THE CENSORS OF BUMBLEDOM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000600010001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1974
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 2001Ci1.1:11-1460"-i5ICA!680R000600010001-8
anuary 1974 ? ?
?
Taylor Branch
In which the CIA bypasses the First Amendment in order to hide a bugged house cat
aR .
1 1 : NO2,,ILIDIZIP.X.?.4....Igt.a..?.1?...91s.c-Vilan
lar,...intelligent-de.ce=y-in-lbe.....AW..;10.....b.U.
. written.,..tha.t.,..the.....ArnericALL-CI4_13a?....?,s,usparssed.
.SoYiet:CoT.nrminism....as..1ho...rno4..p.olterful sinister
force..,?onaytD. "Wilugeuer-tharx_is...tioiiiiae.,...Y..to-
:lance?sytiering,Jrag,.4iLLeLay_12the rest of
Lis..a.r.r...nom-quiek-to....,5,u.spealbP,X.A(1.411ALld
int....1.t.." This view has been widely accepted in
the United States, but it had no political weight
until the Watergate .scandal introduced the
manipulative-techniques of the CIA into Ameri-
....can politics. NT 2 n y_ _earnmeualus_ba?e4;
? pzesstd..the.$).p.inion..tb,at..thaNg.t.e.sz.at.,e. iPtrizPes
have-rniaed_the_possi1.1kty o1_thiLsm_ILLulder-
oover,..totalitarian..methads....csiming;b0rne tg_ouic
.,?shores...to_destroy Our_cleino,CLai.Q.IT.Zciitig11. We
were given a reprieve, they say, because the
amateurs of CREEP had not yet learned the deft
skills by which the CIA arranges the destiny of a
foreign country. .
The most recent evidence suggests that all
this is. nonsense. V.ictar_Marrle_ILLAYEQ.,,,spynt
fourteen-ye.ars,..as.n....C.I.A....exeolltivAaPIO.17..0.44Zigt2;*
-ing-in-1969-rdescribes-Wateig.ale-A.LigiEly?typi-
cal?-?-of -an-Agency ?,operation,e.xposss.1 who. the
fates-caused-a-security.-guard....t.a_sturnble_ov.er
foul-ups.normai to a coyert mission. The officials
in charge of CREEP apparerIlly:sliarja the illu-
sions that lie at the heaa of the Agency?that
the politics of a country .can be guided by tap.:
ping the phone of a Larry O'Brien or a Spencer
Oliver, or by employing someone like Donald
Seo-retti to write fake letters and hire women
to run nude in front of Muskie headquarters.-on--tae....c.,L4 '
O neAkliP mrivgitiP6gAtektige12100 210/013e: CIA-Rbia764010440R001340044000-11
of truth is that the Gemstone information was v..azi to know ?
"essentially useless." The stupidity of the mis- 1110 nto
ainal-s.e.cur
sion-'?from the practical, amoral viewpoint of
the clandestine operative?is vintage Agency
material. ?? .
Like-Watergate,the,,c,m-is-dangerous not..be
t
Calue?oL.t.Le---pr insiple&-iL,..violate,s. The Agency
is good at bribes?it pumped. $20 million into
.the 1964 elections in Chile?and it can super-
vise mercenary -armies in backward countries
like Laos. These things are terrible enough, but
none too subtle or difficult; and Marchetti be-
lieves that ? the . everyday operations of the
Agency give the lie -to the myth of its deadly
professionalism. The CIA does not leave dark
messages written in blood. During his entire
career, Marchetti says that he never came across -
a single "termination mission" by or against a -
career CIA agent. An agent is not a daredevil
but a handler of knaves?he is E. Howard Hunt
directing the freedom-loving Cubans from ?
across the street. The cm's chief weapons are
not the martini-olive bug or the cyanide dart
gun; instead, agents spend most of their time
with memos, and on a real action mission they
are most likely to be equipped with nothing
more than bribe money.
The CIA's fearsome reputation is its best pro-
tection against the meddlesome notions of out-
siders. No one dares move against Leviathan.
r.142?re?,..haLu.ager..been-,.any-se..d.ous_rno y
zar.,dia_Los,ux.b_the_Aze the Qfl1X1S ?
thevesjalLit
irtr-3-heo?n-to4.4.cued...e3Len se,t a. rormattee
2.11a-old-c,ostge.rs-..-on ...the?? in f r tga 1
ailabiag_thaunig.t.s_c_miaL___?ornise
ibooA
myths and expose its operatives as bureaucrats
with delusions, dangerous in spite of themselves,
living off an undeserved reputation- for derring-
do. Only if the Agency were made human, he
believed, could .anything ever be done about
Arnold Toynbee's nightmare..
Apparently th,1,. idea strip* a stu,sitive spot ?
somewhere_itulie_ct.,,k for_fhp stole a
? cop_y_ of _Margietti's book ontline_from a New
Y-ox.Laiibiniaause?Th.o....wats retiml_to
cuL,..beadatarters____,in Lancrle ,
awn:Led. ,ttie lay Jo r_suo,,x_tojsee,R, t eloak; r o
seeing_the:71j.g' lit of day?,,dhe,x-icani.L.Qa.e.......Lo
April 1972, the U.S. government sought and
obtained a permanent court order enjoining
"Victor Marchetti, his agents, servants, em-
ployees and attorneys, and all other persons in
active concert or participation with him" from
disclosing any information, "factual, fictional
or otherwise," without the prior consent of the
CIA. The order was upheld by the U.S. Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court declined to re-
view the case. If Marchetti now speaks out from
his classified mind, he faces instant imprison-
ment for contempt of court?no juries, not even
a show trial. .
. Marchetti, outspooked and outlawyered in
round one, vowed to go on.? .A.f.te.r_sio'nin,_a.
tract, with Alfred A. Knopf for a critical,Lpi n-
ktiort book on the CIA, lie took on a coauthor
.Marks a thirty-y,e9r-ofa
d fkes,L,,A_UO_Lpsjo-e mil nu-
scrip t....11.wasslutifull?v_handst.d..EN r 0 the A g,e11-
ay-in.-August
soning., together yak the censors, hoping.to
avoi dilenuna_of Ue_pirtg..gnic or
risking, iail-But ,the_broo,Leam,p back from Me
sc.iss ors..shop.4iddled...with.,3.39,nationaLsgurity
cl dell cis in.g_rnare...ila am.,a-dft.LeLti.L9 text.
As a new legal challenge to the censorship
begins, all the parties to the case have pulled
out their Sunday rhetoric. For the ACLU 'lawyers
who represent the authors, it is the first legally
sustained exercise of prior restraint on national-
security grounds in the history of the United.
States, a pernicious (but almost unnoticed) re-
versal of the decision in the New York Times
case on the Pentagon Papers. EaC3.1....q.A.A9
piaci!) le...a LI an (Li s....,uc,ithitigiess,?thalLth 9,,v-
ertune.nt."5,.Light....toso_n_duct? ,wi th out
iit tf.az nal.. sub versionaLpeople_likejgamhetti are
-4119..w b 1.411) 0 f
4stala.,.....tb,e_gp.\:_ernment.',s_execulive..-arra_wi4, be
-paralyzed_ae. _V,T, a sit in g ton...w.i11-degenexale.aut o
The Justice Department, representing the
Agency, sees the sanctity of contracts as the
real issue. Marchetti?like Ellsberg,', Marks, and
Vied 10 orkeleaselbOZIOVIDee: CIA-RD MBE= actqQ440QMPActi giich a contract
overrides Marchetti's First Amendment rights.
This is a new twist in the effort to protect offi-
cial secrets, overlOoked in the Ellsberg case.
The Justice Department briefs are loaded with
the lore of corporate trade secrets?citing prece-
dents like .Colgate-Palmolive Co. V. Carter Prod-
ucts?as if Marchetti had threatened to let
loose the magic ingredient in Coca-Cola. Lying
behind all the questions of CIA spying and se-
curity, this rather unorthodox contract approach
to.secrecy carries with it a potential for wide-
spread application against dissenting govern-
ment employees. ? .
Less intelligence than ever
3 ..design _and- partly . b y-,failure?the-CIA,_ has
uzJmummmom,u.A.AJIiaoyy,WflT-bY
mc (:), . sxcialize_ .ia _19.re1gp_mj.ppl al i Qu
,ratiter,:.,Ahan_intelligenc,g. Classical espionage
against the Russians and the Chinese has pro-.
duced one of the driest wells in spy history.
According to Marchetti, the CIA has been unable -
to penetrate the governments of the major Cold
War opponents. The warring spy camps have
bad to content themselves by striking public-re-
lations blows against one another. When Kim
Philby defected to the Russians in 1963, after
twenty years as a double agent in Britain, the
KCB held elaborate press conferences and rushed.
his Memoirs into print to thrill the world with
Soviet spy power. The CIA said his hook was
phony?double agents do not, keep journals of
their perfidy?and most experts. agree that
Philby's activities did not hurt the British or,
help the Aussians very much. Still,- the CIA
smarted under the publicity barrage, and it soon
trotted out one Col. Oleg Penkovsky, claiming
that he had been just as valuable. as Philby.
Former clA. director Richard Helms has said
proudly that Penkovsky had helped the U.S.
detect Russian Missiles in Cuba in 1962. Soon,
Penkovskyls carefully recorded memoirs were
on the best-seller lists, and it didn't matter that
many experts doubted their authenticity, sus-
pecting that the colonel had gotten more than a
little editorial assistance at Langley. Marchetti's
revelations on this matter are clipped from the
book, but he has written elsewhere that Penkov-
sky was a British agent who provided no infor-
mation whatever on the installation of the mis-
siles in Cuba?the Agency detected them from
: aerial photographs. Penkovsky was preoccupied
with other matters, such as insisting that he
wear the full colonel's uniform of whichever
Western intelligence, outfit was debriefing him.
Lila _than lhe_CuIaaalnissi1lt?cr5rsts.06..._c_IA
"Yone AirlSrdVeliPEoWiFibitlasiii00102KM061t-CIA-NDIATS1300138gROIX)61300110011141, if-welad.
got his jo ) only after signing a contractual only-known sYndrome) h.as_not_anticipated., a
nnrifinlInA
.?24-,94-9 tii-ot?ectivA*14-06.1441?111216 `41. CIAIIROP75800813DROD06/1414116101:441d provide
.armect co Irontatiork....m.....W.P_..P.A?,t-1%.0.11.1Y;Jye more grist for the Katzenbach position, which is
..yca r?. No w.-.111e,G A lia.s lacJameznAlg41..talye_n anathema at Langley. Tellizz_the ctA jo,.?sticic
teeti lAirR with i n forma tifaikgarla
giYeal-the.E.eiltagon sprilr.o.L.af,ThgA1,91.1itsjaat ,
provide-tho,crucial-zecita7.....ki9ELIAL.r_l 9n OLLite..Z.taa _t_o_plitpacty their hoods
and nn ea-i
lahat_sps,elal To survive and prosper, the CIA must con-
lotelligckice-ther.e_is....in-th.e_xatid-Vetils-taXgQ1Y vince the public that it is employing all its pro-
loring-incl-of-little?-conacqu.ence.-.In 1964 the
fessional wizardry 'to gnill out future Pearl Har-
Agency learned that the American Embassy in
hors. And it must keep the President thinking
Moscow had been bugged from top to bottom
, that in political *emergencies, when me of ac-
since 1952. For twelve years at the height. of
tion must discard the niceties of constitutional
the Cold War, the KGB hal access to .every se-
theOry; the CIA will respond with piano-wire
cret meisage?within the embassy and to the ca.,
efficiency. Now come Marchetti and Marks to
ble exchanges with Washington?with little evi-
say that the Agency is out ,of the Pearl Harbor
? dent advantage. The great .powers are, too big'
business, ha-vin; abandoned it to the *diplomats
and cumbrous to move with muCh subtlety.?
d the satellite people at the Pentagon. More-
While the intelligence value of .the CIA has an
over, they say, ?the CIA's covert missions are
been whittled down continuously?until Henry .
short on piano wire and long on;iddy P. T.
Kissinger 110W scorns the calculations 4nd P051- Barnum schemes. fit for a Donald Segretti. The
tion papers . of the analysts?the Clandestine
CIA would much rather be subjected to a dozen
Services branch of the Agency (modestly known
books ,by the -usual liberal critics?attributing
as the Plans Division) has mushroomed in size
every 'suspicious automobile accident, Bolivian
and importance. Marchetti and Marks assert
coup, and Republican election to the deadly
that fully two-thirds of the CIA's money and
genius of its agents?than suffer from one in-
manpower.are devoted to covert activities in the
side book like Marehetti's,- which 'exposes' a
form of dirty tricks and paramilitary operations.
Ihislact.,,alon lidth-thc orcruizatiait..c.bPps and clandestine circus behind, the awe-inspiring
curtain of secrecy. .
ilkeludget, fig gr Qrti,t,...wa?,?9?0
.censared_from the, hook;_blit the, _IA r;lented
whpn jay_yers priintwi QauhAt
. Spn_ .,'r-
. - eted
-out-the-inforrnatirm and put it in the Cowes-
:?!;:
. ' V
?
that.. the-cLjaa-Ixamile.d-amAY-it,5_3,01cili-
'''':ily,LITAB.cItErrj-m.Aluc,,s_mANussao? i}:s
getice. functions so coin letel that. it can now
. justify its existence only, on the basis ortre
slandestinejujitsu juries to.:7---actic7Onorei;n
,governments?the bribes, the coups the surai-
' .11 removal of unfriendly political strains
.abroad. Such a specialty is just fine with ire
covert types who run the Agency, but they know
that it is precisely these covert operations that
-have made the CIA vulnerable to public criticism
as the symbol of sinister and undemocratic pre-
occupations within the American government.
Harry Truman, whose administration created
the CIA in 19=1.7, stated repeatedly that the Agen-
cy was 'intended to be the ?centralized intelli-
gence branch of government, not a squad of
. secret D-Day operatives. Recently a whole
chorus of foreign-policy heavies like Nicholas
' deB. Katzenbach have picked up Truman's
theme and argued that the Agency should be
confined to its statutory duty "to correlate and
evaluate intelligence relating to the national
Cats, rabbits, and snake oil
IIE MATERIALS FOR RIDICULE have long
been available, but writers have been so se-
duced by Agency folklore that they have glided.
over the absurd to focus on the imaginary agent
with the garrote in the wings. In The Invisible
Government, David Wise and Thomas Ross de-
scribe the Agency's incredible clandestine feat
of setting up-a CIA radio station, under elaborate
cover, to enCourage and direct the popular up-
rising that was to follow the Bay of Pigs opera-
tion. The agents set up shop on Great Swan Is-
land, a tiny spot in the Caribbean made entirely
of guano and infested with three-foot lizards.
While the front men vainly sought to protect
the unlikely cover story that the new station on
the deserted guano island was an independent
venture on the part of profit-minded entrepre-
neurs?changing around the phony corporate
charter, fending oll, small landing parties of
Honduran students who came to denounce the
CIA .presence and to claim the island as Hon-
duran soil?the intrepid CIA technicians went on
the air to' drum up the spirit' of Cuban revolt.
Three days after the invasion had failed, Radio
Swan was still issuing orders to nonexistent
troops. Even, a year alter the invasion, the sta-
ThevIt O f
tion?renamed "Radio Americas" under the
securityA" I
DDro o IARPF17413fleAMQ1106GMERNA-Bervice Cor-
i all the Tarries on s u etlis"eike216eineqykOn'?P.
poration"--7had not given up. It exhorted free-
Approved For Release 2002/05/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000600010001-8
dom-loving Cubans to- tie up communications by
taking receivers off hooks in phone booths, and
to subvert the Cuban economy by breaking
enough bottles to create a beer shortage..
The Marchetti-Marks manuscript is full of
ane'edotes fit for the Marx brothers or Maxwell
Smart?secret projects to float balloons over
Communist countries, dropping forged leaflets
that promote the democratic alternative; fake
letters to sow confuSion within the French ,stu-
dent movement; agents scrambling for enough
Benny Goodman records to satisfy the longings
of an informant. allatehetti_sos that the most.
ludicrous incidents have been censored to pro-
tect the security of the twilight-zone devices in--
vented in the CIA lab. "X.11..gi.v.e.,y,ou qnc,m-
thg-111,Gy?tack_Qa.t.:.'?he?said,-Lb,=11,40 I
-call't-imagine-that....th a-A gancy.....eauld_stzul.cLaie
WespeaLbundre rs
v.ual }Tars_ to t
could, .be. surgicaliy. implanted insid.e._the...lody
?Lan_ ordinary house_pet..,Theddea...was....finally
.s,euttledy!-hen sorneone Jealizerilhat we couldn't
. control..11te_animai'snuovMen15 toput it i n
tang
cu1dornwhQw42]ac4a dxda.LQL? in the
? clad ? of a target_p_marzt,
0j ts ... 1e.7.1.i.k,e,.
Ty/HE SECRET MYTHS SWIRLING around the
Agency have enabled it to go a long way on
the intricate logic of Rube Goldberg. At the
height of the Cold. War, the Agency 'faced the
problem of contai ?
mi Communism everywhere.
To do so, reasoned the head spooks, it would
he helpful if the American people believed that
the menace was making headway, since this
would stir public support for anti-Communist
measures. To stimulate that belief, it would be
helpful if the government could point to tan-
gible evidence that the Communist party was
making gains right here at home. That might
be accomplished if the ciA could show that many
demented citizens were reading the official news,
paper of the American Communist party, which
in turn could be done if the CIA subsidized The.'
Daily Worker to keep it alive. By this rerrs'on-
ing, CIA OpChltiVeS were put to work concocting
several thousand phony names and addresses
for new, nonexistent "subscribers" to The Daily
Worker. The CIA sent the taxpayers' money to
the apostles of Moscow so that the Cold War
agencies of government could point to the bulg-
ing circulation of The Daily Worker to support
their demands for bigger anti-Communist na-
tional-security budgets.
The samepoiov'er
ers fear the .oency like death has a power u
influence on the operatives in,side tho CIA. Mar-
., . ? , ?
is that secrecy creates a whole culture, and that
the trappings of clandestine work infuse the
most mundane undertaking with the significance
of a spy thriller. It grips the brain. An agent
who makes his calls from a phone booth, decked
out in a disguise and a code name, can't help
feeling the buzz of importance?even if he is
calling to check ?wills subscription to The Daily
. Worker. It is a private glow similar to that ex-
perienced by liberal Democrats who take pre-
cautions against the possibility that their phones
might be tapped. P,Iranoia?is.....the?twin....broth,er
a?the_ciaad,e,s t ing_mgniaLt Y ?
The CIA is a pioneer in the organized use of
. secrecy, and in this role it reflects a general
condition Of American culture. Government se-
crecy is a measure of status and prestige for its
officials, and its symbols-the security clear-
ance, the locked briefcase, the top secret-sensi-
tive discussions, the magic references to the na-
tional security?are highly coveted. They .are
signs of high authority, like the Freudian ter-
minology of the psychiatrist and the computer-
laden tomes of the urbanologist. These signs can
be the mark of genuine and vitally needed skills
?if the Agency's secrets protect the explosive
techniques of master operatives, if the multi-
variable systems analysis of the urbanologist is
.required for genuine insights into the plight of
, ? the eities---:Lbut they can also be the smokescreen
for professional shanianisin. Secrecy provides
not only a badge of importanoe but a meal
ticket. We pay for what we do not understand,
because we hunger for an expert.
eA,ri pan e...mlazilat4,11.1e-faitia?likp?M a 4%. h
r.1.-11,a,rks.,41uzie.a.?`40 -ss191.1R0.11,??..thr..g 1.1 0 ? e
atbakractiej.a.RIX.flt gie.5 z11,1C d n
4_,Emeg,ade inalficjan 1.7lio shows Al4,,,p,nblie
ata.e.,?.f or in ?...15.in sox....khelook-the....0 IA
lacLkept...1sitilin cednes?....o.L.thezoKernnTnt,
/1 t_
vt4j,hau. It is reminiscent of the old Hubert
Humphrey, telling the voters that they would
support the President if they only knew what he
? knew about Vietnam, which, unfortunately, was
clasified. In a pinch, secrecy becomes a mask,
completing the circle of its uses. The snake oil
merchant's greatest secret was not the ingre-
dients of his potions--;---anything would do?but
the gullibility of the people in his audience and
their need to believe that the good doctor could
?? sweep away their real and imagined ills.
n o ws
6 : 88
CIA, but it Approvedicat Reitase2902/9419f
than the others?Jargely_hezauze_d_MatzLIVs
Thigh_p?oaslti7m at the c 4k.?11,1.though.,.nauea_oLthe
'ilia ter a inlhe
neaKspapea.s....ansLin....1.1.14.Xli-loas,,. the
Agency censored it ariLv_ay..,0,:_thezrzullaat
far u thentioat e
what is now only_rumari, The authors estimate
,
that about a quarter of the stricken facts are al-
ready on the public record.
There is a reference in the manuscript, right
after several pages that have been decimated by
CIA censors, to "the CIA's ties with foreign polit-
.ical leaders." The obvious inference to be drawn
is that the authors had identified foreign lead-
ers with past or present CIA connections, and
several sources have identified this kind of ma-
terial as the Most explosive in the book?the
Agency's best case for secrecy by prior restraint.
While it is impossible to evaluate this claim
without knowing precisely what has been cut,
one can make an educated guess after scanning
the public literature on the cIA. and talking with
reporters, ex-agents, and others 'who specialize
in intelligence. l_hay,..e_sione_a_a_psaws
?Likely that the .i.,\.zene,y. is.slase to pluicaljtad:
ers in Jordan, Greec,e, Jalaiapin.anizaz,,
_and NEL.Gemutuy. In general; the Agency
'probably has political ties wherever it has oper-
ated in the past?Laos, Vietnam, Bolivia, Gua-
temala?and also in the smaller countries of
Latin America and Africa, where a little bribe
money. can be effective enough for the spooks
to throw their weight around. All this seems
hardly surprising or fraught with peril for the
national security. And, as Marchetti tells it,
Agency ties to a foreign government do not
necessarily mean that we run the country. They
come closer to meaning that one of our agents
gets to have lunch with a foreign official occa-
sionally, much the way an American mogul gets
lo bend the ear of a Senator from time to time
after making a political contribution.
UT FAIRNESS DEMANDS that we suppress
boredom and consider the Agency's view.
After all, the entire national-security apparatus
of the United States, the Justice Department, the
ACLU, a major publishing house, and the federal
courts are all burning up legal pads trying to
hash .out whether this material should be for-
bidden in the name of military security. Should
Victor Marchetti, by virtue of having sat in the
highest councils of spy headquarters, be allowed
to declare authoritatively that foreign leaders,
are, or have been, tainted by American intelli-
gence? What if the minister loses his job as .a
result, and the CIA is cut off from its leverage
and in formatApOraitectflai-eFteleaset t21102404/06 : 141-10e03(10495Apeld?pc8110?. -g
would say that the cooperative ministers of the .
future will refuse to associate with the CIA for the state air of VeSterVear. for. desnito mile ciA's
CIA-RDP781300380R00060001 0,001-8,
marcnetu replies mat tne nook noes not re-
veal the names of classical spies, citizens of "un-
friendly" countries who slip their military se-
crets. to. a. CIA agent. He says that the book will
.cause embarrassment, but that no exposed con-
tacts. will be rubbed out by the Soviet KGB or
anyone else, and no wars will break out. The
case of Amintore? Fanfani supports his point.
In May 1973, Seymour Hersh wrote a story in
the New York Times about Graham Martin,
now Ambassador to South Vietnam, and his ef-
forts to get the CIA to support Fanfani's wing of
the Christian Democrat party in Italy. This oc-
curred in 1970, when Martin was Ambassador
to Italy, and Fanfani, a former Italian premier,
was trying to take over, the government again
during one of Italy's periodic crises..Fanfani, a
conservative, figured that $1 million from the
cu would gO a long Way toward keeping the
left-wingers out of power, and he made his pitch
to Martin in secret meetings.
There is a hole in the Marchetti-Marks manu-
script where I assume the details of this story
.once were. The Agency censored it, because it
reveals Fanfani's ties to the CIA; but the censors
had to leave in the reference to the Hersh story,
which is quite thorough. The revelations in the
.Times chused Some rhinor repercussions in Italy.
but didn't make any noise in the dark passage
'ways of international espionage. If the censored
anecdotes of foreigners' ties to the CIA are as
tame as this one, the goVernment would have a?
tough time demonstrating a grave threat to the.
national security. Actually, the point of the. dis.-
eussiOn in the book manliscript is that the Times
initially balked at running the story because the
editors thought it wasn't newsworthy----a basic
yawner from back in 1970, dredged up to em-
barrass our new envoy to Thieu's republic.
heKarehetti was P140313_0_1 rssLygiti n g
Jiislook without censorship, one CIA official was
sm- ote as thanks ,.or the Lr_dunction?Ze-
,1
ouse the revehtions would have_Lbiovaxns_out
s2f the water" in many places around the world.alio_Qffiedatnias
He could have meant ,this in the way the Fan7
fani story made future operations difficult in
Italy, or he could ?have been focusing on a sec-
ond kind of exposure in the book?Marchetti's
plans to identify CIA 'cover" organizations in.
a.ral out of the United States. The .Agency wants
to avoid more troubles like the 1967 scandal
that exposed the National Student Association
as a CIA 'front. The Agency's proprietary fronts
are detailed in a chapter that was mutilated in
the first round of censorship. Rocky Mountain
Air, of Arizona,. was identified in a magazine
article by Marchetti. as a CIA domestic airline,
?
iis oe ot ) i ;)o k and has
Agency airlines and corporate covers evoke
(ICI world, ttit446.-ifedipajri. pme, kOD2A35006 : CIAA114175.BQOPNIRM ' llgligIANTP schernes
little impactond a brie pe of media which, in the CIA, is somewhat like casting
interest. But the CIA contends that all these little doubt on the humanity of football in the heat of '
covert fronts make up a vital collective enter- a pep tally.
. prise for clandestine use against .our enemies.
,-Agency officials, have sworn that blowing more
covers like NSA "would cause grave and irrep- f HATEVER THE FINAL 'OUTCOME in the
arable damage to the national security," and -?Kloourts, the .lawyers in the justice Depart.
thereforemust be .censored. . ? merit deserve sOme credit within the profession
for staging one of the most imaginative legal
comebacks in recent history. Charged by the
.Done in by the Princeton men
,Nixon Administration with the task of protect-
ing the government against conspirators and
,A,1- A.B:c4i,Ezt ? VIEWS THE 'CASE with . just . as tattlers, the Department assembled a .truly dis-
?,-,,,,,,,,i much passion as the various lawyers and Mal record. Scores of left-wing ? conspirators
oaavernment officials, but in much earthier fash-
?, were brought to trial without a single convic
ion.. He. sc,ez.3,,hiaseliza4e tanizelaaLa_p_erson al tion, and the prosecutors became successful
.
vendetta by the Old. Box .network. that ha.s. .1.- only when the charge toward security turned in-
u'
?Ns runthe ageney.-The upper reachesofThe ward. John- Dean and Jeb Magruder have been
CIA are cOm-pleCely dominated by ivy League convicted of conspiracy; John Mitchell is
WASPS, most of whom got started in the OSS squirming under a mound of conspiracy evi-
during the war. William Colby, the current di- deuce. Prosecutors who failed miserably against
rector, is fully in the tradition?an OSS opera- hippies and malcontents have been so lethal
' tive who continued his work with the Agency, against their colleagues in the surrounding of-
personally designing the Phoenix .assassination fices that eminences hike Richard Kleindienst,
program. in Vietnam and virtually every other Will Wilson, and Robert' Mardian have fled,
covert operation on his turf, Southeast Asia,?ria;.
hoping to get out of range:
?ing. to the top because he conducted every mis.- ' ' In the midst of all this Came .the loss in the
sion with the skillful good grace of a man who Pentagon Papers case. The Justices ruled that it
appreciates fine wine. A real Princeton pan, say is possible for the government to obtain a re.-
those who meet him. . ' straining order against. a newspaper?that the .
..Marchetti, on the other hand', went to Penn First Amendment is not an absolute guarantee
State .and describes 'himself as "the' cousin of of the right to publish national-security infor-
? bulldozer. drivers." He joined the Agency in mation?but that the government has to facet a
193:3 and worked his way ?up to the executive
Suites on the seventh floor of the CIA building.. heavy .burden of proof. showing that the infor-
!nation is. overwhelmingly likely to harm U.S.
lie was a special assistant to members of the military preparedness by. threatening he loss of
top- brass, ? sitting in on CIA policy meetings, a lives or jeopardizing vital military secrets. 'The
hawk on Vietnam, a general analyst of good Department lawyers warned of horrible calami-
reputation on strategic matters, a lover of
ties if the Times were allowed to publish more
things covert. As he describes it, he began to top-seeret cables by the Old Boys, but the Court
fall away from the CIA Spirit when he saw first
surveyed the ramparts of freedom after the first
hand that the directors and assistant directors
batch of papers had appeared in the Times and
were much- more interested in dreaming up
detected little damage. The government stum-
clandestine operations, the cloak-and-dagger.
bled misrably, and the precedent looked use-
stuff,.than they were in the production and anal- ful to Marchetti. . .
ysis of intelligence. The Agency is still marked
. Then the Department failed to convict. Ells- '
by a split between the analysts and the opera-
berg of espionage, or anything else, and the
tives, with thinly concealed contempt on both ..,_cau?e of secrecy seemed hopeless.. When the CIA
sides. Marchetti shared the analysts' view that
lawyers brought the 'Marchetti problem over to
the clandestine types, like E. Howard ("Eduar-
the Justice Department, two flimsy weapons.
rlo") Hunt, had readtoo many spy novels and
Seezned available to shut him up. They could
worn too many disguises?that?they found the
seek an injunction before a 'judge on the same
Agency a playground for their covert fantasies.
grounds. they had tried agailist the New York
(Any CIA operator, on the other hand, lets you
Times, but the courts had proved to be attached
know quickly that the analysts are pale-faced
to the First Amendment. The second unpromis-
bookworms who "don't do anything" and might ing avenue was the old reliable: criminal deter-
as well be in the State Department.) Marchetti
rence. They could threaten to 'prosecute Mar-
half expected these traditional jealousies. to be
They
chetti for eE)iona,..e if h
ironed out at -ie to 1-p . I - ptin e-12074150
i5/06 : ciArRPRMONAIY.9449P0
M 1., urT knew
ever, that
operativgs wer 1?Rr a .9.ro ,c)foo usy -hate nrib
conviction would be difficult. Marchetti mig,ht..:
plots to care .much. about position papers. He want to take his ease before
lAorrrin In 4415-,en n4Trfnti?refIrnno et " Isca a ? r, a jury. whose mom.
Approved For Release 2002/05/06 : CIA-RDP75600380R000600010001-8
to perceive a grave threat to the national secur-
ity. Besides, a threat is not as permanent as an
injunction; and if it ever lost credibility, ;Mar-
chetti would be free to publish and the govern-
ment would be left with only a long shot at a
post facto remedy in a ?crirninal trial. The se-
crets would already be out. ?
..Whyszer tipon the co2:-Itrut. ,aaproach,
on-"11,-farchezez?,v_agtg.an-Lent,
lasoght about a Newtoniallactvaneejn_the pros-
4,,,tellisatat, discreet government._ It was a
(1) Ulla ..zed-u_finensi_MeJat-a14.0
? .to-prior_aolLaint. The government sued to en- ?
join Marchetti from breaching,: his contractual
obligation ncit to reveal classified information.
Federal officials. submit to other limitations on
' their First Amendmeilt rights as a .condition. of
employment, such as the Hatch Act prohibition
against political activity, and this is merely an-
other limitation?sanctified in writing.
(2) T.,13goyernrnent did not have to shoW
thoLthe. material would clo_lobstantial damage
Lcatte_natioontdeLe/H.s.c, because the terms of the
contract refer only to classified material. Not
many things clearly injure military prepared-
ness, but everything can be classified..
(3) With these two n6w advantages, thil.g.Q.V.
eminent 'could seek prior restraint before a
_inste,ad of conylctm '13,
Justice Department does not like juries. Also,
the hearing would take place in camera, a se-
cret proceeding to discuss classified secrets,
with no reporters to ask fresh .questions.
( 4 ) Ihe?c.ouir.a.ed_sIncst Lou__uvalz_the..1.st 1,c
? more complicated.,..confusing. the-press-hou
slow.n-publicity. The focus shifted
from big sexy matters of secrecy and national
. defense to the question of vlether__Marchetti.
w?-ould_lionor.hisswn written. word. ?
( 5 ) Iilasatil.raet.thisluZio_n??staLies.LLs
enormous value for applic.ation in other ag,en-
cies of the government where secrecy agree- ?
ments_ar.a_roquiced. Already, the addition of
Marks to the case puts the State Department
and its mandatory oath under the secrecy blan-
ket. Conceivably, the Justice Department could
obtain an injunction against anyone, in or out
of government, who has signed a secrecy oath
and is suspected of leaking classified material.
This would not be of much, use against isolated,
unanticipated leaks to the press, but it would
be a potent weapon against known dissenters
with a lot on 'their minds. Even a casual leak
would be much more dangerous for those un-
der injunction, for it would pose the risk of be-
ing jailed instantly for contempt of court..
pies' right to know" victories of the Pentagon
Papers case, and they see the specter of a gov-
ernment whose employees have to get a note
signed by an Old Boy before they can speak
their mind. They know that the power to control
classified information and punish national-se-
curity ,critics would ? be selectively enforced.
Lyndon Johnson, Ted Sorensen, and Bill Bundy
would still be able to make "appropriate usage"
of state secrets in their memoirs without fear of
injunction. (LBJ quoted extensively from the
.?top-secret Pentagon Papers before they ? were
? 'released; but instead of being tried for espi-
onage, like Ellsber0, he received an estimated
81.5 million for The Vantage Point.) Every
spring at budget time, the Pentagon would still
leak . startling new intelligence and tricolor
graphs showing that the collective Russian nu-
clear missile is longer and more explosive than
ours?and the generals will 0-et bigger budgets,
not an injunction. By. carefully exploiting th.e
new legal power of the secrecy contract, the c'0ov-
ernment might be able to revive the absurd,dis-
credited classification system?using the power
of. judges' robes to bring back the old days,
when the function of a classified leak was to
serve the government and. when dissent was of-
ficially approved.
into this libertarian's horror, the Act.0
?1;444/1111.11f1.9:1.4.alltilt.;i1,0p.i.itildilLtir'',...ttl,,SPvor se
'A aselletti. &kat -The_publisbe a s
rin a lit tl e
2.war.e-,Iar.41.Antensl tnent el ont_l t. ?
The plaintiffs will reargue their staunch First
Amendment. position?no prior restraint at all,
under any circumstances. If they fail -again
there, which is likely, they, will argue that the
secrecy oaths. are valid only if the secret ma-
terial is 'properly classified?that is, if its re-
lease would plainly and seriously injure the mil-
itary defense. ' ?
The government lawyers are confident that
they won't have to get into the First Amend-
ment morass, as the' expect the district court to
?reaffirm its decision that the secrecy oath elim-
inates the civil liberties question: "Jur,the.opin..
.ion-of-tb ,Cour.t..tb,a-contrae.t..laices.....th,e case_ont
af-Lho....5,Q2ii,g of_ the First .4212.0111nm:4;and to,
the. u1Jit aunt i.tp volved , the
aoaltracl-c-onslitnte.A..42_1alvez-ctf-the_deLen.a a alTS'
Lights_thare,.u.ncler; It's much simpler for the
courts to look at things this way, the attorneys
say, and if they can make this argument wash
again, the Justice Department will leave behind
. a legacy of secrecy protection that President
Nixon would be proud of. It would be a victory
? for zipper-lipped government snatched from the
Approved FOrlieleaSe 1002105/06 : CP*RDIDt5tb00b86R81:1060001,1360148/ quietly
wade the public is preoccupied with Nixon's
HESE OMINOUS RAMIFICATIONS of the Mar- ?
sanity and his character flaws?something that
__nchetti precedent have sent the ACLU Jawrrs
Approved For Release 2002/05/06 : CIA-RDP751300380R000606010001-8
secrecy guarantee, since classified material
looks much dearer from the inside. .
. If the government wins again, the case will
abound with new ironies. Marchetti and Marks
will have unwittingly helped create the legal
tools to make a vassal of every government em-
ployee who enters the sacred chambers of na-
tional security. In effect, Americans might then
become divided into two basic types--those
sufficiently gulled by the state's alleged need for
privacy to sign its contract of omerta, and
those who refuse. The robots of the first group
would run the government, protected by the
courts against' the public. They would ;tend to
become more cynical about the old ?principles
of the Republic, while the second group would
lose. interest in the government itself. Mesmer-
ized by clandestine fantasies, the courts would
presumably consider. the First Amendment in-
operative in national-security matters such as
the cKA's bugged h.ouse pets. The Agency .would
be left free, in the name of military defense, to
expand its covert missions in the global fringes
of the Third World?the only places where, es-
pecially to the. bombed peasants of Southeast
Asia, it is clearly no joke. The, CIA is drawn to
the Third World like a lonely derelict to a porn
shop, where thc salve for dreams is .cheap and
available. Instead of puncturing the myth of the
awesome powers, Marchetti and Marks
may ultimately find themselves and their secrecy
oaths -being used to reinforce the Agency's poi-
sonous delusions.
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baLASSi i 80 provecttpr bitle ty 2 0 0 2 / 0 5 / 0 6 : CIA-RDp751303$APJX061:111010001-8
ROUTONG AND RECORD SNEEir
SUBJECT: (Optional)
- FROM:
Legislative Counsel
7D43
EXTENSION
6121
NO.
DATE
17 December 1973
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
.
2.
DCI
We are
Senator.
a date
He has
get together
to you
by Taylor
item turns
Marchetti
John
comments
asked
inputs
dickering with
Symington's office
for your meeting with.
indicated that when
he would like
about the attached article
Branch. Since the
primarily around
case I have asked
Warner to give you his
on it. I have also
DDO and DDI for any
they might have.
to set
him.
you
to talk
the
-
3.
4.
-
.
STATINTL
?
.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
i 1.4.
15.
-
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I 0 n SECRET 7 CONFIDE T!,',1_
INTERUAL
U NCLASS IF I Eapproveno0 2002/05/06 : CIA-R105EMINMINtiAb010001-80 SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
Legislative Counsel
7D43 HQ
EXTENSION
NO.
6121
DATE
17 December 1973
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
.
DDI
DDO
The Director
Senator
the middle
Symington
on the
time.
John Warner
on it but
input you
expects to see
Symington shortly
of the week and
wants his comments
attached article at
I have asked
for his commentary
would welcome any
might wish to make.
after
that
2.
?
4.
.
STATINTL
?
.
?
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Approved For Release
2002/05/06
:
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