REPORT TOGETHER WITH SEPARATE AND INDIVIDUAL VIEWS TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 9286 ON AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION FOR THE SAFEGUARD ABM, AND ACTI

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CREST

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General CIA Records

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CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0

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204

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December 12, 2016

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April 9, 2002

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Publication Date:

September 6, 1973

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REPORT

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Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Calendar No. 363 93D CONGRESS l 1st Session I I REPORT 1 No. 93-385 wa~=~L~ ?~:9 REPORT ILL b f TOGETHER WITH SEPARATE AND INDIVIDUAL VIEWS [To accompany H.R. 9286] AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVEL- OPMENT, CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION FOR THE SAFEGUARD ABM, AND ACTIVE DUTY AND SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1973 ow Referral To CONG Not Required Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 TUART SYM1NWTON, Missouri 11 ]CENRYM.JACKSON.Washington 8AM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina IOWA RI) W. CANNON. Nevada TO O MAS J. Mc1N'l'YRE. New ]I ampshire IIARRY F. BY RD, IR., Virginia IIAROLI S.I177GIIES, Iowa SAM NUNN Gcorghi STROM THURMOND, South Carolina JOHN TOWER,Texas PETER H. DOMINICK, Colorado BARRY G OLDWATE R, Arizona WILLIAM SAXBE, Ohio WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia T. EDWARD BRASWPLL, is., C'hirf Counsel and Staff Director JoiN T. TiciR, Chief Clerk Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 CONTENTS Page Committee amendment in the form of a substitute--------------------- 1 Purpose of the bill------------------------------------------------- 1 Percentage reductions---------------------------------------------- 2 Summary of total fiscal year 1974 authorization requests--------------- 2 Summary by major weapon category------------------------- ------ 3 Major changes by Senate committee--------------------------------- 5 Observations relative to bill----------------------------------------- 9 Aspects of bill of special interest-Weapon Systems : F-14--------------------------------------------------------- 13 F-15--------------------------------------------------------- 15 CVN-70 Navy carrier------------------------------------------ I6 Close air support-AV-8A Harrier, Advanced Attack Helicopter, A-10, (A-X) and A-7D--------------------------------------- ----- 17 C-5A------------------------------------- =------------------ 21 Army and Air Force UX and CXX aircraft programs------------ 22' Sidewinder/Chaparral missiles----------------------------------- 23 Laser guided missiles ------------------------------------------ 23 B-1 aircraft------ ---------------------- ------ 24 Defense pilot training: Navy T-2C trainer aircraft and simulators; Air Force simulators------------------------------------------ 26 Strategic cruise missiles and decoys------------------------------ 27 Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system---------------------------- 31 Ballistic missile defense research and development----------------- 32 Site defense------------ 33 Light area defense system (LADS) ------------------------------ 34 SAM-D weapon system --------------------------------------35 Trident------------------------------------------------------ 37 AWACS (E-3A)------------------------------------------------ 40 Title I-Procurement---------------------------------------------- 43 Army aircraft------------------------------------------------- 43 Authorization request-------------------------------------- 43 Summary of House action---------------------------------- 43 Committee recommendation for changes---------------------- 43 U-21/UX utility aircraft-------------------------- ---- 43 Aircraft spares and repair parts----------------------------- 43 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft-------------------------------- 47 Authorization request-------------------------------------- 47 Summary of House action---------------------------------- 47 Committee recommendation for changes---------------------- 47 F-4J fighter---------------------------------------------- 47 F-14A aircraft-------------------------------------------- 47 EA-6B Prowler------------------- 48 A-7E Corsair II------------------------------------------- 48 AV-8A Harrier----------------------------------- -------- 48 T-2C trainer aircraft--------------------------------------- 48 Navy and Marine Corps aircraft recommended for approval-------- 48 A-4 M. (Skyhawk) ----------------------------------------- 48 A-6E (Intruder) ------------------------------------------- 48 EA-6B (Prowler) ------------------ -------- 49 A-7E (Corsair II)----------------------------------------- 49 AV-8A (Harrier) ------------------------------------------ 49 UTI-1N (Iroquois) ----------------------------------------- - 49 All-1J (Sea Cobra) -------------------------------------49 P-3C (Orion) ------------------------------------------- 50 S-3A (Viking) --------------------------------------------- 50 E-2C (Hawkeye) -----------------------------------------50 (Light) twin engine medium transport------------------------ 50 EA-130Q (Hercules) --------------------------------------- 50 KC-1301I (Iercules)______________________________________ 50 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 IV Title I-Procurement--Continued rare Air Force aircraft------------------------------------------------ 52 Authorization request ------------------------------------------ 52 Summary of House action- ------------------------------------ 52 Committee recommendation for changes---------------------- 52 F-5A----------------------------------------------------- 52 A-10 (A--X) ------------------------------------------------ 52 F--I11----------------------- ------------------------------ 52 A--71)------------------------------------------------------ 53 .i3 T-41 D basic trainer----_ ------------------------------------------ .1; 3 UH- lH utility helicopter --------------------------------------- 53 CXX aircraft - - -------- --- .------- ----------------------- iii Aircraf modifications---_ --_--_ 53 Aircraft spares and repair pares------------------------------- 54 Common ground equipmer.t------------------------------------- .1; 4 Ai.r Force aircraft recommended for approval---------------------- 54 F/TF-15A (Eagle)--------------------------------------------- 14 F--4E (Phantom II) ---------------------------------------- 54 4 5E (International Fight,-r) ------------------------------- 54 F--1 I IF ------------------------------------------------------ 114 A--71) (Corsair II) ----------- ------------------------------ .14 E-4 A (Advanced Airborne National Command Post) _ _ _ ----_ _ - 64 L 130E;J13 (Hercules) -------- ------------------------------ 55 T--411) (Mescalero) ------------------------------------------ 55 1H--1H (Iroquois) -------------------------------- 5Z CFI-47C (Chinook)------ ------------------------------------------ 55 Armv missiles--------------------------------------------------- i7 Authorization request ------------------------------------------ 57 SLrnmarv of House action.------------------------------------ 5 7 Committee recommendation for changes______________________ ,7 Safeguard ------------------------------------------------- 57 Lance rrvssile----------------------------------------------- 57 Pershing missile--------------------------------------------- 57 AV/TSQ--73 air defense commimd and control system ---------- 58 Army missilery recommended foc approval------------------------- 58 Dragon raissile -------------------------------------------- - 58 Improved Hawk--------------------------------------------- 58 Lance missile --------------------------------------------- 58 Pershing missile ------------- ----- -------------------------- 58 TOW nmissile ----------------. ------------------------------ 58 AMTS{..73------------------------------------------------ 58 Navy missiles'---------------------------------------------- ------ ' CO Authorization request------------------------------------- 60 Sir,mrnarv of House action..-.--------------------------------- 60 Committee recommendation for changes______________________ f'0 Poseidon-------------------------------------------------- 6'0 Harpoon - -------------- --- --- - -------------------------- (-0 Sidewinder----------------------------------------------- 60 Bulldog --------------------------------------------------- 60 Nava missiles recommended fo:- approval --------------------------- 61 Poseidon ------------------------------------------------- 61 Sparrow--------------------------------------------------- (1 Phoenix--------------------------------------------------- 6l. Shrike-------------- ------------------------------------------------------ 61 Condor------------------------------------------------------ 61 Standard-------------------------------------------------- 62 Aerial targets ---------------------------------------------- 62 Marine Corp, missile ---------------------------------------------- 64 Authorization request- __--------------- .----------------------- 64 House action ------- ------------------- 64 Coniroit.tee recommendation-- ------------------------------ 64 Marine Corps missile recommended for approval__________________ 64 Improved Hank ------------------------------------------ 64 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : cIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Title I-Procurement-Continued Air Force missiles---------------------------------------------- Authorization request______________________________________ House action ---------------------------------------------- Committee recommendation for changes______________________ Minuteman----------------------------------------------- SRAM--------------------------------------------------- Maverick------------------------------------------------- Shrike---------------------------------------------------- Air Force missiles recommended for approval_____________________ Minuterna.n----------------------------------------------- - Maverick------------------------------------------------- Shrike---------------------------------------------------- Short range attack missile (SRAM)-------------------------- Sparrow -------------------------------------------------- Target drones--------------------------------------------- Navy shipbuilding and conversion program----------------------- Authorization request_____________________________________ Summary of House action__________________________________ Committee recommendation for changes______________________ Sea Control Ship______________'_ SSBN fleet ballistic missile submarine________________________ DLG (AAW) guided missile frigate-------------------------- Escalation ------------------------------------------------ Navy shipbuilding and conversion programs recommended for ap- proval-------------------------------------------------- CVN nuclear aircraft carrier________________________________ SSN-688 class nuclear attack submarines____________________ DD-963 destroyers--------------------=------------------- Service craft ---------------------------------------------- Pollution abatement craft__________________________________ Conversion and modernization______________________________ Other costs ---------------------------------------------- Army tracked combat vehicles__________________________________ Authorization request______________________________________ Summary of House action__________________________________ Committee recommendation for change_______________________ M60A1 tank----------------------------------------------- Army tracked vehicles recommended for approval------------------ M578 recovery vehicle______________________________________ M60A1 tank---------------------------------------------- Marine Crops tracked combat vehicles___________________________ Authorization request______________________________________ Summary of House action___________________________________ Committee recommendation________________________________ Navy torpedoes and related support equipment____________________ Authorization request______________________________________ Summary of House action__________________________________ Committee recommendation for changes---------------------- MK-48 torpedo------------------------------------------- Captor--------------------------------------------------- Army other weapons ------------------------------------------- Authorization request______________________________________ Summary of House action__________________________________ Committee recommendation for changes______________________ XM 198 medium towed howitzer____________________________ M60 machinegun ------------------------------------------ M219 machinegun---------------------------------------- M16 Al rifle -- - - - - - --- - Navy other weapons ------------------------------------------- Authorization request_____________________________________ Summary of House action__________________________________ Committee recommendation for changes______________________ MK22 machinegun --------------------------------- Close-in weapons system____________________________________ Page 66 66 66 66 66. 66 66 66 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 70 70 70 70 70 71 71 71 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75BOO38OR000600160003-0 Title I-Procurement---Contintied Marine Corps other weapons-- --------_-__-_--------------------- Nlarine Corps request--------------------------------------- Summary of Rouse action---------------------------------- Committee recommendatioa----------_---------------------- 'l'itle II-Research and developmen~-------- _______---_-_____-__--____ Sec. 201-Research, development, test, and evaluation authorizations_ Authorization requested-----------_-_---_----------------------- House action ---------------------------------------------------- Sumrnarv of committee recomrr.endations.-__---____________________ General discussion of eommitte3 reductions_______________________ Adjustments to fiscal year 1974 research and development authoriza- tion request recommended by the committee ________________-_-_ Major research and development programs ------------ ----____ _-___ Committee action on selected subj,cts in the research, development, test, and evaluation authorizatiou request_______________________ Research and development fiscal year 1974 programs with excess funds --- ..-----------..---------- ------------------------ Navy V/STOL programs----- ------------------------------ Two-phace F-5E Addition of $14.0 million___________________ Utility tactical transport aircraft system (UTTAS)____________ Advanced turbofan engine...--__-__-_-.____ __________________ Aegis--------------------- ----- lhial-mode Redeye missile ------------------------------------ Army all-weather short-range missile__._________________------ Safeguard----------------- ------------------------------- Su.rface effect ships ---------._----------------------------- Changesin R.D. T. E. program structure____________________ Independent research and development------------------------ mical and biological w;arf-e------------------- .______-____ Che a Study of use of herbicides in South Vietnam__________________ Project Sanguine -------------------------------------------- I l untan resources research anc? development____________________ programing of R.O.T. & E______________________ Major weapon systems developed under competitive cost reim- bursementtypecontracta---------- .__________-------_----- Federal contract research centers-s ___________________________ Ue of special termination coats clause on certain research and development contracts- ..---____---_--------------------- Summary by budget activity------_---------___-------------------- Nlilitary sciences ------------------------------- _-- ---------- Aircraft and related equipment______________________----_____ Missiles and related equipment---_- ____-_______------------- Military astronautics and related equipment__________________ Ships, small craft, and reh,ted equipment--- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -- - _ _ _ _ _ _ Ordnance, combat vehicle:, and related equipment ______-__ _____ Other equipinent ------------------------------------------- Programwide rnanagement and support_______________________ Title III--Active duty manpower authorization__________________-__-__ Conmittee recommendations------------------------- -_--____-__-- Rising operating costs --------_--- --------------------- ------------ All-volunteer force problems------. ________________________-- Concernfor manpower managemeat_______________________--_____ Tightening up along the line------------------------------------- Illustrative reductions by service- -________________--__-_-_--_____ Illustrative reductions by mission area ____________________--___--- Command and headquarters-. ------------------------- .-- --- Page 83 83 83 83 85 85 85 86 85 86 92 93 95 95 96 97 98 98 99 ICO IC1 102 104 105 108 110 112 115 116 118 119 1 20 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 129 129 129 129 130 130 131 131 132 133 133 133 139 140 140 141 112 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75BOO38OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/171 PIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 'Title III-Active duty manpower authorization/enlisted aides-Continued Concern for manpower management-Continued page Mission forces--------------------------------------------- 143 Regional deployments______________________________________ 145 Southeast Asia-------------------------------------------- 146 Korea---------------------------------------------------- 146 Europe--------------------------------------------------- 146 Special issues------------------------------------------------- 147 All-volunteer force_________________________________________ 147 Women in the military_____________ _______ 148 ----------------- Annual authorization of civilians____________________________ 149 Other amendments-------------------------------------- 149 Defense manpower report__________________________________ 150 Need for improved management of resources__________________ 150 Title IV-Personnel strength for the Selected Reserves----------------- 153 Title V-Military training student loads______________________________ 159 Title VI-Safeguard antiballistic-missile system_______________________ 161 Title VII-General provisions --------------------------------------- 163 Committee action------------------------------------------------- 166 Fiscal data------------------------------------------------------- 167 Departmental recommendation-------------------------------------- 168 Congressional action on procurement and R.D.T. & E. authorization requests (FY 1964-1974)----------------------------------------- 171 Estimated amounts (as amended) included in the military functions ap- propriations for support of Free World Forces in Southeast Asia, fiscal year 1974------------------------------------------------------- 172 Relationship of authorization to Department of Defense appropriations-- 173 Changes in existing law--------------------------------------------- 177 Separate views of- Senator Thomas McIntyre-------------------------------------- 181 Senator Stuart Symington______________________________________ 181 Senator Howard Cannon_______________________________________ 181 Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr-------------------------------------- 181 Senator Hughes----------------------------------------------- 181 Senator Dominick--------------------------------------------- 181 Senator Saxbe------------------------------------------------- 181 Individual views of- Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr-------------------------------------- 185 Senator John Tower___________________________________________ 187 Senator Harold Hughes________________________________________ 189 Senator Barry Goldwater_______________________________________ 203 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND ACTIVE DUTY AND SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTHS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Mr. Symington, from the Committee on Artned Services, submitted the following REPORT The Committee on Armed Services, to which was referred the bill (H.R. 9286) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1974 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength. for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. COMMITTEE AMENDMENT IN THE FORM OF A. SUBSTITUTE The committee amended the bill by striking all after the enacting clause and substituting a new bill reflecting changes in this bill as recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee. This Senate report refers to the changes in the House bill for informational purposes only. The House passed this legislation on July 31, 1973, at a time when this committee was in the process of completing its actions on this legislation. The Senate Committee on Armed Services voted to report out this legislation on August 3, 1973. All differences in the bill as passed by the House from the version as finally passed by the Senate will, of course, be considered in conference. PURPOSE OF THE BILL This bill would: (1) Authorize appropriations during fiscal year 1974 for (a) major procurement and (b) research, development, test, and evaluation by the Department of Defense; (2) Continue for fiscal year 1974 the authority for merging military assistance financing for South Vietnam and other free world forces in support of the South Vietnam effort and for local forces in Laos, with funding of the Department of Defense; (3) Authorize the personnel end strength for each active duty component of the Armed Forces for fiscal year 1974; Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17: CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 (4) Authorize the annual average military training student load for each of the active and reserve components of the Armed Forces for fiscal year 1974; (5) Authorize the personnel strengths for fiscal year 1974 for the Selected Reserve of each of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces; (6) Impose certain limitations ivith regard to specific procurement actions, provide certain additiona legislative authority, and for other purposes. PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS Percentage Reduction Overall---6.9% From Request The committee recommends authorization of appropriations in the amount of $20,447,968,000, a n-,t reduction of $1,511,132,000 from the request of $21,959,100,000. This is a 6.9 percent reduction from the request as follows: Senate committee Percent recommen- reductie n Request elation Difference of request Procurement --------- .----------------------------- R D T &E 13,401.2 12,388.2 -1,013.0 7.6 . . . ---------- ------------- ---------------- 8,557.9 8,059.7 -498.2 5.8 Total _______________ 21,959.1 20,448.0 -1,511.1 -6.9 House Action For information, the committee recommendation of $20.4 billion is $2.7 million above the authorization as passed by the House. Only those changes that were proposed ley the House Armed Services Com- mittee have been identified in the charts in this report. Those changes reflect a net reduction of $564.1 million. The total reduction in authori- zations made by the House, however, is $1.5 billion as a result of C. House floor amendment in the lorri of an authorization ceiling. There is, therefore, an additional reduction in the amount of $949.7 millior.: which is not identified by line :.ter i. SUMMARY OF TOTAL FIS(AL, YEAR 1974 AUTHORIZATION RE QT) EST 'Fire President`s Budget message of January 29, 1973 recommended. $85.2 billion in new obligational authority for the budget of the Department of Defense. Of this amount, $21,959.1 million required aiithoriza.tion in this bill prior condition for appropriations. The committee would observe thit even though the fiscal year 1974 recommended defense budget authority of $85.2 billion is $1.8 billion more than the fiscal year 1973 President,'s budget request, the fiscal year 1974 authorization request for military procurement and research and development is $1.3 billion less than the total request considered by the committee for fiscal ,year 1973. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Defense outlays (Department of Defense-Military plus Military Assistance) are expected to increase from $74.8 billion in fiscal year 1973 to $79.0 billion in fiscal year 1974. This increase, however? is. related primarily to maintaining military and civilian pay levels com- parable to those in the private sector, to raising pay and benefit levels sufficient to achieve an All Volunteer Force, to paying normal price increases, and to paying increasing military retired pay costs. As can be seen by the comparison of amounts for weapons systems, the in- creases in 1974 are not attributable to the cost of modernizing our military forces. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 1974 AUTHORIZATION BILL- SUMMARY BY MAJOR WEAPON CATEGORY Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense Agencies [In thousands of dollars] Total Appro- Senate amount priation of fiscal Less requiring House Change year 1974 available authori- - from Recom- program financing zation Authorized request mended Aircraft ------------------------- 6,052,100 ------------ 6,052,100 5,878,400 -528,465 5,532,636 Missiles__________________________ 2,885,600 ------------ 2,885,600 2,869,000 -132,200 2,753,400 Naval vessels_____________________ 3,901,800 ------------ 3,901,800 3,788,200 -273,100 3,628,700 Tracked combat vehicles_________ 247,900 ------------ -247,900 239,500 -41,400 206,500 Torpedoes________________________ 219,900 ------------ 219,900 219,900 -16,600 203,300 Other weapons___________________ 93,900 93,900 87,300 -21,200 72,700 Procurement total --------- 13,401,200 ___________ 13,401,200 13,073,200 -1,012,965 12,388,235 R.D.T. & E.'-------------- 8,557,900 ------------ 8,557,900 8,321,797 -498,167 8,059 733 Undistributed reduction----------------------------- -------------- -949,742 _-____------___-_______ -------------------- -- Grand total_________________ 21,959,100 ------------ 21,959,100 20,445,255 -1,511,132 20,447,968 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17: CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Author- ized 1973 App -0- petaled :1'73 New ohli- gational authority requested 11)74 House, authorized Change from Recom request mended Aircraft: Army------ ------------- 133,800 33, 500 181,000 181,000 -13,000 168,00) Navy and Marine Corps- 3,207, 800 2, 822. 3.00 2,958.300 2,958,300 -567.300 2,391,00) Air.Eorce_________________ 2,681, 400 2, 230, 100 2, 912, 800 2,739,100 +51,835 2, 964, 635 6,023,000 5, 094..' (00 6,052,100 5,878,400 -528, 465. 6,523,631 Missiles: Army------ ------------ 704, 700 668, 100 699,900 574, 200 -39, 200 560, 70) Navy----- -------------- 834,.900. 713, 40 680, 200 680,200 -29, 500 650,70) Marine Corps_____________ 22,100 22,100 32,300 32,300 ------ $2,30) Air Force__.________..__-__ 1,786,100 1,670,100 1,573,200 1,673,200 -63,5001,509,70) 3,346,800 3 079,-140 2,885,000 2,859,900 -132,'(x) 2,753,40) 3,179,200 2 970, t4(0 3,001,800 3,788,200 -273,100 3,628,70) 'l`racked combs: vehicles: Army ------ ---------------- 186,500 130?100 201,700 193,300 -41,400 160,30) Marine Corps -------------- 64,500 54, 300 46, 200 46,200 -------------- 46,20) Subtotal-.-------------- 241,000 185, 400 247,900 239, 500 -41,400 206,505 Other weapons: Army--------------------- 61,400 56,:100 51,:300 44,700 -12,400 38,90) Navy. --------------------- 25,700 25, '00 11,'300 41.900 -8,800 33,10) Marine Corps -------------- 900 100 700 700 ------------ - 70) Subtotal _________ _____ 88,000 82.100 93,900 87,300 -21,200 72,70) Research, development, test and evaluation: 7 Army_____________________ 1,978,966 1,829,')32 2,108,700 2,031,686 1,935,933 -172,76 Navy (including Marine Corps)2------------------ 2,708,817 2,548,'13 2,711,700 2,675,300 -55,500 2,666,200 Air Force_ _______________ 3,272,777 3 122, 510 3,212,500 3,110,811 -254,300 2,958,200 Defense agencies ----------- 505,987 435,113 500,400 479,400 -15,050 484,800 Test and evaluation. Defense------------------------------- 27,x)0 24,600 24,600 -------------- 24,600 Emergency fund ---------- 50,000 ------------------------------------------------------------- 'Total, R.D.T. & E.2-- 8,516,547 7 962,198 8,557,900 8,321,797 -498,167 8,059,733 Undistributed redaction---------------------------------------- -949, 742 -------------------------- Grand total procure- ment and R.D.T. & E_____________________ 121,588,747 19, .567,138 21,959, 1.00 20,445,255 -1,511,132 20,447,963 Includes $644,9W,000 additional autborizatio l In: action 801 of Public Law 02-570. Includes $3,000,(K)0 for Special Foreign Currency rrogram for Navy under R.D.T. & E. appropriation for fiscal year 1973 and $::,600,000 requested for f seal year 1974:. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 MAJOR CHANGES BY SENATE COMMITTEE This report discusses in detail all of the various changes recom- mended by the committee on all aspects of the bill. The following is a list of the more significant changes being recommended by the committee. Major Funding Changes-From Request Addition of procurement funding for Air Force F-111 aircraft Addition of $158.8 million for full funding of 12 F-111F tactical fighters. Addition of procurement funds for Air Force A-7D attack air- craft Inclusion of $70.1 million for procurement of 24 A-7D aircraft. Addition of R&D funds for Air Force two-seat version of F-5E aircraft Inclusion of $14 million to initiate development and test of prototype aircraft. Deletion of procurement funds for F-14A Navy fighter and F-4J fighter Denial of authorization of 48 F-14 aircraft and. 10 F-4J aircraft resulting in a reduction of $505.4 million. $197.6 million is recom- mended to continue F-14A program pending resolution of contract and schedule problems. Reduction of funds requested for cost escalation in Navy ship- building programs Reduction of $94.6 million (from $196.7 million to $102.1 million) for estimated increases for escalation in prior year Navy shipbuilding and conversion programs. Reduction in funds for A-10 (A-X) Air Force aircraft Reduction of $50 million ($20 million in R&D and $30 million in procurement) for Air Force A-X program. Total request was for $112.4 million in R&D and $30 million in procurement. Reduction in R&D funds for Air Force B-1 development Reduction of $100 million from $473.5 million requested because of dissatisfaction with delay in schedule and increased program costs. Reduction in Minuteman III program . Reduction of $45.8 million for procurement of Minuteman III missiles. The total procurement request was for $674.4 million. Reduction in Safeguard program Reduction of $42 million ($16.3 million in R&D and $25.7 million in procurement) for Safeguardprogram. The total request for these two areas was $401.0 million. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 6 Denial of funds for Air Force Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAR) $72.2 million of R&D funds deleted and program reoriented to technology. Denial or funds for Navy Strategic Cruise Missile (SCM) Deleted $15.2 million of R&hD funds requested and program re- oriented to technology. Reduction of Air Force F-5A Military Assistance Service- Funded (MASF) aircraft Reduction of $4:1 million from request of $69.3 million for the F-5A Military Assistance Program l: ayhack. Reduction in UH-1H utility helicopter program Reduction of 129 helicopter,, an d $40.2 million from request of 30S helicopters at $96.7 million. Reduction in Poseidon program Reduction of $35.6 million fcr procurement of Poseidon missiles and 5113.6 million for conversion of three Polaris ballistic missile sub- marines to the Poseidon configuration. Reduction in funds for guided missile frigate conversions Reduction of $35.6 million ir. rerluest of $93.7 million for conversion of two guided missile frigates. Reduction in Air Force aircraft modification program Reduction of $35.5 million (from $527.7 million to $492.2 million.) related to B-52 and operational necessity modifications. Reduction in Army M60A1 ,Tank program Deletion of funding in the amount of $33 million for 120 M60A1 tanks. The total request was for 360 tanks at a total cost of $99.4 million. An additional $8.4 million reduction was made in the request ,of $26.6 million for advanced Irocurement. The sum remaining in the bill for this program is $84.6 rrilhon. Denial of funds for Sea Contr,cl Ship Deletion of $29.3 million reque-;tcd in procurement, for design and long lead funds. for Sea Control ,hip. Denial of funds for Navy T-2C trainer aircraft Deletion of 24 aircraft and J26.1 million. Reduction in Army Site Defense program Reduction of $70 million f:-orn request for $170 million because development should proceed at a slower pace. Denial of funds for Army Light Area Defense program Deletion of $42.4 million requeted and direction that program be terminated as not required. Reduction of funds requested for A WA CS development Reduction of $42 million excess to requirements due to revised program. Leaves $155.8 million in the bill for R&D, and $11.7 million for long lead procurement. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 'CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Language Changes The committee added the following specific statutory provisions to the bill: .Statutory language on F-14 Specific provision limiting authorization of funding for Navy F-14 aircraft to $197.6 million to fund the program through December 31, 1973. G-5A Statutory language identical to that contained in the fiscal year 1973 act was adopted which is intended to insure that funds authorized for the C-5A be limited to the cost of that program. Fiscal Year 1974 Southeast Asia Limitation Language similar to prior years was included establishing a ceiling for Southeast Asia Free World.Forces of $952 million. Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile System Language was added which limits deployment of this system to only Grand Forks Air Force Air Base. Statutory language on Navy Surface Effect Ships program The addition of statutory language which authorizes $60.9 million of development funds only for the Surface Effect Ships program. DOD Civilian Manpower An amendment requiring annual authorization of civilian manpower for the Department of Defense was included. Manpower Stationed Overseas An amendment requiring a more complete explanation and justifica- tion of manpower stationed outside the United States was included in the annual Military Manpower Requirements Report. Training Loads An amendment deleting the requirement to authorize training loads separate from and in addition to authorizing manpower levels was included. Support and Overhead Manpower An amendment was added requiring the justification of support and overhead manpower authorizations to be related to the combat forces and support policies. Exclusion of Reserves from Active Duty Strength An amendment making permanent law the provision that excludes members of the Ready Reserve and National Guard ordered to federal active duty from the authorized. active duty strength and requiring a report from the President on any units of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty in the annual Military Manpower Requirements Report. The effect of this language is to require that the Selected Reserves be utilized by the President before expanding the active duty strengths through means of Selective Service. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Changes to Manpower Authorizations The (.Cormnittee recommended the following changes to the requests for active duty end strength and prescribed that the Secretary of Defense F3Imll apportion the reductions among the Services and mission areas with the proviso that it be applied. to the support forces to the maximum extent practicable: Aclivee dzc y end strength lvanbtr 1)01) request --.----------------.- ------------------------------ 2, 232, ?02 Coirrnrittee reduction ---------------------------------------------- -156, 100 Commitaee recom.mendation--------------------------------------- 2, 076, E02 In addition the Committee recon mended the following changes to t:ao annual average strength auth3ri3ation for Reserve Components: DOD request Commi tee recommendalion Army National suard------------------------------_ ----------------------- 379,144 379,144 Army Reserve --------------------------------------- _------------ _--------- 232,591 232,591 Naval Reserve_____ --------------------------- _---------------------------- 116,981 121, 481 Marine Corps Reserve --_______________________ 39, 735 39, 735 Air National Guard--------------------------------------- _---- ------------ 92,291 92,291 Air Force Reserve ------------------------------ ---------------------------- 49, 773 49,773 Total DOD----------------------------- --- ---------------------- 910, 515 915, )15 Coast Guard Reserve--------------------------------------------------------- 11.300 11,300 Contributions of Subcomm itt es on Tactical Air Power arid Research ard Development Vital assistance was rends rec the committee by the significant. contributions of the Tactical 1.i r Power Subcommittee and Research and Development Subcommittee The Subcommittees held in-depth hearings on the subjects within their purviews and their reconunendr- tions were of great assistance to the full committee. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Basic Considerations The committee's consideration of the annual defense authorization bill this year has been colored by three important, and sometimes conflicting, considerations. First of all, economic conditions in the United States are not stable. The sharpest inflation in recent history, extraordinarily high interest rates, recent devaluations of the dollar, and the importance of compet- ing domestic needs, all dictate prudence in defense spending. It is particularly important this year that no waste be permitted in the Defense budget. Over the long run, a sound economy is as important to national security as conventional measures of military might. A second major consideration, which supports the first, is the end of American involvement in the war in Southeast Asia. The American people expect that the coining of peace will bring some dividends in reduced requirements for military expenditures. A third consideration, however, provides an important check on the first two. After both World War I and World War II, a war-weary America sharply reduced defense spending. The lack of national re- solve which was thereby indicated eventually contributed to bringing on, and prolonging, the wars that followed. This must not happen again. Even in a period of detente, the growth of technology has made the world a much more dangerous place than it was either between the world wars or between World War II and Korea. For most of our modern history, public and Congressional support for defense has been sporadic. The swings of the pendulum have been extreme, and at neither extreme has the Nation's defense been well served. From the perspective of history we can see that we have gone through periods of feast for defense spending when we have spent money unnecessarily, and we have also gone through famines in which we have been dangerously unprepared. Defense is the Nation's most important job. For without being able to defend ourselves successfully, neither the economic bounty nor the political liberty which we treas- ure is possible. But, to avoid both waste and danger, some means must be found to dampen the swings of the defense pendulum and to maintain a prudent and adequate level of defense over a sustained period of time. This requires cooperation and good will. It requires the Executive Branch and the Department of Defense to admit their mistakes, to make economics and improve efficiency, to resist proposing excessively expensive weapon systems, and to reform. their procedures to make economies possible. It also requires that those who would economize understand that the scope and complexity of defense in the 1970's means that reform takes time. The committee has tried to balance all of. these considerations this year, and, through the process of compromise, believes it has done so successfully. (9) 96-4 G 7-7 3-- -2 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 1&;IA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 But serious problems lie ahead. The cost cf military manpower and the expensive technology of weapon systems are forcing a change in the way we must analyze military requirements and budgets. As this committee pointed out two ye irs ago in this report: If the geometric cost ncrease for weapon systems is not sharply reversed, then even significant increases in the defense bud;aet may not insure th3 force levels required for our national security. The committee report of that year concluded : The present rising trend cf manpower and weapon system unit costs means that we'will soon see either striking increases in Defense budgets, a sharp decline in force levels and readi- ness, or reform of the weapon system development and pro- curement process. If defens=e budgets are to remain more or less constant, as now seems likely, and consume an ever smaller part of the nation's resources, then the present de- velopment and procurement policies are no longer open to us. They only point, the way to burdensome increases in defense spending, inadequate for-,.es for defense, or to both of those unacceptable alternative,.. The committee regrets that i his dilemma is even sharper today than it was two years ago. The Acquisition of Major Weapon Systems It is becoming increasingly clear that the cumbersome procedure of implementing policy to iinprolre the weapon acquisition process within the Department of Defense r.iust be periodically streamlined by the Congress through the legislative process. In the past the committees have recommended legislation for requiring operational testing and reporting to the Congress. This committee has also recommends, I language intended to monitor and provide more effective management control over specific weapon systems. In other cases the conrnittee has recommended reduction or elimination of specific we ipon systems that were becoming too sophisticated and costly. This .3 ear, for instance, the committee is recommending language restricting the F-14 program because the Wavy has been unable to adequately negotiate contract terms for the past. two years. Last year the committee, ia c,)mmenting on the new Department of Defense procurement policy, stated that issuing a policy without effective implementation is rnsuf lcient. The committee would like to again remind the Department of Defense of the need to take some hard actions to provide effective management of the acquisition of weapon systems. In theory it does not seem proper for the Department of Defense to abrogate its management responsibilities in the develw3- ment and procurement proces;s and to leave the job of reform to the Congress. However it seems that to some areas this dependence may be growing. Uneconomical Procurement Practices The committee is concerned with continued requests for weapon system production at generally low and uneconomical rates. The advantages of a warm prod met.on base are recognized. However, Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 economics argue against maintenance of warm production bases for a multiplicity of systems. The committee recognizes the complexity of this problem but believes, nevertheless, that a thorough study in this area is in order to assure that there are compelling military reasons for uneconomical procurement lots. Last year, expert testimony by both outside and Defense witnesses pointed out that an important step in controlling defense costs was to reduce the size of the development and production base that supports the weapon system acquisition process. Testimony again this year suggested that there was considerable excess industrial capacity to .support defense requirements. No estimate was given on the savings that would result by proper sizing of both Defense and industry support, but cost reductions may be substantial. Defense will be expected. to address this situation on a priority basis. Concurrency The committee continues to oppose excessive concurrency in acquisition of weapon systems. Some overlapping of development and production may reduce initial costs, but the long term costs of sup- porting, maintaining, and ultimately fixing weapons systems that were prematurely introduced into the inventory before development and testing were adequately completed far exceed the initial saving. Of even more importance, premature introduction of new weapons systems has too often resulted in a lower state of readiness because of poor weapon system performance. Even though the Department of Defense has issued policies to eliminate concurrency, there were too many examples in this year's request of undesirable concurrency. It was noted last year that "issuing a policy without effective implementation is insufficient." The committee must insist on efficient and effective management and implementation of policies in this area. Operational Testing The committee is gratified with the beginning steps that have been made in the area of operational testing, although much remains to be done. There is no substitute for this type of proof testing of the development process by the military personnel that will be required to operate and maintain the weapon system. Any attempt to bypass or dilute this essential phase of the weapon system acquisition process must be eliminated and the scope and independence of operational tests should be increased. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 ASPECTS OF BILL OF SPECIAL INTEREST F-14 Once again the committee examined the F-14 program in consider- able detail. Its Tactical Air Power Subcommittee conducted several -days of hearings. The President's budget contained an original request for $633 million, including $572 million in procurement funds for 48 F-14As. It was not until June 19, 1973, that the final Administration position was received for 50 F-14As and $703 million in procurement funds. The $703 million includes $131 million requested in the budget for 10 Marine Corps F-4Js. Committee Recommendation The committee recommends statutory language which will authorize "not to exceed" funding in the amount of $197.6 million through December, 1973. The Navy is advised that none of this funding is available for advance procurement for a fiscal year 1975 buy. The 'committee action was based upon the lack of firm contract schedules and costs for fiscal years 1972, 1973 and 1974. Prior Years Funding Total prior years funds approved are $3.5 billion for 134 aircraft. This includes $1.063 billion for F-14A R&D; $370.5 million for F-14B R&D; and $2.070 billion for procurement. Technical Performance The F-14A aircraft is performing well technically. As of June 30, 1973 there had been 2200 flights and 4400 flight hours. A total of 27 aircraft had been delivered to the Navy. Grumman is behind schedule in meeting deliveries. They hope to overcome this situation during 1973. The committee is most anxious that a definitized and legally binding delivery schedule be established between Grumman and the Navy, and this was a contributing reason in the committee's decisionmaking process. Costs The most important issue with respect to the F-14 program is the unit cost per aircraft and total program costs. The committee for the past 2 years has insisted upon compliance with the contract. On March 8, 1973, Grumman and the Navy entered into an agreement which in. brief provided that (1) Grumman would produce the 48 aircraft in the fiscal year 1973 buy (Lot V) in accordance with the terms of its 1969 contract; and (2) the Navy would release Grumman from the contractual provisions pertaining to subsequent Lots. This meant the Navy and Grumman will negotiate F-14 purchases annually on a year-by-year basis. Grumman advised the Navy that they cannot accept its original contract without going into bankruptcy. (13) Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 :1CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 The committee is keenly interested in. the nature and extent of the cost increases which will resu t from annual purchases versus adhering to the contract. If 179 additon;+;l aircraft are purchased (134 to 313) the procurement unit cost ii estimated at $15.7 million each. If all 313 aircraft are averaged, the program unit cost including R&D costs would be $20;1 million each t;h it total government commitment of $6.3 billion.. The flyaway unit cost for the remaining 179 aircraft is estimated at $11.t; million each, representing an increase of $3.5 million in flyaway costs. The reason for the $3.5 million increase in flyaway cost is (a) $1.45 million to purchase the aircraft "at cost" rather than enforcing the original contract; (h) $1.14 million per aircraft to stretch the program from 2 to 4 years; (c) $500,0)0 per aircraft for profit; and (d) about $400,000 per aircraft for increased cost of government-furnished equipment, etc. In addition, the procurement, unit, cost per aircraft went up $2.5 million per aircraft to fund support and spares costs for approved aircraft carriers, as well as p -ovrding for Marine Corps support and spares. Fiscal Year 74! Costs Grumman and the Navy pl inred to negotiate a price for the 50 air craft in this year's budget by ?December 1973. The committee felt this vas an unreasonable period of i,ime to reach an agreement on ti.e price of the aircraft when the Yovernment had already purchased 134. Therefore, in view of the lack of firm F--14A prices for the 50 planes requested this year, the committee authorized ,only $197.5 million to fund the program through Decem cber, 1973. It denied the reque,t for $505.4 million. After Grumman find the Navy complete negotiations, the Navy should return to t'ie Congress and justify the remaining funds, including a proposed contract between the Navy and Grummori that is ready for signature. The committee will then make a decision on the remaining $505.4 million. It is the committee judgment that an agreed-upon legally binding delivery schedule be presented at that time and, further, that lots IV and V shall have been completel;i negotiated. F-14B The coninuttee is concerned with the status of the F-14B engine program. This is a joint developrrent effort with the Air Force on the F-15 engine. It appears insufficient, funds are in the fiscal year 1974 budget. The committee desires, the Navy to present its recommended F-14B program when the case is oresen+d for the $505.4 million. Prototype Program Secretary Clements requested c=n June 19, 1973, that the subcoln- mittee authorize $150 million -;o initiate an F--14DjF-15N prototype program. Be estimated the total cost at $250 million. The subcoir-- mittee heard subsequent testirr on,, from Mr. George A. Spangenberg, a recent retired Director of the Natty Evaluation Division for all Navy aircraft.I re took significant exc ep-ion to the wisdom of initiating ,iic i a program. '1`lm committee, ater weighing all the evidence, unani- mously concluded insufficient justification existed to initiate a proto- Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/171:5CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 type program that would cost at least $367 million, if the Navy figures are accurate, plus significant added costs for engineering development. It was the committee's judgment that the Defense Department could either conduct computer analyses or an actual aircraft flyoff if that is deemed essential rather than spending the enormous sums required for a prototype program. The committee believes the Navy should examine the potential of a completely new aircraft as a possible alternative to the F-14 in the out-years. The Navy should obtain proposals from industry and evaluate these proposals to determine if a smaller and presumably 0 cheaper aircraft can be: designed to serve as an air superiority fighter to complement the F-14. Once this determination has been made, the committee desires to receive the Navy determination, including the costs of such alternatives as well as a technical evaluation. Committee Recommendation The committee therefore recommends the denial of this $150 million request. F-15 Authorization Request and Committee Recommendation The fiscal year 1974 request is for $229.5 million in R&D, $801.0 million in procurement funding for 77 production aircraft, and $116.6 million. for initial spares. The 77 aircraft plus the 30 approved last year will complete procurement of the first operational wing of F-15s. The committee recommends approval of the full request of $1,147.1 million for the F-15 program. House Action The House reduced the quantity of aircraft in half to 39, and reduced the procurement and spares funding to $587.6 million, a net reduction of $330.9 million. Development problems with the engine were cited as necessitating a slow down in the production program. Program Schedule The F-15 development program started in January 1970. First flight of an F-15 test airplane occurred in July 1972, and the total development program now is well along with 8 airplanes flying in the test program at the time of this report. The first production F-15 will not be delivered until November 1974, 29 months after the start of the flight test program and after 20 test airplanes have been delivered. The 30 production aircraft funded in fiscal year 1973 will be delivered through September 1975 and the 77 fiscal year 1974 aircraft will be delivered between October 1975 and June 1976. Development Status The flight test and ground testing of the airframe and avionics systems have been proceeding well. Only the usual types of problems have been encountered to date. Air Force test pilots have been particularly impressed with the F-15's performance, stating that the airplane has outstanding potential as an air superiority fighter. The development of the engines for the F-15, however, has not been proceeding smoothly. Early in the development cycle, in 1971, a significant design change was made to the engine because perform- ance requirements were not being met. Despite this major change, the Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 1PIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Air Force attempted to complete development qualification by the originally scheduled date of February 1973. The committee's report, a year ago warned that some slip in this Military Qualification Test (MQT) could be expected bu pointed out that there was ample time to qualify the engine before production aircraft deliveries started in November 1974. The engine qualification has in fact slipped. A widely publicized series of materiel failures have occurred in attempting to mature the engine to the point that it car- piT,ss the 150-hour MQT durability run. The latest schhedule now calls for completion of this test in. September, which is 7 months behind t!ie earlier schedule. The test airplanes, however, have been flying routinely with the engines, having accumu- lated over 700 .Hight hours without failures. Other engine problems have teen encountered in the flight testing of the F--15. These are associated with the operation of the afterburner at high altitudes and slow speeds. Afterburner "blowouts" have occurred in. this part of the F'--l5s flight envelope, a, condition which must be corrected before the airplane is ready for combat operations. This type of afterburner problem is not unusual in military fan-,jet powered airplanes; indeed, every one to date including the F-111, British F-4 Phantorn, and F---14A has experienced them. In all pre- vious cases, they have been so.:ved during the flight test program. With the F--14A, for examp e, these afterburner malfunctions took about a year and a half to fix aut the airplane's engines now work well. To scu.mnrarize the committee's assessment of the development status, the problems that have been encountered do not appear unusual for a new airplane, nor do thy appear unsolvable. Durability always takes time to build into a new :engine, yet invariably it is achieved. Likewise the engine operating problems discussed above are not unique and they have been rna tered before. The F-15 development program is very conservative, with a long flight test period yet to go before production airplanes are delivered. The committee believes that the Air Force has set forth reasonable and achievable schedules to resolve the current problems w=ithin the present development and production schedule and that n.c change to that schedule is necessary at this time. F-15 Funding Period Last year the committee report pointed out that the present F--15 contract has fiscal year options for production airplanes delivered well after the following calendar year, the usual funded delivery period. In other words, the airplanes funded in fiscal year 1974 usually would be those to be delivered in calerda.- year 1975. As noted in the program schedule discussion above, this year's F-15s mostly are for delivery in 1976, due to the schedule in the present contract. The fiscal year 1975 F-15s will be covered in a ne contract option, and the committee recommends that the contractual coverage be brought back into line with tlrcu normal funded delivery period. CVN-70 NAVY CARRIER Funding in the amount oF $::399 million for construction of long leadtirne components for CV N- 70 was authorized and appropriated last year. This $299 million h i,s been obligated, and these needed Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17I5CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 components, primarily for the nuclear propulsion plant, are in their manufacturing processes. Committee Recommendation For fiscal year 1974, the committee recommends completion of funding of CVN-70 in the amount of $657 million. CVN-70 is the third ship of the Nimitz class. The first two ships of the class are now under construction-the Nimitz is in final testing and fitting-out stages prior to delivery; Eisenhower follows by about 21 months. CVN-70 will be constructed to the same plans, use the same two-reactor propulsion plant, and employ the same proven aircraft operating facilities on a construction schedule leading to delivery to the Navy in September, 1980. Aircraft carriers are indispensable components of United States naval strength now and for the foreseeable future. The carriers pro- vide essential sea based capability to defend the worldwide sea lanes so vital to our national economy and survival. With the reduction of overseas bases and forces, aircraft carriers operating in international waters provide a mobile capability to employ effective and credible naval power, under complete and unquestioned United States control, to meet any vital national interests. The number of aircraft carriers in service, however, has declined in recent years and faces further inevitable reduction with the retirement of World War II ships. Today's force of 15 aircraft carriers is just 5/3 the force of the mid-1960s. The present 15 carriers include 6 that date back to World War II construction and now face early retirement. CVN-70 represents an absolute minimum replacement effort. It is needed to provide essential modernity for our Navy. Where numbers of ships are being reduced, as our aircraft carrier forces are, the ships retained must provide a wide range of modern naval capabilities and must be able to perform their missions reliably and effectively. The demonstrated effectiveness of nuclear propulsion in aircraft carriers will insure that CVN-70 will have this needed quality of performance. When CVN-70 is completed in 1980, the United States will have only four nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, together with eight oil- burning Forrestal class carriers. The responsiveness of nuclear pro- pulsion will permit the four carriers to be maintained in a high state of readiness, two in the Atlantic and two in the Pacific, prepared to move quickly and decisively to reinforce distant naval forces. The resulting 12 modern carriers are an austere but adequate and effective Naval force capable of meeting national commitments. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT PROGRAMS Committee Recommendations The four aircraft programs which can be categorized as related to close air support are the Marine Corps AV-8A Harrier, the Army Advanced Attack Helicopter, the Air Force A-10 (A-X), and the Air Force A-7D. The committee recommendations are as follows: AV-8A Twenty aircraft requested and $90.1 million; $6.0 million reduction recommended. Advanced Attack Helicopter $49.3 million for R&D requested; $3.5 million reduction recom- mended. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 :19IA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 A-Z9 (A- X) Ten R&D aircraft and 1124 million R&D funding, plus 40'30 million in procurement long lead funds requested; $92.4 million in R&1) funds and 6 R&D aircraft recommended (the committee re(Lc- tion thus is $20 million and 4 aircraft in R&D plus all $30 million requested for production). A-7D No procurement was requested. The committee recommends addition of $70.1 million. to buy 24 A--7 Ds for the Air National Guard. The committee also directs that the Air Force conduct a flyoff between the A-71) and A-10 to obtain the opinions of operational pilots on their relative suitability for close air support and interdiction. AV-8.A Harrier Budget Request and House Action The request for $90.1 million or 20 aircraft is for the last planned procurement of the V/STOL Barrier light attack airplane for the Marine Corps. The House a)proved the $90.1 million requested. Status of Program and Basis for Committee Action Ninety aircraft to support operating squadrons have been ordered through fisca i year 1973. The final buy will provide a training squad- ron of 14 airplanes. plus repair an:_l attrition aircraft, and will complete the program of 120 Harriers. [ncuded_ in this request are 8 two-place trainer versions which will aic_ in pilot transition to V/STOL aircraft. Last year the committee recommended limiting the Harrier program to 60 aircraft, viewing the )ro,,ram as an operational experiment with V/S'I'DE aircraft where larger quantity procurements should await, increased capability fiom advances in the technology. The program did receive authorization and appropriations, however, and with the procurement this far along the committee believes that this training squadron is justified no round out the Marine Corps Harrier program. The 6-,cal year 1974 fundirg request was based on equipping the 20 aircraft with an inertial navigation-attack system. Plans for pro- curement of this equipment have since been cancelled, and a simpler and cheaper baseline avionics system will be used at a net savings of $6.0 million. The committee recommends a $6.0 million reduction and an authorization of $84.1 million. Advanced Attack Helicopter Budget Request and House A ction The Army requested $49.3 million for development work on the Advanced Attack Helicopter ;A.AH.) in fiscal year 1974, The House approved the full amount. Committee Recommendation The, committee recommendk a reduction of $3.5 million, thereby approving a. request of $45.8 -nil ion for this program in fiscal year 1974. The reason for this action, as basically discussed below, is that there are prior year funds remaining in the terminated Cheyenne helicopter program that can be utilized for the AAH program. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17.g CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Status of Program and Basis for Committee Action Last year the committee deleted all of the funds requested for continuing R&D on the Cheyenne attack helicopter. The committee report stated "The action taken in deleting fiscal year 1973 funds for the Cheyenne RDT&E program applies only to that specific aircraft and indicates the committee's concern with the cost and .anticipated manpower support requirement of this weapon system. Assuming that questions regarding helicopter vulnerability are resolved successfully, the committee believes that there is a valid requirement for a more capable attack helicopter." Subsequent to the committee's .action, which was approved by the Senate, the Army announced termination of the Cheyenne project on August 9, 1973 and requested authorization to initiate development of a lower cost but higher performance advanced attack helicopter. The House and Senate conferees agreed to this and $20 million was appropriated to start the program. After a design competition, Bell and Hughes were selected in .June 1973 to build competitive prototypes of the AAH. Both aircraft are smaller, lighter, and considerably more agile than the Cheyenne. These will participate in a flyoff in 1975-6, and the winner will com- plete the development and go into production. The average estimated cost of an AAH is $1.8 million flyaway and $3.1 million program unit cost, including R&D, support, and spares, in 1972 dollars. With a 25 percent inflation allowance, this becomes a $3.8 million program unit cost in "then-year" dollars, which compares to the $5.8 million then-year cost estimated for the Cheyenne. Attack Helicopter Combat Demonstrations in 1972 In 1972 the Army introduced its TOW missile-equipped helicopter gunship into combat in South Vietnam during the heavy fighting in the Spring offensive. Only 2 TOW-equipped helicopters were available, but they were used around Kontum when that city was surrounded and under seige. The result,, were impressive. Of 1.33 combat firings, 107 hits were scored for an 80 percent success ratio and 27 tanks, 15 vehicles, and 33 other point targets were destroyed. Some tanks were knocked out after they had penetrated into the streets of the cities where tactical air strikes could not get at them. Neither of the TOW- equipped helicopters ever was hit by ground fire. Another demonstration of the value of the missile-armed helicopter was obtained from a tri-nation operational exercise in Europe last year. A combined U.S.-German-Canadian Army mock battle pitted Huey Cobra attack helicopters against attacking German Leopard tank columns in the Ansbach area of Central Germany. The Leopards were accompanied by mechanized anti-aircraft units simulating the Soviet Quad-23 system, while the Cobras simulated TOW missile firings. The final overall kill ratio showed 18 tanks destroyed for each Cobra knocked out, and gave a dramatic demonstration of the poten- tial of the attack helicopter on European terrain and in a mid-intensive scenario. Between the combat results with the TOW missile in Southeast Asia and the war-game results in Europe, the Army obtained in 1972 some highly impressive substantiation of its belief in the effectiveness and survivability of the attack helicopter. The committee believes that its place as an essential element of firepower on the battlefield appears well confirmed. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : JA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 A-10 (A-X) and A-7D Budget Request and House Action The A-10 request was for $112.4 million in R&D for development ,and fabrication of 10 R&D aircraft, plus $30 million in the procurement account for long lead production itenks. The House approved the full request. No A-71) procurement was requested. Committee Recommendation For the A-10 (A-X) the ?ommittee is recommending a reduction of $20 million in R&D and elimination of the $30 million requested': in long lead procurement funds. This action leaves a total of $92.4 million in RVzD for this progani for fiscal year 1974. For the A--7D the committee is recommending an authorization of $70.1 million, For fiscal year ' 971 which will permit the procurement of 24 aircraft to further modernize the Air National Guard. Status of Programs The Fairchild A-10 was selected as the winning A-X candidate. over the Northrop A-9 at the end of their competitive prototype flyoff' program, and a contract for engineering development was signed in March, 1973. The contract (alh: for 10 R&D funded aircraft, 6 for - development flight testing anc. 4 for initial operational test and evalua- tion (TOT&E). A contract for long lead production hardware items is scheduled for May, 1974 with the full production contract scheduled for October, 1974. The first RCI) test airplane will not fly until December, 1974. The A-7D is in production and is operational in the Air Force with 411 aircraft procured through fiscal year 1973. The last delivery of these planes will take place in December, 1974. Basis for Committee Action Last year he committee approved the funding requested for the A-X to continue development, but it added the following language in the report: "The existence of the A-X prototypes will allow a thorough opera- tional test and evaluation of t'iis approach to close air support before the commitment is made to ~,,ontinue development and production. The close air support subcommittee recommended that this evaluation include a flyoff, a side-by-side flight comparison, with existing close air support airplanes, and the committee believes that this should be a part of the Air Force's A-X ev?r.Juation program." The genesis of this recommendation was the hearings and report of the Close Air Support Subcornm ttee. That report pointed out that the A-X is being developed under a totally different operational concept than the existing swept-wing jet light attack airplanes. While the A-X weighs about the same as the A-7D, it has a much larger unswept wing which gives the A--X more airborne loiter time, more payload, and allows operation off of shorter runways than the present A-7D or A-4M. Conversely, th ; straight wing design drastically limits the speed of the A-10. Top speed of the A-10 prototype was only 350 knots (although it is hoped to improve this to 390 knots in the production version), wh,.creas the A-7D and A-4M have a top speed of 610 knots. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17~1CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 The close support subcommittee stated that the concept of operating "low-and-slow" should be subjected to a thorough operational test and evaluation with the prototypes, using operational pilots, and that the evaluation should include a direct flyoff comparison with the A-7D and A-4M. To date, this has not been done by the Air Force and operating command pilots with combat experience have not been asked to compare and recommend between the A-10 and A-7D. In 1972 the A-7D was deployed by the Air Force to Southeast Asia, where it obtained excellent combat results. Between mid- September, 1972 and the end of March; 1973, the A-7Ds in Southeast w Asia flew 6500 combat sorties. They had less than at per cent mission abort rate, averaged 60 hours per month per airplane or double the peacetime flying rate, had only 16.5 maintenance. man hours per flight';hpur, demonstrated excellent bombing accuracy with, FACs reporting average 10 meters miss distances, and had an extremely high secondary explosion rate of 25% because of the accurate bombing on supply points. There were only 2 combat losses in the 6500 sorties. In addition, the Navy A-7E, twin to the A-7D, operated routinely in the high threat areas over North Vietnam in 1972 and had the lowest loss rate of any attack aircraft, further demonstrating the A-7's survivability. Because the A-7D is a proven combat airplane, and the best close air support airplane in the world today, the committee insists this year that the A-10 and A-7D flyoff take place at the soonest possible time. Modernization of the Air National Guard The Guard currently operates over 500 F-100s, the backbone of the Guard's tactical force. These airplanes are 18years old, or older, and badly need replacement with newer and more capable aircraft. The committee strongly supports the concept of having a modern and effec- tive Air National Guard that. can augment the active forces in time of national emergency. 'Three squadrons of A-7Ds will be activated in the Guard in fiscal year 1974 from airplanes already ordered in prior years. The committee has added procurement of 24 more A-7Ds this year in order to keep the A-7D production line open until the A-10 and A-7D flyoff is completed. The committee intends that these air- craft are to be used to further the modernization of the Guard. The committee also directs that the five year defense planning program document to be presented to the Congress next year include a specific procurement plan for prompt modernization of the Guard by replacement of the F-100 force. C-5A The fiscal year 1974 budget request in this legislation for the C-5A included $43.1 million towards completing the wrap-up of the production program and $17.4 million in support funds. Committee Recommendation The committee recommends a reduction of $5.9 million in the procurement line item funding request. Subsequent to the submission of the budget, the Air Force has revised its program and advised the committee of the reduced funding requirements of $37.2 million. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 :991A-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 The committee has been advised that this $37.2 million will be suffiicicnt for fiscal year 1974. It is anticipreted that with approval of this sum no further Funds will be needed for the procurement of this aircraft in the normal line item process. Any further requirement will be in the form of spares, modifications, or the like. Production Progress The final C-5A aircraft completed production in February 1973,. and was delivered to the Air Force in May 1973. A total of 81 of these C-5A aircraft were produced, and two of these were subsequently destroyed in ground fires. Tt e aircraft, through May 1973, had flown a total of 96,920 operational hours and 8,740 flight test hours. The committee has monitored the progress of this program very closely since the contract was r>structured in fiscal year 1971. 1.'~ is important to note that during a period of rising inflation, from fiscal year 1971 through the present time, the total program cost estimate has been reduced by over $125 million. The committee believes that the results cf its close invest.gar?ions of the program cost and funding requirements has had much to do with holding down the overall prograrn expenditure. The conarnittee expects that the services can ake note of this in other prograr?is that are now, or may be, in financial difficulties. Restrictive Language The committee again recorim:'nds that the language provisions con- tained in the fiscal year 1.973 Act relating to the use of contingency funding and. subsequent development and procurement funding be continued and applied against $28.4 million of the funding recom- mended for authorization. The :remaining $8.8 million in recommended funding is to be applied against contracts other than that which was restructured. ARMY AND AIR FORCE UX AND CXX AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS The committee has given careful consideration, to the Fiscal Year 74 requests of the Army and Air Force for Utility Aircraft as well as the most recent request of the Army for a separate procurement for the Fiscal Year 73 authorization. The committee conclude;., that since the aircraft authorized for Fiscal Your 73 have not yet been purchased, there is uo reason, at this time to authorize the Fiscal Year 74 request of the Army and of the Air Force. 't'herefore, tie committee recommends denial of the request of the Army for $12.2 million for 20 aircraft and the request of the .Air Force for 89.6 million for 16 aircraft. The committee believes the logic for a joint competitive pro- curement remains valid ar,d, therefore, strongly- recommends the aircraft authorized for Fiscal ''ear ',73 be procured in that manner. Further, the committee can fired no valid justification for increasing the performance specification requirements over those originally approved and recommends the procurement of the Fiscal Year 73 authorized aircraft be limited t.) propeller driven aircraft only. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 :2gIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 SIDEWINDER/CHAPARRAL MISSILES Committee Recommendation The committee recommends deletion of the entire $1.5 million requested by the Navy for long lead procurement of the new AIM- 9I, version of the Sidewinder missile. The Navy request for .$14.8 million for continued production of the AIM-9H is approved. Background The Sidewinder is a heat-seeking or infrared-guided short range missile used by the Navy and Air Force as their basic dogfight missile on their combat airplanes and also used by the Army as a short range surface-to-air missile deployed with field units. The Army calls their version the Chaparral, although it essentially is a -9D Sidewinder. Sidewinder has been in production since the mid-1950s, and has gone through a series of product improvements. The latest improve- ment, now in development, is to modify the IR guidance unit to allow the missile to be fired head-on against incoming aircraft. The Air Force and Navy are developing the -9L jointly, while the Army is developing a different version designated AN/DAW-1. Basis for Committee Action Last year the committee stated its belief that the Army should examine the possible use of the -9L when new Chaparrals are procured, because of the benefits of common, high quantity, competitive produc- tion buys. Since then the -9L has encountered technical development problems. The committee reiterates its belief that a single version of the Sidewinder/Chaparral probably can serve the needs of all three Services in this particular application. The Defense Department should study this matter carefully to determine whether either of the new missile configurations can meet air-to-air and surface-to-air mission requirements before again, requesting production funds for Sidewinder/Chaparral. LASER GUIDED MISSILES Committee Recommendation on Maverick, Bulldog, and the Hellfire Missile System The committee recommends deletion of $8.0 million in R&D funds requested by the Air Force to begin engineering development of a laser seeker for the Maverick missile. The committee recommends addition of $12.5 million in procurement funds for the Navy to com- mence production of the Bulldog missile. The Committee recommends approval of the Army request for $11.2 million in R&D funds to continue development of the Hellfire missile system. Background With the advent of laser-guided bombs in Southeast Asia combat in the late 1960s, the Services began to look towards the use of laser guided air-to-ground missiles to obtain the pinpoint accuracy being achieved with the guided bombs. In 1969, the Navy began develop- ment of a laser seeker to go on the existing radio-guided Bullpup missile. Subsequently, in 1971, the Army began development of a laser-guided Hellfire missile and the Air Force started R&D on an alternate laser seeker for its TV-guided Maverick missile. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/171.:CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Description of Missiles The Bulldog is a rocket powered missile weighing about 500 pounds with a 250 pound warhead, and is used on high speed jet aircraft for close air support. The Maverick also is in the same general sis.e Category, with a somewhat smaller warhead, and is used on the same types of aircraft. The Hellfire is proposed as a much smaller missile, about 60 to 75 pounds, and will be helicopter carried and launched. .Its operating environment is distinctly different from, that of jet ircraf t. 't'here is an existing stock of several thousand Bull-pup missiles available to convert to the Bulldog configuration. The laser guidance package must be bought new, beat the cost of a new missile airframe can be saved with this modification. Tri-Service Seeker Program With the rapid growth of laser technology and weapons, Defense Research and Engineering in 1971 began a tri-service review of all laser guided weapons and system= to assure interoperability of systems (designators and seekers) and to prevent duplication. This DDR&E review concluded that a single laser seeker design should be attempted for the Bulldog, Maverick, and hellfire missiles and further directed in 1972 that the then undevelopedi Maverick seeker should be selected for this purpose. Subsequently, DDR&E directed a "flyoff" between the three candidate seekers, to occur in 1972 through 1973, and rejected a Navy request to be, in production of the Bulldog. Basis for Committee Position When the -''irmmittee reviewed these programs this year, it found that the Bulldog missile had completed development and testing and was ready? for production, wish :t total expenditure of $16.4 million invested in the program. On the rcther hand, the Maverick laser seeker was proposed to start into er.gireering development this year at an estimated total cost to complet on of $16.0 million. The proposed ilyoff would cost a minimum of vii additional $2.9 million. The Marines have an existing inventory of A-4M airplanes with laser target designator/trackers and therefore have an immediate eapabilit.r i-o use ala,er close supI>ort missile. The laser Maverick, how- ever, would rake at least 2 .,o i years to develop. The committee concluded that the Bulldog should enter production norr- and its, laser seeker should be adapted to the A laverick airframe to provide an Air Force laser weapon at minimum cost and the earliest, time. The Maverick appears to be the logical missile for Navy and Marine use when the existing stock of Bulllwo airframes is used up. The committee recommends that the Army examine the Bulldog seeker to see if it can be adapted to the Hellfire missile, but only if this can be done without compromising the helicopter-launched mis- sile requirements. Authorization Request The Air Force request include, $47:1.5 million to continue engineer- ing development of the B-1 advanced strategic bomber, Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 2clA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Committee Recommendation The committee recommends a reduction of $100 million, which will leave $373.5 million for continuation of the B-1 program. In making this reduction, the committee wishes to emphasize that it is not satis- fied with the progress and management of this program and expects the Air Force to show marked improvement during fiscal year 1974. A commitment to production will not be required before fiscal year 1976. Background The need for a follow-on advanced strategic bomber, to replace the aging B-52 G and H force, hay had the full support of the committee since the program entered engineering development in June 1970. During the past 2 years, despite a series of amendments to reduce or deny the funds requested for the B-1, and despite extensive debate in both Houses of the Congress, the program has been approved as proposed by the Department of Defense. The intent of the Congress has been clear in recognizing the need to develop a more technically advanced and capable third leg of the Triad to insure the effectiveness of our deterrent through the remainder of this century. However, the committee cannot be insensitive to the significance of major technical problems which arise and to the attendant increases in program cost. There should be a point beyond which program costs may not be permitted to rise and where other alternatives must be considered regardless of the importance of a program. On April 6, 1973, the B-1 program manager stated before the com- mittee that the program was in good shape and that both time and cost schedules were being met satisfactorily. However, the Secretary of the Air Force advised the committee in writing on July 12, 1973, that serious difficulties had been encountered in the program, that the first airplane had to be delayed by 2 months, the second airplane by 6 months, and the production decision at least a year. The committee also was advised that an additional $78 million would be needed in later years to complete the research and development program and that $266 million additional would be required to procure the quantity of aircraft planned for production. On July 27, 1973, at the request of the committee, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff Designate, and the B-1 Program System Director appeared before the committee to testify concerning the specific facts leading up to the notification to the committee of the problems encountered in the B-1 development program. The Secretary of the Air Force, in response to a direct question, was unwilling to assure the committee that the revised program would be adequate and that further increases in cost or program slippage would not occur. Without this assurance, and considering that the development program is just approaching the halfway mark, the committee is apprehensive that unforeseen technical problems could arise that would cause further delays and increases in cost above the present average unit production cost of $45.2 million, which with research and development costs prorated has increased to $56.7 million. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 26 Committee Considerations The reduction of $100 million recommended by the committee is not identified with any specific, actions to be taken by the Air Force; rather, it is an expression by tIi committee with its dissatisfaction and serious concern regarding the management of this program. The committee has been advised that by October 1, 197:3, the Air Force will provide a, revised estimate o costs of much higher quality than has been previously available. It will also include results of some 3 to 4 months of additional testing and progress accomplished. 't'his inform:.a.- tion will be available in time for final congressional action on the authorization and appropriation bills for fiscal year 1974 which should provide the Congress a more meaningful basis for its decisions. The conunlrtLee is convinced that the B-1 development program must show marked improvement in both management and cost control and .iii technical progress if it is to be continued as a viable program. The Air Force is encouraged to seriously consider other alternatives to the B-1 program in the event that such an alternative becomes necessary. DEFENSE PILOT TRAINING: NAVY T-2C TRAINER AIR- CRAFT AND SIMULATORS; AIR FORCE SIMULATORS Committee Recommendation The comrrutl.ee recommend:; approval of the Navy request for $6.4 million for three undergraduate pilot simulators but recommends denial of the Navy request for $26.1 million for 24 T-2C trainer aircraft and the Air Force request for $5.5 million for a simulator complex. Basis for Committee Action The comrnittee has concluded that the total Defense pilot require- ments, inventories and training rates together with the assets available to meet the pilot training requirement should be comprehensively reviewed prior to additional ceq!rests in this area. The Navy, based on their stated pilot training loads, has insufficient aircraft assets to meet its requirement. However, the committee is aware that, the Air Force has excess trainer aircraft that could fill this requirement. The committee believes, especialty at a time when funds for required weapons systems are becoming Tnore scarce, that the Navy require- ment can be matched up with the excess trainer aircraft of the Air Force, there'uy precluding tie need to proeure additional trainer aircraft at this time. The committee, subsequen to the initial budget request, also was requested by the Air' Force to approve $5.5 million to begin a procure- ment program for T-37 and T- s undergraduate pilot, training simu lators, a program estimated ^;o cost slightly more than $200 million. The Air Force request was net it formal amendment to the authoriza- tion request and had not, as a procurement program, received approval by the Department of Defense. For this reason the committee declines to include in the fiscal year 1974 request $5.5 million to start t'ns Simulator program. This ,action should not be construed as lack of support for use of simulators but, rather that the committee believes that prior to any Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 27 of the Services undertaking a program of this magnitude, the Depart- ment of Defense needs to carefully examine its total requirement for simulators. The committee is convinced that DOD must expand substantially use of flight simulators in support of flight training and in the main- tenance of combat readiness levels in operational units. Recent find- ings of the GAO suggest that substantial reductions in training aircraft inventory levels and combat unit flight operations can. be achieved without reducing the effectiveness of the combat forces, provided that a vigorous effort is initiated by the Department of Defense to procure and operate these systems. The committee also notes that the continuing rise in weapons systems costs, coupled wvitli the concurrent increases in manpower and fuel resource requirements make flight simulators an increasingly attractive alternative to reducing the size and capability of our com- bat forces. The committee, in addition to the overall review of pilot training needs and assets mentioned above, requests that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the submission of the FY 1975 budget, provide a detailed assessment of simulator applicability to all aircraft types in the Defense inventory. In addition, the committee requests that all future procurement requests specifically identify aircraft simulators on the same basis as the aircraft they are designed to support. STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES AND DECOYS Committee Recommendation The Department of Defense has requested that funds be authorized to continue the development of the Air Force Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD) and the Navy Strategic Cruise Missile (SCM), both of which would be employed to increase and strengthen U.S. strategic offensive capability. The amounts requested, together with committee recommendations and the amounts approved by the House, are as follows: Committee recommendation - House Request Change Amount bill1 SCAD ---------------------------------------- 72.2 -72.2 -------------- 22.0 ----- SCM ----------------------------------------------- 15.2 -15.2 -------------- 15.2 Description of Programs SCAD-A long range, air launched, subsonic turbofan powered vehicle to be compatible with and employed on the B-52G and 14 strategic bomber force, first as a decoy, to enhance their penetration capability. Provisions for the armed option are being incorporated in the system design. SCM-A submarine launched. (torpedo tube or vertical launcher) turbo fan powered, very long range (more than 1,000 nautical miles) subsonic, low altitude strategic cruise missile. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17,,gCIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Background SCAD -The development o SCAD has been pointed toward pro- yiding a c iecoy to be used on tt e B-52 G and H fleet to assist in pene- r,ration of strategic targets. Two years ago, when the Armed Services Cornmitt4e recommended apptoval of $10 million for this program, it directed the Air Force to pursue this development as it dual role system in order to provide both a de.,oy and an. armed capability. The Air Force par, proceeded with this; program solely as a decoy, notwith- standing the direction of the Congress. It is ge ne.raJ 77 recognized that `he Air Force has resisted pursuing SCAD with an armed warhead because of its possible use as a standoff launch missile. This application could jeopardize the B-1 program because it would not be necessary to have a bomber penetration if siandeff rnissia were available as a, cheaper and more viable alter- native. The Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) re- viewed the SCAD program on March 15 and April 13, 1973. The I)SARC, after the April 13 review, recommended that the Air Force restructure the iCAI) program to provide for concurrent development of the decoy and the armed and range-extended SCAD consistent %,ith minimizing cost and schedule impact. The Air Force did not comply with this direction, and the issue was left tip in the air pending a, Secretary of Defense decision. Last. year the Air Force justification. for this program identified it as having application not only ,o the B-:52 but also the follow-on B-1 bomber. The Air For ce now states that the B-1 bomber can penetrate without the SCAD as a decoy and that the SCAD, as it is presently being developed, could not be used on the B-1. This represents it dramatic departure from the original concept for employment of this system. The program presented this yens reflects a major increase in total estuna.ted cost, for development from $285 million estimated. as recently as the fiscal year 1974 budget submission in January 1973 to approximately $700 million. The Air Force also estimates that the procurement of the required quantity of 1,310 production missiles would cost an estimated $604 million. In total program costs, this equates to $1 million for each SCAD, which is hardly a cost effective value. This is further complicc,ted by the continuation of technical problems which could have further delayed the program and resulted in even higher costs. The Deputy Secretary of Defem e decision to terminate SCAD as E6 full engineering development program, as stated in his letter to the ArmedServices Cornmittee dated July 6, 1.973, was primarily because the "projected cost is incomm nsurate with its currently perceived. benefits." The Air Force was directed to p_ru?me a vigorous technology program, to keep open an option to develop SCAD or other system if the threat requires, and also including a ;subsonic cruise missile. This program, wall provide for a technology demonstration. of critical subsystem,.;, as well a, interface design efforts with other programs. It will continue: Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 29 development of turbofan engines and completion and test and evalua- tion of the SCAD brassboard B-52 decoy electronics. Management of the program is to include participation by the Navy. The decision also reduced the $72.2 million requested for fiscal year 1974 by $50.2 million to $22.0 million to continue the program with minimum impact on existing contracts. SCM-Last year, $20 million was requested as part of the SALT related add-on budget amendment to initiate this program. This request was reduced to $10 million in the authorization act and to $6 million in the appropriation act. The $15.2 million requested for fiscal year 1974 would initiate a competitive demonstration prototype program for 21 months, leading to selection of one contractor for engineering development. The Navy estimates that the prototype demonstration phase of this program will cost $148.3 million, and that an additional $521 million would be required to complete engineering development. Follow-on production costs were not identified but would add substantially to this total development cost of $669.3 million, making this another multi-billion dollar program. The basic issue involves the question of the need for another stra- tegic weapon system in addition to the major improvements provided by MIRV, the B-1, and Trident. Moreover, the Air Force SCAD technology, if ultimately directed to provide the basis for an armed capability, could be used as a stand-off, air-launched missile against the same targets, in the eventuality that such a capability is needed. The Navy testified that they had structured this program as a. strategic missile to support SALT II discussions. They stated that a tactical version of this missile would provide a significant improve- ment in range over Harpoon, but the tactical requirement has been deferred in order to pursue a strategic capability which is more sophisticated, more complex and, therefore, more expensive. Indicative of the uncertainty surrounding this program within the Department of Defense is the delay of the DSARC meeting from May 24, 1973, to June 14, 1973; and still delayed as of the time of the writing of this report. Committee Guidance The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense has not as yet come to grips with the broader issue of what technology to direct the Air Force and the Navy to pursue to provide the advanced technology and subsystem building blocks from which to evolve weapon systems essential to our future strategic offensive capability. For example, a stand-off missile, carried in large quantity by relatively inexpensive, off-the-shelf aircraft which need not penetrate Soviet air defenses, may be a viable alternative to the troubled B-1. In deleting the total amounts requested for SCAD and SCM, the committee determined that basic technology, up to subsystem and component development, may be conducted. With this objective in mind, the committee addressed a letter to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on August 6, 1973, which provided guidance and stated as follows : Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 30 "With respect to the Strategic Cruise Missile and Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy programs, for which no funds have been allowed by the Committee, the Department may proceed with actions in accordance with the following,, language whicl.r it, is planned to incorporate in the Committee report on the bill. ~In. denying the funds requested for SCAR, the committee recog- nized that the Air Force budget also includes $1.30 million for ex- ploratory and advanced development relating to airframe technology, propulsion technology, and avionics technology, which may support a proposed new weapon system. In the case of the SCM, the Navy similarly has included in its budget some $80 million covering the same three areas of technology. This mak: s a combined total of $210 million that the Department of Defense as available specifically for tech- nor ogy that, is directly applicable to an air-breathing, subsonic decoy or missile if and. when the need should arise. "Consistent with the committee denial of the funds requested, continued support of these technology programs is permitted without further action by the committee The $210 million is available and can be used for these purposes under this various programs for which these dollars are provided. "The committee recognizes the possibility that the Department of Defense, during the current fiscal year, may formulate and establish a specific; program requirement fo:' a new decoy or missile. This could be: the basis for a proposed programming action which the various com- mittees of the Congress would then consider on its merit and, if approved, authorize initiation during fiscal year 1974. If there is no urgency such a proposal could be made as part of the submission of the fiscal year 1975 request. "In this rna_aner the committee will have provided the framework necessary to accommodate any urgent need which the Department of Defense can justify. "Possible applications which complicate Department of Defense considerations of what system to develop raise questions of strategic vs. tactical needs, air launched, surface launched or submarine launched capability, speed and range reluii?einents, and whether a decoy or a missile is re(I aired. I t takes time to shake these out and decide what is needed and when it is needed. "The intention of the Department of Defense to pursue both Navy and Air Force requirements in a coordinated manner is encouraging since it recognizes their joint interests. In his letter of July 6, 1973, on SCAR, the Deputy Secretary of Defense states, `These (Air i+orce) activities will be manf.gei-ially coupled with the Navy's sub- >;onie cruise missile program. in order to achieve an overall strong development effort which avoids duplication. Most of the key sub- svstems and major components apply to either cruise missiles or decoys.' "In summary, the committee recommendations, while denying funds for these two programs, permit the Department of Defense to proceed in. ,in orderly manner with the technology work which it considers xwcessary. It also will permit the Department, when it has formulated the requirement for a specific system, to present the plan to the Congress for considerar';ior and approval." Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 41CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 SAFEGUARD ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM Authorization Request Initial Senate committee authorization House recom- req u est authorization mendation ?R.D.T. & E------------------------------------------------------ 216.0 191.0 199.7 Procurement---- _------------------------------------------------ 185.0 ------------ 159.3 159.3 Total ------------------------------------------------------ 401.0 350.3 359.0 Committee Recommendation-Funding The Committee recommends authorization of appropriations for the Safeguard program in the amount of $359.0 million. This is $42.0 million below the initial request and $8.7 million above the amount approved by the House. The recommended funding of $359.0 million is for continuation of deployment only at the Grand Forks site. Included in the recommended reduction of $42.0 million is $25.7 million in procurement which has been determined to be not required in fiscal year 1974. The remaining $16.3 million recommended for denial is for research effort in the general area of a "ballistic missile .defense test program," the conduct of which is not in direct support -of the Safeguard deployment program. This is discussed further under Title H. Committee Recommendation-Language The committee again recommends language in the bill which pro- hibits the use of funds for deployment except for Grand Forks. Administration Request The Department of Defense authorization request would provide for the continuation of deployment at one site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, which is consistent with the provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. The requested authori- zation would continue to support the attainment of an Equipment Readiness Date (ERD) at the Grand Forks site of October 1974. However, the Executive branch recommended no statutory language regarding the scope of activities to be performed under the Safeguard program funding. Approval of Grand Forks, North Dakota, Site It remains the intent of this committee to support increased sur- vivability of the land-based strategic deterrent within the terms of the ABM Treaty. The completion of the Grand Forks site and the maintenance of a balanced advanced technology effort is critically important to the support of this intent. Construction at the Grand Forks site is essentially completed, and 997 of the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) and Missile Site Radar (MSR) installation activities have been accomplished. Full power emission testing of the PAR commenced in June, and like testing of the MSR is scheduled to commence in September. Installa- tion of Spartan and Sprint missile control and launch equipment is on schedule. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 :$IA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Estimated Complete Acquisition Costs The current estimate of acquisition costs (R.D.T. & E., procure- ment, and military construction) for the Grand Forks site is $5.47 billion, of which. $5.05 billion has been authorized and funded. The fiscal year 1974 recommendation is for $0.36 billion, and $0.06 billion is estimated to be required i p to the Equipment Readiness Date, of the Grand Forks site in October 1974. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Mission The mission of ballistic missile defense is one for which the Ar:mv has been assigned primary responsibility within the Department of Defense. The success with which this responsibility has been fulfilled can be traced over the years through the evolutionary development of Safeguard. Committee Recommendation The .Arley has requested a total of $490.0 million to conduct research and development for ballistic missile defense. The amount, together with committee recommendations for reduction, is distributed as follows: Safeguard- _ ----------------------------------- ---------- Site defense--------------------------------- -------------------- Advanced ballistic missile defense _____________-___________________ Light are defense---- --- ------------------- --------------- Exploratcry and advanced development _____.____________________ Other exploratory development____________________________________ Total---------------------------------------------------- Request Change Recommended 216. D -16.3 1119.7 170.0 100.0 100.0 -42.4 07.6 (42.4) (-42.4)------------- (57.6)-------------- (57.6) 4.0 -------------- 4.0 490.0 -128.7 261.3 This total of nearly $500 mi?lien seems large when viewed in the context of the SALT agreement which limits ABM deployments to Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota and Washington, D.C. While the, research and development on ABM is not constrained by the SALT agreement, it should be maintained at a level which. is consistent with the revised and more limited national objectives for ballistic missile defense. In evahtai;nlg the requirement for research and development fwrnd- ing for ballistic missile defense, there are two issues which emerge; the first is a matter of U.S. strategic policies and the second is the budgetary question of the proper level. of funding. First, t}Le question of overall funding for ballistic missile defense research and development is larzely a judgmental one. Certainly it is advisable to continue a level of ,iffort to comprehend the implications of any new technology and be able to adapt our systems to new technological developments to assure that we stay ahead of the Soviet Union in these technical areas. The current Army request for $490.0 million is considered to be e:ca-sive for this purpose. Since the deployment of Safeguard- is so severely curtailed and it will have only limited effectiveness in most contingencies, it seems Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 IA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 purposeless to continue development spending beyond the require- ments to complete the current deployment for which the committee has recommended $199.7 million as discussed elsewhere in the report. Secondly, the policy issue is focused on the Army request for funds to conduct a prototype demonstration of the Site Defense (of Minute- man) program, and development of the Light Area Defense System (LADS). SITE DEFENSE Committee Recommendation The committee recommends that the program be reduced by $70 million, to $100 million, which the Army has testified will support continued development but at a slower pace. The program can be accelerated later if for some reason it should become necessary. Background The Site Defense system is in its early stages of development and consists primarily of a state-of-the-art phased array radar, a third generation commercial data processor and related software, and a modified Safeguard Sprint interceptor missile. The Site Defense program is presently limited to a prototype demon- stration to provide an option to defend the Minuteman force against a higher threat than Safeguard can accommodate. Site Defense, except within certain limitations, could not be deployed under the provisions of the ABM Treaty except at the National Command Authority (NCA) site. It, therefore, constitutes simply a hedge in the event that the treaty is violated by the Soviets, or if the United States deems it necessary to abrogate the treaty in the interest of its strategic deterrent posture. In plain words, Site Defense is an insurance policy,. albeit a very expensive one. Committee Considerations This program has now slipped a full year, and the demonstration date is now scheduled a year later. If this program were pursued through full scale development and deployment, this could be accom- plished with the completion of the first operational site two years after the demonstration. Last year the importance of completing this pro- gram at the same time as the interim agreement expired was empha- sized by the Army in justifying the amount requested. Since the Department of Defense now proposes a delay in schedule, this date has lost its significance. It is less important, therefore, to complete the prototype demonstration program by a specific date than it is to proceed at a minimum but constructive dollar level to avoid the expenditure of substantial dollar amounts if the decision should be made later to terminate this program. The dollar implications of this program are also a matter of concern. If this program is carried out through complete development, this will cost some $1.7 billion. If the decision is made to deploy this system, an investment of some $2 billion to $2.5 billion would be required to protect Minuteman against a limited near term threat. Supporting this program at the level of $100 million of fiscal year 1974 funds will delay the first Site Defense operation two or more years after the demonstration. If it becomes necessary to accelerate this program, this can be done just as readily as it was delayed. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 :34 The Army has stated that V the decision to reduce fiscal year' 1974 funding had been known prior to the beginning of that fiscal year, the program could have been adjusted but with slippage and increased cost, provided the program was continued through completion. This reduced level-of funding will be adequate to retain and support the contractors' development team. The reduction of $70 millicn also denies the proposal to apply 4i5 million to conduct studies for deployment of a National Command Authority (NCA) site. The nead to expend funds for such purpose has not at this time been demonstrated since the program is limited to a prototype demonstration. Such It, study could be conducted to sonie degree in house, if necessary. LIGHT AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM (LADS) Committee Recommendation The committee recommend, termination of the Light Area Defense- program and denial of the $42.4 million requested for this purpose. Background The objective of this program i5 to develop the capability to provide a light area defense of the United States against accidental or un= authorized ICBM attack by the Soviets and from attack by an emerging nuclear nation such as the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). This program has been pursued until now essentially as it technology program. The total estimated cost for advanced development alone, excluding follow-on engineering development, approaches $300 million. At the request of the Army, a Light Area Defense Study was con- ducted from April through December, 1972, by a study group com- prised of government, industry fend non-profit organizations. The study concluded that: 1. There is sufficient mot:vas.ion to consider seriously light area defense of the United States. 2. Accidental or unauthorized attack by the Soviet Union is a primary concern. 3. The threatened use of nuclear weapons by the PRC or other emerging nations in pursuing an advantage in non-nuclear confronta- tions must be inhibited. 4. Research on LAD can be conducted within the limitations of SALT I and deployment night be permitted under it negotiated modification of these agreements. 5. Estimated cost to develop and deploy LAD against small num- bers of ICBM's or long range submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) amounts to between 1.5 and 3.0 billion dollars. 6. The short range, depressed trajectory SLBM threat is sufficiently different in nature from the .[(_BM threat that no single light area solution. is applicable to botr. Committee Considerations The AB MI treaty precludes the deployment of this system. There- fore, research and development would be conducted solely to provide a hedge to be deployed only if the treaty was abrogated. If the treaty is not abrogated it is simply insurance. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 35IA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 The overwhelming strategic nuclear superiority of the United States, while it would not preclude an accidental attack, should deter a PRC nuclear threat well into the 1980's. If such a threat begins to develop there would be ample time to take the necessary steps to counter it. There are also serious technical questions as to whether a light area defense would be effective in countering either a small attack from the Soviet Union or a nuclear threat by the Chinese. In its thorough review of the Safeguard program in connection with the fiscal year 1971 bill, the committee examined the value of an area defense directed primarily against the Chinese and, in its Report No. 91-1016, page 19, concluded: "Present circumstances do not justify a diversion of our resources from the primary task of defending the deterrent to the less urgent objective of providing a defense against the evolving Chinese Com- munist threat. Whether the development of a thin area defense is a wise response to a future Chinese nuclear capability remains to be demonstrated." That statement was made before SALT I and the committee believes it is still valid today, especially since we have dramatically increased our strategic deterrent capability by adding MIRV to Minuteman and Poseidon, and SRAM to our B-52 inventory. The Trident will add substantially to this invincible force. PRC advances have not kept pace with this progress, nor will the Soviets threaten this capability for the foreseeable future. Conclusion In summary, the committee is convinced that major emphasis in research and development for support of the strategic mission should be placed on the strategic offensive capability. Research and develop- ment on strategic defensive capability, consistent with the ABM Treaty, should, with completion of deployment of Safeguard at Grand Forks, be structured to include a Site Defense demonstration program and a technology program in advanced ballistic missile defense. The committee recommendations for fiscal year 1974 .are in accord with this objective. Committee Recommendation The committee recommends approval of the full $194.2 million requested to continue engineering development of the SAM-D weapon system. This is one of the Army's top priority programs. Description SAM-D is an advanced surface-to-air missile weapon system which is planned to replace both the Nike Hercules and the Improved Hawk missiles in providing air defense of the Army in the field and air defense of the continental United States. In the field Army, SAM-D defenses will be complemented with short range, low altitude, forward area air defense weapons and will be integrated with the Air Force in the overall air defense of the theatre of operations. In the continental United States, SAM-D will defend high value complexes and areas along the periphery of the United States and will be integrated with other continental air defense forces. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 ~&-,IA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 SA'Af-D will provide a marked increase in. performance capability as compared with either of the systems which it will replace. It will be able to engage more targets simultaneously, be more effective against. jamming electronic co-interineasures and maneuvering targets, and relieve the pressure of high military manpower costs by permitting significant reductions in the number of troops required to operate the system. There is no other weapon system under development which can satisfy these requirements. Background Last year the committee, in recommending approval of the full :$171.4 million requested for fiscal year 1973, made the following observations in its report on the Military Procurement Authorization bill (Report. No. 92-962, page 40). The committee considers approval if the t371.4 million does not constitute a commitment to production. Technical progress and development costs will be closely monitored to insure that the expenditure of these funds in addition to the 386.9 million provided previously clearly supports further development efforts. In this re.t;ard, the Army is encouraged to continue its efforts to manage this program in an austere and closely co itrel led manner. The Army has complied fully with this direction, and thus far has managed this program with a high degree of competence. The con- tracior's tear also deserves high marks for their accomplishments to (late. During the floor debate on last year's bill; an amendment was introduced Co delete all of the funds requested by Defense and recom- mended by the committee for fiscal year 1973. However, the amend- ment was withdrawn after an understanding was reached that a thorough review of the progrxn. would be conducted. in conjunction with the review of the fiscal year 1974 request, including separate, formal hearings. The committee has satisfied this commitment completely. Review by the General Accou;iting Office The committee also reques tled the General Accounting Office to conduct a review of the SAM-D eirogrom. Their report, which raised number of questions that have been satisfactorily answered by the Army, is printed in Part 5 of the printed hearings on the fiscafyear 1974 bill. NATO Interest Allegations have been made in the past that there was a lack of interest by our NATO allies in participating in the SAM-D program.. The committee explored this matter and determined as follows: 1. Development of SAM-D is being conducted unilaterally by the United States. In fact, secur.ty classification precluded discussion with these: other countries until December 1971. Since then, they have attended a number of briefings and continue to show interest in the program. 2. The NATO countries regarb the present SAM-D configuration as complex and expensive, although they agree that there is a need for an advanced surface-to-air missile due to the increased threat generated by electronic countermeasures and longer range air-to- surface missiles. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 37 3. Several NATO countries have indicated that they will not under- take unilateral national development of a medium to large SAM, and that it is clearly an important field for cooperation. 4. SAM-D may be relevant to their desired system and that such possibility should be explored. Conclusions In recommending approval of the $194.2 million requested, the committee emphasizes that this does not constitute a commitment to production, but merely the next step in an orderly development program. The!wrogram is progressing satisfactorily; it is on schedule; it is within cost estimates; and no known major technical problems are unresolved. Moreover, the program has been reduced in total estimated cost by some $759 million, from $5.24 billion to $4.48 billion primarily by reducing quantities of equipment required but also by deleting certain unnecessary features. TRIDENT Committee Recommendation The committee recommends authorization of the full $1,527,400,000 to continue developriient and construction of the Trident Submarine Launched Strategic Weapon System, as proposed by the Navy. This amount is distributed by appropriation as follows: Amount Research, development, test and evaluation: of dollars) Trident I Missile --------------------------------------------- 529. 0 Trident Submarine------------------------------------------ 125. 6 Procurement: Ship Construction, Navy (SCN) ------------------------------- 867.8 Weapons procurement, Navy (WPN)--------------------------- 5. 0 Total procurement----------------------------------------- 872.8 Total recommended ------------------- .--------------------- 1,527.4 Description of Program The fundamental and primary function of the military services is to deter nuclear attack in the first instance and to protect the United States and its population if attacked. The submarine based strategic missile system is one of the three elements which. comprise the U.S. strategic deterrent force, usually referred to as the Triad, which bears' this responsibility. The Polaris/Poseidon fleet has been highly successful in this role since 1959 when the first 'submarines became operational. The Minuteman and Titan land based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), and the B-52 strategic bomber have pro- vided the other two essential elements of this force. Trident was conceived to make the submarine based strategic mis- sile force relatively invulnerable to the broad spectrum of potential future threats. It is designed both to improve the capability of the existing Po]arisjPoseidoni fleet and to replace them. Trident consists of two major subsystems: primary strategic missile system, and the submarine system. Both will utilize the latest ad- Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 38 vanes in technology and be designed to increase employment flexi- bility, significantly reduce vulnerability of submarine, enhance suirviv- ability of payload delivered, and greatly expand the dimensions of the U.S.. counterstrike force. The Trident submarine, wbiclr is planned to become operational in 197S, will he nuclear powered, capable of carrying up to 24 missiles, and substan.tuLIly larger and more capable than the Polaris/Poseidon submarines. Initially it will encompass the Trident I (C-4) missile but is designed to accommodate a larger diameter, and longer range Trident. II missile if and when developed. The Trident I missile, which is planned to become operational in 1978, is being developed to give a range of about 4,000 miles, wi'h payload and accuracy equivalent to the Poseidon missile. It will be capable of being backfit.ted on the 31 existing Poseidon submarines, thus increasing the weapon system capability. It will he equipped with an improved ballistic reel try vehicle and will be compatible with ;Un advanced reentry vehicle. The Trident IT missile, for which development is not proposed to begin in fiscal Year 1974, will be larger than Trident I and use the growth til'ace available in the Trident submarine tube. Development will be based on the technology derived from the Trident I missile so that it will not be proposed for initiation until the Trident I develop- ment is well in hand. Background The oldest, of the present fleet of 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines became operational in 1959, so that they will begin to reach 20 years of ago in 1979 when the first Trident submarines are planned to become operational. The oldest Polaris submarines are even now showing the effects of age. From the nature of their continuous operations, with two different crews rotating ,,o keep the submarines on station, wear and tear exceeds that of most other ships. While it may be probable that these submarines will provide safe and economic opera- tion for 25 years or more, and Navy maintenance efforts are geared to provide as long a life as possible, such life in a vital strategic systems role cannot be guaranteed. Limitations on Polaris/Poseidon Fleet There are absolute limits to the improvements. which can be made in the present ships. Growth potential provides only for modest improvements in quieting, sonar, or missiles. The Navy has testified that. it is not e.coanomic ally realistic to convert thefirst ten Polaris to Poseidon. and that introduction. of the Trident I missile in the re- maining 31 ships will use all of the missile growth potential. Significant noise reduction to maintain a lead against anticipated Soviet acoustic technology requires the radically different and quiet propulsion plant planned for the Trident submarines This cannot be backfitted in the existing submarine fleet. Implications of SALT The five-year interim strategi, arms agreement reached with the Soviets in May 1972 limits the number of submarine ballistic missile launchers to 710 and the number of ballistic missile submarines to 44. The significance of this restriction is that the Trident submarine may Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 replace the :Polaris/Poseidon submarine, each of which has 16 launch- ,ers,, on ,a one for one basis, except that this would limit the number of.];aunchers on each Trident submarine to 16. Since the Navy plans to build Trident with 24 launchers each, the total number which would be :allowed under the interim agreement would be 29. This is 12 Jess than the 41 submarines now in the fleet. The committee raised this question last year because of the concern that more submarines with fewer than 24 launchers each would provide :a more survivable and therefore more credible deterrent force. The committee recognizes that this situation may change as a result of SALT 11 negotiations or upon the expiration of the interim agreement. The Navy has testified that the determination of the number of launchers may be considered independently for each submarine, and that the Trident submarine design will accommodate quantities down to 16 launchers on a modular basis without otherwise disturbing construction of the submarine. Acceleration Issue The need for. the Trident submarine as an ultimate replacement for Polariis/Poseidon has not been and is not now at issue. The controversy of last year, and again this year has centered on the question of when it is required to be deployed. Last year the committee rejected the recommendation of the Research and Development Subcommittee to slow the accelerated program ;b:ack to the original schedule which would have been three to four years later than the. 1978 Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date. The Senate and the Congress sustained the committee in sup- porting the accelerated program for fiscal year 1973. A floor amend-ment to slow the program was defeated on a roll call vote. This year the Research and Development Subcommittee, in an effort to explore a range of alternative schedules and provide the committee with several options to the continued accelerated program, requested the Department of Defense to provide alternative cost estimates and schedules. These were reviewed and explored in formal hearings held by the subcommittee. This resulted in the recommenda- tion by the subcommittee that the 't'rident I missile be developed as proposed in order to permit backfit into the Poseidon submarine, but that the Trident submarine IOC be delayed by approximately two years to 1980. This would have reduced the fiscal. year 1974 request by $885.4 million. The committee rejected this recommendation by an 8 to 7 vote, ,and supported the full request for $1.527 billion to continue with the accelerated program as strongly justified by the Department of Defense. Use of Funds Recommended for Fiscal Year 1974 The $1.527 billion will provide for the following effort: (a) $529.0 million to continue engineering development of the 'Trident I missile including the ballistic reentry vehicle and con- current :advanced development of an advanced reentry vehicle. ~ R.D.T. & E.) (b) $125.6 million for continued development of the lead (prototype) ,submarine, including completion of the submarine mock-up, initial Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/171p CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 test procedures, submarine installed subsystems, and equipment construction and test. (R.D.T, & E.) (c) $586.8 million for full funding for the lead Trident submarine. (SCN) (d) $281.0 million to complete procurement of long lead ship com- ponents for the first three fol'ow ships initiated in fiscal year 1973, and. to initiate procurement of long lead components for six additional follow ships for which it is planned to request authorization in later years. (SUN). (e) $5.0 million for initial en? veering planning required prior to architectural and engineering d esign in support of an explosive weapons area for missile production at the proposed refit facility. (W.PN) Conclusion The committee recognizes the vital importance of this weapon system, which is estimated to cost some $12.8 billion for a fleet of 10 as presently approved by the Department of Defense. At $1.3 billion each, which includes the cost of research and development, procure- rnent, construction and support this may be the most expensive weapon 1ystern ever built by the United States. The committee is concerned with the high degree of concurrency which is evident from the plan to have all nine follow-on submarines in various stages of construction before the lead prototype submarine has been completed and fully tested. However, :hip concern is overshadowed by the conviction of the importance of deploying this fleet at the earliest practicable time. The committee considers that the question of the number of launchers for the nine follow-on submarines remains open and subject to later consideration, and that 24 launchers are approved at this time only for the lead subrarne. It should be noted that at ,he present time the approved program is only for 10 systems which is; the basis upon. which the program has been considered by the commute The committee intends to clo.ely follow the development of this weapon system to ascertain its progress against planned milestones and to insure that its costs do not exceed estimates. AWACS (E-3A) Authorization Request and House Action The request was for $197.8 mi?_lion in R. & D. and $11.7 million in the procurement account for long lead items for a fiscal year 1975 production buy. The House ceds?ced the R. & D. request by $42.0 million and approved the $11.7 million long lead funds for a total of $167.5 million for fiscal year 197X. Committee Recommendation The committee recommends it $42.0 million reduction in R. & I)., which leaves 8155.8 million for R. & D. for fiscal year 1974, and approval of the $11.7 million in long lead funds for it total of $1.67.5 million for fiscal year 1974. Program Description and Siatts AWACS is an, airborne radar warning and command and control aircraft. Its unique and distinguishing characteristics are the capa- bility to identify and track low flaying airplanes which would be masked Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 4tlA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 by ground clutter from ground based or other airborne radar planes, its capability to track automatically a large number of airplanes, and its on-board command and control facilities. The AWACS program completed a prototype flyoff in 1972 between two competitors for the radar subsystem, with Westinghouse winning over Hughes. Full scale engineering development began in January 1973 following a Defense System Acquisition Review Council review of the prototype radar "brassboard" results. Operational testing to date has included highly successful Air Defense Command exercises with the current air defense fighter force opposing SAC bomber raids and a NATO demonstration in Europe which evaluated the surveillance and command and control potential of AWACS in tactical scenarios. A prototype of the complete AWACS command and control system is scheduled to fly and complete its testing in 1974, and successful demonstration of its operation will be the basis for a full production go-ahead in late 1974. The production airplanes will begin delivery in 1976. Operational Concept and Force Structure The AWACS system will be usable in any operating environment where radar surveillance and warning, aircraft offensive and defensive command and control, and overall battlefield monitoring are necessary. These uses include the classical CONUS bomber defense mission, all envisionable tactical combat scenarios, plus other non-combat surveil- lance applications. The AWACS is being designed with a single "core" configuration which can be adopted rapidly to its differing missions by simple reprograming of its computers, a process which can be accomplished in a matter of hours. The basic core system thus has an inherent flexibility which does not restrict it to any single use or mission. The current force structure planning for 42 airplanes has a nominal distribution of 25 to CONUS air defense, 10 to the tactical air com- mand, and 7 for the training and airplane overhaul pipelines. Basis for Committee Position The committee strongly supports the AWACS program. Testimony this year on combat experience in Southeast Asia showed that AWACS could have replaced EC-121, C-135, and C-130 airplanes, all fulfilling parts of the radar warning and command and control functions, and would be superior in capability to those 3 aircraft combined. The AWACS also will vastly improve the CONUS air defense effectiveness of the present interceptor fleet of F-101, F-102, and F-106 airplanes. To date the AWACS development program has resulted in the system br'ttering its technical performance goals, completing its milestones ahead of schedule, and underrunning on costs. An Air Force review of the fiscal year 1974 R. & D. funding require- ments, after the budget was submitted, identified a reduction of $42 million without affecting the revised R. & D. schedule. The committee recommends that the request be reduced by this amount. The committee does believe that the operational flexibility inherent in the common core AWACS could allow the overall quantity to be reduced from the 42 aircraft currently programed, and it urges that this be 'considered while the production program is being planned. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Fiscal year Fiscal year House Senate 1973 1973 ---------------'----- ------------------- Fiscal year program program Fiscal year Change from Change from J\ /.. ?\ 1014 ...,- ~. ?i.n e./ Rn.... n.ln.l QtY. Amt. Qty. Aron. Q Y. Amt. Qty. Am.. Qty. Amt. Gety. Amt. Q y. Amt. aty. A..... V-21 utility transport_______________________________________________ '0 12.0 20 12.0 20 12.2 ---------------- 20 12.2 -20 -12.2 VII-1 utility transport l i e i i . o p t e r- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -. 6 8.1- 8 8.1 --------------------------------- ----- - - --------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - O R - 5 6 u ' u s e r v a t i u . i i i e i i ; : o p t e r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ 4k 3 3 . - ------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I t e m l e s s , t h a n - - - - 2.7 ------ 8.3 ------- 2.3 -------- 4 0 -------------------- 4.0 ---------------------- 4.0 Modiflcationofairer t___--------------------------__--- 40.2 -------- 55.6 -------- 56.6 -------- 103.1 ------------------------ 109.1 .___---------------- 109.1 Aircraft support equipment and facilities-------------------- 20.2 -------- 33.8 -------- 29.7 -------- 30.6 ------------------------ 30.6 -------_-_ 30.6 Aircraft spares and repair parts_____________________________ 9.6 ------- 16.7 -------- 12.9 -------- 25.1 ------------------------ 25.1 -------- -0.8 -------- 24.3 Subtotal----------------------------------- 400 106.6 26 I28.5 26 120.6 20 181.0 ---------------- 20 181.0 -20 -13.0 -------- 168.0 Prloryearilnancingavsilable ------------------------------------ -95.0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------- ------ Appropriation requiring authorizFtion_ 33 5 . -------------- 181.0 ------------------------ 181.0 -------- -13.0 -------- 168.0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Millions Army request--------------------------------------------------- 181.0 Senate committee recommended reduction--------------------------- -13. 0 Senate committee recommendation--------------------------- 168. 0 House authorization---------------------------------------------- 181.0 Authorization Request The Army request for fiscal year 1974 totals $181 million. Included in the request is $12.2 million for 20 U-21/UX utility aircraft. The remainder of the request relates to improvement or support of the existing inventory of Army aircraft including $109.1 million for air- craft modifications, $25.1 million for spares and repair parts, and $34.6 million for other support. It should be noted that funding is included in the Air Force aircraft request to procure 332 helicopters for payback to Army for assets already provided to the South Vietnam Air Force. Summary of House Action The House approved the Army request of $181.0 million. House action is shown for information only since the House bill was not referred in time for committee consideration. Committee Recommendation for Changes The committee recommends authorization of appropriation in the amount of $168.0 million, a reduction of $13 million from the request. U-21/UX Utility Aircraft -$12.2 million The committee recommends denial of the request for 20 utility aircraft since the UX utility aircraft approved for fiscal year 1973 are not yyet under contract. This is discussed further under "Aspects of the Bill of Special Interest." Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts -$0.8 million The Army has informed. the committee that a reevaluation shows that these funds are now in excess of fiscal year 1974 funding require- ments. (43) Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 FISCAL 7 EAR 1974 NAVY AND XIARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT REQUEST [In minions of dollars] mo 1. ---?... ;tar la 3 F-arn yaq. imp nnn~ F ate. 7eu. program senate program (appropriated) Program Flscai year 1974 Change from --_.__' (-=Qnt) _ request request Authoriz C request Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. request Recommended 1P Qty- Amt. Qty. Amt. Qty. ___ AAAl Light attack Skvhawk___ __________ Qty' s Qt,- Amt. A-4M Advance procurcement, current vear--------------- 1 A-6E All we tither attack Intruder---- - 24 -------------- 2 0 - _ A-6E Advances procurement, current year-- ____1.2 89.8 21 146.5 21 2 2 24 64.1 "- - '----24 64.1 EA-6B Electronic warfareIntruder _______12 3.7 1.7 146.8 15 128.'4 ---------------- lb 128.4 --_____ -----------__ 2.2 17 - Ib EA-6B Advance procurement, current year ______130. 1 ----- 111.7 134.8 7 111..7 -------- 1.9 -------- 128.4 A-7 F, fliedium attack Corsair II------------- 24 6 116.6 __----___--_?-- B 118. B -------- -15.0 ------ 1.9 73.9 48 155.7 48 160.7 42 6 101, 8 A-E Advance procurement, current year ---------- 511 7 5 -- 30 1.4 8 1.99 A`7 Advance Harrier_______-_ 30 99.9 166.9 ------------- ------- 30 108.3 .7 42 166, .----__ -14 8 42 152.8 ----------- ------- Fighter A~' 8A Advance procmrement, current year--______- 12.0 -------- F 4J -----------------------------------------------1054 12 17. 3 12 8 F-IJ Advance procur'ernent current year- _---_----- 7.1 --"-""? 8.1 --_.____ 43.3 -------- -6.0 ii- 37.3 F-14A vane procureme ------------- ------------ - 10- 111.8 -10 -11 --- ----------------- ------------- _7.0 __6- _ F-14A Advance procurement, current year ---------- 48 600.6 48 407.8 40 8. 0 ---- ---2 -8.0 -1U -114H-53D --------- ----84 8 ----__-_ 75.7 _-_-_-- S 48 47.1.0 I- b0 -8. r ,6 _ lines : eepi;:g helicopter 18 58.3 75.7 ------- 75.8 -------- -20 594. b --- 139.5 .8 -------- 55.0 ------- 275.8 _ 197.6 4 ico ter------------------------------------------ _____1 8 30. V H-3 Helicop ----------------------------------- ------ - - --------------------- ---------- ----------------------------- r lieOPtnent,current year -_____---_ 1.9 _------ - ------11- 29.8 U11 -3,N Advantitilit P ce _ ----------- -I _-______-___ Y elico ter Iroquois---------- 24 15:7 -------------- 24 19.1 UII-IN Advance procuremen ent, current year-------- 2 8 24 19.1 24 --_-- _ AH-l.f Armed helicopter------------------. 1.3 ----- --- 1-3 . 21.0 2i - -- -- ----------------- Ztf.ti 20 28.6 - -- 21.8 ----------------------__ ---------- Z4 21.0 20 . ----- ---------------- 20 21.6 ---------------- 28 211. B Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Ali'-11 Advance procurement, current year--------- P-30 ASW aircraft Orion____________________ 24 P-3C Advance procurement, current year----------- S-3A ASW aircraft carrier based_____________ 13 S-3A Advance procurement, current year----------- E-2C Early warning aircraft________________ 11 E-2C Advance procurement, current year----------- C-9B medium transport____________________ 5 CT-39 light transport_______________________ 2 T-2C Trainer aircraft_______________________ 36 T-2C Advance procurement, current year----------- TA-4J Trainer aircraft______________________ 12 1.7 -------- 1.3 -------- 1.3 ------- 7 7 211.4 12 110.7 12 110.7 12 126.5 ________________ 12 126,5 ---------------- 12 126.5 35.4 12.7 12.7 -------- 8.9 - 8.9 & 9 322.0 35 472.4 35 472.4 45 401.4 ---------------- 45 401.4 ---------------- 45 401.4 24.6 -------- 61.2 -------- 61.2 -------- 54.0 ------------------------ 54.0 ------------------ 227.0 8 129.9 8 129.9 9 141.0 ---------------- 9 141.0 ---------------- 9 141.0 16.7 -------- 18.2 -------- 18.2 24 .3 3 15.6 3 17.0 ---------- ---------------'----------------------- 3.2 5 7.9 5 7.8 35.0 ----21---------------------------- 24 31.3 24 31.3 24 32.1 ---------------- 24 32.1 -24 -2& 7 7 -------- 6.4 6.4 .7 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --- 20.5 --------------------------------------------- 0 ao.a ---------------- 8 46.8 ---------------- 8 46.8 TAV-8A Advance procurement, current year- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1.9---------------- i- 'Twin engine medium transport 9 ---------------- 1 ---------------- 1 LC l3O ------------------ ------------- 4.9 1 4 4..9 9 1 4 4.9 130 9 -130R Adv. proc., current year2.0 0 EC_ ---------------------- E Special mission------------------------------------------------------- 1 12.1 1 10.2 ---------------- 1 10.2 ---------------- 1 10.2 130Q Adv. pros., current year--------------------------------------------------- 1 3 KC-130H Tanker----------------------------------------------------?---------------- - 4 25.0 ---------. a 2F n - Modification of aircraft - 25.0 ---- - - - - ------------ -......, ------- -------- any. 4 -------- moo. s ------------------ --- - 295.4 ---------------------- Aircra t spares and repair parts _____________________ 495.9 ________ 471.6 ________ 476.5 __420.7 ________ +6.9 ________ 427.6 ________ - 47.0 ________ Aireraft component improveme ement-----------------? 43.0 ________ 58.0 -------- 61.3 ____-_ 30.1 ------------------------ 30.1 ____________------------ Aircraft industrial facilities-------------------------- 25.4 -------- 28.2 -------- 28.6 -------- 26.7 ------------------------ 26.7 --_---------------_--_-- Other aircraft production charges-------------------- 27.4 -------- 25.4 -------- 29.8 -----___ 22.4 ------------------------ 22.4 ------------------------- Common ground equipment___________________ . ----- 97.2 -------- 1~9 4 -------- 111.4 -------- 84.5 ------------------------ 84.5 ------------------------ War consumables ? 9 --- -- ? 9 -- -- 2.7 ------------------------ 2.7 ------------------------ 295.4 373.7 30.1 26.7 22.4 84.5 2.7 Subtotal_______________________________ 271 3,295.4 291 2,977.1 297 2,989.1 305 2,95&3 -8 -------- 297 2,958.3 -82 -567.3 223 2,391.0 Financing adjustment------------------------------------------ -155.0 APPropriationrequiringauthorization ---------------------------- 2,822,1 -------------------------- 2,985.3 -----------------------2,958.3 -------- 567.3 -------- 2,391.0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT Navy request------------- ---------- $2, 958. 3 --------------------------- Senate committee recommended reduction------------------------- -567. 3 Senate committee recommendation------------------------- 2, 391. 0 House authorization-------------------------------------------- 2,958.3 Authorization ' Request The Navy request for procurement of aircraft is for $2,958.3 million. ? This request provides for procurement of 305 aircraft and their associated initial spares for $2,261.3 million and $1.24.6 million for advance procurement of long lead materials for aircraft programs planned for inclusion in the FY 1975 budget request. The remaining $572.4 million is for aircraft modifications, replenishment spares and. repair parts, and for support equipment, component improvement, and similar charges necessary to sustain the aircraft inventory. The budget request as submitted in January, 1973, included 48 F-14As and 10 F-4Js. This was revised to 50 F-14As and no F-4J procurement, as is described in the discussion on the F-14 in the section of the report, "Aspects of Bill of Special Interest." Fifteen different types of aircraft are included in the revised request. Individual procurements continue to be in small quantities with 50 F-14As, 45 S-3As and 42 A-7Es being the three largest requests in the FY 1974 program. The funds and aircraft requested provide some modernization of the Navy and Marine Corps aircraft inventory. However, the size of the inventory continues to decrease while the average aircraft, age increases. Summary of House Action The House approved the request for $2,958.3 million, as revised to include 50 F-14As. House action is shown for information only since the House bill was not referred in time for committee consideration. Committee Recommendation for Changes The committee recommends authorization of $2,391.0 million for procurement of Navy and Marine Corps aircraft. This is a reduction of $567.3 million from the request, as follows: F-4J Fighter-$130.7 million reduction The committee recommends deletion of the entire request for F-4J aircraft. This reduction is consistent with decisions made subsequent to the budget request on both the F-4J and the F-14A aircraft programs and is discussed in the section "Aspects of Bill of Special Interest." F-14A Aircraft-$374.7 million reduction The committee recommends approval of $197.6 million and denial of the request for authorization of 48 aircraft. This is discussed in detail under "Aspects of Bill of Special Interest." (47) Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 4CCIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 EA-6B Prowler-,$15.0 million reduction The budget request submi-'ted included significantly increased esti- mated unit costs for airframes and avionics over FY 1973. The com- mittee believes the current request was over-budgeted and believes she program. can be pursued as planned with a $15.0 million reduction, A-7E Corsair II--$14.8 million reduction The requesi; included $9.1 million for initial procurement of the TRAM night attack system. L1=~velopment has slipped, and the sys- tem will not be bought befo'e FY 1975. An additional reduction of $5.7 million is recommended as the addition of Air Force A-7 aircraft will result in reduced cost for the Navy A-7 program. AV-8A Harrier-$6.0 million reduction The budget request was based on procurement with an inertial navigation-attack system. Procurement of this system has been can- celed, and a simpler and cheaper baseline avionics will be used at, a net savings of $6.0 million. T-2C Trainer Aircraft-$20e.1 million reduction The committee recommends approval of $6.4 million for procure- ment of simulators for undergraduate pilot training and denial of further procurement of T-2C trainer aircraft and initial spares for the T-2C aircraft. The committee believes tr.at there are sufficient trainer aircraft assets within the Department of Defense to meet overall undergradu- ate pilot training requiremerts without additional procurement of trainer aircraft at this time. This is discussed further under "Aspects of Bill of Special Interest." DESCRIPTION OF NAVY AND MARINE CORPS AIRCRAFT RECOMMENDED FOR APPROVAL A-4M (b'kyhawk) The A--4M is a single seat, carrier capable, subsonic divebomber, the latest version of the A-4 series, and is powered by an uprated J52-P408 engine. I t is the Marina Corps primary light attack close air support airplane. The fiscal year 1974 recommendation is for $64.1 million and 24 aircraft. It is the first of a planned three-year procurement of 72 air- craft intended. to transition the A--4 inventory to an all A--4M active duty light attack force. A-6E (Intruder) The A-6 is the Navy and Marine Corps night and all-weather attack aircraft. The A-6F has modernized avionics systems but otherwise is similar to the combat-proven A41A. This long-range, twin-jet, sub- sonic aircraft is capable of accurare navigation and weapons delivery, and its specialized electronics equipment permits it to attack targets day or night under all weather conditions. The FY 1974 program of 15 aircraft, at a cost of $128.4 million, is to continue a modest, inventory modernization program and provide a continued new production capability. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 4g;IA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 EA-6B (Prowler) The EA-6B is an electronic countermeasures (ECM) version of then A-6 Intruder and is the only tactical electronic warfare airplane in production in the United. States today. A derivative of the A-6A, it is a four place, carrier-based aircraft with integrated high-powered electronic jammers and modern receivers controlled by a computer. The FY 1974 request was for six EA-6B's at $116.6 million. It is the first of a planned additional procurement totaling 18 new aircraft over three years, which will increase the Navy's operational squadrons to 8. The Navy's goal is 12 squadrons. A-7E (Corsair II) The A-7E is a single-place, light attack aircraft for close air support and interdiction missions. It provides a substantial increase in bomb- ing accuracy, combat radius and load carrying capability over previous light attack aircraft. The A-7E has proven itself in Southeast Asia combat missions. The request was for 42 aircraft and $166.9 million, and the com- mittee recommends 42 aircraft and $152.9 million including $0.8 million for advance procurement. This will permit continuing moderni- zation toward the Navy goal of an all-A-7E light attack force. A V-8A (Harrier) The AV-8A is a single pilot, fan jet powered subsonic V/STOL aircraft, which provides the Marine Corps with V/STOL light jet attack close air support capability. Also included in this year's Harrier program is a request for eight two-place trainer versions of the basic Harrier, which will be used for pilot transition training. This is the final planned procurement of Harriers for the Marine Corps and will bring the total to 112 AV-8A's and eight trainers. The Harrier is discussed in more detail in the section of the report "Aspects of Bill of Special Interest." UH-IN (Iroquois) The U11-IN is the latest model of the famous "Huey" helicopter series. The Navy uses the UH-1N primarily for support of Operation Deepfreeze and for search and rescue missions at naval air stations. The Marine Corps use includes command and control mobility for troop commanders, and all weather movement of troops, equipment and cargo in amphibious assault and shore-based operations. The 24 aircraft recommended are part of a continuing procurement to modernize the Navy and Marine Corps helicopter inventory. The cost is $22.1 million including advance procurement. AH-IJ (Sea Cobra) The AH-1J is a twin engine version of the Cobra helicopter gunship.. It is utilized by the Marine Corps to provide close-in ground fire suppression during aerial and ground escort operations and landing zone preparation. The 20 aircraft recommended for FY 1974 are part of a multiear planned procurement through FY 1976. This year's request is' for $21.6 million. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 ~tlA-RDP75B00380R000600160003-0 P-3C (Orion) The P-3( is a land-based, long-range, four engine turboprop patrol aircraft. Its primary mission i3 antisubmarine warfare with secondary missions of aerial mining, ma.rii.ime surveillance and destruction of coastal shipping. The 12 aircraft recommended at $126.5 million will transition. cue additional squadron from the P- _A to the P--3C. S-3A (Viking) The S .,A is a fixed wing rarrier-based antisubmarine (ASSN) search and attack aircraft containing the latest ASW sensors, inte- grated with a general purpose digital computer. It replaces the old propeller driven S--2 with a modern fan-jet powered aircraft capable of high speed and long range patrolling. The 45 aircraft requested in FY 1974 at a cost of $401.4 million represent the third production increment and together with previously authorized aircraft will provide for transitioning six fleet squadrons to the S-3A. E-2C (Hawkeye) The F;-2C is a carrier-based turbo-prop early warning and control aircraft. It provides the Navy with a modern radar early warning, strike control and surveillance capability. The E `2C has the same basic airframe as the earlier model E-2A/B but is equipped with new avionics, including a new radar ,ystemu. The nine E-2Cs requeste6 at $141.0 million is the final planned procurement at this time. (Light) Twin. Engine Medium Transport This is a commercially procured, FAA certified, land-based trans- port aircraft with an all wea,her category IT capability, powered by two turbofan engines, operating in the transonic speed range. It will provide important logistic support for Marine Corps units and installa- tions. One aircraft, is requested at a total cost of $4.9 million, to replace an obsolete C--118 now used "'or this purpose. EC-130Q (Hercules) The EC-130Q is a, basic C-130 aircraft, modified for airborne com- munications, and with increased engine performance generavor capacity, and special communications, navigation, and flight instru- ment systems. It provides as airborne communications relay inter- facing with other national Co:nrrand and Control authorities. The one aircraft, requested in FY 1974, at a cost of $10.2 million, will augment EC-130Q's presently in the Navy's inventory and will provide mission available aircraft during modification and improvement programs to mission equipment. KC-130H (Hercules) The KC- 130H is a modified version of the C-130 aircraft, provided with removable external and internal refueling tanks, whose primary mission is in-flight refueling of Marine fighter and attack aircraft, with capability for tanker 'erry missions. With internal refueling equipment removed, it can be used as a cargo or transport plane. The four aircraft requested in FY 1974 at $25.0 million are required to maintain current, Marine Corps tanker capability and to provide transoceanic tanker service for Marine Corps and Navy tactical aircraft. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 FISCAL YEAR 1974 AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT REQUEST Fiscal year 1973 Fiscal year 1973 - Fiscal year 1972 program program Fiscal year 1974 Change from Change from program (appropriated) (current) request req nest Authorized request Recommended Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. A-7D Tactical Attack Fighter_____________ 97 203.7 24 83.2 24 83.2-------------------------------------------------- +24 +70.1 24 70.1 A-7D Advance procurement, current year----------- 5.8 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- A-10 (A-X) Adv. proc., current year--------------------------------------------------------------------- 30.0 ------------------------ 30.0 ------ -30.0 ---------------- F-4E Tactical Fighter_____________________ 36 129.2 48 190.2 48 168.1 24 98.6 ---------------- 24 98.6 ---------------- 24 98.6 E-3A Advance procurement, current year------------------------------------------------------------- 11.7 ------------------------ 11.7 ------------------------ 11.7 F-111F Advanced Tactical Fighter__________ 12 112.0 12 151.4 12 151.4 ------------------ +12 +172.7 12 172.7 +12 +151.6 12 151.6 F-111F Adv. proc., current year-------------------- 20.1 -------- 30.0 -------- 30.0 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- F-111 over target and proof testing------------------ 297.9 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------- 116 69.3 ---------------- 116 69.3 -116 -41.0 -------- 28.3 F-5B----------------------------------------------------- 7 11.9 7 11.9 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- F-5E________________________________________ 21 62.4 57 90.4 57 90.4 71 112.0 ---------------- 71 112.0 ---------------- 71 112.0 F -5E Adv. proc., current year---------------------- 7.1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- F/TF-15A Tactical Fighter___________________________________ 30 421.6 30 421.6 77 801.9 -38 -290.1 39 511.8 ---------------- 77 801.9 RF-4C Tactical Reconnaissance Fighter---- 12 39.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- C-5A Prior year unfunded deficiencies and contingency provisions---------------------------- 299.1 -------- 107.6 ---------- 107.6 -------- 43.1 -------- -5.9 -------- 37.2 -------- -5.9 -------- 37.2 C-130E/H Transport________________________ 12 40.1 20 90.0 20 90.0 36 180.6 ______ _ 36 180.6 ---------------- 36 180.6 VC-X (707 class) transport------------------------------------ 4 19.0 4 19.0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- T-41D basic trainer-------------------------- 3 .1 1 --------- 1 ---------- 3 .1 ---------------- 3 .1 -2 --1 1 -------- T-43A navigational trainer--__ 7 40.9 8 46.1 8 46.1 __________________________________________________________________________________ AABNCP Airborne Command Post_____ ______ 2 69.0 2 69.0 1 32.3 ---------------- 1 32.3 ---------------- 1 32.3 A-37B-------------------------------------------------------- 60 32.0 60 32.0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- UH-1H utility helicopter __ 180 63.3 180 53.3 308 96.7 ---------------- 308 96.7 -128 -40.2 180 56.5 HH-53 cargo helicopter---------------------------------------- 6 20.8 6 20.8 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- CH-47 cargo helicopter--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24 51.5 ---------------- 24 51.5 --------------- 24 51.5 VC-137C------------------------------------ 1 8.7 ----- ------------------------------------------ ---------------------- ---------------- Aircraft spares and repair parts---------------------- Common ground equipment________________ Componentimprovement--------------------------- Industrial facilities ---------------------------------- War consumables____________________________________ Other production charges___________________________ Classified projects___________________________________ 577.3 -------- 465.7 -------- 465.7 -------- 527-- ------------------------ 527.7 -------- -35.5 -------- 492.2 407.9 -------- 541.4 -------- 521.0 -------- 579.5 -------- -40.8 -------- 538.7 ---- __ -2.1 -------- 577.4 46.2 -------- 54.6 -------- 54.6 -------- 82.0 ------------------------ 82.0 -------- -5.5 -------- 76.5 48.1 -------- 38.9 -------- 38.9 -------- 25.9 ------------------------ 25.9 ------------- 25.9 16.2 -------- 22.7 -------- 22.7 -------- 23.9 ------------------------ 23.9 ------------------------ 23.9 7.9 -------- 15.6 -------- 15.5 -------- .9 -9 .9 93.9 -------- 74.3 -------- 74.3 -------- 106.0 ------------------------ 106.0 ------------------------ 106.0 579.0 -------- 44.3 -------- 44.3 -------- 29.5 ------------------------ 29.5 ------------------------ 29.5 Subtotal_______________________________ 201 3,042.7 473 2,682.3 473 2,639.8 676 2,912,8 -42 -173.7 634 2,739.1 -226 +51.8 450 2,964.6 Prior year financing available----------------------------------- =443.0 ------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------- Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 millions Air Foree request------------- ------------------------------------ $2, 912. 8 Senate committee recommended addition-------------------------- ?51. 8 Senate committee recommendation------------------------- 2, Q64. 6 House authorization ---------------------------------------------- 2, 739. 1 Authorization Request The Air Force request for procurement of aircraft is for $2,912.8 million. This provides for Drocurement of 676 aircraft at a cost of $1,537.4 million, plus fames for aircraft modifications, spares and repair parts, and other support costs necessary to sustain the aircraft inventory. Of the 676 aircraft, 154 are for the Air Force inventory, including 77 F-15 and 24 F-4E combat aircraft. No ground attack airplanes were included in the request,. 'Elie, other 422 aircraft include 187 F-5s and 3 T-41s, to enhance the capabilities of our allies, and 332 Army helicopters to replace those given to South Vietnam as part of the Vietnam:ization program. Summary of House Action The House made two changes to the initial request, as follows: F-15---Reduced the request for 77 aircraft and $918.5 million for procurement including initial spares to 39 aircraft and $587.6 million for procurement including initial spares. F-111-Added 12 F-111 s and $172.7 million for procurement including spares and support. House action is shown for information only since the House bill was not referred in time for committee consideration. Committee Recommendation for Changes The committee recommends authorization of $2,964.6 million for procurement of Air Force aircraft. This is a net addition of $51.8 million to the request, composed of the following changes: F-5A, -$4.1.0 million reduction Funds totaling $69.3 million were requested for payback to MAP for l its F-5As loaned to South Vietnam. $28.3 million is ident:i.fied as the FY 1974 requirement for F-,,-)E procurement for Taiwan. The remaining $41.0 million hat; already been funded, or reimbursement is not required. The committee points out that this is a funding transaction, and no new F-11A aircraft are to be procured. A-10 (A-X), -$30 million reduction All of the $30 million for long lead production procurement was deleted from the request. The A--10 program is discussed in the section of the report, "Aspects of Bill of Special Interest." F-111, + $158.8 million addition Although not in the Air Force request, funds were added for pro- curement of :12 F-111F airc:.'aft to keep the production line open until (52) Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/1$3 CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 a replacement aircraft enters development. The House added $172.7 million, and the committee reduced this by $13.9 million. This amount is start-up cost incurred because the $30 million in long lead funds, authorized last year by Congress, was not placed on contract in time to prevent a gap in the F-111 production. The committee directs the Air Force to provide the $13.9 million from other procurement sources. A-7D, + $70.1 million addition Although not in the Air Force request, funds were added for 24 A-7D aircraft to keep the production line open until the A-7D and A-X issue is resolved. This is discussed in the section of the report, ? "Aspects of Bill of Special Interest." C-5A, -$5.9 million reduction The committee recommends a reduction of $5.9 million to the request of $43.1 million for the C-5A program. The committee was advised that a ` reevaluation of requirements shows that the $5.9 million is not required. The C-5A program is discussed under "Aspects of Bill of Special Interest." T-41D Basic Trainer, -$0.1 million reduction Air Force advised the committee that two of the aircraft requested for Laos under the MASF program were no longer required. UH-1H Utility Helicopter, -$40.2 million reduction The committee recommends deferral of procurement of 128 of the 308 UH-1H helicopters requested until fiscal year 1975. The amount of reduction is $40.2 million. CXX Aircraft, -$9.6 million reduction The committee recommends denial of the request for 16 aircraft since the fiscal year 1973 program is not under contract. This is discussed further under "Aspects of Bill of Special Interest." Aircraft Modifications, -$35.5 million reduction The committee recommends reduction in the aircraft modification account of $35.5 million. The committee recommends reduction of $15.5 million in a B-52D modification program to enable the Air Force to get back on a normal modification kit procurement cycle which has been disrupted by a late program start. The committee also recommends a reduction in the Air Force account for contingency modifications by $20 million. The committee reduced this account last year for both the Navy and the Air Force; however, the Air Force account was partially restored in conference. In fiscal year 1974 the Air Force is the only service with this account, and it is noteworthy that the Air Force does not show this account in future years' planning. The committee's action in deleting this "con- tingency" account is consistent with action taken last year. It is again noted that the account is being used to start new major pro- grams, and there is sufficient flexibility in the overall modification account to request of the committee reprograming approval for any contingency or unforeseen modification requirement. The committee again wishes to stress the need for management of the modification account at a reasonable level and has noted some improvement in that direction. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 54 Aircraft Spares and Repair Parts, -$9.3 million reduction A reevaluation of requirements by Air Force indicates that .$9.3 million initially requested fc r scare engines for the C-130 aircraft is in excess of requirements. Common Ground Equipment, -$5.5 million reduction Subsequent review by Air Force indicates that the $5.5 million recommended for reduction s excessive to the fiscal year 1974 require- rnen ts. DESCRIPTION OF AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT RECOMMENDED FOR APPRCVAL F/TF-45A (Eagle) The F- 15A is an air superiority fighter aircraft, characterized by a high thrust-to-weight ratio and low wing loading for maximum maneu verability. it is designed to be superior to all present and currently projected Soviet aircraft through the 1980 time period. The Air Force request is for 77 aircraft at a total cost of $801.9 million to complete procurement of aircraft for the first wing. The F'-15 program is discussed in the section of the report, "Aspects of Bill of Special Interest." - F-4E (Phantom 11) The F'--4E is a two-pla,~e, twin tactical fighter for counte'mair, interdiction and close support. It is the latest version of the F-4 series, feat rring maneuvering slats for increased -air-to-air combat capability acid an improvec.. cockpit configuration. F-5E (International Fighter) The F-514'~ is the latest versical of the F-5 series of Freedom Fighters. It. has more powerful engines, carries more fuel, and has more wing area than earlier F-5s, which increase its air-to-air lighter capability. The 71 aircraft requested at $112.0 million will provide for replace- ment of Vietnam Air Force F-5As with F-5Es. F-111F The F-111 F is a variable sweep wing, twin jet, supersonic tactical aircraft used for long range interdiction, with a night and bad weather attack capability. The 12 aircraft recommended will provide attrition replacements for the F-111 force. A-7D (Corsair II) The A-71) is a single seat, single engine light attack divebomber for close air support and interdiction missions. I t is essentially the same airplane as the A-7E ised by the Navy. The 24 aircraft recom- mended will provide for accelerated modernization of the Air National Guard force. E-4A (Advanced Airborne National Command Post) The E-4A is a Boeing 747 commercial transport, modified with special equipment to serve as the national emergency airborne com- mand post for the national command authorities and as the airborne colnruand post for the Strategic Air Command. It will replace the present EC-135 used for this purpose, providing twice the endurance and carrying double the coorrrand staff of the curlier airplanes. The Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17: CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 55 single E-4A requested for $32.3 million will complete an interim program of 3 new aircraft which will use the same mission equipment as the earlier EC-135. C-130E/H (Hercules) The C-130 is a four engine turboprop powered tactical transport aircraft. It is capable of tactical intra-theater airlift, utilizing forward basing in the combat area as required, and also has sufficient range to augment strategic inter-theater airlift if required. The 36 aircraft recommended for $180.6 million are to replace C-130s transferred to South Vietnam. T-41D (Mescalero) The T-411) is a small single-engine piston airplane, essentially a Cessna 182, used as a basic flight trainer. The aircraft recommended will be used for pilot training of free world forces in Southeast Asia and will complete all known requirements at this time. UH-1H (Iroquois) The UH--1H is the standard Huey small troop transport helicopter used by the Army. The ISO aircraft recommended at a cost or $56.5 million are to replace Army assets turned over to the Vietnamese as part of the Vietnainization program. CH-47C (Chinook) The CH-47C is the Army's standard medium troop lift helicopter. The 24 aircraft recommended at a total cost of $51.5 million are to replace U.S. Army helicopters provided to the Vietnamese Air Force. Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600160003-0 Approved For Release 2002/05/17 : CIA-RDP75BOO38OR000600160003-0 FISCAL YEAR 1974 ARMY MISSILE PROCUREMENT REQUEST [In millions of dollars] Fiscal year 1972 program grogram...... Fiscal year 1971 C5 `rC-n. i;nangefrom prog,aua laPProPriated (current) r ) reluest r t eju etuea Authorizd e re'uest Recommended Qty. Ault. Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt- Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt. Qty. Amt Sprint missiles ------------------------------ 179.2 -------- ---- 76.6 -------- n 76.6 -- Cround misstlcs-------------- ---- 169.9 _------ 69.6 -------- 69.6 ---- 'roun etluii;mean------base ------- t -?-_??-----`----`- 263.0 139.1 -- 138.5 ----------------------------------------------------- ?--------------------- Safeguard ----- a s--------- ? 4 -------- ? 1 ---- eguard raps r productioparnts and spt. in mtl- ------- 26.5 -------- 14.6 -------- 14.6 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Subtotal Safeguard ------ aso n , ., _ .. -di missue ------------ -----------__ - n ------------ ----- o -------- 16-- v -------- -25.7 -------- 159.3 -------- -25.7 -------- 159.3 Dragon missile - -__ -------- --- -?------ --- --- +-- - - - -- - --- ----- - - Hon st John ------ --'---- 106-- 106.0 104.8 ------------------------ --------- -' 1 04 8 ----- --------- Lance uussile 6 9 ........................ --- - ------ - ----- ----- - u

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REPORT TOGETHER WITH SEPARATE AND INDIVIDUAL VIEWS TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 9286 ON AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974 FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION FOR THE SAFEGUARD ABM, AND ACTI