capabilities, about which we would be delighted to talk to you in depth.
It is not an immediate problem. But I call this to your attention be-
cause in the later part of the decade we will be forced to deal with
block obsolescence for some of our air capabilities in the same way as
we are forced today to deal with the block obsolescence of the naval
vessels that we acquired 30 years ago during the second world war.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I hope that it has been worthwhile for
you. The committee has been generous with its attention.
Thank you very much.
[Prepared. statement and posture statements follow:]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, it is my privilege to present to
you the FY 1975 Defense program and budget. This is the first budget in a
decade or more that does not provide for the support of U.S. forces in combat.
At the same time, it is a budget that must carry us, through maintenance of a
military equilibrium, on the passage from the cold war toward a period of
enduring peace. In such a difficult period of transition, I have a special duty
to review with you the fundamental strategic issues that we face and the
basis on which we are developing what we consider to be our minimum peace-
time defense and deterrence posture.
As in the past, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H.
Moorer, will give you his report on our military posture. lira will discuss in more
detail than I shall here the current and developing balance of military power.
1. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT
The first issue we must face in our planning is how, at any given time, the
international situation should affect the shape of the U.S. defense establishment.
It is a well-worn truism that our forces exist to support our foreign policy, but
what operationally does that mean? Are there specific elements in the external
world that create the need for military capabilities, overseas deployments, mili-
tary assistance, and continuing programs of research and. development? When
and how should changes in the international situation justify alterations in the
size and composition of our force structure?
As you know, a number of factors external to the United States directly affect
our planning. I shall review them only briefly here.
1. Interests.-The divisions brought on by our involvement in Southeast Asia
have left an understandable desire on the part of many Americans for some respite
from foreign troubles and responsibilities. But recent events in the Middle East
have sharply reminded us that the United States still has very large and im-
portant moral, political, and economic interests outside its borders, and that
these interests may require military protection. Recent events have also under-
lined the extent to which distant troubles can effect and. even jeopardize the
United States itself unless our defenses are strong.
2. Opposing Capabilities.-It is no secret that, in the past, certain nations have
shown themselves hostile to the worldwide -.nterests of the United States and
have acquired the military capabilities to threaten them--and us. We live in
the constant knowledge that the Soviet Union, at any time, could launch a nu-
clear attack-large or small-on the United States itself, and that the Peoples'
Republic of China (PRC) could well develop at least a modest capability for
such an attack during the next decade.
It is generally agreed that some relationship must exist between these threaten-
ing capabilities and the defense posture of the United States. Indeed, we consider
it fundamental that at all times we must have available a sufficiency of ready
strategic offensive forces to retaliate against a Soviet nuclear attack.
The Soviet Union, its partners in the Warsaw Pact, and the PRO also main-
tain large and ready general purpose forces. These forces are in fact the most
usable elements of their considerable and diversified power. It is noteworthy,
however, that many Americans do not insist on a comparable availability and
readiness for U.S. and allied general purpose forces, and even suggest that in a
period of nuclear parity we should reduce them below their current levels.
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It would be economically intolerable, inefficient and certainly undesirable for
the United States by itself to develop a force structure that mirrors this entire
range-the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the PRC-of potential threats. In
any event, the Soviet Union is the only other superpower in the international
political arena. Accordingly, it is primarily in light of Soviet capabilities that we
must judge the adequacy of our own nuclear and non-nuclear deterrent forces.
3. Commitments, Contingencies, and Objectives.-Another factor shaping our
overall defense posture is the large number of formal commitments for mutual
defense that the United States has accumulated since World War II. Not count-
ing the collective security provisions of the United Nations Charter, we are
allied to more than 40 nations in nine multilateral and bilateral treaties. In
addition, we have informal but nonetheless real commitments to other nations
that our defense programs must take into account.
These commitments are important to both our nuclear and our non-nuclear
force planning. In varying degrees they reflect an obligation to maintain mili-
tary capabilities in support of our allies. They give us insights about the types
of contingencies that could arise and about the threats that require deterrence.
They also enable us to share the burden of collective security with a number of
other nations. In some instances they lead us to provide military assistance as
a substitute for the maintenance of additional U.S. forces and their deployment
abroad.
Above all, when worldwide equilibrium and orderly change constitute basic
U.S. objectives, commitments and contingencies tell us where points of potential
pressure exist and where, for purposes of deterrence, specific balances. of military
power must be maintained. On that score, I believe that we must keep a visible
strategic nuclear balance, contribute to a number of regional balances-in Europe
and Asia-and help to ensure the freedom of the seas, as has been the long
tradition of the United States.
II. PLANNING THE FORCES
In light of these factors, we can arrive at the specific nuclear and non-nuclear
forces required for a particular contingency. But those factors do not auto-
matically dictate what overall force structure the United States should main-
tain in this period of transition. Not only does the final calculus depend on a
number of additional considerations, including various perceptions of the key
military balances, it also turns on our assessment of the international environ-
ment and the degree of menace that it poses to our essential interests.
All through the previous decade-quite apart from our special buildup for
Southeast Asia-my predecessors interpreted these factors to mean that we
should maintain active and reserve forces (nuclear and non-nuclear) sufficient
to deter hostilities by:
Giving us counterforce and damage-limiting options, as well as the ability
to retaliate with devastating power against cities, even after a surprise nu-
clear attack by the USSR;
Coping simultaneously with two major contingencies (one in Europe
and one in Asia) and one minor contingency ;
Maintaining superiority in a war at sea and control the sea lines of com-
munication necessary to the support of our forces and allies overseas.
Admittedly the assessment of the international situation during that decade
was more pessimistic than our current estimate. But it also is noteworthy that the
large active forces then at our disposal were intended in most contingencies, to
operate in conjunction with allies and to receive early reinforcement from our
reserves and the draft. Indeed, despite a peacetime military establishment of
2.7 million men and women, we added another 900,000 (starting in 1965) both to
strengthen our forces in Southeast Asia and to maintain our capability to deal
with other contingencies. Only in 1969, with the advent of this Administra-
tion, did a significant reduction in the force begin to take place.
Since that time, estimates of the international situation have become more
optimistic, in large measure because of initiatives taken by the United States.
To the extent that we now consider the political environment less threatening, it
is largely because President Nixon terminated the U.S. military involvement in
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Vietnam, made successful diplomatic overtures to Peking and Moscow, achieved
agreements in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (with the Anti-ballistic
Missile Treaty and the Interim Offensive Agreement), and began the negotiations
on mutual force reductions in Central Europe. As you know, U.S. force levels have
declined substantially in the wake of these initiatives.
The results are shown in the attached table. Not only has the general purpose
force structure now fallen well below the peak levels of 1968, it is actually smaller
than it was in 1964. In other words, we maintain a much more modest defense
establishment in 1974 than was considered necessary in peacetime only a decade
ago. It is equally noteworthy, however, that the considerations which affect our
defense planning are no less demanding. The sheer physical threats, as measured
by the military capabilities of potential adversaries, have actually increased dur-
ing the last ten years. At the same time, so have our foreign interests, with ex-
panded external investments, a larger volume of international trade, and growing
dependence on raw materials from sources overseas. Meanwhile, our political
commitments remain essentially constant, as do the capabilities of our allies.
To underline these developments, and particularly the decline in the U.S. de-
fense posture, is not to imply disapproval of previous initiatives, although some
of the force cuts may have gone too deep. Nor is it to pretend that, in real terms,
we now have a small defense budget as a re:;ult of the reductions in our force
structure. It is true, of course, that defense outlays are consuming a decreasing
fraction of our gross national product (now less than 0%) and federal revenues.
It is also true that in constant FY 1975 prices, we are spending $8 billion less
than in FY 1964, the last pre-Vietnam budget year. Nevertheless, by any measure,
$85.8 billion is a large outlay. The nation should understand, however, that the
total looks so large-and is so large-compared with the $50.8 billion we were
paying for defense in FY 1964 primarily because of four factors :
In fiscal year 1975
[In billions of current dollars]
The remaining costs of Southeast Asia-related. support ------------------
1.8
The increase in military retired pay since fiscal year 1964----------------
4. 8
The growth in military and civil service pay and allowances since fiscal
year 1964---------------------------------------------.-------------
21.1
The effects of inflation on the purchase of goods and services since fiscal
year 1964-----------------------------------------------------------
14.4
Total cost growth ------------------------------------------------
42.1
Were it not for these factors, we would be maintaining our baseline force
structure-the posture we design for long-term, steady-state, peacetime pur-
poses-for about $42.7 billion. However, inflation and real pay increases (not
cost-of-living increases) granted prior to the end of the draft have been sub-
stantial since 1964.
Because our society decided on grounds of equity to mare military and civil
service pay comparable to remuneration in the private sector of the economy,
the bill for defense has gone up by a large amount. Despite the resulting burden,
I doubt that we would want to reverse earlier decisions and implicitly tax our
military personnel for service to the countr;,-with or without the draft. In-
stead, I believe we will want to accept the fact that, because of truly national
decisions in favor of equity-shared in by the executive and legislative branches
alike-a unit of defense is now more expensive than it was ten years ago. Whether
we can bring these unit costs down, and whether we should consider reviving
the draft at some future date, are separable issues that I shall discuss later in
more detail.
IV. THE BASELINE REQUIREMENT
Because defense spending appears so high compared with the past, and be-
cause the international environment is less hostile, we have faced and will con-
tinue to undergo pressures to reduce our defense posture still further, to cut
back unilaterally on our strategic offensive forces, and to thin out our baseline
deployments overseas. Despite these pressures, I believe that we have already
overshot the mark in previous reductions, and that, to the extent that we can ex-
pand the combat structure.(particularly where the general purpose forces are
concerned) without adding real costs, we should be authorized to do so. I have
.several grounds for this view.
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This is the first peacetime defense budget in many years. Nevertheless, I
would be remiss if I pretended that our need for military strength is substan-
rtially less than it was a decade ago, before our major deployments to Southeast
Asia. It is true that our relationships with the USSR and the PRC have im-
proved since then ; Sino-Soviet differences are more visible ; and we no longer
think it so important to insure against simultaneous conflicts in Europe and
Asia. But, as I have already indicated, the military capabilities of those na-
tions in a position to threaten our interests have not declined, they have in-
creased. There is, in fact, no evidence whatsoever that unilateral reductions
-induce reciprocity on their part. Considering the cuts we have already made,
.further reductions should now be dependent upon international agreement with
potential adversaries. And, with SALT and MBFR, we have created the mecha-
y nisms for just such hoped-for reductions. While we await their results, growth
in the force structure brought about by increased military efficiency should not
be denied us, especially since estimates of our baseline requirements are not
precise to the last detail.
As I hardly need remind you, to move from a state of cold war through a con-
dition of detente and improved diplomatic communication to an era of greater
mutual trust an cooperation between East and West is an involved and lengthy
process. It is particularly difficult when our negotiating partners in the enter-
prise are closed societies. As recent events in the Middle East have demon-
strated, tests of will and resolution may be with us for some time to come, and
military strength appropriately displayed will play a meaningful role in their
resolution.
Furthermore, unlike the role circumstances and disposition allowed us to play
prior to World War II, we now unavoidably have the leading part in the de-
fense arrangements of the free world. There is no substitute among the other
industrialized democracies for the power of the United States. Whereas prior
to World War II the United States could serve as the arsenal of democracy and
its great reserve force, now we constitute democracy's first line of defense. There
is no longer any large and friendly shield of defenses behind which we can take
two or more years to mobilize our forces. It is our own ready defenses that con-
stitute so much of the deterrent shield.
Nor is that all. We must also recognize that large and abrupt changes in our
posture and deployments could well produce major effects in the world-not
only on the calculations of the USSR and the PRC, but also on the perspectives
of our allies and on such long-term trends as nuclear proliferation. We are not
the policeman of the world, but we are the backbone of free world collective
security.
To summarize, this is not only the first defense budget of the post-Vietnam
era ; it is also the first defense budget for what President Eisenhower once
called the long haul. Short of a sudden and dramatic improvement in the inter-
national environment, this means that we must provide offsetting power to the
multiple capabilities of potential foes. Deterrence must operate across the entire
'spectrum of possible contingencies; we cannot afford gaps in its coverage that
might invite probes and tests. As far ahead as we can see, a triad of strategic
nuclear, tactical nuclear and conventional forces will be required.
In such circumstances, the force structure we propose for FY 1.975 and the
years that follow must rest on the concepts and methods that I have alluded to
here. That is to say, U.S. interests, the potential threats to them, our commit-
ments, the range of contingencies that might arise, allied capabilities, and our
conception of the role we should play in world affairs, must continue to shape
the defense posture and budget of the United States.
V. RESOURCES AND PROGRAMS : FISCAL YEAR 1974 SUPPLEMENTAL AND FISCAL YEAR
1975 BUDGET
The President's budget proposal you received on 4 February was developed
within this overall context, and includes requests for both FY 1974 Supple-
mentals-the result of pay and price increases and necessary readiness improve-
ments-and the FY 1975 budget.
The flscai year 1974 Supplemental, requests total $6.2 billion in addition to the
amounts already appropriated by the Congress, raising the proposed FY 1974
Total Obligation Authority (TOA) to $87.1 billion. Of this Supplemental amount,
$3.4 billion is required for pay and rate increases. The balance of $2.8 billion is
required to maintain the desired readiness level of U.S. forces.
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This "readiness supplemental"-is largely the result of our recent Middle East
experiences and includes fuel price increases in the amount of $480 million. Also
included are the extra costs of our arms supply to Israel, consisting of increased
operations and maintenance costs and the additional costs for replacing in U.S.
Inventories the material provided to Israel. These extra costs amount to $281
million.
The Supplemental request also reflects the most urgent deficiencies in the
condition of our forces that were made appc.rent by the Middle East hostilities.
With these things in mind, I have included $1,397 million to improve the readi-
ness of our forces, $169 million to increase our airlift capability, and $516 mil-
lion to buy certain high-value weapons and equipment which are now in short
supply in our Services.
The readiness improvements include adding to our ammunition stocks, reduc-
ing the maintenance backlog on our ships and equipment, making sure pre-
positioned equipment is ready for use, improving our defense suppression capa-
bilities, and purchasing short-supply items important for overall readiness.
The airlift improvements I recommend are! modest first steps in it more funda-
mental examination of our airlift capabilities which I believe is necessary. These
first steps include buying additional C-5 and C-141 spare parts, developing a
stretched version of the C-141, and examining the possibilities for relatively
inexpensive improvements to civil airlift to permit them to carry military cargoes
in an emergency.
The FY 1975 budget request in TOA Is $92.6 billion, an :increase of $5.5 billion
over FY 1974, and outlays for FY 1975 are estimated at $81.8 billion. This request
is a substantial one, but I offer no apologies for it. It bears directly on whether
or not the United States will continue to fulilll the responsibilities it has around
the world. In real terms, moreover, it means doing no more: than holding our own
as compared to FY 1974, for the $5.5 billion increase is wholly consumed by pay
and price increases. In fact, the FY 1975 budget in constant dollars is smaller
than the FY 1964 budget of a decade ago. Similarly, the FY 1975 budget outlays
continue for the second year to claim less than six percent of the gross national
product-the lowest allocation of resources to Defense since FY 1950-and con-
tinue also the declining trend of Defense spending as a percent of the total fed-
eral budget, at 27.2 percent for FY 1975.
We do propose in the FY 1975 budget certain new emphases which are meant
to insure that we have the ability to maintain in the future a worldwide equi-
librium of military force. This requires that there be a stable balance of strategic
forces, of general purpose forces-particularly in central Europe-and of mari-
time forces. With this in mind, the FY 1975 program reflects these significant
trends in our forces :
We will continue to maintain the triad of. ICBM, SLBM and bombers in our
strategic forces, improving them and replacing them as appropriate, within the
confines of the SALT I agreements.
We will proceed with several strategic systems research and development
programs which might serve either as replacements for existing allowed systems
or as hedges against the uncertain results of SALT II.
We will decrease our active Air Defense of the continental United States,
reducing the number of air defense fighter squadrons and SAM batteries. With-
out an effective antimissile defense, precluded to both the U.S. and USSR by
the ABM Treaty of 1972, a defense against Soviet bombers is of little practical
value. We will, however, retain the capability to protect the sovereignty of our
airspace and to defend against limited threats.
We will continue improvements in our strategic command and control systems.
In our general purpose force structure, we will halt, and in some areas reverse,
the steady reductions that have occurred since 1968.
We will increase the number of active Army divisions, from 13 to 13?!;,
add new battalions to existing understrength divisions, and convert certain
infantry units into armored and mechanized units. We will do this within
manpower authorizations, by making reductions in headquarters and support
establishments.
For the first time in many years, we will be adding more new ships to the
fleet than we will he retiring from the fleet, thus reversing the trend that
broneht us from 979 general purpose slips in 1968 to 526 ships at the end
of FY 1974.
We will apply the lessons of the recent Middle East war, by giving high priority
to programs such as modern antitank weapons ; tanks ; air defense of land forces
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and its opposite, defense suppression ; improved munitions and more substantial
stocks, aircraft shelters, and the like.
We will improve our readiness by accelerating aircraft modifications and re-
works, restoring ship overhaul schedules, and other maintenance.
We will increase our total airlift and sealift capability, as far as possible
through the use of existing resources, commercial as well as military, Allied
as well as our own, in order to be able to deploy divisions even more rapidly to
Europe in an emergency.
Chief procurement programs for strategic forces involve continuation of pro-
duction of Minuteman III missiles at the minimum rate, completing SSBN con-
version to Poseidon, and the continuation of the TRIDENT SSBN and air-
launched missile programs. In addition, there are several research and develop-
ment programs underway as replacements for existing systems allowed under
SALT I or as hedges against the uncertainty of SALT II and the lapsing of the
Interim Agreement. These R&D initiatives include continued development of the
B-1, Advanced ICBM technology, the cruise missiles, advanced ballistic missile
re-entry systems and technology (ABRES), and a new, smaller SSBN. No pro-
duction decisions on these systems have been taken or are required this year.
In addition we will complete deployment of SAFEGUARD at Grand Forks, and
continue our ABM technology development. We will not go ahead with antiballis-
tic missile defense of the national capital area at the present time. Despite the
enormous importance of strategic programs, TOA for FY 1975 comes to $7.6 bil-
lion, or only 8.4 percent of the total budget, as compared to a TOA in 1964 of
$8.5 billion (16.7 percent of the budget).
The major land force procurement and development programs involve tank/
antitank, air defense, surface-to-surface missiles and mobility systems. The
principal procurement programs are the M60 tanks and TOW and DRAGON
antitank missiles on an accelerated schedule, the SEA-COBRA and COBRA-
TOW attack helicopters, the improved HAWK surface-to-air missile system, and
the Pershing and Lance surface-to-surface missile systems. The major develop-
ment programs are for a new main battle tank, a mechanized infantry combat
vehicle, an advanced attack helicopter, testing of alternative mobile, short range
air defense systems, and the continued development of a tactical transport and
heavy lift helicopter.
In order to maintain naval forces of adequate size and capabilities for the
future, in the face of obvious budgetary limitations, we are giving great emphasis
in our FY 1975 programs to the high/low mix concept for our surface fleet.
Accordingly, we look to the Sea Control Ship and Patrol Frigate to take on
tasks in lower threat areas previously undertaken by aircraft carriers and de-
stroyers. We are also continuing in 1975 our emphasis on ASW capabilities,
on acquiring an antiship missile (the HARPOON), and in pursuing new tech-
nology for the 1980's. The chief procurement programs are a continuation of
the DD-963 destroyer programs, and the DLGN-38 nuclear frigates ; the design
and procurement of the Sea Control Ship, the patrol frigate, carrier and land-
based ASW aircraft and helicopters, antiship missiles, attack submarines, am-
phibious assault ships, and a number of supporting systems. For the longer term,,
we are exploring surface effect technology and its implication for our surface
fleet.
Tactical air forces programs this year reflect the application of the high/low
mix concept. Major procurement programs include the F-14A and F-15 which
will replace a portion of the long -service, F-4 tactical fighter. There will also be
more of the latest versions of several Navy attack aircraft-the A-4M, A-6E
and A-7E. We have included in the FY 1975 budget the initial procurement
funds for the A-10 close air support aircraft, and development funds for new
light-weight fighters, both examples of low cost but capable systems tailored
to particular missions against limited threats. We also include funds for the
initial procurement of 12 tactical AWACS airborne warning and control air-
craft which are expected to improve in significant measure our ability to control
tactical air operations and to provide long range airborne surveillance and warn-
ing for our tactical air forces. Finally, we are giving greater emphasis in our
11Y 1975 procurement and development programs to systems that will locate,
identify and suppress ground air defenses. In this regard, we will continue
procurement of the EA-6B tactical jamming aircraft as well as a number of new
development efforts.
We are not proposing new procurement programs for our mobility forces in
FY 1975. Instead, we propose to make our existing forces more ready and capable
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28
of more extensive operations, by higher crew ratio and more certain availability
of spare parts and the like. We also propose to modify all of the existing C-14,1-
cargo aircraft to increase their capacity by about 30 percent. We are studying
ways to identify and mobilize necessary shipping early in a crisis.
We are working with our Allies to insure greater cooperation and availability
of Allied sealift resources in an emergency. We are also proposing in the FY
1975 budget to modify civilian aircraft in cooperation with U.S. commercial
airlines in order that they might have the necessary capacity to meet the mili-
tary cargoes requirements and be available in time of need. This, of course, is a
much less expensive alternative than buying and maintaining our own larger
airlift fleets. Our overall aim, underlined by the Middle East hostilities, is to
improve substantially our strategic airlift capacity to deploy forces overseas
swiftly in time of crisis.
VI. PERSONNEL FOE DEFENSE
One side, and traditionally the less publicized side, of the Defense programs
are the weapon systems and equipment programs I just discussed. The other,
and now more costly side is manpower. In FY 1975 we are aiming to maintain
a peacetime deterrent force structure of sufficient size, quality and readiness
by using our manpower more efficiently with particular emphasis on getting-
more combat capability by reducing headquarters and support structure. And we
will continue programs to improve the quality of life in the military services..
These are formidable tasks. First, our force structure is much smaller than it
has been in more than two decades, and smaller by almost 40 percent from the
1968 Vietnam peak. We cannot prudently aLow it to shrink further. Moreover,.
we must take steps to increase our readiness and to continue to overcome nagging
deficiencies. Second, FY 1975 will complete the transition to the All Volunteer
Force ; and, despite our smaller active force, we still must recruit one of every
three eligible and available men to man the force adequately. We will increase
also recruiting of young women. Attracting #nnd retaining a sufficient number of
qualified individuals will perhaps be our most significant personnel test in FY
1975. We obviously will have to use our personnel resources more efficiently.
Third, we must improve the organization and readiness of the Reserve and"
National Guard so that they can assume their increasingly important role in
our total security posture. And finally, we must do all of this at as low a cost
as is possible, since manpower already consumes approximately 55 percent of
the Defense Budget and further increases would jeopardize both needed im-
provement in readiness and weapons development programs. It is clear not only
thatthe best efforts of the Defense Department will be required to succeed, but
also that we must have the active support of the Congress and the American
people as well.
Doing our best to make the volunteer force work is one of our highest
priorities. At the end of the first full year of operation of the volunteer concept,
the Department of Defense is within one percent of required end strength. The,
Army, which requires the largest numbers of men is three percent short of its
end strength and has recently been meeting its monthly recruiting objectives..
This is a favorable development, but obviously one which will bear continuing
close scrutiny, especially in light of the requirement recently imposed by the
Congress that at least 82 percent of all new enlistees be of average or above-
average mental ability and that at least 55 percent be high school graduates.
Although the overall record for DOD this fiscal year has been 89 percent with
respect to mental ability and 66 percent for high school graduates, it is expected'
that the high school graduate requirement will cause us some problems in meet-
ing, Army and Marine Corps recruitment goats. Given the uncertainty of the im-
pact of this requirement, we are presently projecting a shortfall of between
10,000 and 20,000 in Army end strength at the end of this fiscal year. This would
represent a 1.3 percent to 2.6 percent shortfall in Army end strength, a tolerable
shortage.
I cannot say yet, despite the encouraging signs of the moment, whether the
volunteer force ultimately will work. But it is far too early to entertain thoughts:
about returning to a system of conscription. Moreover, while cost is not the
only factor in deciding between the volunteer force and the draft, I would
caution that the cost savings associated with a return to the draft appear to be
minimal unless the Congress unexpectedly alters the rule of comparability in,,
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military pay, a rule which was made on its own merits and which predates the
decision to pursue a volunteer force.
VII. NEW DIRECTIONS
Looking ahead, I already have directed the addition of more deterrent options;
than we have previously had available for our strategic nuclear forces, and such,
modifications in targeting doctrine; as might be necessary . to. achieve. them. In;
an era of nuclear parity, we cannot and should not rely primarily on the threat:
of massive replies to deter the great variety of contingencies that could arise in
a nuclear crisis. Our current force structure is such as to permit much greater.
flexibility in our contingency planning without. any erosion of our assured
destruction reserve.
But I stress that each step we take in the strategic field is designed to bolster,-
deterrence, which remains the cornerstone of our strategic philosophy.
However, as I also have indicated, the size and character of our strategic.
nuclear forces could change significantly, depending on the outcome of SALT
We cannot now know the outcome of those negotiations; however, and therefore
I am proposing a number of research and development programs which would,
enable us to respond in kind in order to maintain the delicate balance of deter
rence, should the Soviets decide to deploy a more efficient counterforce capa-
bility than they now deploy. We would prefer, of course, that neither side take
this step. Instead, we would rather see the strategic forces reduced by mutual;
agreement. But we are determined to preserve an essential strategic equilibrium.
with the USSR both in capabilities and in targeting options.
I also am devoting considerable time and attention to NATO and to the future
of our general purpose forces there. My purpose has been to begin a process aimed
at achieving, over the next three years, two fundamental security objectives;
necessary to sustain an adequate defense posture :
First, the construction of a satisfactory basis for maintaining an ade,
quate overall NATO security posture for the long haul, including balanced
forces with rational missions credible to our adversaries and ourselves.
Second, an equitable adjustment of burdens to put United States partial-.
pation in NATO, and the United States military presence in Europe, on a
solid, durable foundation acceptable to both the United States Congress and
public, and to our Allies.
I believe we will be successful on both points.
Also, in our general purpose forces, we are aiming to reduce the support struc-
ture and strengthen our combat forces wherever possible. I believe we can make
reasonable gains here without any sacrifice in essential command and support
functions. I already have noted the additional Army units being raised in this
way during this fiscal year. To make this program work, however, we must allow-
the Army, within its budget, the incentive of retaining the increased capability
that it obtains by trading in support for more combat forces.
We have now had sufficient experience with our strategic airlift to demon
strate its high utility both in standard contingencies and in the more "off-design"
cases for which we do not specifically buy forces. Furthermore, at an appropriate,
time in the future, strategic airlift will enable us to increase our CONUS-based
strategic reserve without any reduction in our support for forward defense in.
key areas of commitment. Strengthening the strategic reserve, in turn, will mean
fewer forces tied to specific theaters and greater flexibility in their allocation
during a crisis. We will be looking for opportunities to increase our airlift capa-
bility, and have included some of our ideas in the current budget.
Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements and I are pursuing the
"fly-before-buy" and "FIi-Lo" policies initiated by Secretaries Laird and Packard
to see whether we cannot further drive down unit costs on our more sophisticated
weapons and at the same time substitute quantity for quality in a number, of
areas. In many situations, large numbers of relatively uncomplicated systems
may prove more effective than equal-cost but much smaller numbers of highly
complex delivery vehicles. As yet, however, I cannot give you a final recom-
mendation on the precise mix of high and low technologies that we should
have in such mission areas as interdiction and close air support, field army
defense, and- sea control. We do have a number of programs already underway,
such as the A-10, the Patrol Frigate and the Sea Control Ship, which I believe
are proceeding in the right direction
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In general, as we deal with these and other specific problems in our adjust-
ment to a long haul posture, there are five basic principles which, in my view,
should guide the future conduct of this department. They are that :
The safety of the United States, its citizens, and their lawful pursuits
continues to depend on the maintenance of a strong defense establishment.
Accordingly, we who represent this department must not be reticent in
stating the needs we have or the pride we feel in the performance of the
duties for our nation.
We have the responsibility, not only to the United States itself but also
to our friends throughout the world, to assure the military balance so
necessary to deterrence and a more enduring peace. Other nations led in
that responsibility for most of the first two centuries of our national
existence ; now the cloak of leadership unavoidably embraces, us, and we
must make the long-terns effort to bear it.
The men and women of the Department of Defense are without peers
as servants of the nation. It does not follow, however, that patriotism can
proceed without respect. We must give them the respect, dignity and sup-
port that are their due. Equal opportunity will continue to be a DOD watch-
word.
To stress our needs is not to ignore an equal obligation, to use our
citizens' resources wisely. We must continue to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of our forces and to add to the arsenal of deterrence.
We can and must become increasingly competitive with potential adver-
saries In a more fundamental sense. We must not be forced out of the
market-on land, at sea, or in the air. Ell Whitney belongs to us, not to
our competitors. He, rather than the medieval craftsmen of Mont St.
Michael and Chartres-however magnificent and unique their art-must
once more become our model.
I cannot say at this juncture exactly what the long haul holds for this
Department. But I can say that unless we are to plan ony by Intuition we must
continue to build our peace structure on the hard facts of the international
environment rather than on gosamer hopes f'or the imminent perfectability of
mankind.
FISCAL YEAR 1975 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
SUMMARY OF SELECTED ACTIVE MILITARY FORCES
Strategic Forces:
Intercontinental ballistic missiles:
Minuteman_________________________________
600
1,000
1,000
1
000
Titan II____________________________________
108
54
54
,
54
Polaris-Poseidon missiles________________________
336
656
656
656
Strategic bomber squadrons______________________
78
30
28
127
Manned fighter interceptor squadrons-------------
40
7
7
6
Army Air defense firing batteries__________________
107
21
21
0
General purpose forces:
Land forces:
Army divisions______________________________
1638
13
13
1334
Marine Corps divisions_______________________
3
3
3
3
Tactical air forces:
Air Force wings_____________________________
21
22
22
22
Navy attack wings
------------------------
15
14
14
14
--
Marine Corps wings-------------------------
3
3
3
3
Naval forces:
Attack and antisubmarine carriers_____________
24
16
14
15
Nuclear attack submarines___________________
19
60
61
67
Other warships_____________________________
363
242
186
191
Amphibious assault ships____________________
133
66
65
65
Airlift and sealift forces:
Strategic airlift squadrons:
C-5A-------------------------------------
3
4
4
4
C-141-------------------------------?----
)
13
13
13
Troopships, cargo ships, and tankers______________
IO)
53
32
32
I Reflects reorganization; total number of strategic bombers remain., unchanged from fis.:al year 1974.
[For supplemental request chart see p. 18.]
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ARMY ELIMINATIONS
? U.S. ARMY, ALASKA
? U.S. ARMY FORCES, SOUTHERN CMD
? U.S. ARMY, PACIFIC
? TASCOM, EUROPE
? ENGINEER CMD., EUROPE
ARADCOM
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CMD.
29-464-74-pt.1-
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Pe rre nt
100 -
THE DEFENSE IMPACT PERCENTAGE SHARE OF:
lr
1~ 111
lip
FEDERAL UNIFIED BUDGET
................
.... ..~ IN.
'- U.S. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
U.S. PUBLIC SPENDING
Percent
100
I
0 1 1 1 I , I 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 , I I I i , I 11111
39 40 44 48 52 56 60 64 68 72 76
FISCAL YEARS
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TOA SUMMARY
FY 1974 & FY 1975
(BILLIONS)
FY 1974
FY 1975
ORIGINAL ESTIMATE 85.0
92.6 *
ISRAELI SUPPLEMENTAL + 2.2
ADDED PAY COSTS, ETC, + .4
-
ADJUSTED REQUEST 87.6 92.6
CONGRESSIONAL CUT - 3.3
STATUS AFTER CUT 84.3
READINESS SUPPLEMENTAL + 2.8
CURRENT REQUEST . 87.1
* INCLUDES $3.4 BILLION FOR ANTICIPATED PAY INCREASES.
INCLUDES $2.2 BILLION FOR ANTICIPATED PAY INCREASES.
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TIM!TO DEPLOY NON?PREPOSITIONED DIVISIONS AND INITIAL SUPPORT TO NATO
AS FUNCTION OF 5-YEAR PROGRAM COSTS
DAYS
REQUIRED 14
TO
AIRLIFT
AVERAGE
DIVISION
AND ITS
INITIAL
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
FIVE YEAR PROGRAM COSTS - BILLION $
REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION AND
CIVIL SERVICE PAY RATES
(FY 1950 = 100)
CURRENT CAPABILITY & COSTS
Total Military RMC
Higher Grade Mlitary RMC
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INVESTMENT OUTLAYS IN CONSTANT (FY 1915) PRICES
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36
DOD MILITAkYAND MAP
FY 1984 PROGRAM AT FY 1975 PRICES.
(OUTLAYS, $MILLIONS)
ACTUAL
FY 1964
OUTLAYS
PAY RAISES COST
AND PRICE AT FY 1975
INCREASES PRICES
MILITARY BASIC PAY
$ 8,511
178.3%
$23,689
MILITARY ALLOWANCES
4,475
62.1'Y0
7,254
CIVIL SERVICE PAY
7,305
84.3%
13,462
PURCHASES
29,286
59.9%
46,830
SUBTOTAL, EXCLUDING
RETIRED PAY
235
91
,
1,209
95.3%
2,362
TOTAL
50,786
84.3%
--
REDUCTION IN PROGRAM EXCLUDING RETIRED PAY: $11,446
FY 1975 DEFENSE BUDGET, EXCLUDING RETIRED PAY
L---~
$79,789
RETIRED PAY
6,011
TOTAL FY 1975 DEFENSE BUDGET
$85,800
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CURRENT DOLLARS
TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY
MILITARY PROGRAM
FY 1964
FY 1968
FY 1974
FY 1975
Strategic Forces
8.5
7.2
6.9
7.6
General Purpose Forces
16.4
30.4
27.9
29.2
Intelligence & Communications
4.4
5.5
5.9
6.5
Airlift & Sealift
1.0
1.8
1.0
1.0
Guard & Reserve Forces
1.8
2.2
4.4
4.8
Research & Development
4.8
4.3
7.0
8.4
Central Supply & Maintenance
4.6
8.4
8.9
9.3
Training, Med. & Gen. Pers. Activ.
7.0
12.2
18.2
20.1
Administration
1.1
1.2
1.8
2.2
Support of Other Nations
1.1
2.4
5.1
3.5
NATO FORCES IN EUROPE
PEACETIME'
DEPARTMENT OE VEFENSE BUDGET
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
(BILLIONS OF $)
ALLIES
TROOPS
US ALLIES
SHIPS
US ALLIES
AIRCRAFT
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38
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES R. SCHLESINUER, ANNUAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 19755
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is my privilege to present to
you the FY 1975 Defense Program and Budget. This is the first budget in a
decade or more that does not include support: of United States forces in combat.
At the same time, it is a budget that must carry us, through maintenance of a
military equilibrium, on the passage from the cold war toward a period of
enduring peace. In such a difficult period of transition, I :have a special duty to
review with you the fundamental strategic issues that we face and the basis oil
which we are developing what we consider to be the lowest prudent peacetime
defense posture.
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will
present his customary report on our military posture. He will discuss in more
detail than I shall here the current and developing balance of military power.
A. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT
Our defense budget proposals, of necessity, reflect our perspective on the
United States role in the world. It is understandable, of course, that there will
be divergencies in judgment among Americans on that role, and those divergen-
eies will be reflected in different estimates of what the defense budget should
be. As the Psalmist tells us, "Where there is no vision the people perish." Hence,
I would like to share with you our vision.
The United States today, as opposed to the period before 1945, bears the prin-
cipal burden of maintaining the worldwide military equilibrium which is The
foundation for the security and the survival of the Free World. This is not a
role we have welcomed; it is a role that historical necessity has thrust upon us.
The burden of responsibility has fallen on the United States, and there is nobody
else to pick up the torch if the United States fails to carry it.
In fulfilling this responsibility we recognize that we are dealing in a world
which is militarily dominated by two states ours and the Soviet Union. There
is no other nation that possesses a military capability comparable to these two
states. Consequently, in judging the military balance, and in deciding upon our
own force posture, we do so primarily with the Soviet Union in mind.
This does not suggest that we are not hopeful with regard to the future peace-
ful evolution of world politics ; quite the contrary. Considerable progress has
been made during the last five years in improving the international political
climate. The President has taken many important initiatives : opening up new
lines of communication with the Soviet Union and with the Peoples' Republic
of China, helping to settle long-standing disagreements between East and West
such as Berlin, beginning in practical ways to put limits on armaments, and
ending our military involvement in the hostilities in Indochina. There has been
it new spirit of cooperation between East and West, reflected in these practical
arrangements, that offers the possibility-Es yet it is no more than that-of a
more durable peace in the future. And as you know, United States force levels
have declined substantially in the wake of these Presidential initiatives, and
the share of our national resources committed to defense has been significantly
reduced.
Neither am I suggesting that the difficulties in the international situation
imply that there will be an unconstrained arms race or ;'requent confrontations
betweenEast and West. It is precisely to avoid these circumstances, and to put
boundaries around arms competition, that we are engaged with the Soviet Union
in SALT II. And it is to achieve a similar objective, through a more stable
balance at lower force levels in Central Europe, that we and our NATO Allies
are engaged in negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions with the
Warsaw Pact states.
While we pursue negotiations about mutt.al reductions of arms, in furtherance
of detente, it is my judgment that we must maintain a worldwide military
equilibrium. Short of that, we create the possibility of vacuums and temptations
that could undermine detente and the hope for improved political relations with
the East.
A policy requiring us to maintain our military strength and alliances while
we are actively pursuing detente with the Soviet Union and the People's Repub-
lic of China may appear to some as incongruous. We have a long tradition in this
country of arming with great haste when war comes upon. us, and disarming with
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even greater haste when the war is over ; and we have tended, often, to view our
relations with other nations in terms of absolutes-friend or foe, ally or adver-
sary, cold war or detente.
Unfortunately, the real world is more complicated. Today, I hardly need argue
that a feast and famine approach to national defense is no longer feasible, let
alone desirable. Our experience in this century has amply demonstrated that
satiating our military establishment in wartime and starving it in peacetime
brings us neither peace nor long-term alleviation of the heavy burden of defense.
In both blood and treasure, it will cost us less to maintain a reasonably stable
level of defense effort until it is possible to achieve genuine mutual reductions
in armaments.
The Soviet Union shows that it, at least, sees no inconsistency between detente
and increasing mlitary capabilities. We see continuing increases in Soviet budg-
ets, forces and forward deployments. The Soviet Union is making significant im-
provements in its strategic nuclear forces and, in concert with its partners in
the Warsaw Pact, maintains large and ready general purpose forces. These
forces are, in fact, the most usable elements of their considerable and diversified
military power. We would serve ourselves and our Allies poorly indeed if we
relied solely on fond hopes or soft words while failing to take practical account
of improving Soviet capabilities.
The Soviet Union has historically been a relatively prudent and sober power
and I trust it will continue to be so. I hope that as a result of our mutual recog-
nition that there is no good alternative to peaceful cooperation, we shall gradually
achieve a world in which security is based upon something more than a balance
of arms. But until such a time arrives we must recognize the need for a stable
balance of military forces. As a minimum, we must keep a visible strategic nu-
clear balance, contribute to a balance of general purpose forces in central Europe
where the bulk of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces are arrayed against NATO,
and together with our Allies maintain a balance of naval forces to ensure the
freedom of the seas and the protection of our sea lines of communication, as has
been the long tradition of the United States.
1. The Strategic Nuclear Balance.-There have been two aspects in the devel-
opment of Soviet strategic forces, one long-term and the other more recent, that
affect our present strategic forces planning and the deterrent value of our
strategic systems. The long-term and quite well known factor is that over many
years the Soviets have been steadily closing the gap in nuclear capabilities be-
tween them and us.
For a period of time prior to 1960 the United States had a virtual nuclear
monopoly. By 1960 it was perceived that our monopoly advantage would ebb ;
and, in fact, it not only began to ebb, but by 1966-67 the Soviet Union had a
very substantial intercontinental counter deterrent. During the early 1960's it
was stated quite clearly by President Kennedy-and also by a large majority
of Americans in both parties-that the United States needed alternatives other
than suicide or surrender, that it needed options which did not imply immediate
escalation to major nuclear war. -
If anything, the need for options other than suicide or surrender, and other
than escalation to all out nuclear war, is more important for us today than it
was in 1960, because of the growth of the capabilities possessed by other powers.
These additional options do not include the option of a disarming first strike.
Neither the USSR nor the United States has, or can hope to have, a capability
to launch a disarming first strike against the other, since each of us possesses,
and will possess for the foreseeable future, a devastating second-strike capability
against the other. This almost certainly will deter the deliberate initiation of a
nuclear attack against cities, for it would bring inevitable retaliatory destruc-
tion to the initiator. Thus, this basic deterrent remains intact.
A development of more recent years is the accelerated improvement in Soviet
missile technology. The Soviet Union now has the capability in its missile forces
to undertake selective attacks against targets other than cities. This poses for us
an obligation, if we are to ensure the credibility of our strategic deterrent, to be
certain that we have a comparable capability in our strategic systems and in our
targeting doctrine, and to be certain that the USSR has no misunderstanding on
this point.
It is true that in addition to retaliatory targeting against urban and industrial
centers, our war plans have always included military targets. The purpose of
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having war plans whose dimensions are generally understood by potential foes
is, first, to deter rash actions. But secondly, if deterrence fails, the war plans
provide the National Command Authorities-the President and his advisers--
with well thought-out, detailed sets of options.
In the past, most of those options-whether the principal targets were cities,
industrial facilities, or military installations-have involved relatively massive
responses. Rather than massive options, we now want to provide the President
with a wider set of much more selective targeting options. Through possession
of such a visible capability, we hope to reinforce deterrence by removing the
temptation for an adversary to consider any kind of nuclear attack. Therefore,
the changes we are making in our strategic planning this year are specifically
intended to shore up deterrence across the entire spectrum of risk. We believe
that by improving deterrence across the broad spectrum, we will reduce to an
even lower point the probability of a nuclear clash between ourselves and other
major powers.
But if, for whatever reason, deterrence should fail, we want to have the plan-
ning flexibility to be able to respond selectively to the attack in such a way as
to (1) limit the chances of uncontrolled escalation, and (2) hit meaningful tar-
gets with a sufficient accuracy-yield combination to destroy only the intended
target and to avoid widespread collateral damage. If a nuclear clash should
occur-and we fervently believe that it will not-in order to protect American
cities and the cities of our allies, we shall rely into the wartime period upon
reserving our "assured destruction" force and persuading, through intrawar
deterrence, any potentional foe not to attack cities. It is through these means
that we hope to prevent massive destruction even in the cataclysmic circum-
sances of nuclear war.
This adjustment in strategic policy does not imply major new strategic weapon
systems and expenditures. We are simply ensuring that in our doctrine, our
plans, and our command and control we have-and are seen to have-the selec-
tivity and flexibility to respond to aggression in an appropriate manner. We do
not intend that the Soviet Union should have a wider range of options than we
do.
Even after these adjustments to our present policy, there remains aserious
potential problem for the future of our strategic policy and forces. In recent
years, the USSR has been pursuing a vigorous strategic R&D program. This we
had expected. But its breadth, depth, and momentum as :aow revealed comes as
something of a surprise to us.
During the past year alone, the Soviets have tested four new ICBM's (the
SS-X-16, SS-X-17, SS-X-18, and SS-X-19), and have developed their first MRV-
submarine-launched missile. The ICBM's are of especial interest. Three of the
four have been flown with MIRV's, and all, of them are being designed for in-
creased accuracy. The very large SS-X-18 will have about thirty percent more
throw-weight than the currently deployed ES-9. The SS-X-17 and SS-X-19 are
considered as successors to the relatively lig'it SS-11. They will have from three-
to-five times the throw-weight of the earlier model SS-11's, which now constitute
the bulk of the Soviet ICBM force. If all three new and heavier missiles are
deployed, Soviet throw-weight in their ICEM force will increase from the cur-
rent 6-7 million pounds to an impressive 10-32 million pounds.
This throw-weight, combined with increased accuracy and MIRV's, could give
the Soviets on the order of 7,000 one-to-two megaton warheads in their ICBM
force alone. They would then possess a major one-sided counterforce capability
against the United States ICBM force. This is impermissible from our point of
view. There must be essential equivalence between the strategic forces of the
United States and the USSR-an equivalence perceived not only by ourselves.
but by the Soviet Union and third audiences as well. This was the essence of
the SALT I agreements.
With these things in mind, we are seeking in SALT II to ensure that the prin-
ciple of essential equivalence is upheld. We are also proposing in the FY 1975
budget several strategic R&D programs conducted within the SALT I agreements
as hedges against the unknown outcome of SALT II and the uncertain actions of
the USSR. The United States is prepared to reduce, stay level, or if need be, in-
crease our level of strategic arms, but in any case that level will be fixed by the
actions of the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union insists on moving ahead with a
new set of strategic capabilities, we will be forced to match them. We would
prefer, however, to reduce the present balance in such a way that strategic
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eegnivalance can be achieved at the lowest cost and least destabilizing level! of
forces,
2. The NATO-Warsaw Pact BaZance.-
There are some who feel that the United States entered indiscriminately into
:security commitments in the post-World War II period, and that it is time to,
review those commitments. I agree that we ought to review our commitments.
But the worst thing of all would be if the United States, in reviewing commit-
merits now believed by some to have been entered into indiscriminately in an
earlier period, were to abandon these commitments indiscriminately-because
many of those commitments are vital to our security, and to the place and role
oof the United States in the world today. We can retreat to the North American
continent, and we can perhaps survive there indefinitely. But it would be a
changed world, and one in which many of the better aspects of the American
society would be increasingly subject to strain.
NATO is perhaps our most important commitment. I hardly need remind this
Committee of the fundamental ties between the United States and Europe, or to
recall for you all we have done in this century to help ensure European freedom
and vitality. Nor need I tell you that American and European interests in the
larger issues of mankind are indivisible. It is for these larger reasons, as well as
our own immediate national interests, that we have worked so hard, over so
many years, under so many Administrations, both Democratic and Republican,
to establish a solid foundation for Western security, and to help ensure political
stability and economic well-being.
As far as I am aware, there is no fundamental disagreement with these basic
assumptions of our European policy. It is instead on certain manifestations of
that policy about which there is disagreement-whether the NATO conventional
forces are adequate for deterrence and defense, and whether the United States is
bearing a disproportionate share of the collective defense burden of the Alliance.
It is precisely to these two aspects of our NATO policy that I have devoted so
much attention 'in my discussions with the NATO Defense Ministers. My pur-
pose has been to begin a process aimed at achieving over the next three years
two fundamental security objectives necessary to sustain an adequate defense
posture :
First, the construction of a satisfactory basis for maintaining an adequate
overall NATO security posture for the long haul, including balanced forces
with rational missions credible to our adversaries and ourselves.
Second, an equitable adjustment of burdens to put United States participa-
tion in NATO, and the United States military presence in Europe, on a solid,
durable foundation acceptable both to the United States Congress and pub-
lic, and to our Allies.
The objective of NATO strategy is deterrence, and the forces we field to achieve
deterrence are both nuclear and conventional forces. The role of these forces has
changed over time. In NATO's early days, the United States enjoyed a clear
superiority in nuclear forces. This allowed early NATO strategy to be based on
the "tripwire" concept, by which conventional ground forces in Europe were
designed to serve primarily to trigger nuclear retaliation by the United States
against a Warsaw Pact attack.
Now, as the Soviet Union reaches nuclear parity with the United States, deter-
rence will be strongly reinforced if there is a balance of conventional as well as
of nuclear forces. This clearly does not mean that we no longer require a nuclear
deterrent. Nor does it mean that the American nuclear commitment to the se-
curity of the Alliance has been outdated. The commitment is firm. But it does
mean that our nuclear forces may no longer carry the same dominant weight in
the balance of deterrence that they did in an earlier period, and this places a
higher value on NATO's conventional military capabilities. Thus a strong con-
ventional capability is more than ever necessary-not because we wish to wage
conventional war but because we do not wish to wage any war.
I have discussed with our NATO Allies what I call the "NATO triad", which
is different in concept from our strategic triad. It is based upon strategic forces
primarily provided by the United States, tactical nuclear forces that would be
available in the event that Western Europe started to be overrun, and a stalwart
conventional capability. I believe that the European Allies are aware of the im-
plications of nuclear parity, and are now more interested in a stalwart conven-
tional capability than they have been since the inception of NATO in 1949. This
new perception is vitally important because the decision to use nuclear weapons
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will be an agonizing decision not lightly entered Into by anybody nor lightly
concurred in by the member nations of NATO.
While many agree with the need and importance of conventional forces, there
is controversy over the balance of military forces between NATO and the War-
saw Pact. It has sometimes been suggested that NATO does not have, and can-
not afford to acquire, a conventional option which does more than serve as a
trip wire for nuclear war. I disagree. Our analysis suggests that NATO has the
essential ingredients for such a balance. If the NATO countries do not falter in
their defense programs, and if we can concert our defense efforts more effec-
tively, there is no reason why NATO should not be able to achieve and sustain
an adequate defense posture for the long haul.
NATO has fielded a large military force of high quality. It is a force of con-
siderable strength. It continues to improve. In many respects it is not the equal'
of the Warsaw Pact force opposing it-for instance, in maneuver divisions and
tanks. NATO's main reinforcements, those from the United States, are not so
close as those of the Soviet Union. But NATO has some strengths of its own,
such as tactical air forces, and the Warsaw Pact has some weaknesses and vul-
nerabilities, such as logistics and the uncertain reliability of some Pact members.
NATO could give a good account of itself in defense, provided NATO gives itself
the defensive weapons and military cohesion it needs. Of course, NATO is
dependent on each member keeping up its individual efforts. All must do their
fair share if the present disparities between NATO strength and that of the
Warsaw Pact are not to become insuperable.
This realistic and positive assessment of NATO's conventional defense capa-
bilities does not mean the existing correlation of forces between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact is satisfactory for our security. While NATO does have substantial
conventional defense capabilities-and it is important that the Soviet Union real-
ize this-there remain objective disparities, and any Mutual and Balanced Force
Reduction agreement must address these disparities if it is to enhance stability.
The second major objective I have pursued with our :European Allies is the
achievement of an equitable adjustment of the defense burden. In fairness, we
should acknowledge at the outset that NATO defense has been far from a single-
handed effort by the United States. Of the peacetime forces deployed in the
European area, our allies contribute approximately 90 percent of NATO's ground
forces, 80 percent of the ships, and 75 percent of the aircraft. In the critical cen-
tral region of Di urope, the United States co atributes only 23 percent of NATO's
manpower-compared, for example, with the Soviet Union's share of 46 percent
of Warsaw Pact manpower.
I am confident, from my meetings with the Defense Ministers, that the Allies
do appreciate the need to achieve a more equitable sharing of the defense bur-
dens. In fact, they have been moving in this direction for the past several years,
as evidenced by the real increases in their defense budge--s--increases that have
occurred notwithstanding the process of detente, and at a time when our own
defnse budget and forces have shown substantial real reductions. I am hopeful
that allied defense budgets will continue to increase overall during the next few
years, although the present economic prospects in some countries are discourag-
ing.
The Allies are of course also aware of tb.e present Congressional requirement
that full offset of the United States balance of payments deficit on defense ac-
count in FY 1974 be obtained and that compensatory reductions in United States
forces stationed in Europe as part of our :NATO commitment be made if offset
arrangements are inadequate. I believe, although I cannot at this time promise,
that offset arrangements- with the Federal Republic of Germany and with our
other Allies will fulfill the requirement of the law without requiring unilateral
redeployments of United States forces from Europe. These arrangements will
make an important contribution to the burden sharing objective we seek.
I do not intend, however, to rest our burden sharing objective on the Defense
balance of payments account. The balance of payments accounts are only one
indicator of the respective burdens being borne by each Ally. What we seek, as
I have mentioned, is an adjustment of general burdens which will put United
States participation in NATO, and the United States military presence in Europe,
on a more solid footing.
But after a more equitable sharing of the defense burden, there is, frankly,
no satisfactory alternative in the near term to the continued presence in Europe
of substantial numbers of United States forces. Reductions in United States
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forces in Europe would be prudent only through successful negotiation with the
Warsaw Pact. While we are seeking greater efficiencies in the use of our forces,
and are working with our Allies to achieve a more efficient and effective alloca-
tion of our collective resources, early improvements of this nature are not likely
to permit unilateral United States force reductions so long as the Warsaw Pact
continues to improve its capabilities.
The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations do hold out a real
prospect for reductions. It is not a certain prospect, for we do not seek reduc-
tions at any cost, but only reductions that contribute to security in Europe. We
and our NATO Allies have put forward proposals which would achieve both a
more stable balance and reduced levels of forces and we hope progress can be
made. Neither purpose would be served by mechanical reductions yielding a
precarious correlation of forces. Both are served by the approach to negotiations
being taken by us and our Allies.
3. U.S.-USSR Naval Balance.-The third area in which we and our Allies want
to maintain a perceived balance with the Soviet Union (and its allies) is in
the forces that can be employed at sea. As a maritime nation, dependent upon the
sea for the vitality of our economy and for mutual support with our Allies,
the sea is more important to us than to the Soviet Union. Therefore, a balance
at sea implies more than a strict numerical balance, for together with our Allies
we would need to protect a minimum essential level of shipping against a sus-
tained interdiction effort by the Soviet Union and its allies.
Historically, Soviet Navy planning has emphasized force to support its land
campaigns by interdicting the opponents' navies, and thereby interrupting the
projection of opposing power by sea. Soviet forces have therefore stressed small
surface combatants, many submarines, antiship cruise missiles, a large patrol
vessel force particularly suited to coastal defense, and naval long-range and
medium bombers.
In the past ten years, however, we have seen a growing deployment of Soviet
naval forces to distant waters. The Soviet Navy began continuous out-of-area
deployments in 1964 in the Mediterranean; these deployments were expanded
later to the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and the west coast of Africa. The
overall level of Soviet deployment activity measured in ship-days increased
roughly six-fold from 1965 to 1970. There has been some leveling off since 1970,
but we anticipate a modest increase in Soviet sea-going activities in the future.
("Ship-days" measure only activity, of course, and not direct combat capability.)
The Soviet Navy, contrary to some opinion, is not presently growing in num-
bers. It is growing in capability. The Soviet Navy has a vigorous ship-building
program to replace older combatant ships with neiy, more capable types. By 1979
the Soviet Union could have several aircraft carriers of the KURIL-class, the
first of which is now approaching operational status. We expect their major
surface combatants to continue for the next several years at a level of about 200
ships, nearly the same as the United States now has. We are seeing a decline in
the overall size of the Soviet submarine force, as they retire older diesel ships at
a greater than one-for-one rate as new nuclear submarines come into the fleet.
Even so, we estimate that by the early 1980s the USSR will have Approximately
twice the planned United States submarine level. This relatively large Soviet
submarine force will continue to pose the primary threat to our sea lanes through-
out the decade.
In sum, as we look ahead we see a Soviet Navy that is becoming increasingly
capable of overseas deployment, whose submarines could pose a significant threat
to free world shipping, and whose surface combatants, with their considerable
antiship cruise missile capability, could inflict serious damage on our naval forces
in a surprise attack. Admiral Moorer will discuss the naval situation in greater
detail.
United States naval forces have been improving in quality since the 1950s. In-
creased emphasis has been given to protection of sea lanes of communication as
a hedge against the possibility of a Soviet campaign against military and eco-
nomic resupply shipping. Major ASW development programs have been carried
out, providing a good surveillance and warning capability and a good capability
to counter the Soviet submarine threat in a sustained conflict. Despite these
improved capabilities, the numerical size of the Soviet submarine force indicates
it could be a significant threat to shipping and naval forces during the early
stages of any major conflict.
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Numerically, the United States Navy has been declining steadily in recent
sears, and indeed has been reduced by about 45 percent since 1969. This reduc-
tion primarily reflects the retirement of many aging World War II-construction
ships, including some early retirements which were made to provide funds for
future procurement. Our carrier forces are declining from it total of 26 in 1962
Io a projected 15 in 1975. (Because our new carriers are larger than their World
War II-construction predecessors, the total number of shipboard naval aircraft
:has only declined by about it third rather than by half.) There has been a
parallel and related reduction in the number of major surface combatants from
more than 300 to the present level of about 200 ships. Amphibious lift ships,
submarines, and support ship forces also have declined numerically from highs
reached during the 1960s. These numerical reductions have, been offset to some
extent by the significantly improved individual capabilities of the ships and
;aircraft.
The current vigorous naval modernization program, funded in part by the
:savings achieved from retiring older ships, should result in surface combatant
force levels climbing back to about 230 ships ty the end of this decade. The num-
ber of general purpose nuclear-powered attack submarines is projected to in-
crease from 59 at end FY 1974 to about 90 by the early 1980s.
These increased force levels are possible in large part because of the decision
to pursue the high-low mix concept. Larger numbers of new units with rela-
tively lower capability can be acquired for the same cost as a smaller number
of high capability forces. Thus the planned overall force mix takes into account
the different threat levels, -enabling us to buy both sophisticated multi-purpose
aircraft carriers and smaller, less sophisticated and less costly Sea Control
Ships : nuclear-powered guided missile frigate as well as smaller patrol frigates ;
and so forth.
These planned modernization programs, together with continuing research and
development leading towards advanced weapons and sensor systems, give us con-
fidence that we and our allies can maintain an adequate naval balance with
respect to the USSR into the early 1980s. Planned maritime forces, sea and air,
will be capable in general of defending essential worldwide sea lanes, providing
a strong capability to project power ashorc in selected areas, and sustaining
current levels of forward deployments.
4. Middle East Lessons.-Soviet actions during the October 1973 Middle East
War show that detente is not the only, and in certain circumstances not the
primary, policy interest of the USSR. The immediate Soviet arms shipments to
Egypt and Syria at the outset of hostilities, the deployment of nuclear-capable
SCUD missile launchers, the peremptory Soviet note to the United States Govern-
ment implying the possibility of direct Soviet military intervention with ground
and air forces, and the forward deployment of sizable Soviet naval forces-over
90 Soviet ships in the Mediterranean at the height of the hostilities and smaller
naval forces in the Indian Ocean-provided another lesson in Soviet willing-
ness to take risks with world peace.
We also learned useful military lessons from the October hostilities. For ex-
ample, the value of United States military capabilities--our capacity to airlift
and sealift needed munitions and equipment over long distances, and the deter-
ring presence of the Sixth Fleet-was proved. Our quick logistical response capa-
bilities and large naval presence had much to do with moderating the effects
of the war.
We learned both from our last campaigns in Vietnam and the ensuing force
reductions after Vietnam. as well from the Middle East crisis, that the readiness
and level of modernization of our forces were not wholly adequate. With the
support of the Congress, we are taking steps to correc- this. Also, while our
Middle East airlift effort was spendidly executed, we found our dependence on
airlift highlighted. We need to increase that capability.
Given the present situation in the Middle East and the growth in the Soviet
naval capabilities and deployments worldwide, we have decided also that United
States interests would be served by our presence in the Indian Ocean on a more
regular basis, i.e., by making more frequent deployments in that area in the
coming year. In consonance with that decision, we are recommending to the
Congress it budget supplement for $29 million for the expansion of our support
facilities on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. This will limit the costs
of Indian Ocean deployments and provide greater flexibility in the types of
forces we would have available in that area of the world.
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In addition, the Middle East war confirmed prior judgments about various
aspects of modern warfare. The principal points are :
The importance of advanced warning and its assessment, and the ready
forces available to take advantage of it;
The heavy attrition of equipment and supplies that can result from
modern, intense conventional conflict ;
The need for balanced, mutually supporting forces, i.e., not just tanks
and aircraft, but infantry, antitank weapons, artillery and ground air de-
fenses as well ;
The new importance of modern antitank and air defense weapons ;
The importance of defense suppression weapons, equipment and tactics ;
The importance of a warm production base, and sufficient reserve stocks
of ammunition, spare parts and equipment ;
The importance of trained manpower.
None of these lessons is surprising. The Department has been working for
some time to improve our capabilities in each of these areas.
5. Settling Down for the Long Haul.-As I mentioned at the outset of this
introduction, this is our first peacetime defense budget in a decade. It is, there-
fore, an appropriate time to consider how best to settle down for the long haul,
for the continuing, steady task of providing an adequate defense for the United
States and its interests. During the next few years, we must search for and
assess the best R&D, weapons acquisition, and other strategies for the long haul.
In doing so, we must ask such questions as how we can most efficiently compete
with our major potential opponents, and what constitutes our own major strengths
and weaknesses.
In our adjustment to a long haul posture, there are five basic principles which,
in my view, should guide the future conduct of this department. They are that :
The safety of the United States, its citizens, and their lawful pursuits
continues to depend on the maintenance of a strong defense establishment.
Accordingly, we who represent this department must not be reticent in stat-
ing the needs we have or the pride we feel in the performance of the duties
of our nation.
We have the responsibility, not only to the United States itself but also to
our friends throughout the world, to assure the military balance so necessary
to deterrence and a more enduring peace. Other nations led in that respon-
sibility for most of the first two centuries of our national existence ; now
the cloak of leadership unavoidably embraces us, and we must make the
long-term effort to bear it.
The men and women of the Department of Defense are without peers as
servants of the nation. It does not follow, however, that patriotism can pro-
ceed without respect. We must give them the respect, dignity and support that
are their due. Equal opportunity will continue to be a DOD watchword.
To stress our needs is not to ignore an equal obligation, to use our citizens'
resources wisely. We must continue to improve the efficiency and effective-
ness of our forces and to add to the arsenal of deterrence.
We can and must become increasingly competitive with potential adver-
saries in a more fundamental sense. We must not be forced out of the mar-
ket-on land, at sea or in the air. Eli Whitney belongs to us, not to our com-
petitors. Fie, rather than the medieval craftsmen of Mont St. Michel and
Chartres-however magnificent and unique their art-must once more be-
come our model.
I cannot say at this juncture exactly what the long haul holds for this Depart-
ment. But I can say that unless we are to plan only by intuition, we must con-
tinue to build our peace structure on the hard facts of the international environ-
ment rather than on gossamer hopes for the imminent perfectability of mankind.
B. TIIE PROPOSED DEFENSE BUDGET
The President's Defense budget proposals transmitted to the Congress on 4
February were developed within this overall international context, and with
the existing economic and fiscal constraints well in mind. These proposals in-
clude requests for FY 174 Supplelnentals-the result of pay and price increases
and necessary readiness improvements-as well as funds for FY 19'75.
1..PY 197! Suppleirtentals.-The FY 1974 Supplemental requests total $6.2 bil-
lion in addition to the amounts already appropriated by the Congress, raising
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the proposed FY 1974 obligation authority (TOA) to $87.1 billion. As shown on
the following table, $3.4 billion of this Supplemental amount is required for pay
and rate increases (most of which was included under Allowances for Civilian
and Military pay raises in the original FY 1974 budget request last year) ; the
balance of $2.8 billion is required to achieve tae desired readiness level for t.S.
[In millions of dollars]
Fuel price increase---------------------------------------------- 480
Middle East payback--------------------------------------------- 231.
Augmented force readiness--------------------------.------------- 1,397
Increased airlift capability --------------------------------- .--------- 169
Accelerated modernization------------------------------------------ 51 s1
Strategic program changes ------------------------------------ ----- 25
Total, force readiness----------------------------------------- 2, 818
Pay and rate changes:
January 1, 1973, pay increase (military and civilian) ---------------- 1,495
October 1, 1973, pay increase (military and civilian)---------------- 1,060
Military retired pay cost-of-living increases :
July 1, 197``3---------------------------------------------------- 257
January 1, 1974------------------------------------------------ 182
Wage board pay increases------------------------------------------ 231;
Increased food costs----------------------------------------------- 107
Postal costs------------------------------------------------------ 48
Total, pay and rate changes--------------------------------- 3, 41:i
Total supplemental request---------------------------------- 6,233
The "readiness supplemental" includes fuel price increases in the amount of
$480 million as well as $231 million in extra costs of our arms supply to Israel.
These extra costs result from our increased operations and maintenance activi-
ties and the additional cost incurred in replacing in U.S. inventories the mate-
rial provided to Israel.
The Supplemental request also reflects the most urgent deficiencies in the
condition of our forces that were made apparent by the Middle Fast hostilities.
With these deficiencies in mind, I have incl zded $1,397 million to improve the
readiness of our forces, $169 million to increase our airlift capability, and $51!;
million to buy certain high-value weapons and equipment which are now in
short supply in our Services.
The readiness improvements include adding to our ammunition stocks, reducing
the maintenance backlog on our ships and equipment, making sure pre-positioned
equipment is ready for use, improving our defense suppression capabilities, and
purchasing short-supply items important for overall readiness.
The airlift improvements I recommended are modest first steps to a more funda-
mental examination of our airlift capabilities which I believe is necessary. These
first steps include expanding C-5 and C-7.41 utilization rates, developing a
stretched version of the C-141, and seeking relatively inexpensive modifications
to civil aircraft to permit them to carry military cargoes in an emergency.
The additional high-value weapons and equipment purchases proposed in the
Supplemental include TOW antitank missiles for the Army and Marines, M-60
tanks and M113A1 armored personnel carriers for the Army, vehicles for the
Marines, P-3C antisubmarine warfare aircraft for the Navy, air munitions for
the Navy and Air Force, and improvements to a number of USAF` aircraft. An
increase in RDT&F funds is also proposed for all of the Services,
Finally, the FY 1974 Supplemental includes $25 million for long lead time
items for the second Trident submarine.
2. The FY 1975 Budget. The FY 1975 Budget request in total obligational
authority (TOA) amounts to $92.6 billion, an Increase of $5.5 billion over FY
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1974 and $12.1 billion over FY 1973. Outlays for FY 1975 are estimated at $85.8
billion, an increase of $6.3 billion over FY 1974 and $12 billion over FY 1973.
These FY 1975 totals include the amounts transmitted to the Congress by the
President, plus estimates for pay raises expected to become effective during the
year and the costs of proposed new legislation.
This request is a substantial one, but I offer no apologies for its size. The FY
1975 Budget bears directly on the question of whether or not the United States
will coninue to fulfill the responsibilities it has around the world. In real terms,
moreover, it is somewhat smaller than the amount actually provided for FY
1973. As shown in the following table, the increase of about $12.1 billion in TOA
over FY 1973 (in current dollars) is almost wholly consumed by pay and price
increases.
Pay and price increases: fiscal year 1973 to 1975 (excluding retired pay)
[Total, in millions of dollars]
Pay increases : January 1973 pay increase (in effect for 6 months of fiscal
year 1973 and all 12 months of fiscal year 1975) ; October 1973 pay in-
crease, October 1974 pay increase ; wage board (blue collar) pay increase- 4, 598
Increased subsistence costs and other military allowances (existing legis-
lation ------------------------------------- 743
Petroleum price increases-------------------------------------------- 1,698
Inflation on other purchases (7 percent from fiscal year 1973 to fiscal
year 1974 and 4.6 percent estimated from fiscal year 1974 to fiscal year
1975) _ -__ -- 4, 689
----------------------------------------------
Space rental to GSA (required starting in fiscal year 1975) ------------- 183
Proposed legislation (military allowances) ----------- --------------- 187
Total -------------------------------------------------------- 12,098
The three general pay increases (military and white-collar civil service) and
the blue-collar (wage board) pay increases which take place regularly over
this period will add about $4.6 billion to the FY 1975 Budget.
The cost of subsistence will be almost a half billion dollars higher in FY 1975
than in FY 1973. The ration rate was $1.46 per man per day on January 1, 1972,
$1.65 on January 1, 1973, and $2.28 on January 1, 1974-the rate reflected in
the FY 1975 Budget. Higher costs for clothing, certain station allowances, and
travel and transportation costs bring the total add-on for subsistance and other
military allowances to $743 million in FY 1975.
Petroleum prices on February 1, 1974, were 123 percent above the prices we
paid in FY 1973. Even assuming no further price increases, as we have in the
FY 1975 budget estimates, this is an add-on of $1.7 billion.
For all other purchases, we estimate (based on Commerce data through De-
cember 1973) that price inflation will amout to 7 percent from FY 1973 to FY
1974, and we hope it will slow to 5 percent from FY 1974 to FY 1975. On this
basis, price inflation will add about $4.7 billion to the FY 1975 Budget.
Beginning in FY 1975, the Defense Department is required by law to pay the
General Services Administration an appropriate rental charge for GSA con-
trolled space occupied by the DoD. This charge will amout to $183 million in
FY 1975.
Finally, we are proposing certain items of military personnel legislation
which-if enacted-will add $187 million to our costs in FY 1975.
This means that if we were to carry on the FY 1973 program at FY 1975
price levels and pay rates-employing the same people, purchasing the same
items, with nothing added-it would cost us about $12,098 million more than it
actually did in FY 1973. In addition, retired pay will increase about $1.6 billion
from FY 1973 to FY 1975. Thus in formulating our FY 1975 budget request, we
had to absorb a total of about $13.7 billion in pay and price add-ons.
Fortunately, we have been able to stabilize the proportion of Defense out-
lays which are devoted to pay and allowances, albeit not without some further
reduction in personnel. As shown in the table below, pay and allowances will
take about 55.4 percent of estimated Defense outlays in FY 1975, compared with
55.8 percent in FY 1973 and 55.2 percent in FY 1974.
29-464-74-pt. 1-4
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PAY COSTS AND MANPOWER TRENDS, SELECTED YEARS
[Outlays in millions of dollars; manpower in thousands]
Fiscal year-
.964
1968
1973
1974
1975
Military basir pay and related------------------------------
$8,511
475
-
$12,779
$'.7,618
5
$17,904
$19,030
M;litaryspecial pays and allowances____
4 305
10
994
~t 2
13,812
14,929
Civil service payroll ---------------------------------------
504
396
,
563
771
878
Family housing (excluding Pay) -----------------------------
-
2
___________ ____------------------------
Subtotal
20,795
9
30536
2,
095
36,803
390
4
38,748
158
5
41,49
6,011
___
---------------------------------
retired pay
Militar
1,20
,
,
,
-------
y
Total pay and allowances____________________________
228'1 2 04
45,397
32,635
35,594
38,296
Purchases--------------------------------------------------------
- ---- -----
------------------------------------
Totaloutlays
50,786
78,027
73,828
79,500
85,800
---
and allowances as percent of the total outlays____________
Pa
43.3
41.8
55.8
55.2
55.4
y
Average strength (nonyears):
691
436
3
324
2
2,218
2,177
Military --: --------------------------------------
--------------------------------------
Civilservrce
1,045
,
1,276
,
1,033
1,014
1,019
----
Total ----------------------------------------------
i, 736
4,712
3,357
3,232
3,196
The current level of pay and allowances as a percent of total Defense outlays
is, of course, substantially above FY 1964 and FY 1968. But this reflects a na-
tional decision to pay our military and civilian personnel a compensation com-
parable to what they could get in the civilian sector of the economy.
In this respect, most of the costs attributed to the All-Volunteer Force result
essentially from this same national decision. About 63 percent of the estimated
$3.6 billion associated with the All-Volunteer Force in the FY 1975 Budget is
nothing more than a major increase in basic pay for military personnel with less
than two years of service-personnel who pr-..or to November 1971 were grossly
underpaid in comparison with the civilian sector and with career military
personnel.
The FY 1975 Budget in real terms is not only less than the amount provided
for FY 1973, it is also smaller than the amount provided for FY 1964, the year
before the Vietnam buildup began. Furthermore, for the third consecutive year
Defense outlays will take six percent or less of the gross national product and,
as shown in the table below, a declining percentage of total Federal budget out-
lays and net public spending.
Defense outlays as a percent of fiscal year--
1964
'.968
1973
1974
1975
Gross national product_________________
8.3
9.4
6.0
9
0
5.9
27
9
5.9
27.2
Federal budget (outlays)---------------
41.8
42.5
.
2
5
.
17
8
17.1
Net public spending___________________
28.1
29.2
18.
.
Indeed, much of the talk about reordering national priorities is quite off the
mark. As indicated in the following table, National Defense spending per capita
in real terms will decline from $325 in FY 1968 to $202 in FY 1075, while Other
Public spending and Private spending is expected to increase from $693 to $900
and $2,421 to $3,055, respectively, during the same period.
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National
defense
spending
Other
public
spending
Private
spending
(consumption
and
investment)
Total
real GNP
per capita
1945 (World War II peak)--
1950
$1,092
$307
$1,232
,
$2,631
,
pre-Korea, post-World War II low) ---------------
19
119
468
1
609
2
196
53
(Korea peak)_______________________________
195
383
391
1,772
2
546
(
6 post-Korea) -----------------------------------
96
269
418
1,941
,
2
629
(
1
1 last Eisenhower year)__________________________
19
245
508
1,896
,
649
2
64(prewai)----- _------------- ___________________
254
569
2;129
,
2
953
1968 (war peak)____________________________------
1975
----------
325
202
693
900
2,421
3,005
,
3,438
4,107
Clearly, a major reallocation of national output has already taken place since
FY 1908, and the notion that Defense is consuming a disproportionate share of
that output-at the expense of our social welfare and to the detriment of our
economy-is simply not supported by the facts. Per capita GNP has increased
substantially during the last decade and all of that increase has been devoted
to the domestic welfare of the nation.
Although the FY 1975 Defense Budget in real terms is somewhat lower than
FY 1973, several important changes in the composition of the program are
planned. As indicated in the following table, incremental Southeast Asia costs
drop sharply from FY 1973 to FY 1.975, while support for the baseline U.S. forces
increases.
DEFENSE BUDGET SUMMARY, FISCAL YEARS 1973-75
[TOA in millions of dollars]
h
1973
1974
1975
C
anges,
1973 to 1975
Current prices:
Baseline U.S.forces ----------------------------------------- 69,769
77,047
83,373
+13,604
MAP -----------------------------------------------------1,120
3,295
1,279
+159
Incremental Southeast Asia costs -----------------------------
5,171
1, 599
1,913
-3, 258
Subtotal, excluding retired pay______________________________
76, 060
81 941
86, 565
+10
505
Military retired pay__________________________________________
4,392
5,164
6; 014
,
+1,622
Total TOA, current prices__________________________________
80, 452
87, 105
92, 579
+12, 127
Constant fiscal year 1975 prices:
Baseline U.S.forces ---------------------------------------------
80,756
82,121
83,373
+2
617
MAP----------------------------------------------------------
1,261
3,449
1,279
,
+18
Incremental Southeast Asia costs_________________________________
6,141
1,720
1,913
-4,228
Subtotal, excluding retired pay______________________________
88, 158
87,290
86,565
-1,593
Military retired pay__________________________________________
5,311
5,662
6,014
+703
Total TOA,constant fiscal year 1975prices -------------------
93,469
92,952
92,579
-890
Included in the $1.9 billion for Southeast Asia costs in FY 1975 is $1,450 million
for the support of South Vietnamese forces and $463 million for U.S. forces-
largely the air units based in Thailand. The rise in these costs from FY 1974 to
FY 1975 results from a sharp increase in support for the South Vietnamese
forces, which more than offsets a drop in LT. S. force costs and the transfer of Laos
support to the regular MAP program. The reason for this increase in support for
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South Vietnam is threefold: first, the ceasefire has not worked as well as we had
hoped and, therefore, South Vietnamese military consumption is well above what
was anticipated: second. unlike FY 1974, there are far fewer prior year funds
available to meet FY 1975 requirements; and finally, in FY 1974 we fell behind
in replacing South Vietnamese equipment losses and greater efforts are required
in FY 1975.
The sharp rise in the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in FY 1974 reflects
the emergency assistance to Israel. The FY 1975 Military Assistance Program, in
constant prices, is about at the same level as in Y Y 1973.
These changes in Incremental Southeast Asia Costs and MAP make possible
within a slowly declining overall Defense budget in real terms (i.e., in constant
FY 1975 prices) a modest increase in the support of the Baseline U.S. Forces. This
increase amounts to about $1.4 billion in FY 1974 and $1.2 billion in FY 1975, or
an increase of $2.6 billion from FY 1973 to FY 1975. The additional resources are
applied primarily in three areas, which in ray judgment require greater em-
phasis-new development initiatives for our strategic forces, augmented readiness
and accelerated equipment modernization for our general purpose forces, and an
increased wartime capability for our strategic airlift forces. Each of these areas
is discussed in detail in the following sections of this Defense Report.
II. STRATEGIC FORCES
Among the major capabilities in the defense arsenal of the United States, the
strategic nuclear deterrent forces command the most attention. Yet compared
with the general purpose forces, their costs are relatively small. And, with brief
exceptions. their costs as a percent of the total defense budget have actually
declined during the past decade.
As is shown in Appendix Table 1, the obligarional authori-y made available for
the strategic forces in FY 1964 amounted to $8.5 billion-16.8 percent of the total
defense budget. After more than a decade of substantial pay raises and a good
deal of inflation, the obligational authority we are proposing for the strategic
forces in FY 1975 comes to $7.6 billion-8.2 percent of the total defense budget, or
less than half the share devoted to those forces in FY 1964. Such relatively modest
figures are hardly compatible with the view that this Administration has been
less than restrained in its conduct of the strategic nuclear competition. By any
measure, our current effort is much more moderate than it was a decade or more
ago.
A. THE BASIS FOR THE STRATEGIC '-NUCLEAR FORCES
To underline the trends in these relatively modest costs is not to minimize the
importance of the strategic nuclear deterrent forces. At the same time that the
United States has necessarily become more engaged in world affairs than ever
before in its history, it has become increasingl,7 vulnerable to direct nuclear attack
and to the possibility of unprecedented destruction. Nuclear weapons now cast:
their shadow over all of us, and even complete political isolation would no longer
relieve us of their threat. The United States is too powerful to be ignored and no
longer far enough away (measured by ICBM trajectories) to be out of hostile
reach. It is understandable, therefore, why strategic nuclear forces should receive
so much attention. Without a firm foundation of nuclear deterrent forces the rest
of our power would not count for much in the modern world.
I cannot stress this last point too strongly. All wars since 1945 have been non-
nuclear wars shadowed by the nuclear presence. The threat to use nuclear wea-
pons has remained, for the most part, in the background, but belligerents and
neutrals alike have known that, like the big stick in the closet, it was there.
Perhaps we may hope that in the future, as in the past, the nuclear forces will
act as a brake upon violence, and that wars will remain conventional or not begin
at all. Perhaps we may even hope that the strategic nuclear forces, by contribut-
ing to a worldwide balance of power and international stability, will carry us
well beyond detente to a more enduring peace and to a. general reduction of
armaments.
Not only are the strategic forces vitally important ; they are controversial as
well. Most of the major defense debates during the past thirty years have cen-
tered on them, and alarms have rung over such matters as the B-36, the bomber
"gap", the missile "gap", MIRVs, and ABM deployments. Much of the debate has
centered on specific weapon systems. But issues have also arisen about the size
and composition of the offensive and defensive forces, the nature of alternative
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target systems, and the desirability and feasibility of enhancing deterrence and
limiting escalation by having the option to avoid destroying enemy cities.
Of equal concern has been the growth to maturity of Soviet strategic offensive
forces. Only a decade ago these forces numbered in the hundreds ; now we count
them in the thousands, and they have a substantially greater throw-weight. As
a consequence, the issue that faces us no longer is (if it ever was) how to avoid
initiatives that might continue or accelerate the strategic competition, but how-
in a situation of essential equivalence-to interpret and respond to a wide range
of potential Soviet Initiatives.
If we are to have informed and productive debate on these matters, it is im-
portant that the Congress and the public understand the evolutionary character
of strategic force planning and doctrine. Accordingly, it is essential to review the
factors that now shape our strategic nuclear forces, the assumptions we make
about these factors in designing our posture, and the directions we propose to
take in our Five-Year Defense Program. In undertaking this review, I will place
particular emphasis on why we are maintaining such comparatively large and
diversified offensive forces, why we are modifying our strategic doctrine, and why
we are proposing the pursuit of a number of research and development projects
as prudent hedges for the future.
What is generally accepted, as a minimum, is that we ourselves must not con-
tribute to any failures of deterrence my making the strategic forces a tempting
target for attack, or prone to accidents, unauthorized acts, or false alarms.
I should also stress that it is only in the process of examining why and how
deterrence might fail that we can judge the adequacy of our plans and programs
for deterrence. And once that analysis begins, it quickly becomes evident that
there are many ways, other than a massive surprise attack, in which an enemy
might be tempted to use, or threaten to use, his strategic forces to gain a major
advantage or concession. It follows that our own strategic forces and doctrine
must take a wide range of possibilities into account if they are successfully to
perform their deterrent functions.
Nuclear proliferation represents another important factor. It is a complex
process driven by many actions and considerations. But one clement affecting
its extent and velocity undoubtedly is the degree to which other countries believe
that the U.S. strategic deterrent continues-or fails-to protect them. Accord-
ingly, in support of our non-proliferation policy, we must take account of the
concerns of other countries in our doctrine and force planning.
There is also an important relationship between the political behavior of many
leaders of other nations and what they perceive the strategic nuclear balance
to be. By no means do all of them engage in the dynamic calculations about the
interaction of Soviet and U.S. forces that have so affected our own judgments
in the past. However, many do react to the static measures of relative force
size, number of warheads, equivalent megatonnage, and so forth. Hence, to the
degree that we wish to influence the perception of others, we must take appro-
priate steps (by their lights) in the design of the strategic forces.
Finally, an important connection exists between U.S. arms control efforts
and the size and composition of the strategic nuclear forces. Arms control agree-
ments are, of course, designed deliberately to constrain the freedom of the parties
in the planning of their offensive and defensive capabilities. Strategic programs,
in turn, affect the prospects for arms control. And specific weapon systems are
the coin of this particular realm. Not only are such systems the mediums of
exchange; they are also the basis for expanding or contracting the forces. As
a consequence, arms control Objectives must have a major impact on our planning.
1. The Problem of Objectives.-I believe it is well understood that the size
and composition of our strategic nuclear forces must depend to some degree on
the magnitude of the overall, deterrent burden that we place upon them. It is
also a matter of increasingly widespread appreciation that these forces cannot
hear the entire burden by themselves, however fundamental their importance
may be. Other capabilities, nuclear and non-nuclear, must be maintained in
strength to cover the entire spectrum of deterrence. What still requires emphasis,
however, is the diversity of roles that the strategic nuclear forces continue to
play. Our ability to achieve major national security objectives continues to be
hostage to the operational doctrine, size, and composition of these forces.
Deterrence has been and remains the fundamental objective of our strategic
nuclear forces. But what precisely do we want these forces to deter? Clearly,
we expect them to forestall direct attacks on the United States ; at the same
time, however, we accept the equally heavy responsibility to deter nuclear attacks
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on our allies. To some extent we also depend on the strategic forces to exercise
a deterrent effect against massive non-nuclear assaults, although we now place
the main emphasis on U.S. and allied theater forces for that purpose. We also
view our strategic forces as inhibiting coercion of the U.S. by nuclear powers,
and, in conjunction with other U.S. and allied forces, helping to inhibit coercion
of our allies by such powers.
While deterrence is our fundamental objective, we cannot completely preclude
the possibility that deterrence might fail. The objectives we would want our
strategic forces to achieve in those circumstances remain an issue to which I
shall return.
2. USSR and PRO Strategic Objectives.--Despite the importance of these
objectives, it is probably the present and i:rospective strategic nuclear forces
of other nations that constitute the single most powerful influence on the
design of our own capabilities. Most of our strategic objectives, in fact, are a
function of these potential threats.
The most important nuclear capability facing the United States is that of
the USSR. As we engage in our own planning, we need to understand better than
we now do why this capability is evolving at such a rapid rate and what the
Soviets hope to gain by such large expenditures and such ambitious programs.
Only with an improved understanding can we decide judiciously what impact
this capability should have on our own choice of strategic programs.
Primarily at issue are the answers to two major questions. To what extent
have the Soviets simply responded to and tried to counter U.S. initiatives? And
to what extent have they sought (and do they continue to seek) something
more ambitious than a capability for second-strike massive retaliation against
the United States?
Much has been written on both counts, at least in the United States. But the
Soviets have not proved especially communicative about their programs and
motives, and the evidence of what they are up to is, to say the least, fragmen-
tary and conflicting. As so often is the case, we are faced with uncertainty.
Admittedly, my counterparts in the Soviet Ministry of Defense could substan-
tially reduce this uncertainty by disclosing current and even past information
about their decisions to the same extent that the United States does. But in the
absence of such candor, we have no choice bit to interpret the available evidence
as best we can.
What does this evidence suggest?
First, the Soviets have proceeded with development of many strategic pro-
grams ahead of rather than in reaction to what the United States has done.
It is worth recalling, in this connection, that they took the initiative in the
deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs, ICBMs, ABMs, and FOBSs. At the present
time, they have four new ICBMs that are actively being flight tested.
Second, the Soviets-through their medium-range (or peripheral attack)
capabilities-may have initially intended to threaten Western Europe as their
only response to the intercontinental U.S. threat to tae USSR in the early
days of the strategic competition. But they have maintained and expanded that
threat long after having acquired the capability to launch a direct attack on
the United States. Indeed, the size of their medium-range force bears no evident
relationship to the capability of its counterparts in Western Europe or even
to any urban target system there.
Third, it is noteworthy that the Soviets are apparent:y not content with the
SALT I agreements, which temporarily froze certain Soviet quantitative ad-
vantages (in ICBMs and SLBMs) in compensation for certain U.S. advantages.
They have decided, as far as we can judge, to strive for at least comparable
qualitative capabilities as well.
To sum up, what we now have to face in our force planning is that the
Soviets have :
Acquired better than numerical parity with the United States in terms
of strategic nuclear launchers (countiag bombers as well as missiles)
Continued their extensive threat to Western Europe even after having
acquired a massive direct threat to the United States ;
Begun to exploit the larger throw-weight of their ICBMs so as to permit
the eventual deployment of as many as 7,000 potentially high-accuracy
MIRVs with large yields;
Started production of the Backfire bomber which could well evolve into
an intercontinental threat.
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It is premature to assess confidently what objectives the Soviets have set
for themselves with these active, expensive programs. However, it is certainly
conceivable that they foresee both political and military advantage, not only
in the growing numerical weight of their forces, but also in their potential to
bring major portions of our own strategic arsenal into jeopardy.
The United States, for its part, cannot afford to stand idly by in the face
of these developments. As I shall discuss later, we are recommending a number
of quite specific research programs to hedge against any sustained drive to
achieve what the Soviet Union may regard, however, mistakenly, as meaningful,
exploitable, superiority. Preferably by agreement or if necessary by unilateral
action, we believe that we must maintain an esential equivalence with them.
We are prepared to balance our strategic forces down if SALT succeeds, or to
balance them up if we must match Soviet momentum.
The Soviet strategic capability no longer is the only one that we must take
into account in our force planning. A second important force from the standpoint
of the United States is that of the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC). During the
past decade, the Chinese have moved steadily from a program of development and
testing to a deployed nuclear capability. We now estimate that they already have
on line a modest number of MRBMs, IRBMs, and nuclear-capable medium and
light bombers.
Previous forecasts about the evolution of this capability have not proved par-
ticularly reliable, and I cannot guarantee any higher confidence in the current
projections. Nevertheless, we estimate that the PRC could achieve an ICBM
initial operating capability as early as 1976 and an SLBM initial operating capa-
bility at a somewhat later date.
We do not yet have much insight into the strategic and political objectives that
the PRC is seeking to achieve with these deployments. But certain interesting
features about them are already evident.
The Chinese are clearly sensitive to the importance of second-strike nuclear
capabilities and are making a considerable effort to minimize the vuhnerabil-
ity of their strategic offensive forces.
The range and location of their systems are such that they can already
cover important targets in the eastern USSR. But they are also located so
as to cover other countries on their periphery.
With the deployment of the ICBM that they have under development (and
later an SLBM), they will have the capability to reach targets throughout
the USSR and in the United States as well.
Our relations with the PRC have, of course, improved very dramatically during
the last four years. Moreover, the present Chinese leadership may well be striving
for exclusively second-strike countercity forces, Nonetheless, we must in pru-
dence take these forces into account in our planning.
Any assessment of the nuclear threats facing the United States must keep
certain other prospects in mind as well. In the not very distant future, five
nations (U.S. USSR, PRC, UK, and France) will have deployed SLBM forces
at sea. It will clearly be desirable in these circumstances to have some idea
about the identity and general location of these different forces, together with
highly reliable communications and tight control over our own land-based and
sea-based nuclear capabilities.
It is even more essential that we focus on the issues that could arise if and
when several additional nations acquire nuclear weapons, not necessarily against
the United States, but for possible use or pressure against one another. Such a
development could have a considerable impact on our own policies, plans, and
programs. Indeed, this prospect alone should make it evident that no single target
system and no stereotyped scenario of mutual city-destruction will suffice as the
basis for our strategic planning.
3. Deterrence and Assured Destruction.-I frankly doubt that our thinking
about deterrence and its requirements has kept pace with the evolution of these
threats. Much of what passes as current theory wears a somewhat dated air-
with its origins in the strategic bombing campaigns of World War If and the
nuclear weapons technology of an earlier era when warheads were bigger and
dirtier, delivery systems considerably less accurate, and forces much more vul-
nerable to surprise attack.
The theory postulates that deterrence of a hostile net by another party results
from a threat of retaliation. This retaliatory threat, explicit or implicit, must
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be of sufficient magnitude to make the goal of the hostile act appear unattain-
able, or excessively costly, or both. Moreover, in order to work, the retaliatory
threat must be credible : that is, believable to the party being threatened. And it
must be supported by visible, employable military capabilities.
The theory also recognizes that the effectiveness of a deterrent depends on a
good deal more than peacetime declaratory statements about retaliation and the
existence of a capability to do great damage. In addition, the deterrent must
appear credible under conditions of crisis, stress, and even desperation or irra-
tionality on the part of an opponent. And since, under a variety of conditions, the
deterrent forces themselves could become the target of an attack, they must be
capable of riding out such an attack in sufficient quantity and power to deliver
the threatened retaliation in a second strike.
The principle that nuclear deterrence (or any form of deterrence, for that
matter) must be based on a high-confidence capability for second-strike retalia-
tion-even in the aftermath of a well-executed surprise attack--is now well
established. A number of other issues remain outstanding, however. A massive,
bolt-out-of-the-blue attack on our strategic forces may well be the worst possible
case that could occur, and therefore extremely useful as part of the force sizing
process. But it may not be the only, or even the most likely, contingency against
which we should design our deterrent. Furthermore, de;?ending upon the con-
tingency, there has been a long-standing debate about the appropriate set of
targets for a second strike which, in turn, can have implications both for the types
of war plans we adopt and the composition of our forces.
This is not the place to explore the full history and details of that long-standing
strategic debate. However, there is one point to note about its results. Although
several targeting options, including military only and military plus urban/indus-
trial variations, have been a part of U.S. strategic doctrine for quite some time,
the concept that has dominated our rhetoric for most of the era since World War
II has been massive retaliation against cities, or what is called assured destruc-
tion. As I hardly need emphasize, there is a certain terrifying elegance in the
simplicity of the concept. For all that it pc?stulates, in effect, is that deterrence
will be adequately (indeed amply) served if', at all times, we possess the second-
strike capability to destroy some percentage of the population and industry of a
potential enemy. To be able to assure that destruction, even under the most un-
favorable circumstances-so the argument goes-is to assure deterrence, since
no possible gain could compensate an aggressor for this kind and magnitude of
loss.
The concept of assured destruction has many attractive features from the
standpoint of sizing the strategic offensive forces. Because nuclear weapons pro-
duce such awesome effects, they are ideally suited to the destruction of large, soft
targets such as cities. Furthermore, since ?ities contain such easily measurable
contents as people and industry, it is posible to establish convenient quantitative
criteria and levels of desired effectiveness with which to measure the potential
performance of the strategic offensive forces. And once these specific objectives
are set, it becomes a relatively straightforward matter--given an authoritative
estimate about the nature and weight of the enemy's surprise attack-to work
back to the forces required for second-strike assured destruction.
The basic simplicity of the assured destruction calculation does not mean that
the force planner is at a loss for issues. On the contrary, important questions
continue to arise about the assumptions from which the calculations proceed.
Where, for the sake of deterrence, should we set the level of destruction that we
want to assure? Is it enough to guarantee the ruin of several major cities and
their contents, or should we-to assure deterrence-move much further and
upward on the curve of destruction? Since our planning must necessarily focus
on the forces we will have five or even ter. years Bence, what should we assume
about the threat--that is, the nature and weight of the enemy attack that our
forces must he prepared to ashorb? How pessimistic should we be about the per-
formance of these forces in surviving the attack, penetrating enemy defenses (if
they exist), and destroying their designated targets? How conservative should we
be in buying insurance against possible failures in perfo: manse?
Generally speaking, national policy makers for more than a decade have
chosen to answer these questions in a conservative fashion. Against the USSR,
for example, we tended in the 1960s to talk in terms of levels of assured destruc-
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tion at between a fifth and a third of the population and between half and three-
quarters of the industrial capacity. We did so for two reasons :
Beyond these levels very rapidly diminishing increments of damage would
be achieved for each additional dollar invested.
It was thought that amounts of damage substantially below those levels
might not suffice to deter irrational or desperate leaders.
We tended to look at a wide range of threats and possible attacks on our stra-
tegic forces, and we tried to make these forces effective even after their having
been attacked by high but realistically constrained threats. That is to say, we
did not assume unlimited budgets or an untrammeled technology on the part of
prospective opponents, but we were prudent about what they might accomplish
within reasonable budgetary and technological constraints. Our choice of assump-
tions about these factors was governed not by a desire to exaggerate our own re-
quirements but by the judgment that, with so much at stake, we should not make
national survival a hostage to optimistic estimates of our opponents' capabilities.
In order to ensure the necessary survival and retaliatory effectiveness of our
strategic offense, we have maintained a TRIAD of forces, each of which presents
a different problem for an attacker, each of which causes a specialized and costly
problem for his defense, and all of which together currently give us high confi-
dente that the force as a whole can achieve the desired deterrent objective.
That, however, is only part of the explanation for the present force structure.
We have arrived at the current size and mix of our strategic offensive forces
not only because we want the ultimate threat of massive destruction to be really
assured, but also because for more than a decade we have thought it advisable
to test the force against the "higher-than-expected" threat. Given the built-in
surplus of warheads generated by this force-sizing calculation, we could allo-
cate additional weapons to non-urban targets and thereby acquire a limited set
of options, including the option to attack some hard targets.
President Nixon has strongly insisted on continuing this prudent policy of
maintaining sufficiency. As a result, I can say with confidence that in 1.974, even
after a more brilliantly executed and devastating attack than we believe our po-
tential adversaries could deliver, the United States would retain the capability to
kill more hall 30 percent of the Soviet population and destroy more than 75
percent of Soviet industry. At the same time we could hold in reserve a major
capability against the PRC.
Such reassurances may bring solace to those who enjoy the simple but arcane
calculations of assured destruction. But they are of no great comfort to policy-
makers who must face the actual decisions about the design and possible use of
the strategic nuclear forces. Not only must those in power consider the morality
of threatening such terrible retribution on the Soviet people for some ill-defined
transgression by their leaders; in the most practical terms, they must also ques-
tion the prudence and plausibility of such a response when the enemy is able,
even after some sort of first strike, to maintain the capability of destroying our
cities. The wisdom and credibility of relying simply on the preplanned strikes
of assured destruction are even more in doubt when allies rather than the
United States itself face the threat of a nuclear war.
4. The Need for Options.- President Nixon underlined the drawbacks to sole
reliance on assured destruction in 1970 when he asked :
"Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single
option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the cer-
tainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should
the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only
measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?"
The questions are not new. They have arisen many times during the nuclear
era, and a number of efforts have been made to answer them. We actually added
several response options to our contingency plans in 1961 and undertook the
retargeting necessary for them. However, they all involved large numbers of
weapons. In addition, we publicly adopted to some degree the philosophies of
counterforce and damage-limiting. Although differences existed between those
two concepts as then formulated, particularly in their diverging assumptions
about cities as likely targets of attack, both had a number of features in common.
Each reouired the maintenance of a. capability to destroy urban-industrial
targets, but as a reserve to deter attacks on U.S. and allied cities rather than
as the main instrument of retaliation.
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Both recognized that contingencies other than a massive surprise attack
on the United States might arise and should be deterred; both argued that
the ability and willingness to attack military targets were prerequisites to
deterrence.
Each stressed that a major objective, in the event that deterrence should
fail, would be to avoid to the extent possible causing collateral damage In
the USSR, and to limit damage to the societies of the United States and its
allies.
Neither contained a clear-cut vision of how a nuclear war might end, or
what role the strategic forces would plan in their termination.
Both were considered by critics to be open-ended in their requirement for
forces, very threatening to the retaliatory capabilities of the USSR, and
therefore dangerously stimulating to the arms race and the chances of
preemptive war.
The military tasks that each involved, whether offensive counterforce or
defensive damage-limiting, became increasingly costly, complex, and difficult
as Soviet strategic forces grew in size, diversity, and survivability.
Of the two concepts, damage-limiting was the more demanding and costly
because it required both active and passive defenses as well as a counterforce
capability to attack hard targets and other strategic delivery systems. Added to
this was the assumption (at least for planning purposes) that an enemy would
divide his initial attack between our cities and our retaliatory forces, or switch
his fire to our cities at some later stage In the attack. Whatever the realism of
that assumption, it placed an enormous burden on our active and passive de-
fenses-and particularly on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems-for the limi-
tation of damage.
With the ratification of the ABM treaty in 1972, and the limitation it imposes
on both the United States and the Soviet Union to construct no more than two
widely separated ABM sites (with no more than 100 interceptors at each), an
essential building-block in the entire damage-limiting concept has now been re-
moved. As I shall discuss later, the treaty has also brought into question the
utility of large, dedicated anti-bomber defenses, since without a defense against
missiles, it is clear that an active defense against bombers has little value in
protecting our cities. The salient point, however, is that the ABM treaty has
effectively removed the concept of defensive damage limitation (at least as it
was defined in the 1960s) from contention as a major strategic option.
Does all of this mean that we have no choice but to rely solely on the threat
of destroying cities? Does it even matter if we do? What is wrong, In the final
analysis, with staking everything on this massive deterrent and pressing ahead
with a further limitation of these devastating arsenals?
No one who has thought much about theso questions disagrees with the need,
as a minimum, to maintain a conservatively designed reserve for the ultimate
threat of large-scale destruction. Even more, if we could all be guaranteed that
this threat would prove fully credible (to friend and foe alike) across the relevant
range of contingencies-and that deterrence would never be severely tested or
fail-we might also agree that nothing more in the way of options would ever
be needed. The difficulty is that no such guarantee can be given. There are sev-
eral reasons why any assurance on this score is impossible.
Since we ourselves find it difficult to be:.ieve that we would actually Imple-
ment the threat of assured destruction in response to a limited attack on mili-
tary targets that caused relatively few civilian casualties, there can he no
certainly that, in a crisis, prospective opponents would be deterred from testing
our resolve. Allied concern about the credibility of this, particular threat has
been evident for more than a decade. In a-ny event, the actuality of such a re-
sponse would be utter folly except where our own or allied cities were attacked.
Today, such a massive retaliation against cities, in response to anything less
than an all-out attack on the U.S. and its cities, appears less and less credible. Yet
as pointed out above, deterrence can fail in many ways. What we need in a
series of measured responses to aggression which bear some relation to the
provocation, have prospects of terminating hostilities before general nuclear
war breaks out, and leave some possibility for restoring deterrence. It has been
this problem of not having sufficient options; between massive response and doing
nothing, as the Soviets built up their strategic forces, that has prompted the
President's concerns and those of our Allies.
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Threats against allied forces, to the extent that they could be deterred by the
prospects of nuclear retaliation, demand both more limited responses than de-
stroying cities and advanced planning tailored to such lesser responses. Nuclear
threats to our strategic forces, whether limited or large-scale, might well call
for an option to respond in kind against the attacker's military forces. In other
words, to be credible, and hence effective over the range of possible contingencies,
deterrence must rest on many options and on a spectrum of capabilities (within
the constraints of SALT) to support these options. Certainly such complex
matters as response options cannot be left hanging until a crisis. They must be
thought through beforehand. Moreover, appropriate sensors to assist in deter-
mining the nature of the attack, and adequately responsive command-control
arrangements, must also be available. And a venturesome opponent must know
that we have all of these capabilities.
Flexibility of response is also essential because, despite our best efforts, we
cannot guarantee that deterrence will never fail ; nor can we forecast the situ-
ations that would cause it to fail. Accidents and unauthorized acts could occur,
especially if nuclear proliferation should increase. Conventional conflicts could
escalate into nuclear exchanges ; indeed, some observers believe that this is pre-
cisely what would happen should a major war break out in Europe. I11-informed
or cornered and desperate leaders might challenge us to a nuclear test of wills.
We cannot even totally preclude the massive surprise attack on our forces which
we use to test the design of our second-strike forces, although I regard the
probability of such an attack as close to zero under existing conditions. To the
extent that we have selective response options-smaller and more precisely
focused than in the past-we should be able to deter such challenges. But if deter-
rence fails, we may be able to bring all but the largest nuclear conflicts to a rapid
conclusion before cities are struck. Damage may thus be limited and further
escalation avoided.
I should point out in this connection that the critics of options cannot have
the argument both ways. If the nuclear balance is no longer delicate and if sub-
stantial force asymmetries are quite tolerable, then the kinds of changes I have
been discussing here will neither perturb the balance nor stimulate an arms race.
If, on the other hand, asymmetries do matter (despite the existence of some
highly survivable forces), then the critics themselves should consider seriously
what responses we should make to the major programs that the Soviets currently
have underway to exploit their advantages in numbers of missiles and payload.
Whichever argument the critics prefer, they should recognize that :
Inertia is hardly and appropriate policy for the United States in these
vital areas;
We have had some large-scale pre-planned options other than attacking
cities for many years, despite the rhetoric of assured destruction ;
Adding more selective, relatively small-scale options is not necessarily
synonymous with adding forces, even though we may wish to change their
mix and improve our command, control, and communications.
However strong in principle the case for selective options, several questions
about it remain. What kinds of options are feasible? To what extent would their
collateral effects be distinguishable from those of attacks deliberately aimed at
cities? And what are their implications for the future size and composition of
our strategic forces and hence for our arms control objectives in this realm?
Many of the factors bearing on these questions will become more evident later
in this statement. It is worth stressing at this point, however, that targets for
nuclear weapons may include not only cities and silos, but also airfields, many
other types of military installations, and a variety of other important assets
that are not necessarily collocated with urban populations. We already have a
long list of such possible targets ; now we are grouping them into operational
plans which would be more responsive to the range of challenges that might face
us. To the extent necessary, we are retargeting our forces accordingly.
Which among these options we might choose in a crisis would depend on the
nature of an enemy's attack and on his objectives. Many types of targets can be
pre-programmed as options-cities, other targets of value, military installations
of many different kinds, soft strategic targets, hard strategic targets. A number
of so-called counterforce targets, such as airfields, are quite soft and can be de-
stroyed without pinpoint accuracy. The fact that we are able to knock out these
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targets--counterforce though it may be-does not appear to be the subject of
much concern.
In some circumstances, however, a set of hard targets might be the most appro-
priate objective for our retaliation, and this I realize is a subject fraught with
great emotion. Even so, several points about it need to be made.
The destruction of a hardened target is not simply a function of accuracy ;
it results from the combined effects of accuracy, nuclear yield, and the num-
ber of warheads applied to the target.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union already have the necessary
combinations of accuracy, yield, and numbers in their missile forces to provide
them with some hard-target kill capability, but it is not a particularly effi-
cient capability.
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union now has a disarming first
strike capability, nor are they in any position to acquire such a capability
in the foreseeable future, since each side has large numbers of strategic
offensive systems that remain untargetable by the other side. Moreover,
the ABM Treaty forecloses a defense against missiles. As I have already
noted in public: "The Soviets, under the Interim Offensive agreement, are
allowed 02 submarines and 950 SLBM launchers. In addition, they have many
other nuclear forces. Any reasonable calculation would demonstrate, I be-
lieve, that it is not possible for us even to begin to eliminate the city-destruc-
tion potential embodied in their ICBMs, let alone their SLBM force."
The moral of all this is that we should not single out accuracy as some sort
of unilateral or key culprit in the hard-target-kill controversy. To the extent
that we want to minimize unintended civilian damage from attacks on even soft
targets, as I believe we should, we will want. to emphasize high accuracy, low
yields, and airburst weapons.
To enhance deterrence, we may also want a more efficient hard-target-kill
capability than we now possess : both to threaten specialized sets of targets
(possibly of concern to allies) with a greater economy of force, and to make
it clear to a potential enemy that he cannot proceed with impunity to jeopardize
our own system of hard targets.
Thus, the real issue is how much hard-target-kill capability we need, rather
than the development of new combinations of accuracy and yield per se. Resolu-
tion of the quantitative issue, as I will discuss later, depends directly on the
further evolution of the Soviet strategic offensive forces and on progress in the
current phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
In the meantime, I would be remiss if I did not recommend further research
and development on both better accuracy and improved yield-to-weight ratios
in our warheads. Both are essential whether we decide primarily on high ac-
curacy and low yields or whether we move toward an improved accuracy-yield
combination for a more efficient hard-target-kill capability than we now deploy in
our missiles and bombers. Whichever way we go, we have more need than the
Soviets for increased accuracy because of cur constrained payloads and low-
yield MIRVs which have resulted from our lower missile throw-weights.
With a reserve capability for threatening urban-industrial targets, with offen-
sive systems capable of increased flexibility and discrimination in targeting, and
with concomitant improvements in sensors, surveillance, and command-control,
we could implement response options that cause far less avilian damage than
would now be the case. For those who consider such changes potentially desta-
bilizing because of their fear that the options might be used, let me emphasize
that without substantially more of an effort in other directions than we have any
intention of proposing, there is simply no possibility of reducing civilian damage
from a large-scale nuclear exchange sufficiently to make it a tempting prospect
for any sane leader. But that is not what we are talking about here. At the
present time. we are acquiring selective and discriminating options that are in-
tended to deter another power from exercising any form of nuclear pressure.
Simultaneously, as I shall discuss later. we and our allies are improving our
general purpose forces precisely so as to raise the threshold against the use of
any nuclear forces.
,. Ceporability of Targeting noetrine and Sizing of Forms.-The evolution in
targeting doctrine is quite separable from, and need not affect the sizing of the
strategic forces. It is quite feasible to have the foregoing options within the
limits set by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive forces.
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What is more, none of the options we are adopting and none of the programs we
are proposing for research and development need preclude further mutually
agreed constraints on or reductions in strategic offensive systems through SALT.
If the Soviets are prepared to reduce these arsenals in an equitable fashion, we
are prepared to accommodate them. In fact, I can say that we would join in such
an effort with enthusiasm and alacrity.
To stress changes in targeting doctrine and new options does not mean radical
departures from past practice. Nor does it imply any possibility of acquiring a
first strike disarming capability. As I have repeatedly stated, both the United
States and the Soviet Union now have and will continue to have large, invulner-
able second-strike forces. If both powers continue to behave intelligently and
perceptively, the likelihood that they would unleash the strategic forces is so
low that it approaches zero. We are determined, nonetheless, to have credible
responses at hand for any nuclear contingency that might arise and to maintain
the clear ability to prevent any potential enemy from achieving objectives against
us that he might consider meaningful. The availability of carefully tailored,
pre-planned options will contribute to that end. They do not invite nuclear war;
they discourage it.
I repeat, we are eager to begin a reduction of the strategic forces by mutual
agreement and on terms of parity. That is our first preference. We would be
quite content if both the United States and the Soviet Union avoided the acquisi-
tion of major counterforce capabilities. But we are troubled by Soviet weapons
momentum, and we simply cannot ignore the prospect of a growing disparity
between the two major nuclear powers. We do not propose to let an opponent
threaten a major component of our forces without our being able to pose a
comparable threat. We do not propose to let an enemy put us in a position where
we are left with no more than a capability to hold his cities hostage after the
first phase of a nuclear conflict. And certainly we do not propose to see an enemy
threaten one or more of our allies with his nuclear capabilities in the expecta-
tion that we would lack the flexibility and resolve to strike back at his assets
(and those of any countries supporting the threat) in such a way as to make his
effort both high in cost and ultimately unsuccessful.
How we proceed on these counts will depend on the USSR. But I do not believe
that we can any loneer delay putting our potential countermeasures into research
and development. The Soviets must be under no illusion about our determina-
tion to proceed with whatever responses their actions may require. And if we
undertake the programs that I shall discuss later, the prospects for misunder-
standing should be low. More sensible arrangements for both parties may then be
feasible.
i. Strategic Balance and International Stability.-Until the late 19EOs, U.S.
superiority in launchers, warheads, and equivalent megatonnage was so great
that we could ignore or disparage the importance of such "static" meansures in
comparing our forces with those of the USSR. Now, however, our numerical
superiority has disappeared in almost every category except that of warheads,
and it could dwindle very rapidly there as well.
Whether the Soviets believe that with the shift in these indicators they have
achieved any meaningful, exploitable, advantage is not clear. However, they
have not been reticent in stressing to a variety of audiences their superiority
over the United States in numbers of ICBMs and other strategic capabilities.
Their words, at least, have suggested that they see these asymmetries as giving
them diplomatic if not military leverage.
As far as we can judge, moreover, the Soviets now seem determined to ex-
ploit the asymmetries in ICBMs, SLBMs, and payload we conceded to them at
Moscow. Apparently, they are considering the deployment of large numbers of
heavy and possibly very accurate MIRVs. As I have already indicated, this kind
of deployment could in time come to threaten both our bombers and our ICBMs.
Admittedly, we would still retain immense residual power in our deployed
SLBM force, and the Soviets would surely know it. But to many interested ob-
servers, the actual and potential asymmetries (as measured by these "static"
criteria) would look even more pronounced in favor of the USSR.
In such circumstances we cannot exclude the possibility that future Soviet
leaders might be misled into believing that such apparently favorable asymme-
tries could, at the very least, be exploited for dipomatic advantage. Pressure,
confrontation, and crisis could easily follow from a miscalculation of this nature.
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It is all well and good to assert that the Soviet leaders, faced by an adamant
and unified America, would come to their senses in time to avoid fatal mistakes
in such a situation and would recognize the illusory nature of their advantages.
But a crisis might already be too late for such an awakening. It is worth a price
in research and development hedges to prevent such illusions from arising in the
first place.
None of this should be taken to mean that exact symmetry must exist between
the two offensive forces. The United States is willing to tolerate the existence of
asymmetries provided that, in an era of alleged parity, they do not all favor one
party. But we are not prepared to accept a situation in which all the visible
asymmetries point in one direction. And we know from experience that the So-
viets are not prepared to do so either. The potential for misunderstanding, miscal-
culation, and diplomatic error is too great to risk. A more equitable and stable
arrangement would lie one in which both sides maintain survivable second-strike
reserves, in which there is symmetry in the ability of each side to threaten the
other and in which there is a perceived equality between the offensive forces of
both sides.
Accordingly, not only must our strategic force structure contain a reserve for
threatening urban-industrial targets, the ability to execute a number of options,
and the command-control necessary to evalua :e attacks and order the appropriate
responses ; it must also exhibit sufficient an-I dynamic countervailing power so
that no potential opponent or combination of opponents can labor under any
illusion about the feasibility of gaining dip-.omatic or military advantage over
the United States. Allied observers must be equally persuaded as well. In this
sense, the sizing of our strategic arsenal, as distinct from our targeting doctrine,
will depend on the outcome of SALT. In default of a satisfactory replacement for
the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive forces, we will have to incorporate
"static" measures and balancing criteria into the planning of our strategic offen-
sive forces.
7. Principal Features of the Proposed Posf+,cre.-This review of the factors that
necessarily shape the planning and programming of the strategic nuclear forces
should also indicate the principal features that we propose to maintain and im-
prove in our strategic posture. They are:
A capability sufficiently large, diversified, and survivable so that it will
provide us at all times with high confidence of riding out even a massive
surprise attack and of penetrating energy defenses, and with the ability to
withhold an assured destruction reserve for an extended period of time.
Sufficient warning to ensure the survival of our heavy bombers together
with the bomb alarm systems and coin nia.nd-control capabilities required by
our National Command Authorities to direct the employment of the strategic
forces in a controlled, selective, and retrained fashion.
The forces to execute a wide range of options in response to potential
actions by an enemy, including a capability for precise attacks on both Soft
and hard targets, while at the same time minimizing unintended collateral
damage.
The avoidance of any combination of forces that could be taken as an effort
to acquire the ability to execute a first-strike disarming attack against the
USSR.
An offensive capability of such size and composition that all will perceive
it as in overall balance with the strategic forces of any potential opponent.
Offensive and defensive capabilities and programs that conform with the
provisions of current arms control agreements and at the same time facilitate
the conclusion of more permanent treaties to control and, if possible, reduce
the main nuclear arsenals.
I will now discuss specific aspects of USSR and PRC strategic activities,
together with the programs that we propose for the achievement of our force and
employment objectives.
B. SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STRATEGIC THREAT
1. The Soviet Union.-One of the most important developments in the strate-
gic threat during the past year has been the Soviet Union's demonstration of a
MIRV technology. While this development had been anticipated for many years,
the scope of the Soviet program as it has now emerged is far more comprehen-
sive than estimated even a year ago. It is now apparent that all four of the new
Soviet ICBM's-the SS-X-18, a large liquid-fueled missile in the SS-9 class; the
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SS-X-17 and the SS-X-19, two medium liquid-fueled missiles with three to five
times the throw-weight of the early model SS-11; and the SS-X-16, a light
solid-fueled missile in the SS'--13 class-employ a post boost vehicle (PBV),
commonly known in our country as a bus-type dispensing system. The SS-X-I6
thus far has been flight tested with only one RV, but the other three ICBM's
have now all been tested with unmistakably MIRVed payloads.
The breadth and depth of this Soviet ICBM program is further manifested
by the wide variety of techniques and technology employed in the new systems.
All four of these systems have computers aboard the post boost vehicles. New
guidance concepts, two different types of post boost vehicle propulsion, and two
different types of launch techniques are employed.
Although the SS-X-16 has thus far been tested with only one RV, a MIRY
version cannot be precluded at this time. Indeed, if a MIRVed version is not
developed, the only benefit to be derived from the use of a PBV in the SS-X-16
would be a possible improvement in CEP. However, it now appears that a land-
mobile version of the SS-X-16 may also be under development. Consequently,
this missile may be deployed in both a fixed and land-mobile mode. As you know,
the Interim Agreement Itself does not restrict the development of land-mobile
systems by either side, but the U.S. Government has unilaterally declared that
it would consider the deployment of such missiles inconsistent with the objec-
tives of the Agreement.
The SS-X-17 and SS-X-19 are apparently competitive developments of a po-
tential replacement for the SS-11. Of the two, the SS-X-17 is technologically
the more advanced. The SS-X-17 has been tested with both a single large RV
and with four MIRVs. The single RV version could carry a large warhead and
probably has sufficient accuracy to give it a very effective hard target kill
capability. The MIRVed version, with much smaller warheads, would be essen-
tially a soft target weapon. The SS-X-19, in contrast, has been tested only with
a MIRVed payload of six RVs. We believe that it is not as yet sufficiently ac-
curate to constitute a hard target weapon.
Nevertheless, the SS-X-17 and SS-X-19 MIRVs are clearly designed for
greater accuracy, e.g., they have reentry vehicle configurations shaped for high
speed atmospheric reentry. Consequently, with further refinements in the PBV
guidance systems (and, hence, better CEPs) they may in time acquire a hard
target capability. Both of these ICBMs can be deployed in the new type silos.
With some modifications to the silos, particularly in the case of the SS-X-19
which is longer than the S-11 and the SS-X-17, they could also be deployed in
the current S-11 silos.
The SS-X-18, like the SS-X-17, has been tested with both a single large RV
and with five relatively large MIRVs. We believe that even the MIRVed version
will have a very respectable hard target kill capability. The SS-X-18 can be
deployed in the new type large silos, and with some modification to the silos, in
the existing SS-9 silos.
In summary, the new Soviet ICBM program represents a truly massive
effort-four new missiles, new bus-type dispensing systems, new MIRVed pay-
loads, new guidance, new-type silos, new launch techniques, and probably new
warheads. If all three of the new and heavier missiles are deployed, throw-
weight in the Soviet ICBM force will increase from the current 6--7 million
pounds to be impressive 10-12 million pounds. This throw-weight, combined
with increased accuracy and MIRV's, could give the Soviets on the order of
7,000 one-to-two megaton warheads in their ICBM force alone. This very im-
pressive program appears to have three main objectives-expanded target cov-
erage (particularly eountermilitary) with MIRVs, improved pre-launch sur-
vivability with the new hard silo designs, and the attainment of a significant
hard target kill capability. Given the warhead yield and CEP currently estimated
for the MIRVed version of the SS-X-18, and looking at the fixed land-based
portion of our strategic TRIAD in isolation from other elements, a force of about
300 of these missiles (permitted under the Interim Agreement) could pose a
serious threat to our ICBM's in their silos, even after those silos are upgraded.
Moreover, It is more than likely that the MIRVed follow-on to the SS-11,
whether it be the SS-X-17 or SS-X-19, will also achieve a respectable hard
target kill capability during the early part of the next decade.
The most notable development in the Soviet SLBM program during the past
rear is the flight test of a new multiple RV version of the SS-N-6. These are
TRVs rather than MIRVs, i.e., they are not individually targetable. Hence,
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this SS-N-6 is similar to our Polaris A-3. There is as yet no evidence of a MRV
or MIRY version of the longer range SS-N-8, which Is being deployed in the
new D-class submarine. Nor is there any evidence of depressed trajectory test-
ing of either the SS-N-6 or the SS-N-8.
We believe that virtually all SSBN production has now shifted to the D-class
which carries 12 launchers each. (There is sonic evidence, however, that a
modified D-class submarine with more than 12 tubes may now be under con-
struction.) A total of 33 Y-class submarines (with 16 launchers each) has been
completed and 18 or 19 D-class had been launched or were being assembled by
the end of 1973, for a total of at least 744 launchers. Thus. it appears that the
Soviet Union intends to go beyond the "baseline" SAL ceiling of "740 ballistic
missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines".
The Interim Agreement gives the Soviet Union the option to replace its old
SS-7s and 8s (209 launchers) with "modern" SLBM launchers (SS-IN-4,; and
8s or better) up to a total of 950 launchers and 62 modern nuclear-powered sub-
marines (Y and D-class or better). However, the phase out of the old systems
is not required until the submarine with the 741st launcher enters sea trials-
which we now estimate will occur in inid-1975. At the current rate of produc-
tion, 6-8 per year, the Soviet Union could have 62 operational "modern ballistic
missile submarines" by mid-1977.
The major ongoing development in the Soviet strategic bomber force is, of
course, the Backfire. We expect the first squadron of Backfires to become opera-
tional sometime this year.
The question of range and primary mission of the Backfire has yet to be fully
resolved. It now appears that the latest model will have a greater range than
estimated for the earlier model. This factor, coupled with its known refueling
capability, would seem to indicate that the Backfire could be used as an inter-
continental as well as a peripheral bomber, the role for which it appears best
spited. Even so, the deployment of this new bomber would not substantially alter
the U.S. air defense problem. As long as we cannot defend our cities against
ballistic missile attack, there is little to be gained by trying to defend them
against bomber attack. Iwill have more to say about this matter when I discuss
our revised air defense program.
With regard to Soviet strategic defensive programs, there is still no evidence
that the construction of an ABM defense for an ICBM area has been started.
(The ABM Treaty allows both sides a total of 200 ABM launchers, 100 for the
defense of the national capital area and 100 for the defense of an ICBM area.)
In fact, there have as yet been no additions to the 64 ABM launchers in place
around Moscow before the ABDI Treaty was, signed. The Soviet Union, how-
ever, has not lost interest in ABM defense. Flight testing of the new ABMs dis-
cussed here last year is continuing.
Modernization of Soviet air defenses is also continuing. The number of ac-
tive SA-2 sites is declining, but additional SA-3 low altitude and SA-5 high
altitude SAMs are being deployed. Similarly, new and moire capable interceptors
are entering the forces, but at a slower rate than older interceptors are being
phased out. Although the Soviet air defense system is the most formidable in
the world and is still being improved, it is not likely to offer an insurmountable
obstacle to our bomber force in the foreseeable future. Should the Soviet Union
develop and deploy an AWACS-FOXBAT "took-down, shoot-down" air defense
system, as described in this report in past years, we would of course have to
counter it with new penetration devices and techniques such as the cruise missile,
bomber defense missiles, and improved ECM,
In this connection, we must be careful not: to draw a false analogy from the
Hanoi and Suez Canal air defense experiences. In both those cases the air de-
fenses were heavily concentrated in a very limited area : moreover, only con-
ventional weapons were employed by the attacking aircraft. In the case of the
Soviet Union, the number of places which have to be defended is very large and,
consequently, the air defenses are spread over a vast area. Our bombers. In
striking back at the Soviet Union, would be penetrating at very low altitudes
to avoid the high and medium altitude SAMs, and would be using SRAMs to-=
attack the low altitude SAM batteries. Moreover, our bombers would be en
ploying nuclear weapons, only one of which need penetrate to destroy the targe
and probably much of its air defenses.
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2. The People's Republ4c of China.-The PRC land-based ballistic missile pro-
gram is progressing slowly but steadily. Most important from the U.S. point of
view is the continuing development of the ICBM, which was flight tested again
in 1973. We remain convinced that the PRC will pursue that program to a suc-
cessful conclusion and achieve an ICBM capability before the end of this decade.
Even a small force of operational ICBMs in hard silos-20 to 30-would give
the PRO considerable strategic leverage ; it would be able to augment its threat to
the principal Soviet cities west of the Urals, and for the first time to extend its
reach to the major cities in the United States.
Production of the BEAGLE light bomber in the PRC is continuing at a very
modest rate. Neither the BEAGLE nor their BADGER medium bomber has suf-
ficient range to reach the continental United States, but both can threaten our
forces and allies in Asia and the Western Pacific, as well as the eastern part of
the Soviet Union.
The PRC is also gradually strengthening its air defenses with the deployment
of additional MIG-19 interceptors and SA-2 type SAMs. Nevertheless, those
defenses, because of their qualitative limitations, are not likely to present much
of an obstacle to either the United States or the Soviet Union in the event of
war, at least during the balance of this decade.
C. U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES AND PROGRAMS
Although the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive forces expires in Oc-
tober 1977, we are continuing to plan our forces within the bounds of that agree-
ment and the ABM Treaty ; and, for intelligence estimating purposes, we are
assuming the Soviet Union will do the same. Admiral Moorer will provide a
detailed comparison of U.S.-USSR strategic forces in his Military Posture pres-
entation. For convenience, a summary comparison is shown on the following
page.
1. Strategic Offensive Forces and Programs.-We plan to continue in our
strategic forces over the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of bombers,
ICBMs and SLBMs-the so-called TRIAD. Our purpose in doing so is not to
provide an independent assured destruction capability in each element of the
strategic forces, as some people have presumed. Rather, it is to achieve a sufficient
degree of diversification in our forces to hedge against both foreseeable and
unforeseeable risks, and to enable us to continue to make available to the Presi-
dent a reasonable range of strategic options as USSR and PRC capabilities
evolve.
I am sure the members of this Comittee are well aware that each of the three
major elements of our strategic forces has its own particular strengths and
weaknesses with regard to pre-launch survivability and the ability to penetrate
the enemy defenses. By maintaining an appropriate mix of the three, however,
we can maximize their collective strengths and minimize the effects of their indi-
vidual weaknesses, thus ensuring that the force as a whole is not inherently vul-
nerable to any one type of attack or any one type of defense.
UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS
Offensive:
ICBM launchersI ------------------------------- 1,054
1,550
1,054
1
575
SLBM launchers 3-------------------- ---------- 656
550
656
,
660
Intercontinental bombers 3----------------------- 496
140
496
140
Force loadings weapons-------------------------- 6
784
2
200
7
940
2
600
,
Defensive: 4
Air defense:
Interceptors 5------------------------------- 559
,
2,800
,
532
,
2,600
SAM launchers----------------------------- 481
9,800
261
9,800
ABM defense: Launchers--------------------------------------
64
--------------
64
I Excludes launchers at test sites.
9 Excludes launchers on diesel-powered submarines.
5 Excludes bombers configured as tankers and reconnaissance aircraft.
4 Excludes launchers at test sites.
These numbers represent total active inventory (TAI),
20-464-74-pt. 1-5
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Force diversification is also essential to hedge against the unforeseeable risks,
such as technological breakthroughs by the other side and unanticipated weak-
nesses in one or more of our own systems. Last year we encountered an example
of the latter, i.e., some unexpected failures in the operational tests of the Poseidon
missile. I will discuss the nature of this problem and the measures being taken
to correct it a little later. At this point, l: simply want to note that this unantici-
pated failure, while worrisome, is by no means critical. Aside from the fact that
the Poseidon force even now can carry out most of its intended missions, we have
a variety of other systems which can fill the gap until the necessary corrective
actions are completed. In short, this is precisely the ki;'id of situation the TRIAD
was intended to hedge against.
In addition to hedging against risks, it well diversilled force is needed-to sup-
port the President's request for "other strategic options." As I indicated earlier,
these other options imply a much wider range of capabilities than that required
for assured destruction only. For example, capabilities are required to destroy
military as well as urban, defended as well -,is undefended, and time urgent as
well as non-time urgent targets. Moreover, the forces should include some
weapons which are highly reliable, some which are highly accurate, and some
which are highly controllable from launch to target. Here, again, each member
of the TRIAD has some unique capabilities to offer.
On balance, therefore, I believe the continued support of well diversified U.S.
strategic offensive forces clearly remains essential to our national security.
Given the increasing size and variety of Soviet strategic capabilities, U.S. force
diversification will be much more important in the future than it has been in the
The principal impact of the new emphasis on "other strategic options", as far
as the FY 1975 Budget is concerned, is on the Minuteman program, particularly
Minuteman III. This missile, with its capacity for three RVs, relatively good
accuracy, rapid retargeting capabilities, and relatively secure and reliable com-
munications links to the National Command Authorities, is clearly a most
versatile and cost-effective weapon.
Even without any additional R&D funding, we believe that the CEP of the
Minuteman III will gradually improve with continued testing. Beyond that
point, further improvements in the counter-military capabilities of our ICBM
force would require the deployment of more than the currently planned 550
Minuteman III missiles, larger yield warheads, an :improved or new guidance
system for Minuteman III, terminally gaided maneuvering RVs (MaRVa) or the
development and deployment of an entirely new ICBM. In view of the on-going
SALT talks, we propose in the FY 1975 Budget to take only those first few steps
which are necessary to keep open these options ; no decisions have been made to
deploy any of these improved systems.
First, we propose to keep the Minuteman III production line going at the lowest
feasible rate-five missiles per month. The FY 1974 Budget request included
$394 million for the procurement of the last 136 Minuteman III missiles, plus $23
million for long leadtime items to protect the option to deploy more than 550
Minuteman III if that should prove desirable. The Congress approved the pro-
curement of 115 missiles in FY 1974, dei'erring 21 to FY 1975. To that 21, we now
propose to add. 40 more for operational test assets, making a total buy of 61
missiles in FY 1975. The $758 million shown for the Minuteman program in
FY 1975 on the table beginning on the following page includes $285 million for
the procurement of the 61 missiles and initial spares, and $15 million for long
leadtime items to keep open the option t'or a FY 1976 buy. No decision has as yet
been made to deploy more than 550 Minuteman Ills; we simply want to keep
that option open. -
Second, we have requested the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to keep open
at the lowest feasible rate the MK 12 warhead production line.
Third, we propose to develop the option for some additional refinements in the
existing Minuteman guidance system, mostly in the software program, which
should further reduce the CEP. Development of these refinements will cost about
$100 million, of which the first $32 million is included in the FY. 1975 amount
shown for Minuteman.
Fourth, we propose to proceed with engineering development of a new higher
yield warhead for the Minuteman III. The new warhead plus the more advanced
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(i.e., miniaturized) arming and fusing mechanism would be incorporated in a
new center section which could be retrofitted into the existing Minuteman III
MK12 RV without any changes in its weight, balance or other flight character-
istics. The flight test data base accumulated for the- MK 12 RV, therefore, would
be directly applicable to the new MK 12A RV, and flight tests of the latter could
be limited to the verification of the new arming and? fusing components. The
R&D and tooling costs (DOD only) for the MK 12A are estimated at about $125
million, the first increment of which-$25 million-is included in the FY 1975
amount shown for Minuteman.
ACQUISITION COSTS OF MAJOR STRATEGIC FORCES MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMSI
[Dollars in millions]
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
1973 actual 1974 planned 1975 proposed:
funding funding? funding.
Strategic offense:
Continued procurement of MINUTEMAN III missiles, MINUTEMAN
Silo upgrading and other related programs_______________ _ - 816 730 758
Preparations for MINUTEMAN II operational base launch (OBL) 16
tests -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advanced ICBM technology__________________________ 8 4 37
Conversion of SSBNs to POSEIDON configuration, continued procure-
ment of POSEIDON missiles and associated effort--------------- 698 313 192
Development, procurement and military construction-TRIDENT 25 2,043
submarines and missiles_____________________________________ 794 1,435() 43
Initiation of design for a new SSBN______________________________________________________25
Development of advanced ballistic reentry systems and technology 93 90 120
(A BRES)-------------------------------------------------
B-52D modifications --------------------- --- ---------------- 46 38 73
Continued development of new strategic bomber, B-1 ------------- 445 449 499
Procurement of short range attack missile (SRAM)-------- ------- 203 133 2
Development of the bomber launched and submarine launched ver-
sions 53 14 125
of the strategic cruise missile____________________________
Initial development of advanced tanker/cargo aircraft__________________________________________ 20
Strategic defense:
Continued development of the over-the-horizon (0TH) back-scatter 3 3 12
radar--------------- ----------------------------------
Continued deployment of SAFEGUARD--------------------------- 599 341 61
Continued development of site defense-------------------------- 80 110 160
Development of advanced ballistic missile defense technology----__ 93 62 91
Development and acquisition of the SLBM phased array radar warn-
ing 50
system----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command and control:
Development and procurement of advanced airborne command post 117 50 90
(AA BNC P)- -----------------------------------------------
DevelopmentofSANGUINEELFsystem___________________ 9 13 13
Civil defense: Continued support of the civil defense program ---------- 82 82 86
1 Includes costs of R.D.T. & E., procurement of the system and initial spares, and directly related military construction.
2 Figures in parentheses are the amounts included in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental.
Fifth, we plan to initiate advanced development of a terminally guided MaRV
for possible retrofit into both ICBMs and SLBMs. This MaRV could give the
Minuteman III a very high accuracy, if such a capability should be needed in
the future. The $20 million required to start this program is included in the FY
1975 amount shown for Advanced Ballistic Reentry System (ABRES).
Sixth, we plan to flight test a Minuteman III with a larger number of smaller
RVs. This payload, if successfully demonstrated, would give us the option to ex-
pand the target coverage of the Minuteman force without any increase in the
number of missiles deployed. About $8 million will be needed to start the test
program in FY 1974 and $19 million to complete the test program in FY 1975.
The FY 1974 sum is included in ABRES and the FY 1975 amount in the Minute-
man lines shown on the table.
The $758 million requested for the Minuteman program in FY 1975 also in-
cludes funds for the continuation of the Silo Upgrading effort, and for the in-
stallation of the Command Data Buffer System at all Minuteman III bases. The
ability provided by the latter to retarget the Minuteman III missiles rapidly
from the launch control centers will greatly enhance the flexible employment pos-
sible with the force. Installation of the new system in the first Minuteman III
squadron was completed last year and all 50 missiles in the squadron were suc-
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cessfully programmed from the launch control center. Deployment of the 550
Minuteman III missiles will be completed by end FY 1975 but silo upgrading and
installation of the Command Data Buffer System in the first two wings, which
were deployed before these programs were started, will not be completed until
FY 1978. Upgrading of the Minuteman II silos will be completed in FY 1980.
MINUTEMAN II OPERATIONAL BASE LAUNCH TEST
In order to demonstrate the ability of our operationally deployed Minuteman
missiles to perform their assigned missions, we now propose to undertake a new
Operational Base Launch (OBL) program involving full range flight testing
out into the Pacific of eight Minuteman II missiles in as close to an operational
configuration and ground environment as possible. Four missiles would be
launched from Malmstrom Air Force Base during the winter of 1974-75 and
four more from that or some other northern base during the winter of 1975-76.
These would be the first full range flight tests of Minuteman missiles from
operational silos. The partial operational base launch tests conducted in 1965,
1966 and 1968, with mixed results, were not actual flight tests. In those tests,
the missiles were loaded with just enough fuel for a seven second burn, enough to
reach an altitude of about one mile, out to a range of about one mile. The first
seven-second test of a Minuteman I from Ellsworth AFB in 1964 was successful.
The other three attempts from Grand Forks AFB in late 1966 were not ; in each
instance the missile failed to launch because of a variety of mechanical difficul-
ties associated with that particular test missile and silo.
All three major versions of Minuteman have, of course, been repeatedly flight
tested from Vandenberg Air Force Base out into the Pacific. But to some extent
these were specially configured test missiles launched from specially configured
test silos under carefully controlled conditions. While the missiles to be launched
in the new OBL program would carry dummy warhea6s, they would be typical
operational missiles in all other respects. Operational flight tests of this sort, i.e.,
from operational silos, are conducted routinely by the Soviet Union ; they have
conducted about 100 firings of this sort.
Development and test of the special equipment needed for safety and for di-
recting and monitoring the launches has already been funded in prior year
budgets. Funds to initiate preparations for the eight Minuteman II OBL tests
would be provided through reprogramming in FY 1974; an additional $16 mil-
lion is included in the FY 1975 Budget to continue that effort.
To ensure a realistic option to modernize our ICBM fore" in the 1980x6, we
nre requesting about $37 million in FY 1975 for advanced technology leading to
the development of an entirely new ICBM:. We are considering the technologies
for both a new, large payload fixed-base missile which could be launched from
the existing Minuteman silos, and a new mobile missile, either ground or air
launched. As noted earlier, the Interim Agreement itself does not prohibit the
development or the deployment; of mobile ICBMs. The United States, however,
has unilaterally stated that in its view the deployment of operational mobile
ICP.Afs would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Agreement. The Soviet
Union has made no response to that statement and, as I noted earlier, we believe
that the development of a land-mobile version of the SS--X-16 may be underway.
Consequently, we cannot preclude the possibility that a mobile version of the
SS-X-16 will eventually be deployed. In that case, we may find it necessary to
deploy a mobile ICBM of our own.
In any event, we intend to pursue this new development at a very deliberate
pace, pending the outcome of the current SALT negotiations. The initial effort
in this new advanced ICBM technology program will be devoted to basing tech-
nology leading to the selection of the preferred basing made, to guidance require-
ments which are unique to mobile missiles, both ai:r-launched and ground-
launched. and to rocket motor technology to increase the amount of throw-
per pound of propellant. A new guidance system would be incorporated
in the new missile. This system, plus appropriately sized MIRVs, would give
the new ICBM a very good capability against hard targets.
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The $102 million requested in FY 1975 for the Poseidon program includes
$129 million to complete the funding (except for FY 1976 and subsequent year
outfitting and post-delivery costs) of the last three of the 31 SSBN conversions
and the last one of the four submarine tender conversions planned, $48 million
for the support of Poseidon missiles, and $15 million for the Poseidon Modifica-
tion Program.
The original FY 1974 Budget included funds for the last five SSBN conver-
sions, but delays in the completion of certain SSBN overhauls made it necessary
to defer the last three conversions to FY 1975. The Congressional committees
were notified of this delay in September 1973 and the amounts appropriated
for FY 1974 already reflect the related funding adjustments. Of the 28 conver-
sions funded through FY 1974, 20 have been completed and are currently de-
ployed, two are in predeployment status, and six are undergoing conversion. As
currently scheduled, the last three conversions will all have been started by
April 1975. This stretchout will reduce the number of Poseidon-equipped sub-
marines on the line, as compared with last year's estimates, by one at end
FY 1975 and two by end FY 1976. The last conversion is scheduled for comple-
tion in April, 1977.
The Poseidon Modification Program is the outgrowth of the deficiencies en-
countered last year in the Poseidon Operational Test (OT) program, which have
already been reported to the Congress. In view of the technical problems re-
vealed as a result of these tests, the Unified Commander suspended the Poseidon
OT program in March 1973.
A thorough review of all the available Poseidon test data leads to the con-
clusion that except for a weakness in the RV nose tip, which we believe has
been corrected and in any event affects only a small percentage of the force,
most of the failures encountered were attributable to random deficiencies in
small piece parts such as transistors, electrical connections, fuses, etc., and in
the preparation of operational missiles for flight tests. In contrast to the Demon-
stration and Shake-down Operations (PASO) test missiles, which come directly
from the Navy's missile facility at Charleston, S.C., four OT missiles are selected
at random from the complement of 16 carried by a submarine returning from
patrol. The selected missiles are then modified by removing the entire payload
section and replacing it with a test payload of dummy RVs and instrumentation,
and by installing a destruct device-all while the missile is still in the launch
tube of the submarine.
The deficiencies encountered in the Poseidon OT tests are typical of those ex-
perienced in other new weapons systems, and subsequently corrected. None of
them is related to the basic design of the Poseidon missile, which we have every
reason to believe is entirely sound.
The Poseidon Modification Program is designed to correct deficiencies in the
Poseidon missile itself, in the special test hardware, and in procedures. The
total cost of the program is currently estimated at $126 million, about $23 mil-
lion to incorporate the necessary changes in missiles still in production and the
balance to modify missiles already delivered to the Navy. About $38 million
would be devoted to the more comprehensive testing of small piece parts, $24
million to replace detonating fuses with those of a new design, $18 million to
improve gimbal assemblies, $10 million to modify firing units, $2 million to re-
place flexible hoses with those of a new design, etc. Improved missiles will be
installed in the 21st through 31st converted submarines ; the first 20 Poseidon
submarines, already deployed, will be retrofitted with the improved missiles over
a period of about three years. The entire modification program is expected to be
completed by 1977.
While failures encountered in the Poseidon operational tests have no direct re-
lation to the Trident missile program, they do remind us once again of the mone-
tary risks involved in moving rapidly into large-scale production of any
new major weapon system. Operational testing, of course, cannot commence
until the system has actually been operationally deployed. But by holding initial
production to a reasonably low rate, we can reduce the costs of correcting those
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inevitable deficiencies which are not discovered until the system is operationally
tested. This is particularly true in the case of such technically advanced and
costly weapon systems as the Trident submarine.
Accordingly, after starting the first Trident submarine in FY 1974, we now
propose to build the nine remaining Trident submarines discussed here last
year at a rate of two a year (instead of three a year) oeginning in FY 1975. In
addition, we currently plan to procure sufficient Trident I missiles to backfit ten
Poseidon submarines. As you know, the Trident I missile is being designed to fit
in the existing Poseidon submarines as well as in the new Trident submarines.
By retofitting the Trident I missile in some of the Poseidon submarines, we can
improve the overall capability and survivability of the existing SSBN force and
at the same time maintain a more economical rate of production for the Trident I.
The IOC of the Trident I missile remains as previously planned, i.e., the
fourth quarter of 1978 (the second quarter of FY 1979), which coincides with
the IOC of the first Trident submarine. We plan to undertake an advanced devel-
opment program which will define our capability to improve and measure the
accuracy of our SLBMs and which, if implemented by retrofit, could lead to
improved accuracy in the future. In addition, the MK 500 MaRV is now under
advanced development for the purpose of demonstrating its compatibility with
the Trident I missile. This maneuvering RV, however, is not terminally guided
since its maneuvering capability is intended to help it evade an ABM interceptor,
rather than to increase its accuracy. Indeed, the MK 500 is expected to be less
accurate than its ballistic counterpart.
The Trident I IOC date should allow ample time for an orderly missile devel-
opment and DASO test program. As noted earlier, the OT program cannot be
started until the system has been operationally deployed. However, we do plan
to conduct OT launches earlier in the Trident program than we did with Poseidon.
Backfitting of the Trident I missiles into Poseidon submarines is planned to begin
in the third quarter of FY 1979.
This revised program will require a total of $2,043 million in FY 1975-$107
million for continued component development of the submarine, $927 million to
complete the funding of the second and third Trident submarines, $240 million
for advance procurement for two Trident submarines per year in FY 1976 and FY
1977, $662 million for the continued develcpment and minor procurement related
to the Trident I missile, and $1.07 million in Military Construction funds to con-
tinue work on the Trident Refit Facility an Bangor, Washington. In addition,
about $25 million is included in the FY 1074 Supplemental to protect the option
for the procurement of two Trident submarines in FY 1975.
Although the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive forces, expiring in 1977,
would require us to phase out an equivalent number of existing strategic missile
launchers as each new TRIDENT submarine enters sea trials, that decision need
not be made now.
Some $16 million is included in the FY 1975 Budget. to initiate design for a
new and less costly SSBN than the TRIDENT. This is another application of the
high/low mix approach. With a TRIDENT force In being, it is not likely that all
of the sea-based force need have the capability provided by the larger and more
costly ship.
The current POSEIDON submarines refitted with the now TRIDENT I missile
could, of course, fulfill this low end of the spectrum requirement. But because of
aging, POSEIDON submarines will have to be replaced at least by the late 1980s
.and early 1990s. Consequently, more SSIiNs, beyond the ten TRIDENT sub-
marines, would eventually have to be built. The design of a smaller, less costly
SSBN would give us the option later in this decade to replace the current
POLARIS/POSEIDON fleet with a mixed force of high performance and high
cost or lower performance and lower cost SSBNs.
The new SSBN would be a somewhat lc.rger than the 640-class (the last class
of POLARIS/POSEIDON submarines) and would be powered by a NARWHAL-
type reactor. In looking toward a smaller and lower cost SSBN, wherein platform
numbers rather than large numbers of tubes per submarine are featured, this new
design would have about 16 missile tubes using the TRIDENT I missile. Funds
requested cover commencement of a conceptual and feasibility design effort,
which will identify cost and characteristics trade-offs.
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ABRES
Included in the FY 1975 Budget is $120 million for the Advanced Ballistic
Re-entry Systems Program (ABRES). This program has been the source of
much of the advanced re-entry technology incorporated in our strategic missile
programs, and to a considerable degree it is responsible for our technological
lead in this area. Moreover, ABRES has made a major contribution to our under-
standing of ABM defense because of its work on a wide variety of ballistic missile
penetration aids. Now that the Soviet Union is catching up with us in re-entry
technology, we must renew our efforts to stay ahead in this critical aspect of the
strategic balance.
The ABRES program is managed by the Air Force, but the work being done
also supports Navy and Army projects. In view of its tri-service nature, we have
decided to give the Director of Defense Research and Engineering a greater role
in the overall direction of the ABRES program. Henceforth, DDR&E will estab-
lish the general scope and priorities of the ABRES program and formally review
the program twice a year. Following these reviews, DDR&E will provide the
Air Force with general and specific guidance, as necessary. The existing ABRES
organization structure, which has members of each service as line deputies to the
ABRES Program Manager, will be retained to assure that close coordination
among the three services is preserved.
The bomber forces are essentially the same as those presented here last year,
with two exceptions. First, all of the active B-52D's and F's will be retained
through FY 1975. Second, beyond FY 1975 our planned B-52 force of 5 D and 17
G/H squadrons will increase by one G/13 squadron (17 to 18). This increase
reflects the reorganization necessary to form a composite Combat Crew Train-
ing Squadron (COTS). The UE of each B-52 squadron will be reduced from 15
to 14 to provide aircraft for the COTS.
Last year the Air Force had planned to start in March 1973 the structural
modification of 80 B-52Ds to ensure that the programmed service life can be
safely achieved. The program was later deferred, pending approval by the in-
terested Congressional committees. Meanwhile the condition of the B-52D air-
craft was found to be worse than originally anticipated. Accordingly, the Air
Force has performed a "fracture toughness" program to test the structure of
94 B-52Ds in order to select the best aircraft for proof test, modification, and
retention. Including the cost of this special test program, which entails the pro-
curement of proof test jigs, the total cost for the test of 94 aircraft and the
modification of 80 aircraft is now estimated at about $240 million,
Last year the cost of modifying 80 aircraft was estimated at $197 million. The
Congress has approved the use of $61 million in FY 1973 and prior year funds
for initial engineering, plant layout and tooling. Another $38 million was pro-
vided for FY 1974, and $73 million in procurement funds is requested for FY
1975. The program is now scheduled to be completed by the first quarter of FY
1977.
In my judgment, the B-52D modification program deserves the full support of
the Congress, notwithstanding its substantial cost-about $3 million per aircraft.
Recently completed U.S. air operations in Southeast Asia clearly demonstrated
the effectiveness of the B-52 in the conventional bombing role. Without the B-
52D force, this capability could be provided only at the expense of our strategic
capabilities which are already finely balanced in relation to the challenge posed
by the Soviet strategic forces.
n-1 nOltnER
Indeed, if we are to continue to maintain an effective strategic bomber farce
through the 1980's and beyond, as I am convinced we should, we will eventually
have to modernize that force. The principal improvements needed are (1) faster
airfield escape and greater protection against the effects of nuclear detonations
in order to avoid destruction by SLBMs which might be launched on depressed
trajectories from Soviet SSBNs operating close to our shores, and (2) a capa-
bility to fly. at very low altitude at high subsonic speed In order to penetrate
improved Soviet air defenses. Although we have no evidence as yet that the
Soviet Union is developing depressed trajectory SLBMs, or plans to operate its
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SSBNs close to our shores, or will undertake major new air defense programs at
home, all of these capabilities will clearly be within its technical competency
and economic capacity.
Accordingly, in planning for the 1980s and beyond, we should provide ourselves
the option to replace the existing bomber force with a more capable aircraft.
The B-1 is being developed for this pu:apose. It will have a distinctly shorter
escape time and much better resistance to nuclear effects than the B-52, and by
virtue of its lower flight altitude, greater speed and smaller radar cross-section,
it should have a much better capability to penetrate improved Soviet air de-
fenses. Moreover, because of its wider range of altitude and airspeed options,
the B-i will provide greater flexibility in employment than the. B-52, thereby
enhancing our ability to execute a wide range of attack options in response to
potential enemy action.
The B-1 engineering development program, however, has encountered a num-
ber of difficulties and delays, necessitating several major adjustments in the
program. The latest of these adjustments was reported to the Congress last
summer. First flight was rescheduled from April to mid-year 1974. More time was
allowed for the fabrication and assembly of Air Vehicles No. 2 and No. 3. The
planned production decision date was rescheduled from July 1975 to May 1970.
Last August, shortly after assuming his responsibilities as Secretary of the
Air Force, Secretary McLucas appointed a special committee, headed by Dr.
Raymond Bisplinghoff, the Deupty Director of the National Science Foundation,
to undertake an independent review of the B-1 program. The principal finding of
this group of technical and management experts was that there are no major
technical problems which preclude the suecessful development and production
of the B-1 aircraft. The Committee. noted, however, that the existing program
plan would make completion of the development effort and successful transition
to the production phase unlikely within projected cost and time schedules. The
Committee also expressed the belief that three aircraft would not he sufficient
to complete development of a complex program such as the B-1 and allow the
final development aircraft to reflect accurately the initial production aircraft.
With regard to schedule and cost, the Committee's best judgment was that a
two to three month delay would be incurred in the projected first flight of fir
Vehicle #1 and a six to twelve month delay in completion of the total develop-
ment program. The Committee also estimated that at least $300 million more
would be required to complete the development program as it was rephased in
July 1973.
The Committee's major recommendation was that the B-1 program should be
restructured to provide for completion of the development effort on a more real-
istic basis and to provide for a less disruptive transition into the production
phase.
Finally, Dr. Bisplinghoff and his associates also furnished Secretary McLncas
with their estimates of potential B-1 performance partimeters--ranging from
Possible, to Most Probable, to Reasonably Adverse. These potential performance
deviations result primarily from an increase in the gross take-off weight of the
B-i aircraft, from about 360,000 lbs to the presently projected 39:5.000 lbs. The
Air Force has conducted a thorough analysis of the utility of the B-1 aircraft
within the full range of potential performance deviations provided by the Coin-
mittee. The Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of StafF, and the Commander
in Chief of the Strategic Air Command have concluded that even under the most
adverse estimates of performance the B-1 would be operationally effective
against the full target spectrum. Moreover, even with the increased weight there
are still 100 airfields in the T].S. which would support continuous B-1 operations
and an additional 220 airfields which would be suitable for use in emergency
dispersal operations. Thus, although some weight rednetinn should result as a
byproduct of engineering changes for purposes of producibility and cost avoid-
ance, there is no requirement for significant changes to the B-1 program solely
to regain performance.
A basic problem highlighted by the Committee was the severe program discon-
tinuity which results from the gap of 24 months between first flight and the
production decision. The contractor would not be able to retain critical skills
and know-how during such an extended gap in effort. Moreover, any plan which
was dependent on the recovery of these critically needed personnel after a pro-
duction decision is made would expose the program to additional technical risks
and costs.
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Accordingly, in order to facilitate the B-1 test flight test program and to pro-
vide a more realistic basis for transition to production, we propose to begin
work on Air Vehicle #4 in FY 1975 and, possibly, Air Vehicle #5 in FY 1976.
These aircraft would provide needed light test data 12 to 18 months earlier than
would otherwise be possible, and they could also be used to introduce engineering
refinements to the basic design.
Although the fourth and possibly the fifth aircraft would be funded with
RDT&E funds, they would ultimately be assigned to the SAC inventory. More-
over, the additional aircraft would be built on existing development tooling,
modified only as required by aircraft design improvements. Thus, there would be
no additional program cost, assuming a subsequent production decision. Nor
would these additional aircraft prejudge the production decision. In consonance
with our fly-before-buy policy, the B-1 is expected to undergo about two years
of flight testing and achieve the essential critical milestones before a production
decision is made. Under the currently proposed program plan, this decision
could be made In November 1976. The FY 1975 Budget includes $499 million for
the B-1 program.
The acquisition of the SRAM (Short Range Attack Missile) will be essen-
tially completed with FY 1974 funding and the planned complement of opera-
tional (UE) missiles, 1140, will be on hand by the mid 1970s. Because of its
relatively poor accuracy and aerodynamic drag on the B-52 G/H, a decision has
been made to phase out Ilound Dog by FY 1976. The number of Quails will he
reduced significantly by end FY 1976.
Last year the Congress was informed of the Defense Department's decision to
cancel the SCAD engineering development program and to incorporate further
work in that area in a joint Air Force-Navy cruise missile technology program.
The Air Force was to concentrate on the development of a small turbofan en-
gine suitable for both an air-launched and submarine-launched cruise missile,
and the related high energy fuel. The Navy was to pursue the development of
the guidance technology which was to be common to both missile systems.
Planning of this joint technology effort has progressed to the point where we
can now present a more definitive program for FY 1975 and beyond. As currently
planned, the Air Force would commence engineering development of an Air
Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) in FY 1975, making maximum use of the
terminated SCAD engineering program for air vehicle design and small turbo-
fan engine development. The new missile would have about the same overall
dimensions as the SCAD so that it could be loaded interchangeably with the
SRAM missile, one for one, both internally on the rotary racks of the B-52 or
the B-1 and externally on the wing pylons of the B-52. It would weigh about
2,000 pounds and would be equipped with a terrain avoidance system which
would permit it to fly just a few hundred feet above the surface of the earth.
The ALCM could be made available for initial deployment in the late 1970s,
but it would be premature to make a production decision at this time. In the
meantime, we have authorized retention of some of the Quail unarmed decoys.
The Navy SLCM, using the common technology base, would be developed in
both strategic and tactical variants, and would be sized to take maximum advan-
tage of the, standard torpedo tubes. The strategic version would carry a nuclear
warhead about 1500 am. Like the ALCM, the SLCM would have very good ac-
curacy and penetrate at low altitudes.
While the strategic variant would be primarily a submarine-launched missile,
the tactical variant would be designed to be launched from surface ships as well
as submarines since It would be primarily a conventionally-armed anti-ship
missile. The tactical variant would have a range in excess of 300 am.
A total of $125 million has been included in the FY 1975 budget request for
the combined cruise missile program-$80 million for the Air Force ALCM and
$45 million for the Navy SLCM.
ADVANCED TANKER/CARGO AIRCRAFT
It is clear that if we continue to support a large strategic bomber force for any
extensive period of time into the future, a new refueling tanker will eventually
be required. The cost of acquiring a sufficiently large number of such tankers
would undoubtedly be quite high. It may be possible, however, to satisfy that
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tanker requirement in conjunction with some other important requirement, such
as augmentation of our current airlift capability. Accordingly, we have included
920 million in the PY 1975 Budget for studies and investigations of alternative
approaches to this tanker requirement. The effort will be divided in two parts :
(1) Competitive studies to determine the most effective way to convert a cur-
rently available wide-bodied civilian transport aircraft into an efficient military
cargo/tanker aircraft,
(21 An initial investigation of the trade-offs between a modified (from a cur-
rently available aircraft) and a newly designed strategic tanker/cargo aircraft,
with particular emphasis on fast escape and hardness.
2. S'trategio Defensive. Forces.-I believe it is clear from what I have already
said that without effective ARM defenses, air defenses are of very limited value
against potential aggressors armed with strategic missiles. This interdependency
of anti-ballistic missile and anti-bomber defenses has been well understood for
many years. But as long as there was some chance that we might deploy at least
a thin nationwide ABM defense, it made sense to keep open the option to deploy
a complementary air defense. Now that the ARM Treaty limiting both sides to
only 100 operational ARM launchers at each of two sites has been signed. the
deployment of even a thin nationwide ABM defense has been foreclosed. Indeed,
we have deferred all work on the second ADM site for the defense of the National
Command Authorities (i.e., the national capital area). Given the very tight
defense budget constraints under which we now have to operate, we cannot in
good conscience postpone any longer the basic adjustments in our air defense
program made necessary by the changing worldwide situation,
You may recall that former Secretary of Defense McNamara in his last posture
statement in 19ti set forth six possible purposes that our air defense system
might serve in the 1970s:
1. Peacetime surveillance to prohibit free access over North America from the
air.
2. Nth country defense to prevent damage from an attack by such countries
as Cuba. the PRC . etc.
1. Discourage the Soviet Union from developing and introducing new bomber
threats which would be costly to neutralize.
4. Limit damage to our urban/industrial complex from a Soviet bomber attack
in the event deterrence fails,
5. Preclude bomber attack on our withheld strategic missile forces.
r,. Provide a complete mobile "air defense package", portions of which could
he deployed to any part of the world for use in periods of local nrisis.
The fourth purpose-limit damage to our urban/industrial complex-is now
possible only to the extent that we are successful in limiting the scope of any
conflict that did occur. Since we cannot defend our cities against strategic mis-
siles, there is nothing to be gained by trying to defend them against a rela-
tively small force of Soviet bombers. I am sure the Soviet leaders understand
that an attack on our cities, whether by bombers or missiles, would inevitably
result in the destruction of their cities. Even if the USSR uses all of its ballis-
tic missiles against our strategic offensive forces and reserves its bombers for
use against our cities, repeated analyses have convincingly demonstrated that
under all foreseeable circumstances we would have sufficient surviving forces
to retaliate decisively against Soviet cities. It is this assured capability to re-
taliate decisively against Soviet cities even after absorbing the fall weight of
a Soviet nuclear attack that offers the best hope of deterring attack and thus
protecting our cities, not our ability to defend them against bomber attack.
The fifth purpose --preclude bomber attack on withheld ICBMs, or bombers,
for that matter--might still have some advantage today. That advantage, how-
ever, would be seriously eroded if the USSR deploys its new MIRA'ed ICBMs up
to the limits allowed by the Interim Agreement. If it did so, the USSR would
have enough ICBM RVs to launch a. series of follow-on attacks against our with-
held ICBMs. It would also have enough SLBMs for follow-on attacks against
bomber bases or against SLBMs in port. Thus, to protect our withheld ICBMs,
SLBMs in-port, and bomber bases, we would need a balanced defense against
both missiles and bombers. Such a defense is foreclosed by the ABM Treaty.
With regard to the third purpose--discourage the USSR from introducing new
bomber threats-I believe we should continue to pursue a broadly based R&D
program in the strategic air defense area. That program, however, should be
focused on basic research and the advancement of technology, rather than on
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engineering development of new weapon systems. We already have a number of
new and expensive air defense weapon systems developed or under development
for general purpose forces applications-e.g., F-15, F-14 (Phoenix), AWACS,
SAM-D. But we must take care not to fall behind the Soviet Union in basic
knowledge and understanding of the air defense problem. We need this knowl-
edge and understanding, in any event, for our bomber programs. And, we should
in prudence hedge against the possibility that a technological breakthrough or
some other change in the strategic situation might make the deployment of new
systems for continental air defense both feasible and desirable.
The first and last purposes-peacetime surveillance and control and mobile
air defense forces-and to some extent the second purpose, Nth country defense-
are still feasible and necessary. We must, as a very minimum, ensure the sov-
ereignty of our air space ; it would also be very helpful to have available a mobile
air defense capability which could be deployed promptly overseas.
Forces provided for the first purpose would also provide a reasonable level of
defense against the unlikely contingency of an Nth country air attack on the
United States, most conspicuously Cuba. We have no reason to believe that Cuba
has nuclear weapons or is likely to acquire any in the foreseeable future. Further-
more, Cuba's air force is very limited in payload and range; it could reach only
the southeastern part of the United States. Finally, the consequences to Cuba
of a surprise air attack on the United States would be so grave that the chances
of its occurrence must be rated at near zero. With regard to the PB.C, we have
no evidence whatsoever that that nation is seeking an intercontinental bomber
capability.
The first purpose requires only a thin area-type defense plus a high quality
surveillance capability. Accordingly, we now propose to phase out all of the
strategic Nike-Ilercules batteries (which are all located around nine urban
areas) and eventually reduce the interceptor force to 12 squadrons-six active
and six Air National Guard (ANG). The Nike-Ilercules batteries and their Fire
Coordination Centers will be phased out by the end of FY 1975. Also in FY 1975,
the active interceptor force will be reduced to six F-1.06 squadrons, and two
F-706 squadrons will be added to the Air National Guard, for a total of six
F-100 ANG squadrons. Seven ANG F-102 squadrons will be phased out in
FY 1975. Current planning for FY 1976 includes phase-out of the remaining
F-102s and evaluation of the continued utility of the F-101. Pending a review
of the retention of F-101s, these six interceptor squadrons will be retained until
the end of FY 1976.
In addition to these strategic air defense forces, we will have one active Air
Force air defense squadron (F-4s) and three active Army Nike-Ilercules bat-
teries in Alaska, and one ANG air defense squadron (F-1.02s converting to F-4s
in FY 1976) in Ilawaii. (Canada has a number of CF-101 air defense squadrons
operational.) We will also continue in place the active Army general purpose
forces Nike-Hercules and Hawk batteries now operational in Florida. In addi-
tion, there will always be other general purpose air defense forces available in
the U.S.-fighters and SAMs, and eventually some tactical AWACS-which
could be used to augment the strategic air defenses in a crisis. And, of course,
we will continue to have the option to deploy a new interceptor (e.g., F-15 or
F-14) and a new SAM system (e.g., SAM-D) for CONUS defense, since those
programs are being pursued in any event for the general purpose forces.
A CONUS air defense system structured primarily for peacetime surveillance
would not require an AWACS force, the principal purpose of which is to pro-
vide. a survivable means of control of air defense aircraft in a nuclear war en-
vironment. However, as I noted earlier, a mobile air defense force which could
be deployed quickly as a "package" would still be extremely useful in support
of our general purpose ground and air forces overseas. We proposed, therefore,
to retain the AWACS (now designated E-3A) program for that purpose, and I
will discuss it later in context with the general purpose air forces.
The Defense Department has been working for a number of years with the
Federal Aviation Administration to consolidate the military and civilian radar
and control centers in CONUS into a common, jointly operated system designed
to serve both military and civilian needs. This work is still going on. Nine joint-
use surveillance radars are now in operation. In FY 1978, joint-use radars will
replace all military surveillance radars in CONUS. These U.S. radars, and pos-
sibly some of the Canadian radars near the border, will feed into 13 USAF/FAA
Joint Control Centers ; the first four will be operational by end FY 1977 and all
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13 by end FY 1979. The six existing Regional Control Centers (SAGE) will be
phased out in FY 1978. A new command and control plan tailored to the revised
air defense structure and missions is new under development by the Air Force.
As the new joint system becomes operational, one of the two CONUS manual
Control Centers and the last CONUS Buic III Control Center (in Florida) will
be phased out. All of the remaining airborne radars will be phased out by end
FY 1977. Although no changes are planned through FY 1979 in the surveillance
radars and control systems in Alaska and Hawaii, the Air Force is currently
investigating the feasibility of employing CONUS Buie assets for the semi-
automation of the Alaskan air defense systems.
For deployment in the 1980's we propose to continue work on the development
of the Over-the-horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radar, for which $12 million is
included in the FY 1975 Budget. This radar promises to extend the early warning
capability against bombers. Three such radars-one each on the East and West
coasts, and one covering the southern approach-would give good coverage on
all except the northern approach to the U.S. For the northern approach, we will
have to retain the 31 DEW line radars until such time as we can perfect an
OTII radar, or some other system, which can operate successfully in the presence
of the intense electrical disturbances which characterize the northern auroral
zone.
As my predecessor, Elliot Richardson, reported to you last year, we plan to
complete deployment of the one remaining Safeguard site at Grand Forks for
defense of Minuteman. Work at all other sites has been terminated. The $61 mil-
lion included in the FY 1975 Budget for development of Safeguard is principally
for completion of the check out and installation of the software ; funding for
procurement, military construction and system flight testing was essentially com-
pleted with the FY 1974 Budget.
The Grand Forks site with 30 Spartan and 70 Sprint launchers, one Missile
Site Radar (MSR) and one Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) is scheduled
to be completed in FY 1975. The equipment readiness date is still estimated to be
October 1974, and an initial operational capability is expected to be achieved
by June 1975.
The Safeguard system test program at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific is pro-
seeding very satisfactorily. In the first Safeguard system test series (1970-71),
1.2 out of 16 tests were successful, 2 were partially successful and 2 were unsuc-
cessful. In the second series, which will now be concluded in July 1974, 33 tests
were conducted through December 1973-3C were successful and three were un-
snecessfnl. Seven tests remain to be completed, but some of these may be omitted
if the current test objectives can be met with fewer tests.
Included in the FY 1975 Budget is $160 raillion to continue work on the Site
Defense Program, the objective of which is to demonstrate a development pro-
totype ABM system specifically designed for the defense of Minuteman. I believe
this program is a prudent and necessary hedge. It would give us the option to
defend our Minuteman force against a Soviei; ballistic missile attack should that
become necessary, or in the event that an acceptable permanent agreement on the
limitation of strategic offensive arms cannot be achieved. It would also give us
the option to deploy a more advanced ABM system for the defense of the National
Command Authorities, if that should he found desirable some time in the future.
The Site Defense Program will be conducted on a very austere basis. It must
be borne in mind, however, that Site Defense must be developed with "system"
applications in mind, if the demonstration of the development protoype is to be
of any real value.. Development of the hardware, e.g., the improvements to the
Sprint missile, the new small (relative to the MSR) radar, and the data proc-
essors is well within the state of the art. What needs to be demonstrated is the
capability of the system as a whole, including in particular the software.
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ADVANCED nMD TECTINOLOGY
We also plan to continue the Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Technology
effort at about the same level as in recent years, and $91 million is included in
the PY 1975 Budget for that purpose.
The rationale for continued research and development in BMD, as well as re-
entry systems (ABRES) technology, is founded on two specific SALT related
objectives. One is to provide the Soviet leaders with strong incentives to nego-
tiate additional strategic arms limitation agreements. The other is to motivate
them to keep the treaties and agreements already made.
Nations make treaties, and nations keep treaties, only when they regard such
actions to be in their best interests. If the Soviet leaders believe that they could
gain an advantage over us in the absence of an agreement, they would have no
incentive to reach agreement. But if we confront them with the prospect that
even with strenuous efforts on their part they would not be able to shift the
strategic balance in their favor, they would have an incentive to reach agreement
on maintaining the balance, if for no other reason than to save money. Similarly,
if we fail to advance our ABM technology while the Soviet Union continues to
pursue its on-going ABM development programs, which are clearly permitted by
the Treaty, the Soviet Union might achieve a position where, by abrogating the
Treaty, it could shift the strategic balance drastically in its favor before we
could react.
Consequently, Ave must continue to pursue ABM technology programs of suf-
ficient breadth and depth to ensure that we can :
Keep our qualitative lead in ABM technology over the Soviet Union.
Understand and assess Soviet ABM activities which our intelligence sources
reveal to us.
Achieve the knowledge and skill needed to deploy an effective ABM system
if that should become necessary.
SATELLITE AND SLBM RADAR WARNING SYSTEMS
For surveillance and eary warning of ballistic missile attack, we now depend
on a variety of systems. The most important of these is the satellite warning
system. We now maintain on station one satellite over the Eastern hemisphere
and two over the Western hemisphere.
The Eastern hemisphere satellite would provide the first warning of a Soviet
(or PRC) ICBM launch. This warning would be verified first by the forward
scatter Over-the-Horizon (OTH) system and then by,the Ballistic Missile Early
Warning System (B)AIEWS). The capability to correlate data from BIVIEWS,
satellite and other sources will provide highly credible warning of ICBM attack.
The Western hemisphere satellites provide the first warning of SLBM
launches against the U.S. Complementary warning coverage is now supposed
to be provided by the 474N SLBM "dish" warning radars. Unfortunately, these
474N radars-four on the East Coast, three on the West Coast, and one on the
Gulf Coast-have limitations against Soviet SLB.MIs, particularly the new longer
range SS-N-8. Moreover, there are a number of limitations in the current satel-
lite coverage-it does not fully encompass all of the areas from which the
SS-N-8 could be launched, it is susceptible to temporary solar induced outages
which may cause some loss of coverage in those areas not covered by both
Western Hemisphere satellites, and it is not entirely free of false alarms. To
provide full coverage of the expanded SLBM threat area, and ensure prompt
verification of the satellite data, we must have a more effective and reliable
complementary warning system than the 474N radars.
Accordingly, we again propose to replace those radars (including the standby
SLBM warning radar at Moorestown, N.J.) with two new SLBM Phased Array
Warning Radars-one on the East Coast and one on the West Coast. These much
more reliable and capable phased array radars, together with the Western
Hemisphere satellites, would provide highly credible warning of a Soviet SLBM
launch against the U.S. First warning of such an attack would come from the
satellites, and within a very short interval, which increases with the distance the
launching submarine is from our coast, verification of the attack would come from
the SLBM phased array radars.
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The phased array radars would not cnly verify the signals received from the
satellites but would also fill in any gape which may occur in the satellite cover-
age as a result of solar reflections. The additional confidence which we would
gain in the reliability of the warning would, in my judgment, be worth the
acquisition cost of the two radars-now estimated at approximately $100 million.
The FY 1975 Budget provides for further improvements to the satellite sys-
tem and includes $50 million to begin acquisition of the SLBM phased array
radars.
3. Command and Control.-Continuity of command and control of the strategic
forces by the National Command Authorities-before, during and after a nuclear
attack on the United States-is a basic tenet of our national security policy. This
means that we must not only ensure, to the best of oar ability, the survival of
the NCA and their principal advisors, but also the minimum essential com-
munications links with the subordinate commands and the operating forces.
The command and control of U.S. military forces worldwide is normally con-
ducted through the Worldwide Military Command and Control System
(WWMCCS). The national level elements of this system include the National
Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, the Alternate National
Military Command Center (ANMCC), and the National Emergency Airborne
Command Post (NEACP) based at Andrews AFB, Maryland. The President,
no matter where he may be-in the White House, Camp David, San Clemente,
Key Biscayne, or airborne in the Presidential aircraft-is always kept in con-
tinuous communication with the NMCC, and through it, with the alternate na-
tional military command centers, the subordinate commands and the military
forces.
These national military command centers are linked to the subordinate coin-
mands and the military forces worldwide by a wide variety of communication
modes-land lines, underwater cables, VLF, LF, HF, UHF radio, satellite relay
systems, etc. During the next few years we propose to increase significantly our
efforts to improve the security and survivability of these WWMCCS supporting
communications networks, particularly that portion designated as the Minimum
Essential Emergency Communications Network (ME, ECN). MEECN is the basic
system for communicating executive orders to our forces in wartime. Conse-
quently, special attention must be given to its survivability under nuclear attack.
With regard to the strategic offensive fo?ces, connections between the national
level command centers and the Strategic Air Command and its forces are pro-
z idc d through a deliberately redundant system of communications and command
posts. SAC, in addition to its principal command post at Omaha, Nebraska, also
maintains two alternate ground command posts and one.airborne command post.
The SAC airborne command post is in continuous communication with the SAC
command post at Omaha. On receipt of warning of a nuclear attack on the
United States, the SAC airborne command post would be linked to the SAC
forces and the national military comnnand centers, including the NEACP, by
the Post Attack Command and Control System (PACCS). One of the PACCS
components, the Mid-AUXCP, can assume the CINCSAC function in the event
that the primary SAC AIlNCP is inoperable.
The national military command centers are linked to the sea-based strategic
missile forces, either through the appropriate subordinate commands or directly,
by means of a deliberately redundant system of Navy radio transmitters and by
the Tacamo relay aircraft. To maximize the survivability of communications
from the NCA, these Navy transmitters (including Tacamo) can also be
reached via those communications links involved in directing SAC forces.
Messages could also be relayed to the ballistic missile submarines via ships at
sea, communication satellites, Loran, etc.
This system of command and control of the strategic offensive forces, how-
ever, is not now as survivable as the forces themselves. That is why the Defense
Department has proposed, in addition to the improvements in the existing coin-
munle,itions network, the continued development and deployment of the Air
Force Satellite Communications System (AFSATCOM), the Advanced Airborne
Command Post (AABNCP) aircraft, and the Sanguine extremely low frequency
(ELF) radio relay site. These three programs offer the best prospects, at this
time, for a substantial advance in the survivability and effectiveness of our
national command and control system under nuclear attack.
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AFSATCOM AND SURVSATCOM
The AFSATCOIMI system, when fully deployed, will consist of a combination
of special communications transponders and channels carried on board "host"
satellites placed in orbit for other missions (e.g., Navy FLTSATCOM satellites)
plus numerous ground and air terminals. This deliberately redundant satellite
system will not only provide greater assurance that essential NCA instructions
reach our forces, it will also enable the forces to report back the data needed
by the NCA to maintain sure control and to execute a variety of nuclear
options. We are also developing the technology needed to improve further the
survivability of strategic communications satellites, This technology will lead
to a new Survivable Satellite Communications (SURVSATCOM) system which
should be available by the time it is appropriate to replace the AFSATCOM
system sometime in the 1980s. Funding for AFSATCOM is included in other
programs. Funding of SUIVSATCOM as a separate program element is expected
to begin in FY 1976.
AACNCP (E-4)
The AABNCP program, as currently planned, would be pursued in several
stages geared to our growing understanding of the command and control
problem in a nuclear war environment, and to the further development of appli-
cable technology. It should be borne in mind in this connection that the aircraft
itself (the Boeing 747, now designated the E-4) presents no particular tech-
nological problem. It is the equipment which goes into the aircraft that is our
principal concern in this program. We would expect the aircraft to have a
useful life of about 20 to 25 years. During that period, we would probably re-
equip the aircraft, in whole or in part, as new technology becomes available
and as changes in national policy dictate new missions to be accomplished by the
strategic forces.
Accordingly, the longer range equipping program has been divided into
"blocks", Block I is the currently approved configuration of the AABNCP. The
airborne computer, which was associated with the original configuration of the
AABNCP aircraft, has now been deferred from Block I to Block II.
I believe this deferral is a sensible move ; the problems involved in an air-
borne automatic data processing (ADP) system have not yet been sufficiently
resolved. The airborne ADP system must be compatible with the ground-based
WWMCCS ADP system, since selected portions of the ground data base must
be readily transferable to the airborne ADP. We are currently investing sub-
stantial funds in the modernization and standardization of this ground-based
ADP system. Unfortunately, the ground ADP equipment cannot be used directly
in the AABNCP aircraft because that equipment has not been designed for air-
craft operations. Also, further research must be (lone on shielding airborne com-
puters against nuclear effects, particularly when the aircraft is airborne.
Finally, we have yet to formulate precisely which portions of the WWMCCS
ground data base are actually required in the AABNCP. This would depend
largely on how one would conceive the NCA function aboard the NEACP air-
craft and the SAC commander's function aboard the SAC airborne command post.
If the NCA is to be in a position to exercise a choice among a wide range of
nuclear attack response options, including some which may not have been pre-
planned, the data. required aboard the aircraft would be quite extensive. In the
case of the NEACP, it would probably include status of forces and damage assess-
ment information for both sides (U.S. and the attacker), status of allied and
other national forces, and so forth. The SAC airborne command post might re-
quire even more detailed data, e.g., location and status of spare engines, reload
weapons, fuel supplies, missile spare parts, maintenance capabilities, etc.
But even without the airborne ADP, the E-4 with the new Block I C' equip-
ment (including antennas and terminals for satellite communication) and the
greater available space, longer endurance, shorter takeoff, and other features,
will greatly enhance our command and control capabilities under nuclear at-
tack, as compared with the existing EC-135s. The new and more powerful com-
munications equipment will help to overcome interferences caused by a nuclear
environment ar jamming, as well as provide an interface with both the AFSAT-
COM satellite system and the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS).
Moreover, the E-4 will have a computer terminal through which it can connect
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directly into the WWMCCS ground-based ADP system. It can thus acquire the
latest data as long as the ground-based system continues to function. Thereafter,
it would have to operate in a manual mode, using whatever data is already
aboard plus updating by direct communications with the subordinate commands.
The additional space would accommodate the larger staffs required for manual
operations.
In order to provide an interim NEACP capability with the new aircraft, pend-
ing the development of the Block I CS equipment, the first three operational air-
craft will be equipped with the existing C' package to be transferred from three
EC-135s. The first two operational aircraft, designated E-4A and the one R&D
aircraft, designated E-4B, were funded in the FY 1973 Budget. A third opera-
tional E-4A aircraft was funded in the FY 1974 Budget. The three operational
E-4A aircraft constitute Phase 1A of the Block I program.
Phase 113 provides for the development of the Block 1 advance C' package and
for the acquisition of three operational E -4Bs, complete with the new C' pa ek-
age, for the NEACP function. The $90 million requested for FY 1975 includes
$58.8 million to continue the development of the Block I C' package, $22.3 million
for the construction of new facilities for the E-4A aircraft and alert crews, and
$9 million for the initial increment of the Block II program. The Block II funds
would be used to initiate the definition of the airborne ADP system and such
further improvements in the comznunieatio is capabilities, of the B-4B as may be
found technically feasible, desirable and cost effective. Procurement of the three
operational E-4Bs, with the Block I advanced C? package, would be funded in
FY 1976 and would complete Phase I B.
Phase 1C of the Block I program involves the retrofit of the first three E-4A
aircraft with the Block I advanced C3 package.
The total cost of the Block I program is now estimated at about $550 million.
The cost and timing of the Block II program cannot now be estimated since it
has yet to be fully defined.
The SLB3I force, when at sea, is still the element of our strategic offensive
forces least vulnerable to sudden nuclear attack. The communication links from
the NCA to the individual ballistic missile submariner, however, are less Sur-
vivable than the submarines themselves. Bence, we must make every feasible
effort to ensure reliable communications wit~a the SLBM force under all foresee-
able circumstances.
The Sanguine Elf system, in the present state of our knowledge, still holds
the best promise of providing such a survivable communications link with our
ballistic missile submarines. The Sanguine transmitters would increase the
number of aimpoints the Soviets would have to attack if they were to attempt
to disconnect communications to our submarines and have a reasonable assur-
ance of doing so. The Sanguine signals would decrease susceptibility of our
communications to atmospheric disturbances and enemy jamming. Sanguine
would also improve the survivability of the submarines themselves by removing
them and their antennas from the near-surface environment. Moreover, notwith-
standing popular fears to the contrary, the Sanguine system would pose no known
environmental, ecological, or biological dangers to the area in which it is
installed.
The need for a more survivable communications link to our ballistic missile
submarines is clear, and the technical feasibility of the Sanguine system has
been reasonably well demonstrated during the four years of work at the Wis-
consin test site. In view of the fact that we have no better alternative on hand.
I strongly urge this Committee to support tha Sanguine program. We need not
decide on the location of the operational site at this time, but we should press
forward with the development of the system and prototype testing at the exist-
ing Government test sites. Concurrently, we should conduct a comparative anal-
ysis of all potential sites with a view to making a final recommendation before the
operational system is ready for deployment. A total of $18.2 million has been
included in the FY 1075 Budget for the continuation of the Sanguine program
on this basis.
4. Civil Defense.-The shift in our strategic deterrence policy which I dis-
cussed at the beginning of this section does not diminish the need for a vigorous
Civil Defense Program. A Soviet counterforce attack which deliberately avoids
our cities-for example, a large scale attack on Minuteman--would still produce
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a large amount of nuclear fallout which could drift over our cities. It would be
highly desirable, therefore, to continue our efforts to identify additional fallout
shelter spaces for our population.
We expect to identify about eight million more shelter spaces per year,
principally from new construction. We do not plan, however, to stock any more
shelter spaces with Federal resources ; we now have about 108 million spaces
stocked for eight days usage. Instead, contingency planning will be continued by
State and local governments to complete expeditiously the stocking of all identi-
fied spaces from locally available resources in the event of an intense interna-
tional crisis.
Since it is quite possible that a period of intense crisis would occur before an
attack, it may be feasible to relocate non-essential personnel from cities and high
risk areas during such a period. Accordingly, some preliminary contingency
planning is being undertaken for this purpose, including :
The designation of high risk areas.-Through our Civil Defense Regions and in
cooperation with the States, unclassified maps depicting areas deemed to be at
high risk from the direct effects of nuclear weapons are being developed. These
maps assume military installations and industrial and population concentrations
would be high value targets. Consideration is also being given to the designation
of those areas which may be subjected to high levels of fallout as high risk
areas.
Development of plans for relocation of the population in a crisis.-As the first
step in crisis relocation planning we are developing allocation schemes to permit
the population from some 250 of our urbanized areas to be assigned to appro-
priate host areas. The primary end product of this first step is expected to be
the publication of information materials for distribution to the public in periods
of severe crisis. These publications would advise the public "where to go and
what to do" should relocation be implemented. Training of DCPA personnel and
State and local personnel in handling relocation is currently underway. During
the later portion of fiscal year 1.974 we will be conducting some eight to ten pilot
projects to provide on-the-job experience and to field test techniques. Concurrent
with the pilot projects, research and development efforts will be initiated to
provide planning guidance for State and local planning of, inter alia, food dis-
tribution during the relocation period, provision of fallout protection in host
areas, and emergency services support.
The implementation of an "all effects" shelter survey.-The survey is designed
to identify the best shelter protection available from fallout in all areas, and from
the direct effects of nuclear weapons in high risk areas. This data will provide
a basis for inplace shelter plans and also should provide input for shelter plans
for both the "key operating personnel" who would be located in target areas after
implementation of relocation plans, and the evacuated population in host areas.
The survey data should be useful for identifying the need to upgrade existing
shelter and the usefulness of expedient shelter measures.
The ability to conduct coordinated emergency operations must exist where
the people are located-Le., in the local jurisdictions throughout the United
States. This means that the Federal Government must continue to meet its
responsibilities under the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, to
provide leadership, guidance and assistance to the State and local governments.
Development of civil defense capabilities which are essential to our national
security also generates, as a bonus, an improved readiness on the part of State
and local governments to conduct coordinated operations in peacetime emergen-
cies and disasters. This peacetime capability is a secondary, but important, objec-
tive of the Civil Defense Program.
Included in the FY 1975 Budget is a total of $86.3 million for the Civil Defense
Program. Of that amount, $9 million will be required for the shelters program,
$40.3 million for financial assistance to State and local governments, and the
remainder, $37 million, for related supporting programs such as training and
education, attack warning, and radiation detection.
III. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
The resources that we commit to the general purpose forces constitute by far
the largest part of the Defense budget. Not only do they include most of the
Army, Navy, Marine Corps forces, they also cover the tactical units of the Air
Force, all of our airlift and sealift and most of our National Guard and Reserve
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forces. Our security assistance programs go to the support of the general purpose
forces of other nations. In addition, a substantial share of our outlays on in-
telligence and communications, and research and development, as well as a large
percentage of our indirect support programs, are attributable to our general
purpose forces. Although there is no precise way to allocate many of these costs,
we estimate that more than 70 percent of our Defense expenditures is attributable
to the general purpose forces and activities related to there.
The allocation of such a large proportion of the Defense budget to general
purpose forces may seem perverse in what has come to be known as the nuclear
age, but there are a number of powerful reasons for it. With the rise of Soviet
nuclear power, which has brought about an approximate parity in U.S.-Soviet
nuclear capabilities, the relative contribution to deterrence made by our own
strategic forces has inevitably declined, even though these forces continue to have
a unique and indispensable role.
In an era of world-wide U.S. interests, power politics and nuclear parity, it is
preferable to deter or to repel limited threats by limited means. To do that re-
quires a capability to place boundaries on conflicts and exercise some degree of
control over the escalation of violence in the event that deterrence should fail.
The general purpose forces, it is generally agreed, are best suited to these pur-
poses.
1. The Role of Theater Nuclear Forces.--Of the resources we invest in the gen-
eral purpose forces, almost all go to conventional rather than to our tactical
nuclear capabilities. In part, this Is so because many of our delivery systems-
artillery, short-range missiles, and tactical aircraft-are dual-capable, and there-
fore the distinction between their nuclear and their conventional role is not clear
cut. But in greater part, it is because our forces, in their conventional role, can
he used more flexibly, and contribute more to our critical defense posture and to
the world-wide military equilibrium we seek.
While it is essential to theorize about the nature of tactical nuclear warfare,
we must acknowledge that as a practical spatter, the initiation of a nuclear en-
gagement would involve many uncertainties. Acceptable boundaries on such a
conflict would be extremely difficult to establish. A nuclear engagement in the
theater could well produce much higher military and civilian casualties and
more widespread collateral damage than its non-nuclear counterpart, depending,
of course, on the character and length of the engagement. What is more, it is
not clear under what conditions the United States and its allies would possess
a comparative military advantage in a tactical nuclear exchange.
Why, then, do we maintain such large and diversified nuclear capabilities in
our main theater commands? The answer is threefold. First, maintaining these
capabilities is essential to deterrence so long as opposing forces maintain similar
capabilities. They help to deter a limited first-use of nuclear weapons by an op-
ponent and along with the conventional and nuclear forces, help create a general
deterrent against either conventional or nuclear aggression. Second, should de-
terrence fail, the tactical nuclear capabilities provide a soiree of nuclear options
for defense other than the use of the strategic forces. Third, given our doctrine
of flexible response, we do not preclude the use of nuclear weapons by the United
States and its allies in order to prevent a successful aggression.
There are, in other words, ample grounds for the continued maintenance of
tactical nuclear weapons. I do not wish to argue, however, that our current
posture-particularly in Europe-is ideal or that we do not need to improve
it in a number of respects. To the contrary, it is already evident that we must,
at a minimum, improve the survivability of these systems and upgrade their
command and control.
At the same time, I must stress that our tactical nuclear systems do not now
and are most unlikely in the future to constitute a serious substitute for a
stalwart non-nuclear defense. In fact, we must recognize in our planning that
the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons-however small, clean, and
precisely used they might be--would be the most agonizing that could face any
national leader. Accordingly, we and our allies must keep strong conventional
forces at hand. Tripwire strategies or a "plrnned insufficiency" of non-nuclear
capabilities are not sufficient for credible deterrence.
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2. Sizing the General Purpose Forces.-While the basic justification for the
general purpose forces is generally understood and accepted, it is more difficult
to determine the size, composition, and dgployment of these forces. This is re-
grettable but hardly surprising, for the process of establishing requirements (both
quantitative and qualitative) does not lend itself to the simple mathematics of
the strategic nuclear exchange.
Of course, one way to dispose of the sizing problem is simply to produce a
carbon-copy of the main threats. To adopt such a course, however, would impose
impossible demands on our resources, overlook the facts of allies and geography,
and ignore such phenomena as the Sino-Soviet split. Right now, for example,
the USSR deploys nearly a fourth of its ground forces in the vicinity of the
PRC's borders ; unless the political situation in the Par Fast changes quite
dramatically in the near future, it would be conservative planning at its worst
(and most expensive) to count these forces as part of the threat to NATO which
would necessitate countervailing forces of our own there.
A more complex but at the same time more practical procedure is to define
theaters of vital interest to the United States-theaters such as Europe, the
Middle East, Southeast Asia, Korea, Japan, and essential sea lanes--estimate
specific threats that could materialize in these theaters and the contributions
of allies, and then determine what forces we should provide to maintain an
equilibrium. Once that is done, we can go on to decide how many of these con-
tingencies might arise simultaneously.
Obviously, such a procedure is not without its problems. For example, how
appropriate is this kind of planning in an era of detente-and what is the alter-
native to some form of capabilities planning? If specific contingencies are selected
as the basis for determining our requirements, what evidence do we have that
they, rather than some unanticipated event, will occur? And what is to prevent
such planning from degenerating into an effort to anticipate every eventuality,
however remote?
I confess that there are no easy answers to these questions. But to pretend
that efforts at detente have suddenly made the world a safe place for our citizens
and their pursuits would be to fly in the face of recent evidence to the con-
trary and ignore the role of the general purpose forces in producing deterrence,
stability and the possibility of going beyond detente to a more durable peace. The
time has not yet come, in short, to abandon capabilities planning.
a. The planning process
To overcome the drawbacks of capabilities planning, and particularly to keep
our force requirements from becoming open-ended, we have developed a planning
algorithm which makes the general purpose forces the function of several fac-
tors, namely :
Our analysis of the most demanding contingencies that could arise in theaters
of primary interest to the United States and the requirements they would levy
on allied and U.S. forces;
A determination of the number of contingencies, considering the international
situation, that might occur more or less simultaneously and for which we should
have active and reserve forces available ;
The initial strategy that we and our allies should adopt, such as forward
defense ;
The length of the initial phase of the conflict and its implications for the mix of
active and reserve forces, strategic mobility, anti-submarine warfare (ASW),
and logistics.
To the extent that this planning algorithm has become a matter of public
knowledge, it has been used in a somewhat mechanical fashion primarily to
advocate a reduction in general purpose forces. To avoid future misunderstand-
ings about its application, a number of points about the algorithm should be
kept in mind.
Its purpose, in focusing on selected theaters and contingencies, is not to pre-
pare only for those eventualities. Rather, the objective is to discover what we
would need if major challenges occurred in areas of vital interest to the United
States. Once this need is determined, the general purpose forces can be sized
to these very demanding contingencies. With these baseline forces established,
we should then have in hand the capability both to deal with other contingencies
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that arise and to perform a variety of other functions in support of our foreign
policy.
This means, in turn, that once we have established our baseline requirements,
we should test their adequacy against a number of "off-design" cases to see
whether what can lick the cat can also lick the kitten. Indeed, we have recently
had just such a test thrust upon us-and a very emphirical one at that-in the
form of the Middle East war. As it turned out, our attack carriers (used as
enroute airfields) and our strategic airlift, bought for quite other purposes,
proved themselves very smartly and efficiently in an "off-design" contingency.
b. The strategic concept
in the 1960's, as a result of this planning process, we adopted a strategy and
force structure that purportedly enabled us to deal simultaneously with the initial
stages of a war in Europe, a war in Asia, and a minor contingency elsewhere.
Since 1969, with explicit acknowledgement of the Sino-Soviet split and the Presi-
dent's opening of detailed negotiations with both the USSR and the PRC, the
strategic concept has been changed in the following major respects.
We now plan our forces to deal with a major conflict in Europe or Asia and
to respond simultaneously to a minor contingency elsewhere. Thus, we have
dropped one of the big contingencies for which we most be simultaneously pre-
pared and have adopted, in the jargon, a 11war strategy instead of the 21/
war strategy of the 1960's.
The change in strategic concept has accompanied the reduction in the baseline
general purpose forces. The principal change was the reduction in the number
of active Army divisions from 16% in 1064 to 13 in 1973. (Although the number
of naval combatants has also declined substantially, the result is more a function
of budgetary constraints and the retirement of obsolescent ships than of the
changes in strategy-).
The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine, and the modified
strategic concept-accompanied by these reductions in active forces-have led
to the recurrent expectations that large savings in the budget for the general
pnrpo.ve forces could be realized. Yet in current dollars, the costs of the reduced
general purpose forces have continued to rise. Part of the reason for this seem-
ingly perverse effect is, of course, inflation and the disturbingly rapid increase
in the price of new weapon systems. But the most important factor has been
the increased cost of manpower as we have adopted pay comparability and
phased out the draft. As It consequence, we have to recognize that:
The general purpose forces tend to be manpower-intensive so that unit costs
are bound to be. higher than they were a decade ago ;
Substantial general purpose forces will nonetheless be required if we are to
maintain a worldwide equilibrium and at the same time avoid increased reliance
on nuclear weapons ;
Even so, we still need to practice greater efficiency in the utilization of the
manpower that we acquire.
3. The Planning Contingencies. The strategic concept determines the overall
requirement for general purpose forces. But the planning contingencies are what
generate the specific demand for divisions, air wings, war reserve stocks, strategic
mobility and naval forces. The two contingencies that constitute the main basis
for force planning are :
An attack on NATO by the nations of the Warsaw Pact, led by the USSR;
An attack in either Northeast or Southeast Asia with the direct involvement of
the forces of a major power.
While these may be considered unlikely contingencies, we find them useful
for several reasons:
They provide a measure of the threats that could be deployed against us.
They take account of allied contributions in key theaters.
Their low probability may well be a function of the fact that we prepare
for them.
They provide the principal variables that determine the qualitative aspects of
our forces,
a. The Center Region of NATO
The most demanding feature of the NATO contingency is the potential threat
to the Center Region. It creates two sets of risks for the Alliance. The first is
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the danger of surprise attack launched by the deployed forces of the Warsaw
Pact. The second is the possibility of an assault after a period of mobilization and
deployment by the Pact.
(1) The deployed threat
We estimate that the forces which the Pact could launch against the Center
(that is, the Federal Republic of Germany) with very little warning consist of:
The 27 divisions deployed by the USSR in East Germany, Poland and Czech-
oslovakia ;
The 31 divisions deployed by East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland ;
About 2,800 aircraft, of which the majority are primarily air-to-air fighters.
These 58 divisions represent a very immediate and palpable threat to the Center
Region. Moreover, we believe that the 27 Soviet divisions (which do not include
the four Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions in Hungary) constitute a much
larger force than would be required by any defensive mission in Eastern Europe.
The more than 8,000 tanks which we estimate these Soviet forces to possess fur-
ther underlines their offensive potential. It should be recalled, however, that :
Warsaw Pact division forces are substantially smaller than their NATO
counterparts;
Deployed Pact manpower in these ground forces amounts to about 925,000 men ;
The Warsaw Pact maintains less of its logistics structure in peace time than
does NATO.
To counter this immediate threat, NATO has in the Center Region of Europe
about 201/3 divisions and more than 2,700 aircraft in a roughly comparable area
of Western Europe. The total includes five French and 41/3 United States divisions
(but, not our Berlin brigade or two armored cavalry regiments). Manpower in
ground forces amounts to about 770,000, including French forces in Germany.
Around half of our tactical aircraft are fighter-bombers.
As a consequence of these deployments, there is an approximate balance be-
tween the immediately available forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the
Center Region. The Pact has an advantage over NATO in the number of men
in ground forces. The Pact also has a large numerical superiority in tanks (about
15,500 to 6,000 for NATO). But NATO possesses important quantitative or quali-
tative advantages in tank destroyers, antitank weapons, trucks, logistic support,
and-most important of all-modern fighter aircraft.
Our Army forces in West Germany and our tactical air wings in West Ger-
many and the United Kingdom make a vital contribution to the maintenance
of this balance in Central Europe. They constitute about one-fourth of the total
ground forces and the modern fighter attack aircraft in the Center Region.
As the arithmetic of the situation demonstrates, the Pact has some quantita-
tive advantages. Unilateral withdrawals of United States ground and tactical
air forces from Europe, despite the continued massive Soviet presence, could
begin to tilt what has proven to be a relatively stable balance dangerously in
favor of the Warsaw Pact.
In the circumstances, I cannot in good conscience recommend that we take out
units short of an agreement with the Pact on mutual and balanced force reduc-
tions. Whatever their other roles--and they are important-the United States
forces in Europe, in their current size and composition, perform a critical mili-
tary function, and it is much more than to serve as part of a tripwire. They are
sized to help maintain a stalwart conventional defense against an attack by
the Pact after little warning, and I believe that mission continues to be essential
despite the steps we have taken toward detente.
To stress the importance of the United States contribution to the defense of
Western Europe, and to the maintenance of a conventional balance of deployed
power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, is not to argue that we can be
complacent about the situation in the Center Region as it now exists. The Soviets
continue to add to and improve their capabilities there. And, as I have stressed
to our allies in NATO, the relative weight of the European contribution to the
common defense needs to increase still further. Our confidence in the balance,
which is not yet very high, must also be strengthened by a series of specific
improvements in the allied posture. In particular, I have proposed :
Actions to reduce the balance of payments and budgetary costs of current U.S.
deployments so that we can comply with the Jackson-Nunn Amendment and at
the same time avoid unilateral troop withdrawals ;
Measures to increase our defense effectiveness which include an expanded
program of aircraft shelters, improved coordination among allied tactical air
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forces, more antitank weapons, and a more substantial position in war reserve
stocks.
(2) The mobilized threat
The adoption of these and other programs does not signify any change in basic
NATO strategy ; nor does it preclude the use of nuclear weapons should a Pact
assault prove of overwhelming weight and speed. However, our efforts should
contribute to the deterrence not only of attack by the deployed forces but also
of the other and larger attacks of which the Pact is capable.
I am reasonably optimistic about our abiL.ty to deter even the largest of these
attacks, provided that the Alliance continues with and expands its force improve-
ment programs. As matters now stand, however, the probability of a successful
forward defense by conventional means only is lower than I consider prudent.
How the Soviet marshals would rate their own chances for a successful attack
is uncertain.
While caution is appropriate about the numbers, we believe that the Warsaw
Pact could, with a few weeks mobilization, deploy on the order of 80-90 divisions
to the Center Region. The bulk of the reinforcements would have to come from
the Soviet Union and would probably be drawn from the military districts in
Western Russia. With additional time and risk, further reinforcements could he
deployed from as far away as the Sino-Soviet border.
This latter threat: would have a significant probability of breaking through
NATO's forward defense. But the USSR, like NATO, must also be concerned
about theaters other than the Center. Consequently, while we aspire to deal with
even the high threat, we concentrate for current planning purposes on the "desig-
nated" threat of 80-90 divisions.
How rapidly the Pact could make this total force ready for attack is a matter
of uncertainty. There is little doubt about the ability of the Soviets to call up
and move large numbers of men into East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
at a very rapid pace. Whether these forces would be fully combat ready with all
of their logistics support in place is debatable. Nevertheless, we assume for plan-
ning purposes that the Pact could have its 80-90 divisions essentially on line and
ready to attack in the Center Region within a relatively short period of mobiliza-
tion.
The speed and power with which NATO could respond to the "designated"
threat within the same timeframe is another factor surrounded by uncertainty.
That we would acquire very prompt indications of so massive an undertaking is
hardly in doubt. Essentially in question is how the Alliance would evaluate this
information and how long it would take to decide on NATO's response. For plan-
ning purposes, we assume that NATO would start its mobilization somewhat
later than the Warsaw Pact.
Whether these are reasonable assumptions can be argued. During the Berlin
crisis of 1961, the I'nited States actually mob' lived two National Guard divisions.
alerted two others, and moved about 40,000 n:en to Europe prior to any action by
the Pact to mobilize additional forces. In 196E. however, NATO did not take overt
action when the Soviets deployed forces into Eastern Europe for the invasion of
Czechoslovakia.
If a reasonable amount of time is available for a NATO mobilization and de-
ployment, a great deal can be done to defer..d against the "designated" threat.
Exactly what forces would be required from the United States, and how rapidly,
would depend on the size and speed of the Soviet reinforcement.
In terms of manpower, the U.S. contribution could he substantial and quick.
Indeed, if manpower alone were the only tes of effectiveness, the European Al-
lies could match the "designated" threat with very little additional U.S. effort.
However, numbers of organized units, levels of equipment, stocks of war con-
sumables, and other variables are also impcrtant, and substantial numbers of
U.S. ground and air forces would be needed.
In addition to the 41/1 divisions and 22 tactical air squadrons already deployed,
we stockpile the equopment for at least 2'/s divisions in Europe. In CONUS itself
we maintain 32/; heavy Army divisions in the active forces that we could commit
to SACEUR. To these eight divisions (4%+3%), we could add at ]east four other
active divisions and several Reserve component brigades. To complement the
ground forces, we could also provide at least 38 active and reserve fighter-attack
squadrons along with supporting reconnaissance and ECM aircraft.
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With the war reserves that we propose to stockpile, we should be able to fight
these forces longer than we believe that the Pact could sustain its attack.
To stress that we and our NATO allies have the ground and tactical air forces
to mount a stalwart defense against the "designated" (or expected) Pact threat
does not mean that we can view the situation in Europe with complacency. As I
have indicated, NATO has somewhat fewer forces than the Pact, and if more
pessimistic assumptions are made about several key variables (such as Pact
mobilization and deployment time, warning and allied responses), the NATO
position begins to look more precarious and the nuclear threshold becomes lower.
It is also the case that while a rough balance of forces is essential to deterrence,
it by no means guarantees an acceptable outcome for NATO if deterrence should
fail. Even as we preserve the equilibrium, there remain a number of quantitative
and qualitative weaknesses in our collective posture that must be removed.
b. The flanks of NATO
While the needs of the Center Region of NATO and our sea lines of communica-
tion provide the basis for most of our general purpose forces, it would be impru-
dent to assume that these would be the only theaters of conflict. The flanks of
NATO-the Northern and Southern Regions-could easily come under attack
separately or simultaneously in default of adequate deterrent forces.
The. Soviets maintain ready divisions in the vicinity of Norway's lightly-
defended northern frontier. In the South, the four Soviet divisions in Hungary,
other units in the USSR itself and Hungarian, Bulgarian and Rumanian forces,
constitute a potential threat to Italy, Greece and Turkey. As a consequence, both
flanks may require additional support both on the ground and in the air.
c. Asia
Asian requirements have greatly affected our general purpose forces planning
in the past decade. Beginning in 1969, with the advent of this Administration,
significant reductions in the size of our forces in Asia have taken place. These
reductions stem from major changes in our relations with Asian powers in the
last few years, especially with the PRC ; the withdrawal of United States forces
from South Vietnam; and the growth in capabilities of our Asian Allies-capa-
bilities which are now quite considerable. As a result of these changes, the re-
quirement to maintain Asia-oriented forces is less demanding than in the past.
Nevertheless, we consider the possibility of conflict in Asia in deciding upon
the characteristics and forward deployment of United States forces, because the
continuing instabilities in Asia could involve the United States, and because
having the visible capability to act can help to avoid, through deterrence, the
necessity for action. A further large-scale or rapid reduction of United States
forces in the Western Pacific would have unsettling effects in the region. There-
fore, we continue to deploy one Arniy division to South Korea ; a Marine Am-
phibious Force in Japan, including Okinawa, three tactical fighter wings at
various bases in the Pacific, tactical fighter squadrons in Thailand, and B-52
aircraft on Guam and in Thailand ; and naval deployments, including three car-
rier task :forces, in the Western Pacific and, on occasion, in the Indian Ocean.
In Northeast Asia, South Korea's defense capabilities have been considerably
improved in the last five years-to such an extent that, when the present mod-
ernization program is completed, we may have reasonable confidence in South
Korea's ability to defend itself against an unaided attack by North Korea. At
the moment, the principal role of our forces in Korea is to provide a hedge
against the uncertainties and deficiencies in South Korea's defense posture, and
to provide an inducement to caution on the part of North Korea against the
precipitation of new hostilities.
As we look forward, we see the most useful role for United States forces in
the Pacific as providing a strong measure of visible support for our Allies, a
credible deterrent to those who might risk new hostilities, and a general um-
brella under which our Allies can pursue negotiations and internal development
in an environment that encourages cooperation and discourages hostilities. There-
fore, our present plans call for maintaining our forward deployments in the
Pacific.
We also intend to retain capabilities for Asian contingencies in our general
purpose forces. For instance, we maintain both Army and Marine divisions in
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the United States which are rapidly deployable and have a capability to operate
in the Asian environment. Our tactical air forces retain a rapid deployment capa-
bility and are able to operate under austere conditions if necessary. We also
retain a naval presence in the Pacific and must be able to defend the long supply
line to the Far East.
We do look to the possibility of additional reductions in our air forces in
Thailand and our B-52 force on Guam, when the situation in Southeast Asia
permits.
We are also strongly recommending to the Congress a continuation of the
essential military assistance programs needed by our Allies to strengthen their
general purpose forces and improve their defensive capabilities in this difficult
period until more lasting peace arrangements are achieved. The stronger our
Allies, the greater is the incentive for North Vietnam and North Korea to seek
negotiated solutions, thus enhancing the possibility for peace in this troubled
part of the world.
(1) Antisubmarine warfare
Although we would have to depend primarily on active forces and airlift for
a quick NATO mobilization and the early stages of a war in Central Europe,
there are obvious risks in placing such heavy reliance on only one form of mo-
bility. Moreover, we should be able to start delivering very large tonnages by sea
within a relatively short time after having established our sea lines of communi-
cation (SLOC). These tonnages could be of great value in a prolonged mobiliza-
tion ; they might contribute to the initial stages of a large-scale defense, and they
would be essential to a more protracted conflict. For all these reasons we main-
tain some sealift, would charter more in an emergency, and would deploy sub-
stantial antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces--principally in the form of attack
submarines, patrol aircraft, carrier air, and escorts-for protection of the sea
lanes.
The precise justification for the size and composition of our ASW forces is
quite complex and I do not propose to discuss it in detail. It should be evident,
however, that the main threat to our Atlantic (and Pacific) shipping comes from
the large Soviet attack and cruise missile submarine force. Our most effective
strategy against this threat is a defense in depth, based on a series of barriers-
manned primarily by submarines and aircraft-between the enemy threat and
allied shipping. In addition, we would want to provide close-in protection for our
merchant marine (particularly in convoy) with surface escorts and carrier-based
aircraft.
These functions permit calculations of kill probabilities for various types and
numbers of ASV systems against the threat, and thus lead to the establishment
of force requirements. Our current estimate, are that with existing and planned
U.S. and Allied ASW forces, we could eventaally turn back the enemy submarine
threat without an unacceptable loss to our merchant shipping or to our naval
forces.
(2) Sea control
While I have placed primary emphasis on the submarine threat, I do not wish
to underestimate the emergence of the Soviet surface fleet and land-based naval
aircraft as factors of increasing weight in the maritime balance of power. We
have estimated in the past that most of these ocean-going vessels, the long-range
aircraft, and portions of the attack and cruise missile submarine forces were
intended to counter our carrier task forces.
Now, however, Soviet objectives may be more ambitious. With the launching
of one 40,000-ton carrier (comparable in size hut not in mission to our Essex
class) and the construction of another underway, with continuing efforts to es-
tablish overseas bases on the coasts of Africa, in the Indian Ocean, and in Cuba,
and with a gradual growth in open-ocean operations, the Soviet leaders are clearly
intent on making their naval presence felt on a worldwide basis. With the reopen-
ing of the Suez Canal, this objective will become more easily attainable.
These expanded forces and operations may be primarily designed to establish
a political presence, but for the first time they put the Soviet Union in a posi-
tion to challenge the United 'States and its allies for control of the seas. Cer-
tainly that has already been the effect cf their naval deployments in the
Mediterranean.
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Whichever may be the correct interpretation, we are determined to maintain
our own sea lines of communication on a worldwide basis and to ensure that the
naval balance of power does not tilt against us. In the long run, we anticipate
that, with homeporting, 12 carrier task forces--five in the Atlantic and Medi-
terranean, and seven in the eastern and western Pacific-are adequate to any
challenge from the Soviet surface navy and long-range aircraft in regions of
interest to the U.S. FIowever, qualitative improvement in those task forces tand
in our other surface combatants, will be necessary in order to upgrade
defenses against antiship missiles and to improve the range and accuracy of our
own attack ordnance. I shall discuss these improvements when I come to the
specific programs for the Navy general purpose forces.
As part of the effort to ensure a naval balance, we plan to expand our facili-
ties at Diego Garcia and maintain a more frequent presence in the Indian Ocean.
We may also wish to consider the use of long-range land-based aircraft for patrol
in that general area. .
4. Other Planning Factors.
a. Strategic mobility
I do not propose here to review what constitutes the preferred choice among
such options as deployed forces, prepositioned equipment, and various types of
strategic mobility (airlift and sealift). As a result of previous decisions and
because we support the strategy of forward defense, we are committed to a mix
of deployed forces, prepositioned equipment, and heavy dependence on strategic
airlift in the form of C-141's and C-5A's. An earlier deployment concept designed
to deliver the required number of divisions within a relatively short time called
for a. larger number of C-5A's than we have procured, plus a fleet of Fast De-
ployment Logistic Ships that we have not acquired at all. As a consequence, while
we have adequate forces to reinforce the Center Region, we do not have sufficient
lift to get them all there as rapidly as we would like.
We may be designing to a scenario that is excessively demanding. If it were
to take the Pact longer than we assume to deploy its 80-90 divisions, the time-
table for our own deployments could be relaxed somewhat. Furthermore, if the
European allies continue to improve their reserve forces, as the Federal Republic
of Germany is doing with its Territorial Army, the pressure to deploy all the
U.S. reinforcements by a very early date may decline. In either of these cir-
cumstances, a late arriving division may be more valuable to the defense of the
Center Region than we currently assess it to be. I should add that even under
the current scenario, forces deploying after D-day may still have an important
role to play in strengthening NATO's defenses.
I do not consider it wise, however, to bank on all the uncertainties turning
out in our favor. In any event, our strategic airlift demonstrated its worth dur-
ing the recent war in the Middle East, and other occasions may arise when we
will want to exploit its capability on an even larger scale. Accordingly, I believe
that we should expand our airlift so as to enhance our NATO reinforcement
capability. That, in turn, should give us ample capacity for Pacific contingencies
and the `off-design" cases that -I have mentioned earlier.
If we are to increase our strategic airlift to handle the requisite amount of
tonnage for the NATO contingency, we should also improve the readiness of our
ground forces to exploit it. It is not efficient to have a large and costly capacity
for long-range mobility if equipment and men are not ready for loading as it
becomes available. Nor will the lift have been fully utilized if units, having
debarked from their aerial ports, cannot move to their combat positions in a
timely fashion. Therefore, I shall also propose specific measures to accelerate
the deployability of our forces.
b. National Guard and Reserve Forces
As should be evident, our contingency planning depends heavily on the National
Guard and Reserve as well as on our active forces. This means that to be
useful, they should have a high standard of readiness. Whether, in fact, they
do, and whether they are worth their costs, is a recurrent question. It is
perhaps most relevant to the Army ground forces.
During the past decade, the costs of the Army Reserve and National Guard
forces have nearly tripled, and they now have received substantial quantities
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of modern equipment. Yet despite repeated efforts to increase their readiness,
even the highest-priority Army Reserve brigades do not become available for
deployment as early as we would like. Except under very optimistic assumptions
about the time required for Pact mobilization and deployment, the upshot is
that the majority of Army Guard and Reserve units cannot play a role in
the early and critical stages of a war in Cen?ral Europe.
I recognize, of course, that the Army Guard and Reserve have other important
functions to perform in circumstances where mobilization and deployment pro-
ceed at a more leisurely pace, as was the case during the Berlin crisis of 1961. I
also believe that we should take out some insurance against the possibility of
a war in Europe continuing at high intensity for a protracted period even
though our first priority must go to outlasting the Pact in the first phase of an
assault. The National Guard and Reserve provide that insurance.
However, we must examine whether we are getting an adequate return from
our investment in these forces in terms of their contribution to our more
demanding contingency plans. My initial examination last fall led to my deci-
sion that some cuts should be taken in those units that are only marginally
effective, with the savings that result to be applied to increasing the capability
of other Reserve Component units. I have directed that, a more comprehensive
study of the Reserve and National Guard be made, and this study is now
underway.
5. Summary.-It should be clear from the foregoing that we place consider-
able emphasis on NATO in our planning algorithm. However, because we are
planning on a moderate basis to respond to the various NATO contigencies, we
have the forces available for, and largely suitable to, other eventualities. At the
same time, we are avoiding the extremes cf an open-ended demand for general
purpose forces and a completely arbitrary sizing and deployment of the forces
related only to intuition (however well informed) about the current political
climate. To follow the moderate course I have outlined does not, however, ab-
solve us from continuing to test our baseline forces against "off-design" contin-
gencies. Nor should it cause us to ignore well-established political trends that
warrant changes in our basic force structure and deployments.
I realize that in laying out the basis on which we plan our general purpose
forces, I may invite controversy. Challenges no doubt can be leveled at the as-
sumptions we make about continguencies, scenarios, threats, warning times,
allied contribution and the other factors that are so critical to the size, composi-
tion and deployment of our forces. But sirce controversy already exists about
these forces. I would prefer to see the public informed to the fullest extent pos-
sible so that we can join with our critics to see where, specifically, our differences
lie. Only then can we consider systematically the options and their implications.
My own view is that :
The general purpose forces will continue to grow in importance as nuclear
parity continues.
We have a minimum of these forces considering the extent of our interests
and responsibilities and the capabilities of potential opponents.
To reduce the force structure further would undermin
th
e
e stability that
comes from a basic equilibrium, and would lower the chances for a more endur-
ing
peace.
We are, however, reassessing the types of forces we have and, in particular,
the size and contribution of the support st-ucture, to see whether adjustments
can produce a more effective overall force balance with greater combat capability.
Whether or not there is agreement with these judgments, I trust that there
will be no doubt about the basis for them. I will now proceed to the specific pro-
grams we propose to support the general purpose forces.
B. LAND FORCES
In consonance with the foregoing policy considerations, we propose to main-
tain in FY 1975 a land forces structure of somewhat more than 25 Division
Force Equivalents (DFEs)-211/ Army active and reserve component divi-
sions and four Marine Corps active and reserve divisions. This force is 1/3 of a
division larger than that planned for FY 1974. but it provides about 7%/,4 fewer
DFEs than we had at the end of FY 1968, the Vietnam peak. The Army intends
to strive for a greater than planned combat strength in its FY 1975 force struc-
ture by reducing headquarters and support elements.
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The land forces structure is expressed here in terms of Division Force Equiva-
lents because that concept provides a good standard of measure for land forces
capabilities. In the Army (active and reserve) it encompasses the division itself
plus two support increments (SIs), totaling about 48,000 men. A comparable
Marine Corps force, totaling about 32,000 men, would include the division itself,
supporting force troop units, and selected helicopter, helicopter support, and
anti-air missile units which are organic to a Marine Aircraft Wing.
The DFE is a notional concept in the sense that it is an average used for the
planning and management of the overall force structure, particularly in the
Army. For example, an Army force structure of 21 DFEs would require more
than one million men when deployed abroad for sustained combat. In peacetime,
however, some of the support increments for the active forces, including those
deployed abroad, are maintained in the reserve components, as shown below for
end FY 1974.
Support
Divisions increments
Active Army: iyy y
------
Deployed in Europe-------------------------------------------------- 1
Deployedin Korea--------------------------------------------------------- g
Deployed in the United States------------------------------------------------
14
Total, Active------------------------------------------------------------- 13 27a,5
Army Reserve components------------------------------------------------------
Total, Army -------------------------------------------------------------21 4134
The support increments include not only such familiar service support units
as medical, supply, maintenance, transportation, and construction, but also com-
bat and combat support units such as separate brigades and battalions, armored
cavalry regiments, artillery battalions, air defense battalions, surface-to-surface
missile battalions, and aviation units.
Obviously, the composition of a particular force would be tailored to the
requirements of the combat theater for which it is designed. An Army Corps
designed for deployment in Western Europe, for example, would differ markedly
from one designed for deployment in South Korea or Southeast Asia. These dif-
ferences are taken into account in planning the total Army force structure.
While 48,000 may still be a good estimate of the number of personnel required
to man and support a U.S. Army division in sustained combat abroad, I am by
no means satisfied that the allocation between combat and support spaces is at
the optimum. Nor am I satisfied that the number of service support units de-
ployed abroad is at the proper level, considering our rapid reinforcing capabili-
ties and the service support functions which our allies could provide both in
peacetime and in wartime. As I indicated earlier, we are now actively reexamin-
ing these so-called "teeth to tail" issues, not only in the Army but also in the
other services.
1. FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES
In FY 1975, we will begin to see the effects of our efforts to reallocate Army
resources from support and headquarters into combat forces ; about nine maneu-
ver battalions will be added to the active Army structure. The 25th Infantry
? Division, with only six active maneuver battalions, will continue to rely on one
National Guard infantry brigade (two Bns), plus one separate Reserve infantry
battalion for roundout. However, the Army has an independent brigade (197th)
which is counted as part of the 131/3 division force and which could be used to
roundout this division in a nonmobilization situation. The associated reserve
component units will be closely supervised by the parent division staff and will
take their summer training with that division.
In addition, four reserve component brigades (1 airborne and 3 infantry) are
being converted to two mechanized and two armored brigades in FY 1974. These
four new "heavy" brigades will be added to the five existing mechanized and
one existing armored brigade (making a total of seven mechanized and three
armored brigades) now earmarked for early deployment in a major contingency.
Two more infantry brigades may be converted to mechanized brigades in FY
1975, depending upon the availability of equipment. We know from experience
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that a reserve component brigade can be made ready for deployment much
sooner than a reserve component division. Hence the emphasis is being placed
on brigades, rather than on divisions, for the early deployment role.
Over and above these two ongoing efforts to make the total force concept a
reality, we are now considering a plan to affiliate a substantial number of re-
serve component batttalions with the active Army divisions and the early de-
ployment reserve brigades. The brigades of an Army division are normally as-
signed three or four battalions but are organized to control as many as five bat-
talions. By taking advantage of this broader control potential, we can signifi-
cantly increase our early reinforcing capability, since in the event of a war the
affiliated battalions could mobilize and deploy as part of' the active Army divi-
sions and early deployment reserve brigades.
This concept is a new departure for the United States Army. We will be
watching with great interest the progress of this experiment in total force
planning.
A comprehensive study is now underway to provide an in-depth analysis of
all the factors involved In enhancing the contribution of the National Guard
and the Reserve under the Total Force policy. Organization, manning, recruiting,
retention, equipment, training requirements. operational :readiness, mobilization
deployment objectives, management systems and structures, programming,
budgeting and funding procedures, and possible trade-offs between Active and
Guard/Reserve forces will all be considered in this study.
Meanwhile, it would be inefficient to maintain units no longer needed, or units
which cannot be adequately equipped or trained. Accordingly, we are now taking
steps to make improvements in reserve component readiness, both in equipment
and training. To provide resources for these improvements, I am proposing
some reductions in the size of the Army reserve components, both in structure
and in paid drill strength. The reductions in structure will come from units which
are excess to our needs and from other management actions. We will provide the
details on these structure changes as our planning progresses.
With respect to the combat support forces, the first Chaparral/Vulcan air
defense batteries are scheduled to be introduced into the Army reserve compo-
nent in FY 1975. Subsequently, the first Aerial Fire Support Units will enter
the forces.
in the active Army forces, the deployment of the new Lance surface-to-surface
missile will permit the last of the Sergeant and Honest John units to be phased
out. A modified version of the AT-1G equipped with the Tow missile, the All-IQ
(Cobra-Tow), will also be introduced into the active Army.
No significant changes are planned in the :Marine Corps force structure. How-
ever, beginning In FY 1975 one rifle company in each of 18 of the 27 active
infantry battalions may be carried at zero strength. (In FY 1973-74 one conm-
pany in each of nine battalions was carried at zero strength.) This arrangement,
or some suitable alternative, Is made necessary by the general squeeze on active
duty personnel. The equipment for these companies could be placed in storage.
In an emergency, given the additional personnel authorization, the Marine Corps
could quickly man these 18 companies by drawing on trait.ed personnel in other
less essential assignments.
2. LAND FORCES MOD)rRNIZATION
In contrast to the naval, air and mobility forces, the land forces are organized
primarily around formations designed to accomplish specific functions rather
than around equipment. Hence, the same kinds of equipment are used by several
different types of organizations, including both Army and Marine Corps. Accord-
ingly, this discussion will be focused on specific items of equipment without
reference to the kind of units that will employ them.
As I noted at the beginning of this section of the Report, in addition to con-
tinned equipment modernization we now need to improve substantially the
materiel readiness of our general purpose forces, including the replacement of
assets provided to Israel or otherwise consumed in connection with the recent
Middle East conflict. Shown on the following table are the major land forces
equipment modernization and Improvement programs proposed in the FY 197
Budget, as compared with the amounts provided for those programs in FY 1973
and now planned for FY 1974. The FY 1974 figures include the FY 1974 Supple-
mental requests, shown in parentheses.
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ACQUISITION COSTS OF MAJOR LAND FORCES MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS'
din millions of dollars]
1973
1974
1975
actual
planned
proposed
funding
funding2
funding
Close combat (tank/antitank):
Continued modification and procurement of M60series tanks (includ-
ing Marine Corps)-------------------------------------------
(47)227
250
Modification and procurement of M88 recovery vehicle (including
Marine Corps) ------------------------
3
59
Procurementdfarmoredpersonnel carrier(M113A1)_ ________________________ _
(4
)
-------------
Development of new main battle tank________________ 22
4
69
Developmentofinechanizedinfantry combat vehicle (MNV)___------ 8
12
9
Development and procurement of armored reconnaissance scout
vehicle ----------------------------------------------------- 12
Development and continued procurement of TOW and Dragon anti-
tank missiles (including Marine Corps)_________________________ 97
(92)217
Attack helicopters:
Procurement of TOW modification for Cobra attack helicopter(AH-1)---------------- 73
Procurement of Cobra-TOW attack helicopter (AH-IQ)-----------------------------------------
Procurement of Sea Cobra attack helicopter_______________________ 34 26
Development of advanced attack helicopter________________________ 20 49
Air defense:
Acquisition and testing of foreign short range air defense system
(SHORANS) missile and Chaparral modifications_________________ 4 3
61
Stingger missile system----------------------------------------- 20 25
34
AN/ TSQ-73 air defense control and coordination system_____________ 5 13
7
Acquisition of improved Hawk surface-to-air missile systems (includ-
ing Marine Corps) ------------------------------------------- 144 137
11
1
Continued development of SAM-D surface-to-air missile system------ 171 194
11
Fire support (surface-to-surface missiles):
Development, modification, and procurement of Pershing missile
___________ 56 64
system
31
__
Acquisition of Lance missile system_____________________________ 104 81
65
Combat support (air mobility helicopters):
Continued development of utility tactical transport aircraft system
(UTTAS) ------------------ 50 103
54
Continued development of heavy 38 60
58
r Includes costs of R.D.T. & E., procurement of the system and initial spares, and directly related military construction.
2 Figures in parentheses are the amounts included in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental.
a. Close combat (tank/anti-tank) program
The recent Middle East conflict reaffirmed our earlier conclusion that modern
anti-tank weapons fired from the air as well as the ground can provide an effec-
tive counter to the modern tank. The anti-tank weapon, however, is primarily
a defensive weapon and cannot take the place of the more versatile tank, particu-
larly in the offensive role. Hence, a proper balance of both types of weapons is
required in any combat theater that lends itself to mobile armored operations.
Placed in the NATO-Warsaw Pact context, where our overall strategy is
primarily defensive while the other side's strategy is primarily offensive, modern
anti-tank weapons in sufficient numbers can help to offset the Warsaw Pacts
superiority in numbers of tanks. Accordingly, we plan to continue our efforts to
improve NATO's anti-tank capabilities while at the same time we continue to
modernize our tank forces.
MOO series tanks
For the near term modernization of our tank forces we propose to continue the
procurement of the M60A1 series tanks. Last year, it was planned to increase the
rate of production of the M6OA1 series tanks from 360 per year (for the Army
only) to 480 and then to about 515 per year through FY 1976 to provide the
Marine Corps 428 M60A1 tanks to replace their old M48s and M103s. Now, in
view of the lessons learned from the recent Middle East war and to replace the
tanks furnished to Israel, we have decided to increase MOO series tank production
to about 665 per year over the next few years.
Furthermore, we believe the Army should replace more of the gasoline pow-
ered M48 tanks still assigned to its reserve components. Accordingly, we have
included in the FY 1974 Supplement about $47 million for an addition 133 M60A1
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tanks, some of which will replace tanks sold to Israel. (In addition, the Army
will buy 155 M60A1 tanks with the funds eeceived from the sale of less costly,
earlier model tanks to Israel.) Thus, a total of 768 M60A1 tanks would be funded
in FY 1974-648 for the Army and 120 for the Marine Corps.
For FY 1975 we are requesting a total of $250 million for M60 tanks, includ-
ing $234 million for the procurement of 664 tanks (510 Improved M60A1s for the
Army and 154 MG0A1s for the Marine Corps), $8 million for RDT&E, and $8
million to equip some existing M60A1s with acid-on gun stabilization, top loading
air cleaner, improved reliability engines, and improved electrical systems.
The last of the 428 Marine Corps M60s are scheduled for procurement in FY
1976, at which time the Army plans to buy the M60A3 which, in addition to the
add-on stabilization and other improvements mentioned above, will have a laser
rangefinder, solid state ballistic computer, tube-over-bar suspension, and com-
mander/gunner passive nightsight. The M60A3s (and the M60A1s to be retrofitted
to the M60A3 configuration) will replace the earlier M60s in the active Army, and
the earlier M60s in turn will replace old M48s in the reserve components.
M88 recovery vehicle
The M88 recovery vehicle, which has been out of production since the early
1960s, is designed to retrieve disabled tanks of M60 sine from the battlefield
under combat conditions. The existing M88s are powered by gasoline engines.
We now propose to buy a diesel-powered version of this vehicle and convert all
the existing M88s in the inventory to diesel power. A total of nearly $59 million
is included in the FY 1975 Budget-$50.3 million for procurement of 117 M88s
(77 for the Army and 40 for the Marine Corps), and $8.4 million for the con-
version of the first increment of M88s to the M88A1 diesel engine configuration.
A final buy of the M88A1 is planned for F`_? 1976, and retrofit kit procurement
is planned through FY 1978.
Armored personnel carrier (M113A1)
We are also requesting about $41 million in the FY 1974 Supplemental for the
procurement of 923 M113AI s-some to replace vehicles provided to Israel and
the bulk of them to replace the M114 three-man, command and reconnaissance
vehicles used in the reconnaissance role. Tle M114 has proven to be very diffi-
cult to maintain and the Army needs a more dependable vehicle, such as the
M113A1. The use of the A1113A1 in place of the 11114 in Europe is intended as an
interim measure since the M114s now in use there are scheduled 1:o be replaced
eventually by the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle (ARSV) which is now
in development. These additional M113A1s, when no longer needed in Europe,
would be used to replace other M114s in the active Army.
h ew main battle tank
For the longer term modernization of the Army tank inventory, we are pro-
ceeding with the development of the new main battle tank, the XM-1. This
program is the successor to the X11-803 (MET-70) which was terminated by the
Congress in 1971. The XM-1 development program was approved by the Deputy
Secretary of Defense in January 1973, and in June 1973 contracts were placed
with two firms to develop prototypes for competitive evaluation. The $69 mil-
lion request for the XM-1 in FY 1975 is to continue development.
The XM-1 will probably have the same main armament as the M60A3 (i.e.,
the 105mm gun), improved fire control, and a new type of armor which prom-
ises increased survivability against modern anti-tank weapons. The acquisition
cost of the tank itself will be about twice as much as the M60 A3, but on a ten
year system cost basis (i.e., the cost of buying the tank plus ten years of opera-
tion) the cost would be only 20 percent higher. Even so, the question remains:
Is the XM-1 likely to be worth 20 percent more than the M60A3? The answer is
not yet clear ; it depends largely on how much better the new type armor proves
to be a s compared with the M60A3 armor.
Our M60A1 is certainly as good, if not better than the Soviet T-62. We cannot
prudently assume, however, that Soviet tank technology has come to a stand-
still ; they may be working even now on a new, significantly improved medium
tank. Furthermore, as the recent Middle East war again has demonstrated, our
tanks must not only be able to defeat the opposing tanks, they must also be able
to survive against the opposing tanks and anti-tank weapons. In this respect, the
XM-1 should have a distinct advantage over our M60 series tanks.
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Accordingly, I believe it would be wise to proceed with the XM-1 development
program to provide both an option for the production of a new, more survivable
main battle tank for the 1980s, as well as a hedge against a Soviet breakthrough
in tank technology.
MICV
The $9 million included in the PY 1975 Budget for the MICV program will con-
tinue development of this new lightly armored, tracked, infantry fighting vehicle
and its primary armament, the Bushmaster system. First procurement for the
operational inventory is scheduled in FY 1977. The initial procurement objective
is 1,186 vehicles, enough to replace the M113A1 armored personnel carriers for
the rifle squads of a portion of our Mechanized Infantry battalions and to pro-
vide for a training base. The MICV, which will carry a fully equipped squad of
combat troops, is designed to operate as a companion vehicle with tanks as part
of the combined arms team.
Armored reconnaissance scout vehicle (ARSV )
The $33 million requested for the ARSV in FY 1975 includes $8 million for
continued development, and $25 million for production tooling and the first 35
production vehicles for test. Three tracked prototype vehicles from one contrac-
tor and three wheeled prototype vehicles from a second contractor are now
being subjected to competitive testing. No decision on the production test con-
tract will be made until these tests have been satisfactorily completed.
The ARSV is a. three-man lightly armored combat vehicle which is intended
as the ultimate replacement for the M114 three-man command and reconnais-
sance vehicles with our cavalry units in Europe. As noted earlier, the M113A1
will serve as an interim replacement until the ARSVs are delivered. The initial
procurement objective is 1,147, sufficient to equip most of our cavalry units and
provide for a training base.
Tow and Dragon
As I indicated earlier, our assessment of the results of the Middle East con-
flict has led us to the conclusion that the production of Tow and Dragon anti-
tank missiles should be substantially accelerated.
Production of the Tow missile is now running at 12,000 per year, all for
Army. Procurement of the Tow missile for the Marine Corps was scheduled
to begin in FY 1975. We now propose to increase FY 1974 procurement to 23,425
missiles-6,000 more for the Army and a first quantity of 5,425 for the Marine
Corps. In addition, we plan to buy 985 more Tow launchers for the Army in FY
1974, .making. a total of 1,158. The first procurement of launchers for the Marine
Corps was originally scheduled for FY 1975. We plan to buy the first 100 in FY
1974. A total of $92 million is included in the FY 1974 Supplemental for these
purposes.
In FY 1975, we propose to buy a total of 30,319 missiles and 1,041 launchers-
24,000 missiles and 762 launchers for the Army, and 6,319 missiles and 279
launchers for the Marine Corps. These procurements are substantially higher
than planned for FY 1975 last year. A total of $149 million is included in the
FY 1975 Budget for the Tow program-$138 million for procurement and $11
million to continue development of a night sight for Tow.
Under this accelerated program, the Army will achieve its Tow inventory ob-
jective by FY 1977 instead of FY 1978 as planned last year, and the Marine
Corps, by FY 1976 instead of FY 1977.
Procurement of the Dragon anti-tank missile began in FY 1972 with the
purchase of a limited production test quantity of 560 missiles and 28 trackers
for the Army. Last year it was planned to buy 9,200 missiles and 900 trackers
for the Army in FY 1975. We now propose to increase the FY 1975 procurement
for the Army to 15,200 missiles and 1,200 trackers, and buy the first increment
of 1,378 missiles and 158 trackers for the Marine Corps. A total of $129 million
is included in the FY 1975 Budget for the Dragon program.
Both the vehicle mounted Tow and the one-man portable Dragon anti-tank
missile systems offer significant improvements in combat effectiveness as com-
pared with the weapons they will replace. The Tow is replacing the jeep-mounted
106mm recoilless rifle, and the Dragon is replacing the two-man portable 90mm
recoilless rifle. Army forces in Europe will receive first priority in the delivery
of these weapons.
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b. Attack helicopters
Our experience in Vietnam confirmed our judgment on the usefulness of Tow-
armed attack helicopters in the anti-armor role, particularly with respect to
Europe where the Warsaw Pack enjoys a substantial superiority over NATO in
number of tanks. Accordingly, we intend to press- forward with our Tow-armed
helicopter programs during the coming fiscal year.
Cobra-Tow modification
Last year $73 million was provided to modify the first 101 AH-1G Cobra heli-
copters (out of a prospective total of 298) to carry the TOW missile. Eight Rail)
prototype Cobra-Tow helicopters (designated the All-1Q) had been previously
funded.
We still plan to complete the modification of the remaining 189 AH-1Gs to
the Cobra-Tow configuration in FY 1975. Evaluation of the performance of the
prototype vehicles, however, indicates that engine upgrading and a change in the
transmission will be needed if the AH-1Q is to carry a full load of eight TOW
missiles in addition to the normal armament and fuel load of the AH-1G. The
AH-1Q as presently configured can carry 2 to 6 TOWs (depending on the weather
and altitude) in addition to its other armament and fuel load.
Accordingly, we now propose to increase tt.e power of the current. AH-1 engine
and substitute the gear boxes and transmission used in the Marine Corps AH-1J
for those now used in the AH-1G. We are requesting a total of $87 million in
the FY 1975 Budget for time modification of the 189 AH--lGs to this upgraded
configuration. A final decision on the procurement of these modifications, how-
ever, will not be made until the test and evaluation of the improved AH-1Q has
been satisfactorily completed.
Cobra-Tow procurement .
In addition to modifying a total of 298 AH--].Gs to the upgraded configurations,
we also propose to buy about 300 new improved configuration AH-1s during the
FY 1975-79 period. The Army needs a total of about 1335 attack helicopters to
equip the current force structure (active and reserve). The current inventory is
now about 260 below that figure, and the shortfall is expected to increase even
further due to peacetime attrition and the phasing out of approximately 300 UII-
lal utility helicopters now used as substitute attack helicopters.
The only new attack helicopter in development, the AAH, is expected to cost
more than twice as much as the upgraded AI-1-1Q. Consequently, we would buy
only enough AAHs to meet the most demanding requirement. The procurement of
some 300 upgraded AH-1s in the FY 1975-79 period would not only avoid the
potential shortage but also maintain a "warm" production base. A total of $28
million is included in the FY 1975 Budget for the procurement of the initial in-
crement of 21 upgraded AH-1Qs.
Sea Cobra attack helicopter
The Marine Corps in recent years has been buying a twin engine version of
the AH-1 for over-water operations. Forty-nine of these AH-Us were procured
in FY 1969 and prior years, 20 in FY 1973, and 20 more were funded in FY 1974.
Another 35 are needed to complete the equipping of three active squadrons and
two training elements (a total of 84 UE aircraft).
We believe that some of the All-1Js should be configured to carry TOW, and
all should be configured to carry the newly developed protective devices (e.g..
infrared suppressors, detectors, jammers, and decoys), in addition to their cur-
rent payload. In order to do so, however, the payload capability of the aircraft
clearly needs to he improved substantially. The AH-1J (Improved) will cost
about a half a million dollars more per aircraft than the current AH-1J ($1.5
million vs. $1.0 million). But we believe that the enhanced capabilities of the
AH-1J (Improved) will fully justify the additional cost.
Accordingly, we now propose to buy 15 of the improved A1-1Js in FY 1974,
instead of the 20 current model All-lJs previously planned. The $31 million
included in the FY 1975 Budget for this program would provide $27 million for
another 20 All-1J (Improved) Attack Helicopters, plus about $4 million for
advanced procurement for the final 20 to be procured in FY 1976.
Advanced attack helicopter (AAH)
The FY 1975 Budget also includes $61 million to continue development of the
AAH for the longer term modernization of our attack helicopter force. As you
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know, the AAH is the successor to the Cheyenne attack helicopter program that
was terminated by the Army in August 1972. The Army, OSD, and the Special
Subcommittee on Close Air Support of the Senate Armed Services Committee (in
its Report issued in June 1972) have all concluded that there is a need for both
fixed wing and attack helicopter close air support on the modern battlefield. The
AAII would help to fulfill the attack helicopter portion of this mission in the
1080s and beyond.
The AAFI program is.being pursued on a design-to-cost basis in the hope that
we can develop a suitable attack helicopter that is less costly and less complex
than the Cheyenne. Development contracts have been awarded to two contractors.
Each will fabricate two flying prototypes to be evaluated in a competitive fly-off
in March 1976. If all goes well, the first production AAHs, for test and then
inventory, would be procured in FY 1978-79.
c. Air Defense
Air defense of the army in the field has come tinder a great deal of scrutiny as
a result of the recent Middle East conflict. One conclusion upon which there is
general agreement in the Defense Department is that major improvements in our
theater army air defense capabilities are urgently needed.
Air defense of an army in the field is usually provided by a mix of aircraft,
SAMs, and AAA weapon systems supported by radars, command and control
systems, electronic warfare equipment, and passive (camouflage, dispersion; etc.)
defense measures. The air defense objective is to limit the opponent's effective-
ness in attacking our critical assets and to counter the air attack in such a way
as to permit our field army forces to maneuver as required.
The evolving Soviet field army air defense doctrine features highly mobile
SAMs and AAA which are designed to provide protection for fast moving tank
and mechanized infantry forces. In the recent Middle East conflict, however,
Soviet field air defense equipment, particularly in the case of Egypt, was also
employed in a heavy barrier defense involving three SAM systems (SA-2), SA-3
and SA-6) each operating in a different but overlapping altitude and range
regime. This mode of deployment was probably peculiar to that situation ; it
would not be consistent with a highly mobile Soviet offensive in Europe.
Compared with the Soviet Union, the low-to-medium altitude air defenses
(other than aircraft) of the U.S. Army in the field are considerably less mobile.
The principal mobile elements of the Soviet system are the SA-4 and SA-6 SAMs,
and the twin 57mm and ZSIJ-23-4 guns. The comparable U.S. elements are the
Hawk and Vulcan/Chaparral. The SA-6, for example, moves in two tracked
vehicles-the missile launcher vehicle and the radar van-and can fire with
little preparation. The Hawk, in contrast, moves in several wheeled vehicles
and requires considerably more time to set up and fire, but it is quite effective in
the medium altitude regime. The Soviet ZSU-23-4 is track-vehicle mounted and
radar directed. The U.S. counterparts, the Vulcan gun and Chaparral short range
missile, are also mounted on tracked vehicles but they are. not radar directed and
therefore lack an all-weather capability.
Thus, our most immediate need for air defense of the Army in the field is an
effective all-weather, highly mobile, low altitude system. We also need an
improved follow-on to the Redeye man-portable SAM. For the longer term
modernization of ground forces air defense, we are continuing the development
of the SAM-D as a potential replacement in the 1980s for the Nike Hercules as
well as for the Improved Hawk.
Development of short range air defense systems (SHORADS)
Several of our allied have developed Shorad systems which may be able
to meet our need for an all-weather capability, By drawing on these develop-
ments, we. can conserve our R&D funds for other essential development pro-
grams which we, in turn, can share with our allies.
Accordingly, we have conducted preliminary firing tests of three foreign short
range air defense missile systems-the French Crotale, the German Roland II,
and the U.K. Rapier. We plan this summer to select one of the three systems
for further intensive tests to determine whether it can be modified, and at what
cost, to meet our particular requirements.
Inasmuch as it will take some time to test and produce the selected foreign
system, and in view of the fact that the need for improvement in this area is
urgent; we also propose to continue, as a hedge, the improvement program for
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the Chaparral. The current improvements being tested would significantly er-
hance the effectiveness of the Chaparral missile, but not to the level of effec-
tiveness promised by the foreign systems.
The $61 million included in the FY 1975; Budget for the Shorads prograz.:
would provide $35 million to acquire from the U.S. licensee (there is a U.S. li-
censee for each of the three foreign missiles) a limited test; quantity (about five
sets of equipment and 100 missiles) of the selected Shorad system, and $26
million to modify the first 1500 Chaparral missiles. If we decide to acquire
the foreign Shorad for the operational inventory, it will be produced in the
U.S. by a U.S. licensee, and the excess Chaparral assets will be turned over to
the Reserve Components.
Stinger
The Stinger is an advanced man-portable air defense system being developed
to replace the Army and Marine Corps Rede:7e, which will need replacement in
the late 1970s, Stinger will be faster than Redeye, and will utilize is more effec-
tive guidance system.
The $34 million requested in the FY 1975 Eudget would provide for continued
development. The first production quantity is, scheduled for procurement in FY
1976 for the Army. Procurement for the Marine Corps is scheduled in FY 1977.
AN/TSQ-73 Air defense command and control system
The current AN/MSG-4 ground force Air Defense Command and Control system
was deployed in 1958; it is extremely costly to operate and maintain, does not
integrate easily into other services' C2 systems, and can be easily jammed. Ac-
cordingly, we plan to replace that system with the new AN/TSQ-73. The $7
million included in the FY 1975 Budget for the AN/TSQ-73 is needed principally
for the continued testing and engineering changes on the five units procured
with FY 1974 funds,. Procurement of additional units has been deferred pending
the satisfactory completion of the tests and the successful accomplishment of
the necessary engineering changes.
Improved Hawk
A total of about $11.0 million is included in the FY 1975 Budget for the Improved
I-lawk program-$89 million for the Army and about $21 million for the Marine
Corps. The Army amount includes $81 million for the procurement of thelast 9
battery conversion kits, 520 missiles and the last increment of 38 Improved
Platoon Command Posts (IPCPs), and $8 million for the development of further
modification to improve the performance of the Hawk system. The Marine Corps
amount ($21 million) provides $17 million for the procurement of 230 missiles,
about $2 million for three IPCPs, and about $2 million for the installation and
check-out of six battery sets.
The Improved Hawk conversion program is on schedule ; the first Basic Hawk
battalion was converted to Improved Hawk in November 1972 in USAREUR/
Seventh Army. The Army will complete procurement of this system in FY 1977
with a total of 90 battery sets and the Marine Corps in FY 1.976 with a total of 14
battery sets.
SAM-I)
The SAM-D, which is intended as a potential replacement for the Nike Hercules
ane! Improved Hawk, is a very complex surface-to-air guided missile system. The
performance specifications call for a high single shot kill probability in a sophis-
ticated electronic countermeasure environment, and an ability to conduct multiple
simultaneous engagements against the type of high performance targets that
potentially could be employed against U.S. forces in the field in the 1980s and
beyond.
After an intensive review of the status of this program. last year, we have
decided to reexamine SAM-D in order to provide emphasis on austerity, and to
ensure adequate testing of the guidance system and the phased array radar
before we proceed with Engineering Development. Past experience with such
complex systems has conclusively demonstrated that it is faster and cheaper in
the long run to ensure the proper performance of the key components before
proceeding with full scale development. A total of $111 million is included in the
FY 1975 Budget to continue the SAM-D development program.
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d. Fire support (surface-to-surface missiles)
The two current acquisition programs in this area are the Pershing and the
Lance.
Pershing
The $31 million requested in the FY 1975 Budget would provide $20 million for
the Pershing I and $11 million to demonstrate technology for a major upgrading
of the system.
The Pershing I amount includes $11 million for the last increment (88 missiles)
of a four-year missile modification program designed to extend system life, $1
million for spare parts and $8 million for the procurement of 58 automatic
azimuth reference systems.
The current Pershing IA Missile System is a good example of "modernization
by modification". Since the system was first fielded in 1962, it has been repeatedly
modified through modular product improvements which have provided increased
weapon system reliability and maintainability, better mobility, survivability,
and flexibility in nuclear fire support for SACEUR's General Strike Plan. Recent
additions to the system include the automatic azimuth reference system which
enables the Pershing to be fired from unsurveyed firing positions, and a sequential
launch adapter which provides a reduction in firing response time in the Quick
Reaction Role in support of the NATO mission.
Nevertheless, we now believe that we should start to examine the technical
feasibility of a major upgrading of the Pershing system that would incorporate
the latest available technology. The $11 million would support that effort.
Lance
A total of $65 million is included in the FY 1975 Budget for the Lance surface-
to-surface missile system. Of that amount, $30 million is for the procurement of
another 194 missiles (less warhead sections) for the U.S. Army. The balance of
$35 million is needed for the procurement of warhead sections (excluding the
nuclear device which is provided by the AEC) both for the U.S. Army and for the
support of Lance systems sold or expected to be sold to our NATO allies.
The Congress has stipulated that a study of the cost-effectiveness of the non-
nuclear warhead for Lance be submitted prior to the request of funds for the
procurement of such warheads or missiles to carry them. The Defense Depart-
ment, of course, will comply with that request if our analyses indicate this op-
tion is worth pursuing.
c. Combat support (air mobility-helicopter)
The United States in recent years has led the rest of the world in the use
of helicopters to enhance the mobility of the land forces. Although the Soviet
Union is now placing considerably more emphasis on this aspect of land forces
mobility, we are still well ahead in this area, except for heavy lift helicopters.
And, of course, we must also develop a successor to the Army UH-1 tactical
transport helicopters, most of which were acquired during the Vietnam war
build-up.
Utility tactical transport aircraft system (UTTAS)
The Uttas is the intended successor to the UH-1 in the tactical transport role.
The development program, for which $54 million is requested in FY 1975, is
proceeding well. The engine development contract was awarded in March 1972,
and contracts for the development of prototype aircraft were awarded to two
competing contractors in August 1972. The selection of a single contractor for
final development and production is scheduled for November 1976, after a pro-
totype fly-off and evaluation of the two competing designs has been completed.
The Uttas would provide the Army in the 1980s with a utility transport heli-
copter that emphasizes reliability, maintainability, and survivability in sus-
tained combat or field operations. In contrast to the UH-1, the Uttas would be
able to carry a full combat equipped Army squad. Also, it would be more effec-
tive than the UH-1 in the resupply and medical evacuation roles.
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Heavy lift helicopter (HLH)
The current Army helicopter designed for the heavy lift mission ins the ~'II-54
The lift capacity of this helicopter is about ten tons, not enought to lift many
types of land forces equipment which are subject to damage in battle. Accord-
ingly, the Defense Department is now developing the technology for a new hel=i-
copter, the HLH, that could lift about 221/i tons. We envision that this heli-
copter would be used to satisfy the heavy ~Tertical lift requirements. of all the
services in both a combat support role, such as air-mobile operations or recovery
of damaged vehicles, and in a combat service support role to move snpp e.s and
unload ships.
To continue development of the HLH, we are requesting $58 million for FY
1975. This amount will continue design and fabrication of the first prototype
with rollout scheduled for May 1975. In addition, fabrication of a seconc' prOto?
type will be initiated. Extended reliability endurance testing will be mccom-
plished on major dynamic components, the flight control system and engines. A
full prototype flight test program will be undertaken in FY 1976 and a decxssfon
will then be made as to the future course of the HLH program.
:3. EQUIPMENT OF ME RESERVE COMPONENTS
Emphasis on the modernization of equipment in reserve components continued
during the past year in consonance with the Total Force Policy. Significant Im-
provement in the levels and quality of equipment on hand in Guard and Reserve
units has been achieved. Issues of major items of equipment to the Army
'Guard/Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve during FY 1973 totaled $714 mil-
lion, of which Army received approximately $682 million and the Marine Corps
$32 million. As of the end of FY 1973, on hand combat-capable equipment in the
hands of troops for the Army National Guard and Reserve totaled approximately
$3.66 billion (about half of the mobilization requiremment), and in the Marine
Corps, about $155 million (almost all of thy', mobilization requirement).
It is interesting to note that from the end of FY 1969 through the end of FY
1974 a total of almost $3.3 billion of equipment will have been delivered to the
Army reserve components compared with a total of"less than $.7 billion of equip-
ment retired. Nevertheless, some important Army reserve component equipment
deficiencies remain to be corrected. These are mainly in the newer items of
equipment-Tow/Dragon anti-tank missiles, M60 series tanks. Chaparral air
defense missiles and modern communication equipment. Action is being taken
to alleviate these deficiencies as fast as the needs of the active Army permit.
With the exception of long leadtime procinction items, which are funded but
not yet delivered, the equipment required for the Marine Corps Reserve Division
is either in the hands of existing units or in Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks.
Associated with the equipment program is the requirement to provide adequate
storage and maintenance facilities, as well as field training areas, to complement
the influx of equipment. To meet this requirement, the Department of Defense
in 1970 undertook a facilities improvement program designed to provide adequate
facilities for all Army Guard and Reserve units by the end of 1980. A total of
$242.7 million has thus far been provided for this program, and another $102.7
million is requested for FY 1975.
C. NAVAL FORCES
As I indicated earlier, one of the major objectives of the General Purpose Forces
Program is to ensure, together with our allies, the maintenance of an appropriate
naval balance with the Soviet Union, taking into account the differences in the
objectives of the two forces. In planning our naval forces during the past few
years, we have had to take into account two internal considerations.
The first was the need, given the prevailing fiscal constraints and the block
aging of many World War II-constructed ships, to reduce force levels over the
near term in order to provide the funds needed for modernization over the long
term. The number of commissioned general purpose ships in the fleet (including
the Naval Reserve Force) has, in fact, been reduced from 951 at the end of FY
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1968 to 588 at end FY 1973, and is programmed at 522 for the end of FY 1975..
Beginning in FY 1977, the trend will be markedly reversed as the number of new
ships delivered to the fleet exceeds the number being retired.
The second consideration-the need to pursue assiduously the so-called "high--
low mix" approach to weapon system acquisition-has already been discussed.-
This concept is particularly applicable to the ship construction program, and the
Navy has made a valiant effort to apply it, particularly to the surface escort and
major aircraft platform categories.
1. AIRCRAFT PLATFORMS
The planned program for sea-based aircraft platforms is an excellent example
of the high-low concept in practice. As you know, we are now building three
4 NIMITZ-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, the last of which is expected to
cost almost one billion dollars. These will be very large multi-purpose aircraft
carriers capable of operating the Navy's most sophisticated fighter/attack and
ASW aircraft under the most demanding conditions in high threat areas. This
extensive capability, however, is not needed in low threat situations, such as es-
corting merchant ships or Naval underway replenishment groups in ocean areas
outside the range of Soviet land-based aircraft. For this latter purpose, a rela-
tively small and austere aircraft platform capable of launching V/STOL aircraft
and helicopters for air defense and ASW.protection would be sufficient. The Sea
Control Ship, which is expected to cost less than $120 million in escalated,
"then-year" dollars (excluding the lead ship and all outfitting and-post delivery
costs), is intended to fulfill this low cost/limited performance aircraft platform
requirement.
a. Aircraft carriers
The United States, since the Korean War, has kept five or more carriers con-
tinuously deployed-two in the Mediterranean and at least three in the Pacific.
The wisdom of maintaining forward deployed carrier forces on a continuous
basis has again been impressed upon us by recent events in the Middle East.
Normally, with all carriers homeported in the U.S., a total of 15 active carriers
would be required to support five forward in peacetime. Indeed, the attack
carrier force level has varied between 14 and 17 ships since 1960, with an average
of 15.
Two, years ago, in the face of increasing fiscal and manpower pressure, it was
decided that the attack carrier force would have to be reduced. In order to sup-
port the five carrier forward deployment with fewer total carriers, it was also
decided to locate the dependents of the crews of two carriers overseas-one in
the Pacific, and one in the Mediterranean. With this arrangement, the five car-
rier forward deployment could be adequately supported on a continuous basis
with a total of 12 carriers, For contingency operations of relatively short dura-
tion, the 12 carrier force could support more than five forward ; and in wartime,
of course, all available ships would be deployed forward. Accordingly, it was
planned last year to reduce the carrier force from 15 at end FY 1974, to 13 at
end FY 1975, and eventually to 12.
Now, however, in view of the difficulties encountered in completing the home-
porting arrangements for a carrier in Greece and the need to retain a capability
to deploy a carrier periodically in the Indian Ocean, we have decided to hold
the carrier force at 15 through FY 1975, reducing to 12 in later years. The first
_ of the three Nimitz-class carriers (the Nimitz) is now expected to be delivered
to the fleet in FY 1975, and the second (the Eisenhower) is contracted for deliv-
cry 21 months later (which now would be late FY 1976 or early FY 1977). The
last Nimitz-class carrier, the Carl Vinson, is expected to be delivered in FY 1981.
While no further changes in the estimated costs of the three Nimitz-class car-
riers have been reported to my office in the past year, delays in the delivery of
the Nimitz and the Eisenhower could increase their costs. The delays being en-
countered with the Nimitz and the Eisenhower are not expected to affect the
delivery schedule for the Vinson, which, as shown on the table beginning on the
next page, was fully funded in FY 1974.
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ACQUISITION COSTS OF MAJOR NAVAL FORCES MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS,
[In millions of dolls rs]
1973 1974 1975
actual planned proposed
funding funding 2 funding
Aircraft platforms:
Procurement of CVN-70 aircraft carrier__________________________ 2S9 657 -_.--___--____
Design and procurement of the sea control ship___________________ 13 29 143
ASW Aircraft:
Development and procurement of S-3A carrier-based ASW aircraft__ 618 548 562
Modification of SH-3 helicopter_________________________________ _ 9 17 24
Development of the HSX------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
Continued procurement of the P-3C land-based ASW aircraft ..----- 132 (50)202 152
Other surface combatants:
Procurement of DD-963 destroyers______________________________ 249 612 464
Procurement of DLGN nuclear-powered frigates_________________________________ 81 256
Acquisition of patrolfrigate____________________________________ 204 6 437
Continued development of Aegis ship air defense system ----------- 79 40 67
Acquisition of the light airborne multipurpose system (LAMPS) ----- 51 32 34
Development and test of surface effect ship______________________ '2 61 58
Acquisiton of patrol hydrofoil missile ship________________________ 20 23 108
Antiship missiles:
Acquisition of the harpoon antiship missile_______________________ EO 81 136
Development of encapsulated harpoon___________________________ _ 12 12 13
Acquisition of active Standard antiship missile____________________ 20 8 35
Acquisition of Condor antiship missile___________________________ 28 33 30
Attack submarines:
Procurement of SSN-668-class nuclear attack submarines ---------- 1, 048 921 548
Continued development and procurement of MK-48 torpedo -------- 176 183 160
Acquisition of the AN/BQQ-5 sonar system_______________________ 30 57 72
Undersea surveillance systems:
Undersea surveillance systems: Development and development of Sosus
and improved Sosusand developmentof Tass_______________________ 127 144 137
Underway replenishment and support ships: Procurement of underway
replenishment and support ships__________________________________ 189 -------------- 209
I Includes costs of R.D.T. & E., procurement of the system and i iitial spares, and diractly related military construction.
2 Figures in parentheses are the amounts included in the fiscal year 1974 supplemen:al.
When the Vinson is delivered, the Midw2y will be retired and we will then
have a 12-ship force comprised entirely of large post-World War II carriers, in-
cluding four nuclear powered. By 1985, however, the first; of the Forrestal-class
carriers will be 30 years old and we must be prepared to replace them some time
in the 1980s if a force of 12 ships is to be maintained. Accordingly, we have tenta-
tively programmed the first of a new class of lower-cost carriers, designated the
CVX. The characteristics of the CVX have not yet been defined, but conceptual
studies and preliminary design work are underway. We expect this effort to be
oriented toward ship dimensions, propulsion system and ogler features that would
be compatible with a design-to-cost goal of about $550 million in FY 1973 dollars.
The study and preliminary design phase should result in completion of a Develop-
ment Concept Paper (DCP) in 1974 that will better defina the characteristics of
the proposed new carrier and the alternatives available.
The program to convert attack aircraft carriers (CVA) to the multipurpose or
CV configuration is being continued. The CV operates fighter, attack and ASW
aircraft and combines the role of the OVA and the ASW carrier (CVS). Experi-
ence to date has shown that the problems associated with operating all three types
of aircraft on the large deck (Enterprise/Forrestal class) carriers can be over-
come. Three Forrestal-class carriers are now being operated as CVs, and three
more are planned to be converted to that configuration in FY 1975. The Enter-
prise and Nimitz will be converted to the CVN configuration in FY 1976, and
Eisenhower will he delivered as a CVN. The last two Forrestal-class ships will
be converted by FY 1977. After that we expect to operate 11 CV/CVNs and one
CVA until the Vinson is delivered and the Midway is retired.
b. Sea Contro f, Ship
The Sea Control Ship (SCS), as I noted earlier, is expected to be the key ele-
ment on the "low" side of the spectrum of seabased air capability. Its primary
mission is to provide seabased aircraft (V/:3TOL and helicopter) for protection
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of underway replenishment groups (URGs), amphibious groups, and convoys
when operating in low air threat areas where protection by the much more
capable and costly CVs is not available. In fulfilling this primary mission, the
SCS with its embarked aircraft and accompanying escorts will provide surveil-
lance against surface and submarine threats, localization and attack of identi-
fied submarine threats, and attack of surface and limited air threats beyond
surface combatant range.
The SCS will be a relatively low-cost, austere vessel of about 14,000 tons, with
a planned complement of 14 helicopters and three V/STOL. aircraft, plus mainte-
nance facilities for two Lamps helicopters (which would be deployed aboard ac-
companying surface combatants).
Last July the Navy completed a lengthy test of the SCS concept in a coordinated
fleet environment using a helicopter assault ship, the USS Guam, as the test plat-
t t raft
lrc
form and AV-8A Harriers and SH-3H helicopters as the initial es a
These tests have verified the basic concept, but some deficiencies were identified,
particularly with respect to the ability of the planned helicopter complement
to sustain the continuous ASW and surveillance operations needed to fulfill the
mission. The Navy plans to correct these deficiencies and conduct additional
tests with a full complement of SH-3H helicopters and AV-8As, modified as
required to ensure their suitability for the SCS role.
I am well aware of the uneasiness expressed in the Congress with regard to the
SCS program. I am convinced, however, that the high-low concept offers, the only
feasible solution to the problem of maintaining the required total combat capa-
bility within current budgetary constraints. We must have quantity as well as
quality if we are to maintain an appropriate naval balance with the Soviet
Union.
The SCS with the SH-3H and the AV-8A would provide a useful capability at
a relatively low cost, thus facilitating its acquisition in quantity. Moreover, like
all air-capable ships, the SCS would be equipped, over its lifetime, with several
generations of aircraft. Development of a new, more capable ASW aircraft, the
HSX, is now under consideration, and evenutally a new, improved V/STOL
fighter will become available. These new aircraft would further improve the
combat capabilities of the SCS.
In view of the fiscal constraints which are likely to prevail in the foreseeable
future, we are proposing a program of eight SCSs. The lead ship would be funded
in FY 1975, the next three in the following year, and two each in FY 1977 and
1978. We hope to hold the average cost of the follow-on ships to $117 million
in escalated "then-year" dollars (excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs)
through such techniques as rigid design to cost, competition between shipbuilders,
and an independent design validation by a second shipbuilder. (The lead ship
would cost $172 million.) Under this schedule, delivery of the ships to the fleet
would be spread over the FY 1978-1981 period.
The FY 1975 Budget includes $143 million, which together with $29.3 million
provided in FY 1974, will finance the construction of the first SCS (the lead
ship). As directed by the Congress, none of these funds will be obligated, pend-
ing approval by both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.
2. ASW AIRCRAFT
The Navy plans to operate its CVs and CVNs with two squadrons of fighters,
three or four squadrons of attack aircraft, and one squadron each of ASW
fixed-wing aircraft and ASW helicopters per carrier. This aircraft mix can be
varied within limits, depending upon the specific mission of the carrier, e.g.,
primary attack or primary ASW.
S-3
We plan to acquire one squadron (10 aircraft) of the new S-3s for each of
the 12 carriers expected to be in the fleet in the late 1970s. If intensive ASW
operations are required, two squadrons (20 aircraft) per carrier could be pro-
vided by drawing on the S-3 complements of other carriers-e.g., those under-
going overhaul or those which are least likely to encounter large submarine
threats.
Procurement of 93 aircraft has already been funded, including 45 in FY 1974.
A DSARC review of the S-3 program in October 1973 indicated that testing up to
that point had been successful. Accordingly, execution of the contract option on
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the FY 1974 quantity of 45 aircraft was approved under the Continuing Resolu-
tion Authority. A total of about $562 million :is provided in the FY 1975 Budget
for the continued acquisition of the S-3, including $504 million (in addition to
the $54 million provided for advance procurement in FY 1974) for the procure-
ment of another 45 aircraft and $56 million of advance procurement funds for
the remaining 41 aircraft to be procured in FY 1976.
The first few S-3s are expected to become operational this year. Five squad-
rons are expected to be available in FY 1975 and the full 12 squadrons by the
end of FY 1977.
SH-S
The ASW helicopter force currently consists of nine squadrons (8 UE aircraft
per squadron) of SH--3s. Eight squadrons are allocated for CV use and one squad-
ron for testing aboard the "interim" SCS (i.e., the GUAM). Procurement of the
SII is tentatively scheduled to be resumed i:a the FY 1976-79 period to provide
additional helicopters for the multi-purpose carriers and for the SCSs.
In addition, a. program is now underway to modernize the current force of
S11-3 A/D/G helicopters to the new SH-311 configuration (the one we plan to
buy in the FY 1976-79 period) which will have significantly improved ASW and
surveillance capabilities. The first two squadrons of SH-3s are being converted
to the H model in FY 1974-75. Another $24.4 million is included in the FY 1975
Budget for the modification of an additional 14 SH-3s.
HSX
As noted earlier, the IISX is being developed as an eventual replacement for
the SH-3F1, as well as the Marine Corps' CH-46 medium assault helicopter, some-
time in the 1980s. The HSX would have better ASW sensors and avionics than the
SH-3, and greater endurance and payload. Thus, it would provide an improved
ASW capability against the quieter and more capable Soviet submarines expected
in the 1980s. Some $2 million is included in the FY 1975 Budget to initiate devel-
opment of the HSX.
The Navy carrier-based ASW forces also include six S-2 and four SII-3 squad-
rons in the Naval Reserve. These units would be used to replace attrition in the
active force. The S-2s will have this role only until FY 1978, when the active
force will complete the transition to S-3s. The S-2s, however, could also be oper-
ated from forward land bases during a contingency, thus increasing our capabil-
ity to conduct ocean surveillance and to provide protection to convoys.
P-3
In addition to the carrier-base ASW aircraft forces, the Wavy also has a total
of 36 squadrons of land-based ASW aircraft 21 active and 12 reserve. The active
force is now equipped with the A, B, and C models of the P-3, but the older
P-3As are being replaced, one squadron per year, by the new P--3Cs. The P-3C
has a more capable, computerized avionics system which permits it to operate
more effectively with the more advanced ASW sensors, including the new DIFAR
directional sonobuoy system. The P-3As released from the active force are being
transferred to reserve units to replace the obsolete SP-2 ASW aircraft.
Replacement of the P-3As in the active force is scheduled to be completed in
FY 1979, at which point we would have 15 squadrons of P-3Cs and 9 squadrons of
P-3Bs. Procurement of P-3Cs to replace the P-313s would be initiated with FY
1979 funds and the first P-3P. squadron would be replaced in FY 11180. The FY
1975 Budget includes $139 million (in addition to the $9 million provided in
FY 1974) to procure another 12 P-3Cs, plus $12 million of advance procurement
funds for the planned FY 1976 buy, and $1 million for construction of a P-3
Tactical Support Center (TSC) Training Building.
The upgrading of the reserve force with P- As and Bs released by active units
will also continue through the decade. All 12 of the Naval Reserve units will be
equipped with P-3As by the end of FY 1951.
.',. OTHER SURFACE COMBATANT SHIPS
In addition to aircraft platforms, the Navy's surface combatant force includes
cruisers, frigates, destrnrers. and ocean escort ships. These other surface com-
batants have many potential missions, but the size of the force and the config-
uration of individual ships are determined 'primarily by the need to provide
perimeter defense for high-value naval forces and, in conjunction with our allies,
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for military resupply shipping during a major conflict with the USSR. Surface
combatant screens constitute the final defensive barrier protecting high-value
surface ships, while tactical and patrol aircraft and attack submarines provide
the outer defense against enemy air and submarine threats.
Notwithstanding the substantial improvement in the Soviet surface navy
during the past decade, the Soviet submarine force is still the principal threat
to our naval forces and military resupply shipping. This is so because the sub-
marine force is the only element of the Soviet Navy that can operate, in war-
time, at long distances from bases for sustained periods without air cover.
Accordingly, ASW screening needs must take precedence over AAW needs in
determining the size and character of our surface combatant force.
Recent analyses tend to confirm our conclusion that surface combatant screens
could contribute significantly to attrition of both the air and submarine threats
to escorted units. These ships would be particularly important for close-in de-
fense against the quieter Soviet torpedo attack submarines. Moreover, surface
combatant screens can make a major contribution in AAW protection by attrition
of incoming cruise missiles, which are a potent and steadily growing threat to our
? ships'at sea.
The U.S. requirement for other surface combatants is related to the size and
character of the Soviet threat, the number of forces and groups requiring protec-
tion, the level of defense desired for each protected force or group, and the con-
tributions of surface combatants that can be expected from our allies. In addi-
tion, an allowance must be made for ships in overhaul at any one time.
The U.S. forces to be protected by surface combatants in a conventional war in
Europe, the most demanding force planning contingency, include the 12 carriers,
the amphibious shipping for 11/3 Marine division-wing teams, about ten Under-
way Replenishment Groups (URGs), and five merchant ship convoys.
Based on discussions with our NATO allies, we conclude that a substantial
number of ships capable of open-ocean escort duty would be made available for
use in the Atlantic sea lanes in the event of a war with the USSR during the late
1970s and early 19,80s. We would also expect significant help from allies in the
Pacific. There is some doubt, however, that allied ships would be on hand where
required for convoy duty early in a conflict. Consequently, we plan to provide
enough U.S. surface combatants to protect the military convoys which would
be sailed during the first month of a major war. As the allied ships become avail-
able, the U.S. combatants initially used for convoy duty would be made available
as replacements for losses which would inevitably be suffered in the early stages
of a major war against the USSR. In view of the many uncertainties involved
in calculations of this sort, as well as the need to maintain a balanced moderniza-
tion program, the Defense Department has established an interim goal of 250
escorts, including a large number with at least'an austere area AAW capability.
At the end of the current fiscal year we will haven total of 198 such surface
combatants, including 37 Naval Reserve ships in commission and two ships in
conversion. In FY 1975 the downward trend will be reversed as one more DLGN
and the first three DD-963s are delivered to the fleet. By the end of that fiscal
year we will have 202 ships, including 72 dual-purpose (le., AAW-ASW) and 130
? ASW-only. Of the latter, 37 will be Naval Reserve ships in commission. This
force would be supplemented in wartime by 12 modern Coast Guard cutters which
carry ASW weapons and sensors.
Some 137 of the 202 Navy escorts expected to be in the force at the end of FY
1975 will still be serviceable in the mid-1980s. By that time, three more DLGNs
already funded, as well as 27 more DD-963s of the 30 now planned, will have
been delivered to the fleet, giving us 167 serviceable ships. Adding the currently
planned 50 Patrol Frigates (PF) and the proposed two additional DLGNs, will
bring the total to 219, of which 115 would have at least an austere area AAW
capability (the PF will have one surface-to-air missile launcher). If we include
the Coast Guard Cutters, which have an ASW capability equivalent to that
planned for the PFs, the total becomes 231.
The proposed program would still leave us somewhat short of the overall force
goal. To remedy this apparent short, fall and to maintain an orderly replacement
program, the Navy has proposed two new ship construction programs. The
nearer term program would be a new class of area air defense destroyer, now
designated the DGX, which would replace the older DDG and DLG type shins
as they reach retirement age beginning in the early 1980s. The longer term pro-
gram involves the development of a new type; high-speed "surface effect" de-
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troyer, now designated the DSX. This latter effort has not ;pet progressed beyond
the stage of experimenting with small scale (100 ton) test craft, and the mis-
sion and configuration of the ship are still undefined. Both ships are far enough
in the future that no attempt has been made to fix the size of the programs, and
there is ample time for further review of surface combatant requirements before
it will be necessary to do so.
DD-963
With regard to the DD-963 destroyers, the FY 1975 Budget includes $464 mil-
lion which, together with the $198 million provided in FY .1974 for advance pro-
curement, would complete the funding for the last seven ships at the initial
target price established in the contract with Litton Industries. That contract, in
addition to the customary provision for the escalation of wage rates and nia-
terials costs, also provides for a resetting of the target price on the basis of
actual cost experience, but not to exceed the ceiling price. On October 29, 1973,
the contractor submitted such a repricing proposal. Negotiations are expected to
take about four months, and a firm agreemer..t on the increase in cost should be
reached by the Spring of 1974.
On the basis of the data available at the time the FY 1975 Budget was pre-
pared, it appeared that the cost increase on the 30 ships could amount to about
$260 million-about $200 million for an Increase in the target price, plus about
$60 million in additional escalation charges resulting from the increase in the
target price. The $200 million increase in target price, however, is still short of
the $351 million difference between the initial total target price ($1,789 million)
and the total ceiling price ($2,140 million). Moreover, the contractor's repric-
ing proposal is higher than our estimate. Henee, we cannot now preclude the
possibility that the firm agreement on the adjustment of the target price may ex-
ceed this $200 million increase.
Escalation of wage rates and material costs must be added to both the target
price and the ceiling price. Escalation computed on the basis of the initial target
price is estimated at about $397 million ; this, together with the $00 million of
additional escalation resulting from the increase in the target price, would bring
the total escalation cost to $457 million. Adding that amount to our estimate of
the revised target price, i.e., $1,989 million, would bring the total cost of the
Litton contract up to $2,446 million. Including the costs of other DD-963 related
contracts (GFE, etc.) the total cost of the 30-ship program would be more than
$3 billion.
Since an agreed figure on the Litton contract cost increase was not available
at the time the FY 1975 Budget was prepared, and since the additional funds will
not he required for obligation in FY 1975 in any event, we propose to finance any
cost increase in the FY 1976 Budget.
Given the labor shortage at the Litton shipyard in Pascagoula, we cannot rule
out the possibility that progress on the DD-963 program will be affected by the
delays encountered with the LHA program, which was to have preceded it in
construction. Work on the two programs is now proceeding simultaneously and
the first LHA, as well as the first three DD-963's are now expected to be delievered
during FY 1975. The DD 963 lead ship was launched on November 10, 1973, and
all 30 destroyers are now expected to be delivered by the end of FY 1978. In FY
1979, the last of the World War II destroyers are expected to be phased out of
the active force.
D 1X T
We now have five nuclear-powered frigates (DLGNs) under construction.
Delivery of these ships, together with the cruiser and two frigates now in the
fleet, will give us a total of eight nuclear-powered surface combatants-enough
for two nuclear-powered attack carrier task forces when none are in overhaul.
Two DLGN-36 class ships funded in FY 1967 and FY 1968 are nearing comple-
tion : the first, CALIFORNIA, is now scheduled to be delivered to the fleet in
FY 1974, and the second, SOUTH CAROLINA, in FY 1975. Delivery of the first
three DLGN--38 class ships, which were funded in FY 1970-1972. will be delayed
about seven months each because of a shortage of skilled labor in the shipyard.
Based on the revised schedule, DLGN-38 is expected to be delivered in FY 1976,
and DLGN-39 and 40 in FY 1977.
Last year the Congress added to our FY 1974 budget request $79 million for
advance procurement of long leadtime Items for two more DLGNs (DLGN-41
and 42). Notwithstanding the high cost of this class of ships, we have decided.
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to go ahead with one in FY 1975 and protect the option to go ahead with
the second in FY 1976. Accordingly, we have included in the FY 1975 Budget
a total of $256 million-$152 million to complete the funding of the first
of these two ships (DLGN-41) for which $116 million ($46 million in FY
1970-71 and $70 million in FY 1974) has already been provided, $92 million in
additional advance procurement funds for the second of these two ships (DLGN-
42) for which $19 million ($10 million in FY 1970 and $9 million in FY 1974) has
already been provided, and $12 million for escalation and post-delivery costs on
the five DLGNs already under construction. Another $167 million would be
required in FY 1976 to complete the funding of DLGN-42. Thus, the total funding
would amount to at least $268 million for DLGN-41 and $278 million for
DLGN-42.
Clearly, we will not be able to afford many surface combatant ships at these
prices. Yet, as I noted earlier, we must in this decade phase out all of the remain-
ing World War II surface combatants from the active forces. If we are to procure
the large numbers of ships that will be needed to maintain a force of even 200-225
other surface combatants, it is evident that the bulk of them must come from the
"low" side of the spectrum. It is for this reason that we want to press forward
with the Patrol Frigate program.
PP
The PF will be much smaller and less costly to procure and operate than the
DLGN-38 and DD-963 class ships currently under construction, but it will be
designed to provide protection against both air and surface, as well as subma-
rine attack. With a displacement of 3,500 tons, the ship will have a launcher and
fire control system for surface-to-air and anti-ship (i.e., STANDARD and IIAR-
POON) missiles, a 76 mm gun, ASW torpedoes and accommodations for two
LAMPS helicopters. The "design-to-cost" approach is being applied vigorously
to the PF program, and the average unit procurement cost to completion and out-
fitting and post-delivery costs, is now estimated at about $70 million (i,e., in
then-year dollars). The production contract for the lead ship, funded in FY 1973,
was recently awarded, and construction is scheduled to begin in late 1974. The
FY 1975 Budget includes $437 million to finance the currently estimated cost of
the first seven follow-on ships (excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs).
Another 11 ships are scheduled for procurement in FY 1976, and the remaining
31 ships would be funded in the FY 1977-1979 period under the current plan.
The PF lead ship would be delivered to the fleet by the end of FY 1977 and the
follow-on ships during the 1978-1983 period.
While the PF program as currently planned will provide significant numbers
of austere but capable ships for the modernization of the surface combatant fleet,
we must also be prepared to replace the current DLG/DDG ships which will
begin reaching retirement age in the early 1980s. The DGX, mentioned earlier, is
being planned for this role. This ship would be equipped with the new AEGIS
fleet air defense system which has a high power, long range phased array radar
with a greatly improved target tracking and designating capability, and which
uses the modified STANDARD missile. The Navy believes that engineering de-
velopment of the AEGIS system will be sufficiently advanced by FY 1977 to war-
rant funding of the first DGX in that year. The preliminary design goal calls
for a ship with a displacement of about 6,000 tons and and average cost per
follow-on ship of about $125 million in FY 1973 dollars.
Aegis
The Adgis system, which has been in engineering development for four years,
is now being oriented toward the new DGX. But because of its modular design, the
system will be adaptable to other classes of ships as well. DGX is currently
planned to have a one launcher system, but a two launcher version is still an
option for ships of DLGN size. Another $67 million has been included in the FY
1975 Budget to continue development of the Aegis system.
Lamps
Another important system that is being acquired to improve the capabilities
of our surface combatants is the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (Lamps).
This system involves a helicopter operating from a destroyer-type ship, together
with the associated support, communication and acoustic data processing equip-
ment aboard.the ship. Its role is to provide surveillance and detection of hostile
submarines and surface ships, localization and attack of detected submarines,
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and targeting information on surface ships. Lamps could be used on all surface
combatants which are equipped for helicopter operations.
Lamps is being acquired in two phases. The MK I, which involves installation
of shipboard equipment and conversion of H-2 helicopters already in the inven-
tory to an SH-2 configuration, became operational in FY' 1972, and the bulk of
the modifications have been funded. The MIS III, the second phase, includes the
development of improved avionics and shipboard systems to be used with a modi-
fied version of a current or new airframe. Three H-2 helicopters are being modi-
lied to test components and the integration of the new airborne and shipboard
systems. After the airframe has been selected, now scheduled for late 1975, con-
tracts will be let for the eight prototype LAMPS MK III helicopters and the re-
lated avionics and sensors for test and evaluation. A production decision on
Lamp MK III will not be needed until the late 1970s.
The FY 1975 Budget contains $34 million for LAMPS-$14 million for the
i1IK I modification program, $18 million to continue the MK III development
effort, and $2.5 million for a LAMPS helicopter maintenance hangar.
,,SEAS
For the modernization of the surface combatant force in the more distant
future, the Navy is pursuing the development of the Surface Effect Ship (SES).
The SES, as you know, is a variation of the air cushion vehicle and will use rigid
sidewalls integral to the hull structure to contain the air cushion. If the required
technology can be successfully developed, it would make possible the construction
of ocean-going ships with speeds of 80 knots cr more.
The development effort to date has concentrated on testing of the two 100-ton
test craft completed in 1972, the preliminary design of a 2000-ton prototype
ocean-going ship, and the development of the key subsystems for the larger
ship. The preliminary design studies, recently completed. by several competing
contractors, have examined the technical feasibility and cost of a 2000-ton SES
and provided technical proposals for the development of such a ship.
The SES development program is admittedly a high risk venture from the
technological point of view, but it could also have a high payoff in terms of
combat effectiveness. The central problem is to develop an ocean-going version
of the SES with sufficient range, payload capacity and sea-keeping capability to
warrant its cost. The key technical areas which must be mastered are the air
cushion seals, the waterjet inlets, and ride control systems, i.e., the subsystems
unique to this type of craft.
Accordingly, the principal emphasis in the FY 1975 program will be on the
further development of the technology required for the principal subsystems,
including additional testing of the 100-ton craft. When these steps are completed,
we will again review the status of the program and decide on whether to under-
take full scale development of the propulsors, transmissions, lift fans and seals,
and complete the detailed design of the 2000-ton prototype, Pending that decision,
which would be reflected in the FY 1976 Bridget, we are requesting $58 million
for the SES development program in FY 1975.
PIIDI
In addition to the major surface combatants, which I have just discussed, the
Navy also operates a small number of "minor" combatants, i.e., patrol ships of
less than 300 tons. These ships normally operate against surface combatant
ships as well as other surface craft in the conduct of surveillance, screening and
special missions in coastal areas, island waters, and inland or narrow seas. The
force now consists of 1.4 Patrol Gunboats, all of which were built since 1965. Tn
FY 1975 this force will he augmented by the first two of a new class of Patrol
Hydrofoil Missile ships (PHM).
The PHM is a cooperative NATO development program in which the U.S. is
sharing its hydrofoil technology with other NATO nations. A Memorandum of
Understanding signed by Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United
States in November 1972 provides for a cooperative development and production
effort.
Two U.S. lead ships are currently undc>r construction. and we tentatively
plan to build 28 more of these ships for our use. The FRG has indicated its in-
tention to have its ten ships built in the U.S. Italy expects to have at least one
ship built here, and may build additional ships in its own yards. A production
agreement among the three participating governments is expected to be signed
later this year.
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The first version, the semi-active Standard missile (SM-1-MR) is now installed
in six DEG and two Patrol Gunboats (PG) not previously missile-equipped. The
second version, the Standard anti-radiation missile (ARM) is planned for instal-
lation on 12 DDGs and four PGs (two PGs already have this system installed).
The third version, Active Standard with a radar seeker, is still in development.
This version of the Standard missile will have a range capabiilty beyond the
ship radar horizon.
The range of the Standard semi-active missile is limited to the range of the
ship's radar, since the missile's target must be illuminated by a ship radar. The
Standard Arm and Active Standard, equipped with an anti-radiation homing
capability and an active terminal seeker, respectively, eliminate the need for
illumination of the target by a ship radar and thus permit engagement of targets
beyond the ship radar horizon.
Unfortunately, Active Standard has encountered development delays and can
no longer be regarded as an interim program. It is now concurrent with Harpoon,
and under current schedules, could be introduced to the fleet only a few months
before Harpoon. Development of the Harpoon, however, is not sufficiently ad-
vanced to warrant cancellation of the Active Standard at this time. Accordingly,
we are continuing development of the Active Standard missile, but only as a
backup to Harpoon. Both programs will be carefully reviewed later this year,
following completion of development testing of both systems, to assess the need
for the continuation of Active Standard as a backup to Harpoon.
Meanwhile, FY 1974 funds will be utilized to initiate an 18-missile Active
Standard test program-eight for development test and evaluation and ten for
operational test and evaluation. If the DT&E firings are successful, and if
Harpoon experiences development delays, then we would proceed with the ten
operational tests and authorize long leadtime procurement for the Active Stand-
ard missiles needed to equip and support 12 DDG/DEG ships. This number of
ships would give the Navy a reasonable interim capability pending availability
of Harpoon.
Since procurement of the Active Standard missiles could be started in I+ Y 1975
if OT&E is successful, we have included $35 million in the FY 1975 Budget for
this program-$1 million to continue development and $34 million for the pro-
curement of the 74 missiles needed to equip the 12 ships. Thus, if Harpoon devel-
opment does slip, we will be in a position to start procurement of Active Standard
without further delay.
Condor
The Navy is also developing a long-range, electro-optical air-to-surface missile,
Condor, for use by attack aircraft against both land and sea targets. This stand
off missile could significantly improve the capability of our aircraft carrier forces
to bring opposing surface ships under attack.
Development of the basic missile is essentially complete, and pilot line produc-
tion missiles are being procured with FY 1973-74 funds for operational test
and evaluation of Condor. Engineering development and flight testing of the dual
mode radar and electro-optical seeker version of Condor will be conducted in
FY 1975-76. This version would have a night/all weather capability. To reduce
unit cost, a non-secure data link is also under development. Operational test
and evaluation of the dual mode Condor is now scheduled to be completed in
FY 10'76. The FY 1975 Budget includes about $30 million for this program-$10
million for continued development and $20 million for the procurement of 35 pilot
line missiles, the minimum number needed to keep the line going pending a deci-
sion on full scale production, now expected in early 1975.
Attack submarines are potentially the most effective element of our varied
ASW forces. Nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), because they are
uniquely able to operate covertly; can be used to establish effective ASW barriers
in waters which are otherwise under the control of enemy surface and air forces,
and in which it would be untenable for other types of U.S. ASW forces to operate.
SSNs could also be used in open ocean search for opposing submarines, and some
would be needed in the Mediterranean.
In addition to the foregoing missions, the Navy is also investigating the use of
SSNs for escorting high-value surface ships such as carriers in open ocean areas,
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These hydrofoil ships will be capable of both hullborne and foilborne propul-
sion, and the U.S. version will be equipped with the U.S. Harpoon anti-ship
missile, an Italian designed rapid-fire gun, and a Dutch designed fire control
system. The ships produced for the FRG ani Italy are expected to be equipped
with an anti-ship missile of a European design.
Out of a total of $108 million in the FY 1975 Budget for this program, some
$101 million in RDT&E funds is for the completion of construction and initial
operational test and evaluation of the two leadships and for the preparation of
a development data package for use in competitive bidding for the construction
of the follow-on whips. The remaining $92 million is for construction of the first
four follow-on ships for U.S. use. But before these follow-on ships are placed
on contract, the results of the initial operational test and evaluation of the two
leadships, now scheduled to be completed in early 197;, will be carefully re-
viewed together with analyses of mission requirements to ensure that the ship
is ready for quantity production and to verify the quantity required.
Harpoon
One of the most urgent needs of our surface combatant force is an ability to
cope effectively with the large and still growing Soviet anti-ship missile threat,
particularly when operating beyond the range of our land-based airpower and
unaccompanied by sea-based airpower. Under these conditions, Soviet surface
ships armed with SSMs can greatly outrange our gun-equipped surface com-
batants. In response to this need, the Defense Department has undertaken
several anti-ship missile development programs, including aircraft and sub-
marine launched, as well as surface launched systems.
The principal Navy anti-ship missile program is the Harpoon. This missile
is designed to be launched from all of our surface combatants (except the Patrol
Gunboats), the S-3 and P-3 ASW aircraft, the Navy's A--6 and A-7 attack air-
craft and, in a special encapsulated version, from all but the oldest SSNs. The
status of the program was reviewed by the DSARC in May 1973, and the con-
elusion reached was that developmental progress had been excellent and that
initiation of engineering development was fully warranted. Accordingly, the
weapon system development contract was awarded in June 1973, and the pro-
gram is proceeding satisfactorily. Test firings have verified the missile design
concepts, and test vehicles have been launched successfully from a P-3 aircraft
and from the ASROC launcher of a Destroyer Escort.
The next phase of the Harpoon program involves the fabrication and testing
of actual prototype missiles. The June 1973 contract provides for 40 prototype
missiles as well as command and launch systems for P-3 and S-3 aircraft and a
variety of surface combatants. These equipments will be used for the develop-
ment test and evaluation phase to be conducted by-the contractor with the as-
sistance of Navy personnel, beginning in early 1974.
The progress in this testing and evaluation effort will he reviewed in the sum-
mer of 1974, and if the results up to that point are satisfactory, we will initiate
production of pilot line missiles. Accordingly, we have included in the FY 1975
Budget a total of $130 million-$58 million to continue the Harpoon develop-
ment effort, and $78 million for the procurement of 150 pilot line missiles (58
for operational test and evaluation and 92 for the first operational deployment
of Harpoon).
Encapsulated Harpoon
The encapsulated Harpoon Is a Harpoon missile fitted with a launch capsule
that would make it compatible with existing torpedo tubes. It would give our
first line SSNs a longer range weapon, to complement their torpedoes, for use
against surface ships. Prototype capsules are being developed and will be given
structural and hydrodynamic tests during FY 1974. The Navy plans to complete
system test and evaluation and to initiate pilot line production during FY 1975.
The FY 1975 Budget includes about $13 million to continue this program-$10
million for development and $3 million for procurement of the first 20 capsules.
(The missiles themselves are included in the 58 Harpoons being procured for
OT&E.)
Standard S.lf
The Standard SSM program was initiated in 1971 to provide an interim anti-
ship missile capability until the Harpoon could be developed and deployed. The
Standard SSMI is operational in two versions with a third now in development.
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a role now being fulfilled primarily by surface ships. There are, however, sev-
eral tactical employment problems to be resolved ; for example, the difficulties
involved in coordinating a "friendly" submarine with other types of ASW forces
in wartime.
Given the prevailing fiscal constraints, we believe that a force of about 90
SSNs should be sufficient, together with other ASW forces, to support the essen-
tial requirements as we see them now. At the end of FY. 1974 we will have 61
SSNs in the fleet and 27 funded but not yet delivered-for a total of 88. Of the 23
688-class nuclear powered SSNs funded through FY 1974, none will have been
delivered to the fleet by the end of that fiscal year. Indeed, all 11 SSNs funded in
FY 1973-74 were placed on contract within the last six months and the last one
is scheduled for delivery in FY 1981. Thus, the shipbuilders involved have a very
4 large backlog ahead of them. The submarine building program proposed for FY
1975 and subsequent years takes this backlog into account and is designed to
maintain at least the 90 SSN force level over the next several years.
SSN-688
+ Our current plan is to procure three 688 class SSNs in FY 1975 and five every
two years thereafter for the remainder of the 1970s. That will not only support a
force level of 90 SSNs but also permit the early retirement of some of the older
SSNs. Looking to the longer term future, I believe we should examine the feasi-
bility and desirability of building a new class of SSNs that would be smaller
and less costly than the 688 class which is now costing us almost $200 million
each.
The 688-class leadship, LOS ANGELES, was originally scheduled for com-
missioning in August of this year. This ship will be delayed about six months
due to late delivery of contractor-furnished equipment and a slower-than-planned
buildup of the workforce at Newport News, which is also building a variety of
surface ships. Thus, the first SSN-688 class ship is expected to be delivered in
FY 1975, with an additional 22 to be delivered by the end of FY 1981. The $548
million included in the FY 1975 Budget would provide $503 million, which to-
gether with $78 million provided in FY 1974 for advance procurement, would
complete the funding of the three submarines proposed for procurement in FY
1975, plus $45 million for escalation, outfitting and post-delivery costs on prior
year programs..
i3K-48 Torpedo
The effectiveness of our attack submarines is being significantly improved with
the acquisition of the MK-48 Torpedo. This wire-guided, acoustic homing torpedo
was designed primarily for use against submarines, but it also has a good capa-
bility against surface ships. Operational evaluation of the MIC-48 was completed
in 1972, and the system was finally approved for fleet use in October 1972.
Procurement of the MK-48 in quantity began in 1972, and some 500 torpedoes
were funded in both FY 1973 and FY 1974. The FY 1975 Budget includes $155
million for the procurement of another 450 torpedoes, plus about $5 million for
RDT&E. When these 450 torpedoes are delivered, a large part of the current Navy
procurement objective will have been fulfilled.
AN/BQQ-5 Sonar
While the MIS-48 torpedo will be the primary weapon of the attack submarine
force, the new digital, multibeamed sonar system, with both hull mounted and
towed acoustic arrays, will be the principal sensor. This system, designated the
AN/BQQ-5, underwent extensive developmental testing during 1972 and 1973, and
was approved for production last year. It is being installed in all of the new 688-
class SSNs, and it will be backfitted into all PERMIT and STURGEON-class
SSNs during regular overhauls commencing in FY 1976. The FY 1975 Budget
includes a total of about $72 million for this program-$16 million for develop-
ment and $56 million to procure eight systems for the backfit program, plus one
training unit. When the AN/BQQ-5 enters service in FY 1975 not only will cur-
rent Soviet submarines be detectable at significantly greater ranges than cur-
rently possible, but also the advanced beam forming and display features of this
equipment will allow our SSNs to substantially increase their search rates.
5. Undersea Surveillance Systems.-The primary U.S. undersea surveillance
system is now the fixed Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), but mobile and
deployable Towed Array Surveillance Systems (TASS) are also under develop-
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ment. In addition, the Navy is examining the potential usefulness in the future
of different types of systems, such as the Moored Surveillance System (MSS),
which would employ buoys, and the Suspended Array Surveillance System,
(SASS), which would use large, fixed, buoyantly suspended hydrophone arrays.
Towed arrays have also shown consideratle potential as tactical sensors. In
the tactical escort role the towed array would be used by surface combatants in
much the same manner as current active sensors. The ships would have a proc-
essing capability on board to evaluate contacts, and LAMPS or other ASW air-
craft would be used to prosecute the attack. Navy analyses and at-sea tests have
shown that towed arrays should make a significant contribution to the ASW
effectiveness of surface combatants.
The Navy plans to award a contract and start design and fabrication of an
engineering development model of the surveillance TASS in FY 1975 and subject
this model. to at-sea test and evaluation in FY 1976. Work would also be started
in FY 1975 on an advanced development model of the Escort TASS.
A total of $137 million has been included in the FY 1975 Budget for the
SOSUS and the TASS programs-$116 million for SOSIS improvements and $21
million for the development and test of the two versions of TASS.
6. Amphibious Lift and Mine Countermeasure Forces.--The current amphib-
ious lift force objective is to provide a sufficient number of modern 20 knot ships
to transport simultaneously the assault elements of 1 Marine Amphibious
Forces (MAFs), i.e., 11/,3 Marine division/wing teams together with their unit
equipment (excluding fixed-wing aircraft which are transported on attack car-
riers--or flown to the threater) and initial stocks of supplies. This force would
enable us to conduct a division-size amphibious assault; in a major combat
theater (e.g., on the northern or southern flank of NATO), while at the same
time retaining limited amphibious assault capability to cope with a minor con-
tingency elsewhere.
The present amphibious force of 65 ships has sufficient capacity to lift just
over one MAF, but is short of helicopter platform ships. We are now able to
maintain three battalion landing team amphibious forces (corresponding to
about 1/9 of a MAP) deployed forward continuously, one without helicopters
because of the shortage of helicopter decks. A fourth unit, usually without heli-
copters, is deployed on an intermittent basis in the Caribbean.
With the five large general purpose Amphibious Assau't Ships (LHAs) now
under construction are delivered to the fleet, the remaining older, less efficient,
ships will be retired, the helicopter platform shortage will be eliminated. and the
overall lift capacity will be increased to 1y3 MAFs (including ships in over-
haul). At that time (late FY 1977) the amphibious lift; would consist of _66
ships all with speeds of about 20 knots. With this force, we will be able to main-
tain four battalion-size amphibious forces, all with major helicopter ships de-
ployed forward continuously. However, even with the LHAs, it would be neces-
sary to transfer ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic to be able to mount a
division-size amphibious assault in the NATO area.
As you know, the LHA program has experienced numerous delays and con-
tractual disputes. The first LHA was finally launched in December 1973 and is
expected to be delivered to the fleet in March 1975, a delay of about two years
from the original contract delivery schedule. Two more ships are scheduled to
be delivered in each of the next two fiscal years, the last about 33 months beyond
the originally scheduled date.
The current dispute concerns the contractor's (Litton Industries) request for
an equitable adjustment of $271 million in the contract price, which was sub-
mitted in March 3972. The Navy found this request to be unsubstantiated, and on
28 llbruary 1973 the Navy Contracting Office issued a unilateral decision setting
the new target price at ceiling. Litton thereupon filed an appeal with the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, and the Navy subsequently filed its re-
sponse. Hearings before the Board are yet to be scheduled.
On the basis of the Contracting Officer's decision, the total cost to the Govern-
ment of the five LHAs will amount to about $1,145 million. Of that amount, the
Congress has provided about $1,127 million, leaving about $18 million in outfit-
ting, and escalation charges to be funded as the ships are delivered.
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The active mine countermeasure forces have undergone substantial reductions
in recent years and further reductions are planned in the FY 1974-73 period as
additional ships are transferred to the reserve forces. In part, this reduction has
been offset by the greater use of mine countermeasures helicopters, of which
there are now 21 specially equipped RI=I-53Ds in the force. These 21 helicopters,
alone, could support a MAF-size amphibious assault against a medium mine
threat, assuming several days' time to clear the area.
7. Uunderway Replenishment and Fleet Support Shipe.-The Navy operates
a total of about 120 underway replenishment (UNREP) ships, large tenders, and
other fleet support ships such as salvage ships, tugs, and submarine rescue ves-
sels. These ships provide wartime underway logistics support and mobile, for-
ward area maintenance and repair facilities for deployed naval forces. In peace-
time, support ships deploy to the Mediterranean and Western Pacific to support
the Sixth and Seventh Fleets. Additional support ships can be deployed from the
United States to sustain increased combatant ship activity in these or other areas
during a crisis or in wartime.
Support ship force levels reflect requirements for both wartime and peacetime
support of naval forces. The wartime requirements for UNREP ships are derived
from estimates of the number of naval forces to be supported simultaneously,
their expected location and distance from logistic bases, consumption rates for
ordnance, fuel, stores, and repair parts, and the projected duration of the con-
flict. Peacetime requirements are derived from calculations of what is needed
to support a smaller number of deployed ships operating in more widely dis-
persed areas,
Planned UNREP ship forces will provide a wartime capability to support de-
ployed carrier and amphibious task groups in up to about four or five locations
simultaneously. Denial of foreign bases, however, would reduce the number of
simultaneous fleet operating areas which could be supported with our pro-
grammed UNREP forces. For example, a requirement to conduct sustained war-
time operations, including carrier operations and a division-size amphibious
assault, without foreign bases in an area such as the Eastern Mediterranean
would force a drawdown in combatant ship deployments elsewhere because of
the increase in UNREP ship cycling distances involved.
Forward deployments of UNREP ships in peacetime generally include about 16
to 18 ships. With the continuing decrease in the size of the UNREP force, how-
ever, it is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain this deployment without
undue personnel hardships. Accordingly, the Navy plans to homeport a few sup-
port units overseas and operate others through the Military Sealift Command
(MSC). MSC-operated ships are manned almost wholly by U.S. civil service
crews. The ships remain abroad, even for overhauls, and the crews are rotated
annually by air. Consequently, MSC-operated ships can achieve greater time on-
station and, hence, higher utilization rates in peacetime than active Navy-
operated ships. Five Fleet Oilers and one Store Ship would be operated by MSC
in FY 1975, and three more Oilers in FY 1976, for a total of nine UNREP ships
under MSC control.
? Tender force level goals are derived from planned wartime roles based on esti-
mates of the number and location of ships to be deployed, the estimated volume
of repair work needed, and the availability of overseas bases. Current forces can
provide sustained maintenance and limited battle damage repair capability for
most deployed surface ship forces in wartime, assuming concurrent availability
of TJ.S.-operated ship repair facilities in either Japan or the Philippines. Peace-
time forward deployment of tenders is .generally limited to two ships in each
ocean, which can easily be maintained within planned force levels.
Force levels for minor fleet support ships are derived from estimates of the
likelihood of major damage to combatants requiring salvage or towing in a for-
ward area, routine towing and other tug duties, and other servic" support
requirements. Planned forces can support early deployment of several tug-type
vessels for salvage support in a contingency. In peacetime, forward deployments
are limited largely to a few submarine rescue vessels, ocean tugs and salvage
ships, which can be accommodated within the planned force. As in tb& case of
the UNREP force, the Navy plans to operate more of the minor fleet support
ships in the MSC. A total of 13 ships will be MSC-operated by the end of PY
1976, and five more will be added from new construction by the end of VV
1979.
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Because of their lower priority, the large scale modernization of the support
ship forces has been repeatedly deferred and now lags far behind modernization
of the combatant ship forces. Consequently, there will still be more than 50
World War II-constructed support ships in the active fleet at the end of FY
1977, the year in which the last of the ships now under construction or funded
is delivered to the fleet. Clearly, a major effort to modernize the support ship
force can no longer be deferred.
AE, AFS, AO, AD AND ATF
Accordingly, we propose to undertake in the FY 1975-1979 period a substantial
ship building program in this area. A total of 32 ships would be built, at a cur-
rently estimated cost of about $2 billion. The program would include ten Fleet
Oilers (AO), five Destroyer Tenders (AD), two Submarine Tenders (AS), two
Ammunition Ships (AE), three Combat Stores Ships (AFS), and ten Fleet Ocean
Tugs (ATF). These ships would be delivered to the fleet between FY 1978 and
FY 1983, leaving about 25 World War II-constructed ships still in the active
fleet at the end of FY 1983. A total of $209 million is included in the FY 1975 ?
Budget to procure the first three ships-an AD, an AO, and an ATF.
The general purpose air forces-comprising the Navy carrier air wings, the
Marine Corps aircraft wings, and the tactical aid units of the Air Force-are
the most expensive component of the general purpose forces in terms of invest-
ment costs. In contrast to the land forces, which are heavy in personnel, the
tactical air forces are heavy in equipment. And, because of the incessant growth
in complexity, as well as in capability, each new generation of aircraft in the past
has cost several times as much as the one it replaces, ever after an appropriate
adjustment is made for inflation. This growth in the cost per unit has, in turn,
placed increasingly severe constraints on the number of new aircraft which could
be procured each year.
But quantity as well as sophistication is essential if our general purpose air
forces are to be able to perform successfully their assigned missions. No matter
how effective a particular tactical aircraft may be, a certain minimum number
is needed to cover a battlefield, a front or a combat theater; or to equip an air-
craft carrier force. In view of the growth in the size and quality of the Soviet
tactical air forces during the past few years and the further growth in capabili-
ties projected over the next few years, I believe we stand in danger of falling
below that minimum quantitative level if present trends are allowed to continue
unabated. Consequently, here again we must apply the principle of the "high-
low" mix, and the programs proposed in this area for FY 1975 reflect that
application.
I noted in my discussion of the land forces that one conclusion drawn from
the recent conflict in the `Middle East is that major improvements in our field
army air defense capabilities are required. Another conclusion we have drawn is
that the defense suppression capabilities of our tactical air forces must be further
improved. We learned that lesson earlier ir. Vietnam and a variety of actions,
both technical and tactical, were taken to improve our capabilities in this regard.
But the intensity and effectiveness displayed by the ground air defenses in the
Middle East conflict impressed upon us even more compellingly the need to take
still further actions to enhancethe defense-suppression capabilities of our tactical
forces.
Our tactical air forces not only represent a great investment of national re-
sources, they are also a most essential element in our national defense strategy.
We count on them to offset in part possible numerical inferiorities in land forces
as compared to potential adversaries. And, particularly in the ATATO-Warsaw
Pact context, where we bear in relation to our allies a proportionately greater
responsibility for tactical air, our tactical air forces serve as an "equalizer".
Hence, we must ensure their continuing ability to perform their mission
effectively.
That objective can be achieved, we believe, by providing our tactical air forces
with improved self-protection radar warning (RW) equipment, tactical elec-
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tronic warfare (EW) support forces, and a greater number and variety of im-
proved defense-suppression weapons and devices. Both in Vietnam and in the
Middle East, it has been demonstrated that tactical air forces which are provided
with this type of support can successfully accomplish their mission even in the
face of heavy, sophisticated air defenses. Accordingly, special attention is given
to this need in the FY 1974 Supplemental and the FY 1975 Budget.
1. Force Structure.-The Navy will operate 15 aircraft carriers in FY 1975
with a total of 14 air wings. This arrangement is temporary, since the number
of carriers is scheduled to decline to 12 later in this decade. At that time the
number of wings will equal the number of carriers. Each carrier wing is normally
assigned three attack squadrons (one medium and.two light) and two fighter
squadrons. The wings associated with the new NIMITZ-class carriers, however,
? will be provided an extra light attack squadron. When the last two HANCOCK-
class carriers are retired, all the remaining A-4 and F-8 squadrons will be phased
out of the active forces.
By end FY 1974 the three Marine Corps wings will consist of ten attack
sqadrons (five A-4s and live A-6s). Three HARRIER (AV-8A) squadrons,
and 12 fighter squadrons (all F-4s), for a total of 25 squadrons. This structure
will be continued through FY 1975, except that one squadron of F-4s will be re-
placed by the first squadron of F-14s.
. The Navy and Marine Corps reserve, which at the end of FY 1974 will have a
total of 18 squadrons (11 attack and 7 fighter), will be reduced to 17 squadrons in
I+'Y 1975 (11 attack and 6 fighters). These units, however, will be modernized over
the next several years as F-4s and A-7s are released from the active forces.
The active Air Force at the end of FY 1975 will have a total of 69 squadrons
in 22 wings. We propose to modernize substantially the equipping of this force
during the next several years. All of the A-7 squadrons would be phased out
and replaced by A-10s, and about half of the F-4 squadrons would be phased
out and replaced by F-15s.
The A-7s and the F-4s released from the active Air Force would be used to
modernize the Air Force reserve components. The Air National Guard at the
end of FY 1975 will have a total of 27 tactical fighter and attack squadrons, 17
of which will be F-100s. All of these F-100s will eventually be replaced with
A-7s and F-4s. The Air Force Reserve, which now has four A-37 and three
F-105 squadrons for a total of seven squadrons, would be modernized by replac-
ing the F-105s with F-4s.
In addition to the attack and fighter aircraft discussed above, the Navy,
Marine Corps and Air Force also have a number of specialized electronic coun-
termeasure aircraft which are specifically designed for defense suppression. The
principal aircraft in this category is the EA-6. The Navy now has about 30 EA-
6Bs and the Marine Corps has 23 EA-6As. The Navy's EA-6B inventory will be
built up during the next few years to equip fully the 12-carrier force.
2. Acquisition Programs.-As shown on the table beginning on the following
page, the FY 1975 Budget provides for both the near term and long term modern-
ization of the general purpose air forces.
The largest single aircraft acquisition program for the Navy and Marine
Corps is the F-14. We now plan to buy a total of 334 F-14s, enough to equip
12 squadrons for the Navy carrier air wings and four squadrons for the Marine
Corps wings.
The F-14, as you know, is a two-place, twin engine, variable geometry, super-
sonic high performance carrier-based aircraft that has been designed particu-
larly for fleet air defense. It has an all-weather capability to deliver the long
range PHOENIX and medium range SPARROW air-to-air missiles, as well as
a visual attack capability using an M-61 gun and the SIDEWINDER short range
missile for close-in, air-to-air combat. Its primary role in fleet air defense is to
destroy enemy bombers carrying air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) before the
ASMs can be launched. Hence, the F-14/PHOENIX system's ability to operate
at extended ranges from an aircraft carrier is crucial to successful fleet defense
in the face of a significant air-to-surface missile threat at sea.
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ACQUISITION COSTS OF MAJOR TACTICAL AIR FORCES MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS r
tin millions of dollars]
Fiscal year-
1973 1974 1975
actual planned proposed
funding funding 2 funding
Navy and Marine Corps aircraft:
Continued development and procurement of F-14 multin',ission
628
737
756
fighter---------------_--------------------------------
Acquisdion of Phoenix missiles ___--_-------------------------- 99 100 100 34
Development of a new austere fighter, the VFX----------------------- - ___---___-___-__------
Acquisiiion and modification of A-6 attack aircraft________________ 241 184 199
Acquisition of A-7E attack aircraft______________________________ 181 150 159
Procurement of A-4M aircraft__________________________________ 2 (58)116 67
Procurement of AV-8A Harrier aircraft___________________________ 125 56 --------------
Development of Navy V/STOL fighter____________________________ 11 24 19
Acquisition of EA-68 aircraft___________________________________ 157 124 129
Acquisition of E-2C fleet early-warning aircraft_______________ ____ 175 160 119
Procurement of F- 5E aircraft--------------------------------------------- (10) --------------
Air Force aircraft:
Continued development/procurement of F-15 air superiority fightor-_ _
908
1,129
1,076
23
Development of lightWeight fighter prototypes (including engine) _-_-
43
47
2
Development of air combat fighter----------------------------------------------------------- 3
ort
-air su
10
l
f A
pp
ose
c
-
Development and advanced procurement o
48
107
2fi8
aircraft----------------------------------------------------
Acquisition of Maverick ,, oissiles-_---_____ _
79
61
68
70
Development and procurement of E-3A (AWACS)-----------------
194
163
7
37
Development of EF-1ll jamming system -------------- ----------
3
15
I Includes costs of R.D.T. & E. procurement of the system and init al spares, and directly related military construction.
a Figures in parentheses are the amounts included in the fiscal yer:r 1974 supplemental.
Procurement of the F-14 began in FY 1971 and the first two squadrons entered
the forces in FY 1973. The program, from a technical point of view, is progress-
ing satisfactorily, but the financial aspects have caused great difficulties.
In March 1973, however, Grumman (the prime contractor), finally agreed to
build- the 48 aircraft in Lot V (FY 1973 funding) under the terms of the
original contract (i.e., at the contract ceiling price) thus bringing the total num-
ber of aircraft under the contract to 134. In September 1973, the Navy and
Grumman sucessfully completed negotiations on all outstanding issues relating
to Lots IV and V (FY 1972-73 procurements) and signed a contract for the
procurement of the next 50 aircraft funded in FY 1974. An equitable adjustment
of $18.3 million was allowed on Lot IV to cover both a six-month slip in the
commencement of that Lot due to the effects of the crash of aircraft No. 1 and
to provide for some additional tooling to increase production from four to six
aircraft per month in order to recover the schedule. No adjustments were made
on Lot V. The new airframe contract for the 50 aircraft funded in FY 1974 is
a fixed-price incentive instrument with a target cost of $281.5 million, a target
price of $306.5 million and a ceiling price of $325 million.
The FY 1975 Budget includes a total of $756 million for the F-14 program-$12
million for R&D, $674 million for the procurement of the next increment of 50
aircraft, and $70 million for advance procurement. The production rate will be
built up to six per month as previously planned, but two per month (for a
period of 15 months) will be produced for the Iranian Air Force. The Govern-
ment of Iran, as you know, placed an order for 30 F+-14s and associated spates,
missiles, etc. Twenty-four of these aircraft will be delivered to Iran in FY 1976
and the remaining six in FY 1977.
The Phoenix long range air-to-air missile program is proceeding on schedule.
The first units are now operational and about $100 million is included in the
FY 1975 Budget for the procurement of another 340 missiles and initial spares.
While some minimum number of F-14As is clearly essential for fleet air de-
fense, we cannot afford, nor do we need, an all F-14A carrier or Marine Corps
fighter force. Consequently, the Navy is now studying the characteristics of a
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new austere, lower cost fighter (designated the VFX) to serve as the eventual
replacement for the remaining F-4s, in both the Navy carrier and Marine Corps
air wings. We believe this practical application of the high/low concept should
be pursued as expeditiously as possible. Accordingly, $34 million is included in
the FY 1975 Budget to provide the option to commence engineering development
of the VFX.
A total of $199 million is included in the FY 1975 Budget for the A-GE pro-
gram-$10 million for R&D, $130 milion for the procurement of 12 more A-6Es
for the Navy, $2 million for advance procurement, $57 million for the modifica-
tion of 48 A-GAs to the A-GE configuration and $.5 million for military construe-
tion. It is currently planned to complete the conversion of all Navy and Marine
Corps A-6 squadrons to the A-6E configuration by FY 1978. Beginning in FY
1979, the Navy A-GE squadrons would be increased from the current nine UE
to 12 UE per squadron. The Marine Corps A-6 squadrons already have 12 UE
aircraft each.
! A-7E
The FY 1975 Budget also includes about $159 million for the A-7E pro-
gram-$8 million for R&D, $147 million for another 34 A-7Es and $4 million for
advance procurement. During the next five years, all of the remaining A-7A and
Bs in the active Navy units will be replaced with A-7Es and the older aircraft
transferred to the Navy Reserve to modernize those forces.
The $58 million requested in the FY 1974 Supplemental for Marine Corps
A-4Ms would provide for the replacement of aircraft furnished to Israel. The $67
million requested in the FY 1975 Budget would provide $58 million for the
procurement of 24 more ABMs for the Marine Corps plus $2 million for advanced
procurement and about $7 million for RDT&E. All of the remaining A-4Es and
Fs in the active Marine Corps will be replaced by the much more effective A-4M,
and the A-4Es and Fs to be transferred to the Marine Corps Reserve will replace
the still older A-4Cs which were produced in the 1958-62 period.
NEW V/STOL FIGHTER
The $56 million provided in FY 1974 will complete the funding of AV-8A
(HARRIER) V/STOL fighter procurement for the three Marine Corps squadrons.
The Navy, however, is now working on an advanced V/STOL technology develop-
ment program consisting of three separate aircraft designs : the XFV12A proto-
type, with the thrust-augmented wing (TAW) ; a design with the lift-plus-lift
cruise engine ; and the Advanced Harrier. Because of the TAW's great potential,
the Navy has given it first priority among the three designs, pending successful
completion of development milestones in 1974. The first and most critical mile-
stone, the thrust augmentation demonstration, is scheduled in March 1974. A
full-scale lift demonstration is planned by the end of 1974. If successfully de-
veloped, this aircraft would be the prime candidate for use aboard the Sea Con-
trol Ship. The FY 1975 Budget includes $19 million to continue this develop-
ment effort.
As noted earlier, the Navy is still in the process of acquiring sufficient EA-6B
electronic countermeasure aircraft to equip the 12-carrier force. The $129 mil-
lion included in the FY 1975 Budget would provide $6 million for R&D and $123
million for the procurement of an additional six aircraft.
Last year the Navy planned to acquire a total of 30 E-2Cs, which together with
the earlier model E-2Bs, would provide one squadron (4 UE aircraft) of Fleet
Early Warning Aircraft for each of the planned 12 carrier air wings. The funds
requested in the FY 1974 Budget were to provide for the procurement of the
last nine of the thirty aircraft.
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A recent review of the fleet early warning capabilities has persuaded me that
it would be desirable to acquire at least six more E-2Cs. An inventory of 36 E-2C
aircraft would permit the formation of a sixth squadron. This, in turn, would
enable the Navy to maintain two squadrons forward (one each with the 6th
and 7th Fleets) at all times on a normal one-in-three rotation cycle. The E-2C is
markedly superior to the E-2B, particularly in a high threat environment and
in overland target detection.
A total of about $119 million is included in the FY 197?; Budget for the pro-
curement of the six E-2Cs.
The $10 million included in the FY 1974 Supplemental for the F-5E.would
provide five aircraft for the Navy Fighter Weapons Schoo. to replace five A-4s
furnished to Israel. These F-5Es would be used in place of A-4s to stimulate
the MIG-21 in the training of Navy fighter crews, a purpose for which they are
much more suitable than the A-4s.
The F-15 is the first fighter in many years which has been specifically de-
signed to excel in air-to-air. combat. It will be armed with a new medium range
air-to-air missile system and an improved close-in air-to-air missile system, as
well as the proven M-61 20mm gun, and it should be superior to any fighter the
Soviet Union is likely to deploy in the next 10-l.5 years.
Flight testing of the F-15 is proceeding satisfactorily and the aircraft has
met all of its performance milestones on or ahead of schedule with the excep-
tion of engine qualification. The problem wit] the engine encountered last year
has been resolved and the qualification test is now complete. On the basis of the
test results to date, we believe the aircraft is technically sound and will be
able to perform in full the mission for which it has been designed.
We now plan to buy a total of 729 F-15s. The first procurement of 30 F-15s was
funded in FY 1973. Another 62 aircraft were funded in FY 1974. The FY 1975
Budget includes a total of $1,076 million--$183 million for R&D and $893 mil-
lion for the procurement of a third increment of 72 aircraft. The remaining 565
aircraft are scheduled to be procured in the FY 1976-80 period.
This schedule represents a stretchout of the procurement program planned last
year. There are a number of reasons why this action would be desirable.
First, the revised production rate will better match the aircraft to the avail-
ability of its new air-to-air weapons.
Second, a slower production build-up will preserve options on the total quan-
tity of F-15s to be procured, and allow a more orderly introduction of improved
versions of the aircraft. Given the interest of several allies in this aircraft, keep-
ing the production line open beyond the originally planned date may well result
in some foreign orders for the F-15.
Third, while lower unit cost can he achieved at higher production rates, the
cost of slowing the F-15 production build-up will be more than matched by the
higher force and readiness levels which could he achieved during FY 1975 and
1976 through the use of funds that would otherwise have to he expended for a
higher rate of F-15 production in those years. In suns, we believe the trade off
between a. faster rate of F-15 procurement and the retention of near term com-
bat capabilities should be resolved in favor of the latter.
The FY 1973 and 1974 procurements will permit the Air Force to form a train-
ing squadron and the first two operational F-15 squadrons in FY 1976.
Lightweight. Fighters and Air Combat Fighters
As in the case of the Navy, we cannot afford, and we do not need, an all high-
capability fighter force in the Air Force. It was to meet the need for a fighter at
the low-cost end of the high/low mix that the "lightweight" fighter prototype
development program was initiated in FY 1972. This program involves prototype
development by two contractors of two different experimental versions of a low-
cost, visual combat fighter aircraft incorporating new, advanced aircraft design
concepts. At the same time, the prototype development of a new advanced tech-
nology, high thrust-to-weight turbojet engine was also initiated.
The first of these "lightweight" prototype fighters (General Dynamics' YF-16)
was rolled out last December and flew in January: the second (Northrop's YF-
17) is expected to fly in April of this year. These experimental prototype fighters
(two from each contractor) will be put through a comprehensive 12-month flight
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test program during which we intend to assess the combat value of the many tech-
nological innovations incorporated in these aircraft.
On the basis of the work already accomplished in the experimental prototype
lightweight fighter program, we believe that the development of a new low-cost,
high performance fighter which can perform tactical air missions under visual
flight conditions is entirely practical and should be vigorously pursued. Accord-
ingly, we have included in the FY 1975 Budget $23 million ($13 million for the
aircraft and $10 million for the engine) to proceed with the experimental proto-
type lightweight fighter program on an accelerated basis, and $36 million to start
the development of a new Air Combat Fighter.
The A-10 represents another major application of the high/low mix concept.
It incorporates in a relatively low-cost airframe all of the principal character-
istics that are essential for close air support-maneuverability, responsiveness,
lethality, survivability, long loiter time and simplicity. Armed with the high
s velocity 30mm GAU-8 gun, the MAVERICK air-to-surface missile and other ord-
nance, the A-10 promises to be very effective against tanks and other armored
vehicles. Consequently, it would be particularly valuable in Europe, since the
Warsaw Pact ground forces are very heavy in armor.
Testing of the two Fairchild prototype aircraft and the GAU-8 30mm gun is con-
tinuing. While Fairchild is now fabricating six full-scale development models
of the A-10, the first of these is not expected to be delivered until December 1974.
Furthermore, the GAU-8 gun, which is a key element of the A-10's armament,
will not be ready for full-scale testing until late this year. Hence, the fly-off be-
tween the A-10 and the A-7, directed by the Congress last year, will have to be
conducted with one of the two available prototype aircraft, which is not fully
representative of the A-10 we propose to produce, and which will not have the
GAU-8 gun.
By the end of this year, however, the GAU-8 gun/aircraft compatibility tests
and two back-to-back 150-hour engine qualification tests should be completed.
Based on the results of these tests and the A-10/A-7 fly-off, a decision will be
made on the production of the A-10. Pending this production decision, we have in-
cluded a total of about $268 million in the FY 1975 Budget for the A-1.0 pro-
gram-about $94 million to continue development and to provide for the fabri-
cation of four RDT&E aircraft, $145 million for the procurement of the first
26 production aircraft, and $29 million for advance procurement. We tentatively
plan to buy a total of 729 A-10s to equip the planned active and reserve com-
ponent squadrons.
The Maverick air-to-ground missile promises to be one of the most cost-
effective air-launched weapons in our inventory, particularly against such
small, hard, moving targets as tanks and armored personnel carriers. The MAV-
ERICK'S performance in the recent Middle East conflict was quite impressive,
although the conditions there were much more favorable for such electro-optical
weapons than would be the case in Europe. The FY 1975 Budget includes about
$88 million for the procurement of another 6,000 Maverick missiles for the
Air Force.
Defense planners have been convinced for some time that future demands on our
surveillance, warning and control capabilities in support of tactical air opera-
tions, particularly in the context of a European conflict, will be quite severe.
This conviction was reinforced by the complexities of the surveillance, warning
and control function in both the Southeast Asia and the Middle East conflicts.
Recent flight demonstrations in Europe, as well as the U.S. have confirmed
the high potential of AWACS to meet this requirement for long-range airborne
surveillance and warning, and positive and precise control of forces engaged
in the full range of tactical air operations. We believe AWACS would also be
capable of supporting ground, naval and amphibious operations by providing
commanders with an integrated air-ground situation summary in real time.
Finally, AWACS could assist In the NORAD air defense mission, since some of
these aircraft would normally be based in CONUS as part of our general purpose
forces mobile air defense pool.
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Because of its potential effectiveness in the tatical role, as well as its inherent
flexibility and mobility, we propose to continue AWACS engineering develop-
ment and procure the first 12 aircraft in FY 1975. The final production decision
would be made in December 1974, and would be based on the successful comple-
tion of the System Integration Demonstration flight tests, the Airborne Integra-
tion Laboratory and Software Development Laboratory testing, and studies of
additional command, control and communications equipment needed to support
the tactical mission. The FY 1975 Budget includes a total. of about $770 million
for the E-3A program-about $220 million for R&D and $150 million for procure-
ment.
We tentatively plan to buy a total of 34 aircraft, including the three test air-
craft already available, which will be reconfigured as operational AWACS. Twelve
more aircraft would be bought in FY 197E and the last seven aircraft in FY
1977. In contrast to the first 12 (Block I) aircraft, the Block II aircraft would
be fully configured for the tactical mission. Current planning for the Block II
buy includes identifying joint Service requirements to assist in determining
alternative equipment configurations and evaluating the impact of these alterna-
tives for long lead time funding. We are also working with our NATO Allies,
who have expressed interest in AWACS as a. common system to improve NATO's
air defense and command and control capabilities.
The current inventory of tactical aircraft with the primary mission of defense
suppression consists of two squadrons of F-105G Wild Weasel aircraft, two
squadrons of F-4C Wild Weasel aircraft, and 35 EA-(;Bs. The F-105Gs are
scheduled to be replaced with advanced F--4 Wild Weasel aircraft in the late
1970s, and, as noted earlier, the authorized inventory of EA-6Bs is scheduled
to increase.
The F-105G and F-4C Wild Weasel systems were developed using off-the-
shelf hardware as a quick-reaction counter to the surface-to-air missile (SAM)
threat in North Vietnam. Combat experience in that conflict, however, disclosed
a number of deficiencies which the advanced F-4 Wild Weasel system, now
under development, is intended to correct. But as the Middle East conflict dem-
onstrated, our tactical air forces should be prepared to operate in a very intense
air defense environment. To be able to do so effectively, the Air Force needs an
airborne jammer with a much greater capacity than can. be fitted into an F-4.
'1'he EF-111A, which would be an Air Force F-111A equipped with ALLQ-a9
jammers of the type used in the Navy EA--(B, is intended to fulfill that require-
ment. The $37 million included in the FY x.975 Budget for this program would
permit a continuation of the prototype development effort now in progress.
Defense Suppression Weapons and Equfpmcnt
In addition to specialized electronic countermeasure aircraft, defense suppres-
sion involves a wide variety of weapons and equipment, and these also deserve
greater emphasis than they have been receiving. Accordingly, funds are included
in both the FY 1974 Supplemental and the FY 1975 Budget to augment our capa-
bilities in these areas.
The following are some examples of the increases that are provided in the FY
19T4 Supplemental :
$31. million to procure the Advanced Location Strike System (ALSS). The
ALSS is an airborne/ground-based, all-weather system designed to locate air
defense electronic emissions at extended ranges and to guide an air-to-ground
weapon against the emitters. It uses time-of-arrival (TOA' techniques for emitter
location and distance-measuring equipment (DME) for guidance of air-to-ground
weapons.
$3 million to improve the capability of ALSS to locate and identify electronic
emitters more rapidly, to control simultaneously a greater number of DME
guided weapons, and to make it more mobile.
$75 million for new pods and modification of existing pods to improve the ea-
pattility of our tactical aircraft to cope with the Soviet tactical air defense
threat.
$5 million to procure additional chaff dispensers for our tactical aircraft. As
the Israeli Air Force has demonstrated, chaff, if used properly and in sufficient
quantities, Is an effective means of aircraft self-protection even against high
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density SAM defenses. Chaff provides false targets to the SAMs and masks the
aircraft from the SAM radars.
$20 million to procure Radar Homing and Warning (RHAW) receivers for
Air Force F/RF-4s, A-7s and F-111s. These receivers will provide real time
warning of air defense electronic emissions directed at the aircraft, thereby en-
abling the pilot to initiate the proper countermeasures to degrade the air
defenses.
$23 million to procure 800 additional Shrike (AGM-45A) missiles. The
Shrike is the major air-launched, anti-radiation missile (ARM) in our cur-
rent inventory. It can be carried by all Navy attack aircraft and most F-4 and
F-105 Air Force aircraft.
$2 million to accelerate development of an infrared countermeasures system
to protect Navy tactical aircraft from SA-7 type weapons.
$4 million to accelerate development of the Highspeed Anti-Radiation Missile
(HARM), a follow-on to the current ARM.
$18 million to accelerate the development of guided glide bombs, initiate de-
velopment of a long-range stand-off defense-suppression missile, and make other
improvements in defense-suppression weapons.
Among the defense-suppression efforts included in the FY 1975 Budget are
the following :
$25 million to develop a Precision Emitter Location and Strike System
(PELSS) based on Time of Arrival/Distance Measuring Equipment (TOA/
DME) techniques. This system may be a modified ALSS or a new PELSS, de-
pending on the cost effectiveness of possible improvements.
$9 million to continue development of the Modular Guided Glide Bomb
(MGGB-II). The MGGB-II is currently being developed as an area stand-off
weapon for use with ground and airborne locator and strike systems.
$18 million to continue development of HARM.
Passive Airbase Defense
Recent JCS and Air Force analyses have shown that hardened aircraft shelters
that can completely protect aircraft from strafing, and also provide greatly
improved survivability from other conventional munitions, constitute one of the
most effective passive defensive measures we could take. The availability of
such shelters for all of NATO's tactical aircraft could have a major influence
on the outcome of a conventional war in Europe.
Shelters have been provided for all in-place and dual-based USAF aircraft
in the NATO Central Region. At the urging of the U.S., the NATO Ministers
approved in December 1973 the expansion of SACEUR's protection program to
include 70 percent of U.S. rapid reaction earmarked aircraft scheduled for de-
ployment to Europe. Even so, a sizeable number of the U.S. aircraft planned
for later deployments to Europe would remain unsheltered.
To remedy this situation, we now propose to undertake a five-year program
which would provide additional hangarettes needed to shelter the entire USAF
force of fighter, attack and reconnaissance aircraft planned to be deployed to
NATO. Also included in this program would be other passive defense measures,
such as dispersal and camouflaging, and protected POL storage areas, mainte-
nance shops land similar essential facilities. Some $65 million is included in the
FY 1975 Budget for the first increment of this program. As a necessary comple-
ment to this program, we will also continue our efforts to encourage our NATO
allies to fund adequate shelters for all of their tactical aircraft.
I noted earlier that one of the most urgent improvements needed in our gen-
eral purpose force posture is a major increase in our strategic airlift capability.
An increase in our total mobilizable strategic airlift capacity is needed to en-
hance our ability to move large-scale reinforcements to Europe during the criti-
cal early weeks of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. An increase in our active
strategic airlift capacity is needed to enhance our ability to resupply an ally
promptly in an emergency, without resort to a mobilization of the reserve forces.
These enhanced capabilities, I am convinced, will greatly strengthen the deter-
rent to aggression against ourselves and our allies, in Europe and elsewhere ;
and they will also enable NATO to accept with greater confidence a NATO-
Warsaw Pact mutual and balanced force reduction agreement which involves
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a partial withdrawal of both U.S. and Soviet forces from the central region
of Europe.
In addition to the strategic airlift forces provided by the Military Airlift
Command (MAC) and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), our mobility forces
also include the strategic sealift forces provided by the Military Sealift Com-
mand (MSC) and the U.S. Flag Merchant Marine, as well as the tactical airlift
forces assigned to the Tactical Air Command, the Unified Commands, and the
Reserve Components. The strategic sealift and tactical airlift forces also require
improvement, but the first priority at this time must be given to the strategic
airlift forces.
1. Strategic Airlift.-The military strategic airlift now consists of four
squadrons of C-5As (79 aircraft) and 13 -squadrons of C-141s (275 aircraft),
together with an equal number of C-5A and 0-141 Reserve Associate Units which
do not have any aircraft of their own. These Associate Units are collocated
during peacetime with the active force squadrons and :assist in the operation
and maintenance of the active force aircraft on a part-time basis. When mobi-
lized, these units make possible a rapid increase in the rate of utilization of the
active aircraft. In addition to these military' assets, there are now 246 long-range
commercial aircraft in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, including 153 cargo-convertible
and 93 passenger aircraft. These aircraft become available to the Defense De-
partment upon activation of the CRAF.
The crucial importance of immediately available strategic airlift forces of
substantial capacity was once again convincingly demonstrated during the recent
Middle East conflict. We have every reason to believe that our ability to resupply
the Israeli armed forces promptly and in sufficient quantity at the critical point
in the conflict not only restored the military balance but also was one of the
decisive factors in bringing about the cease-fire.
Throughout the period of the airlift, October 13-November 14, MAC C-141s
and C-5s maintained a steady flow of supplies to Isrf.el, including weapons,
ammunition, spare parts, medical supplies and other material. More than 22,000
short tons of cargo were delivered during the period, with as many as six O-5A
and 17 C-141 missions per day. The C-5A with a total of 145 missions accounted
for almost 10,800 tons, and the C-141 with a total of 421 missions accounted
for more than 11,600 tons. The C-5A averaged 74 tons of payload per mission,
while the C-141 averaged 27 tons. Lajes Air Base in the Azores was the only
intermediate point available for refueling and crew staging on these missions,
which averaged 6,459 nm one way.
The C-5A, because of its ability to carry equipment too large or too heavy
for other aircraft, was a key factor In the success of this airlift effort. The
cargo moved by C--5A included M-60 and M-48 tanks, each weighing about 50
tons. Among the other large and heavy items airlifted by the C-SA were fuselages
for A-4E aircraft, CII-53 helicopters, 175mm self-propelled guns weighing 29
tons each, the 155mm howitzers weighing 25 tons each. All of these items are air-
transportable only in the C-5A.
A high degree of reliability was maintained during the airlift: the departure
reliability rate for the C-5s was 96 percent and for the C-141s, 98 percent. At
the same time, MAC also airlifted the UN peacekeeping force to Cairo; -sup-
ported three JCS exercises, the SAC redeployment from the Pacific and 100 other
special missions; and, in addition, maintained its regular cargo and passenger
flights over its worldwide route structure.
Although the 'Middle East airlift was an impressive performance, it involved
the movement of only about 22,000 short tons of cargo. In contrast, the deploy-
ment to Europe of the Army and Air Fcrce units initially earmarked for a
NATO contingency, together with their essential equipment and initial supplies,
would involve the movement of more than a half a million short tons of cargo,
albeit over a shorter distance-an average of about 4,700 nm one way vs. 6,450
nm in the case of the Middle East airlift. Moreover, given the well founded
probability that the Warsaw Pact are geared for a short, intense war in Europe,
plus the possibility that some of the U.S. forces currently deployed in Europe
may be withdrawn in the future, there is a great premium on being able to
more those forces and their equipment much more rapidly than is now planned.
Clearly, under those circumstances, the first few weeks of a war in Europe
could well be the most critical.
Hence, a dependable U.S. capability to deliver large scale reinforcements to
Europe quickly In an emergency could not only be decisive in preventing a NATO
defeat, it could also be decisive in deterring the attack in. the first place. Indeed,
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I can think of no more impressive a deterrent to a Warsaw Pact attack on
NATO than a clearly demonstrable U.S. capability to put down in Europe a
fully-equipped combat-ready division (including its supporting forces) every
few days. That is why I am so firmly convinced that a major expansion of our
strategic airlift capacity deserves a very high priority in the allocation of
resources among our general purpose forces programs.
As matters now stand, it would take an average of about 19 days per division
to move to Europe a force of several divisions with their Initial Support Incre-
ments and all of their combat essential equipment if we were to move them by
airlift only. However, there are several actions we can take now to increase
substantially our strategic airlift capabilities within the next few years.
C-5A and C-141 Wartime Utilization Rates
The first of these actions involves an increase from 2.0 to 2.75 in the active
forces crew ratios for the C-5As and the C-141s, plus a commensurate increase
in maintenance personnel and in the war reserve stocks of C-5A and C-141 re-
plenishment spares. These increases would permit a sustained wartime aircraft
utilization rate of ten instead of eight hours per day, and an initial surge war-
time utilization rate (for a period of 45 days) of 121/2 instead of ten hours per
day. That would be equivalent to a 25 percent increase in the wartime capability
of the MAC strategic airlift forces.
This action alone could reduce the average deployment time per division from
about 19 days to somewhat less than 15 days. The additional cost would be $200
million per year ($100 million in FY 1975, the first year) for military personnel
and operations and maintenance, plus a one-time cost of about $130 million for
war reserve spares. As shown on the following table, about $109 million is in-
cluded in the FY 1974 Supplemental and $21 million in the FY 1975 Budget for
the procurement of additional replenishment spares for this purpose.
C-141 Modification
The second action involves the modification of the C-141s to increase their
usable payload capacity. As you probably know, the C-141 for most missions is
space-limited, rather than weight-limited. Hence, by increasing the size of the
fuselage we can increase the payload capacity without any significant loss of
effective range or cruise speed.
More specifically, the C-141 modification would involve lengthening the fuse-
lage by 280 inches (part fore and part aft of the wing), modification of the wing
fairing and aircraft controls to reduce drag, and the installation of in-flight
refueling (receiving only) equipment (The C-5As already have an aerial refuel-
ing capability.) These modifications will increase the payload volume of the
C-141 by 30 percent ; it will be able to carry 13 cargo pallets compared with the
present 10. This improvement, which is equivalent to adding 90 C-141s to the
airlift force, could further reduce the time required to deploy the planned force
to an average of about 121/2 days per division.
ACQUISITION COSTS OF MAJOR MOBILITY FORCES MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS
[in millions of dollars[
1973 1974 1975
actual planned proposed
unding funding a funding
Strategic airlift:
Procurement of additional replenishment spares for C-5A and C-141
aircraft------------------------------- ------ 23
(109)
21
Modification of C-141 aircraft to increase their capacity__________________________
(40)
50
Acquisition of 3d C-5A fatigue article__________________________________________ (6)21 --------------
Planning and initial engineering of C-5A wing modification_____________________________________ 16
Modification of civilian wide-bodied Passenger aircraft to a con-
vertible (cargo-passenger) configuration______________________________________
(19)
155
Tactical airlift:
Procurement of additional C-130 aircraft_________________________
94
(33)216
22
Prototype development of advanced medium STOL transport (AMST)_
25
25
56
I Includes costs of R.D.T. & E., procurement of the system and initial spares, and directly related military construction.
2 Figures in parentheses are the amounts included in the fiscal year 1974 supplemental.
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Moreover, all of the MAC strategic airlift aircraft will have an air-to-air
refueling capability and thus will be less dependent on foreign bases. Selected
air crews, however, will have to be provided regular training in refueling tech-
niques, which has not been the case in the past.
The cost to modify the entire fleet of 275 C-141s is estimated at about $450
million. The impact of this modification on operating costs cannot yet be precisely
estimated, but little or no increase is now believed to be involved. (The cost of
adding 90 C-141s to the fleet would be about $1.4 billion for procurement and
$1015 million a year for operation.) We have included $40 million in the FY 1974
Supplemental to commence engineering and tool design. Another $50 million is
included in the FY 19,75 Budget to complete engineering, fabricate the tooling,
and begin the modification of the first few aircraft.
C--5A Fatigue Tests
To reduce still further the number of days required to deploy the planned force
we need even more airlift capability, especially the capability to carry large and
heavy items of equipment. The C-5A was developed specifically for this role.
Unfortunately, it is now out of production ; furthermore, its wings are structurally
deficient in relation to the original fatigue life goal. This deficiency has been
alleviated in part by the incorporation of a new "load distribution" system in the
wings, as recommended by the C-5A Independent Review Team. With this sys-
tem, it is estimated that the service life of the aircraft may be as much as 18,000
to 20,000 hours, but as yet we have no empirical data to support that estimate.
To acquire that data in a more timely fashion, we now propose to accelerate
the afquisition and test of the third fatigue article, which incorporates the new
load distribution system. Accordingly, the $55.8 million needed for this purpose
has been included in the FY 1974 Supplemental (rather than the FY 1975 Budget
as previously planned) thereby increasing the funds available for obligation in
FY 1974 to about $21 million.
C--;A Tying Modifcation
The Independent Review Team also recommended that a further and more
extensive wing modification, which would extend the service life of the C-5A
to at least 30.000 hours, be developed and installed. The Air Force estimates that
this program would cost more than $600 million for the 79 C-5As now in the
force.
Inasmuch as these aircraft are accumulating an average of only about 1,000
flying hours per year, I believe we should obtain the complete fatigue test results
on the current load distribution system modification before we commit ourselves
to another, more costly modification. Pending the receipt of these. results, how-
ever, I believe it would be useful to examine more closely the work involved, the
benefits to be derived, and the most probable cost of this new modification pro-
gram. Accordingly, $15.5 million has been included in the FY 1975 Budget to
initiate engineering and planning for this modification.
Wide-bodied Passenger Aircraft Modification,?
In view of these problems, it would obviously be premature to consider the
procurement of additional C-5As at this time. Moreover, we believe that a large
amomit of additional airlift capacity can be acquired at a far lesser cost through
a Government-financed program for the modification of existing civilian wide-
bodied passenger aircraft (Boeing 747s and McDonnell-Douglas DC-10s) to a
convertible (cargo-passenger) configuration, and for the operation of these modi-
fied aircraft under the CRAF program.
Two cargo-configured 747s are now in commercial operation. These aircraft
have a visor door in the nose and can accommodate all but "outsize" cargo (i.e.,
cargo that can be carried now only by the C-5A). By installing a large, side-
leadtnf; cargo door aft of the wing trailing edge, however, the 747 could be con-
figgured to accommodate about one-third of the "outsize" cargo involved in moving
the planned force. The remaining two-thirds of the "outsize" cargo would still
have to he carried by the C-5As. Thus. the capacity of the existing C-5A force
sets a practical limit on the expansion of our strategic airlift capability over the
near term. that is until a new large cargo aircraft can be developed and produced,
or the production of an appropriately modified C-5 can be resumed.
Assuming that we go forward with the two airlift proposals I discussed earlier
(i.e., the increase in wartime utilization rates and the modification of the
G-141s), the addition to the CRAF program of about 110 cargo-convertible 747s
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,(or their equivalent in DC-10s, calculated at about two-thirds of a 747) would
bring our airlift capability up to the full potential permitted by the existing
C-5A capacity. This strategic airlift force-the C-5As, C-141s, existing CRAF,
plus about 110 convertible 747s-could airlift the planned force (including the
Initial Support Increments) to Europe .at an average rate of about seven clays
per division.
There are now about 110 U.S. airline-owned 747s in service. Another 55 747s
are operated by the airlines of our NATO allies. In addition, U.S. airlines also
operate about 100 DC-10s, but only about 20 are the long-range version. (The
wide-bodied Lockheed 1011 is too short range to be considered in this context.)
Our current plan is to negotiate agreements with the U.S. airlines to make
their 747s available for modification and then to operate them as part of the
Civil. Reserve Air Fleet. In order to ensure that these aircraft will be available
in an emergency to operate into hostile areas in the same manner as the military
.airlift aircraft, we may need new legislation similar to that covering merchant
seamen. This new legislation would require U.S.certificated commercial airline
crews, in event of a national emergency declared by the President, to operate
wherever the necessities of war may dictate.
We may also be able to work out some sort of an agreeemnt with our NATO
allies that would bring their 747s into the program. I have already discussed
this matter in a preliminary way with some of the NATO Defense Ministers, but
it is too early to draw any conclusions as to the prospects for such agreements.
The modification of the 747 passenger aircraft to a cargo-convertible con-
figuration would involve the installation of a nose visor cargo door and/or a
large side-loading door, the strengthening of the upper cargo deck, and the
installation of a.cargo floor weight distribution system. The modification cost
per aircraft would be about $5.6 million with the nose door only, and $0.6
million with both doors. Since these aircraft would be out of service during
the period of modification, the airlines would have to be paid compensation for
the loss of revenue, which we believe would amount to about $800,000 per air-
craft. In addition, the convertible feature would increase the operating cost to
some extent ; this might amount to about $400,000 per aircraft over a ten-year
period.
Finally, we may have to provide the airlines with some sort of an incentive
payment for assuming the additional obligations and inconveniences involved
in this program. Heretofore, we have relied upon the award of peacetime airlift
contracts as the principal inducement for the air carriers to participate in the
CRAF program. With the sharp decline in contracted airlift following the with-
drawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, there will not be enough Defense business
to provide the necessary incentives for an expanded CRAF program.
Taking all of these factors into account, the cost to the Government could
amount to about $9-10 million per modified 747.
The long range DC-10s could be modified with a side-loading cargo door and
a strengthened upper cargo deck for about $5 million per aircraft. Although
these DC-10s can carry about two-thirds of the payload weight of a 747, they
are height limited and therefore cannot carry many items of military equipment.
Hence, they would be useful primarily as bulk carriers, as are the existing CRAF
aircraft.
In addition to the modification of the aircraft, we must also develop and
procure the new Material Handling Equipment (MIIE) needed to load and un-
load military equipment expeditiously. In contrast to the C-5A and C-141, whose
main cargo decks are at about truck-bed height, the main cargo decks of the
747 and DC-10 are about 16 feet above ground level. The cost of acquiring the
new MIIE, however, would be relatively small in relation to the cost of modifying
the aircraft.
To start this wide-bodied passenger aircraft modification program promptly,
we have included $19 million in the FY 1974 Supplemental to initiate engineer-
ing and planning, and $155 million (including $5 million for MIIE) in the FY
1975 Budget to complete engineering and tooling, and to modify the first 10-12
747s.
Admittedly, there are many other problems, besides the availability of air-
lift, that must be solved if we are to develop a capability to move large forces
to Europe promptly in an emergency. The forces to be moved must be maintained
in a state of readiness commensurate with the expanded airlift capability. Ap-
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propriate actions must be taken to ensure the availability of adequate airport
facilities to assemble and load the cargo at the point of departure and to unload
and clear the cargo at the point of arrival. A ad, of course, there is the question
of vulnerability at the point of arrival, which. in turn is related to the question
of strategic warning. Assuming we are able to detect a Warsaw Pact mobiliza-
tion within a week after it begins, we may be able to close a large part of the
force before the start of hostilities. In any event, a clear and convincing` U.S.
capability to move large forces quickly overseas in an emergency should provide
a powerful deterrent against attack.
2. Sealift.-The DOD-controlled sealift capability, which is already quite lim-
ited, will continue to decline. In the late 1970s the Military Sealift Command
force is expected to consist of only two Roll On/Roll Off cargo ships and eight
tankers, plus three cargo ships and ten tankers on controlled fleet charter.
Nine of the ten tankers are being acquired through a build and charter arrange-
ment and do not involve any capital investment by the Defense Department.
These tankers are relatively small, shallow daft ships used primarily to trans-
port POL into smaller, less developed ports. All nine are scheduled to be available
to the MSC-controlled fleet by the end of FY 1975.
Last year it was planned to acquire two :Multi Mission Ships (MMS), also
through a build and charter arrangement. A lack of response from the shipbuild-
ing industry because of the limited number of ships contem.plated, however, has
caused this program to be reevaluated. Thus these ships will not be available to
MSC in FY 1975 as originally scheduled. In;,tead, we have now scheduled one
ship to be available in FY 1976 and the second one in FY 1977.
Notwithstanding our current emphasis on strategic airlift, we will still need a
substantial sealift capability to sustain and augment the forces initially deployed
by airlift. Even in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict some of the later deploying
forces (e.g., Army reserve component divisions and their support increments)
would have to move by sea, as would the bulk of the resupply for all of the U.S.
forces already deployed. Sealift accounted for 96 percent of the tonnage moved
to Vietnam during the course of that conflict, and even with the expanded airlift.
it will no doubt account for a high percentage of the tonnage moved in any other
sustained conflict in which we may become involved in the future.
Since the capability of the DoD-controlled ,;ealift will probably be insufficient
to support even a minor contingency in a time,y fashion some years hence, heavy
reliance will have to be placed on the U.S. Merchant Marine and, in the case of
a NATO conflict, on the commercial fleets of our NATO allies as well. The Na-
tional Defense Reserve Fleet, which stood us in good stead during the Vietnam
war, now consists of the 130 ships which are currently scheduled to be phased
out in FY 1978.
The sealift problem is not so much a matte.. of total capacity as it is of early
availability of suitable ships. Given sufficient time to assemble the ships, the
U.S. Merchant Marine, augmented by up to 200-300 NATO flag ships, could provide
more than enough sealift to meet even the most demanding; NATO contingency.
Consequently, the principal emphasis in this area has been placed on early avail-
ability, not only in a mobilization declared by the President, but also for lesser
contingencies not involving mobilization.
With regard to the mobilization contingency, a major step forward was taken
last year in conjunction with our NATO allies to increase the availability of
NATO flag shipping in the event of a major U.S. deployment; of forces to Europe.
Under the agreement reached last September, the NATO Defense Shipping Execu-
tive Board (DSEB) which is designed to cont-ol in wartime the more than 3,000
deep draft, dry cargo vessels in the N1TOshipping pool, would be activated
promptly upon the declaration of a NATO mobilization. Some 300 suitable NATO
flag ships (primarily break bulk and some roll-on/roll-off), which normally
frequent U.S. East and Gulf Coast ports, would be "earmarked" in peacetime to
facilitate their early acquisition in a contingency. These ships would be chan-
neled to U.S. on-load ports in response to specific U.S. deployment requirements.
We have assured our NATO allies, however, that European flag ships would not
be requested if suitable U.S. flag ships were available.
With regard to contingencies involving the deployment of perhaps one or two
divisions, the Defense Department has been striving for a number of years to
develop a system which would provide sufficient commercial sealift without the
declaration of a mobilization by the President. The 11ISC under the Sealift Readi-
ness Program has obtained commitments from the commercial shipping lines to
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make at least 117 ships available for such a lesser contingency, with at least half
to be available in the first 30 days,
One of the key difficulties inherent in this Sealift Readiness Program is that
operators would risk the loss of their regular trade routes to other U.S. as well
as foreign lines if they took their ships off those routes to carry Defense cargo
for any substantial period of time. This problem emerged briefly during the Viet-
nam conflict. However, we were still able to draw on the Victory ships in the
National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), and there was still a large number of
World War II-built ships in the Tramp fleet. Now, however, the Tramp fleet is just
about gone, and the ships presently in the NDRF are scheduled to be retired in
FY 1978.
It is apparent to us that before that time arrives we should examine again
the need for a capability of the sort now represented by the NDRF. A revitalized
NDRF would fit in well with the'Sealift Readiness Program. We would have to
rely on the berth line industry only during the initial stages of a non-mobiliza-
tion contingency, until the NDRF ships could be broken out of the reserve and
placed back in service. This arrangement would limit the deleterious effect on
A the competitive position of the berth line operators. We believe that the Defense
Department, together with the Maritime Administration, should reexamine the
feasibility of continuing some of the ships still in the NDRIe beyond FY 1978,
as well as the possibility of adding newer ships to the NDRF to replace or
supplement the old Vi Cory ships. Meanwhile, the National Academy of Sciences
has undertaken a study +o determine whether the berth line industry can rem
spond to long or short term nonmobilization emergencies without loss of their
competitive position, which eventually could result in a reduction of the U.S.
flag fleet, thus eroding our sealift mobilization base.
Another problem involving the Defense Department's relation with the U.S.
shipping industry concerns the manner in which we procure sealift in peacetime.
Under the present so-called MAX-MIN procedure no shipper is permitted to
carry more than 50 percent of DoD cargo on most MSC routes (75 percent on a
few), and the low bidders must agree to reserve a minimum of 25 percent of
their capacity for Defense cargo. This system preserves the competitive prin-
ciple, while at the same time it places some restraints on competition in the
interest of maintaining a broad mobilization base. A bid rank or "pecking order"
is established among the bidding lines, and the cargo is then allocated to the
low bidders among the carriers actually offering service on a given route.
Last August the Maritime Administration (MARAD), supported by the Fed-
eral Maritime Commission (FMC) and most of the berth line operators, proposed
a cargo allocation system whereby all carriers offering service on-a route would
be assured of some cargo, with the amount allocated to any one carrier being
a function of the "bid" spread. Their contention is that the MAX-MIN procedure
causes large fluctuations in cargo allocations as the positions of the carriers in
the bid rank change from one bidding cycle,to the next. MARAD and FMC be-
lieve that these fluctuations create a "feast-or-famine" situation which is par-
ticularly harmful to those carriers in poor financial condition, and which could
lead to erosion of the sealift mobilization base. While we fully appreciate the
? concern of the Maritime agencies and the industry, we do not believe the evi-
dence thus far presented is sufficiently convincing to justify either the relaxation
of competition or the acceptance of the additional costs that would necessarily
be involved.
3. Tactical Airlift.-The tactical airlift forces at the end of FY 1974 will con-
sist of 17 C-130 squadrons (with about 325 aircraft) in the active force and 36
units (with about 370 aircraft, mostly C-130s) in the Air Force reserve compo-
nents. We plan to maintain essentially the same force levels through the late
1970s, but with some further modernization of the reserve component units,
which account for about 40 percent of our total tactical airlift capability. Dur-
ing the next few years all of the remaining C-124s and C-123s in the Air Na-
tional Guard will be replaced with C-130s.
We are also taking action to reduce the overhead and command structure of
the reserve components by consolidating certain units which are colocated, at
the same installation. Four AFR and two ANG units, which were previously
programmed to have eight UE C-130 aircraft each, are now being combined to
form two AFR and one ANG squadrons with 16 UE aircraft each, the same
size as the active force squadrons. This change will enable us to achieve an
annual saving of about $2.7 million with no loss in wartime capability.
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C-130
The C-130 is probably the most versatile and reliable tactical airlift aircraft
in the world and is now in use by many other nations. Procurement of the C-130
for U.S. forces.had beep expected to be completed with the FY 1974 buy, but
once again our inventory of C-130s has been reduced, this time by the transfer
of aircraft to Israel. Accordingly, $33 million has been included in the FY 1974
Supplemental for the procurement of six more C-130s for the Air Force. An-
other $22 million is included in the FY 1975 Budget for four additional C-130s
to replace two C-130s and two C-7s which are expected to be transferred from
the Air Force Reserve to South Vietnam as attrition replacements.
Although no further procurement of C-130s for U.S. forces is planned, the
production line is expected to remain open during the next few years to meet
the demands of other nations. Thus, we will-have the option to procure addi-
tional C-130s later on if that proves to be necessary.
While the C-130 is a proven, effective aircraft, we continue to believe that
tactical airlift modernization will eventually be needed, probably sometime in the
1980s. The objective of the Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMST) proto-
type program is to demonstrate new STOL technology and provide an option to
replace not only the C-130, but also the current STOL aircraft, the C-7 and
C-123.
I au1 aware that, there has been considerable opposition in the Congress with
regard to the AMST program and that the FY 1974 budget request for that pro-
gram was cut from. $67 million to $25 million. The two basic objections registered
were: (1) that the AMST would need an advanced turbofan engine (the develop-
ment of which had been terminated) to be effective; and, (2) that it will be
too expensive relative to the proven C-130.
The Air force maintains that a new en,;ine is not needed, and points to the
fact that both prototype contractors are using proven engines that will meet the
established design and performance goals. As for costs, two of the principal
objectives of the prototype program are to obtain visibility on costs and opera-
tional factors associated with short field performance, and to define engine and
airframe characteristics which would substantially reduce maintenance support
requirements.
The two contractors involved, Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas, are each build-
ing two prototypes and are using different; powered lift concepts for achieving
improved STOL performance. The total cost of the four aircraft prototypes, as-
sunling a continuation of both contractors programs, would be about $210 mil-
lion, and there is no commitment to engineering development or production.
Because of their different technical approaches to powered lift, the fabrication
and testing schedules of the two contractors differ. Major assembly by McDonnell-
Douglas began in late 1973; Boeing is scheduled to begin in inid 1974. First fight
as well as completion of the one-year flight test program differ for the contractors
by a similar period of about half a year.
The current design-to-cost goal for AMST is now being reexamined. But as a
practical matter, we will not have a sound basis for estimating the production
costs of the AMST, or for determining whether it will be an economically attrac-
tive alternative to the existing or a modified C-130, until the prototype phase of
the program is completed.
On balance, I believe that we would be best advised to proceed with the AMST
prototype program, and about $56 million has been included in the FY 1975
Bud;xet for that purpose. The bulk of the finds would be devoted to the fabrica-
tion and assembly of the prototypes. In addition, the propulsion systems would
be verified, and tests of structural components begun. Because the impact of the
$42 million reduction in the FY 1974 request has not as yet been fully assessed,
and because each of the contractors is using a different technical approach, I
cannot state at this time whether one of the contractors will be eliminated, or
the work of both stretched out. I hope by the time the Air Force witnesses appear
before this Committee the matter will have been resolved.
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IV. MANPOWER ron DEFENSE
The Department of Defense will complete during FY 1975 its transition to a
peacetime force structure. The last of the draftees will have concluded their :re-
quired service, and we will begin to see whether the volunteer force will receive
the measure of support needed to maintain the Armed Forces in the size and
quality required for the nation's security. It is clear that the volunteer force
concept cannot prove a success unless the Armed Forces do have the full support
of the people and the Congress.
For our part, we in the Department are doing our best to make the volunteer
force succeed and at as low a cost as possible. With this in mind we have set
ourselves the following manpower objectives for FY 1975:
4 To attract and retain a sufficient number of people of adequate ability to main-
tain the peacetime force structure and state of readiness needed to protect our
national interests.
To use personnel more efficiently.
To continue improving the living and working conditions in the military
services.
As has been mentioned previously in this report, U.S. forces are now much
smaller than they have been in more than two decades. By the end of FY 1975,
our military manpower strengths, as shown in the table on the following page,
will have been reduced almost 40 percent from the 1963 Vietnam peak. Civilian
manpower has been similarly reduced, although to a lesser extent-largely due
to increased civilianization of military positions.
This reduction in our active forces still leaves us with a formidable recruiting
task-one young man in three of those qualified and available must volunteer for
military service if we are to meet our goals.
The smaller size of our active forces also means that the Reserves and Na-
tional Guard are assuming greater importance in our total security posture. But
if they are to play the role required of them in these new strategic and man-
power circumstances, improvements in both organization and readiness will be
required. I will say more about this later.
ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL
[End of fiscal years in thousands[
Total
DOD
Army
Navy
Marine
Corps
Air Force
1950 pre-Korea) --------------------------------
1,460
593
382
74
411
1952 peak-Korea)------------------------------
3,636
1,596
824
232
983
1964 (pre-Vietnam)------------------------------
2,687
973
668
190
857
1968(peak-Vietnam)----------------------------
3,548
1,570
765
307
905
1974_____________________________________
2,174
782
551
196
645
1975-------------------------------------------
2,152
785
540
196
630
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
DIRECT-HIRE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL-MILITARY FUNCTIONS
[End of fiscal years, in thousands[
OSD-JCS and
Total Navy/Marine other Defense
DOD Army Corps Air Force agencies
1950---------------------------------
715
266
293
154 2
1952---------------------------------
1,308
515
481
310 2
19641-------------------------------
1,035
1
360
332
1
305 38
19681-------------------------------
1,287
1
462
419
1
332 75
1974---------------------------------
2
1,029
356
326
270 76
1975---------------------------------
1,027
359
324
210 75
1 These totals include Array and Air National Guard technicians who were converted from State to Federal employees
in fiscal year 1969. The fiscal year 1964 and 1968 totals have been adjusted to include approximately 38,000 and 39,000
technicians respectively. The fiscal year 1968 total excludes 32,000 disadvantaged youth employees.
2 Includes 19,000 positions in fiscal year 1974 supplemental.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
29-464-74-pt. 1--9
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A. THE VOLUNTEER FORCE
The last draft call was issued at the end of 1972. When induction authority offi-
cially expired on July 1, 1973, a total of 51,000 draftees remained in uniform. By
the end of fiscal year 1975, the last conscripted soldier will have completed his
required service, and the active forces for the first time in more than a quarter
of a century will be manned solely by volunteers.
Making the volunteer force work is one of our highest objectives. While the
challenge is considerable, our resolve is firm. A comparison. of the numbers of true
volunteers from previous years with projected future year requirements provides
some indication of the magnitude of the task ahead.
Estimated true volunteers,' Enlisted accession requirements (projections),'
fiscal year- fists. year- -
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 - 1978
Army---------------------- 102 127 165 201 217 185 1S0 170
Navy-_ ------------------- 50 75 84 83 90 95 80 85
Marine Corps --------------- 42 49 54 59 53 55 55 55
Air Force------------------ 59 72 88 75 78 100 90 75
DOD2 ---------------- 253 323 390 419 438 430 405 385
1 All sources: Men, women, prior service, nonprier service.
2 Totals may not add due to rounding.
At this point, I would like to review the major problems encountered to date
in moving to the all-volunteer concept.
1. Active ForCe8
(a) Strengths.--Total military strength at the end of December 1973, was
98 percent of original Service planning objectives. The principal shortages were
in the Army and the Navy, with the Army's shortage largely attributable to
recruiting shortfalls and the Navy's to revised Service planning for FY 1974.
(It should be noted that strength shortfalls of this magnitude and larger also
occurred periodically during the era of the draft.) The strengths, by Service,
are shown in the following table.
MILITARY STRENGTH, DEC. 31, 1973
jin thousands)
Army ------------------------------------------------------------
802
782 20
Navy-----------------------------------------------------------
566
556 9
Manne Corps--------------------------------------------------
94
189 4
Air Force --------------------------------------------------------
674
674 0
Department of Defense--------------------------------------
2,235
2,202 33
1 Fiscal year 1974 President's budget.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
We estimate that the Navy and Air Force will, at the end of FY 1974, be
close to their revised end strength authorizations. The Army, which is 21/2
percent short of its prescribed end strength, has in the last four months met
95 percent of its recruiting objectives. This is a favorable development, but it
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would be premature to regard it as a harbinger of success, especially in light
of the requirement recently imposed by the Congress that at least 82 percent
of all new enlistees be of average or above average mental ability and that at
least 55 percent of all new enlistees be high school graduates.
(b) Accessions: (1) Non-prior Service Enlistments.-The category of mili-
tary manpower that presents the most difficult recruiting challenge is, of course,
that of non-prior service male enlisted personnel, which accounts for the bulk
of the annual accessions to the military forces. The acquisition of other cate-
gories of personnel-officers, women, prior service enlistees-while not entirely
free of problems, is a more manageable undertaking. The successful attainment of
an all-volunteer force, therefore, rests heavily on our ability to acquire a suffi-
cient number of qualified non-prior service male enlistees for both the active
? and the reserve forces.
Assuming an active duty strength of about 2.2 million men and a Selected
reserve (i.e., drill pay) strength of about 1 million men over the next five years,
we estimate that we will have to acquire about 460,000 non-prior service male
enlistees each year-about 360,000 for the active forces and 100,000 for the re-
serve forces. Recruiting that number of men each year will require the enlist-
ment of about one out of every three militarily qualified and available (non-
college) males tinder the age of 23 years. This goal, on the face of it, may initially
appear unattainable. But the actual performance in calendar year 1973, par-
ticularly with respect to the active forces, was not far off that mark. As shown
in the table on the following page, the four Services together recruited approxi-
mately 327,000 non-prior service male enlisted personnel, about 91 percent of
the total number required.
(2) Prior-service Rccnlhistments.-One of the brightest spots in the All Volun-
teer Force program has been the success the services have achieved in reenlist-
ing prior-service personnel. Not only does this reduce the requirement for non-
prior service personnel, but it substantially lowers training costs.
In November 1973, the Services attained 110 percent of their objective for
prior-service accessions. In December, the figure rose to 119 percent. Overall,
in the first half of FY 1974, the Services have attained 104 percent of their ob-
jective. Special efforts are being made to ensure that we continue this high
level of achievement. The upswing in recent months would indicate that these
efforts are meeting with success.
(c) Quality.-The mental ability requirement specified by the Congress is
not expected to pose a serious recruiting problem. As indicated in the following
table, all of the Services except the Army have been able, thus far, to meet the
82 percent mental standard, and the Army is only slightly below that standard.
PERCENT OF NONPRIOR SERVICE ENLISTED ACCESSIONS IN MENTAL CATEGORIES I, II, AND III (AVERAGE ANDS
ABOVE)
1964
19731
1974
(July-
December),
Army-----------------------------------------------------------
80
84
81
Navy------------------------------------------------------------
89
84
97
Marine Corps-----------------------------------------------------
91
84
93
Air Force---------------------------------------------------------
96
96
99,
All DOD----------------------------------------------------
85
87
89,
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NONPRIOR SERVICE MALE ENLISTMENT, CALENDAR YEAR 1973
[in thousand!l
Program
objective
Actual
accessions
Percent
achieved
January-March:
`------------------------------------------
Army
----
38.7
35.7
92.2
-------
-
Navy
-------------------------------------------
14.0
14.3
102.1
-- --- ---
Marine Corps-
----------------------------------------------
11.8
11.4
96.6
-
Air Force-----------------------------------------------------
20.0
20.0
100.0
84.5
81.4
96.3
April-June:
-
Army
- - --------------------------------------
33.5
25.6
76.4
-----------
--
Navy
-------------------------------------------
22.9
16.3
71.2
----------
Marine Corps
----------------------------------------
10,9
11.3
103.7
-------
Air Force ------------------------------------ -------------
19. 1
19.1
100.0
DOD------------ ------------ -----------------------------
86.4
72.3
83.7
navy
16
0
13
7
6
85
Marine Corps
-? Force--------------------
.
.
.
DOD ----------- ------------------------------------------
111.1
97,6
87.8
October-December:
Army
-------------------------------------------
40.6
37.8
93.1
-------------
Navy
------------------------------------------
13.6
13.7
100.7
-------- - ---
Marine Corps
-----------------------------------------
11.0
9.8
89.1
------
Air Force ---- ----_------------------------------------------
13.9
14.0
100.7
Calendar year total:
Army
--------------------------------------
164.9
140.6
85.3
-----------------
Navy
-----------------------------------------------
75.0
68.0
90.7
-------
Mairne Corps
-----------------------------------------
45.7
46.1
--------
Air Force------ --------------------------------------------
71.5
71.8
100.4
I Individual service strength plans. Program objectives exclude add-ons to compensate for previous shortfalls.
Indeed, the trend for the Department as a whole shows some improvement,
particularly compared with FY 1964, the last pre-Vietnam draft year. More-
over, these new entries into military service compare very favorably with the
17-22 year age group of the non-college civilian population, of which only 64
percent are in mental categories I, II and II:[.
The 55 percent high school graduate star.dard, however, could cause recruiting
difficulties for the Army and the Marine Corps. As shown in the following table,
the Marine Corps has been below that level for some time; and the Army fell
below it, in the first six months of FY 1974. Consequently, it is possible that:, at
least in part because of this limitation, both the Army and the Marine Corps
could fall short of their currently planned June 1974 end strengths.
PERCENT OF NONPRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS THAT ARE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES1
Fiscal year-
---
1974 (July to
1964
1973
December)
Army
--------------------------------------------
67
60
54
----------------
Navy
- -------------------------------------------
58
71
73
----------------
Marine Corps
---------------------------------------------
61
51
51
-----
Air Force------------------------- -------------------------------
84
87
96
All Department of Defense ---- -------------------------------
llncludes draftees.
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The Department will, of course, abide by the mental qualification and high
school graduation standards prescribed by the Congress. But it should be borne
in mind that there are other quality attributes that, while less measurable, can
be equally or more important from a military point of view. These attributes
include motivation, physical condition, trainability and moral background. The
young man who really wants to serve in the armed forces of the United States,
and who has the physical capacity and mental aptitude to adapt readily to the
stresses and strains of military life is a very valuable asset, particularly in the
combat arms. It is not apparent that the nation can afford to deprive itself, arbi-
trarily, of the services of such men just because they do not have a high school
diploma.
I believe it would be prudent, therefore, to give the Services some degree of
discretion in making exceptions to the two general standards established by'the
Congress. Each potential recruit should be treated as an individual, taking into
account all of his qualifications for a particular military job, not just his general
intelligence and level of formal education achieved.
In an attempt to further refine existing quality standards, the Services are
moving away from the use of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (prescribed
by the Department of Defense during the draft) as the principal measure of
mental ability, Much greater use is now being made of specialized aptitude tests
for determining initial eligibility for military service and for assignment to a, par-
ticular occupational specialty. These tests assess a wide range of skill aptitudes
and assist the Services in determining the military jobs for which an individual
is best qualified. In this respect, they are proving to be a more reliable indicator
of job performance than either high school graduation or mental category status.
In point of fact, high school graduation appears to be a better indicator of pros-
pective disciplinary problems than of ability to perform a job.
Moral standards are also a measure of potential disciplinary performance.
In this area, we strictly limit the number of enlistment waivers granted for
felony policy records and for drug usage. In the Army, for instance, the number
of such waivers has been reduced from 5.6 percent of accessions in FY 1970 to
1.4 percent in FY 1073.
In the present voluntary environment, the Army can now use the first several
months of service to screen out those who prove to be disciplinary or motivational
problems. Although there may be an increased cost in terms of attrition rate, it
is on balance a more cost-effective method of retaining the largest number of
qualified men from the available pool.
In general, our experience to date has not supported initial apprehensions
that ending the draft would result in a degradation in quality. Standards of
enlisted in-Service performance have been maintained, and unit readiness has
not only been sustained but is improving as personnel turnover is reduced.
(d) Costs.-Claims that the major cost of military personnel is largely at-
tributable to the volunteer force effort are in error. The largest single fnetor in
growing manpower costs has been pay increases designed to achieve and main-
tain comparability with civilian sector wages. It is important to recognize that
the principle of maintaining comparability, established by law in 1967, pre 1Ctes
the decision to pursue a volunteer force. There is no question that comparability
would have been necessary in achieving a volunteer force, but the principle
itself is ,ourid, with or without the draft. and stands on its own merits.
Estimates of the cost of the volunteer force vary depending on what programs
the estimator choose to include as being directly or indirectly attributable to
the decision to end conscription. The range of estimates shown below r'sislts
from various plausible assumptions about which budget programs should be
attributed to the volunteer force effort.
RANGE OF ANNUAL AVF COSTS
in millions of dollarsi
Case II Case II I
(nrnlect (maximum
Case I volunteer attributable
(base costs) programs) costs)
Fiscal year:
1.974--------- - --------------------------- 733. F. 3,132.6 3,745.9
1975-------------------------------------- ------------- -.... 743.4 2,977.9 3,677.4
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Case I (Base Costs). The Case I estimate is, in our opinion, the most realistic
estimate of Volunteer Force cost since it reflects additions to Service budgets
after FY 1971 for programs considered ab: olutely essential to making the con-
version. In both 1974 and FY 1975, more than one-third of the total cost repre-
sents expansion of active and reserve forces recruiting/advertising programs.
Another third is comprised of legislated compensation programs such as the
ground combat enlistment bonus' and R.O.T.C. scholarships. The remaining third
accounts for such programs as education and travel entitlements and improve-
ments in living conditions and services.
Case II (Project Volunteer Programs). This mid-range estimate covers, in ad-
dition to Case I costs, the budget costs associated with "]Project Volunteer" pro-
grams. These are the pay and allowances increases granted in November 1971,
to provide pay comparability with the civilian sector for junior officer and junior
enlisted personnel. It is our view, as it way that of the Gates Commission, that
these pay and allowance increases should have been provided as a matter of
equity. It is for this reason that we do not feel these costs are properly charge-
able to the all volunteer force as such.
Case III (Maximum Attributable Costs). This estimate includes all programs,
however remote, which can in any way be related to the AVF effort. These addi-
tional costs, amounting to over $000 million in both FY 1974 and FY 1975, are
primarily for programs to improve the living and workir.g conditions of Service
men and women. About three-quarters of tl.is amount represents Army costs for
barracks construction programs and the c.,vilianization of certain menial non-
mission oriented tasks. While these programs may have aided the successful con-
version to an AVF, they are actions which would or should have been taken in
any event.
With the exception of Case 1, a modest decline in cost is projected for FY 1975
as compared with FY 1974 owing to a smaller force size and downward adjust-
ments in grade structure.
None of these cost alternatives take into consideration the concept of the "net
cost" of the volunteer force. All of the estimates would be lower if savings from
other agencies and activities were taken into account, such as the reduced Selec-
tive Service budget and diminished training and Permanent Change of Station
(PCS) costs made possible by increases in lengths of enlistment.
Most important are the substantial cost savings resulting from reduced per-
sonnel turnover. In FY 1971. for example, two-year enlistments represented 76
percent of total enlistments in the Army's Combat Arms. Today only nine percent
of that total are two-year enlistments. This represents an increased utilization
per training dollar of 57 percent. During the high draft years (1967 to 1969) each
military accession contributedan average of 3.3 productive man-years, including
an allowance for reenlistment experience. Today each accession contributes an
average of 4.1 productive man-years. Afte- FY 1975, this figure is expected to
increase to 4.5 productive man-years. We estimate that the annual reduction in
costs that will flow from these changes wit. amount to between $400 million and
$500 million in FY 1975 and between $500 and $600 million in FY 1976 and
beyond.
There has been some conjecture concerning a possible need to return to a sys-
tem of conscription. Before the nation entertains any thoughts along these lines,
we need additional experience with the volunteer force. I would also caution that
the cost savings associated with a return to the draft appear to he minimal--on
the order of $300-$400 million annually (not considering the offsetting effects
on costs of increased personnel turnover that would follow). This is assumi"p
that present levels of pay would not be reduced were we to revert to the draft.
(e) Problem Areas: (1) Armif Recruitment.-One of the most pressing prob-
lems we have been facing in the "all volunteer" atmosphere has been that of re-
cruiting shortfalls in the Army, where many jobs are viewed as being less than
attractive and where enlistment requirements are more than twice those of any
other Service. The reasons for the shortfalls are several and varied. A general
reason has been the post-Vietnam disenchantment with the military in general-
disenchantment characterized by indifference. Until this indifference changes
into positive support, we will continually be challenged in meeting Army acces-
sion requirements. The other causes underlying the shortfalls relate to the ap-
plication of quality standards and to numbers of recruiters.
With respect to quality standards. in February 1073, the Army limited male
non-high school graduate recruitment to 30 percent of its monthly enlistment
I Includes the ncndine Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonits Revision Act with a full
year cost of $77.8 million.
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total in an effort to increase high school graduate enlistments. Prior to this,
the male volunteer non-high school graduate enlistee intake had been running
about 48 percent. The loss of large numbers of potentially good soldiers from
the non-high school graduate pool prompted the Army to return in July 1973,
to a program which maximized the intake of high school graduates without
limiting non-high school graduates. During the time that the 30 percent restric=
tion was in effect, the Army recruited 13,800 fewer non-high school graduates
than it did during the same period the previous year. Since supply is highly
sensitive to high school graduation status (for FY 1975 the difference between a
70 percent and 55 percent high school screen would mean approximately 37,000
accessions), this type of screen will have to be carefully set and controlled.
Another major cause for recruiting shortfalls was an under-strength condition
in the Army recruiter force. The table below shows that the recruiting force was
short approximately 1,000 recruiters during the summer months, the height of
the recruiting season. It is difficult to quantify the precise effect of the under-
strength condition, but there can be little doubt that it was substantial. The
more important consideration at this point is the action being taken to correct
the situation. The Army has moved to bring its number of "production (front-
line)" recruiters up to full strength. All newly assigned recruiters will be oper-
ating in a fully-trained capacity by early spring 1974.
ARMY RECRUITING PERSONNEL
January
1973
July
1973
December
1973
Total recruiter personnel:
Authorized---------------------------------------------------
6,658
6,636
6,510
On station--------------------------------------------------
6,341
5,221
1
6,825
Production recruiters:
Authorized---------------------------------------------------
4,725
4,725
4,725
On station---------------------------------------------------
4,446
3,752
1
5,341
1 Temporary overstrength authorized.
In November 1973, the Army also began assigning specially selected officers
to take charge of recruiting areas (the geographic entities directly under the 64
recruiting main stations). These talented, high quality officers should prove an
effective complement to the senior non-commissioned officers already assigned to
these areas, particularly in communicating with educators, parents of prospec-
tive enlistees, and community leaders.
Unit of Choice Option
Guidance for unit-of-choice and station-of-choice recruiting, the Army's most
successful recruiting option, has been revised to permit commanders to recruit
against projected losses nine months into the future, assuming that every man
in their unit or station will depart after 16 months. This has effectively tripled
the number of vacancies for which commanders can recruit. By providing can-
vassers throughout the country-as was done successfully in FY 1973--it should
be possible to increase the number of accessions significantly.
UNIT OF CHOICE CANVASSERS
Average number 1972-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
625
April 1973-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
485
July 1973-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
509
December 1973---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1,034
Two-year Enlistment Option
Another step which the Army has taken to enhance recruitment is a recent
modification of its two-year enlistment package. For enlistees in mental cate-
gory III or higher, an option is now being offered wherein a man or woman
who enlists for two years can select assignment to European duty or to a school
(within a limited set of courses), but not both. It is likely that a considerable
number of additional accessions will be attracted by this option who would not
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otherwise enlist. However, we will be watching developments in this area very
closely since there is a possibility that longer term enlistments may be ad-
versely affected.
It should be recognized that there are practical limitations on the extent to
which options of the type above can be offered :
(1) The Service must be in a position to maintain its credibility by honoring
the obligations associated with such guarantees.
(2) The greater the number of option enlistees, the less flexibility there is for
Army managers to assign personnel.
(3) Many highly skilled individuals take options which do not fully utilize
their talents.
Combat Arms Bonus
The Army's four-year combat arms enlistment bonus remains an essential
tool for meeting strength requirements of the combat arms in the all volunteer
environment. It is estimated that shortfalls in the combat arms without the bonus
would be on the order of 10,000 enlistments per year. This shortfall would result
because the Army requires nearly half of all DoD accessions (it is presently
first choice among only one-fourth of prospective enlistees), with the combat
arms requirement representing 25 percent of all Army enlistments. If the sane
incentives were used for the combat arms as are used for the rest of the Army,
only 15 percent of Army accessions would select combat arms versus the 25
percent required. The bonus goes a long wey toward closing the gap, with any
shortage made up by assigning selected numbers of enlistees from among those
not committed under other options.
In May, 1973, the bonus policy was changed in an attempt to upgrade quality.
Instead of offering a $1500 bonus to high :school and non-high school enlistees
alike, the $1500 bonus was discontinued and a $2,500 bonus offered only to high
school graduates of mental category III or higher. The costs associated with the
$2,500 amount are roughly equal to those In purred under the $1500 program, but
it is estimated that the supply of high school graduates ino the combat arms has
increased by about 15 percent. Although the original intent of upgrading quality
is being served, the total supply of all personnel into the combat arms has de-
creased by about ten percent.
We are evaluating this situation to ensure that we are addressing our needs in
the right priority. Changes will be made as required.
We have remained well within the budgetary limitation of the $46.5 million
for bonus payments approved by the Congress. Of the more than 400,000 persons
enlisting in the military Services during FY 1973, only seven percent were en-
listed for the bonus.
The effects of the four-year enlistment on turnover in the combat arms is shown
in the table on the following page. During the first half of FY 1974, about 40
percent of non-prior service personnel entering the combat arms received the
four-year bonus, and it is estimated that 50 percent of these would not have
enlisted in the combat arms without the bonus.
The Marine Corps has less of a problem in meeting combat arms requirements
since total accession requirements are less than a third of those of the Army.
The bonus is not used for the Navy or Air Force.
Education and Training
A survey taken last year indicated that education and training opportunities
continue to be prime incentives for enlistment. Approximately one-fourth of the
enlistees surveyed indicated that they woti:d not have enlisted without the CI
Rill. About two-thirds said they were stro agly influenced by opportunities for
advanced education and training. Continuat:.on of such benefits appears essential
for the volunteer force effort.
Physical Standards
We are presently reviewing medical standards associated with entrance into the
Armed Forces to determine if they are higher than necessary. Any adjustments
in the standards will be undertaken only after the most careful analysis.
(2) Minority Accessions.-There has been considerable speculation that a
volunteer force will primarily attract enlistees from disadvantaged socioeco-
nomic backgrounds. Whether ornot there is a higher percentage of minorities in
the Services than the population at large is not a concern to us: The Department
of Defense is an equal opportunity employer and is concerned solely with how
well an individual performs his job, a fact well illustrated by the 26 percent black
composition of the 82nd Airborne, our most combat-ready division.
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EFFECT OF REDUCED TURNOVER
ARMY COM1AT ARMS
TRAINING TIME
M
FY 1971:
TIME ON JOB
The Gates Commission devoted considerable research to the contention that
a draft-free Army would eventually become predominantly black. The Commis-
sion estimated that the proportion of black personnel in a volunteer Army would
approximate 18 percent as compared to the 12.8 percent prevailing at that time
(1971). After one year under the volunteer mode (through December 1973),
black personnel comprise about 20 percent of total Army enlisted strength, or
about 15 percent of total DoD enlisted strength.
BLACK PERSONNEL AS PERCENT OF TOTAL ENLISTED STRENGTH
Army
Navy
Marine Corps
Air Force
DOD
Fiscal year:
1971-----------------------------
14.3
5.4
11.4
12.3
11.4
1972-----------------------------
17.0
6.4
13.7
12.6
12.6
1973_________
18.6
7.7
16.9
13.4
14.1
1st half
19.9
8.1
17.7
13.8
14.9
The Department of Defense will continue to apply the same standards of
trainability and adaptability to military discipline to black enlistees as we do to
those other races. Those who meet our standards will be accepted. Those who do
not will be rejected.
(3) Critical Skills Shortages. Currently, approximately one-sixth of all
physicians on active duty are serving voluntarily. Of the remainder, the majority
are serving because of the recent "doctors draft", while the rest are fulfilling
DoD training obligations. Since drafted physicians serve for only two years
and first term retention rates are quite low, between one-third and one-fourth of
the physician force turns over each year. The challenge of maintaining an
adequate number of physicians while shifting from the draft to a volunteer
system is a major one.
This fiscal year marks the beginning of some very real problems with respect
to numbers of military physicians. Chief among the reasons for poor retention
and attraction of health professionals to the military is the very substantial
difference between their pay and that of their civilian counterparts. Proposed
legislation now before the Congress provides for variable incentive pay ranging
up to $15,000 per year and an increase of special pay for physicians with two
years of service to $350 per month.
The Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program is proving an
effective tool for procuring professionals in the critically short-supply health
professions. It provides annual financial assistance for some 5,000 students
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pursuing graduate education in these critical area,, in return for an active duty
obligation of one year for each year, or fraction thereof, of program participa-
tion. A minimum obligation of two years is required by each of the military
departments. Scholarships cover tuition and related costs and provide an annual
income of approximately $5,300. A total of 4,777 students have participated since
the program's inception in September 1972. Of these, 511 students who entered
the program in their senior year have graduated. There are currently 2,787
medical students, 1,1110 dental students, and 319 other health professional stu-
dents in the program.
The number of health professionals needed in the Armed Forces is presently
being reappraised in an inter-agency study en military health care. This joint
effort by the Department of Defense, the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, and Office of Management and Budget will assess alternative means
of resolving problems related to the potential shortages of military physicians
created by the end of the draft. Specifically, it will :
Assess the ability of current military medical programs to meet the future
health needs of the Armed Forces ;
Evaluate the existing military medical care system and alternat'ves to it with
respect to their costs, quality of care, requirements for health care professionals
and ability to meet DoD health care objectives ; and,
If appropriate, recommend modifications to the military health care system
that will be consistent with DoD missions and objectives, be compatible with
civilian health care needs, and minimize the overall costs of military medical
care.
The problems of attraction and retention in the critical skills area are by no
means, limited to physicians. They extend to all skills which command a pre-
mium wage on the open market. Continued excessive turnover of expensively
trained specialists lowers the effectiveness of our military units and imposes
heavy repetitive training costs.
To cope with this problem, authority is needed to pay enlistment and reen-
listment bonuses on a cost effective basis in selected short supply occupa.ticns in
return for a commitment to serve for a stipulated number of years. Such bonuses
can be viewed as a prepaid wage differential based on the qualifications of the
individual and the unique needs of the Services.
Legislation has been proposed which provides for expanding enlistment and
reenlistment bonus authority. Under existing law, enlistment bonus authority is
restricted to individuals enlisting for at least three years in specified combat
elements of the Army and Marine Corps. A more flexible application of the en-
listment bonus as has been requested would increase enlistment of critical skills
personnel in the Army alone by between 10,000 and 12,000 per year-and obtain
more than one extra. year of time on the job per enlistment. This would in turn
reduce training costs, thereby offsetting the cost of the bonuses. It is estimated
that by offering an enlistment bonus within the $3,000 limitation, the Services
would meet their requirements in the following critical skills and avoid sub-
stantial costs for each bonus enlistee :
Training cost
Training savings
per bonus
accession'
Army light air defense electronic repairman------------------------------------
$20,000
$12,100
Marine Corps ground radar repairman----------------------- -----------------
8,500
3,700
Hawk fire control repairman --------------------------------------------------
45,000
27,700
Weapons system radar repairman----------------------------------------------
19,300
16,900
When shortages in a particular skill develop, alternative management actions
will be pursued prior to employing the bonus. Whenever a bonus is applied, it
will be done in the most cost effective manner possible.
Current law provides for a Regular Reenlistment Bonuswhich is paid to all
reenlistees without regard to specialty. As a result, 25 percent of these payments
are made in skill areas where sufficient retention can be achieved without a
bonus. This translated to more than $43 million in both FY 1972 and FY 1973 in
unnecessary payments.
Current law also provides for a Variable Reenlistment Bonus which is paid
only to reenlistments in critical skills and only for the first reenlistment. This
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fails to address retention problems for certain critical skill shortages at the
second reenlistment point.
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus we have proposed would provide the flexi-
bility of applying the incentive after 21 months of a member's initial ten years
of service. The amount paid would depend on the severity of the retention prob-
lem in a particular skill. Members who reenlist in a skill where no shortage,
exists would no longer receive a bonus. While additional costs of about $4 million
would be incurred in each of the first two full conversion years (FY 1975 and FY
1976), annual savings would be up to $77 million by the fifth full year of oper-
ation. Enactment of this proposed bonus would enable us to spend our retention
funds more effectively and to reduce substantially our future costs.
(4) Women in the Services.-Today there are more than 60,000 women serving
in military uniform. This is consistent with our longer-term goal of having ap-
proximately 130,000 women in uniform by FY 1978. The following table depicts
future year targets for each Service.
DOD PLANNED END STRENGTH FOR WOMEN, FISCAL YEARS 1975 TO 1978
]In thousands]
Army:
Enlisted ----------------------------------------
34.4
40.4
43.8
47.3
Officer-----------------------------------------
4.6
4.8
5.0
5.4
52. 1
Navy: Enlisted-------- -------------------------------
17.2
20.2
20.4
20.5
Officer-----------------------------------------
3.9
4.1
4.3
4.3
Marine Corps:
Enlisted----------------------------------------
2.3
2.5
2.7
2.7
Officer---------- - ---------------------------
.4
.4
.4
.4
Air Force:
Enlisted----------------------------------------
25.4
31.2
37.3
43.5
5.6
6.0
6.6
DOD:
Enlisted ---------------------------------------
79.3
94.3
104.2
114.0
Officer-----------------------------------------
14.2
14.9
15.7
16.7
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
In FY 1973, 20,800 women enlisted in the four Services. The FY 1974 goal
calls for enlisting more than 30,000 women-an increase of almost 50 percent.
We are confident this goal will be met. All career fields are now open to women
except for certain combat and direct combat-support positions denied them by
law or regulation.
The average term of service for female enlisted personnel has increased from
2.44 years as of June 30, 1972, to 2.70 years as of June 30, 1973. This lower turn-
over will act to reduce both turbulence and training costs.
(5) Civilianization.-As we move toward an All-Volunteer Force, we have
been reexamining our "mix" of military/civilian personnel to determine the extent
to which increased civilianization can reduce the requirement for military per-
sonnel and, collaterally, personnel costs. The policies governing the use of mili-
tary and civilian personnel have remained substantially unchanged for more
than 20 years. Simply stated, they provide for the use of civilian personnel in
jobs which do not require military incumbents. The more obvious constraints on
how far we can proceed in this direction are the effect on combat capability and
on the military rotation base.
Our present intentions are to push civilianization as far as we possibly can
within the limitations of the above constraints. We are presently engaged in
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civilianizing some 31,000 military positions.. to be completed by June 30, 1974.
An additional 0,6100 military positions, representing the "support tail" for the
31,000 are also beng eliminated. The military spaces for these jobs were deleted
in last year's budget. In FY 1975, more than 8,500 military jobs will be civilian-
ized along with an associated 1,250 position "support tail".
2. Reserve Forces. Under the Total Force policy, the Selected Reserve of the
National Guard and Reserve provides approximately 30 percent of the manpower
immediately available for national security in any future emergency. The econ-
omies of the Guard and Reserve in relation to the cost of like active force units
are real economies only to the extent that the Guard and Reserve can produce
levels of readiness commensurate with Total Force needs and can respond within
a timeframe which makes their contribution meaningful.
In the Air National Guard, the Air Force Reserve and in selected units of other
components, training and mobilization planning have progressed to the point
where responsive readiness is being attained. In others, :further efforts have to
be made to improve training and shorten :'esponse time.. While significant ha-
provements in readiness potential have been achieved through providing addi-
tional and newer equipment, much remains to be done to ensure adequate pre-
mobilization readiness.
The economies of the Guard and Reserve also depend to a large extent on the
relationship of the force structure of these components to the actual needs of
the active forces for emergency augmentation. In this regard, some restructur-
ing of Guard and Reserve units has been effected. The Army has converted all
Guard and Reserve units to standard active Army tables of organization and
equipment. The Navy has restructured its aviation program to provide equipped
and deployable force units rather than flight training programs for replacement
personnel. The Air Force has eliminated certain medical and postal units for
which there was no immediate need and has converted a portion of its units to
the associate concept which provides for full mobilization utilization of selected
active Air Force transport aircraft. These examples represent a positive first step
In the direction of what the total Force must provide. We intend to accelerate
the effort to relate every unit and every individual in the Selected Reserve to a
specific priority mobilization mission. The Military Manpower Requirements Re-
port for FY 1975 will provide details relating Guard and Reserve manning levels
to present force structure.
While the initial emphasis of the Total Force policy was to increase the readi-
ness and capability of forces in being, priority is now being given to a review of
mission assignments, force structure, and training concepts. With this review in
progress, efforts to improve manning, equipping, and training will continue to go
forward. These efforts will be particularly directed toward improving the readi-
ness of those units which have demonstrated their ability to meet manning ob-
jectives and to meld newly available equipment with manpower resources into
an effective mobilization force.
(a) Manning the Guard and Reserve.-With the exception of the Air National
Guard, reserve components have not been able to recoup fully the sudden losses
in Selected Reserve strength which occurred with the temporary expiration of
induction authority during the summer of 1971 (the present trend in Army Na-
tional Guard recruitment, however, is qu?.te favorable). The following chart
shows Selected Reserve manning as of December 31, 1973, and compares it to
the combined officer and enlisted strengths that existed when the general losses
began.
SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTHS
DEC. 31, 1973
Officer . ---------------------------
34.648
37.721
18,299
2.753
11,658
10,435
Enlisted ---------------------------
1357,813
1189,517
100,814
30,371
80,813
35,776
Aggregate____________________
1 392,461
1227,238
119,113
93,124
92,471
46,211
JUNE 30, 1971
Aggregate --------------------------
402.175
263,299
130,041
47,006
85,689
50,180
Net change
-9,714
-36,061
-10,923
'3, 882
+6,782
-3,969
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While officer strength has remained high, non-prior service enlisted accessions
in all DOD reserve components for the first six months of FY 1974 were 17,802
against a program objective of 53,224 for the same period. Improvements in
recruiting, however, have begun to reverse the downward trend, producing net
gains in strength since the beginning of FY 1974 in three of the six Guard and
Reserve components. Volunteer enlistments in the first two quarters of FY 1974,
have been almost twice those of the same quarters of FY 1973.
Prior service accessions have generally been better than expected (73,170)
compared to the December 31, 1973, objective of 51,679) and significant improve-
ment has taken place in the retention of first term members of both the Guard
and Reserve. For example, the Ariny National Guard, which had a first term
reenlistment rate of 13 percent in FY 1972, increased that rate to 21 percent for
the first quarter of FY 1974 and Naval Reserve rates which were 15 percent in
FY 1.972, increased to 40 percent during the same quarter.
Today's. personnel shortages in the Guard and Reserve stem. from two basic
causes. The first cause was the expiration of induction authority. The second was
the associated absence of recruiting personnel and expertise-understandable
when one considers that commanders and administrators had been accustomed
to processing draft-motivated enlistment applications on a waiting-list basis,
rather than actively seeking new members. A major effort has been made to im-
prove Guard and Reserve recruiting capability. Total Guard and Reserve budgets,
for recruiting and recruiting advertising have been increased from $18.9 million
in FY 1972 to $71.6 million in FY 1974, with much of the increase being applied
to the assignment and training of recruiters.
While increased effort and recruiting capability have been the most apparent
contributors to the slowing of loss rates, other Total Force initiatives are also
having an effect. The basic concept of a Total Force has in itself provided a new
sense of purpose. Guardsmen and Reservists now see growing evidence that they
will be called and have a role to play in future emergencies. Equipment modern-
ization is seen to symbolize genuine interest in Guard and Reserve readiness.
Supply priorities have been revised to reflect missions and deployment schedules
and no longer differentiate between active force and Reserve component ele-
ments. These improvements in equipping coupled with improved facilities and
increased involvement with the Active Forces In joint training exercises are en-
hancing motivation which should augur well for retention of current personnel.
Under new "round out" concepts, Army Guard and Reserve units of various sizes
are added to active Army units at the next higher command level to increase
the capability of the active units. Where such assignments have been made, the
close integration of the Army Guard or Reserve unit into its parent organization
has resulted in better readiness and increased enthusiasm among unit members.
Since these initiatives and improvements in training do more to increase re-
tention of those currently in the program than they do to attract new members,
ways must be found to increase accessions of non-prior service enlisted personnel.
With an eye toward retaining to the maximum extent possible present cost dif-
ferentials between Reserve and Active forces (annual pay for Guardsmen and
Reservists runs about one-sixth of that received by their active. force counter-
parts), improvements have been sought which are most likely to yield maximum
results at minimum cost : relaxation of limitations on purchases in military ex-
changes for members of the Selected Reserve, extension of full time coverage
under Servicemen's Group Life Insurance, provision of equitable benefits for
Guardsmen and Reservists who are Injured or killed while on active duty for
less than 30 days or while traveling to and from training, and permission for
retired active force enlisted personnel to participate in the Selected Reserve
without loss of their retired pay.
In addition to those legislative proposals which have already been submitted,
additional actions which might assist in improving Reserve recruitment are
being considered. Two of these measures concern retirement. The first involves
a revision in the Reserve retirement system (compatible with the new system
proposed for the active forces) which would provide additional retirement op-
tions to the Reserve member and improve the protection available for his family
should he die before reaching age 60. The second measure would raise the cur-
rent limit on inactive duty training credit for retirement purposes so that those
individuals who are required to perform extra training to improve unit readi-
ness would be able to include this training In the computation of their retired
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pay. A great deal of effort is going into developing these proposals in such a
manner that they remain in the low cost category of incentives.
Another proposal under consideration which has substantial support within
the Guard and Reserve community would entail limited tuition assistance during
membership in the Selected Reserve. We are also investigating the degree to
which application of improved training methods and advanced training tech-
nology can reduce the time required for initial active duty training. Reducing
the time of required absence from civilian life to a period more compatible with
normal civilian vacation schedules could be a great help in attracting high
school graduates who have the summer free before they begin college or whose
civilian jobs are programmed to start in the fall of the year. If it is determined
that the time can be reduced without impairing training, we will propose a
revision to the appropriate law.
Go.edd?.-Funds budgeted for support of the Guard and Reserve have risen
.steadily over the past several years to their present level of $4.5 billion. They
will increase to $4.7 billion for FY 1975. Personnel costs presently constitute
approximately 41 percent of the total with the balance made up for the most
part by items designed to improve operational readiness--higher levels of opera-
tional training, better training sites, more maintenance facilities and improved
capability for maintaining modern equipment.
RESERVE COMPONENT BUDGET
(Dollars in Billions)
(b) The future of the Guard and Reserve in the Total Force.-As mentioned
previously a major and comprehensive study has been initiated to examine all
aspects of the Guard and Reserve role in the Total Force picture and to recom-
mend actions which will ensure future Total Force effectiveness. This study is
placing a major emphasis on availability, force mix, limitations, and the poten-
tial of the Selected Reserve for use in future emergencies. It will also respond
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to the Congressional Amendment to the Armed Services Procurement and Au-
thorization Act which calls for assessing the Air National Guard and Air Force
Reserve readiness and management effectiveness and the potential for merger
of the two organizations.
In view of the broad scope and sweeping nature of this study, the Guard and
Reserve structure which subsequently emerges may be considerably different in
many respects from the present structure. The end product should be a Total
Force comprising the active Armed Forces and those units of the Selected Re-
serve which are essential to meeting initial military contingency requirements
and which can be further augmented through mobilization of additional Reserve
elements.
B. MANPOWER UTILIZATION
In this time of high personnel costs it is more imperative than ever that we
utilize our people in the most effective manner possible. Toward this end, we
are taking a hard look at how we might enhance our overall combat capability.
We are also realigning domestic and overseas base support structures to keep
them consistent with projected force levels and requirements.
By the same token, we seek the beneficial effects of inter-Service competition
while avoiding the non-beneficial. The notion that each of the Services should
be independent of the others so that it doesn't have to rely, as it were, on external
sources of support is outdated. We can no longer afford it. We have to now think
in terms of Total Force structure as opposed to separate interests. Consolidation
of certain aspects of the Service training efforts represents a step in this
direction.
1. Headquarters Reductions.-During our military involvement in Southeast
Asia, substantial augmentation of a number of headquarters establishments was
necessary to cope with attendant problems of command and control, logistics,
and administration of forces totaling more than four million military and civilian
personnel. Over the past four years, we have been phasing down these head-
quarters functions. Between FY 1971 and FY 1973, headquarters manpower was
cut 16 percent, more than 20,000 military and civilian jobs.
Although substantial reductions have been made, I am persuaded that further
economies are possible. We are presently studying ways to make further cuts
in our headquarters establishments without adversely impacting combat force
effectiveness. I am pleased to report that a good start has been made. The Presi-
dent's FY 1975 budget calls for a reduction of almost 9,000 headquarters jobs by
June 30, 1975, from the FY 1974 estimates included in last year's Presidential
budget. In addition, some 7,000 headquarters positions and functions are being
transferred to field activities to improve efficiency and standardize headquarters
functions. I expect to achieve further substantial reductions after the present
review is completed and to use these savings to improve combat capability.
2. Base Closures.-The base realignment announcement of April 1973, is affect-
ing Defense installations and activities in 32 States, the District of Columbia, and
Puerto Rico, and is resulting in the elimination or reassignment of approximately
42,800 positions (26,200 civilian and 16,600 military). Attendant with this re-
a'ignment, 28 communities have thus far asked for Federal assistance. Through
the end of December 1973, the President's Economic Adjustment Committee has
seen to it that these communities have received $2.4 million in technical assistance
funding, $6.7 million in manpower retraining funds, and $1.5 million in other
Federal program resources related to the conversion effort. More important, the
President's Committee has helped each of these communities formulate a recovery
strategy. This kind of assistance-designed to help communities help them-
selves-will continue until each has overcome the economic impact of realign-
ment actions.
At this time, exceedingly few civilian personnel have had to be laid off without
a job opportunity. A good example is the case of the Hunters Point Naval Ship-
yard in San Francisco where virtually all of the approximately 4,000 workers who
have been displaced to date have been provided suitable alternatives.
Additional realignments of military installations both at home and abroad
are presently under consideration. As a part of this program, we have recently
ordered changes affecting 59 overseas activities/installations which in turn will
affect approximately 4,000 personnel and result in an annual savings of about
$35 million.
3. Training.-While individual training is a fundamental prerequisite to com-
bat readiness, it is also expensive, making very high demands on scarce resources.
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In monetary terms, individual training costa in excess of $6 billion each year.
In manpower terms, about one-sixth of all military personnel-students and
trainees, instructors and support personnel-are engaged in the training mission
and therefore unavailable for duty in operational units. The following table
shows the general trend over the past decade.
1964
1968
1971
1972
1974 1975
1973 (estimate) (estimate)
Individual training personnel (military
end-strength, thousands) -------------
Training personnel (as percentage of
total strength)-----________________
403
15.0
700
19.8
507
19.9
405
17.5
354
15.6
364
16.6
341
15.8
A high proportion of individual training, notably recruit training and initial
specialized skill training, is a function of the number of new entrants into the
Services. This, in turn, is sensitive to such factors as term of enlistment and
loss rates. As the table shows, training personnel consumed almost 20 percent of
total military strength in FY 1968, when two-year inductees formed a high
percentage of new entrants. Although the present trend is down, we are trying
to further reduce the resources devoted to individual training by all means
consistent with maintaining a skilled and co::nbat-ready force. One approach we
are pursuing is that of tailoring the training to the real rather than theoretical
demands of a specialty. As an example of the kind of savings obtainable from
this approach, we have achieved an annual savings of more than $2 million in
the training of electronic and cryptographic equipment repairmen alone.
We are also emphasizing joint training, consolidating as many single-Service
courses as practical into joint courses. An inter-Service Training Review Board
has been formed which in its first months of operation identified 37 training
courses which were subsequently consolidated into 18 joint courses. This resulted
in an annual recurring savings of $480,000. Other courses with large enrollments
are currently under review for possible consol-dation.
Another approach we are pursuing is that of applying advanced technology to
the training mission itself. For instance, we have undertaken a major program to
expand the use of simulators in flight training. The long-term objective of this
program is to substantially reduce flying hours consumed in flight training which
in turn will generate savings in both aircraft maintenance and fuel consumption.
There are other ways of conserving training resources without loss of effective-
ness which we are pursuing-lateral entry (enlisting skilled personnel at pay
grades commensurate with their training and experience) : better use of trained
personnel ; use of on-the-job training in appropriate skills; and better manage-
ment of training support and overhead, to mention only a few.
C. MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
Manpower requirements result from the force levels described earlier in this
report. The force levels themselves are derived from the national strategy de-
signed to cope with a specified level of threat. Recommended military manpower
strengths for FY 1975 are shown in the table on the following page. These
recommended strengths will be explored in considerable depth in the forthcom-
ing FY 1975 DOD Manpower Requirements Re port to the Congress.
We strive for precise determinations of requirements in all areas of manning
for all situations. The Services develop their respective manpower requirements
through the use of planning factors, industrial engineering techniques. computer
simulation and the like. We have high confidence in the requirements calcula-
tions, particularly with respect to strategic and general purpose forces. Sonie
areas, of course, are more difficult to quang.fy than others since their require-
ments may be relatively independent of total force size. For example, such mat-
ters as how many intelligence officers should be assigned any given unit are
more a function of the threat to be assessed than they are the size of the unit
involved. The same sort of consideration hclds true for research and develop-
ment manpower where requirements relate primarily to technology and to the
weapons developments of potential adversaries.
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This uncertainty in programming the optimum level of requirements in some
support functions sterns from the difficulty in relating support levels directly
to force effectiveness. Through various studies presently in progress, we are at-
tempting to better define, and analytically quantify where possible, the relatio.n-
ships between support resource inputs and force effectiveness outputs.
MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
[Active duty end strengths in thousands
Stratigicforces ----------------------------------------------
124
123
115
General purposes forces--------------------------------------
909
901
929
Land forces--------------------------------------------
512
513
537
Tactical airforces ---------------------------------------
165
169
169
Naval forces--------------------------------------------
190
178
176
Mobilityforces ------------------------------------------
43
41
47
Intelligence and security---------------------------------
63
56
48
Communications----------------------------------------
47
49
40
Research and development-------------------------------
35
33
34
Support to other nations---------------------------------
4
5
5
Geophysical activities------------------------------------
14
13
13
Mission support forces---------------------------------------
342
309
311
Reserve component support------------------------------
14
15
14
Base operating support----------------------------------
239
208
212
Crew and unittraining -----------------------------------
36
35
35
Command----------------------------------------------
52
51
49
Central support forces---------------------------------------
389
358
346
Base operating support----------------------------------
47
42
42
Medical support-----------------------------------------
92
83
82
Personnel support---------------------------------------
32
31
31
Individual training --------------------------------------
- 151
140
131
Command----------------------------------------------
44
38
37
Logistics-----------------------------------------------
21
21
20
Federal agency support----------------------------------
3
4
4
Individuals-------------------------------------------------
326
327
312
Transients---------------------------------------------
106
90
88
Patients and prisoners-----------------------------------
12
10
10
Trainees and students-----------------------------------
197
215
201
Cadets-------------------------------------------------
10
12
12
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Another relatively imprecise aspect of determining manpower requirements is
that of forecasting future needs. Our stated requirements at any given time are
those we believe to be essential in light of our assessment of security needs and
of the need to allocate available resources between competing demands such as
research and development and weapons procurement. As we get closer to plan
execution, we refine our estimates to conform more closely to the realities of
what is a continually changing situation. This is, of course, the same process used
by any major industrial firm.
Other complicating factors also have to be taken into consideration. In a no-
draft environment, for instance, the seasonality of volunteer accessions and the
retention rates of those already in the forces will affect actual strengths at any
point in time. Another example of such factors is the impact of inflation on funds
for military personnel appropriations as the year progresses. If Permanent
Change of Station move costs or food prices increase more than expected, the
military personnel program may have to be adjusted in other areas to stay
within the total funds available. This adjustment in the personnel program may
take the form of forced losses (early-outs) or reduced accessions, either of which
may affect on-board strength at the end of the year.
29-404-74-pt. 1-10
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The point to be made, in short, is that there are fundamental uncertainties in-
volved in manpower planning. In spite of the increase in such uncertainties that
emanates from an "all volunteer" environment, we are sizing our military forces
on the assumption that we will meet whatever recruiting goals are needed. In
fact, we have programmed an increase in Army strength. for FY 1975-a move
which I think demonstrates our confidence in being able to meet or stay close to
requirements.
D. PERSONNEL POLICIES
While it is important that we seek to improve utilization of manpower, it is
equally important that we do so in the most equitable manner possible. In this
regard, nothing impacts so much on morale as the policies we employ in manag-
ing our personnel. The potential impact of every action we take in this area must
be carefully weighed in advance to ensure the fairest possible treatment for
everyone.
We are attempting to apply this standard in those initiatives presently under-
way: realignment of the military and civilian grade strictures, modernization
of the military retirement system, and restructuring of the military compensation
System.
1. Grade Structure.-We are examining very closely the present grade struc-
ture to ensure that it is no richer than that required to meet the combined needs
of readiness and personnel management.
The status of flag and general officers has recently been the subject of a great
deal of scrutiny by individual members and working committees of the Congress.
Invariably it is noted that the number of flag/general officers on active duty
today is proportionately higher with a 2-million strength military establishment
than it was with a 12-million strong establishment in 1945.
RATIO
1/1000
1/2000
1/3000
1/4000
1/5000
1/6ooo
RATIO OF TOTAL FLAG OFFICERS TO TOTAL ACTIVE MILITARY FORCES
45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 74 75
The change that has taken place over the past three decades has largely
evolved from significant functional and organizational changes. The Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958; the establishment of the Department of Defense, a
separate Air Force, and the Joint and combined staffs and commands ; the De-
fense research and development effort ; and the sophistication of weapons and
support systems have all contributed to additional flag officer requirements
within the Defense establishment. Although these requirements would suggest
the need for more rather than fewer senior officers, the Department of Defense
has remained within its authorizations established either by statute or as limited
administratively by the Senate Armed Services Committee. In addition, as we
complete the post Vietnam adjustments in our force posture, our Fiscal 1975
program calls for reducing the active dutp strength of our top military man-
agers from 1,352 to 1,231, the lowest flag officer level since 1954.
With respect to the remainder of the officer corps, the Services are confronted
with the difficult task of scaling down a re. atively large career force which has
been maintained since 1951; a task made al[ the more difficult by the substantial
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expansion required for the Vietnam war. Time and a period of stability are
necessary to achieve a balance of age, experience, and rank in the smaller forces
programmed for the future if we are to avoid unnecessarily harsh and debilitat-
ing actions against our career people.
Table 1 below demonstrates the dynamic changes that have occurred in the
military personnel structure over the past decade. By the end of FY 1975, the
officer force will have been reduced by 124,000, nearly one-third since the Vietnam
peak. Table 2 shows a representative sampling of the commissioned officer grade
distribution over the same period of time as compared to the programmed levels
for FY 1975. The comparison shows that since the peak Vietnam strength was
reached in 1969, the Services have been controlling and managing their structures
downward.
During FY 1975 one out of every two military positions eliminated will be
an officer. While large numbers of junior officers (many of whom were brought
to active duty during the war years) have been released, the release of senior
officers has presented some problems-for two basic reasons. First, reductions in
force do not generally produce proportionate reductions in senior officers, pri-
marily because there are fixed organizational and management functions which
are not eliminated or significantly reduced when forces are reduced. A second
and perhaps equally significant reason is that of tenure afforded by law. A regu-
lar officer may not be involuntarily retired before his mandatory length-of-
service retirement date except under punitive conditions or by reason of physical
disability or unsatisfactory performance of duty. Thus, existing procedures pro-
vide for the separation of certain officers, but they do not permit the early
involuntary retirement of officers who are excess to the needs of the Services in
times of force reductions.
TABLE 1.-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TOTAL OFFICER AND ENLISTED STRENGTHS
]in thousands]
Officers'-----------------------------
337
419
321
305
295
Enlisted------------------------------
2,349
3,041
1,932
1,870
1,858
I Includes warrant officers.
TABLE 2.-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, COMMISSIONED OFFICER GRADE DISTRIBUTION
Generals/admirals---------------------
1,294
1,336
1,291
1, 248
1,231
-105
-7.9
Colonels/captains_____________________
15,323
18,277
16,231
15,911
15,734
-2,543
-13.9
Lieutenant colonels/commanders; --------
36, 347
43, 999
36, 454
34, 839
33, 646
-10,353
-23.5
Majors/lieutenant commanders ---------
55, 081
73, 645
59,80 1
56, 887
55, 427
-18,218
-24.7
Captains/lieutenants and below-------.-
213,085
251, 147
186,481
176,470
170,634
-80,513
-32.1
To address this problem, we have proposed legislation that would authorize the
Service Secretaries to involuntarily retire certain regular officers serving in the
grades of Lieutenant Colonel/Commander and Colonel/Captain. It is a necessary
piece of legislation if we are to respond to demands that grade structure balance
be maintained during periods of force reductions.
This proposal represents an advance portion of an even more extensive legis-
lative package recently forwarded to the Congress, the purpose of which is to
implement the recommendations of the Report on Officer Grade Limitations sub-
mitted to the Congress in May 1973. The new grade limitations recommended in
this report for Colonel/Captain through Major/Lieutenant Commander are de-
signed to enable us to meet our officer requirements on a long term basis while
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providing adequate career opportunity for attracting and retaining young officers.
This proposed legislation would provide new tools essential to more effective
management of the officer force, provide adequate career opportunity, and unify
what have heretofore been disparate rules among the Services. In this connection,
it should be noted that the Air Force is currently provided comparability in
career progression with other Services through temporary grade authority which
expires September 30, 1974. If the proposed legislation discussed above is not
enacted during the 93rd Congress, it will be necessary for us to take separate
action to extend the temporary grade authority for the Air Force.
On the enlisted side, there are nine different pay grades, the top five of which
(E-5 through F-9) include "sergeants" varying in title from "bunk" sergeant to
sergeant major. Many are NCOs, but many others are sk;:1led technicians and
specialists who operate and maintain complex equipment. At the end of FY 1974,
we expect to have about 251,000 NCOs and technicians in these five )gay grades in
the Army. The bottom four enlisted grades include recruits, privates, privates
first-class, and specialists/corporals. Recruits and privates, will total about 252,000
at the end of this fiscal year and specialists/corporals about 176,000. Thus 37 per-
cent of the enlisted force occupy the top five grades with the remaining 63 per-
cent in the lower four grades. In other words, there are about 1.7 times as many
in the bottom group as in the top.
DOD CAREER FORCE VS TOP 5 GRADES
1965 - 1974
As can be seen in the table on the following page, the numbers of enlisted per-
sonuel in the top five grades for all Services have been continuously decreasing
since FY 1969, when over one million held the highest ranks. Some 20 percent
of this group consisted of personnel in their first four years of service who were
advanced to the higher grades to meet Defense needs. By reducing the number in
the top five grades and establishing minimum time-in-service criteria for promo-
tion, fewer personnel are now attaining the grades of E-5 and up during their
first four years of service. This results in a better correlation of experience with
grade levels and a more equitable relationship between experience and compen-
sation. Since less than four percent of the enlisted force had more than 20 years`
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service at the end of FY 1973, the present decline in the number of careerists
can only be accelerated through forced attrition. Forcing large numbers of per-
sonnel out of the service short of retirement without severance pay would severely
deplete the experience level of the force (until such time as it could be syste-
matically restructured), adversely affect retention, and require higher procure-
ment of inexperienced volunteers. In summary, it is our intention that the down-
ward trend in numbers of careerists and those in the top five grades will continue
at a manageable rate-in keeping with the principles of sound personnel manage-
ment.
2. Retirement.-In March 1971, the President appointed an Interagency Com-
mittee to review the military retirement and survivor benefit system and to
recommend changes as deemed necessary. In January 1972, a DoD Retirement
Study Group was formed to review the recommendations of the Interagency
Committee. The Study Group's recommendations, which provide the basis of our
proposal presently before Congress for changing the non-disability retirement
system, treat retirement as one of a number of interrelated elements of the com-
pensation system (basic pay, survivor benefits, bonuses, special pay, and the like).
The compensation system itself has changed over recent years as active duty
pay and allowances have increased substantially. In the past, a highly liberal
retirement system could be justified in terms of off-setting the low pay received
by an individual while on active duty. Since direct compensation has increased
so dramatically, it has been appropriate to reappraise the retirement system.
The DoD Retirement Study Group noted several defects in the present retire-
ment system : no retirement benefits are vested in the individual before serving
20 years ; retirement annuities are based on terminal pay; appropriate separa-
tion payments are not available ; the annuity formula does not provide a sufficient
retention incentive beyond 20 years of service ; and the system itself is generally
ineffective as a personnel management tool.
With respect to cost, $2.4 billion were allocated to retirement in FY 1969;
in FY 1973, the cost rose to $4.4 billion ; and in FY 1974, with no change to the
retirement system, $5.2 billion would be required. The projected growth in re-
tirees and retired pay costs is going to place this element of compensation in
increasing competition with other requirements for, scarce DoD resources. The
Uniformed Services Retirement Modernization Act (H.R. 12505) addresses this
aspect and attempts to rectify other shortcomings of the present system. A com-
parison of the long-term cost implications of the present and proposed systems
is shown in the table below.
When all parts of compensation are considered, individuals who retire under
the new retirement system will receive substantially more overall compensation
throughout their service career and retirement than members who retired before
these changes occurred. Nothwithstanding these larger considerations, however,
the proposed retirement system will still be a liberal, progressive system when
compared to most plans presenty offered in the nonmilitary sector.
A review of the standards and criteria for disability retirement showed that
the laws governing such retirement were sound, but that the standards used in
? determining physical "unfitness" for military service were unrealistic. Accord-
ingly, on January 29, 1973, new guidelines were issued which require that a
finding of physical "unfitness" for purposes: of disability retirement be a. factual
finding that a member is unfit to perform the duties of his office, rank, grade or
rating.
The number of disability versus non-disability retirements during the period
March through September 1973, has decreased considerably when compared to
the same period in 1972 (see second table).
3. Compensation.-All compensation changes are addressed to two problems :
(1) manpower shortages resulting from a zero-draft environment, and (2)
inefficiencies in the military compensation structure which result in excessive
personnel costs. Most compensation changes address both of these problems, but
with varying degrees of emphasis.
(a) Plight Paj.-The existing system of flight pay was developed in 1945, and
later adjusted in 1955. While this system has in the past assured sufficient
volunteers for aviation it has been generally ineffective in retaining a sufficient
portion of trained aviators beyond their initial obligation. A principal reason for
this has been the way in which flight pay incentives are structured. The highest
rates are awarded to senior officers of over 18 years of service, while junior
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officers at their retention decision point and most flying-intensive years are
offered relatively modest incentive rates. The inadequate retention resulting
from this system has resulted in substantial training costs.
RETIREMENT COST PROJECTIONS, PRESENT AND PROPOSED SYSTEMS
[Dollars in billions[
Proposed system (Retirement Modernization
Present system Act-RMA)
Retired pay Retired pay Retired pay Retired pay
of past of future of past of fut?lre
retirees retirees retirees retirees
(persons (persons (persons (persons Cumulative r
retired retired in retired retiree in difference
before fiscal year Total before fiscal y=.ar Total for all
fiscal year 1975 and retired iscal year 1975 end retired intervening
Fiscal year 1975) later) pay 1975) later) pay years
1976__________________ $5.4 $0.7 $6.1 $5.4 $11.8 $6.2 +$0.1
1980 ------------------ 5.3 2.6 7.9 5.3 2.5 7.8 0
1990__________________ 4.8 8.1 12.9 4.8 7.6 12.4 -2.9
2000__________________ 3.4 15.6 19.0 3.4 14.6 18.0 -12.1
o Difference includes all years starting with fiscal year 1975, not just those years shown.
Assumptions: (1) RMA is implemented effective July 1, 1974, (2) Force size is fixed at 2,140,000. (3) Base
pay increases 5 percent per year and CPI increases 1.5 percent per year. (4) All involuntary separatees choose
lump sum equity pay rather than deferred annuity. (5) Readjustment pay is not included in RMA total. It
would reduce total cumulative year 2000 from $12,100,000,000 to $10,500,000,000.
COMPARING IST 7 FULL MONTHS UNDER NEW GUIDELINES WITH SAME PERIOD 1 YEAR EARLIER (MARCH--
SEPTEMBER)
Percent with
Percent with
Grade
Total
Disability
disability
Total
Disability
disability
07-010----------------
169
77
4.i.6
183
14
7.7
06--------------------
2,676
525
13.6
2, 288
151
6.6
04-05-----------------
5,377
566
10.5
4, 981
263
5.3
01-03-----------------
743
359
43.3
462
187
40.5
Warrant officers ---------
813
105
12.
1,110
67
6.0
-------
-----
--
Total officers-__-_
9, 778 1,632 16. 7
9, 024
682
7. 6
E7-E9--------- ------
19,385 2,107 10.9
22, 578
901
4.0
E4-E6-----------------
18,494 3,728 20.2
16,013
1, 841
11. 5
E1-E3-----------------
1,418 1,020 71.9
1,285
939
73.1
Total enlisted
men -----------
39,297 6,855 11'.4
39,876
3,681
9.2
Legislation presently before the Congress (13.R. 8593) provides for restructur-
ing the flight pay system. If enacted, it would increase the incentive for younger
aviators at their retention decision point. The current FY :L974 officer flight pay
budget is $213 million. The estimated cost of the proposed system is $211.8 mil-
lion. Since it costs us approximately $300,000 to train a new pilot (exclusive of
certain fixed costs), it is anticipated that considerable additional savings will
also accrue from improved retention.
(b) Military Pay Adjustment System. The current military pay adjustment
system is linked to that of Federal classified employees. However, the uniformed
services operate under a pay and allowances system rather than a salary sys-
tem, and current law requires that all upward pay adjustments be placed into
basic pay with nothing going into allowances. This practice coupled with peri-
odic noncomparability related increases in allowances serves to distort the entire
comparability process and greatly increases the cost of military compensation
items dependent on basic pay for their computation-most notably retirement
pay.
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To correct this imbalance, we have proposed legislation (H.R. 10370) that
would provide for the allocation of a portion of future comparability pay in-
creases into quarters and subsistence allowances. Such a system would increase
allowances to more meaningful levels, reduce the size of basic pay increases,
lower the costs of retirement and other basic pay related compensation items,
and make the military compensation system for active duty personnel more
nearly comparable to that of Federal classified employees (the intent of current
law). It is estimated that savings of more than one billion dollars would accrue
by the fifth year of operation when contrasting the effect of the new system with
what would otherwise occur under existing comparability law.
4. Civilian Employment.-The greatest problems confronting us in this area
are the simultaneous and contradictory demands from the Congress to effect
further reductions in civilian employment while simultaneously civilianizing ad-
ditional military positions.
(a) Grade Levels. As with other Federal agencies, the Department of Defense
has over the long-term experienced a persistent rise in the average grade of
? civilian positions. In August 1971, a program was implemented to reverse the
trend with encouraging results :
GENERAL SCHEDULE (AVERAGE GRADE)
DOD
Decrease
from 1971
Federal
average
Increase
from 1971
1971
-------------------------------- ------
7.81
--------------
7.92
--------
---------
1972
--------- -----------------------------
7.73
-0.08
7.96
-{-0.04
--------
1973-----------------------------------------------
7.66
-.15
7.95
+.03
While anticipated civilian work force reductions in the Department of De-
fense will tend to raise the average grade, more liberal retirement benefits will
tend to offset this effect. However, true civilian personnel cost reductions will
only be achieved through management practices that keep positions and organiza-
tional structures in line with actual work requirements. Through our ongoing
program of position review and evaluation we will continue, to pursue our goal
of improving manpower utilization.
b. Selective Retirement. While we are concerned about making improvements
in grade structure, we are equally concerned about the aging status of our
civilian work force. The present system permits employees the option of remain-
ing employed for as many as 15 years after attaining full retirement eligibility,
while management has no option whereby it can replace senior, retirement-
eligible individuals with younger, potentially more versatile employees.
The problem has been compounded in recent years by the sharp downward
trend in our civilian employment as we have moved to a peacetime posture.
Reduction-in-force procedures tend to increase the average age of the work
force and inhibit the development and retention of recently recruited younger
employees. U.S. Civil Service Commission statistics show that 16.3 percent of
the total civilian work force in June 1972, were over 55 years of age, compared
with 15.7 percent in June 1970. It is significant, too, that approximately 16 per-
cent of the Federal civilian employees in 1970 who were over age 55 had more
than 30 years of service, while nearly 21 percent of the 1972 work force over
age 55 had more than 30 years of service.
In an effort to increase retirements during periods of manpower turbulence,
legislation was obtained (PL 93-39) in June 1973, which during periods of major
reductions in force permits employees with 25 years of service (regardless of
age) and with 20 years of service at age 50 to optionally retire. Although PL
93-39 has provided some relief, the problem could be further eased if we were
granted some measure of authority to initiate retirement on a selective basis.
We would propose such retirement for those Civil Service employees who meet
the requirements for optional retirement eligibility and whose retirement would
permit the retention of younger members of the work force who would other-
wise be separated by reductions in force.
As presently constituted, the Civil Service retirement system provides man-
agement with little or no role in deciding which employees are to retire and
at what time. The only true options are vested in the employee who can retire
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anytime he wants after age 55 if he has completed 30 years of service-but
who doesn't have to retire until he reaches age 70 or becomes disabled.
A reasonable middle ground would be tc authorize the selective retirement
of employees at the GS-13 level and above who are at least 55 years of age
and have at least 30 years of service. Their agency should have the authority
to compensate them accordingly through a supplemental benefit. This proposal
would give management a cost-effective option approaching that long given
employees. It would also leave protected those employees who have insufficient
service to receive full annuities.
c. Minority Employment. Our performance in civilian minority employment has
been better in the blue collar sector than it has for white collar workers. Minority
representation in Wage Grade employment has remained above 25 percent despite
sharp cutbacks in the blue collar work force between 10E~9 and 1973. While the
total number of Wage Supervisors also fell during this timeframe, the number
of minorities holding such positions has increased from 3,663 to 4,268-a 22.5
percent rate of increase.
Improvement in white collar (GS) Defense employment has not kept pace
with our progress in blue collar minority employees and supervisors-or with
the rest of Federal GS employment. In 19W, minority employment at the GS
9-11 levels was 8.5 percent, close to the 7.0 percent of non-Defense agencies. By
1973, it had only risen to 8.2 percent while the non-Defense agencies had reached
11.0 percent. The same held true at the GS 12-15 levels : 3.1 percent in 1967 vs.
3.5 percent for the rest of the Federal Government; increasing to 4.4 percent by
1973, when the rest of government had reached 6.2 percent. We are seeking to
improve our record in this area through more diligent executive search for
minority candidates whenever vacancies occur.
Of those Defense contractors reviewed during the first three quarters of
calendar year 1973, total employment had faLen 136,000 since 1969, while minority
employment had increased by nearly 57,000. We have reason to believe that this
trend will continue.
1. Race Relations.-Race relations in the Services remain a problem as racial
incidents continue to occur. The fact that disciplinary measures are often per-
ceived by minorities to be impacting on them in an inequitable manner serves to
further exacerbate their frustrations and dissatisfactions. These perceptions con-
tribute to polarization which in turn leads to confrontations.
The principal program designed to offset these problems is the race relations
education program, the nucleus for which is the Defense Race Relations Institute
(DRRI) at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. Upon completion of training at
DRRI, graduates of the Institute (approximately 1,200 each year) are expected
to conduct race relations training within their respective Services. A Racial
Perceptions Inventory Study is currently being developed on a contract basis
which will enable commanders to assess the effectiveness of this training.
We require race relations training each year for all military personnel. In
addition, all General and Flag rank officers receive special race relations orienta-
tionund equal opportunity management courses.
Most of our equal opportunity thrusts have been directed toward the black-
white problem. Historically, the concerns of other minorities have been over-
shadowed by their small statistical representation. As gains for black Americans
have become visible, though, these minorities have begun to seek improvement
in their own lot and to rightfully demand their constitutional share of the benefits
of our society. The specific problems of all minorities in the Services are now
being addressed through the curriculum at the Defense Race Relations Institute.
While substantial gains have been made in enlisted minority accessions, a
continuing need exists for more minority officers of all types. Increased empha-
sis has been placed on this aspect of reeruilment, but progress to date has been
slow and is expected to continue in this vein-particularly in view of the highly
competitive alternatives available in the private sector.
Our present directive pertaining to off-base housing is the strongest and most
effective document promulgated on this subject to date. It now protects women,
permits the use of verifiers in cases of suspected discrimination, requires com-
manders to impose 180-day sanctions against violators, provides greater relief
for complainants and extends application overseas.
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2. Drug Abuse Control.-The Department of Defense still has many serious
problems concerning drugs and alcohol in the Armed Forces and will continue
to have them to a certain extent as long as the abuse of these substances remains
endemic to our society. However, the use of heroin, which was the most alarming
problem in 1971, has abated considerably, and problems with other types of drugs
also appear manageable at this time. Service programs for identification, treat-
ment/rehabilitation and prevention through education continue to be refined
and new, innovative techniques developed.
Identification of the drug abuser remains the key to reducing and controlling
the drug problem. The major objectives of the present identification program are :
(1) to identify drug abusers at an early point, before serious physical or psycho-
logical harm has occurred; (2) to provide a degree of deterrence for some indi-
viduals who might otherwise be inclined to experiment with illegal drugs ; and
(3) to provide improved data on the prevalence of drug abuse by area.
Our exemption policy which enables self-referral to treatment programs on a
non-punitive basis is our most effective means of identification. Under this policy,
more than 73,000 Service members involved with drug abuse have volunteered
?, to receive treatment and rehabilitation. Not only does this approach exempt the
Service member from disciplinary measures, but it also enables him to leave
the Service under honorable conditions if in-Service rehabilitation doesn't prove
feasible.
The DoD urinalysis screening program is another effective method of identify-
ing drug abusers. Rigorous sensitivity standards identify the casual or experi-
mental user as well as those who are more seriously involved. Eleven regional
drug testing laboratories are presently in operation, which have to date handled
more than 4,000,000 tests.
All Services have developed treatment/rehabilitation programs which have
proven effective in returning the majority of drugs abusers to duty. The disposi-
tion of recently identified military drug abusers as of the end of FY 1973 is as
follows :
Rehabilitated and returned to duty________________________________________________
44,692
52.0
Still undergoing rehahilitation____________________________________________________
8,609
10.0
Separated after rehabilitation-----------------------------------------------------
27,606
32.1
Transferred to Veterans' Administration hospital for additional treatment_______________
5,107
5.9
Total--------------------------------------------------------------------
86,014
100.0
From a peak of 8,818 discharges reached in calendar year 1971, administrative
discharges for drug abuse continue to decline. For the first six months of CY
1973, only 1,820 discharges were given. This can be attributed to a decline in the
incidence rate of drug abuse, full implementation of the exemption program, and
the success of rehabilitation programs in returning servicemen to duty.
3. Alcohol Abuse.-The Department of Defense alcohol abuse prevention pro-
gram has been implemented worldwide for all Services. Educational material
has been made available for all personnel, and courses of instruction in alcohol
abuse prevention are to be included in all school curriculums, from basic training
through the Service Academies.
Emphasis on guidance and counseling for the individual who experiences dif-
ficulty with alcoholism is reflected in the increased admissions rates at treatment
facilities.
Calendar year
January-June,
Calendar year
1972
1973
Army -
------------------------------------------------------------------
5, 255
5, 344
-----
Navy -------------------------------------------------------------------------
1,059
1, 134
AirForce ----------------------------------------------------------------------
408
341
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Reporting procedures for rehabilitees are being refined to provide follow-up for
determining the success rate of treatment.
V. MANAGEMENT
In this final chapter of the Defense Report, I would like to describe briefly
the principal management improvements that Deputy Secretary of Defense Wil-
liam P. Clements, Jr., and I are pursuing. Cur emphasis is on improvements in
four areas:
Planning and management guidance given to the Military Departments and
Defense Agencies,
Management of the weapons acquisition process,
Achievement of efficiencies and economices in the support structure, and
In this difficult time of energy shortage, ensuring that we have good energy
management and conservation practices.
Deputy Secretary Clements and I decided to continue the practice of our im-
mediate predecessors and give the Services budget guidance rather than detailed
force guidance.
Budget guidance, in our view, together with my general defense planning
guidance and the military planning guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff en-
cournges the Services to analyze more fully the tradeoffs between alternative
uses of resources. Naturally, this guidance takes into account the needs of the
Department as a whole. It aims at ensuring that the Services are working in
the right strategic direction in shaping their program recommendations and that
the Service programs are complementary, not duplicative. This policy is one of
our major efforts to strike the right balance between the beneficial effects of de-
centralization and inter-Service competition and the adverse effects of inter-
Service redundancy and excessive rivalry.
We have continued the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
essentially unchanged in preparing the FY 1975 program and budget. This has
proved a satisfactory arrangement for preparing, reviewing and determining the
force structure and major equipment programs we require. We are examining the
PPBS system, however, to see how it can be strengthened and, particularly,
whether or not it is possible to achieve better coverage of the support area within
the I'PBS. I will give you a more complete analysis on ttis in my next Defense
Report.
We also have begun a management by objectives (MBO) program in order to
focus top management attention on a key list of specific management objectives
we expect to accomplish, primarily in the support area. The MBO program is
being used to supplement the PPBS and to provide a "results" oriented approach
to Rol) management.
Both Deputy Secretary Clements and I realize, of course, that good manage-
ment is not so much a matter of management systems, whatever they are called,
as it is of the demonstrable results achieved. It is our intention to stress results.
We also are trying to improve the communication and interchange with the
Congress on management issues and data. For example, among the most im-
portant elements of our reporting system are the Congressional Data Sheets
and the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs). In December, 1973, I initiated
a review of the SAR system and directed that the results be discussed with
interested Congressional committees prior to any substantial change in the svs-
tcm. 1)ur goal in the review is to streamline the SAR so that it can he fully
responsive to DOD management needs as well as providing Congress with the
timely information it needs and desires.
The review is well underway. The review committee is considering 22 separate
issire --including recommendations from the Congress, the Comptroller General,
,and the Department-for improvement ane, refinement of the SAR.
I am concerned that we achieve the right balance between Congressional
oversight of the Department of Defense and the flexibility necessary within the
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Department to manage our programs efficiently. Secretary Laird spoke to this
issue from his extensive background in both the Congress and the Department
of Defense in his final report to the Congress in January 1973. It is too soon for
-tie to have adequate insights or specific recommendations for achieving this
balance, but it is an area in need of scrutiny and discussion between us. I will
have more to say about this later. I am sure the Congress will be as interested
in this question as are we in the Department.
We have said that we want to keep force structure in order to maintain per-
ceived balances. To do so, we also want to keep. pace with potential adversaries
in modernization. At the same time, there is a need to maintain a certain average
age of systems in the force. However, the rising costs of our newer weapons
systems, the relatively modest increases in real value of Defense budgets, and
some previous postponements or other delays in modernization (notably those
that arose during the war in Southeast Asia) have led to a significant aging
4 problem in the force. The aging problem is seen in the increasing approach to the
end of service life of particular force elements (i.e. bloc obsolescence), retire-
ments without replacement, greater maintenance backlogs and funding require-
ments, and extensions of expected service life. Aging leads to significant pressures
on force structure, for systems either wear out and are withdrawn from the
force without replacement, or they are replaced on a less than one-for-one basis
by significantly more costly systems.
Various solutions to this problem have been discussed, such as "high/low"
mixes of systems, increased procurement funding, reduction of force structure
where possible, and better management during the development and procure-
ment cycle so as to reduce the unit costs of systems.
We have conducted studies of this problem.in the past year. One significant
effort has been to have the Services draft "extended planning annexes" which
look at modernization in the force beyond the present planning period, that is
FY 1980 and beyond. This was one of the recommendations of the DoD Cost
Reductions Study. These extended planning annexes have been used by the
Services to estimate the impact on forces in the 1980's of a constrained level of
budget in constant dollars. The major variables for trade-offs in these studies
were force, age and size as well as the unit costs, leaving aside consideration of
performance against the future threat. Thus we have made the assumption that
the presently planned force structure is generally appropriate for the foreseeable
future. The studies also assumed that maintenance requirements of new equip-
ment will be the same as those for current equipment (probably optimistic),
and assumed in some cases (such as Navy fighters) that new systems will cost
less than those currently being procured. These studies have also left aside the
possibility of radical changes to the U.S. Defense budget or the demands of any
conflicts that might occur. The studies concentrated on major acquisitions, which
constitute about 65 percent of total procurement. Thus the Army reviewed in de-
tail about $2 billion of their annual assumed procurement budget, the Navy
about $7 billion, and the Air Force between $3 and $4 billion, depending on the
year. The remaining procurement funds would support other procurement (mu-
nitions, spares, modifications, etc.).
The conclusions reached in these studies were that our General Purpose Forces
tended to age throughout the next 15 years. Major exceptions were tanks and
airlift aircraft. These exceptions were also the only cases in which the average
age of the systems was maintained at half the expected service life. All other
major categories of systems tended to age at a significant rate. The most press-
ing problem is the tactical Air Forces where the Services now project much longer
system life than history would suggest is realistic. This assumption requires
further study before acceptance. But whatever the assumption, the age of tacti-
cal aircraft is increasing at nearly half a year per year, resulting in an average
fore age of over 10 years by 1985, in comparison to the current age of leis than
six years.
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1980
1985
1989
Navy fighters---------------------------------------
Navy attack ---
Air Force fighter/attack ------------------------------
Other systems show the follcwing aging trends:
5.1
5.6
NA
7.3
7.9
7.0
8.8
12.2
9.0
7.9
01.7
11.0
AVERAGE AGE OF SYSTEMS
(Years)
1980
1984
Normal life
Army helicopters------------ ------------------------------------
11.2
12.2
12-15
ArmyWks_-------------------------------------------------
10.8
9.8
20-30
Navy general ourpose ships ---.------------------------------------
11.4
12.9
25-30
Air Farce airlift aircraft ---------_--------------------------------
17.0
15.0
20-25
These average ages compare to projected .ifetimes shown below. Life proje+-
tions are based primarily on engineering service life estimates and do not reflect
technical or tactical reasons for changing models. In general, while the experi-
ence column below reflects the combination of all reasons, the air frame serv-
ice life should be expected to exceed the actual service life. Using historical ex-
perience with the life of systems as the bae,is for projecting the life of newer
systems would tend to increase the magnitude of the aging problem, since more
new aircraft would have to be procured in order to keep the force at an acceptable
age. More rapid turnover of the inventory would be the result.
E'rperieneeversus projected Nfetimc (fi,7lrter/attack aircraft-years)
Experience:
Projection :
F-8 ------------------------
10.0
F-4S/N --------------------- 17. 5
F-100----------------------
18.0
F-14 ------------------------
19.6
F-1-05
----------------------
16.0
A-7 -------------------------
20.2
F-104
----------------------
10.0
A-6 ------------------------
18.4
A-1 ------------------------
20.0
We have attempted to make some estimates of the resources needed in the
1980- 85 period to stabilize the aging process for all major classes of weapons,
and suspect that as much as a $1 to $2 billion increase in major procurement
fending may be needed in that period to stop the aging process if no force level
changes are made. Rolling back the age of equipment would take more and would
depend on how long we wait.
In the budget review of the past several months, we have initiated and acceler-
ated a number of procurement programs for existing proven systems in order
to arrest again while maintaining force structure. We haiie also funded system
reworks and modifications which should contribute to extending the service life.
We will now make sure that our estimates are correct. We will also set long-term
force level goals and realistic long-term funding expectations. Certainly more
stability in planning Defense resources thar we have had heretofore would be
of assistance. Whether the international situation, conflicts, or domestic con-
siderations will permit this remains to be seen. We are also attempting to reduce
the age of weapon systems by the following measures :
Improved independent cost analysis in the Services and OSD. The cost analysis
improvement group (CAT G) was established in January of last year. It is de-
scribed in greater detail later in this section.
Design to Cost. Production unit costs have been established by defining unit
cost thresholds in the development concept paper (DCP) approved by the Deputy
Secretary. The cost threshold obligates the program manager to attempt to
develop a weapons system that can be acquired within the cost threshold.
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"Fly Before Buy". Operational test and evaluation (OT&E) before production
has received major emphasis with the establishment of a Deputy Director of De-
fense for Research and Engineering for T&E. DOD Directives now require an
initial operational testing phase prior to the production decision. This should
reduce the need for costly modification and retrofit programs after production
initiation and should increase the probability of avoiding major failures in pro-
duction systems.
Prototype Programs. A few prototype development programs have been initi-
ated which may provide low cost procurement options without requiring in
advance a commitment to procurement.
Low Cost Systems Development. Systems such as the A-10, patrol frigate, and
Sea Control Ship were conceived as low unit cost weapons systems.
In conclusion, the program we have presented this year should enable us to keep
the greater part of the present force structure while making significant progress.
in replacement and modernization. However, we have some indications of signifi-
cant aging problems which will come upon us in the future, particularly in the
1980--85 time period. This may require some significant changes in procurement
programs in the coming years.
C. Tn:E WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS
In December 1972 a study was completed in the Department and subsequently
reviewed in detail by Deputy Secretary Clements recommending improvements in
our weapons acquisition procedures. During the last year a number of decisions
have been taken to implement the major. recommendations. The principal changes
are noted in the following report sections on long-range planning and review and
weapons systems cost reduction.
1. Long Range Planning and Review.-We are preparing three experimental
Mission Concept Papers (MCPs) on strategic offense, continental air defense,
and theater air defense. These papers are planning documents designed to provide
an understanding of the broad functional and fiscal context into which proposed
new systems should fit during their development, acquisition and operational
life. The MCPs include assessments of the threat, resources currently projected
as available for the specific mission area, potential military needs, and major
deficiencies in projected operational capabilities. They will have the following
uses in the procurement of new weapons systems :
Early identification of new technology required.
Aid in setting unit cost targets and evaluation of affordability.
Planning for efficient use of the industrial base.
Estimating resource allocation and availability.
Scheduling weapon system development and replacement, including force im-
plications of new developments.
2. Weapons System Cost Reduction.-To decrease the cost associated with the
greater performance demanded of replacement weapons systems, we are making
a sharp distinction between systems that are needed and those that are "nice to
have". As obvious as this sounds, its implementation requires that we have
clearly established force objectives and requirements. We are doing this in
Development Concept Papers (DCPs) and within the Defense Systems Acquisi-
tion Review Council (DSARC). We are structuring our forces with the "Hi-Low"
force mix concept. For a particular mission, we would have a small number of
high-performance, sophisticated weapons capable of coping with the maximum
enemy threat and a larger number of less sophisticated and less expensive but
capable weapons for countering the lower capability enemy threats.
We are changing our weapons acquisition objectives from an emphasis on
improving the state-of-the art in performance to an emphasis on quality equip-
ment having an acceptable performance for an affordable cost. When a require-
ment for a particular weapon system is objectively substantiated, we ask how
this need can be satisfied as economically as possible, Controlling of sophistica-
tion must be accomplished very early in the weapons system life cycle process.
We cannot afford unnecessary items in any system, and we must adhere to the
requirement that any post-contract design changes be tied to decisions on dollar
availability.
Having decided on design essentials, the designer must focus clearly on unit
production costs, as well as on the cost of operating the system, before the design
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goes into production. In order to do this, we have asked "Request for Proposal
(RFP) /Contracts Requirement Review Boards" set up in all Services to examine
RFPs and contracts to ensure :
Minimum use of exclusive military material specifications in favor of more
general commercial standards and practices where practicable.
Promotion via RFPs of full use of "off-the-shelf" and/or standardized compo-
nents developed for either military or commercial use.
Maximum flexibility allowance in contractor design to encourage tradeoffs
in performance, schedule or other specificaticns for savings in acquisition or life
cycle costs.
We have developed a design-to-a-cost concept within the Department that
makes cost, along with performance and schedule, of primary management con-
cern throughout the acquisition process. The Services have submitted unit fly-
away cost goals for major systems still in development. These will be the basis
for determining design-to-a-cost goals. By the end of the fiscal year, our plan is to
have extended these procedures to all major weapon systems where it is possible
to use them.
With design-to-a-cost, the Services and their project managers will have the
authority to make the performance and schedule adjustments necessary to achieve
cost goals. For future programs, a design-to-a-cost estimate will be established at
the earliest possible date, but not later than entry into the full scale development
phase of the acquisition process.
A Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CA%G) was established within OSD to
assess the reasonableness of cost estimates and the criteria used in their develop-
ment. At the same time, each Service has developed a staff component capable of
preparing independent parametric cost estimates. These Service components,
working with the OSD CAIG, prepare an independent cost analysis each time a
weapons system is reviewed by the DSARC.
The CAIG is still too new for us to assess fully the effect it will have, if any, on
reducing cost growth. Some results, however, already are evident. The devel-
opment of a separate cost estimate, free from the optimism and pressures of the
program advocacy channels and using different techniques, has provided an inde-
pendent and objective check on the reasonableness of the project manager's esti-
mate. Perhaps the most important benefit, however, has been that conflicting cost
views become visible at the top level, thus allowing free and open discussion of
the cost issues involved in defense systems procurement at the highest policy
levels before important decisions are made.
We are emphasizing the use of new technology for reducing costs and improv-
ing reliability as well as for increasing the performance and range of capability
for our weapons systems. New technology is useful, however, only when it be-
comes a proven scientific or engineering capability ready for application. DoD
has a record of too often adopting new technology that is insufficiently proven and
then having problems in system development which cause unanticipated increases
in cost. This situation must be corrected. Spending more on experimental proto-
type demonstrations of new technology and demanding demonstration before its
adoption ("Fly-Before-Buy") can yield highly leveraged, multifold savings in the
later costs of engineering development and production. New technology can be
used directly to save money by :
Simplifying design, decreasing materiel and manufacturing costs and increas-
ing shelf or service life.
Improving safety and ease of handling of weapons, equipment and material
thus decreasing the logistic and maintenance support required.
Providing knowledge and the apparatus necessary to automate manufacturing
and logistic operations in order to gain manpower savings.
New technology can be applied indirectly to save money through increases
in effectiveness of weapons systems or through design of. modular components
useful in more than one weapons system.
Within a relatively fixed total DoD budget, any savings from technology appli-
cations will hopefully be realized in the form of military potential retained in
the face of an increasingly competitive environment. Such savings could help to
keep us from "pricing ourselves out of the market". Savings in the form of re-
tained capability are not easily measured and, consequently, are hard to prove.
They are nevertheless real and important. New technology will yield savings
only if we take a hard line in limiting the application to meeting truly essential
requirements in efficient ways. This we intend to do.
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3. Project Managers.-The success of a major weapons system acquisition pro-
gram is determined not only by our ability to acquire equipment which meets the
stated technical performance objective within planned schedules and costs, but
also by how effectively the system operates in combat and by its ability to be
supported and maintained in the field. The project manager's responsibility en-
compasses all these aspects of weapon system development and acquisition. Ex-
perience, good judgment, and a long tour in the assignment are essential if the
project manager is to meet these responsibilities successfully. Recognizing this,
the Services are continuing to place greater emphasis and importance on selec-
tion of project managers, on giving them the authority and accountability re-
quired to run their programs and then on keeping them in the job for a longer
period of time. Examples of Service efforts are noted below :
The Navy bases the selection of Navy major project managers on selection
board procedures similar to those used for the selection of command officers of
major combatant ships, since the project manager position is the equivalent
of a major combatant ship command in terms of career enhancement. The other
Services have placed equivalent emphasis upon attaining higher caliber indi-
viduals for project managers assignments.
The Army has increased the average tenure of project managers. The,tenure
of ? officers reassigned during the period January 1 through June 30, 1973, was
3.3 years as compared to 1.3 years during the same period in 1969. Similar or
greater increases in tenure time have been shown by the other Services.
The Services are seeking ways to streamline the reporting requirements of the
project managers to higher authority. Under the Air Force "Blue Line" reporting
system, for example, the project manager is allowed direct communication with
the commander of the Air Force Systems Command, the Air Force Chief of Staff
and the Secretary of the Air Force. He uses "after-the-fact" reporting to inter-
mediate commanders.
In order to ensure that the Services continue to place a high priority on ac-
quiring and keeping able people as project managers and that the project man-
agers are given the authority, responsibility and accountability required to
successfully accomplish their tasks, we have formulated a project manager objec-
tive as.part of the Management by Objective program. It consists of:
Increased emphasis on education and experience in selection of project
managers.
Greater promotional opportunities for project managers.
Equating major project managers with major commands in terms of career
enhancement.
Rotation of project managers to coincide with program milestones rather than
an arbitrary date. This allows longer tenure for project managers.
Clearly defined charters from higher authority to the project manager delineat-
ing his range of authority and responsibility.
Accountability to higher authority by the project manager for the successful
and timely completion of project milestones.
D. SUPPORT STRUCTURE
I am placing intense management effort on the realignment of our support
structure. The Services, Defense Agencies and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense are critically examining the requirements and needs of the operating
forces for support. It is my intention to allow the Services to reallocate to the
combat force those resources saved by decreasing and consolidating the support
establishment. This conversion of support resources to combat resources pro-
vides an incentive and the means by which the military Services can help to
maintain the level of combat forces necessary for our national security. We are
seeking "swords from fat".
1. Base Realignments.-The DOD base realignment program has as its objec-
tive the significant reduction of operating costs by reviewing the use of military
installations at home and around the world and by reducing or realigning those
bases which must be kept. Reduction of operating costs is being approached in
a two-phased program.
In the first phase, and within a short timeframe, we expect to reduce or re-
align a variety of bases both here and abroad as the result of internal military
department management improvements. The Service Secretaries have advised
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me that when these actions are completed they will have drawn down the mili-
tary base structure to a level consistent with current force structure support.
In this connection, I would like to point out that over the past decade there
have been almost 3,400 separate actions tat 'en to close, reduce or realign niil.i-
tary installations on a worldwide basis. These actions have resulted in the
reduction of approximately 700,000 military and civilian personnel.
It is obvious, however, that the Defense Department must press ahead toward
the achievement of additional savings in the overhead and support areas associ-
ated with military bases. If we do achieve, in fact, a military base structure
consistent with the requirements for support of current forces then we must
move on to the next plateau. This involves a concerted effort to maximize the
cross or joint Service utilization of bases and facilities. This is not seen as cross
or joint Service use in the rather conventional sense of similar but separate
Service facilities at a single installation. Rather it is seen as the sharing of cer-
tain logistical functions that give evidence of commonalty. Such functions is
aircraft and vehicle maintenance and repair fit this context, for example. There
are several others.
Additionally, we are reviewing the orga.n'.zation of the military departments
with respect to the numbers and kinds of headquarters and headquarters facili-
ties. Given the significant reduction in size of the Armed Forces over the past
several years, opportunities now exist to consolidate or eliminate some of these
headquarters activities.
2. Standardization of Management Systems.-Many of the basic characteristics
of management systems within the Department are common to more than one
Doll component. Significant advantages can be realized if these management
systems are standardized with respect to system design and related automatic
data processing equipment and procedures. Among the advantages are more
effective use of limited personnel resources with hard-to-find talents, reduced
training requirements, ease of audit and management review. Although stand-
ardization of management systems has been a consideration in system design
in the past, we feel that increased emphasis from top management in the De-
partment will bring further improvements. Our particular targets are those dif-
ferent systems operated by different defense components to perform essentially
identical functions. Differences which are essential to satisfy inescapable varia-
tions in component missions will be accommodated, but unnecessary differences,
which exist only because of long term usage, will not be tolerated.
As part of our management by objectives program we have established a task
force under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to
standardize defense management systems where standardization will reduce
systems development or maintenance costs, or operating costs, without sacrifice
of support essential to management.
3. Support Cost Accounting by Weapons Spstem.-Support costs in general are
not accounted for along weapon system or support system lines. It is not possible
with the present DoD management and accounting system tofind out, without
a specific large-scale study, how much we spend to support specific weapons
systems. Nor is it possible to assess easily the impact on readiness of alternative
budget allocations which relate to these costs. Present management guides and
controls are inadequate to give confidence that reductions do not impact readi-
ness.
The Department of Defense management and accounting system is designed
primarily to identify costs organizationally and functionally. In the interest of
more efficient management of the resources used in operations and maintenance
of weapons systems, we believe it is necessary that we have cost-effective man-
agement and accounting of support costs by weapons support system. The break-
out of operation and maintenance cost by weapon or support system is necessary
to meet our major goal of optimum readiness within budget constraints. While
there have been previous efforts to establish equipment maintenance cost account-
ing by weapon support system, these have been limited in scope, and implementa-
tion is only partially complete.
As another one of our management by objectives actions,, we have established
a task group to consider management focus, data needs, data systems and cost,
system uniformity and phasing of implerientation to develop a system to
identify maintenance and other operations costs by weapons or support system.
J,. Lorlistic Support Aspects of Weapons Acquisition.--The improvement of
reliability, maintainability and life cycle support of new weapons Is receiving
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increased emphasis within DoD. Logistic support is a major design parameter
with the objective of reducing the number of equipment failures, cutting repair
costs, and decreasing distribution and inventory costs of components through
greater standardization. To assure that design objectives are reached and that
required logistic planning has been accomplished, a plan for logistic support has
been made an integral part of weapons system development plans. Demonstration
that logistic design parameters have been achieved is a major objective of de-
velopmental and operational testing and evaluation. System program managers
have been charged with the responsibility for assuring that support resource
requirements are integrated with operational requirements to accomplish suc-
cessful deployment of new systems.
5. Logistic Systems Management.-Many of the logistics systems within the
Department were, for the most part, developed individually by each of the DoD
components in support of their separate logistics operations. The lack of central-
ized planning and control of these systems has been noted by Congressional com-
mittees, the GAO, and OSD study groups such as the President's Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel (on which Deputy Secretary Clements served) and the Joint
Logistics Review Board.
Specific criticisms have been directed toward the need for OSD to strengthen
its overall direction and control of these systems ; to reduce their proliferation ;
to increase their functional and technical compatibility, interface, standardiza-
tion and integration across the DoD components ; and to better manage the rapid
increases in development costs associated with highly integrated systems using
third generation computers and advanced telecommunications.
To alleviate these criticisms we have taken several specific management actions
in the last few years in cooperation with the DoD components. Among these were
the establishment in 1970 of a DoD Logistics Systems Policy Committee (LSPC)
whose principal goal was to develop coordinated long range logistics objectives
and assign implementing actions. Among the recommendations of the LSPC was
integration into single Defense agencies of separate Service organizations for
management of subsistence stocks and for property disposal management.
On October 1, 1973, implementation of the plan for worldwide integrated
management of subsistence stocks began. This plan consists of two phases :
Phase I brings all wholesale stocks into an integrated management system and
Phase II extends that system to all retail stocks. The Defense Supply Agency
will be authorized overall policy and direction in the area of inventory manage-
ment of wholesale subsistence stocks. Despite this fundamental change, requisi-
tioning procedures for ships and units remain the same and thus little disruption
or confusion will be caused at the user level. The integrated nature of this
system will allow us to be more fully aware of what we need, what we have,
where it is, and how to move the DoD subsistence stocks most efficiently. There
are a number of small problems remaining in the implementation, but we are
confident that this new management system will prove to be both economical
and responsive in peace or wartime.
A plan to integrate the DoT) property disposal program on a worldwide basis
became a reality on July 1, 1973, when the Headquarters of the Defense Property
Disposal Service (DPDS) became fully operational. DSA will exercise overall
responsibility for the program to include centralized policy direction, inspection,
and audit functions.
Program management and staff supervision are to be exercised by the DPDS.
Major features of this integrated management effort are worldwide inventory
management, worldwide management information and a centralized accounting
system.
6. Reduction of Items in Inventory and Elimination of Duplicate Inventory
Management.-The support of U.S. Armed Forces is expensive in terms of mate-
riel costs and management effort. The use of improved technology in communica-
tions, automation, transportation and distribution will offset some of the fund-
ing problems. Innovative management can provide economical support without
disrupting essential missions. Our military supply system must include only the
minimum number of items required for effective Service operations. Not only
must older, seldom-used items be phased out of the system, but the vast range
of sizes, types and varieties of the same basic item must be reduced. Efforts to
control proliferation of items in the inventory are necessary for an economical
support system.
29-464-74-pt. 1--11
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A program for eliminating duplicate management of consumable items in the
Department of Defense is now in effect. The responsibility of each military
Service to procure and manage the items it needs and uses has resulted in the
past in competition between the Services fo:- procurement of available materiel.
With the advent of an integrated materie. management of consumable items
program, a single manager is designated to assume total wholesale logistic sup-
port responsibility for all users of a single item. Ile is no longer an Army, Navy
or Air Force manager exclusively. He has become a Doi) manager obligated to
provide impartial support to all military Service customers. The effort marks a
major milestone in attaining a logistics objective of one item/one manager.
While management responsibilities have been determir.ed for all consumable
items, there still remains the task of transferring responsibilities and inventories
from one or several managers to another. A special joint task group is monitor-
the completion of the logistics support responsibility realignments.
ing
7. Productivity Program.-In August 197:3 Deputy Secretary Clements estab-
lished a DoD productivity program under the leadership of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Installations and Logistics). The objectives of the program are
to: ^
Promote productivity improvements at atl levels of responsibility throughout
the Department.
Foster the development and use of productivity measurements.
Establish a working environment giving full consideration to meaningful and
mature worker/manager relationships in which both can fully participate and
realize mutual benefits.
The program includes coordination of productivity improvement efforts within
the Department and development of a management information system which
will provide useful productivity data for DoD management purposes.
Management efforts in the productivity program are geared toward workload
stabilization, procedures simplification, organization realignments, application
of human engineering and productivity improvements through capital invest-
ments. All of these efforts are necessary to offset the increased cost of personnel.
Enhancing productivity through capital investments is a relatively new
emphasis within the Department which can make signif.cant contributions to-
ward improved productivity in future years, and the Army Materiel Command
(AMC) initiated a test program on this in FY 1973. The Ammunition Procure-
ment and Supply Agency (APSA) was given authority by AMC to administer
a capital investment program at government-owned contractor-operated plants
without requesting prior approval for each project from higher command. Of 24
projects approved, 15 had paid back their costs by the end of December 1973.
The total cost of the 24 approved project, was approximately $480,000. The
savings will be $1.7 million annually if current production rates continue. With
the success of this test program, AMC has budgeted $1.9 million for the program
in FY 1974.
Within the entire Department the potential applications of the APSA test
are significant. The Air Force has initiated a program whereby the Air Force
Logistics Command has been given approval authority 'or depot maintenance
facilities projects and the Navy is reviewing the possibility of applying a similar
program.
DoD energy consumption represents a $2.1, billion item in our FY 1974 budget,
mostly to be spent for procurement of petroleum fuels. Recognizing that this area
represented a prime opportunity for economy and better control of fuel distri-
bution, we placed bulk petroleum fuels under integrated management control
as of July 1, 1973. This was implemented through the transfer of personnel and
petroleum stocks, excluding "on-base" stocks, to the Defense Fuel Supply Center
(DFSC) of the Defense Supply Agency.
The timeliness of this move was evident as the system was put to its first
real test almost immediately with the advent of the oil embargo. As significant
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shortages of bulk fuels began to occur, we were able to distribute the diminish-
ing resources more effectively. This was particularly important when the imme-
diate effect of the oil embargo was the cutting off of our overseas forces from local
sources of fuel, necessitating replenishment of depleted stocks directly from the
United States. A current inventory and location of bulk fuels in support of the
Mediterranean forces was quickly available, and an assessment of product
availability and measures necessary to provide continuing support to both the
Navy and. Air Force was developed rapidly.
In September, 1973, the Defense Energy Task Group was established to con-
duct a comprehensive study to define DoD energy-related problems and to
recommend measures for strengthening the management of DoD energy re-
sources. As a result of that study, a Director for Energy, reporting directly to
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), has been
established with overall program manager authority for this vital resource.
The study established that the Department consumes 2.4 percent of all the
energy used in the United States and 3.5 percent of the national petroleum usage.
Within the Federal Government, DoD is the largest consumer, accounting for
85 percent of Government energy use. In FY 1973 DoD procured nearly half of
all its petroleum from foreign sources, primarily for overseas use.
To meet the current problem, the military Services have taken strict actions to
conserve fuel through reduced consumption, while trying to avoid an unac-
ceptable impact on readiness. Among actions taken are :
A major reduction in aircraft flying hours.
A reduction in the speed of Navy ships during transits and operations and a
major overall reduction in Navy ship operations.
An increased emphasis on reducing energy requirements through R&D pro-
grams.
An aggressive energy savings program throughout DoD to decrease heating,
lighting, and vehicle fuel use.
I am proud of the conservation performance of the armed forces which has
resulted in Defense leadership of all federal agencies in energy conservation-
Our currently programmed level of petroleum consumption in Fiscal Year 197-1
is at the lowest level in 16 years. It is almost 42 percent below the peal con-
sumption years of the Southeast Asia war and approximately 15 percent below
the FY 1973 consumption rate.
While we shall continue to share the same hardships and sacrifices being borne
by other sectors of the nation in our housekeeping and administrative support
elements, we must have sufficient fuel for our combat forces to remain opera-
tionally ready. To assure this, we shall seek priority allocation under the Emer-
gency Petroleum Act of 1973 whenever operational readiness requires.
Beyond conservation, there is at least one other action that can be taken to
help meet the immediate fuel needs of the nation and thus of national defense.
That is temporary activation of the Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 1 at Elk Hills,
California. Within 60 days of Congressional approval, Elk Hills could be con-
tributing up to 100,000 barrels a day or more to the nation's crude all supply.
And, within a relatively short time thereafter production could be brought up
to 160,000 barrels a day. This would offset well over half the maximum potential
impact imposed on the domestic economy by denial of foreign-source petroleum
to U.S. Forces. To this end, I am hopeful the Congress will support the request
of the Administration to achieve production from Elk Hills for one year.
In summary, our contributions to energy conservation will be:
Using only those energy resources needed to maintain operational readiness.
Avoiding wasteful practices and improving energy resource management.
Obtaining priority supply under appropriate authority for only the minimum
essential needs for national defense.
Directing energy-related R&D in helping develop alternate energy sources and
in improving energy-consumption efficiency.
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Fiscal year-
----------------- --
---------------
1964
1968
1973
19741 1975 3
Summary by functional classification:
Military personnel________________________12, 983
19, 939
23, 639
24, 452 25, 898
Retired military personnel____________________ 1,211
2,093
4,392
5,164 6,014
Operation and maintenance__________________ 11,693
20,908
22,148
24, 156 26,596
Procurement ------------------------------- 15,036
22,550
18,574
18,653 19,867
Research, development, test, and evaluation---- 7, 053
7, 264
8,020
8, 333 9,389
Military construction ------------------------- 977
1,555
1,464
1,821 2, 150
Family housing and homeowners assistance
program_________________________________ 602
614
1,009
1,148 1,273
Civil defense ------------------------------- 111
86
82
82 86
Special foreign currency program_____________ 0
0
3
3 3
Naval petroleum reserve_____________________ 0
0
0
0 24
Military assistance program__________________ 989
588
1,120
3,295 1,279
Total, direct program (TOA)________________ 50, 655
75, 597
80, 452
87,105 92, 579
Summary by program:
Strategic forces----------------------------- 8,505
7,236
7,253
6,883 7,628
General purpose forces______________________ 16,406
30,375
25,810
27,899 29,183
Intelligence and communications______________ 4,378
5,551
5,683
5,949 6,464
Airlift and sealift____________________________ 1,044
1,756
860
973 1,053
Guard and Reserve forces____________________ 1,768
2,196
3,897
4,385 4,796
Research and development___________________ 4,813
4,277
6,463
7,003 8,409
Central supply and maintenance -------------- 4,639
8,422
8,643
8,873 9,330
Training, medical, other general personnel
activities--------------------------------- 6,959
12,183
16,361
18,193 20,078
Administration and associated activities-------- 1,077
1,237
1,719
1,849 2,164
Support of other nations______________________ 1,066
2,364
3,762
5,098 3,474
Total, direct program (TOA)________________ 50,655
75, 597
80,452
87,105 92, 579
Summary by component:
Department of the Army-------------------- 12,275
24,972
21,656
22,096 23,618
Department of the Navy_____________________ 14,458
20,765
25,425
27,575 29,568
Department of the Air Force__________________ 19,958
24, 917
24, 707
25, 523 28, 029
Defense agencies/OSD_______________________ 1,007
1,519
2,008
2,165 2,649
Defense-wide --------- _--------------------- 1,857
2,750
5,454
6,399 7,350
Civil defense_______________________________ 111
86
82
82 86
Military assistance program__________________ 989
588
1,120
3,295 1,279
Total, direct program (TOA)----- _---------- 50, 655
75, 597
80, 452
87, 105 92, 579
Financing adjustments_________________________ 14
1,143
49
-178 320
Budget authority (140A)__________________________ 50,669
76,740
80,404
86,928 92,899
Outlays________________________________________ 50,786
78,027
73,828
79,500 85,800
1 Amounts for proposed legislation for the volunteer force, in litary retired pay, and flight pay are distributed
($99,000,000).
2 Amounts for military and civilian pay increases, and military retired pay reform, volunteer force and other proposed
legislation are distributed ($2,242,000,000).
Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.
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Strategic forces:
Intercontinental ballistic missiles:
Minuteman --------------------
600
1,000
1,000
1
000
Titan 11 -------------------
108
54
54
,
54
Polaris-Poseidon missiles
336
656
656
656
Strategic bomber squadrons_____-----------------
78
30
28
27
M annel fighter interceptor squadrons_____________
40
7
7
6
rmy ai
A r firing batteries__________________
107
21
21
0
General Purpose forces:
Land forces:
Army divisions______________________________
16
13
13
133
Marine Corps divisions_______________________
3
3
3
3
Tactical air forces:
Air Force wings_____________________________
21
22
22
22
Navy attack wings___________________________
15
14
14
14
Marine Carps wings_________________________
3
3
3
3
Naval forces:
Attack and antisubmarine carriers_____________ -
24
16
14
15
Nuclear attack submarines___________________
19
60
61
67
Other warships__________________________
368
242
186
191
Amphibious assault ships_________________
133
66
65
65
Airlift and sealift forces:
Strategic airlift squadrons:
C--5A--------------------------------------
0
4
4
4
C-141------`-----------------------------
0
13
13
13'
Troopships, cargo ships, and tankers______________
101
53
32
32
TABLE 3.-ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, AND RESERVE
COMPONENT STRENGTH
Direct-hire civilian:
Army x-------------------------------------
360
462
333
356
359
Navy______________________________________
332
419
322
326
324
Air Forcer_________________________________
305
331
271
271
270
Defense agencies____________________________
38
75
72
76
75
Tote lr-----------------------------------
1,035
1,287
998
1,029
1,028
Active duty military:
Army______________________________________
972
1,570
801
782
785
Navy______________________________________
667
765
564
551
541
Marine Corps_______________________________
190
307
196
196
196
Air Force___________________________________
856
905
691
645
630
Reserve components (in paid status):
Army National Guard________________________
382
389
386
383
372
Army Reserve______________________________
346
312
284
280
252
Naval Reserve______________________________
132
131
129
120
111
Marine Corps Reserve_______________________
48
48
38
37
36
Air National Guard__________________________
73
75
90
92
90
Air Force Reserve___________________________
67
46
45
56
54
I These totals include Army and Air National Guard technicians, who were converted from State to Federal employees
in fiscal year 1969. The fiscal years 1964 and 1968 totals have been adjusted to include approximately 38,000 and 39,000
technicians respectively.
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REPORT
UNITED STATES MILITARY PoSTURa FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975
(By Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U.S.N.)
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate this opportunity
to present my views on the military posture of the United States. In my opinion,
no task assigned senior US military leaders is more important than the duty of
keeping the Congress and the American people fully informed on military matters.
In the final analysis, our military posture and our national security can be no
stronger than the determination of the American people to defend our Nation
and its freedoms. This collective will is both developed and represented, in large
measure, by Congressional attitudes and decisions. Your role in this process is
vital.
In my prior assessments of the military balance and in the over 100 appear-
ances before Congressional Committees, it has always been my intention to relate
the military issue at hand to the actual and potential challenge facing the United
States on the international scene. That remains my intention in this, my fourth
assessment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs cf Staff.
The military posture of the United States can be judged. meaningfully only by
relating our military forces-both strategic and general purpose-to those of our
most powerful potential adversary-the Soviet Union.
In this regard, the negotiation and signing of the Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement on
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(Interim Agreement) constituted first steps in our effort to restrain the obvious
and destablizing momentum of the USSR strategic force buildup and to estab-
lish some control over the deployment of significantly inc:eased strategic forces
by both the US and USSR. The force levels for the US and USSR established by
the ABM Treaty are equivalent, but the numerical ICBM and SLBM force levels
authorized for the Soviet Union by the Interim Agreement are larger than those
authorized for the United States. Because of technological and other strategic
pffensive advantages possessed by the United States, this temporary imbalance
-was considered acceptable, particularly when weighed against the advantages of
reaching some agreement on limiting strategic arms. In the Joint Resolution au-
thorizing the acceptance of these agreements, however, you will recall that the
Congress specified the President should seek a future agreement which "would
not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior
to the limits provided for the Soviet Union." Compliance with this Congressional
mandate is a primary objective of the current follow-on negotiations to conclude
.a permanent agreement.
I report to you today that aggressive modernization programs, which could
place the United States in a position of strategic inferiority in the foreseeable
years ahead, now are being undertaken by the Soviet Union. These programs,
although aggressive, are within the terms of the Interim Agreement now in effect.
If we are to maintain our relative position. we must continue the development
and deployment of the strategic systems requested by the President and must
continue to insist upon the equivalence which the Congress so wisely has called
for as an ultimate goal in our Strategic Arms Limitations negotiations.
With regard to the balance between the general purpose forces of the Soviet
Union and the United States, I have noted wth apprehension for the past several
years that a major shift in the naval balance is taking place. The US still has
the edge with regard to the projection of our naval power as a result of the
global reach of our fleets through our carrier and amphibious task forces. The
USSR, however, is building a modern and increasingly powerful naval force
capable of interdicting sea lines of communication and obstructing this projec-
tion of our military power across the oceans to assist our allies. The exact role
of the new Soviet carrier force is not clear, but we may be sure that it portends
a new era in the projection of seapower by the USSR.
The tactical air forces of the Soviet Union are in the midst of a major and
significant modernization program. The program appears to be directed at over-
coming the long-standing qualitative advantage held by US tactical air forces
in the ground attack role.. The Soviet tactical air forces hold major quantitative
and some qualitative advantages in the air superiority role.
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The Soviet weapons and equipment observed in the Middle East, together with
other evidence, clearly show that the large USSR ground forces also are being
modernized with new tanks and new combat vehicles, as well as new and sophis-
ticated combat support weapons and systems. Additionally, there are indications
that the Soviet Union is developing air mobile units with ground attack heli-
copter support which, when combined with its new tanks and combat vehicles,
will increase the tactical mobility and firepower of its ground forces.
The strategic programs of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), by contrast,
are proceeding somewhat slower than estimated last year. We still expect the
Peoples Republic of China, however, to deploy by the end of this decade a small,
but effective, ICBM force which will be capable of striking all of the Continental
United States. PRC general purpose forces are being modernized, but also at
a relatively slow rate-when compared with those of the US and USSR. Never-
the less, the Peoples Republic of China is continuing to increase its overall
military power.
Events of the past few months in the Middle East once again have proven that
the military balance must be assessed on the capabilities of potential adversaries
rather than on their announced or estimated intentions. Intentions change much
more quickly than capabilities and often change solely on the basis of the oppor-
tunities that a lack of opposing capability presents. Therefore, the only sound
course of action for our future defense planning is to analyze, as best we can,
the military balance between the United States and opposing forces based on the
capabilities of existing forces projected over the next few years.
Before I turn to the first set of charts, I would like to remind you of the
principal caveats.
First, the US force data are drawn from the currently projected Five Year De-
fense Program. USSR and PRC data are based on the latest intelligence esti-
mates and projections. Both US force data and USSR estimates assume that the
ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement will remain in force for the next five
years.
Second, the intelligence organizations can estimate with a fair degree of pre-
cision the forces our opponents will have operational in the next year or two.
Beyond that point, the estimates become less certain.
Third, while the intelligence organizations cannot predict quantitative de-
ployments very far into the future, they can provide a good indication of the
kinds of weapons systems which may be deployed several years from now.
Finally, some degree of personal judgment cannot be avoided in comparing the
military posture of one nation with another. Consequently, some of my colleagues
may disagree with me on specific details, but I believe there is a general con-
sensus within the Defense Department on the fundamental aspects of these com-
parisons. You will have, of course, other opportunities to discuss these matters
when each of the Service Chiefs presents his report on the major programs of more
particular
the ongoing his initiatives Service. For of the this USSR and PRC than to those of the
attention to concern
STRATEGIC FCRoEs
I have emphasized in the past that no task is more important, from a military
perspective, than that of developing, maintaining, and protecting a credible stra-
tegic deterrent. Detente, offering the opportunity for relaxation of tension, re-
quires that we be strong enough to negotiate with confidence and to insure that
our good will is not misconstrued as lack of will, thereby encouraging confron-
tation. This task presents many challenges because, in making an assessment of
the military capabilities of our potential adversaries, we cannot afford to look
only at the capabilities of those forces in being today. The long leadtime of mod-
ern strategic weapon systems demands that we also devote our best efforts to
the evaluation of the relative military balance as it is likely to evolve in the
years ahead and as it is likely to be perceived in the eyes of our potential ad-
versaries, our allies, and the rest of the world. If we are to maintain a credible
strategic deterrent, actual military strength is essential, but the appearance of
military strength cannot be neglected.
Significant US and USSR initiatives-Strategic offensive systems
Shown on Chart 1 are the ongoing US and USSR strategic offensive initiatives
which will have significant impact on the strategic balance. I will highlight these
initiatives so that the dynamic nature of military balance for the foreseeable
future can be fully understood.
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SIGNIFICANT US & USSR INITIATIVES
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS
US USSR
ICBM.
MINUTEMAN III SS-X-16
SILO MODIFICATION SS-XA7
SS-X-18
SS-X-19
NEW SILOS
SS-11 MRV
SILO MODIFICATION
SLBM
POSEIDON CONVERSION SS-N-8
TRIDENT DELTA
C-4 SS-N-6 IMPROVEMENTS
BOMBERS
B-i
B-52 MODIFICATIONS BACKFIRE
CHART NO I
The Soviet Union clearly has embarked on an unprecedented major commitment
to the modernization of its strategic offensive force.
Four new ICBM designs of varying classes and characteristics currently are
being flight tested. These new systems will incorporate improved launch, guid-
ance, and reentry techniques, which will permit the USSR to introduce accurate
MIRVs into its missile inventory. A corollary of these significant new missile
programs is the parallel construction and modification of hardened silos, capable
of surviving appreciably higher overpressures and ground shocks. Additionally,
a multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) version of the SS-11 is being deployed rapidly
in some of these new silos for "light" ICBMs.
The USSR has moved forward rapidly in modernizing its SLBM force. The
new 4200 nm SS-N-8 has been deployed aboard the first three DELTA-class sub-
marines-now in series production. Improvements for the SS-N-6, the SLBM
deployed aboard YANKEE-class submarines, may be nearing operational status.
This new MRV variant of the SS-IN-111is expected to have a slightly longer range
and may be deployed in YANKEE-class submarines.
We are uncertain as to the exact military role of the new BACKFIRE variable-
geometry wing, supersonic bomber. It is certainly capable of performing inter-
continental attack missions, but it is probably best suited for peripheral attack.
We anticipate that it will be assigned both roles.
In contrast to the Soviet Union's dramatic program, ongoing US initiatives in
the strategic arena are modest and deliberate. The United States does not have
any new ICBM systems under engineering development, but it is carrying out
advanced development work on improved ICBM technology. Continued improve-
ments also are being made in both MINUTEMAN II and III systems. By the end
of FY 1975. all MINUTEMAN Is will be replaced by MINUTEMAN Ills. Addi-
tionally, the hardness of MINUTEMAN II and III missiles and silos is being
upgraded, and a Command Data Buffer system is being installed to permit the
rapid remote retargeting of MINUTEMAN Iii missiles. These improvements are
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designed to increase further the survivability, flexibility, and responsiveness of
our MINUTEMAN force.
As was noted last year, the last of the POLARIS A-2 SLBMs will be phased
out of the US force by mid-1974. By mid-1977, the planned POLARIS-to-
POSEIDON conversion program will have been completed. At that time, we will
have 31 POSEIDON submarines and 10 POLARIS A-3 submarines. The first TRI-
DENT submarine, with the new 4000 nm C-4 missile, is expected to enter the force
in FY 1979.
The B-1, which is being developed as a replacement for a portion of the B-52
force in the 1980s, will begin flight testing this fall. The results of the flight test-
ing will be examined carefully prior to a production decision being made next
year. In the meantime, funds are included In the FY 1975 budget request for
modification of 80 B-52D bombers to insure their availability until the B-1 is
capable of entering the force in adequate numbers to allow for retirement of the
B-52D.
US and USSR ICBM forces
Shown on Chart 2 are the principal US and USSR ICBMs currently deployed.
Before discussing the individual characteristics of these ICBM systems, a brief
review of the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms is appropriate so
that the operating international legal constraints applicable to the US and USSR
may be recalled.
At the bottom of Chart 2 are the numbers of ICBM launchers that we associate
with the Interim Agreement. The numbers in parentheses indicate the US esti-
mate of new USSR silos under construction on the date the Agreement was
signed.
COMPARISON OF US AND USSR ICBMs
MINUTE-
MINUTE-
MINUTE-
SS-7
SS-9
SS-il
SS-13
TITAN II
MAN I
MAN II
MAN III
SS-8
54
1000
SAL 209
313(25)
1096(661
1054
TOTAL SAL 1618
The Interim Agreement establishes limitations on the deployment of strategic
forces by both the US and USSR. Both parties are limited to a relatively large,
but unequal, number of fixed land-based and submarine-launched strategic offen-
sive ballistic missile launchers. With but one important exception (i.e., the size
of ICBM silos), the Interim Agreement places no significant constraints on the
'qualitative characteristics of the missiles or the launchers. Moreover, it is also
important to recall that the agreement places no limitation on other types of
strategic offensive weapons (e.g., long-range bombers, cruise missiles, and air-
and sea-based mobile launchers-other than on submarines).
Under the Interim Agreement, ICBM launchers are classified by age and by
size. The year 1964 divides launchers for modern ICBMs from "older" types
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deployed prior to that date (e.g., SS-7, SS-8. and TITAN II). There is no
agreement on a general definition of "heavy," but a unilateral US, statement pro-
vides that a "heavy" ICBM is an ICBM having a volume significantly greater
than that of the largest "light" ICBM operational on either side at the time the
Interim Agreement was signed. Therefore, under this definition the SS-11, SS-13,
and MINUTEMAN are "light" ICBMs. No additional fixed, land-based ICBM
launchers may be constructed by either party after the freeze date of July 1,
1972; but modernization and replacement may be undertaken.
The Agreement prohibits converting any of the "older" or "light" launchers
into launchers for modern "heavy" ICBMs, but SLBM launchers may be substi-
tuted for the "older' launchers, if desired. Under the terms of the Agreement,
therefore, the US could "modernize" all of its 1000 MINUTEMAN and its 54
TITAN II launchers to MINUTEMAN III or any other modern "light" ICBM;
but it could not replace any of the TITAN II or MINUTEMAN launchers with
modern "heavy" ICBMs. Similarly, the L SSR could "modernize" all of its
ICBMs, but only the 313 SS-9 asociated la'anehers (288 operational SS-9s and
25 new silos under construction in SS-9 complexes at tt.e time the Agreement
was signed) can be converted to new "heavy" ICBMs.
All of the 1030 SS-11 and SS-13 launchers, operational at the time the Agree-
ment was signed, may be modernized for new "light" ICBMs. New "light"
ICBMs also may be installed in the 66 new silos, under construction at the time
of the Agreement, provided the dimensions of the launcher are not increased by
more than 10-15 percent. As I already have mentioned, the 209 "older" SS-7 and
S,S-8 launchers (and 54 US TITAN II launchers) may be replaced by SLBM
launchers.
These "older" SS-7s and SS-8s, deployed in both hard and soft sites, are the
first Soviet ICBMs shown on Chart 2. We believe that the Soviet Union will sub-
stitute SLBM launchers, under the terms of the Interim Agreement, for some
or all of these launchers. Before this is done, we consider that we should receive
timely notification through the Standing Consultative Commission.
The SS-9 is a very large ICBM with four different versions. The SS-9 MOD 2
has a single reentry vehicle (RV) with the largest yield of any known ICBM
and constitutes the bulk of the SS-9 force. The MOD 1 also has a single RV with
a slightly smaller yield ; however, only a relatively small number has been de-
ployed. These two missiles are the only operational Soviet ICBMs with the com-
bination of yield and accuracy needed to attack hard targets effectively, but
there are insufficient numbers of these missiles deployed to constitute a signi-
ficant threat to our total MINUTEMAN force.
The enigmatic 5.S-9 MOD 3 has been tested both in a depressed trajectory
mode and as a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). The last test
was over two years ago, and there is still substantial question as to Its exact
capabilities, mission, and extent of operational deployment. We do not believe the
MOD 3 has been deployed at any of the regular SS-9 complexes.
The MOD 4 has received more attention in recent years than any other version
of the SS-9 because it has provided us wtih the clearest indication of the Soviet
Union's determination to develop MIRV's. rwo years ago I reported on the
abrupt termination of MOD 4 testing as follows :
"No further flight-tests of the SS-9 MOD 4 have been noted since November
1970. If the Soviets were indeed trying to develop a MIRV system, which I
believe is the most plausible explanation for the MOD 4 development program,
the project has either been sent back to the drawing boards or abandoned as
such."
In January of last year, 26 months after testing had stopped, a new MOD 4
test was detected. The three RVs carried were of a much different design and
were- equipped wtih parachutes to insure a soft landing and recovery. More
R&D tests of the MOD 4 were carried out in 1973, and some improvement in
targetinz flexibility has been noted. But in view of the progress made on the
improved "heavy" ICBM, the SS-X-18. it remains questionable whether the
USSR will develop the MOD 4 into a MIRY system. It could be deployed, of
course, on a very limited basis as an MRV rather than a MIR V.
Soviet military planners probablyview the SS-11 as their counterpart to our
MINUTEMAN. The 88-11 has a slightly higher yield, but is considerably less
accurate. than the MINUTEMAN. Comparable numbers of S9-11s also have
been deployed.
Three versions of the SS-11 have been tested but only the MOD 1 and MOD .1
have been deployed. Our evidence indicates that the MOD 2 program probably
has been terminated. Neither the single RV MOD 1 or the MRV MOD 3 has the
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proper combination of yield and accuracy to threaten MINUTEMAN or to be
effective against other hard targets.
The SS-11 MOD 1 has been operational since 1966. In addition to its inter-
continental mission, the MOD 1 also has been tested at a reduced range. This
supports the belief that the SS-11 also could be used for peripheral attack mis-
sions against China and Europe.
Extensive testing of the MRV version of the SS-11 has been conducted since
1969. This test program has been very successful for the USSR. We believe
that probably the MOD 3 initially was developed to facilitate penetration of
ABM defenses by multiplying the number of warheads to be dealt with by a
defender. Despite the severe restrictions on ABM defenses imposed by the ABM
Treaty, the USSR is deploying rapidly the SS-11 MOD 3. Therefore, it must see
advantages in utilizing the MOD 3 against undefended targets, as well as de-
fended ones-probably because of greater targeting flexibility and accuracy.
The last Soviet missile shown on Chart 2 is the SS-13-the only solid fuel
ICTiM in the operational inventory. Only 60 SS-13 launchers have been deployed.
As I have already indicated, all of our MINUTEMAN Is will have been phased
out by mid-1975. At that time, our ICBM force will consist of 550 MINUTEMAN
His, 450 MINUTEMAN IIs, and 54 TITAN IIs.
We do not have sufficient information., as yet, on the four new USSR ICBMs
being tested to provide physical comparisons of them, similar to those shown on
Chart 2 for currently deployed ICBMs. We do have estimates of some of the
important characteristics, as you will note from Chart 3.
CHART No. 3
SS-X-16 SS-X-17 SS-X-18 SS-X-19
Follow-on------------------------------------------ SS-13-------- SS-11-------- SS-9--------- SS-11.
Range (nautical miles)------------------------------- Over 5,000____ Over 5,500 ---- Over 5,500-___ Over 5,500.
MIRV warhead-------------------------------------- Probable----- Yes ---------- Yes ---------- Yes.
Estimated number of MIRV's------------------------- (r)---------- 4------------ 5-8---------- 4-6.
Digital computer------------------------------------ Yes---------- Yes ---------- Yes---------- Yes.
IOC ---------------------------------------------- 1975--------- 1975--------- 1975--------- 1975.
1 Unknown.
The SS--X-18 now being tested at Tyuratam is a large, two-stage liquid pro-
pellant ICBM. It probably is intended as a follow-on to the SS-9. The most
significant new characteristic of the SS-X-18 is the addition of a bus-type MIRV
system with an on-board digital computer. This new post boost vehicle (PBV)
is similar to the one employed in our Minuteman III and Poseidon. We be-
lieve the SS-X-18s probably will have the capability of dispensing five to eight
independently targeted warheads. Increased accuracy is a definite goal of the
new test program. Finally, we cannot rule out a single RV option for the SS-
X-18. Recent tests have employed a single RV, thus indicating a continuing
interest in a large warhead with greater accuracy.
As you can see from Chart 3, the SS-X-17 and SS-X-19 are both considered
follow-on missiles to the SS-11. Since these are very extensive test programs
for expensive systems, they may be competing designs, with only one to be
chosen for ultimate deployment as a follow-on to the SS-11. We believe that a
similar competitive design and flight test program was employed prior to the
decision to deploy the SS-9. It would be premature at this time, however, to
rule out the possibility that both may become operational. Both systems have
on-board computers and have been tested with MIRV warheads. We estimate
that one or both of these systems could be deployed in 1975.
The SS-X-16 is the only new solid propellant ICBM being tested by the USSR
and is a logical successor to replace the 60 SS-13s in silos. The SS-X-16 is
about the same size as the SS-13, but has greater range and payload capability.
We have no direct evidence that the SS-X-16 will be deployed in a mobile mode ;
however, indications suggest that the Soviet Union is developing the SS-X-16
with the option of deploying it as a land-based mobile ICBM.
As you know, the United States unilaterally has stated that it would consider
the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of
the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the Strategic Arms Limitation ob-
jectives, even though the USSR would not agree to restricting deployment of
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mobile ICBMs. Development and testing, however, of a land-mobile ICBM sys-
tem are not prohibited.
So far, the SS-N-16 has been tested only with a single RV. Nonetheless, there
are indications that the USSR plans to develop a MIRIT payload for the SS-
N-Y3 similar to the other three new ICBMs. Either version could be ready for
deployment in 1975, but if a MIRV version is planned for this time frame, a
high priority testing program would have to be instituted soon.
NUMBFR or
LAUNCHERS
1600 -
USSR
US
-US AND USSR
ICBM LAUNCHERS
0-
T
65
67 169 '71 73
MIDYEAR
Shown on Chart 4 are the latest projections of US and USSR ICBM forces,
assuming the limitations incorporated in the Interim Agreement remain in effect.
This is the first of the quantitative charts that I initiaLy developed for this
presentation four years ago. As I repeatedly have noted, there is a degree of
personal professional judgment included in these assessments ; however, in an
effort to provide you with all the information available, it would seem appro-
priate to note that our estimates of Soviet strategic growth over the past four
years have been on the conservative side.
We estimate that the USSR, at mid-1973, had a total of 1,47 operational ICBM
launchers-1527 at the time of the Interim Agreement in 1972, plus 20 SS-11
MOD Ss now operational in new small silos. The remaining new silos probably
will be operational by mid-1974, giving the USSR, at that time, a total of 1587-
only 31 short of the estimated SAL ceiling. By mid-1975, the new large silos are
estimated l o become operational with the SS-N-18 missile system.
Considering all available evidence, it is our best estimate that the Soviet ICBM
force over the next five years will be closer to the lower Interim Agreement limit
of 1409 ICBMs than to the upper maximum limit of 1618. (1409 ICBMs is the
limit if all of the "older" ICBMs are replaced by SLBMs.) This is based on our
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belief that the USSR will exercise its option to replace the older, less effective
ICBMs with modern SLBMs. We also believe the remaining ICBMs will be
modernized by replacing them with the new systems already described.
US and USSR, SLBM forces
Chart 5 provides a comparison of US and USSR SLBMs, all of which are opera-
tional except the TRIDENT C-4. The C-4 SLBM is included because of its
major importance to the military balance in the years ahead. The C-4 will have
a range capability approximately double that of the POSEIDON. The final design
characteristics, of course, cannot be confirmed until the development process is
completed and the missile is tested. Nevertheless, it will reflect significant tech-
nical and operational advances over the POSEIDON. The initial operational capa-
bility (IOC) of the new missile will coincide with the completion of the first
TRIDENT submarine in late 1978.
The TRIDENT C-4 missile also will be compatible with the POSEIDON sub-
marine. Backfit of this advanced SLBM can be accomplished during little more!
than a normal tender (repair ship) availability period for the POSEIDON sub-
marine. Plans are made to backfit TRIDENT C-4 missiles in POSEIDON sub-
marines with an IOC for the first backfit in FY 1979.
It already has been noted that the current POLARIS/POSEIDON conversion
program of 31 submarines will be completed in FY 1977. This will leave 10 PO-
LARIS A-3 submarines with 160 SLBMs and 31 POSEIDON submaines with
496 SLBMs, for a total of 41 SSBNs with 656 SLBMs in the force. We cannot ex-
ceed this number of SLBMs under the Interim Agreement without exercising the
option to replace our TITAN II with "modern" SLBMs. Under this option, we
could have as many as 710 "modern" SLBM launchers on 44 "modern ballistic
missile submarines."
Full funding for the first TRIDENT submarine and advanced procurement
funding for the second TRIDENT submarine were appropriated last year. Com-
pleted funding for the second and third, plus advance funding for four more
TRIDENT submarines, in a 10-ship program, is being requested for FY 1975.
Since this new system will be discussed, in detail, by other Defense witnesses, I
will not pursue the matter further, except to say that the TRIDENT subma-
rine, like the C-4 SLBM, will represent major technological and operational ad-
vances over our POSEIDON submarine. I urge your continued support for this
essential program.
Turning to the SLBMs of the Soviet Union, the SS-N-S, which I indicated last
year was soon to become operationl, now has been deployed on at least three
DELTA-class submarines. It has the longest range (4200 nm) of any operational
SLBM. This extra range is significant when compared to the range of the SS-N-
6 (1300 nm), because it greatly enlarges the ocean space available for patrol
while remaining within range of the United States. As a result, both our SLBM
launch detection and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) search problems are mag-
nified. In addition, there is tenuous evidence indicating that some DELTA sub-
marines now under construction are being lengthened. Should this extra length
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be used to accommodate additional SLBMs, a slightly modified DELTA, equipped
with more than the standard 12 SLBMs, may be in production.
The Interim Agreement limits the number of SLBNI launchers and "modern
ballistic missile submarines" to the nnmbe_?s "operational and under construc-
tion" at the time the Agreement was signed. Additional SLBIis may become
operational only as replacements for "older" ICBMs (e.g., S8-7s and SS-8s)
or for SLBbI launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines. By Protocol, a nego-
tiated "operational and under construction" baseline for the Soviet Union of 740
"ballistic missile launchers on nnelear-powered" submarines was accepted. The
Protocol also provides a ceiling for the USSR of 950 modern SLBMs and 62 mod-
ern ballistic missile submarines in the event the replacement options are exer-
cised. In any event, we estimate that modern ballistic missile submarines will
continue to be produced by the USSR at a rate of five to seven units a year for
the next few years.
There are indications that the Soviet Union already has embarked on a program
to modernize the YANKEE-class submarines-first deployed in 1968. In addition,
as already indicated, a new longer-range MRV variant of the SS-N--6 is nearing
operational status and may be deployed aboard YANKEE-class submarines.
US AND USSR
SLBM LAUNCHERS
NUMBER OF
LAUNCHERS
1000
IiS
200-1
le-
USSR
T
65 67 69 71 73
MIDYEAR
CHART No. 6
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The latest projections of US and USSR SLBM launchers are shown on Chart 6.
We estimate that the USSR, by mid-1974, will have a total of 666 SLBM launchers,
excluding the 60 on 20 GOLF-class submarines. These 60 launchers have been
excluded from the USSR strategic forces projections after mid-1972 since they
are not considered "strategic missile forces" under the terms of the Interim
Agreement. Instead, they are included in the Soviet "theater nuclear forces" after
that date.
US and USSR strategic bomber forces
Shown on Chart 7 are the US and USSR strategic bomber forces projected
through mid-1974. In each of my past three Military Posture statements, I have
reported to you on the progressive development of a new variable-geometry wing,
supersonic bomber by the Soviet Union.
US AND USSR
Y INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBERS
NUMBER
(INVENTORY)
OF
BOMBERS
1000
800
600
400
60 6`7 69 71 73
MIDYEAR
INCLUDES USSR MEDIUM BOMBERS
US
. USSR"
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Throughout the development of this new BACKFIRE bomber, there has been
some uncertainty over its primary mission. The reason for this uncertainty stems
from its design and flight characteristics, which place it in between our FB-111
and B-1. In comparison with US intercontinental bombers, it weighs two and one-
half times as much as an FE-111 and is about four-fifths as large as the B-1. Its
rionrefueled maximum combat radius is about 3100 nm.
We estimate that the BACKFIRE will be deployed operationally in 1974. Un-
refueled, BACKFIRE probably is best suited for a peripheral role. Nevertheless,
when deployed with a compatible tanker force, BACKFIRE constitutes a poten-
tial threat to the Continental United States. It is expected to replace some of
both the current medium and heavy bombers, and to be employed on both periph-
eral and intercontinental missions.
Although the older medium bombers of the USSR probably do not figure promi-
nently in Soviet plans for an attack on North America, some could be used on
two-way missions against targets in Canada and Alaska and on one-way missions
against other parts of the United States. For this reason, I have projected the
total bomber force of the USSR on Chart 7.
In terms of just intercontinental bombers., the US now has, and most likely
will continue to have, at least into the 1980s, a substantial quantitative lead over
the USSR, even after considering the deployment of a portion of the BACK-
FIRES in an intercontinental role. As I already have noted, funds are included
in this year's budget for additional modification of 80 B-52D bombers to insure
their continued availability until the B-1 could be capable of entering the force
in adequate numbers to allow for B-52D retirement-probably the early 1980s.
The B-1 will begin flight tests late this year. A production decision will be
made, after detailed evaluation of the four RDT&E aircraft-probably in late
1976. Under the current planning, the B-1 force could be operational in the early
1980s. The B-1 is the first bomber designed to have both a. high pre-launch sur-
vivability and a high penetrating capability in a high-threat environment. It also
will have a significant stand-off capability for attacking heavily defended targets
with the SRAM. On a comparable mission, it is expected to be able to carry
significantly more payload than the B-52 and have a much greater penetration
capability. We also believe that it will have important qualitative advantages
over the BACKFIRE in range, payload, and penetration capabilities. The B-1
represents a major technological advance over the B-52 and the FB-111, and I
strongly recommend your continued support for this extremely important
program.
Since the B-1 is not expected to enter the US force until the 1980s, the US inter-
continental bomber force will continue to be composed of B-52s and FB-Ills
through the rest of this decade.
US and USSR strategic offensive balance
Four general measures have been used to summarize quantitatively the overall
strategic offensive balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.
These are: numbers of delivery vehicles, megatons, warheads, and throw-weight/
payload. It should be understood, of course, that these measures, either singly
or collectively, do not provide a complete comparison. There are a number of
other factors, primarily qualitative in nature-such as warning, readiness, com-
mand and control, pre-launch survivability, reliability, accuracy, range, and
penetration capability-which also must be borne in mind in assessing the strate-
gic balance. These other factors cannot be reduced to a measurable common
denominator suitable for graphic presentation. Some of the more significant
factors in regard to individual weapons systems already have been discussed
in the Report of the Secretary of Defense and in this statement. Other factors
will be addressed later in this analysis.
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US AND USSR OPERATIONAL
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE DELIVERY VEHICLES
(ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBERSI
NUMBER
OE
VEHICLES
3000-r---- -- -
2500
0 s
65 67 69 71 73
MIDYEAR
CaAnT No. 8
The total numbers of operational US and USSR strategic offensive delivery
vehicles, projected through mid-1974, are shown on Chart 8. It should be noted
that in this chart, only intercontinental bombers are included and only the opera-
tional ICBM launchers and the "operational" ballistic missile submarines are
counted.
As can be seen on this chart, the USSR has totally eliminated our overwhelming
lead in delivery vehicles and now has surpassed us by over 100 operational deliv-
ery vehicles. This USSR quantitative advantage over the US is not expected to
widen much further over the next five years primarily as a result of SAL con-
straints. Moreover, the extensive modernization program of the Soviet Union
will keep the exact number of operational ICBM launchers and deployable SLBMs
in constant flux, but relatively level, as new construction is completed, old
launchers are converted, and submarines are overhauled.
Ten years ago, the US had five times the available megatonnage as the USSR.
The USSR has taken over the lead in strategic offensive megatons, and now far
surpasses us in this measure of the strategic balance. The sharp drop in US
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megatons from 1966 to 1970 reflects the reduction in heavy bombers and the sub-
stitution of smaller-yield for higher-yield weapons during that period. The
decline, thereafter, reflects the substitution of lower-yield MIRVs for higher-
yield single RVs in our strategic missiles.
The US is expected to maintain its substantial and significant lead over the
USSR in numbers of strategic offensive warheads and bombs. If the USSR
pursues a rapid modernization effort, this US advantage could be greatly dimin-
ished, but not eliminated, over the next five or six years. On the other hand, if a
slow modernization effort is pursued by the USSR, the US lead probably will
remain relatively constant and will continue to be very la:rge at least during the
next few years.
The USSR has a distinct and demonstrable advantage in missile throw-weight,
but the US has a major advantage in bomber payload. The throw-weight advan-
tage of the Soviet Union has been reflected b its large megatonnage lead. As the
USSR develops its new family of ICBMs with their larger throw-weight and
MTRZ-s, this increased throw-weight advantage also will be reflected in the num-
ber of warheads as well as in large total megatonnage. Thus, the gross advantage
in throw-weight gives the USSR the potential eventually to overcome the only re-
maining quantitative missile lead under these criteria. The US, however, should
continue to retain a substantial edge in bomber payload.
Signficant US and USSR iniitiativcs-Strategic, defensive systems
The US and USSR strategic defensive initiatives are displayed on Chart 9.
These ongoing efforts will have far less impact on the strategic balance in the
immediate years ahead than the strategic offensive initiatives. In fact, the
significance of this chart is more related to what it doesn't show than to what it
does. There are several reasons for this apparent restraint. on both sides, but the
primary limitation is the constraining influence of the ABM Treaty between the
US and USSR.
SIGNIFICANT US & USSR INITIATIVES
STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS
US USSR
ABM
SPARTAN/SPRINT 2 NEW ABM SYSTEMS
SITE DEFENSE
INTERCEPTORS
MIG-25 (FOXBATJ
WARNING AND COMMAND & CONTROL
SLBM WARNING RADAR 0TH RADAR
0TH-B RADAR
AWACS
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The ABM Treaty prohibits a nationwide ABM defense and places strict and
substantially equivalent controls on ABM launchers, missiles, and associated
radars. Under these limitations, the US currently is proceeding with the deploy-
ment of SPARTAN and SPRINT ABM missiles at only one location-Grand
Forks, North Dakota-and is continuing research and prototype development of
the advanced SITE DEFENSE System. The USSR has an operational GALOSH
ABM system around Moscow, with limited capabilities, and is doing research and
development work on two new ABM systems.
Turning to air defense, the Soviet Union already has in being an extensive
nationwide system employing surveillance, warning, and control systems, a
variety of surface-to air missiles, and a very large interceptor force. The FOX-
BAT, now designated the MIG-25, adds a major capability to the Soviet air
defense force. It is a MACH-3, all weather interceptor and carries a new air-
to-air missile. Since the optimum performance of the FOXBAT seems to be at
high altitudes, we believe that at least one of its primary roles will be against
high-altitude, high-speed attackers, such as air-to-surface missiles.
Although the US has no new strategic interceptors, the introduction of the
F-14-being developed for fleet air defense-and the F-15-being developed as
an advanced air superiority tactical fighter-will improve significantly the over-
all air superiority capabilities of US general purpose forces. Either or both of
these aircraft also could be employed by strategic air defense units. Similarly,
the US austere SAM-D program, which is being developed primarily to provide
air defense for the Army in the field in the 1980s, could be effective in a strategic
defense role, if so assigned.
The US air defense system, even at its peak, was never comparable in size to
the one deployed in the Soviet Union. Based on our overall priorities within a
constrained budget, primary emphasis in USair defense is now being placed on
surveillance, control of air space, and providing warning of a bomber attack.
There are clear risks involved in reducing our capability to limit a potential
adversary's ability to employ manned bombers and cruise missiles against the
US. However, improvement of US air defense surveillance and control capabili-
ties should, in the future, reduce those risks somewhat, since the limited air de-
fense force assets and available general purpose augmentation forces then could
be employed with greater effectiveness.
In the meantime, US initiatives in strategic defense are limited to new tech-
nology in early warning and command and control. In addition, we are retain-
ing the options, as mentioned, to convert new general purpose force interceptors
and the SAM-D to strategic defense at a later date. Funds for procurement of
the first US initiative listed-SLBM Warning Radar-were rejected last year
by the Congress because of a belief that "our present warning systems are ade-
quate." A study of these systems has been initiated by the House Appropriations
Committee "in order to adequately evaluate future requests of this nature from
all the Services." I welcome this study because I have been convinced by several
JCS/DOD studies and reviews that our SLBM warning systems are not adequate,
particularly in light of the deployment of the Soviet 4200 nm SS-N-S SLBM.
The Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radar system is being developed
by the US to provide long-range surveillance, detection, and warning of aircraft
from the surface to the ionosphere. Although a production decision has not as yet
been made, it could be operational by the early 1980s.
AWACS the last US initiative listed, stands for Airborne Warning and Control
System. This system consists of a new all-altitude surveillance radar with asso-
elated data processing and command and control equipment installed in a
Boeing 707 airframe. By mid-1977, it should provide signicantly improved
surveillance capabilities with respect to radar detection, active and passive
tracking of airborne objects, identification of aircraft, and interceptor control
for our tactical and strategic defense air forces.
The USSR is continuing its research and development of over-the-horizon
(OTH) radar. Finally, the USSR has a modified transport aircraft, called the
MOSS, which has been utilized in airborne warning and control since 1968. No
new USSR AWACS-type development has been noted.
.US and USSR strategic defensive forces
The GALOSH ABM system deployed around Moscow consists of four com-
plexes; each with two TRY ADD engagement radar sites (one large target track-
ing radar, and two smaller interceptor tracking and guidance radars, per site),
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plus 16 GALOSH missile launchers-for a total of eight TRY ADD radar sites
and 94 operational launchers. (The ABM Treaty authorizes the US and the
USSR to deploy up to 100 ABM missiles or. launchers for the defense of the
national capital and 100 more for the defense of an ICBM area.)
Target acquisition and tracking are provided by two large, phased-array DOG
HOUSE regional radars near Moscow. In addition, there are large, high-powered,
phased-array HEN HOUSE early warning radars deployed around the periphery
of the Soviet Union. The deployment of additional early warning radars is not
prohibited by the ABM Treaty, provided the radars are deployed along the
periphery of the national territory and are oriented outward.
Early in 1971, following a three-year lapse, new construction activity was
begun at three previously abandoned ABM complexes near Moscow. Although
the ultimate mission for these new facilities is not clear. we still believe the
Soviet Union will complete the deployment of the Moscow A73M defenses up to the
Treaty limit-six ABM radar complexes and 36 additional ABM launchers.
Such-deployment is expected to take place during the latter part of this decade.
In this regard, Soviet ABM test firings continued during 1973. As already noted,
it is postulated that two new systems are under development.
With regard to the TJS ABM program, we now plan to complete the Grand
Forks site with 100 missiles on launchers, a Missile Site Radar, and a Perimeter
Acquisition Radar. This site is expected to be operationally ready by mid-1975.
As a, hedge against the emergence of new threats which could gravely jeopard-
ize our national safety, we plan to continue the development of the prototype
of the SITE DEFENSE system through FY 1975 towards the demonstration
in 1977 of an improved capability to defend our MINUTEMAN force in the
1980s.- Research also will be continued on new technological approaches to even
more advanced ABM systems.
The strategic situation is still fraught with many uncertainties, particularly
in light of the ICBM MIRV development of the Soviet Union. It is only prudent,
therefore, that we continue our efforts to advance our ABM technology to the
full extent permitted by the Treaty and retain the option to deploy a more ad-
vanced ABM system for the defense of the National Command Authorities or
to deploy a more extensive system should the ABM Treaty be abrogated for any
reason.
As previously mentioned, the deployment of the long-range SS-N-S SLBM has
enlarged greatly the ocean areas from which an SLBM attack against the United
States can be launched. Some of these areas are beyond the coverage of all of
our existing SLBM detection systems. The highly reliable phased-array radar
system being requested will provide the long-range detection and tracking cap-
ability required to insure adequate warning of an SLBM attack from these re-
mote areas. It also will complement our satellite coverage in other areas. This
is required because the satellite is blanked out under certain predictable solar
conditions, thus allowing an SLBM to be launched without warning. Addition-
ally, it is essential that the National Command Authorities be provided the
highly credible warning data that can be obtained only wi,:h detection by more
than a single physical phenomenon.
Our current projections of the US air defense force have declined while the
USSR air defense forces are essentially the same as those I presented here last
year. As a result of budget decisions, primary emphasis is being placed on air-
space-surveillance and peacetime control and warning cf a bomber attack.
AWACS development funding has been transi'erred to General Purpose Forces,
although the AWACS still will be required to fulfill strategic, as well as tac-
tical, missions. All existing CONUS strategic air defense surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) will be phased out of operation by the end of FY 1974, although deac-
tivation will not be completed until FY 1975.
All F-102 interceptors will be phased out by mid-1976, but 242 F-106s and 124
F-101w will he retained at least through mid-1976. Pending a review on the re-
tention of the F-101s, this force could be maintained at about that level through
the 1970s. As I indicated earlier, in crisis situations general purpose fighters and
SAMs could augment CONUS defenses ; but, of course, these are the same forces
that frequently are deployed elsewhere in a crisis. Thus, the Soviet Union's
commanding lead over the United States in numbers of air defense radar sites,
command and control facilities, surface-to-air missile launchers, and inter-
ceptoraircraft is expected to increase.
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The first element of the modernized US air defense warning and control sys-
tem-the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft-will be-
come operational in FY 1977. The second element-the Over-the-Horizon Back-
scatter (OTH-B) radars-could become operational in FY 1980. As I have al-
ready noted, the US is retaining the option of utilizing new general purpose
force developments, such as the F-14, F-15, and SAM-D, in strategic defense
roles, should this become desirable at a later date.
Shown on the right side of Chart 10 are the US and USSR home defense in-
terceptor forces projected through mid-1974. The reductions planned in US in-
terceptor forces already have been noted. The Soviet force, although declining
slowly in numbers, is being steadily modernized. By mid-1974, the four newest
interceptors-FIREBAR (YAK-28), FIDDLER, FLAGON-A (BU-15), and
FOXBAT (MIG-25)-will account for about 50 percent of the force, while the
two oldest interceptors-FRESCO (MIG-17) and FARMER (MIG-19)-will
account for only 25 percent. The FISHPOT (SU-9/SU-11), introduced in 1959,
accounts for the remaining 25 percent. The FLASHLIGHT (YAK-25) was
phased out during the past year.
US AND USSR ST' ATE C DEFENSIVE FORCES
3000
2000
1500
1000
US USSR US 1sSR US USSR US USSR
1969 1974 1969 1974
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE LAUNCHERS INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT
By the late 1970s, the Soviet Union may have interceptors with a look-down/
shoot-down/radar/missile system, and may deploy a new AWACS with a look-
down capability over land, as well as water. Such an interceptor/AWACS
force could pose a formidable threat to our bombers. While we have no direct
evidence of the existence of either system, we are hedging against this contin-
gency with the development of a strategic cruise missile and electronic counter-
measures, should these threats to our retaliatory forces materialize.
Shown on the left side of Chart 1.0 are the US and USSR home defense Sur-
face-to-Air Missile (SAM) forces. The number of operational US strategic SAM
launchers will decline to zero at the end of FY 1974.
There was a slight decrease in the Soviet strategic SAM force during the past
year ; continued deactivation of SA-2 sites exceeded newly activated SA-3 and
SA-5 sites. The SA-3 is a low-altitude system while the SA-5 provides long-
range, high-altitude defense.
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PRC strategic forces
The strategic offensive programs of the Peoples Republic of China, when com-
pared with the Soviet Union and the United States, represent a relatively small-
scale, but well-conceived, effort. The overall strategic offensive capability of the
PRC, however, is steadily growing and mt,st be taken seriously even by the
super powers. The deliberate, but unhurried, pace of the PRC strategic offensive
programs reflects the comparatively small number of technically qualified per-
sonnel working on these programs, the relatively limited resources available, and
finally, the influence of long-range goals, rather than shor: term objectives.
As indicated last year, a substantial expansion of nuclear production facilities
is underway in the PRC. For this reason, we estimate that the Chinese stock-
pile of nuclear weapons will be expanded more rapidly in the years ahead.
Last year, I outlined the four different PRC strategic land-based missile
programs and indicated that both an MRB..VI and an IRBM system may have
been deployed. This deployment can now be confirmed. The third system. a
limited-range ICBM, is still not believed to be operational ; however, it could
be deployed later this year. Although capable of reaching deep into the Soviet
Union, this missile will not be able to reach the Continental United States (ex-
cept for the western part of Alaska).
The fourth PRC system, a full-range ICBM, has not progressed as rapidly
as we estimated last year. This large miss~;le is in the same class as the US
TITAN and the Soviet SS-9. It probably will not be operational until 1970
or 1977.
Forecasting the rate of progress of the PRO SLBM program has proven to he
a very difficult task. We believe that the PRC is determined to develop a sub-
marine-launched ballistic missile and a modern ballistic missile submarine;
however, estimates of the operational dates for an SLBM and a new submarine
have been, in the past, overly optimistic.
The PRC has one Soviet-type GOLF-class diesel-powered missile-launching
submarine, which it built during the early 1960s; but to our knowledge, it has
never been equipped with missiles. If the PR,C Is indeed developing an SL-RAT. it
is reasonable to assume that this submarine will be used as the test platform.
No other operational PRC ballistic missile submarines are known to us; however,.
we cannot preclude the possibility that one or more may be under construction.
In any event, we believe that it will be at least 1977 before such a system could
become operational.
Turning to the strategic defensive forces, we expect the PRC to develop a mod-
ern all-weather interceptor during the next few years. As to the PRC surface-to-
air defense system, we believe it is capable of providing only a limited point
defense of key urban and industrial areas, military installations, and advanced
weapons complexes. Although this system has undergone significant upgrading
in the past four years, it still has major weaknesses. The PRC has only one
operational SAM system, basically a copy of the USSR SA--2 system. We estimate
that the PRC, by mid-1973, had deployed several hundred SAM launchers and
that this deployment will continue to increase during the next few years.
Overall US and USSR strategic balance
The overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union
is in a state of dynamic equilibrium or in more familiar teems-relative strategic
parity. The Soviet Union has, however, generated a momentum in new strategic
offensive programs which, in the absence of successful negotiations or increased
strategic offensive programs of our own, could easily upset this balance I. the
future. The USSR holds a significant numerical and throw-weight advantage in
missiles, but the US today enjoys an equally significant counterbalance in areas
of key qualitative importance-e.g., missile accuracy, MIRVs, submarine quiet-
ness, and underwater technology. Deployment of the 4200 nm SS-N--S has given
the USSR a temporary qualitative advantage.
The Soviet Union has developed a new supersonic bomber with intercontinental
capabilities, but the United States will continue to retain, for a number of years,
a significant advantage in the number of intercontinental bombers and in bomber
payload. The US maintains a significant advantage in ABM technology, but the
USSR has an operational ABM system and is continuing its research and develop-
ment on new systems. The Soviet Union has an enormous advantage in air defense,
but the US currently maintains the technological and operational capability to
penetrate these defenses, should it become necessary to do so.
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The advantages in the strategic balance which the United States holds over the
Soviet Union are primarily qualitative in nature and are in areas of high tech-
nology. For example, our radar technology is still superior to that of the Soviet
Union. There are several other areas that could be mentioned, but these techno-
logical advantages are transitory at best and are partially offset by the larger
warhead yields and missile throw-weight of the USSR. This Soviet throw-weight
advantage is a key element because it facilitates the large-scale MIRY develop-
ment, already underway at a rapid rate.
These examples are illustrative of the US qualitative technological lead over
the Soviet Union in areas impacting on the strategic balance. The Interim Agree-
ment does not constrain either the Soviet Union or the United States from
pursuing new technology nor does it limit modernization of strategic systems as
long as the quantitative restraints are observed and the sizes of the ICBM silo
launchers are not increased significantly. The relative military strategic balance
is currently in equilibrium, but dynamic and fragile. The essential equivalency
necessary to the preservation of peace is, therefore, neither self-perpetuating nor
permanent.
It was for this reason that prior to the consideration of the ABM Treaty and
Interim Agreement by the Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enumerated the
following three assurances which we regard as essential if the United States is
to guard against degradation of its national security posture :
Assurance I-"A Broad Range of Intelligence Capabilities and Operations to,
Verify Soviet Compliance in a Strategic Arms Limitation Environment."
Assurance II-"Aggressive Improvements and Modernization Programs."
Assurance III-"Vigorous Research and Development Programs."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain firmly committed to these three Assurances
which are supported in the FY 1975 Defense Budget and the supplemental re-
quest for FY 1974. Assurances II and III are particularly pertinent to this dis-
cussion. If we fail to maintain weapons systems technological superiority or if
we fail to maximize our strategic offensive capabilities within the contraints
of our internationhl obligations, we will find that the qualitative advantages we
now hold will have evaporated and that the United States will be placed in a
position of strategic inferiority, thereby risking both peace and freedom.
The dynamic equilibrium now existing between the United States strategic
forces and those of the Soviet Union increases significantly the importance of
US general purpose forces (including theater nuclear forces) in the deterrence.
of conflict below the level of strategic nuclear war. Neither the US nor the USSR
will be capable in the foreseeable future of executing a disarming first strike.
Under these circumstances, as vital as they are in maintaining an overall deter-
rent to major conflicts, strategic nuclear forces are less likely today to deter the,
lesser forms of conflict than in the days of our overwhelming nuclear superiority'.
Therefore, ready, mobile, and versatile general purpose forces, sufficient to pro-
vide a deterrent of their own, must continue' to be one of our prime objectives
and; concerns.
Detente, as we have seen this past year, does not mean the total absence of
tension between the US and USSR, nor does the positive improvement in our
relations with the Peoples Republic of China mean that the possibility for con-
flict in Asia has been removed. Economic imbalance, political ambition, social
upheaval, resource demands, and military adventurism remain among the po-
tential causes of war. Hopefully, continued diplomatic efforts ultimately will be
able to establish a world order capable of settling all disputes through political
and legal mechanisms without the use of force or the threat of force. Until that
time, the United States and its allies must remain fully prepared to protect and
defend our vital interests wherever and whenever threatened by those who would
be our adversaries. Our ability to protect these vital interests in military situa-
tions, short of strategic nuclear war and particularly at the lower end of the vio-
lence spectrum, depends to a great extent on our general purpose forces.
Each of the Service Chiefs will discuss with you in detail those areas of par-
ticular concern to his Service. I will provide an overall comnarison of United
States general purpose forces with those of the Soviet Union and the Pennies R?---
public of China, with some emphasis on deployments ; a brief analysis of the
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US, USSR, and PRO land, sea, and air general purpose forces; and a brief dis-
cussion of the recent Middle East war with emphasis on important conclusions.
Overview
The Soviet Union maintains an impressive active duty force strength of about
four million men, backed up by a trained reserve force of at least another four
million men who have served with the active forces in the last five years. There
are about twenty million men registered in the ground force reserve alone.
Large as it is, the active force of the Soviet Union is not as large as the PRO's
active establishment, which has a strength of over four million men and an
armed militia of over five million men. By way of comparison, the United States
maintains a much smaller active force of about two million, supplemented by
about one million individuals in selected re;serve units pl-zs others who are indi-
vidually available for immediate mobilizaton. There are about three million total
US reservists, standby, and retired member=. Of course, each of the three nations
mentioned could, over time, field a much larger force. These figures simply
display the force levels that would be available in the initial stages of a major
conflict.
The United States, of course, does not plan to emulate the USSR or PRC in
acquiring, training, equipping, and maintainng a peacetime general purpose force
of such great size. In gross terms, it costs the United Stares many times more in
one-time investment and in annual incremental costs to recruit, train, and main-
tain a general purpose force soldier than it costs the USSR. Thus, if the United
States were to attempt to compete in terms of numbers with the Soviet Union, it
would require far more than the current DOD budget just to maintain equivalent
general purpose force levels. Conscription and rigidly controlled economies, of
course, are burdens borne by the USSR that appreciably reduce the costs to
maintain such large general purpose forces.
These fiscal realities alone, however, do r.ot determine the relative size of the
forces. Geopolitical realities also play a maior role in determining force require-
ments. The Soviet Union is a massive hear;-,land astride ,wo continents, at once
a European and an Asian nation, contiguous to most of the world's major
powers-Western Europe, Japan, China, and the Middle East. The United States,
on the other hand, is an insular nation, continental in size, unthreatened by
hostile neighbors, and separated from important interests and allies by two
oceans. Our general purpose forces reflect this position and perspective.
US and USSR general purpose forces dispositions
The geopolitical factors discussed above also play a major role in the pattern
of deployments of the US and USSR. Because of its geography and political
goals, the USSR deploys forces, not only for greater internal security, but also
as a direct adjunct to its externally deployed forces. Thus, considering location
and disposition, the forces along its borders are, in reality, forward-deployed
forces projecting global Soviet power. Soviet forces are deployed forward on a
massive scale, are offensively designed, and are concerned with controlling buffer
states as well as projecting power.
In contrast, our Armed Forces are not located within the United States for
internal security reasons, nor are they deployed overseas with any intent to
coerce our allies. We seek only to deter potential adversaries across the entire
spectrum of conflict as well as to assure our most important allies. If our deter-
rence and assurances are to be credible, they must be based on clearly evident
warfighting capabilities. Basic to this eapabiity is the concept of forward defense.
Under this concept, the United States maintains forwa ?d-deployed forces and
reinforcement capabilities in defense of US and allied interests. Accordingly,
certain locations require a US force presence primarily to assure allies of our
resolve to honor our commitment or to otherwise support US peacetime political
interests. These deployments are small and essentially defensive in nature.
The nine divisions located in the Continental United States include a mix of
forces composed of every type US division, -including two Marine divisions.
Fifty-eight percent of our TACAIR squadrons are maintained in the United
States. These are highly mobile forces capable of responding to worldwide contin-
gencies. The concentration of naval -forces adjacent to European waters reflects
the high priority a ssigned to the security of this region.
Should deterrence fail in Europe, US forces in conjunction with our NATO
allies Must be capable of halting the aggression firmly and swiftly. We have a
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capability to accomplish this mission today, and it is the recognition of this
capability that underpins the initiatives toward detente in Europe. The adverse
trend in relative strength between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has been dis-
cussed in past statements. We must continue to improve the combat potential of
US forces and to urge our allies to modernize and improve the combat readiness
of their forces.
The Secretary of Defense has concentrated on the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance.
Repetition here of what he has described already would serve no useful purpose.
Suffice it to say, deployment of substantial US forces in Europe and the Mediter-
ranean is still required to supplement the forces of our allies more directly in
contact with potential adversaries. Significant unilateral reduction of American
military presence from the European area would affect adversely the military
balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and would affect adversely ongoing
attempts to reduce our force levels through MBFR negotiations. A unilateral
change of this nature would damage simultaneously the security interests of the
United States because, as I indicated last year, I firmly believe that the fate of
a Western Europe is of vital importance to our own security.
US Asian deployments, which are heavy in naval and air assets, reflect both
our commitment to the area and our insistence that our allies continue to provide
the manpower necessary for their own defense. It remains a US goal to avoid
involvement in any war, but particularly a land war of attrition in Asia.
US general purpose forces are deployed to the Western Pacific to deter aggres-
sion and to reassure our allies, particularly Korea and Japan, of our continuing
interest and ability to play a major stabilizing role in the area. These forward-
deployed forces would be crucial in a major conflict, serve as a deterrent to
regional escalation of local confrontations, and demonstrate our resolve to remain
a Pacific power and to continue to fulfill our treaty commitments.
Our forces in Asia have been significantly reduced over the past few years
as a result of the lower level of conflict in Southeast Asia and the signing, in
Paris on January 27, 1973, of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
Peace in Vietnam. If we are to avoid a significant impact on our national secu-
rity, in my opinion, these forces can be reduced substantially only in response
to a significant lessening of tensions and conflict in the area. Without such
changes in the political and military situation, US military presence in Asia, at
approximately current levels, probably will be required for some time to come.
Two factors remain to be examined on the issue of deployments-the special
problems associated with the Indian Ocean and sealift and airlift capabilities.
Soviet military and political activities in the Indian Ocean area clearly dem-
onstrate the USSR's continuing pursuit of long-range regional objectives. Before
1965, there was no regular Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The USSR
reached an average of 4300 naval ship days per year for 1969-70. By 1973, it
had more than doubled that presence ; but, in large part, this resulted from the
salvage and harbor-clearing operation at Bangladesh. The Soviet Union now
operates about nine combatants/submarines and 21 naval auxiliaries in the area
and has, during periods of tension, clearly demonstrated a capability to surge
and reinforce.
Currently the PRC has little or no capability to project military force into
the Indian Ocean area.
The United States has important interests in the area, even beyond the self-
evident need for access to oil and mineral resources. We must demonstrate to
both allies and would-be adversaries US resolve to deter threats to the vital sea
lines of communication in the area and to prevent closure ofthese lines of com-
munication if deterrence fails. Access to the resources of the region is indis-
pensable to the survival of both NATO and Japan. Therefore, we must be in a
position to deter activities that are directed against the interests of the United
States or its allies.
If we are to accomplish these objectives, and, at the same time, counter po-
litically the growing Soviet presence in the area, we will be required to expand
on a more permanent basis our limited force presence. Some expansion of the
communications facility on Diego Garcia is important to our interests in the
Near East, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. We have requested funds to ex-
pand the present facility to support the additional ships, aircraft, and attached
and embarked personnel needed to implement this moderate increase in US force
presence.
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No discussion of deployment would be complete without some mention of ca-
pabilities to resupply and reinforce.
The Soviets obviously have not placed the same emphasis on the development
of heavy military transport as the US. The US C-5A fleet consists of 70 aircraft
capable of lifting M-60 tanks, and 234 of the smaller C-141s. We plan to increase
the effectiveness of the C-141 aircraft by elongating the fuselage by 30 percent
to increase its capability for carrying ove-sized cargo and additional combat
troops.
In regard to sealift, the USSR operates 1,500 merchant ships totalling about
12.5 million deadweight tons. Of this total there are some 370 cargo ships and
112 tankers which appear to be equipped and suitable for long-range military
sealift. All are less than 20 years old, are capable of speeds in excess of 14 knots,
and have the required heavy lift booms and hatch size. As noted last year, Soviet
shipbuilding facilities have been expanded so significantly that they retain the
option to double their current capability by 1980.
The United States operates only 239 comparable ships of 3.4 million dead-
weight tons and 162 tankers which meet similar military supply requirements.
The US Navy provides amphibious lift for the assault elements of more than
one Marine Corps Division/Wing team (MAF) and plans to operate, by 1978,
sufficient lift for one and one-third MAPs. I believe that with sufficient over-
flight privileges and base rights, the US has the capability to project the neces-
sary military power to control the early critical stage of a confrontation in those
areas of the world where our interests come in conflict with those of the USSR.
We plan to expand our sealift and airlift forces so as to maintain a credible
strategic mobility capability. If we fail to provide this capability, then our
potential adversaries will know that they can always pick the point of con-
frontation and concentrate their forces with impunity.
T7S neneral purpose forces readiness
There are two factors affecting future US readiness that are particularly
worthy of attention at this time.
First, the all-volunteer force environment will have an increasing impact on
our nubility to attract and retain that level of expertise required to maintain a
satisfactory level of readiness. This impact will be felt most in the technical skill
positions. Another facet of this problem is leadership. Unless dedicated young
men of good character continue to be attracted to a military career, we soon can
expect to possess an Armed Force led by second-raters. The military strength of
our Nation rests not on weapons systems alone, but, rather, is embodied in the
character, ability, and morale of those entrusted to use them. First-class leaders
will.be attracted only if the Nation as a whole recognizes the need for such lead-
ership and also actively seeks to create pride in military service.
The second factor adversely impacting on future readiness is the energy prob-
lem. We have implemented maximum POL conservation measures and drasti-
eully curtailed training missions and exercises. These restraints only now are
beginning to be reflected in our readiness posture. We can maintain minimum
acceptable readiness under present conditions only for the short term. Continued
reductions in routine training and major exercises will result in gradual, but seri-
ous, cumulative degradation in the long team. Returning to optimum training
levels will be difficult as a result of price increases, even if the fuel becomes
available.
Significant US and USSR initiatives-General purpose forces systems
The principal US and USSR general purpose force initiatives are shown on
Chart 11. There are other important ongoing programs, of course, which could
he listed for both the US and USSR, but these are believed to be the most sig-
nificant. You should note that nine of the Soviet systems listed have progressed
to the point of deployment, while only two of the US systems are in that cate-
gory. Recognizing that legitimate disagreements may exist over which general
purpose systems should be included on this chart, the emphasis displayed by
these newly developed Soviet systems clearly illustrates the broad scope of
USSR general purpose force modernization. The list also reflects our limited
ability to detect research and development on Soviet general purpose force
systems.
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SIGNIFICANT US & USSR INITIATIVES
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES SYSTEMS
us
ARMY "BIG FIVE": AAH & UTTAS
XM-l TANK & MICV
SAM-D
? DRAGON & TOW ANTITANK WEAPONS
CH-53E HVY ASSAULT HELD
A-10 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT A C
F-15 (EAGLE) FIGHTER
EF-111A
? F-14 (TOMCAT) FIGHTER
688 CLASS ATTACK SUB
LHA AMPHIB ASSAULT SHIP
SEA CONTROL SHIP
PATROL FRIGATE
)HARPOON EQUIPPED]
NEW MEDIUM TANK
? NEW FIGHTING VEHICLE
- BROM- MISSILE SYSTEM
HIND A HELD
FENCER A VGW FIGHTER BOMBER
MIG-23 (FLOGGER) FIGHTER
SU-20 GROUND SUPPORT A C
V STOL FIGHTER
KURIL CLASS CARRIER
? KARA CLASS CRUISER
? KRIVAK CLASS DESTROYER
? AMGA CLASS MISSILE
SUPPORT SHIP
The Soviet Union, despite the clear commitment it is making to the major
modernization of its strategic offensive forces, has not neglected general purpose
force modernization. New tanks, aircraft, and ships are being developed and de-
ployed, apparently as a long-range, sustained, and deliberate "across the board"
modernization.
A new tank, a new armored fighting vehicle, a new missile system mounted
on an existing armored vehicle, and a new assault helicopter currently are
being deployed with Soviet ground forces. The deployment of a new medium
tank, a new fighting vehicle (which is air-droppable, amphibious, and equivalent
to a light tank), and an armored missile system is consistent with the reliance
placed by the USSR on armored and mechanized equipment. These new weapon
systems will provide evolutionary improvements over similar existing equipment,
but they should not change materially the overall effectiveness of the ground
forces.
There are numerous indicators that the Soviet Union has begun to increase its
emphasis on improving the capabilities of its tactical air forces to engage in
ground attack missions, particularly in regard to non-nuclear conflict. Con-
vincing evidence of this trend is supplied by the development of the four Soviet
aircraft listed on Chart 11.
The FENCER A, for example, is the first modern Soviet fighter to be devel-
oped specifically as a fighter-bomber for the ground attack mission. Although
the MIG-23 (FLOGGER) is capable of serving as an interceptor, it also has an
important ground attack capability. The SU-20 is an improved version of the
FITTER B, also with an improved ground attack capability. The V/STOL
fighter is expected to serve as the fixed-wing tactical aircraft for deployment in
the new Soviet aircraft carrier. In contrast to the evolutionary improvements
of the ground forces, these ongoing tactical air initiatives, when fully imple-
mented, will add significant new capabilities to the Soviet Frontal and Naval
Aviation forces.
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The deployment of the first KURIL-class V /STOL carrier will add a completely
new dimension to Soviet naval capabilities. Although not comparable to the
multi-purpose US carriers with their varied complement of sophisticated air-
craft, this class of ships will free USSR naval forces from their total dependence
on shore-based aircraft. With complementary Soviet programs in underway
replenishment ships, command and control ?ruisers, and amphibious ships, this
class of ships will further strengthen the increasing capability of Soviet forces
to operate worldwide. The other three naval initiatives listed for the USSR also
will strengthen this same capability. The KARA-class cruiser and the KRIVAP-
class destroyers are heavily armed ships wi"h impressive arrays of antiahip and
antiair missiles, as well as antisubmarine sensors and weapons. The AMG A-
class ships will provide missile support for all classes of ballistic missile sub-
marines thus potentially improving the sustained effectiveness of these sub-
marines when deployed away from the Soviet Union. It is obvious that ships of
this size and sophistication are not needed by a navy structured merely for
coastal defense.
Turning to the ongoing US initiatives, the emphasis has been placed on major s
new programs designed to influence our mililary capabilities in the late 1970s acid
1980s. In regard to the US Ground Forces initiatives, the Army "Big Five"
weapons systems have been designed to provide major qualitative improvements
in combat equipment for use by ground forces that may be on a battlefield in the
1.980s. Superior equipment is indispensable for our ground forces because we plan
for them to exploit technology rather than depend upon abundant manpower. The
DRAGON and TOW constitute a significantly improved family of antitank
weapons to provide protection to ground force units. TOW currently is being
deployed and DRAGON will be deployed in the near future with our Army ground
forces. A request for funds to provide this same capability to Marine Corps
ground forces is contained in the FY 1975 Defense Budget. The last item, the
CH-53E, is an Improved prototype version of the CH-53D helicopter currently
deployed in Marine Corps units. It is expected to have the capability to lift over
90 Percent of Marine division combat equipment and Marine tactical aircraft
without disassembly. No production decisions have been made on any of these
initiatives except for the DRAGON and TOW antitank weapons.
The first three initiatives listed under Tactical Air Forces are ongoing Air
Force programs. The A-10 is an attack aircraft specifically designed and opti-
mized for the close air support mission-particularly in the role of defeating
enemy armor and providing accurate delivery of ordnance in proximity to friendly
ground forces. A production decision on this aircraft is being withheld until a
fly-off has been completed between the A-10 and the in-service A-7 aircraft. The
F-15 (EAGLE) is an advanced tactical fighter being developed for the Air
Superiority mission ; but it also is expected to have an air-to-ground capability,
with accuracies at least as good as those of the A-7D attack aircraft. As an air
superiority fighter, it should out-perform any known Soviet fighter aircraft now
in service or projected for service in the 1980s. The EF-111A is being developed
,is a prototype by installing the latest jamming subsystem in the sophisticated
F-111A fighter, to provide an important qualitative improvement in the Air
Forte's manned tactical ECM capability.
The Navy's F-14 (TOMCAT) is the only Tactical Air Forces initiative listed
which is currently operational. Designed for both fleet air and fleet area defense,
the F-14 should-like the F-15-be superior to any Soviet fighter aircraft
through the 1980s. The F-14 also has an excellent air-to-ground attack capability.
None of the US ships listed under the Naval Forces initiatives is currently
operational; however, the first 088-class nuclear-powered attack submarine
(SSN) and the first LIIA amphibious assault ship should be delivered to the fleet
in FY 1975. The 088-class SSNs are expected to be generally qualitatively su-
perior to the best Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines. With the completion
of the five ships in the LHA program in FY 1977, the amphibious forces of the
Navy should attain the capability of lifting the helicopter and surface assault ele-
ments of one and one-third Marine Amphibious Forces and achieve this in mod-
ern 20-knot ships.
The last two ships listed, the sea control ship and the HARPOON missile-
equipped patrol frigate, are to be key elements in providing sea-based air, antiair,
,and antisubmarine capabilities to small task groups, underway replenishment
groups, amphibious assault groups, and convoys that do not have aircraft car-
riers in company. Both of these new ships will be austerely, but adequately, de-
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signed to fulfill this important mission of protecting our sea lines of communica-
tion in lesser-air-threat areas, freeing our carriers to employ their capabilities
in protecting our sea lines of communication in high-air-threat areas.
Ground forces
Chart 12 provides a comparison of US, USSR, and PRC inventories of selected
major ground force weapons and equipment. Accurate comparisons in this area
are difficult because our estimates of Soviet and PRC ground force weapons in-
ventories, of necessity, are based to a large extent on evaluations of their force
requirements, division structure, and tables of organization and equipment.
Also, there are always numerous problems of definition and classification in-
volved in the categorization of weapons and equipment.
CHART No. 12
GROUND FORCES-MAJOR WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
1 Ratiosl
U.S.S.R./
United States
U.S./PRC
Medium tanks------------------------------------------------------------------
4:1
1:1
APC and fighting vehicles --------------------------------------------------------
3:2
6:1
Artillery -----------------------------------------------------------------------
3:1
1:3
tleavy mortars-----------------------------------------------------------------
2:1
1:2
Antitank weapons---------------------------------------------------------------
(11
Helicopters---------------------------------------------------------------------
1:5
20:1
Soviet doctrine places great emphasis on the massive use of tanks, armored
vehicles, and heavy firepower to win the land battle. Associated with this doc-
trine, the USSR tends to arm its ground units with large quantities of weapons
and equipment, which we have always considered reliable and serviceable, but
generally of slightly lower quality than comparable US materiel.
The US has never attempted to match the USSR in quantities of ground force
personnel or materiel, but we have taken pride in our superior weapons systems
and equipment. The Soviet Union, learning lessons from Vietnam, has continued
a very deliberate and effective program, both to modernize its ground force
equipment and to place large numbers of sophisticated weapons in its ground
force units. The US, because of its involvement in Vietnam, has been required,
in recent years, to expend most of its resources maintaining and procuring cur-
rent models of weapons and equipment.
US technology is still, by and large, superior; but this new Soviet moderniza-
tion trend, combined with its already massive quantitative superiority, makes it
imperative that we continue to modernize our ground forces equipment and con-
tinue to pursue those potentially rewarding new areas of technology that might
become most useful in the years ahead.
A substantial portion of the Soviet tank force consists of the effective T-62
medium tank, recently employed in combat by Syrian and Egyptian forces in the
Middle East. Series production has begun on a new medium tank, the M-1970.
The remainder of the Soviet tank force consists of older T-54/55 medium tanks.
The PRC is continuing to produce the type 59 tank-a copy of the Soviet T-54.
The US medium tank inventory is less than one-quarter of our estimate of the
total USSR inventory, but about the same as the inventory of the PRC. Our
main battle tank, the M-60, is comparable to the Soviet T-62. The M-60 series
(M-60/A1/A2) now constitutes slightly over half of the US Army inventory.
M-60A1s will be delivered to th:,~ Marine Corps in June of this year. Over the
next three years, M-60A1s will replace all of the old M-48s in both active and
reserve Marine Corps units.
An improved version of the M4)OAi; to be designated the M-60A3, will have a
laser range finder and other improvements over the M-60A1. Also, the 152 mm
gun/SHILLELAGH missile launcher version of the M-60, the M-60A2, will be
fielded in Europe in the near future. For the 1980s, the Army is developing a
completely new tank, the XM-1. Prototypev to be developed by two competing
contractors will be tested (beginning in 1976) before a production decision is
made.
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The newest Soviet fighting vehicle is the new light, amphibious vehicle, al-
ready noted. This relatively small (less than 10 tons) armored vehicle is prob-
ably air-droppable, and we believe that production is continuing.
The PRC inventory of APCs and fighting vehicles is still small in comparison
with the US and USSR. The Chinese have been producing their own APCs
and light tanks for several years. The design of this equipment, however, while
similar to older Soviet tanks and APCs, does reflect some improvements. These
vehicles, like the medium tanks, continue to be distributed to operational units
at a moderate rate.
The principal US AFC, the M-113, was first introduced into the Army in 1959.
While this vehicle provides adequate transportation and protection to the
infantry squad, unlike the Soviet BMP, it cannot be classified as a fighting
vehicle. We, therefore, believe that the BMP is superior to the M-113. Initial
testing has begun, however, on a new and improved Mechanized Infantry Com-
bat Vehicle (MICV). This new vehicle is programmed to be a partial replacement
for the M-113s in Europe-oriented mechanized battalions, It will have greatly
improved fire power, mobility, and troop protection characteristics, as compared
with the Al-113 series.
The principal amphibious landing vehicle -..n the US Marine Corps is now the
LVTP-7. This vehicle is lighter, faster, and more maneuverable than the
LVTP--5, which it has replaced recently in all combat units.
Both the USSR and the PRC, with their much larger ground forces, have about
three times the number of US artillery pieces and heavy mortars. Although the
PRC has increased its production of artillery in recent years, most of its current
inventory still consists of USSR World War II types. Most of the USSR and PRC
tube artillery pieces have a greater range capability than their US counterparts,
but new US ammunition developments are underway which should close this
range gap in the 1970s. Also, our extensive use of self-propelled artillery gives
us the advantage in mobility.
Because of the wide variety of antitank weapons-ranging from the US one-
shot, throw-away 66 nim Light Antitank Weapon (LAW) ar.,d the USSR shoulder-
fired reloadable 85 mm grenade launcher (RPG-7), through recoilless rifles and
guns, field guns, and guided missiles-I have been unable to find a simple quanti-
tative measure with which to compare the ITS, USSR, and PRC inventories of
these weapons. By and large, I would judge that the US has an overall qualita-
tive advantage over the USSR in antitank weapons, due in large part to our new
ground forces family of antitank guided missiles-TOW, DRAGON, and SHI7.-
LELAGH. We believe that these weapons are clearly superior to the Soviet
SNAPPER, SAGGER, and SWATTER antitank guided missiles. TOW is both
ground/vehicle-mounted and helicopter-mounted ; DRAGON Is man-portable ;
and SHILLELAGH is tube-fired from the M-60A2 tank and the M-551 recon-
naissance vehicle. The Soviet antitank missiles are generally ground/vehicle-
mounted. Both the US and the USSR have large numbers of the smaller man-
portable antitank weapons. The PRC has thousands of older antitank weapons.
mostly of World War II types. In this area, tie PRC is distinctly inferior to both
the US and the USSR.
Turning to the final item on Chart 12, the US still has far more helicopters
dedicated to the ground combat role than the USSR and the PRC combined.
Although, we believe US helicopters also are superior in design, the USSR is
producing a new assault helicopter, the HIND-A. Deployment of this versatile
helicopter will increase significantly the hel [borne-assault capability of Soviet
ground forces. Other Soviet helicopters are also In production, and we can expect
a steady increase in this force over the years.
There are two major new US Army programs, already mentioned, which
should improve substantially the US heliborne and helicopter assault capabilities
in the 1980s. These are the 1JTTAS squad assault helicopter and the Advanced
Attack Helicopter (AAH). The UTTAS, which is now in the engineering develop-
ment stage, will be able to carry, even under adverse climati,2 conditions, an entire
Army squad in addition to the crew. It will ?eplace eventually the "Huey" as the
mainstay of the Army assault helicopter force. The AAH helicopter will have
greatly improved performance and survivability characteristics over the AH-1
COBRA. It will have also an operational capability at night and In adverse
weather. In addition, both the Army and the Marine Corps are developing im-
proved versions of the AH-1 COBRA gunship,, which will be capable of firing the
TOW missile.
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Tactical Aim Forces
Shown on Chart 13 are the US, USSR, and PRC tactical aircraft inventories,
including fighter, attack, light bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft.
The US figures include all such aircraft, both active and reserve, in the Air
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, but exclude those used for training (about 850
in 1974) and those assigned to and discussed previously under Continental Air
Defense '(about 500 in 1974).
The Soviet figures similarly exclude tactical-type aircraft used for training
(about 2000 in 1974) and fighter aircraft assigned to the PVO Strany (Air
Defense of the Nation) forces (about 2500 in 1974). Some of these aircraft
could be diverted to the tactical role.
In the PRC, most fighter aircraft are assigned a strategic home defense mission
(over 3000 in 1974). The PRC figures, therefore, include only the tactical aircraft
(fighters and light bombers) in the active inventory of the Air Force and Naval
Air Force. On the other hand, home defense interceptor units participate in
ground support training exercises ; and it is believed that many of these strategic
home defense aircraft would be utilized, whenever necessary, in a tactical role.
No reserve aircraft figures are available for the PRC.
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
6000
US
USSR
65 67 69 71 73
MIDYEAR,
CHART No. 13
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The US tactical aircraft inventory will decline slightly over the next few
years. The substantial modernization taking place during the next five-year period
will partially offset the effect of this decline in total inventory, but the rate of
deployment of the new aircraft, e.g., F-14, F-15, and A-10, will not quite equal
the attrition and replacement of the older aircraft. As the Secretary of Defense
has indicated, the increasing costs associated with sophisticated high-performance
aircraft are such that programmed modernization is not as rapid as desired.
In the Air Force, the major changes in the tactical aircraft programmed inven-
tory will result from the introduction of the F-15 (EAGLE) air superiority
fighter and the A-10 close air support aircraft. (The A--10 aircraft is an im-
portant part of the Air Force program ; however, no production decision will be
made until after it completes a fly-off with t:he A-7 and other tests.)
The F-15 (EAGLE.) slowly will replace the F-4E as the primary air superiority
fighter for the Air Force ; and the A-10, under the current program, will phase
into the active force beginning FY 1977. The first squadron of F-15s is pro-
grammed to be operational in early FY 1976. Some A-7s and F-4s now in the
active forces will be transferred to the Reserve Forces to continue this essential
part of our total force modernization program..
The criteria for selecting the F-15 (EAGLE) design features were based on
providing an air-to-air combat capability superior to that of threat aircraft
projected for the 1980's; however, the high thrust-to-weight ratio and low wing
loading also provide a capability to carry large external loads. The "hard points"
built into the wings and fuselage to carry fuel tanks are compatible with mul-
tiple ejector racks for conventional weapon,. This aircraft has the sensor, com-
putational, and display systems required for various manual and semi-auto-
niatic all-weather ground attack missions. Therefore, the F-15 (EAGLE) also
should have an excellent ground attack capability.
The A-10, in contrast to the F-15, has been designed primarily for the close
support mission. It is a much less sophisticated and less expensive aircraft than
the F-15. The short take-off and landing (STOL) capability of the A-10 will
permit it to use short battlefield area airstrips ; and its large fuel capacity will
provide long loiter time, both of which are important characteristics for a close
air support aircraft. In addition to its internal 30 mm Gatling gun, the A-10
has 11 external pylons to carry a large mixed ordnance payload. Its survivabil-
ity under high intensity battlefield conditioas is greatly enhanced by armor in..
stalled around the cockpit and other critical components, including: redundalit
structural components, backup flight controls, and self-sealing foam-filled fuel
tanks. The simplicity designed into the A-10 should allow it to be serviced. and
operated from bases with limited facilities close to the forward edge of the cattle
area.
In the active Navy, the new F-14A (TOMCAT) is scheduled to replace about
half the F-4s. It also will replace four squadrons of F-4s in the actj ve Marine
Corps. A-7Es will replace the older versions of the A-7 and A-4 if the active
Navy in a primary light attack role ; while in the active Marini Corps, this
role will continue to be assigned to the A-4 (the improved versic{n, A-4M) and
the new AV-8A (IIARRIER). The V/STOL capable HARRIES has exceeded
expectations in its initial operational service.
The F-14A (TOMCAT) is designed to operate from MIDWAY and larger class
carriers, as well as from Marine Corps fields ashore. Initial carrier suitability
trials were conducted successfully in June 1972. The first two active Navy
squadrons are now operational, and the first: active Marine Corps F-14A (TOM-
CAT) squadron will be operational prior to the end of FY 1975.
One of the most important features of the F-14A (TOMCAT) is its AWG-9
fire control system and the long-range, all-weather, air-to-air PHOENIX missile.
This weapons system is capable of simultareouslr engaging multiple supersonic
targets at ranges out to 60 nm and at altitudes up to 80.000 feet. Intensive testing
of this newly operational missile has confirmed its outstanding effectiveness.
The attack capabilities of the Navy A-6 and A-7E and the Marine Corps A-4M
aircraft should be improved by new systems under development. The target ac-
quisition and attack multisensor system (TRAMS) will be installed in the A-6
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and the A-7E, and the angle rate bombing system (ARBS) will be retrofitted
into the A-4M.
The experience gained from Vietnam and again in the recent Middle East
conflict has reemphasized the importance of effective electronic warfare sys-
tems operating in the modern SAM environment. Continued modernization of our
electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic support measures (ESM) is
essential to our general purpose program. All Military Services are engaged
in this effort. Under tactical air forces programs for FY 1975, for example, the
Air Force is developing the EF-111A to improve its manned ECM capability.
Funds also are being requested to initiate prototype efforts to expand the ECM
capabilities of the Navy EA-6B. Other Service ECM programs, both in R&D and
in new procurement, also are being pursued.
In the area of command and control, the AWACS, already discussed under its
strategic defensive role, also will have a major tactical mission and should
greatly increase the effectiveness of all tactical aircraft under its control.
The primary additions to the Soviet tactical air force inventory over the next
five years are expected to be the MIG-23 (FLOGGER), FENCER A (a new VGW
fighter-bomber), SU-20 (improved FITTER B), and MIG-25 (FOXBAT). All of
these aircraft except the FOXBAT, a high-altitude interceptor, have an impor-
tant ground attack capability. This increased Soviet emphasis on new tactical
aircraft has required an upward reevaluation of our total future inventory
projections for the next few years.
In contrast to our under-estimation of the future aircraft inventory of the
Soviet tactical air forces, our last year's estimate for the growth rate of the PRC
tactical air forces was too high. The PRC tactical aircraft inventory still is
expected to continue its growth, but not as rapidly as projected last year.
As already indicated, the Soviet Union appears to be making a determined
effort to erase the long-held advantage in the ground attack role held by US
tactical air forces. On the other hand, the USSR traditionally has emphasized
the air superiority capabilities in its tactical aircraft and has gained thereby a
clear quantitative advantage and some qualitative advantages in this role. With
the deployment of new US and USSR aircraft, these differences will tend to
narrow ; however, I believe US tactical air forces will be superior in both roles
in the 1980s if we actively pursue the tactical aircraft modernization programs
already underway-particularly the F-14A (TOMCAT) and the F-15 (EAGLE).
Naval Forces
Shown on Chart 14 is a comparison of the numbers of US, USSR, and PRC
major operational combat surface ships. The Soviet force at mid-1974 is expected
to consist of approximately two guided missile helicopter ships, 17 missile cruis-
ers, 13 gon cruisers, 43 missile destroyers, 36 gun destroyers, and 104 escorts,
for a total of about 215 ships. It is very likely that this force will decrease
slightly as ; he retirement and transfer of older surface ships exceed the de-
liveries of tho more sophisticated and generally heavier new ships.
A substantial Soviet naval modernization program is underway. As already
indicated, several new classes of combat surface ships are being constructed in
the Soviet Union. Other older classes are undergoing major conversions involving
the addition of new missiles, antisubmarine systems, and communications
equipment.
The largest Soviet surface combatant ever constructed is the recently launched
KURIL-class aircraft carrier. The ship is over 900 feet in length and should
displace 30-40,000 tons, when its fitting-out period is completed. The deck con-
figuration and the lack of, catapults or arresting gear indicate that this ship
apparently is designed to operate V/STOL aircraft and helicopters, rather than
more conventional fighter and attack aircraft. It should be capable of carrying
25 V/STOL aircraft or 36 helicopters. It is believed, however, that a mixture
of the new V/STOL aircraft, mentioned under New Initiatives, and HORMONE
helicopters is the most likely complement. The first ship of this class, with its
complement of V/STOL aircraft and helicopters, could join the fleet in late
1975. A second carrier is under construction.
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MAJOR OPERATIONAL
NUMBER COMBAT SURFACE SHIPS
OF SHIPS
400
U
200 USSR
100
PRC
65 67 69 71 73
MIDYEAR
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Probably the most heavily armed class of ships in the world for its displace-
ment (about 9000 tons) also is being constructed by the Soviet Union. Two of
these KARA-class guided missile light cruisers are already operational and more
are expected to join the fleet in the next few years. The KARA-class is the first
ship in any navy to be armed with three separate missile systems.
As a result of the high ship construction rates during the 1950s, the Soviet
Union-like the United States-faces a growing problem in the 1970s of obso-
lescence among its gun destroyers and escorts. A substantial portion of these
old ships, however, has been, is, or will be modernized to prolong its effective
life. The best candidate to replace the older destroyers still is believed to be the
KRIV AK-class.
As shown on Chart 14, the PRC major combat surface ship force is quite small,
but is growing slowly. A substantial portion of the force is composed of Soviet-
designed destroyers and destroyer escorts about 20 years old. Several Chinese-
designed missile-equipped surface combatants have been built in the past 10
years and more are under construction.
The largest ships in the PRO fleet are the new guided missile destroyers, the
first of which became operational in late 1971. Each ship carries STYX-type
missiles, antiaircraft guns, and antisubmarine weapons. More of these ships are
expected to be operational by mid-1974, and others are under construction, or
fitting out. It appears, however, that major surface combatants are not receiving
the same priorities in the PRC Navy that was evident only a few years ago.
In contrast to the slow progress in the construction of major combat surface
ships, the PRO is expanding rapidly its guided missile boat force. By mid-1974,
it will have over 100 of these small surface combatants ; and this number is ex-
pected to increase over the next few years. All of these boats are armed with a
Chinese version of the highly effective Soviet-designed STYX surface-to-surface
missile. This missile boat force significantly enhances the PRO Navy's capability
to engage in coastal operations.
The total number of US major combat surface ships (174 for FY 1974) has
dropped to the lowest level since prior to the Korean War. This declining trend,
however, is being reversed ; and for the next few years, new ships are pro-
grammed to be delivered faster than the old ships are retired from the active
fleet.
During an extended conflict involving the Soviet Union, protection of our sea
lines of communication would be a matter of vital importance to our Nation.
The last two new ships-the patrol frigate and sea control ship-are essential
components of our plan to improve the US capabilities for this complex mission
in areas of lesser threat. More sophisticated ships (e.g., aircraft carriers, de-
stroyers, guided missile frigates) still will be required for potentially more in-
tense areas of conflict,, but these two new classes of austere ships with their
V/STOL aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and ASW systems should be fully capa-
ble of providing adequate antiair and antisubmarine protection for small task
groups and convoys in less intense areas of conflict.
The HARPOON missile will be the primary surface-to-surface armament for
the patrol frigate. This versatile cruise missile weighs about 1400 pounds (1100?
pounds for the air-launched versions) and is capable of carrying either a 500-
pound nuclear or conventional warhead about 60 nm. The HARPOON already
has been flight tested about 30 times with considerable success. It is expected'
to be operational, both in a surface-to-surface and an air-to-surface version.
The US, USSR, and PRO cruise missile and attack submarines are projected,
through mid-1974 on Chart 15.
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CRUISE MISSILE AND ATTACK SUBMARINES
NUMBER
OF SUBS
6~ 71 73
MIDYEAR
The Soviet Union has the largest submarine force in the world. This will con-
tinue to be true throughout the next five years. The total number of submarines,
however, is expected to decline throughout this period, as the older diesel sub-
marines are phased out faster than the new, more sophisticated submarines are
delivered to the fleet. The primary uncertainty relates to the rate of new con-
struction.
Soviet cruise missile submarines have a rrimary missicn against naval surface
ships, and a secondary mission (using torpedoes and mines) against other sub-
marines. The CIIARIE-class, which has been operational since 1968, is the only
operational submarine in any navy capable of launching cruise missiles while
submerged.
Over one-half of Soviet submarines are still diesel-powered. No new diesel-
powered ballistic or cruise missile submarines have been constructed in recent
years, but a new diesel-powered attack submarine is now entering the submarine
force. It is believed to satisfy .Soviet requirements for a relatively inexpensive
non-nuclear replacement for the workhorse submarine, FOXTROT.
Except for one single modern-design, long-range submarine, the PRC sub-
marine force consists primarily of Soviet-designed, but Chinese-built, medium-
range WHISKEY- and ROMEO-class submarines. Roth of these Soviet classes
were considered to be excellent submarines at one time, but they incorporate
features which now are considered obsolescent by US and USSR standards. The
PRC may have produced a new version of the ROMEO-class. If so, series produc-
tion of this submarine or possibly even a further improved version could begin in
the near future.
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After a long period of decline, the total number of US attack submarines will
begin to rise again in 1975, as the first 688-class nuclear-powered submarine
enters the fleet. The Congress already has approved the construction of 23 of
these new submarines through FY 1974, and production is programmed to con-
tinue at a rate of two to three per year through 1979. We believe that the 688-class
is superior to the best of the USSR attack submarines (i.e., the VICTOR-class)
because of its greater quietness and better sonars.
The US does not have any submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCMs) at this
time, but research and development has been initiated on an encapsulated version
of the HARPOON antiship missile, which will be deployed aboard future sub-
marines of the 688-class. Serious consideration is being given to retrofitting the
HARPOON weapon system in 688-class submarines already under construction.
Research also is being carried out on a long-range SLCM (1200-2000 nm range),
which may have a tactical version.
The PRC naval forces will continue to be much smaller and much less capable
than those of the US and the USSR. Although the Chinese Navy will have a
greater capability to project its power beyond the China Seas, it will remain pri-
marily a defensive force at least throughout the rest of this decade.
In evaluating the relative strength of the US and USSR general purpose Navy
forces, it is always important, as I have indicated in previous years, to bear in
mind their differing primary objectives. Because of our great dependence on
overseas sources of raw materials and because of our strong ties to overseas allies,
we must insure our acess to the seas in both peace and war. Consequently, US
Navy general purpose forces have been designed primarily to control the sea
lines of communication and to project our military power across the oceans.
The Soviet Union, in contrast, is less dependent on overseas sources of supply
and is less involved with overseas allies. Its long-term objective apparently is to
weaken our ties with our overseas allies and prevent us from coming to their
assistance in time of war. Accordingly, in the past, the Soviet Navy general pur-
pose forces have been designed primarily as a defensive and spoiling force to
disrupt our sea lines of communication and to obstruct the projection of our mili-
tary power across the oceans. Today, a new and more offensively oriented Soviet
naval posture is developing. I have pointed out for the past few years that the
Soviet Navy is continuing to expand its global reach. The new carriers will add a
new capability, which will help to free selected major combat surface ships from:
total dependence on shore-based aircraft for tactical air support ; new and mod-
ernized heavily armed carriers and destroyers will strengthen the already for-
midable combat capabilities of the surface fleets ; and new underway replenish-
ment ships will allow the fleets much more freedom of movement in distant ocean
areas.
Increased attention to the naval infantry, and modernization of the amphibious
lift capability-particularly with the new potential for sea-based tactical air
support-also indicate new Soviet interest in projecting its offensive power from
the sea.
I do not believe that even with these new ships and added capabilities, the So-
viet Union can match US capabilities to project military power from the sea. As
I have reported to you for the past few years, however, the increasing Soviet
threat to our sea lines of communication from the large and increasingly sophis-
ticated submarine force is of considerable concern. In short, the Soviet naval
capabilities are becoming more formidable every year, and we must take note of
the increasing readiness with which Soviet naval forces are being deployed to
areas of serious international tension. An increase in the size of the fleet, together
with vigorous modernization, is necessary in order to insure both the success of
our forward deployment strategy and our control of the seas along essential sea
lines of communication.
Theater nuclear forces
Our theater nuclear capability is one of the military tools indispensable to suc-
cessful deterrence and defense. Before discussing specific theater nuclear forces,
however, a brief note as to the objectives underlying their deployment seems
appropriate. The European theater will be used as an example of the capabilities
throughout our general purpose forces.
NATO's doctrine of flexible response, to which the United States subscribes,
requires a capability to confront aggression at any level of action across the spec-
trum of warfare. Should it appear that the aggression cannot be contained and
the situation restored by direct conventional defense, the strategy calls for a
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carefully controlled, deliberate raising of the scope and intensity of combat. As
the threat of a NATO nuclear response becomes progressively more imminent,
the costs and risks become disproportionate to the aggressor's objectives.
One escalatory step envisioned by the Alliance is the selective use of tactical
nuclear weapons. These weapons have certain inherent advantages in the process
of deterrence and control of escalation. First, because of their limited range
and yield, they are not a direct threat to the survival of the USSR as a nation.
Second, their accuracy allows targeting of military forces with limited collateral
damage. Third, many of these weapons are primarily defensive in nature. Bar-
rier plans, demolitions, and SAMs are too:;s of a defender, not an aggressor.
Fourth, the inherent mobility and dispersal capability of these weapons en-
hance their survivability and reduce the temptation to attempt to destroy them
by preemption. A potential adversary is confronted with possible nuclear ca-
pability in every artillery position across the entire front. This spread of common
delivery means presents the enemy with an extremely difficult targeting prob-
lem. Finally, these weapons give the allied command an ability to strike a sig-
nificant blow to massed enemy forces.
The conventional balance in Europe is such that in the event Warsaw Pact
forces are able to mass and apply armored pressure to any given point in the
defense line, NATO ability to defend with conventional forces is greatly weak-
ened. The ability to apply limited nuclear firepower under all-weather condi-
tions to the armored point of the thrust greatly contributes to theater deterrence
and is an intermediate option between conventional warfare and general nuclear
war. These theater nuclear weapons are a quick response to counter the difficult-
to-acquire, fleeting, regenerative battlefield targets, the destruction of which is
believed essential to a successful defense or' Western Europe or any other area
of the world where our vital interests are at stake.
In addition to the strategic nuclear forces discussed earlier, both the US and
the USSR have large theater nuclear-capable forces. In this regard, the PRO
is still far behind the US and the USSR, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
While the US and USSR theater nuclear weapons inventories number in the sev-
eral thousands, the PRC total nuclear weapons inventory (strategic and theater)
probably numbers in the few hundreds. As noted earlier, however, the PRC nu-
clear weapons stockpile is expected to increase rapidly over the next few years,
as fissionable material production facilities are expanded.
The US theater nuclear-capable land-based forces include units with tactical
aircraft, tactical surface-to-surface missile and rocket launchers, artillery, SAMs,
and atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), but no MR/IRBMs or medium bomb-
ers. The Soviet theater nuclear-capable land-based forces include MR/IRBM
launchers, medium bombers in Long-Range Aviation, light bombers and fighters
in tactical air units, and tactical surface-to-surface missile and rocket launchers
(and possibly artillery and ADMs) in ground units.
The US theater nuclear-capable naval forces include carrier-based aircraft,
SAM launchers on surface ships, and a wide variety of antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) weapons, but no cruise missile launchers. The Soviet theater nuclear-
capable naval forces include cruise missile launchers on surface ships and sub-
marines, medium bombers in naval aviation units, and possibly ASW weapons,
but as yet no carrier-based aircraft.
The PRC theater nuclear-capable forces include MRBAI and IRBM launchers,
medium and light bombers, and other tactical aircraft. We do not believe the
PRC has nuclear-capable weapons for its naval forces at this time.
As I pointed out over the past few years, it is difficult to draw precise con-
clusions as to the relative balance between the US and the USSR in theater
nuclear weapons. This is so because of the uncertainties inherent in estimating
Soviet nuclear weapons inventories, as well as the problems involved in evaluat-
ing Soviet nuclear weapons technology, now that all testing is conducted under-
ground. Nevertheless, I continue to believe that the US is at least the equal of
the USSR in overall capability, and probably still the superior in nuclear
weapons technology. The PRC, while still far behind the US and the USSR, is
now a significant nuclear power in its region.
I believe a final word is in order concerning the need for modernization of
our tactical nuclear stockpile. Since, in many situations, a favorable military
balance depends on the qualitative advantages we possess in our weapons sys-
tems, technical obsolescence can serve only to degrade the credibility of the ITS
nuclear deterrence in the eyes of both US allies and potential enemies. Today's
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technology in warheads and delivery systems can provide an improved theater
nuclear stockpile with greater accuracy, modern security devices, and a wider
variety of yields. Exploitation of this technology would provide major improve-
ments in response time, flexibility of employment, and a substantial reduction
in the unintended collateral damage effects of theater nuclear weapons. This
can be done while maintaining or improving the capability to destroy military
targets, especially enemy maneuver units in proximity to friendly troops.
The only new theater nuclear warhead or bomb in production now is the war-
head for LANCE, which currently is being deployed to Europe, and as I men-
tioned earlier, will replace HONEST JOHN and SERGEANT for all US units.
We also have Congressional approval to build additional B-61 bombs with im-
proved security features. This modern bomb provides our airmen with a versatile
weapon compatible with improved aircraft design.
The most important progress in our modernization efforts for tactical nuclear
weapons has been realized in the form of advance technology concepts on the part
of the AEC laboratories. The Services, working in close concert with the AEC,
are insuring that only the more flexible weapon concepts, which provide for
efficient use of nuclear materials, shorter response time, lower collateral damage,
and enhanced security, are recommended for modernization candidates.
Middle East
No discussion of the relative military posture between the US and USSR
would be complete without an analysis of the recent conflict in the Middle East;
its genesis, lessons, and consequences in terms of US interests in the area.
Strategically, the Middle East is important because of two major factors-
one geographical and the other geological. Geographically, the Middle East is the
corridor connecting the Eastern Hemisphere's three major continents. It is the
avenue through which a Soviet strategic line of communication to the Far East
may be established. The advent of supertankers and intercontinental aircraft
may have lessened the area's geographical importance, but certainly has not
eliminated it. In addition, the eastern Mediterranean is vital to the defense of
NATO's southern flank. Geologically, the primary resource of the Middle East
is oil. Middle East oil supplied 13 percent of pre-boycott US demand, 75 percent
of Western Europe's, and 85 percent of Japan's. Within the next decade, there
is not likely to be significant diminution in the dependence of the industrialized
West and Japan on the Middle East. Prior to initiation of the President's Energy
Program, projections indicated that the US could require Middle East oil to ful-
fill over 30 percent of our needs in the 1980s. One-third of the non-Communist
world's supply of oil is projected to come from Saudi Arabia and Iran alone.
Superimposed on these strategic considerations Is the longstanding political
commitment made by both the Congress and the President to the survival of
Israel. The credibility of this commitment, like all other US International obliga-
tions, depends on the proven past record of performance by the United States,
including the performance of our Armed Forces. Further complicating the situa-
tion is the fact that the area is the birthplace of three of the world's great
religions.
It is against this background that the varied, compound, and interdependent
objectives of the United States must be viewed. Peace and stability are our
principal national objectives, and defusing the Middle East crisis is central to
global security. This point, where the interests of major powers converge, has
all the necessary ingredients for being the cockpit for great power confronta-
tion; ; and yet, there are political and military forces at work well outside the
scope of the usual "Communist" and "Free World" Interface. The area threatens
to be the "Balkans" of the late 20th Century.
Second only to peace is the crucial need to insure access for both the US
and her allies to the energy resources of the area. Until substitute energy sources
are established, we will remain dependent, in part, upon oil from the Middle
East. Also present here is the potential for divisiveness which could damage
severely the cohesion of the Atlantic community and US-Japanese relations.
The fragmentation of US alliances which could result from the issue is a matter
of grave concern. Serious diplomatic efforts to reduce this potential divisiveness
continue.
A further US goal remains the denial of hegemony over this strategic area by
the Soviet Union or any other power with interests inimical to the United
States-ambitions not unknown to Russian history. Domination of the area by
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such a power would. endanger NATO's southern flank, reduce US mobility, and
endanger our lines of communication. It also would sever the economic and mil.i-
tary relationships we have so carefully nurtured in the interest of the region's
stability, progress, and independence.
On October 6, 1973, the diversity, turmoil, mutual fear, and mistrust, rampant
in the region, again passed over the thrf:shoid of semi-controlled tension---
neither war nor peace-into conflict for the fourth time since Israel's founding.
A combined Arab force of over 2000 tanks and 100,000 infantry, engaged an as
yet not fully mobilized Israeli force of about 400 tanks and 5000 infantry, simul-
taneously, in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. The conflict was violent and
costly. The supply and re-equipping of the Arab states by the Soviet Union is
estimated to have cost in excess of $2.6 billion. Efforts to insure an uninter-
rupted flow of supplies to Israel during the conflict in order to maintain a balance
of forces in the area, resulted in US expenditures of about $1 billion, including
airlift operating costs of $42 million. Congress promptly enacted an Emergency
Security Assistance Act providing $2.2 billion for Israel. When the ceasefire
became effective on October 24, 19'73, the Israelis held the dominant terrain in
the Golan Heights and a sizable new segment of Syrian territory. On the Sinai
front, Israel had established a bridgehead across the Suez Canal and nearly
surrounded the Egyptian 3d Army of about 25,000 men. The Soviet Union had
a naval force of 96 ships, including 29 modern surface combatants and 23 sub-
marines, in the Mediterranean-at their peak strength--a force equal to the
total number of such ships operated out of home waters by the USSR worldwide
in 1969.
There has been much commentary and repeated analysis of this conflict, a
great deal of which would give the impression that a new era of warfare has
been entered and that the "lessons learned'' are of such significance that new
military texts are required. In my view, this impression is unjustified. Time-
honored strategic and tactical concepts have been underlined, reinforced, and
footnoted-not repealed or replaced. These footnotes to military history are,
however, important and worthy of consideration.
First, ready, in-being, deployed forces are essential to maintaining the terri-
torial integrity of any area whose defense is required. The October War pre-
sented striking illustrations of two considerations which traditionally have sup-
ported this concept. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) intelligence organization
possesses a well-deserved reputation for excellence ; yet, the attackers were able
to achieve almost complete strategic surprise. They masked their preparations
behind a facade of routine exercises, a carefully executed political deception
plan, a cloak of secrecy, and good communications security, including extensive
secure landline communications.
Military capability has been described as being the product of men, material,
and morale, with the result that as any one factor approaches zero-capability
approaches zero. This war, like most, was decided primarily by the impact of
leadership, ability, and training.
The IDF faced a force with qualitative and quantitative advantages in equip-
ment, quantitative advantages in personnel, and the benefit of tactical surprise.
The attacking force executed a thoroughly rehearsed simple plan and gained
their initial objectives. However, the IDF ultimately achieved dominant posi-
tions on both fronts.
Adaptability and flexibility of leadership were characteristics very apparent
in the IDF. The initiative displayed by officers of all ranks was often the key
to success. IDF doctrine requires commanders to stay forward to "read the
battle." Although the price was high, the advantages gained through decisive
leadership at the critical moment made the losses worthwhile. On the other
hand, the Egyptians and Syrians were well trained in manning Soviet equipment
and executing Soviet tactics.
This conflict reaffirmed that in the last analysis, the success or failure of an
investment in national security depends upon the ability to attract to the service
of the country (both active and reserve) outstanding young men and women who
will rise to positions of military leadership responsibility. There is a difference
between leadership and management. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of
personality, vision, and training. Its practice is an art. -Management is a science
and of the mind. -Managers are necessary ; leaders are indispensable. We, too,
must continue to create and inspire military leaders-junior and senior.
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Additionally, the classic doctrine that the priority of employment of air as-
sets must be given to gaining and maintaining air superiority over the battle-
field has been proven once again. Today, gaining air superiority includes defeat-
ing enemy SAMs in detail. Until enemy air defenses are degraded, any applica-
tion of aerial firepower will be costly, but the losses will go down as air defenses
are taken out. This was made clear during the LINEBACKER II operation in
North Vietnam and again during the Middle East War. In the interim, ground
forces must be capable of fighting with reduced reliance upon close air support.
This can be accomplished by continuing to equip and maintain a balanced, mu-
tually supporting, combined arms team of infantry, artillery, and armor.
The Soviet Union has devoted considerable effort toward development of a
? SAM and AAA capability, and in both Vietnam and the Middle East, has dem-
onstrated a willingness to deploy SAMs and AAA extensively outside the Soviet
Union and Warsaw Pact countries. The surface-to-air arsenal provided to the
Arabs includes SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 missile systems ; 57 mm, 85 min, and
100 mm guns with FIRE CAN fire control radar ; and ZSU-23-4, ZPU-4, ZPU-1,
and 37 mm plus smaller crew-served weapons and individual weapons. In both
Egypt and Syria, SAM systems were well forward, with many firing units lo-
cated within about 50 km of the line of contact. Additionally, massive numbers
of SA-7 missiles (both hand-held and possibly mounted on BRDMs) and AAA
guns were in the same area. Supporting these weapon systems was a surveillance
radar system providing complete overlapping coverage at all altitudes. This
defensive belt was both dense and thick. In order to achieve air superiority in the
face of such defenses, it is necessary to avoid, suppress, or destroy such systems.
ECM and the ability to locate and destroy mobile SAMs must be modern and
sophisticated. Standoff weapons can play a major role in this effort. The Air
Force is applying special management emphasis to the accelerated development
and procurement of systems to suppress air defenses.
On the other side of the coin, we know that a land army can provide initial
defense against a modern tactical air attack by extensive employment of mobile,
integrated surface-to-air missile systems ; but for defense in depth, these ground
force weapons must be complemented by air superiority fighters. We are develop-
ing, therefore, a program to provide a more mobile, capable, and responsive fam-
ily of battlefield air defense weapons and are reexamining deployment tactics and
the basis for determining surface-to-air launcher levels.
Finally, the lessons and impact of the war with regard to direct US operations
should be addressed. Three facets are of particular concern ; supply levels and
production base, mobility, and operating bases.
The enormous' expenditure of missiles, artillery shells, and antitank munitions,
together with the level of equipment attrition, demonstrates once again the neces-
sity of maintaining ample stocks of conventional munitions and equipment.
Difficulties experienced as a result of providing moderate quantities of equip-
ment and munitions to Israel have emphasized the magnitude of worldwide defi-
ciencies in the level of arms, munitions, and war material maintained by the
United States. These serious shortages of specific types of munitions are com-
pounded by distribution problems and inadequate storage facilities overseas.
Critical shortages of equipment and secondary items exist. New requirements
from future crises in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, or elsewhere for similar
support would further complicate the problem and could degrade significantly our
conventional deterrent.
The conflict once again demonstrated that an efficient logistic system is the
backbone of any sustained combat capability. If we are to provide our forces
with that degree of material readiness sufficient to conduct a conventional defense
in NATO or elsewhere and to provide our allies with the ability to defend them-
selves, we must quickly build up inventory levels for all items of supply and equip-
ment in conjunction with establishing warm production bases for selected high
consumption items. We anticipate establishing a CONUS-based stock of munitions
and equipment which can be used to support allies under emergency conditions,
and improving and enlarging storage facilities for prepositioned war reserve
stocks overseas in order to improve short-term response capability and to relieve
the immediacy of the demand for airlift/sealift in the event of hostilities.
The Soviet Union again demonstrated its increasing capability to project its
influ.ence and military power strategically beyond its contiguous borders. For
the first time, this was accomplished by a rapid, continuous airlift coordinated
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with an impressive sealift. The threat to the peace of the world has been increased
by this newly portrayed capability to introduce and maintain some of the most
sophisticated Soviet weapons far outside the Ir.nd mass of the USSR.
Effective strategic movement of war materials depends upon the complementing
capabilities of airlift and sealift. We must retain the capability to respond
rapidly with airlift to move personnel and essential supplies and equipment, and
to provide sealift capability for the non air-transportable equipment and heavy
tonnages required for sustained operations.
ITS resupply of Israel demonstrated the excellent capabilities of the C-5A
and C-141. Over 500 total sorties insured an uninterrupted flow of essential
supplies while the conflict continued. Increased numbers of outsized and over-
sized aircraft are essential if we are to achieve the airlift capabilities necessary
to support our NATO commitment and to support the national policy of providing
the material necessary for our partners to repel aggression, using their own man-
power in their own defense.
Sealift and protection of sea lines of communication are also essential to both
contingency and follow-on support operations The airlift mounted in the Middle
East conflict xeceived well-deserved praise. Not so well publicized is the fact that
from October 6, 1973, to date, sealift accounted for over 71) percent of the total
tonnage moved. In order toreestablish and maintain an effective strategic move-
ment capability, sealift forces must be augmented and modernized as a necessary
complement to strategic airlift. This must include maintaining and modernizing
sufficient naval escorts and carrier task forces to protect these sealift forces en-
route= We also must continue to insure that our naval forces are capable cf
responding as fully and rapidly as they responded to this crisis.
Finally, the issue of operating bases must be faced. The United States was
disappointed, but not surprised, when some of our allies did not perceive their
national interests as being identical to ours. Without the cooperation of Portu-
gal, which consented to the use of Lajes, the resupply operation which made
Israel's survival possible could not have been conducted without great hazard
and almost prohibitive cost. The world has shrunk in political terms, but it is
still just as many miles from a US depot in Arkansas to the Middle East as ever.
If we are to be able in the future to respond to a call for help of the nature and
magnitude of the Israeli operation, we must continue to develop and invest in
secure bases, where we can operate as free of foreign political constraints as
possible, while still maintaining our alliance system. The best runway, storage
facilities, geopolitical location, or deep water port is of little utility if political
constraints preclude its use.
Ultimately, the issue is whether the United States can afford to rely solely upon
the good faith of others when it is believed that the vital interests of the
United States or of one of its allies are in imminent peril. If we are to rely on
our ability to respond to conflict as a deterrent, then we must face the conse-
quences of forward-basing US air, ground, and sea forces in areas where our
important interests may be altered by military or political compulsions beyond
our control. In the long run, assuming we maintain the proper mix of ready,
mobile, and versatile general purpose forces, these consequences of forward-
basing will pose far fewer dangers for the US than would the withdrawal of
these forward-deployed forces.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the concerns I have expressed over the aggressive
modernization effort; being undertaken by the Soviet Union in both strategic and
general purpose programs have been fully substantiated. The new capabilities
which these programs will provide to the USSR must weigh heavily in any
determination of the future plans for our Nation.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize and appreciate the solemn Constitutional
obligation placed upon the Members of Congress to personally consider and
collectively enact, during the next few months, appropriate legislation to "raise,"
"support," "provide," and "maintain" Armed Forces for the "common Defence."
As your uniformed military advisers, we strongly recommend that you support
in fall the President's Defense Program and Budget for Fiscal Year 1975 and
the supplemental request for Fiscal Year 1974.
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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
If it is agreeable with the committee, we will have a session this
afternoon and give the members a chance to ask questions, as well as
give you a chance to further present your problems and describe your
requests.
You make a very strong argument regarding strategic forces. You
refer to the detente and negotiations with the Soviets. We have before
? us now the question of how much are we going to build up in the
Indian Ocean with the opening of the Suez Canal. I believe you have a
$29 million request in the supplement.
Secretary SCHILESINGER. Yes, sir.
? The CHAIRMAN. This seems to me like a very simple question. I
think it is certainly all right to mention it in open session. If we are
going to have a big buildup over there that would call for another
fleet, a great augmentation, at least, of what we have, why couldn't
that area be the subject of negotiations or agreements of some kind?
I am sure that if we go to building, the Soviets are going to go to
building. So is there any chance to reach an agreement through
negotiations?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Will you comment on that, please.
Secretary ScIILESINGER. I think that is an area of possible negotia-
tions with the Soviets. And I think that there are various areas of the
world that at least hypothetically could be demilitarized. There will
be no need to maintain a fleet in the Indian Ocean unless it is neces-
sary for the stabilization of that area. As a general proposition, Mr.
Chairman, we calculate our naval forces on a worldwide basis in ac-
cordance with the capabilities of our allies and the capabilities of our
potential foes. Where those forces are precisely stationed is perhaps
secondary to the issue of what are the sizes of those fleets.
Our purpose in regard to Diego-Garcia is to provide us for the first
time with a base in the Indian Ocean-and it will. be an austere base,
Mr. Chairman-so that we would have a facility if it were necessary
for us to move in that area and station forces. The Suez Canal will
be reopened, and as far as we can see now, that offers certain prospects.
Mr. Chairman, Admiral Moorer may have an additional word that
he would like to say.
The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, do you want to say something ?
STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S.N., CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ACCOMPANIED BY COL. ROBERT M.
LUCY, U.S.M.C., LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS
Admiral MooRER. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the U.S.S.R. already has use of port
facilities as Berbera in Somalia. They continue to operate their forces
around Socotra Island. ']'his means that their presence in terms of ships
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days has increased significantly, even though the Suez Canal is not
open. What we are saying here, as the Secretary emphasized, is that,
we feel we need one facility in the Indian Ocean that can be used
by our air and naval forces, in transit or for operations in the Indian
Ocean, without having to make prior arrangements each time on a
case-by-case basis as we do today.
The CHAIRMAN. It is easy to agree with that. My question was, why
isn't this a subject of negotiations. Do you favor undertaking such
a course?
Admiral MooRER. Sir, I presume you are suggesting that we have an
area in the Indian Ocean where no naval operations would take place
by either side.
The, CHAIRMAN. You could have some kind of a special agreement
as to it. It could be tied to the idea of a peaceful use of the Suez Canal
and other points. We are just reaching out in the dark looking for
something. `tire are trying to get an agreement on as much as we can. I
don't know whether it is practical to try or not. I would think it is.
Admiral MooRER. That has been discussed in the past, as you know,
Mr. Chairman. Diego-Garcia was selected because of its geographical
location. Even for simply transiting through the Indian Ocean, we
feel we require an austere base that we can use without difficulty.
The CHAIRMAN. I raise the question of how fair are we going. No
one can be certain. I was here during debates on going into NATO,
and voted for it. I think it has been the most successful venture since
World War II. But at that time later President Truman and then
General Eisenhower estimated that we would never need put over
one or two divisions in Western Europe. But it has been thrown at
me in debate over there many times what he said. But I think we have
got to be hardheaded about this matter before we go to setting up
over there on a scale beyond what is necessary. We want your opinion
as to how much this may grow.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, we do not visualize this as
increasing our naval forces. In some respects it may result in some
economy with regard to the size of forces, because of a reduction in
transit time.
The CHAIRMAN. Your point is that we could better use the forces
we already have.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, Sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. My real point is, is there any chance
to get an agreement to neutralize this area? It seems to me like if
there is, it should be pursued now bei'ore there is a race between the
United States and the Soviets in this particular area of the world.
Certainly there is a race on now as to most of it.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. We will discuss that with Dr. Kissinger,
Mr. Chairman, as you would be inclir-ed to do, I think.
The CHAIRMAN. I- imagine you already have, haven't you?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Not the particular question that you have
raised, Mr. Chairman-whether we should enter into discussions with
regard to the neutralization of this area. However, I think that if
a Soviet base structure exists in the Western Indian Ocean, we must
also be able to operate there from a base much closer than Subic Bay,
which is about 4,000 miles away.
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The CHAIRMAN. I wouldn't think you would have any trouble in
proving to me the need for some structure there. That is not really
my inquiry now, although I wouldn't like to be rushed into a supple-
mental bill. That is a matter for you to justify.
NARWIIAL AS SUPPLEMENT TO TRIDENT
This additional submarine that you have mentioned, that is pri-
marily a supplement to Trident, the Narwhal, you called it?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, Sir. We are investigating a new sub-
marine, smaller than the Trident, which will use the Narwhal pro-
pulsion principle.
The CHAIRMAN. It is primarily a supplement to Trident?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. That is right. The ultimate composition of
our fleet ballistic submarine force will be paced by SALT and by
developments by the. Soviet Union.
The CHAIRMAN. Will it have the capability of becoming a successor
to Trident?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir, it could have that capability, de-
pending on the strategic situation.
The CHAIRMAN. I mean by a successor that you think that there is
a possibility now, if we develop this Narwhal, that we wouldn't have
to build as many Tridents, is that right?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. I think that that is a possibility, Senator.
Once again, we will have to review very carefully what the overall
Soviet strategic developments are. The initial Trident program was to
replace the 10 Polaris submarines.
The CHAIRMAN. I think that is another program where the commit-
tee ought to ask for the most complete proof from a military stand-
point and policy standpoint. We got into that Trident matter before
I knew it. I supported the hurry-up schedule as a matter of policy. It
seems to me like things are quiet enough now to take a little more time
in weighing this one.
Secretary SCIILESINGER. We have adjusted our Trident procurement
plan, Mr. Chairman. As I believe you have noticed, we are going to
build one in the first year, and two in the following years, instead of
three per year.
The CHAIRMAN. Fine. You can determine that later.
I want to mention just one other thing. I saw General Abrams the
other day. He was very much pleased about working out reduction in
headquarters and picking up that third of a division.
Secretary ScHLESiNGEr,. A third of a division plus a number of
battalions.
The CHAIRMAN. He is the kind of soldier that I described before as
having mud on his boots. I was glad to see him happy. I thought that it
had been agreed here that we would have 13 divisions. I was expecting
the committee to be notified before you went to increasing them. You
are planning to go on to 14, you say, by some early date. If we need 14
divisions we made a mistake in reducing to 13.
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Secretary Sch LESINGER. I mentioned that in my statement for the
record, Mr. Chairman. Because we do not want to have an early re-
course to nuclear weapons, it is my judgment that our general pur-
pose forces may have been reduced a it too much. We recognize how
the Congress and the public feel about manpower and resources, and
what we want to do is convert the reductions we make in headquarters
and support areas into additional combat capability. We have been
urged to do so by this committee.
The CfcAIn-MAN. I think that that is a matter of judgment, and I
commend you for going into it. But we would like to go into it with
you.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a matter of judgment. I commend
you for going into it. We would like to go into it with you.
I asked a gentleman, I remember, a few years ago, how many re-
ductions there would be within that 1S divisions, or plus that many,
how much it was to be reduced when the fighting stopped in Vietnam.
lie said one division. That is when I began trying to go into this more
and more, because I saw what the Army left alone was going to do.
They were going to keep 17 division.
My time is up. I am glad you made this presentation in the way you
did.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. It is refreshing to have it in this form rather than
so formal and so much about the threat.
Senator Thurmond, may I call on you now, please, sir.
Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, I would like to commend you
for a most enlightening statement this morning. .1 hope the press will
see fit to carry as much of that statement as possible.
Dr. Schlesinger, as you know, a high administration official, Dr.
Fred Ikle, Chief of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
stated recently that the United States should move away from a re-
liance on land-based missile for nuclear deterrents, and encourage the
Soviets to do the same. Would you comment on this remark?
Secretary SCHHLESiNGER. I think the point that Dr. Ikle was attempt-
ing to make was that with the increase of accuracy and throw weight,
land-based missiles become more vulnerable in tli-a long run. However,
it is my judgment that we must retain a mix of capabilities. Fashions
change in this area, Senator Thurmond. It was only a few years ago
that it was advocated that we eliminate the bombers and go to ICBM's
and SLBM's only. Bombers have become increasingly fashionable, and
some recommend that we eliminate the ICBM's and go to bombers and
SLBM's only.
The ICBM's provide the possibilii,y of selectivity, careful control,
and greater accuracy than we have in the SLBM's. They also provide
a substantial contribution, to the strategic balance with regard to
throw weight.
It would be my judgment-and I can go into this in greater detail
in a classified session-that the elimination of our ICBM's would
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be an unwise move. I have indicated that we are prepared to be paced
by the Soviet Union. If the Soviets are prepared to reduce their stra-
tegic forces, we would be prepared to do so, too. But we must have
essential equivalence.
Senator TIIURMOND. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, recognizing that the Soviets are testing four new
families of intercontinental ballistic missiles and acquiring the MIRV
technique, in what timeframe do you feel our Minuteman missiles will
be vulnerable to an enemy attack?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. I would not expect that vulnerability to
occur until the Soviets had 4 or 5 years after initial deployment of
their new missiles to digest the technology and the operational charac-
teristics of those missiles. Consequently, Mr. Chairman, I would think
that 1980-1979 at the earliest-would be the point that the Minute-
man missile could be vulnerable, and probably a later date than that.
I should also emphasize, Senator Thurmond, that it is all very
well-and I cannot stress this too strongly-it is all very well to have
paper models of missile exchanges. However, nobody will ever know
the real world accuracy of operational targeting from real world silos
to real world target sets until such time as there is-and we hope we
avoid it-experience in nuclear war. We must fire north, for example.
We have never fired north. So in operational practice, there will be an
inevitable degradation from the accuracies achieved at the test ranges.
And for this reason, Senator Thurmond, I do not believe that either
of the great powers can, in the foreseeable future, acquire a high con-
fidence capability against the large number of silos that exist in each
of the force structures. Consequently, I do not believe that the counter-
force options as decribed by some are attractive. They may be less
preposterous options than attacking cities. But they are not attractive.
We must remember this, because there are those who assume, as they
build models of missile exchanges, that in fact they do know precisely
what those parameters are.
I see Senator McIntyre smiling at this point. Senator McIntyre
knows well the existence of technological and operational uncertainties
and the impact that they may have operationally.
Happily, we have never had a missile war. Consequently, there would
be surprises with regard to the operational details. No one will ever
acquire a high confidence capability to go against silos in large
numbers.
MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF LAND-BASED FORCES
Senator TIIURMOND. Mr. Secretary, in view of Soviet investments
and technological advances in the ICBM field, do you think they
would agree to follow mutual reductions of such land-based forces?
Secretary ScirLESINGER. I most fervently hope so, and I believe it
is reasonable for the Soviets to do that, because, as I have stressed, I
believe that we must, as a nation, take the necessary steps to main-
tain essential equivalence. If the Soviets, with their greater throw
weight and throw weight potential, exploit the technologies pres-
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ently available to the United States and thereby refrain from balanc-
ing down, we would be forced to maintain the balance by increasing
our capabilities. It is advantageous for both sides to reduce their
throw weight in the future. It is as advantageous, or more so, for the
Soviet Union to do so. Consequently, I always hope that the great
powers will do what it is reasonable for them to do. I am occasionally
disappointed, however.
Senator Txxn ~owD. Mr. Secretary, what steps are we taking to
assure that the survivability of our Minuteman missiles is enhanced?
Secretary SCxLESINGER. VSnnator, the survivability of our land-
based forces, as well as our sea-based forces, is something that de-
pends upon the technologies and the reliability developed by a hypo-
thetical foe.
We can harden our silos. We have proceeded to harden the over-
whelming majority of those silos. Unless we are constrained by a
permanent SALT agreement, we will examine mobility for our land-
based ICBM forces as a possible hedge against their destruction.
We shall, of course, continue a technology effort in the ABM
area, not because we expect to have to deploy site defense, but be-
cause our technological edge. I think, is what helps induce the Soviet
Union to agree to the limitation on ABM defenses. And the retention
of that technological hedge is a useful way of avoiding any tempta-
tion for a race in this area.
Senator Txr,RivaoND. Mr. Secretary, do the Soviets seem to be build-
ing a strategic force for deterrent reasons, or a force that would be
a superior force in a nuclear exchange?
Secretary ScxrrsiNrrR. We cannot tell what the Soviet objectives
are, and I doubt whether the Soviet Union knows for certain what
its specific objectives are.
I think there are conflicting pressures within the soviet Union, that
a large part of the leadership of the Soviet Union embraces detente,
and they would like to work out a reasonable balance. I think there
also are elements in the Soviet society that are primarily concerned
about the national security of the Soviet state, and they would prefer
to push on. I think these elements recognize that unless they are up
against a nonreacting United States, they cannot obtain superiority.
But they have the momentum behind their programs so that if the
United States fails to respond, then, indeed, the Soviets would have
a measurable superioritin terms of reciprocal cou;eterforce capabili-
ties. In addition, they'-would have a superiority with regard to the
perceived capabilities of both sides. They hope, I presume, that the
United States will fail to respond. At best, they want to hedge by
having those capabilities available. We, do not know what they will
do with the potential. Hopefully, they will not use all of that potential.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I believe my time
has expired.
Secretary SCHLESINGrR. Thank you, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.
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Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, I will study your extempora-
neous statement. You covered a lot in it that you didn't, cover in your
prepared statement. I have some thoughts about the subjects that you
did cover. I also have some questions, on your prepared statement.
An article by the new head of the Arms Control Agency, in the
Foreign Affairs quarterly of January 1973, referred to advancing
the targeting proposal you now propose. I thought an article in that
publication the following October nullified the logic of this proposal;
but in any case, the new strategic doctrine you now advance is a coun-
terforce strategy of directing our strategic missiles against military
targets in the Soviet Union, particularly missile silos, through re-
targeting, and improved accuracy and yield of warheads.
Of particular concern to those who question this doctrine is that it
assumes limited or surgical nuclear war as both acceptable and possi-
ble. There would appear nothing new about U.S. missiles being aimed
at military targets in the Soviet Union. All tactical or theater nuclear
weapons in NATO are targeted on military targets. General Good-
paster confirmed this in his testimony before my Subcommittee of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
A portion of our Minuteman force has always been aimed at military
targets.
Let us note that during the debate on the ABM the Defense Depart-
ment argued that the Minuteman force was vulnerable, and hence had
to be protected with defensive missiles. Now the rationale has switched
180 degrees. The Defense officials are saying that neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union land-based missiles are vulnerable to a
first strike, and hence the possibility of limited strikes at military
targets is more likely, and therefore the need now for a counterforce
capability.
The accuracy of U.S. warheads is already considered excellent, con-
sidered better than that of the Soviet Union. At some point, however,
the Soviets could achieve comparable accuracy. Nevertheless, why
should the United States encourage the Soviets to spend billions on
better accuracy by now announcing that this country plans to develop
a counterforce capability ?
In my opinion, this plan, which obviously will cost many, many
more billions, coordinated with the changes made in the original
Kissinger SALT I agreement in Moscow, makes it difficult if not im-
possible for us to have any success in the planned SALT II talks. Your
proposed changes in doctrine may be real, or just so much jargon
for the purpose of another bargaining chip at the SALT II talks.
(Shades of the multibillion dollar waste on that recent other bargain-
ing chip, now abandoned, the ABM !
There has been some talk of eliminating Minuteman on both sides.
In the first place, one doubts whether it could be negotiable. Second,
any such elimination would make our strategic bombers more vul-
nerable by eliminating the launch time gained by the Soviets firing
their land-based missiles at our Minuteman sites.
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Another source of serious concern, as Nye view this gigantic increase
request in the defense budget is the rapidly shrinking circle of outside
scientists and experts who serve as consultants to the administration
on various technical matters. As a result, fewer and fewer outside
experts have access to the essential c assified mai.erial, because it is
determined that they do not have a need to know. This development in
turn limits the number of people who can intelligently advise Mem-
bers of Congress, particularly on technical Defense issues.
I consider this a very serious development, one that could, as mili-
tary technology becomes more complex, lead us farther down the road
our Constitution was created to block.
Those are some of my thoughts. I would be glad to have you study
my observations and give me a reply. I will study your extemporane-
ous remarks and ask some questions agr.nnst it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have to say at this time.
The CHA1irr1AN. Thank you very much, Senator.
Secretary SCILLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, may I make some observa-
tions at this time?
The C1riunMAN. Yes.
Secretary Sdnnr.s1NOER. Senator Symington's statement raises a
number of issues, some of which I agree with, and some of which I
certainly do not necessarily agree with. I am sure that Senator
Symington will retain an open mind on those issues, as he always does,
as we attempt to lay them out in the weeks ahead.
We are changing our strategic doctrine. We are not necessarily
clanging our targeting. We are emphasizing selectivity and flexi-
bility. I believe, Senator, if you will confer with many of the people in
the Arms Control community, that they, and many of the people you
and I know, will approve of the shift in targeting doctrine. Accuracy
buttresses that new doctrine, but is not essential to it. Certainly these
people prefer that the American President have an option other than
killing 85 or 115 million Russians with the consequent return blow.
There are very few people that I know in the Arms Control commu-
nity who do not feel that moving away from this kind of mass
destruction as the only established doctrine is a step forward.
In your remarks, Senator, you raised some questions about counter-
force. We recognize that land-based missiles will grow increasingly
vulnerable. We are not raising a question about that. T stated earlier
that neither side can have a high confidence in its capability to destroy
a sufficient proportion of those land-based forces so as to preclude the
other side from launching a devastating blow with its residual force.
When we speak of counterforce-going against military targets-
we are not necessarily referring to silos. We can talk about other
military targets, and some of the force will, of course, be directed
against soft military targets. And I think that it is generally recog-
nized that there are advantages to holding these kind of targets at
risk, as opposed to the massive targeting of cities. We have had an
inversion of attitude in the United States in recent years, in that some
people., who I think have not thought through the problem, take a
moral stance in favor of a declaratory doctrine that emphasizes the
killing of 200 million. people and the utter elimination of the urban
industrial base of at least two societies and probably more.
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I recall the reaction on the Hill to our accidental bombing of a
Cambodian town last summer, in which 15 civilians or so were killed.
The reaction on the 11111, and by some members of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, was that a strategy that even, permitted the acci-
dental death of civilians was an improper strategy. What is the rela-
tionship between that point of view and the embracing of a strategy
that calls for the automatic death of 170 or 180 million people?
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, you have a couple of minutes here.
Senator SYI4rINGTON. I would make this observation. As a member of
the Joint Atomic Energy Committee I know that you take as a prem-
ise a clean bomb; but I don't think there is any supposibility of having
a clean nuclear war. The way you put it on a moral basis* you would
only kill a few million people instead of hundreds of millions of
people. I don't understand that at all, any more than I understand why
we are building a lot of bombs without the approval of the host coun-
tries in Europe to use them, because those countries feel that what
would be. a tactical war to us would be a strategic war to them.
So I think this matter ought to be threshed out on a technological
basis and not on a moral basis. Because there is no way I know-and
I have studied it to the best of my ability over the years as a member
of the Joint Committee-that you are going to use nuclear weapons
without killing a great many people.
Secretary SCIILESINGER. I agree that many people would be killed,
Senator. And we recognize the problems with regard to NATO. It is
for that reason that we are attempting to shore up the whole NATO
structure.
The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, you have exhausted your time. You may
prepare an additional point, if you specially wish to, for the record,
Secretary Schlesinger.
[The information follows:]
I. agree that we should address this problem on a technological basis-and that
is exactly what we are doing. Nevertheless, we should do all we can to reduce
the number of civilian casualties and collateral damage involved in a nuclear
exchange. Aside from the moral issues involved, the deterrent effect of the theater
nuclear posture is weakened if the Soviets believe NATO would not use nuclear
weapons against Pact forces on NATO territory because of the collateral damage
involved. In addition, the leaders of our NATO allies are placed in an untenable
political position if they cannot assure their people that vigorous efforts are being
made to reduce the collateral damage which NATO nuclear weapons could cause
if used on NATO soil.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Tower.
Senator TOWER. Mr. Secretary, hasn't the increase in Soviet naval
activity in the Indian Ocean been coincident to the 6- or 7-year phase
out of British forces from Suez to Hong Fong?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator TowER. In other words, they intended to fill a vacuum that
the British left there?
Secretary SciHLESINGER. Yes, sir, the Soviet activity certainly is co-
incident. Historically, they have moved in at about the same time the
British moved out.
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Senator TOWER. Are there any British bases in the Indian Ocean
now?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. They have an air base at Masira, I believe,
and a few vessels going in and out, and the island of Diego Garcia
is a British island.
Senator TowER. Frigates?
Admiral MooREu. Aid auxiliaries.
Senator TowER. We don't have anything in there on a continuing
basis, do we?
Admiral MoonEn. We have the Middle East Force, composed of three
ships, operating out of Bahrain.
Senator TOWER. The vicinity of Diego-Garcia is one that is in ex-
istence. All we are doing is expanding our capability there.
Secretary SCAT SI1GER. Yes, we are extending the air strip and
putting in a new storage capability.
Senator TOWER. Would we be proposing to keep special equipment
or POL there?
Admiral Moormn. Yes, sir. We would increase somewhat the stor-
age capacity that is already there.
Senator TOWER. Does the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean
constitute a threat to free passage through the Malacca Straits?
Admiral MoonER. It could, sir, because the Soviets, of course, have
operated down around the Andeman Islands. And the point here is
they have acquired access to certain ports, and they have acquired the
experience in operations in that area.
They have established a very effective communications station for
command and control. So all these things put together simply will
enhance their ability to operate naval fcrces in the Indian Ocean area.
Senator TOWER. Switching to another subject, weren't most of the
Israeli aircraft losses to SAM-6 fire?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. They were mostly to SAM's and AAA.
Senator TOWER. Their number of losses were actually relatively
small in air-to-air combat, were they not?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. They only lost a few aircraft, sir.
Senator TOWER. So does this teach us anything about the need to
improve our target penetration capability?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. It does indeed, and that is reflected in our
budget request. We are talking about more accurate weapons, such as
Maverick, Shrike, and Hobo that I mentioned earlier. These are among
the weapons that would reduce the number of sorties required against
particular targets through greater accuracy. In addition, we have
augmented our defense suppression budget. Defense suppression is
one of the things that the Air Force is quite concerned about.
Senator TOWER. So the Israelis are actually confronted with even a
more sophisticated aircraft defense than we faced in Vietnam, is that
not correct?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think more sophisticated in terms of qual-
ity, not quantity.
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PROGRESS OF ALL-VOLUNT7EEER ARMY
Senator TowER. How do you view to date the success of the All-Vol-
unteer force concept? Do you anticipate that it is going to work, or
do you think there is some possibility that we might have to reinstate
the draft?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator Tower, we cannot guarantee that
we be successful with the All-Volunteer force. We have indicated that
we will do our best. We are encouraged by the results of the last 2 or 3
months. In the first 5 months, approximately, the Army was getting
about 85 percent of its quota. There was a consistency and regularity
in those statistics that was distressing to us, although not to the
statisticians.
In the last 2 to 3 months, the Army has gotten more than a 100 per-
cent of its quota. Consequently, we are encouraged, and believe that
we can make the All-Volunteer force work so long as we get this flow
of recruits.
There is always the possibility of having to go back to conscription.
It is not a possibility that we are actively examining at the present
time.
Senator TOWER. It is not one that you anticipate you would have
to go through in the near future?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir.
Senator TowER. About how long do you think it will take you to
assess the success of the All-Volunteer concept in terms of meeting
your requirements?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. I think that we will have to examine this
at least for a full year's operation, and perhaps a little bit longer. But
by next fall, if we have a clear and visible failure, which I do not
expect, we would be able to report to the committee on that.
Senator TowER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Secretary, let me say that the military must make an all out
inexhaustible effort to make the volunteer system work. I don't believe
that the American people will favor reenacting the draft, and Con-
gress wouldn't either.
Senator Cannon.
Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, how have we sized our general purpose forces? You
talked a lot about the constraints that were imposed by Congress.
have the dollar constraints really been the cause, or what is the
basis?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. I think it is a mixture, Senator Cannon,
between the general budgetary situation as perceived by the President
in submitting his budget, andLthe views of priorities on the Hill. Most
of our money is spent on. the general purpose. forces. We are spending
about 40-50 percent of what we spent in the early sixties on strategic
forces. When reductions have had to be made, they have tended to
come out of the general purpose forces. In my view, we should attempt
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to avoid any situation in which we are forced to have early recourse to
nuclear weapons. I believe, therefore, that we should strengthen our
general purpose forces, and that they are altogei--her too thin at the
present time,.
Senator CANNON. You said on page 4 of your statement that one
factor sizing the general purpose forces apparently was contributing
to a munber of regional balances in Europe and in Asia.
Secretary SCULFSINGEJI. Yes, sir.
Senator CANNON. What do you believe shouldbe our relative con-
tribution to NATO, for example?
Secretary SCHLFSINGFR. I cannot be specific about that as a general
proposition. I have indicated that I feel that the European countries
should do more. We are making at least as sizable a contribution to the
ready forces of NATO at the presem: time as we should be making,
and our allies should, in my judgment, be making; more. The eonvcu-
tional posture of the Alliance in the southern portion of the Center
Region is far better in terms of maintaining the stability of the con-
ventional balance than in the northern portion. At the present time,
the northern portion is the responsibility of others. I believe that
NATO should do more to strengthen the, northern portion.
But the United States, I believe, is the ultimate recourse of the
nations of Western Europe. Only through the strength provided by
the United States can they hope, as small and medium-sized powers,
to stand up against the major forces represented by the Soviet Union
and its allies.
Your question, focused on how much of our force structure should
be prepared to go to Europe. There is a distinction between our ready
contribution, which at the present time is 41/3 divisions, and the larger
contribution. We size our forces for a major conflict, hoping that that
conflict will not take place and will in fact be deterred by the existence
of our forces and those of our allies. #.ut in the event of a conventional
conflict in Europe, we would be sending on the order of 11 or 12 di-
visions to Europe as a way of helping to deter what is an immediately
ready-I hesitate to use the word "threat"-a ready capability on the
other side of 86 to 88 divisions.
Senator CANNON. In your statement you indicated that in the six-
ties your predecessors maintained or were required to maintain an
active and reserve force to fight 21/2 wars. Now, we know that that
was never accomplished. It became very evident as a result of South-
east Asia that this was just a paper objective rather than a real ob-
jective. I am wondering how realistic our objective is now with respect
to the view that we have of our problem at the present time?
Secretary ScnLF.SINGFR. I agree enrlirely, Senator Cannon, with the
thrust of your connnents. The 21/1-war capability turned out to be
much less than that. As a result, we mobilized 900,000 additional men
and expanded the force structure substantially during the Vietnamese
conflict. And that was what formally would be regarded as half a
war.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.
The only thing we can say is that in scaling clown our aspirations
from. 21/2 wars to 11/2 wars, we are more realistic at the present force
level. I think that the 161/3 divisions that we previously maintained
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prior to the Southeast Asia war was on the thin side-very thin side-
in relation to a 21/2-war capability. It was barely reasonable for a 11j2-
war capability. I think we are very much on the thin side today, but
less so than we were prior to 1965.
Senator CANNON. But the objective has changed. You don't en-
vision a requirement for a 21/2-war situation today ?
Secretary SIILEsINGER. No, sir. I hope that we will have an oppor-
tunity in classified session to go through all of the considerations
that go into the NATO issue. I think you will see that our forces are
paced, by the NATO commitment, by the U.S. presence in Northeast
Asia, plus certain reserve forces that we ought to maintain. But our
Army general purpose force structure is not ample today. We have the
lowest number of man that we have had since the wringout under
Secretary Johnson prior to the Korean war.
Senator CANNON. Do you have any comment on the role of the
Reserves vis-a-vis the active units in this total force concept?
Secretary SIILESINGER. We wholly endorse the total force policy. In
the. briefing that General Abrams gave to the chairman yesterday-a
briefing that he will be giving to this committee-he indicated the
closer integration of the Guard and Reserve units into the active duty
forces as a mechanism for increasing the ready combat capability of
the United States. So we are wholly in support of that policy.
EQUIPPING OF GUARD AND RESERVES
Senator CANNON. One of the policies in the past with respect to the
Guard and the Reserves has been to pass off old equipment to these
units to give them units to train with and work with. Is that concept
being changed at all here? Shouldn't these units be equipped the same
as the regular units with modern, up-to-date equipment rather than
just having hand-me-downs, so to speak?
Secretary SIILESINGER. It is a little embarrassing for me, Senator,
in view of the chairman's introductory remarks, to plead poverty be-
fore this committee. But I will plead poverty. Yes, indeed, we are
looking at that. We would like to speed up the pace of modernization
of the Guard and Reserve forces. But that will cost money, and we
can only do it slowly. As I indicated, there is an aging problem even
with regard to the active duty forces. So whether we can catch up in
that area is a question that we will have to examine at length with
this group.
Senator CANNON. Mr. Secretary, in your opinion is this Defense
budget adequate for our national security today?
Secretary SHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator
The CIIAIrMAN. The chair will recognize the Senator from Colo-
rado now, and he may continue with his time when we reconvene.
And the chair would be inclined to favor those that were here this
morning but didn't get to ask questions, when we return.
We will take a recess now until 2 :30.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee was recessed until 2:30
p.m. of the same day.]
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MILITARY PROCUREMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1975
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.
Tl tt t
ze
o
t t
t
35
c
mml ee me , pursuan
,o recess, a
.
p.m., In loom 11147
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).
Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, McIntyre, Byrd,
Jr., of Virginia, Thurmond, Dominick, and Taft.
Also present : T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff
director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; W. Clark McFadden IT, counsel;
Hyman F. Fine, Don L. Lynch; John A. Goldsmith, George Foster,
Charles H. Cromwell, Edward B. Kenney, Charles J. Connelly,
Robert Q. Old, professional staff members; and Christine E. Cowart,
clerical assistant.
Senator SYMINCTON [presiding]. The hearing will come to order.
Chairman Stennis asked that I start it off.
Senator Dominick, you are recognized, sir.
Senator DOMINICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to start out by saying, Mr. Chairman, that I think that the
Secretary's off-the-cuff delivery this morning was one of the most
brilliant analyses I have heard in a long time. He did a superb job.
It is not easy to do, with the scope of the program that, we have.
It was a help to me.
And it was a help, I think the chairman said, over and beyond
your prepared statement. I certainly congratulate you on that,.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, USN,
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND COL. ROBERT M. LUCY,
USMC, LEGAL ADVISER AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, JCS-Resumed
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Thank you, Senator.
Senator DoIINICK. I did want to get in with a few questions, Mr.
Secretary. First of all, on the Trident, when you talked about the
options between Narwhal and the Trident, I wasn't quite sure what
this meant insofar as your planning of the Trident was concerned.
Does this mean that we are not going forward with the acceleration
of the Trident?
(215)
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Secretary SCILLESINGER. I believe that I indicated in response to
an earlier question, Senator, that the pace of the Trident program is
slower than had been anticipated a year ago. We are planning two
boats this year rather than the three that had been programed; that
is one in fiscal year 197 4 and two in fiscal year 1975 rather than the
more rapid pace of the previous program. So there is some decelera-
tion of the acceleration, if I may put it that way.
Senator DOMINICK. Does that mean that the building of the Trident
submarines which were in last year's budget, do not proceed at the
rate DOD desired?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I am not sure what you are referring to in
that connection. There was a cut of $210 million in advanced proceure-
ment funding, and the Congress in its report indicated that the De-
partment of Defense should report back with regard to whether that
cut would adversely affect submarine production. In the fiscal year
1974 supplemental, we are asking for a return of some portion of that
reduction in response to the Senate's direction. Specifically, we are
asking for $25 million for long lead-time items for the third boat.
Senator DOMINICK. Is the Narwhal a Poseidon type submarine,
equipped with a Trident type missile?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. It would be- roughly the size of the Poseidon,
but it would have an advanced reactor which we believe would give
it an enhanced degree of quietness as compared. to the Poseidon. It
would have, as you suggest, the Trident I missile in it.
Senator DoMINICK. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned at the beginning
of your remarks today about the additional throw weight which is
being incorporated into the Soviet ICBM, particularly I believe the
SS-18, is that correct? Is that the right figure?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. The SS-18 will 'have about 20-30 percent
more throw weight than the SS-9, but the 17 and the 19 will have two
to three times as much throw weight as the SS-1.1. We are more con-
cerned and surprised by the throw weight associated with the 17 and
the 19 than with the 18.
Senator DoINIINICK. My recollection-and I may be wrong-is that
under SALT I modernization of weapons was allowed but larger silos
to encompass them was not. Will the SS-18 require a larger silo on
deployment?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. In some cases, the rlew missiles will re-
quire some enhancement of the present silos. The statement made by
the United States at the time of the SALT I agreement was that any-
thing in excess of a 15-percent enlargement of the present dimensions
of silos would be taken by the United States to be a violation of the
agreement. The Soviet Union is in a position to incorporate these new
ICBM's in silos which are no more than 15 percent larger than the
earlier version. So it would not be a violation of the agreement.
Senator Do rINICK. It would appear, then, that at the time the
Soviet Union entered into SALT I that they already had this in mind,
is that right?
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Secretary ScHLESINGER. Yes, sir. It is very clear that they had these
new missiles in mind, and that the SALT I agreement was drawn in
such a way as not to preclude deployment of these new missiles.
Senator DOMINICI{. That would also indicate that with the addi-
tional throw weights they would have an almost immediate capability
of MIRV'ing?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Yes, sir. We believe that the missiles that
would go in the holes, if not constrained by SALT II, would be
planned to be 11IIRV'ed, and that the Soviets have the capability of
starting the deployment of those missiles within the near future.
Senator DoaziNicii. I don't know whether this is classified or not. We
will have a classified session later. So if you would prefer not to
answer this in open session, just say so. What number of warheads
would they have on a SS-18?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. We have seen as many as five RV's on the
18, and they may go as high as eight RV's, Senator. Of course, the
technological possibilities are more or less unlimited in that connec-
tion. There is a trade-off between the size and yield of the RV and the
number of RV's. But at the present time, we have seen five and would
anticipate no more than eight.
Senator DOMINICK. In prior sessions before this committee it has
been indicated the Soviets have MRV's, but not MIRV's. Are these
MIRV's?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Yes, sir, on the new missiles.
Senator DOMINICK. Have they had enough tests to make sure that
they are reasonably accurate?
Secretary ScnLESINGER. No, sir. I believe that would not be the case.
If I may amplify that, an important characteristic of the new mis-
siles-the 16, 17, 18 and 19-is that they have onboard computers
which the prior generation of missiles lacked. Consequently, this gives
them the potential for better guidance and improved accuracy, and, of
course, the MIRVing possibility.
You asked earlier about when the Soviets would know about the
accuracy of these new missiles. I do not believe the program of tests
to date provides them with much assurance about this capability. But
the program of testing is continuing.
Secretary DOMINICK. Are they in the process of presently deploying
the 16, 17, 18 or 19?
Secretary SCh LESINGER. No, sir, not as yet.
Senator DoMZNiciK. On page 22 of your written statement you refer
to the strategic airlift, and the strategic reserves. By that are you im-
plying further overseas reductions are in order? If so, what countries
and what numbers, and what is the time schedule?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. We are not planning any unilateral reduc-
tion of our forces in Europe at this time. The reductions we would
take in NATO would be mutual reductions resulting from the MBFR
negotiations. The improvements we plan in airlift and our reserves
would give us the opportunity of deploying forces to Europe rapidly.
For other parts of the world, of course, the answer is that we have
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been reducing forces. We have reduced forces in Japan, Korea, and
Southeast Asia including Thailand. Five hundred and fifty-thousand
men have been returned from Vietnam. With the exception of Viet-
nam, these improvements would offer the possibility of reinforce-
ment, should there be trouble.
But the airlift capability is related to equipment reinforcements, as
in the airlift to Israel last fall and the airlift prior to the agreements
that were reached with the North Vietnamese bringing an end to hos-
tilities in Southeast Asia-or at least the American involvement in
those hostilities. So the airlift is necessary for more than the move-
ment of troops.
As you know, Senator, we are planning to expand the capability of
our airlift without increasing the number of aircraft in the force. For
example, we are planning to increase the crew manning of the C-5s
and the C-141S, which will permit a greater wartime utilization rate.
Also, we are proposing the development of a stretched version of the
C-141 which would enhance the carrying capacity of the existing
C-141 by about 30 percent.
These are relatively cheap changes.
Also, we are proposing to modify some 747's.
TIME TO DEPLOY NON-PREPOSITIONED DIVISIONS AND INITIAL SUPPORT TO NATO
AS FUNCTION OF 5-YEAR PROGRr.M COSTS
DAYS
REQUIRED
TO
AIRLIFT
PVERAAF.
Division
AND ITS
INITIAL
SUPPORT
CU:IRENT CAPABILITY & COSTS
MODIFY 110 747 EQUIVALENTS
L.. I I I .__._.I__.,_
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Now the effect of this would be to reduce the time required for the
deployment of an average division to Europe from 19 days to 7 days,
utilizing the improved airlift.
Senator DOMINICK. I might say I am delighted over that. That is
something that I have been pushing for for a long time.
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Mr. Secretary, on pages 13 and 14 of your statement you say :
We will decrease our active air defense of the Continental U.S. reducing the
number of air defense fighter squadrons and SAM batteries. Without an effec-
tive antimissile defense, precluded to both the U.S. and USSR by the ABM
Treaty of 1972, a defense against Soviet bombers is of little practical value.
I have some doubt about that conclusion; however, to continue your
quote,
We will, however, retain the capability to protect the sovereignty of our air-
space and defend against limited threats.
Does that conclusion-namely, that the defense against Soviet
bombers is of little practical value-affect the total requirement for
a AWACS aircraft?
Secretary ScHLrsINGri:. No, sir. Ultimately it would, if we deter-
mine that there is no relevancy to the deployment of AWACS for con-
tinental air defense. The chief role of the AWACS that we see at the
present time relates to improving the air defense capabilities of our
general-purpose forces in Europe. The initial AWACS buy will be
related to this general-purpose force mission rather than to continental
air defense.
As I indicated in my statement, our continental air defense require-
ments include a limited capability, so that nobody has a free ride over
the United States. While we recognize that in a coordinated nuclear
strike Ave would be unable to protect American cities, still Ave do not
want anybody to feel that he can overfly the United States or the North
American continent without paying a significant attrition. That would
be the principal purpose of our air defense forces.
Senator Do-1rTNTrcu. My time has expired. Thank you.
Senator, SYMnNGTON. Senator McIntyre.
Senator MCINTYRE. Mr. Chairman, are we tinder a 10-minute rule?
Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.
Senator MCINTYRE. Mr. Secretary, I want to say at the outset that
your presentation this morning .I felt was brilliant. I found it very in-
structive. I don't say I agree with everything, but I thought your dis-
cussion of the perspective of the worldwide role of strategic forces
was excellent.
Secretary ScirLrsrNGER. Thank you.
Senator McINTYRi:. There is one thing that the American people
would like to know. Last year we had, I think Ave called it, the bud get
of peace, and SALT I was in the air. We thought maybe that this
meant that somehow we were going to come down from this horror
race that we are involved in. This year we are in, it seems to me, a
different climate again. SALT II is lagging. The requests before the
committee are multitudinous. I say this even though you have said
some things on Ii,. & D. that I kind of like. For example I agree with
you that just because we develop a system Ave don't have to go ahead
and deploy it.
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Still Mr. Secretary, must we continue to escalate and escalate and
even up to the confrontation? When will we find the day when people
begirt to see the senselessness of sonic of the tIuiigs we arc doing?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, I am optimistic, in that regard. I
think that with regard to SALT I, we did break the momentum behind
the numerical buildups associated with the Soviet Union's strategic
missile forces, particularly the ICBM program. We now have a quan-
titative lid on both sides with regard to these forces. And we are hope-
ful that in the course of SALT II we can reach a permanent agreement
assuring equivalence. hopefully at a lower level of forces than we have
today. Now, it is plain, I drink, that the gross capabilities embodied in
the numbers and throw weight of Soviet missiles under development,
if married to present American-type technology, hold the potentiality
for initiating r,nother turn in the arms race. That need not materialize
if both sides exercise judgment and restraint, and I think there is a
reasonable hope for that.
I should also point out that we are only spending $7.6 billion a year
directly on the U.S. strategic forces, which is about 8.2 percent of the
total defense budget, aside from retired pay and other questions of
that sort. In the early 1960's, the United States was spending far more
in real terms. In fact, our current spending on our strategic forces is
about half of what it was in that earlier period of time. Now, that
is not the millennium, but it does indicate some degree of prudence and
constraint on our side.
In sum, while I can't give you a totally optimistic answer, I think
there is some basis for hope.
Senator MCINTYRE. I think that you must be able to understand how
people like ourselves that represent the constituents back home have
to explan these developments. I remember SALT I after they wanted
another $400 or $500 million to spend on new equipment, new items.
So it is discouraging. Every year I have a feeling about this time that
the military begins to try to scare the hell out of us. I don't say they
do this intentionally. I just think it is part of the game. I was glad to
hear you say that you didn't want to unduly alarm us.
RETALIATION CAPABILITY
Here is a question. I know the answer, but let me just ask it. Does
the Soviet Union today, this moment, have the ability, the capability
of destroying our strategic forces without the certainty of its homeland
being annihilated?
Secretary SCULESINOER. Absolutely not, Senator. They have no cer-
tainty because they cannot destroy the- retaliatory forces of the United
States.
Senator MCINTYRE. That really isn't the ball ;game, but it is reas-
suring to know that.
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I see my old friend Trident. I want to ask a question that I asked
last year. If there is the possibility, Mr. Secretary, or Admiral Moorer,
for that matter, that a Narwhal submarine would be a replacement for
Poseidon instead of Trident, why not relax the Trident submarine pro-
gram by reverting to the 1980 IOC, 2 years later? This would permit,
we argued last year, the backfit of Trident I missiles, the C-4 missile,
into Poseidon hulls beginning in 1977 if needed, and it would minimize,
Mr. Secretary, the vast investment now proposed for Trident con-
struction with little if any risk.
Secretary SMILE SINGER. My judgment on that, Senator-and I think
that we need to give you a fuller response on that question-is that
we are now engaged in a program whose funding and expenditure rate
support an initial operational deployment of the Trident in 1978. I
believe that more money is required to stretch out many of these pro-
grams than to go ahead on schedule. Now, as I indicated earlier, there
is a deceleration of the acceleration in the case of the Trident produc-
tion rate. But that applies to the number of boats bought in each year
rather than stretching out the production time of particular boats.
Senator MCINTYRE. This is not the place to get into an argument.
But it seems to me you have injected an idea of a different type of
a submarine than I heard about last year. I don't know if it is big-
ger than the Poseidon. I have a figure here of $1,166,800,000, if I read
correctly, for fiscal 1975, ship construction, submarines two and three,
advance procurement. So now another factor, a different type of sub-
marine is now a possibility, and all during that whole debate you could
never show us whether you had anything that necessitated urgency.
You always could have taken the Trident I missile and put it on the
Poseidon, which it will fit, but it still doesn't make sense to me. But J
will talk that over with the R. & D. fellows when they come by.
Senator Nunn and I had-he is not here, because he is on a mission
for the chairman-found ourselves in Ankara in the NATO meeting,
when everything was happening back here. You talked about NATO
as the cornerstone, and you invited us to go and take a look at it. I
don't think there are enough days in the week to look at all the things
we are supposed to look at. But, Mr. Secretary, the German representa-
tive said there that the American troops are all in the wrong place,
they are all down in Bavaria. One delegate said, you have got too many
headquarters. Are you going to take a look at it?
Secretary SCILESINGER. Yes, Sir.
Senator MCINTYRE. Have you been on the ground, taken a field trip?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir.
Senator MCINTYRE. I am impressed by your argument on NATO, as
the cornerstone. I don't want to see any unilateral action. I was all set
last year, you know, with a year of Europe. I thought a lot of things
were going to happen.
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Secretary SC 11 LESINGER. A lot of things did happen.
Senator MCINTYRE. But if you want the Congress to stand behind
this NATO as you made it very emphatic today, you have got to help
us. The fuel situation was a lot tougher for the European countries,
than us. But it was disgusting. The Soviet Union was overflying
Turkey, and we weren't allowed even to come near it, and other coun-
tries. You know better than I. It was kind of a sickening thing, Mr.
Chairman, to see our allies falling apart on us. Admittedly, the pinch
was a lot tougher on them than us.
You want to have the Congress stand behind l\T ATO-and I want
to stand behind it. I want to have some help. And I am not getting it.
Secretary SCIILESINGER. I agree with that entirely, Senator McIn-
tyre. In my initial comments I indicated that the strength of the con-
ventional deterrent is far greater in Southern Germany than it is in
Northern Germany, and that this is due to the presence of the U.S.
forces in the South. Sometimes it is said that the U.S. forces are mal-
deployed. Of course, if we had time in an emergency, we could rede-
ploy them in part. We are moving ahead with regard to better inte-
grating our air assets in both the north and south, so that the. large
body of American aircraft could be employed in the defense of the
northern region should an attack take place there. But in general, we
agree with your comments in that regard.
We are also in agreement with regard to the headquarters issue and
the report that Senator Symington presented for this committee last
year. I think that we are making significant progress in that area, and
we will have more progress to report.
Finally, the United States cannot provide a conventional deterrent
by_ itself. It must have the willing support and the ready support of
its European allies. If the only purpose of American troops is to pro-
vide a presence, then we can provide that presence with fewer forces
than we have in Europe today. The European alL' es must do more. We
have heard fair words on. this subject from our European allies. We
hope their deeds will correspond and that we can provide persuasive
evidence of this. If our European allies fail to provide the necessary
forces, we are in agreement with your implied suggestion that the
conventional forces we have deployed, however useful in some hypo-
thetical context, might not be as useful as we would like in the con-
text of an actual conflict in central Europe.
Senator MCINTYrE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SFMI.xoTON. Senator Taft.
Senator TArT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, you just stated that you are hopeful with regard
to the degree of support we are going to get from our NATO alies.
Isn't it true that just within recent weeks there have been indications
from both Great Britain and Germany that we cannot expect the
degree of financial support and support of payment to us that we
had hoped that we were going to get?
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Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think there has been no change in the
situation in recent weeks. The British, of course, have a far more
massive balance-of -payments problem than we have. From the very
outset they have indicated that, although they are spending a sub-
stantial proportion of their gross national product on defense, they
will not help us on balance-of-payments questions.
The Germans, of course, have been the primary source of offset,
and they will continue to be. I think we will be able to announce a new
offset agreement shortly, and that from the standpoint of the finance
side, the Germans will have made a major contribution.
Also, the Germans are restructuring their forces, which will result
in the addition of three brigades, hereby increasing their force struc-
ture from 33 to 36 brigades. They are using some of their manpower
to form a newer and readier reserve. This is a hopeful sign. Within
a brief period of time, the Germans are prepared to mobilize 1.2
million men. So, although there are some deficiencies in the contribu-
tion of our NATO allies, I think the German contribution per so is
one that is not without a high degree of respectability.
Senator TAFT. I wasn't talking so much of their contribution. It
is encouraging to hear that they are willing to take steps that would
make their own contribution more effective. What I was talking about
is support payments. Do you think we are going to get more support
payments out of Germany next year than we have had in the past year?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think so, Senator. I am not familiar with
the negotiations, but I think we are on the verge of an agreement
with the Germans on the offset. That is a bilateral rather than a
multilateral arrangement.
Senator TAFT. You have mentioned the possible shift in the counter-
force concept so far as nuclear strategy is concerned, and you discussed
the throw weight changes and the balance that is involved. If we are
going to pick soft targets, isn't it possible that the Russians, in looking
at our potential throw weight, are also taking into account that if we
targeted a soft target it might well be their East Asian army? We
have had almost no discussion with regard to these questions on throw
weight of the Far Eastern situation, and China's potential, and what
Russia's reactions are related to that potential.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Since 1965, the Soviets have built their
forces in the Far East so that they now have roughly 40 divisions
there. From 1965 to 1969, much of their buildup went into the Far
East. Since 1969 there has been a further building up of forces
facing Western i+ urope as well.
The posture of the Soviet Union is such that we do not believe they
would move against China unless there were an additional buildup
in the Far East. The Soviets have something on the order of half a
million troops out there. The Chinese have about 1.2 million troops
along the Siberian border.
Is that sufficient, Senator Taft?
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Senator TAFT. I was really questioning what effect it had-isn't it
a fact that shifting to a counterforce concept may be a destabilizing
factor insofar as the Far East is concerned and the Russian-Chinese
thing, because we are taking into account now that, we may be target-
ing possible military targets in that area? If I were a Russian I would
certainly be thinking that way.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I don't think that would be a destabilizing
factor, Senator. As you know, there has been speculation in the press,
for some time now-at least a year-about the possibility of a hypo-
thetical Soviet counterforce attack against Chinese nuclear capabili-
ties. We cannot read the Soviets' mind. But let me underscore here
that it is far easier to hypothesize about these attacks when one is
working with paper and pencil than it is actually to make the deci-
sion, given the capabilities available, to launch such an attack. But
that would be an issue in the Kremlin. I don't believe any change in
our targeting strategy is likely to have much impact on it one way
or the other.
Senator TAFT. Mr. Secretary, I think earlier in your testimony you
mentioned a 5-to-1 throw weight threat unless we reacted or unless
SALT II had some effect. What time phase were you talking about
in discussing that?
Secretary SCIYLESINGER. I think I must await a classified session to
cover this particular point fully. But the indication I gave earlier
was that if the Soviets were to start refitting their existing holes
about 1975-76, and if they redeployed. at the rate of 15 percent per
annum, it would be about 1981 before they had the amount of throw-
weight advantage indicated.
Senator TAFT. With regard to the submarine question, Senator
McIntyre has already asked you, what are we talking about costwise?
I was very interested to hear the discussion of the Narwhal concept
and the 16 missile approach, because, very frankly, I was unable to
support Trident, simply because I felt that perhaps there were better
approaches that could be developed very much along these lines. Is
the sole reason that we are not moving faster toward Narwhal rather
than Trident related to cost? Or what are the factors which we are
weighing in the balance?
Secretary SCIiLESINGER. I think each submarine has its own unique
advantages. The advantages of a new SSBN with the Narwhal-type
propulsion system are that it would be less costly and the smaller
number of tubes per boat may give it greater inherent protection in
the long run appropos contingent developments in the ASW area. The
advantage of the Trident submarine is that with the larger number of
tubes per boat and the greater size of the missile tubes themselves, it
can house a larger missile with extended range, or concurrently, the
possibility of greater throw weight. The latter could counterbalance
Soviet throw weight in certain hypothetical contingencies.
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Senator TAFT. You are not talking about a smaller missile than the
Narwhal itself, just the missile itself.
Secretary SCILESINGER. The smaller SSBN we are investigating
would carry the C-4 missile-the so-called Trident I -winch is
the missile to be initially deployed in the Trident submarine. The
Trident submarine also will carry, at a future date, the Trident 11
missile, which is a much longer missile than the C-4, with greater
range or throw weight, as the case may be. That larger missile, the
D-5, could not be carried by a smaller SSBN-class submarine, which
would be limited to the Trident I.
Senator TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Taft.
Senator Byrd.
Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
OUTLOOK OF 1975 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST
Mr. Secretary, the Defense Department has asked for a supplemental
appropriation for the 1974 fiscal year. If the Congress approves the
Defense Department proposal for fiscal 1975, can you give the com-
mittee assurance that the Defense Department will not seek a supple-
mental for 1975?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. There is now no intention whatsoever, Sena-
tor Byrd, to seek a supplemental for fiscal year 1975. However, I would
hesitate to give complete assurance in that regard because the inter-
national climate might change.
I brought along the President's budget for fiscal year 1974, Mr.
Chairman. We have inserted in the record the page front the budget
apropos Senator Symington's question this morning. The budget au-
thority requested in that budget was $85.2 billion, and this included
the pay supplemental that was mentioned earlier. That had been
briefed to the committee.
Barring an international catastrophe that I cannot imagine at this
point, Senator Byrd, the answer to your question is "No," we would
not be contemplating a fiscal year 1975 supplemental.
Senator BYRD. Thank you.
What is the unfunded military retirement obligation at this point?
It was $133 billion last year.
r Secretary SCILESINGER. It is a staggering sum, Senator. If it were
$133 billion last year, it will be even larger this year, and larger next
year.
Senator BYRD. I am taking that $133 billion from memory. If you
don't have the figure available, would you supply it for the record?
Until just last year or so that figure was carried in the budget. But
beginning last year it was eliminated from the budget.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. That does not reduce the Federal liability.
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Senator BYRD. You don't have the figure available, I take it?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir. I shall insert it in the record.
[The information follows:]
The unfunded military retirement obligation is currently projected at $149
billion as of June 30, 1974.
Senator BYRD. In your prepared remarks, Mr. Secretary, you state
that the fiscal year 1975 budget in constant dollars is smaller than the
fiscal year 1964 budget of a decade ago..
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator BYRD. What inflation factor did you take to arrive at that
,conclusion?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I don't have a chart that is handy on that,
Senator, but pay increases between 1964 and 1975 are in the order of
178 percent.
Senator BYRD. But you are speaking in constant dollars. What I
am getting at is, I assume what you mean is if there had been no in-
flation, is that what you meant?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. I meant no inflation or pay increases. The
pay increases have been, as you know, very substantial.
Senator BYRn. What I am trying to do is understand your sentence
here : "In fact, the fiscal year 1975 budget in constant dollars is smaller
than 1964."
Secretary SCHLESINGER. If we take the pay rates and the price level
of 1964, the budget that we are proposing today would come in at
about $46.6 billion, or, correspondingly, the program of 1964 at 1975
pay and prices would come in at about $93.3 billion.
Senator BYRD. When you say "constant dollars," doesn't that mean
eliminating the inflation factor?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator BYRn. But you are bringing in something else now about the
pay changes?
Secretary SMILE SINGER. The adjustment of pay to reflect changes of
productivity in the general economy is one of those factors that must
be taken into consideration in maintaining constant dollars.
Senator BYRD. If I understand it correctly, then, it seems to me what
you are saying is that the dollar has decreased in value by 50 percent
during that period of time. I don't deny that it has.
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Let me see if this chars, will be helpful, Sen-
ator Byrd.
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DOD MILITARY AND MAP
FY 1964 PROGRAM AT FY-1975 PRICES
IOUTLAYS, $MILLIONS)
ACTUAL
FY 1964
OUTLAYS
PAY RAISES COST
AND PRICE AT FY 1975
INCREASES PRICES
MILITARY BASIC PAY
$ 8,511
178.3%
$23,689
?
MILITARY ALLOWANCES
4,475
62.1%
7,254
CIVIL SERVICE PAY
7,305
84.3%
13,462
PURCHASES
59.9%
46,830
SUBTOTAL, EXCLUDING
RETIRED PAY
49
577
84
0%
235
91
,
.
,
RETIRED PAY
1,209
95.3%
2,362
TOTAL
50,786
84.3%
93.597
4
--
46
REDUCTION IN PROGRAM EXCLUDING RETIRED PAY: $11,
EXCLUDING RETIRED PAY 1
FY 1975 DEFENSE BUDGET
$79
789
,
,
RETIRED PAY
6.011
TOTAL FY 1975 DEFENSE BUDGET
$85.800
In 1964, for example, we had about 2.7 million men under arms. We
had a much lower pay scale.
Senator BYRD. I was just interested in the inflation factor. What
does the Department of Defense consider to be the inflation factor over
that period of time?
? Secretary ScHLESINGER. It is a composite, Senator. The last item
on the chart, which is the inflation for the outside purchases of the
Department, is 60 percent. That might be what you would refer to as
the inflation factor. The other items reflect the fact that the pay rates
for various categories of people have gone up substantially. We take
all of those items into account in our constant dollar calculations.
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228
Senator BYRD. In relation to the total Defense budget do you feel
that the Defense Department is spending enough on weapons
acquisitions?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Given the overall level of resources, I think
the answer is "Yes." We will be moving toward greater efficiencies,
we hope, in the use of our manpower. But given the present set of
price relationships that we face, we think that this is the best alloca-
tion of resources under current conditions. We are down substantially
with regard to the acquisition of weapons.
Senator BYRm. Your request for procurement in 1975, plus your
supplemental, is less than $15 billion, frs I understand it.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Of course, procurement includes some other
items that are not included in the authorization bill, such as ammuni-
tion accounts and the rest. Our request for procurement, R. & D. and
construction, which we regard as the investment account, amounts to
$31 billion in fiscal year 1975 prices.
Senator BYRD. But the new authorization for weapons systems is a
little less than $15 billion.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, Sir.
Senator Byrn. Your new request for authorization for R. & D. is
about $9 billion.
Secretary SCI[LESINGER. Yes, Sir.
Senator BYRD. The two taken together is a relatively small percent-
age of your total request.
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Yes, sir, that is the inverse of the higher
rates that we must pay for manpower today.
Senator Byrn. In your table 1 where you break down by summary
a function of the classification you have military personnel. I don't
see an item in here for civilian personnel. I assume that is probably
under operation and maintenance, is it?
Secretary Sc11LESINGEI;. Yes, sir, ii; is under C). & M. for the most
part. The civilian manpower runs about $15 billion.
Senator BYRn. You mentioned in your excellent presentation this
morning that the Europeans constitute 80 percent, of the ready NATO
forces.
Secretary SCI[LESINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator BYRD. Would you amplify on that a bit?
Secretary SCUHLESINGER. Of the ready forces cf NATO, the Euro-
peans are putting up about 90 percent of the ground forces, about SO
percent of the naval forces, and about 75 percent of the air forces.
Those are the forces that are presently deployed is the NATO regions.
The NATO allies-European allies-maintain something on the order
of 21/., million men under arms. Most of those, of course, are deployed
near the NATO frontiers. For the United States, our major contribu-
tions to NATO do not fall in the aggregate deployment of our forces
overseas; rather, that we maintain the strategic deterrent for the allies,
that we provide the nucleus of the tactical nuclear deterrent for most
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229
of them, that we furnish the intelligence and reconnaissance by and
large for the allies, and that we make some contribution to the im-
mediate ready forces. Our contribution is indicated on the next slide
with regard to troops, ships, and aircraft.
NATO FORCES IN EUROPE
PEACETIME
US ALLIES
TROOPS
US ALLIES US ALLIES
SHIPS AIRCRAFT
So I would say that we have a pretty good bargain in the sense that
for every element of the ready forces we put up, our allies put up about
four. However, in terms of the additional forces that would be brought
up, particularly air, the United States provides a very substantial part
of the contribution, something on the order of 50 percent, rather than
20 percent.
. Senator BYRD. That was the point that I thought should be
developed.
44 Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
In the case of reinforcement, we would provide a major share-50
percent, I believe, is the approximate number.
Senator BYRD.. In your judgment would NATO be strengthened if
Spain were a part of NATO and would allocate some of her forces
to NATO?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think there is no question about that.
That is fairly straightforward arithmetic.
Senator BYRD. Is that being advocated by the Department of
Defense?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I would shy away from the word "advo-
cacy." We have put out some hints about closer cooperation between
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230
Spain and the NATO alliance. It is not clear that the possibility of
that close cooperation is universally regarded with acclaim within
the Alliance.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, your time has expired..
Senator BYRn. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The CHAIRMAN. I have some other questions, as other members
doubtlessly do. I think we ought to till on Admiral Moorer at this
point.
You have a prepared statement, I know, Admiral Moorer.
Admiral MooRER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. We will come back to the questioning of the
Secretary.
Would you put your statement in the record, Admiral, and either
summarize it or point to the things that you want to emphasize.
Admiral Moomin. Yes, sir; I would be glad to do that.
[The information follows:]
I appreciate this opportunity to present my views on the military posture of
the United States. In my opinion, no task assigned senior US military leaders
is more important than the duty of keeping the Congress and the American people
fully informed on military matters. In the final analysis, our military posture
and our national security can be no stronger than the determination of the
American people to defend our Nation and its freedoms. This collective will is
both developed and represented, in large measure, by Congressional attitudes
and decisions. Your role in this process is vital
In my prior assessments of the military balance and in the over 100 appear-
ances before Congressional Committees, it has always been my intention to relate
the military issue at hand to the actual and potential challenge facing the United
States on the international scene. That remains my intention in this, my fourth
assessment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The military posture of the United States can be judged meaningfully only by
relating our military forces-both strategic and general purpose-to those of
our most powerful potential adversary-the Soviet Union.
In this regard, the negotiation and signing of the Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement on
Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(Interim Agreement) constituted first steps in our effort to restrain the obvi-
ous and destabilizing momentum of the USSR strategic force build-up and to
establish some control over the deployment of significantly increased strategic
forces by both the US and USSR. The force levels for the US and USSR estab-
lished by the ABM Treaty are equivalent, but the numerical ICBM and SLBM
force levels authorized for the Soviet Union by the Interim Agreement are larger
than those authorized for the United States. Because of technological and other
strategic offensive advantages possessed by the United States, this temporary
imbalance was considered acceptable, particularly when weighed against the ad-
vantages of reaching some agreement on limiting strategic arms. In the Joint Res-
olution authorizing the acceptance of these agreements, however, you will recall
that the Congress specified the President should seek a future agreement which
"would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces
inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union." Compliance with this Con-
gressional mandate is a primary objective of the current follow-on negotiations
to conclude a permanent agreement.
I report to you today that aggressive modernization programs are now being
undertaken by the Soviet Union which could place the United States in a posi-
tion of strategic inferiority in the foreseeable years ahead. These programs,
although aggressive, are within the terms of the Interim Agreement now in
effect. If we are to maintain our relative position, we must continue the devel-
opment and deployment of the strategic systems requested by the President
and must continue to insist upon the equivalence which the Congress so wisely
has called for as an ultimate goal in our Strategic Arms Limitations negotiations.
With regard to the balance between the general purpose forces of the Soviet
Union and the United States, I have noted with apprehension for the past several
years that a major shift in the naval balance is taking place. The U.S. still has
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the edge in the global reach of our fleets through our carrier and amphibious
task forces. The USSR, however, is building a modern and increasingly powerful
naval force capable of interdicting sea lines of communication and obstructing
the projection of our military power across the oceans to assist our allies. The
exact role of the new Soviet carrier force is not clear, but we may be sure that
it portends anew era in the projection of seapower by the USSR.
The tactical air forces of the Soviet Union are in the midst of a major and
significant modernization program. The program appears to be directed at over-
coming the long-standing qualitative advantage held by U.S. tactical air forces
in the ground attack role. The Soviet tactical air forces hold major quantitative
and some qualitative advantages in the air superiority role.
The Soviet weapons and equipment observed in the Middle.East, plus other
evidence, clearly show the large USSR ground forces also are being modernized
with new tanks, new combat vehicles, as well as new and sophisticated combat
support weapons and systems. Additionally, there are indications that the Soviet
Union is developing air mobile units with ground attack helicopter support
which, when combined with its new tanks and combat vehicles, will increase the
tactical mobility and firepower of its ground forces.
The strategic programs of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), by contrast,
are proceeding somewhat slower than estimated last year. We still expect the
Peoples Republic of China, however, to deploy by the end of this decade a small,
but effective, ICBM force which will be capable of striking all of the Continental
United States. PRC general purpose forces are being modernized, but also.at
a relatively slow rate-when compared with those-of the U.S. and USSR. Never-
theless, the Peoples Republic of China is continuing to increase its overall mili-
tary power.
Events of the past few months in the Middle East once again have proven
that the military balance must be assessed on the capabilities of potential ad-
versaries rather than on their announced or estimated intentions. Intentions
change much more quickly than capabilities and often change solely on the basis
of the opportunities that a lack of opposing capability presents. Therefore, the
only sound course of action for our future defense planning is to analyze, as
best we can, the military balance between the United States and opposing forces
based on the capabilities of existing forces projected over the next few years.
STRATEGIC FORCES
I have emphasized in the past that no task is more important, from a military
perspective, than that of developing, maintaining, and protecting a credible stra-
tegic deterrent. Detente, offering the opportunity for permanent and lasting relax-
ation of tension, requires that we be strong enough to negotiate with confidence
and to insure that our good will is not misconstrued as lack of will, thereby
encouraging adventurism. This task presents many challenges because, in making
an assessment of the military capabilities of our potential adversaries, we cannot
afford to look only at the capabilities of those forces in being today. The long
lead time of modern strategic weapon systems demands that we also devote our
best efforts to the evaluation of the relative military balance as it is likely to
evolve in the years ahead and as it is likely to be perceived in the eyes of our
potential adversaries, our allies, and the rest of the world. If we are to maintain
a credible strategic deterrent, actual military strength is essential but the appear-
ance of military strength cannot be neglected.
Significant U.S. and U.S.S.R. Initiatives-Strategic Offensive Systems
Shown on Chart 1 are the ongoing U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic offensive initia-
tives which will have significant impact on the strategic balance. I will highlight
these initiatives so that the dynamic nature of military balance for the foreseeable
future can be fully understood.
The Soviet Union clearly has embarked on an unprecedented major commitment
to the modernization of its strategic offensive force.
Four new ICBM designs of varying classes and characteristics currently are
being flight tested. These new systems will incorporate improved launch, guid-
ance, and reentry techniques, which will permit the U.S.S.R. to introduce accurate
MIRVs into its missile inventory. A corollary of these significant new missiles
programs is the parallel construction and modification of hardened silos, capable
of surviving appreciably higher over-pressures and ground shocks. Additionally,
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a multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) version of the SS-11, is being deployed rapidly
in some of these new silos for "light" ICBMs.
The U.S.S.R. has moved forward rapidly in modernizing its SLBM force. The
new 4200 nm SS-N--8 has been deployed aboard the first three DELTA-class
submarines-now in series production. Improvements for the SS-N-6, the SLBTvi
deployed aboard YANKEE-class submarines, may be nearing operational status.
This new variant of the SS-N-6 is expected to have a slightly longer range and
may be deployed in YANKEE-class submarines.
We are uncertain as to the exact military role of the new BACKFIRE variable-
geometry wing, supersonic bomber. It is certainly capable of performing inter-
continental attack missions, but it is probably best suited for peripheral attack.
We anticipate that it will be assigned both roles.
In contrast to the Soviet Union's dramatic program, ongoing U.S. initiatives
in the strategic arena are modest and deliberate. The United States is undertak-
ing only basic research on advanced ICBM technology. No new ICBM system is
under engineering development. Continued improvements are being made, how-
ever, in both MINUTEMAN II and III systems. By the end of FY 1975, all
MINUTEMAN is will be replaced by MINUTEMAN IIs. Additionally, the hard-
ness of MINUTEMAN II and III missiles and silos is being upgraded ; and a Com-
mand Data Buffer system is being installed to permit the rapid remote retargeting
of MINUTEMAN III missiles. These improvements are designed to increase fur-
ther the survivability, flexibility, and responsiveness of our MINUTEMAN force.
As was noted last year, the last of the POLARIS A-2 SLBMs will be phased
out of the U.S. force by mid 1974. By mid-1971, the planned. POLARIS-to-POSE-
IUON conversion program will have been completed. At that time, we will have
31 POSEIDON submarines and 10 POLARIS A-3 submarines. The first TRIDENT
submarine, with the new 4000 nm C-4 missile, is expected to enter the force in
FY 1979.
The B-1, which is being developed as a replacement for it portion of the B-52
force in the 1980s, will begin flight testing this, fall. The results of the flight test-
ing will be examined carefully prior to a production decision being made next
year. In the meantime, funds are included is the FY 1975 budget request for
modifications of 80 B-52D bombers to insure their effectiveness until the B-1 is
capable of entering the force in adequate numbers to allow for replacement.
Significant U.S. and U.S.S.R. Initiatives-Strategic Defensive Systems
The U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic defensive initiatives are displayed on Chart 2.
These limited ongoing efforts will have far less impact on the strategic balance in
the immediate years ahead than the strategic offensive initiatives. In fact, the
significance of this chart is more related to what it doesn't show than to what
it does. There are several reasons for this apparent restraint on both sides, but
the primary limitation is the constraining influence of the ABM Treaty between
the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
The ABM Treaty prohibits a nationwide ABM defense and places strict and
substantially equivalent controls on ABM h.unchers, missiles, and associated
radars. Under these limitations, the U.S. currently is proceeding with the deploy-
ment of SPARTAN and SPRINT ABM missiles at only one location-Grand
Forks, North Dakota--and is continuing research and prototype development of
the advanced SITE DEFENSE System. The U.S.S.R. has an operational GALOSH
ABM system around Moscow, with limited capabilities, and is doing research
and development work on two new ABM systems.
Turning to air defense, the Soviet Union already has in being an extensive
nationwide system employing surveillance, warning, and control systems, a vari-
ety of surface-to-air missiles, and a very large interceptor force. The FOXBAT,
now designated the MIG-25, adds a major capability to the Soviet air defense
force. This MACH-3, all-weather interceptor carries a new air-to-air missile.
Since the optimum performance of the FOXBAT seems to be at high altitudes, we
believe that at least one of its primary roles will be against high-altitude, high-
speed attackers, such as air-to-surface missiles.
Although the U.S. has no new strategic interceptors, the introduction of the
F-14-being developed for fleet air defense-and the F-15--being developed as
an advanced air superiority tactical fighter-w.111 improve significantly the overall
air superiority capabilities of U.S. general purpose forces. Either or both of these
aircraft also could be employed by strategic all defense units. Similarly, the U.S.
austere SAM-D program, which is being developed primarily to provide air de-
fense for the Army in the field in the 1980s, could be effective in a strategic
defense role, if so assigned.
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The U.S. air defense system, even at its peak, was never comparable in size to
the one deployed in the Soviet Union. Based on our overall priorities within a
constrained budget, primary emphasis in U.S. air defense is now being placed on
surveillance, control of air space, and providing warning of a bomber attack.
There are clear risks involved in reducing our capability to limit a potential ad-
versa.ry's ability to employ manned bombers and cruise missiles against the U.S.
However, improvement of U.S. air defense surveillance and control capabilities
should, in the future, reduce those risks somewhat, since the limited air defense
force assets and available general purpose augmentation forces then could be
employed with greater effectiveness.
In the meantime, U.S. initiatives in Strategic Defense are limited to new
technology in early warning and command and control. In addition, we are
retaining the options, as mentioned, to convert new general purpose forces to
new air-to-air missile. Since the optimum performance of the FOXBAT seems
to be at high altitudes, we believe that at least one of its primary roles will be
against high-altitude, high-speed attackers, such as air-to-surface missiles.
Although the U.S. has no new strategic interceptors, the introduction of the
F-14-being developed for fleet air defense-and the F-15--- being developed
as an advanced air superiority tactical fighter-will improve significantly the
overall air superiority capabilities of U.S. general purpose forces. Either or both
of these aircraft also could be employed by strategic air defense units. Similarly,
the U.S. austere SAM-D program, which is being developed primarily to provide
air defense for the Army in the field in the 1980s, could be effective in a strategic
defense role, if so assigned.
The U.S. air defense system, even at its peak, was never comparable in size
to the one deployed in the Soviet Union. Based on our overall priorities within
a constrained budget, primarily emphasis in U.S. air defense is now being placed
on surveillance, control of air space, and providing warning of a bomber attack.
There are clear risks involved in reducing our capability to limit a potential
adversary's ability to employ manned bombers and cruise missiles against the
U.S. However, improvement of U.S. air defense surveillance and control capa-
bilities should, in the future, reduce those risks somewhat, since the limited
air defense force assets and available general purpose augmentation forces then
could be employed with greater effectiveness.
In the meantime, U.S. initiatives in Strategic Defense are limited to new
technology in early warning and command and control. In addition, we are
retaining the options, as mentioned, to convert new general purpose force inter-
ceptors and the SAM-I) to strategic defense at a later date. Funds for procure-
ment of the first- U.S. initiative listed-SLBM Warning Radar-were rejected
last year by the Congress because of a belief that "our present warning systems
are adequate." A study of these systems has been initiated by the House Appro-
priations Committee "in order to adequately evaluate future requests of this
nature from all the Services." I welcome this study because I have been con-
vinced by several JCS/DOD studies and reviews that our SLBM warning sys-
tems are not adequate, particularly in light of the deployment of the Soviet
4200 nni SS-N-8 SLBM.
The Over-the-Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B) radar system is being developed
by the U.S. to provide long-range surveillance, detection, tracking, and identifica-
tion of aircraft from the surface to the ionosphere. Although a production deci-
sion has not as yet been made, it could be operational by the early 1980s.
AWACS, the last U.S. initiative listed, stands for Airborne Warning and Con-
a trol System. This system consists of a new all-altitude surveillance radar with
associated data processing and command and control equipment installed in a
Boeing 707 airframe. By niid-1977, it should provide significantly improved
surveillance capabilities with respect to radar detection, active and passive
tracking of airborne objects, identification of aircraft, and interceptor control
for our strategic defense and tactical air forces.
The U.S.S.R. is continuing its research and development of over-the-horizon
(OTII) radar. Finally, the U.S.S.R. has a modified transport aircraft, called the
MOSS, which has been utilized in airborne warning and control since 1908. No
new U.S.S.R. AWACS-type development has been noted.
PRO Strategic Forces
The strategic offensive programs of the Peoples Republic of China, when com-
pared with the Soviet Union and the United States, represent a relatively small-
scale but well-conceived effort. The overall strategic offensive capability of the
PRC, however, is steadily growing and must be taken seriously even by the
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super powers. The deliberate, but unhurried, pace of the PRC strategic offensive
programs reflects the comparatively small number of technically qualified per-
sonnel working on these programs, the relatively limited resources available,
and finally, the influence of long-range goals, rather than short-term objectives.
As Indicated last year, a substantial expansion of nuclear production facili-
ties is underway in the PRO. For this reason, we estimate that the Chinese
stockpile of nuclear weapons will be expanded more rapidly in the years ahead.
Last year, I outlined the four different PRO strategic land-based missile pro-
grams and indicated that both an MRBM and an IRBM system may have been
deployed. This deployment can now be confirmed. The third system, a limited-
range ICBM, is still not believed to be operational ; however, it could he de-
ployed later this year. Although capable of reaching deep into the Soviet Union,
this missile will not be able to reach the Continental United States (except for
the western part of Alaska).
The fourth PRO system, a full-range ICBM, has not progressed as rapidly as
we estimated last year. This large missile Is in the same class as the US TITAN
and the Soviet SS-9. It probably will not be operational until 1976 or 1977.
Forecasting the rate of progress of the PRC SLBM program has proved to be a
very difficult task. We believe that the PRC is determined to develop a submarine-
launched ballistic missile and a modern ballistic missile submarine; however,
estimates of the operational dates for an SLBM and a new submarine have been,
in the past, overly optimistic.
The PRO has one Soviet-type GOLF-class diesel-powered missile-launching
submarine which it built during the early 11,60s, but to our knowledge, it has
never been equipped with missiles. If the PRO is indeed developing an SLBM, It
is reasonable to assume that this submarine will be used as the test platform. No
other PRO ballistic missile submarines are lmown to us; however, we cannot
preclude the possibility that one or more may be under construction. In any
event, we believe that it will be at least 1977 before such a system could become
operational.
Turning to the strategic defensive forces, the PRO surface-to-air defense sys-
tem is capable of providing only a limited point defense of key urban and indus-
trial areas, military installations, and advanced weapons complexes. Although
this system has undergone significant upgrading in the past four years, it still
has major weaknesses. The PRO has only one operational SAM system, basically
a copy of the USSR SA-2 system. We estimate that the PRC, by mid-1973, had
deployed several hundred SAM launchers and that this deployment will continue
to increase during the next few years.
Overall US and USSR Strategic Balance
The overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union
is in a state of dynamic equilibrium or in more familiar terms-relative strategic
parity. The Soviet Union has, however, generated a momentum in new strategic
offensive programs which, in the absence of successful negotiations or increased
strategic offensive programs of our own, could easily upset this balance in the
future. The USSR holds a significant numerical and throw-weight advantage In
missiles, but the US maintains an equally significant counterbalance in areas of
key qualitative importance-e.g., missile accuracy, MIRV's, submarine quietness,
and underwater technology. Deployment of the 4200 nm SS-N-8 has given the
USSR a temporary qualitative advantage. The Soviet Union has developed a new
supersonic bomber with intercontinental capabilities, but the United States will
continue to retain, for a number of years, a significant advantage in the number
of intercontinental bombers and in bomber payload. The US maintains a sigmifi-
cant advantage in ABM technology, but the USSR has an operational ABM system
and is continuing its research and development on new systems. The Soviet
Union has an enormous advantage In air defense, but the US currently main-
tains the technological and operational capability to penetrate these defenses,
should it become necessary to do so.
The advantages in the strategic balance which the United States holds over
the Soviet Union are primarily qualitative in nature and are in areas of high
technology. For example, our radar technology is still superior to that of the
Soviet Union. There are several other areas that could be mentioned, but these
technological advantages are transitory at best and are partially offset by the
larger warhead yields and missile throw-weight of the USSR. This Soviet throw-
weight advantage is important because it facilitates the large-scale MIRY devel-
opment, already underway at a rapid rate.
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These examples are illustrative of the US qualitative technological lead over
the Soviet Union in areas Impacting on the strategic balance. The Interim Agree-
ment does not constrain either the Soviet Union or the United States from pur-
suing new technology nor does it limit modernization of strategic systems as
long as the quantitative restraints are observed and the size of the ICBM silo
launchers are not increased significantly. The relative military strategic bal-
ance is currently in equilibrium, but dynamic and fragile. The essential equiva-
lency necessary to the preservation of peace is, therefore, neither self-perpetuat-
ing nor permanent.
The dynamic equilibrium now existing between the United States' strategic
forces and those of the Soviet Union increases significantly the importance of
US general purpose forces (including theater nuclear forces) in the deterrence
of conflict below the level of strategic nuclear war. Neither the US nor the USSR
will be capable in the foreseeable future of executing a disarming first strike.
Under these circumstances, as vital as they are in maintaining an overall deter-
rent to major conflicts, strategic nuclear forces are less likely today to deter the
lesser forms of conflict than in the days of our overwhelming nuclear superiority.
Therefore, ready, mobile, and versatile general purpose forces, sufficient to pro-
vide a deterrent of their own, must continue to be one of our prime objectives
and concerns.
Detente, as we have seen this past year, does not mean the absence of tension
between the US and USSR, nor does the positive improvement in our relations
with the Peoples Republic of China mean that the possibility for conflict in Asia
has been removed. Economic inbalance, political ambition, social upheaval, re-
source demands, and military adventurism remain among the potential causes
of war, hopefully, continued diplomatic efforts ultimately will be able to estab-
lish a world order capable of settling all disputes through political and legal
mechanisms without force or the threat of force. Until that time, the United
States and its allies must remain fully prepared to protect and defend our vital
interests wherever and whenever threatened by those who would be our adver-
saries. Our ability to protect these vital interests in military situations, short
of strategic nuclear war and particularly at the lower end of the violence spectrum, depends to a great extent on our general purpose forces.
Significant US and USSR Initiatives-General Purpose Force Systems
The principal US and USSR general purpose force initiatives are shown on.
Chart 3. There are other important ongoing programs, of course, which could
be listed for both the US and USSR, but these are believed to be the most sig-
nificant. You should note that nine of the Soviet systems listed have progressed
to the point of deployment, while only two of the US systems are in that category.
Recognizing that legitimate disagreements may exist over which general purpose
systems should be included on this chart, the emphasis displayed by these newly
deployed Soviet systems clearly illustrates the broad scope of USSR general pur-
pose force modernization. The list also reflects our limited ability to detect re-
search and development on Soviet general purpose force systems.
The Soviet Union, despite the clear commitment it is making to the major
modernization of its strategic offensive forces, has not neglected general purpose
force modernization. New tanks, aircraft, and ships are being developed and de-
ployed, apparently as a long-range, sustained, and deliberate "across the board
modernization.
A new tank, a new armored fighting vehicle, a new missile system mounted on
an existing armored vehicle, and a new assault helicopter currently are being:
deployed with Soviet ground forces. The deployment of a new medium tank, a
new fighting vehicle which is air-droppable, amphibious, and equivalent to a
light tank, and an armored missile system is consistent with the reliance placed
by the USSR on armored and mechanized equipment. These new weapon systems
will provide revolutionary improvements over similar existing equipment, but
they should not change materially the overall effectiveness of the ground forces.
There are numerous indicators that the Soviet Union has begun to increase
its emphasis on improving the capabilities of its tactical air forces to engage
in ground-attack missions, particularly in regard to non-nuclear conflict. Con-
vincing evidence of this trend is supplied by the development of the four Soviet
aircraft listed on Chart 3.
The FENCER A, for example, is the first modern Soviet fighter to be developed
specifically as a fighter-bomber for the ground-attack mission. Although the
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MIG-23 (FLOGGER) is capable of serving as an interceptor, it also has an
important ground-attack capability. The SL-20 is an improved version of the
FITTER B, also with an improved ground-attack capability. The V/STOL fighter
is expected to serve as the fixed-wing tactical aircraft for deployment in
the new Soviet aircraft carrier. In contrast to the evolutionary improvements
of the ground forces, these ongoing tactica. air initiatives, when fully imple-
mented, will add significant new capabilities to the Soviet Frontol and Naval
Aviation forces.
The deployment of the first Kuril-class V/STOL carrier will add a completely
new dimension to Soviet naval capabilities. Although not comparable to the multi-
purpose US carriers, with their varied complement of sophisticated aircraft, this
class of ships will free USSR naval forces from their dependence on shore-based
aircraft. With complementary Soviet programs in underway replenishment
ships, command and control cruisers, and amphibious ships, this will further
strengthen the increasing capability of Soviet forces to operate worldwide. The
other three naval initiatives listed for the USSR also will strengthen this same
capability. The Kara-class: cruiser and the Krivak-class destroyers are heavily
armed ships with impressive arrays of antiship and antiair missiles, as well as
antisubmarine sensors and weapons. The Amga-class ships will provide missile
support for all classes of ballistic missile submarines, thus potentially improv-
ing the sustained effectiveness of these submarines when deployed away from the
Soviet Union. It should be clear to all that ,hips of this size and sophistication
are not needed by a navy structured merely for coastal defense.
Turning to the ongoing US initiatives, the emphasis has been placed on major
new programs designed to influence our,military capabilities in the late 1970s
and 1980s. In regard to the US Ground Forces' initiatives, the Army "Big Five"
weapons systems have been designed to provide major qualitative improvements
in combat equipment for use by ground force, that may be on a battlefield in the
19Ws. Superior equipment is indispensable for our ground forces because we
plan for them to exploit technology rather than depend primarily upon man-
power. The Dragon and TOW constitute a significantly improved family of anti-
tank weapons to provide protection to ground force units. TOW is currently
being deployed and Dragon will be deployed in the near future with our
Army ground forces. A request for funds to provide this same capability to
Marine Corps ground forces is contained in the FY 1975 budget. The last item,
the 0H-53E, is an improved prototype version of the CH-53D helicopter cur-
rently deployed in Marine Corps units. It is expected to i .ave the capability to
lift over 90 percent of Marine division combat equipment and Marine tactical
aircraft without disassembly. No production decisions have been made on any
of these initiatives except for the Dragon and TOW antitank weapons.
The first three initiatives listed under Tactical Air Forces are ongoing Air
Force programs. The A-10 is an attack aircraft specially designed and opti-
mized for the close air support mission-particularly in the role of defeating
enemy armor and providing accurate delivery of ordnance in close proximity to
friendly ground forces. A production decision on this aircraft is being withheld
until a fly-off has been completed between tl,e A-10 and the in-service A-7 air-
craft. The F-15 (Eagle) is an advanced tactical fighter being developed for the
Air Superiority mission ; but it also is expected to have an air-to-ground capa-
bility, with accuracies at least as good as those of the A-7D attack aircraft.
As an air superiority fighter, it should out-perform any known Soviet fighter
aircraft now in service or projected for service in the 1980s. The EF-111A is
being developed as a prototype by installing the latest jamming subsystem in
the sophisticated F-111A fighter, to provide an important qualitative improve-
ment in the Air Force's manned tactical ECM capability. The Navy's F-14
(Tomcat) is the only Tactical Air Forces' initiative listed which is currently
operational. Designed for both fleet air and fleet area defense, the F-14 should--
like the F-15-be superior to any Soviet fighter aircraft through the 1980s.
The F-14 also has an excellent air-to-ground attack capability.
None of the U.S. ships listed under the Naval Forces' initiatives is currently
operational ; however, the first three 688-class nuclear-powered attack sub-
marines (SSN) and the first LHA amphibious assault ship should be delivered
to the fleet in FY 1975. The 688-class SSNs are expected to be generally qualita-
tively superior to the best Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines. With the
completion of the five ships in the LHA program, the amphibious forces of the
Navy should regain the desired capability of lifting the helicopter and surface
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assault elements of one and one-third Marine Amphibious Forces and achieve
this in modern 20-knot ships. The last 2 ships listed, the sea control ship
and the IIARPOON missile-equipped patrol frigate, are to be key elements in
providing sea-based air, antiair, and antisubmarine capabilities to small task
groups, underway replenishment groups, amphibious assault groups, and convoys
that do not have aircraft carriers in company. Both of these new ships will be
austerely, but adequately, designed to fulfill this important mission of pro-
tecting our sea lines of communication in lesser-air-threat areas, freeing our
carriers to employ their capabilities in protecting our sea lines of communica-
tion in high-air-threat areas.
Overall U.S. and U.S.S.R. General Purpose Forces Balance
Soviet doctrine places great emphasis on the massive use of tanks, armored
vehicles, and heavy firepower to win the land battle. Associated with this doc-
trine, the U.S.S.R. tends to arm its ground with large quantities of weapons
and equipment, which we have always considered reliable and serviceable but
generally of slightly lower quality than comparable U.S. material.
The U.S. has never attempted to match the U.S.S.R. in quantities of ground
force personnel or materiel, but we have taken pride in our superior weapons
systems and equipment. Recent evaluation of Soviet tanks, armored vehicles,
electronic warfare systems, and missiles leads us to believe that the techno-
logical gap is being closed. The Soviet Union, learning lessons from Vietnam,
has continued a very deliberate and effective program, both to modernize its
ground force equipment and to place large numbers of sophisticated weapons in
its ground force units. The U.S. because of its involvement in Vietnam, has been
required to expend most of its resources maintaining and procuring current
models of weapons and equipment.
U.S. technology is still, by and large, superior; but this new Soviet trend,
combined with its already massive quantitative superiority, makes it imperative
that we and our allies continue to modernize our ground forces equipment and
continue to pursue those potentially rewarding new areas of technology which
will become useful in the years ahead.
The increased Soviet emphasis on new tactical aircraft has required a re-
evaluation of our estimates regarding the future U.S.S.R. total inventory. Con-
trary to our estimate last year, the total number of Soviet tactical aircraft is
not expected to decline over the next few years and may even be increased.
As already indicated, the Soviet Union appears to be making a detemined
effort to erase the long-held advantage in the ground attack role held by U.S.
tactical air forces. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. traditionally has emphasized
the air superiority capabilities in its tactical aircraft and has gained thereby a
clear quantitative advantage and some qualitative advantages in this role. With
the deployment of new U.S. and U.S.S.R. aircraft, these differences will tend
to narrow; however, I believe that by the end of this decade, U.S. tactical air
forces will have a qualitative advantage in both roles if we actively pursue the
tactical aircraft modernization programs already underway.
The overall number of U.S. major combat surface ships has dropped to the
lowest level since prior to the Korean War, but, this trend is being reversed
as newer ships are programmed to be delivered faster than the old ships are
retired from the active fleet. Similarly, the declining trend of attack submarines
is also being gradually reversed by replacing World War II-type diesel-powered
4 submarines with modern nuclear-powered attack submarines.
The Soviet Union currently has about 40 more major combat surface ships
than the U.S. and about three times as many attack submarines (including
cruise missile submarines). Many of these Soviet ships and submarines are
old and undoubtedly will be phased out of the active fleet in the next five
years. Major new construction and conversion programs also are underway,
however, in almost all Soviet major ship and submarine categories.
In the past, the Soviet Navy general purpose forces have been designed primar-
ily as a defensive and spoiling force to distrupt our sea lines of communication
and obstruct the projection of our military power across the oceans. Today, a
new and more offensively-oriented Soviet naval posture is developing. The global
reach of the Soviet fleets is being expanded and new emphasis is being placed
on projecting military power from the sea as a national policy.
I do not believe that even with these new ships and added capabilities, the
U.S.S.R. can match U.S. capabilities to project military power from the sea,
although the increasing Soviet threat to our sea lines of communication from
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the large and increasingly sophisticated submarine force is of considerable con-
cern. In short, the Soviet naval capabilities are becoming more formidable every
year, and we must take note of the increasing frequency with which Soviet
naval forces are being deployed to areas of serious international concern. Vigor-
ous modernization of our fleet is essential in order to insure both the success
of our forward deployment strategy and our control of the seas along essential
sea lines of communication.
Prior to the consideration of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement by the
Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff enumerated the following three assurances
which we felt must be taken if the United States is to guard against degrada-
tion of its national security posture :
Assurance I-"A Broad Range of Intelligence Capabilities and Operations to
Verify Soviet Compliance in a Strategic Arms Limitation Environment."
Assurance II-"Aggressive Improvements and Modernization Programs."
Assurance III-"Vigorous Research and :Development :Programs."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain firmly committed to t;aese three Assurances.
Assurances II and III are particularly pertinent to this discussion. If we fail to
maintain weapons systems technological superiority or if we fail to maximize
our military capabilities within the constraints of our international obligations,
we will find that the qualitative advantages we now hold will have evaporated
and that the United States will be placed in a position of military inferiority,
thereby risking both peace and freedom.
In this statement, I have concentrated primarily on the weapons and equip-
ment improvements necessary in our forces. There are important questions about
force structure, readiness, reserve forces and the forces of our allies that also
must be considered in the total picture of tha worldwide balance of forces. These
aspects have been broadly covered in the testimony of the Secretary of Defense,
and will be covered in detail in the testimony of other Department of Defense
witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SIGNIFICANT US & USSR INITIATIVES
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE: SYSTEMS
US USSR
ICBM
MINUTEMAN III SS-X-16
SILO MODIFICATION SS-X-17
SS-X-18
SS-X-19
NEW SILOS
SS-11 MRV
SILO MODIFICATION
SLBM
POSEIDON CONVERSION SS-N_ 8
TRIDENT DELTA
C-4 SS--N-6 IMPROVEMENTS
BOMBERS
B-1
B-52 MODIFICATIONS BACKFIRE
CHART NO T
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SIGNIFICANT US & USSR INITIATIVES
STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES
US
USSR
MIG-25 (FOXBATJ
WARNING AND COMMAND & CONTROL
SLBM WARNING RADAR 0TH RADAR
0TH-B RADAR
AWACS
SIG 'F CANT US & USSR INITIATIVES
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES SYSTEMS
us
ARMY "BIG FIVE": AAH & UTTAS
XM-1 TANK & MICV
SAM-0
* DRAGON & TOW ANTITANK WEAPONS
CH-53E HVY ASSAULT HELD
A-10 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT A/C
F-15 (EAGLE) FIGHTER
EF-111 A
* F-14 (TOMCAT) FIGHTER
688 CLASS ATTACK SUB
LHA AMPHIB ASSAULT SHIP
SEA CONTROL SHIP
PATROL FRIGATE
(HARPOON EQUIPPED)
GROUND FORCES
NAVAL, FORCES
? NEW MEDIUM TANK
? NEW FIGHTING VEHICLE
? BRDM- MISSILE SYSTEM
? HIND A HELD
FENCER A VGW FIGHTER BOMBER
? MIG-23 (FLOGGER) FIGHTER
? SU-20 GROUND SUPPORT A/C
V/STOL FIGHTER
SPARTAN/SPRINT
SITE DEFENSE
KURIL CLASS CARRIER
? KARA CLASS CRUISER
? KRIVAK CLASS DESTROYER
? AMGA CLASS MISSILE
SUPPORT SHIP
? CURRENTLY BEING DEPLOYED; STILL IN PRODUCTION
29-464-74-pt. 1-16
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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Mr. Secretary, I have been noticinn? various statements, as well as
other items in the press, stating in such a way as to believe that we are
hanging on the ropes militarily, that we are unprepared, that we are
being exceeded at the critical level, and everything has been tipped,
or most everything, drastically in favor of the Soviets. I don't believe
a word of it. Just look at our own arsenal and see what we have. I
don't believe it.
I amn getting down to something concrete now. Recently I read a
comment in a column as follows : "Repairing the military balance and
restoring the credibility of our war deterrent forces must be the first
concern."
This story on the credibility of our Armed Forces says in a way that
the credibility has been lost. Do you believe that t he statement in this
quotation is true, or in any way near true?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I think you ought to tell the American people
exactly what you believe about it, because they have been told over
and over again stuff that I think is junk.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think at this time and for the immediate
future-at least until 1977, when the ir_terim agreement ends-that we
have an appropriate balance of strategic forces. We hope that both
sides will exhibit restraint in SALT II, and that the strategic balance
will be maintained as a result.
As I indicated earlier, I think we may be a little thin on the general
purpose forces side, but I also think we have in this budget the
ingredients for the necessary strengthening of those general purpose
forces.
The CIIAIRMAN. All right. Here is another quotation.
This writer said that during the Middle East crisis in the eastern
Mediterranean "a clash would have resulted in an American disaster."
Ile was referring there to their navy and our Navy in the eastern
Mediterranean.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. May I comment on that?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. That is why I brought it up.
Secretary SemILESINGER. One must always look at; the scenario which
is assumed. There is a natural prudence in the estimates by some mili-
tary people and by some non-military people as a result of their
proclivity to use what is referred to as the worst possible case. I believe
that the assumptions on which a statement such as you read rests in-
clude the following features :
(1) That the Soviet Union in such a hypothetical engagement
would have had the ability to use land-based aviation around the
borders of the Mediterranean, in particular the airfields in the eastern
Mediterranean.
(2) That the United States would not have been able to use land-
based air under those circumstances, so that the Navy would be forced
to defend itself, as it were, without the augmentation of additional
capabilities associated with NATO.
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(3) That the Soviet Navy under those circumstances, backed up by
Soviet, air, would indulge in a massive first strike against our fleet
without warning.
Given those three assumptions in such a scenario, one can come to
the conclusion mentioned. But I think that those three assumptions
must be carefully examined. If those three assumptions were invalid,
I think that our fleet in the Mediterranean still possessed the edge as
compared to the Soviet forces.
The CHAIRMAN. I am certainly encouraged to know how much you
have been thinking about those very points, and analyzing them so
well.
I am going to give you a chance to comment too, Admiral, in just a
minute.
But talking about the land-based air power there around the Medi-
terranean, unless our NATO allies saw fit to join in the clash with us,
there is no way that we have land-based air available there, unless we
just went out and conquered some nation and took its land and built
the base.
Secretary SCIILESINGER. We are not advocating that policy, Mr.
Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. No. As I say, it is very remote that we could an-
ticipate that and be ready on that front.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. One can always design, Mr. Chairman, the
worst possible case which shows the U.S. military forces at a decided
disadvantage. What one must also do is to estimate the probability of
that worst possible case occurring. In my judgment, the Soviet Union
would have been ill-advised to have taken the action postulated in the
third assumption, which is a massive initial strike against our fleet and
would certainly not have done so, even in the absence of the issue of
land-based air to which you refer.
The CHAIRMAN. I think you have certainly made a very fine state-
ment about it.
I have another one here that I just want to bring up as an illustra-
tion : "The balance of military power between the United States and
the U.S.S.R. is getting more and more disastrously unfavorable to
the United States." Do you agree with that statement?
Secretary ScIILESINGER. I think that the trends in recent years have
been unfavorable to the United States. But I do not see the basis for
the word "disastrously." As you know, the Soviet Union has been in-
creasing its military manpower from 3 million to 3.8 million in the
same period of time that we have reduced from 3.6 million to 2.1 mil-
lion. We have reduced our expenditures in constant dollars by about
one-third since fiscal year 1968. The Soviet Union since 1965 has been
increasing its expenditures in constant rubles by about 3 percent. The
trends are unfavorable to the United States. But we still have, and
we can maintain, a rough balance of forces. So, the word "disas-
trously" seems inappropriate.
The CHAIRMAN. I am certainly glad to get your opinion on those
matters and get it out before the American public. And I hope that
they will be spread by the media, because I have found out that there
is a constant stream of these disastrous paintings one way or another
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before the American people. And they keep hearing those things. If
they keep hearing those things over and over they will believe them at
their worst.
Admiral Moorer, may I call on you briefly? I say briefly, because
mytime has run out.
Admiral MOORER. First, let me say that I agree with the Secretary's
assessment, sir. I would also comment that we already have aircraft
in Europe that are available for operating with and assisting the
fleet. When one makes an assessment of a hypothetical conflict, he
must do it, I think, in terms of the real world. The thought that the
Soviets would start another war by an uninhibited surprise attack
on the fleet without having in the meantime made all kinds of hostile
moves in preparation across the entire scope of Eurasia and the Mid-
dle East is not a very real one.
The CirAIRMAN. All right, sir. You said you did agree with the Sec-
retary's statement?
Admiral MooimR. Yes, sir.
The CIiAIRMAN. Is there anything further? I have. a few more min-
utes here. Is there anything else you wish to say on that?
Admiral MooRER. No, sir, except that in that situation where you
had 2 fleets deployed in an area such as we had at that time, while it
is true that the Soviet Union had the highest number of ships-about
00-but most of those-over half of them-were supply ships, boilers,
water barges, and things of that kind. The Soviet Union had some su-
periority in surface-to-surface missiles. On the other hand, we had
three aircraft carriers there. So, in looking at this kind of hypotheti-
cal conflict, one must take into consideration not just the situation
between two fleets, but the entire situation throughout the broad area
and the tension existing at the time.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, I thank you. I know it is worth a great
deal to have your opinion.
On page 20 of your statement, Admiral, you say :
The Soviet Union currently has about 40 more major combat surface ships
than the United States and about three times as many attack submarines.
And you go on to say :
Many of these Soviet ships and submarines are old and undoubtedly will be
phased out of the active Beet in the next five years.
I would like for you, if you could, to file a statement showing how
many of those Soviet ships are old and will undoubtedly be phased out.
Admiral MooRER. Yes, sir. In my posture statement I show that.
[The information follows:]
f Deleted. ]
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Type 0 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 14 15 to 19 20 plus
Guided missile helicopter ship. ------- 1 1
Guided missile light cruiser ----------- 6 5 3 1
Light cruiser------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10
Heavy cruiser---- ------
Guided 1
missilefrigate -------------- 5 11 3
Guided missile destroyer ----------- - 5 ------------ 5 6 2
Guided missile destroyer (SSM)------------------------------- 1 3
Destroyer-------------------------------------------------------------- 26 12
Destroyer escort____________________ 7 40 19 20 19
Radar picket patrol escort________________________________________________ 8 2
Patrol guided missile boat.. ---------- 8
Guided missile boat (large/small).-.-.- 10 44 73 ------------------------
Patrol craft and submarine chasers-.__ 40 70 20 80 25
Motor torpedo boats_________________ 40 40 40 40 20
Mine warfare----------------------- 30 80 60 60 50
Amphibious ships ................... 28 52 5 20 -----___-_--
Auxiliaries r------------------ 27 26 9 6 6
Ballistic missile submarines__________________________________ 12 8 ____________
Ballistic missile submarines, nuclear. -- 30 2 8 ________________________
Cruise missile submarines ------------ 2
Cruise missile submarines, nuclear.... 10
Submarine, nuclear__________________ 13
Submarine------------------------- 10
2
15
10
1
19
18
4
38
105
10
8
127
235
180
280
105
74
20
40
rz ------------ 11 ------------ 25
20 10 ------------------------------------
7 10 ------- 30
20 45 110 185
I These figures reflect major Soviet naval types in the auxiliary category (AEM, A0, AOR, AR, AS). There are over 600
additional ships in this category, generally of lesser size and capability.
The CHAIRMAN. Very fine. We will come back.
My time is virtually up. Senator Taft, may I call on you next,
please.
STRATEGIC CHINESE DEVELOPMENTS
Senator TArr. Admiral Moorer, I have, also mentioned in question-
ing the Secretary a matter of what impact the growing Chinese poten-
tial might have on the Russian thinking insofar as the strategic de-
velopments are concerned. Would you comment on that? And do you
think that the Chinese developments are responsible in part for the
decision of the Russians to go ahead with vastly expanding their fleet
and also seeming to expand their ground forces?
Admiral MooiER. Sir, first, so far as the Chinese capabilities are
concerned, as I said in my statement a moment ago they are growing
at a somewhat slower rate than we estimated a couple of years ago, but
nevertheless they are developing a strategic capability, as well as im-
proving and modernizing their air force, their army, and their
navy. Now, the U.S.S.R. has maintained for the past few years about
40 to 43 divisions and 1,000 to 1,200 aircraft along the Chinese border.
There is no question about the fact that the U.S.S.R. has to take into
consideration the capability of the Chinese.
So far as the momentum the Soviet Union has with regard to the
new missiles, I think that represents its overall intent in acquiring
quantity and quality in its strategic systems vis-a-vis the Unite
States. As the Secretary and I both have said, it is interested not only
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in its military capability, but also in how that capability is perceived
worldwide by other nations.
Senator TAFT. Thank you very much, Admiral.
Just one other area of questioning. You talked about specific
weapons and how they are going to be used and how they add up.
Often, however, it would seem to me that we could learn from history
that conceptual changes really have been more important than any-
thing else. While, for instance, on pagas 25 and 21 of your testimony
you mentioned the ship-to-ship missile potentiality of the Russians,
there doesn't seem to be really too much emphasis being put on re-
examining the concept of how we use the weapons that we have. Do
you anticipate that there will be additional emphasis put upon con-
ceptual research into the budget we are talking about?
Admiral Moomm. Yes, sir. As we move along and technology per-
mits the acquisition of new capabilities and techniques, we must alter
our tactics and concept of operations. An example of that is the now-
obsolete battleline--ships were right behind each other close aboard.
Now ships are spread out over a very large operating area. You never
find a concentration of ships in the old manner because of potential
vulnerability from new weapons and possible surveillance by the other
side.
Senator Teri. How do you perceivea carrier force lining up against
an attack of Soviet vessels with surface-to-surface combat possibili-
ties ?
Admiral Moo=. The sequence of events involved would determine
the outcome. First, adequate surveillance will ensure that you know
where these ships are so the platforms can be destroyed.
Second, of course, is the destruction of the missiles--first, the de-
struction of the firing platform, and then the destruction of the mis-
siles. Various countermeasures leading to interception of the missiles
en route to the target are available and deployed.
Senator TAFT. You don't anticipate that there could be major dis-
ruptions of carrier operations, not single carriers, but major night
interruptions by attacks of this kind?
Admiral MooliEn. Of course, if the ship is hit in certain places it will
be disrupted. But the first effort would be toward preventing the firing
of the missile in the first place.
In this connection, Senator Taft, we should be prepared to accept
higher losses in personnel and all types of weapons in our forces-
Army, Navy, Air Force-than we have seen in the past. I think this
is simply an historical fact. As the weapons become more efficient, the
loss rate will go up. This situation was evident in the recent Middle
East war, for instance.
Senator TAFT. Do you feel that we ought to go ahead with further
development of surface-to-surface missiles ourselves?
Admiral MooRFR. Yes, sir; we are. the Harpoon missile is a missile
which is adapted to not only maritime aircraft, but ships and sub-
marines as well.
Senator TerT. Thank you very much.
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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Symington.
ABM AND TRIDENT PROGRAMS COST
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, in the discussion with Senator
Byrd about constant dollars I would make the observation that you are
adding increased pay to inflation using the same cost twice. Also you
always use 1968 as the year to compare which was the year of the
height of the Vietnam war a time when we had the most people out
there and were spending the most money. There is merit in some-
body saying that while we were trying to beat the Vietnamese, the
Soviets were using their own money to improve their forces. It would
be interesting to know just how much the arms control disarmament
discussion, generally called SALT, is costing our taxpayers. The ABM
was sold as a bargaining chip; Trident was sold as a bargaining chip,
and this new counterforce targeting is being sold as a bargaining chip.
It took us 4 years to win World War IT. What we dropped on Ger-
many and Japan in 4 years was one-twenty-fifth of 1 percent in TNT
equivalent of what we have in the nuclear stockpile ready to drop
tomorrow. Looking at the other vital aspect of true national security,
the economic picture, I am worried about still more bargaining chips
that pop up regularly and so heavily increase our military cost.
Would you give the committee the total program cost of the ABM,
the Trident and this new concept of targeting? You can't do that now,
but would you supply for the record?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Let me take one shot at it.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will you supply all that for the record?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Oh, yes, indeed.
[The information follows:]
The total acquisition costs for the ABM and Trident are:
--------------------------------- $5,M447
ABM (Safeguard) _________________- Trident ---------------------------------------------- ----------- 13,937
Estimated total cost of the new programs related to targeting doctrine is $310.7
million. This includes $245.7 million (total acquisition cost) for the Command
Data Buffer, an on-going program that provides rapid, remote targeting for
Minuteman III; and $65 million in FY 1975 for the following efforts :
Technology development [deleted] of Poseidon warheads to give SLBMs
an increased flexibility ;
Improvements in our ability to detect and process information concerning
enemy missile launches ;
Development of a survivable nuclear burst reporting system ; and
Increased data handling and communications capability to improve the
flexibility of our forces.
The FY 1975 budget includes $98 million for Command Data Buffer and the
other programs associated with the new targeting doctrine.
Secretary ScH3LESINGER. You made some observations, Senator
Symington. We do not invariably use fiscal year 1968. Earlier, I com-
pared our current position with fiscal year 1964. We can do that for
any period of time that you would like. But I think that by share of
the GNP, manpower, and any particular variable that you would like
to employ, the costs of the Defense Establishment today are lower
than they have been at any time since 1950-on any relative basis.
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On the constant dollar estimates, of course, there are always dif-
ferent indices that can, be used. But our estimates are put together
without double counting and on the basis of consistency.
Whether or not the ABM was an appropriate bargaining chip, of
course, is an issue that people will differ on. In my judgment, the fact
that we were able to head off major deployment of ABM, which could
have cost at least $30 billion, indicates that the start we made may
have been a high pay-off item even in the financial terms to which you
alluded. Trident, of course, has been justified not as a bargaining chip,
but as part of our modernization program. As a general rule, the best
bargaining chip is the perceived willingness of the American public
and the American Congress to support our defense capability to what-
ever extent is necessary.
SUPPORT FOR U.N. COUNTRIES
Senator SYMINGTON. On page 3 of your statement you say, Mr.
Secretary : "Not counting the collective security provisions of the
United Nations Charter, we are allied to more than 40 nations by nine
multilateral and bilateral treaties." For the record, would you supply
what are the 40 nations and what are, the treaties, and what are, as
you say, informal but nevertheless, real commitments toward the na-
tions that we must take into account in our defense budget. Would
you also list the number of American military or civilians working
for the military in the countries in question.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
The attached tables list applicable treaties and the parties thereto. It should
be noted that several nations are party to more than one treaty. This portion
of the response is unclassified. The accompanying U.S. military and DoD civilian
employee strengths are as of 30 September; 1973, and only the military figures
are classified confidential.
The informal commitments that we must take into account in the Defense
budget include the public assurances of at least four Presidents of our intent to
preserve the security of Israel and to maintain stability in the Middle East in
keeping with the 1957 Joint Resolution of the Congress on the Middle East.
Security Agreements were concluded with Iran and Pakistan, members of
CENTO, based on that Resolution. (For strength figures, see Item 10, attach-
ment.)
We must also take into account the assurance given the non-nuclear nations,
when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was before the U.N. Security Council,
that the U.S. would act, in consonance with the U.N. Charter, to counter nuclear
aggression or the threat of such aggression against non-nuclear nations party to
the Treaty.
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1. 1947 I nter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio
Treaty):
Argentina____________3
Bolivia__________________ 5
Brazil___________________ 15
Chile------------------- 4
Columbia________________ 3
Costa Rica_______________
Dominican Republic-_____ 1
5. 1954 Southeast Asia. Collective]
Defense Treaty (SEATO):
Australia_______________ 22
France__________________ 17
Now Zealand____________ ___
Philippines_____________ 1,070
Thailand________________ 286
South Vietnam, Republic
of____________________ [Deleted[ 811
United Kingdom ---------- 1,561
6. 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty:
Republic of the Philip-
pine------------------ 1,070
7. 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty:
Republic of Korea__________ 1,222
8. 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty:
RepblicofChina ------ 181
9. 1960 Treaty of Mutual Coop-
peratinn and Defense: Japan_ 5, 881
10. Informal commitments: (Deleted[
Israel------------------- 1
ran-------------------- 35
Pakistan---------------- ----------
El Salvador_____________
Guatemala_______________ ]Deleted] 1
Haiti___________
Honduras---------------
Mexico ------------------ 1
Nicaragua_______________ 1
Panama________________ 3
Paraguay________________ 4
Peru 2
Trinidad and Tobago_____ 1
Uruguay----------------
Belgium_________________ 408
Canada________________ 92
Denmark (including
Greenland)_____________ 4
France_______________ _ 17
Germany, Federal Repub-
lic of_________________ 12,625
Greece__________________ 178
Iceland_________________ 127
Italy____________________ [Deleted] 886
The Netherlands---------- 117
Norway____ 24
___________
Portugal(includingAzores) 117
Turkey__________________ 354
United Kingdom (includ-
ing Bermuda)_________ 1,561
4. 1951 ANZUS Security Treaty:
Australia________________ 22
Venezuela_______________
2. 1936 general treaty between
the United States and Pan-
ama (art. X), entered into
force on July 27, 1939.
3. 1949 North Atlantic Treaty:
Senator SYMTNGTON. On page 6 of your prepared statement you
say :
The sheer physical threat, as measured by the military capabilities of poten-
tial adversaries have actually increased during the last 10 years. At the same
time, so have our foreign interests, with expanded external investments. A
larger volume of international trade, and growing dependence on raw materials
from sources overseas.
Would you describe for the record what investments you are refer-
ring to ?
[The information follows:]
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US Cumulative Direct
investment Abroad
Billion US $
, 1.9%
$1.7
7.0% 5 5.9
10.3% $15.
Unallocated
Other Less Developed
Middle Eaet
$31.9
4.4% $1.4
$1.61.4??
26.3% $8.4
0.6?a 35.1% $11.2 $0.3
$49.5
3.1%
22.0?.0 $10.9
31.0% $15.31
2.1%
Other Developed
Japan
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator SiMMINGTOIV. Thank you. Presumably you weren't referring
to Chile, were you?
Secretary ScnniEsrNGER. That is not one that I had in mind.
Senator SYMINGTON. Last year and this year you mentioned the need
for some legislation that would enable you to get rid of some unneeded
civilians. Have you sent up that legislation, and if so, when did you
do so?
Secretary SOIILESINGER. I am not sure that that has been cleared by
the OMB as yet. But we will attempt to have that up here shortly,
Senator.
The CIIAIRMTAN. Do you expect that if you get that legislation
through you can reduce the civilians?
Secretary SciiLESINGER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. But you are adding about 30,000 civilians this year,
are you not?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. Senator Symington, the chairman
asked about that in his initial statement. The increase in the civilians
is associated with our civilianization program. I have felt that we could
reduce the civilian work force of the Department. But it is difficult
1 Page 57, International Economic Report of the President, transmitted to the congress
March 1973.
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to reduce it given the lifetime contract which exists under the civil
service system.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
If, as you say "environment is less hostile," are you still confident of
your $7 to $13 billion requested increase in the military budget, de-
pending on how you figure the supplementals?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. I think I have reduced that to $5 billion,
Senator. I think that is right. As I have indicated, the main increases
here are for readiness and for R. R D. options. The latter may or may
not have to be taken up, depending on the outcome of SALT.
Senator SYMINGTON. The taxpayer isn't as well acquainted with
those details as you and I, and I am asking for the public record.
Do you think under the philosophy of Dr. Ikle, as he described in an
article a year ago last month, there is any real chance of obtaining a
in eaningful SALT II agreement?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I most certainly do, Senator.
Senator SYMINGTON. We will see.
We have been awaiting favorable results from MBFR negotiations
for many years, to my certain knowledge for at least 8, probably closer
to 12. Why do you believe we could expect any success at this time?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. I think there has been a change of condi-
tions in the sense that in the past, there were no negotiations going on,
there were just discussions about the possibilities of negotiations. Since
October 30 of last year, we have been engaged in close negotiations
with the Warsaw Pact as an alliance. And I think that the positions
taken by both sides are promising.
Senator SYMINGTON. On page 9 of your statement you say :
Considering the cuts we have already made, further reductions should now
be dependent upon? international agreement with potential adversaries.
There have been some cuts in quantity, but as you said, our quali-
tative position has greatly improved. Do you believe in the theory of
overkill ?
Secretary SCh LEsINGER. Let me answer that very succinctly. No, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. You don't think there is significance to the
fact that, as I mentioned, what we dropped in the 4 years of World
War II, all told, is one twenty-fifth of 1 percent of what we have ready
to drop today, in TNT equivalent.
Secretary SCHLFSINGER. The problem with that is, first of all, we
deal now with bilateral capabilities. And we are in a position in which
we must be able to survive a first strike and have a meaningful option
for the President of the United States. That depends, in my judgment,
upon the ability to target certain assets on the other side. Merely tak-
ing the Hiroshima bomb, the number of casualties, and multiplying
that by the megatonnage in the current arsenal and so forth, is only
an interesting arithmetic exercise, and has no strategic significance.
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Senator SYMINGTON. I believe it does have some strategic signifi-
cance, and believe your answer that you don't think there is anything
whatever in the theory of overkill is quite a statement in itself.
During the recent Mideast crisis only one country in Europe, Portu-
gal, agreed to give us any help. I understand since then the British
offered the use of some bases. But that wasn't known when we had a
hearing on this in another committee, The fact we received so little
help when we were in deep trouble, trouble to the point where we had
to declare a worldwide alert, should this not affect to some extent our
military position in Europe?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. The military position in Europe refers of
course, to an attack on one of the members of the Alliance rather &n
on a country outside of the Alliance, such as Israel. The record of the
European allies in the Middle East war is one that I would like to dis-
cuss with the committee in classified session. But I should say that
some of the allies were far more forthcoming in a quiet way than has
appeared in the press.
The CHAIRMAN'. Thank you very much. Your time is up.
Senator Thurmond.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Moorer, what evidence do you see that the Soviets are tak-
ing steps to upgrade their tactical air force to provide a greater capa-
bility in the ground attack role? I am just wondering if you consider
the Fencer aircraft of theirs is similar to the A-10?
Admiral MOORER. The. Fencer, I believe, is the first aircraft that
the Soviet Union has developed specifically as a ground attack air-
craft.. It is a much larger aircraft than the A-10-more like our F-111.
As I said, the Soviet Union had previously emphasized air superiority.
It is now developing aircraft which will have much improved capabil-
ity for the ground attack role.
Senator THURMOND. And the Hind, -which is an attack helicopter.
Admiral MOORER. That is right. The Soviet Union is building those
at a fast rate. The SU-20, the Flogger; the Fencer A; and the Hind
helicopter, are all associated with ground attack or interdiction.
Senator THunMOND. They are taking; steps to upgrade their tactical
aircraft so that they will have a greater ability in the ground attack
role, there is no question with that, is there?
Amiral MooRLR. No, sir.
Senator THuRMOND. In the Mideast war the Soviets gave the Arabs
two weapons systems which played key roles. I am speaking of the
SAM-6 mobile ground-to-air missile system, and the Sagger antitank
missile system which is fired from armored vehicles. Why has the
United States failed to develop a system such as the SAM-6?
Admiral MOORER. The SAM-6, as you know, Senator Thurmond, is
a mobile missile system which also has a low-altitude capability. Of
course, we are going forward with the =improved Hawk, a similar kind
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of weapon system, which incidentally, did quite well itself during this
war. I agree with you, and the Secretary has already said that we are
going to concentrate, as a result of what we observed in the Middle
East war, in improving this battlefield protection. And so, this is an
area which does require attention, and we are doing that, sir.
Senator TIIURMOND. Do you feel that we can make our Hawk sys-
tem more mobile?
Admiral MoonrR. I feel that we must have systems that are more
mobile.
Senator TIIURMOND. Admiral Moorer, do we plan to make any
changes in our antitank capability by developing a new weapons sys-
tem or modifying the present system such as the TOW and Dragon?
Admiral MooxEn. Sir, the performance of the TOW, I think, is very
noteworthy. Although we will, of course, examine very closely the
results of the use of the TOW and improve where necessary, we feel
that that weapon has been very good indeed.
Senator TIIURbrOND. Admiral Moorer, what do you see as the best
course we can follow to avoid being surprised by the Soviets in the
area of strategic weapons?
Admiral MooRER. I mention that as one of the assurances that the
JCS put forward with respect to SALT I; that is, a capability of
maintaining suitable surveillance to determine what improvements,
what programs, and what construction are taking place so far as the
Soviet Union is concerned.
Senator TFHURMOND. Admiral Moorer, how does Backfire, the new
Soviet bomber, compare with the B-1 as a strategic weapons system?
Admiral MOORER. Sir, it is also a swing-wing, large aircraft. It is
not quite as large as the B-1. If the Soviet Union moves forward with
a significant tanker program, that would cause us to take an even
harder look at what the Backfire might be used for. It can certainly
reach without refueling most of the periphery of the NATO nations
and China, and with aerial refueling it can cover virtually all of the
continental United States.
Senator TFIURMOND. Admiral. Moorer, why has the Defense Depart-
ment continued to delay our Minuteman III production rather than
making a definite decision to conclude it or convert additional Minute-
man II's to the MIRV capability?
Admiral MOORER. Sir, this is one of the options, of course, that is
associated with achieving this overall essential equivalence. As is the
case with the other type strategic systems-the ICBM, the submarine,
and the bomber varieties-we are watching the SALT II negotiations.
As the Secretary already has said, we will take what action is neces-
sary to maintain this equivalence.
Secretary SolILESINGER. Senator Thurmond, may I add a word on
that?
Our objective with regard to the Minuteman III has been to main-
tain the line at minimal economic costs given a respectable rate of pro-
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duction, until such time as Ave learn what the result will be of the
SALT II negotiations. We are trying to minimize the total production
costs while keeping the line alive.
Senator Taiutza oND. Admiral Moorer, if Soviet missile accuracy
reaches a point where our Minuteman forces would become vulnerable,
what recommendation would you make to offset this disadvantage?
Admiral MoextrP.. In the first place, I do not think that in a real
exchange anyone knows precisely what the results would be. This is
why we have insisted on maintaining a TRIAD : the bomber and the
SLBM submarine, as well as the ICBM. If this situation which you
assume appears to be, in fact, coming about, then we would have to
give consideration to making land-based missiles mobile, or replacing
them with some other type of delivery vehicle. But there is no reason
for this concern today and for at least several years ahead.
Senator Txzrrr;MMOND. Admiral Moorer, as you knew, rising personnel
costs have reduced our funds for weapons definitely. I have supported
the volunteer armed forces on the groL.nd that we could get the num-
bers that would be qualified, and we could afford it. I believe we can
get the numbers, but the questions of getting the quality we need and
bang able to afford it remain question marks. Do you feel we are sig-
nificantly weakening our military posture because so many of the
defense dollars are having to go to manpower costs?
Admiral MOORER. Sir, without the Selective Service System, of
course, there is no alternative to making the pay of the military man
equivalent with that of his civilian opposite. I agree with you very
strongly that the quality is important, and in some cases, more im-
portant than quantity. The quality of the people that are attracted
over the years must be watched very carefully. If we cannot reach
both of these requirements, quality and. quantity, than we would have
no recourse but to go back to some kind of mandatory service., I
would say at the moment, however, that the indications are that we
can acquire a sufficient number of volunteers of the proper quailty.
This has been our experience recently, but with some minor deficiencies.
This is something that, as the Secretary said earlier, we have to watch
very closely, and watch those two poixres. Obviously, if we can't reach
the necessary requirements, then we wi'.l have to ta.~e other steps.
Senator Tm-RATONn. What do you see as the ultimate solution alter-
native to the manpower cost?
Admiral MOORFR. I think manpower costs are a nationwide prob-
lem-in and out of the Service. There is no real solution to it in terms
of driving the cost of manpower down. Selective Service requires an
individual to perform tasks at a wage level less than he could acquire
on the outside, thus taxing him and not the Nation. I don't think
there is any real solution, particularly in peacetime., to the problem of
substantially reducing manpower costs if, at the same time, you main-
tain the requirements of quantity and quality.
Senator THU~r.MOND. Thank you, Admiral. I think my time is
about up.
The CIIAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator McIntyre.
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Senator MCINTYRF. Admiral Moorer, on page 6 of your statement
you state : "In contrast to the Soviet Union's dramatic program, on-
going U.S. initiatives in the strategic arena are modest and deliberate."
If we discount those Soviet initiatives which are pointed toward catch-
ing up with us qualitatively where we are in the lead, wouldn't that put
our program in closer balance, and wouldn't the balance tip strongly
in our favor if we examine our respective research and development
efforts and give consideration to our strategic cruise missile develop-
ments-$120 million you have got this year on this program-and the
advanced ballistic reentry system which has your MIRV going on,
and MIRV coming up. Wouldn't the balance tip strongly in our favor
once you give up the idea that they are trying to catch up with us
qualitatively, if you then take a look at the new areas we are work-
ing in?
Admiral MOORFR. I think you could draw that conclusion, Sena-
tor. But here again we must watch the progress of SALT II. What
we are trying to do is to acquire essential equivalence. The United
States is making a very honest and straightforward effort to reduce
the overall force levels. The Soviet Union certainly is moving for-
ward at one time with four missiles which are, in terms of quality,
far superior to the numerically superior ones it has deployed already.
All of these things must be looked at in order to arrive at the overall
balance. That is why the Secretary made the point, I believe, that
every program we start is not necessarily going to go into production.
But we need those hedges.
.Senator MOINTYim. You are always going to meet that great argu-
ment, the sunken cost. You have heard that theory.
Admiral MooRFR. Yes, sir.
Senator MCINTYRE. That is a tough one to beat in conference on
the House side; we have already spent x billions of dollars, and we
can't lose it.
Mr. Secretary, last week the staffs of the four congressional com-
mittees responsible for authorization and appropriation of funds for
the Department of Defense were briefed on the fiscal year 1975 De-
fense budget. You appeared at that time and stated in response to a
question on bargaining chips for the forthcoming round of SALT
talks that the most important impression that the United States could
make upon the Soviets is that the Congress and the American people are
in complete accord with the policy of this administration concerning
further reduction in strategic nuclear weapons based on a concept
of parity. You also stated that this would be more significant than
merely investing in new developmental programs. If a sense-of-the-
Congress resolution stating this position was adopted by both Rouses,
would you be prepared to terminate, slow down, or defer new strategic
developments proposed for fiscal year 1975?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I would have to take a look at the details
of that resolution, Senator. Let me try and amplify my remarks to
ensure that they are precise.
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What I did say was that the most important bargaining chip is the
evident will and determination of the American public as expressed
through Congress, which is far more important than the acquisition
of specific weapon systems. I also indicated at that time that if the
Congress were to authorize the Department to spend $15 or $20 bil-
lion for the necessary R. & D. without going ahead on deployment
before coming back each year and telling the Congress what the state
is of the Soviet program, and what steps the United States would
have to take to match it and maintain essential equivalence, that would
be a very powerful bargaining chip, and more so than the deployment
of forces and the purchase of additional equipments.
I think that I should emphasize that I was referring to deferring
deployment rather than the necessary R. & D. on capabilities.
Senator MCINTYRE. I don't want to take too much time. But you
have made it very clear that one of the most important things for
SALT is that the American people back this budget request of yours.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I was not making a, budget plea at that
time; I was making a general observation.
Senator MCINTYRE. I thought that was a very strong thing, to get
across the word that we not be second. I believe .Admiral Moorer said,
"Tom, if you are going to be second, you might as well be 15th."
I want to ask you, please pay attention to the fact that if the sense
of the Congress resolution backed up the need for parity, would that
affect some of your thinking, if the American people were behind it?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. It might well, Senator.
Senator MCINTYRE. If you have any other thoughts on that question
I would appreciate it if you would provide them.
Secretary SCiHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator MCINTYRE. You mentioned that :retargeting does not
require- increased accuracy.
Secretary SCHLESINGER*. That is correct. The change in strategic doc-
trine does not require increased accuracy.
Senator MCINTYRE. I want to be sure you said that, because a ques-
tion is coming up. You mentioned that retargeting does not require
increased accuracy
Secretary SCHLESINGER. The change in targeting doctrine rather
than retargeting.
Senator MCINTYRE. All right. If this is so, why develop increased
accuracy, since, as you well know-a.-Id it scares some of us-this could
be interpreted by the Soviets as a destabilizing move and a turn
toward first strike capability. Wouldn't this invite an acceleration of
the strategic arms race?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, I do not think that it would invite
an acceleration of the strategic arms race. I think that accuracy in
itself should not be made the culprit or the symbol of the inability of
either side to acquire a first strike disarming capability. As I indicated
earlier, a first strike disarming capability is, for better or worse, be-
yond the reach of either side. We have treated accuracy as a symbol
of the inability and the unwillingness of either side to reach for a
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first-strike disarming capability. Accuracy itself would help sub-
stantially and it would augment the change in targeting doctrine. But
it is not essential for that change, although it does improve the
performance
Senator MCINTYRE. I think that may clarify your case a little. I am
not sure yet.
Admiral Moorer, I want to ask you a question. Why is there a
need for the Navy to begin developing a low cost fighter when the Air
Force lightweight fighter program can be used as a basis for both
services?
Admiral MOORER. I think here again, sir, this is simply a multiple
development hedge to see whether it is possible to acquire a capability
of this kind at a lower cost.
Perhaps the secretary wants to comment on that.
Senator MCINTYRE. We will try to put them together
Secretary SCIILESINGER. I think that is an excellent question, sir, and
we shall continue to look at the two programs simultaneously.
Senator MCINTYrE. It is the greatest thing in the world, Mr. Secre-
tary, to try to get these services to get together. They like to get to-
gether, but when they do they start to fight and compete against each
other.
Secretary SCIILESINGE R. It may be the greatest thing in the world,
but it is not the easiest thing in the world.
Senator MCINTYRE. On the B-1, I think it is a fair question, but
probably Secretary McLucas would be better. But I am going to ask
you, Mr. Secretary, because it does involve something that we fellows
who fool around with this R. & D. stuff and try to understand it are
getting confused about. I am sure you will get confused before you get
through with it too. You have stated that there has been no production
decision on the B-1 promise, nor is any required this year. You have
also stated that you adhere to the fly-before-buy policy for weapons
system procurements. The Air Force, however, advises that fiscal year
1975 budget includes funds for either B-1 aircraft to be configured as a
production aircraft and to be later included in the operational inven-
tory. The program as previously structured was presented as a fly-
before-buy program. Does DOD plan to have a firm procurement
policy for all programs, or will each program be fitted with a procure-
ment policy of its own?And as I go by this, I am thinking of what you
did on Sam-D.
The last part. If this new B-1 aircraft and another one planned for
fiscal year 1'976 by the Air Force are to be configured as production air-
craft, then they will probably require-look out-production-type
tooling and engineering. How much of this production-type effort do
you plan before making a production decision?
Is that a fair question?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. That is an absolutely fair question, Senator.
I agree with the thrust of your comments that we should not uncon-
29-464-74-pt. 1-17
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sciously make a production decision and drift through the acquisi-
tion of production tooling while we, are still in the It. & D. stage. I
think that is an excellent question and its thrust is correct. I am not
prepared to answer it with a detailed response at the moment, but we
shall review the program so that what you were suggesting-that we
not drift into a production decision more or less inadvertently-does
not arise.
Senator MCINTYRE. You know what you have done to Sam-I). I
don't say that in fighting mood. Bu:t; you have said, now, let's go out
and prove this missile.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, Sir.
Senator MCINTYRE. It was kind o= a shock. But I buy it. But I see
on the B-1 that is not to be the case.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, Sir.
Senator MCINTr ui. That is how you get me confused.
Secretary SCHLESINaER. Your point is well taken. Sam-D is an ex-
ample of d program that was preceding to systems. acquisition prior to
the resolution of the technological uncertainties. However, we held
the program back so that we could resolve those technological uncer-
tainties prior to a decision to go for a system. In all cases, the B-1 in-
cluded, we reserve the decision to procure until these uncertainties
are removed. We thick it is necessary for the Ur:ited States to under-
stand these technologies. Similarly, for just the reasons that you are
setting out, we ought not to drift into a premature production decision
on the B-1.
EFFECT OF CHINESE THREAT
Senator MCINTYRE. I will just ask this for the record, because I think
it ought to be on the record. How do you see, Mr. Secretary, the evolv-
ing Chinese ICBM threat impacting on the ability of the Soviets and
the United States to agree on limiting or possibly reducing ICBM and
SLBM forces?
Secretary SCh LESINGER. It is not a favorable development, Senator.
Alairv of the studies of arms control by the arias control community
have presuppo ed a two man game, as it were. The addition of a third
party is a destabilizing element. If, for example, both the United
States and the Soviet Union were to desire to have equality with two
major opponents, you would have, arithmetically or mathematically
the portents for an astronomical growth in strategic requirements. I
think this is an issue that is not disturbing in the short term, because
the Chinese capability remains relatively small Compared to the cap-
ability of the two major suites. But in the longer run, it is a subject
that is disturbing, and we have not got a method of grappling with it
as vet.
Senator MCTNTYRE. I agree. And I think that I forget this-I tend
to look at our "friends". the Soviets, as a potential foe-please God,
never-and forget that it is t double p ?oblem.
Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The C.HAII.MAN. Thank you.
Senator Byrd.
SenatorBYnn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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257
ESCALATING PERSONNEL COSTS
Admiral 11loorer, you know I am a strong advocate of a strong de-
fense. I believe it is vital. What concerns me about our defense budget
is that when we compare 1974 with 1964, this has been a tremendous
increase of about 70 percent or more in the budget. But only 3 percent
of that increase in cost has been for weapons acquisitions, for pro-
curement, for military construction, and for R. & D., for the invest-
ment part. Another way of saying it, 97 percent of the total increase
has been for personnel costs, maintenance, and operations. Is not that
something to be greatly concerned about for the future ?
Admiral MooRER. I certainly agree with you, Senator Byrd. Here
again, the Soviets do not have the same problem. This means that for
equal budgets they are in a position to make a much larger investment
for equipment.
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Senator Byrd, may I amplify on that com-
ment?
In 1964, we had a fairly high procurement year, associated primar=
ily with acquisition for the strategic forces. We are now attempting to
keep a lid on the strategic forces. And if you look at the baseline in-
vestment, shown on this chart, we are not in as bad a position com-
pared to 1964 for the general purpose forces.
INVESTMENT OUTLAYS IN CONSTANT (FY 1975) PRICES
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258
We do have an aging problem, which 'is a source of concern. It would
be a major source of concern only if the failure of SALT were to re-
sult in significant new expenditures on the strategic forces. But the
acquisition, as you can see in that earlier timeframe, was to a large
extent devoted to strategic forces, whereas today our acquisition of
strategic forces is quite limited.
Senator BYRD. Put it another way, then. Take today's budget and
just compare it with itself, so to speak. A relatively small percentage
of that is going to P. & D. and procurement, around 30 percent. But
you don't feel t~aat is a cause for concern?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. We would, of course, prefer that the price
relationships were different. We do not feel that it is appropriate now to
tear down the force structure further. Consequently, we must moder-
ate our pace of modernization. I think ;you were quite right in raising
questions about that. We believe we have an optimal balance in the
program between modernization and the retention of force structure.
Senator BYRD. Can you project what the defense budget might be in
the period 1976 to 1980?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Assuming a relatively favorable settlement
at SALT, I think we would wish to maintain roughly the present
force structure. This implies an escalation each year in terms of price
and pay of about 6 to 7 percent. That would mean that we would have
an increase of $5 to $6 billion a year.
Senator BYRD. If there were no SALT agreement?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. If there were a SALT agreement.
Senator BYRD. $ 5 to $6 billion each year compared to the previous
year.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator BYRD. Because the personne:'L costs have increased so much,
and the ratio of personnel costs to the total budget is so high, should
not the services be able to get along with less personnel because pre-
sumably with the higher pay scales you should be, able to get better
qualified personnel? Are you frozen at '2.1 million for military person-
nel and 1 million for civilian personnel?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir. As I: indicated earlier, I think that
some reductions could be made on the civilian side if there were greater
flexibility in that area. I think we should be cautious about reducing
our military manpower further. Prior to the Vietnam war, we main-
tained approximately 2.7 million men under arms. We have dropped
back to about 2.1 million. And we have reduced the force structure.
As I have indicated, I think that the force structure is a little thin on
the general purpose forces side. But what we area trying to do is to
convert some of the bodies that we already have into combat
capability.
Senator BYnn. With the substantial 'increase in pay, is it not logical
to wssiime that you i~,et better qualified people, and would need to
have less personnel as a result?
Secretary Scrrr,r,,sINGEn. The increases in pay, Senator Byrd, pri-
marily fall under the heading of catch-up. From the time of the Korean
war until 1967, approximately---
Senator BYRD. I understand all that. But the fact is that there has
been a very substantial increase in pay. And what I am asking is,
should not that result in getting beater qualified individuals?
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REGULAR MILITARY COMPENSATION AND
CIVIL SERVICE PAY RATES
(FY 1950 a 100)
Higher Grade Military RMC
1950 , 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1950 1970 1972 1974 1976
Secretary SCIILESINGER. As is shown on this slide, the pay increase
simply compensates for the increase of pay elsewhere. If you study the
chart, we had a major lag with regard to lower rank military person-
nel, both on the officer side-lieutenants-as well as E-l's, E-2's, and
E-3's. Civil Service pay has been way out in front of military pay, even
higher grade regular military compensation. What we have done re-
cently is to catch up with a period of time-a decade or more-in
which we did not allow junior personnel to participate in the gains of
the economy.
Senator BYRD. I am not critical of that at all, and that isn't the point
I am suggesting.
Secretary SCIILTSINGER. I think the answer is, "No," we do not feel we
are going to get higher quality personnel unless we are to increase pay
factors even more than we have.
Senator BYRD. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary ScnLP]SINGER. I am sorry to say that, Senator. I wish it
were otherwise.
Senator SYMINGTON [presiding]. Senator Thurmond.
Senator TiluRMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Total Military RMC
Lower Grade
RMC
Militar
y
(E-1, E-2, E-3 0-11
:: i.....,.i .................
700 I -L I I L_1__l_ a_ L_L.
Mr. Secretary, in your statement you describe the fiscal year 1975
military manpower request as baseline force levels below which we
should not go. Why are these particular levels so vital to our defense?
Secretary SCIiLESINGER. As I indicated, Senator Thurmond, I believe
that we have become a little bit thin on the general purpose forces side,.
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T would prefer to see our general purpose forces a little bit more robust
than they presently are. For that reason we are attempting to convert
existing manpower in the support side. into combat capability without
increasing aggregate manpower. My mein concern is that by thinning;
out our conventional forces too much, the United States and its allies
would, under certain circumstances, be forced to have too early a re-
oourse to nuclear weapons. I think that is a decision that we should
seek to postpone as long as possible by a robust general purpose force
capability. I think that we are now on the thin side.
Senator TiITJT{RTOND. Mr. Secretary, are you confident that these levels
in the Active Forces can be maintained under a no-draft environment?
Secretary Scxi isINGFR. We have been doing well these last 3 months,
Senator. Prior to those last 3 months, Lae Army was making about 85
percent of its quota. If it regularly made only 85 percent of its quota,
we could not maintain these forces. We have indicated that we cannot
guarantee success, but we think that we probably can maintain the
2.1 million men.
Senator Titux-oxn. Mr. Secretary, why have Guard and Reserve
strength levels declined along with the regular force levels?
Secretary SCHSLINGF$. There are two reasons for that, Senator. One
is reflected by the question you asked previously. The disappear-
ance- of the draft has weakened incentives to join the Guard and Re-
serve Forces. As a result, we have had some reduction in the Reserve
ground forces.
This is a reflection of the fact that, in this environment, we are
unable to obtain the number of recruits that, we might have hoped
for on the Reserve Forces side. That is o_ie issue.
The other issue with regard to the reduction of Guard and Reserve
Forces refers to the air defense problems that I mentioned this morn-
ing. Given the Soviet capability, air defense seems to have low pay-
off as a way of protecting the United States aganist devastating nu-
clear attacks. We have reduced our air defense capabilities in both
the. Active duty Forces and the Reserve Forces.
Senator THURMOND. Do we have adequate incentives to attract the
Guard and Reserve members?
Secretary Scurasszxor!.r,. I believe that the results indicate that-
we are not able now, with the incentives that we have, to attract the
numbers that we might have hoped fo:. into the Guard and Reserves.
Senator TiruiiMoNi. Mr. Secretary, what is the military force level
in the fiscal year 1975 and the payroll cost? I have a figure here of
about 2.2 million people, and $19 billior. is the cost.
Secretary Sciii,FsiNGFiR. That is straight military personnel com-
pensation. Our total costs of people amounts to 55 percent of the budget
request of $92 billion, which is about $50 billion.
Senator Tiiviintoxn. What is the civilian personnel level in the De-
partment of Defense for 1975, and what is the payroll cost?
Secretary Sciff FsiNGrx. The civilian personnel level is approxi-
mately 1 million people, and the payroll cost is approximately $15
billion.
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Senator TIItnnroND. I have about $14 billion. So it is approximately
correct.
Mr. Secretary, on what basis do you justify an increase of 30,000
civilian personnel in 1974? And I believe you have covered that
partially. But how would you explain that to, the public-how would
we explain it?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. There were two aspects to it, Senator Thur-
mond. One is the civilianization program, by which we are attempting
to turn some jobs that previously were performed by military person-
nel into civilian jobs. This partly reflects some difficulty in acquiring
the appropriate number of recruits for all of the jobs. Also, the Civil
Service provides you with greater stability in many jobs. This has
caused an augmentation of our civilian work force.
Senator TIIURMOND. In effect, if you have reduced the military per-
sonnel, which I believe you have, but you are increasing the civilian
personnel, you really don't bring about very much reduction, do you?
Secretary SCHL ESINGER. That is correct, not in the aggregate. We
are saying two things. First, that some of the jobs previously held by
uniformed military can be performed by civilians. Second, that we
probably can reduce the civilian payroll, but not efficiently under the
existing statutes governing retirement.
Senator TFIURMOND. Mr. Secretary, what jobs were civilians doing
in the military system that could not be performed at less cost by
military personnel?
Secretary SCH ESINGER. To give a complete answer, I would have to
submit that for the record. Senator Thuriuond.
[The information follows:]
When we were drafting people, we would from time to time get draftees with
a high degree of skill in some expensive specialty, such as mathematicians and
computer programers. When we then used those people in those specialties, we
obtained their services at far less cost than that of a civilian of comparable
talent. But those are exceptions and, in any event, irrelevant today. We have
paid close attention to the relative costs of those military positions which have
been converted to civilian during the past decade ; on an average basis the conse-
quence of the conversion has been a saving to the Department of Defense and an
even larger saving to the Government as a whole. We have done this through,
analysis of the military and civilian grades, and the differential costs attributable
to each. On a position-by-position basis, the net cost/savings has typically come
to near zero, but the extra reduction in military strength has always produced
a net saving. This is the pipeline support (principally trainees) required for the
? military but not for the civilian work force. Thus, if we convert 1,000 military
jobs, we would increase the civilian force by 1,000 but we would cut the military
force by about 1,200. Those extra 200 reductions in military strength make the
difference. In the present substitution program, we plan to do the same type of
analysis on a specialty-by-specialty basis. We may find some specialties wherein
military personnel are less costly but expect that their number will be small.
Senator TIIURMOND. Mr. Secretary, DOD strength levels have
drained, but personnel costs still amount to around 56 percent of the
Defense budget. I believe you said 55.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator TIIURMOND. I have the figure of 56.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think it is down just a trace this year, a
few tenths of a percent from fiscal year 1973.
Senator TIIURMOND. Do you feel that the personnel costs are stabiliz-
ing at this level?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. We hope to hold it in this range.
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Senator THURMOND. Is there any way to get any assurance of doing
that?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir. I think, though, that if there were
another move in the arms race and we were forced to acquire weapon
systems more rapidly than we presently are, we would reduce the rel-
ative proportion of personnel costs.
Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I have some questions here on
air defense that I think are right important, but rather than to take
the time of the committee, if it meets the approval of the chairman,
I will just pass them on to you and let you answer them for the record.
Senator SYMINGTON. Without objection.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.
[Questions submitted by Senator Thurmo:Zd. Answers supplied by the Depart-
ment of Defense.]
Question. In view of the reductions in ou? Air Defense forces proposed in the
budget, how much Air Defense do you feel is necessary to protect against a
bomber attack?
Answer. Surveillance and peacetime control of our airspace and warning of
a bomber attack are the primary missions of the CONUS air defense force. For
the airspace surveillance and control mission, a force of about 200 interceptors
properly deployed around the periphery of the country appears to be sufficient.
Although we are not structuring our force to accomplish bomber defense, the
planned force will provide defense against a limited attack, e.g., one mounted
from a neighboring country such as Cuba. i'urthermore, in a crisis our CONUS
air defense force, augmented with general purpose forces, may provide limited
defense against bomber attacks such as those that could be mounted by the
Soviet Union. Maintaining air defenses which could effectively defend against
Soviet bomber attacks, however, is not sound or feasible in an era of large Soviet
ballistic missile forces against which we cannot defend.
Question. What savings are being realized by these reductions?
Answer. Although not all the scheduled CONUS air defense reductions will be
completed during FY 1975, we expect savings of about $ 70 million in FY 1975.
Once the reductions are completed, we expect even greater per year savings, or
about $760 million over the FY 1975-1979 period.
Question. Is AWACS being developed and procured for the Air Defense role?
Answer. AWACS is being procured primarily for control of our theater offen-
sive and defensive air forces. When not deployed oveaseas in support of our
theater forces, the AWACS aircraft are to be assigned to a geneal purpose pool,
and therefore, should be available for continental air defense. However, the
number available in the United States at any one time will be variable.
Question. How many AWACS planes are to be bought: and what is the total
R&D and procurement cost of this program?
Answer. We tentatively plan to buy a total of 34 AWACS aircraft (including
the three refurbished DT&E aircraft). We .plan to purchase 12 aircraft per year
beginning in FY 1975. In considering production, each annual procurement would
be considered as a separate block of aircraft as well as it separate decision. We
estimate total RDT&E costs to be about $ L.2 billion and, assuming 34 aircraft
are bought, the procurement costs would be about $1.3 billion.
Question. Will tactical aircraft, as opposed to interceptors be used for Air
Defense? -low many?
Answer. Potentially, all tactical and training resources in the United States
are available for continental air defense in times of crisis. However, some of
these resources are scheduled for deployment overseas in support of our over-
seas commitments, and may not be available for CONUS air defense. We anti-
cipate that 200-300 Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft normally eta-
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tioned in CONUS could be commited to CONUS air defense if no units are
deployed overseas. If some units are deployed overseas, 100-200 aircraft will be
available in CONUS to augment our air defenses.
Question. Does DOD plan to buy any F-15s or F-14s for the Air Defense
mission? How many?
Answer. We are not now planning to buy either the F-14 or the F-15 for the
CONUS air defense mission. Since these aircraft are being bought for fleet and
theater air defense, we will continue to have the option to procure additional
aircraft of either type for the CONUS defense role. Further, some F-14 and F-15
units will be stationed in the United States, and may be available to augment the
CONUS air defense force if needed.
Question. Is the NORAD or ADC headquarters being reduced because of the
Air Defense cutback?
Answer. No. In June of 1973, these two headquarters were consolidated as a
part of a management improvement program. A manpower savings of 904 spaces,
including ten general officer and twenty-six colonel positions, was accomplished.
Because of the phase-out of Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile forces from the
Strategic Air Defense Mission, the Army plans to deactivate the Army Air De-
fense Command (ARADCOM) and its headquarters at Colorado Springs. This
deactivation, based upon the Air Defense cutback, should result in further reduc-
tions to the CONAD Headquarters staff. No further reduction in the Aerospace
Defense Command (ADC) headquarters is planned at this time.
Question. Can the Air Defense mission be fully met with the forces remaining
after these force level reductions?
Answer. Yes. Surveillance and peacetime control of U.S. airspace can be fully
met with the CONUS air defense forces remaining after the reductions.
Question. What missile will replace the Nike-Hercules missile in the continen-
tal Air Defense role?
Answer. We are not now planning to replace the CONUS air defense Nike-
Hercules missile units that are being phased out because surface-to-air missiles
are not needed for airspace surveillance and control.
Question. Where will SAM-D be used for Air Defense, in the United States or
Europe?
Answer. SAM-D is being developed principally for field army air defense.
It would be deployed primarily in support of U.S. Army units overseas, with
most of the overseas deployments providing air defenses for our forces stationed
in Europe. However, about one third of the SAM-D fire units probably would be
based in the continental United States. If available, they could be used for
Continental Air Defense.
Question. Are the trained manpower resource in the Air and Army National
Guard units being converted to other roles?
Answer. In the Army National Guard, we have authorized the retention and
application of the technician spaces made available as a result of the Nike-
Hercules reductions to other areas of the Army National Guard where techni-
cian shortages exist.
In both the Army and Air National Guard, every effort is made to place
excess technicians against other known vacancies. Civil Service reduction in
force procedures apply and, where technicians cannot be placed in other jobs,
separation allowances are paid.
Military paid drill personnel are authorized and encouraged to transfer first
to other Guard units, and second to other Reserve Component activities within
reasonable distance of the reservist's residence.
The Army Guard units themselves are deactivated and cease to exist since,
at the present time, there are either no other roles or equipment available
to assign to these units. Under these circumstances, there will be some loss of
skilled personnel.
Although the current program calls for Air National Guard Fighter Interceptor
Squadron deactivations, we are studying roles and missions for these units. This
is also being considered by the OSD Study Group for the Guard and Reserve
in the Total Force.
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Question. Recognizing Air Defense is a mission particularly suitable to the
Air Guard, have you considered transferring more of the remaining units from
the Regular to the Guard? Would this be cheaper?
Answer. Yes, we have considered transferring some of the remaining Air
Defense units to the Air National Guard and have determined that the current
force mix provides the most suitable Air Defense posture through FY 1975.
We have retained an option to reexamine the Air Defense force structure by
keeping six squadrons of F-101s in the ANG inventory during FY 1975, squadrons
which we had earlier planned to eliminate.
We have achieved cost reductions through elimination of the F-102s in FY
1975.
It may be possible to achieve further cos?; reductions by transfer of some of
the remaining Active force F-106s to the Air National Guard.
In any event, the force mix of Air Defense interceptors between the Active
and the Air National Guard will be that mix we determine :o be the most effective
and economical within the constraints of prudent risk.
Question. Has a definite study been made to determine what roles now being
performed by the Regulars could be transferred to Reservists and Guardsmen?
Answer. No, but in August 1973 I directed that a Study of the Guard and Re-
serve in the Total Force be, undertaken. This study, which includes considerations
of availability, force mix, limitation and potential of the Selected Reserve in a
national emergency, specifically addresses the task of identifying Active force
missions which are economically and militarily suitable for transfer to Guard
and Reserve forces. The study will be completed in the fall of 1974.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, once tactical nuclear weapons
in Europe have been used, presumably in a possible conflict with the
Soviet Union, do you believe the war could be prevented from escalat-
ing to a nuclear exchange on a strategic level?
Secretary SCIta SINGER. It could be. Senator. It all depends on the
circumstances.
Senator SYMINGTON. At what level of confrontation do you believe
there can be a, natural and well-recognized division line?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I am sorry, Senator, did you say division
line?
Senator SYMING'roN. Yes.
Secretary SCIILESINGER. I think for that to occur, nuclear weapons
would have to be employed in small numbers, and in clearly defined lo-
calities, rather than generally.
Senator SYMINGTON. Could you give us an example of possible sce-
narios of (1) surgical strategic strikes; and (2) a tactical nuclear war
in Europe that would not result in escalation to an all out nuclear
exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir, but I would prefer to do that in
classified session.
Senator SYMINGTON. What is your estimate of the collateral damage
to the civilian population that would result from the limited surgical
exchanges just noted?
Secretary Sc11LESINGER. I would have to provide you with data else-
where. I)id you say civilians?
Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.
Secretary SCIiLESINGER. That could range in the area of the tens of
thousands.
Senator SYMINGTON. We had some hearings in the Joint Atomic
Energy Committee with the premise there was or would be a clean
bomb.
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Secretary SCIILESINGER. I think there is no clean bomb. There are
bombs that are cleaner than others, but there is no clean bomb.
Senator SYMINGTON. That is why I asked you about the collateral
damage to the civilian population.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. How much money is requested in
the fiscal 1975 budget to implement this counterforce doctrine?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Our request for the retargeting capabili-
ties is in the order of $100 million.
Senator SYMINGTON. Not in billion?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir. I am referring to the strategic data.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you give us the estimated figure?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
The FY 1.975 Defense Budget includes $33 million to complete development
and to continue procurement of the Command Data Buffer ; and $65 million for
the following development efforts :
Technology development [deleted] of Poseidon warheads to give SLBMs
an increased flexibility ;
Improvements in our ability to detect and process information concerning
enemy missile launches ;
Development of a survivable nuclear burst reporting system ;
Increased data handling and communications capability to improve the
flexibility of our forces.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Is it planned to improve the ac-
curacy of both the Minuteman and Polaris Poseidon as well as to pro-
vide a retargeting capability for those two components of the TRIAD?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. If you permit me to answer the following
question, we would be improving the retargeting and the accuracy of
both ICBM's and SLBM's, not necessarily the Poseidon or the Polaris.
Senator SYMINGTON. What effect do you believe this newly
announced counterforce strategy will have on any possible success at
SALT IT?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, may I emphasize once again that
we have no announced counterforce strategy, if by counterforce one
infers that one is going to attempt to destroy silos. We have a new
targeting doctrine that emphasizes selectivity and flexibility. But
counterforce as it is usually interpreted-going after a large array of
strategic nuclear targets-is not our intention. Consequently, I would
expect that our new targeting doctrine would not have an adverse
effect on SALT IT. Any discussion is open in SALT II that will re-
strain the overall capabilities of the two sides. We are prepared to
restrain our own capabilities, and we trust the Soviets are equally
willing to restrain the growth of their capabilities.
Senator SYMINGTON. I have some questions on Diego-Garcia, but
will get into those in the supplemental.
You advised we go over and look at our forces in Europe. I have
been going over nearly every year since 1950. I was. shocked, as I am
sure everybody else was who was interested in our position in Europe,
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when the French pulled out. Do you believe our forces in Europe
today, without the support of France in NATO, constitute a true
shield?
.Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think we have got enough room to
manipulate armies without the French?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I don't think we have enough, but I think
the Soviets, looking out at 700,000-plus men under arms west of the
Elbe, regard that as a formidable deterrent. As long as the Soviet
marshals are not in a position to give a high confidence of success esti-
mate to their colleagues in the Politburo, I think that is an indication
of the relative effectiveness of our conventional shield.
Senator SYMINGTON. I don't understand that.
You say in your statement : "The fiscal year 1975 budget outlays
continue for the second year to claim less than 6 percent of the gross
national product." What do you estimate the gross national product
will be for 1975?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. It will be about $1.4 trillion. I can insert
the precise number in the record.
Senator SYMINGTON. 1.4 trillion?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. The GNP estimate for fiscal year 1975 is
$1,455 billion.
Senator SYMINGTON. What contingency is needed for the additional
one-third division that is being set up.
Secretary SCHLE.SINGER. As I have indicated, I think that we have
been on the thin side and that the reflection of our force structure
on the general-purpose forces side has been taken because of budgetary
pressures rather than because of the contingencies that we faced. I
think the additional one-third division is related to our overall pos-
ture, notably the conventional reinforcement in Western Europe.
Senator SYMINGTON. Has there been any change in our M-60 tank
position as a result of the Mideast War?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir, and when you deal with the sup-
plemental request you will see a reflection of that change.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you file for the record the definition of
an attack helicopter?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
An attack helicopter is one which, because of its armament and weapons, pro-
vides antitank/antivehicle, and antipersonnel capabilities in support of in-
fantry and armored units.
Senator SYMINGTON. Is the Sea Control Ship ran aircraft carrier?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. It carries aircraft. ) regard it as a mini-
aircraft carrier. I am not sure that Navy people regard it as an aircraft
carrier.
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Senator SYMINGTON. Admiral, I would ask some questions of you on
these matters, but didn't see your statement before you came up today.
Are the characteristics of the Harpoon classified that you re-
ferred to?
Admiral MooRER. Some of the performance is, yes, sir. But the fact
that there is a Harpoon which can be adapted to aircraft, ships and
submarines is not classified.
Senator SYMINGTON. Is the military working, Mr. Secretary to get
a STOL ?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. The answer is yes. We can give you a more
precise answer on the record.
Senator SYMINGTON. Will you do that?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Yes, sir.
[The information followsj
Yes. The major military STOL effort is directly associated with the VSTOL
programs. The useful payload of VTOL aircraft such as the AV8-A and the
XFV12-A increases rapidly when a short rolling take off is permitted. This addi-
tional payload capability is considered in developing mission profiles and capabili-
ties. STOL payload is not a design requirement however, since the VTOL vertical
lift and controlability dictate the aircraft design.
Senator SYMINGTON. If something to this end isn't done it will be
the first time that I know of where the military obtained a fallout
from a commercial venture.
In your statement you say we must recruit "one of every three
eligible and available men." Do you think we can do that?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I am hopeful, Senator.
Senator SYMINGTON. Have you a record of the cost of your recruit-
effort, including the advertising?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. We can insert that into the record.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you do that?
[The information follows:]
RECRUITING/ADVERTISING BUDGETS I FOR ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL FISCAL YEARS 1973-75
[In millions of dollars]
Army '------------------------------------------------------------
135.1
181.1
196.3
Navy 3-----------------------------------------------------------
92.8
105.1
110.3
Marine Corps-----------------------------------------------------
37.8
40.6
40.8
Air Force---------------------------------------------------------
56.1
63.5
61.6
Recruiting station leases + ----------------------------------------
13.7
13.5
28.5
DOD advertising fund----------------------------------------------
0
3.6
8. 0
I Excludes operation and personnel expenses for AFEES.
2 Includes funds for unit of choice recruiters and a reporgraming request for fiscal year 1974 which has not yet received
fina DOD approval.
3Includes funds to recruit 2 by 6 reservists and certain support funds for other Naval Reserve programs.
4 Army acts as executive agent for leasing program. Increase in fiscal year 1975 is due to the enactment of Public Law
92-313 which affected the transfer of GSA funding for recruiting leases to Army and levied additional user charges for
stations occupying Government space.
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Senator SYMINGTON. You say-and this is only for information-
that at least 82 percent of all new enlistees will be of average or above
average mental ability, and at least 55 percent be high school gritdu-
ates. Ifow do you figure 82-percent average or above average'?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. The 18 percent refers to mental. group IV.
Senator SYMINGTON. Would you supply information on this for the
record, the percentage of that group in the Army 5 years ago, and
what it is today, and what it is extrapolated to be 5 years from now.
Secretary SCIILESINGER. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
In 19(59, all new male accessions into the Military Services were tested on the
Armed Forces Qualification Test. The AFQT was a 50-minute test to measure
military trainability. Since the end of the draft, the Military Services have
moved toward the use of more comprehensive aptitude test batteries for deter-
mining eligibility for military service, enlistment guarantees and assignment to
military occupations. For comparative purposes, these new aptitude tests are now
converted to the old mental groupings. The data for the Army for the first seven
months of FY 1974 show that 19% of its new enlisted accessions were in mental
group TV. In FY 1969, 28% of Army enlistees and inductees were mental group
IVs. The proportion of mental group IVs enlisted five years from now is esti-
mated to be about 18%.
Senator SYMINGTON. Do you recommend altering any of the rules of
comparabilit in military pay?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think, Senator, that it would be premature
for me to answer that question. I shall study it and give you a re-
sponse. That is something that deserves careful study.
[The information follows:]
We submitted a legislative proposal in March 1973, recommending a modifica-
tion of the present method expressed in law for the allocation of matching pay
increases for military personnel. It was introduced in the Congress in Septem-
ber, 1973, as H.R. 10370. Experience since submission of that legislative proposal
indicates needed improvement in the bill of both a technical and substantive
nature. We are preparing a revised proposal which would modify and correct
last year's recommendation. We expect to submit our revised proposal in the
near future.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
How do you justify your fly-before-buy position when you are
purchasing 10 Trident submarines at some $1,300 million a piece be-
fore you have completed one?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. The reactor of the submarines, or course,
has been prototyped. The development of the hull is a straightforward
technological development. I think the question of the state of the
art applies primarily to the missile rather than to the ship itself.
Senator SYMINGTON. So your answer is?
Secretary SCIILESINGER. My answer on that is that the degree of
prototyping in advance is dependent upon the degree to -which one is
pushing the state of the art. For that reason, one should follow a
strict fliT-before-buy policy with fairly sophisticated aircraft. frith
other kinds of developments that do not push the state of the art, one
can ameliorate the requirements.
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Senator SYMINGTON. So you don't think there is any dichotomy in
the Trident program and the fly-before-buy policy?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. That would be overstating it, Senator. I
think you have put your finger on something of a dilemma, and I tried
to answer that without defining that there is a dilemma.
Senator SY MINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Again, I will be quite brief here.
CAPABILITY Or OUR NATO ALLIES
Mr. Secretary, on page 6 of your statement you say in effect that the
capability of our ahies in Western Europe has remained essentially
constant. I am pro NATO but I want to ask you to just open up and
tell us what you know on tins. If there are any facts now that indicate
that there is a growing threat, sober threat, why aren't those allies
doing more to increase their capabilities? In other words, somebody
is mistaken about this threat. If it is as bad as you gentlemen think
it is-and I know you think it is that way-those people that live
closer to it, it seems to me, would have at least as firm and as strong
ideas about it, and would be s~.urrying around doing more about it.
You are a man that is quick to grasp things. You have been in the
Pentagon several months now. What is your idea about this?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, I can only point to the fact that
there is a difference between the logical inferences that the Europeans
might draw and the psychological forces at work.
Let me say with regard to their capabilities that on the one hand
they have not increased their force structures. However, there is a
substantial upgrading program in terms of the equipments which are
resulting in larger budgets. This program has not been sufficiently
rapid for our satisfaction.
There is-di~ tendency, I think, to say that the Soviets are so formi-
dable that there is no point in doing anything; that whatever the allies
do, the Warsaw Pact will dominate them.
Under those circumstances there is some large-scale tokenism on the
part of our allies, who put up forces sufficient to keep the Americans
happy and to retain an American .presence in Europe, but which is
not devoted to counterbalancing the forces to the East. And I think
that psychology is changing-I hope it is-but I cannot report com-
plete success.
The point you are making is very well taken. The only answer is,
in part, that, given the interdependence of all of our western society,,
the allies must perceive the need and be willing to make the sacrifice,
in order to get the end results that you refer to.
The CHAIRMAN. I don't remember that I mentioned this to you gen-
tlemen or not. But we want to have a special hearing where some of
you put it together with reference to the lessons you learned from
this war, about weapons, and all. And I hope we don't run into a sit-
uation where one service thinks one thing and one another. We can't
decide that as between services. But what is the changed situation-
at least have a statement upon which there is agreement, and then be-
low the line you can put the disagreement.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
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Admiral MoollEn. Mr. Chairman, I don't think there is any disagree-
ment with respect to the lessons learned. We would be very happy to
supply it. It is in my military posture; statement, which will be sub-
mitted later.
[The information follows:]
No discussion of the relative military posture between the US and USSR would
be complete without an analysis of the recent conflict in the Middle East; its
genesis, lessons, and consequences in terms of US interests in the area.
Strategically, the Middle East is important because of two major factors-one
geographical and the other geological. Geographically, the Middle East is the
corridor connecting the Eastern Hemisphere's three major continents, it is the
avenue through which a Soviet strategic line of communication to the Far East
may be established. The advent of supertankers and intercontinental aircraft may
have lessened the area's geographical importance, but certainly has not eliminated
it. In addition, the eastern Mediterranean is vital to the defense of NATO's south-
ern flank. Geologically, the primary resource of the Middle East is oil. Middle East
oil supplied 13 percent of pre-boycott US demand, 75 percent of Western Europe's,
and 85 percent of Japan's. Within the next c.ecade, there is not likely to be sig-
nificant diminution in the dependence of the industrialized West and Japan on
the Middle East. Prior to initiation of the President's Energy Program, projec-
tions indicated that the US could require Middle East oil to fulfill over 30 per-
cent of our needs in the 1980's. One-third of the non-Communist world's supply of
oil is projected to come from Saudi Arabia and Iran alone.
Superimposed on these strategic considerations is the longstanding political
commitment made by both the Congress and the President to the survival of
Israel. The credibility of this commitment, lice all other U.S. international obli-
gations, depends on the proven past record of performance by the United States,
including the performance of our Armed Forces. Further complicating the situa-
tion is the fact that the area is the birthplace of three of the world's grea.t
religions.
It is against this background that the varied, compound, and interdependent
objectives of the United States must be viewed. Peace and stability are our prin-
cipal national objectives, and defusing the Middle East crisis is central to global
security. This point, where the interests of major powers converge, has all the
necessary ingredients for being the cockpit for great power confrontation ; and
yet, there are political and military forces at work well outside the scope of the
usual "Communist" and "Free World" Interface. The area threatens to be the
"Balkans" of the late 20th Century.
Second only to peace is the crucial need to insure access for both the U.S. and
her allies to the energy resources of the area. Until substitute energy sources
are established, we will remain dependent, in part, upon oil from the Middle East.
Also .present here is the potential for divisiveness which could damage severely
the cohesion of the Atlantic community and iJ.S.-Japanese relations. The frag-
mentation of U.S. alliances which could result from the issue is a matter of
grave concern. Since diplomatic efforts to reduce this potential divisiveness
continue.
A further U.S. goal remains the denial of hegemony over this strategic area by
the Soviet Union or any other power with interests inimical to the United
States-ambitions not unknown to Russian history. Domination of the area by
such a power would endanger NATO's southern flank, reduce U.S. mobility, and
endanger our lines of communication. It also would sever the economic and mili-
tary relationships we have so carefully nurtured in the interest of the region's
stability, progress, and independence.
On October 6, 1973, the diversity, turmoil, mutual fear, and mistrust, rampant
in the region, again passed over the threshold of semi-controlled tension-neither
war nor peace-into conflict for the fourth time since Israel's founding. A com-
bined Arab force of over 2,000 tanks and 100,000 infantry, engaged an as yet not
fully mobilized Israeli force of about 400 tanks and 5000 infantry, simultane-
ously, in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. The conflict was violent and costly.
The supply and re-equipping of the Arab states by the Soviet Union is estimated
to have cost in excess of $2.6 billion. Efforts to insure an uninterrupted flow of
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supplies to Israel during the conflict in order to maintain a balance of forces
in the area, resulted in U.S. expenditures of about $1 billion, including airlift op-
erating costs of $42 million. Congress promptly enacted an Emergency Security
Assistance Act providing $2.2 billion for Israel. When the ceasefire became effec-
tive on October 24, 1973, the Israelis held the dominant terrain in the Golan
Heights and a sizable new segment of Syrian territory. On the Sinai front,
Israel had established a bridgehead across the Suez Canal and nearly surrounded
the Egyptian 3d Army of about 25,000 men. The Soviet Union had a naval force
of 96 ships, including 29 modern surface combatants and 23 submarines, in the
Mediterranean-at their peak strength-a force equal to the total number of
such ships operated out of home waters by the USSR worldwide in 1969.
There has been much commentary and repeated analysis of this conflict, a
great deal of which would give the impression that a new era of warfare has been
entered and that the "lessons learned" are of such significance that new mili-
tary texts are required. In my view, this impression is unjustified. Time-honored
strategic and tactical concepts have been underlined, reinforced, and footnoted-
not repealed or replaced. These footnotes to military history are, however, im-
portant and worthy of consideration.
First, ready, in-being, deployed forces are essential to maintaining the terri-
torial integrity of any area whose defense is required. The October War pre-
sented striking illustrations of two considerations which traditionally have sup-
ported this concept. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) intelligence organization
possesses a well-deserved reputation for excellence ; yet, the attackers were able
to achieve almost complete strategic surprise. They masked their preparations
behind a facade of routine exercises, a carefully executed political deception plan,
a cloak of secrecy, and good communications security, including extensive secure
landline communications.
Military capability has been described as being the product of men, material,
and morale, with the result that as any one factor approaches zero-capability ap-
proaches zero. This war, like most, was decided primarily by the impact of lead-
ership, ability, and training.
The IDF faced a force with qualitative and quantitative advantages in equip-
ment, quantitative advantages in personnel, and the benefit of tactical surprise.
The attacking force executed a thoroughly rehearsed simple plan and gained their
initial objectives. However, the IDF ultimately achieved dominant positions on
both fronts.
Adaptability and flexibility of leadership were characteristics very apparent in
the IDF. The initiative displayed by officers of all ranks was often the key to suc-
cess. IDF doctrine requires commanders to stay forward to "read the battle."
Although the price was high, the advantages gained through decisive leadership
at the critical moment made the losses worthwhile. On the other hand, the
Egyptians and Syrians were well trained in manning Soviet equipment and exe-
cuting Soviet tactics.
This conflict reaffirmed that in the last analysis, the success or failure of an
investment in national security depends upon the ability to attract to the service
of the country (both active and reserve) outstanding young men and women who
will rise to positions of military leadership responsibility. There is a difference
between leadership and management. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of
personality, vision, and training. Its practice is an art. Management is a science
and of the mind. Managers are necessary ; leaders are indispensable. We, too,
must continue to create and inspire military leaders-junior and senior.
Additionally, the classic doctrine that the priority of employment of air assets
must be given to gaining and maintaining air superiority over the battlefield
has been proven once again. Today, gaining air superiority includes defeating
enemy SAMs in detail. Until enemy air defenses are degraded, any application of
aerial firepower will be costly, but the losses will go down as air defenses are
taken out. This was made clear during the LINEBACKER II operation in North
Vietnam and again during the Middle East War. In the interim, ground forces
must be capable of fighting with reduced reliance upon close air support. This
can be accomplished by continuing to equip and maintain a balanced, mutually
supporting, combined arms team of infantry, artillery, and armor.
The Soviet Union has devoted considerable effort toward development of a SAM
and AAA capability, and in both Vietnam and the Middle East, has demonstrated
a willingness to deploy SAMs and AAA extensively outside the Soviet Union and
Warsaw Pact countries. The surface-to-air arsenal provided to the Arabs includes
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SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, and SA-7 missile systems; 57mm, 55::nm, and 100mm guns
with FIRE CAN fire control radar ; and ZSU-23-4, ZPU-4, ZPU-1, and 37mm
pins -smaller crew-served weapons and individual weapons. In both Egypt and
Syria, SAM systems were well forward, with many firing units located within
about 50 km of the line of contact. Additionally, massive numbers of SA-7 mis-
siles (both hand-held'and possibly mounted on BRDMs) and AAA guns were in
the same area. Supporting these weapon systems was a surveillance radar system
providing complete overlapping coverage at all altitudes. This defensive belt was
both dense and thick. In order to achieve air superiority in the face of such
defenses, it is necessary to avoid, suppress, or destroy such systems. ECi{ and
the ability to locate and destroy mobile SAM;s must be mocern and sophisticated.
Standoff weapons can play a major role in this effort. The Air Force is applying
special management emphasis to the accelerated development and procurement
of systems to suppress air defense.
On the other side of the coin, we know that a land army can provide initial
defense against a modern tactical air attack by extensive employment of mobile,
integrated surface-to-air missile system ; but for defense in depth, these ground
force weapons must be complemented by air superiority fighters. We are de-
veloping, therefore, a program to provide a more mobile. capable, and respon-
sive family of battlefield air defense weapons and are reexamining deployment
tactics and the basis for determining surface-to-air launcher levels.
Finally, the lessons and impact of the war with regard to direct US opera-
tions should be addressed. Three facets are of particular concern ; supply levels
and production base, mobility, and operating bases.
The enormous expenditure of missiles, artillery shells, and anti-tank muni-
tions, together with the level of equipment attrition, demonstrates once again
the necessity of maintaining ample stocks of conventional munitions and equip-
ment.
Difficulties experienced as a result of providing modera'.e quantities of equip-
ment and munitions to Israel have emphasised the magnitude of worldwide de-
ficiencies in the level of arms, munitions, and war material maintained by the
United States. These serious shortages of specific types of munitions are coin-
pounded by distribution problems and inadequate storage facilities overseas.
Critical shortages of equipment and secondary items exist. New requirements
from future crises in Southeast Asia, the 117'.ddle East, or elsewhere for similar
support would further complicate the problem and could degrade significantly
our conventional deterrent.
The conflict once again demonstrated that an efficient logistic system is the
backbone of any sustained combat capability. If we are to provide our forces
with that degree of material readiness sufficient to conduct a conventional de-
fense in NATO or elsewhere and to provide our allies with the ability to defend
themselves, we must quickly build up inventory levels for all items of supply
and equipment in conjunction with establishing warm production bases for se-
lected high consumption items. We anticipate establishing a CONUS-based
stock of munitions and equipment which can be used to support allies under
emergency conditions, and improving and enlarging storage facilities for pro-
positioned war reserve stocks overseas in order to improve short-term response
capability and to relieve the immediacy of the demand for airlift/sealift in the
event of hostilities.
The Soviet Union again demonstrated its increasing capability to project its
Influence and military power strategically beyond its contiguous borders. For
the first time, this was accomplished by a rapid, continuous airlift coordinated
with an impressive sealift. The threat to the peace of the world has been in-
creased by this newly portrayed capability to introduce and maintain some of
the most sophisticated Soviet weapons far outside the land mass of the USSR.
Effective strategic movement of war m,.terials depends upon the comple-
menting capabilities of airlift and sealift. We must retain the capability to
respond rapidly with airlift to move personnel and essential supplies and equip-
ment, and to provide sealift capability for the non air-transportable equipment
and heavy tonnages required for sustained operations.
U.S. resupply of Israel demonstrated the excellent capabilities of the C-5A
and C-141. Over 500 total sorties insured an uninterrupted flow of essential
supplies while the conflict continued. Increased numbers of outsized and over-
sized aircraft are essential if we are to achieve the airlife capabilities necessary
to support our NATO commitment and to support the national policy of providing
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the material necessary for our partners to repel aggression, using their own
manpower in their own defense.
Sealife and protection of sea lines of communication are also essential to both
contingency and follow-on support operations. The airlift mounted in the Middle
East conflict received well deserved praise. Not so well publicized is the fact that
from October 6, 1973, to date, sealife accounted for over 70 percent of the total
tonnage moved. In order to reestablish and maintain an effective strategic move-
ment capability, sealift forces must be agumented and modernized as a necessary
complement to strategic airlift. This must include maintaining and modernizing
sufficient naval escorts and carrier task forces to protect these sealift forces
enroute. We also must continue to insure that our naval forces are capable of
responding as fully and rapidly as they responded to this crisis.
Finally, the issue of operating bases must be faced. The United States was
disappointed, but not surprised, when some of our allies did not perceive their
national interests as being identical to ours. Without the cooperation of Portugal,
which consented to the use of Lajes, the resupply operation which made Israel's
survival possible could not have been conducted without great hazard and
almost prohibitive cost. The world has shrunk in political terms, but it is still
just as many miles from a U.S. depot in Arkansas to the Middle East as ever. If
we are to be able in the future to respond to a call for help of the nature and
magnitude of the Israeli operation, we must continue to develop and invest in
secure. bases, where we can operate as free of foreign political constraints as
possible, while still maintaining our alliance system. The best runway, storage
facilities, geopolitical location, or deep water port is of little utility if political
constraints preclude its use.
Ultimately, the issue is whether the United States can afford to rely solely
upon the good faith of others when it is believed that the vital interests of the
United States or of one of its allies are in imminent peril. If we are to rely on
our ability to respond to conflict as a deterrent, then we must face the conse-
quences of forward-basing U.S. air, ground, and sea forces in areas where our
important interests may be altered by military or political compulsions beyond
our control. In the long run, assuming we maintain the proper mix of ready,
mobile, and versatile general purpose forces, these consequences of forward-
basing will pose far fewer dangers for the U.S. than would the withdrawal of
these forward-deployed forces.
The CHAIRMAN. That is fine. But I think we get a whole lot more
from. briefing on special problems that way, and testimony, we can call
it testimony, and put it into the record, than we do by the repetition of
the hearings, from this one on a lot of it would be repetition.
Senator Thurmond, I will call on you next.
Senator TIrURMOND. I have no further questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator McIntyre.
Senator McINTrYRr. On the supplemental request, this includes an
item of $217.6 million.
SUPPLEMENTAL P. & D. REQUEST
Senator Symington, yon will be interested in the supplemental; you
t. There is an item in there of $217 million for
are going to handle it.*
R. & D. Half of this is for civilian pay raises pursuant to law, but
about half, $108.5 imillion, is to improve the future readiness of our
forces.
In the past, Mr. Secretary, except for SALT I; and Southeast A sia's
operational requirements, and classified pay raises, research and devel-
opment did not meet the criteria for supplementals. This is because
the period of time required to develop equipment is too long to meet
an early operational need, and because the few months gained by seek-
ing a supplemental, instead of inclusion in the next year's budget,
would have little if any effect on the ultimate availability of that
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equipment. Moreover, even if a case could be made for any or all of
the readiness items which you have in there, there are sufficient funds
on low priority items within the $8 billion available for 1974 that re-
programing would satisfy the need. Do you agree with that statement?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I agree with that statement in part, Senator.
Senator MOIL TYRE. In part?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes.
Senator MCINTYRE. What part do you disagree with?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think the issue of the items included here
should be examined on their merits. We have had an experience in the
Middle East that suggests certain potential deficiencies in our forces.
For example, the. air defense suppression problem i; one that comes to
mind. As a result of those experiences, the sooner we get started on
that problem, the better. I think you will want to review with your
group the items in that list and come to a conclusion on the merits of
those items.
Senator MCINTYRE. Have you read Representative Stratton's report,
had -a chance to just run through it?
Secretary SC$LESINGER. No, sir.
Senator MCINTvRI. You should do it. The TOW missile was never
used in operation. They tried it out.
Secretary SCHLESINGrR. It was used operationally, but I will deal
with that in classified session.
Senator MCINTYRE. OK, you know more than I do, then.
But the thing that interested me in just passing, it said that the
Israelis had trouble with a TOW on a night proposition. So for some-
thing like 10 bucks they put it on the TOW and got night vision
operation on the TOW missile. And I don't know, in R. & D. we are
trying to spend quite a bit of money to try to find the answer for a
night vision device for the, TOW missile. I may be barking up a tree
that is wrong, but I am going to pursue it.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. You may be barking up a tree that is right,
and we should pursue it.
Senator MCINTYRE. I hate to think that somebody could make
something for $10 that we are spending t aousands for.
I am not going to argue with you too much on the Trident sub-
marine, and the R. & D. The missile guidance system installed in the
hull is not a low-risk technology that we are trying to develop here.
Mr. Chairman, this year in R. R D.--and I am not an opponent
of R. & D., don't get that idea, we just try to take a hard look at it-
and there is an awful lot of stuff to look at this year-comparing the
fiscal year 1974 appropriation of $8.1 billion for research and devel-
opment, your request for $9.3 billion for 1975 represents an increase
of 15 percent. It is also the largest amount, ever requested for this
appropriation. Why is so large an increase required in 1 year? You
think it is that urgent, apparently. But briefly, why have we got a
jump of 15 percent in 1 year?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think, Senator, I would prefer to avoid
discussing these matters in terms of percentile increases. I think that
one would have to review the individual. programs, and if the aggre-
gate of those individual programs makcs sense, that that is sufficient
justification. If they do not make sense, any arguments about a 15-
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percent increase or a 10-percent increase or a 20-percent increase do
not make sense.
Senator MCINTYRE. We don't have the staff or the time to take a
look at all our R. & D. programs, we can only pick and choose, a few
here and there. So some of them go through the wringer and get
away from us.
Last, when the Trident program was presented last year the Navy
estimated that $1.7 billion would be required in fiscal year 1975. The
current request for 1975 is for $2.2 billion, or $4,500 million more.
Can you explain this major increase?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. I cannot.
Senator McINTYUE. For the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information follows:]
Last year, in the FY 1974 Budget the PY 1975 program acquisition cost of
Trident was estimated at $2.4 billion ; $1.759 billion for the submarine and $.067
for the missile. Now, the FY 1975 estimate is $2.0 billion ; $1.381 billion for the
submarine and $.661 billion for the missile.
The R&D request for the submarine has remained essentially constant,
changing from $.108 billion to $.107 billion. However, the building rate for the
submarine has been modified from 1-3-3-3 starting in FY 1974 to 1-2-2-2
starting the same year. This schedule change results in a lower procurement
estimate of $1.107 billion rather than the $1.453 billion estimate of last year.
Military Construction estimates have decreased from $.198 billion to $.107 billion.
The R&D request for the missile remains essentially the same, decreasing from
$.652 billion to $.649 billion. The change in procurement funding is minor, reduc-
ing from $.0111 billion to $.013 billion.
Thus, the only major change in the FY 1975 estimates relates to the slowing
of the submarine production rate, from 3 to 2 per year beginning in PY 1975.
The CHATI MAN. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Symington, did you have something more?
Senator SYMENGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would thank the Secretary
and Admiral Moorer for their courtesy and tolerance in answering the
questions. The only way you can get the facts is to ask the questions.
I would say one thing in support of Senator McIntyre's position as
chairman of the Subcommittee on Research and Development. The
first year Dr. Foster was the head I was sympathetic with the rise in
the cost of research and development. But over the years little or no
hardware came out of the other end, for at least the last 5 years. Some
of us have been saying that we get the arguments around here while
the Soviets get the hardware. The best illustration, off the top of my
head is the fact a Navy plane, not designed as an air superiority
fighter because it was two-seated, was laid down in 1954. Nevertheless,
it was such a good plane that as of now, today, the F-4 is still the best
plane we have in service certainly in any quantity, for that particular
job. At the same time at least 5 years ago I had in my office photo-
graphs of 13 different Soviet fighters developed during that period.
So I would hope Senator McIntyre, when he asked the question,
what do we need that money for, would remember that, $9.4 billion is
a lot of money to put in research and development. If you coordinate
that situation with the fact there is a growing lack of truly independ-
ent scientists, independent from the Pentagon, as the defense budget
increases by billions, we are running into a real problem.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHASRRIVIAN. Yes, sir. Thank you.
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DEFENSE SPENDING AS PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL BUDGET
Mr. Secretary, here on page 13 of the statement-and I just have this
one question-up at the top of the page you were comparing the 1975
budget with the 1964 budget fiscal year each time. I direct your atten-
tion to the last part of that sentence, quoting : "And continue also the
declining trend of Defense spending as a percent of the total Federal
budget. at 27.2 percent for fiscal 1975."
I know somewhere in here we started adding in the trust funds, like
the social security money, for instance. and erroneously calling that
part of the budget. When we say budget, 'I think it is highly misleading.
That would run your percentages way down, the first year that new
way of figuring went in, that would run your percentages way down.
Your appearance here may not have any meaning--it may have a real
meaning and it may not, that is my point..
THE DEFENSE IMPACT PERCENTAGE SHARE OF:
Percent
100 r-
-,. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET
20
U.S. PJBLIC EMPLOYMENT
r r l r r r l i r r l i i r l i r r l i i l r h i i i {~y,~.l_{ 0
0
39 40 44 48 52 56 (0 64
FISCAL YEA 2S
Secretary SCI[LESINGEii. We can make those calculations on any basis,
Senator.
If you take the so-called administrative budget, or what is now
called the Federal fund budget, the DOD proportion of that has de-
clined from about 70 percent in the early fifties to about 40.percent
today. The unified budget, which is
The CIIAImrAN. Pardon me. In the early fifties we didn't have what
you call a Federal bud get, did we?
Secretary SCIII,ESINGER. The change Occurred in the late sixties under
President Johnson. But the administrative budget became one that is
now known as the Federal fund budget, and the trust funds were added
in to make the unified budget. And anyway that you calculate it, of
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course, the share of Defense in the total. has declined. In relation to
total TJ.S. public spending, we are clown to about 17 percent at the pres-
ent time, which is the lowest that it has been since prior to Pearl Har-
bor. In terms of the unified budget, adding in the trust funds, we are
at about 27 percent, which is a decline from about 60 percent in the
early fifties. And if you take the administrative budget, or the Federal
funds aspect of it to which your question directly referred, we are down
from about 70 percent of the total to about 40 percent of the total. So
that the general decline, I think, is reflected, whichever set of assump-
tionS you wish to use.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Just on the use of the term "constant dollars," I thought it was
clear that when you used that term that that was where you made
allowances just for inflation. If you put salaries in there now, you
could just as well put in automobiles, tanks, or anything else, it seems
to me like, figuring according to what constant dollars are. The in-
crease in salaries, that is just an increase in salaries. And that ex-
plains it.
Secretary SCHLESINGER. To the extent that the increase in salary
is offset by a genuine increase in productivity, that would distort the
results somewhat. But I think that we recognize that the increase of
the basic pay of a private from $21 a month in 1940 or 1941 to $307
a month is not necessarily reflected in the increase in productivity.
Those salary increases also reflected the general rise in the price level:
The CHAIRMAN. If you are going that long route around, you had
just as well describe it each time to me and say, as compared to 1942,
or whatever your comparison is. But constant dollars just carries the
idea of inflation, I though in all the departments.
Secretary ScHLESINGER. The general approach toward the use of
constant dollars is widespread, and it is based upon a set of con-
ventions, some of them arbitrary. But I think that the use of the con-
stant dollar approach to reflect general changes in purchasing power
is a useful device to better be able to compare one year with another.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is very handy. But this is just to get an
argument over the meaning of the term. Anyway, as it is uniformly
used in these statements from the Department of Defense, when you
say constant dollars, you are talking about inflation plus increase in
salaries, is that right?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else included?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further additional that you want
to say, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary SCHLESINGER. If I may come back to your initial state-
ment, you referred to the fact that this is a record defense budget, the
highest one on a percentage basis since 1942, and in terms of outlays,
the highest since 1945. I would point out that it has taken 28 years for
the Defense budget to reach the level of the Second World War, despite
pay increases and generalized inflation, which are the bases of rising
prices. At the close of the Second World War in 1945, the total Federal
budget was $96 billion, of which $82 billion was spent on defense.
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Some $13 billion was spent upon non-defense items. Since the non-
defense budget has risen in those 28 years from $13 billion to $218
billion, I believe that we can say that there are a number of other bud-
gets that have reached a record level. As a matter of fact, all budgets
other than DOD have reached new records each and every year. This
morning, for example, if I may choose one, I looked up the increase
in the legislative branch budget, and that has increased by a factor of
30 since 1945. So, in an era of inflation and of pay =increases, we must
expect a gradual increase and new records every year, records that
we do not necessarily want.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR M'INTYRE
Senator MCINTYRE. Mr. Chairman, may I submit for the record a
number of questions for Admiral Moorer and the Secretary?
The CHAIRMAN. All right, without objections Senator McIntyre's
questions will be placed in the record at, this time, and let the answers
in his record follow the questions.
[Questions submitted by Senator McIntyre. Answers supplied by the Depart-
ment of Defense.]
Question. You state (page 9 of Admiral bloorer's statement) that no new
USSR AWACS-type development has been noted. Would you care to speculate on
the reason for their lack of interest since they should have as much a need for
AWACS as we?
[The information is classified and has jeen furnished separately to the
committee.]
Question. You state that the Soviets have generated a momentum in new
strategic offensive programs which could easily upset the relative strategic bal-
ance. What specifics are available to support this statement?
Answer. I believe this is a moderate assessment of a dramatic Soviet program.
Specifics include :
Extensive flight testing of four new ICBMs--SS-X-16, SS-X-17, SS-X-18, and
SS-X-19-with MIRV testing on the latter three has been conducted. These new
missiles feature increased throw-weight and some employ improved launch and
guidance techniques as well as MIRVs. The Soviets are also constructing new
small and new large silos, and are modifying current silos ; all capable of sur-
viving appreciably higher over-pressures and ground shocks.
The SS-11 MOD 3, a multiple reentry version of the SS-11 is being rapidly
deployed.
The USSR has also moved forward rapidly in modernizing its SLBM force.
The new 4200 um SS-N-S has been deployed aboard the first three Delta-class
submarines-now in series production. A new MOD 2 multiple reentry vehicle
(MRV) of the SS-N-6 MOD 1, deployed aboard Yankee-class submarines, is
nearing operational status. This new MRV SLBM has a slightly longer range than
the MOD 1 [deleted] and may be deployed in the last few Yankee-class sub-
marines produced. [Deleted.]
The new Backfire variable-geometry wing, supersonic bomber is being pro-
duced [deleted] and will soon be deployed. It is probably best suited for periph-
eral attack, but it is fully capable of performing intercontinental attack missions
and constitutes a potential threat to the Continental US.
Question. If the Soviets ultimately are able to match us In the quality of stra-
tegic, weapons while exceeding us in quantity, would U.S. security then be
threatened? Or doesn't this invincibility of our Triad, although outnumbered,
represent an effective deterrent?
Answer. If the Soviet Union is ultimately able to match us in the quality of
strategic weapons while exceeding us in quantity, U.S. security could indeed be
threatened. In such circumstances the Soviet: might achieve strategic capabilities
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which we could not match-for example, an ability to threaten the destruction of
our ICBM force-giving them such a clear-cut strategic advantage as perhaps to
tempt them to exploit their superiority for diplomatic advantage ; and this, in
turn, might well lead to confrontations and crises in which the U.S. would be at
a considerable disadvantage. In this sense, the world's perception of this imbal-
ance in strategic force could be as dangerous to our national security and interests
as the disparity in actual capabilities.
The strategic TRIAD provides us a diversification of capabilities, but the
existence of such a diversified force cannot in itself deny the threat to our na-
tional security that would ensue from a Soviet achievement of strategic superi-
ority. To counter this potential adverse shift in the balance, we would have to
strengthen those elements of the strategic forces where our capabilities would
otherwise be inferior to those of the Soviet Union. The strategic R&D initiatives
proposed in the FY 1975 Defense Budget represent the first tentative steps which
we should take now to place ourselves in a position to prevent such a shift in the
strategic balance if in future years it appears imminent.
Question. In your opinion, if we were engaged in a lesser form of conflict with
the Soviets than a strategic nuclear war, do you believe that if the Soviets were
threatened by complete defeat they would not consider a first strike with strategic
nuclear weapons to be a viable alternative?
Any?wer. The central thrust of the policy I am advocating is to make such an
escalation in the level of hostilities an extremely unattractive alternative for
the Soviet Union. That is why I have consistently stressed the need for deter-
rence across the entire spectrum of risks. At each step of the escalation ladder,
we want to make negotiations a far better alternative than a major escalation
in the level of hostilities. For example, we want a powerful NATO conventional
defense posture in Europe to deter the Warsaw Pact from launching an attack
on Western Europe in the first place. If that deterrent should fail, we want a
sufficient theater nuclear capability in Europe to deter the Soviet Union from
escalating the conflict to a theater nuclear war. And we also want a powerful
strategic nuclear capability to deter the Soviet Union from escalating the con-
flict to a global nuclear war, particularly before cities become the targets. At
none of these levels do we feel that our forces are so large as to be able to
threaten complete defeat of the Soviet Union. It is our objective to maintain an
equivalence and balance between forces that will always make a first strike
with strategic nuclear weapons an unattractive alternative.
So long as we retain this force equivalence, neither side will be able to achieve
what I refer to as a "disarming first-strike" capability, i.e., a capability to at-
tack and reduce the opponent's strategic offensive forces to the point where he
could no longer penetrate the initiator's defenses in sufficient numbers to cause
unacceptable damage to his population and industry. Thus, under these circum-
stances, a Soviet "first-strike with nuclear weapons" against the United States,
including our cities, could hardly be an attractive option. A first-strike attack
on our strategic retaliatory forces which deliberately seeks to avoid our cities
also would not be a very viable alternative providing we maintain and improve
our capability to respond effectively to that sort of attack. Neither type of first-
strike attack would yield the Soviet Union a net advantage, and both types of
attack would be very costly to them as well as to us.
All our efforts-in negotiations, in targeting doctrine, and in weapons develop-
ment-are aimed at preserving and hopefully improving mutual deterrence.
Question. Admiral Moorer, why do we have only a limited ability to detect
Soviet research and development on general purpose force systems?
Answer. 1. Soviet research and development programs devoted to general pur-
pose weapon systems represents what is perhaps the most difficult detection task
we undertake. The low visibility that is an inherent characteristic of R. & D.
in support of Soviet Ground Force weapon systems is due, in large measure, to
the following practices by the Soviet Union : [Deleted.]
Question. Admiral Moorer, you state that the list of Soviet and U.S. general
purpose force systems on Chart 3 Is incomplete, yet you make the point that nine
of the Soviet systems listed have been deployed compared with only two of ours.
Isn't this comparison misleading, since to make a meaningful comparison you
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would have to examine and compare the quai.ity of existing forces and include
all other on-going programs which are not listed?
Answer. As I have stated, it is not the intent of Chart 3 to provide a com-
prehensive comparison of overall strengths and capabilities. That is the func-
tion of the entire section on general purpose forces in my complete report on
relative military posture. Instead it depicts what we consider trends and weight
of effort in the chart showing significant new development initiatives in the
general purpose forces category. The nine-to-two ratio fcr systems being de-
ployed reflects, in part, our limited ability to detect R. & D. on new Soviet gen-
eral purpose systems described in answer to the preceding question. Of course,
we know about our own B. & D. initiatives from concept formulation through
production and deployment..
Question. Mr. Secretary, on page 21 of your statement, you indicate in rela-
tion to the upcoming SALT discussions that you are "proposing a number of
research and development programs which would enable us to respond in kind
in order to maintain the delicate balance of deterrence, should the Soviets de-
cide to deploy a more efficient hard-target-kill capability that they now deploy."
Will you please answer the following questions to the extent possible now, and
provide classified details and elaboration later for the record.
how would you define a "delicate balance of deterrence'
Answer. The balance of deterrence is now delicate becaase the Soviet IUnion
has achieved strategic parity with the United States. We no longer have that pre-
ponderance of strategic nuclear power which up to now has tended to offset
Soviet advantages in other, military capabilities, notably ground forces. Conse-
quently, we dare net permit the Soviet Union to achieve to ,;igniliczcnt edge in any
area of importance to the strategic balance, for example, in hard-target kill capa-
bility. We hope to at-tain that goal through negotiation. But if we fail in that
direction, we must be prepared to counter the growth in Soviet hard-target kill
capabilities with appropriate steps of our own.
Questtion. Will you identify the specific programs to which you refer and the
amounts requested for liscal year 197:5. Group them either as replacements for
existing systems or hedges against the failure of SALT 11 and the lapsing of
the interim agreement.
Aalsuscr. The programs T. referred to in inc statement are basically research
and development eiVorts in the area of IC.i3J1 and, to a leaser extent, in SLBMMI
accuracy and/or yield improvement'lb provide us with the future option to
match reasonably promptly the hard-target capabilities the Soviet Union is cur-
rently developing, the following research anc developments are being proposed :
77 million in research and development funding is being requested to
improve Minuteman accuracy, to develop and RV which retains the physical
characteristics of the current RV but with increased yield, and to begin
development of a terminally-guided accurate MaRV.
The Advanced ICBM effort would continue in advanced development ($37
million), and provide a basis for an engineering development decision in
FY 1977, to develop a follow-oil ICBM incorporating increased yields, greater
accuracies and more survivable basing.
The Trident I program includes funds to initiate research and develop-
ment to improve accuracy and to develop alternative payloads.
All of these research and development efforts would be pursued in pace with
developments in Soviet strategic capabilities. Whether any would eventually be
deployed is for later decision. That decision of course would be influenced by the
outcome of SALT II, and. the direction of Soviet advanced developments and
deployments.
Question. What criteria were established to determine these specific program
requirements?
Answer. The major criterion used to establish specific program requirements
was the need for essential equivalence between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces.
Major imbalances in the relative capability of strategic offensive forces could
significantly undermine deterrence of aggression or invite coercion in crises. One
such dimension is the ability to destroy military tragets-airfields, submarine
bases, and other installations, including "hard" targets such as ICBM's in silos.
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'Soviet deployment of a significant capability to destroy U.S. ICBM's would be
destabilizing, for it could tempt a leader to exercise that option. By demonstrating
our resolve to deny such a unilateral capability, we hope to make clear to the
Soviet Union the futility of such a move.
Question. What programs, if any, were considered but discarded because they
did not meet the criteria?
Answer. Programs were discarded which did not demonstrate both the capa-
bility to respond appropriately to threats to our forces and to show our willing-
ness and capability for restraint. Also, for example, procurement funding at this
time (i.e., while the current SALT negotiations are underway), would fail to
demonstrate our willingness for mutual restraint. We have therefore limited the
request to R. & D. funding.
Question. Does the expression "enable us to respond in kind" mean that we have
hard evidence that the Soviets are pursuing the exact same developments? If not,
why are we supporting these developments, since this goes beyond what we need
to "respond in kind?"
Answer. Yes, we have hard evidence the Soviets are pursuing developments
which would increase their hard-target kill capability. The Soviets have available
today approximately 300 SS-9 missiles whose large warheads give them a credible
hard target kill capability. Of the new ICBM's, the SS-X-18 and SS-X-17 have
been tested with large single warheads. These warheads together with the esti-
mated accuracy of these new systems would give them also a hard target kill
capability. The MIRV warheads on the new large SS-X-18 and the SS-X-19
missiles are also large enough to allow hard tragets to be attacked with good
expectation of significant damage. Finally, all four new Soviet ICBM systems
presently in development have new guidance systems whose characteristics indi-
cate that they are designed to increase accuracy as compared with the older
Soviet ICBM's.
Question. What evidence do you have that the Soviets are developing a hard-
target-kill capability and when do you believe they could achieve an operational
capability?
Answer. The evidence that the Soviets are improving their hard-target-kill
capability was cited in the answer to the previous question. The SS-X-18 missile
with its single reentry vehicle payload could be operational in 1975. The single
reentry vehicle SS-X-17 could be ready for deployment in late 1974, but most
likely by mid-1975, The SS-X-17 could probably begin deployment by late 1975.
The MIRVed versions of the new ICBMs require more testing than single reentry
vehicle versions because the smaller MIRV warheads require greater accuracy
which can only be confirmed through more extensive testing, and this could delay
their deployment somewhat.
Question. Is there the serious risk of triggering a qualitative strategic offen-
sive race by proposing such a large number of new programs?
Answer. The funds proposed for these new R&D programs are relatively mod-
est, as indicated earlier. We simply are taking the first few prudent steps to hedge
against Soviet deployment of improved strategic offensive forces, but without
committing ourselves to deploying compensating systems in our own forces. At
the same time, we are negotiating in SALT II to reduce the strategic capabilities
of both sides. The choice is with the Soviet Union. I believe that U.S. readiness
to improve its forces, should Soviet actions make that necessary, will add to the
incentives for the Soviets to negotiate mutually satisfactory limits on strategic
offensive armaments.
Question. If we pursue a wide range of new strategic developments we have
established numerous options which are a clear signal to the Soviets that we
can, if necessary, develop and produce advanced strategic weapons to counter
any new threat which their large research and development program can evolve.
We can do this by limiting our research and development to critical long lead
technology and constraining the level and pace of work, consistent with orderly
technical progress, to minimize expenditure of funds, but at the same time insure
that we are keeping pace with the Soviets. Then, if they begin to make a move
we are in a position to match it, Why don't we adopt this approach and. avoid
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major dollar commitments to new programs which are hard to turn off once they
get Started, and which, when cancelled have a disastrous effect on industry and
on the hundreds or thousands of people who are thrown out of work?
Answer. The basic approach you outline as in fact the thrust of our strategic
development programs. Our strategic initiatives are explicitly designed to pro-
vide us with a range of viable alternatives from which timely selections for de-
ployment can be made. It permits us to examine-at low cost and with no com-
mitment to deploy-the relative merits of various options. Developing these
options is not a commitment to produce and deploy them:: it is rather to provide
us with a ready posture so that we can respond, if necessary, by producing
them.
Question. Do you believe that there are differences in the strategic problems
of the U.S. and the Soviets for geopolitical reasons, such as the common border
between China and Russia, which could justify the need for any greater strategic
offensive capability by the Soviets?
Answer. There are differences in the strategic problems, but at the present
time, these do not justify the need for any greater Soviet strategic offensive
capability.
Question. Mr. Secretary, we appear to be broadening and expanding trade
with the Soviets including the sale of technology such as building a truck factory
and entering long term agreements for joint development or computer technology.
In your opinion, isn't this in the long term going to backfire on us? Aren't we
helping the Russians catch up with our technology which is the primary lead
we have over them in the quality of our weapons and in production know-how?
Answer. This is a risk, Senator, but there is also an op: ortunity to ameliorate
over the long run the tensions in our relationships with the Soviet Union. To
minimize the risk, we examine on a case-by-ease basis each major transaction
directly important to national defense.
Question. Mr. Secretary, you state (page 9) that "growth in force structuie
brought about by increased military efficiency should not be denied us . . .
Shouldn't increased military efficiency, in fact, permit us to reduce our forces
since we should with increased efficiency be able to do the same job with less
equipment and less men?
Answer. By "increased efficiency" I mear., that we have improved the "teeth-
to-tail" ratio of our forces, so that weget a larger proportion of combat man-
years for a given total strength. We have done this through reductions in head-
quarters and supporting forces. In keeping with our view that General Purpose
Forces are somewhat thin, we propose to apply those savings to increasing our
combat capability.
Question.. On page 10 you state "there is no substitute among the other indus-
trialized democracies for the power of the United States." While this may have
been true in the past, haven't these countries reached a state of economic growth
which would permit them to provide an increasing portion of such power from
their own resources?
Answer. The countries of NATO Europe do now provide a larger share of the
total gross national product (GNP) of NATO and of the total military expendi- A
tures of NATO countries than in the past. For example, in 1954, of total NATO
GNP the US produced about 59% and NATO Europe 37%.; in 1972, the US pro-
duced about 55% and NATO Europe 41%. Of total NATO military expenditures,
in 1954 the US provided roughly three-fourths and NATO Europe one-fourth ; in
1978, the US provided roughly two-thirds and NATO :Europe one-third. Sim-
ilarly the total defense expenditures of NATO Europe have grown more rap-
idly in real terms than those of the US, between 1954 and 1973. In particular,
while US defense expenditures in real terms, and as a percent of GNP, have
been declining for the last five years, Allied expenditures have been increasing.
Question. You also state (bottom page 10) that "Deterrence must operate
across a broad spectrum of contingencies ; we cannot afford gaps in its coverage
that might invite probes and tests." Do yet: seriously believe that we can avoid
probes and tests even with an effective and broadly based deterrence?
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Answer. As the question implies, the ultimate decision to initiate "probes and
tests" rests with the Soviets. While we cannot guarantee that such actions will
not occur, we can-by maintaining broadly based deterrence-impress upon any
nation that might contemplate such a course, that no benefits are likely to accrue
and that the risks are unacceptably high. Certainly, perceived weakness in either
the resolve or the strength to resist will encourage such probes and tests.
Question. Despite the ABM Treaty of 1972, you are asking for substantial in-
creases in advanced ballistic missile defense. Specifically, Site Defense increases
from $110.1 million to $160.0 million, and Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense
from $61.8 million to $91.4 million. Why not restructure these programs and
limit them to critical, long lead technology at nominal cost?
Answer. The ABM Treaty does not preclude R&D for ballistic missile defense
and we see the Soviets moving forward rapidly in this area. Therefore, it is im-
portant that we maintain a vigorous ballistic missile defense R&D program to
prevent the Soviets from gaining a technological lead over us that could threaten
the strategic balance. Such an R&D program needs to maintain a system devel-
opment capability in addition to the exploration of long lead critical technologies
because one of the principal problems in missile defense systems is the overall
system interaction and integration. The maintenance of a system capability will
[deleted] provide a base if missile defenses are needed in the future. The Site
Defense program provides this system development effort, and the $160 million
funding requested for FY 1975 is necessary to pursue the orderly and timely
development of this option for Minuteman defense. The Site Defense system
demonstration at Kwajalein in FY 1977 and FY 1978 will provide the Soviets
with a highly visible indication of our ballistic missile defense system capability.
The Advanced Ballisic Missile Defense program is specifically structured to
resolve critical, long lead technology issues at the minimum necessary cost. The
program covers a broad scope of rapidly advancing technologies applicable to
ballistic missile defense such as optical sensors, computer software and high
performance interceptors. The program also involves critical field experiments
that improve our understanding of the complicated physical phenomena such
as missile reentry effects encountered in defense scenarios. We look to this pro-
gram to maintain pace with the Soviet Advanced R&D and help prevent techno-
logical surprises by them. Last year, our $100 million request was reduced to
$61.8 million, reducing significantly our ability to consider critical technology
issues. We have reacted to express Congressional concerns in this area and this
year are requesting $91.4 million, which is a return to a funding level typical of
prior years, and which will permit us to carry on the vigorous program necessary
to maintain a lead in strategic defense technology.
Question. Are you familiar with the findings and recommendations of the Bis-
plinghoff Committee report on the B-1 development, and could you comment on
them?
Answer. Yes, I am familiar with the Bisplinghoff Committee report.
The principal finding of this group of technical and management experts was
that there are no major technical problems which preclude the successful devel-
opment and production of the B-1 aircraft. The Committee noted, however, that
the existing program plan would make completion of the development effort and
successful transition to the production phase unlikely within projected cost and
time schedules. The Committee also expressed the belief that three aircraft
would not be sufficient to complete development of a complex program such as
the B-1 and allow the final development aircraft to reflect accurately the initial
production aircraft.
With regard to schedule and cost, the Committee's best judgment was that a
two to three month delay would be incurred in. the projected first flight of Air
Vehicle #1 and a six to twelve month delay in completion of the total develop-
ment program. The Committee also estimated that at least $300 million more
would be required to complete the development program as it was rephased in
July 1973.
The committee's major recommendation was that the B-1 program should
be restructured to provide for completion of the development effort on a more
realistic basis and to provide for a less disruptive transition into the production
phase.
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Finally, Dr. Bisplinghoff and his associates also furnished Secretary McLueas
with their estimates of potential B-1 performance parameters-ranging from
Possible, to Most Probable, to Reasonably Adverse. These potential performance
deviations result primarily from an increase in the gross take-off weight of the
B-1 aircraft, from about 360,000 lbs. to the presently projected 395,000 lbs. The
Air Force has conducted a thorough analysis of the utility of the B-1 aircraft
within the full range of potential performance deviations provided by the Com-
mittee. The Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, and the Commander
in Chief of the Strategic Air Command have concluded that even under the
most adverse estimates of performance the B-1 would be operationally effective
against the full target spectrum. Moreover, even with the increased weight
there are still 100 airfields in the U.S. which would support continuous
L'-1 operations and an additional 220 airfields which would be suitable for use.
in emergency dispersal operations. Thus, although some weight reduction should
result as a byproduct of engineering changes for purposes of producibility and
cost avoidance, there is no requirement for significant changes to the B-1 pro-
gram solely to regain performance.
A basic problem highlighted by the Committee was the severe program dis-
continuity which results from the gap of 24 months between first flight and the
production decision. The contractor would not be able to retain critical skills,
and know-how during such an extended gap in effort. Moreover, any plan which
w. as dependent on the recovery of these critically nee-led personnel after a
production decision is made would expose the program :o additional technical
risks and costs.
Accordingly, in order to facilitate the B-1 flight test program and to provide
a more realistic basis for transition to production, we propose to begin work
on Air Vehicle # 4 in FY 1975 and, possibly, Air Vehicle # 5 in FY 1976.
These aircraft would provide needed flight: test data 12 to iR months earlier
than would otherwise be possible, and they could also be used to introduce
engineering refinements to the basic design.
Although the fourth and possibly the fifth aircraft would be funded with
RDT&I+, funds, they would ultimately be assigned to the SAC inventory. Nlore-
over, the additional aircraft would be built on existing development tooling,.
modified only as required by aircraft design improvements. Thus, there would
be no additional program cost, assuming a subsequent production decision. Nor
would these additional aircraft prejudge the production decision. In consonance
with the fly-before-buy-policy, the l;-I is expected to undergo about two years
of flight testing and achieved the essential critical milestones before a produc-
tion decision is made. Under the currently proposed prop,am plan, this decision
could lie made in November 1976.
Quextion. We have learned some important les:,ons from the Mideast conflict.
How has this been applied to our development programs? Have we terminated,
initiated, or change direction of any developments?
Answer. Dr. Currie, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, will
discuss this subject in detail with the conurittee. (See his statement of 26 Feb-
ruary 1974 before the committee.)
Question. Conventionally powered attack submarines are about one-third the
cot of nuclear powered submarines. Has this been studied by your system
analysis office to determine if a mixed submarine attack fleet has merit?
Answer. The primary mission of our attack submarine force is to help defend
g , ainst the hostile submarine threat to our shipping and surface naval forces.
Submarines accomplish this mission by using their sonar equipment to detect the
enemy at long ranges and then moving covertly to intercept and attack. While
both nuclear and conventional submarines can be equipped with effective ASW
sensor::, the unlimited submerged tactical mobility of nuclear submarines con-
t ra sts sharply with the very limited intercept capability of submarines which
must rely on batteries to remain relatively quiet and therefore undetected. It is
primarily for this reason that the U.S. has been building only nuclear-powered
submarines for ASW. We are continuing to examine the feasibility and desira-
bility of building a new class of nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) that would
be smaller and less costly than those currently under construction.
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Question. The Air Force budget includes $36 million to begin engineering
development of an Air Combat Fighter, based on the Lightweight Fighter
Prototype. Since flight test of the prototype will be conducted during fiscal
year 1975, why not wait until the tests are completed and evaluated and then
start engineering development in fiscal year 1970
Answer. The General Dynamics prototype, the YF-16, is in flight test now and
the Northrop prototype, the YF-17, should begin flight testing this April or May.
Without accelerating the test program, which is feasible, each prototype should
have completed sufficient flight testing in fiscal years 1974 and 1975 that an
intelligent decision can be made to move one of the two candidates into full scale
development in the third or fourth quarter of 1975. Some of the Air Combat
Fighter funds will be expended during the early part of fiscal 1975 for design
trade-off analysis as part of the "missionization" of each design. The remain-
ing funds will be used for the selection process and the beginning of the engineer-
ing development phase. The alternative-that is, to wait until FY 1976-would
create a nine month gap during which period the contractors would have no sup-
port to maintain their engineering efforts for the program. The chosen path is in
the best interest of the U.S. government both from the standpoint of time and
dollars.
PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR 11UOIIES
[Questions submitted by Senator Hughes. Answers supplied by Department
of Defense.]
Question. Mr. Secretary, in your confirmation hearing, I asked the following
question: Do you share the view, previously expressed by Secretary Laird and
Secretary Richardson, that the United States should not develop weapons with
increased yield and accuracy so as to give a "hard target kill" capability? Could
not the development of such weapons be construed as having a first strike poten-
tial? You answered : "I share the views of previous Secretaries of Defense that
we do not have and are not seeking a disarming or first strike capability."
Despite that answer, how much is in the new budget for improving the yield
and accuracy of warheads? If we proceed along these lines, how can the Russians
be sure that we are not developing a capability to disarm their land-based mis-
siles in a first strike?
Answer. As noted in an answer to an earlier question, approximately $77
million is included in the FY 1975 Defense Budget for R&D to improve the
accuracy and yield of minuteman III RVs. In addition, some portion of the $37
million requested for Advance ICBM Technology will be devoted to work on
accuracy. Also, funds have been included in the Trident I program for an ad-
vanced development effort which could lead to improvements in the accuracy of
that missile.
None of these potential improvements in the accuracy and yield of our strategic
missiles, however, could conceivably give us a disarming first-strike capability.
A "disarming first-strike capability" implies a capacity to attack and reduce an
opponent's strategic offensive forces to the point where he could no longer pene-
trate the initiator's defenses in sufficient numbers to cause unacceptable damage
to population and industry. As I have repeatedly stated, we neither desire, nor
can we attain, based on straightforward calculations that the Soviets them-
selves can make, a disarming first-strike capability against the Soviet Union.
Nor, if we are reasonably prudent, can the Soviet Union achieve such a capa-
bility against us.
The new R&D efforts we are proposing do not and cannot result in a disarming
first-strike capability. They are in response to what the Soviet Union is already
doing in its strategic missile programs. If the Soviet Union replaces itscurrent
SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs with the new MIRVed ICBMs that are now being flight
tested; which is legally permitted under the SALT Interim Agreement, the
Soviet Union could then pos, ess the potential for a major counterforce capability
to threaten the bulk of our land-based missiles in a first strike. We do not intend
to'permit the Soviet Union to achieve a unilateral advantage in this vital area of
strategic nuclear power. We hope to foreclose such a possibility in the course
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of the SALT negotiations by dissuading the Soviet Union from fully exploiting
its marked advantage in missile throw-weight. Failing that, we want to place
ourselves in position to effectively strengthen our deterrent. Our purpose in
proposing these new developments, therefore, is to ensure that the Soviet Union
does not acquire-contrary to the spirit of SALT I-an asymmetry of strategic
capability, and to ensure also that the Soviet Union is under no misapprehension
on this point. In any case, our new development efforts will be placed in con-
siderable measure by the direction of Soviet strategic force programs.
Question. Since the South Vietnamese already have one of the largest armed
forces in the world, including more planes than they can even use at present,
why have you requested nearly double the amount of military assistance for
next year?
Answer. The principal cause for the increase in this year's budget request is
the continuing high level of combat in the Republic of Vietnam. Last year's budg-
et, as revised in June 1973, was based on the assumption that only sporadic
cease-fire violations would occur. We were able to further pare the FY 1974
budget requirements by relying on resources previously appropriated but not yet
delivered to South Vietnam. Rather than the low level of combat which was
assumed, the South Vietnamese have experienced numerous upsurges in combat
activity, including regimental sized attacks supported by armor and artillery.
The threat posed by North. Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces in the Republic of
Vietnam has grown rather than diminished. Our budget request for FY 1975 is
based on the assumption that the level of combat activity since the cease-fire
will continue, and it represents our projections of the military assistance which
the South Vietnamese Armed Forces will require in this environment.
Question. Will you take steps to declassify the documents on Cambodia bomb-
ing recently delivered to the committee?
Answer. I consider the classification assigned that information still appro-
priate.
Question. There is a lot of concern in the Congress over the large number of
troops stationed overseas-because of the costs, the political entanglements, and
then the fact that many of. these facilities could not even be used for the emer-
gency resupply effort to Israel last fall. How many troops will you bring home
next year and how many overseas bases will be closed?
Answer. As you know, our deployments overseas are under constant review by
the Department of Defense to adjust and maintain them in. accordance with our
treaty commitments and our foreign policy objectives. As you also know, the
negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in. Vienna seek mutual
reductions in forces on the part of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. These
negotiations are now, proceeding in a serious manner and we have hopes that
they will be successful. Unilateral withdrawal of United States troops while
the negotiations are in progress, however, would seriously injure their chances
of success by removing the Warsaw Pact's incentive to negotiate and encourag-
ing them to wait for us to make further unilateral withdrawals. The course of
the MBFR negotiations, therefore, will be one of the considerations influencing
our overseas troop strength in the coming year.
As I announced last November, some realignments and reductions in our over-
seas bases are now being made for efficiency reasons. These adjustments do not
impact on our military capabilities. That announcement concerned 59 actions in
12 countries spread over a period of time and will ultimately result in a reduc-
tion of about 3900 personnel, both U.S. and local.
We continue to look at U.S. installations and headquarters from the point of
view of making our operations more efficient, and we are continuing to explore
further reductions, but it is not possible to predict the results of this review at
the present time.
Question. How serious is your effort to develop a new air-launched cruise
missile? Couldn't this be a lower-cost alternative to apenetrating B-1?
Answer. We are conducting advanced development programs to demonstrate
the performance characteristics of such a missile prior to engineering devel-
opment. The various trade-offs between range, accuracy, penetrability, and cost
are to be validated.
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Both the Air Force and the Navy are cooperating in these programs. Since
the B-1 provides improved pre-launch survivability over any other aircraft launch
platform, electronic countermeasures to enhance penetrability and a manned
crew for decision making, it could not be replaced in the overall sense by an air-
launched cruise missile. For the 1980's and beyond, we need to insure that we
have a survivable launch platform such as the B-1. The air launched cruise
missile could be an adjunct to this survivable bomber force.
Question. What are you going to build on Diego Garcia? If that's all we have
in the Indian Ocean, won't it be extremely vulnerable? And what assurances
would we have that any such facility could be used in all Near Eastern and South
Asian contingencies?
V Answer. The expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia will include an enlarged
anchorage, a longer runway, an aircraft parking apron, pier construction, a
warehouse, enlarged POL storage capacity, power plant expansion, a modest
maintenance capability and increased quarters and other structures related to
the support of U.S. personnel.
Diego Garcia would not be any more vulnerable than any other U.S. military
base abroad. In fact, since it is located on an otherwise unpopulated island,
it should be far less vulnerable to political disturbances than most other U.S.
bases abroad. Its availability for contingencies is, of course, a matter for agree-
ment between the U.K. and U.S. Governments.
Question. How significant is the retargeting you told the press about? What
percentage of assigned targets for bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs were urban-
industrial versus military before this change and what are the percentages now?
Answer. With regard to alterations in our targeting doctrine, we believe it
makes sense and is not so novel as the media would make it seem. This targeting
concept has been discussed at least from the days of Secretary McNamara's
Athens address. The need for strategic flexibility and selectivity has been dis-
cussed in the Defense Reports of Secretary McNamara, Secretary Clifford, and
Secretary Laird. We are simply placing greater emphasis than heretofore on op-
tions other than massive strikes in order to be able to deter conflict across the
entire spectrum of risk. The current options are not being abandoned, rather
they are being supplemented with other, smaller options to provide greater
flexibility in targeting. The assigned targets under the current options remain
unchanged.
Question. How much have we spent in each of the last five years on (1) ASW
R&D and (2) ASW procurement? How does this compare with the Soviet effort
in both cost and quality?
Answer. U.S. It. & D. efforts for ASW items (including some multi-mission
items) for the last five years have amounted to approximately $2.2 billion. Distri-
bution by year was : (In millions
Fiscal year : of dollars)
1970
------------------------------------------------------------
42.8
1971
------------------------------------------------------------
551.5
1972
-------------------------------------------------------------
548.6
1973
------------------------------------------------------------
367.5
1974
------------------------------------------------------------
324.2
A meaningful costing of U.S. ASW procurement efforts is not possible because
the aircraft and ship platforms for ASW equipment and weapons are multi-
purpose platforms,-e.g., DD 963 destroyers-have other missiles in addition
to their ASW mission. Any allocation of the platforms' costs to the ASW mis-
sion would be arbitrary and dependent upon scenario assumptions that are con-
stantly changing. While costs could be accumulated for specific types of ASW
equipment and weapons, even this would require some arbitrary allocation of
cost for items like the MK 48 torpedo, which is both an anti-submarine and an
anti-ship weapon. Soviet ASW system procurement is similar to that of the
U.S. Navy in that ASW platforms have several missions.
Equivalent cost estimates for Soviet ASW R. & D. programs cannot be pro-
duced due to Soviet security precautions. The full extent of Soviet ASW develop-
ment activities is unknown, although we do have some evidence of testing and
production of certain weapons and sensors. A qualitative comparison of United
States and Soviet ASW systems which have become operational within the last
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five years may be useful. Both countries appear to be carrying out general ini-
provement of their ASW aircraft, surface combatant, submarine, mine warfare,
and surveillance forces. For example, during the last five years both countries
have introduced-
New long-range ASW patrol aircraft (the May and Bear F in the U.S.S.R. ;
the P-3C and S-3A in the U.S.A.) ;
New multipurpose surface combatants capable of ASW operations (for ex-
aarple, the tiara, Ifresta.II, 1fricak, and Grisha Classes in the U.S.S.R. : the
California (DLGN-30) and Kno.v (DE-1052) Classes in the U.S.A. ;
New submarine types with ASW as a mission (the Victor class SSN in the
U.S.S.R.; the Sturgeon class SSN in the U.S.A.) ;
New types of ASW ordnance, [deleted] ASW aircraft torpedo in the
U.S.S.R. ; the Mark 48 21" submarine torpedo in the U.S.A.) ; and
New types of surveillance/search systems (for example, the [deleted]
system in the U.S.S.R. ; various types of passive towed array sonar systems
in the U.S.A.).
Additionally, the Soviets are known to have been testing several new kinds of
mines which appear to have ASW as a princiJal role. We estimate that several of
these are in production and operationally available. The U.S. Navy has a new
ASW mine system designated Captor in development which is expected to become
operational [deleted].
In general, U.S. ASW systems discussed above are significantly superior to
Soviet ASW systems, particularly when evaluated against opposing submarine
targets. Recently delivered U.S. systems cor:.tinue to show greater effectiveness
than equivalent Soviet systems. In part, this difference reflects differing overall
priorities in the two navies. The Soviets place greater emphasis on strategic
deterrent and a.ntiship operations than on ASW, while the U.S. Navy places as
much or greater emphasis on ASS'!' anon any other Naval mission. These differing
ASW capabilities also reflect the generally hgher level of U.S. technology.
Question. A stable deterrent may well require mutual agreement to limit ASW
development so that each nation has an invulnerable second strike capability.
What are the quantitative and qualitative factors in ?.SW capability which
could be mutually verifiable?
Answer. We do not agree that stability of the deterrent and the continued
invulnerability of the second strike capabilities of each nation require a mutual
agreement to limit ASW development. There is no known ASW capability or
technology which for the foreseeable future would eliminate the second strike
capability of either the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.
Moreover, the question of a mutual limitation on the development or deploy-
ment of ASW forces must be approached with caution. Our ASW forces are pri-
marily designed to protect our long and critically important sea lines of co;n-
nrunications against the numerically superior Soviet general purpose submarine
forces. A general agreement to "limit ASW development" could place the United
States and its allies at a considerable disadvantage by limiting our general pur-
pose ASW capabilities, for there is no practical way that we know of to distin-
guish strategic (ballistic missile submarine) and tactical (general purpose sub-
marine) ASW activities.
Question. What are the programs and associated costs for improving warhead
yield and accuracy? For which missile systen s are these intended?
Answer. To provide us with the future option to match reasonably promptly
the hard-target capabilities the Soviet Union is currently developing, the follow-
ing research and developments are being proposed :
$77 million in research and development funding is being requested to
improve Minuteman accuracy, to develop an RV which retains the physical
characteristics of the current RV but with increased yield, and to begin
development of a terminally-guided accurate MaRV.
The Advanced ICBM effort would continue in advanced development ($37
million), and provide a basis for an engineering development decision in FY
U)77, to develop a follow-on ICBM incorporating increased yields, greater
accuracies and more survivable basing.
The Trident I program includes funds to initiate research and develop-
ment to improve accuracy and to develop alternative payloads.
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All of these research and development efforts would be pursued in pace with
developments in Soviet strategic capabilities. Whether any would eventually be
deployed is for later decision. That decision of course would be influenced by
the outcome of SALT II, and the direction of Soviet advanced developments and
deployments.
Question. When is the Soviet Union expected to have the capability we now
have to detect submarines as quiet as Poseidon? As Trident?
Answer. [The information is classified and has been furnished to the Com-
mittee.]
Question. Which programs now in the budget could not be deployed under the
existing SALT agreements?
Answer. All the systems now in the budget could be deployed within the cur-
rent SALT agreements, although these deployments naturally would have to
conform to terms of the agreements. For example, the ABM Treaty would pro-
hibit any future deployment of the Site Defense System at Grand Forks in
excess of 18 radars and 100 interceptors.
Insofar as strategic offensive systems are concerned, our currently planned
deployments are fully consistent with the Interim Agreement and, as indicated
earlier, the R&D programs we have underway are prudent steps to hedge against
possible Soviet deployments of improved strategic offensive forces. We have not,
however, committed ourselves to deploy compensating systems and continue to
seek, in SALT' II, to stabilize at current levels and ultimately to reduce the
strategic capabilities of both sides.
Question. Which programs in the budget are intended primarily as hedges
against the failure of a permanent SALT agreement and which are for pro-
grams which we would want to have in any event and which we would expect
the USSR also to want to have?
Answer. U.S. R. & D. programs in the FY 1975 budget are directed at the
whole range of uncertainties about the future of Soviet strategic programs. As
noted in response to earlier questions, the Soviet Union, within the bounds of
the current Interim Agreement, could pose a threat to our land-based missile
forces if it fully exploits its substantial advantages in missile throw-weight and
numbers. Our general objective is to ensure essential equivalence between United
States and Soviet strategic forces, preferably by achieving a permanent SALT
agreement, but if necessary even without that agreement, and our R. & D. pro-
grams are proposed with this in mind. In SALT we are seeking to constrain,
and even reduce, offensive capabilities of both sides. In the event we should not
achieve in SALT all we would hope, we feel we can do no less than develop in
R. & D. the options to deny an asymmetrical, destabilizing advantage to the So-
viet- Union.
Question. On the basis of recent tests, what are the reliability factors for our
Minuteman, Polaris, Poseidon, and Titan missiles?
Answer. The currently approved Joint Chiefs of Staff reliability factors for
these systems are: [Deleted.]
Question. What are the increased costs and benefits of testing Minuteman from
existing silos rather than Vandenberg?
Answer. The cost of the eight launch OBL program is $26.9 million. The ap-
proximate cost of an eight missile test launch from Vandenberg Is $24.3 million.
This cost includes test range support cost, missile transportation, and refurbish-
ment of launch silos.
The primary testing benefit of the OBL program is assurance of existing oper-
ational data which has been derived piecemeal from Vandenberg launches, labor-
atory tests, ground electronic tests in the operational units (Modified Operational
Missile and Simulated Electronic Missile tests), and such. The full range opera-
tional launch ties all of this together in one end-to-end exercise and correlates
the data upon which our effectiveness calculations are based. The U.S. has never
fired an ICBM from an operational silo. Vandenberg tests differ from OBL. For
an OBL the missile will not be removed from the silo; the operational RV is
simply replaced with a test BY. Electrical/mechanical connections in the opera-
tional silo are not disturbed. Ground electronics for an entire operational squad-
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ron are tested in OBL. The VAFB missile is 10" longer and 300 lbs. heavier than
an operational one. OBL flights overland will verify gravity models developed
from VAFB flight data. VAFB silos have additional hardware protection systems
because they are re-used. Two OBLs will be from non-protected (pure opera-
tional) silos which will provide data on the possible refire capability for Minute-
man.
Question. Will you please provide an unclassified table of strategic force
strengths for 1973 and 1974, including (at least) ICBM launchers, SLBM launch-
ers, Strategic Bombers, and Total Offiensive weapons (force loadings) for the
U.S. and USSR?
Lnited
States
U.S.S.R.
United
States
U.S.S.R.
Offensive:
ICBM launchers'-------------------------------
1,054
1,551)
1, 054
1, 575
SLBM launchers a-------------------------------
656
559
656
_ 660
Intercontinental bombers 3-----------------------
496
14')
496
140
Force loadings weapons--------------------------
13,784
2,209
7,940
2,600
Defensive: 4
Air defense interceptors 5 ------------------------
559
2, 800
532
2,600
SAM launchers---------------------------------
481
9,801)
261
9,800
ABM defense launchers---------------------------------------- 64
--------------
64
r Excludes launchers at test sites.
Excludes launchers on diesel-powered submarines.
3 Excludes bombers configured as tankers and reconnaissance aircraft.
4 Excludes launchers at test sites.
5 These numbers represent total active inventory (TAI).
Question. What progress have our NATO allies made in providing the offset
agreements required under the Jackson-Nunn amendment?
Answer. We have asked the Allies to offset total US defense expenditures in
NATO Europe which are estimated at $2.1B as defined under the Jackson-Nunn
Amendment.
We are negotiating a new bilateral offset ?.greement with the Federal Republic
of Germany, and hope to conclude those negotiations soon. We are confident that
the agreement will include a renewed commitment by the Germans for additional
procurement, troop facilities rehabilitation, and an additional amount to pay for
certain US budgetary costs incurred in the Federal Republic.
We have also asked the other NATO Allies to offset those ITS defense expendi-
tures not covered in the US-FRG bilateral agreement. The Allies have declared
their intention to participate in arrangements which provide a common solution
to the US problem. The Allies have not agreed to any given solution at this time.
However, a NATO Study Group has reviewed US expenditure data and, in
December 1973, presented the NATO Ministers with several options which could
serve as a basis for offsetting US expenditures.
The NATO Ministers have also instructe& the appropriate NATO Committees
to study the possibility of reducing the percentage share of the US contribution
to various NATO common budgets. Perhaps of equal importance is the fact that
the NATO International Staff has taken on the task of devising a system to
credit Allied purchases of military related items in the United States.
Question. What is the current strategic significance of Guantanamo naval
base? What alternatives are there to this facility?
Answer. [Deleted] the US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is an im-
portant unit in the US Caribbean base complex, consisting of Panama, Roosevelt
Roads, and Guantanamo Bay. The complex was developed to: (1) protect the
ocean approaches to the US and shipping Between the Caribbean and Eastern
Atlantic/South American ports, (2) defenc. the Panama Canal, (3) carry out
ASW operations, and (4) support combatant naval forces in the defense of the
Caribbean sea area. Guantanamo provides an important large, deep-water, all-
weather base for Caribbean naval operations and training, and for support of
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units of the Atlantic Fleet. Retention of these facilities provides assurance of a
coutirnring US military and political position of strength in this area. There are
no alternative facilities with all these advantages.
Question. What part of the budget can be attributed to the all-volunteer force?
If the draft were to be reinstituted next year, what would be the likely first year
savings?
Answer. It is not possible to give a precise accounting of the share ?f the DOD
budget that can be directly attributed to the conversion to the All Volunteer
Force (AVF). The total dollar amount depends upon what programs one chooses
to include as costs directly attributable to the AVE
The most realistic estimate of the increase in the DOD budget which can be
directly attributed to the AVF is $734 million in FY 1974 and $743 million in
FY 1975. This is less than one percent of DOD's total budget authority for
those years. Over one-third of these totals include expansions to the Active and
Reserve forces recruiting and advertising programs. Another one-third com-
prise legislated compensation programs such as the combat arms enlistment
bonus, the full annual cost of pending legislation for enlistment/reenlistment
bonuses ($77.8 million), and various scholarship costs for ROTC and Health
Professions. The remaining third accounts for a wide variety of programs in the
areas of eduction and travel entitlements for certain junior enlisted personnel
and improving living conditions and services on posts and bases.
These totals exclude comparability pay raises which have been granted
military personnel since the principal of military pay comparability with the,
civilian sector was established with the enactment of Public Law 90-207 in
1967, several years before the first efforts began to convert to an AVF.
These totals do not reflect savings which have been realized through longer
initial terms of service and an overall reduction in turnover throughout the
force. For example, during the high draft years (1967 to 1969), each military
accession contributed an average of 3.3 productive man-years, including an
allowance for reenlistment experience. Today, each accession contributes and
average of 4.1 production man-years. After 1975, this figure will increase to
4.5 productive man-years. The annual budget savings that will occur as a
result of these changes amount to $400 million to $500 million in 1975 and $500
to $600 million in 1976 and beyond. Thus, the incremental cost of the AVF
is probably $300 million or less.
Question. How would you define "a major counterforce capability?" What is
the present U.S, counterforce capability? How bas that capability changed over
the past five years? How does it compare with present Soviet counterforce capa-
bility?
Answer. A strategic "counterforce capability" is the capability to attack effec-
tively opposing military targets. These military targets include, but are not lim-
ited to, an opponent's strategic nuclear forces. We have had a limited counter-
force capability for many years. With the growth in Soviet strategic missile
forces from the 1960's onward, the Soviet Union can now be said also to have a
limited counterforce capability.
While the United States has had the capability for some time to target military
as well as industrial targets-and indeed our targeting plans have always in-
cluded both kinds of targets-our targeting doctrine has involved relatively mas-
sive responses. Because of the growth in Soviet strategic missile capabilities, and
their capacity now to pose a greater range of threats, we are adjusting our tar-
geting doctrine to enure that the President has a wider range of selective options
and is not restricted principally to massive options. We are putting potential op-
ponents on notice that we are actively pursuing selectivity and flexibility in our
targeting, and we believe that this will add to deterrence across the wider spec-
trum of risk.
A "major counterforce capability" implies a capability to inflict major damage
on some principal element of the opponent's military forces-such as his ICBMs,
his SLBMs, or his bombers. The new family of Soviet ICBM's-especially the
MIRVed version of the SS-X-18-if deployed in the numbers permitted under the
Interim Agreement-would represent a significant step toward a "major coun-
terforce capability" against our ICBM forces.
The present U.S. strategic counterforce capability is quite limited. While the
U.S. counterforce capability, including the hard-target capability, has improved
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over the last five years as the MIRVed Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles
have been deployed and the accuracy of the latter has been improved, we lack a
major counterforce capability against the Soviet strategic offensive forces, except
perhaps against their bombers which constitute the least important element of
those forces.
If the Soviet Union replaces its current SS-9 and SS-1:1 ICBMs with its new
MIRVed SS-X-18, SS-X-19 and SS-X-17 LCBIIs while we make no further
improvements in our counterforce capabilities, the Soviet capability against our
ICBMs will greatly exceed our capability against theirs by the end of this decade
or the early 1950s. Further Soviet development of more advanced missiles would
eventually allow them a high confidence counterforce capability against our
ICBMs.
We prefer and hope to stabilize mutual capabilities in the SAUl' negotiations.
But we would be foolish to allow the Soviets to think they might be permitted
to upset the strategic balance on which deterrence and stability depend, and it
is against the uncertainties in the future direction of Soviet strategic forces that
we have included strategic R&D programs is our FY 1975 budget.
Question. The President's budget message says that Soviet military spending
is increasing. Can you provide detailed, preferably unclassified data on Soviet
military spending? How reliable are these et,tinnates? What are the major prob-
leins in making such estimates and comparing, them with LUS spending? In partic-
ular, how much has the USSR spent on defense in each of the last 10 years, cona-
pared with US spending?
Answer. Classified comparable estimates of the level of Soviet military spending
as compared to US defense spending over a ten year period have been prepared.
[Deleted.] Since these estimates are for comparison with US defense spending,
the level of Soviet defense activity is estimated in dollars and represents, other
than manpower cost in support role, what it would cost to reproduce the Soviet
force in the US. A constant (1972) price base has been used. Thus, variations in
spending levels shown in the data should reflect changes in the forces and pro-
grams themselves and not inflation. [Deleted.]
Question. How does total Warsaw Pact spending on defense compare with that
of NATO over the past five years?
Answer. The estimated dollar costs for the Warsaw Fact and NATO Allies
shown below provide an indication of the general size of the respective defense
hrograrns by showing what they would cost if purchased and operated by the
U.S. A constant (1972) price base has been used, therefore the data reflects
changes in the forces and programs themselves and not inflation.
ESTIMATED DOLLAR COSTS OF NATO AND WAFSAW PACT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
fin billions of do'lars)
NATO:
United States ---__--
__
___
_ - -____
-____ ____--- -- --
102.20
98.70
91.20
82.80
77.50
NAATO TO Euuroopepe (i (inn
France)________________________
ng
cludi
43.69
44.17
43.65
44.53
44.66
Total----------------------------------------------
145.89
142.87
134.85
127.33
122.16
Canada--------------------------------------------------
2.13
2.02
1.82
1.89
1.82
Total, NATO----------------------------------------
148.02
144.89
136.67
129.22
123.98
Warsaw Pact:
U.S.S.R. r--------------------------------------------
NSWP2----------------------- --------------------- [Deleted]
Total, Warsaw Pact----------------------------------
r Includes military retirement pay.
2 Preliminary.
Question. What are the comparable amounts and percentages of total defense
budgets spent at present by USSR and US on: strategic programs, military man-
power, naval programs, military R&D?
Answer. The information is classified and has been furnished separately to
the committee.
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Question. Please provide estimates of the costs of U.S. forces committed to
NATO defense for fiscal years 1973, 1974, 1975. How are these costs calculated?
What factors are included?
Answer. (The information will be provided by separate correspondence.)
Question. How valid is the contention that missile throw-weight is the funda-
mental long term determinant of strategic strength? It is assumed that the U.S.
has reached a technological plateau in making other qualitative improvements
in our strategic forces? Are there important qualitative improvements that can
be made other than MIRY and increased accuracy?
Answer. Missile throw-weight is a basic parameter for assessing the strength
of strategic missile forces since technological improvements coupled with a
throw-weight advantage can result in a perceived strength imbalance. In the
long term, with technological equivalence, throw-weight would be a fundamental
determinant of capability. We have not reached a technological plateau. Our lead
in technology allows us many options for qualitative improvements. Other than
MIliV and accuracy, which provide a number of options for maintaining
strategic equivalence, we could vary the yield of existing warheads and improve
the effectiveness of our missiles. Ultimately, without an equitable agreement
for strategic arms limitations, we could use our technological base to increase
dramatically the throw-weight of our missiles. We do not desire a technology
or throw-weight race, but we are prepared to take those actions necessary to
maintain overall equivalence until an equitable agreement is reached.
Question. What are the estimates of how many people would be killed in the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. as a result of a major attack by the other nation limited
to military targets?
Answer. Fatality estimates are subject to considerable uncertainty One to the
sensitivity to assumptions about magnitude of attack, targets attacked, warn-
ing, weather conditions, and other technical factors associated with the nuclear
weapons employed. A major "military only" attack could mean an attack on
ICBM silos only ; ICBM silos, bomber bases, and submarine ports ; or all mili-
tary targets.
An attack on our ICBM silos only would probably result in approximately
[deleted]. If bomber bases.and submarine ports were also attacked, the number
of fatalities would increase substantially because, unlike ICBM silos, many of
these facilities are located near population centers. [Deleted.]
Question. How does Soviet airlift capacity compare with that of the United
States?
Answer. The U.S. airlift force consists of strategic airlift (70 C-5s and 234
C-141s) which are used for intertheater movement and tactical airlift aircraft
(primarily 489 C-130s) which are used for intratheater movement. The Soviet
airlift force consists of about 30 operational AN-22 aircraft with a capability
somewhere between that of our C-141 and C-5 and about 700 operational AN-12
aircraft with a capability slightly less than that of our C-130s. The Soviet AN-22s
are used strictly for strategic airlift whereas the AN-12s are used for both
strategic and tactical airlift. It is not clear how many of the Soviet AN-12s
could be used to satisfy strategic airlift requirement. Thus any comparison of
Soviet and United States airlift forces must consider that the total airlift force.
The following table shows the number of aircraft and the current wartime
surge capability of the United States and Soviet airlift forces to move palletized
cargo over a 1500 nm distance.
Number of a!rcraftI ----------------------------------------------------------- 793 730
Capability (kilotons/day) --------------------------------------------------------- 16.3 4.7
1 Includes United States' C-1417, C-5's and C-130's and Soviet AN-22's and AN-12's.
The above capability can be augmented upon mobilization by U.S. Civil Re-
serve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft and Soviet Aeroflot aircraft.
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Although the United States has substantially more airlift capability than the
'Soviets under similar movement conditions, the U.S. edge is offset by the location
of the two nations relative to areas of national interest. For example, in a NATO
contingency, the distance from the Central Region to Soviet bases would be about
1500 mm whereas the U.S. would have to transmit a distance of about 3500 mm.
Furthermore, the Soviets could make maximum use of their rail and road net-
work leading to the area.
Finally, when considering the capability to move extremely heavy and large
items such as battle tanks, the U.S. could employ its 70 C-5s, while the Soviets
would be able to use its 30 AN-22s for such lifts.
Quuestion. How does Soviet sealift capability compare with that of the United
'States?
Answer. Overall, the Soviet merchant fleet of 1500 vessels of approximately
1000 gross registered tons is the world's fifth largest merchant marine fleet in
number of ships and ninth in total tonnage. The U.S. fleet of 971 ships ranks
ninth in total number, but the tonnage capability of these ships is the seventh
largest in the world since U.S. ships are normally larger than the Soviet's. The
USSR has some 370 cargo ships and 112 tankers which are believed to be equip-
ped and suitable for long range military sealift. All are less than 20 years old,
are capable of speed in excess of 14 knots, and have the needed heavy lift boons
and hatch size. The United States operates 239 comparable ships and 162 tankers
which meet similar military supply requirements.
Soviet amphibious lift is capable of transporting between 9000 and 11,000
troops and is expected to increase [deleted]. Presently, the U.S. amphibious lift
force has sufficient capacity to lift just over one Marine Corps Division/Wing
(MAP) which includes about 39,000 troops. By 1978, the overall capaciity of U.S.
amphibious lift capacity will be increased to 11/3 MAP (approximately 44,000
troops).
Question. Whatis your view of a joint European strategic force?
Answer. Whether or when there will be a joint European strategic force is of
course very much a matter for the Europeans themselves to decide in the first
instance. At this time, it is a matter that is talked of not for the near term but
for the more distant future. Our view of such a force would depend upon the
circumstances surrounding its creation, the shape it took, and its relationship
to Western defense.
Question. What assistance has and does the United States provide to the
British strategic force?
Answer. As you are aware, the U.S.-U.K. Agreement for Cooperation on the
Use Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes was made in 1958, and the
U.S.-U.K. Polaris Sales Agreement was concluded in 1963. These agreements
have permitted cooperation on nuclear strategic force development of value to
both parties. We have sold the British Polaris A-3 missiles and associated
weapon systems equipment for their strategic deterrent and assisted them in
their upkeep and routine test-launches.
For the past several years, pursuant to these previous agreements, we have
furnished assistance .to the UK in their Polaris missile improvement program to
maintain the viability of the Polaris weapon system. In this regard, the U.S. role
is to provide support for the UK program in selected areas of design, engineering
and test assistance.
Question. Does the U.S. contemplate changing its policy toward assisting
French strategic forces?
Answer. The question of the role of French strategic forces and their relation-
ship to U.S. and NATO deterrent capabilities is one we have under periodic
review. Our policy in this area is and will be keyed to considerations of how
French strategic forces may relate to the overall Western deterrent and defense,
and to the general character of the relations between our two countries.
Question. What work on ABMs has the U.S.S.R. done in the past two years?
What is the nature and extent of work on a second ABM site?
Answer. Soviet ABM development is discussed in detail in Admiral Moorer's
Military Posture Statement. Soviet work on ABMs during the past two years
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has consisted of continuing ABM R&D. [Deleted]. No increase in deployment
at the Moscow site or deployment of a second system has been undertaken.
Question. Does the U.S. plan to send ASW planes to Diego Garcia?
Answer. Diego Garcia is programmed to be an austere support facility that
will have a capability to support air ASW missions, if and when these are re-
quired. U.S. ASW aircraft will operate from Diego Garcia from time to time.
Question. In Iran and Saudi Arabia, what are the nature and extent of : U.S.
military liaison activities. DOD-funded projects, sales of military equipment,
and projects. using DOD personnel?
Answer. In Iran, we have a total of approximately 1102 DOD personnel.
Major activities involving these personnel are : Army Mission (ARMISH-MVIAAG),
EUCOM support activity, Gendarmarie Mission (GENMISH), Defense Attache
Office, USA STRATCOM, Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT Teams) and
various USAF and USA communications and airlift support activities. With the
exception of the TAFT Teams, for which the Iranians reimburse us, all activ-
ities are DOD funded. [Deleted.] The total number of DOD personnel in Saudi
Arabia is approximately 327. Major activities which utilize these personnel are
U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM), the Corps of Engineers (COE), and
TAFT Teams, Saudi Arabia reimburses us for the TAFT Teams and the COE.
USMTM is DOD funded.
Question. Please list the types, quantities, and total costs per month of military
equipment and supplies furnished to South Vietnam and Laos since January 27,
1973.
Answer. The requested data for Vietnam for the period 1 February 1973
through 31 January 1974 are listed by supplying Military Departments at TAB
A. Consolidated data for Laos, broken out by Calendar Quarter, for the period
1 January 1973 through 31 December 1973 are listed at TAB B.
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