TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENT - S. 1988

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000500410006-0
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• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 10, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN

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December 10, 1974
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 21021
tic energy supplies; and fourth, the
establishment of Federal and State pro-
grams to equitably distribute the inevit-
able energy shortages that will be experi-
enced for the forseeable future.
The uhtted States is faced with a
deepening energy crisis. Future energy
shortages threaten Government and in-
dustry programs to expand energy shi5=
plies which are being delayed and even
canceled in the face of inflation and
high interest rates as well as a general
deterioration in our economy. Extraordi-
nary steps will be needed if we are to
assure that the likelihoods of millions
of citizens will not be unreasonably dis-
rupted by the resultant shortages.
The recent Project Independence re-
port analyzes the perils of the United
States preient heavy reliance on oil im-
ports. The report also outlines the tough
ehoiees that must be resolved by the
American people. In the months ahead
the Congress will review these choices.
Already it is clear our actions must go
beyond the voluntary energy conserva-
tion measures that are being advocated
by the administration. Tougher meas-
ures" are going to be required. As con-
sumers all of us must be prepared to ac-
cept sacrifices if the problem is to be
solved. Present imports of oil at inflated
prices are beginning to sap our economic
strength and drain our monetary re-
serves.
Certainly the executive branch must
have the tools to cope with another en-
ergy emergency as well as to stimulate
new domestic energy. supplies. These au-
thorities were contained in 8. 3267, the
Standby Energy EfnergencY 'Authorities
Act, which was -Clehatea in this body on
May? 8 and 13, 1074. That measure was
carefully developed over several months
to reed experience gained during last
winter 4 cppo on embargo.
For a variety of reasons, Mr. President,
including opposition by the then Nixon
administration, --Senate ?action on this
meastire Was cliseatinued last spring.
The hill, S, 3'267, was complex in nature
and its ramifiCations were widespread.
At the time the legislation was respon-
sive to the current energy problems.
Today, Mr. President, join Senator
HENRY M.,74,c,EvN gn 'all amendment in
the nature, gr oe,SUbstitute for S. 3267.
Amendment No. 200'6, the Standby En-
ergy Authorities Act. This measure
grant e the Administrator of the Federal
Energy Administration with discretion-
ary authority to Implement mandatory
energy conservation programs in order
to restrain the U.S, consumption of en-
ergy?principally ol/ consumption from
foreign sources.
azgrilent. alsQ provides contin-
atti4 plang g authority for end-use ra-
tioning. this" provision is to be employed
only when the Preside riVdetermines that
an energy shortage exists. The Congress
also retains the right to veto within 15
days any proposals by the adminis-
tratien to exerotse Other thpffinergy con-
seivation or the ..,r eXict-ill5q. rationing
authorities.
AL pn visioned, mandatory energy con-
serval= measureemottld be employed as
the first step toward greater energy self-
sufficiency. End-use rationing would be
instituted only as a last resort, but even
then on an equitable basis.
'Mr. President, the States have moved
ahead and will continue to exercise a
niajor role in our coping with our coun-
try's energy problem. In fact, the States
can take major credit for keeping the
petroleum allocation program afloat
` during last winter's severe shortages,
often filling the vacuum, while the Fed-
eral regional program Was being orga-
nized, and backstopping delayed Federal
decisionmaking.
In recognition of the vital functions
to be served by State programs, the Con-
gress in establishing the Federal Energy
Administration directed in section 20
that special attention be given to the
role of State government.
Further recognition of the need for
strong State leadership is provided in
this amendment to S. 3267, the Standby
Energy Authorities Act, which is pending
on the Senate's calendar. Provision is
made for State energy program and im-
plementation grants and with respect to
energy conservation, for State and local
exemption from Federal programs, where
strong programs exist.
The States must assume major respon-
sibility for striking a balance between
the goals of environmental protection
and resource development. In reality we
are involved in two crises, one involving
energy and the other current environ-
mental policies.
The success of a national energy pol-
icy will be due largely to the ability of
State government to develop regional
energy policies. Their ability to take the
energy crisis in hand, and match sup-
pliers and users is essential.
It is not enough to speak of national
energy self-sufficiency. To the extent
practicable, we also must concern our-
selves with regional independence.
These provisions do not address the
longer term energy supply problems fac-
ing our country; these programs are
concerned only for equitable distribution
of energy shortages.
In recognition of the need to increase
? domestic energy supplies the amendment
contains two major provisions: first, sec-
tion 106 of the bill authorizes the Federal
Energy Administrator to undertake vari-
ous actions to increase domestic petro-
leum supplies; and, second, the measure
authorizes the FEA Administrator to
preferentially allocate limited supplies of
materials and equipment to energy pro-
duction.
This authority?section 106?is in-
tended to provide increased domestic
supplies of petroleum over the short-term
while long term alternatives are being
pursued. Four principal actions are avail-
able to the PEA Administrator: First, to
require existing oil fields in the private
domain to operate at their maximum
efficient rates of production; second, to
require production in excess of maximum
efficient rates from oil fields on lands in
which there is a Federal interest; thrid,
to require the consolidation of unitization
of individual companies' production froin
the same oil and gas fields, when on
Federal lands, where necessary to meet
national security and defense needs; and
fourth, to adjust the product mix in
A. 4
domestic refinery operations; fit' ucord-
ante with national needs and priorities.
Looking to the longer term it is neces-
sary that the pending amendment also
assure that the exploration for and pro-
duction of new domestic petroleum sup-
plies is not constrained from a lack of
availability of equipment and materials.
Thus the Federal Energy Administrator
is authorized in section 105 to assure the
availability of such supplies for this pur-
pose during periods of equipment or ma-
terials shortages. This provision will pro-
vide industry with access to the min-
ing equipment and supplies necessau
to expand coal production as well as the
tubular goods and drilling rigs required
for the exploration and development of
new domestic oil and gas supplies.
Mr. President, this amendment con-
tains authority in title II for the Presi-
dent to formulate a, plan and establish
the mechanisms to control and reduce
oil imports. This program is supplement-
ed by provisions in title III for the exam-
ination and creation of a national stra-
tegic reserve system for electric utilities,
for industry, and for our country as a
whole.
I am aware, Mr. President, that there
is some confusion and uncertanty about
the extent and possible duration of the
energy crisis. However, there is little
doubt that an energy crisis does exist
and will persist. The fact that these
shortages will continue requires that we
enact legislation to enable equitable dis-
tribution of the available supplies to ac-
commodate regional as well as national
needs.
This amendment provides the neces-
sary back-up authorities to cope with
anticipated shortages and is so titled the
Standby Energy Authorities Act. It pro-
vides the mechanisms to accommodate
our economy and our way of life to
energy shortages in an equitable manner,
with minimum disruption to our eco-
nomy. The provisions are based on ex-
perience gained last winter during the
embargo. ??
Senator BARTLETT has directed very
plausible arguments to delay the action
on this measure: the measure Senator
JACKSON and others of the Senate, in-
cluding myself, have cosponsored. How-
ever, further delay would be to ignore the
need for the United States to move now
and then develop the means to 'cope with
our long-term energy crisis.
I think that the gentleman from Okla-
homa can agree with me on this, that
there is a necessity for an interim au-
thority to cope with immediately, short-
term energy supply interruptions. There
is general language in this bill which
would provide necessary standby
authority.
Now, Mr. President, I am satisfied that
this measure achieves that purpose in a
very practical way and I would hope for
its early enactment.
I supported similar legislation a year
ago, and I understand that Members can
disagree.
In conclusion. Mr. President. it is my
understanding. and / am only partially
Informed that the President of the
United States, tonight, is expected to ad-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 10, 1974
dress himself to our country's energy
Problems.
I am not sure that that is to take place,
but as I close I wimt the debate to reflect
that the President must realize that de-
cisions on this matter must not be de-
layed or postponed.
We must come to gripS with it in one
form Cr another; hopefully with the co-
operation of the administration and the
support of the. American -people.
Mr. BARTLEIT. Mr. Presidene, I say
to the distinguished. Senator from West
Virginia that I an very sorry our col-
leagues did not hear his remarks, par-
ticularly when Ile was reciting some of
the leaders of this Nation and the tre-
mendous challenges which they met,
they met with action in a very forthright
manner.
I am reminded of another problem
which faces this country and the world
and that is the matter of food shortages,
I am so pleased, I would say to my dis-
tinguished friend from West Virginia.
that this Nation is now gearing up to
make every effort to maximize its efforts
to provide food, as well as to encourage
other nations to do liaeWise, to provide
food for themselves as well as to ex-
change information so that the rxisting
amounts of food that exist around the
world can be better utilized than they
have been in the past for emergency use.
But in looking at that problem, which
of counse the distinguished Sena tar from
West Virginia knows very well requires
energy to maximize, I am concerned
about approaching this problem and
fighting it with only ore arm, sine that
is just cutting back.
I am concerned about this approach
with the international cooperation
agreement that we have with our friends
in Europe, that if we only es chauge
shortages and have the ability to work
on the demand side of the equation, we
are not going to be able to face up to
the problem directly.
This Congress must tell the people of
this country that we are going to pro-
vide the sufficient amounts of energy to
meet the need& we are going to cut back
on expeneive imports, but that we are
not going to approach it with ooe arm
behind the back and we are no
play just into the hands of AIa
countries and other nations d make
ourselves more vianerable to tl in than
we already have.
We are going to bite the b let. We
are going to make every effort a be as
strong a nation as we have bee ' in the
past, and to provide sufficient en Ty for
this country to employ its pe le, to
guarantee its safety, and to hay high
standard of living.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. ROBERT C BYRD. Mr. Ph idea,
suggest the absence of a quart=
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Ti clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative cler rev-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Preiddent,
I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
TIME, LIMITATION AGREEMENT?
HR. 14449
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President.
I ask unanimous consent that there be a
time limitation on the bill, H.R. 14449?
an act to provide for the mobilization of
community development and assistance
services and to establish a Community
Action Administration in the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare
to administer such programs?of 1 hour
to be equally divided between the assist-
ant inajorita leader and the distinguished
Republican leader or their designees;
that there be a time limitation on any
amendment thereto of 30 minutes; that
there be a time limitation on any de-
batable motion or appeal in relation
thereto of 10 minutes, and that the
agreement be in the usual form.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so ordered.
The text of the unanimous-consent
agreement is as follows:
U ANIMOUS-CON SENT AGREEMEN1
Ordered, That, during the consideration
of 11.N.. 144.49 (Order No. 1220, an act to
provide for the mobilization of community
development and assistance services and to
establish a Community Action Adminiatra-
tion in the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare to administer such programs,
debate on ar y amendment shall be limited
to 30 minutes, to be equally divided and
controlled by the mover of such and the
trumager of the bill, and debate on any debat-
able motion or appeal shall be limited to 19
minutes, to be equally divided and controlled
by the mover of such and the manager of
the bill: Provided, That in the event the
maneeer of the bill 's in favor of any such
amendment or motion, the time in opposi-
tion thereto shall be controlled by the
Minority Leader or his designee: Provided,
further. That no amendment that is not ger-
mane ,0 the provisions of the said bill shall
be received.
Ordered further, That on the question of
the final passage of the said bill, debate shall
be limited to 1 hour, to he equally divided
and controlled, respectively, by the Senator
from West Virginia (Mr. Robert C. Byrd)
and the Senator from. Michigan (Mr. Griffin)
or their designees: Provided, That the said
Senators, or either of them, may, from the
time under their control on the passage of
the said b llot additional time to any
g the consideration of any
ndrnent, debatable motion, or appeal.
Ordered further, That the vote on final
passage of the bill shall occur at 10:30 a.m.,
Friday. December 13, 1974.
TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENT?
S. 1988
Mr. ROBERT C. :BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that there be a
time limitation on S. 1988?a bill to ex-
tend on an interim basis the jurisdiction
of the United States over certain ocean
areas and fish in order to protect the
domestic fishing industry, and for other
purposes of 1 hour, the time to be
equally divided between Mr. MAGNUSON
and Mr. ST.EVENS; that there be a time
limitation o'a any amendment of 1 hour;
a time limitation on any amendment to
an amendment of 30 minutes; a time
limitation on any debatable motion or
appeal of 10 Minutes; and that the agree-
ment be in the usual form.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The text of the unanimous-consent
agreement is as folloaS:
UNAN IMOUS-CONSIINT AGREET,IENT
Ordered, That, on Wednesday, December 11,
1974, duriag the consideration of S. 1980
(Order No. 1233), a biL to extend on an in-
terim basi3 the jurieeiction of the United
States over certain ocr. an areas and fish in
order to protect the domestic fishing indus-
try, and for Other purposes, debate on any
amendment in the first degree shall be lim-
ited to 1 hour, to be equally divided and
controlled by the mover of such and the
manager of the bill, debate on any amend-
ment in the second degree shall be limited
to 30 minutes, to he equally divided and
controlled by the mover of such and the
author of the amendment in the first degree,
and that debate on any debatable motion or
appeal shall be limited to 10 minutes, to be
equally divided and controlled by the mover
of such and the manager of the bill: Pro-
vided, That in the event the manager of the
bill is in favor of any such amendment or
motion, the time in opposition thereto shall
be controlled by the Minority Leader or his
designee: Provided further, That no amend-
ment that is not germane to the provisions
of the seat, bill iall be received.
Ordered further, That on the question or
the final passage of the said bill, debate shall
be limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided
and controlled by the Senator from Washing-
ton (Mr. Magnuson) end the Senator from
Alaska (ar. stevens) : Provided, That the
said Senaters, or either of them, may, from
the time under their control on the passage
of the sale, bill, allot additional time to any
Senator during the consideration of any
amendment, debatable motion, or appeal.
? Ordered further, That no rolleael votes on
this bill occur before e:30 p.m.. Wednesday.
Oe-ember 11, 1974.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT
AGREEMENT
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,,
ask unanimous consent that, after the
leaders or their designees have been rec-
ognized under the standing order tomor-
row, the Senate proceed to the considera-
tion of S. 1988, and if there be any
rolleall votes ordered on amendments to
S. 1938 or on final passage thereof, that
such votes not occur until the hour of
3:30 p.m., at which time the votes then
occur on the anaendments in sequence
as they aae called up before the Senate.
and the vote on final passage to occur
immediately after the vote on such
amendments.
Be it provided further that upon the
conclusion of debate on S. 1988, the Sen-
ate proceed to the Consideration of H.R.
14449, the so-called 0E0 bill; that a vote
on final passage of that bill, if a rollcall
vote is ordered, not occur until the hour
of 10:30 a.m. on Friday; and, provided
further, that votes on amendments to the
0E0 bill may occur tomorrow at the
time, of tae expiration of any such de-
bate on amendments, and that paragraph
3 of rule XII be waived.
Provided further, that at no later than
the hour of 1:30 p.m. tomorrow the Sen-
ate resume consideration of the amend-
ment?I believe it is No. 17?the amend-
ment in disagreement, in the conference
report on the supplemental appropria-
tions bill and, more specifically, the
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1/29Wic? 814:5R_D_F'ARRIRBOR000500410006-0
CON
,
proViding gall& charter and flight rental
. _
service. ,
Thu UMI?itel.eehool was founded in 1906 by
Hey. Ja1ne.S.Tr5rithe',' yoUng `Presbyterian
miasiohary; .t70- e U Th
CatZ 'e mountain chil-
dreri,Avte :when there were few schools
liAe-Oza-frce?,:FrOin ,hoarding grade school
It evolved into a school, then a junior
college and finally, In 1964; beeiiiiie a full
four-year nondenominational, coeducational
college Of liberal efts: Eaah change in cur-
ricula came in response to the -slow increase
of better public seho-OIS in the Ozarks and a
gradual realization that a progressively
higher level Of edi.ICsAion was needed as the
region developed:
-
The scenic CatiOP_US at Point Lookout, only '
two Miles es.af ofDikaoiLi08---ntributee to the
overall tourTain appeal of the Table Rock-
Taneycomo area :? Ife-ading--West on Highway
76 out of Dransoznrtoday's visitor meets a
partial resurrection of the former 160-acre
MattheWshpft,,Steaci,at Shepherd of the Hills
Varna. An oor-theater, 'defining the sec-
ond larges t iateridance An. the country, ad-
joins the old mill where sninmer tourists wit-
neat ` nightly reenactments of.:-.C.zark family
life airing "Old Matt'Sh
Closer to Table Reck; on the opposite side
of 16, is 1..hr?er ROW.' Cat, Sharing its site
with Marvel Cav,.*:EaSe 21)`-stOry high in-
teri9r is said to be the $icird largest cave in
the Nation. ilvi bpll 11ty presents 19th'
?
Century craftsmen and actors working in a
replica of an 1880- pioneer - mining- town that
includes an old,,lintype" ,photo studio as
weg aa??, rArIng. 461 the exploits of former
04b, .00 -IcnOWn."6.-S? the.' "Bald snob-
bers.!' ..? _
? A hel1eeptei'ilde7priiides aerial views of
Table ekenraion-bbals offer lake tours,
banks witl3. distinCtive hillbilly names offer
countit in-tide and the loeal reads are lined
CeaP,Olesp?.Nor?leti mugetuns,
.0,?taurapts, motels and Shopping cen-
ers ' irYierpis z c191,1b,t fISVT4le. Hock has
been a boon. t4. tl Oaar,1 together With its
sister lakes' on .t4e, upper *lute River. As
1974- marches fOrWar.d. into the beginnings of
anOther_ tmir10,,eappn.,' the. energy crunch
will certainly rear its head in the Tri-
area' of .Talge'.:4,OCic-Taxie-yodind,
Shoals, An ,Fary Arnie:if tirticle in he Bran-
son Beaconreported a 'telephone urvey of
resorf. 0*/ieta p.Ointing to a cons sus that
more 'tourists- ,i_voUld: come for full. acetions -
from .shorter_distan0a?, but that t number
of one and 'two-days trips would ? ecline.
Since then Ig winter ga:i.pw a ice have
disappeared, the dogwood; redbud nd shad-
bush bloonia?haVe..Ockied, and t moment
of truth. ii *Wiling' for 19'74,- End the year
visitation help dete the the
direction a regional economic de-ions for
the near fiitUre,.. Per the long ra e future;
of the Ozarkj tile very permanen of Corps
-lakes ench, as Table Rock serves a man-
made anclicr;amippg the economi waves of:
uncertaintY.Table Rock's magne is not
likely to dinainfsh In its power ? attract'
visitors to southwest Missouri.
: ...;
ODfiairta AROUND
037 pill potter)
The eCQ2IQBIc . changes occasio by the
advent of '1401:Beek'Lake and t forming,
of Lake Taneycorrio are portraye n an ex-
cellent ,piee.c of writing in a rece Corps of
Eo.gtheer!Jyp2?lication, Water s tram."
traeL Assistant Ed r of the
Corp? written forum for the d nssion of
issues aiiPhotcoluresolVing weer resource
problems. The author of this particular ar-
ticle, SeymOur Reitman, presents' an Inter-
esting and inter-prefivo paper on how these
two projectar--.; 111040 changes produced an
econoinia. !..inAstOgarks Shepherd of the
Hills coup. 'ryHOili.C1pal benefactors of both
Table Rnck IraIre.,04.14,1E0 Taneycorao.
? 6
Names of individuals and factors that are
familiar to those of us who know the Ozarks
are given due credit for their part in helping
make this area.a bona fide tourist-attracting
segment of our American heartland. Names
like the Empire District Electric Co., builders
and owners of Powersite Dam back in 1913
and the start of the now famous Rainbow
trout stream?Ta.neycorno; the late Jim
Owen, pioneer float-fishing major domo; the
famous Ozark "johnboats" used by the float
fishermen; Harold Bell Wright and Old
Matt's cabin that became a best-selling
novel, "Shepherd of the Hills"; Rockaway
Beach, Hollister, and Forsyth?prominent
Taney Court resort communities; Shell
Knob; Kimberling City and John, "The
Diver." And there is the growth of area banks
such as Branson's two financial institutions,
Peoples Bank & Trust and Security Bank.
Mentioned also are the familiar names of
School of the Ozarks, Silver Dollar City and
Marvel Cave.
This excellent piece of "ink" for the Bran-
son area is a real detailed documentary that
earns Reitman a congratulatory nod for good,
sound reporting of the facts.
It is an optoinistic piece of writing be-
cause it relates facts?not fiction. Those of
us who have watched the growth and the
progress of the Shepherd of the Hills Country
to a position of national prominence as a
tourist-attracting area, can easily re-cognize
by reading the article that the writer did his
investigative reporting with an alert eye and
ear to the influence and the impact the com-
ing of TaneYcomo and Table Rock lakes to
this area has really meant to economic
stability and progress.
Reitman's final sentence in the lengthy
(and illustrated) article in "Water Spec-
trum" seems to sense the continuing good
future of the area when he writes:
"Table Rock's magnetism is not likely to
diminish in its power to attract Visitors to
Southwest Missouri."
Right on, Mr. Reitman, right on!
CONCLT.II0 OF MORNING
INESS
The ACTINC4' PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Is there further morning business?
If not, morning business is concluded.
EMERGENCY MARINE FISHERIES
PROTECTION ACT OF 1974
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore.. The pending business is S. 1988,
which the clerk will state.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
A bill (S. 1988) to extend on an interim
basis the jurisdiction of the United States
over certain ocean areas and fish In order
to protect the domestic fishing industry, and
for other purposes.
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill.
The Amiga PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Who yields time on the bill?
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, the
Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) and
I are in charge of the time on this meas-
ure. I just do not know who in particular
is opposed to this bill as of now. The
Committee on Armed Services reported
it favorably. The Committee on Foreign
Relations reported it unfavorably by one
vote, I think. The Committee on Com-
merce also reported it favorably, I think
unanimously except for two votes in op-
position. So I do not know just where the
organized opposition is.
S
S 21079
Maybe we ought to call up the State
Department and have one of their people
come up here and handle the opposition
time. They were lobbying already this
morning against the bill, which is of
course their privilege.
I want to make an opening statement
and, by that time, I guess, we will get a
few Members in the Chamber, and then
we can work this out.
They are bringing a statement over
now from my office, so I suggest the ab-
sence of a quorum.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. The time to
be equally divided.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, the time will
be equally divided on both sides, and the
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
H.R. 8214, SENATE RESOLUTION 390,
S. 2022, S. 2928, HR. 13370, AND S.
3593 PLACED UNDER "SUBJECTS
ON THE TABLE"
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the follow-
ing measures on the calendar be placed
under the heading "Subjects on the
Table": Calendar Order No. 949, H.R.
8214; Calendar No. 1075, Senate Resolu-
tion 39-0; Calendar No. 1090, S. 202-2;
Calendar No. 111.3, S. 2928; Calendar
No. 1120, H.R. 13370; and Calendar No.
1208, S. 3953.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD subsequently
said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous
consent that Calendar Orders No. 949
and 1120 be restored to their place on
the General Order Calendar.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
QUORUM CALL
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum, and
I ask that the time be charged equally.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, the
Senate has before it S. 1988 which is en-
titled the "Emergency Marine Fisheries
Protection Act of 1974." It is intended to
provide the United States with fishery
management?and I underline the word
"management"?jurisdiction over fish
within a 200-nautical-mile zone and over
an anadromous species of fish, such as
salmon, beyond such zone for the pur-
pose of managing and conserving such
fish.
This assertion is necessary, because a
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number of stocks of fish off our coasts are
now either completely, or almost com-
pletely, depleted or seriously threaten-
ed?mainly because of foreign fishing.
This aPplies to both coasts, the Pacific
and the Atlantic, and to the gulf.
I want to *tress that there are some
People Who are concerned about this
measure, because there is a possibility,
they and I hope, that we can arrive at
a Law of the Sea Agreement, ni the
United Nations Conference to take place
in Geneva in March, and I Will talk about
the conference a little later. But I want
to stress that this is an interim measure.
It will terminate automatically at the
time a proper international agreement
is forthcoming from the United Nations
Law of the Sea Conference and is either
in force or provisionally applied.
Mr. President, on June 1 of lase year,
the Senate adopted the Eastland resolu-
tion, Senate Concurrent ResoTinian 11.
It was designed to "express a national
Policy In respect to support of the U.S.
fishing Industry."
That measure clearly recognized the
pressures from foreign fishing fleets on
our adjacent resources: It also under-
scored the need to act soon to protect
these resources from further depletion.
Perhaps more important, it recognized
that Ceargress might need to take in-
terim raeasures to conserve overfashed
stocks and protect our fishermen. Today
we are about to consider legislation
which epeaks directly to this need and
the stated intent of the Senate more
than a year ago.
My concern in this matter of conser-
vation of our offshore fishery stocks be-
gan long before the introduction of S.
1988. But inquiries to our Department of
State have always brought the same tir-
ing, tedious answer, "Wait, we will take
care of it." Well, they have not taken
care of it at all.
May I suggest that I went to my first
conference on these fishery matters 16
long years ago. Sixteen years, and still
nothing has happened. In the meantime,
the stocks have been depleted.
Wait, wait. They are probably calling
up Senators arotind here today saying,
"Oh, *Malt, we will take care of it."
Well, they made this same call about
16 years ago and nothing has happened.
"Give us time to negotiate and obtain
agreements on conservation." Now we
have more of the same?"Wait." This is
their standard request.
Mr. President, I have used the word
"wait" now about three times and I want
to use it again?this is the fourth time.
Wait, wait, wait.
They were up at the United Nations
with this problem for about 3 years,
nothing happened. But they did pass a
resolution up there, Mr. President, the
first action they took and the only ac-
tion?a resolution to adjourn the meet-
ing to go to Caracas, Venezuela.
Well, they Were down there and noth-
ing happened. They had 100 or more
Items an the agenda, but they did not
pass or agree on ore. They finally agreed
on another resolution to convene, to go
to Geneva in March. Then after Geneva,
they want to go to Vienna. That is a great
seaport, Vienna; they understand fishery
problems in Vienna.
I do not know what will happen beyond
that, but they probably will just keep on
going, Now, in the meantime, I say we
have to do something to prevent the de-
pletion of our fish stocks.
It was in the Law of the Sea prepara-
tory meetings where our representatives
hoped that the delegates from other na-
tions might abandon the growing move-
ment toward an extended economic zone
in exchange for the so-called "species
approach" proposal from the United
States, and this Was a legitimate effort,
there are things to be said on both sides
of that, but it did not arrive at any
result.
It became increasingly evident to me
that there was nothing wrong with our
salesmen; they simply had the wrong
product when they tried to sell the species
approach. From the close of the 1973
Geneva preparatory meeting?now they
are going back?we were asked to with-
hold legislative action until the just-
ended Caracas meeting.
Mr. President, we have done a lot of
waiting, more than our share.
I want to point out, because we only
have a half hour and I will yield to other
oeople who are interested, I just want
to say again that this is an interim
measure and that if they arrive at some
agreement In Geneva, hopefully?I
would not bet on it ?but hopefully we
will say, "Amen." This is simply a tem-
Porary measure to protect us and our
fisheries.
Now, one other thing. We are entering
period of unemployment. I Want to say
hat the unemployment in the American
lshing industry has been at 10 to 15 per-
tient for a long, long time, and it will
get worse unless. we send a message to
'he conference at Geneva, and unless
we begin to protect our marine fisheries.
The foreign harvesting fleets off our
coast, however, have showed no restraint
in anticipation of some kind of world or-
der in the matter of jurisdiction and
harvest. In fact, they have expanded.
This year, for the first time, we find East
Germany and Poland with substantial
fisheries on the west coast. These fleets
ire out to get all the fish they can, while
they can, for they know that any agree-
ment reached by the United Nations will
be for broadened coastal nation interest
and control.
On July 11 of this year at the Caracas
Conference, the State Department's
argument of delay in support of the
epecies approach came to an abrupt halt.
The U.S. Special Representative of the
President and U.S. Representative to the
Law of the Sea Conference, Ambassador
John R. Stevenson, placed the United
States in alliance enth those willing to
agree to some kind of 200-mile fishery
urisdiction.
The present position of the United
States at the continuing Law of the Sea
Conference is reflected in S. 1988. In
act, at the hearings before the Foreign
Relations Committee, Ambassador Ste-
venson said of the new U.S. position:
The fishing section gives the coastal state
exclusive rig,ht> for the purpose of regulat-
ing fishing in the 200-mile economic zone,
E object to a duty of conserve and to ensure
full utilization of fishery stocks taking into
zecount environmental and economic factors.
He then went on to say:
In substance, there IH no significant dif-
ference between the objectives of S. 1988 and
the United States proposal at the Conference.
Mr. President, if we could assume that
there might be agreement at the 1975
Law of the Sea Conference, we would still
be faced with a period of years before a
sufficient number of nations could ac-
complish ratification. To allow our off-
shore fishery stocks to continu.e under
the preser t virtually unrestricted har-
vesting pressure of foreign fleets for such
a period if to me unthinkable.
Testimony from Government witnesses
advises that the United States plans to
propose that any fisheries agreement
achieved would be applied on a provi-
sional basis. That is, it should be put into
effect without waiting for the individual
nations to ratify. Th.e State Department
stated:
Provisions application is a recognized con-
cept of international law and our proposal
was favorably received.
May I call attention to the fact that
such an action would not be much dif-
ferent in effect from the interim pro-
posal we have before us today in S. 1988.
No one in the Congress could be more
pleased than this Senator if agreement
might be reached in 1975. I support
world consensus on the fisheries ques-
tion and feel it will mirror S. 1988.
Now that a mass of the earlier argu-
ments against this legislation have been
laid to rea:, by the passage of time, we
are told that acting unilaterally is im-
proper. International lawyers view the
law of the oceans OS a process of "con-
tinuous ineeraction; of continuous de-
mand and response," a developing system
whereby unilateral claims are put for-
ward, the world community weighs the
claims and then such claims are either
accepted cr rejected. This process of
claim/counterclaim has molded the law
of the sea for centuries. It is only re-
cently that treaty lawmaking has been
in vogue. I suggest that the interna-
tional community's need for clear rules
of action in the sea, will be served by
passage of S. 1988.
The issue is quite ,slear. We are either
going to stand up for the proper man-
agement and conserve don of the fishery
resources off our coast or we are going
to be concerned about what the world
may say about us in the continuing law
of the sea forum. I must cast my vote
on the side of the fishery resources.
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yield
5 minutes?
Mr. MACfNUSON. Yes, I yield to the
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the statement
that I made at the hearings in Washing-.
ton December 6, 1973, be placed, in the
Recoire, and also the statement made
at Providence, R.I., May 13, 1974, be
placed in the RECORD.
There being no objection. the state-
ments were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
S. 1988 AND 11.R. 9136, THE IN7VERIM FisnERIES
ZONE EXTENSION AlSrn MANAGEMENT ACT
OF 1973
(Remarks .By Senator Joins 0. PASTORE)
For years, the United States has attempted
to prevent the depletion of American fish
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stocks and preserve the American fishing
fleet by entering into international treaties
such as the International Commission for
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries and many
bilateral treaty arrangements:
Through treaties' and agreements, the
'United States attempted to persuade foreign
nations to moderate their fishing efforts off
the American coast, not only to help Amer--
ican fisherman, but also to prevent the ex-
termination of fishing stocks.
These efforts have not succeeded. With
numerous treaties, including IdNAP: in force,"
we in New England have watched as the for-
eign fishing fleet off' our shores burgeoned
from a few vessels in the ,1950% to hundreds
of vessels .currentlY. And Most of these for-
eign vessels are inOre modern, larger and more
efficient than mostof Our New England
, ,
vessels. -
The state of the American fishing fleet is
a disagrace and this has been said too often
for me to belabor it here except that I do
want to not* that 'while the American gov-
ernment has prOVfdeci Substantial subsidies
for many industries, fmr too long the Ameri-
can fisherman. was ignored. For- the most
part, our New England 'fishing veggels are
individually owned Vessels that are too small
and far,' far, too' Old` to' dorn-pete With the
enormous :factory ahi pS 'and mother ii'hips
that crops the World'apcbans With large satel-
lites, of lv'eSSOls'tO fish. off Ilew Eng-
land. And even these Smeller Satellite vessels
are larger and better equipped than the fish-
ing boats of our New Ilrigland fishermen.
huttatcheir SA thf haddock hasprac-
tiOillY disapPeargritie YelloWtall flounder
has 'been SerionSlidapleted and the herring
and the cod are now endangered: -While we
WOO ttisduathig " Management and
harvest teChnkties at. the United Nations?
rasiavbft*ogn fishing fleets, using elec-
tronic inethods' ?rhsve been decimating our
offshore reSourceS.'Frhetrine for 'watching is
BecauSe,ariNiMetea,:tok6n,.driCe One
Of the prond'ailInctlitgaaf fishing porta
in the northWaSt Atlantic, now has a small,
barely suitiving "il.Phine fleet. Hundreds of
fishermen were driven from their livelihood
on the sea a..a foreUn fleets virtually exter-
minated the, fiedd9qk.. _
'
For Years the (aMs'ihig "-fleet' of' Gloucester,
MO the 'greatest la America,
struggled for survlvdi. rn Bedford,
whic4, reinains-bile 'Of thi reading' fishing
porta on the te.5t-C-O4t: the' viability Of a
fleet and hundrOda-of Jobs' are threatened as
our Stock* of yellowtail flounder are steadily
diminished.
In Rhode 144,44; our lislierinen have been
111070 'fortunate than the fishermenin our
Meter state Of,l*s,Safehusett.s.' Fortunately in
Point Judith, we hatran extremely capable
group of fishermen, leir63, 346 Dykstra, who
formed *bat *as, the'titSt Suce.essful and Via-
ble fishernieri's, 'cOOP.eratiVe association on
'the. Eat coast, perhaps in the United states
-.the Point Judith FiSherinen's, Ceoperative
Association.
The ro-iiit .11,11.6 cO7Ob's marketing ar-
rangements, the Of the' deg- in Point
Judith and, the rea.Oni:celfidneas of the fish-
ermen gaVe then]. the car,i'ahility Of switching
31'01H one ,species to (nether depending on
the MarkOt, and availability of the fish. It
ws.S this kind Of ifeXlhility that has been a
key tad whatever -SuCcess Point Judith has
40,4$h ?Sta'xiiii afloat. -
:?149Od'ekarriPle.'ert-filS lithe Way in `Which
Rhode rslaild'ilaharinen, geared uri-to fish
offshore lobsters when techniques for profit-
ably taking those stocks were developed a
few years no. Rhode Island fishermen and
fiShernien, kom'NeW dford were among the
fiT4 to exialoit th6 offShore lObster stocks.
by the Rational Marine -risheiie:s
ri?rvigo indicate& tbe-re- WEIS- an' abundant
stftly or offshore lobster that could toler-
ate heavy fishing without being depleted.
The Japanese assured us that they would
not catch offshore lobsters but many of our
fishermen have reported sighting Japanese
vessels taking lobsters offshore.
The Russians assured us they were not in-
terested in taking lobster. But the massive
gear they drag along the ocean bottom
Scoops up everything in its path. And while
we have been able to board Russian vessels
for on-deck inspections, we have been pro-
hibited from inspecting holds where lobsters
Would be stored.
It is not accidental that after a bonanza
year for Point Judith fishermen in offshore
lobstering in 1971, the offshore stocks were
practically wiped out by the following year.
Now it was not Point Judith fishermen who
depleted those stocks, but rather the scores
of huge Russian vessels that pounded those
offshore beds with heavy equipment for
months in the winter of 1971-1972.
We thought we had understandings with
the Japanese and the Russians but those
understandings left us with scores of fisher-
men .who lost thousands of dollars in invest-
ments. Because after gearing up to take
lobsters, they had to switch to other species
after the offshore lobster stocks suffered SO
under foreign pressure.
The depletion of offshore lobster stocks
was so severe that at Point Judith alone, off-
shore landings in 1972 fell of 500,000 pounds
from 1971 and preliminary indications are
that the 1973 landings could be down one-
third from the 1972 landings.
Now I realize that a half million pounds
of lobster is not a large figure when com-
pared to the total lobster landings in New
England or even when compared to Maine's
lobster landings.
I tell the story only to illustrate the point
that intense foreign fishing pressures over
even a short period of time can have an
extensive and direct impact on our rapidly
depleting marine resources.
We all remember the difficulties Westport
and New Bedford offshore lobstermen have
encountered over the past few years with
Russian vessels plowing through their sets
of lobster gear tearing up hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars in equipment.
I am therefore happy to say that I am a
cosponsor of S. 1988, a bill to extend on an
interim basis the jurisdiction of the United
States over certain ocean areas and fish in
order to protect the domestic fishing indus-
try. This bill would extend the present fish-
eries zone to 197 miles which, with the 3-mile
territorial limit, would give protection to
fisheries for a distance of 200 miles. The rea-
son for my cosponsorship is a simple one. I
cannot stand by and watch the foreign com-
petition harvest the fish which should be
on American dining tables.
My interest in this matter extends to the
sport fisherman as well.
It was not too long ago that I provided
by way of supplemental appropriation addi-
tional Coast Guard protection of our lobster
fishermen who had been harassed by the Rus-
sians within 200 miles of our shore.
Our traditional fishing grounds off Rhode
Island have been depleted. The foreign trawl-
ers catch fish, bone it, and freeze it on board.
They are far ahead of in in this regard.
I know that there are some fishermen who
would oppose this 200-mile limit. It doesn't
protect the salmon fishermen on the west
coast, in the northwest and Alaska. It doesn't
set well with the tuna fishermen because this
limit is what the Peruvians are trying to do
to them now. It doesn't please the shrimp
fishermen because of their high-seas shrimp
fleet.
However, all attempts to come to an inter-
national agreement based on a biological
rather than geological basis have been in-
effectual.
Therefore it is necessary for the United
States to move unilaterally until such agree-
ments can be worked out. We cannot sit and
wait while our own coastal waters are being
depleted by foreign trawlers of nations who
are holding up negotiations.
I am pleased today to hear the testimony
of Jacob Dykstra, President of the Point
Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association,
Inc., who is a proponent of this legislation. I
am sure his views will point out the need for
direct action by the United States immedi-
ately.
OPENING STATEMENT
(By Senator JOHN 0. PASTORE)
Today, the Senate Commerce Commitee's
Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere
continues a series of hearings we have been
holding on legislation which would extend
American jurisdiction over ocean fishing
from the current 12-mile limit to 200 nauti-
cal miles on an interim basis. We have held
hearings in Washington, D.C., the state of
Washington, Alaska and California. Tomor-
row a field hearing will be held in Boston.
I want to welcome to the bench my good
friend Ted Stevens of Alaska who is co-
sponsoring with me S. 1988. Senator Stevens
is the senior minority member on the Oceans
and Atmosphere Subcommittee and a strong
supporter of a 200-mile fisheries zone.
We on the Commerce Committee view field
hearings such as this one as absolutely vital
to a full discussion of this legislation which
is the most important national fisheries is-
sue now before the Congress, an issue which
is vital not only to our fishermen but to all
Americans.
We have taken our hearings into the field
because this issue is so critical and because
we have to make every effort to obtain as
wide a range of views as possible on the
matter. It is impossible for everyone to jour-
ney to Washington to testify and that's why
we're here.
We have scientists from the University of
Rhode Island, members of the General As-
sembly and representatives of sportsfisher-
men's groups scheduled to testify.
But we also want to hear from the com-
mercial fishermen who, on a day-to-day
basis, must confront the massive foreign
fleets operating just off our shores. I know
that the fishermen have a most articulate
and capable spokesman in Jake Dykstra but
if there are any fishermen here who would
like to speak and who are not scheduled we
would be happy to hear from you after the
scheduled witnesses have finished testifying.
We are sponsoring this bill for two funda-
mental reasons. Because we have to protect
our fleets?our fishermen who have a tradi-
tion of three centuries of going out to sea
and who are now losing their livelihoods by
the thousands. And because we have to move
quickly before breeding stocks of already
seriously depleted species are endangered.
Virtually every single commercially valu-
able fish in the waters off New England is
being rapidly depleted. You can name them?
the cod, the haddock, the lobster, the At-
lantic herring, the yellowtail flounder, the
Atlantic mackerel, the Atlantic halibut.
If anyone needs to be convinced of the im-
pact made by the foreign fleets on our New
England fishermen let's take a look at what
has happened to Gloucester and New Bedford
and Boston.
Boston was once the home of one of the
proudest and largest fleets on the northwest
Atlantic. Now it has a tiny fishing fleet.
Thousands of Boston fishermen were driven
from their liveltood on the sea as foreign
fleets virtually exterminated the haddock
and Boston was once the biggest haddock
port in the world.
Gloucester was once the greatest fishing
port in America. Today her fleet struggles for
survival. In New Bedford, which remains
one of the leading fishing ports on the east
coast, the viability of a fleet and thousands
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of jobs are threatened as our stocks of yel-
lowtail hounder steadily diminish.
Now r know?an of us who are sponsoring
this legislation?Senator Stevens, Senator
Magnuson, we know that ultimately the so-
lution to the problem of the systematic de-
struction of our marine fishery resourees by
overfishiiig can only Mine when the nations
of the world agree to an international regu-
latory regime governing the exploitaticn and
the conservation of the world's fishery
resources.
But, w a feel very strongly that our iisher-
les and Our fishermen' must be given interim
protection until such international agree-
ments gei) into effect. Otherwise there may be
nothing left to protect.
After three years of preparation, the Law
of the Sea Conference will get under way in
Caracas a little more than a month from
now on J'one 20.
What are the prospects of rapid agreement?
Just two weeks ago in Washington, Kenneth
Rush; the Acting Secretary of State, testi-
fied before this committee? rather reluc-
tantly / might odd, and only after being
prodded several times by questions?that the
Department of State does not expect an
agreement this summer.
He expressed uncertainty about obtaining
an agreement by 1975. Well, it may be several
years Wore deliberations are completed.
And it's going to take a few more years atter
that--sorne have testified as many as 10
years--before the requisite number of na-
tions will ratify the treaty to implement it.
So now we are talking about 1980 or 1985
or even beyond before we have a working in-
ternational instrument. Now if we continue
to sit on our halide, which is the position
of the State Department and the 'White
House, there are just not going to be enough
fish left worth protecting by 1980.
We have taken testimony in Washington,
but I wqat to repeat Where in Providence,
that by 1980 the world's fishing fleets are ex-
pected tse take 100 Millicat tons of fish. Sci-
entists tell us that 100 million tons is the
inaelecuuie yield of fish that can be taken
from the oceans of the World annually with-
out doing biological harm to world breed-
ing stocks. The world's fishing fleets ars now
harvestin,s about 70 million tons of fish an-
nually.
.These are the best projections available
to the National Marine Fisheries Service.
But in the face of this kind of forecast, the
State Department and the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration neverthe-
less come before us to tell us that we are
making a serious mistake in considering this
legislaticen. They plead with us to do nothing
until the Law of the Sea Conference com-
pletes its deliberations.
The State Department tells us that it the
United States takes unilateral action in ex-
tending its fisheries zone to 200 miles the
U.S. position at Caracas will he jeopardized.
I am ii. direct disagreement with the De-
partment of State and so are a considerable
number of Senators and Congressmen. In-
deed, we feel that Congressional approval
of a 200-mile limit bill will strengthen the
position AA our negotiators at Caracas. In
fact, many observers tell us a 200-mile fish-
eries zone is likely to come out of the Law
of the Sea Conference anyway.
We can no longer tolerate or afford delay
because foreign fleets, anticipating a 200-
mile zone coming out of the Law of the Sea
Conferenee, are increasing their activity off
our shores. Once a 200-mile fisheries zone
is established they will then be able to ne-
gotiate with us downward from a bigher
number Of vessels because, and we all know
this, a 200-mile zone will mean a gradual
reduction in the number of foreign vessels.
not a disappearance of all foreign vessels.
There is no question that if we do not
take action quickly to try to moderate for-
taign fishing pressure in New England waters
and in other .emericae coastal areas, some
species are going to be irreversibly depleted.
This is not just rhetoric because the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service has done
study after study demonstrating the decline
of important New England fish stocks under
ihe impact of foreign fishing fleets.
I am concerned about further delay and
remain skeptical about the effectiveness
of international negotiation despite some
heralded successes in establishing overall
fishing quotas by the Laternational Commis-
sion for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
IICNAF) last October in Ottowa.
My concerns flow from the fundamental
lack of success, of ICNAF, a vehicle for in-
ternational negotiation, over the past quar-
ter century. Now ICNAF was established
when the Northwest Atlantic.?the fishing
grounds off New England, the Georges Bank
and the Grand Banka?was still the richest
and most preiiiic fishing grounds in the
world.
With ICNAF watcheeg?these great fish-
ing grounds, which New Englanders fished for
centuries without doing ecological damage--
the foreign fleets moved in and decimated
the largest stocks of fish in the world.
Not until the very existence of the haddock
was imminently threatened did ICNAF take
firm action late last year. But the damage
to the haddock was so great that the mem-
ber nations of ICNAF were forced to clamp
a ban on all directed fishing for haddock.
For decades the Georges Bank haddock
fishery had been yielding 50,000 metric tons
annually, mostly to American fishermen.
This is the maximum the Georges Bank had-
dock fishery could yield without sustaining
biological damage. Our scientists knew this
when the foreign fleets moved in in the 1960's
and disrupted the balance sustained for so
long by our New England fishermen.
Now, from a point 30 years ago where we
took 60,000 tons of haddock yearly from the
Georges Bank, our fishermen have been en-
jeined from going out and fishing purposely
for haddock. Only accidental catches of had-
dock taken while fishing for other species
are permitted. ?
This is not secret information. The facts
and figures concerning the demise of the
haddock have been developed by the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service which has
been documenting this catastrophe for 10
years now. But what did the United States
do about it? Nothing! Nothing effective was
done until the haddock was on the edge of
extermination and it still remains to be
seen if the October ICNAF agreements will
work or can be enforced.
I will not document what has happened to
toe yellowtail founder or the herring or the
cod but the tale of massive depletion of these
species in the face of inaction by the United
States is similar if not quite as dramatic. It
is a story clearly told in the statistics and
documents furnished )ne by the National
Marine Fisheries Service.
What I am saying is this is crisis fisheries
management and totally inadequate. We have
b) move before our fishes and our fishermen
are on the endangered species list.
And what I em saying Is that 25 years of
international negotiations involving 16
countries through ICNAF has been tragically
ineffective. The time for waiting for inter-
national negotiations to succeed is over. That
is what I am saying and that is what my
celleagues such as the distinguished Senator
from Alaska?who has witnessed the same
esolpgical disaster occur in the waters of his
sate--are saying.
Let me take a moment to describe the bill.
S. 1988 is an interim measure to extend the
contiguous fisheries zone of the United States
to protect our resources and our fishing in-
dustry until agreements are reached. The bill
mandates the Secretary of State to initiate
negotiations as soon as possible with all for-
eign governments whose vessels now fish off
American coasts to regulate?mot eliminate--
foreign fishing from Ameeican coastal waters.
The government would also be mandated to
seek international negotiations for the ra-
tional use and conservation of American
fisheries resources. The bill would authorize
the Seeretary of Commerce to carry out or
subsidize research to improve conservation
of fish and it would authorise $1 million for
that purpose.
Before we proceed, I want to note that my
colleague Se:labor Pell, and our Congressmen
Fernand St Germain and Robert 0. Tiernan
have submitted statements for this hearing
and I now want to introduce them int e the
record.
welcome you all here today and :ook for-
ward to your testimony.
Our first witness
Mr. PASTORE. Now, Mr. President, let
us understand what this is all about. No
one wants to interfere with the freedom
of navigation on the seas, and this is not
the purpose of the bill at all. Anybody
who wants to ship to the United States
of America can Come here and come
within the 200-mile limit and nobody is
going to bother him. That is not the pur-
pose at all. The purpose here is con-
servation.
When I was up in Rhode Island at the
hearings on May 13, 1974, they showed
us these slides; these fishermen showed
us these slides.
Here is this big Bulgarian ship, almost
as big as one of our old battleships, with
all kinds of equipment on board, going up
and down the Rhode Island coast de-
stroying our lobster pots, destroying all
of our fishing nets, and we are trying to
save and conserve our fishing industry. It
is not alone the economics, Mr, Presi-
dent; it is a question of propagation of
the species.
They come in here from Russia, they
come in here from Japan, they come in
here from Bulgaria, they come in here
from all over the world. They just sweep
up all of our fish. There is nothing left.
The haddock is all gone and it is hard to
find lobster anymore, and the few pots
they have out there are being destroyed.
Suit after salt is being brought; nothing
is being pa:.cl, and that is what we are
up against.
Now we are saying here, give us a
chance, give us a chance in management.
We are not prohibiting anybody coming
in, but what we are trying to do is to
manage this in such a way that every-
body can eat the fish, not alone the Bul-
garians, the Russians, and Japanese.
That is what this is all about, and I
:hope that the Senate will go on record.
There is a Imitation on this bill. It goes
out of effeo; immediately upon a multi-
lateral agreement. We are looking for-
ward to it, tut as the manager of the bill
already pointed out, the distinguished
Senator from -Washington, for 12 years
they have been promising a multilateral
agreement and nothing has ever hap-
pened.
I am afraid that unless we in Con-
gress take a step, nothing Is ever going
to happen, 8.nd the purpose of this bill
is to give them a nudge at Geneva. If we
pass this bill today in the Senate I will
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guarantee that the tone in Geneva will limit and the proposed 200-mile fishery
be a lot different_ thEM .i..**,:lik .Cftrft- , Wile liMit, Nothing Will change with re-
.
cas where ikt was_ an a? solute _dienis.1, gard to the traditional American policy
failure. . . . of respecting the concept of freedom of
; 'Mr.. President, it is 'imperative that shipping on the high seas.
the Congress move as expeditiously as If an international negotiated settle-
possible in passing S. 1988, the Einer- ment of a 200-mile fishing zone cduld be
geney Marine Fisheries Protection Act reached quickly, it would be most desir-
e! 1974. -" ' ' able, but such a settlement is nowhere in
' With each passing day, the impor- sight. The long-awaited and much-
tanbe of enacting this bill into law, in- heralded Law of the Sea Conference in
creases. The stakes: axe net small. The Caracas has brought us no closer to this
continuedeidsterice Of -the Anieriean goal. In the meantime, without effective
, _ , . , . - .
fishing induirry IS at stake. An industry steps to regulate the intensity of foreign
that is built upon ocean fishing, one Of fishing off our shores, our fish stocks, at
the oldest c,ommercial enterprises en- one time the greatest in the world, will
gaged In by Americani Is directly threat- continue to decline under steadily in-
ened and' little:hai lpeen,clerie to help creasing foreign fishing pressures. We
onr fisliernien. 0444 the fact' that the certainly do not propose to eliminate for-
warning flagihave been flying now for eign fishermen from fishing off America's
nearly two deeades. It appears that the shores, but only to moderate these fishing
Congress is ping 'tO' have to take the pressures somewhat. This bill would give
initi.01,Ye M'id, $]..11),,K,t ould 'be a small the U.S. Government the tools to reason-
step toward heIgng oin. ITShernien sin-- ably regulate, by negotiation, foreign
vive under the increagligli intense pres- fishing effort, And it must be remembered
sures OZ *Ave, Zpreign fishing fleets. that this is an interim measure that will
Furth,prinere, ankperhaps
mare criti- remain effective only until the United
cal in the,lerig run, the. continued exist- States can negotiate an extended fishing
awe of some Ofeits, Rest important zone with the other nations qf the world,.
stocks of ocean fish,ieb. direbt. and in- This bill must be enacted into law now,
minent don er,' the oceans provide one and we must immediately move to imple-
ti t
of the w . 1, ' Q?VaippiNant resources ment good management and conserva-
1
'a t9Qc1: w .._,P .p.a,tioii,s., OtSfie world tion policies if we do not want to see the
gT,Ope: 0. he fieXt decade tO .solve the oceans of the world slowly become de-
WerleV,s'problem Of rood shortages and to pleted of edible fish.
61 se;Onn
.1.
entain*: a t;t4e ifyijArL, nc :i ti?ue to yield 'OPt is absolutely eS,- r thank the Senator for yielding me
sentiat t
the time.
an Undiminished _enpnlY . of feed. arid Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield
protein. such time as the Senator from New
Yet this IS no liiii0r-a-certainty. We Hampshire may use. .
once thought the ocean47, of 'the World Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I am a
would yield iob ii-Inai tons a fish an- cosponsor of this bill and am in complete
nually without biological damage being accord with everything the Senator from
done to fish Stckki and that this maxi- Washington and the Senator from Rhode
mum.sUitainable,yield,w4d be achieved Island have said.
by abotit 1060. alit' "we now find that I think that the President has been
feyeriehly infenSiVe: fishing has caused misled and ill-advised concerning the
biological daink09 1'4. stocks in some effect of this bill and the need for it. It
area and ive?80 ilq19-niei.ecilmn_ 4git is imperative this bill be passed.
'total fish 'hary,ests wAl, opti046, to In- Therefore, as a cosponsor of the pend-
ereaSe year by year by year. After tak- Ing bill, S. 1988., I wish to express my
Mg fOr granted what, we thOught were strong support for this legislation, carry-
the limitless reipurceos ot, the seas, we lug the short title of .the "Emergency
suddenly are .sheolked ., by how limited Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974."
they actually are. Mr. President, in expressing my sup-
'We want to. deprive no one of the food port for S. 1988, I am well aware that
he needs; we Want to prevent no nation the President and several representatives
from fishing to 'teed its hungry people. of the executive branch have communi-
But we, ,n-Apsf take immediate, steps to cated their respective opposition to this
conserVp oUr_ 0,41 ,,-ukppjiep. we mut iin,.- bill on the grounds that "passage could
mediately begin implementing censer- seriously harm U.S. oceans and foreign
vation and Ash management programs relations interests," and that our best op-
t? insure that there will De Ash left in Portunity for resolution of the problems
the oceanafor ou which S. 1988 addresses lies in "a corn-
This grandchildren.
,bill will be e, SMalll moye in the urehensive new oceans law treaty now
right direction, This ,bill would bring the being negotiated within the Third United
it',I.S. .GoVernment hit() the active man,- Nations Conference on the Law of the
agement of fishery. resources. The bill Sea."
-WPWa: iit-148.119PP,,e-ethgr nktio-11s, to The President has further stated that
rout.tbe pro less of fisheries deple- Pending such a comprehensive new ocean
t on and Perhap?.. persuade them to join law treaty he "will do everything possible
with the United States in conservation consistent with our present legal rights
efforts., to protect the interests of U.S. fishermen
The State Department 11- s testified and to preserve the threatened stocks of
repeatedly at our hearings that this bill living resources off our coasts."
Will damage enr foreign relations with Ur. President, I believe that the ex-
respect to our open seas policy. This bill ecutive branch is sincere in its belief,
does not affect the completely free move- albeit somewhat misguided, in the opin-
ment of ships of any other nation be- ion el the Senator from New Hampshire,
tween the U.S. 3-mile territorial sea that S. 1988 is not needed at this time.
S 21083
However, Mr. President, I feel quite
strongly that the contrary is true. The
Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection
Act" of 1974 is needed, and it is needed
now. This leifslation was introduced al-
most a year and a half ago by the dis-
tinguished chairman of our. Committee
on Commerce, Senator MAcKusox, along
with myself and several other concerned
Senators. It has received the most careful
consideration not only by our Committee
on Commerce, but by the Senate's Com-
mittee on Foreign1iclations and by the
Committee on Armed Services. Our own
Committee on Commerce conducted no
less than 12 days of hearings on this leg-
islation and 8 days of those hearings
were conducted in sites outside of Wash_
ington, D.C., in coastal areas most de-
pendent upon the conservation of our
fishery resources.
S. 1968 was approved overwhelmingly
by the members of our Committee on
Commerce. It was approved on a vote of
8 to 6 by our Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, and by the very narrow vote of 8
to 9 failed to be reported favorably by
the Committee on Foreign Relations. I
know of few bills that have undergone
the scrutiny of several committees in this
fashion and survived to be considered by
the full Senate.
Quite frankly, Mr. President, I believe
that many who have sought to oppose
S. 1988 have failed to appreciate fully
two very significant points. First, with S.
1988 those of us sponsoring the legisla-
tion are seeking to fill a void by provid-
ing some immediate national action to
cOnserve valuable fishery resources off
our own shores which are in danger of
being seriously depleted by excessive fish-
ing activities conducted by foreign na-
tions. Second, as described in the very
title of the bill, we seek to extend on an
Interim basis this jurisdiction over fish-
ery resources only to 200 nautical miles
as an emergency measure to protect our
domestic fishing industry. Accordingly,
S. 1988 further provides?
That its provisions shall expire and cease
to be of any legal force and effect on such
date as the Law of the Sea Treaty, or oth-
er comprehensive treaty with respect to fish-
ery jursdiction, which the United States has
signed or is party to, shall come into force
or is provisionally applied.
In summary, Mr. President, we are not
proposing in the Emergency Marine Fish-
eries Protection Act of 1974, that we close
our eyes to the international negotia-
tions still underway at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea. On the contrary, these international
efforts have been specifically recognized.
But, recognizing the time needed to de-
velop an acceptable law of the sea treaty,
as demonstrated by the futility of the
negotiating sessions this past summer in
Caracas, Venezuela, this bill seeks only
to protect our economic interests as a
coastal state, a concept already recog-
nized and acknowledged in the current
international negotiations.
Finally, Mr. President, I would con-
clude by observing that although my
State of New Hampshire has a relatively
short coastline, it, along with its sister
New England States, has a fishing in-
dustry of significant economic impor-
tance and one which is L.,f a long-stand,-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 11, 1974
mg tradition. That most important in-
dustry today faces severe economic
hardship, not from within our borders,
but from outside in waters beyond our
present fishery jurisdiction In tradition-
al fishing grounds which are in danger
of having their resources depleted by
the activities of foreign' fishing fleets.
S. 1988 is in the interest of our coastal
States and in the interest of our nation
if we are to be able to look to the sea
as a solute of food in the future. And,
Mr. President, it is for this reason and
in keeping with these interests that I
urge the favorable consideration of the
Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection
Act of 1974, by my colleagues in the
Senate.
Mr. M.AGNI.TSON. Mr. President, I
yield to the Senator from Maine.
Mr. MUSKIE. / that& the dik tin-
guished Senator from Washington.
At the outset I compliment Senator
MAGNITSON and Senator STEVENS, and the
other Members of the committee, who
have been pursuing this matter so dili-
gently. I have had the opportunity to
observe their efforts closely, both in
Washington and in Caracas. And their
effectiveness regarding this legislation
Is a tribUte to the leadership qualities of
these two Senators.
Mr. President, S. 1988 is one of the
most important bills to come before the
Senate during this entire session of Con-
gress. Slimly put, this legislation would
provide the United States with manage-
ment jurisdiction over fish within a 200-
mile nautital zone, pending the conclu-
sion of an International oceans agree-
inent. The bill also provides Veda' pro-
tection for anadromous epodes that are
hatched in this country and then mi-
grate out into the high seas before re-
turning to spawn in the streams of their
origin.
There is an urgent need to enact this
Interim legislation. Fishermen off both
our east and west coasts are rapidly los-
ing the livelihood of generations because
as a nation we have not responded ade-
quately to global developments in recent
years, allowing our fishing industry to
sink to a low state in our national
priorities,
Specifically, within the last 5 years, the
fishing effort of foreign fleets off our
coasts has Increased severalfold, in a way
which has been so dramatically described
by the distinguished Senator from Rhode
Island (Mr. PASTORE).
At any given time large groups of for-
eign vessels can be sighted off our shores.
In fact, the world's fishing effort is now
so much greater than a decade ago that
stocks Oall be decimated in a season or
two, a rate much faster than interna-
tional negotiations are likely to impose
effective regulation upon them.
The situation in the Gulf of Maine is
Illustrative of the gravity of the situa-
tion. In 1969, Maine fishermen landed
more than 54,000.000 pounds of herring
In 1973, they landed 37,000,000 pound.
In 1969, Maine fishermen landed more
than 58,000,000 pounds of groundfish and
ocean perch. Last year, they landed only
36,000,000 pounds. In 1969, Maine fisher-
men landed almost 18,000 000 pounds of
arldting. Last year landings of whiting in
Mine dropped to 5,500,000 pounds:
Similar declines in landings can be
shown for other species. The simple fact
is that as a result of a massive foreign
fishing effort off our coasts in the last
fey years, scientists have now concluded
that about 25 stocks of fish are depleted
or threatened with depletion.
At present, the United States is party
to 22 international fishing agreements
ar d virtually all of the fish stocks de-
pleted or threatened with depletion are
subjects of these agreements. Obviously,
further steps must be taken to prevent
the depletion of our offshore stocks?for
the sake of conserving the world's fish-
eries resources as well as preserving the
U.S. fishing industry. And enactment of
S. 1988 is the most effective interim step
that our Government can?and should--
tate to manage, regulate, and control the
tasing of fish within. 200 miles of our
shores.
During the first week in August, along
with Senators STEVENS and PELL, I at-
tatded the Caracas Conference. At the
time. I indicated my support for S. 1988.
Reaction was predictable?that this kind
of unilateral action could conceivably
torpedo the Conference. Well, with
respect to the Conference, let me state
my own view.
My first impression from visiting the
Caracas meetings is that the prospects
for eventually writing a new law of the
sea are more promising than I expected
them to be before X attended the Con-
ference. But my second impression is
that achieving that goal is going to take
much longer than the more optimistic
dc legates to the Conference would like to
st ggest. After 5 years of preparatory
werk, the Conference is still bogged down
In preliminary matters. About 60 of the
149 nations are still trying to develop
ti dr own national positions on the use
ol the seas, while many of the others
we widely divergent points of view.
Even Ambassador Amerasinghe, the
chairman of the conference, has ex-
pressed public doubt about the possibili-
ti..ls for progress at the conference in the
near term. His colleague from Sri Lanka,
C. W. Pinto, perceptively summarized
the progress achieved in Caracas when
he said after the meetings concluded at
the end of August?
Progress has been not in bringing the sides
closer together, but in clearly defining where
they are farthest apart.
It is my own guess that it will take at
least until 1976 before the nations repre-
sented at the conference can work out
the complex range of issues?and there
a e some 90 of theta in number--that
n,ust be worked out if a new law of the
sea is to be written. Time and time again
lit discussions with foreign diplomats in
Caracas, I heard it said that "we need
time to build new international law."
Certainly, time is needed for ideas to
mature concerning some of the more
cnmplex issues the conferees are dealing
with.
But if we are to meserve our offshore
asicks, I do not think we can afford to
wait until the Law of the Sea Conference
produces a treaty. For by the time this
takes place, there will be precious few
offshore stocks to protect.
In Caracas, several foreign delegates
suggested to me and the other U.S. Sena-
tors attending the conference that the
United States ought not to act irrespon-
sibly by enacting unilateral fish legisla-
tion, such as the bill before us today. If
we are being asked to exercise restraint
with respect to this kind of legislation,
then it seemed to me not unreasonable to
ask restraint in the ehortrun of those
who have created the problem off our
coasts?the Soviets, the Germans, the
Poles, the British and the Japanese. But
when I suggested this to their delegates
in Caracas, X got very little positive re-
sponse and sensed that few of these na-
tions share our sense of urgency about
the need to protect offshore fish stocks
in the North Atlantic.
And upon my return to this country, I
was further disturbed by an increasing
lack of restraint on the part of those
countries which are fishing off the coast
of my own State of Maine. Haddock is
already an endangered species. And yet
Britain is now beginning to fish for had-
dock off our coasts?in complete viola-
tion of the Zero quota for haddock in the
North Atlantic agreed to at the recent
ICNAF meetings.
In addition, this summer there have
been a number of incidents?and the
number is Increasing?.of intrusions upon
the fixed gear of our herring fishermen.
These intrusions constitute nothing but
wanton and apparently deliberate de-
struction, leaving our fishermen with
little but uncertain claims against name-
less perpetrators.
Where is the restraint on the part of
these countries and their fishing fleets
with respect to intrusions upon our
coastal waters, our Continental Shelf,
and our fishermen? Where is the re-
straint with, respect to the incidental
fishing that has not been negotiated
under ICNAF?of lobster and other
ground species? That incidental fishing
goes on without any pretense of control
under XCNAl. And no restraint is shown.
So I say that the lack of restraint on
the part of the great maritime powers of
the world is a greater danger to the Law
of the Sea Conference than this legisla-
tions
Now, there is a recent precedent for
taking a hard-nosed attitude to protect
our fishing interests. And that precedent
has to do with the ICNAF agreements
themselves.
In June of 1973, the 17 member na-
tions of the International Commission
for the Nortawest Atlantic Fisheries held
their annual meeting and discussed the
need to limit the total fishing effort in
the Northwest Atlantic. The meeting did
not produce any agreement, largely be-
cause this country could not get any
other members to exercise restraint. But
during the summer of 1973, in large part
due to domestic political pressure, the
U.S. Government announced that it
would withdraw its membership from
ICNAF if concrete progress was not made
In 1973 to limit foreign fishing in the
Northwest Atlantic. As a result, in Octo-
ber of 1973, a special meeting of ICNAF
was convened in Ottawa at which an
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19 S 21085
agreement was reached on an overall
quota system for the fisheries off the
Atlantic coast of the United-States. The
quotas reached applied toboth individual
species?some 54?and to the overall fish
catch.
For l91,4, the overall quota was set at
929,000 metric tons. For MS, the over-
all quota was to be reduced to 850,000
metric tons, with the U.S. share of the
total quota increasing from roughly 20
to 25 percent in 1975. And for 1976, the
member nations have agreed to set an
overall quota at a level consistent with
maintaining the maximum sustainable
yield.
The difficulty with this agreement is
that it is not enforceable. It is not being
enforced now, nor is it enforceable
against what the British are doing. And
It is not having any effect at all in pro-
tecting our fishermen and fish gear from
deliberate sabotage and destruction of
their gear.
? May I say that protecting our offshore
fishery stocks is something more than a
national interest. It is a global interest.
If we coastal states do not take effective
action to protect these stocks, who in
Heaven's name is going to do so?
The Russian fishing fleet? The Jap-
anese fishing fleet? There is no evidence
to support any such possibility.
? So I say it is proper and necessary for
Congress to enactthis legislation. And
whatever doubts I may have had on that
score before I went to Caracas have been
resolved by my attendance at that con-
ference, notwithstanding the fact that I
remain convinced that an enforceable
international agreement on the use Of
the Oceans is the best Way in the long run
to stop the overfishing which threatens
to ruin our fisheries resources.
One final point about S. 1988. And that
Is that this legislation is consistent with
the U.S. position as enunciated in Ca-
racas. In a major statement on July 11,
Ambassador Stevenson, head of the U.S.
delegation to the Conference, announced
a new U.S. position on the concept of a
200-mile economic zone.
At the time, he stated that?
This country is prepared to accept, and
indeed, would welcome general agreement on
a 12-mile outer lirnit for the territorial sea
and a 209-mile outer limit for the economic
zone provided that it Is part of an acceptable
comprehensive Package.
The point is, moreover, that the new
U.S. position accepts the concept of 200
miles for fishery management jurisdic-
tion. It also accords with the two other
fishery management proposals contained
In S. 1988?that management of anad-
romous species such as salmon be han-
dled by the nation in whose rivers they
Spawn and that managemnt of migra-
tory species such as tuna be handled
through international commissions.
But, Mr. PresidenMis legislation dif-
fers from the official U.S. position in one
critical respect. It recognizes the urgency
of today's situation and mandates im-
mediate interim uniXteral action to reg-
ulate and conserve our offshore marine
resources, This is precisely the reason
why I rise to support this legislation and
urge its passage.
Mr. President, on behalf of the distin-
guished Senator from Washington (Mr.
/VfAmusoN) Senator STEVENS, Senator
KENNEDY, Senator PACKWOOD, Senator
WEICKER, and myself, I call up my
amendment which is at the desk.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. The amendment will be stated.
The 'assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to read the amendment.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask that
further reading of the amendment be
dispensed with.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
"SEC. 13, Secton 4 of the Fish and Wildlife
Act of 1956 (16 U.S.C. 742c; 70 Stat. 1121),
as amended, is further amended by adding
the following new subsection:
"(f) (1) The Secretary of Commerce is au-
thorized, under such terms and conditions
as he may prescribe by regulation to use
funds appropriated under this section to
,
compensate owners and operators whose fish-
ing vessels or gear have been destroyed or
damaged by the actions of foreign fishing
vessels operating in waters superjacent to
the Continental Shelf of the United States
as defined in the Convention of the Con-
tinental Shelf.
"(2) Upon receipt of an application filed
by an owner or operator pursuant to this
subsection after the effective date of this
subsection by the owner or operator of any
vessel documented or certificated under the
laws of the United States as a commercial
fishing vessel and after determination by
the Secretary that there is reason to believe
that such vessel or its gear was destroyed or
damaged while under the control of such
owner or operator in waters superjacent to
the Continental Shelf of the United States
?by the actions of a vessel (including crew)
of a foreign nation, the Secretary shall, as
soon as pradticable but not later than 30
days after receipt of an application, make
a non-interest-bearing loan to such owner
or operator from the fisheries loan fund cre-
ated under subsection (c) of this section.
Any such loan, as determined by the Sec-
retary, Shall be in an amount equal to the
replacement value of the damaged or de-
stroyed property and the market value of
fish, if any, onboard such vessel and within
such gear which are lost or spoiled as the
result of such damage or destruction. Any
such loan shall?
"(A) be conditional upon the owner or
operator of such damaged or destroyed prop-
erty assigning to the Secretary of Com-
merce any rights of such owner or operator
to recover or such damages;
"(B) be subject to other requirements of
this section with respect to loans which are
not inconsistent with this subsection; and
"(C) be subject to other terms and condi-
tions which the Secretary determines neces-
sary for the purposes of this subsection.
"(3) The Secretary of Commerce shall,
within one hundred and eighty days of re-
ceipt of a loan application, investigate each
incident as a result of which a loan Is made
pursuant to this subsection and?
",(A) if he deterthines in any such case
that the destruction or damage was caused
solely by a vessel (including crew) of a for-
eign nation, he shall cancel repayment of
such loan and refund any principal paid
thereon prior to such cancellation and seek
recovery from such foreign nation;
."(B) if he determines that the damage or
destruction was not caused solely by a vessel
(including crew) of a foreign nation or solely
by the negligence or intentional actions of
the owner or operator of the vessel, he shall
require such owner or operator to repay such
loan at a rate of interest determined by
him, pursuant to subsection (b) of this sec-
tion, which rate shall be retroactive to the
date the loan was originally made; or
"(C) if he determines that the damage or
destruction was caused solely by the negli-
gence or intentional actions of the owner or
operator, he shall require the immediate re-
payment of such loan at a rate of interest
determined by him, pursuant to subsection
(b) of this section, which rate shall be retro-
active to the date the loan was originally
made.
"(4) The Secretary of Commerce and the
Secretary of State shall, with the assistance
of the Attorney General, take steps to collect
any claim assigned to him under this subsec-
tion from any foreign nation involved.
Amounts collected on any such claim shall
be deposited in the fisheries loan fund.
"(5) This subsection shall apply with re-
spect to damages or destruction of vessels or
gear occurring on or after January 1, 1972.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I have
discussed this amendment with the dis-
tinguished Senators MAGNUSON and
STEVENS. Indeed, they are cosponsors of
it.
This amendment is designed to deal
with a serious problem resulting from the
increasing incursion of foreign fleets
into our offshore waters?the problem of
reimbursement of American fishermen
for damage to their vessels or gear caused
by foreign fishermen.
For many years, fishermen off both the
east and west coasts have suffered serious
and often disastrous economic losses as
a result of damage to their gear caused
by foreign fishermen. There are interna-
tional procedures for making claims
against foreign vessels which damage or
destroy fishing gear. But current pro-
cedures are slow, cumbersome, and sel-
dom effective, with the result that most
American fishermen do not even bother
going through the laborious process of
filling out the necessary claims forms.
And in a given case, even if the claims
process is eventually successful, the in-
dividual fisherman with a median income
of $8,000 per year is forced to carry the
financial burden of between $2,000 and
$4,000 for several months or longer.
This summer there were a series of in-
cidents damaging the fixed gear of fish-
ermen off the Maine coast. These in-
cidents of wanton and apparently de-
liberate destruction by West German
ships left our fishermen with only the
most uncertain claims against the
identified perpetrators. Under the exist-
ing procedures, the most likely result of
recovery efforts is that nothing will
happen.
It is bad enough that we are allowing
foreign fishermen to deplete our offshore
stocks and to threaten the health of the
U.S. fishing industry. We must not con-
tinue to allow foreign fishing vessels to
destroy the gear of American fishermen
without providing adequate and imme-
diate financial reimbursement for our
fishermen'.
The amendment I am introducing to-
day is designed to meet this problem.
Specifically, this legislation would require
the Federal Government within 30 days
to assume financial responsibility for
losses to U.S. fishermen caused by for-
eign vessels, pending international nego-
tiations to recover the loss from the for-
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December 1.1, 1974
eign gOvernment involved. In cases where
there Is reason to believe that damage or
destruction did in fact occur as a ',result
of foreign fishing activities, documented
claims would be paid by the Secretary of
Commerce in the form of a non-interest-
bearing loan from. the fisheries loan fund
set up under the Fish and. Wildlife Act of
1956.
Congress created this fund expressly to
finance or refinance the cost of purchas-
ing, constructing, and equipping, main-
taining, or operating commercial fishing
vessels or gear. The loan would be made
in an amount equal to the replacement
value of the damaged or destroyed prop-
erty and the market value of fish on
board a, damaged or destroyed vessel or
within lost, damaged, or destroyed gear.
After the Secretary of Commerce has
completed an investigation of the inci-
dent?an investigation which must be
completed within 6 months after t ae loan
application has been filed?the loan
would be converted to a grant if it were
found that the American fisherman was
not at fault. If, however, the Searetary
found that the damage or destruct: on was
caused by an act of God such as a storm,
the non-interest-bearing loan would be
converted into a loan with interest at a
rate set by the Secretary.
If the American fisherman were found
to be at fault because of negligent or
fraudulent activity, the Secretary would
require the immediate repayment of `the
loan at an interest rate he deemed ap-
propriate and the fisherman would be
subject to criminal prosecution. Govern-
ment responsibility would be retroactive
to January 1, 1972, since most of the
serious damage done to American fisher-
men's gear has been done during the
past 3 years.
Mr. President, I would like to add that
this legislation is not only simple in its
intent and construction. But if enacted,
it could be administered In a straight-
forward and relatively inexpensive man-
ner. Nv.th the enactment of this amend-
ment, 3: would not, for example, foresee
the need to expand the bureaucracy or
_ to set up any new administrative or-
ganizations to handle claims filed by U.S.
fishermen against foreign vessels I be-
lieve the National Marine Fisheries Serv-
ice, as presently structured, could eandle
any increase In the demands made upon
it as a result of this legislation.
Furthermore, the $4 million currently
in the fisheries loan fund should prove
to be more than enough money to take
care of any claims filed pursuant to this
legislation. So it will not be necessary
for Congress to authorize any new
moneys with the *passage of this bill.
Mr. President, as things stand today,
most American fishermen feel the.; filing
claims is hardly worth the time, money,
and trouble since there is such a high
probability that pursuit of the existent
claims process will prove fruitless. It is
imperative that the Federal Government
initiate new measures to reform the
claims DrOCESS. The amendment I inn of-
fering today?by providing the individual
fisherman with the capital he needs to
get back in business while the Gavern-
merit negotiates with the responsible for-
eign governments for reimbursement?
provides, I feel, a reasonable approach
to this problem. I urge my colleagues to
support this legisle,
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ap-
plaud the S.,enator from Maine for this
amendment, and 3: would hope that he
would make me a cosponsor.
In support of this amendment, I have
in my office now several cases of fisher-
men in my State 'mhos? gear has been
damaged, whose boats have been dam-
aged, whose nets he been damaged, and
they have to file a claim with a: foreign
government.
The Russians just settled two cases in
Rhode Island, and it took 2 years to do it.
By that time the fishermen were almost
ready to go out of business.
I have another ease in my office of a
fisherman who has made a claim against
the Spaniards and the Russians or Japa-
nese.
The big question here is that we pay
off when foreign governments seize our
vessels down along the coast of South
America, ani I think the same ought to
be done up here, too.
Mr. MUS:KIE. I thank the Senator
from Rhode Island for his point.
Mr. MAGNUSON. As the Senator from
Rhode Island pointed out, there is ample
precedent for this. We have helped our
fishermen like this for years with the
squabbles they have had off the western
coast of South America. It just means
that fishermen whc are damaged, little,
independent people and often a family
operation, cannot wait very long to get
paid. This has worked out fine. The Gov-
ernment has paid the claim, The Govern-
ment utilmately gets the money back
sooner or later, but big government can
wait longer than a little fisherman.
The Senator Iron Alaska and I would
be glad to accept the amendment.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MUSKIE. I yield.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am
pleased to cosponsor the amendment.
We have had some very serious prob-
lems in my area. I recall once when we
had the new pride of the Alaskan fish-
ing fleet on the g sounds for the first
time, the Viking King. A foreign trawler
went across its trawl line and actually
stripped the whole trawl gear out of this
brand new vessel. It Was laid up for the
whole season. and lost the entire season.
I believe that the great problem of
putting one small outfit in a position of
negotiating with a foreign government,
and that is really what occurs on our
fishing grounds, cart only be met through
the amendment that we have all cospon-
sored with the Senator from Maine.
Mr. President, I think this amend-
ment is a very good addition to this bill.
I hope in due time the whole Congress
will recogn12e the validity of this ap-
proach.
Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator yield
for a further observation?
Mr. MUSKIE. Yes.
Mr. PASTORE. The State Department
is opposed to the pending bill, but the
State Department has no qualms at all
in seeing to It that when our fishermen
are arrested along the South American
roast, and they are fined, we reimburse
them for the fine. We deduct it from the
foreign aid we give them, and we pay
them the balance. Then if their boats or
catches are confiscated we try to do
something for them.
I am saying if that is the position that
we are going to be in in South America,
It is abort time we began to do some-
thing for our fishermen who are damaged
up around New England.
Mr. M13SKIE. I thank the Senator
from Rhode Island for his comments.
Mr. corroN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. MUSK. Yes.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, I would
like to have my name added as a co-
sponsor of this amendment.
Mr, MUSKIE. Mr. President, I ask
that both the Senator from Rhode Island
and the Senator from New Hampshire be
added as cosponsors.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection it is so ordered.
Mr. M1JSKIE. I yield to Senator PACK-
WOOD, who introduced his own bill. With
Se?nator KENNEDY, we combined our
efforts to produce this amendment. I ex-
press my eppreeiatior.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, I can
echo the same experiences that the Sen-
ator from Maine and others have had.
Within the last 6 or 8 months off Oregon
we have had Russian trawlers going right
over the nets of our fishing boats.
We have. had the Soviet-United States
Fishery Claims Board, which has failed
to provide compensation to the vast ma-
jority of those American fishermen who
have sustained damages. We have one
claim of two fishermen of Oregon over
a year old, with nothing done, no finding
of fault or lack of fault, nothing.
If that is the situation we are going
to put our fishermen in, it seems to me
it is incumbent on the American Govern-
ment to take some responsibility for
these claims and let them argue as to
whether whoever hr-mens to run over
these nets is liable.
I am delighted to Join with the Senator
from Maine and others in cosponsoring
this amendment. I regard it as vital
to the protection of our fishermen's
interests.
Mr. President, I am extremely pleased
to be able to join with Senators Meseta
MAGNTISON, KENNEDN, HATFIELD, and
WEIMER in sponsoring this amendment
to S. 1988, the Emergency Marine Fish-
eries Protection Act of 1974. Our amend-
ment provides a more speedy and equita-
ble procedure for the recovery of claims
brought by American commercial fisher-
men who have had -Weir vessels or gear
damaged by foreign, fishermen.
Last summer I met with four black cod
fishermen from Astoria, Oreg., who pro-
vide a vivid example of why this legisla-
tion is so desperately needed. During the
last 18 months each of these four men
has lost thousands of dollars of fishing
gear when Russian vessels tore out their
buoys and pots.
Their sit aation is not unique in Oregon.
In February 1974 I conducted hearings
In Coos Bay, Oreg., and received testi-
mony from other fishermen complaining
about harassment, intimidation, and
damage to their vessels or gear by foreign
fishing fleets.
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DeCember 11, 19
. ,
Unfortunately, Oregon fishermen have debate on the nomination of Mr. Frank
found it virtually impossible to be G. Zarb.
reimbursed for their claims. The prob- The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
lem finds its rodt in bureaucratic red- pore. Without objection., it is so ordered.
tape, diplomatic finagling, and In the Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
end the burden is borne by the fisher- I ask unanimous consent that the dis-
men. And, Mr. President, this is one net cussion on the nomination follow the
our fishermen cannot handle; it is a net disposition of the nomination of Mr.
of overbearing circumstances which I Conant.
believe our fishermen should not have to The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
handle. pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
I am sure that other coastal Senators Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD subsequently
will attest to the fact that their -fisher- said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous
men have similar concerns. On the east consent, as in executive session, that my
coast and on the west coast, off Coos previous consent orders with respect to
Bay, Oreg., and Boothbay Harbor, Maine, 7rwrirt. 4444 ty0e,....
this Nation's commercial fishermen ha'' PRESIDENT pro tern-
been mauled by foreign fishing fleets th3 pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
deplete our marine resources and thel
if that were riot enough, deliver th
knockout punch of gutting buoys an
pots, leaving fishing gear a mangled Ines .
I believe those Americans who fish o The Senate continued with the consid-
our shores, who bend their bacis an eration of the bill (S. 1088) to extend on
fight the sea, need a helping hand wile an interim basis the jurisdiction of the
the fight of the sea switches from pur1 United States over certain ocean areas
suing fish to being pursued by foreigi ahd fish in order to protect the domestic
fleets. fishing industry, and for other purposes.
What, we propose would simply an Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield
efficiently provide loans in the amount myself such time as I may need.
equal to the replacement value -of the My State has more than half of the
damaged or destroyed property owner coastline of the United States and is the
by the complainant. If the Secretary or great protein warehouse of this country,
Commeroe determines the 'destruction,? if not of the world. We have suffered too
was caused by vessels of a foreign nation, king from the marauding invaders off
he is authorized to cancel repayment of Otir Coast who at one time I described as
the loan. If the damage involved was not being people who used vacuum cleaners
incurred by actions of a foreign vessel on the ocean for, through' their trawl-
er gear. Now I think it would be more
at and timely to say that they are really
strip-mining the oceans, and they are
doing it in a way that is absolutely be-
yeind repair. We have already lost 12
species which are now in the situation of
being threatened with extinction as a
result of the activities of foreign fishing
fleets off our coasts.
We seek here a very direct approach.
We seek to temporarily extend our fishing
zones 200 miles, in order to declare con-
servation principles that all civilized na-
tions should adhere to, to be applicable to
the areas off our coasts. It is a temporary
solution.
This approach is based upon the con-
cept that all of us who support this bill,
I believe, would rather have a multi-
lateral, firm, permanent solution accepted
by the world by consensus to protect the
fisheries resources of the oceans. But it
seems impossible to get the Law of the
Sea Conference to recognize that no time
is left for the fisheries?that there is no
time to debate the navigation problem,
the problem of the seabed, the width of
straits. All those questions, incidentally,
will not be affected by time. Only the
future of the fisheries of the oceans of
the world will be affected by time, and
time is running out for those fisheries, so
fqr as I am concerned.
ell j4ve been privileged to be sent to
LIMITATION OP DEBA* ON 'ki9MI-, ' ch of the Law of the Sea meetings to
NATION OF FRANK G. ZARB date, since I have been in the Senate, and
I share the feelings of our chairman, the
Mr. ROBERT Q. BYRD. Mr. President, great ,Senator from Washington (Mr.
I as nnanimous.consent, as in executive MAGNUSON) 7 in terms of the progress that
session, that there be not to exceed 1 hour has not been made. We have yet to sepa-
EMERGENCY MARINE FISHERIES
ACT OF 1974
then the owner will be required ,to repay
the loan- at a rake of interest determined
appropriate by _the ? Secretary of Corn-
thence.
Finally, Mr. President, this amendment
was conceived in order to put the fisher-
man back into the business of fishing
and out of channe swIAieh, flow with red
tape and International stalemate. It is
the U.S. Government wliich should deal
with those nations responsible for the
damage done by their fleets.
The fisherman shotild he allowed to
do what he knows best and what the na-
tion needs most: his fishing abilities.
Loans authorized by this amendment
would take the fisherman out of hock
and put him back at the helm where he
belongs. The Senate in passing this
amendment can restore that order.
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr, President, I move
the adoption of the amendment.
The ACTING PRESIDaTT pro tern-
pore. The question is on agreeing to the
amendment of the Senator, from. Maine,
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. MUSKI. Mr. President, I move to
reconsider the vote by which the amend-
ment was agreed to.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move
to lay that motion on the table.
Themotion to, table was agreed to.
rate the one issue that could be-solved by
the world now; the only issue, as I said,
that will be affected by the passage of
time?that is the issue of fisheries protec-
tion.
I do not see how we can do other than
send a very strong message to the Law of
the Sea negotiators in Geneva. That mes-
sage should be that we are willing to go
back again in April; that we are willing
once again to try to convince the nations
of the world that they must stop the
Vacuum cleaner mehods of the foreign
fishing fleets not only off our coasts but
also off the other coastlines of the world;
that if they fail to do this next 'year,
that this Congress will have no alernative
but to act unilateraly, not on an interim
basis, but permanently to extend our
jurisdiction to 200 miles and to declare
stiff penalties on anyone who violates the
sound conservation principles that the
world has now come to recognize.
I had hoped we would be able to get
this bill passed by Congress this year. We
know now that we cannot. We now know
that in the closing days of Congress, it
will not pass the other body. But I urge
the Members of the Senate to support
this bill, to send that strong warning
and message to the Law of the Sea nego-
tiators: tell them we are losing patience
with this group of international nego-
tiators who seem to spend more time on
procedure than they do on the substance
of the problems before them.
I mentioned to the representatives at
Caracas that we had a habit in the Sen-
ate that if we wanted to record our long
speeches, we would do what I am going
to do now, and that is to put the speeches
in the RECORD and try to summarize our
meaning. But they went through almost
6 weeks in Caracas, with each represent-
ative of each country reading almost a
2-hour or 3-hour speech. As a conse-
quence, they achieved nothing. They
were no further along when they left
Caracas than when they left Geneva 2
years earlier.
I hope that those negotiators will
know after today that we cannot await
another session such as that and that
they should produce a firm outcome, at
least on the fisheries issue, in Geneva,
when they meet there again.
Mr. President, it is a pleasure to rise
today in support of S. 1988, the Emer-
gency Marine Fisheries Protection Act
of 1974. For my State, Alaska, and for
other U.S. coastal fisheries States this is
the most important fisheries legislation
to come before the Senate in many years.
After 15 hearings here and in the field
the Commerce Committee overwhelm-
ingly reported this bill favorably. The
Armed Services Committee held three
hearings and last week also reported it
favorably. The Foreign Relations Com-
mittee earlier reported it by a narrow 9-8
adverse vote.
As Senators know, S. 1988, sometimes
called the 200-mile bill, was introduced
as a deterrent to the onslaught of foreign
fishing which has built-up off our shores
since the end of World War IL Having
exhausted their own fish resources, sev-
eral foreign nations, using the most ad-
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S 21088 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Decfmzber 11, 1974
vanced vessels and gear, have converged
on Waters near the coasts of the 'United
States and are depleting our fish one
species after another. These invaders
systematically strip an area of its fish,
without regard to conservation practices
which could guarantee a lasting supply
of flah resources for the tables of the
wor10. Then they proceed to another
ateante do the same thing. Our hearings
have established that the emergency is
genuine, and that extension of our fish-
eries jurisdiction to 200 miles would af-
ford the protection necessary tc sustain
our coastal species.
Before summarizing the provisions of
the bill, I would like to address some of
the misunderstandings and disagree-
ments it has aroused.
Thee administration, at the behest of
the State apartment, opposes the bill,
telling us that such action in Congress
upsets the delicate balance of our law of
the Sea negotiations. I cannot agree. In
faet, I am Convinced that the serious
fisheries problems brought out in our
extensive public hearings on S. 1988 re-
affirraed and unified the outrage of the
People of this Nation over the foreign
fishing issue, and strengthened the posi-
tion of our negotiators. One thing not
Widely known is that this legislation does
not differ In concept from the position
laid before the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence by the United Statesiast summer in
Caracas, Venezuela. What the State De-
partment objects to is not the concept
of S. 1988, but the fact that it is being
sought unilaterally, legislativear, and
immediately, rather than internation-
ally, diplomatically, and interminalbly.
The Defense Departreent has joined
State in opposing this bill, asserting its
long-held, inflexible position that our
fisheries claim could lead to armed con-
frontations and would trigger, retaliatory
larger claims by foreign governments?
resulting iri the eviction of our nuclear
detertent forces from the coastal water-
ways and straits of the world. We may
be assured that the members of the
Armed Services Committee, the majority
of whom favor S. 1988, gave full consid-
eration to its strategic military implica-
tions. In fact 'their committee report
stated the belief that passage of S. 1988
would not significantly affect the mo-
bility and survivability of U.S. fen:es.
Moreover, the committee reported that
passage of S. 1988 would give the Secre-
tary of State sufficient leverage to work
out satisfactory fishery arrangements
with foreign nations without resort to
armed confrontations. Many of my col-
leagues will recall that similar leg elation,
adding a 9-inile li.S. fisheries contiguous
zone, passed the Congress and became
law in 1966, and that there was neither
retaliatory territorial expansion nor
other negative reaction by foreign gov-
ernments.
Mr. President, my answer to both State
and Defense is that S. 1988 would apply
to fishing only, and, true to its name, it is
an interim fisheries zone extension and
management act which would cease to
exist as soon as International fisheries
conservation measures are constunniated.
It is doubtful that foreign nations will
sacrifice their other important diplomatic
goals by overreacting to our emergency
move to sustain a renewable resource so
necessary to a protein hungry world. In
this regard I emphasize that S. 1988 re-
quires that we allow foreign fishermen
to harvest whatever balance of the sus-
tainable yield off eur coasts is not caught
by U.S. fishermen.
I do want to make clear my conviction
that comprehensive law governing the
oceans, including fisheries, is an impor-
tant internationai objective. As an ad-
viser to the U.S. law of the Sea delega-
tion, I attended preparatory sessions last
year in Geneva and New York, and the
so-called "substan sive" sessions this sum-
mer in Caracas. Regrettably, this experi-
ence convinces rue the comprehensive
treaty being pursued is at least 2 years
away. The fact is, there are nearly 150
nations having various economic, politi-
cal, and social oh eracteristics consider-
ing an agenda of some 80 issues. Fish-
eries, unlike the others, simply cannot
wait for resolution of so many problems.
A common argument against a 200-
mile limit Is that enforcement would be
difficult. I believe enforcement under this
concept would be itrimeasurably less com-
plicated than unter the present myriad
of treaties establishing various sizes and
shapes of zones to protect various species
of fish.
I am disappointed that some of those
who oppose S. 1988 have spread word
among the salmon fishermen a Alaska
and other west coat States that the legis-
lation would lead to a retaliatory increase
in high seas salmon fishing by other na-
tions, mainly the Japanese. Actually. S.
1988 provides for protection of anadro-
mOus species such as salmon, as far as
they migrate?whi Inn indeed, exceeds 200
miles offshore. Even if this were not a
fundamental provision of the bill, we
could assert powerful leverage on Japan
by conditioning the continuation of its
vitally important pollack fishery within.
our 200-mile zone upon total abandon-
ment of its much emaller high seas sal-
mon effort.
Briefly, I shall LOW outline the major
provisions of the bill:
Section 4 provides that the United
States would, on en interim basis, exer-
cise exclusive fishery management re-
sponsibility and authority in a zone ex-
tending, to a total of 200 miles offshore.
In the case of anedromous fish this au-
thority wotici be extended to the full li-
mits of their migratory range. In no case
would this zone extend within the terri-
torial waters or fisheries zones of other
nations. Highly mieratory species such as
tuna are excluded nvm the provisions of
this section in order to preserve the exist-
ing treaties, The vest migratory range of
these fish necessitates international
agreement, because controls by a single
nation would be inconsequential in man-
aging the species. 'Phis position is shared
by the U.S. fisheries article being for-
warded at the Law of the Sea Conference.
Section 3 pro% des that traditional
foreign fishing mey be allowed only to
the extent that th optimum sustainable
yield cannot be harvested by U.S. citi-
zens.
Section 0 would establish a Marine
Fisheries Management Council which
would be required to submit to Congress
within 2 years the elements of a marine
fisheries management system to preserve
and protect fish with the following ob-
jectives: enhancement of the total na-
tional and world food supply; improve-
ment of the economic well-being of our
commercial fishermen; maximum feasi-
ble utilization of methods, practices and
techniques that are optimal in terms of
efficiency, protection of the ecosystem of
which fish are a part, and conservation
of stocks and species.
Sectio:a 7 would require the Secretary
of State to negotiate new treaties and
renegotiate existing ones to achieve con-
sistency with this act.
Section 8 would provide that this act
would neither extend nor diminish the
jurisdiction of any State over any na-
tural resources beneath and in the
waters beyond the territorial sea of the
United States.
Section 9 specifies prohibitions under
the act, including violations of interna-
tional fishery agreements, and provides
for civil penalties riot to exceed $25,000
for each day of violation; criminal pen-
alties not to exceed $50,000 fine and/or
1 year imprisonment; and civil forfeit-
ure of any fish or fishing gear used, in-
tended far use, or acquired in violation
of this section.
Section 10 would empower the Secre-
tary of Commerce and the Coast Guard
to enforce provisions of the act; to board
and inspect vessels: to arrest suspected
violators: execute precesses issued by the
court, and sieze fish and fishing gear
found aboard any fishing vessel or sup-
port vessel engaged in any activity pro-
hibited ty this act. U.S. district courts
are vested exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases arising under this act.
Section 11 provides that the manage-
ment authority under section 4 of the act
become effective 90 clays after enactment
and that all, other provisions become ef-
fective oa the date of enactment. The
provisions of the act would expire on the
date that, the Law of the Sea treaty or
other comprehensive fish management
and conservation treaties to which the
United States is party come into force.
Section, 12 authorizes appropriations
of not to exceed $5,000,000 to the Secre-
tary of Commerce and $13,000,000 to the
Secretary of the Department in which
the Coast Guard is operating, for each of
fiscal years 1975, 1976, and 1977.
Mr. President, S. 1988 would establish
a system for conserving our fish stocks
while allowing a sustained harvest of
desperately needed animal protein for
the people of the United States and of
the world. As the title indicates, this is
"emergency" legislation. I respectfully
urge its passage.
Mr. President, I call up my amend-
ment which is at the desk.
The legislative clerk proceeded to read
the amendment.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President. I ask
Unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered;
and, without objection, the amendment
will be printed in the RECORD.
The amendment is as follows:
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December .11, 1974 CONtlIESSIONAL RECORD?SENSATE
On page 16, line 13, insert the following:
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration shall take steps to verify the
authenticity of the foreigncatch statistics
and any other relevant data furnished for the
plfzposa of this paragraph, including placing
observers aboard as necessary during any
fishing operations that may be authorized
for foreign fishing vessels pursuant to this
Act".
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have
called this amendment to the attention
of our chairman and the manager of the
bill. -
This amendment would specifically
delineate the procedure to be established
under section 5(d) of S. 1988. That sec-
tion requires that the best available
scientific information, including data
compiledhy a foreign nation., be utilized
in determining the allowable level of
foreign fishing which may be authorized
in an area where U.S. fishermen are not
harvesting the full sustainable yield. Spe-
cifically, my amendrn ent would authorize
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration to take steps to verify the
authenticity of data provided by foreign
governments, including the placement of
observers on foreign fishing vessels.
In the case of U.S. fishing vessels, catch
and catch records are available for in-
sPection and verification by United
States and State fishery agents when the
vessels return to their home ports to dis-
charge and sell their catch. Our Govern-
ment is now spending a great deal of
money for this purpose, to verify these
catch records.
Foreign vessels, on the other hand, do
not land their catcht,s in U.S. ports, thus
removing any opportunity for V.S. ob-
servers to inspect their landings and
verify the species and cateh records of
their fishing operations. Under these cir-
cumstances, our Gov ernment has no way
of knowing the extent of their fishing op-
erations and the amount of their catch
by species, or otherwise, except through
such data as the foreign governments
choose to provide.
? It must be recognized that the catch
data, and other information which for-
eign governments will be furnishing.pur-
suant to this section, will be intended to
support their cases for the continuing
operations of their fishing fleets.
I point out that we do not unilaterally
terminate totally their fishing rights, but
we extend to them a right to continue
fishing under certain circumstances and
provided they stay within the available
catch so far as the sustained yield con-
cept is concerned.
For this reason, it is highly inappro-
priate and could be highly misleading to
take, at face value, whatever statistical
and other information they may put for-
ward for this purpose.
Mr. President, I urge my good friend,
Vac manager of the bill, to add this
amendment to this bill.
MAGNtrpon Mr. President, we
,
have discussed this amendment. I move
the adoption of the amendment.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. The question is on agreeing to the
amendment of the Senator from Alaska.
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. MAGNUSON. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I do
not know of anyone else who desires
time.
Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield me 2 or 3 minutes?
Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield the Senator
2 minutes. That is enough for his side
of the story. [Laughter]
Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. President, I agree
with the Senator from Alaska that there
Is no point in making long speeches on
this point; we may as well put our state-
ments in the RECORD. However, I do feel
that it is important to the Senator from
California that I reflect what the view
is of a significant segment of the fishing
industry in my State.
As some of my colleagues know, S.
1988 would have enormous impact upon
the tuna fishermen in my State. It is also
anticipated by some of the sports fisher-
men in the southern part of the State
that it would have an adverse impact on
them, particularly if Mexico should de-
clare a territorial jurisdiction over 200
miles of offshore water in retaliation to
the decision of the United States to de-
clare a 200-mile territorial jurisdiction
over our coastal waters.
I did hold hearings in California. I
mint say that there is a division of
opinion. The coastal fishermen in north-
ern California are supportive of the leg-
islation of the Senator from Washing-
ton. They feel that they have to protect
their livelihood from the trawlers from
the Soviet Union and Japan. They feel
very much the way the Senator from
Washington expressed his viewpoint, that
it is absolutely important to conserve
our coastal fisheries.
On the other hand, the fishermen in
the central and southern parts of my
State, who fish for tuna, fear that if we
pass this legislation, other coastal States
in Central and Latin America will do the
same and will make it impossible for
them to catch tuna in the future the way
they have in the past. This would ad-
versely effect a very important part of
the protein diet which is available to
Americans as a result of these fishing
crews going down and catching tuna
which would otherwise be unavailable.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
may we have order in the Senate Cham-
ber, please?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Senate will be in order.
The Senator from California will
proceed.
Mr. TUNNEY. I also wish to point out,
Mr. President, that in my view, although
I can totally understand the desire on
the part of the Senator from Washing-
ton and of those people who support him
in his desire to protect their fisheries,
and their disgust at the fact that there
has not been an international agreement
to protect our fisheries but it seems to
me that we should wait until the Geneva
S 21089
meetings are concluded this summer be-
fore we take this unilateral action. I am
totally aware of the fact that this legis-
lation beeomes inoperative if there is a
multilateral agreement reachedur ng
the conference to be held in Geneva in
1975.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. TUNNEY. May I have just 1 more
minute?
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield
1 more minute to the Senator from Cali-
fornia.
Mr. TUNNEY. I suggest that we listen
to the Department of State on this issue
and that we listen to the Department of
Defense and recognize that it would be
best to wait until the various nations of
the world get together and have a chance
once more to try to hammer out what has
to be a most difficult agreement. We have
such a conflict between coastal States
and interior States, and differences of
opinion between developing States and
developed States as to what the law of
the seas should be?not only as it relates
to coastal waters, but the deep sea waters
as well; as it relates to the riches that
apparently exist in the coastal waters,
the subsoils of the coastal waters, as well
as in the deep sea.
Mr. President, there is no one in
the Senate who has worked harder on
this legislation than the distinguished
chairman of the Commerce Committee.
Furthermore his expertise in this area is
extensive. However, in this particular
case, I must respectfully diverge from
the chairman's position.
B. -1988, Mr. President, would have
enormous impact on the State of Cali-
fornia. California is the base for one of
the largest coastal, distant water, and
sport fishing fleets in the world.
Extensive consultation with represen-
tatives of these groups and two days of
hearings in California have convinced me
of the need to oppose S. 1988 for the
following six reasons:
First, S. 1988 I believe may violate
international law.
Second, S. 1988 could endanger our
global defense interests.
Third, S. 1988 will seriously undermine
the Law of the Sea Conference and in-
crease the odds of its ultimate dissolu-
tion and failure.
Fourth, this legislation fails to protect
our coastal fish stocks and by threaten-
ing to destroy the Law of the Sea Con-
ference may end the hope for meaningful
protection of our coastal fisheries in the
future.
Fifth, it threatens the economic viabil-
ity of our distant water fishing fleets by
increasing the likelihood of harassment
and reprisals, by foreign nations, which
have already illegally seized more than
145 of our fishing boats on the high seas
in the last 7 years.
Finally this legislation's conservation
provisions are inadequate and therefore
fail to protect the long-term interests of
the American consumer.
In order to place this proposed legisla-
tion in historical context it must be re-
membered that the United States has
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S 21090 CONGRESSIONAL iRECORD? SENATE December 11, 1974
consistently protested the extension by merely 50 miles off its coasts?has given surveillance would require further in-
other nations of fisheries jurisdiction be- the world stark we of the type of crease in the Coast Guard's operating
yond the 12-mile limit as a violation of gunboat diplomacy that can be elicited funds of $47.2 million a year.
International law. by unilateralism. In light of the face that S. 1988 au-
When a few countries in Latin America In such an environment of accelerat- thorizes increased fielding for enforce-
anilaterally extended their jurisdiction lug acrimony it is my fear that whatever merit at a much lower level-e$13 million
to 200 miles there was nearly universal hope the Law of the Seas Conference has for esch of the fiscee years 1975, 1976,
protest in the Senate and the Fisher.- may be extinguished. and 1977. There is 3. eason for concern
man's Protection Act was paseed in order At the same time a unilateral exten- as to whether S. 1938 will afford signif-
to assist our fishermen to resist what was sion under S. 1988 could come under icantly increased protection of our
described as a brazen breach of interne- attack as a breach of international law coastal fishermen.
:Lionel law, and practice. The Ieternational Court of At the same time our distant water
For the Senate to sanction an abrupt Justice has just recently held that Ice- fishermen would be jeopardized. In
and unilateral extension of our fishing land's unilateral claims were inconsistent hearings I chaired in California, it was
j urisdic lion to 200 miles off our COMA with the fishing rights of the United pointed out that the tuna industry is
would be seen by the rest of the world Kingdom and the Federal Republic of dependent on multinational :conserve-
as a precipitous reversal of policy. 13ecre- Germany. A unilateral claim by the tion agreements. A proliferation of 200-
tary of State Kissinger, underlining the United States will clearly lead a number mile exclusive- fishine zones worldwide
gravity of this proposed action, has stated of nations to try to bring the United would conflict with the maintenance and
in a letter to Senator FutellIntIT that? States before the International Court of extension .ef such multinational agree-
Passage Of is. 1985 would be .sermus[y harm- Justice. ments. Already Ecuador, which was a
ful to our foreign relations and nay effort to The U.S. Government will then be member of an international tuna man-
enforce a unilaterally established 200 mize laced with an extremely agonizing deci- agement regime pulled out after urn-
:fisheries zone against non-consenting nm- ;ion?either we will refuse the Court's laterally proclaiming an exclusive 200-
tions would be likely to lead to contrenta- jurisdiction claiming that the unilateral mile limit. Peru simply has refused to
tions . . . and would encourage a wave of
claims by others which would be detrimental tccretion of nationa i. control over a 2C0- join such tuna management agreements
to our overall oceans interests in naval mobil- !mile fishing zone which comprises 2,582,- on the ground that it would derogate its
Uy and the movement of energy suppeies. 000 nautical square miles is strictly a 200-mile exclusive fishing zone. There is
I lomestic matter?o we will accept the reason to believe that Japan and other
The proponents of S. 1988 have claimed :nternational Court of Justice's jurisdic- parties to tuna agreements may face
that as this legislation relates solely to lion, which will threaten the immediate internal political pressure to abrogate
:fishing it will not affect other aspects of outlawing of our 200-mile fishing zone as their participation if we extend our fish-
oceans affairs. The State Department
lug zone to 200 miles. The result would
a violation of intereational law.
however has stated that it is clearly in- In other words we are heading toward be chaos and confrontation.
consistent with the 1958 Convention on a situation in which passage of S. 1988 Such a result could devastate the
the High Seas to which the United States may threaten the prospects of progress American tuna industry and its 28.000
and 45 other nations are parties, at the Law of the Sea Conference, while employees and a payroll of over $200
They note that although S. 1988 S. 1988 itself may be found to be in con- million last year.
breaches this convention in the area Of travention of international law. American consumers also would be
freedom of fishing, there is no reason to
We should remember that the alterna-
hurt. They bought $1 billion worth of
believe that other nations wil nc t use
live to multinationil agreements con-
canned tuna in 1973, two-thirds of U.S.
our breach as an excuse to abrogate the ( erning the Law of the Sea could be a grocery shoppers purchase tuna on a
1953 convention in the sensitive areas crazy quilt of unilateral claims contin- regular mcrithly bash. The market is
of freedom of overflights and freedom of - seine being propounded with the final presently gemering at a rate of 6 percent
navigation. Deputy Secretary of Defense arbiter?raw force. annually. If the international tuna
Clement has underlined the magnitude That force may be required should not agreements are jeopardized, we will see
of this threat by stating: iie ignored, a massive escalation in the cost of
If the United States, by unilateral art, ab- There is no reason to believe, for ex- canned tuna. This could add hundreds of
rogates one identified freedom, we :face the ample, that the Russians, Japanese, and millions of dollars to .eur food bill and .
unhappy prospect that other nations may ether major natione that fish off our weaken our balance of trade posture.
claim the right unilaterally to abrogate other
elentified freedoms, including the freedoms
coast will acquiesce riieekly to the licens- Another serious problem with this lege
er navigation and overflight . . . Military i ig requirements of S. 1988. Such pay- Islation is that the proposed mechanism
mobility on and over the high seas Is de-- rients would be a de facto acceptance of for a conseevation program for our Na-
pendent to a significant degree um . the main- cur unilateral claims. Therefore, it is tion's coastal fisheries is not sufficiently
tenance of the freedom of the eas. These I kely that the United States would face stringent. Although the proponents of
i'reedoms sanction and protect the activate!! S;iff opposition to collection of these fees. S. 1988 maintain that cur coastal fishing
of our forces. Reduced International waters
led closed straits, therefore threate both Foreign oppositioe to collection of stocks have been daneerotisly depleted:
;n
Ille eurvivability and utility of our deter- license fees is likely to put severe strains the legislation, while attempting to limit
rent. In this connection, it should be noted on the enforcement mechanisms con- foreign fishing depredations, fails to set
teat over 40% of the svorld's oceans lie within ttined in S. 1988. The Coast Guard lin any immediate eneorcement proce-
200 miles of some nation's coast and that Which would have ties primary enforce- dares against overfishieg of our coastal
virtually the entire operating areas of the raent responeibility imder S. 1988. litei :fishing stocks by our men fishermen. In-
ignited States 6th and 7th .Fleete lie within le ritten the Commerire Committee that stead it sets up a so-cabed fisheries men-
h waters.
ii our fishing jurisdietion is extended to agement council to peopose a ooastal
in answer to these charges t is being a 200-mile zone the coast Guard will be management regime. Under S. 1988, it
.eleimed that S. 1988 is merely a "tern- soread "very, very ti Linty" and "this is could take as long as 2 years before these
winery" expedient, and that by showing likely to be true without regard to the proposals ai.e promulg teed. If our fish
our determination it will spur action in regulations imposed on foreign fishing stocks are so seriously threatened, such
the Law of the Seas Conference. vessels, probability of violation, et a hiatus could be serior sly detrimental.
I believe that the opposite result is cetera." The Coast Guard further has It is essential that ri ny legislation to
more probable. If the Senate Passes this written that even under their minimum regulate coastal fishing focus on the con-
legislation, a number of -nations will pens for surveillance of an extended servation of coastal feh stocks. There
probably use our action as an excuse to fisheries zone this woeld require acquisi- appear to be superior alternatives to S.
put forward their own extended claims. tion costs of $63.2 million to increase 1988 which would allow for more satie-
Soon these conflicting claims, unsanc- their operating faellades to "6 high en- factory, evenhanded. end scientifically
tioned by international law, will lend to entrance cutters, 6 lone range search air- based conservation proerams,
increased, worldwide friction and inter- craft, 4 medium ranee search aircraft The 1958 Geneva Coe vention on Fish-
national incidents. The so-called cod a id 10 shipboard he icopters" and that ing and Conservation of the High PoAs,
war precipitated by Iceland's extension reactivation time would extend from "ii of which we are a signatory, for example.
.ef its fishing zone?riot to 200 miles but to 11 months." Furthermore. this level of contains article VII which allows a na-
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article could apply not only to fish up to
200 miles off our shore, but to coastal
fish that travel ,even further off our
coasts.
Also, regulations carried out in accord-
ance with the 1958 Geneva Convention
would have the force of international
practice behind them, since the conven-
tion has been signed by 33 nations. Fur-
thermore, any actions and regulations
under the convention must be based on
solid scientific evidence and must regu-
late both domestic and foreign fisher-
men.
It seems to me that if we decide to take
Immediate action in regard to coastal
fisheries the article VII approach is su-
perior to S. 1988.
Coastal fishery conservation which
maintains our renewable fishery re-
sources at a level of maximum sustain-
able yield is in the best Interest of do-
mestic and foreign fishermen alike. It is
In the best interest of thousands em-
ployed in the industry, and in the best
interest of consumers who want a plenti-
fu.l supply of seafoods at reasonable
prices.
Mr. President, Chairman MAGNUSON
and the other members of the Commerce
Committee have worked hard on this
legislation. Nonethelcs, I believe S. 1988,
as presently constituted, cannot solve
our coastal fishing problems.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I yield
4 plinntes to the Senator from Hawaii.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise with
considerable reluctance to speak in op-
position to this measure because of my
great admiration and great love for our
Chairman, the Senator from Washing-
ton.
Hawaii is a State surrounded by water,
and, therefore, obviously, we should be
concerned about fishing. This morning,
I should like to address myself not to fish-
ing but to other aspects involved in this
measure.
I am concerned as to how this meas-
ure will affect our national security. The
Department of Defense has pointed out
that if we should decide to adopt this
measure, it will open the floodgates for
other nations to adopt similar legislation,
and, if this should happen, the opera-
tional areas of our Sixth and Seventh
Fleets would be most seriously curtailed.
For example, movenient in the Caribbean
would be, to some extent, halted. Move-
ment in the Mediterranean would be
made extremely difficult and movement
In the China Sea, the Japan Sea and the
Philippine Sea would be made almost im-
possible.
Mr. President, there is another point.
If we should adopt this measure, then, if
enforcement is necessary, we shall have
to increase our coastal forces. Our Coast
Guard would need additional equipment
and manpower. We have no idea as to
whatthe cost would be, but I assume that
it would be in the many millions.
Finally, Mr. President, many experts
have suggested that this measure would
be in violation of the 1058 Convention.
on the High Seas. Some nations will just
refuse to recognize this unilateral action
on the part of the United States and
will make its matter of their sovereignty
to intrude upon the so-called 200-mile
sovereignty of the United States. We shall
have confrontations.
I recall very vividly, as do my col-
leagues here, the extension of 50 miles
that led Iceland into an unfortunate
cod war with Great Britain. I should
hate to see a salmon war or a tuna war
being conducted on the west coast of the
United States.
So, Mr. President, much as I join my
chairman in making every effort to assist
our fisherieS- and our fishing industry, I
find that there are other elements of this
measure which lead me to oppose it.
I thank the Senator very much.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am
happy to yield a minute to the Senator
from South Carolina.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I
thank my colleagues for a conple of
minutes.
I am rather surprised at the position
of some of our colleagues, because I know
we have been all working on this partic-
ular measure. I understand that the tuna
fishermen are quite concerned. My dis-
tinguished friend from Alaska and I at-
tended the Law of the Sea Conference
representing those tuna fishermen. We
have their interest at heart. We have the
national security interest at heart, and
we have the international interest at
heart.
The point is, Mr. President, that every-
one cries for leadership, but there is no
leadership. When we try to lead and fix
a point to attain, then we want to adopt
the age old political approach of when
in doubt do nothing, and stay in doubt
all the time.
What is the alternative? Are we going
to continue to meet and eat and meet
and eat? I ask the Senators, have they
ever been to these blooming things?
When will they ever end? Does anyone
really contemplate an international
treaty agreement, with all the various
ramifications? By the time we get the
economic zone idea settled, then we get
the national defense question.
By the time you think you have got
that fit into a packaged agreement, then
there squirts out the tuna problem, and
about the time you think you might whip
that, then the archipelago states come
In; then all the other interests come in,
and all the way down the line.
I think we have given it a pretty good
try to bring about a consensus. I think it
was our own Secretary of State?I should
say our Ambassador, not the Secretary
of State, who at one time worked as As-
sistant Secretary, John Stevenson?who
announced at Caracas that the United
States accepts in principle the 200-mile
economic zone. I am told that at Caracas
that the United States accepts in prin-
ciple the 200-mile economic zone. I am
-
told that at Caracas that was tentatively
approved by a substantial majority.
I am inclined to think that is as far
as it is ever going to reach. Now the dis-
tinguished Senator from Washington
conies alOng and says, "11aving reached
that much." Mr. President, government
is the art of the possible, not the im-
possible. In another 10 years, that war
In Iceland will repeat itself in Peru, and
now northern Ecuador is beginning to
be heard.
So the very argument employed by
my distinguished friend from Hawaii
about the fishing wars is exactly what
we are trying to avoid.
The world is becoming smaller each
day. We are running out of time. It
would be delightful if we could all sit
around a table and meet and eat in
agreement, but lawyers have made ca-
reers out of this blooming problem of
the law of the sea, and I get the impres-
sion when I attend one of these things
that the worst thing that could happen
would be if they do agree. Everyone
would come along and pick out the next
place, and say Geneva has good eating
places and Vienna has good eating
places, and on down the line.
But the problem of Iceland is there,
and the danger of war is imminent. I
wanted to put our fisheries within the
200-mile zone, but I did not want to
confuse the leadership of our distin-
guished chairman, the Senator from
Washington. He has brought it to a
head. I think it should be brought to a
head, and I think it should be passed by
the Senate. If we can adopt this economic
zone of 200 miles, then, working from
that point, which is generally agreed
upon and which would be followed by a
majority of the nation states, we can
work out where these warships can go.
The very crowd that worries about
warships traveling around and being
around and in and out and everything
else is the same crowd that does not
want any warships in the Indian Ocean.
They cannot have it both ways, Mr.
President. They say, "Oh, we can't move
around if you de this." Then we will
have a military construction appropria-
tion bill with the Diego Garcia issue,
and that same crowd that is running
around now will say, "Oh, don't go into
the Indian Ocean." The whole ocean is
much less than the 200-mile economic
zone.
We cannot have it both ways. We have
to exercise the leadership here in Con-
gress that is lacking in the administra-
tion; and that is what the Senator from
Washington is attempting to do this
morning.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Alaska yield for a ques-
tion?
Mr. STEVENS. lain glad to yield.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Is there anything in
this bill that has anything in any way
to do with legal territorial waters?
Mr. STEVENS. No, this is an interim
extension of a conservation zone for fish-
eries protection and management.
Mr. PACKWOOD. It has nothing to do
with freedom of navigation?
Mr. STEVENS. No, it does not. It
merely manages the water column and
the access to the creatures of the sea
within that water column.
Mr. PACKWOOD. It has nothing to do
with national security?
Mr. STEVENS. No, it has no impact on
national security considerations, and
does not change the current law of the
sea as far as that is concerned.
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S 21092 CON GRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 11,1974
,
Mr. MAGNUSON. It does have a little afraid some of our people will take guns I want to tell the Senate something,
bit to do with national security in re- and take the situation into their own and I hope again the Chair will listen to
verse, hands. this: If we sent an American fleet to, say,
Mr. STEVENS. Yes, but the Senator is Mr. PACKWOOD I would not blame the coast of Japan, within 200 miles of
talking about the military. them, the island of Japan, and started to fish,
Mr. PACKWOOD. I am talking about Mr. MAGNUSON. I would not blame Japanese citizens would call their Diet in
Ole military. them at all. They are all out of work, session in 24 hours end throw us out.
Mr. MAGNUSON. It seems to me we Mr. PACE: WOOD. The Russians go So would Russia. What are the South
would feel better if within the 200 miles aver there and teas up their nets, and American countries doing? Taking ad-
our own ships operated instead of Rus- some of these days they are going to take vantage of us every time they have a
sian ships off the coast of Oregon staid machineguns and go after them, chance, and I don't know why we aren't
Washington, with radar equipment. Mr. MAGNUSON The Defense De- protecting our own.
charting the seas along the coast. sartment says "danger of gunboat wars.- Some people fear that other nations
Mr. PACKWOOD. The point I are that is an argument I cannot buy. will retaliate?retaliate for what? Japan
making is that there is nothing to pre- Another is that it, would be costly to has got bigger fish to fry than the sal-
vent a foreign ship from navigating with- enforce. As the Senator points out, it is mon problems with us, I will tell you
in 200 miles. lust as costly to enforce the 12-mile limit that; and so has Russia.
Me. MAGNUSON. No, not at all. is it is the 200. I say if we went fishing like the other
Mr. PACKWOOD. The argument is The Alaskans lenottv that. Nearly every people are going fishing off the coasts
made by the Defense Department and nonth there is a Russian ship they haul of these other countries, we would be
the State Department that we are re fine them and let them go. It would thrown out as quickly as they could get
jeopardizing our national security, and ie no more expensive to pick them up their legislative bodies assembled to pass
that argument is baloney. As the Senator vithin 200 miles. a law against us and send a gunboat out
has said, we may want to address our- So I cannot buy that, and get us out of there. But we sit here.
selves to that some day, and maybe have Mr. President, following up this line Mr. HOLLINGS. And the State De--
a conference on it some day, but this bill of discussion right now, I want to men- partment will recommend it,
has nothing to do with that. 'This bill is lion the 8-to-6 vote in the Senate Armed Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes. "We cannot
to stop the pillage of our fishing outside iServices Committee which rejected the touch this," they will say. They will say
the 12-mile limit, and in some castes in- lSefenise Department claim. As the Sen- this is too touchy a subject, and we -can-
side the 12-mile limit. etor points out, this bill has nothing to not touch this.
If we do nothing, there are going to no with national security at all. Mr. :HOLLINGS. We pay the fines for
be Russian ships, Polish ships, and Chin- I know this is a big argument in the our fishermen in Peru, and we will pay
ese ships next year, sneaking inside the law of the Sea Conference. I do not fines for flesh* off of Ecuador, but we
I2-mile limit in a fog. I now why this is so. I have been to rev- cannot get in our own
When people ask, "If you extend this e ral of these confetences, I will say to Mr. MAGNUSON. We cannot get in
outside the 12-mile limit, how are you my colleagues, that I do not know why our own.
going to enforce it," my answer is, "It it is that an American delegation from I do not understand anyone opposing
is easier, with Coast Guard cutters or the State Department with many other this bill. It only protects our fisheries. It
niems in a conference will go through
s plane, to catch someone penetrating has nothing to do with anything but
20 miles inside a 200-mile zone than 1 everything, and ma-ybe come to some fishing, If we can arrive at a Law of
mile inside the 12-mile zone." t ood agreements. the Sea agreement, I will be the first to
If we want to save these fish, they Then the last day when half of them say "Amen.' S. 1988 is A temporary piece
have to lee protected, or there will lee no tell start going home they throw a fish- of legislation.
ash left for anybody. It is fine to speak cries provision out in the middle of the The biggest unemployment in the
about negotiating treaties, but that does floor to try to cut that up. It is an or- country almost 15 percent in my area
not do us any good if we do not have a I hen, and I cannot, for the life of me, and in New England?is with fishermen,
treaty covering every species. We snake t nderstand why these people do not want That is the biggest. 'With all this other
a treaty for one kind of fish, and we fold t ) protect our coastal fisheries. unemployment, I do not know what our
Pie next year they are taking a differ- Mr. PACKWOOD. That is our State fishermen are going to do.
.ent kind of fish. Department, and tiny want us to play Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will the
So I hope those from the coastal States Uncle Sucker to every country around Senator yield?
and the inland States will recognize the S ere. Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes.
critical necessity. All we are asking is Norway extends iti- zone out. We will Mr. STEVENS. The unemployment in
that the fish be protected and preserved, s t here until every coastal country in the great northwest of Alaska reaches
and we are not jeopardizing national t le world has extended its zones out urn- 35 percent now, in villages of the people
security, freedom of the seas, or any- laterally before we act because the State who live in the worst conditions under
thing else by the passage of this bill. Ltepartment does not want to step on the .American flag. They are the people
s toes. '
Mr. MAGNUSON. No, not at all. The anybody who used to fish for these species in the
A
:Department of Defense sent up the chief Mr. MAGNUSON.nd depleted all our near waters off our shore, but the fish do
of staff?what is his name? s- ocks in the meantime, not get there anymore because the great
Mr. PACKWOOD. General Brown?,Another thing we have to think about. invading fleets of 'the foreign countries
Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes. ?to testify we do get an agreement in Geneva? come into the area, right along side, and
against the fishing bill, and he came, but Rhich I doubt because I have enough ex- sometimes within the 12-mile limit, and
the Armed Services Committee rejected p ,eilences with that sort of thing t,o pre- take all the fish.
his arguments. d cte?it is going to take 2, 3, maybe 4 I would like to ask those people who
There was a letter circulating this 3r, mrs or longer before the nations ratify oppose this because they fear retaliation,
morning that I cannot understand, some it. In the meantime our fish disappear retaliation from whom? It is the Rus-
of these arguments. For example, it says In the Bering Sea, the Senator from slam, the Japanese, thei Koreans, and
' It would increase the danger' of gun- Alaska will tell you, we used to have a big the Eastern European eations that are
boat wars." . h ilibut fleet. Now, none, none. off our shores.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Is that the letter All the ocean perch is gone off the coast I flew between Dutch Harbor and the
i,igned by Senator Towers? 01 Oregon. And this it the worst salmon Pribilof Islands one time and I literally
Mr. MAGNUSON. Yes, Senator Terwea Year we have ever had in all our history. stopped counting. It looked Ilk
e the in-
end Senator CRANSTON. "Increase the Tuna has nothing 1,o do with it. And vasion fleet off the coast of France. I
clanger of gunboat wars." As a matter of ti e shrimp people?I listened to them for was trying to count those that were
fact, without having a 200-mile limit, fur a long time. I hope the Chair will larger than any Alaska fishing vessels,
ste will have more than gunboat wars; lieten to this. We are not doing anything There were over 100 of them, some with
we well have real problems with conges- to the shrimp :people. In this bill we en- two- or three-story apastments on their
Icon of ships off our coasts, and the situ- courage an agreement between coon- sterns. Some of them are year round,
anon is getting to the point where I am tries on shrimp, and stay in the pack ice.
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GRESSIONAL RECdith-25ENATE
December 11, 1974 CON
I do not think eVeryone understands
what is going on.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. STEVENS. When they say retali-
ation, retaliation from whom?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time
of the Senator has expired.
Mr. STEVENS. I will be happy to
charge it to my time, I am speaking.
We have extended our jurisdiction be-
fore. President Truman extended it, uni-
laterally out on the Outer Continental
Shelf with the Outer Continental Shelf
declaration in 1948. Not only has every
nation recognized the principles Presi-
dent Truman declared, but they have
followed it in terms of the creatures of
the shelf.
We extended our conservation, our
contiguous zone, out 12 miles unilaterally
after a series of meetings that went on
for almost 14 years. We extended it 12
miles and every nation recognized our
right to do so.
The opponents of S. 1988 talk about
the cod war. The cod war was a 50-mile
extension of national jurisdiction which
was brought about by an invasion of
fishing nations into the waters of Ice-
land. Do you know who won? They talk
about the cod war, the Icelandic people
won. They were the only ones who had
the guts so far in the last 20 years to
stand up to these nations, and they won.
And we cqntinue to have the opposi-
tion, and I recognize the opposition, of
the tuna people and the shrimp people?
our own people to S. 1988. But we took
care of them when they were In trouble.
We have been paying their fines, we have
been getting their people and their ves-
sels out of custody in Latin America.
? One of the first jobs I ever had when
I became a lawyer was to help get a crew
out of custody in South America that had
been on a tuna boat that had been
seized off the coast of South America.
We have been doing this now for at
least 25 years. In the meantime, we do
nothing for these people who invade our
shores. All we are asking is let us seize a
few of the foreign vessels which violate
good conservation practices and let their
nations bail thein out and pay their
lines.
We can go on living?we have lied
with South America for 20 years?despite
the fact that they have seized our tuna
and shrimp vessels. The strange thing is
that the wealthiest fishing fleets in the
? country are the tuna and shrimp people,
and they are oPposing this, which is
really a relief measure to stop the inva-
sion of the distant water fleets within
the area of those people who cannot af-
ford to go off to the shores of South
? America or Africa to fish. These are the
little people who fish in almost rowboats,
in long boats, in little vessels that cannot,
as we say, go outside
Now we can save these fish. We pro-
pose to do it on the basis not of exclu-
sionary' claima of national jurisdiction?
we say in this bill they can continue to
come within our waters so long as they
recognize the principles of conservation
that we declare are necessary to preserve
these species of fish.
If they did that down off South Amer-
ica, we would not have any trouble at all.
It is the South Americans who have not
recognized the International Tuna
Agreement. We have. I cannot under-
stand the opposition but, particularly, I
cannot understand the national defense
argument that there is going to be re-
taliation by other nations.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STEVENS. Yes.
Mr. PASTORE. The purpose of this
bill is not exclusion as much as it is con-
servation.
Mr. STEVENS. Absolutely.
Mr. PASTORE. It is management in
order to conserve.
We actually have eliminated entirely
the haddock up around New England. I
mean that is all gone, and before you
know it it will all be gone, and after all,
in order to propagate, you have got to
have fish there, and if you sweep it all
out, you will have no propagation, and
the time will come when all of us will
have to go hungry.
.
All we are saying is, all we want is, an
equitable, Justifiable management to
make sure that we conserve these species
in order that we can all eat and not ship
it all to Moscow and to Peking and to the
Ginza or wherever they want to bring it.
Mr. STEVENS. I would just like to add
to what the Senator from Rhode Island
said. It is not just haddock, it is herring,
mackerel, menhaden, sable fish, shrimp
in the Pacific, yellow tail, flounder, hali-
but, and now coming into a threat of
extinction is the Alaska pallack.
Did you know in 1 year alone these
foreign fishing fleets took a billion
pounds of Alaska pollack out of the
,Bering Sea, in the North Pacific? A bil-
lion pounds, and they did it in the same
year we stopped harvesting ocean mam-
mals, an act we tool: in order to let the
ocean mammals rebuild their stocks.
What ,happened was the foreign fishing
fleets came in and stole the 'ocean mam-
mals feed so that today there are more
ocean mammals dying of malnutrition
than used to be harvested.
Mr. PASTORE. How about the red
herring that the State Department fished
out in order to kill the bill?
Mr. STEVENS. It would be nice to put
them on an endangered species list.
Mr. President, the Senator from South
Carolina seeks recognition, and I yield
to him such time as he may need in op-
position to the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator has 4 minutes remaining.
The Senator from South Carolina is
recognized.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise
in opposition to S. 1988, a bill to extend
on an interim basis the jurisdiction of
the United States over certain ocean
areas and fish in order to protect the
domestic fishing industry. My opposition
to S. 1988 is based on my concern over
its potential impact on U.S. national se-
curity interests, a concern shared by five
other members of the Armed Services
Committee.
Let me stress that I share the concern
of the sponsors of S. 1988 that there is
a requirement to protect our domestic
'S21093
fishing industry. However, because of se-
curity implications and other potential
difficulties, such as enforcement prob-
lems, potential 'retaliatory actions and
conflict with existing international law,
I do not believe this is a problem that
can be solved unilaterally at this time
by the United States as S. 19_8_8 proposes.
The protection of a nation's fishing re-
sources is a subject of interest to at least
all the coastal nations of the world. With
the world's food resources decreasing, it
is also a subject that will be of increas-
ing interest to every nation of the world.
Therefore, Mr. President, this is a
problem which must be addressed and
solved by all of the interested nations
of the world. This, of course, is one of
the purposes of the Third United-Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Mr. President, administration officials
testified before the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee that they expect the
Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea to conclude a timely
Oceans Law Treaty next year. The treaty
would include the basic protective pro-
visions of S. 1988 but would, of course,
have the advantage of being accepted by
the over 100 countries participating in
the Conference. It would also preclude
the need of each nation to take some
arbitrary unilateral action which would
Possibly be offensive to nations with
whom we now have no direct conflict.
Such arbitrary actions would almost cer-
tainly impact on our own national se-
curity interests.
Mr. President, the Armed Services
Committee reviewed S. 1988 as it might
conflict with our national security in-
terests. Gen. George S. Brown, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified
that the passage of S. 1988 at this time
would be counter to the security interests
of the United States. A main concern
was that other nations, in response to
such a unilateral action might impose
more restrictive measures, such as ter-
ritorial limits on their adjacent waters.
General Brown pointed out that in the
territorial sea, submarines are required
to navigate on the surface, and in the
absence of free passage through straits
because of expanded territorial sea
claims, we would be forced to negotiate
with a particular country to transit sub-
merged.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs also
stressed that the mobility of our general
purpose forces depends upon freedom to
navigate on and under the high seas and
certain international straits as well as
freedom to fly over the high seas and
certain international straits. Therefore,
he contended our Nation must be careful
about taking unilateral action which
might cause other coastal states to ex-
pand territorial control over a greater
Portion of its adjacent seas.
Of course, there is no hard evidence
that other coastal nations would, in fact,
impose additional territorial sea claims
should the Congress pass S. 1988. How-
ever, I believe we should heed the collec-
tive judgment of the Joint Chiefs and
not approve S. 1988 at this time. In the
meantime, we should give our delegation
to the Conference on the Law of the Sea
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S 21094 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE Decoitbee 11, 1974
a full opportunity to conclude an Ccearis zention on the nigh Seas. many nations ing stocks would pass into the hands of
Law Treaty next year a they tettified 'vou Id refuse .to recognize 200-mile U.S. a wide ran
s
ge of governments, many of
cricron incotiotni s would increase as for-
they expect to do. Failing to achieve thatimit which care little or nothing about en-
gn nationalsn ntlad to fish. A lesser ex-
treaty, it would then be appropriate to anslon---to 50 miles---led Iceland into the vironmental protection.
reevaluate the requirement for S. 1988. ecent "Cod War" with Great Britain, Mr. President, supporters of S. 19881
Mr. President, other points the Sen- We hope you will join us in voting 'no" have sought to create the impression that
ate should consider are: on S. 1983. 40% of the world's oceans are et their goal is to preseree fishing stocks--
First. It extends U.S. fishing jurisdic- take- as if the fishing inclustny were one sinele
tion by 2 million square mild;. Enrerce- sir) eerely, differentiated whole.
merit would be difficult and costly if the ALAN CRANSTON. Actually, there are three important
'OHN TOWER.
United States acts unilaterally;segments a the fishing industry that
Second. The fining and imprisonment The PRESIDING DraeICER. The Sen. could be seriously harmed by passage of
of foreign fishermen could provoke, seri- ittor from Alaska has 3 minutes. S. 1988.
ous con' rontations; Mr. STEVENS. President, what First in value is the shrimp industry,
Third. Unilateral action by other na- ether time is remaining to the Senator headquartered in the Gulf 'States. An
tions could folk)* and would seriously i rout Washington? estimated 19,000 people harvest approxi-
impact on passage of sea and air eorces The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three mately $200 million of shrimp a year--
of the United States in key spots around minutes on the bill. 24 percent of the value of our total fish-
the world; Mr. STEVENS. Does the Senator from ing catch. The richest areas are located
Fourth. Efforts at the Laws of the See California seek recognition? off the coasts of Latin American court-
Conferenee to get a multilateral agree - Mr. TUNNEet. I have already made my tries, especially Brash, Mexico, and
ment would be endangered; s tatement in opposition, I have nothing Venezuela. Passage of S. 1988 could de-
Fifth. Approval of S. 1988 would be to add to it. prive long-distance shrimp fishermen of
inconsistent with current international Mr. MAGNUSON. Well, Mr. President, stock and force them te compete for urn-
law as agreed at Geneva in 1958 and low much time do we have left? ited numbers of U.S. coastal shrimp.
signed by the United States. The inter- The PRESIDING OFFICER. It was 3 Next comas the salmon industry of the
national court recently held Iceland's minutes, it is slightly less. Pacific Northwest. In 1913, over 32,000
declaration of a 50-mile limit was not Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, PaS- 'fishermen la Alaska. Oregon, Washing-
enforcible under international law, sage of S. 1988 would have several time- ton, and my own State of California
and elate and harmful consequences, landed over $120 million worth of sal-
Sixth. Finally, S. 1988 could endanger Some say that since the House has not mon. This represents 14 percent of the
present wean passage which brings to passed a similar bill, and since S. 1983 value of al. U.S. fish landings in that
the United States oil and many other will not become law this year, it does not year.
vital resources we have to import. matter what the Senate does.
, Mr. President, for those reasons I urge I disagree strongly. By international agreement, salmon
my colleagues to oppose passage g S- The Senate, and the Senate alone,, fishing areas have been divided between
1988 at this particular time, must ratify any and all treaties negoti- the United States, Japan. and Canada.
Passage of S. 1988 would probably un-
ted through the Law of the Sea Con-
sent Whether Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- dermine this agreement and put new
fce. eer or not S. lit88 becomes
sent that a letter signed by the Senator pressure on Japan to redouble its fish-
tar etv, we Senate does on this bill
from Texas (Mr. TOWER) and the Sena- lhat th S
will have an extremely important im-
tor from California (Mr. CANSTON) be ing efforts cutside the 200-mile zone.
Peet. The passage of the bill in the Sen- Third in value is the tuna industry. In
printed bathe RECORD.
a'e would strongly imply rejection of any 1973, 9,000 tuna fishermen harvested
'There being no objection, the letter h.ternational agreement that fell short about $90 million in tuna, representing
was ordered to be printed in 'the Reimen,o' its terms. about 10 percent of the total catch for
as follows: Conversely, since S. 1988 will not be- that year. Most of this harvest comes
U.S. Senate,
come law at this time, its passage would from the waters off Latin America. Pas-
Washington, P.C.
DEAR COLLEAGUE: The .Senate will seamy griln nothing positive. Its sole effect sage of S. 1988 would lead to a new rash
take up 8. 1988, the Fraergeacy marine would be to sabotage existing talks. of unilateral claims and multiply our
Fisheries Protection Act of 1074. We are Mr. President, S. 1988 is being pro- long-standirg problems with tuna about
writing to urge you to vote against this meted in the name of conservation. Bult seizures and fines.
bill.
conservationists are sharply divided on These three segments of the fishing in.
We agree with the sponsors of the bill that ti 13 bill. dustry--shrimp, salmon, and tuna?ac-
re:metal fishing stocks are severely depleted,
count for 48 percent of the value of all
that agreement at the Law of the Sea Con- Here is what the Sierra Club had to
ference seems distant, and that the U.S. my about S. 1988 last September: fishing stocks landed by U.S. fishermen,
must therefore take unilateral action to save The Sierra Club believes that S. 1988 can I want to see more eftective preserve-
the fish. The real question is: what kind bi- detrimental to the emservation and pro- tion of fishing stocks, too?but not at the
of unilateral action? te3tion of the living ccean resources and tiexupestrynse. of almost half of .the fishing in-
S. 1988 would not necessarily save the inconsistent with international efforts to se-
fish. Better legislation has been introduced etre proper conservation and environmental Mr. President, sponsors of S. 1988 say
(H.R. 156.19/S. 3783) which would permit m magement of the oceans and their re-
unilateral action after 6 months. S. 1988 sources it is Only an "interim" measure.
calls only :or a new commission to study the The Sicrra Club feels that S. 1988 . . . But once the United States claimed a
problem fer 2 years. se 'Musty jeopardizes conservation and en- -200-mile fisheries Jurisdiction, how likely
S. 1988 could seriously damage national ei-onmental protection efforts, both interne- is it that any of that jurisdiction would
security. Deputy Secretary of Defense Clem- Urinal and national in s3cipe, be surrendered?
eats has pointed out that Other nations
might retaliate by curtailing the freedoms The Sierra Club added that S. 1988 And how likely is it that other nations
of navigation and overflight. Virtually the Would make it extremely difficult for the would sit idly by while the United States
entire operating areae of the U.S. 6th and inernationol community to secure mini- claimed both the right to fish off their
7th fleets lie within 200 miles of ficarie mum environmental standards for the coasts and a unilaterally-imposed 200-
nation's coast,
protection of the living marine environ- mile fishing preserve?
S. 1988 would be costly and difficult tc en-
rrl' Given the close linkage between fish-
Force. It would add 2,531,800 square miles to -rit
the area Which the t1.s.roast Guard now That raises a conservation issue that ing and other ocean-related issues,
polices with difficulty?an area elual S. 1988 totally neglects: What is to be would other countries :seriously accept
to 92% of the land MASS of the United done about saving the fish off other na- the claim put forth by supporters of S.
States, The Coast Guard conservatively iisti- Liens' coasts? 1988 that the bill "relates only to fish--
-
mates that policing the known fishing areas
es the Sierra Club points out, world- ing"?
only would require $63.2 million in start-up
costs and add $47.2 million to annual op- Wile unilateral "grabs" would preclude If the United States succumbs to pres-
orating costs. the adoption of minimum environmental sure for unilateral action to further its
Finally, S. 1988 would increase the danger standards on the basis of international own interests, other nations can be ex-
of gunboat wars. It violates the 1958 Con- ag-eement. Management of coastal fish- pected to take unilateral actions to fur-
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December 11, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
ther theirs. These actions may represent
deliberate retaliation, or they may
simply represent a breakdown of a giant
and ongoing international effort to save
the seas from war and anarchy.
Supporters of S. 1988 have taken the
curious position that the bill "reflects
current international thinking." They
even go so far as to say that it Is "the
kind of bill the International Court
would approve."
By "International Court," I take it
they the International Court of Justice
at the Hague. The Court does not ap-
prove bills; it decides cases based on its
Interpretation of international law. The
weight of legal opinion that I have en-
countered comes down heavily against
the legality of the bill. Specifically, a uni-
lateral declaration of a 20Q-mile fishery
zone would violate the freedom of fishing
established by the .1958 Geneva Conven-
tion on Freedom of the High Seas. Legal
ratification of a 200-mile fisheries zone
would require international agreement
of the sort now being negotiated through
the Law of the Sea Conference.
Supporters of the bill may argue, as
they have in their "Dear Colleague" let-
ter, that S. 1988 would not automatically
eliminate foreign fishing within the 200-
mile zone. But from the point of view of
international law, that is not the point. It
Is the mere extension of jurisdiction, not
Its application, that is in conflict with
the 1958 convention.
It is particularly unfortunate that S.
1988 is being considered now, just when
the United States is making progress on
both bilateral arid multilateral fronts.
DiSCUS81011.6 with Japan have already
led to a voluntary cutback in the north-
eastern Pacific and the eastern Bering
Sea. Japan's annual fish catch in those
waters will be reduced about 25 percent.
Furthermore, Japan has agreed to bar its
fishermen from some Alaskan and west
coast waters during several months of
the year.
Negotiations are also underway with
the Soviet Union and other major fish-
ing nations.
A new, tough enforcement program to
protect the living resources of the Con-
tinental Shelf went Into effect on Decem-
ber 9. if foreign vessels take incidental
catch while trawling for fish, they will
be required to return it to the sea, or
face stiff penalties.
Even on the multilateral front, things
are not as bad as supporters of S. 1988
would have us believe. On the one hand,
they argue that agreement and ratifica-
tion of a law of the sea treaty will
not be achieved until 1980 and even be-
yond. On the other, they cite growing
International support for an interna-
tionally negotiated 200-mile "economic
zone." Anyone who has followed the his-
tory of these talks, and who is familiar
with the terms of the proposal offered
by the United States in 1970, knows that
we have come a long way toward agree-
ment.
But there is a critical difference be-
tween a 200-mile economic zone, with
primary, jurisdictional reserved for the
coastal state based on certain Interns,
tional standards, and an outright
unilateral seizure. One is based on the
principle of international law and the
peaceful settlement of disputes; the
other is not. One is both legitimate and
acceptable to the world community; the
other is not. One would encourage
restraint and cooperation in the man-
agement of ocean resources; the other
would not.
I have read the counter-arguments
made by proponents of S. 1988, and I am
not convinced. The arguments which I
'offered in a "Dear Colleague" letter,
signed with the distinguished Senator
from Texas, JOHN TOWER, remain valid.
Briefly, they are:
First, S. 1988 would not necessarily
save the fish. It calls only for a new
commission to study the problem for 2
years. And by extending unilateral juris-
diction, it would damage the prospects
for several major segments of the fish-
ing industry whose interests extend
beyond a U.S. zone.
Second. S. 1988 could damage national
security. Other nations might retaliate
by curtailing the freedoms of navigation
and overflight. They might not do this
in specific retaliation against a 200-mile
extension, but merely to assert their own
interests unilaterally. S. 1988 would give
them a green light.
Third. S. 1988 would be difficult to
enforce. Its supporters say that many
nations would respect our zone and that
it would be self-enforcing, at least to
some extent. But to some extent it would
not. Nations which would be least likely
to accept a unilateral extension to 200
miles are precisely the nations that have
the heaviest stake in fishing. There is a
lot of difference between policing a zone
which is considered legitimate, and po-
licing a zone which is not.
Fourth. Finally, S. 1988 would increase
the danger of gunboat wars. Supporters
of the bill deny this by arguing that it
would not automatically eliminate all
foreign fishing within the 200-mile limit.
Still, if 37 foreign fishing boats entered
the 200-mile zone unimpeded, and if the
Coast Guard seized the 38th one, what
would its government do? Senator STEN-
xis, the distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, pointed out
in his minority views on S. 1988 that?
The fining and imprisonment of foreign
fishermen under S. 1988 would surely be
Considered by major fishing nations to be a
serious provocation. Hence the risk of armed
confrontation between U.S. military forces
and fishing boats or escort gunboats of such
nations as the U.S.S.R. and Japan could be
substantial.
This whole area is simply fraught with
risk.
To sum up, Mr. President, S. 1988 con-
tributes little or nothing that is positive.
Its passage now would only serve to block
and sabotage and delay. And were it to
become law, it would open up a wide
range of dangers involving 40 percent
of the world's oceans. I strongly urge a
"no" vote.
Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, by
passing the Interim Fisheries Zone Ex-
tension Act, by extending our fisheries
200 miles from shore, we merely seek to
S 21095
extend basic principles of conservation
to the sea. Frankly, Mr. President, with-
out passage, extinction of our marine re-
sources is imminent.
Opponents of this measure over a year
ago asked the Senate to postpone our
deliberation until the Law of the Sea
Conference had a chance to hold its 1974
midsummer meetings in Caracas. There,
we were told, through international co-
operation a global accord could be
reached on fisheries.
Well, Mr. President, true to the pre-
dictions of the able chairman of the
Commerce Committee, true to my sus-
picions, true to the fears of all the
sponsors of this measure, the hopes for
an agreement on fisheries conservation
were false. No accord was reached. ?
So now we are told another conference
resumes in Geneva this March. Maybe
we shall be satisfied then. Or perhaps in
Vienna later next year. Or possibly on a
return to Caracas. We just do not know,
but this much I am sure of, we can no
longer afford this pattern of postpone-
ment.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a New York Times article de-
scribing the globe-trotting adventures of
the United Nations Law of the Sea Con-
ferences be inserted in the RECORD at the
conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. PACK WOOD. Now, I do not oppose
the work of the conference. We need
global cooperation on fishery conserva-
tion. We need agreements on navigation
rights, on the mining of the seabeds, on
how best to deal with ocean pollution.
Eventually we shall have them. But,
"eventually," "possibly," "probably," is
not reversing the severe depletion of
coastal fish species we are suffering to-
day?devastation documented by the
National Marine Fisheries Service, as
according to their statistics Oregon's
catch alone in 1973 marked a 5.1 million
pound decline from 1972 landings.
So, we ask only that a 200-mile fisher-
ies jurisdiction be implemented. We are
not talking about navigation rights, a
concern voiced by the Defense Depart-
ment about this bill. We are not usurping
the role of international discussions
-(vhich has concerned the Department of
State, for we have stressed time and
again this is an interim measure. Upon
enactment of an accord by the law of the
sea conference this legislation will expire.
We cannot wait for Caracas, Geneva,
or Vienna. We cannot wait another 1, 2,
or 3 years. If we intend to ever escape
the desperate straits we now find our-
selves in, we must act today to conserve
our fisheries. If we are serious about sav-
ing our resources, passage of this interim
measure is imperative.
Mr. President, before yielding the
floor, I ask unanimous consent that an
excellent letter to the editor of the
Post, written by the Senator from
Alaska, which cogently discusses many
misconceptions concerning the bill, be
printed in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
?
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S 21096
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CONGRESSIONAL R ECORD ? SENATE Dee. 1),')ei. it,
iSee elidbit2.) . Those of us Who sronsored S. 1988, the
Exnaerr 1 Emergency Maxine Fisheries Protection Act
oe 1974, did not do so in haste or without
l Fi om the New York Times, Aug. 10, 1.0741 k aowledge of its imp) ications. The Senate
..,-/,...,si,o S re LAW C*NiPaitigilCE ENDS Wrrn , Commerce Committee has held fifteen public
Iirrree AcitTEVED hearings on the legislation in coastal states
cmtsess,-trEmmorms, Avg. 29 (neuters) ,? daring this session of Congress. The position
The (entree -United Nations Law of the See ce` many senaters on fells issue, including
Conferente, billed as one of the most 'vital nine, has been shaped by many goers of per-
clebat68 la Titatarr, ended today with little sonal observations of the compounding de-
, o show beyond an agreentent to meet "exile e' ruction of our fisheries resources by huge
in Geneva next March. f reign fishing fleets Oa:Acidly owned pm'
Optimists had expected the 10-week con- centrolled by foreign eovernments.
terence to produce at least the framework of These fleets are highly efficient, as you
a new world treaty to deal with ocean pollu- point out; they also ere operated without
tion, fishing disputes, navigation rights mad regard to the conservatien-mana,gement prao-
1 he ownership and sharing of oil, gas anti t ces necessary eo enable fish to sustain their
mineral resources in coastal will era. R )ecies. Coastal species presently in a state
Dozens of the 3,000 delegates from nearly of depletion or In serious danger are haddock,
150 naticent and observer groups had already tolibut, herring, mese-laden and yellowtail
left before their national -digs were lowered flounder in the Ana, .tici Alaska pollack,
for the 'oat time in the sunlit court of the hake, halibut, mackerel, sablelish, shrimp
towering high-rise conference complex here. end yellowtail sole in the Pacific. Foreign
NO* begins the accounting to governmente fleets, which long ago fished out their own
at home. Some delegates maintain that their e 'este' writers, continue to take these spe-
negotiatMg powers were watered Comm by the cies off our shores with 'ant regard to the cen-
Oition of the stocks.
abserioetef clear- . .
Many who were eiew to the i;erripneeted As an advisor to the U.S. delegation to the
issues bearing on laws to control explottatiou I aw of the Sea Confer= nee, I have attended
of the sees have said in private itt at camera- preliminary sessions at Geneva, Switzerland,
and New York and last :summer's substantive
inise on the main confrontation here between
sessions in Caracas, Veeezuela. International
rich and poor nations can only be achieved
at the Mnisterial ? licw is the best way to bring lasting order to
tee economic, navigational and environmen-
Delegedion leaders say that divergent view.;
te. problems of our ocee in and to our fisheries
on many ,guestions have been nen-owe n
d down
rroblems as well. Hoe ever, such agreement
in group discuesions outside the epee con-
i ; two years oe more away. The future of
ference debate.
our fisheries is the only LOS issue which will
Christepher Pinto of La/1h%, leading e
t e affected by the pan age Cf time.
riroup studying how to farm an authority
S. 1988 was drafted 5?a an emergency C011-
,'ovcrning ineabed minerals, said: good
servation meaniure pertaining to fisheries
deal of progress has been made, end a sound
only, It will expire on the effective date of a
foundation laid for further wont."
law of the Sea treaty. S. 39e8 calls for a grad-
ient many feel this preliminary woe%
al phase-down of foreign fishing through a
should have been completed in the "United
renegotiation of our e ;dating, less than ef-
Nations seabed committee following the 'Met
f active bilateral and raultileteral fisheries
Law of dee Sea Conference in len and the
agreements Vela foreign nations and through
second. in 1960. en, treaties Where necessary to effectuate
A corrindttee formed here to pot Nei op text;
the act. It also would establish conditions
of all draft articles for incorpowstion in it
nder which traditions; foreign fishing could
final treaty has had no drafts embeeitted
is allowed to the extent that our own fish-
no work to do. ermen do not harvest the sustainable yield.
The goal of the conference was a treaty
I cannot believe that such an approach
replacing lite centuries-old conceot if "free'
dom of thuseas."The projeeted treaty would will provoke retaliaticel?that is, exteneion.
f territorial waters be any nations which
safeguard, for future generations the once- are not planning to do so anyway. 'You will
rich fishi.ng grounds now worked to near- recall that Congress acted in 1988 to extend
exhaustion and threatened by pollution. cur fisheries zone to twelve miles despite
The envisioned treaty was also expected ton the grave warnings from our State Depart-
guard the mineral Tamen:as against specula- tient similar to those Nc, e hear today. No con-
tors and to guarantee an equitable dientribu- frontations occurred atter the 1966 action. In
tkai of seabed wealth. fact, the statue quo was maintained by en-
But mrary were ceetain from the start that eign goveriamerits. If, o!1 the other hand, our
there wan little chance of a conrensen oh e contiguous zone of twelve miles had not been
treaty l'reenework sit thie gathering, the big- established and foreign fleets had operated
gest interteetioned tonferente ever held, up to three miles off cur shares through re-
John I. Stevenson, loading the Illitted cent years, not only would our list of im-
States delegation, said yesterday thet the periled fish been more extensive but we would
political will to negotiate was Viewing raalnly leve had continuous confrontations between
because of a general correolotten that there ITS, and foreign vessels.
would have to be further sessions. Most of the conservative organizations en-
Now hopes are pinned on government-to- ' -
orse S. 1088. You are
government contact and negotiations be a consistent supporter
f fish and wildlife conservation end in 1972
working groups 'brilbre the conference re- championed passage of the Marine Mammal
sumes in Geneva. Protection Act' I recal'' one article you pub-
"It's quite obvious we bane souse veer di fri- I nshed at that time demanded a full mom-
cult work to do before we can orenite it. tiiii,ft,"turlum on the harvest of Pacific fur seals
said Alan Beesley, deputy head of tie Ca- even though etch a moratorium would have
nadian delegation, constituted unilateral action in an activity
But conference observers expect that a fur- controlled by international treaty. The Ma-
ther session may be needed?and is likely to rine Mammal Protection Act, as you know,
be held in Vienna later next year?before any 13 now law and a partta moratorium for re-
firm plata cantle made for the projected re- 5 earch purposes hes been negotiated and is
turn 10 Caracas for signing a 'treaty, in. effect. Ironlcally, one of the situations
that research could prove is the commonly
' Exieurr 2 held belief that more cf our seals die of mal-
!nutritive 'than are harvested and the reason
[From the Washington Post, Cock 26. Ll24]
for this is that foreign fleets are annually
Itesecnese "Conolikss eere Ms LAW' or rus harvesting more than a billion pounds of
etre one of our fur seal's main foods, the Alaska
I hope you will allow me to respond to your pollack. An additional irony is that while
October editorial "Congress and the Law the increasing population of ocean mammals sides over these meetings from a podium 10
of the Sea." Approved For Releasea2ftfI1Y9107 w.ielteIRD1278111eitfl80RfOtkitiffoEfl0000-0age, towering over the
fleets our fisheries cannot sustain the in-
creased pressure from bone the foreign fleets
and the additional mammal population.
The only way to allow tee mammals to re-
build their stocks and the fisheries to to do
the same is to enact S. 1988.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President. at
this time, L ask unanimous consent to
insert in the RECORD two newspaper
articles which I behave accurately re-
flect the progress made at the Law of the
Sea Conference this summer in Caracas.
The first is from the New York Times
and was written in the middle of this
summer's session. The second appeared
in the Washington Pcst and &scribes
the closing of the session and the assess-
ment of its progress by the President of
the Conference.
There being no objec tion, the articles
were ordcred to be priated in the Rge-
olio, as follcrrs:
nsociacw; SLOW AT SEA 1 AW FAWLEY; MANY
SPEAK PliptierldLY Or STALEMATE
(By Leslie IL Gelb)
Cam/teas, VENEZUELA, Aug. 2?The Parepee
Central, a complex of futuristic-looking sky-
scrapers deeleneel for totally self-conteineri
Irving, has been inhe,lalted since late June
by abontit 4,700 people e hose almost total
daily coecern. is the sea niat lies nation miles
beyond the mountains ale, t ring Canines.
They are delegates tcei he United Nations
law of tee sees conference, officials of inter-
national organizations said representetivee of
various economic interests ard of a number
of liberation movements.
The purpose of the conference is to come
up by Aug. 21) with some einci of coherent, if
tentative, agaement ou navigation, fishing,
and sea mining, a partial pact that will have
the effect of restraining it, ,tions from making
individe al lanes on the sea. Then, next spring.
the delegates; will meet in Vienna to turn
that agreement into a ireaty. Thee' prog-
ress hera is painfully Slow; many speak pri-
vately on steternate.
ORIGINAL
The original goal of the Caracas meeting
was to piOftice a di aft eionsteution for all
nations. Thst treaty, it was hoped, would
e.stablish 11CW territorial emits and zones of
control for merino reeten 'as beyond the ter-
ritorial limits, and proviee seine kind of in-
ternational authorityo'er exploitation of
the deep sentods.
"We're moving, but el: wly," said John U.
Stevenson, the head of United State dole-
gntiquie
"I ethereal to meet 'General Assembly
goal of a treaty before the end. of 1915," said
bin Stevenson's deputy, eohn Norton Moore.
But while everyone here puts a good face
on what is going on when speaking for the
record, unofficially the participants in this
third United Nations conference on the law
of the seas since 1958 talk of stalemate.
The votes are -there, says an American
delegate, but the means for setting up a
strong international authority for the deep
seabeds are rot. The privete and national in-
terests represented hen, seem as various and
complex as the animal and plant life of the
sea itself. It here are nations with coasts,
landlocked nations, powerful nations and
underdeveloped' nations ?all with special
axe* to grind.
It the roust confereece hall, a theater
that has been converted to look like, a Gen-
eral Assembly hall in New York, hundreds
of men and women, representing 14:8 coun-
tries, meet daily. They are the core of the
conference, the experts: most of them have
been working on law of the sea for most of
their mature lives.
Andres Aguilar of Venezuela, a veteran
diplomat in Matters involving the sea pre-
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December .11, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 21097
delegates In the rear of the great room sits This, as 'Jens Everisen, the head of the
Louts B. Sohn of Harvard University, who has
been occupied with sea law for 15 years.
Toward the middle of the room are Joseph
Warioba of Tanzania, a lawyer who has been
working on the subject five years, and Alvaro
de Soto, a young Peruvian diplomat whose
entire career is devoted to the search for a
coherent law of the seas. .
Their experience and expertise are typical
of most others here, as is their zeal; they
meet from early morning to late evening,
and they confbr while at meals.
What drives these men and women is a
concern that without a new law of the seas,
nations will assert. more and more separate
claims on fishing, on sea mining and on
navigation, leading to international anarchy,
new tensions and new conflicts.
The president of the conference, Hamilton
Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka, likes to
refer to the hoped-for document as a state-
ment of agreement, Whose language would be
couched in actual treaty form, a document
that would fall somewhere between a draft
treaty arid a declaration of principles.
One problem, a European diplomat says,
is that such a statement "cannot be ham-
mered out by voting; that would tear this
conference apart. If a delegation feels its
national interests are being outvoted," he
went on, "it might simply pick up and leave.
This must be done by consensus."
GEOGRAPTIT A FACTOR
"Tell me the exact geographical situation
of a nation," an American delegate said, "and
I will tell you its exact negotiating position
at this Conference:"
The United States, which has teamed up on
some !seizes with other maritime nations such
as the Soviet Union and Japan, is making
proposals along the following lines:
A 12-mile territorial limit as long as there
is no interference with passage over and un-
der stralts.-"Territorfal seas" now vary from
3 miles to as many as 200.
Beyond the 12 miles, a 188-mile economic
zone, each nation having exclusive rights
there to submarine resources?many such
projected zones are rich in oil and natural
gas?but not to fish or navigation. Fisheries
would operate under the principle of -full
utilization: international arbiters would
step in when a "host" nation was not taking
a certain amount of fish from the area to
determine whether other nations might
use it
Establishment of an international agency
that would issue licenses to nations or cor-
porations to mine deep seabeds. The oceans
are known to contain vast stores of manga-
nese nodules, from which nickel and copper
can be derived. But only a few nations have
the teelinological ability to do the mining.
ti,rurx VARIES
Unity at the conference among about 77
less developed nations varies from issue to
issue. Some Latin-American states such as
Peru and Ecuador simply want a 200-mile
limit. But most Of them, the delegates say,
look for a 12-mile 'territorial sea" with con-
trol over straits and an economic zone of
about 200 miles, with exclusive rights to all
resources, but not control over navigation,
and full international ownership and Con-
trol of the deep seabeds.
Still another group of about 40 nations,
many of them landlocked, want to share in
the resources of both the economic zone and
the deep seabeds. Then there is a cluster
of states like Norway and Australia that '
want full control to the limits of their con-
tinental shelves.
The voting procedure calls for each article
to be carried by two-thirds of those present
and voting, as Tong as that is a majority of
all 148 nations represented here. But in each
nation's proposal, agreement on any one Is-
sue is tied to agreement on an other issues.
Norwegian delegation, sees it, means a queer
kind of juggling, in which all the balls must
be in the air at the same time, long enough
for all to see that their interests are being
accommodated.
And no nation represented here will make
a fundamental concession until the others
do. As an American delegate put it, "How
can we wire Washington asking to make
compromises when no one else around here
is making any compromises?"
SEA LAw CONFERENCE CLOSES IN DEADLOCK
(By John Virtue)
CARACAS, Aug. 29.?The third U.N. Sea-Law
Conference ended in deadlock today and the
conference president said there was little
hope of drafting a new treaty governing the
use of the sea at a follow-up spring session
in Geneva.
Conference President Hamilton S. Amera-
singhe of Sri Lanka indicated that as many
as three more sessions might be needed by
the 148 participating nations to obtain a
signed treaty in 1975.
"There has so far been no agreement on
any final text on any single subject or
issue," Amerasinghe said in closing the con-
ference, which ended its 10-week session
deadlocked on the four key issues needed for
a treaty to replace the current 17th-century
sea code.
"I am convinced, given the best-will in the
world, it will be physically impossible for us
to finish the drafting of the treaty by the
end of the spring session in 1975," he said
later at a press conference.
Earlier this week, the conference agreed to
reconvene in Geneva March 17 to May 3
and then to return to Venezuela in mid-
summer for signing a treaty, if one is
negotiated by then. Amerasinghe indicated,
however, that another session might have to
be squeezed in between Geneva and Caracas.'
While most delegates said publicly that the
conference had achieved the expected, they
privately expressed disappointment at the
slow progress and the gulf between the posi-
tions of the rich industrial nations and the
poor developing ones.
The division between the delegations knew
no ideological bounds.
The United States and the Soviet Union
were the leaders of the industrial nations,
and China backed the aspirations of right-
wing South American military dictatorships.
The conference became deadlocked on four
key issues:
Territorial limits: the developing nations,
led by Ecuador and Peru, insist on virtual
sovereign control over all activities within 200
miles of their coasts. The industrial nations,
led by the United States and the Soviet
Union, favor giving coastal states full centrol
over a 12-mile limit but opening up a further
188-mile economic zone to fishing and scien-
tific research by other nations.
Deep sea mining: The developing nations
want preferential treatment in mining
cobalt, copper nickel and other deposits
through a strong international authority,
which would set its own rules and decide who
mined where. The industrial nations want
the rules written into the treaty.
Pollution control: The developing nations
want mild controls for themselves and hard
ones for the industrialized nations, who they
say polluted while achieving their develop-
ment. The industrial nations want uniform
international standards.
Straits passage: This is the key Soviet and
U.S.? issue. Both want freedom of passage for
their warships and merchant fleets through
the more than 100 straits in the world. The
straits nations, most of them developing ones,
want control.
"The No. 1 priority is the mobility of our
naval and air forces and the importance of
retaining our nuclear deterrent," said U.S.
Special Ambassador John R. Stevenson re-
cently.
Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI.), here briefly
for the conference, predicted that the Sen-
ate would not ratify treaty that did not
guarantee free passage.
Stevenson, in a wind-up news conference,
expressed confidence that a sea treaty could
be signed in Caracas if enough hard work is
done in Geneva. "There is no cause for bill-
ing the conference a failurerhe said.
"We certainly did not come to Caracas
expecting to go back with a signed treaty,"
said Tanzania's J. S. Warioba, expressing the
feeling of many delegates, "But we had cer-
tainly come expecting to achieve more than
we have."
Amerasinghe cautioned the nations against
taking any unilateral action before a treaty
is negotiated. In this, he echoed Stevenson,
who warned that any extension? of U.S. fish-
ing limits by the Senate could touch off uni-
lateral action by other nations.
There are several bills in Congress to ex-
tend the fishing limit to 200 miles, a concept
officially opposed by the United States at
the conference.
Ecuador and Peru, the hardliners among
the developing nations, claimed a 200-mile
limit in 1952, touching off the "tuna war"
with the United States. Some 200 U.S. fishing
trawlers, most of them from San Diego, have
been seized during the past 10 years in the
disputed waters.
The two South American nations said their
claim was simply an extension of the Tru-
man Doctrine, under which the United States
in 1945 claimed control over the seabed re-
sources of the continental shelf, which ex-
tends beyond 200 miles from the coast in
some parts of the Atlantic. The two Pacific
nations have virtually no shelf, so they
claimed a 200-mile limit instead.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, my
distinguished colleague, Senator ERNEST
HOLLINGS of South Carolina, is one of the
genuine experts in the Congress on the
oceans, the problems of our fishing in-
dustry, and law of the sea. As chairman
of our committee's Subcommittee on
Oceans and Atmosphere and as chair-
man of the Senate's National Ocean
Policy Study, he is acutely aware of the
need to move now to do something about
establishing a method of protecting the
resources of our own waters.
Senator HOLLINGS recently spelled out
his views in an outstanding message
delivered on October 23 before the
Johns Hopkins University Ocean Policy
Project Conference on Law of the Sea
at Airlie House in Warrenton, Va. Sen-
ator HOLLINGS and I both serve as con-
gressional advisers to the U.S. Law of
the Sea delegation, and I ask unanimous
consent that the text of his remarks be
herein printed in the RECORD and that
those concerned about the oceans heed
his wise advice.
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ME LAW OF TFIE SEA: A DIFFERENT
PERSPECTIVE
(By Senator ERNEST F. HOLLINGS)
The Ism of the sea interests of the inter-
national community are not necessarily
totally opposite to those of the United States,
and vice versa. Those who believe that the
more parochial interests of coastal nations
must be ignored in devising a treaty on
ocean uses suffer frdm an acute case of what
I would call, "internationalist near-sighted-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE December 11, 1974
nese." An indispensable part of a university
acceptable treaty on law of ,the :set, is an
accommodation of -coastal nation interests.
The jot, of the negotiators is to balance both
more specific interests Of Ooastal nations
and the broader interests Of all rattlens,
broader interests Which are Sometimes re-
ferred to as the "common heritage of man-
kind." Without a fair balancing, there simply
will be no treaty. To Flay that an eitconamo-
dation of coastal nation interests is incom-
patible with international interests Is to say
that international interests will never be
recognized in a treaty.
The Third United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference is unquestionably political. un-
like the previous two Conferences, this, the
most recent and most ambitious of attempts
to codify ocean law, is not a purely technical
taking place in a vacuum, away frcen the
pressures , of general world and United Na-
tions panties. X do not believe I am a pes-
simist When I say that all nations attending
the Lave Of the Sea Conference are, in large
measure, pursuing their own self-intereets.
And it is fair to say that the United States
is no more fervent in this puree/it than are
most other countries, In fact, it anything,
the U.S. positions on ocean matters are per-
haps mere balanced than many other na-
tions, particularly those of some of the devel-
oping nations which are flush With their own
brand of strong nationalistic desires
At, one time, not too long ago, the United
States and a few other nations were clearly
dominant in the pursuit of their national
interests, in the ocean and otherwiee. Quite
dramatically, the world balance has ehifted
to nations which possess much-needed min-
eral resources. Developing nations now have
a solid majority in the United Nation.; Gen-
eral Assembly, The Group of 77 proposal on
Rules and Regulation" in Cominietee
this summer evidences their desire ic swing
the balance in favor of producing natioes,
A few oil-rich nations are dictatiug exorbi-
tant prices for the energy which fuels MIT
society. And other producers of vital raw
materials. are weighieg the possibility of
price and production cartels in order to boost
their infiumscm
These changed wore! circumstance:I have
shattered, previous conventional wisdom
abept relationships between natioils Eco-
nomic and technologic dominance by any
single nation will soon be a thing of ths past.
Control of vital resources May very well be-
come the pivotal factor in deterreinieg world
power in the years to come. -
Put in this context, I think it is easy to
SeE,, that a number of general worid issecs
a al play an important role in the U.N. Law
of the Sea Conference and these may have
no direct relevance to the specie? question
of ma in the world's oceans. With this back-
ground, I hope my remarks on Law of tee
Sea will be clearer.
Since time prevents ens from dismissing in
detail all the elements on an acceptable
new of the Sea Treaty, I plan to discuss Dye
of the more important issues; (I) naviga-
tional freedoms; (2) the iiitermatiogel
,4:1 1,rea: (3) fisheries; (4) the continental
self; and (5) ocean pollution.
Tor the mutt part, the positions taken by
our delegation in Caracas and elsewhere have
been well-considered attempts: at balancing
the varioas disparate interests and views of
)our pluralistic nation. For the most peen
these positions enjoy the support of Coe-
gress. But there are differences of opinion
on various points which Congress had de-
cided to discuss'?namely the fisheries gum-
tion, and 'deep sea mining for manganese
modules. ft is healthy in our system for each
branch of government to honestly enpress
and pursue its own viewpoint. This in Why
I'm here this evening.
ikrAVTGAi2ONAL TIMM=
Given the changing world ffirctintstancer
which I have mentioned I question the wee-
dem, and even the point, of placing impor-
tance of military issues ahead of resource is-
sues. This has definitely been the case up to
now. Is it really any longer logical to sub-
ordinate our resouree objectives in the
oceans to our military objectives? Why, for
example, do vie refuse to address the proven
problem of overfishing on the basis of some
tenuous fear of restricted military naviga-
tional freedoms? Especially now in these
times of food short:at:es and high inflation
rates.
It would seem to me that the question of
access of resources ennui(' be given equal
status with military objectives by our law
of the sea negotiators. This would *fleet
real world problems end recognize the fact
that resources indeed are as powerful as
:military weapons, perhaps more so. We have
learned that It coulet be more difficult for
this nation to fight an oil embargo, than it
is to fight, a war. And without oil there can be
go successful war. Why shouldn't our Law
ef the Sea policy reflect this?
I believe that the U.S. is better served by
separating commercial navigational issues
from purely military ones. Every nation
eenefits from unrestrieted vessel transports-
don on the oceans. Every coastal nation
.s either a producer or a consumer of raw
-naterials and fishing products. If a coastal
tation were tc arbitrarily restrict the ocean
transport of oft, copper, bauxite, or any other
?aw material or commercial item, every na-
eon, developed or wadeveloped, which is
-termed would loudly protest. It is in every
? talons' interest that he flow of trade con-
;Mite without restraint. I see no reason to
eonclude that the werld will not agree on
iin ocean regime which protects the innocent
passage of commercial vessels through any
waters, except those designated as strictly
.nternal.
This being se, the military desire for free
or unimpeded transit should not piggyback
nor confuse this commercial transit question,
'ehe military arguments should stand on
I heir own merits, and rise and fall on that
basis. Unimpeded tran) it rights for our mili-
tary vessels should list be the sole non-
riegotiable item in U.S. Law of the Sea policy.
Our delegation should concentrate on the
inportant resource issues.
An acceptable Law of the Sea Treaty is one
which, at the very least, protects the naviga-
tional freedoms of commercial vessels, It
thould also protect, the right of free transit
ef our military vesmils in international
traits.
THE INTERNATTM,AL SEABED AREA
After this summer's session, it would ap-
ear that the most coetentious issue in the
IDS negotiations is the question of the deep-
Ca bed. This Is the area of the "common
I eritage of mankind" iend control of its re-
eturces is the basic bone of contention. The
I lost critical problems seem to be three: (1)
what will be the nature of the resource ex-
i.loration and exploitation system; (2) what
v ill be the functions and powers of the in-
t ernationed organization ( the Authority)
which governs activiters in this area, and
( I) what will be the nature of the decision-
) iaking process which guides the Authority.
The division on these problems represents
iet widest on any issue in the Conference,
a Id It is fundamental. I : is the United States'
v ew that the discretion of the Authority to
r .gulate resource exploration should be
limited. Constraints or discretion should be
specifice in the treaty. The U.S. also wishes
a system of licensing designed to enure that
companies have tho incentive to exploit the
n sources that exist. Tier developing nations,
ot the other hand, the "Group of 77", would
giant the Authority almost complete dis-
cretion. Their desire seems to be to protect
lend-based producers. :In fact, according to
their view, if a company contracted to do ex-
pi oratory work on seabed resources in the in-
ternational area, there is no asurance that
the same company will be given the op-
portunity to make good on its exploratory
work and be allowed to produce and sell the
resources. Land-based mineral producers
spoke loudly in the halls of the Barque Cen-
tral of creating cartels similar to OPEC to
control prices and production.
Unquestionably, this eebate is of the high-
est concern to the United States. I think I
can safely say that Congress would not tips
prove a treaty which _establishes an inter-
national body with unlimited discretion to
control deep, seabed mining. Only those with
an extreme Sense of internationalism would
approve the result.
Frankly, the United States and other de-
veloped countries appear headed toward eco-
nomic war with producing nations over raw
materials. 'This conflict is underway now
and can only intensify le the near future. To
allow the majority of U.N. nations to deny
the U.S. access to seabed minerals critical to
its well-being is unthinkable. The effect cf
oil prices Is taking its toll on our society.
Since the U.S. possesses the technology to
develop the resources of the deep ocean, it
is in a strong bargaining position. It shred('
not give it up easily. It is also in the interest
of all nations that raw materials be made
abundantly available. Without them, many
developing nations will riot progress and the
world order will be dangerously strained.
Summarizing, Congress would strongly
support a treaty which--
(I) ensures fair access to deepsea minerals
by U.S. companies under reasonable condi-
tions;
(2) prevents land-based producers from
controlling production;
(3) does hot discourage investment nor a
ntir return on such investments;
(4) prevents monopoly and pollution in
connection with deepsea bed activities.
loss
I was quite pleased this summer when
Ambassador John Stevenson announced in
Caracas that the United States approves, in
principle, the concept of a 200-mile economic
zone as part of an over-ell acceptable law of
the sea treaty. As a cosponsor of Senator
Magnuson's 'MIL S. 1988, to establish each a
sone for fisheries management prior to an
effective ocean jurisdiction treaty. I view this
move as overdue. The "eoecies approach" to
fisheries managements is beat laid to rest.
Since our delegation noes not object to
the substance of S. 1983, but basses its strong
objections to the bill's Vining, there is little
eisagreemene about wItee, are the beet fish-
cries provision?I thine they are in the U.S
proposals now. But there will continue to be
eiss,greement on whether earlier implemen-
tation cf these provieleine is needed.
Clearly, the 200-mile Limit es the world
consensus, Yet our long-distance fishing
iii-
torests must not be foreelosed from harvest-
ing what other coastal nations cannot take
ie their 200-mile zones. Access should be on
a reasonable basis and without harassment,
It makes no sense to allow available food
resources to go to waste wings the world is
so short of protein. Food should not be a
weapon; and a requirement of full utiliza-
tion of resources within the 200-mile zone
would prevent it from being used as such.
The recent decision by the International
Court Of Justice in the Iceland v. Great
Britain case :legitimized Use concept of pref-
erential rights for coastal states in coastal
fishing areas. There shoiliel be little question
about the issue in the Law of the Sea. But the
Court also identified the need to protect
traditional fishing rights of other nations.
This balance will require definition and fine
tuning,
The best law of the sea treaty from the
standpoint al fisheries includes the follow-
ing: (1) a 200-Mile fishing management
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 21099
sone; (2) a coastal nation duty to assure full
utilization of available resources; (3) rec-
ognition of Preferential rights for coastal
nation. fishermen; (4) an accommodation of
other nation's traditional fishing rights by
the coastal nation; (5) as the guiding prin-
ciple, the duty to conserve resources by
maintaining the optimum or maximum sus-
tainable yield of fish stocks.
THE CONTINENTAL SIIELF
It has been said that you can tell who is
happy about the likely outcome of the Law
of the Sea Conference by who remains quiet
in a meeting such as this. If this is true, the
oil companies aren't saying much?but they
never do. Although this nation's romance
with the oil companies is turning sour, no
one disputes the fact that we need oil re-
sources. With land supplies diminishing and
exports expanding, we desperately need al-
ternate sources. Only the continental shelf
offers some real relief from the pressures
caused by fuel shortages, the drain of capi-
tal, and continuing inflation due to gasoline
prices. Consequently, Congress supports
wholeheartedly the U.S. proposal to include
within our resource Jurisdiction the conti-
nental shelf out to the edge of the continen-
tal margin..
As we all know, the last Conference on
Law of the Sea left the seaward limits of
coastal state control over the continental
shelf rather vague. The existing Convention
on the Continental Shelf now provides
coastal nations with Jurisdictions out to
wherever the resources. can be developed. Set-
ting the seaward limit of 'coastal nation
jurisdiction at the continental margin seems
to enjoY general support. Adopting of this -
limit will eliminate uncertainty and help
this nation move with all deliberate speed
toward self-sufficiency in oil.
I am somewhat skeptical about our ability
to protect U.S. oil investments on other na-
tion's continental shelves. Whatever the
ocean treaty says, there will always be the
threat of expropriation.. The stakes are sim-
ply too high. We may be better off by selling
oil technology to the highest bidder rather
than building an entire oil production oper-
ation only to have it expropriated by a for-
eign nation.
/ am also somewhat skeptical about the
concept of revenue sharing as a mandatory
concept. While sharing the benefits of the
deep seabed ocean resources with developing
nations has great moral appeal, dangers do
exist. While it may in the first instance ap-
pear to be international responsibility, reve-
nue sharing could lead to a reckless selfish-
ness on the part of beneficiaries who might
seek to control all development to satisfy
their own desires.
However, revenue sharing from the re-
sources of the continental shelf of the United
States is, in my opinion, totally unaccept-
able to the Senate. The energy and economic
crisis that this country finds itself in has
destroyed any chance of this form of revenue
sharing being ratified by the U.S. Senate. A
mandatory revenue sharing requirement for
continental shelf resources would preclude
the flexibility we need in solving our energy
and economic problems. Given the attitude
of many producing nations, we cannot afford
to lose our flacilaility or our control of alter-
nate sources of oil or related capital re-
sources.
OCEAN FOLLIJTION
Unfortunately, delegates at the Caracas
Conference do nnt seem to be taking the
need to protect our ocean environnaent very
seriously. If we have learned anything from
our recent interest in the ocean, it is that
we must be worried about its health, Conse-
quently, I believe strong environmental
standards should appear where appropriate
in the -treaty. Deep sea mining, oil and gas
development, and tanker operations are all
potentially polluting and harmful to ocean
health. To prevent damage, specific standards
to prevent or minimise pollution should be
clear and enforceable.
What should be the goal of the marine
pollution provisions in the Law of the Sea
Treaty? Quite simply, it should be to prevent
adverse impacts on the marine environment
as a result of ocean use and development. The
major problem right now is tanker pollution,
both accidental and operational. But because
of the international nature of the tanker
business, companies have been able to find
havens from both safety and environmental
standards. We must find alternatives to the
traditional practice of relying on flag-nation
enforcement. If flag-nations do not begin to
conquer the problem of ocean pollution, na-
tions whose coastlines and port areas are
threatened should be able to take steps to
solve the problem themselves.
International standards for pollution pre-
vention should be minimum standards. Na-
tions should be able to require more stringent
standards on vessels entering their ports if
such are shown to be needed. This would
include both vessel construction standards
and permissible discharge restrictions. Sanc-
tions for violations, however, should not un-
duly delay any vessel but should assure that
punishment is fair and swift and that laws
be observed.
The principal international oil pollution
treaty now in existence has resulted only in
seven attempts at enforcement. And this is
despite the fact that oil pollution and vessel
traffic have both been on the increase.
Stronger enforcement measures are needed.
Consequently, port-nations should be able
to enforce discharge standards no matter
where the violation occurs. The oceans are
Interrelated and oil dumped in one part
of the world may find its way to shores far
away. Vessel operators must know that laws
will be enforced, otherwise there is no de-
terrent to cutting time by dirtying the sea.
The question has been asked whether the
United States should seek a pollution control
zone together with a 200-mile economic zone.
If the problem of oil pollution from ships is
not solved, the problem may be solved by
establishing such a zone. A heavily polluted
200-mile fishery zone is a benefit to no one.
If vessel operators and flag states are not
required to adopt and enforce measures
which Will eliminate or greatly reduce the
pollution of the sea, then a 200-mile pollu-
tion zone will be necessary. With 95% of our
imports being carried in foreign-flag vessels,
the United States can only hope that Liberia
or Greece will be tough. If they aren't, the
U.S. will move to protect itself.
SUMMARY
Some have stated?in classic doomsday
fashion?that if a Law of the Sea treaty is
not developed disaster will result?meaning
war or worse. I respectfully disagree. The
Law of the Sea Conference is not a last gasp
effort to maintain world peace. For this rea-
son, if it does fail, nations will seek alterna-
tive ocean arrangements, on a bilteral, re-
gional, or multilateral basis. In fact there
are a number of oceans issues which, when
freed from more contentious issues, could be
easily settled by separate treaties.
One of the stumbling blocks to agreement
In. the present deliberations is the desire of
the undeveloped nations to present a unified
position through the Group of 77. Getting
agreement on ocean issues within a single
country is extremely difficult. But achieving
a single, unified position among the nearly
100 developing countries seems well nigh to
impossible. As long as the developing na-
tions attempt to negotiate in concert
threugh the Group of 77, then agreement
cannot be, reached, and the Conference will
fail. If that happens, the possibility of deal-
ing with developing nations on a one-to-one
basis may allow for the give and take neces-
sary to Make agreements on use of the sea.
If ocean law is not settled by a treaty or
treaties, this nation should not reject tak-
ing carefully devised unilateral action. For
some reason, many people seem to believe
that all unilateral action is inherently bad
and illegal. This is not necessarily so. The
basic process of international law of the sea
has been one of claim and counterclaim.
That is, one nation makes a claim in the
ocean to protect or advance what it believes
to be its legitimate interests. The rest of the
world community then evaluates this claim
as to its reasonableness, then rejects or ac-
cepts it. If this nation were to act unilater-
ally in the ocean and its action reflects what
most nations would accept, then the cause
of defining international law is advanced.
If a treaty cannot be agreed upon, I be-
Here that this nation must seriously con-
sider unilateral action?for sure on fish-
eries, and perhaps on other matters as well.
Granted we must be careful and sensitive
if we take this route. But it is a legitimate
option. If we reject this option we may suc-
cumb to "internationalist near-sightedness"
and be faced with even greater confusion in
the ocean than now exists.
MASTAL FISHERY JURISDICTION
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, as
evidence of the world trend in coastal
fishery jurisdiction, I bring to my col-
leagues' attention a recent article which
appeared in "the New York Times de-
scribing the plans of the Government of
Norway to control foreign fishing within
200 miles of their shores. I ask unanimous
consent that the article be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
NORWAY PLANS TO EXTEND FISHING LIMITS
(By Terry Robards)
Oslo, Nonway.?The Norwegian Govern-
ment is trying to bar foreign fleets from com-
mercial fishing waters off the coast.
The aim is to extend control in three
stages to waters 200 miles from shore.
The first phase involves a ban on trawling
in an area totaling 5,000 square miles, mainly
off the northern coast. The internationally
recognized 12-mile limit would be extended
at certain key points, in some cases by up to
42 miles, and the Government hopes to have
the first phase completed by Christmas.
In an attempt to minimize international
resistance, a broad diplomatic effort has been
undertaken, involving visits by a Norwegian
delegation to nine countries, among them
Britain, East and West Germany and the
Soviet- Union. The plan remains controver-
sial, and some political leaders wonder
whether a clash reminiscent of the so-called
cod wars between Britain and Iceland can be
averted.
Jens Evensen, a Norwegian Minister With-
out Portfolio who is in charge of the delega-
tion, acknowledged in an interview that the
waters in question had been traditional fish-
ing grounds for foreign fleets.
"But they have been more traditional for
the Norwegian fleet," said Mr. Evensen, an
expert on international maritime law who
was given leave from his position as Mintister
of Commerce to conduct the negotiations
with other countries. He has also visited
France, Denmark, Sweden, Poland and
Belgium to explain the Norwegian stand.
The message he carried was that cod and
other fish in the Barents Sea and adjacent
waters were threatened with extinction be-
cause of overfishing. The catch this year will
be a million tons, he said.
"The experts think a maximum of 57,000
tons should be taken," he said. "It's an
enormous overfishing problem." He added
that trawling fleets had been driven away
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CONGRESSIONAL R ECORD ? SENATE Deceiro5er 11, 1974
from Iceland, Canada, Latin America and
West Africa and were now concentratiag in
he Barents Sea.
Mr. Eveneen mentioned Spain and Battu-
al, whose fleets were inactive in Norwegian
waters until this year. He said Spain's Catch
t his year would total 45,000 tons, compared
with 250 tons in 1973, while Portugal's catch
.his year would reach 28,000 tons, compared
with virtually nothing last year.
"These are examples of the problems we
m:te up against here," he continued. "Norway
'Las reduced its fishing from 480,000 tons to
80,000 tons at the same time."
He noted that the Soviet Union, Poland,
Sritain ar.d East Germany had also curtailed
tieir fishing,
Fishing has been one of Norway's most
txtporta,nt industries for centuries. A major
nortion of the nation's four million people
derive their livelihood from fishing or from
ttrocessing.
Along the northern section of the shoreline
many fishermen still operate with old-
fashioned long lines nod bottom nets that
end to snag on the equipment used by big
toreign as well as Nowegian trawlers,
So the first phase of the Government's
plan is to protect the local fishermen by ex--
I-ending the 12-mile limit.
The second stage involves the establish-
ment of a 50-mile limit that would be re-
?evicted to the Norwegian fleet and saw FIct to
Norwegian conservation measures.
The third stage involves the creation of a
200-mile economic zone under Nocaeglar
,.entrOl.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, am
thorougly in sympathy with and in sup-
sort of the Senator from West Virginia
,n reference to the Senate rules here
about the allotment of time. I knew
his bill was coming up, S. 1988. 1: ?was
engaged in a conference regarding an
bill, trying to get it ready to be
'isrought up, and I thought I was :retina
to be called.
Now, Mr. Persident, this bill, S. 1988,
is a bill that was referred to the Com-
merce Committee, also to the Foreign Re-
lations Committee, and the Armed S'erv-
ices Committee. We had hearings on the
bill and consideration was given to it,
and a majority of the committee voted
fo report the bill favorably for passage.
I voted against that position. Of course.
IS chairman, it was all right with me to
submit it for consideration and to report
the bill then. I did mention that I
thought the record ought to be complete,
and encouraged for the record the filing
of a minority report, and I also said that
I would make a few remarks because it
is such a far-reaching policy involved.
Mr. .President, I believe that Passage
il S. 1938 at this time would be unwise.
S. 1988 could adversely' affect U.S. na-
tional security interests, as Well as other
U.S. ocean interests, such as surface
shipping and the mining of mineral re-
sources on the ocean floor. S. 1988 'would
be incorsistent with U.S. obligations un -
der international law and 'does not, in
my view, represent the most effective
means of resolving U.S. fishery problems.
I have a great deal of sympathy with
the problem presented. Also it is a matter
of judgment as to the best remedy to ap-
ply. I lean toward the idea that the effec-
tive remedy would almost necessarily
come through multilateral action of the
nations involved rather than unilateral
action by us.
I emphasize I do not minimize the
problems of the depletionof U.S. coastal
fishing stocks and the growing economic
pressures on the U.S. coastal 41shing in-
dustry. The State that I have the honor
represent has industry there along
hiese very lines.
I recognize these Q.:* serious problems
t sat deserve the prompt and strenuous
e Torts of both Congress and the Execiss-
t ye. But passage of S. 1988 at this time
I do not believe is the most appropriate
v ay to deal with the problem.
ENFORGEMEN'T PROBLEMS
S. 1988 would extend U.S. fishery juris-
diction by approximately two million
ivare miles. Enforeement of S. 1988
t iroughout such a large area will be dif-
f cult and costly.
Open defiance of US. authority within
t iis vast fishery will he a temptation and
could be a reality. Gyeat Britain, for ex-
ample, recently defied Iceland's decla ra-
t on of a 50 nautical mile fishery zone.
The result was the so-called cod war in
tehich various armed confrontations took
r lace between vessels of Great Britain
and Iceland.
I illustrate merely the seriousness of
t re matter.
The fining and imerisonment of for-
eign fishermen by the United States
under the authority of S. 1988 would
surely be considered Ly major fishing na-
t.ons to be a serious provocation. Hence,
Lae risk of armed co: ifrontation between
1('.S. military :forees and fishing boats or
escort gunboats of f: Lich nations as the
r.S S.R. and japan (amid be substantial.
RETALIATORY MEASURES BY OTHER NATIONS
The mobility of U.i. strategic and gen-
eral purpose forces is well as the sur-
vivability of U.S. stategic forces could
Le threatened by various unilateral ac-
tions of other natians in response to
k . 1988. Administratien officials expressed
toe fear that in response to the passage
of S. 1938 other nations would act in
arying degrees to prevent naval surface
end submarine passage as well as mili-
tary overflight of certain coastal ocean
reas. If the United F. i:ates in its acknowl-
edged leadership position at the Law of
the Sea Conference succumbs to pres-
eures for unilateral :.',ctiOn to further its
own interests, other nations can naturally
lie expected to take iinilateral actions in
their peculiar intereets. These unilateral
sctions by other natons could well take
the form of expanding their territorial
.,eas, or in some cases, denying unimpeded
transit through straits.
All the major ocean issues which are
Presently before the Law of the Sea Con-
erence--from fishing rights to mineral
rights to territoriel jurisdiction?are
elosely interrelated. Commonsense and
precedent suggest that other nations
would respond to S. 1988 by various rail-
lateral actions.
rNDERMINING A FAVORBLE LAW OF TI-IE SEA
CONFERENCE
Through the Law of the Sea Confer-
ince, the United States is trying to estab-
ish international agreement on the
erucial national security concepts of un-
impeded transit of straits and a narrow
lefinition of territorial sea with the right
to innocent passage. Narrowly defined
territorial seas, that is, 12 miles or less,
and the right to unimpeded transit of
straits which includes submerged transit
are essential to the range and mobility
of the U.S. strategic submarine deterrent.
More importantly, the absence , of
narrowly defined territorial seas and the
right to unimpeded transit of straits
would result in serious constraints on
surface fleet operations in such critical
areas as the, Mediterranean Sea.
The chief of the U.S. negotiating team
at the Law of the Sea Conference, Special
Ambassador John It. Stevenson, has
stated:
The number one prior; ty [of the U.S. at
the Law of the Sea Gonfei once] is the mobil-
ity of our naval and air forces and the impor-
tance of detbining our noclear deterrent.
Without an interne tiOnal agreement,
constraints imposed by foreign nations
on U.S. naval mobility could be unevenly
applied by both unfriendly nations and
allies to impede U.S. naval forces re-
sponding to local or regional crises. The
recent Cyprus and the Yam Kippur war
clearly demonstrated the importance of
ELS. naval mobility And unrestricted
military overflight. These rights of mili-
tary flexibility have never been guaran-
teed in a substantial international agree-
ment before now.
TO strike the best overall agreement
at the Law of the Sea Conference, the
United States needs the flexibility and
leverage that comes with having the
broadest range of issues on which to
negotiate. By being able to bargain with
fundamental fishing and economic rights
of the Law of the Sea Conference, the
United States has the best opportunity
to achieve an international agreement
that will guarantee. comprehensively and
systematically, U.S. ocean. interests af-
fecting national security.
INCONSISTENT WITH IN TERNATIONAL LAW
A unilateral declaration of a 200 nauti-
cal mile fishery zone would violate the
freedom of fishing as established in the
1958 Geneva Agreement to which the
United States was a signator. The Inter-
national Court has recently held that
Iceland's declaration of a 50 nautical
mile fishery zone wee not enforceable
under international law. The United
States has tionsistently refused to recog-
nize any territorial or fishing claims be-
yond the 12-mile Uinta To be sure, fish-
ing conditions have changed since 1958
and there is a growing consensus among
nations for a 200 mile coastal fishery
jurisdiction. But prevailing international
law on freedom of fishing, however fra-
gile, cannot be overturned by the unilat-
eral action of a single nation. Legal justi-
fication of a 200 mile fishery zone would
require a multilateral expression of na-
tions that could be beet achieved in the
Law of the Sea Conference.
RISKING OF ALL OTHER U3. OCEAN INTERESTS
In addition to national security, the
United Stases has a variety of other na-
tional interests which could be both
threatened by retaliatory actions stem-
ming from S. 1988 and deprived of satis-
factory resolution in the Law of the Sea
Conference. U.S. interests hi the eco-
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'December 11, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
nomic resources 'ef the ocean bottom, the
commercial shipping of all types of car-
goes including' oil, and the full range of
fishery interests, both Coastal and dis-
tant, are all at stake in the Lav of the
Sea Conference. Through the bargaining
of a multilateral negotiation all of these
Interests can be most apPropriately bal-
anced and preserved. To the extent that
countries act unilaterally on one of these
Issues, the chances of an overall agree-
ment will become less.
? Mr. President, how much remaining
time do have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Mississippi has 10 minutes re-
? maining.
Mr. STENNIS. Ten minutes.
I change that request, Mr. President,
to 15 minutes only, so I would have 5
left.
Mr. ROBERT C. :BYRD. Mr. President,
if the $enator needs more time?
Mr. STENNIS. I am going to use *less.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I want the
Senator to be assured there is no ob-
jection.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
coxcLusrox
Mr. President, briefly stated, the
United States is confronted with serious
coastal' fishing problems. I want to em-
phasize that by every means, rather than
let an inference from my position here
show that I was not interested or that I
do not recognize these problems.
By passage of S. 1088 the United States
V.111 be resorting to coercion rather than
Cooperation to resolve Its fishery prob-
lems. I stronglY oPpOse this course of ac-
:Lion. The United States should continue
to seek a resolution to its fishing prob-
lems in the normal course of the Law of
the Sea Conference.
? ,
We should push and urge definite and
effective multinational action and a final
agreement as to a course of law binding
on all parties and thus resolve these fish-
ing problems. Failing in this, unilateral
action by more than one nation is highly
probable, and we would have to be among
those that move in that direction.
-
Now, Mr, President, / again thank the
membership for perrnitting me to use this
time, particularly at this moment. I un-
derstood there was nothing else pressing
just now, and again I regret that I was
not here when the other part of the
debate took place.
? Mr. President, I yield the floor. I yield
back such time as may remain.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senator
from Texas (Mr. Towss) be removed
from the list of sponsors of S. 1988, a bill
to extend the fisheries jurisdiction of the
United States ti:o 200 nautical miles, and
for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, Without
objection, it is so ordered.
? Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I wish
to, commend Senator MAGNUSON and the
menibers of the various eorrimittees
which have worked?so clillgentlY to Pr9-
vide legislation for emergency relief to
the American coastal fishermen. S. 1988
represents a desperately needed attempt
to solve our coastal fishing problems.
For the past several years, I have been
urging action to halt the critical deple-
tion of U.S. Coastal fishery stocks. The
accelerating plight of our fishermen is
emphasized by the several stocks such
as haddock, herring, mackerel, and hali-
but which are dangerously close to de-
pletion beyond the point of self-renewal.
As a source of protein, fish have tre-
mendous value because it has been a
renewal resource. As the world food
shortage worsens, it is evermore appar-
ent that the United States must prop-
erly manage and conserve its fishing
resources.
S. 1988 is an interim measure which
will take effect to preserve our coastal
fisheries, and would expire automatically
whenever the United States ratifies an
International treaty with respect to fish-
ing jurisdiction. The treaty making prog-
rem has been painfully slow, and in the
meanwhile the damage to American fish-
ing interests continues and threatens to
become irreversible. Indiscriminate fish-
ing by fleets of other nations which use
modern equipment that sweeps the sea
clean has seriously aggravated our prob-
lem. Over fishing by these fleets has be-
come a principal cause of the dwindling
stocks off our shores. We can wait no
longer to protect the interests of our
fishermen. I believe we have already
waited too long to act in conserving our
fishing resources. I believe S. 1988 is a
reasonable approach to the serious prob-
lem we are facing in managing our own
living resources in our oceans and I urge
immediate passage of this bill.
Mr. McINTYR,E. Mr. President, I want
to speak in favor of S. 1988, the Emer-
gency Marine Fisheries Protection Act.
The Armed Services Committee saw fit
to report this measure out favorably.
The committee should be commended
for its positive and expeditious treat-
ment.
Mr. President, the serious depletion of
our fisheries resources can no longer
be ignored. In 960, U.S. fishermen,
except for a few Canadian vessels,
were the only ones fishing the George's
Bank area. In 1961, Soviet ships were
taking 68,000 tons from the bankS. By
1965, the Soviets were fishing as far
down the east coast as Chesapeake
Bay?hauling in a catch of over half a
million tons?an amount far in excess
of what our fishermen were taking.
Scientists from the United States and
other countries have recommended an
allowable level of harvest, but by 1970
the catch taken by foreign fishermen
reached million tons, a level far be-
yond that recommended allowable level.
Moreover, Mr. President, between 1960
and 1972 the U.S. share of the total catch
dropped by 43.8 percent.
The fishing practices of nationally
owned or heavily subsidized foreign
fleets, directed by national policies which
Insist upon increased protein production
from the seas regardless of where it ex-
ists and with no heed to conservation,
are intolerable. The pillaging of our
. _
waters by foreign fishing vessels has
forced us to become fish importers. In
1972, the United States experienced an
adverse balance of payments of $1.3 bil-
lion in fish and fisheries products?a
318-percent increase since 1960.
?g 21101
It must be understood that current
fishing activities affect not only our level
of fish stock but our future sources of
food, particularly protein food, our bal-
ance of payments, and our domestic fish-
ing industry.
During discussion of that matter be-
fore the Armed Services Committee it
was said that S. 1988 might be difficult
to enforce. Senator Stevens assured the
committee, and supported his statement
with correspondence from Adm. 0. W.
Siler, Commandant of the U.S. Coast
Guard, that the Coast Guard would be
able to respond to any extension of fish-
eries jurisdiction immediately by using
our active inventory. Contingency plans
are already being developed by the Coast
Guard to protect an increased zone of
jurisdiction.
I have received various reports from
New England fishermen of open con-
frontation between our domestic fisher-
men and those of foreign fleets. This
legislation will clarify the responsibili-
ties and allow able fishing levels for all
fishermen and remove this potentially
dangerous situation. The Coast Guard
is the rightful authority to deal with
these domestic coastal problems and not
commercial fishermen.
The Department of Defense expressed
fear that this legislation would affect
our freedom of overflight and free pas-
sage of straits.
Dr. Frank E. Carlton, president of the
National Coalition for Marine Conserva-
tion, has developed a paper based on an
article by Dr. Robert E. Osgood, dean of
John Hopkins School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies entitled "U.S. Security
Interests in Ocean Law." I would like to
quote from Dr. Carlton's article:
Dr. Osgood's scholarly examination of the
121 straits listed by the Department of State
that would be nationalized by a 12 mile
territorial sea demonstrates that there are
only 16 that could have importance and that
9 of those are either non-essential or fall
within the territory of our military allies.
Of the remaining 7, all but 3 either offer no
significant targeting advantage or are too
shallow or dangerous to approach submerged.
Dr. Osgood's analysis reveals that only Gi-
braltar and two Indonesian straits are stra-
tegically significant areas which might be
politically questionable if a 12 mile terri-
torial boundary were established. For the
purpose of the nuclear deterrent the entire
Soviet Union can be targeted from the At-
lantic and Pacific Oceans and the Arabian
Sea. Dr. Osgood's studies clearly demonstrate
that the physical and political necessity of
free transit through international straits is
not supported by objective information and
should certainly not be considered a non-
negotiable item inhibiting international
agreement on ocean use.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that
logic as well as experience indicates that the
concept of innocent passage is actually re-
lated to commercial vessels. If there is any
real question that the passage of a warship
Is not innocent, one must wonder why any
nation would sign a treaty permitting un-
impeded passage, or conversely how such an
agreement would deter any nation from
"necessary" military action against such
passage? Obviously, strategic significance is
related to the capacity to place missile-
launching submarines in secret position,
which Dr. Osgood's analysis demonstrates
does not depend physically or certainly le-
gally upon free "transit."
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The cariMittee micluiled that the me-
bilitY and surefitability of v.S. military
force* would not be siginficitntly affected
by the passage of S. 1988,
Mr. President, considering all these
things?what are we doing?', We in offi-
cial canacity contintie to negeotia.te, wring
our hands, ten our fishennee to be Pa-
tient, ajened millions to document the
drastic 'decline ed these -protein re-
sourcesa-and for wba,t apingtoseS?eto
save the :resource for further expliotlittos
by foreign fleets?
I realize that the best possible solution
to clarification of our ocean law is
through an agreement at the Law of
the Seas Conference. From all repeats I
have received, we veill be lucky to get an
agreement signed and ratified IV all the
member ?nations by the end of thin de-
cade. obr fish resources cannot wait.
This legislation represents our present
riegolo position at the Luw of the
Seas Conference. The estabilehment of a
200-mile coastal fisheries no has the
endorsement of a majority of nations at
the LAW of the Seas Confeeeace. Since
this meaeure pertains Whet? fisheries,
passage t4 S. 1988 should ne unclerienne
our bargeining position imt rather WC-
pedite itternational agreement on the
princtple of a 200-mile zone.
I Should 'point out that 3.6 iiatiOne have
already eatended Asheny tuitedietion be-
yond out present 11-mile limit.
International law must be flexible.
When present international ?fisheries
regulations were established, the fish re-
source sfination wat coradeletably differ-
ent.'
Today, We see etagifflosent ilucud levels
of fish sits,thretened eat further by
modedna technically more efficient, anal
patently noncenserration oriented fish-
ing practices. In these changed circum-
stances, ere find we have a .a.sfrog :aced
to reduce our payritents imbalance and
at the seine time protecting our feture
source's dt protein.
S. IOU is an emergenr5r, interim, con-
servation measure which will allow pro-
tection of our domestic resources until
such time as international agreements
can be worited eat. -
Mr. Preddent, in my jutftwent, It is
absolttte4r imperative that we pass this
noW--before it is too late.
Mr, CiSlL Mr, President, S. 1908 is
Intended to prevent highly efficient for-
eign fishing fleets from further deplet-
ing stocks of coastal fish off the shores
of the United States.
I know Of no one in the ?Senate, in the
? Coneresons a whole, or 4n the-country
who disagrees with that obtective. un-
questionably, our coastal fishermen have
a legitimate grievance. Tilde livelihoods
are being threatened by derdetion of the
stocks of haddock and other stocks by
foreign fishermen who axe.. harvesting
these fish taster than stock4 tan be re-
plenished.
Unfortima. teiy, however, E*nate pees-
age of 811988, even without similar ac-
tion by the House or enactment or the
bill into law, could ieenardte our best
hope of affording our fieherpeen the full
degree of protection then WO-
,
I know-of no one who ts fialnillar with
the problem of foreign 'fishing off our
coasts who does not agree that our obi ee-
ayes could best be achieved by an inter-
national agreement among all the na-
tons of the world.
An international effort has been un-
derway for a number of years to reach
jast such an agreement. As it is in any
effort to merge the interests of a large
number of parties, progress has been slow.
Eat there has been progress.
At the rube session of the Law of the
Sea Conference in Caracas, Venezuela,
last summer there evolved a broad con-
s anus among the 14E, nations participat-
lag that there shotael be an interna-
tionally recognized 200-mile zone in
which each coastal slate should exercise
e"ronoinic jurialictior.
No one expected that consensus to be
formalized into a final treaty package
a, Caracas. That teak faces the second
ssion of the Law of he Sea Conference
St heduled to begin in Cleneva in March. It
a ill not be an easy task. There are more
than fishing rights involved. There are
mining rights, protection of the enviren-
ix.ent, rights cf traneit, rights of scien-
tific research, and rights of communica-
tion that must be coneidered.
Assembly of these matters into a final
ti eaty package? at ?armlet- will require
political decisions. The delegates at the
Caracas conference did not have the au-
thority to make politic al decisions. Those
who represent the Meted States and the
other nations of the world at Geneva
must have that authority. I have already
written to Secretary of State Kissinger
that I belfeve top level negotiators must
take part in the Geneva Conference and
that an agreement must be reached on
these issues in 1975 Even before the
Caracas Conference ethers representing
this and other countries have recognized
that an agreement rust be reached in
1975 or it will not be reached at all.
But we, by our ace ons in the Senate
today, could destroy any chance of agree-
ment at Geneva bele e that conference
even begins.
As many of you know, the Committee
on Foreign Relations voted-to unfavor-
ably ?L wort this legislation. t is the be-
lief of the majority of that committee
that this type of unilateral action by the
United States will inevitably encourage
other countries to make similar or broad-
es claims of national jurisdiction.
If history is to repeat itself, as it often
does, then ithe response of other nations
to this legislation is not likely to be hm-
ited to comparable restrictions on fish-
ing. Despite the assertions of some of us,
such action could seriously damage over-
all 'U.S. ocean interests, including im-
portant security and energy needs. As
Deputy Secretary of Defense W. P. Clem-
ents, Jr., pointed out to the Foreign Re-
lations Committee?and I am quoting:
It the Unitedr States by unilateral set,
abrogates one identified freedom, we face the
unhappy prospect that other nations may
claim the right untiaterally to abrogate
ruttier identified freedoms, Including the free-
doms of navigation and overflight.
This threat to high sets freedoms is not, in
our view, at an fanciful. A logical and pre..
dictable outgrowth of elpanded fisheries jur-
isdiction is expanded jurisdiction over marine
perlutioli Which arguably affects marine re-
sources. Given the mksconeeptions in many
countries on the 'pollutioi.' aspects of nucleiai
powered vessels carrying uclear weapons, r, a
are geiaulnely concerned that such restric-
tive claims missy be advarvied, either on their
own merits or for unrelvted political ends,
as a direct consequence o? enactment of this
Tais is in fact the history of most
claims to expanded terra octal jurisdiction.
Our strategic deterren', is based upon a
triad of nucelar delivery systems, an essen-
tiat portion of which is ;eaborne. Our get.,
Lkral purpose forces, desi ,.;ried to deter wf-r
below the strategic nucir ar war level, MIL3t,
if the deterrent is to be credible, he free
to move by air and sea to those areas when)
our vital interests are threatened. Military
mobility on and over the -high seas is de-
pendent to a significant degree on the main-
tenance of the freedom of the seas. These
freedoms sanction and protect the activities
of our forcem. Reduced i-ternational waters
and closed straits, therefore, threaten both
the survivability and MAI ty of our deterrent.
In this connection, it should be noted that
over 10 percent of the world's oceans lie
within 50 miles of same nation's coasts and
that virtually the entire operating areas of
the United States' Ste and 7th fleets lie
within such waters.
If the United States now abandons its op-
position to unilateral eltims in the ocean.
we will inevitably be fact d with an increas-
ing number of competing retaliatory or 'un-
related claims impacting adversely on na-
tional security interests. If, as we expect,
enactment of this legisla-lon results in ex-
tended delay in the Law of the Sea negotia-
tions, we will have reverted to the uncertain
and dangerous procedure of shaping a new
legal order for the world's ,.aiertas by the proc-
ess of claim and COUnte;rtsim, act= and
reaction, which hopefu:4 eventually would
coalesce into customary international law.
This is a dangerous waj to regulate even
economic rehlions arnom states. But when
the elating begin to affect the 'mobility of our
strategic and general purpose forces, the risk
involved in the process of challenge is much
higher. To set the natio/ on this path to-
ward resolution of oceami policy issues, is, in
our view, both dangerots and extremely un-
wise.
As I said, that is a qeote from Deputy
Defense Secretary W. P. Clements.
The passage of this bill could also seri-
ously disrupt existing relations with a
number of distant water fishing nations
which have iraditlonalle fished in waters
off the U.S. coast. This could lead to dan-
gerous confrontations, .:oarticularly with
the U.S.S.R. and Japan. A similar dis-
pute between Iceland anti the United
Kingdom led to the no v infamous "cod
war," and is still a point of serious con-
tention between the two nations.
It would be extremely unfortunate if
the United States upset the current
trend toward international cooperation
and detente, when a generally accept-
able international agreement is so near.
To adopt S. 1988 at this time would
be inconsistent with U.S. international
legal obligations, particularly the 1958
Convention on the Nigh Seas which see-
ducally identifies freedom of fishing as
an essential element of the oversra high
seas freedoms. Forty-six nations; have
signed that convention and the United
States has consistently opposed all ?thee
unilateral claims on the basis that they
are violations of intern itional law. The
drastic reversal of our pesition called for
In S. 1988 would seriously undermine
tr,S. credibility on di future ocean issues.
To me, it would be beth unreasonable
and unrealistic to adopt legislation
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December 11, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
which would be almost impossible to en-
force. The 200-mile zone created by S.
1988 would add 2,531,800 square nautical
miles to the area which the U.S. Coast
Guard now polices. This represents ari
area comparable to 92 percent of ,the land
mass of the United States. The Coast
Guard has conservatively estimated that
Policing the known fishing areas only
would require $63.2 million in start-up
costs and would add $47.2 million to their
annual operating costs. In the absence
of international acceptance the cost of
enforcing a 200-mile zone would be more
than any conceivable benefit to U.S. fish-
eries interests.
? In conclusion, I believe the wisest
course for reasonable men, at this time
is one of restraint, to give the U.N. Con-
ference a little more time to work out
an international agreement. It is hard
to imagine a greater guarantee of end-
less international strife than would be
represented by failure of that conference.
The role of congressional restraint in
making this possible is absolutely critical.
By using restraint at this time we will
be risking nothing. Should the confer-
ence fail, there will be more than enough
time to take unilateral action during the
next Congress.
I ask unanimous consent that the let-
ters from President Ford, Secretary of
State Kissinger, Secretary of Commerce
Dent, and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Clements, opposing passage of S. 1988,
all be printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the material
Was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Trap WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, D.C., September 24, 1974.
Hon. HUGH SCOTT,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR HUGH: As you know, the Senate now
has before it a bill, S. 1988, which would
unilaterally extend the contiguous fisheries
zone of the United States from 12 to 200
Miles. I greatly appreciate your vote against
reporting this bill favorably out of the For-
eign Relations Committee. While I fully un-
derstand the problems in protection of living
resources off the United States coast which
have led to the 'consideration of this legis-
lation, passage could seriously harm U.S.
oceans and foreign relations interests, in-
cluding our fishery interests, and could pare-
doxinally destroy the best opportunity we
have had to definitively resolve our fisheries
problems; that is by a comprehensive new
oceans law treaty now being negotiated with-
in the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea.
When the new oceans law treaty is con-
cluded I expect that it will offer broad pro-
tection for our fisheries interests. In the
meantime, you may be assured that I will do
everything possible consistent with our
present legal rights 'to protect the interests
of United' States fishermen and to preserve
the threatened stocks of living resources off
our coasts.
The Law of the Sea negotiations are most
Important, and our nation is deeply com-
mitted to their success. As such it is vitally
important that the United States support
the Conference in every way possible.
I would, appreciate your calling the at-
tention of the Senate to the strong opposi-
tion of. the Executive Branch to this legisla-
tion. I am sending identical letters to Mike
Mansfield and John Rhodes.
Sincerely,
GERALD R. FORD.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., September 22, 1974.
Hon. J. WILLIAM FULDRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Foreign Rela-
tions Committee recently held hearings on
5. 1988, a bill to extend unilaterally the
fisheries jurisdiction of the United States
from the present 12-mile limit to 200 miles.
I wanted you to be aware of my view that
passage of this bill would be seriously harm-
ful to our foreign relations and I was pleased
to learn that the Committee reported out S.
1988 with an unfavorable recommendation.
I sympathize with the concern for our
coastal fishermen which has motivated this
legislation. However, the best protection for
them and the best solution for our fisheries
problems is a timely ocean law treaty. The
United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea has made substantial progress in for-
mulating such a treaty and will be meeting
again next spring with a view towards con-
cluding an agreement in 1975. Passage of S.
1938 or similar legislation unilaterally ex-
tending our jurisdiction at this time would
be especially damaging to the chances of
concluding a treaty.
Passage of S. 1988 would hurt our relations
with Japan and the Soviet Union as well as
with other nations fishing off our coasts. In
addition, any effort to enforce a unilaterally
established 200-mile fisheries zone against
non-consenting nations would be likely to
lead to confrontations. Adverse reactions by
foreign nations would be understandable for
the United States itself has consistently pro-
tested unilateral extensions of fishery juris-
diction beyond 12 miles. A unilateral exten-
sion by the United States now could en-
courage a wave of claims by others which
would be detrimental to our overall oceans
intsrests, including our interests in naval
mobility and the movement of energy sup-
plies.
I very much appreciate that a majority of'
the Foreign Relatjons Committee opposed
passage of S. 1988. I hope that other mem-
bers of the Senate will also carefully eval-
uate the foreign affairs consequences from
passage of this legislation in the middle of
the law of the sea negotiations.
Warm regards,
HENRY A. KISS/NCER.
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., September 14, 1974.
Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: It is my under-
standing that the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will shortly take up -considera-
tion of S. 1988, the Emergency Marine
Fisheries Protection Act of 1974. Accord-
ingly, I am taking this opportunity to con-
vey to you the views of the Department of
Defense, that enactment of this legislation
would have a serious adverse impact on the
national security interests of the United
States. ?
The bill would extend the contiguous
fisheries zone of the United States to a dis-
tance of 200 miles from the baseline from
which the US territorial sea is measured.
Within this expanded zone the United States
would exercise exclusive fishery manage-
ment responsibility and authority, with the
exception of certain highly migratory
species. In addition, the bill would extend
the fisheries management responsibility and
authority with respect to U.S. anadromous
species, beyond 200 miles, to the full extent
of the migratory range of such species on
the high seas. The bill asserts on behalf of
the United States preferential rights to all
fish within the new US contiguous zone
and to US anadromous species, and provides
for a method whereby foreign nations which
have traditionally fished w ithin the new
S, 21103
zone or for US anadromous species may, for
a fee, be permitted such portions of any
stock which cannot be fully harvested by
US citizens.
The United States is a signatory to the
1958 Convention on the High Seas, which
specifically identifies freedom of navigation,
freedom of overflight, and freedom of fish-
ing as among the constituent elements of
the overall freedom of the high seas. The
proposed legislation would unilaterally
abrogate, contrary in our view to US obliga-
tions under that Convention, the freedom
of fishing in significant portions of the high
seas. The response of other nations to this
legislation is not likely to be limited to com-
parable restrictions on fishing. If the United
States, by unilateral act, abrogates one iden-
tified freedom, we face the unhappy pros-
pect that other nations may claim the right
unilaterally to abrogate other identified
freedoms, including the freedoms of naviga-
tion and overflight.
This threat to high seas freedoms is not,
in our view, at all fanciful. A logical and
predictable outgrowth of expanded fisheries
jurisdiction is expanded jurisdiction over
marine pollution which arguably affects
marine resources. Given the misconceptions
In many countries on the "pollution" as-
rects of nuclear powered vessels and vessels
carrying nuclear weapons, we are genuinely
concerned that such restrictive claims may
be advanced, either on their own merits or
for unrelated political ends, as a direct con-
sequence of enactment of this legislation.
This is in fact the history of most claims
to expanded territorial jurisdiction.
Our strategic deterrent is based upon a
triad of nuclear delivery systems, an essen-
tial portion of which is seaborne. Our gen-
eral purpose forces, designed to deter war
below the strategic nuclear war level, must,
if the deterrent is to be credible, be free
to move by air and sea to those areas where
our vital interests are threatened. Military
mobility on and over the ? high seas is de-
pendent to a significant degree on the main-
tenance of the freedom of the seas. These
freedoms sanction and protect the activi-
ties of our forces. Reduced international
waters and closed straits, therefore, threaten
both the survivability and utility of our
deterrent. In this connection, it should be
noted that over 40 percent of the world's
oceans lie within 200 miles of some nation's
coast and that virtually the entire operat-
ing areas of the United States' 6th and 7th
fleets lie within such waters.
Whether the proposed legislation contains
sufficient distinguishing features to remove
it from the ambit of the recent Interna-
tional Court of Justice decision that Ice-
land's unilateral declaration of 50 mile ex-
clusive fisheries zone was under the relevant
circumstances illegal is not for this Depart-
ment to decide. However, we do perceive that
the United States would not be in a strong
position to oppose by legal means, unilateral
claims by foreign states restricting our naval
or air mobility near their coasts.
Our experience in attempting to obtain
overflight clearances in Europe during the
most recent Arab-Israeli conflict leads us
to conclude that bilateral negotiations can-
not be 'depended upon to ensure the military
mobility necessary to achieve US foreign
policy objectives. What this bill invites then,
Is a situation wherein the United States
must either acquiesce in serious erosion of -
its rights to use the world's oceans, or must
be prepared to forcefully assert those rights.
Thus far I have focused on what I consider
the short term consequences to flow from
enactment of this legislation. The long term
adverse consequences to our national secu-
rity interests are of equal, if not greater,
concern. We recognize the worldwide trend
toward expanded jurisdiction by coastal
states over fisheries and other economic re-
sources off their coasts. One of ,the Sunda-
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mental objectives of the Iltentrtenent of De-
fense in the Law of the Sea negotiations
undertaken with the expredi consent of the
Senate extending over the last several years,
has been to ensure that such expansion takes
place in a multilateral context resulting let a
treaty which clearly identifies the limits be-
yond which such expansion may not go. As
the negottetion tee progressed, we have de-
veloped a degree of ecofidence that we will
be able to influenee and control the limits of
any expanded jurisdiction so as to protect
and exclude from foreign control, those ac-
tivities, facilities and operate= tSsentistl to
our national security.
In our judgment, enactment of the prb-
posed legislation would seriously erode the
prospect for a broadly based multilateral
treaty putting to test the broad range of
Increasingly contentious ocean issues.
We base this judgment on a number of
factors. Our appreciation of the criticality of
the multilateral solution has led us over the
years to pretest vigorously eletaally all uni-
lateral extensions of coastal state jurisdic-
tion, vehatewer their avowed functional par-
pose. lbasetineett of the proposed legislation
would be a dramatic and highly visible re-
versal of past US policy. For the US to adopt
unilateralism as a viable approach to omens
policy prolelems at this juncture, would seri-
ously tuiderout the tredibility of ITS neeotia-
tors not only on the fisheries issue, but also
on our bade commitment to international
agreement; This unilateral seta= could re-
sult in an eroskm of the Workers perception
of our other essential objectives such 0,3 Un-
impeded 'transit through and over straits,
which we have Identified as both corner-
stones of our policy and essential elements
of an acceptable solution.
From a substantive interest standpoint,
the legislation /ends support and gives added
international respectability to the poe.tions
and polleies of precisely tame* states who
have been most hostile to one defense Ob-
jectives, and it would at the same time offend
and Impose eatentenic loses on the very
states wee) have most condetently supported
at the Law of the Sea Conference positions
we deem &merited for the protection cf our
national security hatereets.
Finally, we beFieve enactment of the pro-
posed legiadation would Vire stibetantial aid
and consort to the hard line proponent; of
delay -in late Conference. It ovoid lend cre-
dence and Support to their argument that
the long term trend in ceean law is toward a
200 mile territorial sea, evolved through is
conscious parallelism of unilateral claims.
In short, the prophesy of extended delays iu
law of the sea negotiations, which some
argue requires the proposed legislation, will,
in our vieW, become self-ftiMtng prophesy
if it ts emoted.
If the Butted States now abandons its
opposition to unilateral claims.ixs the ocean,
we will inevitably be faced with an increas-
ing number of competing, retaliatory or un-
related claims impacting adversely on na-
tional security interests. If, es we expect,
enactment of this legislation tee:Mtn !al-ex-
tended delay in the Law of the Sea negotia-
tions, we Will have reverted to the uncertain
and dangerous procedure of shaping a new
legal order for the worldh Means try the proc-
ess of claim and counterciatne, actioa and
reaction; which hopefully eventually would
coalesce tato ceadoenary international law.
This is is dangerous way to remilate even
economic relations -among states. Wit when
the olatitObeght to affect the mobility of our
strategic _ ?Old general purpose 11,reet, 12W risk
invented ea the process of challenge is roach
Metier. Tis.set the tation on this path toward
resolution of el= pollee lamest is, in our
view, batik dangelotie and exhremely einvelee.
very ihrech appretiate this eppentunity to
set forth the view* of the flepartrnent of
Defense noltit respect tog, WK. end egipreci-
ate the consideration I am sure they will Shelf. We feel that these s teps will alleviate
many of the problems facing our fishing la-
w. P. CLEMENTS, Jr. dustry, and we will coutt tee to seek other
avenues to resolve the problems pending
THE SECRETARY ?Yr COMMERCE, inultilaterel agreement in the LOS forum.
Washington, D.C., F-ptember 25, 1974. We believe it important the the U.S. not de-
Hen. firefeterr 0. lefameresow, stray the existing atmosphere of serious sic-
Cit airman, Committee on COmmerce, U.S. gotiation in the LOS Conic rence by our own
Senate, Washington, D.O. unilateral act. In that atmosphere the De-
Deka MR. CHAIRMAN: 1 wish to express my
deep concern over the possible enactment of
S. 1988, ii bill to exit- d unilaterally the
fisheries jurisdiction of the United States
from the present 12-mile limit to 200 miles.
As you know from rcy testimony before
your committee, we in Commerce are ex-
tremely concerned over the conditi6n of
many of the fisheries resources off our
shores. We are aware oe the need to obtain
mere adequate conservation measures which
will enable us to protsct these and other
valuable resources. Ws believe that the
United States must he--a the authority to
mana,ge fisheries and other resources within
a 200-mile economic zoae and, indeed, this
summer in Caracas, the United States indi-
cated its eupport for s 200-mile economic
zone.
However, Commerce 5rmly believes that
the prudent approach to the establishment of
a 200-mile economic zone is through a Law
of the Sea international treaty which will
protect our fisheries, the entire range of in-
creasingly valuable mineral resources on the
ocean bottoms and, of course, provide the
rights of passage essential to the national de-
fense. The LOS Confers. we is underway and
making progress. We believe that the United
States should pursue this solution of our
fisheries problems further. We think it is not
is. the national Interest to isolate the fisher-
ies issue as S. 1988 would do.
We are convinced that a unilateral declara-
tion by the Untied States of a 200-mile Syne
will create very- serious problems involving
oor relations with other nations of the world
and could indeed jeopardize the LOS Con-
ference. It would be inconsistent with our
historical position concerning international
hew. Such a declaration might not be hon-
ored by nations fishing off our coasts, thus
creating major enforecment problems and
confrontations which we must be prepared
to face. It could lead te abrogation by other
nations of existing fisheries agreements, one
or the most critical being the International
Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the
North Pacific Ocean, which provides protec-
tion to salmon of U.S. origin. It would be a
unilateral abrogation of the freedom of fish-
ing as set forth in the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas to which the United States is a
party. It could result In unilateral claims by
other nations which could go substantially
beyond fisheries policiee. Apart from the ob-
vious national security implications, it could
effectively destroy the progress made to date
toward achieving a meaningful international
settlement of fisheries problems.
Needless to say, enactinent of the bill would
have very serious adverse effects on our ins-
tant water tuna and shrimp fisheries.
receive from yore and your Committee.
Because of the national security, diplo-
matic, and commercial transportation impli-
cations, end the adverse fisheries effects men-
tioned above, we are compelled to oppose the
enactraent of S. 1988, and we urge you to
reconsider pushing ties legislation at this
time.
We recognize the need for immediate milts-
ores to assist cur fishermen, In that regard,
we have strengthened a number of the inter-
national agreements which we have with
other nations to protect U.S. fisheries re-
sources. We am working toward provisional
application of the fisheries chapter of the
Law of the Sea Convention prior to ratifica-
tion by countries. We have instituted new
enforcement procederee designed to protect
the living resources found on our Continental
partment of Commerce representatives to
LOS will be instructed to press forward dil-
igently to a resolution of the problems of the
conference.
Because of the Implications of S. 1988 to
the -foreign relations of the United States,
as nientioned above, I am forwarding a copy
of this letter to Senator Felbright. Likewise,
because of the very seri eus concern that
Commerce has; that the national security of
the United States riot be impaired, as we be-
lieve passage of S. 1988 will do, I am also
forwarding a copy of this letter to Senator
Stennis.
Yours sincerely,
DERICK 13. DENT.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr President, the
Senate has the oriportneity today to con-
sider the Emergency Marine Fisheries
Protection Act of 1974. This bill would
extend the fishing zone of the United
States to 200 miles to provide protection
to our fish and marine resources.
On behalf of the fishermen of
Massachusetts, I want to thank the dis-
tinguished chairman of the Commerce
Committee, Senator MAGNUSON for the
time and effort he has out into develop-
ing and guiding this legislation to the
Senate floor today. From the time Sen-
ator MAGNUSON first introduced the
Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection
Act, over a year and one-half ago until
it reached the Senate floor today, Sena-
tor MiSoNBSON has sought the views of
fishermen from all over the Nation in
perfecting and refining this legislation.
He brought the Senate Commerce Com-
mittee to the fishermen and asked for
their help.
Hearings were held by the Commerce
Committee :n all the major fishing areas
. of this country including my own State
to give those who know best, the fisher-
men, a chance to tell of their problems
firsthand.
In addition, hearings have been held by
the Senate Armed Se-vices Committee
and the Foreign Relationt Committee to
discuss every concern expressed by my
distinguished colleagues on this legisla-
tion.
It has bean a long road but today we
have the chance to act on this legislation
which will end the abuse and destruction
of one of our most valuable resources, our
fish stocks. Today we have the answers
to the concerns exprei-sed that the leg-
islation might hamper our foreign rela-
tions. Today we know that the best and
the only way to assure that in the future
we will have fish and marine resources
to share with the rest of the world is to
extend the fishing zori; to 200 miles and
provide a management scheem to protect,
these resources.
During the course of hearings On the
Emergency Marine Protection Act, sev-
eral facts tecame clearer to all of those
interested in the prekervation of our fish
and marine life:
First, that several fish stocks are now
in jeopardy of extinction, and that the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE
commercial fishing industu is severely
threatened if the depletion of the stocks
continues;
Second. that present treaty arrange-
ments are ineffective to stop the devasta-
tion of the resources because lack of ade-
quate enforcement procedures.; and
Third, that immediate, interim action
Is required to reverse this critical situa-
? tion while international neptiatiorts are
pending.
Evidence has been gathered by the
committees of the Senate which esta,b-
fishes that haddock, herring, mackeral,
halibut, and yellow-tail flounder are
dangerously close to depletion beyond
the point of self-renewal.
Warnings from the Department of
State, the Administrator of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, and the National Advisory Commit-
tee on Oceans and Atmosphere all point
to the need for immediate ?action though
some disagree as to the best way to
achieve the Preservation of dwindling
gtocks. The Advisory Committee stated
in 1972; -
FI ab. resources are limited . . the poten-
tial exists in the world to destro.y these re-
sources, and . . if our fisheries are not in
fatal trouble now, they are going to be unless
something is done about conserving the
rtsaurce.
Off the coast of Massachusetts, during
the peak fishing seasons, American fish-
ermen In 75-foot vessels are competing
against factory-trawlers from other na-
tions that number over 200 at one timp.
The fishermen of New,England have
been patient. They have waited for ef-
fective enforcement of existing treaty
arrangernente. 'They have tirelessly ne-
gotiated with other members of the In-
ternational Commission for the North-
West Atlantic Fisheiles since 1950 to And
a way or everyone to share equitably
in the fish catch and at the same time
preserve and protect the fish stocks from
Whitton.
laMally, in October of 1973, after two
decades of discussing adequate manage-
'Vent of North Atlantic resources, agree-
Merit was reached on quotas which would
allow some stocks to begin to replenish
themselves, not this Year, but in 1976.
?&Id al the while, the talk of quotas
Continued, violations by foreign fisher-
men cOntinued, the stocks continued to
dwindle, and the New England fisher-
mea Willed in Ille4 gear-
There is no one among us that does
not hope that the Law of the Sea Con-
terenCO will arrive at a satisfactory so-
lution to the conservation of the world's
fish resources, 13ut that is a complex and
slow process which became even more
evident at the Caracas meeting. One
hundred and forty-eight nations are dis-
cussing 8() ocean issues,
And while we cannot hope for a quick
solution to any of these complex prob-
lems, the encouraging note is that based
on the most recent Law of the Sea dis-
cussion,, it is clear that an agreement on
fish resources will be suhstantiallY the
same as the legislation before you today.
The Senate Armed Services Committee
report concluded; '
An undeniable Momentum exists for In-
ternational acceptance of a 200 nautical mile
fishing jurisdiction. S. 1988 would allow the
United States to lead that momentum rather
than be swept up by it.
The Emergency Maxine Fisheries Pro-
tection Act is in substance the U.S. posi-
tion for the Law of the Sea negotiations.
It was encouraging to us that our repre-
sentatives to the Conference arrived at
this position and presented it at the Con-
ference. What does not make sense is
that these same distinguished experts do
not view S. 1988 as assisting and en-
hancing their bargaining position at the
Conference.
The Emergency Marine Fisheries Pro-
tection Act is a conservation measure; it
does not extend our territorial limits; it
does not affect commerce or navigation;
it simply allows management of the fish
resources off our coasts.
The Emergency Marine Fisheries Pro-
tection Act does not abrogate existing
treaty agreements, in fact it encourages
new, effective treaties to carry out the
provisions of this bill.
The Emergency Marine Fisheries Pro-
tection Act does not supersede any in-
ternational agreement reached at the
Law of the Sea Conference; it is an in-
terim measure designed specifically to
pass out of effect as soon as the Law of
the Sea Treaties are in force.
Most importantly, interim extension of
4he fishing zone is the only enforceable
method of protecting fish and marine
resources. Since the U.S. position for the
Law of the Sea Conference is a fishing
zone of 200 miles, it is clear that even-
tually the United States is prepared to
enforce the limit. The issue is when. The
Senate Commerce Committee study sug-
gests that for the most part, the exten-
sion of the fishing zone will be self..
enforcing since most nations agree with
extended fishing zones. In addition, the
large-scale foreign fleet operations,
which S. 1988 is designed to control are
easily seen by fishermen and the U.S.
Coast Guard and surveillance presents no
?impossible problems.
The most serious concern expresed by
some of my Senate colleagues on the issue
of extended fishery jurisdiction was that
it would have a detrimental effect on our
national security interests.
,It is clear that S. 1988 does not alter
the legal status of any vessel on the high
seas; that it does not expand out terri-
torial limits; that it does not affect the
navigation rights of foreign vessels off
Oar coast. The Senate Armed Services
Committee, after thorough study con-
cluded that the claims that foreign na-
tions would retaliate by imposing terri-
torial or transit restrictions on our mili-
tary operations to be "exaggerated and
without sufficient support."
Thirty-six nations have already ex-
tended their fishing limits beyond 12
miles and another 25 nations have indi-
cated their support for 200-mile fishing
limits at the Law of the Sea Conference.
It is unthinkable that these same na-
tions would use S. 1988 as a precedent
for restricting navigational or overflight
freedoms.
The Emergency Marine Fisheries Pro-
tection Act of 1974 is not designed to
hamper relations between nations, but
to foster good will among all maritime
nations which participate in the world
fishing industry. It is not designed to
?S21105
draw a line around our country, but to
encourage a reasoned, sensible, and co-
operative approach for all nations to
join in the conservation of our marine
resources. It is not designed to be a
permanent solution to a difficult prob-
lem, but a temporary measure that will
assure that when all the international
negotiations are finished, there will be
fish and marine resources left for the
world to share. By passing S. 1988, the
Emergeny Marine Fisheries Protection
Act of 1974, the Senate of the United
States is asking all the nations of the
world to join with us as responsible cus-
todians of the ocean's resources for all
generations to come.
Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, it is my
intention to vote in opposition to S. 1988.
I am well aware of the problems currently
confronting our fishing industry, and I
have long supported effective measures
to deal with those problems. In February
of 1973 I joined with many of my Sen-
ate colleagues in cosponsoring a concur-
rent resolution urging that steps be taken
to provide adequate protection for our
coastal fisheries against excessive foreign
fishing, and supporting conservation and
scientific management of fisheries re-
sources within U.S. territorial waters.
Mr. President, though I heartily ad-
mire the thought and effort which the
distinguished Senator from Washington
and others have devoted to this bill, it is
my considered view that S. 1988 is not the
best way to accomplish these ends.
This bill would be detrimental to the
fundamental interests of the United
States in a number of ways, as the chair-
man of the Armed Services Committee
has so ably pointed out in his report to
this body. The United States is currently
negotiating, through the framework of
the law of the Sea Conference, a number
of closely interrelated questions. One of
these is clearly the national security is-
sue, that is, whether or not our naval
forces will be able to continue to move
freely through international waters. Also
at stake are our exploration and utiliza-
tion of seabed resources, commercial
shipping rights, and distant as well as
coastal fishing interests. Each of these
issues is carefully balanced during the
current negotiating period,4and if we take
strong unilateral action in one area, we
are likely to have to make serious and
damaging concessions in others.
Mr. President, I would like to address
myself for a moment to one of the spe-
cific issues involved in this delicately bal-
anced negotiating process: the issue of
distant water fishing rights. A number of
my colleagues who join me in opposition
to this bill have expressed the view that
if this legislation is enacted we will ex-
perience "retaliation" from our neighbors
in Central and South America.
The proponents of the bill, in turn,
have asked "Retaliation from whom?"?
since our chief problems with excessive
foreign fishing in our coastal waters come
from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
and Japan.
I would argue, however, that "retalia-
tion" is not the proper term. What we
are likely to experience is not "retalia-
tion" but "Imitation"?imitation of a
powerful nation like the United States.
which by taking this kind of action would
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 11, 1974
be asserting the kind of leadership role sibilities of correcting the obvious over-
which other nations were likely to fi thing. However, the Commission has re-
follow. peatedly failed to live up to its mandate.
As this body is well aware, Mr. Pr Si- Most recently at its Ottawa meeting
dent we have seen this happen before list fall, ICNAF was presented with care-
when the United States `has established fully prepared scientific evidence clear-
a precedent of this sort When we adopted b detailing the rap,dly declining fish
a 12-mile fishing limit in 1966, our iestion stocks in the Northwest Atlantic region.
caused a proliferation among other Det- 1 et the Commission responded with only
tions of extended claims to territorial a 3-year program to reduce the foreign
waters. In like manner, if We enact the fishing effort--a pros :ram which will not
legislation before us, we can expect that even begin to reverse overfishing until
others will follow our example with 1975 or 1976. Moreover, the success of
similar jurisdictional claims. If nations the Ottawa agreements are contingent
such as Mexico and Brazil were to fol- upon strict compliance of all member
low in our footsteps and severely restrict rations. Past prece:lent unfOrtunately
our abilta, to fish off their shores, many indicates that such I: ompliance has not
U.S. vesz;els will be forced to abandon been forthcoming and there is no reason
their traditional fishing grounds and ta believe that it will be forthcoming
return to the already heavily fished gulf in the future.
area. The effect of this will be twofold: ICNAF's failure to regulate these for-
first, to cripple Many of the small eign fishing endeavors, coupled with the
shrimpers in Our Florida fishing Indus- decline of our domestic fishing industry,
try; and second, to undermine the favor- as led to genuine interest on the part of
able price on seafood and shrimp which Congress in establish ng a 200-mile con-
Florida currently enjoys and instead to tinguous fishing zone Such a zone would
escalate that price to every consumer effect only flehing xghts and not such
The question / would put to the pro- rights as navtgation, free and innocent
pOnents of S. 1988 is this: if our chief passage, or other time-honored rights of
problems in this area are in fact with the high sea. Morec ier, such a zone is
the SovietUnion, Japan and a few other seen as only an intierim measure con-
nations, why should we take this diastic tingent upon future agreements to be
step which upsets our delicate negottat- 'worked out at the Ii ternational Law of
lug stariee and invites imitation all over the Sea Conference. It is expected that
the world? A much more realistic em- the conference will recognize the marine
proach under the circumstances is that resources off our coast as our property.
put forward by the distinguished Sen- Mr. President, the United States can
ator from Mississippi: to negotiate hi- no longer rely on the faith of foreign na-
lateral agreements directly with those tions or on the effic,,cy of international
few nations involved. I urge that we pro- egreements to save its fishing resources.
ceed quickly along that path and that we If we are to save the n and the men and
vote noll to enact S. 198o.
women who harvest them, S. 1988 must
kr. noomm. Mr. President, today is be enacted. Such action will not only pro-
a day for which we in-New England have 'ride needed relief for our fishermen,
waited anxiously. For today the Ben- but it will assure t se Nation and the
ate will finally express its will as to the world of continuing availability of one
need for a 200-mile fishing limit. I am of our most vital food sources. I urge my
eOnfident that this expression will be colleagues to SUPPOrl. S. 1988.
favatable. Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President with
Of the need for this legislation there the consent of the acting majority leader,
can be no doubt. Our beleaguered fishing would like to keep ;I minutes before the
industry has arrived at a critical cross- vote. The Senator from Mississippi (Mr.
road. Not only are the men and women SeeNurs) wants to make a statement of
who make up this industry becoming the position of the Armed Services Corn-
increasingly and inexorably forced out mittee, which voted for this bill. So I
of business, but the very product, they 'vould like to have 3 to 5 minutes before
seek is tacreasingly--and needless13,--he- the vote on the bill to allow him to be
coming extinct. able to say something.
This state of affairs has been brought Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Very well.
about by the tremendous increase in the Mr. PAST()RE. Why not have third
fishing efforts of foreign nations off our seeding now?
cOast..I'llet 10 years ago our New England Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Very well,
fisherMen were responsible for over 90 reading.
percent Of the total catch off New Eng- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The que,s-
land. Now they account for less than 45 ion is on agreeing to the committee
percent. This has all but shattered our amendment in the nature of a substitute,
once thriving fishing industry and even is amended.
more importantly, left our fish stocks The committee amendment in the na,-
seroiusly depleted.
When the effects of this huge foreign
effort first became clear, I, like many of
my colleagues, was hopeful that the In-
ternational Commission for Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries--ICN'AF--could and
would resolve the growing imbalances.
Created to l'protect and conserse the
fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic in
order to take possible the maintenance
of a maximum sustained catch from
these fisheries," ICNAF offered real pas-
5 minutes for the proponents and not to
exceed 5 minutes for the opponents of
the bill before the vote occurs and that
the time for the proponents be in charge
of Mr. 1VLsenusosr and that the time .in
opposition be under the control of the
Republican leader or his designee.
The PRESIDING OFFICEste. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to insert in the
RECORD letters that the proponents of the
bill have circulated.
There being no objection, the letter was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:
U.S. SENATE,
Docember 6, 1974,
Dna COLLEAGUE: A vote in the Senate on
S. 1988, the "Ifinergency Marine Fisheries Pro-
tection Act of 1974" may take in the near
Suture, By this letter, we wish to dispel the
misinformation which opponents of this
much needed conservation measure have
used to prevent its paesage.
First of all, it is conceded by all that im-
portant coal species of fish off our shores
are severely depleted and that, despite 22
fishery agreements with other nations, fur-
ther depletion is likely to occur if a solution
to the overffehing problem is not found soon.
Since agreement on and ratification of a final,
effective Law of the Sea treaty will not be
achieved until perhaps 1980 or later, if at ell,
unilateral action by the United States to pro-
tect its fisheries must be taken If the fish off
our shores are to be saved. In our view, the
action proposed by S. 1968 will prevent fur-
ther depletlon without tremendous cost;
will not seriously damage mur security inter-
ests; and reflects the current views of most
coastal nations. Furthermore, the bill will not
create "gunt oat wars" since it does not auto-
matically or totally prohibit foreign fishing in
the claimed 200 mill fishing zone.
S. 1988 will prevent depletion of fishery re-
sources. Patterned after the United States
fisheries position put forward, in the UN, Law
of the Sea conierenee. S. /988 would provide
this nation with SOStnagernent jurisdiction
over coastal and azoadromous stocks of fish.
The bill is founded on the rationale that a
coastal nation has a much greater stake
in protecting the fish off its shores than do
long disance fishing nations whose fleets can
move elsewhere if the fish difiappead. With
tnanagemene authority cut to 200 miles, the
U.S. will be able to control the massive for-
eign fishing effort it cannot now control.
S. 1988 will not damage our national secu-
rity interests. Statements that other nations
may, or wiil be entitled to, "retaliate" by
curtailing tido freedoms of navigation and
overflight are both highly speculative and
without foundation. First of all, why would
other coastal states which also want extended
fisheries jurisdiction have any desire to "re-
taliate" in any fashion? Approximately 86
coastal nations have extended their fishery
limits in the ocean beyond 12 miles, the
existing limit of U.S. fishery Jurisdiction. In
addition., another 25 to 30 nations have in-
dicated their support for a 200 mile fishery
limit in the Law of the Sea Conference,
Consequently, S. 1968 reflects current in-
ure of a substitute, as amended, was ternational thinking on the question of fish-
agreed to, cry limits. Since this bill expressly preserves
The PRESMING OFFICEIC. The ques- the freedoms of navigation and overflight
d relates only to fishing, it is inconceiv-
tion is on the engrossment and third able that oeher nations will, or could, effec-
reading of the bill. tively use S. 1988 as a precedent for restrict-
The bill was ordered to be engrossed ing navigational or overflight freedoms. Fut-
for a third reading and was read the third therznore, there is simply no general world
support today for restricting these freedoms.
time.
TIME LIMITATI ON AGREEMENT In 1986, wren the UB. Congress established
the present 12 mile fishery limit (over similar
Mr. ROBERT C. F,YRD. Mr. President, Defense Department opposition), no "retail-
I ask unanimous consent that at the ation" took place. There is no reason to ex-
hour of 3:30 p.m. there be not to exceed pect it if S 1988 is passed either.
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December 11, 1974 ,t CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
S. 1988 would not be difficult or costly to
enforce. Ironically, opponents of S. 1988
argue that a 200 mile limit would be inapos-
sible and extremely e:ipensive to enforce. We
must point out that the United States has
stated in the Law of thedSea Conference that
It would accept a treaty containing a 200
mile fishery jurisdiction limit.
In other words, the U.S. will be patrolling
a 200 mile limit sooner or later irrespective
of what happens to S 1988. Nonetheless, we
believe that the Coast Guard cost estimates
are ,etaggerated and that fishery areas can
be successfully policed at a more reasonable
cost.
First, many nations will respect our zone
and to the extent they do, S. 1988 will be
self-enforcing. Secondly, our own fishermen
will do some of the surveillance since the
foreign fishing operations which hurt fish
stocks the most are easily seen, large-scale
fleet operations covering broad expanses of
water, usually in well-known fishing areas.
And lastly, the Coast Guard cost projections
Ignored the use of satellites and other re-
mote sensors for detection of violaters, a
cheaper method of enforcement than air-
craft and ships. Additional vessels and planes
will be needed, but at modest levels and cer-
tainly not all at once.
S. 1988 will not create a "fish war" danger.
It j often said that ?5.1988 will lead to con-
ilict somewhat similar to the recent "cod
war" between Iceland and Great 1;5rjta1.s.
That conflict was created because Iceland
totally prohibited foreign fishing within its
claimed $0 mile zone awl refused to nego-
tiate with Great Britain to accommodate
English fishermen's traditional fishing rights.
S. 1988 is a completely different measure.
It would not eliminate automatically and
totally all foreign fishing within the 200 _mile
limit. In fact, all existing foreign fishing
done pursuant to treaty would be main-
tained. Instead, it is the intention of the bill
to negotiate with other nations to reduce
their effoits to levels commensurate with
conservation needs, while recognizing their
traditional fishing rights. With the preferen-
tial rights afforded our fishermen in the bill
and with management responsibility, this
nation will be in a stronger bargaining posi-
tion to Control the foreign effort. As we see it,
S. 1988 is the kind of bill the International
Court would approve.
We urge you to join with us in taking this
vital step toward conserving and protecting
our oceans' living resources. The continued
viability of one of mankind'sprimary sources
of food hangs in the balance.
Sincerely yours,
Warren G. Magnuson, Henry M. Jackson,
John 0. Pastore, Edward M, Kennedy,
Ethatind S. Muskie, Ernest P. Hollings,
Thomas J. McIntyre, Ted Stevens,
Lowell Weicker, Bob Packwood.
17.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C.?Deeernber 6., 1974,
U.S. Senate.,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR --: As you know, the Senate Com-
mittee on Armed Services last week reported
favorably on S. 1988, the "Emergency Fish-
eries Protection Act of 1974", which would
establish a 200-mile fisheries conservation
management zone off U.S. coastal shores.
llle COnauerce Committee earlier reported
the bill faveratily after holding 14 public
hearings here in Washington and in various
coastal states. Foreign Relations Oommit-
tee adversely reported the bill by a close 9-8
vote. Hopefully, S. 1988 will soon be on the
floor for Consideration. By all appearances,
the vote would be close.
Senators from coastal fisheries states, most
of Whom support the bill, believe this is a
measure of critical importance to the sur-
vival of our fisheriea, and we urge you to
Join in assuring its passage. The three corn-
mittees have compiled comprehensive infor-
mation confirming the high degree of de-
struction inflicted on our coastal fisheries by
huge foreign fishing operations. The prob-
lem Is recognized by our government, which
has introduced fisheries articles similar to
the provisions of S. 1988 into the U.N. Law
of the Sea Conference. Still, our State De-
partment objects to any action on the bill
during the interminable deliberations of the
Conference.
The fundamental controversy over S. 1988
is one of timing, not concept. Having served
as a. Congressional Advisor to the U.S. Law
of the Sea delegation, I support, the over-all
effort and believe international law govern-
ing the oceans is desirable. However, I also
believe fisheries is one issue that cannot wait
for the achieVement of a comprehensive
treaty and that a temporary, emergency con-
servation management move dealing with
fisheries only, such as envisioned by S. 1988,
will do no harm to ongoing negotiations.
Those opposing the bill have reiterated the
inflexible position held through the years
that any zonal expansion by the U.S. could
create a threat to national security. Mem-
bers of the Committee on Armed Services
faced this issue squarely during three pub-
lic hearings. Despite high-level military
testimony, including that of the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the majority of the
Committee concluded that the legislation
would create no particular problems to na-
tional security. Armed Services Committee
Report No. 93-1300 is newly available and
has had little time for circulation. Conse-
quently, I am attaching for your informa-
tion a copy of pages 4 and 5, which discuss
national security considerations and state
the Committee conclusion.
Please call me if you wish to discuss this
important bill further. Also, I have asked
Bud Walsh (4-9347) and Bud Costello (4-
1251), of the Commerce Committee majority
and minority staffs respectively, to cooper-
ate in any way possible to provide your staff
with any additional information requested.
With best wishes,
Cordially,
TED STEVENS,
U.S. Senator.
TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974
AMENDMENT NO. 2022
Mr. HELMS, Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that amendment No.
2022, in connection with the Trade Re-
form Act, which I sent to the desk yes-
terday and which has been printed, be
considered as having been read, to meet
the requirements of rule Axil should
cloture be invoked or in connection with
MR. 0'70, the Trade Reform Act.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and it
is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the name of the
distinguished Senator from South Caro-
lina (Mr. THURMOND) be added as a co-
sponsor of amendment No. 2022:
The PRESIDING OF.F.LCER, Without
objection, it is so ordered.
COMMUNITY SERVICES ACT OF 1974
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senate will now%
resume consideration of H.R. 14449,
which will be stated by title.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (MR. 14449) to provide for the mo-
bilization of community development and
assistance services and to establi?h a Corn-
S 21107
munity Action Administration in the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare
to administer such programs.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time for
debate on this bill shall be limited to 1
hour equally divided between the Sena-
tor from West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C.
BYRD) and the Senator from Michigan
(Mr. GRIFFIN) , or their designees, with
30 minutes on each amendment and 10
minutes on any debatable motion or ap-
peal.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum and
I ask unanimous consent that the time
not be charged to either side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
, Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING 0.F.FICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr, NELSON. Mr. President, the
Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare unanimously reported the pending
bill to extend the Economic Opportunity
Act programs. The bill is titled "The Head
Start, Economic Opportunity, and Com-
munity Partnership Act of 1974."
The House passed bill, H.R. 14449, to
transfer the Economic Opportunity Act
programs to the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, passed the
House of Representatives by a vote of
331 to 53 on May 20, 1974.
The last rollcall vote on 0E0 legisla-
tion in the Senate took place June 30,
1972, when the Economic Opportunity
Amendments of 1972 passed by a vote of
75-13.
The Head Start Economic Opportu-
nity, and Community Partnership Act of
1974 extends the Authorization for anti-
poverty programs under the Economic
Opportunity Act for 3 years?through fis-
cal year 1977. These programs include
Head Start, Follow Through, Commu-
nity Action, Senior Opportunities and
Services, Emergency Food and Medical
Services, Community Economic Devel-
opment programs, and Native American
Programs.
The Office of Economic Opportunity
itself would be continued until October
1, 1975. At any time after June 30, 1975,
the President may submit a Reorganiza-
tion Plan proposing to transfer commu-
nity action and the other remaining
0E0 programs to the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, except
for the Community Economic Develop-
ment program which would be trans-
ferred to the Department of Commerce.
In accord with reorganization plan
procedures, either the House or the Sen-
ate could disapprove such a reorganiza-
tion plan within 60 days of its transmit-
tal. If the President did not submit a
reorganization plan, or, if either house of
Congress disapproved it, OED would be-
come the Community Services Adminis-
tration, which would be an independent
agency in the Federal Government.
The legislation extends the authoriza-
tion for local initiative funding for com-
munity action programs,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE December 11, 19';
The committee-reported bill would re-
tain the 80 percent Federal share with
respect to financial assistance to com-
munity action programs. This is the same
as the current law's provision setting the
Vederal share at 80 percent of the pro-
gram costs for corrinuniitY action pro-
grams.
In accord with the administration's re-
quest, the committee-reported bill con-
solidates the legislative authority for the
Head Start and Follow Through pro-
grams within the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, in recognition of
the fact that operational responsibility
for such programs has been in HEW for
several years.
In addition, the bill includes titles re-
lating to Native American programs and
research programs along" the lines re-
quested by the administration.
The legislation adds a new section au-
thorizing a community partnership pro-
gram Of incentive grants to match to
these lUnds made available by State and
local governments for community ac-
tion programs.
The pending legislation does not ear-
mark funds for particular purposes. In-
stead it authorizes the appropriation of
such sums as may be necessary?leaving
to the appropriations process any spe-
cific earmarking. HoWever, it does pro-
vide that, if funds appropriated for local
initiative community action in excess of
$330 million, then half of any each ex-
cess amount should go to the new incen-
tive program to match State and local
contributions to community action 3C-
tivities.
COMMITTEE COMPROMISE
The committee-reported bill is a com-
promise between the views of those who
support transferring OED to HEW and
those who support the continuation of a
separate agency for antipoverty Pro-
grams. The part of the legislation which
involVed the most difficult consideration
was the question of where the Office of
Economic Opportunity should he located
organizationally.
At the present time, the Offiee of Eco-
nomic Opportunity retains actual opera-
tional responsibility for local initiative
community action programs, community
economic development programs, senior
opportunities and services, and emer-
gency food and medical services. But
most of the other programs initiated by
the Office of Economic Opportunity have
the past several years been spurt off un-
der delegation arrangements to other
departments and agencies of the Federal
Government.
The bill which was passed by the House
of Representatives earlier this session
(H.R. 14449), provides for the programs
which now remain under the administra-
tion of the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity to be transferred to the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare
except for the cornintmity economic de-
velopment Program which the House-
Passed bill would transfer to the De-
PareMent of Commerce.
The bill I introdUced in the Senate (S
3870) was similar to the House-passed
bill in propositii tti trartafer the remain-
ing 0E0 programs to W.
The other major bill was introduced
by Senators JAVITS and KENNEDY (S.
3798). The Javits-Kennedy bill proposed
creation of a new independent agency to
replace the Office of Economic Opportu-
nity as the Federal Government's anti-
poverty agency.
A large number of people
Nation have urged the Congress to sup-
port the continuation of any agency
within the Federal Government to serve
as the focal point for antipoverty efforts.
Whether or not the Office of Economic
Opportunity is este Wished as a separate
agency within HEW or remains as a
separate agency, there should be no
doubt that there is broadly felt need in
this country to have a strong antipoverty
agency.
Aside from the question of where the
antipoverty agency should be located,
the other major difference between the
committee-reported bill and the House-
passed bill is that the bill passed by the
House reduces the Federal share for lo-
cal initiative community action pro-
grams from 80 percent in fiscal year
1975, down to 70 percent in fiscal year
1976, and then to 60 percent in fiscal
year 1977.
While the purpose of the House-
passed phasing town of the Federal
share is to encourage State and local
contributions to cemmtmity action pro-
grams, the impact upon hard-pressed
'State and local governments is to impose
a severe fiscal imeact at a time when
the state of the economy is such as to
make it particularly difficult for State
and local governments to budget for new
activities which they have not budgeted
in the past.
To a limited ee tent, some State and
local government have devoted some
funds to commue ity action programs.
The committee-reported, bill contains a
new community partnership program
which seeks to encourage and reward
those States and local governments
which provide increased funding for
community action activities in the
future.
Under this new incentive program,
funds would be provided to assist State
and local governments which enter into
arrangements with community action
agencies to support activities and serv-
ices in addition to those which have
been provided by community action
agencies. In other words, these activities
would be supplemental to existing com-
munity action programs.
NEED TO CONTINUE TNE ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS
The need for the antipoverty pro-
grams authorized by the Economic Op-
portunity Act hat; been underscored bY
support from national leaders represent-
ing a variety of viewpoints. They insist
that we not abandon programs that have
demonstrated their effectiveness in
reaching out to help solve the problems
of the poor, and have urged that the
Federal Govern nent continue and
strengthen. these programs. The Na-
tional Advisory Council on Economic
Opportunity concluded that even in nor-
mal times federally funded antipoverty
programs "are important in urban areas
and indispensable in rural areas."
President Ford stated in his economic
message to the Congress of October 8:
I know that low-iecome and middle-
income Americans have been hardest hit hr
Inflation. Their budgets are most vulneralne
because a larger part their income goes
for the highly inflated costs of food, fuel
and medical care.
Food, housing, and fuel costs, together
constitute 82 percent of the increase in
the cost or living. But they make up a 40
percent larger chunk of the budget of
the low-Income family than of the aver-
age family. For the poor, as well as for
others, there is little relief in sight. As of
the third quarter of 1914, the Wholesale
Price Index was increasing at a 28.1 per-
cent annual rate, and the price of indus-
trial commodities has been rising at a
rate of 20.3 percent, insuring higher
prices for many necessary products into
the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, the 'substitution effect"
that serves to cushion somewhat the
blow of economic distress on middle-
income families simply does not function
below the poverty line. As HEW econ-
omist John Palmer said in a recent study
on the effects of inflation:
The pocr have littlo or no fie xibili-07 to
adjust to job or reel income losses: if the
'demand for unskilled labor slackens there
tiro no loWer-paying jobs for which they can
compete. :Lf the price of low-grade cuts of
beef rises, there are no lower cuts to sub-
StitIltk?.
COMMUNITY ACTION
Although community action programs
were once highly controversial, they now
enjoy wide acceptance and support from
State and city officials and civic leaders
from all .sections of the country, reflect-
ing political persuasions across- the
board, from conservative to liberal.
Community action agencies clearly
perform a unique and essential function
not only in providing services to the
poor, but in reflecting the specific con-
cerns of the communities they serve. Lo-
cal participation and flexibility are the
cornerstones of the community action
program.
The community action program has
been successful because it has been tai-
lored to the unique needs of each local
community. ? There are over 900 com-
munity action programs at the present
time. A total of 95 of these community
action programs are public agencies op-
erating through the local government
structure. Other conimunity action agen-
cies are nonprofit private agencies which
are governed by boards consisting oi
public representatives and community
leaders.
Community action agencies have been
effective in mobilizing other Federal anci
local resources. Thus, community action
programs operate manpower programs
and receive funding through the Com-
prehensive Employment and. Training
Act. In addition, many community ac-
tion programs operate Head Start pro-
grams and receive funds directly from
the Office of Child Development for
carrying our Head Start programs.
The committee believes that one of the
most important functions of community
action agencies is to initiate innovative
programs. In the past? CAP's have re-
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becember 10, .194 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
nuclear safeguards. I do, however, ex-
pect that the fiscal year 1974 nuclear
safeguards budget for the ATMS Control
an Disarmament 4ger4 and the sue-
oesSor agencies-to the AEC?the Nuclear
Regulatory bomrniSsion and the Energy
Research and :Development Administra-
tion?will provide enough funds to assure
a vigorous international safeguards
effort. /t would" be, a gross perversion of
the world's prtiorities to suggest that a
few million dollars,ie too high a price to
pay for the maintenance of world order.
The ACTING rarstoENT pro tern-
pore. The bill is open to further amend-
ment. If there be no further amendment
to be proposed, the question now is on
agreeing to the cOmmittee amendment,
as amended.
The cominittee amendment, as
amended, was agreed to.
The ACTING mp$IDENT pro tern-
pore. The question is on the engross-
ment and third reading of the bin.
The bill was ordere& to be engrossed
for a third reading and was read the
third time.
TheACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
.
pore. under the previous order, the Sen-
ate will now proceed to the consideration
of an, 16609, Calendar No. 1234, which
the clerk will state by title.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill Mil. 16695) to amend Public Law
93-276 to in ease the authorization for ap-
propriations to the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion in accordance with section 261 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and
for other purposes.
The ACTING IRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Under the previous order, all after
the enacting clause is struck, and sub-
stituted therefore is the text of S. 4033,
as amended by the Senate.
The question is on the engrossment of
the amendment and the third reading
of the bill.
The amendment was ordered to be en-
grossed and the bill to be read a third
time.
The bill was read the third time.
The ACTING PrtESIDENT pro tern-
pore. The bill having been read the third
time, the question is, Shall it pass?
The bill (H.R. 10609) was passed.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move
that the vote be reconsidered.
T C. BYRD. I move to lay
that on the table,
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
EMERGENCY MARINE FISHERIES
PROTECTION ACT OF 1974
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Under the previous order, the Sen-
ate will now proceed to the considera-
tion of S. 1988, which the clerk will state
by title.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows; ,
A faat (S. 190) to extend on an interim
? .trae luciseliction of the United States
over *tatn ocean gess and fish in order to
protect the domestic fishing industry, and for
other purposes.
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill which had been reported from the
Committee on Commerce With an
Approved
amendment to strike out all after the
enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof:
That this Act may be cited as the "Emer-
gency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of
1974".
' DECLARATION OY POLICY
Sue. 2. (a) Fumnees.?The Congress finds
and declares that?
(1) Valuable coastal and anadromous
species of fish off the shores of the United
States are in danger of being seriously de-
pleted by excessive fishing effort.
(2) StOcks of coastal and anadromous
species which inhabit waters of the 3-mile
territorial sea and the existing 9-mile con-
tiguous fishery zone of the United States
are being depleted by foreign fishing efforts
outside the 12-mile combined zone in which
the United States presently possesses fishery
management responsibility and authority.
(3) International negotiations have so far
failed to result in effective international
agreements on the conservation and man-
agement of threatened stocks of fish.
(4) There is danger that further depletion
of these fishery resources will occur before
an effective general international agreement
on fishery jurisdiction can be negotiated,
signed., ratified, and implemented, unless
emergency action is taken pending such
international agreement.
(b) runeoses.?It Is therefore declared to
be the purpose of the Crongress in this Act?
(1) to take emergency action to protect
and conserve threatened stocks of fish by
asserting fishery management responsibility
and authority over fish in an extended con-
tiguous fishery zone and over certain species
of fish beyond such zone, until a general
international agreement on fishery Juris-
diction comes into force or is provisionally
applied;
,(2) to extend, as an emergency measure,
the fishery management responsibility and
authority of the United States to 200 nauti-
cal miles;
(3) to extend, as an emergency measure,
fishery management responsibility and
authority of the United States over anadro-
mous species of fish which spawn in and
fresh OT estuarine waters of the United
States; and
(4) to commit the Federal Government to
act to prevent further depletion, to restore
depleted stocks, and to protect and conserve
fish to the full extent of such emergency re-
sponsibility and authority, and to provide for
the identification, development, and imple-
mentation within 2 years of the date of en-
actment of this Act of the best practicable
management system consistent with the in-
terests of the Nation, the several States, and
of other nations.
(c) Poraex.?It is further declared to the
policy of the Congress in this Act?
(1) to maintain the existing territorial or
other ocean Jurisdiction of the United States
withOut change, for all purposes other than
the protection and conservation of certain
species of fish and fish in certain ocean areas
pending international agreement on fishery
- .Pfrisdic lion;
(2) to authorize no action, activity, or
assertion of jurisdiction in contravention of
any existing treaty or other international
agreement to which the United States is
party other than that necessary to further
the purposes of this Act; and
(3) to authorize no impediment to or in-
terference with the legal status of the high
seas, except with respect to fishing to the ex-
tent necessary to implement this Act.
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 3. As used in this Act, unless the con-
text otherwise requires?
(1) "anadromous species" means those
species of fish which spawn in fresh or estu-
arine waters of the United States but which
migrate to ocean waters;
S 20956
(2) "citizen of the *United States" means
any person who is a citizen of the United
States by birth, by naturalization or other
legal Judgment, or, with respect to a cor-
poration, partnership, or other association, by
organization under and maintenance, after
the date of enactment of this Act, in accord-
ance with the laws of any State: Provided,
That (A) the controlling interest therein is
owned or beneficially vested in individuals
who are citizens of the United States; and
(B) the chairman, and not less than two-
thirds of the members, of the board of di-
rectors or other governing board thereof are
individuals who are citizens of the United
States;
(3) "coastal species" means all species of
fish which inhabit the waters off the coasts
of the United States, other than highly
migratory and anadromous species;
(4) "contiguous fishery zone" means a zone
contiguous to the territorial sea of the United
States within which the United Slates exer-
cises exclusive fishery management and con-
servation authority;
(5) "controlling interest" means (A) 75
percent of the stock of any corporation, or
other entity, is vested in citizens of' the
United States free from any trust or fiduciary
obligation in favor of any person not a citi-
zen of the United States, (B) 75 percent of
the voting power in such corporation, or
such other entity, is vested in citizens of the
United States, (C) no arrangement or con-
tract exists providing that more than 25 per-
cent of the voting power in such corporation.,
or such other entity, may be exercised in
behalf of any person who is not a citizen of
the United States, and. (D) by no means
whatsoever is control of any interest in such
corporation, or such other entity, conferred
upon or permitted to be exercised by any
person who is not a citizen of the United.
States;
(6) "fish" includes mollusks, crustaceans,
marine mammals (except the polar bear,
walrus, and sea otter), and all other forms of
marine animal and plant life (but not in-
cluding birds), and the living resources of
the Continental Shelf as defined in the Act
of May 20, 1964 (78 Stat. 196);
(7) "fishing" means the catching, taking,
harvesting, or attempted catching, taking, or
harvesting of any species of fish for any pur-
pose, and any activity at sea in support of
such actual or attempted catching, taking,
or harvesting;
(8) "fishing vessel" means any vessel, boat,
ship, contrivance, or other craft which is used
for, equipped to be used for, or a type which
is normally used for, fishing;
(9) "fishing-support vessel" means any
vessel, boat, ship, contrivance, or other craft
which is used for, equipped to be used for,
or of a type which is normally used for, aid-
ing or assisting one or more fishing vessels
at sea in the performance of any support ac-
tivity, including, but not limited to, supply,
storage, refrigeration., or processing;
(10) "highly migratory species" means
those species of fish which spawn and migrate
during their life cycle in waters of the open
ocean, including, but not limited to, tuna;
(11) "optimum sustainable yield" *refers
to the largest economic return consistent
with the biological capabilities of the stock,
as determined on the basis of all relevant
economic, biological, and environmental fac-
tors;
? (12) "person" includes any government or
entity thereof (and a citizen of any foreign
nation);
(13) "Secretary" means the Secretary of
Commerce, or his delegate;
(14) "State" means any of the several
States, the pistriet of Columbia, the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa,
the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the territories
and possessions of the United States;
(15) "stock", with respect to any fish,
Means a type, species, or other category
capable of management as' a unit;
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CONGIESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE December 10, 1974
(16) "traditional foreign fishing" means
longstanding, active, and continuous fishing
for a particular stock of fish by citizens orf a
particular foreign nation in compliance with
any applicable international fishery agree-
ments and with the laws of such foreign
nation; and
(17) "United States", when used in a geo-
graphical context, includes all State,
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY
SEC. 4. (a) CONTIGUOUS FISHERY ZONE.--
( L) There is established, for the duration of
this Act, a fishery zone contiguous to the
territorial sea of the United States. The
United States shall exercise exclusive fishery
management responsibility and authority
within this contiguous fishery zone.
(2) The contiguous fishery zone has as its
inner boundary the outer limits of the 'ter-
ritorial sea, and as its seaward boundary a
line drawn so that each point on the line Is
197 nautical miles from the inner boundary.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the fishery management responsibil-
ity and authority of the United States within
the contiguous fishery zone of the United
States shall not include or be construed to
extend to highly migratory species, except to
the eittent Stich species are not managed
pursuant to bilateral Or inultilateial inter-
national fishery agreements.
(b) Arenatoelous Sem-ea.?The fishery
management responsibility and authority of
the United States with respect to ,anadro-
mous species, for the duration of this Act,
extends to such species wherever found
throughout the migratory range of such spe-
cies: Provided, That such responeibility and
authority shall not extend to such species to
the extent found within the territorial waters
or contiguous fishery zone of any other
nation.
(c) OENMIAL.---The United States shall
manage and conserve, and have preferential
rights to, fish within the contiguous fishery
zone, and With respect to anadrerrous spe-
cies of fish, pursuant to the reeponsibility
and authority vested in it pursuant to this
section, subject to traditional foreign fishing
rights as defined and recognized in accord-
ance with section 5 Of this Act.
(d) REGULATIONS.?The Secretary is au-
thorized to promulgate such regulations in
accordance with section 553 of title .3, United
States Code? as are necessary to implement
the purposes of this Act. The Secretary is
further authorized to amend suce regula-
tions in the manner originally promulgated.
FOREIGN FISHING RIGHTS
SEC. 5. (a) GENERAL.,--The Seers ,ary and
the Secretary of state, after consultation
with the Secretary of the Treasury, may
authorize fishing within the contiguous fish-
ery zone of the United States, or ler mead-
Toulon!! species or both, by citizens of any
foreign nation, in accordance with this sec-
tion, only if such nation has traditionally
engaged in such fishing prior to the date of
enactment a this Act.
(b) PecenesoNs.?The allowable level of
traditional foreign fishing shall be set upon
the basis of the portion of any stook which
cannot be harvested by citizens of the
United States. Allowed traditional foreign
fishing and fishing by citizens of the United
States annually shall not, for any stock, ex-
ceed the optimum sustainable yield for such
stock.
( C) RECIPEOCITY.?Trad I Uonal foreign fish-
ing rights shall not be recognized nursuant
to this section unless any foreign nation
claiming such rights demonstrates that it
grants similar traditional fishing rights to
citizens of the United States within the cen -
tiguous fishery zone of such nation, if any
exist, or with respect to anadromous species
which spawn in the fresh or estuarine waters
of such nations.
(d) Pnoccomzes.?(1) In determining the
allowable level of foreign fishing with re-
spe:t to any stock, the Secretary shall utilize
the best available scientiec information, in-
cluding, but not limited to, catch and effort
stal istics and relevant available data com-
piled by any foreign nation claiming tradi-
tional fishing rights.
( 1) The Secretary is authorized to estab-
lish reasonable fees which shall be paid by
the citizens of any foreign nation engaged
In exercising foreign fishing rightds recog-
nized under this section.. Such fees shall be
set in an amount sufficient to reimburse the
Un. ted States fcr administrative expenses
inc erred pursuant to this section and for an
equitable share of the management and con-
seration expenses incurred by the United
Stases in accordance with this Act, including
the cost of regulation and enforcement.
(s) Peocierriole.?Except .. as provided in
the Act, it shall Ice unlawful for any person
not a citizen of tee United States to own or
operate a fishing vessel or fishing support
veseel engaged in fishing in the contiguous
fishery zone of the United States or for
anadromous species of fish.
MALINE FISHERIES :MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVA-
TION PLANNING
SEC. 6. (a) Osmerners..--It is the intent of
the Congress that the following objectives
be considered and included (to the extent
practicable) in plans, programs, and stand-
ard s for the management and conservation
of marine fisheries; (1) evaluation of actual
and foreseeable casts and, benefits attribut-
able thereto; (2) enhancement of total na-
tional and world food supply; (3) improve-
ment of the economic well-being of fisher-
men; (4) maximum feasible utilization' of
methods, practices, and techniques that are
opt,mal in terms of efficiency, protection of
the ecosystem of which fish are a part, and
conservation of stocks and species; and (5)
effectuation of the purposes stated in section
2(b) (4) of this Act. Due consideration shall
be elven to alternative methods for achiev-
ing these objectives.
( FISHERIES MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.--
TWIT, is established a Fisheries Management
Coencil (hereinafter referred to as the
"Council"). The Council shall consist of 11
Ind visual members, as follows:
(1) a Chairman, a qualified individual who
shall be appointed by the President, by and
witi the advice and consent of the Senate;
(1) three Government members, who shall
be the Secretary, the Secretary of the de-
par .:anent in which the Coast Guard is op-
erre.ing, and the 'Secretary of State, or their
dule authorized representatives; and
(.1) seven nongovernment members, who
shall be appointed by the President, by and
wite the advice and consent -of the Senate, on
the following basis?
( 1.) three to be selected from a list of
qualified individuals recommended by each
of the regional figneries commissions or their
sue :lessors, one of whom shall be a repre-
semative respectively of Atlantic, Pacific,
and Gulf of Mexico commercial fishing ef-
fort s; and
(.3) four to be selected from a list of
qualified individuals recommended by the
Nal tonal Governors Conference, at least one
of whom shall be a representative of a coastal
Sta ,e.
As used in this paragraph, a list of quali-
fied individuals shall consist of not less than
three individuals for each Council member
to 1 e appointed.
A used in this subsection, "qualified indi-
vidual" means an individual who is distin-
gut tied for his knowledge and experience in
fisheries management and, conservation, and
who is equipped by experience, known
talents, and interests to further the policy
of ibis Act effectively, positively, and inde-
pendently if appointed to be a member of the
Board. The terms of office of the nongovern-
meet members of the Council first taking
otliea shall expire as designated by the Presi.-
dent at the time of nomination?two at the
end of the first year; two at the end of the
second year; and three at the end of the third
year. Th term of office of the Chairman` of
the Council Shall be 3 years. Successors to
members of the Council shall be appointed in
the same manner as the original members
and, except in the case of Government mem-
bers, shall have terms of office expiring 3
years from the date of expiration of the terms
for which their predecessors were appointed.
Any individual appointed to fill a vacancy
occurring prior to the expiration of any term
of office shall be appointed for the remainder
of that term.
(C) POWERS AND DUTIES.?The C011.11C11
shall?
(1) engage in the preparation of a plan
or plans for marine fisheriee management
and conservation;
(2) provide information and expert as-
sistance to States and local or regional fish-
eries authorities in marine fisheries man-
agement and conservation;
(3) adopt, amend, and repeal such rules
and regulations governing the operation of
the Council and as are necessary to carry out
the authority granted under this section;
conduct its affairs, carry on operations, and
maintain offices; appoint, fix the compen-
sation, and assign the duties of such experts,
agents, consultants, and other full- and part-
time employee as it deems necessary or ap-
propriate;
(4) consult on an ongoing basis (A) with
other Federal agencies and departments; (B)
with officials or coastal States 'who are con-
cerned with marine fisheries management
and conservation planning; (0) with ap-
propriate officials of other nations which are
exercising traditional foreign fishing rights,
through the good offices of the Secretary of
State; and (D) with owners and operators
of fishing vessels;
(5) enter into, without regard to section
3709 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States (41 U.S C. 6), such contracts, leases,
cooperative agreements, or other transac-
tions as may be necessary in the conduct of
its functions and duties with any person
(including a government entity);
(6) prepare a survey of fisheries subject
to the emergency conservation and man-
agement authority granted to the United
States by this /1ct, including, but not limited
to, depleted stocks and stocks threatened
with depletion; and
(7) survey, study, and prepare a marine
fisheries management plan setting forth the
elements of a national management system
to conserve and protect fish.
(d) REVIEW BY Coles:Reese?The Council
shall submit the marine risheries manage-
ment plan adopted by the Council to the
Senate Committee on Commerce and the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries of the E:ouse of Representatives not
later than 2 years after the date of enact-
ment of this Alt. The marine fisheries man- -
agement plan shall be deemed approved at
the end of the first' period of 180 calendar
days of continuous session of Congress after
such date of transmittal unless the House
of Representatives and the Senate pass reso-
lution in substantially the same form stat-
ing that the marine fisheries management
plan 18 not falored. if the House and the
Senate pass resolutions of disapproval un-
der this subsection, the Council shall pre-
pare, determine, and adopt a revised plan.
Each such revised plan shall be submitted
to Congress for review pursuant to this
subsection. For purposes of this section (1)
continuity of cession of Congress Is broken
only by an adjournment sine die; and (2)
the days on a/arch either House is not in ses-
sion because of an adjournment of more than
3 days to a day certain are excluded in the
computation of the 180-day period.
(e) Mrseetneeteous.?(1) The marine fish-
eries management plan which is adopted
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Vecember 10, 1974
after,reeiew by the Congxess is not subject United States under any lawful treaty, con-
' pprove os, e
CQNGRESSIONAL RECOILU ? SENATE
by the Council and ,W1110,11 bearMea effective to abrogate any duty or responsibility of the
to review by any court. _ vention, or other international agreement
(2) The Council khan. halve le, Seel Which which is in effect on the date of enactment
shall be judicially recognized. of this Act.
(3) The Adminlstratorpf General Services (C) BOUNDARIES AGREEMENT.?The Secre-
Shall furnish the Ceuncil with such offices, tary of State is authorized and directed to
equipment, supplies, and services as he is initiate and conduct negotiations with adja-
aUthorized. to. furnish to any other agency cent foreign nations to establish the bound-
er instrunientalitzqf, tb,e, United States. aries of the contiguous fishery zone of the
(4) A member, of the Council who is not United States in relation to any such nation.
otherwise en, emplo,yee of the Federal Gov- (d) NONRECOGNITION.?It is the sense of the
ernMent may _receive $300 per diem when Congress that the U.S. Government shall not
recognize the limits of the contiguous fish-
ery zone of any foreign nation beyond 12
nautical miles from the base line from which
the territorial sea is measured, unless such
nation recognizes the traditional fishing
rights of citizens of the United States, if
any, within any claimed extension of such
zone or with respect to anadromous species,
or recognizes the management of highly mi-
gratory species by the appropriate existing
bilateral or multilateral international fish-
ery agreement,s irrespective of whether such
nation is party thereto.
RELATIONSHIP To STATE LAWS
engaged' in the actual performance of his
duties as a. member pf the Council plus re-
babureernent for travel, subsistence, and
ether necessary expenses incurred in the
performance (?,f such duties. Eaeh member
of the CO14.4c1,1 shall be authorized. such
amps afeareeneeeessa,rev to enable him to ap-
point__,,ez?4 CelitileetXsate an adequate qualified
MUlletnne, professional staff responsible and
fealaject to his contrel, but not otherwise sub-
t toCo. In the Council.
(1) _TERserNsenee.?The Council shall
Mee- fo exist 39 days after adoption by Con..
rets or the eaerifee fieheries plan pursuant
to. subsection (c1) of this section.
(g) AnT,Hoerz, /mom?There are hereby
atItharieed, te be appropriated for the pur-
poses 'of'thia. section a sum not to exceed
(111,00,000 for each of the fiscal years ending
Otine ao, 1975, and June 30, 1976.
NATIONAL FISHERY AGREEMENTS
GENERAL.?The Secretary of
eetipon the request of and in 000pera-
V42 t4e Secretary, shall initiate and
ldkict negotiations with any foreign ne-
n Wiesielleia engaged in, or whose citizene
One 'eligaged-in, fishing in the contiguous
a 20957
The amount of such civil penalty shall be
assessed by the Secretary, or his delegate, by
written notice. In determining the amount
of such penalty, the Secretary shall take
into account the nature, circumstances, ex-
tent, and gravity of the prohibited acts com-
mitted and with respect to the violator, the
degree of culpability, any history of prior
offenses, ability to pay, and such other mat-
ters as justice may require.
(2) Any person who is found to have com-
mitted a prohibited act and against whom a
civil penalty is assessed under paragraph (1)
of this subsection may obtain review in the.
appropriate court of appeals of the United
States by filing a notice of appeal in such
court within 30 days from the date of such
order and by simultaneously sending a copy
of such notice by certified mail to the Sec-
retary. The Secretary shall promptly file in
such court a certified copy of the record
upon which such violation was found or
such penalty imposed, as provided in sec-
tion 2112 of title 28, United States Code
The findings of the Secretary shall be set
aside if found to be unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence, as provided by section
SEC. 8. Nothing in this Act shall be con- 706(2) (e) of title 5, United States Code.
strued to extend the jurisdiction of any (3) If any person fails to pay an assess-
State over any natural resources beneath meat of a civil penalty after it has become
and in the waters beyond the territorial sea a final and unappealable order, or after the
of the United States, or to diminish the in- appropriate court of appeals has entered final
rtsclictkm. of any State over any natural re- judgment in favor of the Secretary, the Sec-
source beneath and in the waters within the retary shall refer the matter to the Attorney
territorial sea of the United States. General, who shall recover the amount as-
PROHIBITED ACTS AND PENALTIES sewed in any appropriate district court of
the United States. In such action, the valid-
ity and appropriateness of the final order
imposing the civil penalty shall not be sub-
ject to review.
SEC. 9. (a) PROHIBITED ACTS.?It is unlaw-
ful for any person to?
(1) violate any provision of this Act or
, fleecy Zone of the ,U,nited_4tata4 ar for Stelatle any regulation issued under this Act, re-
treart.,4us: species.. .714.0 secretary or state, garding fishery within the contiguous fish- (4) The Secretary may, in his discretion,
upon the reepiest of ancteinecooperation_ with ery zone or with respect to anadromousconditions, any civil penalty which is
compromise, modify, or remit, with or with-
the SePretarzehall in addition initiate and _species; ,out
conduct negotiations with any foreign na- (2) violate any provision of any inter- subject to imposition or which has been im-
' tion in whose ,contigtious fishery zone or national fishery agreement to which the posed under this section.
equiValent economic zone citizens of the United States is party negotiated or re- (C) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.?Any person who
'Matted States are engaged in fishing or with viewed pursuant to this Act, to the extent willfully commits an act prohibited by sub-
Iteepect to arzadicanoust species as to which that such agreement applies to or covers section (a) of this section shall, upon con-
Mich nation ,a4Perte . Management responsi- 'fishing within the contiguous fishery zone viction, be fined not more than $50,000 or
'Why and.authpritY enrj for which-citizens of or fishing for anadromous species as defined imprisoned for no more than 1 year, or
the United. State, fiela,, The purpose of such in section 4 of this Act; both.
negptiations shall .iffe,to enter into interns- (3) ship, transport, purchase, sell or offer (d) CIVIL PORFEITURE.?(1) Any district
Venal fishery, agreements on A bilateral or for sale, import, export, possess, control, or court of the United States shall have juris-
Multilateral basis to effectuate the purposes
. , . . maintain in his custody any fish taken I
policy, and provisions of this Act. Such violation of paragraphs (1) or (2) of this
,' ements mar include but need not be subsection where such person knew or had
' Itreited to, apeementsto provide for tbe
. reason to know that such taking was not
Ineelegerteent- end QQAPerVattenUf- lawful;
(1), coastal species, which are found in (4) violate any duly issued regulation un-
both_ th4 ereedeeenis fishery zone of the der this Act with respect to making, keep-
United 5 t a.tea. and ,the equivalent such zone ing, submitting, or furnishing to the See-
or a foreign nation adjacent thereto; retary any records, reports, or other infor-
(2) anadrornous species, which are found niatim;
during the coupe of their migrations in (5) refuse to permit a duly authorized
ocean areas subject to the fishery manage- representative of the Secretary, or of the
meat responsibility and. authority of more Secretary of the department in which the
than one nation; . .. Coast Guard is operating, to board a fishing
- (3) highly migratory_ species which are or vessel or fishing-support vessel subject to
May be covered. by international fishery his control where the purpose of such re-
agreements;? and quested boarding is to inspect the catch,
(4) coastal species, which are found in fishing gear, ship's log, or other records or
areas subject to the fishery management re- materials; or
sponsibility and authority of any foreign na- (6) fail to cooperate with a duly au-
Ilion, through, measuree, which allow citizens thorized representative of the Secretary, or
' of the United States to harvest an opera- of the Secretary of the department in which
priate portion of such species in accordance the Coast Guard is operating, engaged in a
with traditional Unitoed States fishing rights reasonable inspection pursuant to paragraph
in such areas. ?(5) of this subsection, or to resist any law-
(b) lememe.?The Secretary of State shall ful arrest.
review, in cooperation with the Secretary, (b) Corn, PENALTIES.?(1) Any person who
each treaty, convention, and other inter- is found by the Secretary, after notice and
national fishery agreements to which the an opportunity for a hearing in accordance
United States is party to determine whether with section 554 of title 5, United States
the provisions of such agreements are con- Code, to have committed an act prohibited
eistent with the purposes, policy, and pro- by subsection (a) of this section, shall be
visions of this Act. If any provision or terms liable to the United States for a civil for-
of any such agreement are, not so consistent, feiture in accordnace with subsection (d)
the Secretary of State shall initiate negotia- of this section and for a civil penalty. The
tions to amend' such agreement: Provided, amount of the civil penalty
That nothing in this Act shall be construed ceed 25
diction, upon application by the Secretary
or the Attorney General, to order forfeited
to the United States any fish or fishing gear,
used, intended for use, or acquired by ac-
tivity in violation of any provision of sub-
section (a) of this section. In any such pro-
ceeding, such court may at any time en-
ter such restraining orders or prohibtions or
take such other actions as are in the inter-
est of justice, including the acceptance of
satisfactory performance bonds in connec-
tion with any property subject to civil for-
feiture.
(2) If a judgment is entered under this
subsection for the United States, the At-
torney General is authorized to seize all
property or other interest declared forfeited
upon such terms and conditions as are in
the interest of justice. All provisions of law
relating to the disposition of forfeited prop-
erty, the proceeds from the sale of such
property, the remission or mitigation of for-
feitures for violation of the customs laws,
and the compromise of claims and the award
of compensation to informants with respect
to forfeitures shall apply to civil forfeitures
incurred, or alleged to have been incurred,
under this felbsection, insofar as applicable
and not inconsistent with the provisions of
this section. Such duties as are imposed upon
the collector of customs or any other person
with respect to seizure, forfeiture, or dispo-
sition of property under the cumstoms laws
shall be performed with respect to property
used, intended for use, or acquired by activ-
ity in violation of any provision of subsection
shall not ex-
is section by such officers or other
,000 for each ay of each violation, persons as may beat &lied for that pur-
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20958 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? SENATE December 10, 1974
S
the nomination.f former Gov. Nelson
pose by the Secretary of the department in CaDER TO POSTPONE S. 4033 o
which the Coast Guard is operating. INDEFINITELY Rockefeller to be Vice President of the
ENFORCEMENTUnited States.
SEC. 10. (9) GENERAL.?The provisions of I ask unanimous consent that S. 4033 be I have known Nelson Rockefeller for
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
this Act shall be enforced, together with
indefinitely postponed. many years. I have known him in his
regulations issued under this Act, by the Sec- capacity as a distinguished Governor of
rotary and the Secretary of the department The ACTING I. RESIDEN Pro tern- -a great State, as a functionary of the
in which the Coast Guard is operating. Such pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. Republican Party, as a candidate for the
re
? Republican nomination for the Presi-
Secretaries may by agreement, on 5,
bursable basis or otherwise. utilize the per-
sonnel, services, and facilities of any other
Federal agency in the performance of sixth
commis rEE mErnsinG DURING dency. I know him to be a man of integ-
SENATE SESSION- rity, of initiative, and of energy. I be-
lieve that he will be an extraordinarily
( b ) Pow Eas.?Any person duly ai i thorized Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, good Vice President of the United States,
duties.
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section I ask unanimous consent that the Corn- and I commend him to my colleagues for
may---mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, their support on the upcoming vote on
(1) board and inspect any fishing vessel with hearings scheduled on the D-2 this day, in this Chamber,
contiguous fishery zone of the United States, during the session of the Senate today. I could elaborate at some length on my
or ffshing-support vessel which is within the lands in Alaska, be authorized to meet
or which he .has reason to believe is fishing The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- evaluation of this man and his qualitica-
for anadromous species: tions and competence to serve in the high
(2) arrest any person, with or without a Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, position for which he has been chosen by
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
warrant if he has reasonable ea:Use to be- . the absence _ a uorum. the President of the United States. I can
be-
lieve that such person has committed an act I suggest tne Mosinee ol q point out that Nelson Rockefeller comes
prohibited by section 9(a) of this Act; The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- from a distinguished American family
(3) execute any warrant or other process Pore. The clerk will call the roll, whose philanthropy has extended to vir-
issued by an officer or court of competent, Tie assistant legislative clerk pro- tually every section of the country. We
jurisdiction; and ceeeed to call the roll. in Tennessee have a particularly fond
(4) seize st1,1 fish and fishing gear found Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, recollection of the contributions of the
onboard any fishing vessel or fishing-support I ask unanimous consent that the order Rockefeller fatnily to the assembling of
vessel engaged in any act prohibited by sec- for the quorum call be rescinded. the Great Smoky Mountains National
tion 9(a) of this Act. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- Park and the contribution to the people
(c) COITRTs.?The district courts of the Pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. of the United State
tion over all cases or controversies arising s by that family.
United States shall have exclusive Jurisdic-
I recall in 1968 when Governor Rocke-
nnder this act. Such court may issue all S. :3639 PLACED UNDER "SUBJECTS feller called me on the telephone and in-
warrants or other process to the extent mac- ON THE TABLE" dicated that he fully understood that he
essary or appropriate. In the case of Gum, was not my Choice to be the Republican
such actions may be brought and such proc- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- presidential nominee, but asked whether
ess issued by the District Court of Guam; in dent, I have been notified by Mr. MoN- I would arrange for him to meet Repub-
the case of the Virgin Islands, by the District DALE that there will be no intention to licans in my State to discuss his pros-
Court of the Virgin Islands; and in the case proceed with the consideration of S. pects and the possibility of finding min-
or American Samoa, by the District Court 3639, a bill to provide for the develop- port in the Volunteer State, which I
for the District of Hawaii. The aforesaid
courts shall have jurisdiction over all ac-
ment and implementation programs for agreed to do.
youth camp safety, during the remainder Governor Rockefeller arrived, and I
to the amount in controversy or the citizen- of this session because of the impos- was privileged to introduce him to the
tions brought under this Act without regard
ship of the parties. sibility of getting action in the other Republican State Executive Committee
DURATION OF ACT body this year. and to most of the so-called Republican
l
SEC. 11. (a) EFFECTIVE DATE.?The ItTOVt-
ask unanimous consent that that bill establishment. I found him. to be very
eions of section 4 of this Act shall become be transferred to the calendar of "Sub- generous in his appraisal of the political
effective 90 days after the date of enactment jects on the Table." situation. He was tmoffended by the fact
of this Act. All other provisions of this Act The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tent- that I believed that he did not have a
shall become effective on the date of enact- poae. Without objection, it is so ordered. single supporter in that group. But he
inent. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- felt then?and I think this is an impor-
(b) TERMINATION psrs.?The provisions of dent, I suggest the absence of a quorum. tent consideration in terms of his quell-
this Act shall expire and cease to he of any Th_
e ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- fications to serve as Vice President?that
legal force and effect on such date as the
Law of the Sea Treaty, or other comprehe:a- pore. The clerk will call the roll. it was important that the Republican
sive treaty with respect to fishery jurisdic- The assistant legislative clerk pro- Party have a choice and that it should
tion, which the United States has signed or ceeded to call the roll, not become a party of rigid ideology;
Is party to', shall come into force or is provi- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- that it should have a free choice among
:tonally applied. dent, I ask unanimous consent that the a moderate, liberal, and conservative
AUTHCRLEATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS order for the quorum call be rescinded, points of view.
SEC. 12. Except with respect to section 6 The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. I applaud him for that, because I be-
and section 9 of this Act, there me author- HerHAWAY). Without objection, it is SO neve that our two great national parties
ised to be- appropriated for the purposes of ordered. should be essentially nonideOlogical and
this Act to the Secretary such sums as are
that they should encompass a broad
necessary, not to exceed $4,000,000 for ea,clispectrum of points of view ranging from
of the fiscal years ending June 30, 1975, tenDITIONAL PERIOD FOR THE the liberal to the conservative.
June 30, 1076, and June 30, 1971, and to the TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE ItWits my p
Coast Guard is operating such sums as are leasure then to :present
Secretary of the department in which the MORNING BUSINESS Governor Rockefeller to tile Republican
each necessary, not to exceed $13,000,000 for eh Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- establishment in Tennessee and to hear
of the fiscal years ending June 30, 1975, dent, I ask unanimous consent that there his sincere remarks in behalf of his own
June 30, 1976, and June 30, 1977. be an additional period for the transac- candidacy.
tion of routine morning business, not to As a mar. who possesses a broad and
. e:sceed 5 minutes, with. statements there- successful range of experience both in
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. laresident,
I suggest the absence of a quorum. ill limited to 5 minutes. and out of government, former Governor
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Rockefeller should prove to be substan-
pore. The clerk will call the ron, objection, it is so ordered. , tially helpful in his new role. Already a
The assistant legislative clerk pro- =0 man of na1onal prominence, the Vice
ceeded to call the roll.
President designate has become even
NOMINATION OF NELSON A. ROCKE- better known to the Members of Con-
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President. FET .LFR TO BE VICE PRESIDENT gress and the American people since his
I ask unanimous consent that the order THE UNITED STATES
for the quoruni call be rescinded. nomination on August 20.
OF
?????111???.1=1110111.=.........
to r. BAKER. Mr. President, I am Mr. Rockefeller has undergone what
The ACTING
pore. Without 0
?
koinA34-4.kasp.Noantie9i6k7poiCIARRIN1711300.880Rbtf08VO411ittie0the ITI?St e"rileiat".
Approved For Rel
December 10, 197.4
? ingly detailed examination of any Vice
Presidential nominee in our Nation's
history. Both the Senate and Rules Com-
mittee and the House Judiciary Commit-
tee have devoted a great deal of time to
hearing personal teStimony from the for-
mer GOvernor on the widest possible
range of issues. In these public hearings,
Nelson Rockefeller has responded with
directness and goodlwill.
? In addition, a T6561111 of testimony has
also been heara Trbin Mr. Rockefeller's
supporter's ancrhis adversaries. It would
4001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75 6380R000500410006-0
ESSIONAL RECORTY.--= ATE S 20959
tion of Nelson Rockefeller's nomination
to be Vice President of the United States.
I thank the leadership for giving me
this opportunity to make these remarks.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS this nominee has been examined as thor-
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, oughly and extensively as almost any
I ask unanimous consent that morning nominee in the history of the country.
business be closed. This has been one of the most exten-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without sive and thorough nomination hearings
objection, it is so ordered, ever held. After such scrutiny, it is clear
seem that every conceivable concern re- to me that the nominee is equal to the
' lating to MS fithess to serve in the sec-
ond highest office in the land has been EMERGENCY MARINE FISHERIES
President of the United States.
addressed in the public hearings and in PROTECTION ACT OF 1974 Because of the nominee's personality
the press. * ' ' '- 7he Senate continued with the consid- and involvement over many years in
? I think' it is a tribute both to the Vice eration of the bill (S. 1988) to extend many aspects of public and private life,
President designate and to the members on an interim basis the jurisdiction of the hearings were necessarily more de-
af the &nate 11-tules Committee that his the United States over certain ocean tailed, requiring the nominee himself to
notninatfoii. has been ratified unani- areas and fish in order to protect the appear personally for 22 hours. I can
tnousIy:fiy- that committee. I anticipate domestic fishing industry, and for other think of no individual who could have
that the favorable action by the Rules purposes. withstood such an exhaustive inquiry
Committee will be upheld in an over- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, more favorably than Nelson Rockefeller.
whelmi4 Vote on the Senate floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum. Nelson Rockefeller has served the
So7oISPOnents of the Rockefeller The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk State of New York and the Nation for
, nomination outside Congress have urged will call the roll. almost 40 years. This is clear evidence
MernigiVO join them in oppOtition be- The assistant legislative clerk pro- of his executive ability and his qualiflca-
cauSOn their judgment, the nominee ceeded to call the roll. tions for filling the second highest office
does net- ineet some standard of ideo- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, in the land. Any man who can serve
logicareaty or has not expressed agree- I ask unanimous consent that the order 15 years as the Governor of New York
raent on Some specific issue deemed of for the quorum call be rescinded. certainly has the executive qualities
OVerririg importance.
? NO1VIINATION OF NELSON
ROCKEFELLER
Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I have re-
viewed the hearings and the investiga-
tion of Nelson Rockefeller to be Vice
President of the United States. After
careful scrutiny, it is clear to me that
, ' ' The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without? needed to be Vice President.
Itq.01,1s, to me, however, that these are objection, it is so ordered. Throughout his years of dedicated
net the "criteria that a nominee must Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I ask unani- service to the State of New York and this
meet, 1 sus*peet that, if perfect ideologi- mous consent that Arthur Kuhl and Nation, his broad range of acquired ex-
cel_ c,.41:4tibility were reatired, there David Keeney of the staff of the Corn- periences uniquely qualify him for the
might be as many names in contention mittee on Foreign Relations be accorded office of Vice President.
as there are Members of this body. In- the privilege of the floor during the con- Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
deed, PYthident Ford solicited from the sideration of the pending measure. sent that a list of some of Mr. Rocke-
Mem ers of the Senate and the House, The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without feller's accomplishments appear in the
froniIje dovernors, and from the public, objection, it is so ordered. RECORD at this point.
aut1is for filling this office. I think Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, There being no objection, the list was
it i `Meant that the name of Nelson I suggest the absence of a quorum. ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
RocleIler appeared conspicuously on a The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk follows:
majo ty of such lists.
itklieve that we should now proceed,
and pSOceed promptly, to the confirma-
tion qf his nomination. I applaud the
? leadeishiP of the senate for ordering this
vot is afternoon. I intend to support
an4 to Vote for the confirmation of the
nora*e?
The qlestion remaining is a simple
one: 'bees 'Nelson Rockefeller meet the
qualifiatiOns for the Office of the Vice
? Presf &it?as designated in the 25th
ante ? believe that an affirma-
tive answer to that question is obvious. objection, it is so ordered.
will call the roll. As Governor of New York:
The assistant legislative clerk pro- Expanded the State Univeristy to 72 cam-
deeded to call the roll. puses.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- Proposed bond issues that built new park-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the lands and state parks.
Instituted the first state financing for mass
order for the quorum call be rescinded. transportation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without Overhauled the state's welfare system for
objection, it is so ordered. the first time in 20 years.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, Increased the state police force and
I ask unanimous consent that S. 1988, the through a statewide prosecutor's office bore
Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection down on corruption in New York.
Act of 1974, be temporarily laid aside. In medicine, he led the way for adoption
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without of a state medical care program, created
the bureau of heart disease, the birth defects
institute, and two new state medical schools.
Mrlegidellt, I have grave reserva- Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, He created job development and authori-
tioos -a qu't the 25th amendment. I do I suggest the absence of a quorum. ties to provide low cost loans for business ex-
Mt XelleVe that it has worked well. I The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk pansions and to induce business to locate and
...., .._
believe fritithild. be changed, if not in will call the roll, expand in low income areas.
fact repedle . Notwithstanding that, I The assistant legislative clerk pro-
In housing, his administration completed
believe that the requirements of the 25th ceeded to call the roll, or started almost 0,000 units for low income
amendinefit Which are now the law of the Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, families and el Mated discrimination in
housing, employ nt, and public accommo-
? land have lieeii tally met and satisfied by I ask unanimous consent that the order dations.
the teStirnorly of Nelson Rockefeller and for the quorum call be rescinded. For senior cit ns he created a state office
ther Viiiiie-Sseglirefbre the Committee on The PRESIDING Ortoteri-t. Without for the aging I luding property tax reduc-
tion for the el rly citizen.
vital areas of concern to the
and his record of hard work
shments in these fields qualify
ntly to be Vice President.
international area:
rved under President Franklin Roose-
as program director for the office of Co-
ordination of Inter-American Affairs.
He later served as Assistant Secretary of
State for American Republic Affairs.
O Rules and' Administration of the Senate objection, it is so ordered.
and the Judiefiry Committee of the
House of Representatives. I believe that
former Governor Rockefeller has more
? than met the standards designated
? therAi and that his past service indi-
cates his potential to be of valuable as-
? sistance to our Nation in the years ahead.
It is in the best interest of the entire
country, then, that I urge the confirma-
?' ? Approved For Release 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500410006-0
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that Mr. LONG
be recognized for not to exceed 15 min-
utes to speak out of order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER:
objection, it is so ordered.
out
These are
entire coun
and acco
his im
In
S 20960
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE Dece:in ber
He also served as Chairman of the :Enter-
American Development Cannalesion whieh in-
cluded all 21 Americau Republics.
In 1950 he was named Chairman c)f the
International Developnaent Ativieory Booad
that developed the blue print for Axnerites)
foreign asalstan.ce prow ant
Mr. LONG. Mr. President, it is unfor-
tunate that some of our Men-leers seem
so obsessed with the wealth of Mr. Rocke-
feller. The assumption on the part of
some is that a man can be too rich or too
economically powerful to be ft for the
Presidency or the Vice Presidency.
I think it would be well that we focus
attention on some of the man's very fine
contributions to public life and in the
way in which he has used his wealth for
the improvement of his Nation, hie com-
munity, and his neighbors.
The privacy of his family has beer,. in-
vaded for the purpose of completely ex-
ploring his wealth.
Attention should now be focused or
the quality of his public life, whine is
extensive.
The acelemplishments of Nelson Rocke-
feller are extensive and impressive. And,
it goes without saying that he had a ful-
filling and: highly successful career as a
public servant.
We would be fortunate to have Nelson
Rockefeller as our Vice President. The
country certainly needs a Vice President
in these crucial times of domestic and
economic difficulties.
I hope that his confirmation can be
accomplished expeditiously.
TAX HAVEN ASPECTS OF AMERI-
CAN-OWNED SHIPPING OPERATED
UNDER THE LIBERIAN FLAG
Mr. LONG. Mr. President, on Prie.ay,
November 29, 1974, there appeared in the
Washington Star-News a very thought-
ful article by James It. Polk, discussing
the tax haven aspects of American-
owned shipping operated under the Li-
berian flag. I would commend it to ray
colleagues.
It is especially significant because
comes to cur attention at a time w n
the Nation generally feels that the er-
national oil companies have be per-
mitted to make excessive profits d es-
cape with little or no tax pa ent to
this Government on their operties
abroad. What some of us ire been
hearing for many mon ow is that
a great deal of so-called scene profits
of the international oi Y ompanies are
being sheltered in their. oreign shipping
companies which ar 4:Separately char-
teredi under separat ations and semi.-
ate corporations in e cases.
At a time when American labor is
fighting for the pilvilege of a mere hand-
ful of jobs on seine of the tankers bring-
ing oil to America, it will arouse resent-
ment to learn that the most privileged
people on Earth, the internatioaal jet
set and the international wet set?these
who spend more time in bathing suns
than they do in business cloth?are
permitted by this Nation to more their
money around from one tax haven to
another, paying no income tax anywhere
s dies any time an .American labor man One change in the tar reform\
asks for a job, repeal the exemption for overseas
I have lived long enough to learn Lilat Proate and require that the earn
t iere are usually twD sides to an argu- reinvested in the same f( reign operationff
elude taxation. ? to
ent. Nevertheless, I raust confess I have The elect of the repel, if passed, is still
e. 'eat difficulty in seeing why thaw v. ho rather foggy. One staff expert on Capitol Hill
o.'e privileged to export capital produced said, "I don't think moet et the members
b e hard-working American labor, hiring Tully grasped it."
their labor in the f -mine-stricken na- The secone pr poseS a more senous
bans of Asia and A [rice at the going peril to the tax ter. A caego 'bin, backed
wage paid in those countries, should not by shipping i and American shipyirds,
aa some point pay some reasonable would require ? at 30 percent of the oil Ira-
amount of taxes to some government Ported into s country be, carried on IT S.
tankers.
somewhere. Senators will be interested That b bitterly fought by American oil
t,c learn that the Liberian merchant ma- compant already has passed both houses,
ri tie is being eperatee out of a building d o Senate approval of a 'conference
across the street from the White House. report is needed next week before
They May be somewhat surprised to the eacure goes to the White House,
find that the Liberian merchant marine ed abort the bill's Impact on tanker
hes been represented ?;ar more effective- trations in Liberia, Lininger said, "That's
lit in the White House and the State t hard to foresee. I don't see how it could
helpaBut how much it will hurt eventually. I
Departerient than the American me don't kn?.wt.
ci ant marine.
The Liberian tax operation has been
The Americans who own the Lib profitable for International Bank for a eurn-
rn rchant marine are people abou ber of years. Ltninger dalined to say how
we should learn a great deal e. profitable, bet he did say, "Frankly,
[ask unariinious consent been an extremely satisfactory and worth -
de to which I refer be in.e,e in the while investment."
Rreorte at this point. A financial filing by Ieternational Bank
Mere being no olan , the article with the Sectirities and Exchange Commis-
sion includes this statement:
the RECORD, The International rrest Company of
Liberia acts 88 the maritime administrator
BELIPpiNG: BANK Liberia, which activity is the major source
rif TAX HAVEN of its income. . . . The total income of the
. Polk) International Trust Company constitutes
substantial portion of the total income of all
S eank has a little- )
col the foreign subsidiary hanks."
oncession to operate a How much is a substantial portion'? That
or Anericarnowned sine-
ws:least:el nation of Liberia. isn't answered, But the total foreign income
and earnings for Interhational Bank's over-
the Inn. oil industry sail seas properties last year was listed at just
tankers wider the flag of under $2 lignites.
pe income saxes through loop_
sines of tie Atlantic. However, ties is still nos a big cut of all
was ordered to be prin
as follows:
)0P1-10LES BEN8FIT II
HERE Runs Ian
(By
J. Washington-
known, long-te
Major tax have
pir.g in the Afr
The giants
many of t
Liberia to
holes on
a he
Afri
lit -I-
Hoc
ing
ritime admit istration of Viet
sultry is run, in effect, from an
r office looking eown on the White
om the International Bank's build-
1701 Pennsylvania Ave. NW.
e International Beni: Ltd., a parent of
First National Bank of Washington, Is a
Is ncial chain owning most of the stock of
in International Trust Co. of Liberia, Which
not only handles the ship registration in that
Eat-on, but also acts as tee tax colleeter.
Fad T. Lininger, a p)lite, white-haired
Am -rican financier who is a senior vice presi-
dent of International Blink, carries a chug
tite : he is also, by long- term appointment,
the senior deputy maritime commissioner for
Liberia.
Tie International Bane subsidiary's (-en-
trees to serve as the Maritime Administration
in African tax shelter' in apparently lu-
crative. Its income doper is on the level of
shie registrations--in effeet, the bank gets e,
cut of the tonnage tax i ayme.ats--and ac-
counts for a substantia' piece of all the
basens foreign earnings.
The tax haven in Liberia exists because
US law doesn't cover mirseas earnings in
the 3hIpping industry by 'oreig-a-based sue-
sista ries of American firma -
At a result, a dozen or tore oil ram/sante)
hate created foreign offsheots to own tankers
regi) tered in Liberia to Ca 'ry their crude (Al
the ugh seas.
of International Bank's profits. The com-
pany is a major owner of Financial General
Bankshares, a local banking chain which con-
trols the First Rational Bank of Washington.
Union Trust Company, Arlington Trust Com-
pany, and Clarendon Bank ee Trust, as well as
the Bank of B affalo and the National Bank
of Georgia.
Because of the tax advantages, Ltberia,
which is located on the western curve of
Africa, hes the largest merrhant fleet in the
World. Steel, auger and aluminum com-
panies, as well as private shipping tyecrons,
join the oil giants in registering vessels Under
that country's Bag.
The International Bank operation pro-
vides the services for firms to set up foreign
corporations ta Liberia, administers the
maritime law teem and handles the anneal
ship taxes and other assessments.
"They collect It as the government's
agent," Lizsinge:? said.
in addition to the initial registration fee,
Liberia has an ennual tax n a dime per ton
on a ship's cargo capacity. However, a
tanker bringing oil from the Middle East
a half-dozen times a year would pay three
times that amount in Ane -dean port fees
alone.
The big advantage is found in income
taxes. Liberia doesn't tax the earnings of its
ships. And there is a large loophole in the
U.S. income tax.
A, last count by the 7r.S, Maritime All- It works this way: If tl.ri profits which
min etration, American-cc etrolled firms lied the American oil conmen lee pay their can
) et tankers flying the flag of Liberia, with foreign snipping subsidiaries are left over-
another 79 such tankers eader construction, sea;;, they avoid 'U.S. taxes 'cause of a spe-
T1 e tanker "Statue of Liberty" is actually eine 1962 exemption for such shipping op-
a Liberian vessel, owned a 7 an American oil ere-tame.
company. Sc IS the "J Pail " e Even if tee profits are breuiebt back into
hi lips Oklahoma" and he "Esso Berlin:" this country, rl-ey can be sheltered by the
Te proposals now peeding on Capitol foreign tai. credit. Most of the royalties
le however, threaten this tainshelter_
se 2001/09/07 : CIA-RDP75B00380:00660-0411 OU0bLU-
- v the Middle East
hiring labor under virtual slave conei-
tons, while screaming loudly a,bo it sue- Yei
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November 20, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks
In that connection, a current survey Of
young pebple made by the Rand Youth Poll?
which has monitored trends among those in
their teens, college students and young mar-
ried couples or 22 years?is worth attention.
Almost thr,? in four-72 percent of the
teen-agers po e4:1--regard high spending as
something that' s actually good for the
country. They se ci reason for stinting so
long as they have means to buy.
Of those 'polled, '7 ercent consider them-
selves and their frien wasteful, but it does
not seem to bother the ? 74 percent say the
Subject of thrift is seldo eferred to in their
homes or schools; 64 perc t of them do not
look upon conservation an rift as matters
of much importance.
Such reactions are not pa cularly sur-
prising when you stop to cons r that the
-average annual per capita spen g among
teen-agers has gone up from $278 1950 to
more then $800 estimated for 1974.
Eighty-six percent of the teen -a s in-
cluded in the survey (which, by the wa was
a nationwide sampling) feel that a h er
and higher standard of living--which t
define as more arid more possessions?is
primary goal of the American system.
sixty-three percent consider disruptions
in the production of goods and dislocations
in supply and demand as temporary. They
do not believe there are serious shortages in
the U.S. Of those interviewed, 83 percent say
they have always regarded the nation's nat-
ural resources as inexhaustible. -
Nearly all of those surveyed know some-
thing about the depression years of the '30s.
But 62 percent are convinced it can never
happen again. They Speak of such built-in
"stabilizers" as Social Security, unemploy-
ment ccapensation and insured bank ac-
coUnte.
rm explaining why they don't put much
stock in saving money, 54 percent cite the
large number of Government and private
pension Systems, -profit sharing by cora-
pariles and health programs as assurance that
their retirement years have been comfortably
provided for.
Analyzing his figures, the president of the
Youth Poll, Lester Rand, concluded:
"Thrift as a 011ie went out of style among
this nation's youth as the spending booms
_of the '50s, '60s and early '70s accelerated. The
old proverb, 'a penny saved is a penny earned'
has been completely outmoded.
"Young people easily justify their over-all
wastefulnesS hY claiming that it contributes
to greater consumption and therefore bene-
fits the ecOlio_My as a whole."
In the affluent days before the Great De-
pression, a distinguished American poet, the
late Conrad Aiken, wrote:
All lOvely things will have an ending,
All lovely things will fade and die,
And youth, that's now, so bravely spending,
Will beg a penny by and by.
Subsequent developments gave his words
the ring of prophecy at the time they were
written. Now the results of the Rand Poll
suggest that in the minds of many young
people the prophetic verse has become hollow.
They seem to be. convinced that the piper
has been paid in full, and in advance.
RISING CRIME RATE
HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI
or
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, November 19, 1974
Mr. DERWINSKI, Mr. Speaker, the
public is justifiably concerned and
frustrated over the rising crime rate and
the difficulties that the police face in
defending the innocent person from
criminal- attack.
During the recess, columnist Vernon
Jarrett of the Chicago Tribune very
properly analyzed this subject of urban
crime in his penetrating article of Octo-
ber 23. The column follows:
You CAN'T JUSTIFY CRIME OF MURDER
(By Vernon Jarrett)
I don't care how poor, or how uneducated,
or how ill-housed the murderer may be,
society must never accept poverty or func-
tional illiteracy as a justification for the
willful, callous slaying of innocent people.
Underscore that word "justification" be-
cause what may begin as a sensitive, logical,
humane explanation of -a crime-producing
situation often concludes as a tacit approval
of murder.
ffeel deeply and resentful about that sort
of confused "socioeconomic analysis" be-
cause I have witnessed too many instances
where the murderer is given more sympathy
and understanding than his brutalized vic-
tim.
This is, indeed, a strange phenomenon.
r an example, a black teen-age product of
t ghetto can take a gun and blow a hole
th the head of a black father, mother, or
chi lso a product of the ghetto?anti he
imme ately finds that he has friends from
the u r strata of society.
Not o will the brutality of his crime
become mized and lost in the ozone of
social ana is, the criminal may find that
watchdog ci mittees may be formed to in-
sist that he d others like him get fair
treatment sho he be imprisoned.
And more tha likely, somewhere there is
a group of "conce ed citizens" who will help
arrange for him t et an early parole and
a speedy rehabilita n, and maybe a good
job?in some insta es dtawing salaries
higher than those of ual competence who
never killed a fly.
I'm all for fair and hu ane treatment for
prisoners, and I consider abilitation pro-
grams a must. I contrib to and shall
continue to participate in sp al educational
programs for prisoners.
But I think it remarkable at I rarely
find any committees formed or a programs
designed to help the victim of c inal as-
sault and murder.
However, I have heard many re rts on
the plight of parents whose chilcire were
assassinated in street gang warfare; p ants
of maimed child victims who didn't di
mediately; those parents who didn't h ye
the money to even make a daily visit to t
county hospital by public transportation
parents who had to borrow to buy burial
space and a cheap casket,
They become the statistics of urban sociol-
ogy while the killer is humanized.
At the same time there has been estab-
lished a perverted system of assessing the
seriousness of ghetto-related murders. Even
in the eyes of some black spokesmen, the life
of a black person murdered by a white per-
son?particularly a cop?sudden becomes
more valuable than a person killed by a
black,
By the same token, there are white citizens
who become tlisturbed by the "viciousness"
of a murder of a white by a black gunman
but are not truly disturbed when a white
truck driver is murdered by a fellow white
trucker in a union strike dispute.
Arid in other fuzzy minds, the seriousness
of an assault depends upon the social status
of the victim. I have heard self-appointed
analysts of the ghetto speak lightly of crim-
inal acts if the perpetrator is poor and the
victim lives in a middle-class neighborhood.
These distorted assessments of murder run
counter to the black tradition. Despite what
E 6717z
the mythmakers write and say, the black
tradition is one of resistance to destruction?
particularly self-destruction. That resistance
can be traced to a preoccupation with the
threat of racial extinction which forever pre-
Sented itself in a multiplicity of forms, in-
cluding poverty.
But since poverty, like illiteracy, was so
widespread among blacks, it was not accepted
as an excuse for self-destruction.
As a Southern-reared black youth I recall
vividly how black people reacted to death?
especially untimely and senseless deaths.
Blacks could accept death and rationalize
Its value. But one thing they never ration-
alize its value. But one thing they never ra-
tionalized or forgave: murder, anybody's
murder.,
I do not choose to reject that tradition.
It is needed now more than ever.
ATHLETES HONORED BY
McKEESPORT GROUP
HON. JOSEPH M. GAYDOS
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, November, 20, 1974
Mr. GAYDOS. Mr. Speaker, each year
a McKeesport organization honors select-
ed individuals for their contribution to
the world of sports. The testimonial,
sponsored by the McKeesport Athletic
Sports Association, is one? of the most
popular community events in the area
for it gives the stars of yesteryear an
Opportunity to renew old friendships in
an evening of fellowship.
I was privileged to be one of the guest
speakers at the 1974 banquet, sharing the
program with McKessport Mayor John
Pribanie; Richard Bowen, McKeesport
High School football coach; Samuel R.
Vidnovic and Steve Lesko, toastmasters,
and Father Robert Pietrzynski, pastor of
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Natrona, Pa.
Honored by M.A.S.A. for 1974 were:
McKeesport National Bank Awards?
Howard "Paddy" Peckman, Eugene
"Lefty" Hollar, Nick Butcher and Robert
Ludwick, baseball; Joe Bazzone and
Chuck "Irish" McLaughlin, boxing; Wil-
liam Laughlin, Vic Dietrich and Bob
Ward, football; George "Ganzy" Bene-
dict, Helen Gaydos Murray and Millie
Gaydos Barry, all sports; Andrew Toth,
umanitarian; Herman Levine, sponsor-
s p; Morris "Mushy" Gerendash, pro-
m r; Eddie Rack, golf; Dan Kelly, soc-
cer; Duane Dowden, swimming; John
"Di " Ulm, cartoonist; Bobby Lloyd and
Domi 'ck "Cookie" Donato, softball;
Jules ro" Micklo, organizer, and Rudy
Wheato bowling.
Joe 0 rcich District 15, U.S.W.A.
Awards ieorge "Pete" Goshio, all
sports; Sa "Apples" Clay, football; Bill
Callaway, b ketball; Joe "Goofer" Vuk-
manic, offici ; Russ Hoffman, football
and softball; ohn Sullivan, promoter;
Tom Manning, ponsor; Pete Damarsky,
mushball; Sta 'Ukasik, baseball; Joe
Lupo, youth recr tion; Wilburt "Webby"
Klein, softball* J n "Honus" Lux, bowl-
ing, and Dave Cu en, sportsman.
Julius J. Lenart gh School Awards?
Dave Farina, baseball and basketball;
Mark Yazwa, baseball and foptball; Rich
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks November 20, 1974
Hofstetter, swimming; Joseph Gaydos
Congressional Award--Elroy Face, for-
mer ace relief pitcher for the Pitt.sburg
Pirates; Al Duffy Daily News Baseball
League Award?Neal Mechling: Merlill
Granger American Legion Baseball
Award--Dave Farina; Ellis Morgan Bile-
cial Award?Gerella's Gorillas, fait club
for Roy 'Oerella, star placement kicker
for the Pittsburgh Steelers; Mike New-
man McKeesport Boy's League Award?
:Danny Wertz, and M.A.S.A. Golden Quill
Award?Thomas D. Mansfield, Publisher
of the Daily News.
Mr. Speaker, it is with great pleasure
I call the athletic achievements of these
gentlemen to the attention of my col-
leagues in the Congress of the United
States:
THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFER-
ENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
HON. LEE METCALF
OE MONTANA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
WedriesdaY, November 20, 1974
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, as our
representatives prepare for the second
session of they Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea, which
convenes in Geneva on March 17, we
should note that a single thread runs
through preparatory meetings and the
first session in Caracas this past sum-
mer.
That thread is that mobility of our
defense forces is our No. 1 priority as
we negotiate with other nations on the
broad question: Who oWns, or is re-
sponsible for, two-thirds of Earth, the
oceans, and the land beneath?
That mobility is our No. 1 priority is
a matter of record. At page A30 of the
Washington Post of August 30, 1974, the
chief of our negotiating team, U.S. Spe-
cial Ambassador John R. Stevenson; was
quoted as saying:
The No. I priority is the mobility of our
naval and air forces and the importance of
retaining our nuclear deterrent.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that this n.ewsstory be printed in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the news
story was ordered to be printed ire the
RECORD, itS follows:
SEA-LAW CONEEONCE CLOSES IN DEADLOCK
(By John Virtue)
CARACAS, August 29.?The third U.N. Sea-
Law Conference ended in deadlock today and
the conference president said there was little
hope of drafting a new treaty governing the
use of the sea at a follow-up spring session
in Geneva.
Conference President Hamilton S. A:sclera-
singhe of Sri Lanka indicated that are many
as three more sessions might be needed by
the 148 participating nations to obtain a
signed treaty in 1975.
"There has so far been no agreement on
any final text on any single subject or issue."
Amerasitighe said In etc:Sing the conference,
which exiled its 10-week session deadlocked
on the four key issues needed for a treaty
to replace the current 17th-century sea code.
"I am convinced, given the best will in
the world, it will be physically' Impossible for
us to finish the drafting of the treaty by the
enn of the spring session in 1975," he said
later at a press conference.
elarlier this week, the conference agreed
to reconvene in Geneva Mafch 17 to May 3
mil then to return to Venezuela in midsum-
me r for signing a treaty, if one is negotiated
by then. Amerasinghe indicated, however,
th it another session might have to be
sq teezed in between Geneva and Caracas.
/chile most delegates 'said publicly that
th conferetece 'had achieved the expected,
th ty privately expressed disappointment at
th ) slow progress .and the gulf between the
po talons of the rich ineuetrial nations and
th 3 poor developing ones.
Che devision between the delegations knew
lir ideological bounds.
The Unted States and the Soviet Union
vet re the leaders of the industrial nations,
and China backed-The aspirations of right-
wi rig South. American at ilitary dictatorships.
l'he conference became deadlocked on four
key issues:
Perritorial limits: the developing nations,
led by Ecuador and Peru, insist on virtual
so rereign control over all activities within
20) miles of thesr coasts. The industrial na-
te ns, led by the United States and the Soviet
Union, favor giving coastal states full con-
Del over a 12-mile limit but opening up a
fusther 138-mile economic zone to fishing
as d scientific research by other nations.
Deep sea mining: The developing nations
went preferential treatment in mining co-
belt, copper nickel and other deposits
through a strong international authority,
welch would set its own rules and decide
wno mined where. The industrial nations
wint the rules written : ito the treaty.
Pollution control: The developing nations
went mild contsols for I;hemselves and hard
re es for the industrialised nations, who they
say polluted while ach: eying their develop-
ment. The industrial nations want uniform
in ternational standards .
Straits passage.: This is the key Soviet and
U S. issue. Both want freedom of passage
fcr their warships and merchant fleets
D rough the more than 100 straits in the
w wid. The straits nations, most of them de-
veloping once, want control.
"The No. 1 ptiority is the mobility of our
neval and air forces arid the importance of
is tabling our nuclear deterrent," said U.S,
tecial Ambassador john R. Stevenson
ri cently.
Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), here briefly
ii r the conference, pred.icted that the Senate
w :mid not ratify a treaty that did not guar-
a:itee free passage.
Stevenson, in a wind-up news conference,
espressed confidence that a sea treaty could
be signed in Caracas if enough hard work Is
d me in Geneva. "There is no cause for bill-
is.
g the conference a failure," he said.
"We certainly did no:: come to Caracas ex-
p ecting to go back with a signed treaty," said
7 anza.nia's J. S. Wariobe, expressing the feel-
ii .g of many delegates, But we had certainly
come expecting to acnietre more than we
have."
Amera.single cautioned the nations against
ti tieing any unilateral action before a treaty
it negotiated. Li thus, ie echoed Stevenson,
mho warned that any e:stension of U.S. fish-
ing limits by the Senate could touch off unl-
it teral action by other nations.
There are several bills in Congress to es-
t end the fishing limit to 200 miles, a concept
0.ficially opposed by tee United States tel
tie conference
Ecuador and Peru, I. to hardliners among
t le developing nations, claimed a 200-mile
I mit in 1952, eouchints off the "tuna war"
with the ITnited States. Some 200 U.S. fishing
t -awlers, most of them from San Diego, have
leen seised during the past 10 years in the
e isputed waters.
The two South Amer lean nations said their
claim was simply an estension of the Tru-
ian Doctrine, under which the United States
in 1945 claimed control over the seabed re-
sources of the continental shelf, which ex-
tends beyond 200 miles from the coast in
some parts of the Atlantic. The two Pacific
nations have virtually no shelf, so they
claimed a 200-mile limit instead.
Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, the De-
fense Department has based at least part
of its case on a claim that extension of
the territorial seas would close more than
100 straits around the world to vessels
vital to defense or commerce.
There is evidence that this claim is
questionable.
The evidence is in the hearing record of
the Senate Committee on Armed Services
early last month on S. 1988, the bill to
extend the fishery resource jurisdiction
of the United-States to 200 miles.
It is in a statement by Dr. Frank E.
Carlton, president of the National Coali-
tion for Marine Conservation, Dr. Carlton
made the point that, of the straits which
might be closed by a 12-mile territorial
sea, only 16 "could have importance and
that nine of those are either nonessential
or fall within, the territory of our military
allies."
Dr. Carlton's statement continues:
Of the remaining seven, all but three either
offer no significant targeting advantage or
are too shallow (Malacca) or dangerous to
approach submerged (Sunda).
To Dr. Carlton's statement was ap-
pended a paper by Dr. Robert E. Osgood,
dean, the John Hopkins School of Ad-
vanced International Studies, Washing-
ton, D.C., and director of the Johns Hop-
kins ocean policy project.
I commend Dr. Carlton's statement
and Dr. Osgood's paper to my colleagues
who are sincerely interested in this com-
plex subject. I ask unanimous consent
that be printed in the RECORD at this
i
There being no objection, the state-
ment and paper were ordered to be
printed in the RECORD, as- follows:
STATEMENT BY DR. FRA NR. E. CARLTON
I am Dr. Frank E. Carlton, President of
Use National Coalition for Marine Conserva-
tion, Inc. The Coalition is a national conser-
vation organization committed to the pro-
motion of rational poll-tine and legislation as
it affects ocean use.
The purpose of this piper is to demon-
strate that there are alternative views to the
somewhat adamant and tntractatble opposi-
tion to immediate passage of 5. 1988 ex-
pressed by the Departments of State and
Defense. Information for this statement is
restricted to unclassified material immedi-
ately available to the punlio, e.g., the SIPRI
Yearbook of World Armaments published by
the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, Jane's Fighting Ships, 1973-74,
Jane's Weapons System's 1972-73 and the
annual Military Balances, published by the
International Institute oi Strategic Studies.
Specific rebuttal to certain Defense Depart-
ment arguments relies heavily on a recent
article by Dr. Robert E. Osgood, Dean of
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Interna-
tional Studios in Washington, D.C. entitled
"U.S. Security Interests and Ocean Law"
published in. Ocean Development and In-
ternational Law, the Journal of Marine Af-
fairs, Volume II, No. 1, Spring, 1974. Specific
comments with regard to State Department
arguments draw heavily on an article by
David C. Loring entitled 'The United States-
Peruvian Fisheries Dispuien which appeared
In the Stanford Law Review, Volume XXIII,
February, 1971. For the purposes of this dis-
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November 20, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Extension.s of Remarks
cussion, cOmments will be limited to the
context of international political and stra-
tegic considerations; germane fisheries is-
sues will not be considered. The specific con-
cern of this statement will address points
previously raised by Defense and State De-
partment representatives and which will un-
doubtedly be reiterated before the Senate
Arms Services Committee.
State Department arguments may be sum-
marized in four general points. Immediate
passage of S. 1988 would:
(1) Increase international political ten-
sion,
(2) Deter a successful outcome of LOSC'75,
(3) Be detrimental to the long range in-
terest of "all" U.S. fishery interests, and
(4) Be a violation of International law,
Defense Department arguments may be
summarized in three basic points. Immediate
passage of S. 1988 would:
(1) Add to "creeping jurisdiction",
(2) Cause the loss of significant sea and
air mobility necessary to our defense,
? (3) Lead to an international chaos of
? unilateral action and reaction.
The fundamental thrust of a rebuttal to
these allegations can be expressed in three
general observations:
(1) the strategic necessities cited by De-
fense have been vastly overstated,
(2) increase in international political ten-
sions, doubtful outcome of LOSC '75 and in-
creasing complexity of international rela-
tions are realities, already in a state of active
evolution, which will probably occur in the
same temporal context regardless of this
(S. 1988) or other legislation enacted by the
United States, and,
(3) the conclusion that should follow
from points "1" and "2" is that certain
rigidities in our foreign policies and military
attitudes have demonstrably caused the U.S.
to underestimate the vital importance of do-
mestic and international changes in her eco-
nomic and military capacity to be a global
power and to continue her position as a
leader in international politics, indicating
that fundamental reassessment and change
in these areas is necessary to maximizing the
probabilities and potentials for continued
world peace.
Defense Department officials have stated
that 'U.S. security requires free transient
through straits and the right of military
overflight. It must be pointed out that the
distinction is not between the terms "free"
and "innocent" in so far as strategic consid-
erations are concerned. In reality the rele-
vant comparison must be between "free" and
"secret". Defense contends that the invulner-
ability of U.S. SSBN's and their indispend-
able role to our defense depends on their
legal right to secret passage. Dr. Osgood's
scholarly examination of the 121 interna-
tional straits listed by the Department of
State that would be nationalized by a 12 mile
territorial sea demonstrates that there are
only 16 that could have importance and that
nine of those are either nonessential or fall
within the territory of our military allies. Of
the remaining seven, all but three either
offer no significant targeting advantage or
are too shallow (Malaccal or dangerous to
approach submerged (Sunda). Dr. Osgood's
analysis reveals that only Gibraltar and two
Indonesian straits, Ombai-Wetar and Lorn-
bak, are strategically significant areas which
might be politically questionable if a 12 mile
territorial boundary were established. Pres-
ent political relations with Indonesia as
well as Spain and Morocco are complex and
will undoubtedly become more so, but clo-
sure of the Indonesian straits would not pre-
vent the submerged passage of our subma-
rines into the Indian Ocean. Passage through
Gibraltar is only necessary to the physical
Interruption of surface traffic through the
Mediterranean. On a nuclear deterrent basis
the entire USSR can be targeted from the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Araban
Sea.
Approved
Dr. Osgood's studies clearly demonstrate
that the physical and political necessity of
free transient through international straits
is not supported by objective information
and should certainly not be considered a non-
negotiable item inhibiting international
agreement on ocean use. '
Further detailed analysis of other relevant
considerations:
To what extent would surfoce transient
impair in vulnerability of SSBN's?
Would detection and destruction of United
States' SSBN's after passage through straits
significantly alter U.S. second strike capacity?
Will the Trident system affect our need to
use the international straits in question?
All lead to the conclusion that the absence
of "free transient" through straits would not
seriously weaken the c6ntribution of U.S.
SSBN fleets to our strategic nuclear deter-
rent.
Aside from this line of reasoning, it must
be further pointed out that logic as well as
experience indicates that the concept of
innocent passage is actually related to com-
mercial vessels on grounds of navigations
safety and anti-pollution. If there is any
real question that the transient of a war-
ship might not be innocent, one must wonder
why any nation would sign a treaty per-
mitting unimpeded passage, or conversely,
how such an agreement would deter any na-
tion from "necessary" military action against
such passage? Obviously, strategic signifi-
cance is related to a capacity to place SSBN's
in secret positions which Dr. Osgood's analysis
demonstrates does not depend physically, or
certainly legally, upon "free transient". Thus,
the core of the Defense Department's posi-
tion, as well as the forced extension of their
argument to a fanciful relationship between
a 200 mile economic zone and passage
through international straits, brings grave
question to bear upon the validity of their
position.
On the other hand, a relevant positive con-
sideration is that if restrictions of innocent
passage were imposed upon the world at
large they would in fact work significantly
greater hardships upon Russia's defensive
and aggressive capacities than upon the U.S.
Rational and qualified answers to the
various State Department assertions with
regard to the deleterious effects of immediate
passage of S. 1988 have been presented before
other Congressional committees and are
presently available. Detailed reiteration of
these specifics are therefore neither neces-
sary nor appropriate; however, it is vital
to point out that attitudes underlying the
position of the Departments of State and
Defense, which now dicate their opposition
to extend jurisdictiion; manifests that same
attitude and rigidity which has character-
ized U.S. performance in international re-
lationships for the last 25 years and which
has materially contributed to the difficulties
the U.S. faces today. The record of this per-
formance does not inspire confidence in the
ability of this country to deal wisely and
fairly with regional conflicts and political
confrontations. The 200 mile issue itself is
an excellent example of the United State's
steadfast opposition to a concept and
physical reality that will shortly become
the accepted world norm. The Defense De-
partment's archaic and illusory attitudes to-
ward the necessity of maximum mobility to
maintain our defensive security and the De-
partment of State's insistence to under-
rate the importance of harmony with less
developed coastal nations, have been re-
lated to and supplied further impetus to-
ward th total problem of decline in the
United State's capacity to maintain a global
posture as an economic and political force
and its acceptance by other nations as a
world leader.
The clear schism between the realities of
our domestic priorities and our rapidly
changing international capacities and re-
E 6719
sponsibilities necessitate change. The tra-
ditional attitudes and methods that created
the Peruvian fisheries dispute remain very
much in effect to this date. In discussing the
Peruvian fisheries issue David Loring states,
"the background and growth of the dis-
pute ... can be attributed largely to a series
of mistakes by the United States."
In asking the Senate Arms Committee not
to support the position of the Department
of Defense and State we recognize the cata-
cylsmic disruption with historical precedent
such an event would require. Nevertheless, a
change of this order is necessary to the
reality of maximizing any eventual poten-
tial for continued world peace. The National
Advisory Committee on Oceans and At-
mosphere's third annual' report dated June
28, 1974 stated in its foreword, -"This year
NACOAA worked with the consciousness
that our society may well be on the threshold
of a major discontinuity in human history?
from a world in which natural resources such
as food and energy, and . . . and the regeni-
tive capacity . . . seem to exceed effective
demands, we appear to be moving toward a
state of affairs in which consumption and
utilization of vital resources are generating
new stresses and strains at home and abroad.
To contain the resulted instabilities we must
respond to unprecedented demands on our
capacities to manage natural resources."
It is my respectful contention that these
considerations are more vital to our national
interest than those unsupported allegations
made by the Department of State and De-
fense and do not, in fact, jeopardize either
our international relations or our strategic
defense. To the contrary, the Congress should
recognize that the continued threat of pas-
sage of S. 1988 has been one of the more
positive and constructive forces impinging
upon international negotiations on ocean
use. It must remain for the Congress to
forcefully counteract a long tradition of
policies and practices which have demon-
stratably worsened domestic and interna-
tional problems. Only the Congress itself can
bring the necessary forces to bear to insure
the necessary changes. I earnestly entreat the
committee's consideration of these alterna-
tives.
U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN OCEAN LAW
(By Robert E. Osgood)
Abstract?This paper discusses the need
for reassessing U.S. security interests in the
developing laws and practices concerning the
use of ocean space. The nature of these secu-
rity interests is identified and their impor-
tance is weighed in terms of U.S. foreign pol-
icy interests and the requirements for main-
taining those interests. A projection is made
of the international political context within
which the U.S. must act over the next decade.
Estimates are made of the effects of different
ocean regimes on U.S. strategic nuclear in-
terests and other security interests. Conclu-
sions are offered concerning, from the stand-
point of U.S. security interests, the desirabil-
ity and feasibility of resolving various ocean
jurisdictional issues by means of the pro-
jected law of the sea treaty.
1. THE NEED FOR REASSESSMENT
There is generally a presumption in favor
of the primacy of security interests in a na-
tion's foreign policy. U.S. ocean policy is no
exception, but the conception of security un-
derlying this policy has greatly expanded
from the apparent emphasis on military
mobility in the period leading to the U.S.
Draft Seabeds Treaty of 1970 to include a
major concern with unhampered commercial
navigation in the present period before the
prospective international Law of the Sea
Conference in 1974.
Actually, what appears to the outsider as
the initial dominance of avowed military
needs?particularly the need for "free
transit," as opposed to merely "innocent pas-
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CO:r4GRESS101N.A L RECORD ------ 1....Ictensions of
:it 41." through inte.rnetienal sit at ? aa a'S,-
'Vtq,YS 1Fit ri.e stelae stike a
epieUibt6; rate of the Deteirtmeat ,st Defense
ane Mee, when 1:he ferineleeem. of
It el. ,:icean pol could still tie esewerfully
aliected by a sj ogle f art :HEM I r rl..t itt in a
kee position P7 that seat ,ite, wad tea:, ,arktical
co erre ienee dig sed et:AA:vine
comp:Mated is cc in testes er mil-
eceurity naide, cieepeiiiee? arid
LI, overshadow e more: f teatereened
object:a e et: all te mdivienais
mid ge ? e vibe ,ft mote
inbiee1,41 in Cite 'fel Mt :ration. cif the Deaf t
ecaleses :ate This ob,ective was to bring a
ea::tt area of gr- a-ing i Ott ietitikei Cl ek tele.
tially eleorde sonflier. ader of
lasernationd law ane iieerteaStener Me:ali-
t ions before it ':VaS 400 11:f ,.;e. "PIA reet re it, th6
State Department:, ehr National Secturity
Ceence, eird, foe th it matter, ei tee On-,
partmeet ,el De.e rise as y: ell, tie:: acilievereent
of an i eterratleinal tr iate estaeliele se: .Lta
ro,v? continentit Shelf 1ettestiarte aiterna-
II -I tjt nietricteW,;ti u a he espeeiatisio.
ocean le:sour:le, reweee,
exuloiLati01.1. ear ecol1 ine. detesicier,,,ek,e, aed
neer:rational regulatory inaele eery wes seen
1:13 SerVitig: Americae .kaacieikel it- Learnt
rallilltaitli:ag eangenim, relativere peiteeful
in era'! etivirotik=ne..t.uw fitri tiiat the
narrower intereses cii Deffie were net ned at
corresponding to the lie her inteireet et the
Meted States OA preten ing rut era of inter-
national coneiet rev:eh/1[1e art une compet-
ing claims: to ocean eerreory nu reeeurces,
a hapPy ice
As tee proseectiv( 1::74 7.,Tat:,011S
it or the Set' Conlere' C aperoar let, how-
00' '1 experte e kek,vern-
some parts of the teepiented acean
commenay :inside the eerie-lament
?litere come to think that this eonekieemse
it:PingPi" titq/py: The feer that Drne has
itself loelaid into exeess4 rely rig le
pt item on free transit It rough strs its, which
at not iticliepeasable Ameri:ceit eaterity
WI lien /nay jeop ske th r: !
of the kind v.' eainitaar internaleieel arder
that is essential to it.melea's inotelet eceen
el-lane 'the prevuiti. il olieestpttotcio ii
' is that the prieciple it a Ailffiped4ki
Ltttys!'' thr011:ii,,h straits as become more mi.-
p( int tnen ever becsetee ehe. growing
patented. threat Ito petroteunt aad eone
In eer-eelI tranee. given it preemeet of 'stet-
extive" interpretatioes of mit 'C': neesegffi
lit '-1 teai . recasts:07er, 0 tee in tricaee pa leera
of ieternationel give ami Lake tele; clierac-
terizee t:he barreinher feed neskeitiA,,:iie!: proc-
ess on oceen law, tut WI, Wring S. commit-
ment to free trarteit etre teethe es rather than
weakens the nrospece t. achievine: a useful
Cr aim iffienelve :414 fl?..ar-f,,kiliVel,'Stk,F Saw of the
sea treaty.
Iti rrin:?,,,,stito; the cektcorne ot Vec deli-
palely balanced bareatreng and eitgotiating
oe law of ti le sea issues, evert the esiperts in-
side the government mesa rely on teaselled
lit eleelffire about the essentially
elen-onies Of a ccariptex isettesti precese and
feeders are at a disie,; vantage lit.htdglnp
the fasternovieg state et the ga,ree. ilt't 1111
the eature ol Americart security interests at
eleike tU 0001111 laW it iS
tO ovorvieVr that mair al. least show tee full
range of teem, Interests and sueetee some
priorities among them. es lit tele attSesstneut
cutM, tack at altous to
classified data is mush lese leepetient than
one's perepective on ihe iQiltical eignificance
itt 'weIl-,trtoWtt events and d:evelopmeets open
to public eetetiny. Prete thus. per iresetive
have undertaten an as sesement ter U.S. se-
ckery intereete at stale; in the developing
laws and practices cot cerning ,the use of
I,,') ean spacee
Peolootes at end of a tide.
Remarks November 20, 1974=
The a,monat of tecluiesel detail involved in
a ?:,,?ssintt the U.S. militate security intercete
tIltkeierin regimes is (lisp nportionate to the
nestlee importance of sere:eh?' military Cons'
eels/ate:me. The 'heels g esented here coo-
F-,' no to the now coavaational view that
ter moot impertant se:etrity interests at
ffiee.e. in the law of the era treaty are much
Pt. ader than purely millaty interests. 'Inc
;cy question I wish to eteninate is wheth-
er she official 0,5, posit- en may jeopardize
tee broader interests in kit-tempting to pro-
the narrower ones er whether, on the
otleir hand, as the Lop U.S. ocean officials
seitetatn, the law of the sea provisions in-
ter 'led to proteet US, military intereets
(at rticularly, free transile are indispensable
erving the broader it k.erests (particular-
11e unimpeded passwe ef petredeurn ship-
el:er,) as wee.
2, ITS OCEAN: 55(1.1h,,TY INTERCSTS
11470 U.S. security laterests la the use
it e ocean were articuleted largely in terms
naval inability, and the legal require-
meets of mobility Were 'formulated ? largely
it terms el "free -reamer through inter-
reelonal straits. A. number of these straits
? kild become territotial waters permitting
"innocent, passage" ror American war-
e: s if, as expected, a twelve-mile terri-
e al sea boiled:try were embodied in the
ree,Y international law of the sea treaty
that the Malted Stales MIS committed. to
1.1:ieve. Moro nereowly stele the advantage of
free transit over innomkt pat-cage was de-
tre sd largely in terms of the maintenance of
? terican strategic n mileter capabilities
nigh the ma anountied underwater pas-
of neclear-powered submarines carry-
nuslear mitts lea (SO Mee) Less emptie-
r Led in public etatements were three other
ets :.tritts Interests:
a) Most imp:okitant a' nag these was the
of territorial sea boundaries.
el were seen to be in danger of expand-
lee far beyond twelve miles, up to 200 miles,
k her the lailt enee o. Latin American
t ndary claims, the assertion of anti-pol-
l.
kon zones (eat by Canada), and the proc-
of "creeping jurisdestiene that would
:ind the assertion of anti-pollution end
resource-exploitation zones to claims of
? iltorlal s(ttereiglity.:
Is) Seldom artietilatee in public was the
de lit of military Overflight, (bo which not even
IT-' ecent passage applieSi over key Interna-
Iia eal straits.
c) Not mentiened at all but, one must
Irsdearly surmise, of some significance, was
Ii a right to emplace an t-submarine
listen-
! devices cm the continental shelf,
'hatever may be sand?on taetical-bu-
iffiratic as well as substantive policy
tunde?for the seeming priority of military
ity iniereete at the time, subsequent
di opmenie le the international environs
les at affecting the law of the sea treaty and
Aecrican ocea..ri interest e hare called for a
its sseseineut or U.S. ocean security inter-
ns ; In a ht:rger fratIMWC,AC. of time and cir-
ieeastances. tiliS larger framework, one
C1641, see that; the United States needs to use
fear 'zones of wean span----the seabed, sub-
'I 1.face, surface ak.kei simetedjacent air?in (m-
ese to support four kinds of functions that
:hie the United Strees to sustain ins-
tent domestic and foreign interests:
a) The maintenance ef an adequate itt's-
II to nuclear capability in relation to the
capability.
!hi The enairrienance ef all adequate ea-
ty to project Awe/teen forces overseas in
Ii ated warn.'
c) The Maintenance rif adequate lateln-
get ce and military serveilleace Capabilities.
cl) The protection hi peacetime of U.S.
et. seas, Conuneree, act. se to critical re-
ere trees, and a variety of specific policy ob-
jectives OVerSeaS.
These functions can be regarded as com-
ponents of U.S. national security insofar as
they support American military security, im-
portant external interests, :?ind the well alit of
American citizens abroad read at home. This
Is a broad and rather amorphous defieition
of security, since the objects to be securecl
go far beyond the territoriel integrity of the
United States Itself. But the definition is in
accord with the trernendottis postwar expan-
sion of he AilleriCall conception of natiolial
security beyond the traditional core values
to encompass the security of allies, a wide
range of foreign commitments and other
concerns, and an internatiemal environmen-
tal environment congenial to the protection
of these haereete. To be sure, the nation is
moving toward a more limited and selective
interpretation of its securey interests in its
current phase of moderate retrenchment and
introVersion, particularly insofar as' these in-
terests require the use of armed force. But
having acquired global commitments AS the
dominant counterpoise to the rival super-
power, the United States is not about to re-
vert to its restricted pre-World War II con-
ception of national security.
3. 'FOREIGN POI. :a Coerre'ssr
One's assessment of the importance of
these various security functions depends,
first, upon one's estimate of the impact of
the changing international environment on
America's vital foreign interests and on the
requirements of maintaining these interests
against possible threats I a them. Enough
time has now passed since the announcement
of the Nixon Doctrine, the American with-
drawal from the Vietnam war, and the rap-
procbenient with China to make some reason-
ably confident, although becessarily fallible,
conjectures about the nature of American
security policy and its international environ-
ment over tile next decade.
It is now clear that the foreign policy in-
stituted and consolidated' by the Nixon ad-
mit-listen-tem looks toward the maintenance
of the (IS. position as a superpower with
global interests, global political /military
commitmente, and global influence, but at
a moderated level of expellee and diminished
direct (especially military) involvement.
This posture can be described as retrench-
ment without disenga,gemente Toward this
end, the Mist foreign concern of the U.S.
government is to orchestrate a global windy. s
vim?? di of interlinked agreements and under-
standings with the next strongest and poten-
tially most dangerous State in the world:
the USSR Diplomatically and politically, it
seeks to promote this aim through approach-
meat with the Peeples Republic of China, the
normalization and stabilization of relations
between the two Gernianys, the control of
superpower competition in the less developed
Third World, and the inaidation of detente
from the superpowers' involvements in this
area. Economically, it seeks to promote the
global modus vivendi through the transfer of
capital and agricultural goods to the Soviet
U:teon in order to sustain a Soviet policy and
regime committed to detente. Militarily, it
aims to untiergird the global modus vivendi
with stabilieatton of the U S.-Soviet military
balance Rnd moderation of the arms competi-
tion through mutually acknowledged strate-
gic, parity codified in SALT and, more prob-
lematically, with mutually agreed limitations
on European forces, coupled with joint oppo-
sition to the emergence of new independent
national nuclear forces.
The Nixon administration's second con-
cern is to reconstruct he relations with
America's major allies?the NATO countries
and Japan?so as to give them a compelling
interest in participating in the new detente
relationships with the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China on somewhat re-
vised terms: greater diplomatic independence
and Initiative, accommodation with the
United States of inerei6Sillitly Clivergent trade
arid monetary interests, and increased con-
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E 6721
tribution to eollectiVe defense Under con- the relative decline of American power could litical interests at stake in regional power
tinning preponderant .American manage- lead to a new-multipolar era of confronta- politics they may find themselves backing
ment. . tion But this is too conjectural a possibility contenders in local military actions, demon-
As for the so-called Third World. of the to be the basis for changing the American strations, and even wars, in which their own
largely new and poor cOuntries, which security policy outlined by the Nixon admin- military capabilities will play at least a tacit
scarcely five years ago was thought to be istration. role.
the decisive arena of the Cold War, the It is somewhat less conjectural, however, This trend is growing now in the Persian
Nixon administration hepes to lower Amer- to postulate situations short of large-scale (or Arabian) Gulf area. Growing dependence
lea's profile by leaving the welfare and se- local war in which American security inter- on Middle Eastern; oil gives the United States
curity of developing countries pritnarily to ests, broadly defined, may be in jeopardy. a major material stake in an area in which
their own individual and collective efforts Such situations are most likely to arise where it has had political, commercial, and strate-
of self-help. Having reduced the official esti- indigenous tensions and conflicts threaten gic interests for some time.. The increased
mate of the Communist (and particularly (a) the security of friendly regimes and/or capacity of a few countries to withhold sup-
the Chinese) threat of military attack and (b) the unhindered supply of critical re- ply to the United States because of huge
subversion ln, the Third World and having sources, particUlarly petroleum. In most of currency reserves and alternative buyers, to-
raised the o these situations the protection of American
official estimate of the capacity gether with the possibility that the Arab-
interests would depend on the local configu-
Of weak States te resist Communist control Israeli tension or the influence of radical
ration of interests and power; in some on
imposed from the outside, the Nixon admin- , regimes will provide the political incentive
the use of force and threats of force by in-
istration will rely almost entirely upon the for such withholding, constitutes a new
selective use of military and economic aid digenous countries, which the United States threat to America's regional interests. Simi-
would support or oppose by arms aid and
to centain local Communist aggression. larly, the possibility that local rivalries in
other indirect means. In rare cases, however,
While reaffirM1ng its pledge to shield allies , the area?resulting, for example, in a con-
one can imagine the United States more di-
and other States vital to American security filet between Iraq and Iran, with radical
from directrectly supporting or threatening to support
aggression by nuclear States, it regimes and traditional kingdoms aligning
has virtually ruled out a direct combat role friendly regimes against hostile movements themselves on opposite sides?may disrupt
for U.S. forces in Local wars, that are largely and States, where such support could be ex- American access to oil poses a potential eco-
insurgent or civil. The reduction of Amen- tended by military demonstrations or inter- nornic threat with such a serious impact on
can military personnel by one third, the positions incurring a minimal risk of U.S. American domestic welfare as to be tante-
involvement in war.
reduction of general purpose forces in par- mount to a security threat. At least, these
ticular, and the,. substantial Withdrawal of Thus in the Jordanian crisis of 1970 the threats are not implausible possibilities.
American forces from Asia give tangible U.S. government evidently contemplated Whether America's enhanced interest in
Meaning to this lowering of the American aerial intervention, not only to rescue hos- access to Middle Eastern oil will actually be
military profile in the Third World, togas seized by Palestinian guerrillas and threatened depends most immediately on the
Judging from official pronouncements,
evacuate American civilians, but also to developing pattern of conflict and alignment
America's military _ posture supporting the bolster the pro-Western Jordanian regime among the Middle Eastern and particularly
Nixon-Kissinger revision of foreign policy of King Hussein against the guerrillas and the Gulf States (which control 60 per cent of
will Continue te aim at maintaining stra-
Syria, and, above all, deter the Soviets from the world's proven oil reserves),. on the in-
taking advantage of the conflict or trigger- fluence of violent Palestinian groups, on the
tegic parity with the Soviet ITnion?indeed,
at nothing less than overall teclinolegical Ing a larger war, while impressing them (and capacity of radical regimes to gain and ex-
-
equality (while conceding to Soviet long-
the Arabs) in the wake of the Egyptian mis- pand power, and on the vicissitudes of the
sile crisis, with the credibility of American Arab-Israeli dispute. But the involvement of
range missile forces some numerical su,peri- power in the Middle East. Actually, the quick both superpowers in the politics of the area
ority) and a capacity to respond to nuclear
attack with something more than massive
success of the Jordanian army against El through their major "clients" and other cc-
devastation, The United States_will also seek Fatah forces and Syrian tanks, combined cipients of support means that the possi- to maintain Credible conventional ,as well as ed with Israel's mobilization on the frontier, bility cannot be excluded that American mil-
nuclear protection for its allies. But as coli- ns
were decisive in resolving this crisis favor- itary demonstration or action would be called
ably to American interests. Whether the for to protect access to oil,
pared with the periods after the Korean
and during the Vietnam wars, it will be far, United States would have intervened under Apart from the possibly fanciful scenarios
any circumstances must remain in doubt.. of American military action to protect sup-
less (if at all) concerned with maintaining But the incident illustrates the most likely plies of petroleum, some naval planners and
a policy or capacity for waging large-scale role of American air, naval, and amphibious publicists define American security interests
local wars, as distinguished from small-scale forces in a local crisis or war: deterring So-
interventions. And, in any event, its political viet direct or indirect intervention, inducing more generally in terms of maintaining po-
and material capacity to fight such wars will Soviet cooperation toward a peaceful and not litical influence and pressure in a politically
Substantially decline. unfavorable resolution of the crisis, main- acceptable way through a visible naval pres-
ence in areas, such as the Gulf and the In-
4. TUE INTER,TS:ATIQZTAL roLrriCaL corrrnxr taming Soviet respect for American power
dian Ocean, where the United States cannot
-Under what conditions can the United and will in order to prevent the Soviet Un- afford hostile control of the sea.. One need
States be expected ion from seeking some regional, unilateral
, to retain its position as not accept the more sweeping versions of
the predominant manager of the still bipolar, advantage that would jeopardize the net-Admiral Mahan's theories of naval power,
now moderated and stabilized, military bal-
work of interlinked constraints in the super-
powers' global modus vivendi. In addition, based on ominous but unspecified and highly
ance against the Soviet Union and at the
the role of American forces might be to res- improbable threats to vital lines of corn-
same time retrench its capacity for limited
cue or protect American civilians, to support merce, coupled with overdrawn estimates of
overseas interventipn in local wars while
friendly local regimes against hostile States, Soviet naval power,? in order to appreciate
Maintaining a position of global influence?
and to maintain in the eyes of regional the enhanced political and possibly security
At the minimum, one must postulate the
States the credibility of American power to significance of a far-flung U.S. naval presence
continuation of U.S.-Soviet detente?that is,
in an era of increasing U.S. dependence on
protect American interests. The prospect of
of confined competition within negotiated foreign strategic materials coupled with a
coexlstenceand of compelling political and the United States actually employing its
armed forces in local crises and conflicts will declining U.S. presence on foreign land.
military constraints against Communist
armed action,
remain ambiguous; nonetheless, military Throughout the world, however, the sit-
Willdemonstrations, mobilizations, and maneu- nations that are most likely to damage the
these conditions prevail in the corn- vers will probably be credible enough to be United States' broad security interests this
Mg decade of international politics? Prob- in
ably so. The past era of intense great-power viewed by the American President as an in- presumed period of protracted detente may confrontation and crisis has more than likely dispensable instrument of policy, lest po- be those which the United States cannot af-
eded, A period of great-power diplomatic tential adversaries stumble into a clash of fact by military means, directly or indi-
'11 arms by underestimating his will to use rectly?indeed, situations over which it has
MarieuVer in which, superpower crises, mill- force: little or no control by any means. These are
OR security issues, and concern with the In any case, as new and more structured situations in which American military mo-
military balance (except in the ontext of regional patterns of conflict and alignment bility, military bases, access to oil, and less
arms control) diminish and recede into the seem likely to develop in some parts of the tangible security interests are damaged by
background seems likely to continue for at Third World, the United States and the So- the hostile actions of the weaker and poorer
least a decade. Perhaps this will be a period viet Union can be expected to remain mu- countries, actions which the United States
of considerably less harmbnious great-power tunny constrained yet interested partici- for one reason or another is inhibited from
relations--especially between the United pants, through military assistance and other countering by force. Or they are situations in
States 4rid its major allies?than the admin- means, in the international politics of these which the conflicts among other States im-
istration anticip,at.es. And perhaps in such a regions. They will, in some cases, as in the pinge on American interests incidentally
period there will be a greater erosion of the Middle East, be aligned competitively with rather than by design. (Thus the "cold war"
American material capacity and will to main- opposing aspirants to regional hegemony between Britain and Iceland threatened to
tam n a convincing global posture than the and influence. Where one or both superpow- lead to expulsion of the NATO base from Ice-
Nixon Doctrine pre-supposes. Eventually, the ens have important material as well as po- land). If the frustrations and resentments
diffusion of power and interests among the of the less developed countries, no longer able
world's live developed centers of power and Footnotes at end of article.- to exploit cold war competition, should be
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E 6722 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --Extensions of Remarks Novimbcr 20, 19744
channeled toward organized harassment and
pressure against the developed countries?
whether for purposes of to venue, pohtical in-
fluence, or just nationalist self-as tt action?
the United States might find itself operating
in an environment as hostile to In security
as at the height of cold war corneae ation in
the Third World. The ri big dependence of
the 'United States and es allies on oil and
other natural resources end on etraits, sees,
and overflight which developing countries
are able to control by either uncontested or
physically established claims, makes Amer-
ican commerce and military moist' ity par-
ticularly vulnerable." TY les one of the pri-
mary U.S. Security imperetives in this phase
of history may become the achievement of
mutually advantageous and acceptable work-
ing relationships with coastal Stets s in the
Third World.
It Is apparent from thiet line of cc njecture
that the situations affecting U.S. security,
broadly conceived, are en more hypotheti-
cal than during the height of the Cold War.
Yet American security Pettey, for tis s sake of
deterrence or just insurance against serious
trouble, cannot prudentl s be geared only to
predictable contingencies, even though it
cannot afford to be geared to the werst con-
tingencies Imaginable. With this cautionary
note in Mind we can explore the (ma heathens
of these security considerations for U.S.
ocean policy.
5. U.S. seeisreeto mum EAR II,ITISSE CTS IN
OCtAN 1.5W
In the context of American foreign
and security policy ane the inte -national
environment in which it operates wr can now
tender some estimates Of the effects of dif-
ferent ocean regimes or the specific kinds
of U.S. ocean security interests outlined at
the outset. It is not sufficient to note that
the United States would benefit from maxi-
mum Military mobility in ocean :mace (or
rilaXinnlin freedom to emplace listening de-
vices on continental shelves or to conduct
offshore 'electronic intelligence operations)
and mitten= interference with maritime
access to vital resources That is too sweep-
ing a generality to be translated into laws
of the sea in the real world, where one must.
consider ideal objective: in the context of
such operationally significant meet tions as:
(0,) how likely, and by what means, are vari-
ous States to impede aehievement of these
objectives, (b) how would such impedence
affect U.S interests, (c) to what et:tent and
in what ways would cliffs rent relit), as for use
of the oceans affect such impedence, and
(d) how leasible and ci stly is the achieve-
ment of more favorable regimes?
First, let us apply thee standards of judg-
ment to U.S. nuclear strategic in :erests in
the use of the ocean. Here the chief con-
cern is the efficacy of U S. SSBN--?-Currently
the Polaris/Poseidon feet?partly because
the Onset of MIRVing and improvements in
missile accuracy enhance the importance of
concealing missiles under the ocean and
partly because the ease for free transit of
international straits hes rested most con-
spicuously on the puree): ted security require-
ments of the U.S. underwater fleet The U.S.
government maintains that the invulner-
ability of SSBNe and Is ince their indispen-
sable role in an adequate second-Strike force
depends on their right to pass through inter-
national straits (that is, straits in which
there is regular internetional passage from
one high seas to another) submerged and
unannounced; whereas under existing law
only innocent passage, which, aceording to
prevailing interpretation, requires surfacing
of all suleninrines, 'would be legal in straits
that fall wiehin territorial bonndtries." This
is a distinction that is held to be of great
significance, since tender a 12-mile territorial
sea boundary perhaps more than a dozen
Footnotes at end of erticle.
straits of possible strategic significance
Would be overlaPped by foreign territorial
waters.
To assess the Validity and practical im-
portance of this position, a number of ques-
tions have to be answered:
I. Which of the world's more than 100
international straits (121, according to an
unofficial chart devised by the Office of the
Geographer in the U.S. Department of State)
that would be overlapped by territorial waters
If 12-mile boundaries were agreed upon might
also be important for the mobility of the U.S.
Polaris and Poseidon fleet in order to reach
the areas in which present strategic doctrine
specifies required targets?
The strategic importance of straits is a
matter of judgment on which experts may
differ, but stretching this category to its
reasonable maxim-cure would produce, accord-
ing to information provided by the same
chart of the Office of the Geographer, a
list of 16: Gibraltar, two Middle Eastern
straits (Bab el Mandeb and Hormuz), fem.
Southeast Asian straits (Malacca, Lombok,
Sunda, and Ombsii-Wetar), Western Chosen
strait (between South Korea and Japan),
five Caribbean straits (Old Bahamas channel,
Dominitia, Martinique, Saint Lucia Channel.
and Saint Vincent Passage), Dover, Bering,
and the Kennedy-Robeson Channels.'
Nine of these straits, however, are not
really essential to America's strategic capa-
bility, and some would in any case fall in-
side the territory of military
The five Carileliean straits are not needed
for transit to Polaris/Poseidon patrol sta-
tions, since the Caribbean is not an essential
launching area. They are not, even essential
for access to the Caribbean, since there are
several passages over 24 miles wide (for ex-
ample, te/lone? Windard, Anegada, and Guade-
loupe).*
Western Chosen, the western half of the
strait between Japan and the Korean pen-
insula (which is divided by the Island of
Tsushima), is only 23 miles wide; but Japan,
if not South Korea, would presumably permit
U.S. strategic warships routinely to pass
through this strait to the Sea of Japan?, In
any event, the eastern half of the strait,
Is 25 miles wide), The real sufferer from any
closure of the Korean straits would be Soviet
general purpose forces, which, for example,
would have to travel more than twice as far
from Vladivostok to the Senke,kus by going
the La Perouse route (north of Hokkaido,
south of Sakhalin), thereby affecting Indian
Ocean operations, China coast patrols, or
submarine deployments from Nakhodkaeo
Bab el Mandeb offers no significant tar-
geting advantage over the Eastern Medi-
terranean (and transit through the French
aide of the strait would probably be avail-
able anyway). If the Soviet anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) presence became oppressive
there, or if Gibraltar were closed, the Red
Sea could be considered an alternative de-
ployment area. But nearly all targets that
could be reached from there could also be
reached from the Gulf. Those in areas that
could not be reached from the Gulf (East-
ern Europe, the Baltic Coast, and the Lenin-
grad area) could be covered from the Atlan-
tic. Passage through Hormuz is probably not
necessary now that the shorter-range Polaris
A-1 (with a 1200 nautical-mile range) and
A-2 (1750 nautical miles) have been phased
out in favor of the A--3 (2880 nautical miles).
With Holy Loch available on the west coast
of Scotland, there is no great need for
SSBNs to use Dover in the English Channel.
2. In which cif the remaining straits is
submerged passage physically feasible but
politically unobtainable on a reliable basis?
Malacca is too shallow (10-12 fathoms)
and too buy for submerged passage. Sunda is
barely deep enough (20 fathoms in the ap-
proaches) but requires a passage of over 700
miles within a 50-fathom depth.
The Bering Straits, although about 45
miles wide, are split by Dieenede and Little
Diomede Islands, making each half of the
straits less than 24 miles wide. But since
Little Diomede belongs to the United States,
submerged passage to the Arctic is not in
question politically. Similarly, the narrow
route to the Arctic throne :1i the Kennedy-
Robeson Channels is presumably accessible
by submerged passage, shire it is in Canadian
waters.
This leaves Gibraltar arid two Indonesian
straits, Ombai-Weter and Lombok, as ,stra-
tegically important straits through which
the submerged passage of U.S. SSBNs is now
physically and politically feasible but the
use of which might be politically question-
able if a 12-mile territorini boundary were
established.
The two Indonesian strait; are important
to SSBN operations from the Indian Ocean to
Guam. Without submerged passage through
them, the U.S. would have to circumnavigate
Australia, greatly reductiag the number of
days on active patrol as opposed to transit,
or double back to one of the entrances to
the Timor Sea, 180 to 500 miles east, of
Ombai-Wetar, which would still pass
through Indonesian waters.
An additional hindrance to secret passage
through Indonesian waters results from
Indonesia's interpretation of the archipelago
principle of enclosed waters, according to
which the two strategically straits are
claimed to be internal rather than inter-
national waters.' Although the Inceenesian
government has argued that the archipelago
principle does not infringe on innocent pas-
sage, it requires prior notification of transit
by foreign warships arid has begun to raise
questions about the innocence of super-
tanker passage on grounds of the danger of
pollution they pose. In April of 1972, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ad-
miral Moorer, declared, "We should have and
must have the freedom to en through, under,
and over the Malacca Stmt.". Shortly there-
after, the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian
Navy was reported as ovaruing, "Our armed
forces will attack any foreign submarines
entering territorial waters without permit.
because it means a violation of Indonesia's
sovereignty." lo In response to Indonesian
jurisdictional claims, the United Stales
maintains the international character of
Indonesian straits but, according to press
accounts and Indonesian sources, routinely
provides prior notification of transit by sur-
face ships and presumably relies on scene
special bilateral navy-to-navy arrangement
for submerged passage that is not incon-
sistent with the requirements of concealing
the details of SSBN passage from foreign
intelligence.' o This is a rather contingent
modus vivendi, but as long as an Indonesian
government as friendly as that of Suharto
is in power it satisfies America's needs.
The situation in Gibraltar is more com-
plicated. Although the Strait is only 11.5
miles wide and Spain claims a 6-mile terri-
torial sea, its international character has
been preserved by historic tradition and by
the treaties of 1904 and 1912 between Britain
and France and Spain securing free passage.
In March, 1971, however, there were intima-
tions of a more restrictive view of foreign
rights of transit when Spain- and Morocco
agreed to cooperate to "promote the crea-
tion of Mediterranean awareness" and also
agreed to consult on all matters relating to
peace and security in the Mediterranean and
particularly in the Strait. In June, 1972, the
Spanish government announced at the
United Nations that it would be useful to
consider the freezing of naval forces, fol-
lowed by progressive reductions, in the Medi-
terranean. At the same time, it indicated
that some compromise weer necessary between
free transit and the rights of coastal States
and suggested that such a compromise might
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"November 20, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks
be achieved by a re-definition of the right
of innocent passage.
Thus Spain may have prepared the way for
asserting a right to force SUblnarines passing
through the Strait of Gibraltar, to surface.
But whether, or not Spain chooses to assert
such a right against American SSBNs will
depend, under existing law,. primarily on the
overall political relations between the United
States and Spain. As long as U.S. submarines
are based at Rota, the chances are that these
political relations will permit an arrange-
Ment for submerged transit of US. sub-
marines through the Strait of Gibraltar.
If this, is Rot leA?,thle* eveu the closure of
pibralkg to unannounced submerged U.S.
submarine passage would not be disastrous
to America's strategic capability. After all,
With the Polaris/FOSeitiOn system the entire
Soviet Union can De,targeted from the At-
lantic and PaCide ,OCearia and the Arabian
Sea. Although there has apparently been no
need for SSW/ patrols in the Iiadian Ocean,
an Indian Ocean basa7-84.7, Diego Garcia?
Would obviate the need to use Gibraltar or
the Indonesian straits altogether.
3, To what extent would surface transit
of U.S. SSJ31Ns through straits impair their
invulnerability to Soviet detection, identifi-
cation, and (in the event of NAT) destruc-
tion?
This question really subsumes several dif-
ferent questions:
(a) Is the Soviet capability to detect and
identify Submerged U.S. $813Ns coming
through straits significantly inferior to the
Mine aoviet Capability with respect to sur-
faced. SEl3Ns?
The answer is surely "yes" (assuming, of
course, that submerged transit is not an-
nounced pa advance to the straits State, so
as to become subject to Soviet intelligence
acquisition). It is relatively easy, to detect
surface passage through straits by means of
Surface vessels, land observers, or, satellites,
even at night. 33y far the most effective and
practicable electronic surveillance of sub-
merged vessels is by means of a series of
hYdrophones (or sonars) connected by un-
dersea cables anchored to the continental
shelf, like the U.S. "Caesar" and "Colossus"
system. But this device has to be, hooked
up to a listening station on the shore, which
Would seem to preclude the Soviet Union in-
stalling it at Gibraltar or in Indonesia for
the foreseeable future." Moreover, in the
high traffic-density straits of Gibraltar and
Lombok it Would be very difficult to single
out transiting nuclear submarines from the
high level of background noise. Even in the
less-traveled Ombai-Wetar, possible Soviet
hydrophone arrays would have to be sup-
plemented by "trawlers" or towed arrays to
be effective. The United States and the So-
viet Union hay e developed ocean surveillance
satellites, but U.S. efforts to use them to
detect submerged vessels have proved im-
practical for basic physical reasons that
technology seems unlikely to overcome in
the near future. If the Soviets were willing
to assign nuclear-powered anti-submarine
submarines (SSNs) to monitor the critical
straits, this would somewhat enhance their
submerged detection capability; but the diffi-
culty that Soviet SSNs have had in shadow-
ing U.S. SSBNs from bases indicates that
SSNs would be ne substitute for fixed hydro-
phone arrays.
(b) To what extent can the Soviet Union
continually locate U.S. SSBNs after passage
through straits, assuming that Soviet surveil-
lance deteCts and identifies these SSBNs?
It is now eXtremely difficult, and promises
to remain so far the indefinite future, to
track submarines that have passed through
straits submerged. It is virtually impossible
to track all SSBNs on patrol (that is, in
position to fire) ,u Open-area surveillance
(from aircraft, surface ships, and satellites)
will remain of limited effectiveness unless
Footnotes at end of article,
and until, perhaps, large parts of the ocean
floor are covered with a network of bottom
detection systems in communication with
surface ships and aircraft. The most effec-
tive ASW method in wartime is a forward
barrier-control system, utilizing coordinated
bottom detection devices, other sensors, at-
tack submarines, and ASW aircraft. But in
peacetime this system cannot prevent
SSBNs from passing through the barrier and
disappearing.
(c) Would the Soviet capacity to destroy
U.S. SSBNs which were tracked and located
after detected passage through straits sig-
nificantly affect the U.S. second-strike
capability?
This is unlikely, unless one estimates the
requirements of an adequate second-strike
capability very conservatively. To reduce the
U.S. second-strike capability significantly,
the Soviets would have to be sure of simul-
taneously knocking out most of the 20 to 25
U.S. SSBNs on station at any one time.
Merely a few Poseidon-carrying submarines
(which will eventually comprise 31 of the 41
U.S. SSBNs), each with its 18 missiles with
10 MIRVs on each missile, could overwhelm
the Soviet ABM system. Moreover, this situa-
tion will last at least as long as the initial
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty limiting de-
ployment of ABMs is in effect.
4. How will the prospective new Trident
SSBN system affect the need to use the criti-
cal straits in question?
Although the amount of Congressional
funding and the outcome of efforts in the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to limit
'SSBN ,a are uncertain, the development of a
new Underwater Long-Range Missile System
(ULMS) for the so-called Trident SSBN sys-
tem may produce a successor to Polaris/
Poseidon in the 1980's. The Trident subma-
rine would carry 24 missiles with a range of
between 4500 and 6500 nautical miles and
with MIRV warheads. It would be quieter
and would dive deeper and remain on sta-
tion for longer periods. Deployment of the
Trident system?or, for that matter, the de-
velopment of ULMS on Poseidon submarines,
which is planned for fiscal year 1978?would
virtually obviate the dependence of the U.S.
underwater .nuclear deterrent on transit of
straits.
Taking all these considerations into ac-
count, it would seem that, even without the
Trident system, the absence of a provision
for free transit of international straits in a
law of the sea treaty sanctioning 12-mile
territorial sea boundaries, although impos-
ing some hardships on the operation of the
U.S. SSBN fleet, would not seriously weaken
its contribution to nuclear deterrence. From
the routine operational standpoint the hard-
ship of having to surface submarines would
fall more heavily on nuclear anti-submarine
submarines (SSNs), which play an impor-
tant role in the strategic nuclear equation.
But despite the improved information about
the numbers, direction, and location of
hunter-killer submarines that surface transit
would give to Soviet intelligence, this hard-
ship would not really- increase the willing-
ness of the Soviet Union to launch a nuclear
first strike or greatly enhance the efficacy
of Soviet salvos after an initial nuclear ex-
change. In any event, the same require-
ments of surfacing imposed on Soviet SSNs
would offset the disadvantage to the U.S.
underwaterd
Aside from the problem of detection, how-
ever, there are other operational disad-
vantages to surfacing nuclear submarines
in straits. Where high-density traffic occurs,
as in narrow straits and around headlands,
the nuclear submarine is safer both to itself
and to surface shipping when it is below the
surface. One reason is its huge size. An ad-
vanced model such as the Lafayette is 425
feet in length, has a beam of 33 feet and a t
ubmerged displacement of 8,750 tons, which r
s longer than WW II destroyers and heavier s
I 6723
than some World War II light cruisers. The
nuclear submarine is designed to operate
best when submerged, where she has greatest
maneuverability and her sensors work best
With a low conning tower and no super-
structure to speak of, she must receive ex-
ceptions to her construction standards in
order to comply with light requirements for
night navigation. For this reason and since
much of her hull is below the surface and
not visible to electronic searchers (radar),
merchantmen find a submarine hard to de-
tect. Moreover, a submarine's ability to travel
under the surface frees her from the limita-
tion of surface weather and wave motion,
and any submarine is particularly vulner-
able to collision loss by virtue of its small
reservoir of buoyancy.
The operational disadvantages of surface
transit could be avoided, of course, if the
United States were willing to provide littoral
States with advance notification of under-
water transit, providing that the critical
States in question would regard underwater
transit on these terms as a satisfactory ar-
rangement. But this hypothesis only illus-
trates that the prior issue is the importance
of secret passage.
When pressed to explain the necessity for
free transit of straits, U.S. officials have re-
ferred not only to the security of secret
passage and to the safety of submerged
passage but also to the prospect that, with-
out an international treaty prescribing free
transit, straits States might resort to "sub-
jective" (that is, politically-inspired) inter-
pretations of innocent passage in order to
restrict the passage of U.S. warships. Thus
John It. Stevenson, chief of the U.S. delega-
tion to the U.N. Seabed Committee, testified
before Congress that "We would not contem-
plate notifying [littoral States of intention
to transit straits] because if such a require-
ment is introduced, there is of course ulti-
mately a risk of this leading to control of
transit through straits." This risk, Stevenson
said, lies mostly in the future, and he cited
no case in which the requirement of ad-
vance notification had been used to restrict
naval transit."
In fact, experience indicates that the risk
of restrictive interpretations of innocent
passage applies largely to commercial vessels
on grounds of navigational safety and anti-
pollution?a point which has, until recent
emphasis by the oil industry, received little
attention, perhaps because of the notable
reluctance of the U.S. shipping industry to
pursue its considerable interests in a law of
the sea treaty openly. Surely, these grounds
for controlling the passage of ships offshore
are not purely subjective; they are objec-
tively quite important. If, on the other hand,
one takes seriously the danger that littoral
States will interpret innocent passage and
the requirement of advance notification to
deny transit of straits to American warships
for purely political reasons, then one must
also wonder why these States would sign a
treaty prescribing unimpeded passage or be
deterred by such a treaty.
So much for SSBNs. What about other
components of the -U.S. strategic capability?
In the discussion and controversy about the
need for free transit through straits the issue
of overflight has been all but ignored in
public statements, although the U.S. position
on the law of the sea treaty--presumably for
compelling strategic reasons?prescribes free
transit over straits for military aircraft
(there being no innocent passage for over-
flight recognized in international law).
According to the Triad system, U.S. strategic
nuclear capability requires manned aircraft
as well as SSBNs and land-based missiles.
The U.S. strategic bombing force is still a
sgnificant weapons system, with some dis-
inct advantages of mobility and of control
esponsive to political guidance. One might
uppose that effective denial of military over-
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E 6724 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks November 20, 1974,. ?
flight over key straits would seriously impair
the Gulf of Mexico would a broad national
shelf be likely to restrict U.S. coverage. But
U.S. coverage there is limited anyway, since
Cuba blocks it from CONUS while the Do-
minican Republic lies in the way of coverage
from Puerto Rico.
In any case, as noted above, since hydro-
phones have to be connected to shore sta-
tions (or, at great ,expense, to surface ships),
the United Stets generally needs the permis-
,sion of coastal States to emplace SOSUS on
their shelves, whether within or
beyond the territorial boundaries claimed by
these States.
It should also be noted that an extension of
national claims to the shelf edge probably
would do more damage to Soviet acoustic in-
stallations than to American. Presumably, it
would be difficult to find a government be-
yond. the Norwegian Sea that would consent
to Soviet devices on its shelf. The same is true
of Canada and of Japan (although the effect
of this fact is limited by Soviet ownership of
the Kuriles).
The implications of SOSUS are the same
even if national regimes were to encompass
the continental margin, although the bottom
topography near Iceland makes it difficult to
determine the precise limits of the shelf,
margin, rise, etc. There Is however, a third
possibility if no international regime is
agreed upon 1958 Continenal Shelf Con-
vention states, in part, "the term 'continental
shelf' is used as referring . . to the seabed
and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent
to the coast to where the depth of the super-
water admits of exploitation of the
natural resources of said areas." Since the
technology for exploiting all but the deepest
trenches soon will be available, this could
eventually lead to a delimitation of the sea-
bed nearly on the basis of media lines. In
this event, the United States would own
most of the North Pacific seabed (although it
probably would not be useful for more
listening stations); the United States, effective universally-applicable law of the
Canada, and the USSR would divide up the sea treaty that provided free transit through
Arctic (also without much impact on senors); international straits, established a narrow
the situation in the Caribbean would not be continental-shelf boundary, limited tend-
greatly altered; and Norway Would own tonal sea boundaries to 12 miles, and pro-
much of the seabed beneath the entrance to tected military passage through anti-poilu-
the North Atlantic. tion and other zones, than under the more
Finally, in estimating the impact of alter- restrictive regimes we have postulated. But
na sive ocean regimes on America's military even, the most restrictive regimes we have
strategic capability, one must take into anticipated would not undermine America's
account the effects of extended territorial sea strategic capability on the ocean, particularly
boundaries and other kinds of off-shore if the Trident 'system were operating. More-
zones. These effects, of course, depend in part over, the adverse impact of reetrictive regimes
upon what sort of restrictions coastal States on the totality of Soviet ocean-based etre-
choose to claim and are able to enforce or tegic capabilities would be far more severe
otherwise gain compliance with. Added to than on American capabilities, althongh,
the proliferation of extensive off-shore tern- faced with America's greater strategic de-
tonal claims, coastal States are looking pendence on the sea, U.S. iaaval leaders can-
increasingly to extensive anti-pollution, not be expected to gain much consolation
security, and other functional zones as a from this comparison.
basis for restricting foreign navigation, both In any event, what is the most realistic
military and civilian. Moreover, in the alternative to the postulated proliferation of
absence of a comprehensive and near- restrictive regimes? Is it to insist on the non-
universal law of the sea treaty such as the negotiability of free transit through in ter-?
United States has proposed, coastal States national straits and the maximum freedom
may resort to regional or local treaties?on of the seas against the restrictive inclinations
the model of the Montreux Convention or a of coastal States? Or is it to concede to coastal
version of the Soviet doctr:ine of "closed States somewhat more extensive control of
seas"--that will severely restrict the num- straits, sea bottoms, and sea boundaries,
and methods of transit by war- vshile seeking to protect the really essential
Eastern Bering Strait and the Kenneth -
the utility of the U.S. serategic bombing force, Robeson Channel (given Canadian compl -
as a deterrent. mice). In the Atlantic, patrols could sti II
In practice, however, the right to fly over press fairly far north within the 200-mile
24-mile straits doer not seem to be critical boundary around the Shetlands. In India
to the utility of the U.S. strategic bomber nesian waters, a 200-mile boundary would
force (as distinguished from the U.S. military not be much more restrictive than a 12-flute
airlift capability), since overflight of straits boundary, since Indonesia defines its bound-
is a small part of the larger pattern of over- any according to a broad archipelago doe-
flight, which is evidently managed side- trine. In any case, Poseidon missiles could
quately by special arrangements. where still target all the USSR from points 200
necessary, and which is physically unfeasible miles off Bangladesh and Japan and in the
for most States to deny in any case." southern Norwegian Sea.
The emphasis in American ocean policy on More important than ta e impact of a:-
free transit under, through, or over interne: ()tractive territorial zones and special seas 011
tional straits has somewhat overshadowed S813Ns may be their impact on the integrated
another official concern: that the U.S. stra- operation of fleets?such as the Sixth Fleet
tegic capability may be hampered by terra. in the Mediterranean?which have strategic
tonal sea boundaries or continental se. elf functions beyond providing launching plat-
regimes claimed or established by coastal forms for missiles. But the strategic function
States, of surface ships, apart from. their political
The breadth of the continental shelf re- and psychological uses, has been drastically
girne, one can infer from the published data, erctded by technological advances in attack
might have some effect, on the freedom of the submarines, surface ships, and aircraft.
United States to emplace passive ASW listen- Moreover, it is worth noting that coasi al
ing devices, (SOSUS) on the shelf, pareic- State restrictions would have a much more
ularly off the shores of foreign countries.24 adverse impact on Soviet than on American
Apparently, these devices are most effective strategic mobility. If, fat example, the re-
beyond the 200-meter depth and part way strictions applied to the current narrow sea
down the slope of the shelfea although their boundaries were applied to 200-mile bound-
effectiveness must also depend on the pe- aries, Soviet SSBNs would be restricted to
culler acoustic properties of the ocean at half of the Arctic and to operations from
various temperatures depths. and salinity Petrapavlosk. Submerged passage to the At-
and particularly on the depth of the sound lantic would be prohibited. The Caribbean
channel that focuses sound energy in deep and the southern exits from the Sea of
water. Presumably, the United States.. would Japan would be closed. Soviet fleet ma-
be constrained from placing SOSUS where neuvers would be correspondingly more inn-
be
use of the shelf were not permitted by peded than American by the proliferation of
existing international law or protected by extensive restricted seas, anti-pollution
a new international treaty. Therefore, one zones, and the like.
might assume that an ocean regime that What, then, are the implications of all
extended territorial sovereignty aver the these considerations for the protection of
whole continental margin would adversely American strategic interests under alter-
affect U.S. military security if SOSUS is sital native ocean regimes? Unquestionably, Amer-
to America's strategic capability. ica's strategic capability with respect to the
Undoubtedly, hydrophone array on the Soviet Union would be butter off under an
ocean bottom are critically important to the
U.S. ASW capability, whatever the strategic
or other military importance of ASW may
be.24 Lt. is unlikely that new techn elogy will
reduce their Importance in the net five to
ten years, if ever. These acoustic devices are
perhaps physically vulnerable to Soviet inter-
ference; but the Soviets, one may assume,
are installing many of the same kind of
devices and therefore have a vested interest
in not interfering with them. Most develop-
ing countries do not have the Capability to
locate and destroy the arrays; and the United
States denies, in any cave, that it has placed
them off the shores of these ecu ntries, al-
though their suspicions persist.
Notwithstanding these facts, however, there
is little reason to thihk that the utility of
SOST.18 would be critically affected even by
the broadest boundary of coastal hate sov-
ereignty on the continental shelf. The crucial
monitoring areas where SOSUS needs to be
emplaced, one would judge from the pub-
lished information on the submarine passage-
waYs where they are most useful, are the
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, the
Arctic, the North Pacific, and the Caribbean.
With the possible exception (albeit a key one)
of Iceland enough of the northern European
countries are concerned about the Soviet , ,
SSBN force to permit U.S. listening devices in ships of non-signatories. Assuming, then, strategic needs, whether through a law 01 the
the area. Considering the extent of the shelf for the sake of analysis that more and more sea treaty that strives for universality or
Off Alaska and Canada, the empls cement of coastal States will be trying to apply more through other kinds of arrangements and
hydrophone arrays in the Arctic is not likely and more restrictions on foreign military agreements?
to be severely restricted by a shelf conven- passage within 60 to 200-mile offshore zones We shall revert to this question after tern-
tion. Between Guam, Midway, Hawaii, Alaska, and adjacent seas, what are the implications sidering America's non-strategic security
and the .Aleutians, the United hates can for America's st,rategic capability? needs on the ocean. Suffice it to note here
claire a significant amount of underwater real A 200-mile region that impeded Ameriean that the United States' achievement of spa-
estate on which to t.emplace listening devices naval passage would have the greatest effect cial arrangements and agreements that will
in the North Pacific. Whatever gaps may exist on America's strategic capability in the protect America's essential strategic) tater-
in this coverage would not seem to be affected Arctic, given the premise presented here that ests?demonstrated in U.S relations not only
one way or another ay extended claims to the the Mediterranean is not indispensable to with allies but also with Spain, Indonesia,
continental shelf. Only in the Caribbean and America's strategic nuclear capability. But and Iran?depends on the government's
-- -- even with 200-mile sea boundaries, access to ability to reach favorable bargains in the
Footnotes at end of article, the Arctic would be possible through the total context of its political relations with
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eNovember 20, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extevsions of Remarks
, key coastal States. For this purpose the
United States, even in this period of de-
pendence on Middle East oil, has consider-
able political, economic, and military assets.
Its goad working relations with a number of
locally and regionally powerful 'states mani-
fests these assets. If this is a correct assess-
ment, It would be a great mistake for the
United States to waste political .a.ssete or
pay a big price in terms of other ocean in-
terests in order to achieve illusory maximum
strategic advantages under a law of the sea
treaty that might, in that case, be unac-
ceptable to key States anyway.
6. OTHER IT.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN OCEAN
t.,AW .
In seeming to concentrate so heavily on
the need to protect America's strategic nu-
clear capability, American ocean-law officials
have until recently under-rated more serious
threats to U.S, security interests that im-
pinge on the U.S. capability to conduct lim-
ited military actions and demonstrations and
to protect vital commerce and other peace-
time interests, They have also underrated
America's general security interest, as one of
the principal maritime powers, in maintain-
ing harmonious working relations with the
less developed coastal States of the world.
We have contended that American secu-
rity interests, broadly conceived, will con-
tinue to require the support?actively or
passively, overtly or tacitly?of American
armed forces, particularly outside the devel-
oped centers of the world and most likely in
the Mediterranean-Oulf-Inclian Ocean waters
providing access to the Middle East. It is
impossible to predict or even to assign with
Much assurance an order of probability to
specific scenarios in which the demonstra-
tion or active use of American forces may be
called for. But the conduct of foreign rela-
tions is never susceptible to such precision
of foresight. In general terms, nevertheless,
We can. see that the revised American foreign
policy outlined by the Nixon administration
. requires the stabilization of a reduced but
still global force posture for an indefinite
period of moderated great-power competition
Punctuated by continual disturbances on the
; peripheries of the developed world.
This kind of force posture will continue to
require great military mobility in ocean
, space, but the implications of this require-
ment for American interests in alternative
ocean regimes are not self-evident. In the
event of American direct involvement in a
local war or military action, would American
deployment of naval and air forces in ocean
space depend on the agreed or claimed terri-
torial sea boundaries of coastal States or on
the national positions and international
rules, whether or not sanctioned by treaty,
governing passage through or over interna-
tional straits? Probably not, if the conflict
were regarded as sufficiently important to
engage American armed forces. Similarly, if
America's merchant fleet were to be directly
harassed by Soviet or other ships?an un-
likely contingency in the case of the Soviet
. 'Union, considering its parallel interests as a
. maritime power?or by its physical denial of
access to resources and commerce, the United
States would not be deterred by legal claims
or interpretations, from taking the measures
necessary to protect its vital interests.
Nonetheless, the politics surrounding some
local conflicts might well lead the United
States to heed the objections of non-belliger-
ent States to the passage of U.S. warships
and aircraft through and over waters that
they held to be under their jurisdiction. In
general, the less _directly the United States
were likely to become involved in an armed
conflict and the less critical the outcome to
American security interest, the more the
United States government might be inclined
to heed such objections. Thus if the United
Footnotes at end of article.
States were providing material support to a
bellgerent in a local conflict?even in the
case of Israel, for example?it would probably
hesitate to resist either a belligerent's denial
of American overflight (as in the Middle East
crisis of 1973) or passage of warships and
merchant ships. In incidents short of a clash
of arms?as, for example, those arising from
quasi-legal restrictions imposed on U.S. sea
lanes providing access to oil?such denials
would be particularly difficult, politically, for
the United States to contravene.
It is in situations like these that the kinds
of restrictive territorial sea boundaries and
special zones that we considered in relation
to America's strategic capability can be ex-
pected to exert their major impact. Thus the
Imposition by littoral States of restrictions
on straits, whether in the name of protecting
themselves from pollution or on economic or
more general grounds, is apt to be a far more
important and less easily surmounted ob-
stacle to naval mobility (for example, the
transportation of general purpose forces in a
crisis) and the shipping of oil and other re-
sources than to the efficacy of America's un-
derwater strategic nuclear force. If the crite-
rion of security interest is stretched to
include passage through straits of major eco-
nomic significance (and, incidentally, traffic
density), there are at least ten such straits
about half of which could be controlled by
States that might impose costly, inconveni-
ent, and, conceivably, politically-inspired re-
strictions on the passage of goods and re-
sources of value to the United States.2',
This kind of danger was foreshadowed by
events in the Strait of Malacca a few years
ago. It was a quite reasonable concern about
the ecological disaster that could follow an
accident to supertankers in the hazardous
channels of this strait that provoked Malay-
sia in July, 1969, to claim a territorial sea of
12 miles. Indonesia, which in 1957 had pro-
claimed its archipelago doctrine of sover-
eignty within baselines drawn around its
13,000 islands, joined Malaysia in 1970 in a
treaty dividing the Strait down the middle.
When the U.S. carrier Enterprise and accom-
panying ships passed through the strait en-
route to the Bay of Bengal during the Ban-
gladesh crisis of 1972, Indonesian spokesmen
reaffirmed the right of the littoral States to
control such passage but reconciled this
right with the American action by stating
that the Commander of the Seventh Fleet
had given advance notice.' s The United States
thus avoided a dispute with Indonesia, but
the prospect of more troublesome encoun-
ters in the future had been foreshadowed.
It does not necessarily follow, however,
that the protection of American interests
against such encounters can be secured by
new international legal and organizational
devices. After the Enterprise incident, the
United States government proposed that
"free passage" of straits in a law of the sea
treaty be qualified by international stand-
ards for safety to be established by the In-
ter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) or some other inter-
national organization and enforced, beyond
the coastal State's territorial sea boundary,
by the flag State or port State. 2, But Ma-
laysia and Indonesia, while willing to grant
controlled transit through straits and wa-
ters near their shores at their discretion (al-
though the United States evidently does not
give either Malaysia or Singapore the ad-
vance notification Indonesia claims to re-
ceive), are not willing to relinquish such
control to an international organization
dominated by the United States; and they
are even less willing to entrust enforcement
of pollution and safety standards to the
great maritime States who are increasingly
congesting straits with huge tankers and
Other commercial vessels.
These political facts argue for the adop-
tion of a legal position more accommodat-
ing to the claimed residual sovereignty of
E 6725
coastal States beyond their territorial sea
boundaries. But how serious potential con-
flicts between coastal and maritime States
become will depend on more than success or
failure in the search for a general interna-
tional treaty. After all, there seems to be,
even now, a modus vivendi between the
United States and Indonesia that works
fairly well because jurisdictional differences
are not pressed to the point of codification.
One gets the impression that basic political
factors, such as Indonesia's determination to
become the dominant Southeast Asian
power, its uneasiness about expanding So-
viet naval activity and Soviet alignment
with India, its latent fear of Japan and re-
luctance to become dependent on Japan's
naval power, and its dependence on an
American presence in Southeast Asia, con-
solidated by American economic assistance
and military aid and sales, will have more to
do with an accommodation of U.S. and In-
donesian ocean interests than anything that
is likely to happen at a general interna-
tional conference to negotiate a law of the
sea treaty.
Similarly, the protection of American naval
and economic interests in the Persian (or
Arabian) Gulf seem destined to depend far
more on good relations with Iran than on a
new law of the sea treaty. Indeed, Iran's
drive for control of shipping in the Gulf,
through which two-thirds of the non-Com-
munist world's oil imports pass, tends to con-
flict sivith the tenets of free navigation that
the United States would like to see incor-
porated into a law of the sea treaty. Thus in
March, 1973, Iran was reported to be explor-
ing an agreement with Oman to inspect all
ships passing through the Straits of Hormuz
at the entrance of the Gulf.,0 Observers of
Gulf politics regard Iran's announced con-
cern about the threat of pollution as second-
ary to its concern about Arab governments
supplying arms to Iranian rebels. Iran's in-
clination to seek control of shipping in the
Gulf may run counter to an ideal universal
law of the sea treaty; but, considering the
more than $2 billion in arms the United
States has provided Iran to bolster its claim
to paramountcy in the Gulf, Iran's forward
policy should not be inconsistent with Amer-
ica's broad security interests in the Gulf.
Indeed, if the general U.S. policy of relying
on Iran as a surrogate for U.S. naval power
Is correct, Iranian control of the Gulf may be
the condition, or at least the necessary price,
of protecting U.S. interests in the Gulf.
Restrictions on overflight, as on surface
navigation, exert a far more serious effect on
the mobility of general pupose forces in
limited wars and crises short of war than on
the U.S. strategic capability. In the Mediter-
ranean and Gulf areas, at least, the United
States evidently must count on denial of
military overflight rights even by allied and
other countries in which it has air bases. The
result, as in the case of surface navigation,
Is to enhance the importance of unimpeded
passage over (as through) straits. In prac-
tice, however, the problem of securing es-
sential mobility by overflight is even more
confined geographically. Perhaps it comes
down essentially to flying over the Strait of
Gibraltar. In any case, resolving this problem,
like securing military transit through straits,
will depend primarily on the full context of
political relations with a few key States. If
these relations are not favorable to unim-
peded passage, the key States are not likely
to sign a free transit provision because of
any bargaining that takes place in a law of
the sea treaty conference. If they are favor-
able, the United States will probably have a
better chance of arranging a satisfactory
modus vivendi outside an international con-
ference than of obtaining a legal guarantee
through either a multilateral or bilateral
treaty.
Nevertheless, U.S. ocean policy-makers un-
derstandably cringe from the troublesome
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prospect of contriving the protection of
American ocean security interests through
ad hoe deals with local and regional powers.
As lawyers must, they seek to rest the prcitec-
tion of American ocean interests on treaty-
made laws that apple as gerteralle and unam-
biguously Di passible rather than on triodes
vivendi based on fragile political clignments
and the untidy growth of customary law.
Moreover, they look upon both the threat of
emerieste, ocean interests and the solution
to the threat in abstract terms, consistent
with the American tendency to identify the
national interests with a universal order.
According to this outlook, the more coastal
Countries that assert control over straits
claim 50-mile or 200-mile territorial boun-
daries, demand special restrictioes on in-
nocent passage, or otherwite constrain the
use of ocean space, the more such constreents
are apt to lead to encounters and clashes with
the major maritime Ste tea. Consequently, in
this environment American vita; interests
will be tnereasingly endangered, and the
Melted States will incur growing difficulties
in moving air and naval unite to the sites of
local clashes and crises that effete these in-
terests. This equation, in the official view,
raises the prospeet that, in the absence of a
new universal law of the sea treaty. the
United States Will have to choose between
acquiescing to increasing assertions by coast-
al States of jurisdictional rights that con-
strict American ocean mobility ant forcefully
contesting such assertions.
The resort to force is typically presented as
a prospect that points up the urgency of an
international law of the sea treaty, as though
force?at least when imposed by the strong
against the weak?sa ere either obsolete or too
terrible to contemplate. The generalization is
pertinent but overdrawn. Not than the com-
monly observed le hibitions of the most
powerful States against enforcing their will
on weaker States in the postwar internation-
al environment are any less compelling with
reapeet to the major maritime States pro-
testing their interests on the ?cater'. But tire
eataggerate these inhibitions if we do not
recognize their contingent nature That is to
say, the great powers' constraint in enforc-
ing their interests against the developing
countries depends on a calculus of material
(and, one can argue, long-run pol tical) gain
and political loss that may change with
changing cenditions.
Thus, the political costs of the United
States forcibly protecting American tuna
fishers against the claims of sovereignty by
Peru always seemed excessive compared to
what could be gained by such drastic meas.
urea and what would be lost without them.
But it is misleading to infer from this situ-
ation that the United States would be equally
passive in the face of some threat to a more
serious economic interest or to a military
security interest. British resistance to Ice-
land's 50-Mile eXcluslve fishing-none claim,
which led to a number of clashes between Ice-
landic naval ships add British enitorts, dem-
onstrates considerable British self-restraint
but also shows?despite Britain's withdrawal
of its warships in pursuit of a settlement--
that a maritime State will not necessarily
passively accept the assertions ay a small
State of tf conflicting mean regime when im-
portant economic interests are at stake and
cannot be secured by other means (such as
by licensing arrangements, by trading mill.
tary or economic aid for non-enforcement, or
by gaining compensation for seize 1 ships).
Where military security is involved, more-
over, the maritime States have been bolder in
backing their inteiests than in fishing dis-
mites. The most frequent examples have oc -
cured in Intelligence gathering i Taus, despite
North Vietnam's claimed 12-Milo boundary,
the United States acknowledged that the U.S.
destroyer Maddox was only 11 miles off North
Vietnam shortly before the first Gulf of
Tonkin incident. The United States has not
been reluctant to fly aerial intelligence mis-
sions that contravene unaccepted jurisdic-
tional claims over coastel waters.
Since World War II there have been sev-
eral cases (excluding fishing-rights inter-
ventions and Cold War crises) in which mari-
time powers have exercised their naval
superiority to support their definition of
freedom of the seas. In July, 1951, when an
Egyptian corvette intercepted and damaged
a British nierchantman in the Gulf of Aqaba
during an attempted blockade of Israel, a
British destroyer flotilla, was deployed to the
Red Sea. 'Iwo weeks later Britain and Egypt
reached an agreement on procedures for Brit-
ish shipping in the Gulf. In February, 1957,
American destroyers patrolled the Straits of
Tiran and the Gulf ct Aqaba to prevent
Egyptian interference with American mer-
chant shipping enrol:de to Israel. On Decem-
ber 13, 11,57, President Sukarno's govern-
ment enunciated Indonesia's archipelago
doctrine. Less than a month later, Destroyer
Division 31 passed through the Lombok and
Makassar Straits to reaffirm the U.S. right of
innocent passage. On July 21, 1961, follow-
ing a bombardment by French naval air-
craft, a French cruiser-destroyer group
forced the entrance to the Lake of Bizerte
to lift a Tunisian blockade of the naval base
and re-establish French control, Following
Egyptian closing of the Straits of Tiran in
May, 1967, the Sixth Fleet concentrated in
the Eastern Mediterranean while the Ad-
miralty announced that the carrier HMS Vic-
torious and other units were being kept in
the Mediterranean "in readiness against any
eventuality," although the threat was not
carried further. On April 22, 1969, Iranian
warships escorted an Iranian merchant ship
from lehorrasmehahr (at the junction of the
Tigris and Karun rivers just Inside the Iran-
ian border) to the Persian Gulf in defiance
of Iraqi threats. Apparently a similar inci-
dent had occurred in 1061 in which Iran was
forced to yield for lack of naval 'forces.
On other occasions maritime powers have
simply ignored or rejected coastal State
claims against their activities. Thus the PRC
Chinese routinely challenge U.S. vessels in
the Lema Channel en route to Hong Kong,
and the U.S. vessels routinely disregard these
challenges. France enforces restricted zones
around its nuctear testing site at Mururoa
asoll, despite national protests. During the
Algerian War, France undertook to visit and
search the flagships of more than a dozen
States, on some occasions as far away as the
English Channel.
Thus, if the jurisdictional claims of coastal
States were to jeopardize American economic
or security interests in the Third World, the
United States would not necessarily be de-
terred by immediate politica/ costs from sup-
porting its ocean interests with force, par-
ticularly if the clash of interests occurred
out of the context of U.S-Soviet competi-
tion, which is increasingly likely to be the
case. If such clashes were to become con-
tagious, as regular features of the interna-
tional environment within which the mari-
time powers have to operate, one can even
Imagine some of these powers at least tacitly
cooperating to enforce their conception of
freedom of navigation. Then new laws of the
sea would eventually be defined, over time,
by the kind of military and diplomatic proc-
ess that created the traditional laws, with
test encounters playing a determining role.
This is neither a desirable nor the most
likely prospect, however. Coastal States or
the maritime powers are not likely to be so
intractable in the pursuit of conflicting in-
terests at the expense of their parallel and
common interests in maintaining the flow of
commerce. Nor are the interests of coastal or
maritime States likely to be so cohesive and
single-minded as this prospect presupposes.
Nevertheless, the prospect does adumbrate a
plausible upper limit of conflict, the antici-
pation of which may tend to keep the politi-
cal process of customary and formal law-
making within moderate bounds. Within
these bounds the protection of American
security interests in the ocean will depend,
in the first instance, on the configuration
of political interests and military power
among indigenous States , hat are in a posi-
tion to affect vital "inlet Man military and
resource interests; secondly, on the balance
of U.S.-Soviet interests tied influence as it
affects the actions of these States; thirdly,
upon the perceived and actual disposition of
the United States to back its ocean interests
with force; and, only in this total context,
on the process of asserting, contesting, ac-
commodating, and negotiating the modali-
ties of the rights of navimation through and
over offshore waters and It straits.
Indeed, whether or not a satisfactory law
of the sea treaty is obtained, the United
States, consistent with tee current realities
of international politics RS well as with the
revised view of American power and interests
underlying the Nixon doctrine, must depend
more and more on the tworable configura-
tion of interests arid power among local
States rather than on direct American in-
tervention, by armed fore or otherwise, to
protect its security :tram eats in the use of
ocean space. Insofar as the United States can
affect such configurations at all, it must de-
pend primarily on skill and tact in playing
the politics of trade anci investment, eco-
nomic and military assietance, and tradi-
tional diplomacy in its dealings with the
major oil-producing States and the States
astride commercially a i.d militarily key
straits.
7. TAIPLICATIONS FOR PH, LAW OF THE SEA
TREATT
From the standpoint of American security
interests what conclusion,- can one draw from
this analysis about the dmirability and feasi-
bility of resolving by means of the projected
law of the sea treaty the various jurisdic-
tional issues?present mid potential?con-
cerning the use of the ocean? Although
American law of the sea officials have scarcely
bothered to justify this comprehensive ap-
proach except in the most general terms, they
are moved, one can infer, by several osten-
sible advantages of this approach as com-
pared to reliance on exist, rig laws and modus
vivendi, on separating navigational from
other issues for settlement, or on seeking bi-
lateral or regional treatici and arrangements.
One such advantage is the practical one of
uniformity. The point made by American
ocean officials is that it would be excessively
time-consuming, inconvet dent, and disorder-
ly to make differing ad hoc arrangements
with all the littoral States involved. This
point is compelling as it applies to -jurisdic-
tional zones and other ocean issues affecting
commercial activities?e hether fishing pe-
troleum and mineral exploration and exploi-
tation, or merchant shipp:ng. Having to adapt
these activities to a diversity of local claims,
regulations, and laws could pose such prac-
tical difficulties and contradictions as to im-
pede commerce while leaving unresolved
many sources of internal tonal litigation and
conflict. If, for example. littoral States con-
tinue to impose an inereasing number of
more stringent requirements on the type and
construction of merchant ships, on insur-
ance, and on navigational taxes and tolls for
ehipping, the resulting chaos of claims and
arrangements could be worse than incon-
venient.
This kind of disad.vani age, however, is not
nearly so serious as it applies to naval and air
navigation for security purposes, since, if the
forgoing analysis is correct, the critical prob-
lems of navigation and other military uses of
the ocean are neither so numerous and
diverse nor so intractable to special arrange-
ments as to he beyond satisfactory resolution
on an ad hoc basis, if necessary.
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Of course, as U.S. representatives now em-
phasize, if a universal law of the sea treaty
incorporating free transit could be obtained,
it would be advantageous not only to Ameri-
can military mobility but also to merchant
shipping, in which national commercial and
security interests now merge. But even so,
agreement on free transit would not obviate
the need for special international agreements
applicable to merchant shipping. Hence, the
U.S. government has (a) stressed that the
"free" in "free transit" applies only to un-
restricted passage through international
straits rather than Oa the whole range of ac-
tivities permitted on the high seas and (b)
expressly stated that the problems of navi-
gational safety and pollution risks in inter-
naticknal straits should be resolved by sep-
arate international agreements and orga-
nizations.31
If the right of transit must be qualified,
In any case, by recognition of the legitimate
concerns of littoral States about the hazards
of merchant shipping off their shores and
in adjacent straits, it may be unwise to fuse
the protection of this right with the right
of submarines to go through straits sub-
merged and unannounced. It may also be
unwise to insist on the strict meaning of
"free transit" if the substance of the right
can be as readily protected in practice?and
with less arousal pf the political sensitivities
of post-colonial State,s?under the rubric of
"innocent" or "unimpeded."
A seccind ostenslble,advantage to the com-
prehensive treaty approach to ocean law-
making is that the United States would gain
a bargaining advantage by intermixing the
free-transit straits provision with resource
provisions, such as 200-mile resource zones
and revenue sharing, which are intended to
give coastal States otberwise opposed or in-
different to free transit an incentive to make
concessions to U.S. s,ecurity interests. The
Only trouble with this argument is that, in
practice, the strategy may not work. Indeed,
it may work Just the other way, if coastal
States, observing the great importance that
the United States attaches to free transit,
calculate that they can extract concessions
On their control 9f resource zones and the
his as tbe,price of accommodating maritime
- interests. It remains tO be seen which, if
either, of these bargaining strategies works
better. But so far, judging from the conces-
sions to coastal State control of resource
zones that the United States has already
made, the advantage seems to lie with the
coastal States. Even where these States (as
in Latin America) have evidently made con-
cessions to the TJ. position on free naviga-
tion, they have done so, in accordance with
the Latin doctrine of "patrimonial seas," at
the price of American abandonment of re-
strictions on exclusive resource zones (other
than restrictions of dubious political feasi-
bility, such as compulsory dispute settlement
and security of investments).
A third reason for the comprehensive ap-
proach is the alleged political advantage to
seeking a legal resolution of conflicting in-
terests in the context of a treaty applicable
to all States rather than to a few.
One supposition underlying this point
seems to be that weaker States will find this
general multilateral context less invidious
and less damaging to their national pride
than entering into bilateral or regional ar-
rangements with the United States, and that
therefore they will find It easier to be accom-
modating. The smaller States can explain
their accommodations as concessions to the
general international geluratuaity in which
tu all parttctpate. Tile United States can
avoidlhe stigma of hegemony and limit the
price for compliance the smaller States may
exact.
A related supposition may be that in try-
ing to reach bilateral or regional deals the
Footnotes at end of article,
United States must suffer the political em-
barrassment, as well as the tactical disad-
vantage, of having to satisfy the special in-
terests of weaker States; whereas the United
States is less vulnerable to such pressure for
concessions, and concessions made to one
country or regional grouping are less apt to
embarrass the United States in dealing with
others, if it can generalize its positions and
its modes of influence in the huge multilat-
eral forums of the United Nations.
These kinds of political considerations are,
of course, valid in some cases of diplomacy;
but since they are not valid a priori and in
all circumstances, only an exploration of the
comprehensive approach and its alternatives
could indicate whether it applies to the di-
plomacy intended to protect U.S. ocean secu-
rity interests. Here the evidence is quite in-
complete and will probably remain so. So
far, the requisite number of key coastal
States have been reluctant to concede free
transit in return for international controls
against accidents and pollution, but the
United States has nevertheless managed to
protect its essential security interests. On
the other hand, there is no reason to think
that the United Sates would come any closer
to gaining acceptance of its position through
bilateral or regional deals.
Therefore, it would seem that the case for
including the provisions of special security
concern in a law of the sea treaty depends
much less, if at all, on the alleged advantage
of comprehensiveness and universality than
on the feasibility of persuading a large num-
ber of States, including the key straits
States, to accept particular provisions like
free transit as consistent with their basic in-
terests and sovereignty, no matter what the
negotiating format may be. If the requisite
States agree to free transit, it will not be
because of any advantages of political ac-
commodation and bargaining power inherent
in the negotiating forum but because of the
particular balance of interests that emerges
in the total context of their relations with
the United States and other maritime States.
If they regard free transit as inconsistent
with their interests, for whatever subjective
or objective reasons, the United States would
be ill-advised to make agreement on free
transit the condition of accepting a treaty
that might resolve the jurisdictional issues
pertaining to merchant shipping and com-
mercial activity, where the case for uniform-
ity and universality is compelling. American
security interests will suffer far more from
an international environment in which unre-
solved jurisdictional issues concerning re-
source and anti-pollution zones engender
chronic conflicts and in which coastal States
impose a variety of regulations and restric-
tions on commercial shipping than from in-
ternational agreements on something less
than free transit through international
straits or, for that matter, from no additional
formal agreements on straits at all.
At this point, before the projected inter-
national conference on the law of the sea
convenes, American representatives stoutly
insist that in the end, when all the rhetoric
and bargaining are over and a treaty is up
for final negotiation, the coastal States will
generally accept free transit, because it is
not contrary to their national interests and,
in the case of a few countries with maritime
interests, is a positive advantage. Although
this estimate is shared by few close observers
of international ocean parlays outside the
government and is doubted by some im-
portant individuals and agencies inside the
government, it may turn out to be correct if
the United States makes concessions to the
pride and interests of enough developing
countries. If official optimism about the
prospect of achieving free transit is un-
warranted, however, or if the price is ex-
orbitant, not only U.S. security interests but
the whole range of U.S. ocean interests would
be best served by confining the law of the
E6727
sea treaty's concern with passage through
international straits to general principles of
mutual maritime and coastal State interest,
leaving the precise condition of transit
legally ambiguous. If these conditions need
to be made more precise?which is question-
able?the United States can afford to delay
the formulation of them until some further
accommodation of the various interests of
the United States and the key straits States
crystallizes outside the tense environment
of a huge international conference. Indeed,
this may be the only course it can afford.
In any event, the best alternative to protect-
ing U.S. security interests in a comprehen-
sive international treaty is probably not seek-
ing protection through bilateral or regional
treaties (where the political effort and cost
promise no greater returns) but simply
through modus vivendi under existing law,
leavened by international agreements that
meet the legitimate concern of littoral States
to have a fair share of control, along with
the great maritime users, over the increas-
ingly congested commercial ocean lanes.
The disadvantage of this policy has been
exaggerated by implicit acceptance of the
unexplained assumption in the official policy
that there is some great advantage to getting
many countries to sign an international
treaty embodying free transit (assuming that
they will), although a few straits States re-
fuse to sign it (as even U.S. ocean officials
consider likely). On the face of it, the most
important objective of a treaty provision on
free transit is to gain full legal recognition
of the principle of unimpeded passage
through straits from the few States?for mili-
tary purposes, perhaps only Spain and In-
donesia?that might seriously endanger
American security interests by impeding pas-
sage. If the U.S. position is not based on the
supposition that the key straits States will
subordinate their special interests, as they
see them, to "world opinion", either by join-
ing the multitude of signatories or by relin-
quishing their claims in practice?and this
would be a most unrealistic supposition?it
must be based on the calculation that in the
event of a show-down, the United States will
be in a better position physically to resist as-
sertions of control by these States, forcibly
if necessary, if it can bolster its resistance
with the sanction of a nearly universal treaty.
There may be an element of truth in this
calculation insofar as it applies to the moral
courage of American statesmen; but it seems
naive as it applies to the efficacy of an in-
ternational treaty in either marshalling the
support of coastal State signatories or gain-
ing the compliance of non-signatories.
Nonetheless, one could view this hypotheti-
cal assumption about the psychological and
political efficacy of an international treaty
more hopefully if there were more reason
to share the official U.S. confidence in the
eventual "rationality" of a large block of
coastal and less developed countries that
now seem reluctant to grant free transit.
Against this hopeful prospect one must
weigh the danger that the United States
will only aggravate the problem of reconcil-
ing its interests in unemcumbered naviga-
tion with the interests and pride of a large
number of coastal States in controlling the
use of "their" waters if it insists on obtain-
ing the maximum guarantees for its inter-
ests through international law. By elevating
what must in essence be a set of political
accommodations between the interests of the
great maritime States and many coastal
States into a matter of legal rights and na-
tional sovereignty, the United States may
only polarize the issues. On the other hand,
by asking for less in law, it may get more
protection for its interests in fact. For on
the practical basis of day-to-day dealings,
as opposed to the rhetoric of public inter-
national discourse, most coastal States, in-
cluding the key ones, are not necessarily
opposed to granting in practice what they
?
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E 6728 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks Noveini.ey 20, 19:4,
May refuse to accept es legal prinelple. And
in all anent:Sphere in which the less devel-
oped coastal States do not see themselves
as confronting the great maritime States in
a contest of power, a contest, in which they
must rely on their superior voting strength
In the U.N., a number of these weaker States
whose ,shipping can he hampered be re-
gional rivals may (ohm to the eonclusion
that they have at least as Much interest as
the developed states in unencumbered navi-
gation.
In this "era of negotiation" and of Attleri-
Can "retrenchment without disengagement"
it behooves the United State to deal with
all States?bnt particularly with the sensi-
tive developing Saves of the Third World,
who are undergoing a much-needed redefi-
nition of their interest; on a more tangible
and less romantic basir.--on terms of nrac-
tical mutual benefit and -respect, as free
as possible from ideologicaI and nationalis-
tic preoccupations. There are critical limits
to which the United Si ates can i isist upon
codifying in the universal: writ cf interna-
tional law the protection of intereete that
are primarily the concern of a few great
maritime States without jeopardizing both
legal progress and the pelitical accommoda-
tions on which such progress most rest.
rocieseteres
* Dean, the John': Hopkins School of Ad-
vanced International Studies, Wash' .ngi iton,
D.C., and Director, Johns Hopkins Ocean
Policy Project. The research on this article
was Made possible by a grant from. the Na-
tional Science Foundation,
Ocean Development. and International Law
Journal, Volume 2, Number 1. Copyright 1974
by Cranes Russak & Company, Inc.
1 In this piece I have relied entirely on
Unclassified material. Therefore. I cannot
vouch for the acdaraey of the technical data
that does not come from official published
sources. Since it would be tedious and cum-
bersome, I have not cited a source for every
piece of data. Asids from the great abun-
dance of sueh unofficial data in the daily and
the technical periodical press, I have relied
on a number of special publicatio as. such as
the annual SIPE! Yearbook of World Arma-
ments, publishd by the Stockholm Interna-
tional Peace Research Institute; Jane's
Fight0iii nips 1977,-74 and Jane's Weapons
Systems 1972-73; and the annual Minfary
Balance, published by the Intern vtional
Iii-
stitute of Strategic Studies.
s I assume that in a general war the peace-
time regimes goverr lug the use of the oceans
would be irrelevane, whereas in a was' sig-
nificantly limited geographically and in
other respects these regimes might be ob-
served to some extent.
See America and the Wor/d, iTol. H: Rob-
ert E. Osgood and others, Reireal from Ein-
pire? The First Nixon Administration (John's
Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 1973), Chap ter 1.
On this question, see the somewhat op-
posing Views of Mare Brandon and David
Schtienbauni in "Jordan: the Forgotten
Crisis," Foreign Policy (Spring, 1973;,, pp,
157-81.
s In 1973 more than one-third cf American
oil consumption ranee from abroad and
about 10 per cent from the Middle East. As-
sundae the same rate of increase in U.S. de-
mand, and no imposition of import restric-
tions, dependence on foreign oil is generally
expected to increase to 50 percent of Amer-
ican consuMption and dependence on the
Middle East to 50 per cent of foreign import";
in the next five to ten years, before alterna-
tive sources of oil and energy could theoreti-
cally alleviate this dependence Ir 1973 how-
ever, only Ktrivatt rind Saudi erabta had
enough foreign exchange reserves to be able
to shut down production for a long period.
sThe most intensive rivals in the Gulf are
Iran and Iraq. Iran, having undertaken
substantial military buildup wit h American
as, istance, has become militarily dominant in
the Gulf and shows signs of seeking to be-
come an Indian Ocean power. !easels engaged
its a border dispute with Kuwait. Saudi
Arabia, although not aligned with either
Tran or Iraq, and in the long run perhaps a
:natural opponent of the former, tangibly
shares the interest of Trail and the sheik-
doms in opposing Soviet-supported South
Yemen and the radical contenders for power
Its Oman and se:sea-here, although it now
seems in no danger from radical forces. Like
Iron, Saudi Arabia receives American mili-
tary assistance. Pakistan has strengthened its
alignment with Iran and has provided mili-
tary advisors to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Muscat,
end Oman. India, emissions of its depend-
ence on Gulf oil and irritated by Iran's ties
with Pakistan, has en [tired into economic
and scientific cooperation with Iraq. This
pattern of relations is criss-crossed by terri-
'tonal disputes arid dynast a rivalries among
the Arab Gulf kingdoms and by rivalry be-
tween them arid Iran on religious and other
grounds. It is linked to the Arab-Israel dis-
pute by Israel's close relations with Iran, as
well as by Israel's materiel dependence on
the United States.
Plausible. though milikely, scenarios for
such an eventuality might include, for ex-
ample, an American naval deployment and
possible air action to deter Soviet interven-
tion and support friendly regimes against
Soviet-supported countries and guerillas in
the event of Iranian military action against
radical take-overs in the sheikdoms or Sal tdi
Arabia, possibly' accompanied by a Saudi ap-
pt al for American support against radicals
who were threatening to disrupt supply of
oil to the United States. American armed in-
tervention against an anti-Israeli closure of
production by Saudi Arabia seems less likely
eecept in the context of countering Soviet
i utervention.
See, for example, Tem Engelhardt, 'The
New-Half-Nelson," Far Eastern Economic Bo-
lded', April 9, 1973, pp. 2511., and Cecil Brown-
lee'', "Shift Forced in Military Priorities,"
Aviation Week, :February 26, 1973, pp. 3-F If.
9A balanced assessment of the prospect of
crises and conflicts arising from Middle Fent-
ern oil polities sand affecting U.S. energy in-
terests appears in Robert E. Hunter, The En-
ergy "Crisis- and U.S. Foreign Policy, Head-
line Series, No. 216, June, 1973. On Soviet
naval power and policy, see Geoffrey Jukes,
The Ocean in Soviet Nasal Policy, Adelphi
Papers, No. 87 (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, May, 1972), and Barry M.
Biechman, The Changing Soviet Navy
(Washington: Brookings institution, 1973).
"The opportunities and incentives for de-
veloping countries to threaten U.S. invest-
ments, monetary intereets, and access to nat-
ural resources as levers for political pressure
and harassment, are examined by Fred Beteg-
sten in "The Threat from the Third World,"
Foreign Policy, (Summer, 1973), pp. 102-24.
'According to the 1958 Law of the Sea
Convention, submarines passing through in-
ternational straits "are required to navigate
on the surface, and to show their flag". This ?
n aunt be tantamount to advance notifica-
tion. The offlisiel U.S. interpretation of in-
nocent passage (in line with the Interna-
tional Court of Justice's report in the 1949
Corfu Channel case that "State in time of
peace have a right to send their warships
through straits or seas without the previous
authorization of a ccalsthl State, provided
that the passage is innocent"), does not con-
cede that advance notice ,ef passage through
territorial waters is reestartel. Advance no-
tice of transit through :straits, the U.S. holds,
would rurs the risk of leading to coastal-
State control of tear sit. In practice, the
United States evidently provides advance
notice of surface ships but not submarines
(efecept, perhaps, where secret bilateral ar-
rangements have been agreed).
" The chart, entitled "World Straits Af-
fected by a 12-Mile Territorial Sea", cap-
italizes 16 straits as "nemor". Of these 16
I have substituted Net; ed y -Robeson for
Juan de Fuca,
One of the more strikilig manifestations
of the military establishment's tendency to
leave nothing to chance, (ince committed to
translate military interest:: into law, is the
Defense Department's; el) -.',illingness to de-
pead upon allied permission, as opposed to
legal right, for passage through straits. But
unless the U.S. Navy plane on enforcing free
transit against its allies, ilie codification of
free transit in international law would seem
to add nothing to U.S. naval mobility in the
improbable event that tee allies were un-
willing to grant submerge passage.
Conceivably, the consultation clause in
the Security Treaty with Japan might be
interpreted to require speetial permission for
passage of something as conspicuous as a
task force--in which case the Japanese gov-
ernment might be reluctstat to risk political
opposition by granting permission. But it
seems unlikely that the present Japanese
government would be similarly constrained
from granting occasional submerged passage,
unless its growing concern over Soviet mili-
tary passage impelled it im apply equal re-
strictions to American ships. In that ease,
however, it would also oppose an interna-
tional free transit agreement.
is According to one interpretation, how-
ever, a strait, in which. 12-mile territorial
boundaries come to two miles apart will be
considered as falling within territoral waters.
"Significantly, the Japanese government,
while agreeing with the general principle of
finee transit, has been reluctant to relin-
quish control of Sovet military passage
through the Straits of Tsushima and Tsugaru
(between Hokkaido and Lions:Mu) under the
anticipated 12-mile boundary.
'In December, 1957, the Indonesian gov-
ernment declared that "ail waters surround-
ing, between, and linking the islands belong-
ing to the State of Indonesia . . . canstitute
natural parts of inland or national waters
under the absolute Jurisdiction of the State
of Indonesia. . . . The 12 miles of territorial
waters are measured from the line connect-
ing the promontory point, of the islands of
the Indonesian State.." Embassy of Indonesia,
Report on Indonesia (Witehington. D.C.: No-
vember-December, 1957, January, 1958). Vol.
8, number 7.
n Captain Edward F. Oliver. "Malacca: Dire
Straits," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
(June, 1973) , p. 29.
is The U.S. government officially denies that
It has any agreement with any country to
provide advance notice of the passage of war-
ships through international straits.
Hydrophone arrays towed by surface
ships can be almost as eifective as implanted
systems, but the cost is much greater. More-
over, it is unlikely that towed arrays could
avoid extended territorial seas off straits any
better than implanted arrays. It is techni-
cally possible to deploy implanted arrays at
great distances from shore stations, but the
need for amplifiers and tbe problem of breaks
and maintenance make this option unattrac-
tive.
2, Thus Secretary of Defense Laird stated
on February 20, 1970, "according to our best
estimates, we believe that our Polaris and
Poseidon submaries at e.t.a can be considered
virtually invulnerable today. With a highly
concentrated effort, the Soviet Navy might be
able to localize and destroy at sea one or
two Polaris submarines. But the massive and
expensive undertaking that would be re-
quired to extend such a capability using cur-
rently known techniques would take time
and would certainly be evident." He added,
however. "A combination of technological
developments and the detision by the Soviets
to undertake a world-wide ASW effort might
result in some increased degree of Polaris/
Poseidon vulnerability beyond the mid-
1970's. But, as a defense planner, I would
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ifoventber 20, 1974, CONOR.ESSIQINAL RCORD?Extensions
never guarantee the invulnerability of any
strategic system beyond. the reasonably fore-
seeable future, say 5-7 years." Statement be-
fore joint session of Senate Armed Services
and Appropriations Committee, cited in
SIPR1 Yearbook o/ Work! Armaments and
Disarmament, 1970-71, p. 122.
gg Testimony on April 10, 1973, before the
Subcommittee on International Organiza-
tions and Movements, House Committee on
Foreign Affairs,. 92nd Con., 2nd Sess., p. 12.
Stevenson and Jared Carter, of the Dept. of
Defense, substantiated the risk by citing
Egypt's denial as passage to a commercial ves-
sel in the straits leading to the Gulf of Aqaba
before the June, 1967, Arab-Israeli war on the
grounds that the.cargo bound to Israel was
not innocent, (Egypt, however, based its con-
tention