PROPOSED STATEMENT BY MR. HELMS ON KOCH ALLEGATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000600110009-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: SPEECH

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The proviso in the 1947 Act simply means that (1) the Agency does not
have either the legal ability or authority to put its hands on a single
individual or thing in the United States for police, subpoena, or law
enforcement purposes and (2) the Agency's authorities can not be
invoked for purely internal security purposes such as collecting
information on persons in the United States who, unlike Agency
employees, are not of legitimate concern to the Age.:ncy. It is quite
clear that the Agency's action in the instant case did not entail activities
proscribed in the 1947 Act. Consequently, the 29 January 1973 letter
to Representative Koch stated that we did not consider our activities
to be in violation of these restrictions.
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Proposed Statement by Mr. Helms
on Koch Allegations
1. Amenities
2. Mr. Chairman, I understand the reason I have been called by
you to appear before the Committee is to answer any questions that the
Committee might have pertaining to Central Intelligence Agency's action in
responding to requests from local law enforcement officials for information
on the mechanics of information handling and in several other fields where
the Agency has developed some expertise in the process of carrying out its
foreign intelligence mission.
3. I, of course, will proceed in whatever manner you would like,
Mr. Chairman, but as I see it there are two aspects of the current controversy
and it might be helpful if I give you my views on both of them at the outset.
a. As I understand it the basic question is whether the Agency
by its activities violates a statutory injunction ''that the Agency shall
have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal-
security functions. I would like to first explain what I believe, the
plain meaning of this proviso in the National Security Act of 1947
(102(d)(3)). Secondly I would like to review the activities that were
actually carried out as an aid in your determining if there was in
any way a violation of either the letter or the spirit of the law.
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b. The first part of the statutory proviso talks about
police subpoena and law-enforcement powers. I think that
in the sense that the word is used, the word powers clearly means
legal ability or authority.' In this sense the Agency has no police,
subpoena, or law-enforcement powers. Simply put, we can't
put our hand on a single individual in the United States for police,
subpoena, or law-enforcement purposes. And finally, the
activities in question as you will se are in no way related to even
an attempt to exercise such powers.
c. The second key phrase in the proviso concerns "internal-
security functions. " These words perhaps lack a certain amount of
preciseness but I think that we can agree that the word'function'/by
itself would mean a special duty or performance requirement.
L
I tlc~'er~i-eat meaning o `tee-ier~ii comes through in the
J
legislative history of the 1947 National Security Act itself.
d. I think it might be helpful to look at the statutory context
in which the proviso occurs. (Pass out Section 102). Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947 establishes the Central Intelligence
Agency and the office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Subsectionsta' and bdeal principally with the office of the Director
and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
e. Subsection c involves housekeeping authority relating to
the tenure of employment for Agency employees. The heart of
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Section 102 is Subsection d which sets forth the duty of the
Agency under the direction of the National Security Council.
Subsection d(3) relates specifically to correlation, evaluation,
and dissemination of foreign intelligence information. It is in
that Section that the proviso in question appears.
f. It is clear from the legislative history of the Act that
the Members of Congress wanted no confusion between the
'pursuit of intelligence abroad and police powers at home.
In 1947 it was very clear that.the merging of these two functions
were characteristic of totalitarian states.
g. The concern simply 'put was that there be no "gestapo
in the United States. " Of course, Mr. Chairman, as you know
we have never had a national police force in this country.
But in the context of 1947 with recent experience with Nazi
Germany fresh in our minds and the example of the Soviet Union,
the Congress -wanted to be sure that the somewhat generalized
functions described in other sections of Subsection (d) could not
be invoked domestically for example for the purpose of collecting
j i
information on citizens of the United States who are not of
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 Approved For Release 2003/06/13 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600110009-9
To settle any qualms on this point and to provide confidence to
W,
the public in this respect the ,Committee took a provision from
the 22 January 1946 Presidential directive under which the
predecessor organization of the Central Intelligence Agency
function prior to the implementation of the National Security
Act of 1947.
.h. Paragraph 4 of the 22 January 1946 directive stated.
"4. No police, law-enforcement, or internal-security functions
shall be exercised under this directive. "
, O y
Therefore, I think it is clear that the term internal-security
functions'in-a-way-is used "ro-vi-s-o-asnsomewhat synonymous
with police powers but a1ao to assure that the Agency's activities
abroad stop at the nation's shores- thus the necessity to
distinguish between external and internal functions.
In summary then the proviso " . . . that the Agency shall have no . . . "
was inserted into the CIA section of the National Security Act of 1947 to
`eat :`1 ,;rt_~. [__,_' L,~ i~,t;?,l j,-, dtr c-~' ~.:. it E'.vs-c..-ti
assure that ne-ems.-e-g-rafrted~the Agency any legal authority to pe rform police
A
or general domestic investigative functions within the United States.
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4. The other aspect of the problem is whether the Agency in any
way violated the statutory injunction in its briefing of local police officials
on informational handling techniques and on other matters. (Explain what
occurred.)
5. Clearly these activities are not violative of the statutory injunction
for a number of reasons:
a. They were requested, we compelled no one.
b. None of the activities involved the exercise of police
power or internal security functions by CIA.
c. As I understand the law, local law enforcement is one
of the reserve powers of the State.
d. the LawEnforcement Assistance Act which encourages
assistance to local authorities specifically prohibits any Federal
official from exercising any State powers.
e. It is obvious that me-re co.. ~ does not transform c<
A
State power into Federal power. (Aid for Education, social
welfare
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 Approved For Release 2003/06/13 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600110009-9
Proposed Statement by Mr. Helms
on Koch Allegations
1. Amenities
2. Mr. Chairman, I understand the reason I have been called by
you to appear before the Committee is to answer any questions that the
Committee might have pertaining to Central Intelligence Agency's action in
responding to requests from local law enforcement officials for information
on the mechanics of information handling and in several other fields where
the Agency has developed some expertise in the process of carrying out its
foreign intelligence mission.
3. I, of course, will proceed in whatever manner you would like,
Mr. Chairman, but as I see it there are two aspects of the current controversy
and it might be helpful if I give you my views on both of them at the outset.
a. As I understand it the basic question is whether the Agency
by its activities violates a statutory injunction "that the Agency shall
have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement power s or internal
security functions. " I would like to first explain what I believe the
plain meaning of this proviso in the National Security Act of 1947
(102(d)(3)). Secondly I would like to review the activities that were
actually carried out as an aid in your determining if there was in
any way a violation of either the letter or the spirit of the law.
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 Approved For Release 2003/06/13 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600110009-9
b. The first part of the statutory proviso talks about
police subpoena and law-enforcement powers. I think that
in the sense that the word is used, the word powers clearly means
legal ability or authority. In this sense the Agency has no police,
subpoena, or law-enforcement powers. Simply 'put, we can't
put our hand on a single individual in the United States for police,
subpoena, or law-enforcement purposes. And finally, the
activities in question as you will see are in no way related to even
an attempt to exercise such powers.
c. The second key phrase in the proviso concerns "internal
security functions. " These words perhaps lack a certain amount of
preciseness but I think that we can agree that the word function by
itself would mean a special duty or performance requirement.
I think the real meaning of the term comes through in the
legislative history of the 1947 National Security Act itself.
d. I think it might be helpful to look at the statutory context
in which the proviso occurs. (Pass out Section 102). Section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947 establishes the Central Intelligence
Agency and the office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Subsections a and b deal principally with the office of the Director
and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
e. Subsection c involves housekeeping authority relating to
the tenure of employment for Agency employees. The heart of
Approved For Release 2003/06/13 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600110009-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/13 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600110009-9
Section 102 is Subsection d which sets forth the duty of the
Agency under the direction of the National Security Council.
Subsection d(3) relates specifically to correlation, evaluation,
and dissemination of foreign: intelligence information. It is in
that Section that the proviso in question appears.
f. It is clear from the legislative history of the Act that
the Members of Congress wanted no confusion between the
pursuit of intelligence abroad and police powers at home.
In 1947 it was very clear that'.the merging of these two functions
were characteristic of totalitarian states.
g. The concern simply put was that there be no "gestapo
in the United States. " Of course, Mr. Chairman, as you know
we have never had a national police force in this country.
But in the context of 1947 with recent experience with Nazi
Germany fresh in our minds and the example of the Soviet Union,
the Congress wanted to be sure that the somewhat generalized
functions described in other sections of Subsection (d) could not
be invoked domestically for example for the purpose of collecting
information on citizens of the United States who are not of
legitimate concern to the Agency such as their employees.
Approved For Release 2003/06/13 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600110009-9
 Approved For Release 2003/06/13 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600110009-9
To settle any qualms on this point and to provide confidence to
the public in this respect the Committee took a provision from
the 22 January 1946 Presidential directive under which the
predecessor organization of the Central Intelligence Agency
function prior to the implementation of the National Security
Act of 1947.
h. Paragraph 4 of the 22 January 1946 directive stated
"4. No police, law-enforcement, or internal security functions
shall be exercised under this directive. "
Therefore, I think it is clear that the term internal security
functions in a way is used in the proviso as somewhat synonymous
with police powers but also to assure that the Agency's activities
abroad stop at the nation's shores and thus the necessity to
distinguish between external and internal functions.
In summary then the proviso " . . . that the Agency shall have no . . . "
was inserted into the CIA section of the National Security Act of 1947 to
assure that no one granted the Agency any legal authority to pe rform police
or general domestic investigative functions within the United States.
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 Approved For Release 2003/06/13 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600110009-9
4. The other aspect of the problem is whether the Agency in any
way violated the statutory injunction in its briefing of local police officials
on informational handling techniques and on other matters. (Explain what
occurred.)
5. Clearly these activities are not violative of the statutory injunction
for a number of reasons:
a. They were requested, we compelled no one.
b. None of the activities involved the exercise of police
power or internal security functions by CIA.
c. As I understand the law, local law enforcement is one
of the reserve powers of the State.
d. the Law Enforcement Assistance Act which encourages
assistance to local authorities specifically prohibits any Federal
official from exercising any State powers.
e. It is obvious that mere consistence does not transform
State power into Federal power. (Aid for Education, social
welfare
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Organizational Problems
We perceive ourselves as one Agency with four constituentparts
when in fact we' are a confederation of four relatively diverse entities
when measured against factors which bear heavily on individual performance,
such as:
(1) specific sense of purpose;
(2) expected consequences of performance;
(3) personnel characteristics;
(4) external tolerances;
(5) incentives.
The premise, to the extent it is true, raises a question whether the
common purpose of the Agency is in fact being served by its present
organization. If it is, the next logical question is whether the deputy
directors and several heads of independent offices can effectively manage
all. the problems that they attempt to manage.
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 Approved For Release 2003/06/13: CIA-RDP75B0038OR0006001101lQ9A9/6Feb73
Finally, in our relations with the new Congress we bear two
burdens: first, we carry the responsibility that goes with the high
reputation we have won for our performance and the quality of our product.
Second, we share with other Executive agencies the problem of conducting
our relations with the Congress in the tense atmosphere resulting from the
emerging congressional challenge to executive authority. In these circum-
stances, we can expect: (a) that Congress, as an institution, will
be sensitive to any suggestion that the Agency's product is being
distorted to serve partisan purposes, (b) that some members will
be fearful that the Ag ency's special authorities are being used to
circumvent the will of Congress in pursuit of military or political
objectives, and (c) that a lesser number of members, predominantly
junior members with meager power trying to rise to national
prominence on a "gutsy" issue such as narcotics trafficking, may
criticize the Agency for not making greater use of what they perceive
to be our -limitless capability abroad. It is clear that we cannot
and that we should not attempt to placate all of the divergent attitudes
in the Congress. Intelligence failures, operational blunders and
lack of aggressive action will be seized upon by our critics, but in the
end it will be our supporters in the Congress who will count most,
and we can count-on them as long as- they can count on us to be truly
professional in our work.
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stances, we can expect::: (a) that Congress, as an institution, will
be sensitive to any suggestion that the Agency's product is being
distorted to serve partisan purposes, (b) that some members will
be fearful that the Ag ency's special authorities are being used to
circumvent the will of Congress in pursuit of military or political
objectives, and (c) that a lesser number of members, predominantly
junior members with meager power trying to rise to national
prominence on a "gutsy" issue such as narcotics trafficking, may
criticize the Agency for not making greater use of what they perceive
to be our-limitless . capability: abroad. - It is--clear, that we cannot
and that we should not attempt to placate all of the divergent attitudes
in the Congress. Intelligence failures, operational blunders and
lack of aggressive action will be seized upon by our critics, but in the
end it will be our supporters in the Congress who will count most,
and we can count-.on them as -long as, they can. count on us to be truly
professional in our work.
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HEADQUARTERS EMPLOYEE BULLETIN
DRAFT
22 February 1973
AGENCY b TRAINING~OF DOMESTIC POLICE DEPARTMENTS
1. T e press reported extensively, he Agency haver-beeu
involy n providing certain training a various police units in the
United States. -I;e~rrererte 4 bere~e4 y Representative Edward
I. Koch of New York, lU)- to to the Agency sad-express oncern
that CIA might beinvolved in internal security police functions.
A "I
2. For the information of all Agency employees, it ' be
v,'y p?A-?aslned that in recent years the Agency has provided briefings and-k5s'' Ki,f.
Our ~--
olice forces
a
d
unt
it
i
d
t
i
g
.
n
co
y p
ra
a
ozen c
y
n
n
tag has focused on demonstrations of explosive devices, the Explosive
Residue Detection Technique (ERDT), and Trace Metal Detection,
which was developed by the Agency and later declassified. The
most recent a4nin took place during the period 11-14 September
1972, When twelve officers from the New York City Police Depart-
ment = ie - aznhe f x'ce 31z 1 ing
"oeeu-"e dealt with basic theories of intelligence, clandestine
collection methodology, )the analytical function. Ord e:ectirt!
ruZli' irate ligenc~`effor:
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to Representative
3. In Wry tt
Koch, the Legislative Counsel pointed out that we are cognizant
of the National Security Act of 1947 which specifically provides
powers, or internal-security functions" he provisd the 1947
f_ r-+
%A- 4V vwff-+r&VT
ActAsimply means that (1) the Agency deteither the legal
la~
abilitY1 ,pr uthority to a single individual or 4bsW
in the United States for police, subpoena, or law enforcement
purposes and (2) the Agency's authorities cannot be invoi ed for
purely internal security purposes such as cieeti-ng-inforrm t=on
on era in e- n~'rtrc t+ a ;-u ke--Prg rreyernpkeyeee,
gitimaOo-eencern-to-the +geney. In the instant case
axercise+"'a.ay-polieer-*u
the Agency Z2: LIW
*4444 ~o
rnw~ r engage zn,, a1-+ z.e y functions. The Agency
l assistance toorganizations which do have`respon-
sibilitie s. tM ve
r
0
r
Mr. Richard Helms, former Director of Central Intelligence,
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 7 February
1973, at which time he was questioned concerning our support to
; 'te 'a E wa r~ z W*W-
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public law enforcement agencies. Mr. Helms maintained that
the Agency considered such assistance to be within the provisions
of our charter as well as consistent with the spirit of the provisions
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. That
Act favors Federal assistance to State and local governments in
strengthening law enforcement and authorized the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration to use the resources of all Federal
agencies to carry out its activities.
It will now be Agency policy that future activities of
stances , , rdinaxios--would-beweffected-with-the ppropriate
Federal - agency'such"as- the'Lciw"FtiiforcernentMAssietgnce,--Agency,
,a-nd,' if appropriate; "'ia accrirdarice vv t i~prticeclures .established
under- the `du' thdrity,'and?'requirementsa>of.the-,Intergovernmental
4 w 1 !Z?~ 6 1. lr ~6~/V
/NNVU" I ~~ 4~11 4,A,
W?pp"d POWJsi'3CIA-RDP75B00380R000600110009-9
this natire will be undertaken in only the most compelling circum-
3,a a..?...i- ~.v.~7t.~, c--r tvti.'v:vw, .~,~ ~s~..+~.a+X I
DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES
C:PA
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FACT SHEET
In the summer of 1972, the NYC Police, with assistance
from the Ford Foundation, were establishing an analysis and evalua-
tion unit within their Intelligence Division. At the suggestion of
the Foundation representative, the NYC Police sought assistance
from the Agency as to the best system for analyzing and evaluating
data. We made it clear that CIA had no formal training for outside
groups; however, after preliminary discussion with the police, we
felt that our techniques and procedures, though involving only
foreign intelligence, were basic and could relate to their needs.
A four day briefing was then arranged and given to a group from
the NYC Police.
The briefing was as follows:
a. The theory and technique in analyzing and
evaluating foreign intelligence data..
b. The role of the analyst,
c.. The handling and processing of foreign
intelligence information
The briefing was given by our training staff and for the most
part included material prepared for new analysts. Any added expense
to meet the needs of the police was insignificant. 'Also, we gave no
specific guidance on how their system should be set up, but rather
this was our basic approach which they could apply as they saw fit.
These is no provision of law which either grants or denies
the Agency the authority to conduct such briefings. As any other
Federal agency, we tried to satisfy a request for assistance as
best we could. We considered this to be a basic public responsibility.
Over the years, we have received a number of requests for assistance
on data handling and analytical techniques from outside organizations.
These have included other agencies of Government, the Congress and
the Judiciary.
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