THE VIEW FROM LANGLEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010012-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 21, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

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rr
THE WASHINGTON POST
DATE (.~ -1 PAGE
rfr
IJy Tall 8=110
Szule is a Washington writer and a
former foreign correspondent. His lat-
est book is "Com,pulsive Spy: The Strange
Career of E. Howard Hunt."
U1V1JEIL L Via J. V.1-) -A -7
~"~~TAS 2`IIL United States, ?'1' through tics, but it also helps In Understanding the Central Intelligence Agency and reconstructing the administration's settlement on the compensatlans to be
or otherwise, clirectiy involved in the basic policy of bringing about Allende's and a renegotiation of .'
cvcnl5 that led to the bloody coup d'titat paid for naionalized American Property
e Chile latil Sept. h11 fall one way or another. Cnle, x.1.'7 bil-
nc' ile st Sept. 11? in i.lre militar We are apprised not only that the Iron debt to the United Statq
Y CIA's estimate of the number' of vie.
No"fe.11;114aliof
rcvoluiiorthat ousted he late President Salvador Allende Gossen , a Socialist, tints of tile Milltur
y f.ovornntents re. C'1`UALLX, the basic U.;~. t~u~;l.nre
S h rr roundly denied s, the Nixon pression is four tinges the official San. ?-ferny rd Allende was ;;et fugth J)y
as la-titratiotr and the CIA in tinge figures but that tile United States, Iienry? A. T{iss ndsista 'Urea the Mile
o
partieular'? in effect, condones mass executions and House special assistant for n~ftiole rc
hrrt, givOll the CIA's truck record In imprisonments in Chile because a civil
nverUrvon r nr attempting over. ctrrity affairs, at a aacktirofnrd hie.iiu :
h row
t foreign t1 war there remains "a real Possibility.- for the grass in leacie wn u ,5 cpIili'0, 1'To 0,
overnmetrts-Iran, Guato. Yet, even Colby warmed that tile jut to 12 days after Alf:ndo won it ,u nr:fli[;v to
rnahr, the I3rr3~ of Pigs, Laos and so on tray "overdo" repression.
- deep suspicions have persisted andthat the elections and awaited ;r riCJI (l vntn
thn agency, operating Colby's and Davis' testinton irr Congress. 1:{issinger raid them (hat if
under White unclear, and contr`adictot yffer parts
ouhe directives, has been much more Allende were confirmed, of
li Couunutri~t
Man an innocent observer of the Chilean on a regime would emer o itt Clrilo and iol-
picture of the CIA's activities in Cltile Argentina, Bolle.a and fern nlifIlt fo
r cc'rrf sil.tcr.. AII(Ilde' between Allende 's election in n 1970 and
Lnt' clays ago, election In 1970, tiro Sept. 11 coup ranging from the
t]CIA rather sur?' low this example
trr'vm d y most relueta "Penetration" of all the mayor Chilean For the next three
a
isin confirm lust fy, went quite . political parties, support for anti-regirno ? policy developed Along tiv thr? iii l
a wa It to did so in' secret of
? lvo ltriucipa
testimony pl dernonstrations and financing of the`op: One
position press and other ef? to the Allende
Oct, l thn Isecre 9esti mrnittee toforo unsuspected Agency involve bees. was the dcrtial of enil r crorlifn
oll in1 before be ore tile
Affairs by croups tehere- F;overttment-ile,'5 h.inr.
its di- in financial negotiations between Wash ton even blocked loans by intrnnlianal.
and I' inst~tut?oalu-to awhefl Ate C'trllc,r
reel Dav redericlc ingtolt And Santiago in last 1972 and r ~Ca?
rs, a senior official in the nom c Situati
Dixon when Allende him';nf
reclor, Wiliian B. Colby, rrf,c'ncY'ti Office of Current Intelligence, early 1973 when the Chileans were des- was b?'
bgi s down it vaat. y 11110rrare.
eg(' nscI'1 of tube testinton perately seeking an accommodation. tent of Iris Own. lire
Tile alrancille to thi s writer There are indications that the CIA, nlh'e line ?rs
the supportive CIA activity to aca'lcr:rl.e
vailable to es writety by s acting on the basis of its own reports f,
I` the
the economic crisis and ihfto/ nen u r.
tensive testimony
touches 1"1~
p Ved~nrt>1 gl&9se 1F4 tic~a~4 715 0 to re- ~9~A( QO Unity ,;ovcrfnnent
extensive covert role in Chilean counso ins the White Hons to re- coalition.
Pali- buff Allende's attemnta to,..,wArlr mir
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CIA, From Page Cl
The only ca:ceptiou to the ban on '
credils was the sale of military equip-
reent to the Chilean armed forces--
including the decision last Juno 5 to.
Bell Chile F-5E. jot fighter planes '-
presumably to signal United States sup-
port for the military. Colby's testimony
as well as other information showed
that the United Slates had maintained
close contacts with the Chilean military
after Allende's election.
The Nixon administration's; firm re-
fusal to help Chile, even on humani-
tarian grounds, was, emphasized about
a week before the military coup when
credits to buy 300,000 tons of wheat
hero at a tine when the Chileans had
run out of foreign currency and bread
nhortngcs were developing.
Ou Oct. II, however, the new military
junta was griani.ed $Z4.5 million In
wheat credits after the White I-louse
overruled State Department objections.
The department's Bureau of Inter-
A!ncrican Affairs reportedly believed
that such a gesture was premature and
i I could be politically embarrassing.
All "Uiafo>:'G?isteate" Coup
1,j, AIRAIJOYICALLY, Washington had
r, not hoped for the kind of bloody
nilutary takeover that occurred on Sept,
11.. For political reasons, it preferred
a g.rtgiu-al destruction from within of
the Chiieut economy sa that the Al.
ieudo re?lino would collapse of its own
weight. The CIA's role, it Appeared,
wan to help quicken this process.
Unrlcr questioning by Rep. Michael
J. Jlardngton (D-Mass.), Colby thus
testi.ticcl that the CIA's "appreciation"
of the Chilean economy was that "it
was on a declining plane on ne eco-
iiomie ground in term; of Internal eco-
uninic problems - inflation, with 320
i i'er cent inflation in one year, the clos-
uria of the copper mines, and so forth,
your total foreign deficit was more
than tiro need for it. They couldn't im-
port the food because their deficit was
such that over tho long term they had
no baso for It." Elsewhere in his testi-
mony, Colby said that the CIA reported
"Accurately an overall assessment of
deterioration" and that with the Chilean
navy pushing for a coup, it was only a
question of tiAm bi5ewedtF&mJ eleas6
DATE
But Colby also told the ciubcoiniiitteo
that "our assessment was it might be
u.n. ortunatco if a, coup took place. 1,110
TVni.lunsil Security Council
olic
p
y was
7roreoto it." Ila niado this comas: nt
after Rely. Charles W. Whalen (R-Ohio)
asked Colby whether he agreed with
earlier testimony by Jack Kubisch, the
assistant secretary of state for Liter.
tibn believed that "it would be adverse
to our own United states interest if the
government of Chile were overthrown."
This theme was further developed in
a letter on Oct. 8 from Richard A. Fagen,
professor of political. science at Stan,
ford university, to Sen. J. William Ful-
bright, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Iiclatioiis Committee re
ortin
p
g on a
, meeting between Kubisch and a group
of ucholara representing the Latin Amer-
scan Studies Association.
Fagen said that Kubisch took the view
that "it was not in our interest to have
the military tako over In Cliile. It
would have been better had Allende
nerved his entire term taking the na.
tion and the Chilean people into com-
plete and total ruin. Only then would
j the full discrediting of socialism have
taken place. Only then tiyould people
have gotten the mess.'ago that socialism. '
-,, doesn't work. What has happened has
"No .4~1t(ikafi>itDm" of Sup -osi
e!'aOLBY'S TESTIMONY on the CIA's
to netivilles In Chile supplied a con.,
siderable amount of new iiiforntation, ?
roino of it contradictory, under vigor.
aus questioning by the subcommittee.
Thus at one point Colby said that "I
call make a clear statement that cer-
tainly CIA bad no connection with the
11'1'.oup itself, with the military coup. We
didn't support it, we didn't stimulate
'-it. we didn't bring it about in any way.,,
We obviously had some intelligence
coverage over the various moves being
made but we were quite meticulous in
making sure there was no indication of
encouragement from our side."
Snot involved with the prolonged strike
by Chilean truckers that preceded the
coup.
But pressed by Rep. Ilarrington, Colby
acknowledged that the CIA may have
assisted certain anti-Allende demon.
strations. The following discussion
ensuedi
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Szulc Article Transcript
HARRINGTON: Did. the CIA, directly
or 113rlirerlly, as;+l ,t to-An demoilstra-
lionvg tbron gh tho ur o of sul~aldi.arla s o~
United 114ales corporations in Brazil or
other Lai.ia rlinorican countries?
COLBY: I think I have raid that the
.CIA did not assist the trucking strike.
IIARRINGTON: I think It's a broader,
and more intentionally broader, ques-
tion-any of the demonstrations that
are referred tug in the course of this
'questioning.
COLBY: I am not quito sure of the
scope of that question.
IIARIt1NGTON: I make specific ref.-
erenee to two, om in the October pe-
riod of 1972 and one in March of 1973.
Davis: I am not aware of any support. I
would be surprised if they needed
much support, frankly.
Harrington: In view of your- - -
COLBY: I would Tallier not answer the'
question than give you an assurance and
be wrong, frankly. I would rather not.
If we did, I don't want to be in a poss.
Lion of saying we didn't. But If we
didn't, I really don't mind saying I
won't reply because it doesn't hurt. But
I don't avant to be in it po: itlon of giv-
ing you a false answer. Therefore, I '
think I better just not answer that, al-
though I frankly don't latow the arn-
swer to that' queston right hero as I
alt here."
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p 17
"A Covert O?iea?:it.iiw"
r i-IOUG11 COL1;Y connlstcntly re.
fused to tell il.ai+ nu.bcomuii.ttteo
whether the CIA's operation;i in Chilo
had been nuthorized by tlio "40 Com.
mittee," the top secret group }fended
by ICisshnger in the National Security
Council that approver clandent.ino in-
tel.ligence operations, )to admitted that
'we halo had .. .
varlous relationships
over the years in Chile ? with various
groups. In aomo cases this was approved
by the National Socuri.ty Council and it
has meant some nnai.+tnnc,s to thnni,
That has not ,Iellen Into tho category
we are talking about hero --- the turbu-
lence or the milinty coup."
In proviouv testlnwny before A ups-
me aube6nnnittee, forineir CIA Director
..Richard lielnme diecloeed that the CIA
per, had earmarked $400,000 to support anti-
Allende news medla shortly before his
election. This. was authorized by the ,
"40 Committee" at a meeting In June,
1970. Colby, however, rofured to~ any
whether this otfoi-t, was su,beortu-ntly
maintained, claiming that. t n G, ti.ccy
of CIA operations had to be protected.
Ho then became engaged in this ex-
cliango with Harrington:
Transcript
? .. as you well know, and it has been
referred to in various places,
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COLBYt That does go preclsoly on
to what we were operating mid what
our operations were. I would prefer to
leave that out of this particular re-
port .. .
Harrington: To whom would you feel more
comfortable, if not Congress, to
give this information.
Colby: I would be delighted to give this to the
Armed Services Subcommittee or to the
Appropriations Committee. As a matter
of fact, we have given full accounts of this
to various committees of the House or
Senate.
IIAIRIIINGTON: I think we have run
exactly Into what makes this a purpose-
less kind of exercise .. .
COLBY: If I might comment, the pre-
sumption under which we conduct this
typo of operation is that it is a covert
operation and that the United States
hand is not to show. For that reason
we in the executive branch restrict any
knowledge of this type of operation
very severely and con4tuct?procedures
so that very few people learn of any
typo of operation of this nature.
IHARILINGTON: And we end up with
a situation sueli as at Sept. 11 because
you have a cozy' arrangement.
Corporate Cooperation
THE QUESTION of support to .1
anti-Allende forces by United
States or Brazilian corporations, Colby
and Davis gave Equivocal answers to
the subcommittee. Colby said, "I am
not sure." Davis said, "I have no 'edi-
denco as to that," but Colby interrupted
him to remark that "I wouldn't exclude
it. Frankly, I don't know of any. How-
eve-e, I could not say it didn't happen."
Subcommittee nicinbers pursued at
sonic length the possible involvement
by American corporations In the Chilean
coup because of previous disclosures
that the International Telephone and
Telegraph Corp. had offered the CIA'
$1 million in 1970 to prevent Allendo's'
election. and subsequently proposed a
detailed plan to plunge Chile into eco-
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anhcommtttee chairman, raised the ques-
tion of involvement by Brazilian or
other Latin American corporations,
many of them subsidiaries of United
Slntes firs, because of reports that the
nntl?Allende moves were widely coor.
dinnf.ed. Speaking for the CIA, Davis
replied:
~~ "'There is some evidence of coopera- 1
lion between business groups in Brazil i<
and Chile. However, this is a small share
of the financial support. Most of the
support was internal. There is. aomo
funding and cooperation among groups
with similar outlooks in other Latin
American countries. This Is true with
regard to most of those , governments
I was not thinking so much of
companies or firms so much as groups,,
organizations of businessmen, chambers
of commerce, and that kind of thing
t'. in a country such as Brazil."
Discussing tho CIA's intelligence op-
orations in Chile, Colby said he "would
assume" that the Agency had contacts
with Chileans opposed to Allende,'
Asked by Hnrrington whether the CIA
maintained such contacts in social con.
texts, Colby wide
In that case you get into what we call
the protection of our sources.
"If a gentleman talks to us under the
arsuranco he will not be revcalod, which
can be dangerous in some countries, It
could have been vop, dangerous for
those in Chile ', ? .
Harrington: When you talk about those inter-
relationships with certain business
type connections, are these specific
references you would care to make,
companies or others involved.
I feel that very much falls within the kind
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committees of Congress, to which I would
be glad to report. However I think...
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that a?elntionship, ilduelazy rolation,~l~ip
with the individual, requires that I be,.
Ivory restrictive of that kind of infor-
mation."
MO
Then thi following dialoguo dovel-
opedi
F'ASCELL: Is it reasonable to assume
that the Agency has iionctrated all o:
tho political parties in, Chile?
COLBYi I wish I could any yes'. I
cannot assure you all, becauso we got
Into some splintora.
FASCIILLi Major?
CO1,BY: I think we have an intolil?
genco coverage of most of them. Lot's
put it that way.
FASCIf.LLi Is that standard operat-
lul; procedure?
COL13Yi It depends on the country.
For a country of the importance, of Chile
to the Unitcd States' decision-making,
we would try to get an inside picturo of
what is going on there. I can think of
a lot of countries where wo really don't
spend much time worrying. about their
political parties. I spend much of nay
time worrying about penetrating the
/ Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
pry. ho EI;o:i&oilu io iZoi.0
timony was that the .CIA is actively en-
gaged in economic negotiations between
the United States and foreign coun-
tries. This, hac not been generally known
here, but Colby told the subconunittco
that ,we would normally contribute to
(a) negotiating teams"
ail closures made by Colby in his tee.
NE OF TI/, MOST Intriguing die;
Iie said that "we would try to pros
vide them intelligence as bacllxlrop aor
their negotiations and s'nir:fLnca help
them with appreciation of 'lie "Iirolb.
Colby: We,would have some people who would be
keepi>7.g up to date with the negotiations.
We- would not be a part of the negotiating
group.
Fascell: I understandjhat. I am just speaking
for intelligence reporting purposes.
Fascell: Do you cover the negotiations themselves?
Colby: We would be reading the way negotiations
went. It's like the SALT Agreement and
BFR and things like that.
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Wo follow the day-today pro -
ress in ncgotiatioils. If It's An Import-
ant economic negotiation, 111m ('.i'rcna^
ury) Secretary Shultz' over in Nairobi
and places lino that, we would be in-
formed of what they are doing and try,
to help them."
In the context o1 the Chilean?AmerI-
can nc gotlationa before the coup, the
~yr CIA's Davis said that
"we did have
scale (Juito reIlal)10 reporting at the
time Indicating that the Russians were
advining Allende to put lily rolntiono
with the United States in order, If not
to settle compensation, at leant to reach
some sort of accommodation which
would case the strain between the two
countries. There were reports indicat-
ing that, unlike the'Cubans, they were
In effect trying to move Allondo to
ward A comprouaine agreement .. .
It was our judgment at the time that the Soviets
were very concerned about the state of their
relationship with the United States. They
were involved in a number of negotiations
with us and...
Our judgment was that this grew out of four basic
considerations on their part of trying to keep
situations in Latin America or elsewhere in the
world under control.
Mr. Fascell: Did the Allende Government in fact
undertake to change its posture and seek to take
steps towards. an accommodation with the United
States:
Mr. Davis: Yes. There were some indications
of movement on their part or -at least an interest
in trying to work something out. They didn't
really soften their basic negotiating position
very noticeably. But, as you know, as Mr.
Kubisch pointed out, they did meet regularly
with us.
Mr. Fascelll: Is it your impression or part of
your estimate that part of the step of accommoda-
tion was moving Ambassador Letelier from the
United States back to Chile?
Mr. Davis: At the,time we thought that might
be in their minds, that they might have felt that
they could use him there. It was at a time when
we were just about to go into a round of serious
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their position at the time.
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Mr. Fasce.ll: He told me that that was his
purpose. Do we have any confirmation that
what he was telling me was accurate?
.P5'
p1
It .
w113 our judgment that the [Cl-ilcans]
wero interested in working out nonce
kind of nbodus 17tn,ncdi without, however,
retreating substantially from their po-
sition."
Davis added that "our intelligence
requirement in the negotiations be-
bween the United States and Chile
would. be to try to find out, through
our sources, what their reactions to a
negotiating session were, what their,
reading of our position was, what their
assessment of the state of negotiations
is."
In his narration of the events icacliu;g
to the coup, Colby said that "under tivo.
general deterioration, it was only A
matter of getting the Army, the Navy
and the Air Force to cover it..[sventn>
ally they did get them nil in." Colby
then compared the Chilean tour to the'
19G7 Indonesian revolution, reputedly'.
assisted by the CIA, when the army
ousted President Sukarno. Ile said the
CIA shared the suspicions of the Chil-
can military that Allende was pion.
ning a coup of his own on Sept. 19 to `
neutralize the armed forces, but said
the CIA had no firm Information con-
1firming these suspicions.
rr
"Concern Over 5ceiirily
VIROUGIIOUT his testimony, Colby
drew a grin picture of the junta's
repression and, in effect, predicted that
it would worsen even more became of
the continued strength of the Clcii+,:)a
Mr. Davis: Yes. I think there was some
evidence at the time that they did bring him
home, that they did have him actively involved
because they hoped that he might be helpful in
working out some kind of modus vivendi.
treason. FIe 0rbgA6"F
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death regardless of the effect on
,sL
left. Him estimates of the death toll
were roughly four tin cs tlip figures
announced by the junta and he told the
subcommittee that the Chilean military
had it list of the "most wanted" Allencio
followers whom they hoped to find and
possibly execute.
"Communist Party chief Luis Cor-
valan is being or will be tried for
.
national opinion," Colby said. This In.,
formation led to this exchanger
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P20 WHALEN: You mentioned tbosi
being accused of treason. Did these al-
legodly treasonable activities occur after,
the takeover by the military?
COLl3Y: I think what I referred to
was the head of the Communist Party
who would probably be tried for
treason.
Ile would probably be tried for
treason. Ile would probably be tried :
for activities prior to the takeover. You
can have some question as to how valid
that is in a constitutional legal sense.
There have been some who have been
accused-of it since the takeover.
WHALEN. That confuses me. If lie is
tried for treason against a government
(lie] supported, I cannot understand
that.
COL13Yt You are right,
This was Colby's assessrnent of: thu
present situation:
"Armed opposition now appears tri
be confined to sporadic, isolated at!
tacks on security forces, but the regime
believes that the left is regrouping for
coordinated sabotage and guerrilla
activity. The government probably is
right in believing that its opponent::
have not been fully neutralized. Our
reports indicate that the extremist
movement of the Revolutionary Left
believes its assets have not been
damaged beyond repair. It wants to
launch anti?govenunent activity iii
soon as practical and Is working to
form a united front of leftist opposition
parties. Other leftist groups, including
the Communist and Socialist parties,
are In disarray, but they have not been
destroyed. Exiled supporters of the oust.
ed government are organizing abroad,
namely in 11ome,"
Colby told the subcommittee that
"concern over security undoubtedly in
whet accounts for the junta's contin-
ued use of harsh measnrc3 to deal with
the dissidents. The military leaders ap-
parently are willing to alienate soma
support at home and endure, a bad
press abroad, In order to consolidate
their hold on the country and finlah
the job of rooting out Marxist influ-
C1.1,111co of "Civil War"
'i1;SCtl12ING1 the present situation,
j Colby said:
Iii'/ "Arn1c d resisters eoIIt.Iiiuo to 110
I executed where they nro found, nod a
number of pri;,uners have been shot,
Huppoendly white 'trying to escape.'
,Such deaths probably niunber 200 or
more,
The extent of any international backing for insur-
gency will depend upon how many Chileans at
home show that they are ready and able to take
up arms.
The regime, however, does not appear to be
engaging in wholesale liquidation of its opponents.
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Several thousand people re-
main under arrest, including high-rank.
lag officials of the Allende govern.
went."
Answering questions, Colby agreed
that the CIA's figure of more than 200
executions was higher than the junta's
official estimate, He added that "thero
were a couple thousand, at least, Rill.
ed during the fighting which surround-
ed the coup. it is quite possible that i.f
you went to a city morgue you would
find that number. The official figure of
total killed is 4'16 elvillans and 37 troops
to a total of 513. We would guess, we
would estimate, it is between 2,000 And
3,000 killed during the struggles. That
would not be in my classification as
execution ...
Some of those were shot,
down, There is no question about that, Ps .
They are not just bystanders . .
Fascell: You mean street fighting?
Colby: Yes
I think that is a fair representation of the
size of the conflict.
p tl-24!
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Colby disagreed, however, with Rep.
Robcit II. Steele (R-Conn.) that the
3 junta killings have "done no one any
good."
No such reference- -context is the coup
generally not "killings. " and how junta has
acted since.
V(a3
"I think our appreciation is that it
does them some good .. .
Steele: It does who some good?
The junta,
their concern is whether they could
take this action of taping over the
government and not generate it rent,
civil war, which was the real chance
because the Allende supporters were
fairly activist, There were nrntea in
the country. There was at least a good
chance of it real civil war occurring ar
a result of this coup," Colby said.
Asked whether civil war remained A
possibility, Colby replied that "It wan.
It's obviously declining, but it was a .
real possibility. Yes, I think it is a real
possibility. Whether it's a certainty or
not is not at all Kure."
Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010012-6