FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BUDGET DISCLOSURE (AMENDMENT NO. 1369)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
f- , ~vs y-1 (S-
This package contains:
Proxmire amdmt to S. 3000
Open Budget for CIA
Open Appropriation for CIA ("Mr. President")
Excerpt from Schlesinger nomination
McClellan Letter from WEC 2/22/74
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BUDGET DISCLOSURE
(Amendment No. 1369)
STATEMENTS
A. "Amendment to S. 3000 Proposed by Senator Proxmire" -- short
statement and analysis of problem -- two pages
B. "Open Budget for CIA" -- five pages
C. "Open Appropriation for CIA" -- four pages
D. Untitled -- "Rise in Opposition" -- five pages
BACKGROUND
E. Response to Assertions that Colby/Schlesinger Foresee no Problem
F. Copy of Colby's Confirmation Hearing -- references to open budget
clipped
G. Excerpt from Schlesinger's Confirmation Hearing
LETTERS
H. Letter from Colby to McClellan dated 22 February 1974 Opposing
Disclosure
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
Amendments to S. 3000 Proposed by Senator Proxmire
National Intelligence Program Budget Report
1. Senator Proxmire proposes an amendment which would require
the Director of Central Intelligence to submit an unclassified written report
to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds requested in the budget
for the national intelligence program for the next succeeding year.
2. This matter has been reviewed repeatedly by the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee over the years.
In fact, as recently as April of this year Mr. Colby met with a number of
Senators to review this matter. At that time he stated,t.hat statutory
restrictions placed upon him by the Congress in his capacity as Director
of Central Intelligence to protect Intelligence Sources and Methods preclude
him from recommending or agreeing to the disclosure of the figures which
Senator Proxmire has suggested. He explained that, disclosure of the total
intelligence budget would over the years, by virtue of-the trends disclosed,
provide valuable assistance to our adversaries. He pointed out that if he
were able to obtain similar information regarding our adversaries, he would
find it useful to the United States Government.
3. I believe that disclosing such a figure would only stimulate further
inquiry for greater details regarding intelligence activities, for explanations
of changes or trends, and for the component elements of the total figure.
fT
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
There need be no concern that budgets of other agencies are inflated with
intelligence figures since all intelligence money other than that which is openly
appropriated is included in the Department of Defense appropriations act.
While ours is an open society, certain things must remain secret and this is
one of them. I am strongly opposed to Senator Proxmire's amendment to
require transmissions publicly of the total amount of the national intelligence
program. Furthermore, the CIA subcommittees of the House and the Senate
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees are fully aware of the details
behind this overall figure and they are free to -inquire into these matters' as
deeply as they deem appropriate. I would also point out that if any member
of the Senate wishes to know what that figure is, I would have no,objection
to furnishing this figure to a member only on a classified basis.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
OPEN BUDGET FOR CIA
Amendment No. 1369 institutes substantial changes in the process
by which sums are made available to the CIA and the foreign intelligence
community by requiring the annual submission of an unclassified report
to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds requested in the
budget for the next succeeding year.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provides the basic
authority for financing that Agency without impairing security. During
the Senate consideration of that Act, the Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee explained:
"... Ours will perhaps be the only Government having
a law providing for such an activity. Other governments
simply appropriate a disguised sum of money, without any
authority of law, to handle the whole matter through some
government official. We are writing the whole law out. I
regret we cannot proceed in any other way. If the Senate
knew about the details, it might be willing to do as other
countries do, but we do not do business that way. We are
not doing what other countries do. We are throwing every
possible democratic safeguard around it as we go along. "
[95 Cong. Rec. 6955 (1949) (remarks of Senator Tydings). ]
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
In line with this concept, the budgetary and appropriation process
for funding CIA parallels the procedures followed for other agencies in
the Executive Branch, with certain exceptions authorized by law to protect
intelligence sources and methods. The annual request for funds for the
Agency is not specifically identified in the United States Federal budget.
These funds, nevertheless, are contained in the totals submitted to
Congress in that budget. The specific amount requested by the President
for the Central Intelligence Agency is made known to our committee as
classified material. The specifics of CIA's annual budget are also made
known to our committee and each year Agency witnesses testify before
our committee. The amount of the President's budget request for CIA
that is eventually approved by our committee is contained in the Defense
appropriation bill, although the CIA portion is not specifically identified
as such.
The CIA's budget that our committee reviews in detail consists of
programs inextricably involved with intelligence sources and methods.
Our committee is strongly committed to protection of these intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This committee
objective is wholly consistent with one of the principal objectives of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 and any legislative change, affecting
as it does intelligence sources and methods, is deserving of the closest
scrutiny.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 ZCIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
It has been argued that the mere existence of the budget of CIA
and the foreign intelligence community as a total figure will lead to a
public determination on the amount of Federal resources to be allocated
for foreign intelligence purposes. This desirable objective does not
appear to be achievable without unacceptable diminution and degrading of
the sources and methods of intelligence on which we so heavily depend.
If a public judgment is to be reached on the amount of resources to be
allocated to CIA, a specific public analysis of CIA's programs and
resource requirements would be required so that an informed judgment
could be reached. Without such detail it is difficult to perceive how
CIA and other sensitive programs and requirements could either be evaluated
on their merits or compared with other Federal programs with which they
presumably would be competing for funds. Clearly, making such detail
public would be in complete conflict with present law and practice and
destructive of the very intelligence sources and methods that are, have
been, or are to be funded.
It has also been argued that publicizing the National Intelligence
Program budget would not communicate useful information to potential
adversaries. Our committee is not sure what portions, if any, of this
budget has been identified or accurately estimated by potential adversaries
to whom this information would be useful against the interest of the United
States. However, the precise total may aid in verifying estimates in hand
and in filling in critical gaps in information. Also the year to year trends
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
could provide warning or tip-off of significant developments which could
bear on such life and death issues as our national means of verification
of disarmament agreements.
In view of the foregoing, I am strongly opposed to the proposal
for an unclassified report on the National Intelligence Program budget.
I hold that its enactment would nullify provisions of existing law which
directly and effectively serve our nation's interest through the protection
of intelligence sources and methods from "disclosure" to our potential
adversaries.
It is true the success of our system of Government is dependent
upon an informed public. But I submit that an equally fundamental postulate
is the need to retain the capability to insure the survivability of our
system from potential foreign threats. And in a case such as we have
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
pending before us today, there is no question in my mind which of the
two fundamental concepts must be preserved, especially in-view of the
fact that we have four separate committees in the Congress who know the
intimate details of what we are discussing and who I believe are willing
to share needed information with their colleagues, who are the public`s agents
in this and.other sensitive matters.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
Open Appropriation for CIA
Mr. President:
I rise in opposition to Amendment Number 1369 proposing
an unclassified report to Congress of the total National Intelligence Program,
including CIA's budget.
The funding of the foreign intelligence programs of the Central
Intelligence Agency follows substantially the procedures that apply across
the board to other Executive Branch agencies. Certain procedures have
been adopted, of course, pursuant to law in the interest of providing
necessary security.
The United States Federal budget does not specifically fdentify
funds for CIA. These funds, nevertheless, are contained in the totals
submitted to Congress in that budget.
The gross amount requested by the President for CIA is
communicated on a classified basis directly to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees subcommittees responsible for CIA matters.
In addition, the specific details of CIA's annual budget is presented to these
subcommittees and Agency witnesses testify in an executive hearing on the
budget request. The amount of the President's budget request that is
eventually approved for CIA by these subcommittees is carried in the
Defense appropriation bill, but is not specifically identified.
These procedures for handling the CIA budget and appropriations
are consistent with and in furtherance of provisions of law setting forth
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence. Section 6
of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended (50 USCA 403g)
states:
Sec. 6. In the interests of the security of the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States and in order
further to implement the proviso of section 403(d)(3) of
this title that the Director of Central Intelligence shall
be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Agency shall
be exempted from the provisions of section 654 of Title 5,
and the provisions of any other law which require the
publication or disclosure of the organization, functions,
names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel
employed by the Agency: Provided, That in furtherance
of this section, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget
shall make no reports to the Congress in connection with
the Agency under section 947(b) of Title 5.
Obviously, CIA's budget is revealing of foreign intelligence programs
and the sources and methods used in their implementation. The CIA Act of 1949
as well as the National Security Act of 1947 is a national commitment to the need
to protect intelligence sources and methods from disclosure to our potential
enemies. This statutory commitment in these two acts is wholly consistent
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : elA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
with the principles of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 and any
legislative change, affecting as it does intelligence sources and methods,
is deserving of the closest scrutiny.
The question has been raised that an unclassified report of the
National Intelligence Program would lead to public acceptance of
the amount of Federal resources to be allocated to CIA. Unfortunately,
this objective is not possible without also degrading of the very sources and methods
of intelligence on which our country so heavily relies. Beyond doubt, public
acceptance of the resources to be allocated to CIA would require public
analysis of CIA's programs and resources requirements if the acceptance is
to be based upon informed judgment. I& we -really intend to be&sgrious:
about evaluating. or weighing the.programs of the Central Intelligence Agency
against the -,programs of other Federal agencies for?the expenditure of resources,
we need details.--'-j, Yet, providing such public detail would be'notonly in complete
conflict with present law and practice but more importantly destructive of the
very intelligence sources and methods that are to be funded.
I am also fearful that such a public report would only be a precursor
of an open appropriation for these same programs. This would require
committee recommendation and action by both Houses. Difference between
the Houses would require conference action. Each step in the legislative
process subjects the overview subcommittees to the burden of justifying
their action. Thus, it is doubtful that a security curtain can be tightly
closed once the total figure has been revealed.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
Finally, an open appropriation for CIA means that funds
for unforeseen contingencies (which are usually of an extremely sensitive
matter--not susceptible to debate in the public forum) may require a
supplemental appropriation bill. Thus the open budget could destroy
existing flexibility and adaptability to meet critical situations.
In summary, a public report of the National Intelligence Program
is likely to precipitate overwhelming pressure for specific information on
costs and operations. The revelation of a gross figure is an invitation
to questions and disclosures. Inexorably these disclosures will conflict:
with the existing congressional mandate--set forth in law--that the Director
of Central Intelligence protect and preserve U.S. foreign intelligence
sources and methods.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
Mr. President,
I rise in opposition to the amendment by the senior Senator
from Wisconsin. The proposal has the lure of simplicity but consequences,
I am fearful, that run deep and against our Nation's fundamental interests.
It contains the promise of informing the public while preserving the essential
security of our foreign intelligence capabilities. In fact, I believe
it would serve both interests poorly.
A constant in the needs of sovereign nations is to possess intelligence
about the intentions and capabilities of adversaries. General Washington
wrote one of his intelligence chiefs, Colonel Elias Dayton, that:
"The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent
and need not be further urged--all that remains for me to add,
is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For
upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of the kind,
and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well
planned and promising a favorable issue. "
The tragic experience of Pearl Harbor taught us a number of
painful lessons. In the 1947 National Security Act the Congress took a
giant step toward assuring that executive action or inaction in the international
field would be based upon the best information available. Insofar as it is
possible for the Congress to direct the Executive Branch in the conduct
of essentially an executive responsibility, the National Security Act of 1947
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
provided the authority needed for an effective foreign intelligence
establishment.
The CIA Act of 1949 provided additional administrative authority
for CIA and provided for its funding. The funding of CIA was particularly
important from the point of view of Congress since it establishes the second
of the two principal relationships between an executive branch , :agency and
the Congress--legislation and appropriations.
I believe that our Nation is unique in the intention its legislature
has given to specifying and circumscribing the activities of the agency
designated to perform its foreign intelligence mission. In the process of
working out legislation for CIA it was necessary to somewhat change the
procedures followed in the case of the more normal Federal agency. This
was particularly true in connection with provisions concerning the authorization
and appropriation of funds.
Public revelation in these areas would alert potential adversaries
to programs, needs, and accomplishments. This knowledge could be used
against our Nation's interest to offset the value of intelligence collected or to
neutralize the sources and methods used.
The 1949 CIA Act permits the allocation of sums for the CIA to carry
out its activities without publicly revealing the secret purpose to which such
funds may be put.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
As a matter of fact, the arrangements worked out are completely
responsive to the major elements of the Federal budgetary systems. Changes
from the norm are designed to provide a reasonably controlled environment
so as to protect and preserve the sources and methods which necessarily
must be resorted to in collecting foreign intelligence.
As a matter of fact, I know that the budget of CIA is scrutinized
with greater care than the budget of any other agency of the Federal
Government.
Similar procedures have been used over the years to fund other
governmental activities of an extremely sensitive nature when the public
interest would not be served through the use of more common explicit
procedures. Examples of this include the Manhatten Project for the
development of the atomic bomb and the development of the U-2 airplane.
On May 10, 1960, following the loss of the U-2 over the Soviet Union,
the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Clarence Cannon,
explained that:
"The plane was on an espionage mission authorized
and supported by money provided under an appropriation
recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and
passed by the Congress.
"Although the Members of the House have not generally
been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series
and part of an established program with which the subcommittee
in charge of the appropriation was familiar, and of which it had
been fully apprised during this and previous sessions.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
"The appropriation and the activity had been approved
and recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all
military expenditures and operations, was under the aegis
of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United
States, for whom all members of the subcommittee have the
highest regard and in whose military capacity they have the
utmost confidence.
"The question immediately arises as to the authority
of the subcommittee to recommend an appropriation for such
purposes, and especially the failure of the subcommittee to
divulge to the House and the country the justifications warranting
the expenditure and all details connected with the item at the
time it was under consideration on the floor.
"The answer of the subcommittee is--absolute and
unavoidable military necessity, fundamental national defense.
"This appropriation, and its purpose, is justified by
honored and established precedent. This subcommittee,
including the same personnel with the exception of two members
who have since died, was the same committee which for something
like 3 years provided in the annual appropriation bills a sum
which finally totaled more than $2 billion for the original atomic
bomb. Session after session the money was provided, and the
subcommittee visited Oak Ridge where the work was in progress
without any Member of the House with the exception of the Speaker
of the House being aware of this tremendous project or the expenditure
of the money. According to the testimony of all military authorities
that bomb ended the war and saved the lives of not less than half a
million men who would have had to be sacrificed in the conquest of
Japan. No one has ever said that the subcommittee was not justified
in expending an amount that eventually aggregated more than the
assessed valuation of some of the States of the Union for that purpose.
"And now the most gratifying feature of the entire incident.
"The world has always recognized the remarkable success
of our form of government. It has been the wonder and admiration
of mankind. But they have said that it was at a great disadvantage
in a war with an authoritarian dictatorship.
"We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men
confronted by the most ruthless and criminal despotism can under
the Constitution of the United States protect this Nation and preserve
world civilization. "
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
The CIA is held tightly accountable within the executive and
legislative bodies. There may be disagreement as to whom the members
should be or more particularly what committee they should be from in the
Congress, but I think such disagreements can only be resolved on the basis
of giving priority to the special constitutional roles of the Congress--the
appropriation of funds--the enactment of legislation- -and the oversight of
legislation already enacted. It is difficult to perceive how enlarging a
somewhat small group into a somewhat larger group would assure that
these congressional responsibilities are being fulfilled. Clearly information
on the activities of the CIA should not be displayed in a public arena. To
do so would defeat our national interest.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
Response to assertions that former CIA Director Schlesinger and present
CIA Director Colby have stated that disclosure of total intelligence budget
figures would not pose a security problem.
Statements made by Dr. Schlesinger, during the course of
the hearing on his nomination to be Secretary of Defense, to the effect
that he might support the disclosure of total figures of the National Intelligence
Programs have been taken out of context. I would point out that in
portions of his statement which were omitted ' he Bald and I quote:
"... I would lean against it. But I think that it
could be done. The problem that you get into, you see,
as you well know, Senator, is that it would be just a free
floating figure, unsupported and unsupportable in public,
with nobody except the members of the Oversight Committees
or members of the Armed Services Committee and
Appropriation Committees who would know the details.
Those are circumstances which under certain conditions would
elicit the strong tendency for a flat 10 percent, 20 percent,
50 percent, 100 percent, cut in intelligence activities because
there is an identifiable target with no broad understanding of
what the components are and it is that aspect that I think
concerns me. "
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
Mr. Colby has indicated that while it is his view that a disclosure
of the total intelligence budget figures would not in and of itself present
a security problem, disclosure of these figures annually would reveal
fluctuations in the total intelligence effort. Over a period of years trend
lines could be established which would give our adversaries information
which they do not now have and lead to pressures for further public
explanation of intelligence programs. Much information is now readily avail-
able but as a professional, Mr. Colby has said he could not agree to
giving our adversaries further help by providing the additional information
Senator Proxmire has suggested.
In sum, Mr. Colby has indicated to the members of the CIA
oversight Committees that statutory restrictions (i. e. , the statutory
requirement that he protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure) placed upon him by the Congress in his capacity
as Director of Central Intelligence preclude him from recommending
or agreeing to the disclosure of these figures.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
NOMINATION OF JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
TO BE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HEARING
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, TO BE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
97-861 WASHINGTON : 1973
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
Dr. SCr-ILvSINGER. I think that in the past, perhaps, for a variety of
reasons, reflecting the psychology of the country at that time that there
may have been a tendency to overclassify within the Department of
Defense and within some other components of Government.
That is my response.
May I add to that the word that I would intend to avoid or reduce
excessive classification during- my tenure, if that is achievable. I thinly
we can reduce some of the propensities to overclassify.
Senator Blruw. I think that.would be very desirable. I think that
there is, I understand, the tendency, there is a certain tendency; great
tendency to greatly overclassify.
Senator SYMI1 GToN. Would the Senator yield?
Senator BYRO. Yes.
Senator SYMINGTON. I thank you. I have a friend front Virginia.
The questions that you supply for the record, this is an open hear-
ing. We would like to have the record o.n the Floor when your con-
firmation comes up and I know that the Pentagon will only be too glad
to cooperate with you to get the record out at the earliest possible
time. So we would appreciate it if you would do that.
Dr. ScrHLFSLNGFR. Yes, sir, indeed. This is not a time I would en-
courage delays in response. [Laughter.]
Senator STMINGTON. Thank you.
Senator BYI',D. I am glad to notice your statement that you will
claim attempt to do something in regard to the overclassification. I
think that will be very helpful all clown the line. I may tend to go in
the opposite direction. I am too objective, being a newspaper editor
most of my life, but, I think that the Defense Department has gone too
far in the classification direction.
When you were before the committee for confirmation as Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency, I raised a point as to whether it
might not be appropriate without damaging our intelligence activities,
to make available to the public the total amount of funds being ap-
propriated to the CIA with major breakdowns but not detailed
breakdowns. I think there is a need for classification as to how certain
funds are used but I have not been able to establish in my own
mind the need to say that w numbers of dollars; you cannot say that x
numbers of dollars is being spent for the CIA. You have had an op-
portunity to look at that from the point of view of the CIA. You are
going into the Defense Department which is involved in this also
because it adds to the defense budget. I am wondering if you would
comment on that this morning.
Dr. SCUTLEsINGER. I think that it might be an acceptable procedure,
Senator, to indicate the total figure of the national intelligence pro-
grams. I would not personally advocate it but it may be an acceptable
procedure. I think, as you well know, that this has been discussed not
only with the Armed Services Committees in the two Houses but also
with the Appropriation Committees. There is the feeling that it might
be wise to give the gross figure. I have come to share that feeling at
least in this time frame but that does not say that it is not a possibility.
Senator BYRD. You are not strongly opposed to that, I take it?
Dr. SCTILFSINGFR. I would say that that is something that could be
done on balance. I would lean against it.. But I think that it could be
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700'030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
clone. The problem that you get into, you see, as you well know. Seu-
'htor, is that it would be just a free floating figure, unsupported and
unsupportable in public, with nobody except the members of the Over-
sight Committees or members of the Armed Services Committee amid
Appropriation Committees who would know the details. Those are.
circumstances which under certain conditions would elicit the strong
tendency for a flat 1.0 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, 100 percent, cut
in intelligence activities because there is an identifiable target with no
broad understanding of what the components are and it is that aspect
that I think concerns me.
Senator BYnD. There would be no security reasons why it should not
be done.
Dr. SCHLESINGER. For the gross figure I think that the security con-
cerns are minimal. The component figures I would be more concerned
about but for the gross national intelligence program figures I think
we could live with that on a security basis, yes.
Senator BYrn. Dr. Schlesinger, if you are con armed as Secretary of
Defense will you provide to the appro Teem committees all informa-
tion and data that the committees Teem necessary to adequately
evaluate the requirements and utilization of tax funds?
Dr. ScrinESINGER. I think the answer to that is generally yes.
Senator Byrn. I thought it would be well to have it on the record.
Just one additional question.
The Senate last year passed legislation, and I assume it will do so
again this year, specifying that if U.S. troops are used they can only
be used without the consent of Congress for a specified period of time.
At the end of that time, at the end of the beginning of the enier-
gency, the Congress would have to give approval. In principal, would
you favor or oppose that legislation?
Dr. Scar sirrrr;R. I think, Senator, although I have not studied it
carefully, I would oppose that legislation. The reason for that is it is
very difficult to put this into a specific time frame and an arbitrary,
single procedure may well not serve the country satisfactorily.
I would say this : That at the present time t_he Congress if n wishes,
can pass legislation to forestall any activities almost immediately, it
doesn't have to wait for, months. So that there is within the present
system the opportunity for Congress to exercise its Powers without
setting a specific time period. I think that there is concern about the
war powers but I think that this particular legislation on balance, to
the extent that I understand it, would not tend to serve a fruitful pur-
pose. But I underscore the fact that I have not looked very cleeplti- into
that, and my opinion might be different in 3 weeks' time if I were to
study it carefully.
Senator BY RD. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SYMINGTOiti. Thank you, Senator.
Dr. Schlesinger, I ask this question for Senator Cannon. who is
chairman of the Subcommittee on the Tactical Air Committee that
meets tomorrow.
Did you participate or support Secretary Clements' decision on the
F-1.4 that will be discussed before the subcommittee tomoiTOW ?
Dr. SCHr.ESINGER. I did not participate in that decision save to the
extent that Secretary Clements discussed the decision with me.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP75B00380R0-0700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
2 2 FEB 1974
Honorable John L. McClellan
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
In your letter of 5 February 1974 you asked for my views on
proposals made by Senator William Proxmire in a letter to you dated
30 January 1974 that the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee release
an aggregate figure broken down by agency which indicates the total
amount spent on intelligence by the U. S. yearly.
Senator Proxmire goes on to say he agrees that the release of
manpower statistics and budgetary information that indicates the relative
priorities of the intelligence community cannot be permitted. His basic
purpose is to show to the American public the rough apportionment of
intelligence dollars to defense and civilian agencies while fully protecting
intelligence programs.
You will recall that on 27 July 1973 I responded to a similar request
from you regarding the disclosure of the budget figures for the National
Intelligence Program which I presented to the Subcommittee on 11 July 1973.
I believe the considerations which I outlined in that letter still apply. I
stated my view that disclosure of the total figure would not in and of itself
present a security problem. I went on to explain, however, that I felt it
would establish a precedent for the disclosure of this figure annually. If
this were to occur, the annual fluctuations in our total intelligence effort
would be revealed and it would not be in the national interest to disclose
that kind of information to foreign nations.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7
I pointed out that such disclosure of total figures for all programs
would reveal considerable information about the distribution of our
intelligence resources among different types of intelligence activity and
an annual update of those figures would provide insights into the changes
and trends in our intelligence programs which could be damaging to
intelligence sources and methods.
I am still concerned that public disclosure of total intelligence figures
on an annual basis would lead to pressures for further public explanation
of the programs for which the monies were appropriated. In my judgment
this is the very kind of information which Senator Proxmire has indicated
in his letter to you should not be released.
I feel that the final determination of how information on these funds
should be handled within the Congress is a matter for the Congress to
decide. I feel quite strongly, however, that because of the responsibility
placed upon me by the Congress in the National Security Act of 1947 for
the protection of intelligence sources and methods, I could not authorize
the release of the figures which Senator Proxmire has proposed.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000700030009-7