THERE'S A CIA IN YOUR FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010007-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 26, 1973
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 20026' ... 4i! a' O5B00380R000600010007-2
WI:
DIRTY TRICKS-PART Il
Forgive him, Mother, for Miles Copeland has undertaken
to tell us what CIA is all about; why `intelligence'
and `espionage' are different, what the term `agent'
really means, and why things may just be looking up
There's a CIA ? Your Future
ESIDES THE Encyclopedia Bri-
tannica, a complete set of the
works of Dickens, and autographed
copies of The Jeweler's Eye, The Four
Quartets, and On Being a Real Person,
Mother's floor-to-ceiling bookshelves
contain every known book on spies
and counterspies, with the latest ones
especially in evidence-from Wise and
Ross's The Invisible Government to a
book by somebody named Fletcher
Proutty propounding a theory that the
President of the United States, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
State, and the Director of CIA com-
prise a "secret team" which runs, the
affairs of the country. Why such a li-
brary? "We have to read all this stuff
to understand what everybody says
about us," explained Mother.
,Until the top people at . CIA started
.? reading.what the outside' world thought ; ?
about spies and spying they had to face
their critics in bewildered silence, not
having the faintest idea what they were
talking about. "Is it true," some senator
once asked Frank Wisner when he was
head of the CIA's covert services, "that
in every American embassy you have
at least one agent?" Frank thought the
senator was implying that, the CIA spied
on the State Department. "No, sen-
ator," he said, "We only put agents in
.?~'enmbassies ?of Communist countries:
MILES COPE-LAND
the general public an, understanding
which will silence those critics who
play to the galleries, and to young peo-
ple a picture of Agency work which
will make them suspect that the CIA
might not be such a bad place to be
employed.
Recruiting Good Guys
So long as the Agency can hold onto
its best personnel and recruit high
quality replacements, say its top offi-
cers, it can ride out the post-Watergate
storm and then put itself through the
organizational overhaul it has long
needed.. Recruitment, they say, is the
main problem. The campus disturb-
ances of the past few years have helped
enormously ("anything those creeps are
against, I'm for, a Columbia law. stu- ; .
dent told a CIA recruiter' after having ?_
to karate chop his way through a jeer-
ing crowd to make the interview), but
the constant harping on the CIA's al-
leged misdemeanors by supposedly re-
sponsible adults does plant doubts in
the minds of young people of the sort
the Agency needs. Senator Church may
not be a great statesman, but he is a
senator, and when he flailed out at the
CIA because its officers had actually
talked to ITT. executives some of the
'Agency's' recrdits awaiting 'security
clearances dropped out before the clear-
ances were completed.
On the face of it. the Agency's con-
cern over ITT's problems was clear
enough. A Soviet-hacked candidate was
about to become President of Chile, to
confiscate all American assets in the
now when some congressman or news-
paperman speaks of our employees: as
`agents' we know what, they -mean, and:
we don't fight it. But it does incon-
venience our image."
A "convenient" image, it appears, is
all the Agency seeks. Angus Thuermer,
the CIA's public relations officer, de-
spite all his Shelley Berman chatter is
a very tough hombre and is the only
official in the Administration I have
met who doesn't feel he has to apolo-
gize for the Agency.
He can defend the Agency's actions
in Vietnam, Laos, and elsewhere in.such
a way as to convince almost anyone
whose mind is not totally closed. But,
aside from the. fact that none of ' the
Then he realized that the senator was newsmen he sees feels inclined to re-
talking about regular employees, not port what he says ("It's had taste these
agents, and he had to explain that he days to go around saying nice 'things
would promptly fire any of his employ- about the CIA," a Washington col-
ees who got themselves directly in- umnist told me), the Agency itself
volved in "acent" work, i.e., spying. holds him back. His job is not to give
The senator, 4pgEo gdrlF> 9ticfeJ0" a 2t0,02(Q4WG3 ti -F+ EP7Z5BOO68DRO00600t '1-@oio7d: Spies
from popular books on spies, didn't image such as is sought by Coca-Cola will be brought out
bclicvc him. "Okay," said Mother, "so or Chneral Motors, but tQ pass on to Simon and Schuster.
Image Problem
and Counter-spies
in the spring by
 Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000600010007-2
country, including those of ITT, and
to make his capital a base for anti-
American activity throughout Latin
America. In asking the help of the U.S.
Government ITT was doing exactly
what any American victim of such de-
velopments would be expected to do.
But with a democratically elected sen-
ator raising a fuss, the youngsters rea-
soned, there must have been more to
the affair than met the eye. The insist-
ence of other congressmen that the
CIA's attempts to identify our coun-
try's enemies and learn about their ac-
tivities somehow reflect a "Gestapo
mentality" or result from the "pressures
of Big Business" has scared off even
more-all on the grounds that "the
know something we
Intelligence v.
Espionage
izations of other names do for business
concerns. It resorts to espionage to
about the same extent that busi-
ness organizations resort to it-or
perhaps less, if we are to believe ac-
counts of recent industrial espionage
scandals. Specifically, the CIA's espion-
age unit contributes about 5 per cent
of the material which goes into the
U.S. Government's highest level intelli-
gence summaries, and about one tenth
of 1 per cent of .the, total quantity of
material on which these summaries are
based. One satellite in q, single turn.of
the globe amasses more "intelligence
information" (i.e., raw information
which is processed into "finished intelli-
gence") than the CIA's spies collect in
a month. So what does the CIA em-
ployee do in the course of a day's work?
"We read newspapers," was the truth-
ful answer of an Agency staff member
who was being interviewed by someone
writing in article for a magazine.
minister is, from that. time on, an
"agent"-although not one reporting
information which, strictly speaking, is
indispensable to national security and
which cannot be obtained by other
means.
If the CIA's espionage service is
larger than its officers would like it to
be (apart from operations in Indochina,
it has 15 per cent of the Agency's total
personnel, and 25 per cent of the bud-
get), it is not because of genuine, con-
ventional espionage operations, but be-
cause of the political action activities
with which it has been saddled.
In the Communist countries and
throughout the Third World the CIA
has hundreds of cabinet ministers, gov-
ernment officials, and leading politicians
on its payroll, all seeking "insurance."
Some of them are valuable as agents,
many are not-especially those who do
not gain in confidence, and who decide
that they need reinsurance from, the
other side. All the same, keeping the
doors open to the 'government leaders
and politicians of these countries is re-
garded as a necessary practice in a
world where, whether or not it suits
our democratic principles, ' tremendous
pressures are exerted from the other
side. Every CIA station chief complains
about the deadwood on his payroll, but
he is overridden-by his ambassador,
not by his bosses at Langley. Our diplo-
mats feel that. we must maintain a pre-
tense of obedience to the policy, "We
do.not,'interfere?.in? the internal, affairs
of sovereign' nations,"..' even in those
places where it is obvious that we
couldn't bring about fair elections if
we tried.
My Agency friends tell me that they It is CIA policy to use espionage
are toying with the idea of coming into only in quest of information which is
the open' to explain, mainly to young indispensable to national security, and
people, just what the intelligence busi- which cannot be adequately obtained
ness is all about, and what role the by other means. The CIA's spies some-
Agency is supposed to play in it. While times acquire information which does
the era of Nixonmania lasts, however, not meet these qualifications, but only
I doubt that any program to educate as a byproduct of operations designed
the public on the CIA will get past the to get information which does meet
idea stage. Therefore, during this "sort- them. More often, it gets non-essential
ing out period," as Mother and the -and often useless-information from
others call it, if the story is to be told sources developed in the course of its
it can only be told by a knowledgeable passive "political action" programs. A
outsider. such..as..n}yself: Here (,forgive, ..,prime ?, trlinister: .of ? some, :African
me, Mother) goes. Asian country decides for some reason
First, the layman should be made to -just possibly for the,reason that he
understand that "intelligence" and "es- thinks he is doing what is best for his
pionage" are not synonymous. "Intelli- country-that he wants to stand against
gence," a CIA training manual says, the anti-American currents which sur-
"is looking before you leap." A market
survey is one form of intelligence; an
round him, but he feels he needs in- Secret Army in Laos
surance. After, some weeks of fencing
ordinary map of New York City is with the American ambassador, he is This is by way of saying that the
another. So is looking out of the win- turned over to the CIA "station chief" CIA conies to "political action," as
dow to see what the weather is like -for the reason that the CIA has fa- those operations in aid of interfering
before you decide what to wear to the cilities, and the State Department does without interfering are called, only with
',.office. Intelligence `is anything you. do; not. for setting up Swviss hank accounts, the greatest reluctance. All, political ac-.
any info' rhtatioh?'you, take into *consid- arranging for hasty departures' in case-. tion bperatioris. in w hich the .Agency
oration, in order to maximize your of emergency, and providing all the has been involved, including the small
chances of doing the right thing-or, other elements of insurance needed to percentage of them which have been
more important, to avoid the wrong. bolster the courage of a straight-think- found out and reported in the press,
Only to the extent that you spy to get ing prime minister. In the course of have been planned and conducted on
the information you need are you en- arranging all this, the CIA officer who explicit instructions from the White
gaged in espionage. But most people- is in contact with him gets a contiiwing House.. There is no "invisible govern-
and most corporations and governments flow of political information, most of ment"; the CIA does not generate its
-learn most of what they need to which is concerned with. reasons why own political action operations. It in-
know without having to spy. the man is behaving as he is. As time Jluences the decisions of its superiors,
The CIA is APt eI-tl,FlAK I l ,asegW.0RAP4Q3as (j,,~f>tir[ r7&aQQ3g$,Q} 00Q6QRD1QD)07t}2t market analysts in-
telligence organization, it does for the confidence, the supply of information fi'uence the decisions of the soap man-
llnitccd Statt's Ciovernm nt wlrtt orgiln' is lout on it regular basis, and the prime ufacturers 'who employ them, but in
 Approved For Release 2002/04/03 : CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010007-2
k
every case where one of its political to have access to the target and re-
action operations has failed it has used cruiting them as agents, receiving their.
its influence, unsuccessfully, to per- reports, giving them instructions, and
suade its superiors not to go ahead with paying them. As the attention of the
it. The Bay of Pigs fiasco is an exam- specialists shifts toward the conventi-
ple: A review of the Agency's report- Iles of "the people's war against capi-
ing prior to that occasion shows clearly talism and imperialism" there will be
that its officers had misgivings through- modifications to the approach, but the
out, and on the eve of the launching essentials remain the same.
stated unequivocally that it could not The CIA's agents, please note, are
possibly succeed without the air cover persons who are already inside their as-
which President Kennedy had at the
last minute withdrawn.
CIA, officers are against all large
scale operations, from the attempted
invasion of Cuba to the army in Laos,
simply because they are large scale and
therefore, by definition, out of place in
a secret organization. According to
Mother and his staff, the unsecret secret
army in Laos is probably the Agency's
last anomaly. Although it was a success
(a fact which its critics seem to regard
as irrelevant),'its cost, not only in mere
funds but' in operational manpower and
administrative time, was such as to
throw the whole Agency out of kilter.
Now that it is all over, the CIA's "dirty
tricks" specialists will get back to con-
centrating on what they know best,
"precision penetration," directed against
"targets" of the "people's war against
imperialism and capitalism."
"Precision penetration," as the term
is used by espionage specialists means:
1) identifying a "target"-i.e., the
exact place (an office safe, a conference liner might be formed at six o'clock one
room, the brain of a person) where evening, exist only for the duration of
"the secret" is kept: 2) making a thor- the operation,. then disperse-its mcm-
ough "target study"-i.e., mapping the bers going in various directions to join
target's layout, examining the security other ad hoc groups. Another is that
defense around it, determining what the targets are not offices, complete traditional ways
persons have access to it, and getting with safes containing 'Fop sncmtnr writ- . CIA, however,
whatever information is necessary to ten materials and corruptible file clerks, services of other countries to apply ef-
determine how best to go about recruit- but rooms in the apartments of the ter- fective community surveillance systems,
ing someone insiqq ri~~ec~`bp~~aSC'~2tf~'y~~':sl2E7'5B'610t36tQR01f4G6t~!}l1~(}02tmdue power to gov-
or more persons wh have cen toun in refugee camps. Another difficulty is ernments, which are corrupt or other-
signed targets, not persons who have
been introduced from without. The sug-
gestion that the CIA might pick' out
some clever young Westerner, teach
him perfect Russian, drill him. in con.
tinental mannerisms, and send him off
to insinuate himself into a job in the
Kremlin has always been a fiction. The
CIA has rarely, if ever, employed
Americacitizens as agents. (The U-2
pilot, Gary Powers, was no exception.
A friend of mine in the KGB assures
me that the word "spy" was flung at
Powers only as part of the prosecu-
tion's rhetoric, and that he was found
guilty not of espionage but of "acts
against the security of the state," and
was sentenced for what he was, an ordi-
nary. airplane pilot taking photographs
in forbidden areas of the USSR.) In
modern practice, the CIA does not even
employ locals as agents unless they are
already properly placed to gain infor-
mation of value. In a Moslem country
it would employ only Moslems, never
a Jew or even a Christian. To pene-
trate a Palestinian terrorist organiza-
tion, it would employ only Palestinian
terrorists-Christians being permissible
in this case, since Christian elements
are fast gaining ground ' in Palestinian
extremist circles.
There are various obstacles' in the
way of achieving "precision penetra-
tion" of Palestinian terrorist move-
ments, and all other targets of the
"people's war." One is that these targets
are not only compartmented, but com-
partmented on an ever changing basis:
A group bent on blowing up the Ameri-
can embassy or hijacking a TWA air-
that there are many targets -to pene-
trate, and the relations between them
are so loose and unsystematic that those
who manage espionage operations
against them keep finding themselves
in blind alleys. The only answer to the
problem seems to be to keep whole
communities under surveillance. "This
means we are subscribing to police
state methods," says Mother, "but what
else can we do?"
With intelligence on the "people's
war" pouring in as it presently is, even
the most liberal-minded CIA officers
feel that they have no choice but to do
whatever is necessary to deal with it.
They believe that, sooner rather than
later, the public will swing over to
sharing the alarm, and will become sud-
denly unsqueamish about police state
methods or whatever it takes to give
them a good night's sleep. The CIA,
the FBI, and other security agencies
had better be prepared. They had better
have in readiness methods of "com-
munity surveillance" which have in
them only such invasions of privacy as
are absolutely necessary, and which en-
sure that the invasions are handled with
such discretion and delicacy that even
the most ardent liberal can't conscien-
tiously object to them.
The FBI has a comparatively simple
problem. Provided it, can be assured of
freedom from political influences, it
munity surveillance which will he per-.
vasive enough to check terrorist in-
fluences in the U.S. yet not constitute
more than a minor departure from our
 dai14 `0y. W%iV" SO ?5 to :1V[l1Ci ills' 'tlLera IUli LIz:~ .."i;c~11SC i1Z: `li" L'ci.2 and i]colasing lsulvous
tipping its hand ~~~~v ~g cl Pt aSPn~t~O~/~~ 0~ 5 1 i aPi ~d~~~Q ~ ~ 0~ra~ were spotted, cluse-
terrorists or to provoke premature out-
cries from shortsighted liberals, the
CIA must reorient its covert services so
they can cope with this objective.
Togetherness
Against ? Terror
To wind up this short unauthorized
course on the CIA, may I predict that
the following will be the principal fea-
tures of its covert services' New Look:
1. There will be closer cooperation
between the CIA's covert services and
the FBI and other federal agencies re-
sponsible for the internal security of the
United States' In earlier days, the CIA
and the FBI were barely on speaking
terms, but they have been drawn closer
together by the Watergate affair, and
they will move still closer as clear pic-
tures of the foreign connections of ex-
tremist groups in America begin to
emerge. Until now, there has been con-
siderable conflict between intelligence
and police in counterterrorist opera-
tions: Intelligence leans toward keeping
discreet' track of terrorist groups ? and
neutralizing them quietly, while police-
men lean toward arresting their mem-
bers and bringing them to trial. Intel-
ligence officers think in terms of
information, policemen in terms of
evidence that will stand up in court.
In the future, these distinctions will be-
come less and less important-and
extra-legal (i.e., intelligence) actions
against terrorists will be closely coor-
dinated with. legal (i.e., police) actions
against them. .
2. --There will' be less iise of foreign
security agencies by means of penetrat-
ing parts of them, and more emphasis
on obtaining straightforward official co-
operation. Instead of inducing section
heads to spy for the United States, CIA
station chiefs will convince their bosses
at the top that the control of terrorism
is even more in their interests than in
ours. The CIA is already having
marked success in this. Even the rabid-
ly anti-American Palestinian Liberation
Organization has admitted that "Black
September" terrorism.. has harmed the
Palestinians far more than it has
harmed the Israelis, and all Arab gov-
ernments but two have taken official
positions consistent with this belief.
Many of them have openly admitted to
recognizing that purely local counter-
terrorism is ineffective in the face of
CIA's penetration of the agencies will
continue, but mainly to keep track of
the extent to which they are being mis-
used for internal power purposes. One
hundred per cent of them are being so
misused (of course the fuss, during
Watergate, over the impropriety of
using government investigative agencies
as "resources of the incumbency" is lost
on all populaces but our own), but it is
advisable that we keep tabs on the
effects.
3. There will be more cooperation
than ever before with private organ-
izations-industrial, financial, labor
unions, 'philanthropic, religious; and
educational. The notion that it is some-
how sinful for the U.S. Government to
help American interests, or vice versa,
will pass. These organizations will not
allow themselves to be used to cover
out-and-out clandestine operations, of
course, but there are various quite
proper ways in which they can join in
a common effort, inside their own or-
ganizations and in collaboration with
local governments, to combat interna-
tional terrorism. Cooperation of the sort
which existed during World War II and
just after between the ITT and the
CIA's predecessor, the Office of Stra-
tegic Services, may well become the
model.
4. Already "community surveillance"
facilities-miniature television cameras,
microphones, metal detectors, "black
lights," and X-rays-are being installed
at strategic observation points through-
out major cities,; industrial: areas, .and,
military bases, with concentration on
airports, railway stations, communica-
tions centers, and other places which
are normally most tempting to terror-
ists. Through vast though simplified
monitoring arrangements, a compara-
tively small number of technicians can
keep watch over large crowds of per-
sons, and photograph them so that
they can be studied in detail after
terrorist occurrences. Within days fol-
lowing the IRA outrages in London
railway stations, the British security
authorities had installed equipment to
photograph in their entirety all the
crowds entering and leaving the. sta-
tions. Following the bomb explosion.ili
the King-'s Cross station of September
12. Scotland Yard Special Branch offi-
cials were able to run over. their films
again and again in a search for persons
picked out who is almost certainly the
guilty one. The police now have some-
thing better than an Identikit picture to
go on.
We are not allowed to know the
specifics of the American equivalents
which have been in effect since early in
1970, but friends of mine in the FBI
tell me that they have thwarted perhaps
hundreds of terrorist attacks. So have
the systems which have been installed
by the CIA in other countries of the
world, from Morocco to Hong Kong.
The press does not report thwarted acts
of terrorism, but only those which
elude the system. For some, time to
come,' terrorists will elude the system to
cause an increase in public indignation,
causing, in turn, an escalation of com-
munity surveillance systems.
5. All the while, the CIA and the
FBI will be on guard against being
pushed too fast by all the public indig-
nation, and against its being exploited
by democratic politicians, including
those in "the incumbency." These agen-
cies must become "as antiseptic as the
Supreme Court," as Mother puts it,
adding that the Buckley proposal that
there be "bonded buggers" is already a
reality. The easy access to computer-
ized information-which, incidentally,*
has never been as easy as some critics
of the government have claimed-will
be stopped. Only a select few persons
who have been specially cleared, and
who live under special controls, will
have. access to this information, and be-
fore passing it on to other officials who
must make use of it they will "sterilize"
it so that it contains only what is
needed for the legitimate purposes at
hand, and no more. Once Watergate
has blown over, together with the ]in-
gering sympathies for the Ellshcrgs and
others who have made heroes out of
themselves by leaking official secrets,
congressmen who have a particular un-
derstanding of the problems will push
for legislation to strengthen the position
of the "bonded huggers" and'to enable
them to do their job more efficiently.
But 'even without the legislation, I am
told. there is every sign that the system
will continue to work. Those of us with
sinful pasts may relax; only those sins
which might justly disqualify us from
something we may dare to apply for
will ever be found out. Even then, only
the bonded buggers will know. ^
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