EXTENDING JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES OVER CERTAIN OCEAN AREAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000500410004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 285
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 11, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN

1-1 I t-
APPRIVEgiffitasEffiSlifeliNclellElfillITO?111111?4-2
OVER CERTAIN OCEAN AREAS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. 1988
A BILL TO EXTEND ON AN INTERIM BASIS THE JURIS-
DICTION OF THE UNITED STATES OVER CERTAIN OCEAN
AREAS AND FISH IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE DOMESTIC
FISHING INDUSTRY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
OCTOBER 8, 9, AND 11, 1974
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-251 0 WASHINGTON : 1974
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COMMITTEE ON
JOHN C. STENNIS,
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada
THOMAS J. MeINTYRE, New Hampshire
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., Virginia
HAROLD E. HUGHES; Iowa
SAM NUNN, Georgia
ARMED SERVICES
Mississippi, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
JOHN TOWER, Texas
PETER H. DOMINICK, Colorado
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
WILLIAM SAXBE, Ohio
WILLIAM L. SCOTT, Virginia
T. EDWARD BRASWELL, Jr., Chief Counse/ and Staff Director
JOHN T. TICER, Chief Clerk
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CONTENTS
WITNESSES
Page
Gen. George S. Brown, U.S. Air Force, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff__ 35
Rear Adm. Max K. Morris, U.S. Navy, Joint Chiefs Representative to the
Law of the Sea Conference 35
John Norton Moore, Chairman, The National Security Council Interagency
Task Force on the Law of the Sea, and Deputy Special Representative
of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference 39
Hon. Warren G. Magnuson, U.S. Senator from Washington 73
Hon. Edmund S. Muskie, U.S. Senator from Maine 81
Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from Alaska 91
Lester B. Orcutt, Maine Fishermen's Cooperative Association, Biddeford
Pool, Maine _,. 112
Leonard Roche, Boatowners United, New Bedford, Mass 113
Bill Mustard, National Federation of Fishermen, Washington, D.0 138
William Utz, National Chrimp Congress, Washington, D.0 188
August Felando, American Tunaboat Association, San Diego, Calif 200
Walter Yonker, Association of Pacific Fisheries, Seattle, Wash 225
Charles Carry, Tuna Research Foundation, Terminal Island, Calif 229
Christopher M. Weld, representing the National Coalition of Marine Con-
servation, Inc 238
Robert Walker, Save Our Seas, Washington, D.0 244
(ITT)
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EXTENDING JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OVER CERTAIN OCEAN AREAS
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1974
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
ashington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice at 10:05 a.m., in room 21.2,
Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis,
chairman.
Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), McIntyre, Byrd, Jr., of Vir-
ginia, Nunn, Thurmond, and Taft.
Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff
director; John Ticer, chief clerk; Charles J. Conneely, John A. Gold-
smith, Edward B. Kenny, Robert Q. Old, professional staff members;
W. Clark McFadden II, counsel; Phyllis A. Bacon, assistant chief
clerk; and Christine E. Cowart, clerical assistant.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
The committee meets today to consider the Emergency Marine
Fisheries Protection Act of 1974. We are pleased to have with us this
morning as witnesses, Gen. George S. Brown, chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff and Mr. John Norton Moore, chairman, National Security
Council Interagency?Task Force on the Law of the Sea, Department
of State. In addition, we hope to be able to hear from Senator Magnu-
son later this morning.
This bill was exhaustively studied by the Commerce Committee,
under the leadership of Senator Magnuson, and after full hearings
was favorably reported with amendments on August 8, 1974.
The bill was then referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
which also held hearings. Indeed, Mr. Moore who is with us this morn-
ing testified in those hearings. On September 23, 1974, the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee reported out the bill unfavorably.
On September 30, 1974, the bill was referred by unanimous consent
to the Committee on Armed Services with instructions to report back
not later than November 15, 1974. Because of the impending congres-
sional recess, the committee is trying to expedite these hearings as
efficiently as possible to meet the November 15 deadline.
In its present form the bill would establish a contiguous fishery zone
of the United States to an outward boundary of 200 miles from the
baseline of the territorial sea of the United States. Within this zone
the United States would manage and conserve all fish with the excep-
tion of certain highly migratory species.
(1)
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Most importantly, the bill would grant preferential fishing rights
to the United States and at the same time exclude foreign fishing ves-
sels unless they are specifically authorized to fish within the 200 miles
and have paid a reasonable fee to the United. States. Criminal sanc-
tions accompany the prohibition against unauthorized foreign fishing
and the -U.S. Coast Guard is directed to enforce the regulations issued
under the bill.
It is the purpose of this committee to consider the national security
implications of this bill. We are especially interested in what effect this
bill may have on our military flexibility. Similarly, we would like to
explore the nalional security problems that may arise in attempting to
enforce such legislation. In asking you to concentrate on the national
security aspects of this bill, however, I would not intend to arbitrarily
restrict you from discussing other aspects of this bill which you deem
significant.
This bill ha:3 been sponsored by 22 Senators. It is designed to pro-
tect the domestic fishing industry as well as conserve a valuable na-
tional resource. Given the domestic importance of this legislation, it
is imperative that we fully and carefully define its impact on national
security.
[S. 1988 foLows.]
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? 9,3D CONGRESS
2D SESSION
S. 1988
[Report No. 93-10791
[Report No. 93-1166]
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
? JUNE 13,1973
Mr. MAGNUSON (for himself, Mr. COTTON, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. JACKSON, Mr.
PASTORE, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. BEALL, Mr. BIBLE, Mr. BUCKLEY, Mr. HUGHES,
Mr. MCINTYRE, Mr. RIBICOFF, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. LONG, Mr.
STEVENS, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. HELMS, Mr. PACKWOOD, Mr. GRAVEL, Mr. TOWER,
and Mr. GURNEY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Commerce
AUGUST 8,1974
Reported by Mr. MAGNUSON, with amendments
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part prbated In Italie]
AUGUST 8, 1974
Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations for not to exceed twenty-one
days
SEPTEMBER 23, 1974
Reported by Mr. FULBRIGHT, unfavorably, without amendment
SEPTEMBER 30,1974
Referred to the Committee on Armed Services, by unanimous consent, with
instructions to report back not later than November 15, 1974
A BILL
To extend on an interim basis the jurisdiction of the United
States over certain ocean areas and fish in order to protect
the domestic fishing industry, and for other purposes.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That this Act natty be eked as the "Interim Fisheries gene
4 Extension and Management Aet of 1973".
5 FINDINGS Anti-B EVEATEMEN(2 OP PURPOSE}
6 SEC. 25 The Gengrees finds
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-(4-)- that valuable eeastal and anadreineus species
2 of fish and marine life off the shores of the United States
3 awe in danger of being seriously depleted, and in some
4 eases-,- of becoming extinct-1
5 (2) that stocks of coastal and anadromous speeies
6 within the juinc mile eentiguetts zone and three mile ter
7 riterig sea of the tinited Wates are being seriously de-
8 13kt-eel lte foreign fishing efforts beyond the existing
9 twelve mile fisheries Rene near the eeastlitte of the
10 taiited Sate;
11 (3) that international fleget-4401+S have se far
12 proved ineapalale of obtaining timely agreement an the
13 protection and conservation of threatened species of fish
14 and marine life;
15 444- that there is further danger of irreversible do-
16 pletion before efforts to aehieve an international agree
17 ft lent on jurisdiction aver eoaetal and ftliftdrefliettS fish
18 eries, result in an operative agreement; and
19 , (5) that it is therefore necessary for the United
20 states to take interim fbetkoff to protect and conserve
21 over-fished stocks and to protect Off demes.tie fishing
22 industry:
23 It is the purpose of this Act, as an interim
24 to extend the contiguous fisheries zone of the United States
25 andEt'Attift. authority ever afifbdfelffleitS fish of the United.
26 States in order to provide proper eonsetion management
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1 for sash -zone and fish and to prate-et the domestic fishing ill-
2 ditstry until general agreement is reaelied in international
3 Rego, tiations of lttw of the sea with respeet to the size of sank
4 zones and authority over sash fishy and until an effective in-
5 ternational regulatory regime comes into full foree and effect.
6 EXTENSION' or CONTIOTTOUS FICIIEM110 ZONE
7 Srte, & Section of the Act entitled ilAn A-et to establish
8 a ematigamis fishery zone beyond the territorial sea of the
9 United States;!. approved October 447 4406 -(80 Stat7 908),
10 is amended by striking "nine nautical miles from the nearest
11 point in the inner boundary." and inserting in lieu thereof
12 Lone hundred and ninety seven miles from the nearest point
13 in the inner boundary."
14 EXTENSION OF JURISDICTION OVER ANADROMOUD FISH
15 80ci;? 4, (a) The United States hereby extends its juris
16 ilietion to its anadrommis fish wherever they may range in
17 the oceans to the same extent as the United States exercises
18 jurisilietion layer fish in its territorial waters and eontiguoiis
19 fisheries zone except that
20 (1) such extension of jurisdiction shall not extend to
21 the territorial waters or fishery zone of another eous4rys
22 and
23 (2) sixty days after written notice to the President
24 of the Senate and the Speaker of the Rouse of Repr-e-
25 sentatives of intent to do soi. the Seer-eta-Ey of the Treas
26 ury may authorize a vessel ether than a vessel of the
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Voited States to engage in fishing for suelt fish in areas
2 to which the Vnited States hio extended jurisdiction par--
3 SUftfib te, this seetion apon decrmining, after eonotiltatiort
4 3A-tist the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Cern-
5 mercc, that sada &hitt v, aid not result in depletion of
6 sath fish beyond the level EkeeeRiarf for proper e&Fkeer-Wlr
7 ti-ea purposes
8 -04 As used in this Act the term `Autadromoits fisi311
9 inean3 all living resottrees originating in inland waters of the
10 united States and migrating to and from waters outaide the
t territorial waiers and contiguous fisheries zone of the -United
12 States:
t3 12114343TION e PV-114,10S-Ef2, eiA-91, 13-Y TERA-TIFIEt
14 AND, *6-F6Etail&ENTE1
15 gE49:- 5,- The Secretary of State shall
16 (1) initiate negotiations as somi as possible with
17 sdt foreign gev-ertarkeitts whiali are engaged in; OE Whi61
18 have persons or earn:ponies engaged in commercial fisi3-
19 jag operations for fish protected by this Act, for the pun-
20 pose of entering into treaties Of agreements with %tett
71 countries to earry eat, the policies and provisions of this
22 A-etr;
23 (2) review and; if nee , initiate the amend-
24 melt of treaties-, eenvention* and agreements to whieh
25 the 'United States is a party in order to make suck
26 treaties, eenventions, and agreements eonsistent with
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1 the polieies and provisions of this Act;
2 (3) seek treaties or agreements with appropriate
3 contiguous foreign countries on the boundaries between
4 the waters adjacent to the United States and waters
5 adjacent to such foreign eettritries for the purpose of
6 rational utilization and conservation of the resources
7 eevered by this A-et and otherwise administering this
8 Act; and
9 (4) cock treaties Of agreements with appropriate
10 foreign countries to provide for the rational use and
11 conservation of
12 (a) eoftstal fish common both to waters over
13 which the United States has jurisdietion and to
14 waters over which stieli foreign countries have juris-
15 diction through measures which will make pmsihfe
16 development of the maximum yields from sueli
flsh-
17 (b) ffift-fifOfflatIS fish spending some part of
18 their life eyeles in waters over which such foreign
19 countries have jurisdiction through measures which
20 restrict high seas harvesting and make available to
21 the fishermen of sueli foreign countries an equitable
22 share of such anadromous fish which are found in
23 their territorial waters-;
24 (c) fish originating in the high seas through
25 strengthening existing or7 where needed; creating
26 Rew iittertattiotati eenservatiott erganizationsi and
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-4)- coastal Ash in waters over vidtioli other
2 eout1444e5 nave iarisrliction through measures which
:3 ttke possible the harvesting by United States gsli-
4 twinen of an appropriate share of such fish net being
5 harvested by the coastal country, under users- fees
6,. licences; and regilations iVbieh are rteftdiserhnifua
tory and nonpunitive and take thlited States -tradi-
8 tional fishing into tweennt,
9 friEbTrAlt CII
110 SEA* 4.- The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to pro-
11. mote the conserv-atiott of fi-sh originating in the United States
12 territorial c,ca and contiguous fisheries melte and anairomeas
i lish by carrying out such research, or providing financial.
14 assistanee to f31143-11-e or private agencies, institutions, Of per
15 sons to carry oat research, on nis be necessary,
lb RE (+FIAT IOW/
17 !if are are antliorimsil. to he promulgated such
1.8 regulations tts may be nceessapi- to, carry out the previsions
19 of this Act, but the sums appropriated for any fiscal year shall
20 not &weed .1-100030007
21 EFFECTIVE1 B*11333
22F4?287; '97 41e pre-v-isions of this Act shall heefitne effective
2:3 on the date of enactment of this 4et3. except that the provi
24 niens 04 seetious t anti 4 shall become effective after ninety
95 days ?ollowitc; such tiate 04 enacknent.
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1 TERMINATION DATE
2 SEev 10. This Act shall eeftse to he in effeet Off the date
3 the -1-ikw of the Sea Treaty or Treatio ne-w heinrg developed
4 regarding fisheries jttrisdietion and OORSeiwatioa shall enter
5 ifito fofee;
6 SHOT 44, Nothing contained in this Act shall be eon-
7 stated to abrogate any treaty Of convention be which the
8 United Statea is a party oft the date of the enactment of this
9 A-etT
10 That this Act may be cited as the "Emergency Marine
11 Fisheries Protection Act of 1974".
12 DECLARATION OF POLICY
13 SEC. 2. ( a) FINDINGS.?The Congress finds and
14 declares that-
15 (1) Valuable coastal and anadromous species of
16 fish off the shores of the United States are in danger of
17 being seriously depleted by excessive fishing effort.
18 (2) Stocks of coastal and anadromous species
19 which inhabit waters of the 3-mile territorial sea and
20 the existing 9-mile contiguous fishery zone of the United
21 States are being depleted by foreign fishing efforts out-
22 side the 12-mile combined zone in which the United
23 States presently possesses fishery management responsi-
24 bility and authority.
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(3) international negotiations have so far failed to
result in effective international agreements on the con-
7 servation and management of threatened stocks of Ash.
(4) There is danger that further depletion of these
Ihhery resources will occur before an effective general
international agreement on fishery jurisdiction can be
7 negotiated, signed, ratified, and implemented, unless
emergency action is taken pending such international
9 agreement.
10 (b) PURPOSES.?It is therefore declared to be the pur-
11 pose of the Congress in this Act?
(1) to take emergency action to protect and con-
se;we threatened stocks of fish by asserting fishery man-
14 agement responsibility and authority over fish in an
15 extended contiguous fishery zone and over certain species
It; of fish beyond such zone, until a general international
17 agreement on fishery jurisdiction comes into force or is
18 provisionally applied;
19 (2) to extend, as an emergency measure, the fishery
20 management responsibility and authority of the United
21 States to 200 nautical miles;
22 (3) to extend, as an emergency measure, fishery
23 management responsibility and authority of the United
24 Steles over anadromous species .of fish which spawn in.
25 and fresh or estuarine waters of the United States; and
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1 (4) to commit the Federal Government to act to
2 prevent further depletion, to restore depleted stocks, and
3 to protect and conserve fish to the full extent of such
4 emergency responsibility and authority, and to provide
5 for the identification, development, and implementation
6 within 2 years of the date of enactment of this Act of
7 the best practicable management system consistent with
8 the interests of the Nation, the several States, and of
9 other nations.
10 (c) POLICY is further declared to the policy of the
11 Congress in this Act-
12 (1) to maintain the existing territorial or other
13 ocean jurisdiction of the United States without change,
14 for all purposes other than the protection and conserva-
tion of certain species of fish and fish in certain ocean
16 areas pending international agreement on fishery
17 jurisdiction;
18 (2) to authorize no action, activity, or assertion of
19 jurisdiction in ? contravention of any existing treaty or
20 other international agreement to which the United States
21 is party other than that necessary to further the pur-
22 poses of this Act; and
?23 (3) to authorize no impediment to or interference
24 with the legal status of the high seas, except with re-
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i. spect to fishing to the extent necessary to implement
9 this Act.
3 DEFINITIONS
4 SEC. 3. As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise
5 requires?
(1) "an,adromous species" means those species of
7 fish which spawn in fresh or estuarine waters of the.
8 United States but which migrate to ocean waters;
9 (2) "citizen of the United States" means any person
10 who is a citizen of the United States by birth, by nat-
11 uralization or other legal judgment, or, with respect to
12 a corporation, partnership, or other association, by orga-
13 nization under and maintenance, after the date of en-
14 of this Act, in accordance with the laws
15 cf any State: Provided, That (A) the controlling
16 interest therein is owned or beneficially vested in indi-
17 viduals who are citizens of the United States; and (B)
18 the chairman, and not less than two-thirds of the mem-
19 berg, of the board of directors or other governing board
20 thereof are individuals who are citizens of the United
21 States;
22 (3) "coastal species" means all species of fish
23 which inhabit the waters off the coasts of the United
24 States, other than highly migratory and anadromous
95 species;
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1 (4) "contiguous fishery zone" means a zone con-
2 tiguous to the territorial sea of the United States within
3 which the United States exercises exclusive fishery
4 management and conservation authority;
5 (5) "controlling interest" means-(A) 75 percent
6 of the stock of any corporation, or other entity, is vested
7 in citizens of the United States free from any trust or
8 fiduciary obligation in favor of any person not a citizen
9 of the United States, (B) 75 percent of the voting
10 power in such corporation, or such other entity, is
11 vested in citizens of the United States, ( C ) no arrange-
12 ment or contract exists providing that more than 25
13 percent of the voting power in such corporation, or
14 such other entity, may be exercised in behalf of any
15 person who is not a citizen of the United States, and
16 (D) by no means whatsoever is control of any interest
17 in such corporation, or such other entity, conferred upon
18 or permitted to be exercised by any person who is not
19 a citizen of the United States;
20 (6) "fish" includes mollusks, crustaceans, marine
21 mammals (except the polar bear, walrus, and sea otter),
22 and all other forms of marine animal and plant life
23 (but not including birds), and the living resources of the
24 Continental Shelf as defined in the Act of May 20,
25 1964 (78 Stat. 196);
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1 (7) "fishing" means the catching, taking, harvest-
2 ing? or attempted catching, taking, or harvesting of any
3 species of fish for any purpose, and any activity at sea
4 in support of such actual or attempted catching, taking,
5 or harvesting;
6 (8) "fishing vessel" means any vessel, boat, ship,
7 contrivance, or other craft which is used for, equipped
8 to be used for, or a type which is normally used for,
9 fisting;
10 (9) "fishing-support vessel" means any vessel, boat,
11 ship, contrivance, or other craft which is used for,
12 equipped to be used for, or of a type which is normally
13 used for, aiding or assisting one or more fishing vessels
14 at sea in the performance of any support activity, in-
15 eluding, but not limited to, supply, storage, refrigeration,
16 or processing;
17 (10) "highly migratory species" means those spe-
18 cies of fish which spawn and migrate during their life
19 cycf,e in waters of the open ocean, including, but not
20 limited to, tuna;
21 (11) "optimum sustainable, yield" refers to the larg-
22 est economic return consistent with the biological ca-
23 pabilities of the stock, as determined on the basis of all
24 relevant economic, biological, and environmental factors;
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1 (12) "person" includes any government or entity
2 thereof ( and a citizen of any foreign nation) ;
3 (13) "Secretary" means the Secretary of Com-
4 merce, or his delegate;
5 7/4) "State" means any of the several States, the
6 District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,'
7 American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the
?
8 territories and possessions of the United States;
9 (15) "stock", with respect to any fish, means a
10 type, species, or other category capable of management
11 as a unit;
12 (16) "traditional foreign fishing" means long-
13 standing, active, and continuous fishing for a particular
14 stock of fish by citizens of a particular foreign nation in
15 compliance with any applicable international fishery
16 agreements and with the laws of such foreign nation;
17 and
18 (17) "United States", when used in a geographical
19 context, includes all States.
20 FISHERIES MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY
21 SEC. 4. ( a) CONTIGUOUS FISHERY ZONE.?(1) There
22 is established, for the duration of this Act, a fishery zone
23 contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States. The
24 United States shall exercise exclusive fishery management
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1 responsi5ility and authority within this contiguous fishery
2 zone.
(2) The contiguous fishery zone has as its inner
4 boundary the outer limits of the territorial sea, and as its
5 seaward boundary a line drawn so that each point on the
, 6 line is 197 nautical miles from the inner boundary.
7 (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
; fishery management responsibility and authority of the
9 United States within the contiguous fishery zone of the
10 United States shall not include or be construed to extend
11 to highly migratory species, except to the extent such species
12 are not managed pursuant to bilateral or multilateral inter-
13 national fishery agreements.
14 (b) ANADROMOUS SPECIES.?The fishery manage-
15 ment roponsibility and authority of the United States with
16 respect ;o anadromous species, for the duration of this Act,
17 extends to such species wherever found throughout the mi-
18 gratory range of such species: Provided, That such responsi-
19 bility and authority shall not extend to such species to the
20 extent found within the territorial waters or contiguous
21 fishery zone of any other nation.
22 (c) GENERAL.?The United States shall manage and
23 conserve, and have preferential rights to, fish within the
24 contiguous fishery zone, and with respect to anadromous
25 species of fish, pursuant to the responsibility and authority
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1 vested in it pursuant to this section, subject to traditional
2 foreign fishing rights as defined and recognized in accordance
3 with section 5 of this Act.
4 (d) REGULATIONS.?The Secretary is authorized to
5 promulgate such regulations in accordance with section 553
6 of title 5, United States Code, as are necessary to imple-
ment the purposes of this Act. The Secretary is further
8 authorized to amend such regulations in the manner origi-
9 nally promulgated.
10 FOREIGN FISHING RIGHTS
11 SEC. 5. (a) GENERAL.?The Secretary and the Secre-
12 tary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the
13 Treasury, may authorize fishing within the contiguous fish-
14 ery zone of the United States, or for anadromous species
15 or both, by citizens of any foreign nation, in accordance
16 with this section, only if such nation has traditionally en-
17 gaged in such fishing prior to the date of enactment of this
18 Act.
19 (b) PROVISIONS.?The allowable level of traditional
20 foreign fishing shall be set upon the basis of the portion of
21 any stock which cannot be harvested by citizens of the United
22 States. ? Allowed traditional foreign fishing and fishing by
23 citizens of the United States annually shall not, for any stock,
24 exceed the optimum sustainable yield for such stock.
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1 (C) RECIPROCITY.?Traditional foreign. fishing rights
2 shall not be recognized pursuant to this section unless any
3 foreign nation claiming such rights demonstrates that it
4 grants similar traditional fishing rights to citizens of the
5 United States within the contiguous fishery zone of such na-
6 tion, if any exist, or with resepct to anadromous species which
7 spawn in the fresh or estuarine waters of such nations.
8 (d) PROCEDURES.?(1) In determining the allowable
9 level of foreign fishing with respect to any stock, the Sec-
10 retary shall utilize the best available scientific information,
11 including, but not limited to, catch and effort statistics and
12 relevant available data compiled by any foreign nation claim-
13 ing traditional fishing rights.
14 (2) The Secretary is authorized to establish reasonable
15 fees which shall be paid by the citizens of any foreign nation
16 engaged in exercising foreign fishing rights recognized under
17 this section. Such fees shall be set in an amount sufficient
18 to reimburse the United States for administrative expenses
19 incurred pursuant to this section and for an equitable share
20 of the management and conservation expenses incurred by
21 the United States in accordance with this Act, including the
22 cost of regulation and enforcement.
23 (e) PROMBITION.?Except as provided in this Act, it
24 shall be unlawful for any person not a citizen of the United
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1 States to own or operate a fishing vessel or fishing support
2 vessel engaged in fishing in the contiguous fishery zone of the
3 United States or for anadromous species of fish.
4 MARINE FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION
5 PLANNING
6 SEC. 6. ( a) OBJEcTIvEs.?It is the intent of the Con-
7 gress that the following objectives be considered and included
8 (to the extent practicable) in plans, programs, and standards
9 for the management and conservation of marine fisheries;
10 (1) evaluation of actual and foreseeable costs and benefits at-
11 tributable thereto; (2) enhancement of total national and
12 world food supply; (3) improvement of the economic well-
13 being of fishermen; (4) maximum feasible utilization of meth-
14 ods, practices, and techniques that are optimal in terms of
15 efficiency, protection of the ecosystem of which fish are a part,
16 and conservation of stocks and species; and (5) effectuation of
17 the purposes stated in section 2(b) (4) of this Act. Due con-
18 sideration shall be given to alternative methods for achieving
19 these objectives.
20 (b) FISHERIES MANAGEMENT COUNCIL.?There is
21 established a Fisheries Management Council (hereinafter
22 referred to as the "Council"). The Council shall consist of
23 11 individual members, as follows:
24 (1) a Chairman, a qualified individual who shall be
25 appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
26 consent of the Senate;
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
94
25
18
(2) three Government members, who shall be the
Secretary, the Secretary of the department in which
tie Coast Guard is operating, and the Secretary of
State, or their duly authorized representatives; and
(3) seven nongovernment members, who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, on the following basis?
( A ) three to be selected from a list of qualified
individuals recommended by each of the regional
fisheries commissions or their successors, one of whom
shall be a representative respectively of Atlantic,.
Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico commercial fishing
efforts; and
(B) four to be selected from a list of qualified
individuals recommended by the National Governors
Conference, at least one of whom shall be a rep-
resentative of a coastal State.
As used in this paragraph, a list of qualified individuals
snail consist of not less than three individuals for each
Council member to be appointed.
As us:ed in this subsection, "qualified individual" means an
individual who is distinguished for his knowledge and
experience in fisheries management and conservation,
and who is equipped by experience, known talents,
and interests to further the policy of this Act eff cc-
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1 tively, positively, and independently if appointed to be a
2 member of the Board. The terms of office of the nongovern-
3 ment members of the Council first taking office shall expire
4 as designated by the President at the time of nomination-
5 two at the end of the first year; two at the end of the second
6 year; and three at the end of the third year. The term of
7 office of the Chairman of the Council shall be 3 years. Sue-
8 cessors to members of the Council shall be appointed in the
9 same manner as the original members and, except in the
10 case of Government members, shall have terms of office
11 expiring 3 years from the date of expiration of the terms
12 for which their predecessors were appointed. Any individual
13 appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration
14 of any term of office shall be appointed for the remainder
15 of that term.
16 C) POWERS AND DUTIES.?The Council shall-
17 (1) engage in the preparation of a plan or plans
18 for marine fisheries management and conservation;
19 ( 2) provide information and expert assistance to
20 States and local or regional fisheries authorities in
21 marine fisheries management and conservation;
22 (3) adopt, amend, and repeal such rules and regula-
23 tions governing the operation of the Council and
24 as are necessary to carry out the authority granted
25 under this section; conduct its affairs, carry on opera-
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1 tions, and maintain offices; appoint, fix the compensa-
2 tion, and assign the duties of such experts, agents, con-
sultants, and other full- and part-time employee as it
4 deems necessary or appropriate;
5 (4) consult on an ongoing basis (A) with other
Federal agencies and departments; (B) with officials
7 of coastal States who are concerned with marine fisheries
8 management and conservation planning; (C) with ap-
9 pro priate officials of other nations which are exercising
10 traditional foreign fishing rights, through the good offices
11 of the Secretary of State; and (D) with owners and
12 operators of fishing vessels;
13 (5) enter into, without regard to section 3709 of
14 the Revised Statutes of the United States (41 U.S.C.
15 ij), such contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, or
16 other transactions as may be necessary in the conduct of
17 its functions and duties with any person (including a
18 government entity) ;
19 (6) prepare a survey of fisheries subject to the emer-
20 geney conservation and management authority granted
21 io the United States by this Act, including, but not
22 limited to, depleted stocks and stocks threatened with
23 depletion; and
24 (7) survey, study, and prepare a marine rish,eries
25 management plan setting forth the elements of a national
26 management system .to conserve and protect fish.
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1 (d) REVIEW BY CONGRESS.?The Council shall sub-
2 mit the marine fisheries management plan adopted by the
3 Council to the Senate Committee on Commerce and the Corn-
4 mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of
5 Representatives not later than 2 years after the date of
6 enactment of this Act. The marine fisheries manage-
7 ment plan shall be deemed approved at the end of
8 the first period of 180 calendar days of continuous session
9 of Congress after such date of transmittal unless the House
10 of Representatives and the Senate pass resolution in sub-
11 stantially the same form stating that the marine fisheries
12 management plan is not favored. If the House and the
13 Senate pass resolutions of disapproval under this subsection,
14 the Council shall prepare, determine, and adopt a revised
15 plan. Each such revised plan shall be submitted to Congress
16 for review pursuant to this subsection. For purposes of this
17 section (1) continuity of session of Congress is broken only
18 by an adjournment sine die; and (2) the days on which
19 either House is not in session because of an adjournment of
20 more than 3 days to a day certain are excluded in the cam-
21 putation of the 180-day period.
22 ( e) MISCELLANEOUS.?(1) The marine fisheries man-
23 agement plan which is adopted by the Council and which
24 becomes effective after review by the Congress is not sub-
25 ject to review by any court.
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22
? (2) The Council shall have a seal which shall be
judicially recognized.
3 (3) The Administrator of General Services shall furnish
4 the Council with such offices, equipment, supplies, and serv-
5 ices as he is authorized to furnish, to any other agency or
t; instrumentality of the United States.
7 (1) A member of the Council who is not otherwise
8 an employee of the Federal Government may receive $300
9 per diem when engaged in the actual performance of his
10 duties as a member of the Council plus reimbursement for
11 travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred
12 in the performance of such* duties. Each member of the
13 Council shall be authorized such sums as are necessary to
14 enable him to appoint and compensate an adequate quali-
15 full-time professional staff responsible and subject to
16 his control, but not otherwise subject to control by the
17 Council.
18 (f) TE,RmINATIoN.?The Council shall cease to exist
19 30 days after adoption by Congress of the marine fisheries
20 plan pursuant to subsection (d) of this section.
21 ('j) AUTHORIZATION.?There are hereby authorized to
22 be appropriated for the purposes of this section a sum not to
23 exceed $1,000,000 for each of the fiscal years ending June 30,
24 1975, and June 30, 1970.
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1 INTERNATIONAL FISHERY AGREEMENTS
2 SEC. 7. (a) GENERAL.?The Secretary of State,
3 upon the request of and in cooperation with the Secretary,
4 shall initiate and conduct negotiations with any foreign na-
5 lion which is engaged in, or whose citizens are engaged
6 in, fishing in the contiguous fishery zone of the United
7 States or for anadromous species. The Secretary of State,
8 upon the request of and in cooperation with the Secretary,
9 shall, in addition, initiate and conduct negotiations with
10 any foreign nation in whose contiguous fishery zone or
11 equivalent economic zone citizens of the ,United States are
12 engaged in fishing or with respect to anadromous species as
13 to which such nation asserts management responsibility and
11 authority and for which citizens of the United States fish,
15 The purpose of such negotiations shall be to enter into inter-
16 national fishery agreements on a bilateral or multilateral
17 basis to effectuate the purposes, policy, and provisions of this
18 Act. Such agreements may include, but need not be limited
19 to, agreements to provide for the management and conser-
20 vation of-
21 (1) coastal species, which are found in both the
22 contiguous fishery zone of the United States and the
23 equivalent such zone of a foreign nation adjacent
24 thereto;
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'(2) anadromous species, which are found during
2 the course of their migrations in ocean areas subject to
3 the fishery management responsibility and authority of
4 more than one nation;
5 (3) highly migratory species which are or may be
6 covered by international fishery agreements; and
7 (4) coastal species, which are found in areas sub-
8 ject to the fishery management responsibility and au-
9 thority of any foreign, nation, through measures which
10 allow citizens of the United States to harvest an appro-
11 priate portion of such species in accordance with tradi-
12 tional United States fishing rights in such areas.
13 (b) REVIEW.?The Secretary of State shall review, in,
14 cooperation with the Secretary, each treaty, convention, and
15 other international fishery agreements to which the
16 United States is party to determine whether the provisions
17 of such agreements are consistent with the purposes, policy,
18 and provisions of this Act. If any provision or terms of any
19 such agreement are not so consistent, the Secretary of State
20 shall initiate negotiations to amend such agreement: Pro-
21 vided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to abro-
22 gate any duty or responsibility of the United States under
23 any lawful treaty, convention, or other international agree-
24 ment which is in effect on the date of enactment of this Act.
25 e) BOUNDARIES AGREEMENT.?The Secretary of State
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1 is authorized and directed to initiate and conduct negotia-
2 tions with adjacent foreign nations to establish the bound-
3 aries of the contiguous fishery zone of the United States in
4 relation to any such nation.
5 (d) NONRECOGNITION.?It is the sense of the Congress
6 that the U.S. Government shall not recognize the limits of
7 the contiguous fishery zone of any foreign nation beyond 12
8 nautical miles from the base line from which the territorial
9 sea is measured, unless such nation recognizes the tradi-
10 fishing rights of citizens of the United States, if any,
11 within any claimed extension of such zone or with respect
12 to anadromous species, or recognizes the management of
13 highly migratory species by the appropriate existing bilateral
14 or multilateral international fishery agreements irrespective
15 of whether such nation is party thereto.
16 RELATIONSHIP TO STATE LAWS
17 SEC. 8. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to extend
18 the jurisdiction of any State over any natural resources be-
19 neath and in the waters beyond the territorial sea of the United
20 States, or to diminish the jurisdiction of any State over any
21 natural resource beneath and in the waters within the ter-
22 ritorial sea of the United States.
23 PROHIBITED ACTS AND PENALTIES
24 SEC. 9. ( a) PROHIBITED ACTS.?it is unlawful for any
25 person to?
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(1) violate any provision of this Act, or any regn.-
2 lotion issued under this Act, regarding fishery within
:3 the contiguous fishery zone or with respect to anadro-
4 9n ?us species;
5 (2) violate any provision of any international fish-
6 cry agreement to which the United States is party
7 negotiated or reviewed pursuant to this Act, .to the
8 extent that such agreement applies to or covers fish-
9 ing within the contiguous fishery zone or fishing for
10 anadromous species as defined in section 4 of this Act;
11 (3) ship, transport, purchase, sell or offer for sale,
12 import, export, possess, control, or maintain in hi.!
13 custody any fish taken in violation of paragraphs (1)
14 or (2) of this subsection where such person knew or had
1.5 reason to know that such taking was not lawful;
16 (4) violate any duly issued regulation under this
17 Act with respect to making, keeping, submitting, or fur-
18 nishing to the Secretary any record's, reports, or other
19 information;
20 (5) refuse to permit a duly authorized represent-
21 arve of the Secretary, or of the Secretary of the de-
22 in which the Coast Guard- is operating, to
board a fishing vessel or fishing-support vessel subject to
24 his control where the purpose of such requested board-
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1 ing is to inspect the catch, fishing gear, ship's log, or
2 other records or materials; or
3 (6) fail to cooperate with a duly authorized rep-
4 resentative of the Secretary, or of the Secretary of the
5 department in which the Coast Guard is operating, en-
6 gaged in a reasonable inspection pursuant to paragraph
7 (5) of this subsection, or to resist any lawful arrest.
8 (b) CIVIL PENALTIES.-(1) Any person who is found
9 by the Secretary, after notice and an opportunity for a hear-
10 ing in accordance with section 554 of title 5, United States
11 Code, to have committed an act prohibited by subsection (
12 of this section, shall be liable to the United States for a civil
13 forfeiture in accordance with subsection (d) of this section
14 and for a civil penalty. The amount of the civil penalty shall
15 not exceed $25,000 for each day of each violation. The
16 amount of such civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secre-
17 tary, or his delegate, by written notice. In determining the
18 amount of such penalty, the Secretary shall take into ac-
19 count the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the
20 prohibited acts committed and, with respect to the violator,
21 the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability
22 to pay, and such other matters as justice may require.
23 (2) Any person who is found to have committed a pro-
24 hibited act and against whom a civil penalty is assessed under
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28
1 paragraph (1) of this subsection may obtain review in the
2 appropriate court of appeals of the United States by filing a
3 notice of appeal in such court within 30 days from the date of
4 such order and by simultaneously sending a copy of such
5 notice by certified mail to the Secretary. The Secretary shall
6 promptly file in such court a certified copy of the record upon
7 which such violation was found or such penalty imposed, as
8 provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code. The
9 findings of the Secretary shall be set aside if found to be un-
10 supported by substantial evidence, as provided by section
11. 706 (3 ) ( e) of title 5, United States Code.
12 (3) If any person fails to pay an assessment of a civil
13 penalty after it has become a final and unappealable order,
14 or after the appropriate court of appeals has entered final
15 judgment in favor of the Secretary, the Secretary shall refer
16 the matter to the Attorney General, who shall recover the
17 amount assessed in any appropriate district court of the
18 United States. In such action, the validity and appropriate-
19 ness of the final order imposing the civil penalty shall not be
20 subject to review.
21 '1'4) The Secretary may, in his discretion, compromise,
22 modify, or remit, with or without conditions, any civil pen-
23 alty which is subject to imposition or which has been imposed
24 under this subsection.
25 (c) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.?Any person who willfully
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1 commits an act prohibited by subsection ( a) of this section
2 shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $50,000 or im-
3 prisoned for no more than 1 year, or both.
4 (d) CIVIL FORFEITURE.?(1) Any district court of
5 the United States shall have jurisdiction, upon application by
6 the Secretary or the Attorney General, to order forfeited to
7 the United States any fish or fishing gear, used, intended for
use, or acquired by activity in violation of any provision
9 of subsection (a) of this section. In any such proceeding,
10 such court may at any time enter such restraining orders or
11 prohibitions or take such other actions as are in the interest
12 of justice, including the acceptance of satisfactory perform-
13 ance bonds in connection with any property subject to civil
14 forfeiture.
15 (2) If a judgment is entered under this subsection for
16 the United States, the Attorney General is authorized to
17 seize all property or other interest declared forfeited upon
18 such terms and conditions as are in the interest of justice.
19 All provisions of law relating to the disposition of forfeited
20 property, the proceeds from the sale of such property, the
21 remission or mitigation of forfeitures for violation of the
22 customs laws, and the compromise of claims and the award
23 of compensation to informants with respect to forfeitures
24 shall apply to civil forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have
25 been incurred, under this subsection, insofar as applicable and
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1 not is consistent with the provisions of this section. Such
duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any
:; other person with. respect to seizure, forfeiture, or disposi-
4 tion of property under the customs laws shall be performed
5 with respect to property used, intended for use, or acquired
6 by activity in violation of any provision of subsection ( a) of
7 this section by such officers or other persons as may be
8 designated for that purpose by the Secretary of the depart-
9 ment in which the Coast Guard is operating.
10 ENFORCEMENT
11 SEC. 10. ( a) GENERAL.?The provisions of this Act
12 shall be enforced, together with regulations issued under this
13 Act, by the Secretary and the Secretary of the department in
14 which the Coast Guard is operating. Such Secretaries may
15 by agreement, on a reimbursable basis or otherwise, utilize
16 the personnel, services, and faciiities of any other Federal
17 agency in the performance of such duties.
18 POWER8.?Any person duly authorized pursuant
19 to subsection (a) of this section may-
20 (1) board and inspect any fishing vessel or fishing-
21 support vessel which is within the contiguous fishery
22 zone of the United States, or which he has reason to
23 believe is fishing for anadromous species;
24 (2) arrest any person, with or without a warrant
25 i1 he has reasonable cause to ,believe that such person
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1 has committed an act prohibited by section 9(a) of this
2 Act;
3 (3) execute any warrant or other process issued by
4 an officer or court of competent jurisdiction; and
5 (4) seize all fish and fishing gear found onboard any
6 fishing vessel or fishing-support vessel engaged in any act
7 prohibited Ind section 9(a) of this Act.
8 ( c) COURTS.?The district courts of the United States
9 shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all cases or controversies
10 arising under this Act. Such court may issue all warrants or
11 other process to the extent necessary or appropriate. In the
12 case of Guam, such actions may be brought and such process
13 issued by the District Court of Guam; in the case of the Vir-
14 gin Islands, by the District Court of the Virgin Islands; and
15 in the case of American Samoa, by the District Court for the
16 District of Hawaii. The aforesaid courts shall have jurisdic-
17 tion over all actions brought under this Act without regard to
18 the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties.
19 DURATION OF ACT
20 SEC. 11. (a) EFFECTIVE DATE.?The provisions of sec-
21 tion 4 of this Act shall become effective 90 days after the date
22 of enactment of this Act. All other provisions of this Act shall
'23 become effective on the date of enactment.
24 (b) TERMINATION DATE.?The provisions of this Act
25 shall expire and cease to be of any legal force and effect on
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such date as the Law of the Sea Treaty, or other compre-
2 hensivs treaty with respect to fishery jurisdiction, which
3 the United States has signed or is party to, shall come into
4 force 61' is provisionally applied.
5 AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS
6 Sze. 12. Except with respect to section 6 and section 9
7 of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated for the
8 purposes of this Act to the Secretary such sums as are nec-
9 essary, not to exceed $4,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
10 ending June 30, 1975, June 30, 1976, and June 30, 1977,
11 and tc the Secretary of the department in which the Coast
12 Guard is operating such sums as are necessary, not to exceed
13 $13,000,000 for each of the fiscal years ending June 30,
14 1975, June 30, 1976, and June 30, 1977.
Amend the title so as to read: "A bill to extend, pend-
ing international agreement, the fisheries management re-
sponsibility and authority of the United States over the fish
in certain ocean areas in order to conserve and protect such
fish from depletion, and for other purposes.
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STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE S. BROWN, U.S. AIR FORCE, CHAIR-
MAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM,
MAX K. MORRIS, U.S. NAVY, JOINT CHIEFS REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE
General BROWN. Mr. Chairman and Senator Thurmond, I appre-
ciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to present our
assessment of the impact that passage of the Emergency Marine
Fisheries Protection Act of 1974 would have on the security of the
United States.
First, I assure the committee that the Department of Defense is
well aware of the difficulties being experienced by our coastal fisher-
men. A solution to these problems must be found. Any such solution,
however, must be compatible with our national security interests. I
am convinced that passage of this legislation at this time would be
counter to the security interests of the United States.
The major U.S. military interests in the seas is maximum mobility
for our operations free of interference by others. The United States?
like virtually all of the major powers that have preceded it in his-
tory?has fundamental high seas interests integrally related to its
major power responsibilities and its security.
The mobility of our strategic and general purpose forces becomes
a more important factor in our security as the presence of our forces?
both strategic and general purpose?on foreign territory is reduced.
Worldwide commitments and long lines of communications place addi-
tional emphasis on mobility requirements. Furthermore, the ability
of our deterrent forces to carry out their mission cannot be dependent
on the sufferance of other nations who may perceive their interests
as different from ours.
In regard to our strategic forces, they must be numerous enough,
efficient enough, and deployed in such a way that a potential aggressor
will always know that the sure result of any type of nuclear attack
against the United States is unacceptable damage from our retaliation.
Furthermore, these forces are essential to the maintenance of a stable
political environment within which the threat of aggression or coercion
against the United States or its allies is minimized.
Thus, the survivability of our strategic forces is essential to the
protection of our vital interests. As an indispensable element of our
strategic forces, the United States seaborne nuclear deterrent is de-
pendent not only upon freedom of mobility in the oceans and through
certain international straits but upon secrecy. In the territorial sea,
submarines are required to navigate on the surface. In the absence of
free passage through straits, an extension of the territorial sea from
3 to 12 miles would force us, as to many straits used for international
navigation, including Gibraltar, to attempt to strike the best possible
bilateral bargain for consent to transit submerged. The cost of this
consent may be expected to increase with the magnitude of the known
U.S. interest involved.
Our general purpose forces now play a larger role in deterring
attacks than at any time since the nuclear era began. Like our strategic
seaborne forces, our general purpose naval and air forces depend upon
the maximum mobility for their operations, free of interference by
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others. This mobility will be particularly important to our ability to
deter or respond to localized aggression uring a period of decreasing
overseas presence. Our mobility currently depends upon freedom to
navigate on and under the high seas and through certain international
straits and freedom to fly over the high seas and certain international
straits. Authorityfor coastal States to regulate these activities
degrades our mobility and threatens the peace.
Our antisubmarine warfare operations involve surface and air units
that cannot conduct such operations in foreign territorial seas without
consent. As such operations can be easily observed, our ability to track
Soviet submarines that entered foreign territorial seas submerged?
legally or illegally?would be diminished as the territorial sea is
extended farther seaward.
With this background, it is now appropriate to assess the impact of
the pending legislation on these interests. '
The 'Convention on the High Seas of 1958 specifically lists four high
seas freedoms which are recognized by the general principles of inter-
national law. They are : (1 )-'freedom of navigation, (2) freedom of
fishing, (3) freedom to lay submarine ,mbles and pipelines, and (4)
freedom to fly over the high seas. Tho United States and 52 other
nations are parties to this Convention.
The pr ()posed legislation would unilaterally abrogate freedom of
fishing, one of the constituent elements of the overall freedom of the
high seas. The response of other nations to this legislation is not likely
to be limited to comparable, restrictions on fishing. If the United States,
by unilateral act, abrogates one identified freedom, we face the un-
happy prospect that other nations may claim the right unilaterally to
abrogate other identified freedoms, including the essential freedoms
of navigation and overflight.
In response, many nations will surely claim 200-mile exclusive
fishing zones. Some will claim 200-mile pollution control zones. Some
will claim the right throughout such areas" to promulgate and endorse
restrictive regulations of various sorts against vessels bearing vital
energy supplies to our shores. Some will attempt to prohibit nuclear-
powered vessels, or vessels and aircraft carrying strategic weapons
from venturing within 200 miles of their coast. Some will even claim
a 200-mile zone of sovereignty, thereby completely barring our air-
craft and submerged submarines from their claimed zone. This is the
history of the growth of such claims. Prior to our claim of a 12-nautical
mile fishing limit, there were only 25 claims to a territorial sea of 12.
nautical miles or more. There are now over 80 such claims.
The effect of a 200-mile territorial sea extending off the coasts of
many nations in the world would be devastating to military mobility.
It would result in the prohibition of overflight by aircraft and sub-
merged operation of submarines except at; the sufferance of a coastal
state in almosr 40 percent of what is now internationally recognized
as high seas. The entire Mediterranean would be territorial seas of
the littoral states and could be closed completely to the United States.
Virtually the entire operating area of both the 7th and 6th Fleets
would become territorial sea. An unconstrained extension to even 12
mileswould close the Straits of Bab El Mandeb, Dover, Gibraltar,,
Hormuz, and Lombok. Virtually every passage now narrow enough to
be called a strait would be closed by 200 miles.
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How will we respond to such claims, Mr. Chair nan ? We have
consistently maintained that no nation may unilaterally abrogate
high seas freedoms? that only through multilateral negotiation can
the necessary adjustments in coastal state jurisdiction be properly
accommodated with the common interest of mankind as a whole. What
will be our response after we, too, have succumbed to the temptation
of the quick unilateral solution presented in this bill?
Our experience with overflight clearances in Europe during the
most recent Mideast conflict leads us to conclude that bilateral nego-
tiations cannot be depended upon to insure that military mobility nec-
essary to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. What this bill invites,
then, is a situation wherein the United States must either acquiesce
in serious erosion of its rights to use the world's oceans, or must be
prepared to forcefully assert or purchase those rights.
Let me turn now to the events to be anticipated off our own coasts.
It is highly unlikely that, the major maritime powers who fish off our
coast, especially Japan and the Soviet Union, would acknowledge
the validity of a sweeping claim. To do so would totally undercut their
own position both on fisheries in general and in the law of the sea
negotiations in particular. We must, therefore, assume that such ves-
sels would not seek our permission to fish within 200 miles of our coasts
and that they would continue to do so. Enforcement of the act would
involve boarding, inspection, arrest, and seizure. I cannot predict with
certainty how they would react to such enforcement measures by the
United States.
I can, however, clearly point to the history of the last year in which
the United Kingdom responded to a claim of a 50-mile fishery zone
on the part of Iceland by providing warship escort for the British
fishing vessels.
Our claim would be even more contentious than that which Iceland
has made for two reasons. First, our claim would be more expansive-
200 miles rather than 50 miles?and, secondly, since that time the
International Court of Justice has found Iceland's actions in making
such a claim to be in contravention of the rights of others. Should
other nations choose to follow the pattern set by the -United Kingdom
of providing warship escort for fishing vesse)s, we would be faced
with a direct military confrontation which could easily spread. I am,
of course, not suggesting that we would not be able to meet and defeat
such a threat. I do suggest that the risk of confrontation is un-
warranted.
I would now like to turn to the effects which enactment of this bill
would be likely to have on our ability to achieve a law of the sea
treaty. From the very beginning of the law of the sea negotiations,
the United States has been the strongest advocate of the principle
that international conflicts concerning uses of the ocean can only be
effectively resolved through international agreement. We have in-
variably protested unilateral claims by other states, whether to
extended territorial seas or extended jurisdiction of one type or an-
other, such as fishing jurisdiction. Our protest notes normally stress
our view that unilateral claims to extended jurisdiction during the
course of negotiations can only inhibit the negotiations and decrease
the likelihood of reaching agreement.
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A dramatic reversal of the position from which we have been negoti-
ating, practically on the eve of what is apparently the most crucial
negotiating session, would seem to be capable of no other effect than
utterly destroying our credibility, along with rendering slim or even
nonexistent our ability to obtain an overall package settlement of the
existing disputes concerning ocean uses.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the best way of preserving our essen-
tial mobility :is through a comprehensive law of the sea treaty which
will, in settling existing and potential conflicts, reaffirm by treaty
our vital rights of navigation, overflight, and unimpeded passage of
international straits. The alternative would be their preservation
through their continued exercise despite the denial by others o:f our
right to do so, and the use of force, is defense of such rights, when
confronted by the force of others.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, it is my earnest assessment that th?,
interests of the United States in establishing an equitable and stable
regime for the oceans which will protect all of our interests?resources
as well as national security?are best served by not precipitating
unilateral acts such as those which woald result upon the passage of
S. 1988, but rather by seeking and achieving international agreement
in the law of the sea treaty. ?
In my judgment, enactment of the proposed legislation would seri-
ously erode the prospect for a broadly based multilateral treaty put-
ting to rest the with range of increasingly contentious ocean issues.
Enactment of the proposed legislation would be a dramatic and highly
visible reversal of past U.S. policy. For the United States to adopt
unilateralism as a viable approach to oceans policy problems at this
juncture would seriously undercut the credibility of -U.S. negotiators
not only on the fisheries issue, but also on our basic commitment to
international agreement. This unilateral action could result in an
erosion of the world's perception of our- other essential objectives such
as unimpeded transit through and over straits, which we have identi-
fied as both cornerstones of our policy and essential elements of an
acceptable solution.
If the United States now abandons its opposition to unilateral
claims in the ocean, we will inevitably be faced with an increasing
number of competing, retaliatory, or unrelated claims impacting ad-
versely on national security interests.
If, as we expect, enactment of this legislation were to result in ex-
tended delay :in the law of the sea negotiations, we will have reverted
to the uncertain and dangerous procedure of shaping a new legal
order for the world's oceans by the process of claim and counterclaim,
action and reaction, which eventually would coalesce into customary
nternational law. This is a dangerous way to regulate any relations
among states. But when the claims begin to affect the mobility of our
strategic and general-purpose forces, the risk involved in the process
of challenge is much higher. To set the nation on this path toward
resolution of oceans policy issues is, in my view, both dangerous and
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. We have with us also Mr. John Norton Moore,
Chairman of the National Security Council Interagency Task Force
on the Law of the Sea, Department of State.
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Mr. Moore, we are glad to have you here, sir. You come well recom-
mended I see, not only from your Department, but your background
here. You have a prepared statement, and would you like to read
it now
STATEMENT OF JOHN NORTON MOORE, CHAIRMAN, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA, AND DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PRESIDENT FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE
Mr. MOORE. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Senator Thurmond, Sena-
tor Taft, Senator McIntyre, and Senator Byrd, the Senator from my
own home State. I welcome this opportunity to appear before this
committee to testify on S. 1988 for the executive branch, a bill of funda-
mental importance to U.S. ocean policy. I have a prepared state-
ment, but with your permission, Mr. Chairman, rather than reading
the statement I would like to place the statement in the record, and to
more informally summarize the issues raised by the bill.
The CHAIRMAN Without objection the statement will be placed in
the record.
[The statement follows:]
Mr. Chairman: I welcome this opportunity to appear before the Senate Armed
Services Committee to testify for the Executive Branch on S. 1988 a bill of
fundamental importance for United States oceans policy. This bill raises ques-
tions deeply affecting the defense interests of the nation as well as our fishery
and other oceans interests. In fact, the choice which must be made by this Com-
mittee could well determine whether the United States will continue to enjoy
the mobility on the world's oceans so vital to our security and energy needs.
In testifying in opposition to S. 1988, the Executive Branch is appreciative
that this legislation is motivated by serious concern about overfishing by foreign
fleets of certain stocks of coastal and anadromous fish off our coasts. The threat
to these stocks is real and must be met by effective action. Nevertheless, enact-
ment of this legislation would be seriously harmful to United States defense
and other oceans interests and would not satisfactorily resolve our fisheries
problems.
The United States, and indeed all nations, have vital defense and security
interests in the oceans. These include unimpeded transit through, over and
under straits used for international navigation, and protection of navigational
freedoms throughout the world's oceans. Such mobility is vital to maintain
secure lines of supply for energy and material needs, to provide mutual defense
assistance pursuant to the Charter of the United Nations, and to contribute to
the balance necessary for international stability. All nations also have an im-
portant security interest in promoting a stable legal order which will mini-
mize the oceans as a source of conflict.
Unilateral action extending national jurisdiction in the oceans is harmful to
overall United States oceans interests and particularly to these defense inter-
ests. As such, we have consistently protested to other nations any extension of
fishery or other jurisdiction beyond recognized limits. A unilateral extension
of jurisdiction for one purpose will not necessarily be met by a similar exten-
sion but rather may encourage broader claims which could have serious im-
plications, for example, with respect to our energy needs in the movement
of oil, our national security interests in unimpeded movement of vessels and
aircraft on the worlds oceans, or our interest in the protection of marine scien-
tific research rights in the oceans. Because of our broad range of oceans inter-
ests and our leadership role in the world, a unilateral claim by the United
States would have a particularly severe impact upon the international com-
munity which could quickly lead to a crazy quilt of uncontrolled national
claims. Indeed, it was the threat of just such a result with its open ended
invitation to conflicts and pressures on vital United States interests that led
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to a decision in two prior Administrations at the highest level of Government
that United States oceans interests and the stability of the world community
would best be served by a broadly supported international agreement. This
Administration strongly agrees with that judgment.
Soundings from our embassies and at the Caracas session of the Law of the
Sea Conference indicate that the possibility of unilateral claims by others is
not merely an abstract concern should this legislation pass. Specifically, should
the United States make a broad unilateral claim to fisheries, as does S. 1988,
such a claim is highly likely to trigger unilateral oceans claims by others to an
extended territorial sea or other claims seriously harmful to our vital interests
in both military and commercial navigation. Should such a pattern become the
norm, navigational freedom could be lost in vast areas of the world's oceans. A
200 mile territorial sea. for example, would totally close the Mediterranean. It
would also effectively deprive a majority of all. coastal states of the rights of
unimpeded access they now enjoy to the oceans.
Enactment of S. 1988 could also be seriously damaging to the security interests;
of the United States and all nations in its destabilizing effect and its potential
for promoting conflict. Unilateral extension of our fisheries jurisdiction could
place the nation in a confrontation with the Soviet Union, Japan, or other na-
tions fishing off our coasts. These nations strongly maintain the right to fish
in high seas areas and are unlikely to acquiesce in unilateral claims, particularly
during the course of sensitive law of the sea negotiations in which they have
substantial inteests at stake. The implications for detente and our relations
with Japan are evident. In fact, both the Soviet Union and Japan have already
expressed serious concern over this bill.
it is strongly in the interest of national and global security to encourage
cooperative solutions to oceans problems rather than a pattern of competing
national claims. A widely agreed comprehensive Law of the Sea Treaty will
promote development of ocean uses and will reduce the chances of ocean dis.,
mites leading to conflict among nations. On the other hand, unilateral claims car
only precipitate a downward spiral leading inevitably to increased conflict for
the world's oceans.
Finally, passage at this time of S. 1988 unilaterally extending the fisheries;
jurisdiction of the United States would seriously undercut the ongoing effort o7i
all nations to achieve a (qmaprehensive oceans law treaty. The third United Na.-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea held its first substantive session in.
Caracas, Venezuela, this summer. A second substantive session has been set for
March 17 to May 10 in Geneva. This Conference is of fundamental importance
for the defense and security interests of the United States and indeed of ah
nations. Only by agreement can we assure a rational order for the oceans which
will protect the strong common interests in navigational freedoms and reduce
the potential for conflict. For these reasons, our nation has urged particular care
mid restraint in avoiding new oceans claims during the Conference. A pattern;
of escalating unilateral claims during the Conference could destroy the delicate
fabric of this most promising and difficult negotiation. It could also undermine
the essential political compromise by which all nations would agree on a single
package treaty. And by unilaterally taking such action which we have said mus;;
be dependent on a satisfactory overall compromise, including guarantees for un-
impeded transit of straits, it could seriously harm our defense as well as our
other oceans interests. Appended to this testimony is a statement by Ambassador
john R. Stevenson, the Special Representative of the President, reporting to the
Foreign Relations Committee on the progress made at the Caracas session ort.'
the Ln.w of the Sea Conference.
Mr. Chairman, these principal difficulties with S. 1988 are in no sense alleviated
by its emergency or interim nature. Section 11 (b) of S. 1988 provides that the
act would expire on such date as the Law of the Sea Treaty comes into force
or is provisionally applied. Unfortunately, however, in the interim period the
legislation would be simply a unilateral extension with all of the associated costs
of unilateralism and with none of the benefits of a lasting solution. Moreover,
this legislation could well prevent the agreement which is expected to super-
!..:Nie it.
Just as is true for our defense interests, our fishery interests can only be
satisfactorily protected by a broadly based international agreement. 1 ortunutely,
for the first time in the history of oceans law .it is realistic to expect such a
broadly based agreement in the near future. The strong trend in the Conference
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is for acceptance of a 200-mile economic zone providing coastal states with juris-
diction over coastal fisheries in a 200-mile area off their coast. There is also
support for host state control of anadromous species and for special provisions
on international and regional management of highly migratory species. In this
connection, the United States Delegation has indicated that we can accept and
indeed would welcome agreement on the 200-mile economic zone as part of a
satisfactory overall treaty which also protects our other oceans interests, includ-
ing unimpeded transit of straits used for international navigation.
It is, of course, important that we prevent further depletion of coastal and
anadromous stocks off our coasts before the new Law of the Sea Treaty comes
into force. We have recently announced in testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee
new steps which we will be taking to protect these stocks in the interim period.
We intend to vigorously pursue these and other measures for the protection of
our stocks, including diplomatic initiatives at the highest levels with the principal
nations fishing off our coasts. We also intend to consult closely with the relevant
Committees of Congress as to other measures, including appropriate legislative
measures, which might be taken to provide additional interim protection for
these threatened stocks. We must not, however, risk by our unilateral action the
best opportunity we have had to resolve our fishery and other oceans problems.
Mr. Chairman, we have reached a rare and perhaps fleeting moment in history
when there is opportunity for all nations to agree on a comprehensive legal
regime for over two-thirds of the earth's surface. Such an agreement will lead
to a stability and security for all nations which cannot be otherwise achieved.
The greatest single threat to such an agreement is the pressure for unilateral
action to cope with the growing problems and opportunities in oceans use. To
avoid such pressures overtaking our ability to reach agreement it is essential
that all nations work vigorously to achieve agreement on the timetable set out
by the General Assembly, that is agreement no later than 1975. For our part we
will need the full support of the Congress in this effort.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MOORE. S. 1988 would unilaterally extend the fisheries contigu-
ous zone of the United States from the present 12-mile limit to 200
miles. Though this bill is aimed primarily at fishing problems, such
a unilateral extension would have the most serious consequences for the
defense and security interests of the Nation, as well as our fishery and
other ocean interests.
Mr. Chairman, the choice which must be made by this committee
could well determine whether our Nation will continue to enjoy the
mobility on the world's oceans so vital to our security and energy
needs.
In testifying in opposition to S. 1988, the executive branch is ap-
preciative that this legislation is motivated by serious concern about
overfishing by foreign fleets of certain stocks of coastal and anadro-
mous fish off our coasts. The threat to these stocks is real and must be
met by effective action.
Nevertheless, the enactment of this legislation would not satisfac-
torily resolve our fisheries problems, and would be seriously harmful
to our defense and oceans interest in at least four principal ways.
First, unilateral action extending national jurisdiction in the oceans
is harmful to overall U.S. ocean interests, and particularly to our
defense interests in the protection of navigation through straits, and
throughout the world oceans. Unilateralism by the United States, even
if carefully limited on our part, will lead to unilateralism by other
states. The United States is looked to, particularly for the lead in
oceans policy, and our example will have great impact on others.
Such claims by others could be a 200-mile territorial sea, or they could
be other actions seriously harmful to our defense interests.
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42
The threat of expansion of the. territorial sea or some other uni-
lateral extension of national jurisdiction in the oceans is not merely by
a fanciful threat if we take unilateral action to extend our fisheries
jnrisdiction. The risk is high that a pattern of unilateral extension of
jurisdiction would lead through time to a; 200-mile territorial sea or
other unacceptable restrictions on navigation.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to illustrate, if I might, some of the
consequences for our navigational interests of a 200-mile territorial
sea around the -world. We have a chart of the 200-mile territorial sea
and what its effects would be. The area in pink on this chart indicates
the areas of the world's oceans that would be overlapped by a 200-mile
territorial sea.. As General Brown has indicated, more than a third
of the world's oceans would be lost to overflight and to submerged
transit and there might be, in fact, even greater restrictions placed
on transit.. As you can see the Mediterranean would also be totally
overlapped by such an extensive claim.
In addition, the principal straits and navigational routes through-
out the world would all be substantially impeded.
Second, we. have a chart of the zone-locked states.
The (71rA -ERMAN. Pardon me. Point out the Mediterranean there.
Kr. MOORE. This area, the Mediterranean, would be totally over-
lapped by these 200-mile claims.
The next chart that we have had prepared by the geographer of the
Department of State is a chart which illustrates the effect of a 200-
mile territorial sea or other 200-mile navigational restriction on
coastal states. Now, this is what we call the zone-locked situation; that
is, that strangely enough, under a 200-mile territorial sea or other
200-mile limit restricting navigational freedom, a majority of all
coastal states would lose all access by overflight or submerged transit
to any ocean on which they face, so that every country on this map
which is underlined with a broad black line, and there are about 66
0 r these, would lose overflight rights to the high seas, and the right
or submerged transit from their nation to the high seas, and of course,
with correspo:ading restrictions on others that may have a special
relation to those countries.
Second, Mr. Chairman, it is precisely because of these dangers of
unilateralism leading to severe restrictions on navigation that we have
sought a comprehensive oceans law treaty. The third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea has held one substantive meet-
ing and has scheduled a second meeting for Geneva next spring
from March fr to may 10. We believe that the. Conference is promis-
ing, and that a satisfactory conclusion can provide the kind of pro-
tection which we must have for our defense and security interests.
The demonstration of unilaterial action contained in this bill, com-
ing at this time during the Conference, could well undermine our bar-
gaining leverage and could, in fact, even lead to failure of the Con-
ference. All of us understand that once broad claims are made,
whether they are ocean claims or some other claim, it is particularly
difficult to walk the cat back. So that there would be a loss of nego-
tiating flexibility on the part of the countries with whom we deal.
Such a unilaterial extension at this time could also undermine the
essential political compromise of a single package treaty necessary to
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protect our navigational and defense interests. Were all nations, for
example, to feel free to simply extend their jurisdiction unilaterally
and achieve their principal aim in the ocean, they may have less con-
cern with the broader community freedom particularly community
freedoms in navigation.
Moreover, such an action at this time could undermine the will to
agree at the Conference itself, and the will to make the hard choices
that are necessary if nations are to reach a timely agreement.
Third, Mr. Chairman, enactment of S. 1988 could also be seriously
damaging to our security interests by increasing the risk of conflict
in the oceans. General Brown ha 's indicated very well the potential
for serious conflict with the major distant water fishing nations fish-
ing off the coast of the United States, including the Soviet Union,
Japan, and a number of close allies of the United States. Mr. Chair-
man, though I will not repeat the testimony of General Brown on
this point, I would like to emphasize that it is very much the judg-
ment of the Department of State and of the National Security Coun-
cil Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea that these risks
of potential conflict off our coasts, should such legislation be enacted,
the risk of damage to detente with the Soviet Union, the risk of damage
in our bilateral relations with Japan and a number of other coun-
tries fishing off our coasts are real and serious.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, S. 1988 is not consistent with international
law, particularly with the High Seas Convention. The United States
has consistently protested extension of fishery jurisdiction beyond 12
miles, and in two cases recently arising from the cod war' the Inter-
national Court of Justice has held that even the most modest exten-
sion of 50 miles by Iceland violated the legal rights of the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.
The United States has a genuine security interest in fostering a
rational and stable legal order which would serve to reduce conflict.
Actions counter to such a legal order would be damaging to this in-
terest.
Mr. Chairman, we understand fully that this legislation is intro-
duced to meet a real threat to coastal and anadromous stocks off our
coasts. Nevertheless, for the first time in the history of ocean law, we
have a realistic opportunity in the near future to conclude a com-
prehensive ocean law treaty that will give us the kind of jurisdiction
accepted by others, which will enable us to protect these coastal and
anadromous species.
In the interim period, the executive branch does plan to take vig-
orous interim measures for the protection of our fish stocks, and in
our testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and
more recently in a briefing before the House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee we have gone into detail on the measures which
we will be taking.
In addition, we are willing to actively work with Congress to ex-
plore alternative interim approaches which would be consistent with
international law and our interests in the Law of the Sea Conference,
but could offer substantial increased, protection to our fishery stocks.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, at the present time we have a rare
and perhaps fleeting opportunity to achieve a comprehensive oceans
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law treaty which. will. be strongly in the overall interest of the United
States. We feel that perhaps the greatest single threat to such a com-
prehensive treaty is the pressure for unilateral action, both in the
United States and abroad to cope with the growing problems and op-
portunities in ocean use. To avoid such pressures overtaking our
ability to reach. agreement, it is essential that all nations work vig-
orously to achieve agreement on the timetable set out by the General
.Assembly; that is, agreement no later than 1975. For our part, we
will need the -Full support of the Congress in this effort.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHATRMAN. Mr. Moore, you say you propose vigorous action
now by the executive branch as shown by the testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and one of the TIouse commit-.
tees, too. Does that testimony carry the details of this vigorous action.
von referred to?
Mr. Moorm Yes, Mr. Chairman. In fact, if I could briefly sum-
marize?
The CHAIRMAN. That is my request to briefly give us the highlights.
We are going to ask that that testimony be brought over if it is avail-
able from. the committees.
Mr. MooRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, we are working to achieve increased protection through bi-
lateral fishery agreements and limited multilaterial fishery agreements
with the Soviet Union, Japan and the states who are members of the
International Commission for North Atlantic Fisheries, and through
the other fishery agreements that we have for the protection of the
stocks of our coasts. These agreements have in the past not given
us all of the protection that we have needed, but we are working vig-
orously to got greater protection in the new round of negotiations
on these agreements.
In addition, we have recently announced a new and substantially
tougher enforcement program for the protection of our continental
shelf living resources that are clearly under our jurisdiction under
international law. These new measures will go into effect on Decem-
ber 5 of this year, after a 90-day grace period which will enable the
foreign nations to adjust their fishing techniques or to enter into
agreements with the United States for the protection of these con-
tinental shelf resources.
We have further proposed in the Law of the Sea Conference the
provisional application of the fisheries portion of the treaty. There
has been substantial support for the concept of provisional applica-
tion, and it would mean that if adopted by the Conference we would
not have to wait for an extended period for the treaty to go into full
legal effect, but the fishery portion could go into effect on signature
without delay.
We are also taking actions to raise these serious fishery problems at
the highest levels of government with the principal nations that are
fishing off our coast.
Finally, we are pursuing conversations with the appropriate com-
mittees of the Congress, of both the Senate and the house, to see if
we can find scme other interim measures which would protect our
fishery interests without the adverse consequences that we see in
S. 1988.
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The CHAIRMAN. Is the military cooperating with you in this effort to
get something done about this?
Mr. MOORE. Very much so. There is complete cooperation. In fact, I
think there is a complete consistency of interest in our defense and
fishery interests on this issue.
The CHAIRMAN. There is no effort being made by the military to
block your efforts in representing the fishing industry and others that
are involved in related fields, is that right?
Mr. MOORE. That is absolutely correct. I am glad to say this is not
in any sense a tradeoff between these interests. We believe passage of
this bill would be harmful to our fisheries as well as to our defense
interests.
The CHAIRMAN. You have followed the testimony all the way
through in these other hearings on this bill.
Mr. MOORE. That is correct. Yes I have. I have not personally
listened to all the testimony, but I have followed it.
The CHAIRMAN. You have followed it. I am not anticipating the
testimony here of the fisheries, I do not know what they are going to
say, but how do they answer what you say, what is their main conten-
tion? We will hear from them if they want to be heard, but what is
their main position about this?
Mr. MOORE. There is, of course, a real threat to our coastal and
anadromous stocks off our coast from heavy foreign fishing. We do
need effective solutions to that threat. It is understandable why after
3 years of preparatory work some are getting impatient about achiev-
ing the new Law of the Sea Treaty. But, we have only had a single
substantive session of the Conference itself. The preparatory work was
in the United Nations Seabed Committee. The time is now, this is the
critical year when we are trying to reach agreement in the Law of
the Sea Conference, and we feel the best way to protect all of those
interests is by such a treaty.
The CHAIRMAN. If you do not get such a treaty, and I do not want
to discount your prospects, how are you going to protect the situation
as to our fishing industry?
Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman. I am happy to say that I am optimistic
about the chances for concluding such a treaty in a short timeframe. I
would rather not speculate at this point on what actions the administra-
tion might propose for the protection of those stocks if, in fact, we
were not able to reach a timely agreement.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to discount the prosects, but there is
lof, of membership in the Senate that come from these seacoast States,
and incidentally, I do. I hear from them down there. I want to know
what the problem is, I want to get that from them, and then what the
remedy is from you. If this bill is not the remedy, what is the remedy?
Mr. MOORE. I think there are several remedies.
The CHAIRMAN. I am going to call on someone in the administration
to point out an alternative here. You are asking us to hold this bill
up a year. That is the substance of your testimony in a way, so where
will we be then if you do not get the agreement?
Mr. MooRE. I think you are exactly right, to focus on the need to
have effective action that is going to resolve our fishery problems. We
share that fully. We think that there are two principal kinds of action
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that we need to take. The first of these really is to focus on trying to
get this comprehensive treaty, because one thing is very clear, that
if the other issues in the negotiations are satisfactorily resolved, there
will be a 200-mile area of coastal State jurisdiction over coastal fish-
eries. And therefore, we do not want to do anything at this time that,
in fact, really undercuts our chance to resolve these fishery problems
once and for all.
Now, a second line of attack on this, and I think it is equally im-
portant, is that during the interim period between now and the time
we expect this treaty to be legally in effect, either through provisional
application or otherwise, we must take effective interim measures to
protect, those stocks. We feel that we can do that through a vigorous
program of bilateral agreements and linlited multilateral agreements,
coupled with the. new enforcement measures which we have announced
on September 5, and which we feel will give us very substantial
increased leverage in the fishery negotiations that we will shortly be
entering.
Then in addition to that, we would also like to explore with the
Congress and are doing so at the present time alternative approaches
that, would provide even greater interim protection during this period.
The CHAIRMAN. General Brown, you accept the compliment here I
am sure that you are cooperating with the executive branch of the
Government, and you are a part of it. Now just sum up here in a
sentence or two what your primary objections are as a member of the
!unitary profession and a leader to the bill. They claim that it will not
interfere with you, your submarines and all of the overflights and all
of that.
General BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I think other countries will fol-
low the lead of the United States. The United States is in the fore-
most position of world power. I think there is a vast difference in
impact between what the United States does and what the Latin
American Republic does. There are seven Latin American countries
that have, taken unilateral action purporting to extend the limits of
their territorial sea to 200 miles. We are well aware of that. If the.
United States were to step out and unilaterally claim 200 miles, a
great number of other nations would follow our lead. I think it would.
he a serious omission not to grant at least the year for the Law of the,
Seas Conference to work in the United Nations. It would be wrong..
It is true, that many will challenge my statement on the basis that
t foresee other nations going further than we would go. We would.
restrict only fishing. Our worry is not that others will restrict fish-
cries, it is that they will go beyond that. That is our worry.
The CHAIRMAN. And interfere with you?
Gen.e,ral linowN. And interfere with the security operations.
The other worry is that in enforcing this, in policing this action, the
.tnited States, first, would be violating or going counter to the prece-
dent set by the international court in a case of lesser magnitude; and
i!ceond. I have little doubt that this thing, will grow beyond the scope
of the Coast, Guard ability and that the U.S. Navy is going to have to
participate in the policing of this exclusion of foreign vessels. When
-tve tr.() out with men of war to stop, search, and arrest, it is going to
a little risky, I think it is unnecessary to take that risk. We can
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handle it?there is no question, that the United States has the power?
but I do not think the United States wants to seek confrontation unless
it is necessary.
The CHAIRMAN This bill has been on Capitol Hill for a long time
this year, and there have been a lot of other things that have hap-
pened, including things happening to you. But why did the military
wait so long to let us know about their objections to this bill? We
are now just hero in the closing days, and having to have these hear-
ings hurriedly, and we had to promise to get the report back by No-
vember 15. Almost all of those days are going to be during this recess.
I said we had to promise that because it was already on the calendar
and about to be taken up, and one objection would have thrown it
into a vote. If you do not know why, just answer it that way and let
it go. But it shows the danger of neglect.
General BROWN. I think it is very simply that the executive branch
acted in a very human manner. We assumed the Congress would
understand. After all, the vote was by a very narrow margin; and
admittedly, there was concern in the Committee on Foreign Relations,
but they did report it out unfavorably. It was not until there was
the swell of interest and it appeared that the Senate might act counter
to the committee that we became concerned enough to directly inter-
ject ourselves. The interagency task force had expressed our con-
cerns earlier.
The CHAIRMAN. You all have to worry about so many things, but
you should not assume what we will do about things. All of us that
have been up here a good while do not ever assume anything our con-
stituents do. That is why we have been able to hang on. We did
not assume anything, but we kept in touch with them.
Senator Thurmond.
Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.
General Brown, I assume from your statement that you feel there
will be retaliation, of course, by other nations if we adopted this
200-mile limit?
General BROWN. Without doubt, yes, sir.
Senator THURMOND. If there were retaliation, that would hurt
the United States from a security standpoint, as I construe your
statement?
General BROWN. That is our fear, yes sir.
Senator THURMOND. Would it not also hurt the United States from
a trade standpoint because the United States carries on trade with
more nations in the world than any other country in the world?
General BROWN. That is also true. There are others more competent
to testify on that than I. But quite obviously, that is true.
Senator THURMOND. I might ask Mr. Moore that.
Mr. MooRE. Very much so, Senator. All of our navigational interests
would be major losers by any pattern of unilateral action and compet-
ing claims in the oceans and it would hurt very substantially our in-
terests in the movement of energy supplies and all of the imports and
exports that move now on the world oceans.
Senator THURMOND. General Brown, if the Law of the Sea negotia-
tions fail to produce a treaty next year, and you refer to it in your
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48
statement here on page 9, that provideE, a 200-mile economic zone, do
you feel it would be advisable then to oppose this bill further?
General BROWN. I think that the United States will have to reassess
the entire situation. At, the moment NAT are optimistic that the Law
o f the Sea Ccnference is going to work. If the United States efforts
toward a treaty should fail, then obviously we are going to have to take
a hard look.
Senator THURMOND. You think that there would have to be a re..
appraisal of the whole situation?
General BROWN. Yes, sir.
Senator THURMOND. I believe you indicate that it is your assump-
tion that the Soviet finion and Japan will probably not seek our per-
mission to fish within 200 miles of our coast even if this bill became
law; is that correct?
General BROWN. That is our assumption.
Senator THUR/VIOND. To your knowledge has the Government of the
United States been informed either officially or unofficially that thiE-
would, in fact, be the case?
General Bitcwx. Not to my personal knowledge.
Senator THURMOND. Assuming that this bill, S. 1988, became law,
would you expand upon the potential problems of enforcement other
than what you have said, or do you think you have covered that pretty
well in your statement and in your answers to questions?
General BRowN. I think there is one other point, Senator. The geog-
raphy of the problem is just massive. If foreign warships enter the
picture, it would overwhelm the Coast Guard's ability to adequately
Patrol and 'enforce. Therefore, 7F foresee the Defense Department's
being called on to support the Coast Gua rd in its efforts.
Senator TxtmmoNn. Regarding the right of the United States to
transit certain areas of the ocean submerged, is it your interpretation
that passage of this legislation could cause other countries to extend
their territori al sea boundaries beyond 12 miles, thus forcing us to
request transit permission? -
General BROWN. That is precisely OUT concern: However, if we take
the lead, I th nk it is reasonable to assume that others may expanc.
on it. If they expand on it, other rights and freedoms of the sea wiL
be lost.
Sen ttor THURMOND. That might be 3ornewhat similar to if we ac-
knowledged Cuba, that Central and South -American countries redg.fr-,
feel like well., if the United States has acknowledged Cuba diplo-
matically, we might fall into line too. It is somewhat an analogous
situation in a way, is it not?
General BROWN. It is indeed.
Senator TntuRmoNo. I personally Wink that would be a mistake.
The State Department may feel otherwise. We will not go into that,
Mr. Moore, at this time.
Mr. MooRE. Thank you. Senator.
Senator Tneurnown. Mr. Moore, I might ask you, do you really feel
(onfident that the Law of the Sea Conference will produce a treaty
that will provide a 209-mile economic zone for ocean areas of coastal
States?
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Mr. MOORE. On the one hand I do not want to underestimate the
difficulties of agreement. The law of the Sea Conference is the largest
conference ever held, and it has the most complex agenda of any
multilateral conference. At the same time, it is our assessment that
based on what we have seen in the preparatory work and the first
session held at Caracas that, in fact, there is an excellent opportunity
for early agreement on a comprehensive oceans law treaty.
If all of the issues at stake that must be part of the package treaty
are satisfactorily resolved, there is simply no question that the treaty
will include at least preferential rights over coastal fisheries out to
200 miles. There is overwhelming support in the Conference for a 200-
mile economic zone. In fact, it is one of the features that makes it
particularly tragic to be seeking this by unilateral action now; action
which could endanger an agreement that we have in hand. The Soviet
Union, for example, as part of a comprehensive satisfactory treaty
will accept the 200-mile economic zone, but they will not accept it
through unilateral actions.
Senator THURMOND. The Soviet Union will accept it if this treaty
is adopted.
Mr. MOORE. That is correct. They have said so in the negotiations.
Senator THURMOND. Now, are the provisions of this bill, S. 1988,
in general the same provisions that you are hoping to achieve in the
Law of the Sea Treaty? Or is there very much variance?
Mr. MOORE. Basically S. 1988 does include the principal substance
of our Law of the Sea position on fisheries, so that the major problem
is not with the substance of the bill. It is with the unilateralism of the
action at this time.
Senator THURMOND. I believe you wrote a letter to Senator
Magnuson dated September 5 and advised that foreign governments
whose vessels fished above the Continental Shelf of the United States
are being notified of new guidelines for the enforcement of our rights
to Continental Shelf fishery resources.
Mr. MOORE. That is correct.
Senator THURMOND. You indicated the effective date of these new
procedures would be December 5.
Mr. MOORE. Yes.
Senator THURMOND. First, is December 5 still the effective date?
Mr. MOORE. Yes it is. We have notified through formal diplomatic
notes all of the governments that are potentially affected and which
fish off our coast.
Senator THURMOND. I have just got 1 minute now. Do you think the
new guidelines will be adhered to?
Mr. MOORE. The new guidelines are going to offer substantially in-
creased leverage for conclusion of much more satisfactory fishery
bilateral and limited multilateral agreements.
Senator THURMOND. I have two or three other questions which I will
ask when I come back or you can answer them for the record. Thank
you very much.
Mr. MOORE. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator McIntyre?
Senator MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I must say to the
chairman that I am pleased with the tone of your questions. This
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problem is not a new one, and while I do not pretend to be an expert,
on this bill. I do know of the very severe difficulties that our New
England fishermen are having with this crude and exploitive use of
ottr coastal waters by, as you say, our friends and allies. I can under-
stand too, General Brown, why the Defense Department has concern
here. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, I think it is primarily a problem,
with the Department of Commerce. You notice this bill moved out of
the Commerce Committee on a 10 to 2 vote, and the. Department of
Commerce should be more vigorous in pressing the Department of
State to move on this. My experience here has taught me that the,
Department, of State spends all of its time being friendly with all of
these countries.
Let, me just ask a few questions here.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, pardon me just a Minute. How are you
going to enforce these matters and so forth?
Senator MCINTYRE. Is it not true, Mr. Moore, that this bill represents
very closely our position at the Caracas conference?
Mr. MOORE. The substantive aspects of the fishery provisions of the
bill are very close to our position in the Conference. That is not our
major problem with the bill, In one word the major problem is the
"unilateralism" of this kind of oceans claim.
Senator McifiTryiro. Is it not a fact that the net meeting of this
Conference will not bring, in the most optimistic viewpoint, any final-
ized agreements on the many differences that you have already seen
displayed at the Caracas Conference?
Mr. MOORE. The next session will be held in Geneva from March 17
to May 10. We feel that if all nations approach this session with a spirit
of genuine negotiation that will be necessary to reach the final agree-
ment, that it would be possible to reach an agreement at that session.
We certainly feel that it is particularly important that we adhere to
the General.. Assembly conference resolution for conclusion of this
I reaty during iL975.
Senator -MCINTYRE. That is a most optimistic reply, Mr. Chairman
most optimistic. I have talked to some of Our colleagues who went tc,
this conference, and they say about all that has been arrived at at the
present time is the magnitude of the differences that exist, the param-
eters of the differences that exist between the various countries.
1 indoubtedly I think that I could say in counter to your response,,
Mr. Moore, that optimistically it will be 2, 3, or possibly even 4 years
iefore a meaningful agreement is reached.
Let me ask you, is it not true that this bill is not an attempt for what
you might, call territorial exclusion; rather it is an attempt to regulate
this area so that we may have some management? Is that not a cor-
rect statement about this bill? We are not trying to exclude anybody
10)111 the 200-mile limit.
Mr, MOORE. That is correct. The claim we would be making is a
(hum for an expanded fisheries contiguous zone, but our concern is that;
I the United ,Rtates can make such a unilateral claim in the fisheries
ireti, that other nations can make unilatmil claims in other areas, and
the result will be a spiralling pattern of escalating claims for the
\vorld's oceans.
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Senator MCINTYRE. One thing I notice, General, in your statement
which I have just heard, when you were talking about overflights,
is this commercial overflight or military overflight that you make
reference to?
General BROWN. No, I had reference, Senator, to military overflights.
Senator MCINTYRE. It was my good fortune or misfortune to be in
Ankara and Athens at the time of the Yom Kippur War, and I may
say that our so-called friends of Greece and Turkey were quick to deny
us rights to overflight. So the allies that take their trawlers and their
factories, or their fish factories ships I guess they call them, and come
down and ride right over the nets of our fishermen, they do not mind
taking, but they are very reluctant to give when we need it, and a lot
of us in New England are fed up. I must say that one of these days
you may have a confrontation, and it will not take place in the Mediter-
ranean, it will take place off the coast of Maine and New Hampshire.
Some of our fishing boats are already armed. It might be a very, very
good thing for our Navy and our Coast Guard to accompany some of
our fishing vessels up there. Maybe a little show of force once in a
while would not involve a confrontation that would bring us to war,
but it might involve a confrontation that would cause our friends and
allies to be more respectful of our rights.
I think that the enforcement provision of this, Mr. Chairman,
might in the interim, while we are trying to pass this bill, might be
a little display of yankee determination to keep what is ours and
to be fair with others. I am not going to recite some of the exploitive
tactics of the Soviets or of the West or East Germans' I believe, who
are in there now. And I am not as aware of Senator Magnuson's
problems as I might be, but I know that I have heard him say that
the State of Washington stocks the rivers of Washington with beauti-
ful salmon, and they float on down into the ocean where they are
captured by the Japanese, and they do not get a chance to return to
spawn and increase the number of fish.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, if I may ask you a question there, why
not tell us, if it is within your knowledge, reliable information, what
are the practices here in these waters you are talking about, if you
are prepared at all to do so? I would be very much interested. I
think all of us would.
Senator MCINTYRE. The practices that have occurred off the New
England coast have been the Russian trawlers, fishing fleets sailing
right through, without regard to the extended nets of the American
fishermen, and cutting up the nets, just destroying them. Ruthless
disregard for a little brotherhood, you might say. They also, of
course, in their practices, as I understand it, will fish for the whole
fish, and just put them into the factory vessels, and deliver them to
the factory vessels which will then just chew them up and put them
into protein that is essential for the people of the Soviet Union to
eat to maintain their health. But in the process of doing that it is
exploitive, it destroys fish. For instance, up there in New England
we have lost the haddock, and as a young man working in my dad's
market, I remember the haddock. It was a good fish, and it was a good
eating fish, and it is gone. The haddock is gone, virtually disappeared.
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cad are not far behind. The population of herring, which are a
basic plankton converter to the ocean, and the ocean economy has
declined by an estimated 40 percent in the last 2 years. 'rho 200-mile
limit, as I said,, does not exclude all foreign entry from coming into
the management zone.
I think the referral of this bill to this committee. does give the
Defense Department an opportunity to state their case, hut .1 do
think that the issue before the Congress of the TTnited States is that
we have suffered for 2 years, or 3 years, while the. State Department
lianky-panks around. We are fed up. This is a good bill, it represents
our position, ,thd I do not know what you are talking about in this
vigorous action that you are going to take. You have not taken vig-
orous action so far in the State Department. I would like to see a
couple of our destroyers escort, like T saw over in Athens out there
protecting the. Mediterranean. I would like to see them going up and
down the Atlantic Coast, and T would like to see a little muscle, and
think the New England fishermen would like to see a little muscle
too.
Dkente we like a.nd want, but to get knocked out and run over, not
only by the foreign producers of oil. but by our friends, by their ruth-
less mining of our seas, I think this is a. good bill and it should pass.
am disturbed and reluctant to agree with my good friend here, John
Moore, when he says this is all going to be settled in the enforcement
provisions that they now have underway, or in the future of the
tlaracas agreements or the Law of the Sea Conference that is forth-
coming. We, in New -England, are disgusted and we are ready to arm
our own ships, if we cannot protect our rights.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to say this.
The CILATI2NIAN. Ilank you, Senator, very much.
Senator Taft.
Senator TAFT. Thar k you. Mr. Chairn.tan.
Mr. Moore, if we do not pass a bill of this sort, what leverage are
we going to have at the Law of the Sea Conference to et an agree-
ment, dealing with fishing rights that we are concerned with here
Moonn. Senator Taft, T think that really highlights one of the
most important points which is What is the effect on our negotiating
leverage and. our bargaining position of introducing or passing this
legislation. I think the first thing we would have, to look at is in terms
of what this bill does, that is expanded coastal state fishery juris-
diction. Do we need any additional leverage in the Law of the See,
Conference. I think the answer to that is as far as the conference
is concerned there is no leverage needed on this issue. There is already
agreement in the conference that if all of the other issues are satisfac-
torily resolved, which are the really tough ones to deal with in this
conference, there will be a. substantial e tension of coastal state juris-
diction OVP,V coastal fisheries at least, out to 200 miles on a preferential
tights basis.
Senator TA7r. With the conditions yon have put on, it sounds
like a kind of a pie-in-the-sky proposition. However, it is possible
that we may be able to ..r.et an agreement in the area of fishing, rights
without resolving all of the other issues, because I am inclined to agree
with Senator gellityre. I think it is going to take 2 or 3, 4 years to
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be very optimistic to expect that we are going to get resolution of a
lot of the other questions.
Mr. MOORE. I think it would be very difficult to resolve these prob-
lems without resolving the other ,fundamental ocean law issues. One
of the reasons for the difficult situation we are in on bilateral and
limited multilateral negotiations is precisely that we do not have the
kind of bargaining leverage in these contexts that will enable us to
resolve that problem. We do have that leverage in the Law of the Sea
Conference, because all of the coastal nations are participating. Even
a nation such as the Soviet Union, fishing off our coast, has a broad
range of ocean interests that are also at stake. So, when those interests
are dealt with in a way which is satisfactory to them, and I am opti-
mistic, I see those issues being resolved in a timely fashion, then we
will be able to easily reach agreement on the fisheries issues.
?
The real negotiation on the coastal fishing issue is the question of
whether it should go beyond preferential rights for the coastal States.
And this of course, gets into the necessity to protect distant water
coastal fishing interests. Our shrimp fishing fleets, for example, operat-
ing out of the Gulf States that fish within 200 miles of other nations,
and our tuna interests that fish within 200 miles of other nations. But I
think fundamentally the dilemma that this committee and the Con-
gress has to deal with in this legislation is that we do have a problem
in fisheries, and as Senator McIntyre has said correctly, it is a serious
problem in the protection of some of the stocks. Haddock is a good
example. But the paradox that is by taking unilateral action now we
could undercut the best opportunity our Nation has ever had to resolve
these fishery problems.
Senator TArr. Can you explain what international rights we have
as to fishing beyond the 6-mile limit, or if you would like the 12-mile
limit, but on the Continental Shelf? You seem to imply that there is
some such superior rights in that connection.
Mr. MOORE. That is correct. There are basically three sources today,
for coastal State fisheries jurisdiction. The first is a fishery continguous
zone out to 12 miles in which the coastal State has jurisdiction to
regulate fisheries. The second is under the 1958 Continental Shelf Con-
vention, which has been widely adhered to and is customarily inter-
? national law today, in which we have exclusive rights to the Con-
tinental Shelf living resources throughout the range of the U.S.
Continental Shelf which, of course, goes very substantially beyond 12
miles. The third basis would be a bilateral or a limited multilateral
? agreement that the United States would have entered into with other
nations relating to fishery problems off our coast.
Senator TAFT. What is the Canadian position with regard to this
question? They have as substantial a stake as we if not more
practically.
Mr. MOORE. That is correct. They certainly have a very substantial
fisheries interest, and the Canadian position in the Law of the Sea
Conference on these fisheries issues is very close to that of the United
States. The Canadians, however, also, as I think is true of essentially
every nation participating in this negotiation at the present time, have
refrained from any unilateral action in this interim period during the
continuation of the Law of the Sea Conference. Now, there are, as
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Crene,ral Brown has indicated, a number of States that have claimed the
200-mile territorial sea. Should the United States make any of these
broader unilateral claims, the effect on the world's oceans and the pat-
tern of unilateralism would be very substantially different than if those
claims are made by some of the smaller countries that have a less broad
range of ocean interests.
Senator TAFT. What is the Mexican position?
Mr. MOORE, The Mexicans also recognize the 12-mile fishery con-
tiguous zone, as do we and the Canadians, and the Continental Shelf
fishery regime. They have not made any major unilateral claims be-
yond that.
Senator TAFT. When you say that you are going to have to resolve
the other issues before we can get the fishery issues resolved, are you
talking also about all of these questions with regard to development of
the mineral deposits under the seabed and so forth? We have so much
apparent difference of opinion with many of the developing nations
on this.
Mr. MOORE. Yes. I am talking about those interests also. In fact, one
of the great dilemmas in all of oceans law, and we can see it in the First
and Second U.N. Conferences on the Law of the Sea, is that it is a mis-
take to try to take the issues in isolation, to pick out one thing like the
breadth of the territorial seas as we did at the conference in 1960. The
difficulty is ycu cannot then functionally separate the kinds of resource
jurisdiction that makes sense in coastal States from the kinds of navi-
gational and other freedoms that ought to be protected and remain in
the international community, because you are taking them one at a
Lime. States are free to pick and choose among one treaty that satisfies
them on fish, End they do not sign the treaty on straits and navigational
freedom so that the only way we feel to satisfactorily resolve these
problems, and the only way to get that oceans treaty really is an overall
package. That makes it harder to reach agreement, that makes it more
time-consuming, but .we feel that we are headed toward an agreement
in all of these major areas.
Senator TAFT. What is going to prevent getting around the agree-
ment by using the flag or ships in the registry of nations that do not
participate?
Mr. MooRE. To be successful. I think it has to be a treaty that is very
widely adhered to including all of the major powers and a large seg-
ment of the rest of the international community. The kind of proce-
dures that we are using in the conference are procedures that lead to
that, basically consensus techniques, t'Oortgh again they slow things
down and that is part of the reason for the difficulty. At the same time,
it leads to an agreement that when you get it, really is a meaningful
political agreement among these countries. Beyond that, I think it
simply is a question of if the treaty is widely adhered to and becomes
customary international law then, of course, our interests would be
protected as a signatory to that treaty.
The reverse of the situation is the one that we are concerned about,
which is that without a treaty, a pattern of unilateralism is going to
through time be extremely harmful to the broad range of U.S. ocean
interests, which by the way is not merely the fisheries and the defense
which we have been talking about this morning, but very strongly goes
to the question of our mineral resource jurisdiction over the hydro-
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carbons of the continental margins of the world; it is a question of the
protection of marine scientific research, the question of a good environ-
mental and conservation regime in the world's oceans; it is a question
of conflict management, of having good dispute settlement machinery
for resolving ocean disputes. So that we really have a very broad range
of interests that we feel can only be effectively protected by a compre-
hensive treaty.
Senator TAFT. It sounds very good if you can work it out, and I am
sure that you are right in the desirability of working it all out. But I
still get back to the original question. I am not sure we have the lever-
age, and I am not sure that the passage of this bill, or at least the threat
of passage of it would not add to that leverage. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd?
Senator BRYD. Nothing at the present time, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nunn.
- Senator NUNN. I have a few questions, Mr. Chairman.
What nations now have a 200?mile limit?
Mr. MOORE. There are seven Latin American States with the 200?
mile territorial sea at the present time. These are Peru, Ecuador, Bra-
zil, El Savadore, Panama, Uraguay, and Argentina, and one African
country, Sierra Leone.
Senator NUNN. No European countries?
Mr. MOORE. That is correct.
Senator NUNN. Russia does not claim a 200?mile limit?
Mr. MOORE. No, the Soviets claim a 12-mile territorial sea.
Senator NUNN. How about Japan?
Mr. MOORE. Japan does not recognize any fishery jurisdiction beyond
the 12?mile fishery contiguous zone.
Senator NUNN. What do they recognize beyond the 12 miles?
Mr. MOORE. They do recognize the mineral resource rights under the
Continental Shelf Convention, but Japan is not a signatory to that
convention.
Senator NuNN. What is the difference between Japan's claim of that
territorial waters and the United States claim under the present law?
Mr. MOORE. We both, of course, recognize the lawfulness of the 12-
mile fishery contiguous zone so we would have no difference at all on
? the legal aspects of how far one could unilaterally control stocks. We
do have some differences with respect to the Continental Shelf Con-
vention and living resources under that convention. But, it is our po-
sition that that convention is strongly customary international law at
the present time. There is certainly no credible case today of an inter-
national legal claim to a, 200-mile territorial sea, or to a 200-mile or so
extended fishery contiguous zone.
Senator NUNN. General Brown, what limits does Japan put on say
our attack submarines or our nuclear submarines? How close can they
get to the Japanese shore?
General BROWN. Senator Nunn, we have not had any open inter-
course on nuclear munitions with Japan or others. We neither confirm
nor deny the presence of such weapons. Ships with nuclear propulSion
do enter their waters.
Senator NUNN. What about just your normal submarine activity,
non-nuclear? Can they get within 12 miles or are they
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56
General -BROWN. We recognize Japan's concern over nuclear emis-
sions and those matters, but nuclear propelled attack submarines make
port visits to Japan.
Senator MINN. I mean 12 miles? I am trying to define that territory.
Is it 12 miles?
Mr. Moon. 1 believe it is 3 miles.
General BROWN. Three miles.
Senator NuNN. General Brown, the thing I think which is your ob-
jection mainly is the limitations on our strategic forces and possible
defense forces within the 200-mile, limit. What objections do you have
o this proposal that, you would not also have to a 200-mile negotiated
treaty? Would not those same objections apply to that?
General BuowN. I do not, believe so, Senator Nunn. Our concern
with this bill stems from the fact that the United States would do it
alone. it would be a unilateral action?this is a judgment which
Senator Taft may not share, according to his statement?and it would
undercut the efforts of the United. States to attain a, treaty which would
not only protect fisheries, but also the management of resources, and
most importantly, the other freedoms that are normal to the oceans.
Senator NT:NN. What I am saying is if there is a 200-mile limit ne-
!fotiated by the treaty, has the Department of Defense got a protective,
position within that 200 miles on both our submarines, attack and
strategic?
General BROWN. Yes, sir. The treaty we seek protects transit of
straits, overflight, and the normal navigational rights that we have
today.
Senator NUN N. So a treaty, if negotiated, would protect our rights
i n these areas, our military rights?
General linowN. Yes, sir.
Senator NuN.N. But this legislation does not protect the rights of
other nations within our 200 miles?
General Bnowx. It sets a unilateral example, we fear, that other
nations would follow. We are not certain they would limit their ac-
tions to fishery rights only ; they might include some of the, other
freedoms.
Senator NITN N. \That about the Soviet Union under this legisla-
f ion, as you interpret it? Could they have a submarine operation within
200 miles of our shore if this legislation became law?
General BaowN. This legislation would have no direct bearing on
I hat. It would merely call on the United States to police that area out
to 200 miles against people who are harvesting fish.
Senator N UNN. Just fish?
General Baowx. That is right.
Senator NUNN. So if anybody else limited our submarines, they
would have to go touch beyond what we are doing here in order to
justify it ? If they simply limited, if other nations in the world did
exactly what we are doing with this legislation, it would not in any
way inhibit your submarines from transit, both attack and strategic?
General BROWN. That is correct.
Senator Ntrs-N. And your objections .rire based on not the legislation
being enacted by other countries, but tie fact that, it is your fear tha
they will go beyond this legislation, is that right ?
General 1 iFlOW N. Exactly.
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Senator NUNN. The seven Latin American and one or two African
nations have claimed the '200 miles, is that strictly fishing, or does
that also prohibit your submarine activity?
Mr. MOORE. It claims a territorial sea, which under recognized inter-
national law prohibits both overflight and submerged transit, and
frankly runs the risk of a variety of other serious restrictions on tran-
sit as well.
I should add, by the way, that both the Soviets and the Japanese in
the Law of the Sea negotiations have approached us about this legis-
lation and expressed the most severe concerns about it and have indi-
cated that they share precisely the difficulties that we have with it,
that it is going to lead to the kind of unilateralism that through time
would restrict the navigational freedom of the Soviet Union, Japan,
and indeed all nations.
Senator NUNN. I understand that. What I want to know in simple
terms is are we prohibited from having submarine activity within 200
miles of the nations that have now claimed 200 miles?
General BROWN. We are. But we are now prohibited only by na-
tions that have no ability to police their prohibitions.
Mr. MOORE. Their claim certainly seeks to prohibit it but interna-
tional law would not bear their claim out.
Senator NUNN. You do not recognize their claim?
Mr. Moom. Exactly.
Senator NUNN. They do not have anything to knock our attack sub-
marines out of the area?
General BROWN. Exactly, Sir; Somalia and Sierra Leone do not
present any direct military threat to the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will yield on that, that is not a test,
though.
Senator NUNN. I yield.
The CHAIRMAN. Really the power to retaliate is really not the test,
is it? What you are opposed to is the fact that they have these prohibi-
tions on our activities?
General BROWN. Exactly.
The CHAIRMAN. That you think are impractical and wrong?
General BROWN. I was being a bit facetious, but I was talking about
their power to police their prohibition, not their power to otherwise
retaliate against our actions.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The fact that they do not have that police
power, still the prohibition is on you.
General BROWN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. With moral powers and force, you cannot proceed
without violating their mandate. That is right, is it not?
General BROWN. That is right. I would point out another thing, that
none of these countries, except possibly Panama, have claims in areas
in which we are prone to operate.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator, thank you for yielding. I had wanted to
bring that out.
Senator NUNN. The question I was wondering was, if this legisla-
tion alone were enacted by other nations, it would not prohibit our
submarine activities. They would have to go further than this legisla-
tion, and then they would be in the same position as the seven Latin
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American nations and the two African nations which, as you said, de
not have any practical effect because we do not recognize it, No. 1, and.
No. 2, they do not have any means of enforcement. So what I am won-
(-tering, what then is the basis of the theory? If we are going to not
recognize a claim beyond this, and then, practically speaking, they do
not have the means to enforce it anyway, what is that theory based
upon? I can see the State, Department's fear, but I am talking about
yours.
General BROWN. There are other nations who would have the ability
to police, and whose unilateral actions we would care about.
Senator NUNN. Do you think Japan and Russia and some of the
larger nations then would go beyond this, and say, since the United.
States prohibits fishing within 200 miles, we are going to prohibit
submarines?
General BROWN. That is a fear. Whether it is a reasonable fear is
a matter of judgment.
Senator NuNN. The Soviet Union would not have any real reason.
to do that though because we would do the same thing, would we not?
General BROWN. We may.
Senator NUNN. I am trying to pin down, the fear. This fear is basi-
cally one of assuming other nations are going to go way beyond what
we are doing. The other question I had---
General BROWN. May I add another Defense Department fear you
have not touched on, Senator?
Senator NUNN. Let me, ask this question and I will be glad to, but
T want to get this one in while I have got the time. From the State,
Department -view, when does the Law of the Sea Treaty, when is
your most optimistic estimate of when that could be completed?
Mr. Mooun. 1975'. We feel it is particularly important to complete,
the treaty pursuant to the General Assembly schedule which calls.
for any subsequent session or sessions to be held next year.
Senator NUNN. Are you saying you think it can possibly be corn-
! fleted during that time?
Mr. MOORE. .17-es, sir. It certainly can.
Senator NUNN. What if we put an effective date on this legislation
of January 1, 1976, and we also say in this legistlation if a Law of
the Sea Conference produces a treaty that this legislation shall be
null and void. -Would that obviate your fears?
Mr. MOORE. No; it would not because we' feel this would have much
the same effect upon :the negotiations in undercutting our bargaining.
ability because it would be very clear to those with whom we were
negotiating that we have basically put them under a unilateral threat,
Senator NUN. That is not going to increase your bargaining posi-
t ion rather than diminishing it?
Mr. MOORE. No. This is the point that I think I did not make clear
earlier. It. is just the reverse. In the conference we have some agree-
ment on an extension of jurisdiction over coastal stocks. That is almost.
imiversially agreed and is not a problem.: The problem is in getting
good guarantees in these expanded areas Of resource jurisdiction for
the protection of navigational freedom, for protection of our distant,
water fishing interests, for protection of marine scientific research.,
and other interests that would be very seriously damaged if we give
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some states the idea that through unilateral action they can get the
resource jurisdiction they want in these broad areas without the
necessity to agree to the kind of limitations that will protect those
interests. So in fact, S. 1988 very substantially undercuts our bargain-
ing leverage in the negotiations.
Senator Ntrxic. You would rather have that effective date on the
bill than not having it on there, would you not?
Mr. MOORE. If such legislation were passed, which we think would be
very seriously harmful in either case, yes; it would be better to have
the date than not to have the date.
Senator NUNN. You would have more leverage with the date than
without?
Mr. MOORE. That is correct, but we would have a great deal more
leverage still if we can pursue other ways of trying to resolve our
fishery problems.
Senator NUNN. That is exactly the State Department's position when
we had the Jackson-Nunn amendment which we said we were going
to get when we did not get the offset, and 6 months later the State De-
partment reversed that position and said no, it really does help us a lot.
Mr. MOORE. I can merely testify to the situation in the Law of the
Sea Conference, and with respect to this issue. There is no question
that this has undercut our bargaining ability very substantially in this
negotiation, particularly to protect the United States defense interests.
Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I would like for General Brown
to get the chance to answer that second part of the question.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
General BROWN. I would like to make one point, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nunn seemed to state?if I understood him correctly?that
the Defense interests primarily stem from a fear of the spread of this
unilateral action. It is not only that. It is that the Defense Department
is anxiously interested in success at the Law of the Sea Conference
because we want, in the national interest, the things that can be
achieved by that route. So there are the two concerns.
Senator NUNN. May I ask one other question?
The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.
Senator NuNi.r. The thing that puzzles me about the defense posi-
tion is about the straits and passageways, Gibraltar and all of those.
I do not see how it makes any difference whether you have a 3 mile,
or a 2 mile or 200 miles on those. The 200 miles, it seems to me does
not affect it any more than 3 miles or 12 miles. Would you explain
that? I am sure I missed it.
General BROWN. The fishing right as written in this bill would not,
but if they extended it out?to be a territorial sea, in effect, we could
still stay, but we could not stay submerged, not in the territorial water.
Senator NUNN. What about Bosporus?
Admiral MORRIS. Bosporus is not covered in this because it is
specifically dealt with in another treaty.
Mr. MOORE. That will not be dealt with in the Law of the Sea Con-
ference.
Senator NUNN. I am still not sure. Twelve miles which we have
on the books now and 200 miles claimed, if another nation is going
to do it, all of these passageways are within 12 miles of the shore,
so why was 200 a problem?
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General BROWN. We now have free transit?high seas freedom--
through straits more than 6 nms wide.
Senator Nuisw. I understand that. You say on page 2, General
Brown, "In the absence of free passage through straits, an extension of
the territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles would force us, as to many straits
used for international navigation, inc [tilling Gibraltar, to attempt 1:0
strike the best possible bilateral bargain for consent to transit su'a-
merged." I do :not understand.
Now we are talking about a 200 mile fishing bill here, and you are
talking about 3 to 12 miles, and all of these, all of the passageways
are within 3 mites of shore. So I do not understand the preference of
200 miles.
General BROWN. thider the Law of the Sea Treaty which we a:re
seeking, this freedom of passage will be guaranteed, No. 1. No. 2--
Senator NiTNN. It is now already though, is it not?
General BROWN. No; just outside 3 miles.
Mr. INtooail. A number of states would challenge it. For example,
Spain challenges it for the Strait of Gilbraltar right now. We would
hope the Law of the Sea Conference would make it abundantly clear
that there were these guarantees of free transit through over, and
iirlder straits used for international navigation.
General BROWN. I would like to refer to my sea lawyer, Admiral
Morris.
Senator Ni INN. 1 think this is important, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Let the admiral answer,
Admiral Monms. Mr. Chairman, Senator Nunn, I think this prob-
lem centers around the second part of the general's response; that :is
the interest in achievement of the treaty. As you say, there are many
straits that would be closed by an extension of the territorial sea,
whether it is 6-mile, 12-mile, or 200-m ile, Inherent in the treaty that
we seek--and. we have made this very clear?is free transit of straits
regardless of the distance, from high seas to high seas. That is
then the reason for the, second part of the general's response con-
cerning the treaty. Whether it is 12 miles or 200 miles, it is to preserve
this right of transit. The concern for 200 miles really applies more
to military mobility overall. On the issue of straits any point in an
ocean for as wide as 400 miles would only assimilate a strait ; by
definition it would not he a strait. We Would lose the right of sub-
merged transit and overflight in every area of the world so overlapped
by territorial seas.
There are many straits that would be closed by extension of terri-
torial seas even to 12 miles. We have, however, made it very clear that
a fundamental basis :for this treaty and, our adherence to it will be the
underlying right of transit regardless o:E the extension of the territorial
sea.
Senator MUNN. You are saying the number of miles then is really
mmateri al, bat, this unilateral action by us
Admiral MoRms. In straits it is.
Senator NUNN. Might preclude- a, .successful completion of the Con.-
ference, which would then put down in writing what we already claira
to be the ease on free, passage?
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Admiral Momus. On those straits where there is now, by our defini-
tion, a high seas corridor, yes, sir, and there again it goes back to Gen-
eral Brown's second concern.
Senator NUNN. So we are using free passage in some areas where it
is not really part of a concrete international agreement.
Admiral. MORRIS-. We are using it in the sense of high seas rights by
our definition of high seas measured against the 3 miles we recognize
at this time?and there are over 116 straits where there is such a high
seas corridor.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen, thank you. There are others
that have questions no doubt. I have some questions here that I am
just going to ask unanimous consent that they be inserted in the record
for your attention, gentlemen. If they have already been answered in
your opinion, you can refer to that point and point it out.
Senator Thurmond, I believe you had some additional questions
that you did not quite finish before we left. And I want him to show
that map again because there are members here who were not here.
But let us hear from Senator Thurmond ,first. Senator Thurmond.
Senator Mammon). I had just a few more questions, and had almost
finished, a-n.d they can be answered for the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the Senator's remaining ques-
tions will be inserted in the record for proper answers. ?
Senator McIntyre., that would bring us back to you.
Senator MCINTYRE. I am a little bit confused here now by *hat I
understand the policy as declared in the purposes of this bill states. As
I understand it, it is the, position of the United States of America at
this Caracas Conference?
Mr. MOORE. It is very close to our position on fisheries, that is correct.
Senator MCINTYRE. If that is our position, why is General Brown in
here objecting to the bill? Do we not check with the military before we
take a position?
Mr. MOORE. Yes we do, and this is an interagency position that in-
'eludes all of the executive branch. But again, the problem is the
difference between unilaterally doing this, and agreeing in a treaty
which will guarantee the things that we are particularly concerned
about, and not only defense, but other things including navigation,
including the straits- issue, and I think this is the most important
point, that we cannot simply compare the similar claim that the
United States is making in this bill with what would happen around
the world if only that claim were to be adopted.
If we can do this unilaterally, other nations can and will make
other unilateral 'claims, many of which we feel will be severely dam-
aging to our interests.
The CTIA1RMA]s.v", Let Rs see if he has other questions.
Senator MCINTYRE. I just want to point out to My good colleague
here, Senator- Nunn, that it is my opinion that the statement of Mr.
Moore about the conclusion of this treaty. in 1975 is grossly opti-
mistic. Roughly there are I think approximately 100 nations conven-
ing at this Conference, and after you come to these agreements you
are ? then going to have to go back to their respective countries and
get whatever approval their constitutions or laws require. Meantime,
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other nations are decimating our national resources. And are we
going to have to put up with that?
lie says that unilateral action may set off fireworks. Good. We
ought to have some fireworks.
Now I will be happy to look at your mop.
`1711e, CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator. Thank: you.
Gentlemen, let me say this before we leave. It looks to me like this
matter just comes rapidly down to the point of what are you going
to be able to do about this thing short of passing a bill like this, .111A1
jOSI how strong can :) ou make your position now, within reason, as
to prospects of getting action. As Senator McIntyre said, parliamen-
tary bodies, fled: the tr%ity, if it is consummated, has to go before, very
many of them, with the delays that go with it, and how positive in.
bedrock now can the State Department be on this matter?
Mr. IV:1?mm Mr. Chairman, I think that states the problem. very
well, and I inn very sympathetic with the concerns, the very real con-
cerns that Senator McIntyre and his constituents have. The question
is, How do we really go aboui, in the interest of all of our ocean inter-
ests and our fisheries interests, resolving those problems? We do feel
that this is an extremely difficult negotiation; nevertheless, that :it is
the best way to definitively resolve these problems of coastal fisheries.
We do not feel that we should simply sit back in the interim period
and take no action. We think it is part icularly important in this in-
terim period, until such a treaty can be concluded that we take elec-
tive measures to protect our fish stocks. All of us must also realize
the possibility that this treaty will not be concluded on the timetable
that we seek.
We feel that the new enforcement procedures that we have an-
nounced, plus the kinds of bilateral negotiations that we will be en--
gaged. in over the course of the next year, phis other measures that we
are studying at this time will offer very substantially increased protec-
tion for our :fish stocks. But I think the fundamental problem that we
have to face is that we have an opportunity now, we have the best op-.
portunity we have ever had as a nation, not only on the fisheries prob-
lem, but on all of our oceans issues, to get a definitive resolution. .And
i f we move unilateral y now on these claims. it is not merely fanciful
I hat clainis of other nations will lead to a territorial sea or other dam-
aging ocean claims
My own feeling is we are likely to see very expansive territorial sea
claims around the world should the United States go this route,.
The C4 [AIRMAN. You speak to the possibility of bilateral agreements
if you do not get this comprehensive agreement. Are the possibilities
bright, as to bilateral agreements with Japan or the Soviets? They
seem to be the main ones that you are concerned about.
Mr. MOORE. I think the possibilities of such agreement on more
favorable terms are good. At the present time we do have fishery
bilaterals that are limited to certain species with both the Soviet Union
and the Japanese, and we will be renegotiating those.
In addition? we have announced these new measures which will re-
quire,, for all nations that are using bottom tending gear which would
normally result in the catch of U.S. Continental Shelf living resources,
bilateral agreements with the United States for protection of thos
stocks. So, this will be an additional area in which we will be seeking.
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added protection. I believe we will be getting very substantially in-
creased leverage from the new enforcement measures that we have
announced.
The CIEURIVIAN I assume that all Senators have finished their ques-
tions now. I think the map is worth looking at again by those that are
present now. Do you want to point out the map, Mr. Moore?
Mr. MOORE. Yes, I would be happy to, Senator. I think the first
problem, and we realize that what we are talking about in this exten-
sion is a fishery contiguous zone, so the question is what is likely to
happen if we go the route of unilateralism, will others claim a 200W
mile territorial sea, will they be as restrained as our claim? We feel
the answer to that is they will not. They will make the kind of claim
that appeals to them.
If through time a pattern of unilateralism were to lead to a 20
mile territorial sea, we would have a situation where all of the pink
areas, which is more than a third of the world's oceans, would be closed
to overflight as of right, they would be .clOsed to submerged transit
as of right, and they may have a -variety of other restrictions that
? might be imposed.
In addition, we could see that areas, for example, such as the
Mediterranean would be completely overlapped by these 200-mile
territorial sea claims.
Using the zone locked chart, let me indicate one other effect of a
200-mire territorial sea around the world's oceans. It is that even
though coastal states by definition face an ocean, more than a ma-
jority of all coastal states, there would be 66 out of 119, would totally
lose their overflight rights and their rights to submerged transit, and
a variety of other potential restrictionsif you had a 200-mile territorial
sea around the world's oceans. The reason for that is these states
would have to go through the territorial sea of one or more neigh-
boring states in order to have access to their own seaports. Were that
to occur, it obviously would have the greatest kind of impact on the
sovereignty of those nations, on their ability to protect themselves,
their ability to receive protection from their allies, and their ability
to control commercial shipping in and out of their country. Those are
just the most Obvious of the surface effects of a 200-mile territorial sea.
You can see what a 200-mile territorial sea would do in this pink
area, there simply is no important trade route that does not go through
a number of differing territorial seas under a 200-mile approach. And
are those states going to impose different standards for ship construc-
tion, for example, require a kind of hull construction that we do not
have? This is one of the kinds of concerns that we have if we go to
unilateralism.
One other point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make is that we
may look at the situation as one of, well, why don't we make the
fisheries claim, because if the other nation makes a claim of 200 miles
for a territorial sea, we simply, would not recognize it, and we have
the military power, we can protect our vital interests in these most
serious situations. The difficulty is first that through time that kind
of unilateral pattern of claims in the world's oceans is going to in A
variety of very real ways raise the costs to all ocean interests in the
United States. We probably are not going to use the 7th Fleet to
protect certain kinds of marine scientific research. We have seen in
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the past that we have not used our military power to protect certain
kinds of distant water tuna fishing, interests off Ecuador and Peru.
We have a serious potential for difficulties in bilateral relations; fo:c
example, efforts to cause us to enter into new bilaterals every year to
pass submerged through Gibratar, at great expense to the United
States.
The second difficulty with an approach which says, why don't, we
get what we want and we can continue to resist the claim of othar
nations, is that that is the converse of pte,cisely the situation the Soviet
Inion would be in if we pass S. 1988. If the United States unilaterally
extends its contiguous fishing zone to 200 miles, they are then faced
with a situation of how do we protect our interests? Do we take a
loss of our fundamental interests in fishing right in the middle of
one of the most important international negotiations, or do we use
force or some other leverage to back up the kind of clann that we feel
is essential ? This is one of the things that makes us very concerned
about the potential for conflict.
The CitATRMAN. May I ask a question sight there now? Others may
know but I do not. Who are the main offenders here on this fishing
along our coastline? I have heard tile Soviets mentioned and the
Japanese. Who else?
Senator MoINTyRE. East Germany.
Mr.Alooicn. The two largest fishing nations off our coast are the
Soviets and the Japanese, and there is East Germany and a number
of East Eurcpean countries, and Spain, and there are a number of
others that fisa off our coast.
The CHAiumAx. Senator McIntyre, do you have any additional
names to give on that? Do you know?
Senator MCINTYRE. I suspect the Polish.
The (III/kiln/AN. I see.
Senator MoINTyRe. East Germany, Poland, Rumania.
The C IIAIRMAN. Where else do we fish? I know where the shrimp-
boats off Biloxi go to, but I don't know where everybody else goes to.
Mr. MoouF. This is very important on the impact of the 200-mile
claim. Once again, though your legislation has an exception built
for distant water fishing, there is no reasonable expectation filat if
the other nation went unilateral that we would build in such expec-
tations. We, have two sets of problems. One set of problems would
be the distant water shrimp fleets that are operating out of Mississippi,
for example, and other gulf States which are fishing off of Mexico,
or within 200 miles of the coast of a number of other countries in fie
Caribbean and Latin America.
The, second problem we have would be our distant water tuna fleet
which operates in many cases out of California, and I believe increas-
ingly out of Puerto Rico, which goes down off the coast of Latin
America at the present time and in some other areas, and is fishing
within 000 miles of these areas. And we do not feel that it is a rational
way of conserving tuna to have just a 200-mile limit. It certairly
would very severely hurt our own tuna interests by passage of this
bill.
The CHAIRMAN. What else is there on the east coast that goes to
other a seas, so far as you know; I mean fishing industry?
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Mr. MooRE. Some of our New England fishermen fish in areas which
fall within a projected Canadian 200-mile zone. Tit addition, there is
a substantial spiny lobster industry operating out of southeast Florida,
which fishes in areas off the Bahamas.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, what other questions do we have? May.
I ask for volunteers here now to ask questions?
Senator McINTynE. Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. Senator McIntyre.
Senator MCINTYRE. To (rive the members of the committee a brief
feeling of the impact of this as it pertains to the New England coast
and the east coast, let me say for the record that the Soviet Union
maintains large, highly modernized fishing fleets operating off the
northeast coast, and as far south as Cape Hatteras. In addition to the
Soviet Union Canada, Spain, West Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Ru-
mania, East Union,
Japan, Italy, and others now fish in the north-
east or New England.
In 1972, the number of foreign fishery vessels sighted monthly
ranged from 14 to 329. The fisheries catch amounted to 960,000 metric
tons, equal to the total catch of American fishermen in this area.
In 1972, our per capita consumption of fish was the highest in 45
years, but the quantity of fish landed by American fishermen has
decreased. In 1970 to 1971, the northeast fleet landed 46 percent less
than it had 9 years earlier. The bulk of fish eaten in the United States
are imported. Foreign vessels have succeeded in outfishing our fleets
and have depleted our supplies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And the State Department rolls merrily
along.
Does any other member of the committee wish to say anything at
this time? Any comments or questions to our witnesses? There seem
to be no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.
Gentlemen, I understand that Senator McIntyre has asked you if
you wish to say anything further?
General BROWN. IIe has, and we do not, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Nothing further?
We want to thank you for your appearance here and for preparing
for it, and it seems that you were well prepared.
The committee tomorrow, gentlemen, will hear Senator Magnuson
and others, which include our own Senator McIntyre if he wishes,
and I hope he can attend the meeting. And we will move along as
far as we can on this bill this week, and we must return it to the Senate
floor by the 15th of November.
I will repeat so that you will be sure that you understand that we
are in a time limitation on this, and it was about ready to be taken up
on the floor. If you have any additional testimony we just invite you
now to send it on in representing the departments you have. We are
going to be away, so you might want to file answers or what you think
is an answer to other testimony that may be given here. So we will give
you that opportunity now.
General BROWN.. Thank you.
Mr. MOORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, gentlemen, we will take a recess until
tomorrow at 10 o'clock.
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PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR ;.TENNIS TO GENERAL BROWN
Questions: What specific evidence do you have that passage of this fisheries
legislation would promote retaliatory measures by foreign nations which could
adversely affect U.S. national security?
Answer. This view is based upon two significant and, in my judgment, highly
Frobative facts. First, is the behavior of the international community. Prior to
The United States' claim to a 12-mile fishing 2;one in 1966 only 25 states claimed
a territorial sea of 12 or more miles. Now over 50 states claim a territorial sea
of 12 or more miles. Second, opinion samples have been taken by both the U.S.
delegation at Caracas, and U.S. Embassies around the world. The responses show
that a significant number of countries are withholding action on contemplated
unilateral claims to extended jurisdiction of various types pending a compre-
hensive Law of the Sea Treaty. Many of these indicate that they would proceed
unilaterally prior to completion of the Convention should the U.S. enact S. 1988.
In my view, the United States takes a very serious risk if we ignore this
evidence.
Question: What specific retaliatory measures by foreign nations can you
envision as a result of the passage of this fishery legislation that could threaten
or impede, the IS. strategic military posture? What is your assessment of the
likelihood of these retalatory measures? What specific retaliatory measures
by foreign naticns can you envision as a result of the passage of this fishery
legislation that could threaten or impede the U.S. conventional military posture?
What is your assessment of the likelihood of these retaliatory measures?
Answer: With regard to our strategic posture, the most significant retaliatory
measure the nations of the world could take would be to declare the 200-mile
territorial sea discussed in answer to your previous question. Some nations will
limit their claims to a '200-mile fishing zone, which will have no strategic im-
pact. Other nations will claim only the right to a pollution control zone. They
will attempt to exercise control over vessels bringing vital energy supplies to our
shores, over nu(21ear powered vessels, and over fishing and other craft. 1 art
certain that our movement in this area wou%1 lead other nations to take action
4.ontra ry lo our security interests. There is no doubt as to this. The only question
is the degree.
These unilateral measures would adversely impact on the survivability and the
effeetiveness of ant seaborne strategic nuclear deterrent. Virtually every passage
now narrow enough to no called a strait would be encompassed by a 200-mile
Thus, al?. the straits of the world through and over which the United
States currently exercises high seas rights are potentially threatened by this
bill. The site for localized aggression could he chosen in an area where restric-
tions on our mobility would place the United States at the greatest disadvantage.
My conviction is that these retaliatory measures will be taken, and frem all
the evidence available to me. I believe there is a high probability that various
combinations of these types of claims will result in a significant impact on our
security interesss.
Question: Is it not true that any such retaliatory measures by foreign notions
would have an equally adverse effect on the strategic and conventional military
posture of the Soviet Union?
Answer: No. The past conduct of the Soviet Union clearly indicates that they
may not consider themselves bound by international law with regard to rules
which inhibit their activities in areas where they feel their important interests
are involved. The United States, on the other hand, has traditionally respected
the rules of international law, even under such circumstances.
Question: In your judgment could the U.S. accommodate any of the possible
retaliatory measures by foreign nations and still maintain a satisfactory defense
posture?
Answer: In the event other countries declare a 200-mile territorial sea, the
only possible way to accommodate satisfactory defense requirements would be
to preserve our essential mobility by negotiating or purchasing the right uf
overflight or submerged transit or by the continued exercise of such rights
despite the dem al of others or our rights to do so and the use of force in defense
of such rights when confronted by the force of others. In my view, neither Df
these courses of action is satisfactory.
Question: Would you identify the specific straits and areas where "free
passage" could be jeopardized by the adoption of this fisheries legislation?
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Answer As can be seen from the map provided the Committee, every passage
wide enough to be called a strait would be overlapped by a 200-mile territorial
sea. Access to the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Northern Europe and Asia
would be denied or severely limited.
Question: Do you think the Coast Guard alone is capable of enforcing this
fisheries legislation against foreign vessels?
Answer: The Coast Guard has already asked for and received an agreement
with the Department of Defense for assistance in enforcing the 12-mile limit.
Enforcement within the principal fishing areas of the 200-mile fishing zone
could be accomplished by the Coast Guard only if foreign fishing vessels are
unarmed and unescorted. There is no way, in my view, the Coast Guard could
enforce the 200-mile fishing limit without Department of Defense assistance
in the event foreign fishing vessels are escorted by men of war.
Question: Do y ou think the Coast Guard now has the resources to enforce
this legislation particularly as to fishing zones surrounding U.S. territories such
as Guam, the Virgin Islands, etc.?
Answer: The addition of U.S. territories exacerbates the problem described
above. I believe that the Coast Guard would be capable of enforcing a 200-mile
fishing limit only in the principal fishing areas.
Question: What do you think are the prospects of an armed or military en-
gagement in the enforcement of the fisheries legislation?
Answer: Quantifying this uncertainty is not an easy task. I do believe, how-
ever, there is an appreciable risk of an armed or military engagement, a risk
which is unwarranted at this time.
Question: Do you have any evidence to suggest that as a result of the fisheries
legislation either Japan or the Soviet Union would provide military escorts for
their fishing vessels?
Answer: Mr. Moore has reported serious Japanese and Soviet concern with
regard to this legislation. We have no evidence which would suggest that they
would provide military escorts for their fishing vessels. We cannot, however,
rule out this possibility with regard to the Soviet Union.
Question: In what specific ways is a successful negotiation at the Law of the
Sea Conference in Caracas of fundamental importance to U.S. defense and secu-
rity interests?
Answer: Currently, the mobility fundamental to our security interests depends
'upon the freedom of navigation on and over the high seas and through and over
international straits. These interests can be accommodated only by a compre-
hensive treaty which provides for a narrow territorial sea (no more than 12
miles) and unimpeded passage of international straits. By far the best way of
preserving this essential mobility is through a comprehensive Law of the Sea
Treaty which will reaffirm our vital rights of navigation, overflight, and un-
impeded passage of international straits, and at the same time, settle existing
and avoid potential conflict.
Question: What are the prospects that foreign nations will unilaterally adopt
measures which could threaten or impede U.S. military mobility irrespective of
the status of the fisheries legislation?
Answer: Based on continued good faith negotiations and the maintenance of
the status quo as to unilateral claims by major nations, not more than two or
three countries are known to be seriously considering unilateral claims between
now and the next session of the Law of the Sea Conference which begins in
Geneva next March. I have been advised that diplomatic efforts to persuade
these countries to withhold making such claims in order to enhance the prospect
of reaching agreement during the Geneva negotiations are underway. On the
other hand, should the United States adopt unilateralism, the opposite situation
would prevail, and I would anticipate a flood of unilateral claims threatening
essential U.S. military mobility.
PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR STENNIS TO MR. MOORE
Question: 'What are prospects of achieving effective bilateral or partial multi-
lateral measures to relieve U.S. fisheries problems in the interim period prior to
a Law of the Sea Treaty?
Answer: The Department plans in coming months to negotiate for additional
measures to enable us to exert more control over our coastal fisheries. Significant
progress has been made in the last few years in fisheries negotiations, and we
intend to continue to push for effective and adequate conservation measures. We
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feel that as a result of our previous efforts, heightened public interest, and new
initiatives such as the recent enforcement guidelines for protection of our con.
tinental shelf living resources, our chances for useful negotiations are substan-
tially increased.
I'REPAEUtD QUESTIONS FROM SENA TOR THURMOND TO 131 111 ()ORE
Question: How confident are you that the Law of the Sea Conference will pro-
duce a treaty that will provide for a 200-mile economic zone for ocean areas of
coastal states?
Answer : am confident that one of flue elements of a comprehensive Law of the
Sea Treaty will be a 200-mile economic zone with at least management jurisdic-
tion and preferential rights over coastal fisheries. The inclusion of such a zone
in the Treaty was all but formally agreed to this summer in Caracas, subject of
course to acceptable resolution of other issues, :including guarantees of maim-
peded transit through over and under straits used for international navigation.
What still remains to be negotiated is the nature of the rights and duties within
the zone and special treatment for anadromous and highly migratory species.
Question: Are the provisions of S. 1988 in general the same provisions that
you were hoping to achieve hi a Law of the Sea Treaty?
Answer : The ii-ovisions we hope to obtain in a Law of the Sea Treaty have
the same objectives as 8 1988. We propose to obtain coastal State jurisdiction
and strong management authority over coastal and anadromous resources. ]ilow.
ever, we are also seeking elements in the Law of the Sea Treaty which may be,
undercut by S. 1988. One is special treatment 7(:;,r highly migratory species which
on the basis of their migratory patterns should be managed in accordance with
regulations of if ternational or regional organizations. In addition, we propose
that certain coastal State duties be established in order to ensure conservation
and maximum utilization of fish stocks. The S. ,1988 approach unilaterally ex-
tending our coa.s Al state jurisdiction cannot provide and in fact undercuts these
duties as well as the international basis for agreement.
Question. In your letter of September 5, 1974 to: Senator Magnuson you advised
that foreign governments whose vessels fished above the continental shelf of the,
United States are being notified of new guidelines for the enforcement of our
rights to continental shelf fishery resources. You indicated the effective date of
these new proceetures would be December 5, 1974.
Pi rst. is I )ecorEber 5 sIP 1 the effective date?
Second, how confident are you the new guidelines will be adhered to?
What feedbaet, if any, have you received from foreign governments about
these new guidelines?
How does the United States intend to enforce these new guidelines?
Answer: Yes, December 5 is the effective date.
In answer to sour second question, we will :make every effort to ensure speedy
implementation and full compliance.
We have not yet received any feedback and would not expect to until we begin
the process of negotiating the required agreements.
Iii answer to your last question, the precise instructions to field enforcement
officers of the U.S. Coast Guard and National Marine Fisheries Service are cur-
rently under development and will be promulgated well in advance of Decem-
ber 5. We expect Coast Guard units will patrol the applicable areas, and that
boarding and inspection of foreign fishing vessels using bottom tending gear
which would normally result in the taking of U.S. continental shelf living re-
sources will be the primary method of ascertaining compliance.
My opinion that other countries could well impose even more stringent con-
trols over their coastal w aters if S. 1988 became law is based on several faetors.
First a number of countries are now considering extensions of coastal state juris-
diction. We have tried to discourage such unilateral jurisdictional claims in
of our view that these questions shoal! d be resolved in the Law of the Sea Con-
ference. Should the United States make a unilateral claim, however, it is likely
that some of these other countries would do so as well. As you know, there have
been recent extensions of jurisdiction more inclusive than just fisheries jurisdic-
tion, even in the face of the LOS Conference. For example, Madagascar, Nigeria,
and Tanzania have made extended territorial sea claims since preparation for
the Conference legan. Many countries are not restrained by the navigation, stra-
tegic, scientific research, and distant water fishing interests which are important
to the 'U.S.
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Second, we have taken systematic soundings from our embassies as to the
potential impact of passage of S. 1988 and in many cases it seems evident that
passage would give substantial impetus to a variety of unilateral claims during
the course of the Law of the Sea Conference. These soundings are confirmed by
my discussions with the Soviets and Japanese and a cross section of Conference
leaders from all regional groupings. In short, the impact of passage would be
immediate and substantial in encouraging damaging unilateral claims. These
factors lead me to believe that passage of S. 1988 is likely to be a catalyst to the
same types of unrestrained claims that were made after declaration of the Tru-
man Proclamation in 1945.
PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR THURMOND TO GENERAL BROWN
Question. If the Law of the Sea negotiations fail to produce a treaty next
year that provides a 200-mile economic zone, would you then still oppose this
bill?
Answer. I have been advised that it is extremely unlikely that a Law of the
Sea Treaty acceptable to the United States and a majority of the nations of
the world would not contain a 200-mile economic zone. Furthermore, if a com-
prehensive treaty does not emerge during 1975, the United States would have
to reassess its position on all ocean uses to insure a policy which would best
protect all our interests, resources as well as security.
Question. You indicate that it is your assumption that the Soviet Union and
Japan would probably not seek our permission to fish within 200 miles of our
coasts even if this bill became law. To your knowledge has the Government of
the United States been informed either officially or unofficially that this, in fact,
would be the case?
Answer. I have no knowledge of any communication to the United States
Government by either the Soviet Union or Japan that goes into such specific
detail as to outline any planned response, such as non-compliance. They have,
however, expressed serious concern to us. I ba se my opinion on the overall
Law of the Sea policy of each of those nations. Japan has been equivocal as to
whether she will accept an economic zone. The Soviet Union has made it clear
that she will accept an economic zone only on certain conditions, among which
are treaty recognition of navigational rights, including unimpeded transit of
international straits and certain fishing rights. Were either of these nations to
recognize another's right to unilaterally establish a 200-mile fisheries zone
wherein compliance amounts to recognition, they would have conceded such
right to all nations. This would totally destroy not only their conference
negotiations, but would abrogate the juridical basis on which they presumably
must rely to protect their own interests if the Conference should fail.
Question. Assuming S. 1988 became law, please expand upon potential problems
of enforcement. For example, would it be your recommendation that the task
of enforcement be delegated solely to the Coast Guard or would it be a task
that required the use of U.S. military forces?
Answer. As an additive item to my comments on the respective enforcement
responsibilities in a confrontation situation with Soviet warships off our coasts,
the application of the proper amount of force, whether by the Coast Guard and/
or Department of Defense, would be of singular importance in precluding ever-
increasing escalation. Of equal importance would be the timing and manner
of Department of Defense force introduction whether as a supplement to or
replacement to the Coast Guard.
Question. Regarding the right of the United States to transit certain areas
of the ocean submerged, is it your interpretation that passage of this legislation
could cause other countries to extend their territorial sea boundaries beyond
12 miles., thus forcing us to request transit permission? -
Answer. Yes, it could cause such extensions. As you know, the U.S. does not
recognize unilateral extensions of territorial jurisdiction beyond three miles,
and under international law permission for submerged transit may not be
required in high seas areas. If we act unilaterally on fish it will be very
difficult, if not impossible, for us to maintain that others may not so act on
navigation or other freedoms.
Question: General Brown, everyone would recognize the desirability of an
international agreement as the best course to protect the fishing areas off our
coast. How would you rate the chances for success of such an agreement and
in what time frame do you feel such an agreement could be achieved?
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Answer: I am somewhat optimistic about the chances of agreement in 1975.
and I have been led to believe that interim application of certain portions of the
agreement, inch:a-ling those relating to fishing, could begin shortly after an.
agreement is reached.
Question: Have any other major powers taken unilateral action such as that
now being considered by the Congress?
Answer: No.
Question: Does the Administration know of plans of any major powers to take
such unilateral action?
Answer : Not to my knowledge.
Question: General Brown, as the chief agent of the President in enforcement:
of a 200-mile limit, would you describe for the Committee how such enforement
would he implemented?
Answer: No such plans currently exist. Anything I would say now would be
purely hypothetical. Careful coordination among the Department of Defense,
the :Department of Commerce, and the Department of Transportation would be
required in the formula tion of such plans. Initial responsibility would un-
doubtedly continne to rest with the Coast Guard. The Department of Defense's
contribution would probably be in the ..trea of surveillance, assistance as covered
by an interagency agreement (DOD/DOT), or in the event of confrontation with
escorted fishing vessels.
Question: What would you envision as the most serious problems growing out
of such enforcement?
Answer: Whenever the Armed Forces of the United States confront the Armed
Forces of another nation, the most serious problem is the risk of escalation.
Question: In what ways would you envision that the Japanese or Soviet gov-
ernments might retaliate against U.S. forces operating in their own territorial
areas?
Answer: I am reasonably sure the U.S. forces operating in Soviet-claimed ter-
ritorial seas without the consent of the., Soviet Government would be challenged
by the Soviet Navy in any effective way available to them.
Question.: If a 200-mile limit were adopted by other nations, to what degree
would such an action diminish the effectiveness of our seaborne nuclear
deterrent?
Answer: The range of the missiles on U.S. SSBNs is 2500 miles. You can see
by looking at the map pmvided the Committee that the effectiveness and prompt-
ness of our retaliation by SLICNIs would be considerably constrained by the
denial of the use of the ty:ea noted as a patrol area. Furthermore, the restriction
of the seas constrains our forces and simplifies the Soviet problem of locating
our SSBN patrols. These constraints adversely affect the deterrent capability
of our seaborne nuclear deterrent.
)EP ARTMEN T OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., October 31, 1.974.
Hon. JOHN C. .?,-ENNIS,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mn. CHAIRMAN : I very much appreciated the opportunity to testify on
the Law of the Sea Conference and S. 1988, the 200-mile fishing bill, before the
Armed Services Committee. During the hearing you asked me to respond for the
record as to the prospects of effective bilateral or multilateral measures to re-
lieve U.S. fisher! es problems in the interim period prior to a law of the sea
treaty. During the course of the hearing you also asked several questions related
to the enforcement of existing or prospective regulations.
We are active.,y pursuing three avenues which, in my judgment, will result
in substantially .,mproved protection of our coastal fishery resources. These are
the establishment of new enforcement measures with respect to living resources
of the continental shelf, strengthened bilateral and multilateral agreements with
nations fishing (IT our coasts, and a study of other measures which might prop-
erly be taken to relieve our interim fisheries problems.
Under existing international law the coastal state has jurisdiction over the
resources of the continental shelf inc:Luding living resources such as crab and
lobster. In Septeuiber, the Department of State announced new enforcement.
guidelines with respect to these fishery resources, which will become effective on
I tecember These new guidelines will substantially tighten our control over the
taking of living 7.esources from the United States continental shelf incidental te
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other fishing operations. We have announced that, for the first time, we intend
to board foreign fishing vessels using bottom tending gear (including bottom tend-
ing trawls) which would normally result in the taking of living resources of
the U.S. continental shelf. Unless nations fishing off our coasts have entered into
agreements with us for the protection of our continental shelf living resources,
any taking of such resources will be subject to enforcement by the United States.
Because of their potential impact on foreign nations fishing over our continental
shelf, these new measures will go into effect on December 5, 1974, after a 90-day
grace period to enable affected nations to adjust their fishing methods or to con-
clude agreements with us for the protection of our continental shelf living re-
sources.
Moreover, we have in the past several years strengthened both bilateral and
multilateral regional agreements regulating fishing off our coasts. In the North-
west Atlantic we have instituted a unique and comprehensive management regime
for the regulation of the entire biomass off the U.S. coast. This system involves
separate national quotas for each target species, as well as an overall national
quota for the total catch. There are also a series of additional measures such as
closed areas and seasons, and gear restrictions. This system is now in its first
year of full operation and it should have a significant effect on protection of
the stocks. There are other multilateral and regional negotiations scheduled
during the next few months in which we expect further to strengthen these
measures and to secure new agreements with respect to our continental shelf
living resources.
Finally, in recent weeks we have discussed, on an informal basis with inter-
ested members of the Congress, additional measures that might be taken to
protect our fisheries without at the same time undercutting our chances for a
comprehensive law of the sea treaty, which we continue to believe is the mecha-
nism which will best resolve our fisheries problems as well as protect our other
oceans interests. Specific legislative measures are now under study.
Again, let me express my appreciation for your courtesy and that of other
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee in addressing the very critical
issues of a satisfactory law of the sea treaty.
Sincerely,
JOHN NORTON MOORE,
Chairman, the NSC Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea and
Deputy Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea
Conference.
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EXTENDING JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OVER CERTAIN OCEAN AREAS
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1974
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D .0 .
- The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :05 a.m., in room 212,
Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis,
chairman.
Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Jackson, McIntyre, and
Thurmond.
Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff di-
rector; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; W. Clark McFadden II, counsel;
Charles J. Conneely, John A. Goldsmith, Edward M. Kenney, Robert
Q. Old, professional staff members; Phyllis A. Bacon, assistant. chief
clerk; Christine E. Cowart, clerical assistant.
The CHAIRMAN. Our committee will please come to order.
We are delighted to have Senator Magnuson as our first witness, and
Senator Stevens is already here. He also will be a witness.
We have the names also of Senator Jackson of the State of Wash-
ington, who is a valued member of our committee, and Senator Mus-
kie's name is also here.
STATEMENT OF HON. WARREN G. MAGNUSON, U.S. SENATOR
FROM WASHINGTON
Senator MAGNUSON. Senator Kennedy wants to file a statement too.
Senator McINTyuE. Mr. Chairman, I will file a statement also.
[Statement of Senator McIntyre follows.]
MR. CHAIRMAN : As a member of the Armed Services Committee and a repre-
sentative from a coastal state, I find myself in a unique position with regard to
S. 1988. I have listened to the testimony of the Department of Defense as de-
livered by General George Brown and I have listened to my constituents. It has
become clear to me that this decision is not one of special interest vs. protection of
the general good.
The Defense Department is fearful of retaliatory action by other countries
as a result of our enforcement of a 200 mile limit. Yet, 26 countries already have
extended fishing limits and the problems which the Defense Department has
outlined have not occurred. The situations which my constituents have relayed
to me are real and have occurred. Our commercial fishermen are in trouble and
our fish stocks are being depleted at an alarming rate.
Nowhere is this problem more severe or dramatic than in the New England
waters. Before the 1960s, the New England fishing grounds were, with the
exception of a few Canadian vessels, fished exclusively by American fishermen.
Figures for 1971 and 1972 show catches of well over one million tons from this
area despite universally recognized overfishing and a disastrous decline in
(73)
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abundance of some species, among them herring and haddock. The latest figures
show that of this tremendously increased take of fish, the U.S. share in the
soot-hem New England area is only 12% and in the prolific George Bank area
a mere 10%.
In my view, passage of the Magnuson measure for interim unilateral exten-
sion of U.S. Coastal fisheries jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles off shore would
lee very much in the public interest. It would set the stage for solving many
urgent coastal f sh conservation problems. It would move aggressively toward
accommodation of the special needs of the valuable anadromous fisheries. Con-
trary to the specious apprehensions of the distant-water tuna fishing interests,
it would not conflict in any manner, with their proposals to manage tuna through
some kind of international organization. In evaluating the alternatives, it should
be kept in mind that the combined domestic commercial and recreational fisheries,
collectively, are on the order of 15 or more times more valuable to the American
economy than the tuna fisheries.
Witnesses have expressed conflicting opinions, but my feeling is that enact-
ment of a meaningful treaty resulting from the Law of the Seas Conference will
not, be realized for two or three years. These years are crucial to our rapidly
depleting stock. This interim action, directed by S. 1988, will give aid to our
commercial fishing fleets which have waited patiently for protection from their
government; additionally, it will let the nations involved in the Law of the Seas
negotiations know how serious the U.S. is in protecting its fishing fleet.
The three-year International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fist erlea
Agreement signed in October, 1973, touted as "bringing new hope for gravely
depleted fishing grounds in the Northeast," provides quotas for the Soviet Union
nd other Eastern bloc countries over three times that accorded our fleet. The
United States and Canaria together received less than a quarter of the 923,000
metric ton quote for 1914. This ICNAF "victory" may prevent the Yellowtail
flounder from joining the haddock and the Atlantic halibut in "commercial ex.
Unction." It clearly neither terminates Soviet hegemony off our coasts nor pro-
vides enough catch reduction to permit overall recovery of stocks, or even
nevessarily to arrest their decline.
n the meantime, off the Central Atlantic coast, which does not fall under
international regulation, a new Soviet purse seining fleet has appeared over the
past two years with an estimated capacity greater than the entire U.S. menhaden
fleet. This poses a threa ? to the menhaden fishery, one of the last reasonably
viable coastal fisheries roe naming.
Our fishermen are not competing against individual Soviet or Polish or
Romanian or East German fishermen?they are rather, with only a trickle of
Federal aid, competing directly against nationally owned or heavily subsidized
fleets directed b;7 national policies which insist on increased protein production
from the seas regardless Jf where it exists and without the responsibility of any
conservation et Mc.
And meanwhile we, in official capacities, continue to negotiate, wring our hands,
tell our fishermen to be patient, spend millions to document the drastic decline of
these protein resources, and try to insist that our fishing industry adopt con-
servation practices. For what purpose, I ask to save the resource for further
exploitation by foreign fleets?
The time to act is now. This interim measure does not exclude all foreign entry
into the management zone. It permits entry of fishing vessels belonging to nations
having a traditional interest in the subject fisheries, subject to regulation The
power to regulate is the power to exclude, and this, of course, is what creates the
leverage.
I ask my colleagues to consider this measure carefully. If we do not move to
protect our fishing fleets now?in three years the Law of the Seas treaty will
be protecting an extinct resource.
The CHAIRMAN. That is fine. They will be received and become a part
of our record.
Now let me say to you now that this hearing is open to what I woula
call the fishery people, or groups. I felt we would just notify them
today. You sec, there is a timetable here, and we have to report on the
16th, and I do not want to ask for additional time. We could ask them
to come Friday.
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Senator MAGNUSON. Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion?
The CHAIRMAN. That is why I brought it up.
Senator MAGNUSON. I would think that Friday would be a day when
.the Senate floor would be so busy that you could not have any corn-
mittee meetings. We are going to have literally 15, 20 pieces of legisla-
tion to beat the recess deadline, and anyone else who wanted to testify,
if we come back on the 11th of November, they could come in during
that time and we could Uave a half a day of hearings before you report
the bill.
Tom, do you think that would be better? It is up to the committee.
The CHAIRMAN. No, we want to get the thing done right. I hear now
that they may extend the time of our return, Senator.
Senator MAGNUSON. You mean Our return?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of reconvening. Someone mentioned the
13th, so it has been pushed over to that. We will hear them.
Senator MAGNUSON. All right.
The CHAIRMAN. It is a question though of the staff having a chance
to get things together for us. But, we will have a committee meeting
and we will pass on the bill after the recess. I would like to officially
notify them today, and they can send the testimony in advance. We are
clad t.o recognize the Se,, tor from Washington.
Senator MAGNUSON. Mr. Chairman, I have a very brief statement
and I would ask the opportunity maybe to put some other matter in
the record before you close the, record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that will be agreed to. Senator
Magnuson, are you the author of the bill?
Senator MAGNUSON. No, I am one of the cosponsors. It is a team bill.
The CHAIRMAN. AU right, you are, one of the cosponsors and it came
out of the Commerce Committee with a favorable report.
Senator MAGNUSON. Then it went to the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee in which they divided on it right down the middle.
Senator MIISICIE. About 8 to 9.
Senator MAGNUSON. I know why, and I do not want to take that up
here with you now.
The CHAIRMAN. We are going to go primarily into the possible
military aspect, but T thong] it it would be unfair to exclude the fisheries
and the other side, so to speak, so we will hear all of it.
Senator MAGNUSON. Mr. Chairman, of course I appreciate the op-
portunity to appear here, and I would emphasize?if I only had one
sentence to give to this committee?the emergency situation which
faces our adjacent marine resources; and I would also note that even
the most vigorous opponents of this measure cannot and do not deny
that the threat is a real one, and one which must be met with immedi-
ate action to fisheries.
Since the United States abandoned its ill-fated species approach
theory at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas
on July 11, and Senator Muskie was there, and Senator Stevens went
down there, there would seem to be little reason to debate the question
of the 200-mile fishery jurisdiction. State Department and Law of
the Sea delegation spokesmen now agree that if there is any agree-
ment in these negotiations it will include this kind of an extension.
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7
S. 1988 is a bill to protect the adjacent marine fisheries. It does not
add 1 inch to our territorial sea '1urisdiction. There are those who will
proclaim that, should we take this unilateral action, the world will
scramble to fallow. Further, they may net be as conservative or re-
strictive in their claims as we might be.
in October of 1966 the Congress unilaterally extended the U.S. ex-
clusive fisheries jurisdiction to 12 miles,. I was a delegate in Geneva in
the fifties when we talked about this, arguOd about the mileage or
whether we should extend it at all. It is true that other nations have
since extended their fisheries jurisdictions to 12 miles. But what we
want to remember is that in June of that same year, prior to the U.S.
move, 32 nations had already then claimed the 12-mile fishery juris-
diction. They acted unilaterally. By the time S. 1988 was introduced
in 1973 at least 16 nations had established territorial fisheries or fishery
conservation limits, and I emphasize the word "conservation," of 50
miles or more. -E submit that; we, of coarse, are living in a changing
world, and nowhere on the face of this globe is there more concern and
activity than in the world's oceans. With that concern will come
change, regardless of what any of us do.
Many of the same prophets of fear who haunted the legislative halls
in 1966 in opposition to the 12-mile jurisdiction are with us again as
we consider moving, out further. I for one do not believe we, shanld
even have the luxury to wait around for definitive world statements or.:
fisheries jurisdiction. It may never come..
We have had 12 or 15 years of this. We wait, wait, wait. Wait, wait,
wait. Up until July 11 of this year, S. 1988 was branded as radical
because it sought a 200-mile jurisdiction instead of the highly touted.
species approach. Now, it has become a question of unilateral action.
iii fact, the State Department does not take issue with the substance:
of S. 1988. I suspect that our dwindling offshore fishery stocks are not
much concerned about the kind of action, and I know that our coastal
fishermen are interested only in expeditious action.
Mr. Chairman, T would feel more comfortable with the fate of our
ocean resources if I had not heard rosy predictions about effective in-
ternational agreement so many times before. Our negotiators have
been pleading for time on this issue for as many years as I care to re-
member. They had 100 items in Caracas on the agenda and they did not
resolve, 1. All they resolved is to recess and meet in Geneva; following
that they are going to recess and meet in Vienna. Vienna is a seaport,
it big seaport. And they know all about maritime affairs, and this has
been going on, and on and on for all of these years. Our negotiators
have been pleading for time on this issue over and over again. Wait,
they say, until the preparatory conference begins; wait until they have
concluded; give us a chance at Caracas; let us finish it up at Geneva.
Now, give us until the end of 1975. And we are asked to wait. But I see
no hesitance on the part of the huge foreign harvesting fleets off our
shores. Our fisheries decline. Their efforts increase, and they want
additional time for one more conference, two more, three more.
We, are told that acting unilaterally is somehow improper. I will
not burden the, committee with the precedents on acting unilaterally
on resources of the ocean. I. will put all of that in the record. But one
of the main actions was the Truman proclamation on the Continental
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Shelf when he proclaimed U.S. jurisdiction over the "National .re-
sources of the subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States." This was
required, he said, "in the interest of their conservation and prudent
utilization." i
I will put the rest of this n the record, but I just want to add that
this bill will encourage treaties between nations within the 200-mile
limit. The difference is that now we have no control, and under the
bill we would have control as to what kind of conservation treaties
would be made. We do not deny the right of other nations in certain
cases to come in and ask that they may participate. And it is amazing
to me, if we were to fish within 200 miles of the shores of the Japanese
island, and if we were to start a fleet out there, that the Diet. would
probably meet in 24 hours and kick us out. It would be the same- thing
for Russia, the same thing for England, the same thing for Iceland.
But they want to come over and do all of these things off our shores,
and our fishermen are desperate. And we are not going to violate any
treaties that we have beyond 200 miles. In fact, we encourage under
the bill that they come to us and talk about it. There .may be some
cases where you want to come in?the shelf does not go out that far.
And so we think this is the time for action on this matter.
I am not very modest about certain things; but if we had not intro-
duced this bill, then nothing would have been done about this. I think
we have '-'crot to show?the bill also is of a temporary nature, and if the
miracle happens at Geneva or Vienna and they make an agreement.
the bill is only temporary, and we sponsors would be the first ones
to say all right, we are just running parallel. If you relied upon the
State Department on this matter we would not have any fishing boats.
New England is desperate. The highest unemployment rate in th.4
country is within the fishing industry. We have no ocean perch lett
on the Pacific Coast off the coast of Oregon and Washington. The
menhaden have gone, and up in Alaska the halibut fleet is down to
zero almost, is it not?
Senator STEVENS. Yes, Senator.
Senator MAGNUSON. Almost to zero. I think it is time that we start
to think about our own people a little bit. And in the Defense, Depart-
ment, we have nothing to do with navigation or territorial waters. I
read something somewhere which quoted a Defense Department
spokesman as saying that if we extended our fisheries zone then Spain
would do something rash, or Portugal. The Portugese have a big
fishing industry off their coast in the Atlantic, and if we start to fish
within 200 miles of there, I know what would happen to us, they
would send a gunboat out. That is what he said they would do?they
would shoot across our bow,
But I just hope that this committee will act, and we are not touching
the navigation rules, or the straits, and I understand the Navy's
concern. But, that has nothing to do with fishing. A fishing boat_ is
not going to bother them any.
The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?
Senator MAGNUSON-. Yes.
[The statement follows:]
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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAGNUSON BEFORE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Ourorza 9, 1974
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today in
support of S. 1)88, the "Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of -1974."
I would emphasize the emergency situation which faces our adjacent marine
resources, and note that even the most vigorous opponents of this measure can-
bot and do not deny that the threat is a real one and one which must be met by
immediate action.
Since the United States abandoned it's ill-fated "species approach" at the
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference it Caracas on July 11, there would
seem to be little reason to debate the question of 200-mile fisheries jurisdiction.
State Department and Law of the Sea delegation spokesmen now agree that if
there is any agreement in these negotiations, it will include this extension.
S. 1988 is a bill to prltect the adjacent marine fisheries, it does not add one
ineh to our territorial sea. There are those who will proclaim that should we
take this unilateral action, the world will scramble to follow. Further, they may
not be as conservative or restrictive in their claims as we might be.
In October of 1996 the Congress unlaterally extended United States exclusive
iktiories jurisdiction to twelve miles. It is true that other nations have since en-
muted their fisheries jurisdiction to twelve miles. But let us remember, in June
or that sante year, prior to the U.S. move, thirty-two nations had already claimed
twelve mile fish:try jurisdictions. By the time S. 1988 was introduced in 1973, at
list sixteen tuitions luta established territorial, fisheries, or fisheries conserva-
tion limits of 50 miles or more. I submit that we live in a changing world, and
nowhere on the face of this globe is there more concern and activity than in the
world oceans. With that concern will come change, regardless of what this Com-
mittee. Congress, or tile U.S. government may decide. Many of the same prophets
,,f fear Who haunted the legislative halls in 1966 in opposition to a twelve-mile
jurisdiction are with us again as we consider a 200-mile zone. I, for one, do not
believe we should, or evrn have the luxury to, wait around for a definitive world
statement on fisheries jurisdiction. It may never come.
17p until July 11 of this year, 8. 1988 was branded as radical because it sought
a 200 mile jurisdiction instead of the highly touted "species approach". Now, it
has bevonte a toestion (if unilateral action. In fact, the State Department does
ftot take issue with the tubstance of 1988. I suspect that our dwindling offshore
hsherv stooks are not much concerned about rhe kind of action, and I know that
intc coastal fishermen art interested only in expeditious action.
I would feel more comfortable with the fate of our ocean resources if I had not
itard rosy predictions about effective international agreement so many times
fore. Our negotiators have been pleading for time on this issue for as many
years as I can remember. Wait until the preparatory conferences begin; wait
mail they are concluded ; give its a chance at Caracas; let us finish at Geneva.
And now, give us to the atd of 1975. We are asked to wait, but I see no hesitance
rn the part of the huge foreign harvesting fleets off our shores. Our fisheries
dedline, their eforts increase, and they want additional time for "just one more
Vi in ference."
We are told new that acting unilaterally is somehow "improper." International
1,1-,vvers, however, view the law of the oceans as a process of "continuous inter-
reaction; of continuous demand and response," a developing system whereby Un,-
littoral claims 11,7e put forward, the world community weighs the claims and then
:tact) claims are either accepted or rejected. National law, on the other hand, is
usually a comb,nation of statute and court practice. In international law, the
eoart can obtah jurisdiction only if the parties submit themselves to it. Few
disputes of magnitude, therefore, are tried before the International Court cf
Justice.
tTnilateral action by the United States is not as new or unprecedented as some
would have us believe. In 1886, for example, the United States, citing the right of
self-protection, attempted to regulate foreign vessels exploiting fur seals in the
-Boring, Sea beyond its three-mile territorial waters. The Anti-smuggling Act of
1935 granted the President authority to proclaim an area extending one hundred
nautical miles north and south from a point in which a suspected foreign ship
was hovering and included all waters sixty-two miles from the coast within the
area of two hundred miles thus designated.
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Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Poland, the
United States joined in the Declaration of Panama which established a 300-mile
defense zone around the hemisphere. Following World War II, the zone was ex-
tended from pole to pole and made permanent by Article 4 of the 1947 Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
In 1945 the Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf announced the
annexation of the 'national resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental
shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States."
This was required, we said, "in the interest of their conservation and prudent
utilization."
In more recent times, the U.S.-Brazilian Shrimp Conservation Agreement, con-
cluded on May 9, 1972, may preserve the U.S. position with respect to the 200-
mile limit, but we provide that Brazil may board, search and arrest American
fishing vessels believed to be violating the agreement, and we underwrite Brazil's
enforcement expenses, all within 200 miles of their shores.
S. 1988 may be a unilateral move, but we must be aware that the 200-mile
limit is presently more commonly accepted within this hemisphere than is any
other outer limit of national jurisdiction. It is the predominant position taken
by all nations attending the Law of the Sea Conference and has been for a long
time, despite the fact that United States failed to recognize the position until
July 11 of this year.
The issue to me is quite clear. We are either going to stand up for the proper
management and conservation of the fishery resources off our coasts or we are
going to listen to the prophets of doom and concern ourselves about what the rest
of the world may say about us in the continuing Law of the Sea forum. I do not
believe?and I base this on many years of experience in dealing with the rosy
optimism of negotiators?that the United Nations will reach agreement on the
Law of the Sea in 1975. S. 1988 clearly provides for negotiations with those who
are presently fishing offshore and I fail to see the confrontations which the
Defense Department is concerned with.
The United States position at the Law of the Sea Conference is now almost
identical to that expressed in S. 1988. The only question is time, and we are
already late in looking to our responsibility to protecet these resources. I urge
this Committee to follow the position taken by my Senate Committee on Com-
merce and report the bill favorably.
The CHAIRMAN. You are really familiar with this issue and you are
our expert to a degree on it. I expressed an interest in it yesterday
from the standpoint of the fishing industry involved in my own State.
Senator MAGNUSON. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And I am not trying to cross-examine you, but how
will this help our fishermen?
Senator MAGNTJSON. It will allow us to make rules to fish within 200
miles of our shores, and it will also allow us in certain cases, if we
wanted, to make, an agreement, say, with Japan on some salmon that
they may want. And it would also allow Canada protection from
foreign fleets which come in willy-nilly, without conservation, and
deplete our fishery stocks.
The CILURMAN. You would not let anyone come in unless the Federal
Government made an agreement with them ?-
Senator MAGNusoiv. That is right. In some cases we might. Joint
fishing, if conservation is practiced, is not too serious. The ocean re-
sources should be managed just like timber. You have timber manage-
ment in Mississippi and other places, and in Maine. The oceans can
provide sustained yield for one-third of the world's supply of food if
we just handle it right, and not let them?the Japanese do not practice
any conservation. Fifty years ago, 70 years ago, the best fishing
grounds in the world were around the islands of Japan. They are gone.
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That is why they have to come over and fish in our waters. I think we
better do something about it. If they come to an agreement, if some
miracle happens in Geneva on fisheries, we, will immediately say thank
you, amen, this is a temporary bill. That is all.
The CHATRMAN. Let me ask you one or two other questions now.
And by the way, we tried to sti.r them up here yesterday, the State
Department, and they said they were going to move right in and do
something about this matter. But how long have you been working
on it now, how many years?
Senator MAGNUSON. I attended my first conference in Geneva in
1953.
The CHAIRMAN. And you have been off and on it ever since?
Senator MAGNUSON. Yes.
The CommuAN. What about the situation here if we extend ours
out to 200 miles that these other nations claim we have no authority
to do that and so forth, it is unlawful, illegal and so forth and will
lead to a possible eonfrontation out there? What would be the
situation?
Senator MaoNaisoN. That is not unusual for fishermen. We have
it down ()ft the coast of Peru, and Ecuador and Chile.
The CriAnniAN. 1 have read about it here in Virginia and Maryland.
Senator MAiaNusoN. But we do not have a situation like that. That
is a peculiar situation in the oceans of the world where that cold
stream comes up and meets the warm stream and it comes right close
to their shore, very close, and that is where the big fishing is.
The CHAIRMAN. What is your idea of enforcement? Someone, has
said to me that the Coast Guard could not possibly be of any appre-
ciable service in this, it could not cover the ground. What is your
response?
Senator AlikoNirsoN. The Coast Guard; can enforce anything they
want, and if they need a little extra money to enforce this, why, the:v
could get it. They enforce 12 miles now and they can enforce 200.
They may need two or three more ships, but we can handle that,.
iP they need it:; and I think, the nations will respect this. Once in a
while we have a fellow that. drifts in to our waters and says he lost
his compass and did not know where he was and that sort of thing.
But we can handle that. Alaska does it.
The Ci [AIRMAN. 1 do not want to keep you any longer if you have
to go.
Senator AlAwxrisoN. NO, there is RO problem.
The CI IA-INMAN. Thank you for testifying.
Senator MAnNusoN. We may have to beef up the Coast Guard a
tittle bit obviously, and the Commerce Committee, when they pass
Otis bill out., knew what they had to do because they are responsibl3
for the Coast Guard.
'ITh e Ci Al WO thank you very munch.
About this testimony from the fishery people and the associations,,
want to add one point. We would like them to send in their written
Testimony in advance, so the staff can work on it while we are gone..
So, if the stair will let them know and make that request.
Senator MikomisoN. I want to add just one sentence. Some of the
fishery people, the tuna people, are out in the South Pacific. They
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have a loose agreement. Nobody pays much attention to it. They might
oppose it, but it is all based on fear, fear of what somebody else is
going to do. And I am getting tired of this country not taking care
of things that they should take care of because they are afraid of
some other country. Japan is going to get out of the treaty, our salmon
treaty or something. Japan has bigger fish to fry than this, I will tell
you that.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator. Thank you very much.
Senator Muskie, I will call on you next, if I may.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDMOND S. MUSKIE, U.S. SENATOR
FROM MAINE
Senator MUSKIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, may I say that Senator Magnuson covered the ground
very well and to the point on this question.
But on this question of enforcement and whether or not we
have a 200-mile limit established unilaterally, or by interna-
tional treaty, we still are going to have enforcement problems. So,
the question of whether or not we could enforce a unilateral 200-
mile limit is a red herring as far as I am concerned. No international
force is going to be created to enforce the 200-mile limit set by an
agreement. We are going to have to do it, so that if we are looking
toward that kind of national or international policy, the enforce-
ment problem is the same, and so it is simply not relevant to this
discussion as far as I can see it.
I discussed this with the Coast Guard and they agree with me on
that point.
I would like to make some points which emphasize some of the
points Senator Magnuson made. The first one is this one, and I speak
from the point of view of a New Englander, that fishermen on both
our east and west coasts are losing the livelihood of generations
because as a nation we have not responded adequately to global devel-,
opments in recent years. In the last decade, as we allowed our fishing
industry to sink to the lowest estate in our national priorities, as we
have, the fishing efforts of foreign fleets off our coasts have increased
severalfold. At any given time, large groups of -foreign vessels can
be sighted off our shores. This is true off the 4,500 miles of Maine's
coastline as well as other areas of our coast. In fact, the world's fish-
ing effort is now so much greater than a decade ago that stocks can
be decimated in a season or two, a rate much too fast for international
negotiations to cope with.
There is clearly an urgent need to protect our offshore stocks. But
may I say that protecting these stocks is something more than a
regional or a national interest. It is of global interest. If the United
States does not take effective short run action to protect the fish stocks
of our coasts, who is going to do so? The Russian fishing fleet? The
Japanese fishing fleet? There is no evidence to suggest such restraint
on their part. Indeed, most of these countries will protect their own
offshore stocks, if they have any left to protect. And they will pro-
tect them against us. But, who is going to protect our offshore stocks?
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There are at least 2 species including haddock, herring, mackerel,
shrimp, yellow-tailed flounder' and halibut which are now depleted
or threatened 'with depletion. Are America's or the world's best in-
terests really served by our waiting a couple of more years for diplo-
mats to negotiate a comprehensive interenational oceans treaty be-
fore any meaningful steps are taken to preserve our offshore stocks?
I think not. And I believe an increasing number of Members of Con-
gress agree.
I would like to emphasize, as Senator Magnuson did, that nothing
in the 200-milci fish limit legislation is inconsistent with our negoti-
ated position at the new United Nations Law of the Sea Conference.
If is a position fully supported by the :Department of Defense. In a
statement before the Caracas Conference this summer, which I was
privileged to attend with Senator Stevens, Ambassador Stevenson,
bead of our delegation, said this country is, and I quote:
Prepared to accept and, indeed, would welcome general agreement on a 12-
mile outer limit for the territorial sea and a 200-mile outer limit for the eco-
nomic zone, provided that it is part of an acceptable, comprehensive pacliage.
The U.S. posititm accepts the concept of 200 miles for fishery man-
a!Yment jurisdiction. Ti also accords with the two other fishery man-
agement proposals contained in the bill before the committee, that
management of anadromous species, such as salmon, are handled by
the nation in whose river they spawn, and that the management of
migratory species, such as tuna, be handled through international
commission. So on that, both the U.S. position and this bill are on all
fours on those, points.
rIThe key Defense Department objection to this bill rests then not
on any substa:ntive objection to its provisions. Rather Defense is
worried about the possible reactions of other nations to this step for
it seems to believe, judging by General l3rown's testimony yesterday,
that if United states enacts this legislation, others will automatically
abrogate unilaterally our rights of free transit, overflight. In other
words, they anticipate punitive reactions on the part of nations they
tell us are, on the other hand, negotiating with us in good faith to
establish just this kind of a regime.
As official advisor to the U.S. delegation, I attended the meetings in
Caracas this summer and talked with many foreign delegates. In
none of my conversations was there any indiction that the major na-
tions of the world would react to our passing such a bill by immedi-
ately ending our rights of free transit and overflight. It is true that
in some of these talks foreign delegates expressed reservations about
America's enacting unilateral legislation, but my best guess is that
their first reaction, after denouncing the legislation would be to nego-
tiate at the next session of the UN. conference with a new sense of
urgency. It is important to remember that this legislation will not
prohibit other nations from fishing in the 200-mile zone. In fact, it
would preserve the right of nations which have traditionally fished off
our shores, but it would reserve the right to the United States to man-
age our offshore fish stocks to assure their best and most prudent use.
So, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee, the bill differs
from the official U.S. position in only one respect. It recognizes the
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urgency of today's situation and mandates immediate interim ac-
tion to regulate and conserve our offshore fish stocks. That is precisely
why I am supporting this bill, and why I urge you to do the same.
May I relate to you in closing a conversation I had with one of the
Russian delegates and the Mexican delegates and others at a luncheon
the last day I attended the conference. They pleaded with me to urge
the Congress not to proceed with this legislation. And I made two
points. I made them .specifically to the Russian delegate. I said I
have observed how your country undertakes to protect your national
interests when you see them jeopardized and I have never seen you
reluctant to be hardnosed about those interests. What I am saying
is that we are hurting, so with respect to our offshore stocks, we are
being hardnesed. If the Congress enacts this legislation, it is precisely
for that purpose.. We in the --'United States can never seem to persuade
other nations when we are hurting. There is the tendency to believe
that the United States is so big and so powerful economically that we
can take these insults and not be hurt. What we are saying in this
case is that-we are hurt.
The second point I made to the Russian delegates and the Japanese
delegates is this. I said you have created this problem for us off our
coasts. If you are really that concerned about preserving this negotia-
tion, and if you are really concerned that the unilateral action by the
United States might jeopardize this conference, then I suggest uni-
lateral action that each of you could take, and that is to exercise re-
straint with respect to fishing off our shores until this conference has
concluded its work. If you would exercise that unilateral restraint,
then the Congress might be willing to exercise a similar restraint.
But in the meantime, we intend to do this. This does not touch free-
dom of passage, it does not touch the straits problem, simply it is an
effort to indicate to the world that we are concerned in our own in-
terests and in the world's interests with the depletion of stocks that
are important to future world supplies of protein.
So I think on all counts we are justified in moving ahead. And may
I finally say how much I appreciate the participation of Senator
Stevens, who is here this morning, in that conference in Caracas. He
made a notable contribution. He knows this subject and I commend
his testimony, which I have heard several times on this point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. I am impressed
with your remarks.
Senator McIntyre, do you have any questions?
Senator MCINTYRE. I would like to ask Senator Muskie a question
if I may, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Senator MCINTYRE. First of all, Senator Muskie, and your precedincr
witness, the chairman of the Commerce Committee, you had excellent
testimony which I find very, very warm and receptive as far as this
Senator is concerned. Yesterday we had a Mr. John Moore of the State
Department here. In answer to a direct question that I put to him
about the success of this conference on the Law of the Seas I asked
him when he thought that it would come to fruition and a treaty
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would be agreed upon, and he said 1975, next year. I intimated that I
thought, lie was very optimistic, being very optimistic, but he held to
Ids guns. Would you be willing, and I will ask Senator Stevens after
Ins testimony, to give us some idea of when you think from what you
saw at Caracas that there is a reasonable chance of the Law of the Sea.
Treaty coming to a conclusion and being ratified and approved by all
of the various member nations?
Senator Musstir. I do not believe that it is going to happen, and the,
chairman of the conference publicly expressed his reservations about
that possibility. Another delegate from his country in assessing the
work in Caracas put it, this way : He said all we have done this summer
with all of ern talk is to identify how far apart we are. We have done,
notliing about closing the gaps.
:Ravine. said that, may I say that I was more impressed than I was
prepared tobe that there are sonic very positive prospects that those,
149 nations may eventually agree on a. new Law of the Sea regime,
But the problem is enormously difficult and complex. There are be-
tween 90 and 100 major issues. Sixty of the participating nations
never have attended a conference on this subject before. They have,
not, yet developed their own national positions on all aspects of the,
problem. Mind you that you have three separate areas of concern,
The, conference broke up into the three. committees, the first having
to do with the mineral resources of the. deep seabed, and that is beyond.
the 200-mile Ii mit, and this involves all of rhe developing nations and.
a lot of the landlocked nations, all of them countries who feel that the.
world's resourees have been exploited too, long by the industrial na-
tions and that they must establish their claim and their interests in
these deep seabed resources at this point if they are ever to do so,
In order to resolve that issue alone, time is going to be required.
The second committee had to do with the Continental Shelf and the.
mineral resources and the fishery resources within the 200-mile limit,
fere I think there was progress, more progress toward a concensus
than in the others In other words, I think that the 200-mile limit is,
developing support, pretty broad support, but within that 200-mile.
limit, there is a great deal of disagreement or potential disagreement.
as to what the substance of the 200-mile limit will be. What will hap-
pen to the mineral resources I Are the developing nations entitled to
share in those, or in the, resources of the Continental Shelf beyond 200
miles? That is a very critical issue and that isnot going to be resolved
Second, what do you do about the anadromous species like salmon?
We. have a position but we have not sold it yet to the other nations.
What do you do about. migratory species like tuna? That has not been.
resolved yet, and that is going to take. some time. So, even between
committee two there is a clear outline of what will ultimately be
agreed upon, but there are still problems to be resolved.
Then the third is even more difficult, and that is what do we do
about pollution of the ocean? Who is to have control, what standards.
are to be set, and that all has to do with the authority that we create
in coastal states, flag states, states of national origin with respect to,
pollution by tankers and other vessels, as Well as other forms of pollu-
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85
tion. That involves jurisdictional decisions, but not only with respect
to the 200-mile zone or of the territorial sea, but also the wide open
ocean. Those are difficult issues.
I think that there is a very strong feeling in the conference that it
must succeed, but that does not mean that it will succeed this next
year. I cannot see any prospect that in the Geneva meeting, which
begins in March, and will surely not extend more than 8 or 10 weeks,
that you are going to bring all of this together. I really do not believe
it. I think what we are talking about realistically is another 2 years
of jeopardy to our local coastal fishery stocks, and that time is critical.
Senator MCINTYRE. Would you clarify in my mind some testimony
yesterday which referred to a ruling' I believe it was by the world
court, which seemed to impinge upon Iceland's difficulties that it had
with the British trawlers. Are you aware of that, or could you tell
the committee anything about that world court ruling, and what that
difficulty up there was, and how it was resolved?
Senator MUSK1E. It was related to?I do not know the opinion. I
am not a practicing lawyer in any case at this point, never was a prac-
ticing world lawyer. If I had been, I would not be here. That looks
like a pretty profitable business. But, in any case, the issue was an
attempt wholly on the part of Iceland to enforce, I think it was a 200-
mile or a 50-mile limit, and that does run into questions.
Senator MCINTYRE. Excuse me, was that a territorial exclusion
limit that they had, or was it more of a management, conservation
type that we are talking about?
Senator Music ER. Let me ask Senator Stevens to answer that.
Senator STEVENS. That is a, so-called cod war, Senator McIntyre..
It is my understanding of that recent decision that it places in serious.
questionthe right of Iceland to a certain exclusive, exclusionary
authority in management field, which differs from what is in this bill
which permits foreign fishing in our areas under specific controls, of
course. But, this is not the same as the Ieehind approach which sought
to specifically exclude the British fishing fleet from their banks..
Senator MusKin. I would add something to what Senator Stevens
has said and, you know, it is at the heart of this legislation, that it is.
a conservation problem, it really is. It is related, of course, to the rights.
of our fishermen. But, conservation of these stocks in terms of world
need for food is critical, and at the moment nobody has any responsi-
bility for it, and nobody undertakes conservation practices. Until we
begin that, you know, the waters off our shores are now among the.
world's most important fisheries, and somebody has to exercise author-
ity to conserve it.
The Iceland thing, it was probably too exclusionary, but I have no
opinion on the application of that world court opinion to this legis-
lation. I doubt that there is any.
Senator MCINTYRE. One last question about the testimony yester-
day. I think it was mixed testimony of Defense and State, and in back
of you is a map that sort of brings out one of their difficulties. They
say that our unilateral action will bring a reaction and overreaction,
perhaps aggressively further than we extend, and it will affect over-
flights, and it will bring about confrontations. They point, I think, to
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86
the Mediterranean there on the right hand side, and there points up
the difficulty. You see that it is all colored in, and if you extend the
200-mile limitation to all of the nations that surround the Mediter-
ranean, it is all colored in, and what is the answer to this question
which seems to bother State and Defense considerably ?
Senator Mu-sum. There are three points, perhaps, that I can make.
One, that the straits question is involved in the 12-mile territorial
sea which is now pretty broadly established, and it has not been re-
solved, the. right of free passage, and surely it is involved in the 200
miles, But, we. are. not assorting territorial rights. This bill does rot
assert territorial rights out to 200 miles. And just to assume just to
assume that other nations' reactions will be punitive, and they will
iii!dertfike to establish territorial sea rights out to 200 miles all across
this globe, in the face of the fact that they are meeting at the Law
of the Sea Conference to avoid that kind of thing to me is naive. Sure
they are going to be upset, some of them. Not all of them. West
Germany wi 1 be because she is fishing within not only our 200 miles
bat oar 12-trile limits on occasion. Sc the states which have foreign
f ishing, fleets will he upset, but not the others.
With respect to the reaction that will follow the establishment of
the 2,00-mile limit, what is it, about 30 'countries now have established
the 200-mile
Senator STEVENS. Twenty-six, I think.
Senator Aft-suit:. Twenty-six or 30. and that has not precipitated
the leind of global reaction that the Department of .Defense predicts
will follow this legislation. I think other nations are going to recog-
nize this for what it, is. The, United States is hurting. The other day
we took unilateral action on exports of corn and wheat, something
of a departure from our traditional free trade practices. That has not
triggered protectionism around the globe. It is understood. The as-
sertion of a national interest is understood by every nation on this
globe today, mid if they are really interested in international regime,
then they would not haVe met as they have unless they were inter-
ested. I doubt, that, this assertion of national interest and conserva-
tion is going to trip-ger that kind of reaction.
Senator Mciwrylin. Did you want to add something, Senator
Stevens?
Senator ST1WENS. As far as triggering reaction, I share Senator
Muskie,'s opinion and that of Senator Magnuson, that countries that
are going to be affected by this action will, not take any action follow-
ing. They are specifically the nations that at the Law of the Sea Con-
ference are seeking the narrow concept of limiting any jurisdiction,
whether it is over fishery resources or anything else. Russia and Japan,
for instance, have taken the position that it is contrary to the concepts
that we are supporting at the Law of the Sea Conference. They are
fishing off our shores. They fish off the shores of the State that Senator
Muskie represents and you represent, and my State, which is half the;
coastline of the United States, we have fantastic foreign fishing fleets.
Those fishing fleets come primarily from Russia and Japan. They are
not going to retaliate against us. I think they are going to come in and
want to have a bilateral treaty, which this bill specifically provides
for, in order to protect their rights to the fishery resources that we.
are willing to let them harvest.
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For instance, in terms of fishing for Alaskan pollock, they have been
taking about 1 billion pounds of Alaskan pollock out of the Bering
-Sea in the North Pacific for the last several years. We are not harvest-
Mg that species to any great extent, but the manner in which they are
taking it so depletes the halibut stocks that we find they are taking
more halibut incidental to their catch of pollock than the Canadian
:and the U.S. halibut fleet can take intentionally under the quota sys-
tem that we thought everybody agreed to. As I point out in my state-
:It-lent, we are now in the position where we only have 11 halibut boats
which went out this year. Incidental catch by them exceeds our total
quota that we agreed to as far as the limits of good conservation
practices. We have tried to get the Japanese not to fish for pollock
at the time the halibut come over the edge of the continental shelf.
They could just for a period of a few weeks have missed most of the
halibut as they start migrating inshore. Most people do not realize
that halibut migrate tremendous distances, but they refused to do so,
.and with their bottom techniques they literally vacuum the bottom of
the ocean. We are taking steps to try to prevent that, but they are not
going to retaliate against this. They cannot and still have any access to
our shores, because I think we have other means of tightening down
the screws if they will not go along with this, which I think is a very
modest interim measure for conservation purposes. I think we have a
greater mechanism available to us to take unilateral action, and I think
we could succeed.
Senator MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen. This is very im-
portant and very interesting. You are getting me deeper in the ocean
than I have ever been.
I have just been advised that at 11 :30 we will have a vote.
Senator AI-CISME. Mr. Chairman, could I submit a statement by Sen-
ator Poll?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Without objection. I have a question I want to
ask you, please.
Without objection, the statements here by the Senator from Wash-
ington, Mr. Jackson, and the Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Pell,
will be included in the record at this point.
[The statements follow :1
STATEMENT BY SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL ON S. 1988 FOR TILE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE
Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and Chairman
of its Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment and a concerned
conservationist, I am a strong supporter of S. 1988. It is an interim, emergency
measure designed to safeguard our coastal fish stocks from devastating depletion.
As a long-time member of the United States Coast Guard, keenly aware of the
role that U.S. Naval forces play in assuring our national security, I fully recog-
nize the strategic necessity of the unrestricted passage of those forces through
widely defined international waters and straits.
As an earnest and early advocate of the establishment of an orderly regime for
the world's ocean spaces through international agreement, I know that this
regime must ultimately rest on the multilateral consent of the family of nations.
After careful study of the provisions and safeguards of S. 1988, I am convinced
that it is not incompatible with any of these three considerations?interim U.S.
fisheries management to meet a conservation emergency within a 200 mile zone
off our coasts, freedom of passage for our military forces and an international
.agreement on the law of the seas.
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88
Let me briefly commert on each of these considerations.
That our traditional fishing grounds are being severely decimated by large
scale fishing techniques of foreign fleets is widely recognized even by opponents
of S. 1988. Consequently, an emergency situation has for sonic time faced the
U.S. fishing industry, especially in New England. The U.S. share of coastal
catches has fallen precipitously in Atlantic waters; haddock stocks may have
passed the point of no return ; herring, menfaden, yellow-tail flounder and hali-
but face a similar fate. International fishing commissions have failed to bring
What is required to meet this emergency is U.S. fisheries management within
a 200 mile zone applicable to foreign and domestic fishermen and based on sound
ronservation principles. S. 1088 will make this management possible ad interim
before there are no fish stocks to preserve.
Opponents of S. 1988 keep asking our fishermen to wait for multilateral agree-
ment on the extension of a 20 mile zone. Rhode Island fishermen, American
fishermen, have long been patient.
Ent further waiting for something just around the corner dooms their liveli-
hood. Why round the corner to find nothing there? And further inaction may
subject the United States to an irreversible hiss.
With reference to my second consideration. S. 1988 is clearly limited in scope
to U.S. fisheries management. In no way is it an extension of U.S. territorial
waters or an encroachment upon the traditional freedom of navigation. Except
for fisheries management, it authorizes no impediment or interference with the
legal status of the high seas.
Thus other nations will have no basis for citing S. 1988 as grounds for inter-
ference with ths passage of our military and commercial shipping through rei-
ognized international waters. It sets no precedence for such interference. It
l-rents no confasion as to our position on free passage. It lends no encourage-
ment to creeping territoriality.
Therefore, Mr. Chairnian, as a Senator and American citizen as vitally con-
cerned for our national security as anyone in the Executive Branch, I believe
that S. 1988 is compatiale with the crucial interests of U.S. national defense.
Lastly, 8. 1988 is a provisional measure pending multilateral agreement.
Where other nations are concerned, it is to be implemented through the treaty
process.
No action was taken n the bill prior to or during the Law of the Sea Con-
ference at Caracas. At that Conference, the United States' position on the need
of an ultimate multilateral agreement on fisheries management and conserva-
tion was forcefully put forward. All nations are now aware of that position.
As an interim, provisional measure, therefore, S. 1988 does not reverse tht.t
position, pull a rug out from beneath it, or eliminate a bargaining chip at the
Law of the Sea casino.
At the Conference, there did emerge a strong concensus in favor of the estab-
lishment of a 200 mile economic zone to include reasonable fisheries manage-
ment. S. 1988 ?nrovides just such management, including accommodation for
raditional foreign fishing fleets.
Although unilateral in character. S. 1988 merely foresees future multilateral
action in order to meet an immediate crisis for U.S, fishermen. Indeed, S. 1088
may well prove to be a catalyst in expediting desirable international agreement.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, as a Senator who places the greatest store on the
successful outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference, I believe that the passage
of S. 1988 will n3t dim the prospects for that success.
In view of these considerations, Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge favorable
consideration by the Armed Services Committee of S. 1988.
STATEMENT OE SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON, BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON 8. 1988
I welcome this opportunity today to state my views on S. 1988, the Emergency
Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974. I have been a cosponsor of this mean-
lire since its initial introduction by my colleague from the state of Washington,
Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Com-
merce. Today, I wish to offer a few thoughts on S. 1988 and to respond to the
objections to the bill raised from the standpoint of national security.
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In the first place, the threat to fishery stocks off our shores is very real. There
is almost no disagreement whatsoever that many of the most valuable stocks
of fish off our shores are in a state of depletion. Furthermore, most of this de-
pletion may be directly attributed to massive foreign fleets operating in fishing
grounds near our shores.
In contrast, the opposition to S. 1988 as expressed by this Administration
may be real, or it may simply be perceived. It has been stated that the only
effective solution to our fishery and other oceans problems is a comprehensive
treaty on the law of the sea. It seems to me however, that it would not behoove
the United States to put all of its eggs in that one basket. We should under-
stand that fisheries matters have been the major concern of international law
of the sea for some time now. Other issues are relatively new and have not
developed the long-standing experience which has come from multi-lateral, bi-
lateral, and even unilateral actions on fishery problems. Looking back on our
fishery experience we can see that international negotiations and agreements
have not achieved their basic goal; protection of the stocks of fish jointly fished
by several nations. This is substantiated by the fact that all of the stocks of
fish off our shores presently considered by scientists to be depleted are the
subject of one or more international agreements.
In these days of extremely tight food supplies, the steady supply of fish is an
important swing item in keeping the price of food down. Although protein from
fish plays a much greater role on other nation's diets; the need to import foreign
caught fish has created a national adverse balance of payments of 1.3 billion
dollars. This is an indication of the little known fact that reliance on foreign
caught fish supplies plays a very large role in our overall food diet. This fact I
find quite ironic in that some of the most productive fishing grounds in the world
are located within 200 miles of our shores. Overfishing is a very real national
dilemma, from the standpoint of the consumer as well as the coastal fisherman.
What about the objections to S. 1988? Are they real or perceived? It is said
that passage of S. 1988 would serve to destroy the Third U.N. Law of the Sea
Conference presently underway. However, those who have attended sessions?
have informed me that the real problems of the Conference are the sheer com-
plexity and number of the issue to be settled, and the extremely difficult problem
of getting 150 nations, most of whom have become independent only in recent
years, to agree on these many issues. To say that S. 1988 will cause other nations
to back out of this attempt at international agreement simply overestimates the
impact the U.S. has in that Conference. S. 1988 reflects the general thinking of
almost all coastal nations at the Conference. It is difficult to understand how one
can say that the U.S. is destroying the Conference when it is merely adopting
a fisheries provision which the majority of nations would soon adopt anyway.
It is further claimed that unilateral action by the U.S. is certain to trigger
broad unilateral claims by other nations. While this may be possible, the real
question is whether it is probable. I believe that past international actions will
show that nations do not always follow other nations' unilateral claims. In this
regard, I would cite the Canadian decision to declare a 100 mile pollution zone
in the Arctic Ocean, United States action to quarantine Cuba in 19(12, and the
requirement by our own Coast Guard to bar any vessels carrying liquified natural
gas, U.S. flag or not, from entering U.S. ports unless they are constructed to
Coast Guard standards, All of these actions have not been followed by automatic
and indentical actions by other nations.
If indeed a coastal nation feels certain action is in its interest, it is similar.
Furthermore since S. 1988 probably has the general consensus of the world,
other unilateral actions which do not enjoy such general consensus certainly
would not receive world recognition and we would be proper in opposing them.
This is most definitely the case with actions impeding free transit through
international straits.
Finally, there is absolutely no firm proof that other nations will indeed inter-
fere with our passage and overflight rights through coastal water or straits.
It seems to be in the interest of every nation to assure that free passage or un-
impeded transit remains the basic rule of international law. All Nations, even
coastal ones, are either consumers or producers, and to unduly hinder transit
would be economically detrimental to their own interests.
It has also been stated that unilateral extension of U.S. fisheries jurisdiction
to 200 miles could lead to serious confrontations with the Soviet Union or Japan.
The so-called "Cod War" between Iceland and the United Kingdom is cited as
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an example. In precipitating this "Cod War", Iceland totally excluded fishermen
from the United .Kingdom in their claimed r}o ad le zone.
In contrast, S. 1988 does not automatically or completely eliminate foreign
fishing in the 200-mile zone. It preserves all existing treaty rights to fish and
would recognize traditional fishing rights of foreign nations who, for an extended.
period of time, have fished off our shores. The general impact of S. 1988 is to,
begin negotiations with these nations and to develop a method for controlling?
the overall fishing effort while giving our nation preferential rights. The recent
International Court of Justice opinion in the Iceland v. United Kingdom case ?
recognized the concept of coastal nation preferential rights in fisheries ol its:
shores. Under th?se circumstances, it is difficult to understand how one can say'
that S. 1988 will lead to serious confrontations with other nations.
In closing, I would simply like to note that S. 1988 is an evenhanded reaction
to the very real problem of fisheries depletion. It Seems somewhat unfair that the..
problem, which ]aa.s received the most international attention and for which
international forums have not achieved a satisfactory solution, should be held
captive by other relatively new issues and by unsubstantiated fears held by other
special interests. Unilateralism is not the best policy, if other workable options
are open, but indeed it is a viable option and has always been an option recognized
in international law. If the other options will not achieve desired and fair results,,
balanced unilateral action in tune with world opinion must be seriously con-
sidered. S. 1988 does not address itself to any question but fisheries. It essent'ally -
preserves all other high seas rights in the area claimed. It allows innocent pus-.
sage, does not interfere with straits, and it certainly does not, in any indentifiable-
and real sense., adversely affect our national security interests.
Thank you.
The CHATRMAN. Senator Muskie, I am going to be very brief. The
point was raised here yesterday about the passage of this bill would.
make more. remote or less likely our chances to get this agreement .
that we talk about. this Law of the Sea agreement and so forth. What
is your rock bottom response to that point, ? Is it less likely or more,
likely?
Senator MITSTUE. T think more 'likely. I think more likely, and let -
me give, you my reasons.
The 10 weeks at Caracas was used largely by nations to assert their
national interests. I will tell you that they did it very eloquently and
very effectively, and the record is. replete. with that, so everyone of "
them understan is now that each nation present, the powerful as wellL
as the others, have national interests to protect, and that is why every?
body is gathered there. I think that this action, if it is clearly under-
stood as being conditioned upon the enactment of an international
agreement, will convince other nations that we are interested in an
internationalagreement, that we are not, playing games, that we are
interested in working the issues out. This bill is consistent with our -
position at Caracas. This would I think back up our delegations posi-
tion to indicate that. the Congress supports the position that has been
presented by our delegation at the conference.
think it would add momentum. And if every nation there. is con-
cerned that what may lie ahead of As is anarchy, then the. reason they
are there is to avoid that anarchy. And this action by the United States
I think would. stimulate them to an understanding that the quicker
that they act the better everyone will be. I just do not believe that
this would delay it.. I think it would accelerate it.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to get to Senator Stevens when he speaks to,
cover that same .point.
One other matter there now, on the map over there. Glance at it.
You see Africa and Europe, and they mahe, the point there about tak-
ing up the whole Mediterranean, those 200 miles would; and it just
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covers the whole area there. If you act on all sides, you see, that would
completely dominate all of the area, as it would many other smaller
areas. I would just say what difference would that make, in your opin-
ion, and would that jeopardize our naval activities there, and if so in
what way, or if not, why ?
Senator MusKm. That chart represents argument by horror story,
and not an unfamiliar argument around this town, and especially in
the Department of Defense. If what we were talking about is estab-
lishing a 200-mile territorial sea, and if we were to assume that if we.
did that, established a 200-mile territorial sea that every other nation
on earth would act unilaterally to establish a 200?mile territorial sea,
then, of course, that map then would be relevant. But, that is not what
we are talking about. We are talking about simply a conservation bill
that has nothing to do with rights of passage, nothing to do with the.
assertion of sovereignty out to 200 miles. It is simply a conservation
measure to protect coastal fishing stocks wherever they are. If other-
nations feel they need to protect their coastal fishing stocks, I would
certainly understand their concern. But we are not talking about that,
and that is simply, totally irrelevant to this bill.
The CHAIRMAN. You gentlemen certainly show a fine knowledge of
the subject matter, and I am sure Senator Stevens will too. It has been
helpful to me as well as interesting to hear from you. It is good to have
somebody that knows so much about the subject matter, and it offsets
an experience that I had several years ago. I stopped for a red light
out there, and I was walking between the two buildings, and two gen-
tlemen were behind me, and one said to the other, suppose we go up.
and see our Senator. And he said oh, he is not there. He said I saw in
the paper this morning that they do not even pretend to come down
here until 12 o'clock. The paper said they meet at noon. I-Ie says I think
when they get out of here they don't even do anything but smoke
big black cigars and drink bourbon whiskey. That is what he thought,
and he ought to have been here this morning to here you gentlemen
testify on what you knew about the subject matter right here.
Senator MIJSKIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I say you have
demonstrated your all too familiar interest in the problems of other
Senators in other parts of the country, and you do it well.
The CHAIRMAN We are all in issue in a way.
May I lay before the committee now a bill here on another matter
that we have already finished. We have already passed this once but
it was lost in conference due to the germaneness rule and it relates to
the POW's, merely extending the time allowed for the award of certain
declarations and all. I will put it here on the table before the commit-
tee, and anyone that comes in, Mr. Braswell, call it to their attention.
Senator Stevens, we are glad to have you here, Sir, and we know you
are knowledgeable in this field. We will be glad to hear your written
statement or your oral testimony, either way you wish.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA,
Senator STEVENS. Let me file my statement and have it printed as
though I read it.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. Without objection it will be put in the
record at this place.
[The statement follows:]
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SIATEMENT OF TED STEVENS, SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate having the privilege of testifying today in favor
of S. 1988, the "Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974." I believe
this interim measure is critically needed to protect U.S. fisheries from oblivion
while international conservation measures are being negotiated.
I would stress that S. 1988 only asserts fishery management responsibil ity of
the United States over fish within a 200 nautical mile zone and over anadromous
species beyond this 200-mile zone. It does not affect mineral rights, rights of
unimpeded passage through, over, and under straits used for international naviga-
tion, or any existing rehtionship under, on, in or over this 200 mile nautical zone
besides fishery management.
I have read the testimony of Professor John Moore and General George Brown
before this committee. and. I share their concern with the enactment c;f any
legislation which would not be compatible with the security interests of ft e
I frilled States. I do not believe S. 1988 is such a bill. Again I would like to stress
i hat it only affects fisheries management. It must also be emphasized that S. 1088
;s an emergency measure which would be enacted on an interim basis and would
automatieally terminate when an international agreement on fisheries jurisdic-
tion is ratified or provisionally applied.
Mr. Chairman, already a number of nations have unilaterally extended their
territorial seas. This was done before the United States enacted any legislation
to unilaterally extend our fisheries zone. I do not believe that enactment of
S. 1988 will encourage fray further retaliatory extensions of territorial seas from
nations not already predisposed to follow this eourse in any event.
The small nations who might extend their territorial seas in over reaction
against a similar measure will not even be affeected by S. 1988. They are not
depleting the fisheries resources off the coast of the United States. The nations
depleting the stocks of fish off our coast are basically Russia, Japan and Korea.
'nese nations would have nothing to gain by declaring a 200-mile territorial sea
iii response to S. 1988. The public posture of these nations at the Law of the
Sea Conference calls for a narrow zone for fisheries management. These nations
fish off many coasts besides that of the United States. It would be illogical for
them to extend their fishery management zone or territorial sea in response to
S. 1088.
The many issues involved in the proposed legislation were thoroughly dis-
cussed before the Commerce Committee during fifteen hearings here and n the
field. The (domtrittee overwhelmingly, and on a bipartisan basis, ordered the bid
favorably reporia?d. The Foreign Relations Comnfittee ordered the bill adversely
reported by a surprisingly close 9 to 8 vote.
Before making the final judgment on this bill, I urge you to review Com-
merce Committee Report No. 93-1079, and Foreign Relations Report No. 93-
1160. Also, I ask you to consider these points: 1) Committee hearings firmly
substantiated the emergency need for a conservation management system beyond
our present tweve-mile contiguous fisheries zone to halt the ongoing destruction
of species after species of fish; 2) existing treaties are ineffective in saving the
species : :I) there is no agreement in sight at the Law of the Sea Conference, in
which 150 nations, including the major-distant water fishing nations, are haggling
over some 80 issues; 4) a well-defined 200-mile fisheries boundary will be more
praetical for enforcement than the present patchwork of separate treaty areas.
Mr. Chairman, we cannot afford to wait until this matter is solved by inter-
national agreement. By then there may be no fish to protect.
A rapid international intensification of effort in fishing has been underway
worldwide for more than 10 years. While most resources of the high seas have
barely been touched commercially, the exploitation of fisheries has been pushed
to and even heyand the practical limit in many regions of the ocean. At least 11
commercially valuable species of fish are already depleted or are threatened with
depletion off the coasts of the United States alone. Most of these species have
for some years been covered by some sort of international fisheries agreement.
From an average annual catch of 700 million pounds in the period from 1952 to
1960, the U.S. catch off the New England coast was cut 40 percent to 418 million
Pounds in 1969, while foreign catch increased from an annual 7 million pounds
to over 1.2 billion pounds in 1969.
As an example of conditions on the west coast, in 1963, the United States and
Canada put out 104 halibut boats in the Bering Sea, catching 11 million pounds of
halibut. In 1973, the 7 surviving halibut boats caught a total of 167,000 pounds
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of halibut. In the same period, the Japanese increased their trawl catch 500 per-
cent and, in 1973, caught an estimated 11 million pounds of halibut incidental to
the target catches. In my home State of Alaska, Bristol Bay was this year
declared a State and national diseaster area because of the depletion of salmon
runs upon which the economy of the area depends.
I believe that S. 1988 charts a moderate course for the United States under the
present circumstances, and I hope that Congress will act favorably upon it this
year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would sum up and point out the main
points you want to make.
Senator STEVENS. I want to tell you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator
McIntyre, I have read the testimony you had yesterday from Prof.
John Moore, a brilliant young man, and we are very pleased that he
is involved in these negotiations, and Gen. George Brown. I share
their concern about enactment of any legislation which would not be
compatible with the security interests of our country, and I am sure you
realize that. I do not believe this bill is incompatible in any way with
the national security interests of this country. It is only an emergency
measure. It does not affect the rights of the seabed, the rights to the
surface the unimpeded free passage, innocent passage. It does not
affect the air rights.
All it establishes is a conservation regime to protect the fisheries off
our shores. As I have said before, I just cannot believe that the nations
which would be affected by this action can in their own self-interest
retaliate against us, because they are asserting at the International
Law of the Seas Conference positions which are inconsistent with that
action, and they are also fishing off other shores, not only our own, but
other shores off South America and throughout the world.
I firmly believe that this committee, if it reviews what we have tried
to do, and mind you, in the begining many of us were talking about
a territorial sea of 200 miles, as we look at the Law of the Sea Con-
ference and have participated in it only in Geneva and in Caracas,
and I intend to go back to Geneva and Vienna, however far we have
to go to try and assist in getting an international agreement, we be-
lieve that we cannot wait any longer. Along with Senator Muskie, I
attended these meetings in Caracas, and we were repeatedly told that
it takes time, it takes time to bring about international law that is a
consensus of the world so that it will be enforceable. We do not have
time with regard to our species any more.
There are 11 commercially valuable species that are oft our coasts
that are already depleted or threatened.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the names of those or is it in your
statement?
Senator STEVENS. One of them is halibut, and I will be happy to
supply them.
[The information follows:]
Commercially depleted or threatened fish species off U.S. shores, referred to
in my testimony on page 144, are: Atlantic Haddock, Herring, Menhaden, Yellow-
tail Flounder; Pacific Mackeral, Sablefish, Shrimp, Yellowfin Sole, Alaska Pol-
lock; and the Halibut of both the Pacific and Atlantic.
Senator STEVENS. In New England, the average catch has declined
from 700 million pounds average from 1952 to 1960, cut down to 418
million pounds of fish. While foreign fishing increased in that same
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Period. from 7 million pounds, they ue,d to catch just 1 percent, they
have increased now to where they are catching 1.2 billion pounds off
New England. In otner words, they are catching almost twice as much
as our total fleet used to catch in the 8-year period from 1952 to 19(0.
I mentioned the halibut boats. We used to send out 104 halibut boats,
and we are sending out so few now that they are really not making a
perceptible catch, and I doubt that we will have a halibut fishery un-
less we enact this legislation.
Lot MO to address myself to some, of the questions you men-
tioned, Mr. Chairman.
The CitAnntAx. All right.
Senator STEVENS. With regard to the fisheries enforcement, we in
the Commer3e Committee and the Appropriations Committee have
moved to try and predict the extension, whether it comes about through
this bill or through the international agreement, and we have now au-
thorized, our Coast Guard to acquire jets. We no longer patrol solely
on the surface, of the ocean. With our new equipment we can main-
tain surveillance off our shores with radar, we can establish and iden-
tify these vessels, we can even establish whether they are catching
fish. I am not sure we can go so far as to indicate what type yet, but
think we are almost there. I am sure that we can identify the gear they
use, and if they are using bottom gear off our coasts, they are deplet-
ing. As I said, it is a vacuum cleaner method.
From a fishery enforcement point of view, we have had meetings
with the Coast Guard, and I will be happy to provide to the comms,t-
tee corespondence with the Coast Guard which indicate that they
could enforce this law if it is the national will to do so. But beyond
that, I believe, as I said, it is going to trigger the bilateral negotia-
tions that are necessa ry to protect indiv idiirtl species.
The CHAIRMAN. was thinking about the Coast Guard. Do you
have already a letter from them saying that they can enforce it?
Senator STEVENS. Yes, sir. We have such correspondence.
The CH AIRMAN. Would you make those available?
[The information follows :[
SEPTEMBER 17, 1974.
lion. TED STEVENS,
U. S. Senate,
Washington, D.U.
DEAR SENATOR STEVE:VS : During the period since I sent you my letter of 14 June
1974, we have modified the coverage approach we are using in our planning .Ur
an extension of U.S. fisheries jurisdiction. Cost data has been developed nmre
completely. This letter incorporates and modifies the earlier letter.
The Coast Guard will in the long run he more affected by any regulations
actually imposed on foreign fishing vessels than by an extension of the contiguous
fisheries zone. Those regulations will probably change from time to time ?depe;4(1-
ing upon such things as the status of the fish stocks off our coasts, the availability
of protein from other sources, and the harvesting capacity of the U.S. coastal
fishing fleet. hrobability of violation will vary. with such things as the status of
fish stocks in cther parrs of the world, the attitude of other coastal nations toward
foreign harvesting of their coastal stocks, and the degree of acceptance of the
regulations by the nations whose vessels are fishing off our coasts.
We think that we know where and for what species foreign fishermen are now
fishing off our coasts. Enclosure (11 is a Composite plot of sightings over a two-
year period. The patterns change from time to time and new fisheries are de-
veloped, but there is no reason to believe that the active fishing areas will expend
aromatically following an extension of jurisdiction. The coastal and anadromous
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species are found in areas that are more or less defined. Enclosure (2) is ma-
terial on fish ranges copied from the sources indicated. The areas are for the
most part those where we now have responsibility involving the fisheries under
such provisions as:
1. 16 U.S.C. 986. National and international measures of control in connection
With the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. En-
closure (3) shows the area involved which covers the primary fishing areas Off
the east coast and extends well beyond 200 miles.
2. 16 U.S.C. 1083. Enforcement of the prohibition on foreign taking of Con-
tinental Shelf fishery resources. Enclosure (4) shows the area within the 200
meter isobath. The area of enforcement of this provision actually extends beyond
that isobath as far as the superjacent waters admit exploitation of the resources
and the seabed and subsoil are adjacent the United States. This area covers
primary fishing areas off all coasts.
3. 16 U.S.C. 1027. National and international measures of control in connection
with the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean. This Convention applies to the North Pacific Ocean and Bering
Sea areas that are in some cases more than 200 miles from the U.S. coast.
We think that Mr. Richard II. Philips, editor of Pacific Fisheries Review and
The Fishermen's News accurately describes our fisheries patrol effort on all
coasts in his article on west coast fisheries in the May 1974 issue of the United
States Naval Institute Proceedings.
"The U.S. Coast (filar( does a remarkable job of patrolling the West Coast in
the areas where foreign fleets operate. Those areas stretch from San Francisco to
Kodiak, and on to Adak and include all of the eastern Bering Sea. It is a huge
expanse of ocean, most of the year the weather is miserable, and the Coast
Guard's surveillance ships and airplanes are spread very, very thinly."
Like any, other law enforcement agency, we are uneasy when we are spread
"very, very thinly." That spread will become more apparent with an extension
of jurisdiction if ony because of increased demand for information on offshore
activity within the full range of that jurisdiction. This is likely to be true wth-
out regard to the regulations imposed on foreign fishing vessels, probability of
violation, etc. We have developed a number of coverage ?approaches, and cost
figures are set out in enclosure (5). The figures are based on recent data, but
costs are changing rapidly. Assumptions have been made with regard to the
availability for fisheries patrols of cutters and aircraft that must also serve other
Coast Guard missions.
The cost factors included in the estimates shown in enclosure (5) are those
relating to operating, activating, and procuring cutters and aircraft. Operating
and procurement costs are based on cutters and aircraft now in our inventory or
at such an advanced stage of planning that costs may be determined with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Operating costs are those associated with a 12-
month period when all the cutters and aircraft required for the enforcement ap-
proach are available and operating. This will not be the ease immediately upon
implementation of any new legislation due to the delays in activating and pro-
curing additional cutters and aircraft required to fully implement the approach
adopted.
Two approaches to continuing coverage of a 200-mile zone have been developed
simply to demonstrate the costs involved. They serve no other purpose in our
planning considerations, and we do not feel that the very large expenditures they
require would be in the public interest. The first approach uses a mix of high and.
medium endurance cutters on stations 60 miles apart along the 200-mile perim-
eter. A mix of long and medium range aircraft would patrol the zone twice a
week. The second approach uses cutters every 400 miles along the 200-mile perim-
eter on the theory that most violators sighted by twice-weekly overflights could be
hoarded within 24 hours.
A third approach, which we favor, is based primarily on coverage of known
active fishing areas off our coasts. It is presently being used in our planning with
full recognition that it and its related costs are subject to many variables. This
planned approach would provide various levels of coverage of known active fish-
ing areas in direct proportion to the experienced intensity of foreign fishing
activity, i.e. our enforcement efforts would concentrate on those areas where and
when the fishing is actually being done. Enclosure (6) presents the experienced
variations in that activity over the last few years. In addition, some coverage to
the full range of our jurisdiction will be provided to determine if changes in pies-
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~ent patterns of fishing activity are occurring, to make our presence known
throughout the area, and to facilitate apprehension. This approach would be
usable with any foreseeable extension of fisheries jurisdiction. It is, in fact, use-
ful now in planning our current effort to enforce our jurisdictional limits, moni-
tor compliance with international agreements, and keep informed on fishing al
our coasts.
If this approach were to be fully implemented, we will need to increase our
operating facilities by six high endurance cutters, six long range search aircraft,
four medium range search aircraft, and ten shipboard helicopters. To operate
these facilities will require an increase in our annual operating funds of $47.2
million. The start. up, acquisition and reactivation costs are estimated at $63.2
million. Both costs are estimated in fiscal 1975 dollars. Details are shown in en-
closure (5). I w ould like to caution that these cost estimates are determined by
both the latest economic trends and acceptance of our coverage concept. For this
reason, the estimates must be used with care. If either the concept or the eco-
nomic trends change, the estimates will have to be adjusted accordingly.
The period immediately following an extension of jurisdiction presents particu-
lar difficulties in planning. Added to the unknowns such as the regulatory scheme
and the probability of violation, there will be such other unknowns as the posi-
tions of various nations with regard to existing international agreements and the
U.S. position with regard to any interim period and escalating enforcement
measures. The time of year will also 'be important as demonstrated by enclosure
(6). We expect some cutter shortages until the ships we now hold in reserve are
reactivated. We also expect significant flight hour shortages until additional air-
craft can be prucured. Until this occurs, interim provisions will have to be ar-
ranged to ensure adequate aerial surveillance. These interim costs are not yet
available. It should be noted that they are not included in the estimates shown
in enclosure (5).
We could respond to any extension of fisheries jurisdiction immediately by
using our active inventory of cutters and aircraft to best advantage by 'burnt g
safe speeds only as necessary to maintain the desired range of operation without
regard to fuel cost. We could also overload our cutter crews for a period of time.
If the extension comes within the next two years, we will have in reserve six
high endurance cutters and a number of helicopters. The cutters could be reacti-
vated in six to eleven months. The first helicopter could be operational in about
six months. Cogs of these actions are in enclosure (5).
This is a difficult and complex issue which is complicated by rapidly increasing
prices. For this reason, I request the opportunity to revise the estimates in light
of the latest information available should you find need to use these data in the
future.
Sincerely,
0. W. SinEn,
Adnvirol, U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant.
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Senator STEVENS. I wanted to increase the budget, you understand,
Mr. Chairman, in this case if they could not, and they tell me that they
can do it with their currently planned equipment, with the jets, the
short range or medium range jets that we are going to give them for
fishery enforcement, and it will enable this area to be enforced.
The CHAIRMAN. I think the letter is highly relevant, and if you
wish to I wish you would send it in.
Senator STEVENS. We will be happy to provide that.
The CHAIRMAN.. As a supplement to your testimony, and put it in
the record, without objection.
Senator STEVENS. You said what chance is this going to have to deter
the Law of the Sea negotiations. In our meeting in Caracas, as Senator
Muskie points out, in the main what was heard was speeches. As a
matter of fact, as I left, I think I may have been a little bit too abrupt
with them. I told them that in the U.S. Senate if all 100 of us had a
day of speeches to make, that we would put it in the record and get
around to business on the second day. The problem was, as they all
gave their speeches, all we heard in Caracas was speeches. There have
been no negotiations on the issues. There has been an unwillingness to
segregate the issues such as fisheries, or seabed, pollution, and as Sena-
tor Muskie indicated, there is very little chance that in 1 year they can
accomplish what took 14 years for the last agreement.
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Second, with regard to this map, this map is a very interesting map
and probably will represent. part of the outcome of the water column
ne.gotiations of the, Law of the Sea. I lelieve that now there is tut in-
ternational consensus that as far as fishery resources are concerned, a
200-mile limit is the reasonable approach. The holdouts to that are
basically the people we are after right now. Basically it is the large,
distant water fishing nations that, are maintaining their fleets and
v iolating the prineiples of sound, sustained management that are get-
ting us into this problem, and I do not believe that the. Department of
Defense should show you this map and indicate to you that the enact-
ment of S. 1088 will in any way bring about this, because this is im-
proper, highly improper. Nothing in our bill affects air rights, notning
in our bill alf.,ets unimpeded. innocent passage. Nothing in our bill
affects straits. We are dealing solely with the concept of conservation,
Mr. Chairman, we have the opportunity as a Senator to start a work.
movement toward something different than the concept of the ten-
torial sea.
We have the opportunity to enact legislation that establishes a con-
cept, of conservation in the, interest of the world, of the fisheries, and
their resources that are off these shores. The world is interested. 7.
think that without this action we are going to deplete more and more
species before we can get an agreement. To me, that would be some--
I hing that none of us would want to be it party to. We, can protect
them, and we can protect them and allow these foreign countries to
take. the species that we are not utilizing, and they can maintain their
catch, and we can maintain the balance of our species.
The CFI-AIRMAN. My reference a minute app to the Mediterranean, of
course, your bill could not, apply to the Mediterranean. That is off their
shores, and what other countries can in turn do to us, and possibly
impede our military operations.
Senator STEVENS. Mr. Chairman, the ones that wanted to extend
their territorial sea an 200 miles have already done it. They have
already taken that action. This is a unique action in the sense that it
is a conservation zone, and not a solely exclusive conservation zone in;
that. So, if they retaliated to this legislation and established a similar
conservation zone in the Mediterranean, I think the world would ap-
plaud them. I do not know if you saw the Jacques Cousteau article
on the Mediterranean, but it is in severe jeopardy as far as the fishery
resources are concerned.
The CHAIRMAN. No; I did not see the article. Do you have one that
you want to put in?
Senator SITVEN S. We will be happy to provide that for you.
71'he CHAntmAN-. All right, without objection.
The information will be provided to the cominittee.1
Senator STEVENS. And I will be happy to answer any questions.
The C1TAIRMAN. Senator McIntyre, I will call on you, please.
Senator McIN-Tvitn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yesterday we heard something about confrontation on a military
basis. Let me explore with you or just ask you, because it is obvious
t hat you hayed, long concern with this and that you probably have soni,,
sound reasons to not be overly alarmed at this, but we have to admit,
Senator Stevens, that. in the, periods of time which have occurred be-
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tween the Soviet Union and ourselves, there are periods of tension,
and I can remind you of the Cuban missile crisis, and remind you of
the Yom Kippur war of October of 1973. With that background, let
us suppose we have a scenario that goes something like this, that off
the New England coast a factory ship of the type that I understand
that the Soviets use, accompanied by the trawlers, is Off there violating
our law that we have now passed, S. 1988, and an overanxious captain
of a Coast Guard vessel gets in there and puts a hole through the
Soviet tanker, or through the Soviet factory ship, and it sinks, despite
our best efforts, you know, and 37 Russians are lost. This is the sort
of a confrontation that I thought the military was referring to, and
taken alone, and without the context of a period of tension that proba-
bly would, I hope, be settled without too much difficulty. But what
about this, is there any real danger by putting this law together, and
putting it on the books of catapulting us into a worldwide confronta-
tion with the Soviet Union?
Senator STEVENS. I do not think so. In the first place, as you point
out, it is not the Navy that is going to be involved, it is the Coast
Guard, and the Coast Guard to us is cop on the beat. Today they
really enforce the law off our State, as they do off yours, so we prob-
ably have more to do with them than any other State, and I would
say they are very cautious. Let me point out to you that in 1949 or
1948 we established unilaterally a doctrine of the Continental Shelf,
and following that we did not have any confrontation. What we had
was negotiation. The Russians came in and negotiated with us, with
the TJ.S. Government, and today they have area.s off my State where
they can legally fish for king crab, which is one of the resources that
we have declared exclusive jurisdiction over, and they do that in ex-
change for not getting into areas specifically where we believe that
they could cause great danger to those species.
Japan has negotiated in areas off our shores,- and they. negotiated
those after the .unilateral declaration of the Continental Shelf. We
are now in the course of?and I do not know if you know it?we are
in the course of articulating even to a greater extent what. we
mean by Continental Shelf fisheries, and that is something that will
come up before we are through.
But as a practical matter, I cannot see a confrontation between the
Coast Guard and these vast fishing fleets. They are brought into our
courts. Every year there are 10 or 11 of them that violate the 12-mile
zone. If they violate the 200-mile zone, I hope they are brought in.
There has never been an instance of any military action as a result of
these confrontations. They are boarded, they are told they are in viola-
tion of the U.S. law, and they are brought into our courts. The State
Department is consulted, the Department of Justice is consulted, and
they are tried in the Federal courts. And in my visits to Russia last
year I found that those captains were more wary of being apprehended
and being brought into court, because when they go home, one of their
punishments is that they lose their rank, and they really want to, I
think, live up to an international code as far as fishing is concerned. ?
Today there is no code in this area. They can do Whatever they
want. Therefore, quotas are established for them to bring back to
their shores from our fishery resources without regard to the species
they deplete.
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I would be happy to provide you with a copy of a picture, Senator
McIntyre, that shows the deck of a Russian trawler, and on that deck
are fur seals, king crabs, 18 or 19 identifiable species of fish, even they
were only fishing for pollook, because they were using that bottom
trawler and bringing everything up.
One of our doctrines is that they must return to the sea any species
that is protected under our current agreement. They cannot, bemuse
by the time they get them up they arc already dead. So we have let
them ''cret by with this on the concept that we have no law to regulate
these other species. This is what this will do. Good conservation, sound
conservation practices, will be established. I think they will take al-
most as many fish off our shores under this law, but they will take them
on our schedule, in the areas where they will not deplete the species
that are in danger, and in a manner to preserve that resource for the
future.
Senator AICINTYRE From your long studies of it, I take it that you
feel that the ooportunity for military confrontation of a serious nature
is very remote. Is that true?
Senator STEVENS. I would say it is remote. It is really. The situation
as it exists today is greater cause for concern. I had some hearings in
Anchorage. and Kodiak on the west coast on this bill and would be
happy to point out to you in the record of the Senate Commerce hear-
ings where sonle of these foreign vessels were coming upon our fleets
in the middle of the night, unannounced, you know, not supposed to
be there, and they have, caused great concern among American
fishermen.
T think the chances of a confrontation coming out of one of our
fishermen ramming these foreign fishermen, or causing an interna-
tional incident from that, is greater where there is no cop on the beat
than there is where there will be, because if we have someone out there
enforcing international rules and regulations, I think they will basi-
cally abide by them. The offender will be arrested just as the guy that
is driving 0 miles on the highway today.
But generally, the fishermen of the world, I think, are fairly good
conservationists, but when they are put under pressure. by the horn?,
(ace to come ]aorne with more and more of our species because there is
no control established off our shore, that is the problem, and I think
they will live up to this. I think they will urge their governrrient to
negotiate with us for good, sound bilateral agreements.
Senator Mc INTYRE. I think you are probably aware that off the New
England coast we have had some examples of ruthless tactics by the
Soviet fishing fleet that have caused some of our New Hampshire, and
Maine and Massachusetts ,fishermen to go out loaded for bear, ready to
shoot on sight. So that is why I think there is this danger, I suppose, of
some confrontation that could lead to a very serious confrontation.
One other further (piestion which you probably can deal with very
quickly, but. I am just wondering about the Mediterranean with all of
these countries agreeing to a 200-mile limit which would involve con-
servation, and the same policy that we have in mind with S. 1988.
And you say. I think as Senator Magnuson said, that this bill en-
courages bilateral agreements, so I am thinking, that you know, in the
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Mediterranean with all of these coastal rights, I am just thinking in
the absence of a law or an agreement of a mass intertwining of bi-
lateral agreements between Yugoslavia and Greece' and between
Turkey and Italy, and all of this, and I can see the legal entanglement
that will drive all of us to become world lawyers.
Senator STEVENS. I think you are right, and that is why we, all three
of us, want to emphasize again that we are dedicated to an international
agreement. We are dedicated to the achievement of a meaningful agree-
ment on the law of the sea including the issues that concern the State
Department and the Department of Defense. But the only difference is,
if you think of all of those 80 to 100 issues that are pending before the
law of the sea, you cannot find one other issue where time is going to
make any difference. Time would not make any difference over the
definition of our air rights, or over our unimpeded right to navigation,
or over what happens to the seabed in the removal of minerals. Time
makes a great deal of difference to the fishing, and we do not have the
time to wait that long for negotiations on the fisheries issues. And that
is why we have separated this out. It does not affect this bill before
you, does not affect one thing other than fishery management.
Senator MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask
unanimous consent that included in the record at this point would be
the decision of the world court on Iceland and the U.K. cod war, so-
called, which briefly, and I am paraphrasing, indicates that Iceland
did not have the right to unilaterally extend exclusive fishing rights to
50 nautical miles, but it says down at the bottom in the last paragraph
of its holding, that in the distribution of the fishing resources in the
areas specified in the Icelandic petition, it is entitled a preferential
share, to the extent of the special dependence of its people to fisheries
in the seas around its coast for their livelihood and economic
development.
Thank you very much, Senator Stevens.
Senator STEVENS. Thank you, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. And without Objection, that
decision will be included in the record.
[The information follows:]
79. For these reasons,
THE COURT,
by ten votes to four,
(1) finds that the Regulations concerning the Fishery Limits off Iceland (Reg-
lugero um fiskicioilandhelgi Islands) promulgated by the Government of
Iceland on 14 July 1972 and constituting a unilateral extension of the exclusive
fishing rights of Iceland to 50 nautical miles from the baselines specified
therein are not opposable to the Government of the United Kingdom;
(2) finds that, in consequence, the Government of Iceland is not entitled uni-
laterally to exclude United Kingdom fishing vessels from areas between the
fishery limits agreed to in the Exchange of Notes of 11 March 1961 and the
limits specified in the Icelandic Regulations of 14 July 1972, or unilaterally to
impose restrictions on the activities of those vessels in such areas;
by ten votes to four,
(3) holds that the Government of Iceland and the Government of the United
Kingdom are under mutual obligations to undertake negotiations in good faith
for the equitable solution of their differences concerning their respective
fishery rights in the areas specified in subparagraph 2;
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tt) holds that in these negotiations the Parties are to take into account, inter
alio:
(a) that ii. the distribution of the fishing 'resources in the areas specified
in subparagraph 2 Iceland is entitled to a preferential share to the extent
of the special dependence of its people upon the fisheries in the seas around
its coasts for their livelihood and economic development;
(10 that by reason of its fishing activities in the areas specified in sub-
la ri 2, the United Kingdom also has established rights in the fishery
resources of the said areas on. which elements of its people depend for
their livelihood and economic well-being ;
(c) the obligation to pay due regard to the interests of other States in the
conservation and equitable exploitation of these resources;
(a) that He above-mentioned rights of Iceland and of the United Kingdom
should each be given effect to the extent compatible with the conservation
and development: of the fishery resources in the areas specified in sub-
paragrap.a 2 and with the interests of other States in their conservation
and equitable exploitation ;
(c) their obligation to keep under review those resources and to examire
together, in the light of scientific and other available information, such
measures as may be required for the conservation and development, arid
equitable exploitation, of those resources, making use of the machinery
established by the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention or such other
means as may be agreed upon as a result of international negotiations.
Done in English, and in French, the English text being authoritative, at tie
Peace Palace, The Hague, this twenty-fifth day of July, one thousand nine
hundred and seventy-four, in three copies, of which one will be placed in the
archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the United
Kingdom of Grmt Britain and Northern Ireland and to the Government of the
Republic Of Iceland respectively.
The Ci LAUD/IAN. We have already covered your statement, I believe,
'Senator Mcfrtyre.
Gentlemen, another matter 1 wanted to lay before the committe3.
Senator J ACKSON. Mr. Chairman?
The CumanrAN. I am going to recognize you in just a minute. We
are trying to conclude here.
Senator JACKSON. I understand, Senator.
The CI IAIRAIAN. I am going to recognize you here but we have an-
other matter here on a nomination, what we would call routine, of
General Andrew Jackson Goodpaster to be placed on the retirement
list at the grade of general. And the week will not be up until Friday,
but without objection we can pass on this one, too.
Senator Stevens, 1 want to especially thank you, and I want to send
you one question here.
Senator Thurmond has a word. I will yield to him. He wants to
say something:.
Senator THImmoNn. Mr. Chairman, I Was called over to the House
of Representatives this morning to testify, and I just got back.
Senator Stevens, I just want to congratulate you on a very fine
statement. We have got to consider, I think, the testimony of the De-
fense Department and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
this question and the State Department. I was just wondering, do you
feel there would be a great detriment done if this matter were to be
deferred for 1 more year?
Senator Sr2EVENS. In 1 year we will lose probably another SI or 3
species off our coasts, Senator. We have no way to prevent these people
today from using these trawlers that so affect all species when they
seek just one particular species.
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Senator THURMOND. General Brown is very concerned, and the State
Department thinks that they will have a treaty in a year.
Senator STEVENS. There is no chance that they will have a treaty
in a year. As I said before, they have not even started into serious
negotiations on any issue, and they have 80 to 100 individual issues.
We are trying to separate out as far as our shores are concerned the
only issue in the law of the sea that is going to be affected by the pas-
sage of time. If we are able to do this, we then have the ability to stay
there and negotiate as long as it takes to get the kind of an agreement
that will protect our military rights abroad, will protect our over-
flight rights, but if we are forced to go into a law of the sea negotia-
tion and are pressured by this one subject that is going to be affected
by time, I think we are in a worse position at the international bar-
gaining table, and I invite you to look at the peple that are behind
this bill. We are not the people that are known to want to tear down
our military at home or abroad.
The CHAIRMAN. You can make your answer as brief as you can,
please.
Senator ThuRmorfe. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have other questions?
Senator TIIURIVIOND. No, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to recognize Senator Jackson.
Senator jAcKsox. And might I commend Senator Stevens for a fine
statement. I also want to commend my colleague, the chairman of the
Commerce Committee, Senator Magnuson, for his leadership in Con-
nection with this fight.
The CHAIRMAN. They were all very good.
Senator JAcKsoN. I believe you were kind enough to place my state-
ment in the record already?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it is already in the record.
Senator JACKSON. Coining as I do from the Pacific Northwest, we
have been watching this problem now, particularly since the end of
World War II, and it has become ever more serious each year. What
Senator Stevens said is so true. It is the loss of additional species of
fish in their quest for pulling all of the fish out, and it is destroying
any concept of possible conservation. I must say finally, that it is out
of frustration that we are acting here, really. The Law of the Sea
Conferences have been going on, and on and on, and I agree with
Senator Stevens. I do not see any possibility of an agreement in the
next year.
The CHAIRMAN. That is a very strong statement that you gentle-
men are making on that.
Senator JACKSON. That is another problem. It is out of sheer
frustration.
The CHAIRMAN. You have been familiar with this how many years?
Several I am sure.
Senator JACKSON. This matter, of course, started, just to call it to
the chairman's attention, and Senator Stevens will corroborate this,
prior to, immediately prior to World War II when American fisher-
men armed their boats and were shooting it out with the Japanese
fishermen coming in. Cordell Hull intervened in that one, I think, and
that was in 1939 or 1940. Then after the war it has been going on ever
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since. The large fleets that have been involved, first, of course, were
t he Russian fleets, and the Japanese fleets, and then the Koreans. The
irony of it, I would just say finally, Mr. Chairman
The CHAIRMAN. I am not rushing you, but I want your opinion
though, about the frustration, and the probability of getting an agree-
ment on the law of the sea as they call it?
Senator JACKSON. I think this is an action forcing procedure, really.
It is going to push them, but if we turn around and table this, and do
not act, it is going to be extended further; It is out of slicer frustra-
tion. What can we do?
The CHAIRMAN. You think in the end that it increases the prob-
ability of gettnig a law of the sea agreement, in other words?
Senator JAcKsoN. Yes; I do.
The CHAIRMAN. It increases the chances, and you have had years of
experience.
Senator JACKSON. I am not saying that we are going to get a law of
the sea agreement, but it will certainly be the burr in the saddle.
The CHAIRMAN. I have a couple of questions here for Senator Ste-
vens, and I want to thank you all.
Aside from prohibiting foreign fishing, in what specific ways will
this proposed legislation ensure fishery conservation during the next
2 years?
Senator STEVENS. I reconcile S. 1988 with the Fisherman's Protec-
tive Act first by emphasizing that S. 1988 is intended to be an emer-
gency, conservation measure. S. 1988 would be enacted on an interim
basis and would automatically terminate when an international agree-
ment on fisheries jurisdiction is ratified or provisionally applied.
Second, S. 1988 is not an extension of our Territorial. Sea. Its propo-
nents seek to impose sound management principles within the 200 mile
limit, with a preferential right to U.S. fishermen, not an exclusive fish-
eries zone.
The Fisherman's Protective Act was necessary because of the seiz-
ures of our fishing vessels off South America. These vessels were seized
by nations claiming a 200 mile territorial sea. Under S. 1988, foreign
vessels could only be seized if they violated sound conservation meas-
ures which have the backing of the world community.
The CHAIRMAN. The Fishermans Protective Act imposes a number
of penalties against foreign states who seize U.S. fishing vessels be-
yond 12 miles from their coasts. How do you reconcile S. 1988 with
that law and the policy of the United States under the Fisherman's
Protective Act?
Senator STEVENS. A strong domestic management program must be
provided as art adjunct to any curtailment of foreign fishing in OUT
contiguous zone. S. 1988 recognizes this and includes, in Section 6, a
Marine Fisheries Management and Conservation Planning provision.
This section creates a Fisheries Management Council made up of 11
experts in fisheries management. The Council is charged with prepar-
ing a national marine fisheries management plan. This plan must be
submitted to Congress not later than two years after enactment of S.
1988.
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It is felt by some that the two year (maximum) period this section
allows for the formulation of a fisheries management plan is excessive.
However, considering the time it will take for a foreign phase-down
and for our own fleets to build up to catch the additional available fish,
two more years should not prove harmful to the stocks. The main point
is that this legislation would start the foreign phase-down now.
S. 1988 will provide authority to promulgate sound management
regulations beyond the three mile limit. We will be able to regulate
the manner and the time these coastal species may be taken for the pro-
tection of the species?not for the protection of any particular fisher-
man.
Incidentally, your question No. 2 may suggest there would be a pro-
hibition of foreign fishing under the provisions of S. 1988. As you
know, Section 5 sets forth conditions under which traditional foreign
fishing could be allowed to the extent that our own fishermen canot
fully harvest the optimum sustainable yield.
[Whereupon at 11 :25, the committee went on to other business.]
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EXTENDING JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OVER CERTAIN OCEAN AREAS
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1974
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED FORCES,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 :05 a.m. in room 212,
Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis
(chairman).
Present: Senators Stennis (presiding) , McIntyre, Nunn, and Thur-
mond.
Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff direc-
tor; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; W. Clark McFadden II, counsel; John
A. Goldsmith, Robert Q. Old, professional staff members; and Chris-
tine E. Cowart, clerical assistant.
The CHAIRMAN. Our meeting will please COIlle to order.
This is an open hearing. We are glad to have our visitors.
There is great interest in this bill, and this is a special hearing
set up for the group, more or less, but not limited to those that are
interested in it from the standpoint of the fish and fisheries and
seafood.
I have a very brief opening statement which will largely explain
this particular meeting.
We hope to hear from all interested parties concerning this bill,
the Emergency Marine Fisheries Act of 1974, and especially those
fishing industry groups and conservation groups who may be affected.
All of these witnesses have been given only a single day's notice to
appear before the committee. We greatly appreciate your efforts in
being here, and we will be glad to accept any written statements you
would like to submit for the record up to October 18.
The reason for such short notice and such short hearings is obvious.
This is perhaps the last day of the session of Congress before the
recess because Qf the elections.
We have to report this bill back after the Senate reconvenes. It is
now or not at all as far as giving you a chance to testify.
As a result of these severe time limitations, our hearings must be
concluded today with the exception of what I said about sending in
statements.
In order to expedite the hearings today and at the same time provide
an opportunity for a full hearing on the bill, I ask that the industry
representatives testifying in support of this bill begin the testimony
and try to limit your total time to something in the neighborhood
of 30 minutes. Then this will be followed with approximately equal
(111)
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112
time for the industry representatives in opposition to the bill, and at
the end of this time we would like to hear from the conservation groups,
and as time may :permit, additional witnesses on both sides of the bill.
So you see de door is wide open and I am going to ask those now
whose names I have before me who are representing the fishing indus-
try in support of this bill, S. 1988? to come around when their names
Sin called.
Mr. Lester B. Orcutt, Maine Fishermen's Cooperative Association
of Biddeford Pool, Maine. Come around and sit over here in one of
these chairs.
.Mr. Leonard IRoche, Boatowners United, New Bedford, Mass.
Bill Mustard National Federation of Fishermen.
)o you have a prepared statement?
STATEMENT OF LESTER B. ORCUTT, MAINE FISHERMEN'S
COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, BIDDEFORD POOL, MAINE
Mr. ORcurr. Yes, sir, Senator, I do.
The CHAIRMAN. In the interest of time we will put your entire state-
ments in the record, and staff and membership can study them, and you
give the highlights of it and emphasize the 'points that you most have
in mind.
Mr. ORettrr. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen of the Armed Services Com-
mittee: My name is Lester Orcutt, and I am primarily a fisherman
from Maine and am also president of the Maine Fishermen's Coopera-
tive Association. It is a privilege for me to come to Washington and
testify before this committee in support of a 200-mile fisheries zone.
There are a f3w points that I would like to make and I will gladly
answer any questions to the best of my ability.
Gentlemen, fishing is one of the oldest industries in this country and
to date has been the least protected and has asked for the least from
the Government; of any industry. Presently We are asking for nothing
for the fishing industry except protection of the stocks of fish off our
shores and on our Continental Shelf. It is a matter of self-preserva-
tion not only for the fisherman and, the related industries, but also :for
every man, woman, and child in our country and in the rest of the
world.
Protein is a very necessary part of our daily diet and we are told
that with increasing populations and increasing demands for protein,
that the seas are going to be one of the prime sources on which we will
depend. However, if the, decimation of our fishing stocks is allowed to
continue at the 'present rate, we will have nothing to turn to when we
need it.
It seems to me that this is a very relevant situation for this com-
mittee concerned with national security to consider. After all, what is
more important, to the Nation and the well-being of its citizens.
Presently we are importing over one-half of all the fish that is being
consumed in the TTnited States. Suppose for a moment that these coun-
tries decide that they can no longer afford to send to this country some
of the fish they catch off our shores? The. American fisherman, having
been forced out of business because of the depleted stocks, could not
supply it.
Where do we turn for our protein? We would be forced into an
unfavorable position in order to get this supply.
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Also, with the excess profits that are being derived by the Arab
world from oil, conceivably, provided they felt that they needed a
weapon to use against us, this could be used to buy up the fish that
would normally be imported into this country. I believe that this
should be considered in the deliberations of this committee.
Believe me, gentlemen, the fishermen would welcome an agreement
with the rest of the world for a solution to this very urgent problem.
We all have faith that eventually a workable agreement will come
from a Law of the Sea Conference. Our problem is that we do not have
the time to wait for the 2, 3, or 10 years that an agreement will take
to be reached and then ratified by the various countries. This is why
this is an interim measure and when a Law of the Sea agreement has
been reached and ratified, it would take precedence over this bill.
This bill is not designed to stop the fishing in the waters over the
Continental Shelf by other nations. This bill would only control the
fishing and would allow the taking of fish by other nations over the
amount which the American fishermen are capable of harvesting up
to the maximum sustainable yield for a given specie.
This bill basically is a conservation measure to save the various
species from being fished to the point where they cannot recover. I
cannot believe that other nations would retaliate by declaring a ter-
ritorial sea as this measure definitely would not establish a precedent
for this being done.
The enforcement of the provisions of the bill would probably pose
somewhat of a problem at first, but I am sure that a country as great
as ours would be able to overcome this in a short period.
I believe that the countries in question would respect this law, if
they could be made to realize that everyone would benefit in the end.
'Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You have made a good statement.
The next witness, Mr. Roche.
STATEMENT OF LEONARD ROCHE, BOATOWNERS UNITED, NEW
BEDFORD, MASS.
Mr. ROCHE. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am Leonard Roche, presi-
dent of Boatowners United, New Bedford, Mass. I am a working com-
mercial fisherman, a boatowner-operator, and presently serving as
president of our organization.
Our organization is made up of owner-operators, fishermen who
own and skipper their own vessels.
I have a prepared statement which I will submit for the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection we will put it in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on Armed Services, I am
Leonard J. Roche, President of Boatowners United Inc. of New Bedford, Mas-
sachusetts and I wish to thank you for this opportunity to present a statement
in favor of "Legislation to Extend Our Exclusive Fisheries Zone from 12 to
200 miles.
I have been a working commercial fisherman; boatowner/operator and pres-
ently serve as President of Boatowners United, which is unique in the fact that
we are composed of owner-operated commercial fishing vessels, and which is
100% in favor of S-1988 and FIR-8665.
We cannot understand why the Congress cannot and will not enact a 200-mile
fisheries management, conservation and economic protection act for the benefit
and survival of America's oldest commercial industry.
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We, in the domestic producing fishing industry have neither requested or
received much in the way of dollars or beneficial legislation through the years.
We also have never complained about these absences of political or financial
recognition so connnonly accepted by most other industries as their due. In too
many industries, other than the fishing industry, subsidies, financial assistance
and enabling or protective legislation has become not only a way of life but is
mmsidered a sen3ible business practice.
We are perplexed, however, because in the last ten years we have made a
concerted effort in every way possible to achieve legal protection for our fishing
rights anti resources within the 200-mile offshore limit as specified in H.R. 8015
a ad S. 1988 to no avail.
Continually, oar fishery resources are dwindling annually. Every time a year's
catch figures are received and totalled they are less than the prior year's totals
a rid yet, particularly with the foreign fleets, effort has increased annually, as
has the size, the horsepower and catching or processing ability of their vessels.
I ;nfortuntely, total catch figures only tell a portion of the story.
The big quest on that should be asked is, "What is the unit effort ratio com-
pared to the year past, the last five years and the last ten years." The real answer
lies there with the size of the vessels and where the type of ability is more
important than the numbers of vessels involved. Another factor rarely considered
is how many days the units are fishing on an annual basis. I will wager that in
1971, 1972 and 1973 it took more man and yesSel hours to catch less tonnags
I han in the prior year.
I, as do several others representing ffienestie American fishing interests,
sincerely believe that with the exception of the Spanish fleet, who are using
pair trawlers and on occasion three trawlers towing one net, that the rest of
the foreign fleet activity is not as productive and efficient as their investment
and equipment should justify.
I personally feel that the foreign nationals are out to catch all they can as
long as they can, even if it is counter-productive, and when the stocks are com-
pletely decimated will move on to other fisMing, areas of the world. We Nvli
operate the American domestic fleet, of course,: will not have the vessel capa-
bility to move on to other parts of the world.
We also are engaged in a different species fishery to meet the needs and desires
of the United States consumer. We, by necessity, do not attempt to catch proteir,
regardless of specie, by tonnage to fill foreign needs. We here in New England
catch the quality fin fish to be sold as a fresh product. That is the difference
that too many do not realize and particularly many who oppose or do not under-
stand the necessity for this interim protective legislation.
It is not only the American fishermen who are the losers, as many believe. It is
the American consumer who is going to be the real loser.
One should also consider the values of seafood for its health-giving factors and
it is important enough to save this renewable source of protein for its medicinal
qualities available in a pleasant manner of taking that will not be available to
1hose in need if this forM,gn invasion is allowed to continue to rape the remaining
resources available for harvesting.
The proposed Law of the Sea Conference at Geneva in 1975, unfortunately,
oven if a 200-mile limit is accepted, will take time to implement and ratify. The
resources off New England do not have the time to wait for enactment, ratifica-
tion and implementation. If Congress cannot save the American fishing industry
this year. forget it, because in another year or two at the most there will he
nothing to save.
There are some who call us a fragmented industry with three small fleets cf
antiquated and dilapidared vessels on the Pacific, in the Gulf and here en the
Atlantic.
This so-called decrepit and antiquated fleet caught and landed, dockside, 4.7
billion pounds of product last year (1973) which was about the same as the
landed poundage of 1972.
however, this 4.7 billion pounds catch in 1973 had a dollar value of $907.4
million to the fishermen and vessel owner/operators.
This is not small business !
How can the United States, with all of its economic and unemployment woes,
refuse to save this valuable renewable resource and industry, merely by the
enactment of an interim piece of legislation?
Congress, at the moment, will not even take it out of Committee, to consider it,
to debate its merits and, hopefully, to enact it.
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We are not asking for money, even though we could use financial assistance to
upgrade our vessels, to develop and maintain consumer education programs,
assistance to processors who must meet new E.P.A. and F.D.A. guidelines and
regulations to remain in business. Surprisingly, perhaps we are not opposed to a
Wholesome Clean Fish Act, or similar legislation, because it will benefit the con-
sumer and, eventually, the seafood industry in its entirety.
We in the fishing industry, and myself in particular, cannot understand how the
beef industry in a very short span of time, in this year's session of Congress,
introduces, debates and passes legislation to provide livestock producers with $2
billion in federal loan guarantees to assure that the beef industry can continue
as a viable, profitable industry. The legislation carries a funding price tag of
$2 billion.
We are not knocking this. We are merely requesting the same consideration and
are also stating that there is no funding necessary at this time with our piece of
legislation for the fishermen, vessel owner/operator or processor.
Ironically, a great deal of this same beef in the form of hamburgers will be
purchased by the U.S. School Lunch Program by a prior agreement, and yet
this same School Lunch Program rarely purchases U.S. caught and processed
seafood and shellfish. If an occasional American product is purchased, it is
usually in small lots and of little dollar value to our industry, particularly here
in New England.
We are one of the few food industries that deals primarily with the U.S.
consumer and not the government or institutional trade. We also must compete
daily with the foreign vessel-caught seafood/shellfish products which in many,
if not most instances, are highly subsidized by their governments. We also
now are competing of late, in the wholesale/retail market, with those same
highly mechanized foreign fleets who are raping the resource within the 200-
mile seaward boundary, returning to their homeland or on occasion dropping
off processed product at a free or neutral port and shipping it into the American
and Canadian marketplace.
For the reasons stated I, therefore, close by asking three questions:
I. Does the United States want or need a domestic American fishing
industry?
2. Does the domestic American fisherman and owner/operator have a
right to have a renewable, natural resource available for harvesting?
3. Does the American consumer have a right to purchase a fresh or quick-
frozen quality seafood/shellfish domestic product, caught by American fish-
ermen, with American vessels, in American waters?
Gentlemen, only the Congress can make that decision on behalf of the American
fishermen, vessel owner/operator and consumer.
Respectfully submitted:
? LEONARD J. ROCHE,
President.
Mr. RocitE. I would also like to submit for the record a portion of
a newspaper from New Bedford which gives various reasons for
our support of this bill.
The CIIAIRMAN. Without objection it will be inserted at this point.
[The newspaper article follows:]
[From the Standard-Times, New Bedford, Mass., May 30, 1974]
200-MILE LIMIT CALLED LAST CHANCE?FISHERIES MANAGEMENT NEEDED
(By Jack Stewardson)
The question of a 200-mile fisheries limit boils down to a question of fisheries
management, members of the New Bedford fishing industry strongly feel.
It involves definitely what they feel to be a question of their continued sur-
vival as a fishing industry, but within a larger question of whether the once-
rich grounds off New England can be managed properly, be replenished, and pro-
duce a long-term future.
Fishing industry officials note they have no illusions that the passage of the
Studds-Magnuson interim 200-mile fisheries bill will clear foreign fleets from
their back doors. But they see the legislation as a means, and possibly as a last
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chance, to produce an effective fisheries policy to end the reckless exploitation
of the valuable, renewable marine resources.
"In another few years it won't be economically feasible for any of us to leave
the docks," commented Harry P. Swain, owner of and skipper of the New Bedford
dragger Shamrock and vice president of E:oatowners United Inc. "For many
or us here it's close to that now."
Swain and others in the fishing industry have seen their annual port land-
ings fall from an average close to 120 million pounds annually last decade,
down to 61 mill on last year.
The decline has coincided with the appearance and growth of modern, sophisti-
cated, foreign fishing fleets and the failure of such international conventions as
the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic.
Without protection now, comments William Beaumont, president of the New
Bedford Seafood Producers Association, "tho foreign nationals are going to con-
tinue to clean up here without regard to conservation and then go on to other
places. We can't. We'll be left with nothing."
"They're fisin.ng for protein and that's al'i they really care about," seconded
Leonard J. Roche, president of Boatowners United Inc.
The growing concern among nations of the world over the status of the world's
seafood resources, industry spokesmen feel, is a :symptom of the growing realiza-
tion that past practices, and past international law, have been inadequate to
produce a viable caretaking role over the ocean resources.
The growing number of nations who are looking toward a 200-mile limit, spe-
cially among emerging national communities, say they carry the wave of the
Inture.
Although the United States plans to advance a so-called species approach at
the Law of the ,:iea Conference in Caracus, Venezuela, this summer, New Bedford
officials feel siicn a position is inadequate to the task at hand.
The species approach will leave fish stocks iridigenous to the coastal zone under
the caretaker role of the coastal nation, while placing many of the migrating
ocean fisheries, such as tuna, under continued international control.
"Many of us here in New Bedford have the feeling that all fish stocks are tied
together," commented Joseph F. VeLga, business agent for the New Bedford
Seafood Workers Union. "When one begins to go, they all follow."
"We've seen ir here in New England."
"Instead of salving the problem," commented Atty. Harvey B. Mickelsen, ex-
ecutive director of the New Bedford Seafood Producers Association, "it may
multiply the problems."
They add that a type of species approach tried in the past by the ICNAF con-
vention, setting quotas one individual. species of fish, proved to be unwieldy and
was finally modified last October to include an overall management program.
That management program, keyed to dropping fishing levels in a three-year
period to a point where stocks can filially begin to recover, will be too little too
late, they say.
"Until a year or two ago they didn't have the ability to enforce the treaty
greements," Michelson said. "There was no mechanical basis for enforcement.
Now we're starting to get enforcement but we're running out fo fish.
They also caution that whatever comes out of the Law of the Sea, be it a
species approach or a 200-mile limit, may not be in force in time to conserve and
protect the fisheries.
"it took seven or eight years for the last Law of the Sea agreement to be rati-
fied," commented Austin P. Skinner, secretary-treasurer of the New Bedford
Fishermen's Un:.on. "We just can't wait that long,"
Michelson in turn adds he is highly skeptical that the United States, if a suc-
cessful agreement is hammered out this year in Caracus, or next year in Vienna,
will he able to convince nations, such as the Soviet Union, that the terms of the
agreement should be implemented immediately, before the ratification procesa.
"The big plan of the government is to try and get us involved with other
species," Michelson said. "They're telling us we had better try and find something
else to catch. Co look for something else. The State Department is willing to
write us off."
Much of the r nestion, the pros and cons of the 200-mile limit agree, boils down
to where you fb,h? on yoar back door on on someone else's. In shore shrimp fish-
ermen in the Gulf Coast, they maintain, are , not vocally against a 200-mile
limit as are sh-imp fishing interests who fish off the coast of South America.
It also boils down, they say, to whether or not the resource is to be preserved.
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"I think we would be finally enhancing our image as defenders of the natural
resources which make up such a large share of the world's food supply," com-
mented Howard W. Nickerson, an ICNAP industry adviser.
FLEET DWINDLES
New Bedford's fishing fleet, once numbering more than 200 vessels, has dwin-
dled to approximately 120 vessels today.
SUPPORT OUR
FISH1f1G inDus RY
-Ilang.g over /ED enlif e future of the industry as uda
kno,eitsttheonneientirg derinfation ot our fishing
grounds by the foreign fleets."
Arty, Nar.y B. Mickelson,
brecutiye director of the
New Bed,ard Seafood Produrers.
tosecial,on The Standard.rimes,
February II, 1974
-1-1,,eyer, the present effort of the foreign fleets is
to far beyond the megimum sustainable yield that
their effort will be reducvd anyway because there just
won't be :ro.ohinq left to repopulate the oceans by the
end of the three year pericki"
h,nnendJ Roche, President of
Boatowners United Inc, Inc
Standard.Times, February 10, 1974
"There is an ever increasing need of management
and regulation of our lisAng resources. Too many
f ishiny nations have tor roc many years taken and con.
INA, nod, Os, all fish in sight without any thought
to assistance inctareplenishing the stocks."
0 yio A. Modesto. General Manager of
1' re An, gfeml S:eiccd Norkkeis Associalkn,
Toe Standard.Times. February 10, 1974
"While the energy crises is probably The source 0
Mont concern to area businesses, the Storlds.Megr
onto' 200-mile intente fisheries bill Is the most
toiling factor for the future Al marine related in.
,Astries."
Chester A. Aaihiway, Assistant
T rrnKrer of Ike Ha tha way Mschinery Co.
The Sla,iard.Tirnes, February 10,1974
200 mile Limit a must
A Cloni,i?d Deportmen, Sp.,' Edition. Tb. Stando,d.ti,et mu, )0 1074
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11S
VoliKIGNEES TAKE GLUT me FISH
(By Don. Fraser)
One statistic if: enough to show why U.S. interests are waging a ''death
struggle" to shove the domestic offshore fishing zone from 12 to 200 miles off the
continental coastline.
An in-depth study of the prime finfish catch from 1901 to 1973 by the National
Marine Fisheries Service indicates the U.S. portion of the offshore New England
take dropped from 94 to 10 per cent.
What this drou from nfne to no more than two out of every 10 fish caught
in the rich Atlantic fish-lug grounds means is loss of income to a key Greater
New Bedford industry.
A [arm grips area fishing interests as they watch 17. nations take a variety
of marine species out of the vulnerable Northwest Atlantic in a hard-to-regulate
manner.
The threat of extinction of such species as yellowtail flounder and haddock on
top of the sharp decline in scallop take in recent years has critically under-
mined New Bedford's economy.
There is regulation. The global take off New England is under the eye of the
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). There
is it question as to ICNAF effectiveness.
Despite an effort by ICNAF last October to reduce foreign fishing catches by
30 per cent in 1074, surveillance reports from tile National Marine Fisheries
Services Service indicate the fishing effort, if not the catch, has increased by
more than 1;{ per cent this year.
Who fishes the once lucrative Northwest Atlantic? The Soviets make it big
business.. The Polish, the Bulgarians, the Danish, the French, West and .Fast
Germans, Icelanders, Italians, Japanese, Nor wegians, Portuguese, Romanians,
Spanish and English have been there sharing the banks with U.S. and Canadian
counterparts.
The foreign fleAs contain vessels far bigger in size than U.S. draggers. Many
have holding capacities of over one million pounds of fish.
>CD
177'
4/.
CI)
C:)
?.D
71,
.194.z 'FiZ) '63 64 65 6"; 8 '70 71 '72
gg
741 FOREIGN
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119
Fish catch bar graph on New England fishery outlines growth in little over
decade of foreign fishing catch and at same time indicates decreasing shares
being caught by U.S. fishermen on their traditional fishing grounds.
In most cases they represent highly sophisticated and highly government-
subsidized fishing efforts. The Soviets alone have been sinking close to $600 mil-
lion annually into their global fleets.
They fish round the clock with stern and side trawlers. The foreign fleet is
part of an industry at sea where so-called motherships (factory vessels), cargo
carriers and support ships exist.
What's been billed as "The Great Invasion" occurred in 1961, according to
Milan Kravanja of the National Marine Fisheries Service's Division of Foreign
Fisheries.
The Soviets, who had been using driftnet catches from old side trawlers, ar-
rived in the fishing grounds aboard 300 to 500 vessels to start a decade of sys-
tematically fishing the Northwest Atlantic.
A rust-encrusted New Bedford or Gloucester-based dragger soon became no
- match for a Polish stern trawler, 250 feet in length, capable of carrying 1.5 mil-
lion pounds of frozen fish for months.
The foreign invasion as legitimate as marine law can permit under the 12-mile
offshore domestic limit is seen by the fact that total catch rose from 344,286
metric tons in 1961 to 1,194,597 in 1972.
But, New Bedford and other New England interests did not show the same
percentage rise. The U.S. total overall finfish catch fluctuated downward from
274,919 to 182,974 metric tons.
A classic example of what has happened to a number of top New England
delicacies is the sharp depletion in yellowtail flounder stock principally because
of the 1969 Soviet effort.
The Soviets came into the area east of Long Island and south of Cape Cod and
took 17,985 metric tons of yellowtail unannounced to add to the normal U.S. take
of 19,600 metric tons.
This yellowtail flounder take almost doubled the normal depletion of the
specie in one year and thereafter seriously threatened the stock.
Another classic example of what's happened to the ocean seafood grab is
evident by the haddock depletion. The U.S. took 48,892 out of 59,635 metric tons
from the Atlantic in 1963.
The Soviets, bolstered by sophisticated ships and electronic gear, joined the
harvest seriously in 1965 and took 81,882 metric tons compared to the 57,027
metric tons the U.S. caught.
This high yield led to a two-year effort that contributed to the critical haddock
shortage that prompted the ICNAF to "close" the Northwest Atlantic to haddock
catches in 1972 and 1974.
The two examples disclose to a degree the critical nature of the problem of
Northwest Atlantic commercial fishing when in two years a stock can be over-
fished to the extent it leads to near extinction.
The advent of a 500-foot Soviet or Polish factory ship in competition with a
small U.S. dragger within the last 12 years is a tiny indication of how Atlantic
fish reserves can be exhausted in a decade.
What lasted for a century with little or no threat of extinction based upon
conservative U.S. fishing efforts almost overnight developed into a situation
where mass fishing has almost reached a "point of no return."
STUDDS TESTIFIES
Testimony of Rep. Gerry E. Studds, D-Mass., on legislation to provide for ex-
tended fisheries jurisdiction, senate committee on commerce Boston, May 14,
1974.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity
to appear before you at the beginning of these important hearings in Massachu-
setts. As the main sponsor in the House of Representatives of legislation to ex-
tend U.S. fisheries jurisdiction to a total of 200 miles from our coastline on an
interim basis pending an agreement at the Law of the Sea Conference, I testified
before this Committee in Washington last December. My legislation in the House
(H.R. 8665) is identical to S. 1988, and a total of 77 Members of the House are
now either co-sponsoring my bill or have filed identical bills.
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20
Rather than repeat a description of the proposed legislation, what I would
like to do today is to emphasize the urgent need for it to be passed as quickly as
possible. When Senator Magnuson and I filed this interim 200-mile limit legisla-
tion last June 13th, we knew that the voracious foreign fleets off our coasts were
threatening the continued existence of the most important fish stocks. The situa-
tion today is even more critical.
Increased fishing activities of fleets from Russia and other countries practically
destroyed the population of haddock in the 1l160't.f, and fishermen who depended
OIL haddock for n living were forced to switch to yellowtail flounder and other
species. Now we are faced with a dramatic decrease in the population of yellow-
tail flounder. Increasing numbers of press reports indicate that the flounder
catch in southern New England may have to be reduced by as much as 50 percent
to allow continuation of the species as a commercially viable fish stock in future
years.
It is cruelly unfair for large, highly-subsidized foreign fleets to move in on a
coastal fishery, overfish it to the point of destruction, and then move en to
destroy another part of the world's ocean fish resources. It is unfair to the
domestic coastal fishermen?such as those. from New Bedford?whose vessels are
not built to make long journeys to find fish far from shore, and who must simply
stop fishing when the foreign fleets have cleaned out their part of the ocean.
It is unfair to the American consumer, who will only be able to buy less desirable
species of fish, while the most desirable species are being eaten in Moscow and
Warsaw. And it is unfair to hungry people all over the world, who will have
lost fish as a source of important protein if we continue to allow this destruction
to continue.
More and more scientists are predicting that the world food crisis will only
increase in severity. Right now, many people are starving to death in the Sahel
region of Africa. Biafra, and other areas of the world. An international food
conference is now in the planning stages, and concerned Americans are mounting.
efforts to ship foods to regions stricken by drought and famine.
The fish off our coast?and off the coasts of other nations?are an important
soon* of food, and are especially important to the world supply of protein. It
is our duty as re3ponsible members of the international community to take every
possible action to insure that this important source of food continues to be-
available in future years.
Since the total world catch declined by eight percent in 1972, the United
States must take firm action now to force Russia, Japan, and other nations to
observe proper conservation measures in their fishing activities. Through our
leadership we may be able to stop the destruction of world fish supplies in time.
We have waited too long to act to protect our fisheries.
(]NAF POLICIES CALLED INEFFECTIVE
(By Jack Stewardson)
The failure or the 16-nation International Commission for the Northwest.
Atlantic Fisheries to develop effective policies in managing Northwest Atlantic
fishery stocks has caused New Bedford industry leaders to look longingly to the
day when a 200-mile fisheries limit is a reality. '
They feel that immediate action on an interim basis now, until the Law of the
Sea Conference develops new international fisheries law, may be the only way of
stopping the deMmation of the valuable marine resources off the Atlantic Coast
before it is too late.
The ICNAF convention, they say, although it has methodically and ploddingly
tried, has failed to come to grips with the problem of insuring a rational ex-
ploitation of fishery stocks, which make up a large share of the world's seafooc.
lpply.
The commission, they note, in more than two decades of existence, and in par-
ticular the last decade in which there has been an influx of large, multi-nation
fishing fleets, has been unable to balance fishing growth with conservation.
That, the ,Flalifax-based commission has had its limitation has been acknowl-
edged by even Donald L. McKernan, who, as former special assistant to the
secretary of state in charge of fisheries affairs, has presided over most U.S.
efforts at the international bargaining table.
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McKernan, in noting the organization's imperfections, also would comment the
organization "is the best thing we have now." Increasingly, fishing industry ad-
visers to the commission have come to the conclusion that when the "best we
have" isn't good enough it's time to start looking for something else.
"ICNAF isn't working," comments Mathias Bendiksen, one New Bedford in-
dustry adviser. "Not one fisherman believes in it. We've just been playing games
there."
The problem with ICNAF, Bendiksen and other industry advisers agree, is it
has always reacted instead of acted.
"Most conclusions reached there have been after the fact," commented Austin
P. Skinner, another industry adviser from New Bedford. "And they have not
helped to even keep the fisheries at an even level."
P There also has been some dissatisfaction at times with the positions advanced
by the U.S. commission at the meetings over the years.
"Too many times we have always negotiated from the position of let's give
away as little as possible but at least come home with some type of agreement,"
said Howard Nickerson, the city's third adviser to the U.S. delegation. "We (the
advisers) can only advise but we can't make policy."
Advisers concede that the organization has provided a groundwork for ex-
change of statistical data from member countries although throughout the indus-
try there have been recurring doubts about the accuracy of some of the reports.
But in it's essential task, that of conservation, it has failed and will likely
continue to do so because it does not have the means of developing and enforcing
agreements, they say.
Haddock, now near commercial extinction, and yellowtail flounder, possibly on
that road in some areas, reached the crisis point after unexpected foreign fishing
activity on the stocks, in both cases Soviet fishing efforts.
Today, scientists assessing all the major fishing stocks in the Northwest
Atlantic, note they are being fished at or over the point of maximum sustainable
yield.
Most advisers see a major ICNAF problem of regulating so-called incidental
catches to be one problem that would still be evident under a species approach
being advanced at the upcoming Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas, Vene-
zuela.
Continued depletion of endangered stocks has come about as a result of in-
cidental catches of the species by nations not really concentrating on the stocks,
industry spokesmen say.
The ICNAF organization is now attempting to place an over-all catch limit
on all finfish stocks taken in the Northwest Atlantic so that in another 2% years
the fishing level will be reduced to a point where it can begin to rebuild stocks.
"If we have to wait that long, and we don't have a 200-mile limit, we're not
going to have any fish for the vessel owner and fisherman to catch nor the
processor to process," says Nickerson.
"There will still be problems with a 200-mile limit," Bendiksen noted. "But we
would hope that by placing coastal nations under control we will be able to
minimize them so we can do the job."
200-MILE LIMIT PROPOSAL OUTLINED
1.
The "Interim Fisheries Zone Extension and Management Act of 1973" is a
legislative proposal designed to authorize the United States to take steps to
allow for the "protection and conservation of threatened species of fish" and
to "protect our domestic fishing industry."
The legislation, originally filed last June in the U.S. House of Representatives
by Rep. Gerry E. Studds, D-Mass., and in the Senate by Sen. Warren G. Mag-
nuson, D-Wash., is currently being heard in committee in both branches of
Congress.
The bills currently have 116 sponsors in the House and 21 sponsors in the
Senate.
If enacted the legislation would:
?Create on an interim basis a 200-mile fisheries limit for the United States
for the purpose of bringing fish stocks within that area under management
control of government.
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----Provide for U.S. authority over anadronems species of fish, such as salmon,
which are spawr ed in inland waters, .noth inside the 200-mile zone and outside
in cases where such jurisdiction does not interfere with other nations' fisheries
jurisdictions.
--Authorize the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with nations cur-
rently engaged in commercial fishing operations for fish protected by the act for
the purpose of entering into treaties and agreements to carry its policies and
provisions.
--Authorize the Secretary of State to seek treaties and agreements with con-
tiguous fishing nations to provide for a "rat ions' utilization and conservation
of the resources.'
---Seek airrangaments with nations whose coastal fish are harvested by U.S.
fishermen for a continued U.S. share, under users' fees, of the stocks, and seek
reciprocal arrangements with countries now fishing the United States coastal
zone.
----Become inoperative on the date Law of the Sea treaty or treaties now
being developed on fisheries jurisdiction and conservation enter into force.
The set would not :
----Interfere with free passage rights of foreign vessels with the 197-mile emi-
t iguous zone outside the U.S. territorial limit of 3 miles.
----Bar foreign fishing vessels from fishing inside the contiguous zone, but
would instead bring those fishing activities under the management control of
the coastal state.
BOATOW SEES TESTIFY ABOUT FOREIGN FLEETS
Statement by Leonard J. Roche, President of Boatowners United, Ines te
Senate Commerce Committee on Studds-Magnuson Bill.
Boatowners United, Inc. is made up mostly of owner-operators, New Bedford.
men who own arid work as fishermen on their vessels. They are not speculatom
who move their money from one business to another.
They are fishermen, who have successfully built the New Bedford industry.
into a $70 million business. Yet, the effort of these people may go to waste unless
the wholesale rape of the fisheries stocks in our front yard by foreign national.
distant water fleets is left to present instruments.
Statistics show that in 1065 the industry landed 147,310,000 pounds of fish here
in New Bedford, Massachusetts total landings for that year were 400,630,000
pounds. The condition, of the stocks was good and the future looked promising.
We had a thriving haddock and cod fishery plus an unlimited flounder fishery
including the famous New Bedford yellowtail flounder.
Nine years laser, the naddock fishery is just about extinct. The flounder is
in danger of disappearing.
Our annual catch in New Bedford is no longer 147 million pounds. It is now
60 million pounds, less than half, and this is with more effort and longer :rips.
In the early stages of the game, we pleaded for conservation by all parties
concerned. The more we pleaded, the harder 1 he foreign national fleets fished ml
our stocks of fish.
First they took our full grown stocks, then the smaller fish, until the stocks
were beyond the maximum sustainable yield. Yet they continued until the stocks
were in dangerous condition.
All the while, their representatives sat down with our government represent-
atives within tile International Committee for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
iiiivention and talked in general terms about the need for conserving the sl ticks.
In one instance tile Soviets agreed to stay out of the yellowtail fishing areas
but neglected to pass the word to their enormous fleet which continued to clobber
the stock and teLid our i0 million industry into the fertilizer cooking plants on
the sterns of their vessels.
Just last Week a number of New Bedford boats were fishing on the 360C--0040
line (by Loran Bearings) in the middle of the vast fleet of huge foreign national
vessels. If you were to be present on this scene at night time, it would look to you
just the same as a large city with thousands and thousands of lights as far as
one can see over the horizon. Our men were trying to bring home a decent trip of
yellowtail flounder. They spent most of the time dodging these large vessels
which would bear down on them even though our American vessels had the right
of way. Finally. a Coast Guard vessel arrived to act as interference for the
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American fleet. I remind you, these incidents take place every day in our own
front yard in the Atlantic
This points up an absolute need for extended jurisdiction to the 200-mile limit.
It is a regulation needed for two reasons: conservation and economics. Without
extended jurisdiction, the foreign national fleets will continue uncontrolled?
breaking the chain of life in the ocean until all species are endangered. It is a
known .fact to scientists, fishermen and boatowners that they have broken every
conservation rule in the book, even though they profess to be concerned with
conservation measures.
Economically, the New Bedford Area and other areas along the Atlantic Coast
are dependent for a good portion of their prosperity directly or indirectly from
the fishing industry. It has been suggested by people in other parts of the country
that the fishing industry wait until the Law of the Sea Conference decide for all
nations what will be defined as extended jurisdiction. The fishermen and the
boatowners cannot wait while the cumbersome machinery of international poli-
tics decides our fate. Our fate will be decided by you. Immediate extended juris-
diction will give us the chance to truly conserve the valuable stocks of seafood
off of our shores. In reality, extended jurisdiction should have been done a
number of years ago.
We have consistently asked for this to no avail while we watched the valuable
resource diminish year after year for nine years and continuing. If this country
does not grant immediate extended jurisdiction but decides to wait for the Law of
the Sea Conference to define it, there will be no industry left when this definition
finally materializes because the rape of our fishing grounds continues without
letup by the Foreign National Distant-Water Fleets. The end result will be that
the millions of dollars of vessel investment by American fishermen and the mil-
lions of dollars in wages and salaries derived from the industry will no longer be.
In addition, extended jurisdiction will not help unless controls are placed on
the entry of the foreign national fleets. In other words, extended jurisdiction to
the 200 mile limit will be useless if the Soviets and other such nations are allowed
to continue their past practices.
It is a simple realistic fact that without immediate extended jurisdiction, we
cannot in any way survive as an industry.
LFrom the Standard-Times, New Bedford, Mass., May 30, 1074]
ToDAY's VIEWPOINT: AN INTERIM LIMIT
(An editorial from The Standard-Times of April 12, 1974)
Late last year, Rep. Gerry E. Studds, D-Mass., author of legislation that would
set up a 200-mile fishing limit as an interim measure until an international con-
servation agreement can be worked out, was the lead-off witness for the proposal
before Sen. Warren G. Magnuson's D-Wash., Commerce Committee. Mr. Studds
declared passage of the bill is needed immediately 'or we aren't going to have
any fish to conserve."
This newspaper has been reluctant to endorse legislation of this type, even
on a temporary basis, believing that unilateral U.S. action might inhibit a
broader, international approach aimed at protecting marine life and guarantee-
ing exploitation of ocean resources in an orderly and cooperative manner. Both
Mr. Studds and the bill's co-author, Sen. Magnuson, appreciate this reservation,
but suggest we do not have time to wait for an agreement they hope will come,
without doing something in the meantime. Their arguments become increasingly
persuasive.
With the advantage of perspective gained from his committee hearings, Sen.
Magnuson now has concluded :
The whales and fishes of the world's oceans are being wiped out at an astonish-
ing rate---targets of destructive technology applied on a massive scale.
This problem has come about mainly because Japan, the Soviet ['mien - and
certain other nations have defied "common-sense limits" On their catches. As
a result, we now face the likelihood of total collapse of traditional coastal fish-
eries which provide needed protein for the world and jobs for hundreds of thou-
sands of Americans.
Off New England, the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans have, in a little more
than a decade, almost wiped out the formerly abundant Georges Bank haddock.
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gravely imperiled once-enormous stocks of sea herring, threatened the yellowtail
flounder fishery and depleted stocks of cod and other fishes. U.S. catches have
been cut in half in a few years.
A. new agreement on North Atlantic fishing, although touted as a U.S. "victory,"
provides quotas for the Soviet Union and other Eastern-bloc countries three times
greater than that accorded our fleet. The agreement, written last year, clearly
neither terminates Soviet fishing rights off our coasts nor provides enough re-
duction in catch to permit fish populations to recover.
What is happening off the East Coast is paralleled off the West Coast. Off
Oregon and Washington. Soviet fleets have halved U.S. perch catches in a few
years and are well on the way to decimating the stocks. Off Alaska, the Japanese
have so depleted the sockeye salmon that biologists feel another season of netting
may not only destroy the fishery, but jeopardize the survival of the species,. In
the Bearing Sea. the important U.S.-Canadian halibut fishery has been eliminated
by what are called "incidental catches" by Japanese and Soviet fleets. The "in-
cidental" Japanese catch last year exceeded the entire deliberate catch by
American halibut fishermen.
Moreover, at the recent meeting of the International North Pacific Fisheries
Commission in Tokyo, the Japanese, who account for more than 80 per cent of
the total catch, refused to reduce their fishing effort despite clear evidence that
their failure to do so will result in annihilation of once-plentiful stocks.
lore than 140 nations are expected to take part in the U.N. conference on
the Law of the Sea, which begins in June, an effort designed to cope with these
and other problems. Major proposals have been made that would protect marine
life but there are such deep schisms between participating nations that this con-
ference?as with other international efforts?could end in failure. We sincerely
hope it does not, yet even if it does concur in effective conservation measures, an
agreement could not be ratified for years..
We cannot wait?the fisheries cannot wait?and we, therefore urge swift
passage of the interim 200-mile fishing limit.
EXTINCTION NEAR
Haddock, once the mainstay of Boston and Gloucester fishing boats and an
important secondary catch in New Bedford, has been declared to be on the verge
of commercial extinction by the National Marine Fisheries Service because of
over-fishing.
TODAY'S VIEWPOINT--FOR 200-MILE LIMIT
(An editorial from The Standard-Times of May 14, 1974)
There is nothing surprising and nothing very impressive, either, in the Nixon
administration arguments against the Magnuson-Studds proposal to extend the
U.S. fisheries zone to 200 miles on an interim basis.
Kenneth Rush. acting secretary, Department of State, has presented the
conventional case: Such extension would be harmful on a long-term basis to all
U.S. fishing interests, it would be a violation of international law, it would
jeopardize the U.S..position at the Law of the Sea Conference, and it would
hurt the shrimp and tuna fishing industries.
Mr. Rush also noted that the State Department has been working on bilateral
and multilateral agreements to help the New England and Pacific Northwest
fishing industries.
To these presentations, we would reply:
What is proposed is short-term, not long-term, a stop-gap designed to prevent
the present ravaging of the resource until something multilateral and better can
be arrived at.
.Violation of international law or not, such extensions of fisheries zones are a
fact of international life and have been for several years, and their numbers
continue to increase. Moreover, although it has expressed objection, the United
States has tacitly or implicitly accepted establishment of such zones by other
countries and has recognized their existence by federal payments, direct or in-
direct, arising because of them.
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Concerning the shrimp and tuna fishing industries, they are already living with
the extended fishery zones of other nations. Moreover, because U.S.-subsidized
fines are a good source of income for other countries apprehending our vessels
in their waters, it is reasonable to suppose more countries will establish such
offshore limits regardless of what we do. Further, it is unreasonable to suppose
that they will refrain from doing so simply because we do not.
With regard to the Law of the Sea Conference, we have stated earlier that it
was with reluctance that we supported unilateral action in this area but were
forced to do so because (a) other nations, especially Japan and the Soviet Union,
continue to demonstrate no responsibility whatever with regard to protecting the
resource and, as a matter of fact, threaten it in several areas with exiinction,
and (ii) even though conference agreement on a 200-mile limit seems increasingly
possible, the organization's ponderous machinery insures that implementation of
such a measure will take years.
Finally, concerning the bilateral and multilateral agreements?the Inter-
national Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries providing a classic ex-
ample?although we supported the effort and greeted the much-heralded "con-
cession" gained with editorial hope?experiences proving that such approaches
are ineffective and insufficient.
The Magnuson-Studds approach is neither shortsighted nor selfish; it simply
recognizes that something must be done quickly or we shall not have to do any-
thing?there will be no fisheries resource left. This difficult position was not of
our making; it has arisen because of the irresponsible fishing programs of other
nations in waters adjacent to our coasts.
?
FISHIN' ALMOST GONE
(By Bob Hall)
"Gone fishin'."
Remember the calendars that dotted the walls of businesses and the work shops
of millions of homes?
The posters detailed the idyllic life. Closing up shop for a while to relax with
a beer or soda in a rowboat, the fishing line bobbing gently in a near calm sea
or lake, and the sun shining from a cloudless sky.
But the 1974 business of commercial fishing is far from idyllic. It can be frus-
trating and exasperating as any business. Especially when the catch that used to
come into the port in the hundreds of thousands of pounds, comes in the thou-
sands of pounds.
Solidly supporting a 200-mile limit as an interim measure until some interna-
tional agreement can be arranged, is the New Bedford Fishermen's Union.
The union's chief spokesman, Austin P. Skinner, has good reason to support the
move. A few years ago, the union had 1,500 men aboard 200 boats sailing from this
city to the fishing grounds.
Today, about 900 men sail on 140 boats and unless something, anything really,
is done pretty soon, the fishing fleet could become extinct as the whaling fleet that
once made New Bedford a name known around the world.
The foreign fleets have done their work well on the offshore grounds to a point
where New England's fleets of small fishing trawlers have had less and less to
harvest each year.
Skinner notes the union is not asking for a complete ban on foreign fishing on
the grounds but rather some system of control.
The executive secretary of the Fishermen's Union commented that a permit
or licensing system could be agreed upon under the Studds-Magnuson bill, which
would allow the foreign fleets to fish inside the 200-mile zone.
The bill will offer a means of developing a better enforcement system, he says,
and will allow the United States to determine more exactly what the foreign
fleets are taking from Georges Bank and other fishing grounds. It will provide
better management than is currently available.
The union spokesman doesn't see the immediate adoption of a 200-mile limit
as the answer to the fishing industry's problems.
. It's rather a stop-gap until the Law of the Sea Conference can hammer out
some kind of agreement, if it does at all.
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UNION'S Poserfoist
Statement of the New Bedford Fishermen's Union in support of the unilateral
extension of the fisheries contiguous zone of 200 nautical miles.
Since our Pilgrim forefathers first settled in this area, the fisheries have
played an essential part in the economy of the colonies and latter the nation.
Thank God they cannot see how these fisheries have been desecrated in the last
fifteen years.
The situation grows continually worse with more and more foreign fishing
vessels compe-fing with us for less fish. Existing international agreements have
not worked in the Northwest Atlantic and in our opinion will never he satis-
factory to the domestic fisheries interests.
In the early 1960's, the New Bedford fishermen recognized the need for long-
range conservition methods in the coastal fisheries. Because we were part of an
international management scheme and because the United States had no author-
ity under existing lass', the fishermen had to stand by and watch the depletion
of the major stocks of fish on which we were dependent for our livelihood.
The number of nations in the world community which have extended their
fisheries jurisdictions have increased dramatically and coincides with the growth
of the distant water fishing fleets which have depleted fishery stocks around the
world.
In all probability, the law of the Sea Conference will come to some conclusions
with regard 1:0 either extended jurisdiction or coastal control of the coastal
fisheries. The problem that we see in using this avenue is the fact that any such
international pact usually takes several years to obtain the necessary signatures
to place the agreement. in force.
()or fisheries cannot wait for this type of action. If we do, there will be no
fishery left. We desperately need the type of unilateral action which is being
studied here today.
The basic problem with a multi-national agreement such as ICNAF is that
most conclusions reached are an after-the-fact sort of conclusion and .conserva-
lion measures adopted have not helped to even keep the fisheries at an even level.
We feel that a major reason for this is the question of the by-catch or incidental
fish caught when fishing for a basic species (i.e. flounders caught when fishing
for red or silver hake. The quota for red and silver hake in sub-area 5 for 1974
amounts to 240 metric tons. In 1973, the total catch of red and silver hake was
around 199.8 metric tons of which the U.S. accounted for 2(3.3 metric tons. The
foreign catch was 178.5 metric tons. If this foreign fleet, in catching this amount
also took the allowable 10 per cent incidental catch of yellowtail flounder, they
would have brought on deck approximately 17.3 metric tons of yellowtail flounder
or an a motin equal to more than 70 per cent of what U.S. vessels can land
under established quotas for yellowtail flounder). Before ICNAF could ever
be an effective instrument to protect the fisheries the problem of the incidental
catch would hive to be cleared up.
It has been argued that extension of fisheries jurisdiction would be harmful
to our distant water shrimp and tana fisheries. The recently negotiated agree-
ment with Brazil and the fact that our government re-imburses any fines levied
on the tuna fleet by South American countries is indicative that the U.S. gov-
ernment does in fact recognize the extended jurisdiction of some countries.
S. 1988 would allow the U.S. Government to do the same thing to foreigners
off our shores for a much better reason. This would be for the conservation of
the coastal species.
SEAFOOD WORKERS FEEL PINCH
( By Marilee Hartley)
Like many seafood workers, Betty Soares gets up every morning and tele-
phones her boss to see if there is work that day.
If she is needed, she notifies the babysitter, her mother-in-law, and reports to
Aiello Brothers, Inc., a New Bedford fish processing plant.
But since December she has been Called in only three or four times. The rest
of the time the collects unemployment compensation amounting to less than
half of what she would earn on the job without overtime.
Both Betty, a packer and trimmer, and her husband, Fernando, a fish cut:ter,
have been sea food workers for about 10 years.
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Fred, who has seven years seniority at Coastal Fisheries, has worked regularly.
But he now averages about 32 hours weekly, compared with frequent 60-hour
workweeks a few years ago. "But I'm better off than a lot of others because of
my seniority," he commented.
"We both used to work from seven in the morning until seven at night. We
would cry for time off. Now we cry for work," Betty said.
They say there is no work because there is no fish. Foreign fishermen have
depleted the fishing grounds using nets far smaller than those allowed under
U.S. regulations, the couple say. The foreign fishing boats are also much larger
than New Bedford draggers.
The amount of work began to decline about two years ago "but this year has
been the worst," Betty said. "I've never seen it this bad."
The Soares both feel strongly that things will get a lot worse unless Congress
promptly approves a 200-mile fishing limit for the United States.
Fred said the seafood workers support the 200-mile limit almost unanimously.
A native of Portugal, he is vice president of the Seafood Workers Union, Local
1572-0, International Longshoremen's Association.
"I know Nixon's against the 200-mile limit but I'm against him," Fred said.
"So that makes us kind of even."
Has their reduced income been a hardship? "Of course we've had it rough. I
think everyone in the industry is struggling," Betty said.
The couple have three children, a daughter, 15, and two sons, 13 and 9. They
live at 5 Grinnel St., Fairhaven.
One of their major headaches has been medical bills. Their younger son, Fred
Jr., has a history of illness. He recently contracted hepatitis. The family now
owes several thousand dollars in hospital bills alone.
Fred said the best solution for working people would be a national health
insurance program and particularly better medical coverage for children, Betty
said.
"Most women in my shop have children," she said. "That's why their working.
Some women in my shop don't want to go on welfare, but they're almost foreed
to. Every time a child gets sick they're set all the way back again."
Day care facilities also would be a great asset to women workers, she noted.
"Many times they have to stay home when their children are sick for a day or a
babysitter can't make it," she explained.
Betty lost her seniority at another plant two years ago when her mother-in-
law could not babysit for a time. Her low seniority in the current fish situation
means she is one of the last to be called into work.
Meanwhile, rising costs are adding to the woes. "Utilities, groceries?every-
thing is sky high," Fred said. "There's no way a working person can cope with
the cost of living these days." Especially when fish plant work is scarce.
WIVES AID FISHING HUSBANDS
(By Marilee Hartley)
United Fishermen's Wives is a 50-woman team of well-informed public rela-
tions specialists for the New Bedford fishing industry.
"We formed the group five years ago to help our husbands. They're out fishing
so much, they don't have time to help themselves," explained Mrs. Lucille Swain,
executive secretary of the organization. She is also office manager for Boatowners
United, Inc.
Her husband, Harry, is owner of the fishing vessel Shamrock.
Mrs. Swain explained that the group has 52 active members compared with 90
five years ago because many wives have too many family responsibilities for the
round of activities involved.
One of the group's first projects was to write every U.S. congressman urging
enactment of a 200-mile fisheries limit.
"We got nothing but lip service then. But support has grown in the last five
years," commented Mrs. Janet Connors, president. Her husband, Eugene, is
skipper of the Christina J.
The group feels strongly that unless the limit is approved soon, New England
fishing grounds will be depleted and the industry destroyed.
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Other organization efforts on behalf of the industry have included a campaign
to get local schools to use New Bedford fish.
"Most schools still serve foreign fish, but we did get the Stop and Shop on
:Dartmouth Street to sell fresh New Bedford seafood," noted Mrs. Bernice Calnan,
vice president and wife of Donald Calnan, part-owner of the Betty Earl.
The group also is represented on the New England Fisheries Steering Com-
mittee and participates every year in the Whaling City Festival.
Besides fund-raising for its numerous projects, the organization has donated a
book on fishing to every school in the New Bedford area, has had distress flags
made and sold at cost to New Bedford .fishing vessels and has sponsored a demon-
stration on gonrinet seafood cooking.
About, four years ago, Mrs. Swain and Mrs. Connors visited Denver, Colo., to
promote New Bedford Fish. Sponsored by the New Bedford Fishermen's Union,
the trip was a success, they said.
The group also contributes to a number of charities and sponsors scholarships
for the children of members.
Mrs. Swain stressed that the 200-mile limit is the single most important issue
for the fishing industry. "Without it., we won't have an industry in two to three
years," she said.
She explained that foreign fishermen, equipped with huge factory ships, many
smaller vessels are overfishing American waters.
Regulations on catch limits and net size set 'up by the International Commis-
sion for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries are enforced on U.S. fishermen by the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service, while foreign vessels routinely violate the regu-
lations, she said.
Mrs. Connors said her husband recently found baby lobsters in the bellies of a
cod catch. Cod normally eat herring, "but there are no herring left," she said.
She said the small nets used by many foreign boats catch everything, including
, baby fish. "You never see seagulls behind a foreign boat, because they keep every-
',thing," she remarked
Mrs. Swain noted that legislation o:n a 200-mile limit would also have to include
more funds for U.S. Coast Guard enforcement.
Mrs. Swain said ICNAF has been "a failure," but "it's the only thing we've got."
She said in the long run, another form of organization will be needed.
CITY CAPTAIN PLANS SAIL ON WASHINGTON
(By Jack Stewardson)
George E. Feener first got his feet wet in the New Bedford fishing industry 25
years .ago when he spent his high school summer vacation out to sea aboard his
father's fishing boat.
Today, at a still-yourg 40, and now the owner of three New Bedford draggers,
Feener is planning to sail his Sharon and Noreen to Washington next week to
lobby for support for a 200-mile fisheries limit. '
The "Sail on Washington" is being sponsored by the Save the American Fish-
eries Group, a New England organization composed of legislators, fishing indus-
try officials ani conservationists. The group also has drawn support from many
other sections of the country.
Feener has become part of the effort, he says, because if something isn't done
to protect the New England fish stocks there is going to be a "disaster."
"1 feel in the future if we don't cut down on, the foreign fishing effort we'll be
out of business in another four or five years," Feener says.
"Our boats lAve been competing with foreign trawlers as long as 300 feet," he
adds. "They've been sweeping the oceans. The ocean, is becoming dead."
Feener has made his living from the sea, it's been good to him, but with over-
fishing its "becoming a desert."
Overfishing :Is not the only problem confronting the New England fishing :in-
dustry, he sale., but it makes the other problems academic. "If we've got no fish
to catch, theyT. be no sense in sending an beats out."
.Feener first began feeling the pull of the sea at 15 while still a student at
Fairhaven High School when he went out on his father George's boat.
Fishing ran in the family blood. George Sr., in addition to skippering a number
,of New Bedfccd boats, was also at one time the port delegate to the Atlantic
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Fishermen's Union. A brother, Charles, has been an official in the New Bedford
Fish Lurnpers Union and is currently working with one of New Bedford's
stevedoring outfits.
By the time he graduated from high school, George was ready for a mate's
job on a New Bedford scalloper. By the age of 21, he had become a skipper, one
of the youngest in the port at that time.
Father of four children, Feener no longer is a full-time fisherman but still
makes occasional trips to the fishing grounds. He is a director of the New Bedford
Seafood Producers Association.
With the Sharon and Noreen, he also owns the draggers Gary and Aaron and
the Invader. The Sharon and Noreen and Gary and Aaron are named after his
children.
His oldest son Gary is now at the age when George himself started fishing,
but Feeler says at the moment his son's main interest is in sports.
Although New England's fishing boats have been criticized by a Gulf Coast
shrimp spokesman as being "museum pieces," Feener says he feels the criticism
is not entirely justified.
There are many old boats in the New Bedford fishing fleet. But there are also
some newer ones. One of the reasons, vessel construction has been minor, in
addition to high construction costs in the United States, is because of the uncer-
tainty over the resource.
Feener's Sharon and Noreen was built in 1906. To build such a vessel today, he
says, would cost close to $500,000.
"If a fellow saw signs of a bright future, signs of a good living, maybe things
would be different," he said.
Although high fish prices have in some ways counteract the decline in fish
landings in New Bedford, Feener notes there will be a limit on what the con-
sumer will pay for fish.
"We've had scarcity and we've had good prices," he says. "But to an extent
were going to outclass ourselves by pricing ourselves out of the market."
SEAFOOD DEALERS BACK LIMIT BILL-U.S. FISHERY NEARING DISASTER
Prepared for Presentation Before the Senate Commerce Committee at Boston'
on May 14, 1974 by Harvey B. Mickelson of the Seafood Dealers Association of
New Bedford.
When one finds himself on the brink of disaster he generally reflects in an
attempt to establish how and why he got there. And so it is today. The purpose
of these hearings is the result of circumstances which have in fact become dis-
astrous and were perhaps necessary for a real recognition to be given to the un-
alterable fact that the domestic fishing industry is on the brink of disaster.
As reported in the newspapers, it has been suggested by representatives of,
other facets of the so-called domestic fishing industry, for example the shrimp
people and the tuna people, that the domestic industry should be left at a status
quo to be protected down the line by conventions which have indeed historically
created that situation which exists today.
The fishing industry of the Northeast further reported in the papers has been
called a "museum piece" and it is strange that any aspect of the domestic industry
should be marked by one who has not yet felt the impact of foreign fishing pres-
sure in the particular area that he represents. This would appear to be a fla-
grant nonrecognition of what is capable of happening to any fishery historically
looked upon as domestic, once encroached upon by foreign fishing pressure.
The inability to recognize the circumstances which provoked that type of
remark is tantamount to the inability of the particular person to recognize what
could happen and probably will happen to that group he represents unless, of
course, the group he does represent is not in fact involved in the domestic fishing'
industry.
On reflection, unless one knew it to be otherwise, the past eight or ten years
could be looked upon as a contrived scheme to systematically annhilate species,
of fish under the guise of international agreements and conventions which were
supposedly attempted for the purpose of conserving and rehabilitating those
same species. We in the Northeast may appear to be particularly sensitive to the
impact of the legislation which is being considered by this committee. We have.
lived through the annihilation of haddock and possibly may see the annhilation
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of yellowtail and flounder within a time framework that only amounts to a few
years.
Opponents of the legislation being considered will continue to raise arguments
that the unilateral action by the United States in declaring extended jurisdiction
would reduce the effectiveness of negotiations at such meetings as the Interna-
tional Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries and the so-called Law of the
Sea Conference i;o be held this summer. When in fact I have not heard one com-
ment from any :Knowledgeable person that indicates that there will be any suc-
cess at the Law of the Sea and certainly, based on past performance, one cannot
assume that there will be much success in reducing the amount of foreign fish-
ing activity in those areas subject to IC NAP.
May I siimma?iize a report prepared by the Northeast Fisheries Center for the
I CNAF Advisory meeting on May 8, 1974, with reference to the condition of cer-
tain fisheries:
1, Flounders other than yellowtail, "stock condition in general poor; foreign
bycatch a significant problem."
2. Haddock, "stock still at very low levels; all efforts to minimize by-catch
needed."
3. Herring (regulated fishery), "total available catch may have to be less than
1974 as classes since 1970 do not appear strong."
4. Mackerel, "abundance indices calculated by U.S. show continued decline."
5. Other fish, "survey cruise information indicates low stock levels."
Squid, "concern about increasing fishing activities in this fishery."
7. Yellowtail flounder, Southern New England, "stock has continued to de-
cline as removals exceed recruitment."
S. Yellowtail flounder, east of Block Island, "stock is declining due to removals
exceeding recruitment. Continued fishing will further deplete stock."
In the meeting at which the above information was disseminated, the question
was asked whether it was anticipated a year ago that the fisheries above meri-
t toned would reach the levels that appear to be existent. The answer was "no."
With regard to the yellowtail and flounder, both of which are under interna-
tional supervision, there is very little doubt that the depletion that has taken
place in one year is a result of unreported catches of these fisheries by foreign
vessels. We are now told that it may be necessary to substantially reduce fishing
in certain of the areas referred to above in order to rejuvenate the stocks. Based
on past experience, reduction in overall quantities of fish to be taken will result
in a much greater than proportional reduction in the total U.S. catch, as the
continued taking of large quantities of fish that are not reported by foreign
vessels continues.
One need only look at the history of yellowtail and flounder under international
supervision to see a classic example of negotiated destruction of a natural re-
source in a period of ten years. The foreign vessels will voluntarily remove them-
selves from any area in which it is not economically reasonable for them to re-
main and their voluntary removal will leave in its wake the destruction of a
fishery.
It has been stated time and time again that the United States needs a national
fisheries policy. I concur. But based on past experience, one can conclude that a
national fisheries policy entangled in ICNAF-type negotiations and Law of the
Sea Conferences will bring to other parts of this country what has befallen the
Northeast.
It would appear that fishing pressures along the eastern seaboard by foreign
nations is increasing. I believe that the available information Indicates that the
number of foreign vessels now operating has increased 15 per cent from last year
and that there have been put into service more sophisticated vessels than we ha,Te
had in the past which may, in effect, increase the total fishing capability sub-
stantially more than 15 per cent. The West Coast of the United States in the area
of pollock fisheries will probably be subject to additional fishing pressure as the
Japanese and the South Koreans are hastily increasing the size of their fleets. It
should be obvious that only one reason would cause fishing vessels to come
thousands of miles from their shores and that is that the fisheries domestic to
them have been depleted and now the fisheries that are domestic to the United
States will be depleted.
May I suggest that the only person who could oppose the legislation being con-
sidered would be one whose interests are deeply involved in one or a combina-
tion of two things: that the basis of their business or the industry they represent
is not domestic and/or they are involved in bilateral agreements and special
concession situations with foreign cou.ntries.
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Is that the type of vested interest situation that should determine a national
fisheries policy? Should the results of years of ICNAF and the prospect of years
of Law of the Sea Conferences be the basis upon which the United States should
look forward to a national fisheries policy? May I suggest that either of these
alternatives is tantamount to a national disaster reflecting that which has oc-
curred in the East but multiplied many, many times.
The United States must take immediate control of its natural resources, in this
case, fish. It must analyze the condition of the stocks, the needs of its domestic
producers and its domestic consumption, take those steps that are necessary to
ensure the rehabilitation of those fisheries already ravaged and then negotiate on
a bilateral or multilateral basis with regard to those fisheries in abundance and
those species which, because of their natural migration habits, required unusual
attention.
Let us stop now, look around, see what we have and from a position of control
develop a national fisheries policy free of those entanglements that have brought
us to this moment in time which is our last chance to prevent a national disaster.
BILL 'LAST HOPE,' PRODUCERS SAY
(Statement by Octavio A. Modesto, general manager of the New Bedford Sea-
food Producers Association before the Senate Commerce Committee, May 15, 1974
in Boston.)
The passage of the interim 200-mile-limit bill is our only last hope. We have
been foisted with various forms of conservation and quotas for years. These
methods have not worked. This has only resulted in benefits to the foreign fishing
fleets and a dwindled fisheries resource.
Our haddock has all but disappeared, they take all they can and nothing is ever
put back. Certainly, the farmer could never continue to raise good crops if he
just took the yield and never returned something to maintain the strength of the
source of supply. There is simply utter disregard for this marvelous resource, and
its survival.
We urge Congress to act in favor of the proposed 200-mile interim fishing legis-
lation now pending. It has been said by many that there are doubts about the
ramifications of such legislation, its enforcement and effect upon other ports in
the South. This has not troubled the Latin American countries of Ecuador, Peru,
cod is down to nothing and we were notified recently that we should cut our
yellowtail flounder fishing by 50 per cent. Since Yellowtail is our New Bedford
fisheries' mainstay, how can any vessel or plant survive on a 50 per cent opera-
tion? This would amount to a definite and total strangulation of New Bedford's
fishing industry.
The American fisherman has over the years battled the elements, the fish
themselves and lastly the market prices to eke out a livelihood. For the past 14
years, the American fisherman has been confronted with the "Invasion" of
foreign fleets on our historical New England fishing grounds. The foreign fisher-
men, who are for the most part subsidized by their governments, outnumber
and outsize any of our commercial fishing vessels. With this type of competition,
thousands of miles from their native lands despite any and all quotas taking
all species and all size of fish, our resources are exhausted to the point that
mother nature can no longer reproduce fish to restock our resources and support
the heavy fishing of the foreign fleets.
Our domestic fishermen try to live up to regulations, using proper size mesh
to ensure propogation. I am sure that the foreign nationals pay little attention
to this as evidenced by the reports over the years.
While no one seems to take responsibility of our fishing grounds, everyone
from all over the world fishes hard there and does nothing that can be classed
as conservation. The foreign fishing fleets simply Chile and Brazil, seem to
have managed after the declaration of a 200-mile zone off their coastline. In
fact, we should remember that there is a definite possibility that when the
foreign fleets have cleaned out the New England fishing grounds, they are quite
likely to change their operations to the shrimp area and those who are now
objecting to the 200-mile limit would be singing a different tune.
Although it is late, something can still be salvaged. We have too long been
charitable to the other countries. I would suggest that we agree that "Charity
begins at home" and that we do something about it now . . . Pass Bill S-1988.
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FISH PLANTS CAUGHT IN MIDDLE
(By Bob Hall)
Passage of a 200-mile fishing zone by the U.S. government would be the best
present handed the New Bedford fishing industry in a long time.
It is the sought-after light at the end of the tunnel that fishing interestk locally
have been negotiating for some time.
Edwin J. "Ed" Smith, president of Ell Vee Dee, Inc., at Green and Wood Pier
in New Bedford, is typical of the man caught in the middle.
Costs of business are going up. Fish tonnage is going down. And the family
that buys the fresh and frozen fillets that come from Ell Vee Dee's packing
and processing plant must pay close to $3 for a fish dinner today.
Statistics in multiple form are boring. But here are a few facts about Smith's
operations :
Despite the shrinking fish totals, company expenses have kept rising. In 1)72
and 1973, Smith noted, Ell Vee Dee's payroll was over $000,000. In 1963 and
1004 the total was between $515,000 and $595,000. But in the 60s there was twice
as ninth tish coming into New Bedford to split the expenses.
Eifty-live persons employed in the fillet room haven't worked while 50 "out-
side" workers :ire on a part-time schedule.
Where total work hours once ranged to 50 and 60 a week, it is 20-3) hours
a week now.
The fillet. houses in the city, 12 of them, need 200,000-240,000 pounds of fish
a day. The "take" is 00,000-90,000 because of the fish shortage.
A company dock worker was paid $1.75 an hour in 1963. Ten years later, he
earns $3.85 an hour, on top of other benefits, such as pensions, health and
welfare payments and a guarantee of seven hours pay a day if called to work
even it the plant only operates four or five hours.
Invariably, when workers are let go because there is too little work it ht.rts
the company. "We've lost a lot of key workers to other places," Smith explained.
The workers move on to other industries DA the declining fish tonnage takes its
toll on tho job market.
Smith says he feels his plant and. some of the large fillet houses can weataer
the current shortage "Out for the small fillet houses . . . I don't see how they'll
survive.
(die 20(1-mile limit) is a very important thing," Smith said. "It's a must
for the salvation of not only New Bedford, but (other fishing ports) Boston
and Glonceste7.
The Eli Vee Dee president says he plans to go to Washington shortly to lobby
for support of the Studds-Magnuson bill.
TUNA MEN NEUTRAL TOWARD LIMIT
(By Frank Roylance)
New Bedford tuna fishermen take a neutral position on whether the U.S.
should impose a 200-mile fishing limit off its shores.
The bluefin tuna, they say, are a world-ranging fish and would not always be
protected by territorial fisheries management imposed by one country, as would
native species such as the yellowtail, haddock and cod.
The New Redford tuna seiners?the North Queen, the Sea Rover and the A.A.
Ferrant:e?have been working the brief, three-month summer tuna season for
12 years.
Bluefin tuna begin running off New Jersey in late June and gradually work
their way along the coast of Long Island and New England following the warm-
ing currents until late September or early October.
In a HOTISI' they are protected in their run up the coast by their migratory
patterns which keep them almost exclusively within the U.S. 12-mile fisheries
limit. Puerto-Rican based West Coast vessels and Canadian seiners allowed
inside the contiguous zone by bi-lal=eral treaty, are the only "outsiders" in the
fishery.
It's not certain where the fish go from here, but according to Leonard Ingrande,
who owns the North Queen and the Sea Rover, and Frank Cyganowski, part-
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owner with Ingrande of the A.A. Ferrante, bluefin tagged here have been
caught in the Bay of Biscay off western France, and off Brazil.
New Bedford tuna boats landed 2.6 million pounds of tuna last year. The
catch was mostly bluefin, but included some skipjack as well.
The catches are off-loaded here or at Cape May, N.J., and shipped to Cam-
bridge, Md. for processing.
As far as their own interests are concerned, Ingrande and Cyganowski agree
that foreign fishing fleets are "not after tuna" and pose no direct threat to
tuna stocks.
For the East Coast tuna fishery at least, said Ingrande, "the 200-mile limit . ? .
is not important at all."
Catches of mackeral and herring, which are food for the bigger tuna, are
regulated by international agreement, theoretically at least protecting those fish
as well as the tuna from the kind of over-fishing that depleted these species in
European waters.
The tuna men are not blind to the problems of the draggers and trawlers,
however. "We can appreciate their problems," said Ingrande, and recognize the
need for conservation.
But the tuna are a "world resource," according to Cyganowski, and should be
regulated by international agreement.
The local tuna industry also is reluctant to buck the powerful West Coast
tuna interests. Hence their neutral stance.
Only about two per cent of the nation's valuable tuna industry?second only
to shrimping in dollar value annually?is located here. Cyganowski referred to
the local tuna fleet as the "mosquito fleet."
"It would be presumptuous of us to buck the West Coast tuna interests," he
said. Ninety per cent of the U.S. tuna catch, Ingrande noted, is caught off foreign
waters.
At a Senate Commerce Committee hearing in San Diego, April 17, more than
150 people, most representing the California tuna industry, voiced angry op-
position to adoption of the 200-mile fishing limit.
San Diego Republican Congressman Bob Wilson told Sen. John Tunney, D-
Calif., who chaired the hearing, "The tuna sandwich and the tuna casserole
we've all come to know and love could well become faint memories of the past,
too expensive for most of us to enjoy."
The tuna men warned that adoption of the 200-mile limit sought in the
Studds-Magnuson bills now pending before Congress would encourage South and
Central American countries that have not already done so, to impose similar
limitations.
Rep. Lionel Van Deerlin told the committee the 200-mile limit would be "bad
politics and rotten diplomacy."
August Felando, general manager of the American Tunaboat Association, said
passage of the bill would be a "stab in the back to the multination commissions
that are trying to conserve tuna" from overfishing.
"It's a grand illusion that (the bill) will protect the fish," Felando said. "It
will destroy them."
Joseph Gann, an official of Western Ocean Products, Inc., which operates a
fleet of 13 purse seiners, said fishermen who support the 200-mile limit are in
trouble because of obsolete fishing methods.
? "Washington," he said, "is apparently listening to the voices of politicians
from areas in which fishermen have not been progressive and have not kept up
to their foreign competition."
? "Now," he concluded, "that they are being put out of business by foreign com-
petition, they are screaming for governmental protection in asking for this 200-
mile limit."
Ingrande, who "grew up with" the west coast tuna industry before coming to
New England, said that for Ecuador, which has a 200-mile fishing limit, seizing
U.S. fishing bolts inside their 200-mile limit and exacting fines, has become a
lucrative "industry."
Because the U.S. government reimburses American fishermen for fines and
license fees paid to foreign countries, the ultimate loser is the American taxpayer.
Fishermen also complain of harassment by foreign governments on the pretext
of enforcing their 200-mile limits. Payoffs to gunboat commanders are only one
of the indignities, they say. Rights of passage are also threatened.
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Ingrande related a recent incident in Panama where a U.S. fishing boat was
steaming toward the Canal Zone reportedly to get medical help for a hemorrhag-
ing crewman.
The San Diego-based tunaboat was seized and fined $57,200 for allegedly fishing
inside the 200-mile limit.
Purse-seiners, Ingrancle said, can't stow their three-quarter-mile long nets and
are accused of fishing?or looking for fish?inside territorial waters when they
may only be passing through.
The Studds-Magnuson bill would not interfere with free passage within the
contiguous zone.
I'DITSTRY CALLED AT CROSSROADS
( Testimony of Sen. Edward W. Brooke before the Senate Commerce Commit-
tee, May 14, 1974.)
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your committee
to testify on a matter of great importance to all of us in the commonwealth and
New England. Jt is also my pleasure to welecone you to our state. During your
visit, I hope you will have the chance to taste some of the seafood dishes for
which we are justly famous. I am confident that this would lend even more im-
mediacy to the task at hand, for unless swift action is taken to protect the
region's fish?and fishing industry?we may not have any fish to serve you.
As many will tell you today, the New England fishing industry is at a critical
crossroad. Not only are the men and women who make up this industry becoming
increasingly and exonerably forced out of business, but the very product they
seek is increasingly--and needlessly?becoming extinct.
This state of affairs has been brought about by the tremendous increase in the
fishing efforts of foreign nations off our coast. Just 10 years ago our New Eng-
land fishermen were responsible for over 90 per cent of the total catch off New
England. Now they account for less than 45 per cent. This has all but shattered
our once thrivir.g fishing industry and, even 'more importantly, this has left our
fish stocks on the brink of extinction.
When the effects of this huge foreign effort first became clear, I. like many of
my colleagues, was hopeful that the International Commission for Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries could and would resolve the growing imbalances. Created to
"protect and conserve the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic in order to make
possible the maintenance of a maximum sustained catch from these fisheries,"
ICNAF seemed to offer real possibilities of correcting this obvious overfishing.
However, the Commission has repeatedly failed to live up to its mandate. Most
recently at its Ottawa meeting last fall, ICNAF was presented with carefully
prepared scientific evidence detailing clearly the terrible effects of rapidly de-
clining fish stocks in the Northwest Atlantic region. Yet, the Commission
responded with only a three-year program to reduce the foreign fishing effort?a
program which will not: even begin to reverse overfishing until 1975 or 19713.
Moreover, the success of the Ottawa agreements are contingent upon strict
compliance of all member nations. Past precedent unfortunately indicates that
such compliance has not been forthcoming anf there is no reason to believe that 1.t
will be forthcoming in the future.
Hence the time has come for unilateral action on the part of the United States
Government. We can no longer rely on the faith of foreign nations nor can we
rely on the efficacy of international agreements. We must act now to protect this
great resource and our men and women who harvest it. I believe that S1988 offers
us the best avenue for such action. By extending our contiguous fishing zone ont
to 200 miles, this bill will not only provide our .depressed fishing industry with
needed relief, hit it will assure the nation, indeed the world, continuing avail-
ability of one of our most vital food sources. In essence, it does what ICNAF and
other international agreements should have done long ago.
FLEET FACES CLTT IN FLOUNDER CATCH
The International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries is con-
sidering asking New Bedford fishermen to increase their catches of yellowta 1
flounder on southern New England grounds next year to prevent further depletion
of the stocks.
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Such a decline in catch would leave the U.S. allowable catch, in the area at a
level of about 4,500 metric tons, a level that would practically put the flounder
in that area on the same regulatory level as the haddock, almost an incidental
catch basis.
The yellowtail flounder for years has been the mainstay of the New Bedford
fishing fleet. The crisis developed in 1970 when the Soviet Union reported taking
an incidental yellowtail catch from the area almost equal to the U.S. catch.
FISH LANDINGS FALL
New Bedford fish landings have fallen from a record high volume of 147
million pounds in 1965 to 59 and 61 million pounds in the past two years.
Since 1971, when yellowtail flounder first came under regulation by the Inter-
national Commission for the Northwest Atlantic, port fish landings have failed
to reach the 100 million pound level.
EXCERPTS Or TED'S TESTIMONY GIVEN
(Excerpts from Sen. Edward M. Kennedy's testimony before the Senate Com-
merce Committee in Boston, May 15, 1974) .
It is clear to me and I am certain that today's hearing will demonstrate that it
Is clear to New England fishermen that extension of the fishing zone to 200 miles
is the only way we can reverse the spiralling devastation of our fish and marine
resources.
Volumes of testimony has been gathered by this committee in support of 200
miles fishing zone from other parts of the nation.
The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission recently passed a resolution
in support of the legislation we consider today.
Massachusetts and Rhode Island have already passed 200 mile fishery zone
legislation.
During testimony taken by the Senate Commerce Committee, objections to ex-
tention of the fishing zone have been raised by tuna and shrimp fishermen from
the Gulf and Pacific Coasts. The National Marine Fisheries Service statistics for
1973 show that 11 per cent of the total catch by American fishermen is caught off
foreign shores representing 17 per cent of the total dollar value of the catch by
American fishermen. The legislation to extend our fishery zone is designed to
protect affirmatively 89 per cent of the industry representing 83 per cent of the
dollar value.
But it should be stressed that, in the view of the distinguished chairman of
this committee, nothing in this proposed extension of the fishing zone will ad-
versely affect the tuna and shrimp industries No present treaties in force to
protect those industries will be abrogated. Indeed, future treatiep are encour-
aged by the legislation.
There also has been discussion before this committee regarding traditional
fishing rights as they relate to extended fisheries jurisdiction. What is clear from
that discussion is that international maritime law is an evolving body of law
and that so far that evolution has not kept pace with the technology which has
changed the character of the oceans of the world.
The Truman proclamations of 1945, the 1958 Geneva Convention on fishing
and conservation, the extension of fishing zone jurisdiction by 10 nations?all
reflect changing attitudes in traditional fishing rights concepts which were based
on the theory that the supply of fish was inexhaustible.
The extension of the fishing zone is an opportunity to end the tension between
American and foreign fishermen To reverse the buildup of bitterness and frustra-
tion over the last of enforcement of existing agreements: And to foster interna-
tional goodwill and cooperation among nations to assure the future of maritime
resources.
The conservation of our marine resources is in the best interests of us all?in
the best interests of our commercial fishing industry and our sports fishermen,
of the economy of the developing nations of the world and the people of the world
who depend on fish resources for protein, and it is in the interest of international
good will and cooperation.
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We cannot shirk our responsibility to the ocean resources off our shores. We
can no longer ignore the grim forecasts of depleted stocks. It is our happy duty
to lead the other maritime nations of the world into recognition of the conserva-
tion crisis and the potential for cooperation in alleviating this crisis.
Mr. ilocnn. In addition, 1 would like to make some oral remarks
which I would like to have put in the record as well.
The Ci 'AIRMAN. Without objection.
Mr. RocHE. We have opposition to the bill. We have had informa-
tion that the people from the tuna industry are opposed. We would
like to know who says they are opposed. Many of the tuna people are
quietly buying licenses from foreign countries now in order to fish
within the 200-mile limit of these other countries.
In addition, Star Kist Tuna Co., a subsidiary of Ralston Purina. has
plants and fishing boats operating in South America, Africa and the
trust territories. They have a, joint venture with the Japanese in Japan.
It is their representatives you will hear from in opposition to this bill
today, not the fishermen.
Regarding the shrimp industry, who says they are opposed; not all
shrimpe,rs are opposed. Those who fish off the coast of the -United
States and the Gulf need to and want to have this protection because
they fear what the Cuban and Mexican .9shing interests will do when
their resources dwindle. The Cubans are building a large fishing fleet
Mow.
You know where their expertise COWS from?it comes from the
Soviet Union. We know where the finances come from?the same place.
Will it be in the best interest of our security and defense to allow
a. large fleet of Cuban vessels to operate iii the. Gulf and -Atlantic as the
Soviets now do off of the New England coast.
The shrim.ping interests who are opposed to extending jurisdiction
are those who own facilities and operate vessels inside of the 200-mile
zones of other countries. Ask them when they testify. They represent
2 percent of the shrimp labor force and only 20 percent of the value of
the shrimp land ings.
Regarding the jeopardy of TLS. security, the legislation is an interim
measure--I repeat that?an interim measure until the Law of the Sea
Conference and TCNAF do their job. The legislation does not stop in-
nocent passage over, upon, or under the waters covered by the legisla-
tion. It simply is for fisheries protection, nothing else, to protect the
resources for the future, no joint research project with other countries'
security agreements with other countries, or anything else, will be
affected in any way whatsoever.
It does not a i
ffect any bilateral agreements in any way. If t did,
they could be adjusted as they have in the past.
For the paranoiacs who spread the ridiculous fear that the legisla-
tion is a. detriment and will cause confrontation, I must state that with-
out the legislation there will he confrontation.
Over a month ago, one of our member vessels was hit from behind
by a, huge -foreign national vessel, arid so severelY damaged that it is
still being repaired at tremendous cost to the individual captain
owns it.
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On Sunday, September 22, another vessel from our fleet was hit and
sunk with the loss of a mate's life. Confrontation is taking place. Even
our allies are taking fishermen over the hurdles. I will give you some
statistics.
In an area where there is a zero quota on haddock, we have six Brit-
ish vessels, one of them with 130 tons of haddock aboard, another with
10 tons, another with 96 tons, another with 10.5 tons, and another with
45.2 tons, and the last one with 10 tons. One vessel has 130 tons of
haddock aboard. The skipper told our Coast Guard he had capacity
for 600 tons and would stay until he got his capacity.
The CHAIRMAN. Where did this incident occur?
Mr. ROCHE. This was off the eastern end of the Georgia Banks.
Our men are upset and angry and confrontation will become inter-
national incidents. We can avoid this confrontation if the legislation
is enacted because surveillance and enforcement could become a fact.
The Canadians and the Americans could jointly institute surveillance
and enforcement on two coasts with their overlapping boundaries and
interests.
Canada is going to institute a 200-mile limit. If they do it without
the United States, there will be confrontations. Many other countries
are going to institute a 200-mile limit without U.S. approval or ac-
ceptance. There will be more confrontations.
One final answer for the Pentagon people. The Law of the Sea Con-
ference has already agreed to a -12-mile territorial extension and in
principle a 200-mile check zone. In effect they have already closed the
straits and other passages to military passage, which the Pentagon is
worried about.
This legislation in no way affects the military, it only gives the
American fisherman his just due.
Mr. Chairman, without the legislation we cannot survive as an in-
dustry, not even for 2 more years.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. You have some good points there, too, and from a
practical standpoint I was impressed.
Mr. ROCHE. One last addition to that, Senator, is that our fishermen
are fined and have a criminal record if they catch any haddock in this
area, and the British are cleaning it up.
The CIIAIRMAN. Is there not something that we can do about it?
Under the law, is there not some one who has responsibility over try-
ing to police this matter?
They keep you out, and do we not try to keep others out?
Mr. ROCHE. I think if we had extended jurisdiction of our Govern-
ment surveillance and enforcement, if they enforced as well on the
foreign nationals as they do on the Americans, we would not have any
problems.
The CHAIRMAN. How do they enforce it on you, revoke your license
to fish at all?
Mr. ROCHE. First of all, we are not allowed in these areas; if we are
spotted by a Coast Guard or other surveillance outfits, then when the
vessel returns to shore, they usually receive a summons to go to court.
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The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking from practical knowledge of these
matters?
Mr. ROCHE. -Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You have been in close contact with the problem?
Mr. ROCHE. -Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not mean they arrested you, not yet anyway.,
but you do know that these things happen?
Mr. ROCHE. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF BILL MUSTARD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
FISHERMEN, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. MUSTARD. These gentlemen here are all active working commer-
cial fishermen, I myself try to spend as much time as I can in com-
mercial fishing. However, since I am in Maryland, located fairly close
to Washington, I usually end up here more than I do on my boat.
Before I start my statement, I would like to include the statements
of several pelvale from Mississippi who have expressed a great deal of
interest in this matter.
Marlin Sutherland from Bay St. Louis, and Walter Jackson, counsel
for Gulf Fish3rmen, Inc., of which Mr. Deville is the president. That
is a Biloxi corporation. And Mr. Pete l3arhonovich is the director of
the Mississippi Gulf Coast :Fishermen's Association, which is also a
Biloxi Fishermen's Organization; Mr. Walter Ross, Charles H. Lyles,
Michael Seveli, Capt. Jimmy Bradley, owner of the Jimmy-Diane;
Danny Wenerski, shrimper from Biloxi,, and Ross Tanguis.
These gentlemen are members or directors of the Gulf Fishermen's
Association' and I have a brief statement I would like to include o:a
their behalf.
Mr. Sutherland briefly sums up his comments by saying:
"I am interested in the 200-mile limit and I think it should be put
into effect as soon as we can."
Mr. Lyles from the Gulf Coast Fishermen's Association?both
groups have over 1,000 members in the Gulf Coast-Mississippi
area, and their attorney, Mr. Ross, summed up this way the position
of the Mississippi fishermen by stating, and I quote:
We in the Gulf of Mexico have been somewhat more fortunate, and I qualify
that somewhat--more fortunate than our brothers in the North Atlantic ard
North Pacific. We have not totally escaped. Already they are here and the hour
is late. Already the foreign fleets have catalogued the species and this is a pre-
lude to the coining onslaught. Perhaps we have been spared because the Japanese
only recently mounted a fishing operation in the Gulf of Alaska that wmf.d
stagger the imagination of the American fishermen. The Russians have bee:a busy
doing the same thing off the Northwest Coast of Africa and off of New England,
but our respite I.s temporary.
Our great Mendhaden Fishery, which supports our fishing industry, is in
serious danger. The shrimp fishery has been reconnoitered and catalogued for
harvesting. Our offshore bottom fish stocks are well-known. Therefore, gentlemen,
it is too late. Therefore, with the record of failures by the various international
commissions, we must resort to the unilateral action that will save our resources;
that is, adoptio:a of the 200-mile limit, and now. .
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That statement was by Charles Lyles, representing the Gulf Coast
Fishermen's Organization, and is in the House hearings which will
soon be published.
I would like to sum up the feeling of some of the groups around
the country and some of these other fishing boat captains, and we will
be glad to answer any other questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well.
Mr. MUSTARD. My statement is very brief and I have some appen-
dixes here to support the statement, which will save considerable time.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Mr. MUSTARD. Gentlemen, my name is William G. Mustard. I am a
commercial fisherman and a marine consultant for the National Fed-
eration of Fishermen, a council of 69 fishermen's associations from
Maine to Alaska, with a present combined membership of over 20,000
fishermen.
I have come here to submit for the record some basic facts concern-
ing the 200-mile economic zone bill, S. 1988.
At this time I would like to put an appendix to my testimony in
the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.
[The document follows:]
nEpoRT ON FOREIGN FISHING OFF U.S. COASTS, JUNE 1973
(Prepared by Milan A. Kravanja, International Activities Staff, National Marine
Fisheries Service, Washington, D.C.)
SUMMARY
The number of foreign fishing and fishery support vessels sighted during the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS ) surveillance patrols, conducted in
cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard, increased in June to about 930 vessels, or
90 vessels more than were observed in May 1973. (In June 1972, only 770 foreign
fishery vessels were sighted off U.S. coasts). The large increase in 1973 is due
entirely to expanded foreign fishing off Alaska and continued heavy fishing off
the Pacific Northwest, Table 1 shows the detailed composition of foreign fleets by
country and vessel type.
The largest concentration of foreign vessels remained off Alaska? where their
number increased to 053 (from about 500 vessels in May 1973). This was the larg-
est number of foreign vessels fishing off Alaska in any month during the past 2
years. In June 1972, only 445 foreign vessels were off Alaska, in June 1971?only
413. By far the largest foreign fleet was Japan's; continued heavy fishing for
Alaska pollock (117 vessels) and the peak activity in the seasonal salmon fisher-
ies off the Aleutian Islands (342 vessels) brought the Japanese fleet to about 580
vessels. Virtually the entire fleet licensed by the Japanese Government to fish for
salmon in the North Pacific and the Bering Sea (10 motherships and 341 salmon
catcher vessels) was in the Alaskan area in June. The Japanese engaged in sal-
mon fisheries both south and north of the Aleutians (see fig. 1 for details).
The difference in the number of Japanese vessels fishing for salmon in the
North Pacific and the Bering Sea in 1972 and 1973 is due to variations in the
abundance of salmon species. The number of vessels licensed for North Pacific
and Bering Sea salmon fishing was about the same in both years. In 1972, when
sockeye salmon was excepkionally abundant, several Japanese salmon mother-
ships and catcher vessels fished west of the Date Line in the northern Bering Sea
out of the Alaskan area. This year, when pink salmon is more abundant, all 10
Japanese motherships are concentrating off the Aleutians. The June 1973 Jap-
anese salmon catches consisted mostly of pinks (90% of total catch), according
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to Japanese newspapers. Sockeye catches are reportedly smaller than in 1972 and
the catch of chums is substantially lower. As a result, prices for salmon are
rising sharply in Japan. This year Japanese salmon motherships freeze most of
I heir catch (for sale on domestic markets where the demand and prices are
good).
Other smaller Japanese fisheries off Alaska this month were: Bering Sea crabs
(34 vessels), Pacific ocean perch (17 vessels), various groundtish (22 vessels)
and sablefish (7 longliners). The fishing for herring in the northeastern Bering
Sea was discontinued in mid-June.
The Soviet fleet off Alaska during June numbered 62 vessels; considerably
more than the 24 vessels observed in June 1072. The largest Soviet fishing con-
tinues to be for groundfish (20 vessels), Alaska pollock (5 vessels) and Pacific
ocean perch (8 vessels). The fleet dwindled rapidly as the month progressed and
by its end only about 30 vessels remained fishing off Alaska, a number only
slightly higher than a year ago.
The Republic of Korea is increasing its fishing activities off Alaska. This June,
12 vessels were sighted compared to only 5 last June. They fished for herring,
ocean perch, and Alaska pollock.
Active surveillance of foreign fleets by National Marine Fisheries Service
patrols, conducted with the support of the U.S. Coast Guard, obtained circum-
stantial evidence that some Korean vessels might have fished illegally for salmon
and that the Japanese crab fleet was setting nets within the U.S. contiguous
fishing zone. For details see page 6, para. 1 and 2. The evidence was turned over
to the U.S. Department of State.
There is no information on the penalties imposed by the Japanese Government
WI 3 salmon gillnetters which fished salmon illegally 600 miles east of the absten-
tion line in May 1973 (see May report, page la). Off the Pacific Northwest (Wash-
ington and Oregon states) and off California from 60-70 vessels fished mainly for
Pacific hake, although there were reports of some incidental catches of rockfish.
Over 20 of these vessels fished off northern California during the second half of
June.
In the Gulf of Mexico. all foreign vessels sighted were Cuban. They were en-
gaged in two fisheries: about 10 vessels were fishing for shrimp off the coast a!
Texas; the remaining 15 vessels were fishing snappers off Florida. Their location
is shown in figure 4. The snapper fishery is traditional for Cuban fishermen. The
shrimp fishing off Texas, however, indicates a disturbing increase in effort. In
recent years, the Cuban Government has bought 90 shrimp trawlers in Spain and
30 in France. In addition: only a few months ago, new orders for shrimp trawlers
were placed in Peru. Domestic Cuban shipyards also continue to build shrimp
trawlers of the Lambda class. Altogether, Cuba today has a fleet of over 300
shrimp vessels. During the past years, this large fleet fished off the coast o:f
Brazil and the Guianas, as well as in the proximity of the Cuban coast. Now,
however, there are indications of an increased Cuban shrimp fishery off U.S.
coasts. A large shrimp fishing expedition, under Fleet Commander Hernandez, is
being readied in Cuba and is scheduled to arrive off Texas in late June.
Jim the Northwest Atlantic (off the New England States and in the northern
laid-Atlantic Bight), the number of foreign fishery vessels decreased greatly
compared to the previous month: 168 vessels were sighted in June and 243 in
May.The Soviet, Polish and East German fleets were reduced to about 160 vessels,
while in May their number exceeded 230. This is a seasonal occurrence and it is
believed that?al the autumn fishing gets underway?the number of their vessels
will again increase. Unlike in May, no French or Romanian vessels were sighted
iii June.
Mackerel and herring still constituted the main fisheries, but many other
species were also harvested. Both, the Polish and Soviet fleets engaged in a spe-
cialized ,fishery for squid. Polish vesseA were making hauls averaging 3-8 metric
Ions and lasting 4-5 hours. Gear used was mid-water as well as the high-opening
bottom trawls. The squid is not fished for Soviet or Polish markets as most other
species are; both countries export it to Spain, Portugal and Italy to earn hard
currencies. For details see page 8.
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During hoardings of 14 foreign vessels considerable evidence was gathered
indicating that lobsters are taken as incidental catch by foreign fishermen. There
was no information on how these lobsters are utilized, except that the Japanese
return them to the sea. It is impossible, from the fragmentary data obtained, to
estimate' the total foreign lobster catch off the U.S. Atlantic coast. Additional
details are on pages 8 and 9.
For the first time in a decade, the NMI'S international inspection officers were
allowed to board an East German .side trawler for a courtesy visit.
TABLE 1.?FOREIGN FISHERY VESSELS OPERATING OFF U.S. COASTS DURING JUNE 1973 (EXCLUDING DUPLICATE
SIGHTINGS); BY TYPE OF VESSEL AND COUNTRY.
Fishing grounds
Stern Medium
trawlers trawlers 2
Other
fishing
vessels
Process
and
transport
vessels
Support
vessels a
Research
vessels+
Total
Off Pacific coast:
Off Alaska:
Japan
43
111
387
38
579
Soviet Union
19
37
6
62
Republic of Korea
2
8
2
12
Total
64
156
387
46
653
Off Pacific Northwest:
Japan
Soviet Union
47
3
5
4
3
62
Other
Total
47
3
5
4
3
62
Off California:
Soviet Union
19
3
22
Japan
Total
19
3
22
In the Gulf of Mexico:
Mexican
Cuban
11
11
22
Soviet
Japanese
Other
Total
11
11
22
Off Atlantic coast:
Soviet Union
33
16
065
17
131
Poland
8
8
1
17
East Germany
3
6
9
Federal Republic of Germany
Bulgaria
4
4
Romania
Spain
1
1
02
4
Japan
3
3
Italy
Norway
Canada
Other
Total
52
31
67
18
168
Grand total
182
204
465
69
4
3
927
Includes all classes of stern factory and stern freezer trawlers.
2
Includes all classes of medium side trawlers (nonrefrigerated, refrigerated, and freezer trawlers).
3 Includes fuel and water carriers, tugs, cargo vessels, etc.
4 Includes exploratory, research and enforcement (E) vessels.
Includes 7 medium stern and 58 medium side trawlers rigged as purse seiners.
O Pair trawlers.
41-251-74----10
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Approved For Release 2001/09/01742CIA-RDP75B00380R000500410004-2
11111.1MINIIINge
4' ? ? ? . :1
1 11(
1-11-RR iNc71.,',
15 jT,-;,,,nene
5 South Kdrean 17'
GRO121.!,F 1711
5 So uth-Kor.:3n
SAUD' ISH
2 Jap3nese1
ND1171-7
_ J3-13.17-7,
13
`33,1-11 K.re3n
17.5-291,'une9e
7471,1(114
177 491se.
Japan3se
974771
-?
7 Jotlesc,
3 se3,91-
1 So,111 Kor
74 31_Elr
fmmom Gut..
t 1111111/III. ?t? ? ? e 't?t, e I SI' ' ? . tIt I tjt
?11111MONIIIN
., ? es' 1.11.? ?I$G, ?130,
Foreign Fishing off Alaska ill ',lune l97:,; by country, number
of vessels, principal fishing grounds and species fished.
FOL! re:J-1
Savi
ITRCJI
4 j.k1
4 J4,..,.e39
3 J 3pd nest:
J3pone3e
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1300 125?
II
a
a
a
a
a
Soviet - 22
Hake
N.CobbSaaamaiat
A D ?
A
Alatitaimar
T
0000?A 0
Oks N
Awash
lorkaut
?Mammal
aquiiia Head
Soviet - 40
Hake - Mixed Rockfish
- - - 100 fathom cunt*
, Coes Bey
aP,Afti011
spi 8Iwco
Columbia
St Ciboria
ettimitClip
Maq Moak
AL 1 FOR N IA
0
0
50?
?48?
?46?
?44?
a
Fig, 2 Foreign fishing off the Pacific Northwest in-June1973;
by country0 number of vessels, principal fishing-grounds,
and species fished.
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Approved For Release 2001/09/0174i CIA-RDP75600380R000500410004-2
4Cf
HAKE
Soviet:
19 strn.
trlrs.
3 side \
trlrs.
ape Blanco
OREGON
.:RESCENT CITY
.A7amoth R,
URDU
0 .ape Mendocino
k
?
1" .100 Nautical Miles
100 fathom c.v.
-1000 fathom curie
ORT BRAGG
A
Pt Arno
is I
0
iNCISEO
iRA R
A Fold Ito
1!),
,
F N,
MONTEREY
. ,
I I (P, Sur
C %
A
0 . . .
C ,.....-. `.., k'C'oric.,P.tion '
E-, ... . . . .
...-..
iQ:-.- - os ANGELES
A
(7 . ?
? ? . .
CIIRO BAY
Fig. 3
r 'LONG BEACH
k, 5515?
. ?
D , N DIEGO
E:sEl.CH?A0.1.
? ???,???,??ir . . ?? .? ? ??????-? ......
125' 120'
-ForeLgn fishing off Califcrnia in June, 1973, by country,
number of vessels, principal fishing grounds and species fished.
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WWW VI.901 MAW.,
?
?
1.
S.? ...... .?reeport
latagordp .. .
,
,
IIIIAS,Shrimp ----A.--).?,-). ?
CUBA 3, ..5 n ap
,pp. ?
CUBA, ,5, Shrimp CUBA, 3,Snepper
UNITED STATES
I
r mit$1. ? 0,1.A.'
0.1.CAltOLINA
S.CAIOLINA,
'N
0101101A:
sr$14.
UBA, Brisppc
?
00
?
8a .W
.?
35.
ss.
so.
Figure 4- Foreign Fishing off the Southern United States in June, 1973; by Country,
? Number of Vessels, Principal Fishing Grounds, and Species Fished.,
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146
Cape Elizabe
!ds:!?:H
Port'smont.1
GLPUCE
OOSTONT
- \?
\
Boy of '
Fundy .
r.r /
VESs ,S CATCH
SO T-86 HERRING
VESSELS 4-_-:_m:spAILISH-2
1
E. GE: MACKEREL_
'CATCH
HER141..K.C,2%,
Fundion Ch_o_nyncetof,4?,
? 42'
ME.
Peak ;
B t`141
,/
GeoRGts
o,?,?.
S,E. Pori / ??:
.' VESSELS
SOVIET 15
POLISH-2
Pj "k BULGARIAN-1 N,
LW
1
c?144 00:i;c:
s. VESSELS //CATCH VESSELS CATCH
SOVIET-5 SQUID SOVIET-25 HERRING
POLISi-15 HERRING BULGARIAN-3 MACKEREL
E. GERMAN-3 HAKES E. GERMAN-3 HAKES
SPANISH-1 SUB-AREA 5 SQUID
JAPAN3 SE -3
GEORGES BANK AND VICINITY (SUB-AREA 5 - ICNAF)
7-e.* 98*
SPANISH-1
4
CATCH
HERRING
MACKEREL
HAKES
SQUID
Fig. 5 - Foreign vessels in the Northwest Atlantic in June 1973
by country, number of vessels, principal fishing grounds,
and the species fished.
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U.S. - 92.9%1
Total U.S.
C P
1960 1 1972
Georges Bank
(ICNAF Subarea 5Ze)
Southern New En lan
(ICHAF Subarea 5Zw)
Gulf of Maine
(ICNAF Subarea 5Y)
1260 (ICNAF Stat .ca 61 1972
- 7 -
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DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN FISHING
FLEETS OFF THE U.S. EAST COAST
DURING 1970.
\c7
HUDSON CYN
GOA, MIL r
)CAPE HATTERAS
40
0
n0
'II
REDrISH
HADDOCK
(
SILVER HAKE
FLOUNDER (all sp )
RED HAKE
MACKEREL
HERRING
MENHADEN
ALEWIFE
TOTAL 4311 ?1
2
V SUB AREA 6
NI\\
LANDINGS
SLI9- ARE A
5 5..)(1-:.GFE A 6
38?--td
III
169,966
244
244
12,831
-68,966
16,696
48,469
3,301
55095
2,110
10,796
1,082
101,589
95,231
219,119
39,109
5,065
224,813
14,481
18,680
654,277
406,202 =
1,060,479
Mom Tons
7 0.
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SOO
800
700 ?
600 ?
500 ?
?400
300 ?
200
100
0
67
rorelgn CotCD1
Foreign Vessel's]
V.
----- WaSs1913
Approximately 600 U.S. trawlers in
ICNAF Area
1961 62 63 64 65
66
68
69
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U.S. CATCH
VOLUME OF CATCH BY REGIONS, 1970
(Figures Represent Minim Pounds)
Alaska
/./
eADA.,
CANADA
Hawaii
Oji
i?
Pacificwe
(oh
st
Pacific
Southwest
...-`
UNIFie
L.
Great
Lakes
and
129
Central.
STATES
plle,t't1C
0,11t
SICO
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VALUE OF CATC-1 L 7SICNS, '970
Alaska
(Figures Represent Milli,. DI
?e)
fr
wt',E1
a!)
CANADA
Pacific
Northwest
Pacific
Southwest
mixoce
Greatp ?
Lake
and
Central
UNITID
SI Atli
wAroN'
193.5
Hawaii
0 4.0
NA/
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Appendix A: importance of the U. S. as a coastal fishing natioa
Quantity
4.4
COASTAL
SPFC,ES ---
BP.5%
A WOROMOUS 14,
SEC aI ES
..1(&
-.4 US/STORY -
SPLCI ES
COAST/t. SPECIES
OF FORE I GN COASTS
Value
COASTAL
SPECIES
60.2%
Table 1. Landings and value of I. S. fish and shellfish by major
giieupings, 1972
Column
lishery
2
Quantity
Million Pcrcent
Iciunds
4
Value
Million
dollars
Percent
Coastal species
4,037.7
82.5
522.1
68.2
Anadromous Speciec
216.7
4.4
62.8
8.2.
Migratory species
524.4
10.7
120.6
15.8
Coastal species off
foreign coasts
115.3
2.4
60.0
7.8
Total
4,894.1
100.0
765.5
100.0
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Fishermen
Vessels
Boats
ANMOOAMOLIS
`,FIC IF5
34.55.;
24.2!".
.MIGRATOR, SPLCIYI
COASTAL 5IEC!ES Olf
ICAEIGN (OASES
MIGRATORY , LCiES/
COASTAL SPEC:ES OFF
FOREIGN COASI5
,A,OR, SPECIES .O.
COASTAL SPECIES OFF
FORLIGN COASTS .9's
Table 2. Fishermen, vessels, and boats of U. S. fleet by major groupings
of species,. 1970 estimates
foludo 1 2
3 4
5 6
Fleet Fishermen
Vessels Boats
Number in Percent Number in Percent Number in Percent
Thousand Thousand Thousand
Coastal species
91.9
65.4
5.4
39.6
Analrc.ous species]]
34.0
24.2
4.7
34.5
Migratory specie52/
8.7
6.2
2.2
16.0
Coastal sp,,ciaS
foreign coasts-
5.9
4.2
1.3
9.9
4/
Total-
140.5
100.0
13.6
100.0
58.4 79.3
14.1 19.2
0.4 1.6
0.7 0.9
73.6 100.0
1/ Includes all Alaska and Pacific N. W. salmon fishery.
2/ Includes all Tropical and Albacore tuna fishery.
3/ Includes portion of North Atlantic groundfish, Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery,
snapper-grouper fishery, and 'Gulf spiny lobster fishery.
4/ The total is exclusive of duplication. The 1970 distribution among the four
ficcts was made from 1969 data where the coastal fleet was the residual.
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154
U.S. LANDINGS AND IMPORTS OF FISHERY PRODUCTS, 1960-72
(ROUND WEIGItill
BILLION POUNDS'
15
10
1962
1964
. Includes edible and industrial products,
National Oceanic nnd Atmospheric Administration
1966
1968
1970
197?
National Marine Fisheries Service
Figure
MILLION DOLLARS
1200,
800
400
0
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 72
VALUE OF U.S. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
OF FISHERY PRODUCTS, 1960-72
Imports
National Oceanic And Atmospheric Administration
National Marine Fisheries Service
figure 3
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WHOLESALE VALUE OF U.S. PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS
OF FISHERY PRODUCTS, 1960-72
MILLION DOLLARS
3,000
2,000
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admhaistration
National Marine Fisheries Servic
Figure 2
MILLION POUNDS
300
100
U.S. PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF
FROZEN FISH BLOCKS,1960-72
(PRODUCT WRIGHT)
0
1960
TSUS Number
110.47 Blocks
1962 1964
Tariff rate
1966 1968 1970
Rate prior to 1968 Cents per pound
1.0 0.8 0.5 ' 0.4 0.2
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
1972
Free
National Marine Fisheriea Service
Figure 9
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MILLION POUNDS
U.S. PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF
CANNED TUNA 1960-72
(CANNED WEIGH7)
0
1960 1962 1964 1966
TS18 Number Rate jar,.or to 1,68
112.30 Not in oil, under quota Tariff 12.5 7
112.34 Not in oil, over quota ratec 25 7.
112.90 In oil 35 7
. Includes U. S. peck from imported fresh and frozen tuna.
National 0 eanic and Armoa-bert, Administration
1968
1970
1972
Ad valorem
11 I
10 2
8.5 % 7 I
6 7
22 2
20 %
17 2 15 2
12.5 I
35 2
35 2
35 2 35 2
35 2
National Marine ,'isheries Service
Figure 13
U.S. PRODUCTION Aro ItTORTS OF CANRED TUNA, 1960-72
Tear
1100
1611
1163160,822
1104
1565
1950
1167183,236
1998
1169
1970
1171
1172
.
:
:
;
:
:
;
;
:
:
?
:
6!:
6!:
Pack from
domestic catcP 1/
142,638
163,853
147,586
154,208
161.515
153,231
176,524
181,786
203,531
194,967
230,333
Imports 3!
Pack . . _
In brine : :
:Pack from imported : Total : Under ; Over. : In :
:fresh and frozen 2/: : quota : quota : oil :
Tily,1:3alld..:013a0i, 4/
. .
158,750 : 301,388 03,3,24 596 :
1.,1
146,759 1 310,612 : :2115)0 431 ;
,s
1117,920 ; 335,506 ; 4:9) 30759 358 ;
165,890 ; 326,712 : (:1530:;6104 224 ;
195,626 ; 349,834 : 4:992.) 201 ;
196,890 : 353,405 : :96: 211 ;
,:3
241,037 : 394,268 : 57,987 160 ;
: 05,662)
205,609 ; 383,845 : 62,275 186 ;
: 09,472)
219,433 ; 393,957 : 64,907 150 ;
: 06,985)
216,651 i 393,437 : ,1,,;g3)3 - 158 ;
234,109 ; 437,640 : 70,146 902 153 ;
: 4:10,146)
243,774 ; 433,741 : ,11,4:r4) 1,050 ;
386,28; ; 616,615 : 54,449 384 :
: 618,532)
:
:
Total :
51,755 :
58,663 ;
56,719 ;
57,494 ;
54,647 ;
50,961 ;
61,560 :
05.321 ;
07,173 ;
73,116 :
72,262 ;
59,842 ;
56,513 .
Total
production
and' imports
353,143
369,275
392,225
384,206
404,481
409,366
455,826
454,166.
463,1361
471,552.
.509,102I
498,581
673,121
: ? . : :
1! Includes pack from the U.S. catch landed in Fuerro Rico.
15-..' Includes tuna cannel in American Samoa from foreCgn-caught fish.
:I/ Data on imports may not add to total because imports in be Incare from the Bureau of CuStome and the
total imports and exports in oil are from the Bureau of [h.: Census.
4/ Canned weight.
j Number in parenthesis is quota.
61 Preliminary.
S,urce: Data published in Fisheries of the United States, Canned Fishery Products, and Imports and
Exports of F1sheiy Products.
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U.S. LANDINGS AND IMPORTS OF SHRIMP, 1960-72
(HEADS-OFF WEIGHT)
MAINDM POUNDS
AD}
?::;:::i:::?:?:?::::::
7ft-i-aro
1964
Tariff rate
National Oceanic End Atmospheric Adminietration
1966 1968
1970 1972
Free Free Free Free Free
National Marine Fisheries Service
Figure 25
U.S. LANDINGS AND mroRTs OF SHRXIP. 1960-72
Tear
?
?
?
?
Landings
Imports
Total
Thousand pounds 1/
1960
148,483
119,139
267,622
1961
?
.
103,865
134,564
238.429
1962
?
.
119,154
152,504
271,658
2963
150,737
167,344
318,081
1964
133,113
169,510
302,623
1965
152,346
178,955
331,301
1966
148,255
194,946
343,201
1967
189,972
202,105
392,077
1968
184,065
210,063
394,128
1969
195,002
218,697
413,699
1970
224,272
245,658
469,930
1971 2/
:
236,328
213,857
450,185
1972 2/
234,432
253,065
487,497
1/ Heads-off weight.
2/ Preliminary.
Source: Data published in Fisheries of the United States.
41-251-74----11
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80
nd 'oreich catch of alewives off the U.S. Atiartic
Ct ( in 1,D00 metric tonc) ; 1966 to 1972
70
60
7.\\
50
N
40
2077Er',N
30
.....
77-? - -. ..... ....
.. ... .-7-...,......,
20
... ....
U.S.
70
0
--
1966
-ir---
1/67
---1-----
066 196/
/970
197/
1171
loo.o%
75.9S
5,7.0 41.79.
0.1$
35.710
U..:.-7. as
a :', a Iota
catch.
150
125
1.1)0
50
25
60
?t
1961
1
196:
1963
1963-'75 -
r77
silver
,hake
// 7
/ 2' hake ,
/
1994 1965 , 1966 :,967 1968 1969
1970 1971 1972 1973.' 1974 19
Stviet fisheries catch in the Mid-Atlantic Hight
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THOUSAND TONS
U.S. PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF
FISH MEAL , 1960-72
TSUS Number
184.55 (pelt)
1464 1966 1968 1970 1972
Tariff rate
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Free Free ,Free Free Free
National Marine Fisheries Service
Figure 29
U.S. PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF FISH MEAL, 1960-72
Year
Production
Imports
Total
Tons
1.960
290,137
131,561
421,693
1961
311,265
217,845
529,110
1962
312,259
252,307
564,566
1963
255,907
376,321
632,228
1964
235,252
439,143
674,395
1965
254,051
270,589
524,640
1966
223,821
447,784
671,605
1967
211,189
651,486
862,675
1968
235,136
855,285
1,090,421
1969
252,664
358,350
611,014
1970
269,197
251,492
520,689
1971 1/
292,812
283,249
576,061
1972 1/
:
285,486
391,955
677,441
if Preliminary.
Source: Data published in Fisheries of the United States.
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US. LANDINGS AND IMPORTS OF
AMERICAN (NORTHERN) LOBSTERS, 1960-72
(LIVE WEIGHT)
19 1962 1914 1244 1
ISIS Number
114.45 (p8rtl Fresh, chilled, or frozen Trill rase
National Oceanic and Armosphrric Admintstrstini
Free
Free Free Free Free
National Marin, Fisheries Service
Ficure 20
U.S. LANDINGS AND IMPORTS OF SPINY LOBSTERS, 1960-72
MILLION POUNDS
40
20
10
0
1960
TSOS Number
114.45 (pert
( TAIL WEIGHT)
1962 1964 1966
reals, chilled, or frozen Tariff rate
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administratirm
1968 1970 1972
Free Free Free Free sree '
National Marine Fisheries Ser, ire
Figure 21
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U.S. PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF
CANNED CRABS , 1960-72
(LIVE WEIGHT)
MILLION POUNDS
60
Cotal
20
ISIS Number
114.20 6.7Wiled crab meat tariff rate
196
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
1961 l97 I
Rate prior to 1968
22.57. 20% 187. 15.5% 13% 11.07.
Ad valorem
72
National Marine Fisheries Service
MILLION POUNDS
200
Imports
150
100
50
Figure 19
U.S. PRODUCTION, EXPORTS, AND IMPORTS
OF CANNED SALMON, 1960-72
19
TSUS Number
112.18 Not in oil
112.52 In oil
(CANNED WEIGHT)
Total
U.S. production used domestically
196 19 19.8 1970 1972
Rate prior to 1968 Ad valorem
Tariff 15 %
25.5% /3 % 12% 10 % 9% 7.52
rate
22.5% 20% 17.5% 15% 12.5%
National Oceanic and Atmospheric ALministration
National Marine Fisheries Service
Figure 13
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U.S. LANDINGS AND IMPORTS OF FLOUNDERS, 1960-72
MILLION POUNDS
120
80
40
0
1960 1962 1964 1966
TSUE_Nuonber Rate prior to 1968
?150.35 Whole or dressed
110.70 Fillets or steaks Tariff 1.0
rate 1.5
. Excludes flounders imported as frozen hlocke .
(EDIBLE WEION1)
1968 19 0 72
Cente
0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5
1.0 .9 .5 .3 Free
ac enal Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration National Marino Fisheries Service
Figure 8
U.S. LANDINGS AND IMPORTS OF PACIFIC HALIBUT, 1960-72
(DRESSED WEIGHT)
MILLION POUNDS
notal
1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972
MS Number R4Jnizr to 1568 Cents per pound
110.20 Whole or creased Tariff 0.4 0.3 Free Free Free
110.70 Fillets ard steaks rate, 1.5 1.0 .9 0.5 0.3 Free
National Oceanic aid Att_Lni21-=ic Administration National Marine Fisheries Service
Figure 11
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U.S. LANDINGS AND IMPORTS OF HADDOCK, 1960-72
MILLION.POUNDS
60
40
20
0
(EDIBLE WEIGHT,)
Total
1960
TS0S Number
Rate prior to 1968
1968
1970
Cents per pound
1972
110.15 Whole or dressed Tariff
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
Free
Free
110.50 Fillets, under quota rate
1.875
1.875
1.875
1.875
1.875
1.875
110.55 Fillets, over quota
2.5
2.5
2.5
2,5
2.5
2.5
Excludes haddock imported as frozen blocks.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Nasional Marine Fisheries Service
Figure 5
MILLION POUNDS
100
75
50
25
0
1960 1962 1964 1966
TSUS NuMber Rate prior to 1968
110.15 Whole or dressed
Tel Q.5
110.50 Fillets, under quota rate
110.55 Fillers, over quota 1.875
.5
2.5
*Excludes cod imPorted as frozen blocks.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
U.S. LANDINGS AND IMPORTS OF COD, 1960-72
(EDIBLE WEIGHT)
1968 19
Cents per pound
0.4 0.3 0.2 Free Free
1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
National Marine Fisheries Service
Figure 6
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U.S.. LANDINGS AND IMPORTS OF OCEAN PERCH, 1960-72
MILLION POUNDS
80
.60,
(EDIBLE WEIGHT)
0
1960 1962 1964
1966
'rsu A.
s Number (Flets .9 steaks)
Rat. prior
110.55 Over quota ., 1968
110.50 Under quota . Tariff 1.875
2.5 .
* Excludes ocean perch imported se frozen tlocka.
National Oceanic ane Atmospheric Administration
1968 1970 1972
Cents per pound
1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5
National Marine Fisheries Service
Figure
U.S. PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF GROUNDFISH
FILLETS AND STEAKS, 1960-72
MILLION POUNDS ? ___PRODUCT MIGHT
019
TSUS Number
110.50 Under quota Tariff
110.55 Over quota rate
/
* Excludes imports of frozen fish blocks.
National Oceanic sad Atmospheric AdministretiOa
EateLp1121.12 -1968
1.875
2.5
Cents per pound
1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875 1.875
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Nations/ Marine Fisheries Service
Figure 4
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U.S. Fishery Data - 1972
Coastal & adj. % of High Seas within 200 mi.
10 ? 200 mi Total of foreign shores
Total
TOTAL
Part-time
FISHERMEN
64,180
100%
-__
64,180
Full-time
FISHERMEN
80,352
97.6%
2000,
2.4%
82,352
Number of
VESSELS*
13,850
96.3%
526
3.7%
14,376
Number of
BOhTS.
85,100
100%
---
85, 00
Pounds of
Fish & Shellfish
LANDED
4,347,210,000
88.8%
546,890,000
, 11.2%
4,894,100,000
Dollar value
01 landings
$609,777,000
79.7%
$155,723,000
20.3%
$765,500,000
(*)Vessels: documented
craft 5 net tons & over
under 5 net tons.
Source - NMFS Fisheries of the
United States, 1972.
Poets: craft
FOREIGN FISHING EFFORT ON GEORGES BANK AND ADJACENT AREAS
By Numbers of Foreign Vessels
350
300
250
200
.150
100
,w .
,
50
1970 1971 1972
Total Tralers..... NOTE: Numbers of vessel/days fishing has
Increased by 18 % per year.
Figures do not reflect variance of
ver,sel size or catch capacity.
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--
',:itEIGI-
Fl DM/ E C EMPOST ON GECGE3
BY MEDIUM UNITS
UANK AND AAJACII:T AREAS
:',I, EFCRT
h D
-MD
6-70
D
300
2,10
1u0
0
a ....%
1
a
. . ? ?
/ a ... %
. two
.
Total
STERN
PURE
11EDINE
197/0 1971
effort in Yedium Trawlers ...a...
Trawlers = 5 units
Seiner = 3 units
Trawler = 1 unit
1972
NGTE: Total effort increased by
39% in 1971
46% in 1972
FUWISN, PISHING 'SPORT IN THE PACIFIC N.W. AND ADJACENT AREAS
TY: NUMBERS OF VESSELS C:GHTED
1970
Vessel numbers do not reflect
variance in vessel size or
daily catch capacity.
1971 1972
NOTE:Total sightings increased by
30% in 1970
6% in 1971
7% in 1972
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22099 LS TEE FOIFIC: E.W. AND ALASKA
Converted to Nediun Trawler writs of effort *
1959
Units of effort reflect
variance in vessel size
and catch capvzity.
700
600
500
400
1970 1971 1972
NOTE:Foreign Fishing efforq
increased by:. 37% in 1970
.3% in 1971
9% in 1972
200
100
Mr. MUSTARD. The first point is that the chances of a successful
agreement at the LOS conference in 1975 are very slim at best, just
on the mechanical process of nearly 140 nations voting on the 25 major
issues, and each issue has anywhere from 10 to 15 subissues. The
mechanics of the actual voting process are very lengthy and we doubt
very seriously if they are going to be able to accomplish this at the
next conference.
The second point is that the U.S. position is not now, as Ambassador
Stevenson said, in the mainstream. We are presently left high and dry
on the right bank. With over 100 nations, two-thirds of the confer-
ence are in disagreement with our full package proposal.
No. 3, the State Department and Defense Department are afraid
of retaliatory action of others. History has proven that other nations
are going to act in their own best national interest in spite of what
we in the United States do or say.
But frankly, with over 100 nations at the conference, most of whom
do not care about the present U.S. position in general, and quite
frankly could care even less about our defense posture, they already
know that the United States has instructions to get a treaty at any
cost and the underdeveloped nations and the nations that exploit our
coastal resources are going to stand in line and take us for all we are
worth in fish, scientific research, and foreign aid and, most assuredly,
subversive military passage.
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Innocent passage and commerce will remain basically as it is DOW.
For the large majority of small nations to be able to push the United.
States and the U.S.S.R. military- powers around or out of their newly
claimed economic zones or territorial seas would be a very large po--
itical feather in their caps.
Gentlemen, .:,hey are going to do it regardless, treaty or not, to the
United States and to the U.S.S.R. equally and together.
The other point is as to passage of the Straits. Approximately 20
countries control the present straits of importance. An LOS outcome
of the 12-mile territorial sea is given. The United States and the
-U.S.S.R. will have to establish bilateral agreements to give free mili-
tary passage through these waters. The days of common property
are over.
How did thi-s? principle develop, and why is it no longer valid?
This doctrine dates back to 1609 when Hugo Grotius published an
article in "Mae Liberum." Grotius was the international law expert
at the time. In fact, anyone who studies his work will admit that in
toulay's time Grotius would probably be a 200-miler unless he was em-
ployed by the State Department.
Ills work would lead other major powers to agree on the need for
free transit, which is subtitled "The Right Which Belongs to the
bitch To Take Part in the East Indian Trade."
At this time I would like to submit appendix 2 entitled "Grotius
and the Freedom of Fishing in the Modern Context," for the infor-
mation of the committee and the staff.
[The document follows:]
GROTHIS P.ND THE FREEDOM OF FISHING- IN THE MODERN CONTEXT
(By Richard B. Allen)
(Presented to Dr. john Gamble, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
PSC 464)
When considering jurisdiction over fishery resources it has been common to
cite the traditional freedom of the seas as the overriding concern. Reliance on
this concept is beginning to falter in the face of the scrutiny and self-interest of
the developing nations, who view this tradition as an instrument of the developed
nations by which they can maintain their status at the expense of the less
developed.
The first scholarly enunciation of the freedom of the seas doctrine is credited
to Hugo Grotius. Many lose sight of the fact that Grotius's The Freedom of the
S!,ws was subtitled "The Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the
East Indian Trade." He was, in fact, employed by the Dutch East India Com-
pany, and his writing was not purely academic. As with any writer being -paid
to promote a specific cause, he could net be expected to give equal consideration
to factors which might refute his thesl:s. Grotius himself warns against jurists
who "exercise the authority of their sacred profession not for justice and law,
but in order to gain the gratitude of the powerful." However, even if we take.
Grotius's work an authoritative for his purpose and his time, we cannot trans-
pose his reasoning directly to the present time and apply it to fisheries without
some modification.
We must remember that Grotius was primarily concerned with freedom of
navigation for commerce, not with freedom of fishing. As Grotius said in the
first chapter of his Mare Ltiberum, God spread the necessaries of life out over
the world so that different peoples would trade with one another.' He, in fact,
in this regard, Georg Borgstrom, in a talk before the International Center for Marine
Resource Development, has pointed out the irony of U.S. restrictions on trade with Rus-
sia and the East European nations which forced tnem to develop their fishing fleets to
supply themselves with the fish which the United States refused to sell them.
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based his "argument on the following most specific and unimpeachable axiom of
the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of which is
self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation is free to travel to every other
nation, and to trade with it." It is important to keep this base in mind when
evaluating Grotius's statements
We have long been accustomed to viewing our continental resources as neces-
saries of life which we recover and trade with the world to gain those with
which we are not endowed. In contrast to our continental resources, our living
coastal resources have been open to all takers. They are now at a point where
continued heavy harvesting by any who choose to expend the effort acts to the
detriment of all mankind. As Royce (1972) says: "such resources have been
especially attractive to large vessel operators who have been able to take quick
profits from one stock and move on to another and then to another as the abun-
dance has declined in each. The operators and their governments adhere strongly
to the principle of the freedom of the seas, which allows them to fish anywhere
in international waters and commonly reject responsibility for maintenance of
the resource." To justify such actions by the writings of Grotius is an unwar-
ranted implication that he was seriously concerned with the problem of high
seas resources and his solution was the freedom of the seas for fishing. Grotius
had no reason to be concerned about over-fishing in the ocean; he wrote at a
time when sea fishing was extremely limited and one man's catch had no effect
on another's. I intend to show, as Alan Beesley suggested in discussion at the
1971 Law of the Sea Institute Conference, that if Grotius "were here today he
would no longer preach the absolute doctrine of the freedom of the high seas"
(in Alexander, 1972).
One of Grotius' primary arguments against limiting access to the sea is that
one party's use does not preclude another's. As he states: "Why then, when it
can be done without any prejudice to his own interests, will not one person
share with another things which are useful to the recipient, and no loss to the
giver." One can find no fault with this in regards to Grotius' primary concern
for free navigation; applied to modern fisheries, however, it is an argument for
exclusive control, so devastating has been the effect of the second party's share.
Grotius' reasoning is further expressed by his quote from Vasquez: "But
why, it is asked, does the secondary law of nations which brings about this
separation (from common to private) when we consider the lands and rivers
cease to operate in the same manner when we consider the sea? I reply because
in the former case it was expedient and necessary. For every one admits that
if a great many persons hunt on the land or fish in a river the forest is easily
exhausted of wild animals and the river of fish, but such a contingency is
impossible in the case of the sea." Such a contingency, of course, is entirely
Possible and all too evident. This change in circumstances alone would be suffi-
cient cause to bring fisheries under national conrtol in accordance with the
above reasoning.
Grotius, however, showed additional awareness of the need to allow separate
consideration of possible fisheries problems: "And if it were possible to prohibit
any of those things, say for example, fishing, for in a way it can be maintained
that fish are exhaustible, still it would not be possible to prohibit navigation,
for the sea is uot exhausted by that use."
Certainly Grotius would today show even greater awareness of the difference
between common use for navigation and common use for fishing. This se-
parability of fishing from other considerations is one of the major concerns
today and relying on Grotius involves a problem of comparing technologies. For
his time, Grotius concedes that: "Indeed, if I shall have staked off such an
inclosure in an inlet of the sea, just as in a branch of a river, and have fished
there, especially if by doing so continuously for many years I shall have given
proof of my intention to establish private ownership, I shall certainly prevent
any one else from enjoying the sante right." He continues with a statement that
could have been composed by the Department of Defense : "But onside of an
inlet this will not hold, for then the common use of the sea might be hindered."
Grotius had already dealt with that problem, however, by stating that: "If any
part of these things is by nature susceptible to occupation, it may become the
property of the one who occupies it only so far as such occupation does not
affect its common use." He also recognizes the right of nations to make a contract
regarding jurisdiction over portions of the sea for certain purposes.
In further support of exclusive fishing rights Grotius implies that one party
can prevent another from encroaching on his fishing area as long as the first
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170
Party continues to exercise his right; "jus prohibendi" is in effect , While
'occupation lasts." Considerations of scale and technology and their effect on
resources could snrely extend this concept from rivers and inlets to the offshore
fishing grounds which have been developed to maximum sustainable yield by
one nation and which are threatened with depletion if additional entrants are
:al lowed.
Another of Grotius's primary arguments is that occupation leading to pos-
session of the sea is impossible. As he says: "It has therefore been (lemon-
grated that neither a nation nor an individual can establish any right of private
ownership over the sea itself (except inlets of the sea) inasmuch as its occupa-
tion is not permissible either by nature or on grounds of public utility." He
admits, however, that "according to Marcianus, whatever has been occupied and
can he occupied is no longer subject to the law of nations." Grotius would accept
"the erection of buildings or some determination of boundaries, such as fencing
in," as evidence of possession. Buildings in the form of oil derricks and naviga-
tional structures have been built far beyond narrow zones of national sover-
eignty. Technology has also brought about the use of "imaginary lines" as "a
recognized metlied" of delimiting boundaries, requiring no physical demarca-
tion.
The fact that the land itself was once res communes, and that by Grotius'
time inlets of the sea were considered susceptible to private control leads one
to the progressive conclusion that the entire sea would one day be under some
type of sovereignty. In a way it seems that the progression of national jurisdic-
tion skipped over the sea, going on to an equally indivisible quantity according
to Grotius, i.e. the air. It is useful to distinguish between air and air space and
water and ocean space. Grotius said "that since the sea is just as insusceptible
of physical apprepriation as the air, it cannot be attached to the possessions of
any nation." Air space, however, has been appropriated, and there SeeMS to be no
reason why a descriptive law of coordination could not provide for similar ap-
propriation of the sea.
A. major reason for this discrepancy between sea space and air space is that
most major uses of the sea have been well served by the traditional concept of
free access (Kasahara in Alexander, 1972), but nations quickly realized that
free access to air space would not be in their hest interests. Kasahara also notes
that fishery and pollution considerations are no longer well served by free access.
When read from a 201h century vantage point many of Grotius' dogmatic
assertions based on lath century technology and a peculiar mix of the law of
nature and the law of nations seem to suffer from obsolescence. Most glaring, per-
ps, is his quote from the testimony of Alphonse de Castro, the Spanish theo-
logian: "Such an act (the prohibition of navigation) is not only contrary to the
laws, but is contrary also to natural law or the primary law of nations, which
we have said is immutable. And this is seen to he true because by that same law
not only the seas or waters, but also all other immovables were res. communes.
And although in later times there was a partial abandonment of that law, in so
far as concerns sovereignty and ownership of lands?which by natural law at
first were hold in common, then distinguished and divided, and thus finally sepa-
rated from the primitive community of use ;?nevertheless it was different as
regard sovereignty over the sea, which from the beginning of the world down to
this very day is and always has been a res COMMUniS, and which, as is well
known, has in ne wise changed from that status." One can only ask how an im-
mutable law allowed the division of lands under the law of nations, and why, if
such a thing was possible in regard to the land, it is not only possible, but
just as likely in regard to the sea. Even Van Bynkershoek, an early supporter of
Grotins' principles, stated that Grotius had difficulty squaring fact with theory,
"for there can be no reason for saying that the sea which is under one man's
control is any less his than a ditch in his territory." Van Bynkershoek then went
on to base his argument against wide claims lho sovereignty over the sea on the
lack of capability to control the areas. He thus suggested the cannon shot rule,
which some believe evolved into the three mile limit. Extension of Van Bynker-
shock's reasoning through time would also have allowed the closure of large
areas beyond even the more extreme present claims.
Similarly weak in its reasoning is the statement of Grotius that "it is impos-
sible to acquire by usueaption or prescription things which cannot become prop-
erty, that is, which are not susceptible of possession or of quasipossession, and
which cannot he alienated. All of which is true with respect to the sea." Again,
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,one can only ask why all of this is true with respect to the sea. It is often difficult
to determine whether Grotius is basing his statements of impossibility on physi-
cal or legal grounds, either of which has changed considerably since his time.
Those who continue to support Grotius' conclusions without accounting for the
effects of time on his reasoning are guilty of setting "up a law in word but not in
fact," a sin attributed to the opposition by Vasquez and quoted by Grotius.
Especially embarrassing to those who would transplant Grotius' work directly
into the present time are the many references to free passage over foreign terri-
tory and similar inconsistencies which have arisen over time. Few would demand
today that the shore, as well as the sea right up to the shore, be open to all men.
Nor are there many claims that those "things which the sea has carried away
from other uses and made its own, such for example as the sands of the sea"
or the gold or the oil should be common to all, as they were considered by
Grotius.
In summary we can see that Grotius' criteria of inexhaustibility is no longer
met by fisheries. As Royce (1972) points out, fishery resources have not been
maintained conveniently apart from private ownership, which Grotius recog-
nizes as sufficient justification for abandonment of a common use regime. He
would thus permit the separation of fisheries from other considerations and allow
nations to make agreements providing for exclusive control over fisheries based
on occupation which today is little different on Georges Bank than it was in an
inlet of the sea in Grotius' day. Thus we have met the conditions of ownership
? of both Grotius and Van Bynkershoek and by their own statements they would
accept the possibility of some form of jurisdiction over the high seas.
REFERENCES
Alexander, Lewis M. (ed.) The Law of the Sea: A New Geneva Conference:
Proceedings of the 6th Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute.
Kingston, R.I. : University of Rhode Island, 1972.
?Grotius, Hugo. The Freedom of the Seas or the Right Which Belongs to the Dutch
to Take Part in the East Indian Trade. Translated by Ralph van Deman
Magoffin, New York: Oxford University Press, 1916.
Royce, Wm. F. Introduction to the Fishery Sciences. New York: Academic Press,
1972.
Van Bynkershoek, Cornelius. De Dominio Maris Disertatio. New York; Oxford
University Press, 1923. (Carnegie translation).
Mr. MUSTARD. As to the effects of this philosophy, it led the major
powers to develop the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Convention. The partic-
ipants who ratified these two conventions are now a very small minor-
ity at the 1974 LOS Conference. The attitudes of many of the new
nations and the actual conditions have changed drastically since that
time.
At this time I would like to submit appendix 3 for the record, en-
titled "The 200-Mile Limit and the Law."
The CHAIRMAN. Without Objection it will be admitted.
[The document follows:]
THE 200-MILE LIMIT AND THE LAW
(By Christopher M. Weld?
Since the introduction of the Interim Fisheries Zone Extension and manage-
ment Act of 1973 (S. 1988; H.R. 8665), many legal arguments have been em-
ployed to attack this bill's underlying assumption: namely, that a coastal nation
has the right to extend its jurisdiction over fisheries in coastal waters beyond its
territorial sea. The contentions put forward by the bill's opponents are (i) that it
violates traditional concepts of freedom of the sea; (ii) that it violates cus-
tomary rules of international law; and (iii) that it violates the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1958 and 1960.
* Boston Attorney; Secretary, National Coalition for Marine Conservation.
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S. 1988 was filed in response to the demands of coastal fishermen who were
alarmed by the immensity of the fishing effort and the mounting evidence of
severe depletion of fish stocks in fisheries traditionally regarded as American.
Regardless of differences of opinion concerning the degree of depletion of any
given area or species, it is a generally accepted fact that the size and efficiency
of the world's fleets of distant-water fishing vessels have the capability of de-
pleting a given fishery in a very short time.' It is inarguable also that a number
of commercially valuable species traditionally caught in the coastal waters adja-
cent to the United States have been depleted to the point of being nearly extinct
for commercial purposes?
For hundreds of years. the doctrine of freedom of the seas was held to include
the freedom of unrestrained fishing in the high seas, and this principle was.
incorporated in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas.' As defined by th
Convention, the term "high seas" includes all waters beyond the territorial sea,
which until well into the twentieth century at least were generally agreed to be
restricted to a distance of three miles from a nation's coastline. Within this.
three-mile limit, the nation claiming it is entitled to exercise the same full extent
of sovereignty and control that it exercises over its land, subject to the right of
innocent passage. This doctrine traces back to an essay of Hugo Grotius entitled
"Mare Librum," published in 1609, and the notion that all nations are equally
entitled to the fish in the high seas was based upon the theory that fish constituted
an inexhaustible resource.
Today, fish are increasingly viewed as limited and depletable rather than an
inexhaustible resource. The concept of exhaustibility of a fishery has both.
economic and conservation aspects. First, at some level of intensity of exploita-
tion, there may not be enough fish available in the fishery to provide an economi-
cally profitable yield for all fishermen who wish to exploit it. Once the point is
reached at which a fishery is in this sense "fully utilized," higher catches by one
fisherman will result in reduced catches by others. Given the high fixed costs of
fishing operations, unrestricted access and intensive levels of exploitation be-
yond the point of full utilization may lead to a situation where many partici-
pating fishermen will obi am little or no profit from their fishing efforts. Second,
the biological characteristics of certain fish species are such that fishing efforts
and catches above a certain level of intensity may result in a long-term biological
impairment of productivity of the stock, with consequent harm to the fishery as
an economic resource.'
Add to this the fact that most of the seas' living resources are located in coastal
waters 200 miles from shore and also that more of the world's fisheries are over-
exploited than underutilized at a time when the world's growing population de-
mands ever-increasing amounts of protein, and. the reasons for the reexamination
of the doctrine o-.! freedom of the seas begin to emerge.
Just as the law of the land evolves in a response to the changing needs and
attitudes of the people of any given nation, the changing circumstances a!
nations is reflected in international law. National law, however, is usually a
combination of statute and court practice and operates as a restraint upon the
individual who is relatively powerless compared to the state. Because, in inter-
national law, the court can obtain jurisdiction only if the parties submit them-
selves to it, few disputes of real magnitude are tried before the International
(apart of Justice. There is no authority capable of creating or enforcing statutory
law, and the power of individual nations can be Very great. The law that governs
nations is the law of treaties and customs, and it is said to grow by "progressive
developments" which is largely a matter of assertions and mutual tolerances.
Statement by or. Jame:- Joseph, Director of Investigations, Inter-American Tropicat
Tana Commission, Proceedings from Oregon's 1971 National Discussion Forum 74 (1972)
[ hereinafter cited as 1971 Oregon Proceedings] ; Jacobsen, Bridging the Gap to Inter?
national Fisheries Agreement: A Guide to Unilateral Action, 9 San Diego L. Rev. 454.
459-461 (1972).
On the East Coast Haddock is a frequently cited example as are halibut and ocean
perch on the West Coast.
Convention on the High Seas, open for signature April 29, 1958 [1962] 2 U.S.T
2312. T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as Convention on the High
Seas.
4 Elhier, The Anglo-iceilimue Fisheries Dispute, 1".373, Wisconsin L. Rev. 37, 45.
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With respect to the traditional doctrine of freedom of the seas, there appear
to be conflicting "progressive development": on the one hand, the 1958 and
1960 Geneva Conventions and on the other, unilateral declarations of fisheries
zones by a growing number of coastal states. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the current status of the doctrine of freedom of the seas in order to
determine whether the concept of exclusive fisheries zones is compatible with
the doctrine as it is now generally accepted by the world community.
I. HISTORIC BACKGROUND
For a century following the discovery of the New World, a closed sea ob-
structed European commercial development. In 1493 a Borgia pope arbitrarily
divided the oceans in two, granting exclusive rights in one part to Spain and
in the other to Portugal. A new order emerged following England's defeat of
the "Invincible Armada" in 1588 and the subsequent establishment of British
naval supremacy. As the seas were freed from the Spanish-Portuguese monopoly,
colonies sprang up in North America and other parts of the world; the volume
of world trade expanded substantially; and Europe began its modern economic
growth.
A new juridical regime was established at the beginning of the seventeenth
century to provide a justification for the new economic order. In a work pub-
lished after "Mare Librum," Hugo Grotius, a spokesman for Dutch commercial
interests concluded that the seas were open to all due to their inherently indi-
visible nature.' In time, the principle that no state could impose its sovereignty
upon the sea became widely adopted and was further justified by the notion
that its resources were inexhaustible. It followed that fish were a "free good"
available to whomever made the effort to catch them.? Gradually, exceptions
were made; among them exceptions for piracy, control of the slave trade, hot
pursuit and rescue. But the most important was the doctrine of the "territorial
sea," formulated in the late eighteenth century.
The first measure of coastal state's seaward jurisdiction was the "common
shot rule." A coastal state could exercise jurisdiction as far as its cannon would
fire. Later, three miles was adopted as a uniform limit on jurisdiction. The three-
mile limit has never been universally accepted as a maximum limit, nor has it
ever been sanctioned by a general international convention, in spite of three at-
tempts to codify it.' Since the eighteenth century, a number of countries, includ-
ing the United States, have asserted exceptions to the three-mile limit and bent
the doctrine of freedom of the seas to serve special purposes.
The movement away from absolute freedom of the seas gained momentum (lur-
ing the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who tended to overlook the three-
mile rule when, in his opinion, it inadequately served United States economic
and military policies. The U.S. move away from the doctrine of absolute freedom
of the sea came to a climax with the Truman proclamations of 1945.3 Beginning
with Mexico in 1945 and followed shortly by Argentina and Chile, a number of
Latin American nations, in reliance upon the Truman proclamations, claimed
fisheries jurisdiction and in some cases total sovereignty to a distance of 200
miles from shore. In 1945 no United States fishing interests existed in the area
affected by the Mexican proclamation. When other nations jumped onto the 200-
mile bandwagon, however, representatives of the booming California tuna fleet
served notice on the State Department that they expected to expand operations
into Latin American waters in the near future. Thereupon, the United States
511. Grotius, De Juni Belli Ac Peels, (rt. Kelsey trans., 1925), 190-91.
'1. E. Vattel, Law of Nations, 1758, (C. Fenwick trans., 1916), 106-10.
7 Loring, "The United States-Peruvian Fisheries Dispute ;" 23 Stanford L. Rev. 391.
8Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the
National Resources and Seabed of the Continental Shelf (1945) ; 3 CFR ? 67 [hereinafter
cited as Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf] ; Presidential Proclamation No.
2668, Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas
of the High Seas (1945) ; 3 CFR ? 68 [hereinafter cited as Truman Proclamation on
Fisheries].
41-251--74--12
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rot reated to the three-mile rule, declaring such to be in the best interests ?)f all
nations!
The looming cmfrontation between coastal nations asserting the right to pro?
tect marine resources and overseas fishing nations rejecting such assertions led
to the convocation of the Geneva Conventions of 1958 and 1960. Whatever these
conventions accomplished, and there is substantial disagreement as to that,
neither of them achieved agreement on. the breadth of territorial waters and the
claims to exclusive fishing zones." Nevertheless, the concept of extended fisheries
jurisdiction at least to a distance of twelve miles off shore gained respectability as
a result of the Geneva conventions. As of June 1, 1966, thirty-two nations claimed
fishery zones to twelve miles from their coasts.' The appearance and rapid.
build-up of large distant water fleets in the Northwest Atlantic and the North-,
east Pacific in the early 1960's gave new impetus to demands in the U:aited
States, principally from the coastal fishing industry, for increased control over
foreign fishing,' and the State Department gave the proposed action its blessing
on the basis that recent developments in international practice allowed the rule
to be in conformity with international law." Thus, in October, 1966 Congress uni-
laterally extended United States exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to twelve miles.'
The action was questioned only by the tuna industry, the shrimp industry and
legal scholars."
By the beginning of 19M, at least ILI nations had established territorial, fish-
eries or fisheries conservation limits of 50 miles or more," and the fishing nations
were trying to convene a new Law of the Seas Conference. The developing
nations tend to regard this effort as an attempt by the United States and the.
Soviet Union to ]aold the line against the demands of the developing world for a
greater share in control of the ocean's wealth. In this context, it is not surprising
that among the developing nations, the concept of freedom of the seas is regarded
as tittle snore than a pretext for continued great power control and exploitation
of the seabed and fishing resources at the ex.aense of smaller and poorer coun-
tries. As a historical footnote, it is interesting to note that this thesis was first
asserted in 1938 by Professor Joseph W. Bingham of the Stanford Law School."
H, AMERICAN PRECEDENTS
Today, many cf the developing nations tend to regard U.S. assertions of the
immutability of the doctrine of freedom of the seas as hypocritical, and, in view
?Luring, Supra note 8 at 395.
Bishop, Conver tion on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, April 29, 1958, 62 Columbia L. Rev. 1205 (1362) ; Schaeffer, Some Recent Develop-
ments Concerning Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
San :Meg? L. Rev. 371 (1970) ; Oliver Wet War-North Pacific, 8 San Diego L. Rev. 621
(1971) MaeDougs.1 and Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans, 1962 ; Bilder, eupra
nate 4 at 49 ; McKernon. 1971 Oregon Proceedings, 16.
Statement of L. C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of State, 1966 Senate Hear-
ings 21.
SwYgard, Polities of the North Pacific Fisheries?With Special Reference to the 12-
Mile Rule, 43 Washington L. Rev. 269 (1967).
Agency Report of the Department of State in -1966 Senate Hearings 2.
A Act of October 14, 1966. 80 Stat. 908 [hereinater cited as U.S. 12-Mile Limit .Actl.
'6 Loring, supra n3te 8 at 409.
Biller. A part al listing of nations claiming 50 miles or more includes Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Costr. Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Guinea, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru, Uraguay, Iceland, South Korea, Ghana, Pakistan, India and Ceylon, in addition
to which Canada eittended its jurisdiction to 100 miles for pollution control, and Mexico,
Norway and the Peoples Republic of China have indicated plans to extend jurisdiction in
the near future.
" Bingham, Report on the International Law of Pacific Coastal Fisheries (1938).
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of the long history of differing U.S. attitudes toward the doctrine, it is not hard
to see why.
In 1886, for example, the United States, citing the right of self protection,
attempted to regulate foreign vessels exploiting fur seals in the Bering Sea
beyond its three-mile territorial waters. The Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935 granted
the President authority "to proclaim an area extending one hundred nautical
miles north and south from a point in which a suspected foreign ship is hovering
and including all the waters sixty-two miles from the coast within the area of two
hundred miles thus designated."" Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities be-
tween Germany and Poland, the United States called a meeting of hemisphere
foreign ministers to discuss mutual defense concerns. The result was the Declara-
tion of Panama of October 3, 1939, which established a 300-mile defense zone
around the hemisphere.' The American States declared their "inherent right" to
have the zone "free from the commission of any hostile act by any non-American
belligerent nation," and they agreed to "consult together to determine upon the
measures which they may individually or collectively undertake in order to secure
the observation of the provisions of the Declaration."
The British government viewed the Declaration as a threat to "the well-estab-
lished principle of international law relating to the freedom of the seas and
the rights of both neutrals and belligerents to utilize the sea as a public high-
way open to all alike." " Following World War II, the zone was extended from
pole to pole and made permanent by Article 4 of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance!' This treaty has led some Latin Americans to question
why, if the American states may jointly set 300-mile zones for defense of national
interests against foreign military harm, cannot the same states validly establish
200-mile zones for the defense of national interests from foreign economic
harm?
In 1945 the Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf announced the
annexation of the."national resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental
shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States."
By way of justification, the proclamation stated "recognized jurisdiction over
these resources is required in the interest of their conservation and prudent
utilization . . . ; the exercise of jurisdiction . . is reasonable and just . . ;
self-protection compels the coastal nation to keep close watch over activities off
its shores . . ." Thus, the United States acquired jurisdiction over submerged
lands equal in area to the Louisiana Purchase simply by boldly asserting a newly
conceived right.
Professor Jon L. Jacobson" refers to the Truman Proclamation as the Great
Precedent for the Latin American 200-mile claims, the Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf,' extra-territorial exclusive fishing zones, such as the U.S. 12-Mile
Limit Act and the Canadian anti-pollution legislation.' It should be added that
28 Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 19 USC ?? 1701-11.
10 5 For. Rel. U.S. 36-37 (1939).
205 For. Rel. U.S. 29 (1939).
"Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, September 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681
(1498)? T.I.A.S. No. 1838.
22 Loring, supra note 8 at 417.
"Ia. at 397.
24 Jacobson, supra note 1 at 455.
25 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, ?, Convention on the Continental
Shelf, open for signature April 29, 1958 (1964), 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 559
U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter cited as Convention on the Continental Shelf].
2' See note 7.
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the justification, upon which it is based--namely, reasonableness, the need for
conservation, .1nd self-protection, both anticipates and summarizes all subsequent
rationalization advanced by proponents of jurisdictional extension.
Truman's Vsheries Proclamation followed his proclamation on the Continental
Shelf. It sanctioned the establishment of conservation zones in areas of the high
seas contiguous to the United States; it recognized "the right of any state to
establish conservation zones off its shores . . ." and rested upon "the inadequacy
of present arrangements for the protection and perpetuation of fishery resturces,"
"the possibility of improving the jurisdictional basis for conservation measure
"(the 'special importance' of) fishery resources . . . to coastal communities as
a source of livelihood fInd to the nation as a food and industrial resource; ami
urgent need to protect fishery resources" and "the special rights and equAies of
the Coastal Stet? and of any State which may have established legitimate inter-
est; therein." Shortly thereafter, Mexico proclaimed its jurisdiction over the
continental shelf and fisheries in superadjacent waters, and this claim was recog-
nized by the United States in 1946." When Argentina, Chile and Peru followed
the Mexican declaration with assertions of 200-mile jurisdiction, however, the
United States, at the urging of the California tuna industry, retreated from
the policy stated by President Truman.
Critics of U.S. fisherjes policy in subsequent years allege that it has been
dominated by the distant-water fisheries industry. Whatever the truth of this
may be, 200-mile limits are anathema to U.S. tuna and shrimp boat operators
who frequently operate with 200 miles of Latin American coastal nations. They
claim that the 200-mile jurisdiction asserted by these nations is asserted for
revenue-raising rather than conservation purposes and that any tax imposed
upon their catch impairs their ability to compete in world markets. Certainly
U.S. policy as articulated by the State Department and sympathetic Congres-
sional action have favorcd our distant-water Skhermen, but U.S. policy towhing
on issues directly and indirectly relating to the doctrine of fvedom of the semi
has been highly inconsistent in recent years.
Under the Fisherman's Protection Act of 1954," the federal government com-
pensates vessel owners for tines paid to foreign governments for seizures
w [thin a 200-n- lie limit. At the time that the bill was adopted, the
necessity of protecting United States rights on the high seas was cited, and,
in practice, the custom of encouraging tunaboat operators not to purchase licenses
was held to be an assertim of the principle that: U.S. vessels operating on the
high seas cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of any other nation. With
the passage of time and the aggregation of fines paid, however, it has come
to appear that t.11?. United States has, in effect, subsidized Latin American 200-
mile limits. This appearance, so contrary to stated intent, has been enhanced
by the terms of the United States-Brazilian Slarlinp Conservation Agreement,'
concluded on May 9, 1972, under which the United States agrees to license mad
limit the catch of Arnerl7an shrimp boats fishing within the 200-mile limit
eta lined by Brazil and authorizes the Brazilian Navy to police compliance with
the arrangements. While the treaty expressly reserves the U.S. position with
respect to 200-mile limits, tt provides that Brazil May board, search and arrest
American fishing vessels believed to be violating the arrangements, and it pro-
vides that the U.S. will underwrite Brazil's enforcement expenses. The agree-
ment is a tacit acknowledgement of Brazil's special interest in the fisheries
resources off its coast.' Adoption of the treaty has been implemented by the
passage by Congress of the Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act of 1973 recently signed
into law by President Nixon.
Note from Acting Secretary of State Clayton to Ambassador Espinosa de los Monteros,
Jan. 24, 1946, Department of State file No. 812,0154/12-1445.
28 Fisherman's Protactive Act of 1954, 22 U.S.C. H1971-76 (1964).
2g Agreement between Brazil and the United States Concerning Shrimp, May 9, 1972,
reprinted in 11 Int'l. Legal Materials, 453 (1972).
2? Tinder, supra note 4 at 124.
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In contrast to this apparent willingness to adapt to assertions of extended
jurisdiction, the Congressional mood of the 1950's and 1960's is reflected by the
provisions of the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956,' Senator Thomas Kuchel's
"Freedom of the Seas Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 and
the Pelly Amendment to The Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967," all of which
seek to protect the rights of U.S. fishermen to fish on the high seas without
interference by foreign nations. Nevertheless, the Congressional action of this
period was as out of step with the changing attitudes of the international
community of that time as the codifications of the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Con-
ferences are with the attitudes of the international community today.
III. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
The 1958 Geneva Law of the Seas Conference succeeded in adopting four major
Conventions on the Law of the Sea: the Convention of the High Seas, the Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the
Continental Shelf and the Convention of Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas. As has already been said, the conference failed to
reach any agreement on the crucial issues of the maximum breadth of the terri-
torial sea or the fisheries limits.' A second conference convened in 1960, espe-
cially for the purpose, also failed to reach agreement on the maximum breadth
of the territorial sea and fisheries limit, although a U.S.-Canadian proposal for
a territorial sea of six miles plus an additional six-mile contiguous exclusive
fisheries zone failed by one vote to receive the necessary two-thirds approval of
the Conference. The net result on this score was to reveal a considerable body of
opinion supporting the view that a coastal state should be able to claim an
exclusive fisheries zone of twelve miles.'
The Convention on the High Seas defines the "high seas" as "all parts of the
sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State" and defines freedom of the seas as follows:
"The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to sub-
ject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised
under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of inter-
national law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
"(1) Freedom of navigation;
"(2) Freedom of fishing;
"(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
"(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
"These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles
of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to
the interests of other States in the exercise of the freedom of the high seas."
While few nations would quarrel with the principles expressed by this provi-
sion, many would disagree as to the meaning of the term "high seas," and some
might argue that the exercise of the freedom to fish "with reasonable regard to
Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 16. U.S.C. ? 742 a?j (1964).
',2Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-171, 79 Stat. 660 (1965).
Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-482 ? 3, 82 Stat. 730 (1968).
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, open for signature April 29, 1958 (1964) U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.
5639. 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 27; Convention
of Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas [hereinafter
cited as the Convention on Fishing', open for signature April 29, 1958 (1966) 1 U.S.T.
138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
Bishop, supra note 11 ; "(I)t has not been put into practice by the world's great
fishing nations or the major coastal nations which have been concerned with fisheries
in the past two decades." McKernan, 1971 Oregon Proceedings 16.
,6 Slider, supra note 4 at 51.
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the interests of other States" would include the special interest of a coastal statee
in its coastal waters, which the conference attempted to define in the Convention
on Fishing. This convention declared that all States have the duty to adopt "such
measures as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of tie
high seas" anti that a coastal State has "a special interest in the maintenance of
the productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to?
its territorial sea."
Article 7 of the Convention on Fishing authorized coastal states to adopt
-
"unilateral measures of conservation appropriate to any stock of fish or other.
marine resources in any area of the high ,eas adjacent to its territorial sea,
Provided that negotiations to that effect with other States concerned have rot led
to an agreement within six months," and provided further that the "following
conditions are fulfilled:
(a) That there is a need for urgent application of conservation measures
in the light of existing knowledge of the fishery;
(b) That, the measures adopted are based on appropriate scientific finding:
(c) That such measures do not discriminate in form or in fact against
foreign fishermen."
Except for the fact that this convention contemplated methods of arbitration
and settlement of international fishery disputes, which were not then widely ac-
ceptable, it might have been embraced by the many nations who favored extended
jurisdictions. Ai it was, nearly eight years passed before enough nations signed
the Convention to cause it to enter into effect, and the signatures included,: none
of the major df.stant water fishing nations. States that have been involved re-
cently in serious fishery controversies and are not signatories include those of
the Soviet bloc, Japan, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Iceland and South Korea.'
Opponents of S. 1988 have criticized the bill on the grounds that it contravene s
the Geneva Conventions. While this is undoubtedly true, the contention that the
Conventions preclude the United States from taking action of the nature con-
templated by S. 1988 is difficult to sustain. In the first place, only a limited num-
ber of nations :lave signed any of the Conventions, and barely enough nations
signed the Convention on Fishing to cause it to become effective. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice has suggested that the Convention on the Continental
Shelf, for example, is merely a contractual arrangement among the parties rati-
fying it and does not reflect customary principles of international law." in the
second place, Japan and the Soviet-bloc nations, which would be the nations
most immediately affected by unilateral seaward extension of jurisdiction by the
United States are not parties to the Convention on Fishing and, therefore, have
no right to require that. the United States conform to its provisions concerning
"unilateral measures of conservation." Because the other three Conventions failed
to establish the widths of the territorial sea and exclusive fisheries zones, such.
Conventions create no basis for objection to the action proposed by S. 1988.
Since 1958, the passage of time and the development of technology have effected
a widespread change of attitude toward fisheries zones in the international
community.
A tremendous increase in fishing capability and effort has resulted in a grow-
ing number of overfished stocks, and the need for sound management has become,
critical. Thus, unilateral assertions of the right to conserve coastal stocks are
being increasingly viewed as anticipatory measures of self-defense to preserve a
nation's economic independence and well-being, rather than as a form of terri-
torial aggram112;ement. For example, the Foreign Ministers of Norway, Sweden,
Denmark and Finland assured Iceland in 1972 of their support for its extension
of its fisheries limits." Perhaps worthy of note also is the fact that the Soviets
discontinued all fishing operations within the newly-declared Icelandic waters.
without protest.
coNCLUSIOYS
A study of the doctrine of freedom of the seas tells us that it has meant differ-
ent things in different periods. The seaward boundaries of nations have fluctuated
" Bishop, more note 10.
,8 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (1969) I.C.J. 3.
39 Facts on File 1972, at 714.
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widely from time to time, and today's claimed limits of jurisdiction vary from
three miles to 200 miles, demonstrating that there is no generally accepted rule
of international law regarding the permissible breadth of fisheries limits. Int
fact, the 200-mile limit is now more commonly accepted within the hemisphere
than is any other outer limit of national jurisdiction, and if any one proposition
is unanimously supported by all states, it is that international law does not
permit extensions beyond 200 miles.
Historically, the United States has tended to assert or ignore the doctrine of
freedom of the seas, according to whether the doctrine was consistent with its
current purpose. Today, the position with respect to the doctrine is ambivalent.
The State Department's declared policy is that 200-mile limits infringe upon the
doctrine of freedom of the seas and are therefore contrary to international law.
Nevertheless, practice under the Fisherman's Protective Acts of 1954 and 1967
and the Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act of 1973 clearly constitute a tacit accept-
ance of the Latin American 200-mile limits
The failure of the Geneva Conventions of 1958 and 1960 to come to an agree-
ment concerning the breadths of the territorial sea and exclusive fisheries zone
underscored the lack of a consensus for narrow limits in the international com?
-
munity and gave impetus to seaward extensions of jurisdiction. Although it was
endorsed by only a few of the great fishing powers, the Convention on Fishing
affirmed and expanded the principle of the special interest of a coastal state in
the fisheries in its adjacent waters, first enunciated by the Truman Proclamation
on Fishing, and appended to it the duty of conserving marine resources for the
benefit of all nations. The doctrine has been given further support by decisions of
the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases and
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case."
In 1958 and 1960, few could have anticipated the rapid build-up of the major
distant-water fishing fleets and the technological advances in gear and equipment
that occurred in the 1960's. At that time, fisheries thinking was still clouded by
the concept of unlimited production. Since then, despite greatly increased effort,
the rate of growth of the world catch has slowed, while the rate of growth of
world demand for seafood and fish products is expanding." An increasing number
of the world's fisheries are overexploited, and the need for conservation of the
world's fisheries has become urgent and obvious.
The changing relationship of supply and demand has radically altered the value?
placed upon marine resources by coastal states. Therefore, whatever the sig-
nificance of the Geneva Conventions as an expression of world opinion and inter-
national custom was in 1960 or even in 1966 when the last of them became effec-
tive, it has diminished significantly since. Extensions of jurisdiction over coastal
fisheries are increasingly justified as serving the interests of all fishing nations
by ensuring the continued productivity of protected fish stocks. Nevertheless, the
overriding motivation is economic self interest. It is generally accepted that a
nation's right to defend itself includes the right to defend itself against economic?
aggression and to preserve its economic independence and well-being." Accord-
ingly, wherever there Is a fully-exploited coastal fishery of significant value to?
the economy of an adjacent coastal nation, an extension of jurisdiction based on
a claim of economic self protection and the need for conservation should be met
with broad acceptance in the international community.
It is evident that the international community is rapidly moving toward a
system of ocean regulation in which "freedom of the seas" will have a new and
more restrictive meaning. Perhaps only the principle of innocent passage will
survive the changes of the next decade. In anticipation of the forthcoming Law
of the Seas Conference, U.S. State Department spokesman Donald McKernan is
on record as having said: "We have . . . been persuaded by the compelling-
arguments . . . that the coastal state should have the right to regulate the fish
stocks inhabiting the coastal waters off its shores as well as its anadromous re-
sources." Thus, it would seem that even the U.S. State Department is changing
40 North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 39; Anglo-Norweigian Fisheries Case
(1051), 1.C.J. 116.
41- Shaeffer, supra note 11.
42 Green, International Law & Canada's Anti-Pollution Legislation, 50 Oregon L. Rev.
462, 480-484 (1971).
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s position on the legality of seaward extensions of jurisdiction,.as usual, trail.
jug world opinion by a substantial lapse of time. In summary, then, a 200-mile
limit asserted by one nation "is legal" if it is acceptable to, or at least toleratee,
by, a great numJer of other nations. Such rt.sertions of jurisdiction have been
made "with increasing" frequency in recent years without provoking significant
resistance. The :intensity of the over-all world fishing effort has undoubtedly.
focused world attention upon the desirability of protecting remaining stocks
:Ind the attention of individual coastal nations upon the economic value of coasta,,
stocks, thereby creating a climate of acceptance for exclusive fisheries zones.
Mr. MusTARD. In summation, the international law consisted of con-
ventional law, as mentioned above, and the true test of time is custom-
a ry law. flow many nations would use the law in principle?
The current trend is for nations to claim a unilateral extension of
sovereignty or management control. We must ask ourselves which is
better, a 200-mile territorial sea or a 200-mile economic zone with a 12-
mile territoria_ sea?
in the interest of the major powers--I emphasize major powers--a
200-mile economic zone is best. So how :lo :we go about establishing a
200-mile economic zone?
The LOS is one solution, but in this we are, losing. The other is
wmplatory unilateral action, and you can compare S. 1988 and the
current official United States-LOS position.
At this time I would like to submit Appendix 4, which is an analysis
compared to our present position.
The CHAIRNIAN. It will be admitted to the record.
The document follows :1
COMPARISON BETWEEN S. 1988/H.R. 8665. "EMERGENCY MARINE FISHERIES PRO-
TECTION ACT OF 1974" AND UNITED NATIONS A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47, UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA: DRAFT ARTICLES FOR A CHAPTER ON THE ECONOMIC ZONE AND THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF
1. 200-mile Contiotous Fishery Zone/209 mile Economic Zone
1988----See. 2(b) (2) Purposes.?It is therefore declared to be the purpose
or the Congress in this Act . . . (2) to extend, as an emergency measure, the
contiguous fishery zone of the United. States to 200 nautical miles. . . Sec.
4(a I (2) The contiguous fishery zone has as its inner boundary the outer limits
or he territorial sea, and as its seaward boundary a line drawn so that each
pint on the line is 197 nautical milleS from the inner boundary.
L. 47?Article 2. Limits. The outer limit of the economic zone shall not exceed
200 nautical miles from the applicable baselines for measuring the territorial sea.
2, Coastal State Jurisdietion
1988?See. 2(b) (1) Purposes.?It is therefore declared to be the purpose
0! the Congress in this Act?(1) to take emergency action to protect and con-
serve threatened stocks of fish by asserting fishery management responsibility
a el authority over fish in an extended contiguous fishery zone and over certain
species of fish helond such zone, until a general international agreement on
Ii hery jurisdiction comes into force or is provisionally applied . . .
1. 47?Article 1. General. 1. The coastal State exercises in and throughout
rea beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea, known as the economic zone,
the Mrisdiction and the sovereign and exclusive rights set forth in this chap-
ter for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources, whether
renewable or non-renewable, of the sea-bed and .subsoil and the superadjacent
W:i lu.rs. Article 11. General. The coastal State exercises exclusive rights for the
parpose of regulLting fishing within the economic zone, subject to the provisions
or these articles.
3. Coastal Fish :cries
S. 1988- -Sec. 3(3) As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise re-
wires . . (3) "coastal species" means all species of fish which inhabit the
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waters off the coasts of the United States, other than highly migratory and
anadromous species . . . Sec. 4(c) General.?The United States shall manage
and conserve, and have preferential rights to, fish within the contiguous fishery
zone . . . subject to traditional foreign fishing rights as defined and recognized
in accordance with section 5 of this Act.
L. 47?Article 13. Utilization. 2. For [the purpose of full utilization], the
coastal State shall permit nationals of other States to fish for that portion of the
allowable catch of the renewable resources not fully utilized by its nationals,
subject to the conservation measures adopted pursuant to article 12, and on the
basis of the following priorities ...
4. Anadromous Species Fisheries
S. 1988?Sec. 3(3) As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires?
(1) "anadromous species" means those species of fish which spawn in fresh or
estuarine waters of the United States but which migrate to ocean waters . . .
Sec. 4(b) Anadromous Species.?The fishery management responsibility and
authority of the United States with respect to anadromous species, for the dura-
tion of this Act, extends to such species wherever found throughout the migra-
tory range of such species: Provided, That such responsibility and authority
shall not extend to such species to the extent found within the territorial waters
or contiguous fishery zone of any other nation.
L. 47?Article, 18. Anadromous Species. 1. Fishing for anadromous species
seaward of the territorial sea (both within and beyond the economic zone) is
prohibited, except as authorized by the State of origin in accordance with articles
12 [conservation] and 13 [utilization]. 2. States through whose internal waters
or territorial sea anadromous species migrate shall cooperate with the State of
origin in the conservation and utilization of such species.
5. Highly Migratory Species
S. 1988?Sec. 3(3) As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise re-
quires . . . (10) "highly migratory species" means those species of fish which
spawn and migrate during their life cycle in waters of the open ocean, including,
but not limited to, tuna . . . Sec. 4(a) (3) Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the fishery management responsibility and authority of the United States
within the contiguous fishery zone of the United States shall not include or be
construed to extend to highly migratory species, except to the extent such
species are not managed pursuant to bilateral or multilateral international fish-
ery agreements.
L. 47?Article 19. Highly Migratory Species. Fishing for highly migratory
species shall be regulated in accordance with the following principles:
A. Management?Fishing for highly migratory species . . . within the eco-
nomic zone shall be regulated by the coastal State, and beyond the economic
zone by the State of nationality of the vessel, in accordance with regulations
established by appropriate international or regional fishing organizations pur-
suant to this article.
(1) All coastal states in the region, and any other State whose flag vessels
harvest a species subject to regulation by the organization, shall participate
in the organization. If no such organization has been established, such
States shall establish one.
(2) Regulations of the organization in accordance with this article shall
apply to all vessels fishing the species regardless of their nationality.
B. Conservation.?The organization shall, on the basis of the best scientific
evidence available, establish allowable catch and other conservation measures
in accordance with the principles in articles 12 [conservation].
C. Allocation.?Allocation regulations of the organization shall he designed
to ensure full utilization of the allowable catch and equitable sharing by mem-
ber States.
(1) Allocations shall take into account the special interests of the coastal
State within whose economic zone highly migratory species are caught,
and shall for this purpose apply the following principles within and beyond
the economic zone: [appropriate principles yet to- be negotiated].
(2) Allocations shall be designed to minimize adverse economic conse-
quences in a State or region thereof. . . .
6. Foreign Fishing Rights
S. 1988?Sec. 5(a). General.?The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary
of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, may authorize
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fishing within tie contiguous fishery zone of the United States, or for anadromous
species or both, by citizens of any foreign nation, in accordance with this see-
lion, only if such nation has traditionally engaged in such fishing prior to the
,date of enactment of this Act.
(h) Provisions.?The allowable level of traditional foreign fishing shall be
set upon the basis of the portion of any stock which cannot be harvested by
United State citizens. Allowed traditional foreign fishing and fishing by United
States citizens annually shall not, for any stock, exceed the optimum sustainable
yield for such stock.
(- >
13
o
13
- o -1
n 0?
0 <
CD
CD
0-
m ii
o
TABLE 3.-LANDINGS OF FISH AND SHELLFISH BY U.S. FISHING CRAFT BY DISTANCE OFF U.S. SHORES -1
M
Ca
(:)
(:)
-1
8
co
(:)
..I
? ?
0
1>
X
0
-4
0
CO
0
o
c.4
oa
o
o
o
o
th
I
1ln terms of landing value, dollar amounts in thousands]
!
1
0 to 3 miles
3 to 12 miles
Greater than 12 miles
High seas off foreign shores
Total
i?-?
"
Amount
Percent
Amount
Percent
Amount
Percent
Amount
Percent
1971:
Total fish
Shellfish
$132, 839
165, 229
44
48
$40, 864
59, 559
14
17
$62, 955
102, 089
21
30
$64, 119
15, 546
21
5
$300, 777
342, 423
Grand total
Less tuna
298, 068
152
46
. 002
100, 423
1, 297
16
2
165, 044
14, 204
26
19
79, 665
59, 863
12
79
643, 200
75, 516
Total
297, 916
53
99, 126
17
150, 840
27
19, 802
3
567, 684
1972:
Total fish
Shellfish
123, 384
165, 066
35
40
44, 654
66, 424
13
15
77, 611
132, 638
22
32
102, 564
53, 159
30
13
348, 213
417, 287
Grand total
Less tuna
288, 450
226
38
.008
111,078
1, 283
15
1
210, 249
19, 786
27
16
155,723
99, 334
20
83
765, 500
120,629
Total
288, 224
45
109, 795
17
190, 463
29
56, 389
9
644, 871
1973:
Total fish
Shellfish
235, 234
205,591
48
43
57, 231
103, 255
12
22
80, 465
121, 926
16
26
120, 785
46, 312
24
9
493, 716
477, 084
Grand total
Less tuna
440, 825
474
45
.004
160, 486
1,502
17
1
202, 391
15,512
21
12
167, 097
114,085
17
87
970, 799
131,573
440, 351
52
158, 984
19
186, 879
22
53, 012
6
839, 226
Source: N NIFS
Z-Vb001400900n108?0089LdCN-
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TABLE 4.-LAND I NGS OF FISH AND SHELLFISH BY U.S. FISHING CRAFT BY DISTANCE OFF U.S. SHORES
[In terms of landing volume, pounds in thousands)
0 to 3 miles
3 to 12 miles
Greater than 12 miles
High seas off foreign shores
Total
Pounds
Percent
Pounds
Percent
Pounds
Percent
Pounds
Percent
1971:
Total fish
2, 377, 972
59
842, 297
21
497, 942
12
335, 781
8
4, 053, 922
Shellfish
520, 077
57
210, 079
23
165, 714
18
19, 538
2
915, 408
Grand total
2, 898, 049
59
1, 052, 376
21
663,656
13
355, 319
7
4, 969, 400
Less tuna
633
.0019
5,411
2
50, 414
14
291, 552
84
348, 040
Total
2, 897, 386
63
1, 046, 965
23
613, 242
13
63, 767
1
4, 621, 360
1972:
Total fish
2, 267, 602
57
772, 112
20
436, 600
11
485, 541
12
3,961, 855
Shellfish
471, 935
51
198, 502
21
200, 459
22
61, 349
6
932, 245
Grand total
2, 739, 537
50
970, 614
20
537, 059
13
546, 890
11
4, 894, 100
Less tuna
1, 020
.002
5, 408
1
61, 204
12
456, 743
87
524 375
Total
2,738, 517
63
965, 206
22
575, 855
13
90, 147
2
4, 369, 725
1973:
Total fish
2, 383, 077
60
687, 207
17
399, 434
10
528, 522
13
3,998, 240
Shellfish
466, 524
50
240,035
26
178, 641
19
42, 860
5
928,060
Grand total
2, 849, 601
58
927, 242
19
578, 075
12
571, 382
11
4, 926, 300
Less tuna
1, 150
. 002
4, 440
.008
39, 290
7
470, 703
91
515, 583
Total
2, 848, 451
65
922, 802
21
538, 785
12
100, 679
2
4,410,717
Source: NMFS.
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TABLE 5.?LANDINGS OF TUNA (BY SPECIE) BY U.S. FISHING CRAFT BY DISTANCE OFF U.S. SHORES (IN TERMS OF LANDING VALUE)
[Dollar amounts in thousands]
High seas off foreign
0 to 3 mi 3 to 12 mi Greater than 12 mi shores Total
Grand
Year Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent total
Albacore 1973 $35 0.006 $12, 044 9 $2, 269 2 $14, 348 11 $131, 573
1972 66 .01 16, 356 14 3, 310 3 19, 732 16 120, 629
1971 $1 0.001 2 .002 10, 508 14 3, 551 5 14, 062 19 75, 516
Bluefin 1973 392 .30 452 .34 1, 031 . 78 4, 580 3 6, 455 5 131, 573
1972 91 .08 185 .15 1,117 . 93 5,255 4 6,648 6 120,629
1971 70 .09 129 .17 807 1 3,300 4 4,306 6 75,516
Skipjack 1973 29 .02 866 .66 2, 090 2 21,372 16 24, 357 19 131, 573
1972 23 .02 704 .69 1, 659 1 14, 787 12 17, 173 14 120, 629
1971 29 .04 926 1 2, 148 3 18, 650 25 21, 753 29 75, 516
Yellowfin 1973 48 .04 145 .11 346 .26 85, 864 65 86, 403 66 131,573
1972 109 .09 326 .27 653 .54 75,982 63 77,070 64 120,629
1971 50 .07 174 .23 365 .48 34, 362 46 34, 951 46 75, 516
Source: NMFS.
TABLE 6.?LANDING OF TUNA (BY SPECIE) BY U.S. FISHING CRAFT BY DISTANCE OFF U.S. SHORES (IN TERMS OF LANDING VOLUME)
[Pounds in thousands]
High seas off foreign
0 to 3 mi 3 to 12 mi Greater than 12 mi shores Total
Grand
Year Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent total
Albacore 1973
1972
1971
Bluefin 1973
1972
1971
Skipjack 1973
1972
1971
eltowfin 1973
1972
1971
8
958
570
424
101
106
144
61
324
77
0.002
.18
. 11
. 12
.02
.02
. 04
. 01
. 06
.02
82 . 01 28, 984 6 5, 500 1 34, 566 7 515, 583
193 .03 48, 281 9 9,789 2 58, 263 11 524, 375
3 .0008 34,668 10 10,182 3 44,861 13 348,040
1, 063 .20 2, 237 .43 19, 758 4 24, 016 5 515,583
971 . 18 3, 290 .63 24, 908 5 29, 739 6 524, 375
822 .23 4, 478 1 16, 500 5 22, 224 6 348, 040
3, 095 .60 7, 463 1 93,305 18 103,964 20 515,583
3,258 .62 7,680 1 77, 400 15 88, 444 17 524, 375
4,215 1 10,171 3 100,750 29 115,210 33 348,040
184 . 04 602 . 12 352, 140 68 352, 987 68 515, 583
975 . 19 1, 951 . 37 344, 646 66 347, 896 66 524, 375
304 . 09 664 . 19 164, 120 47 165, 165 47 348, 040
Source: IIMFS.
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VALUE Cl' ANNUAL LANDINGS OF COMMERCIAL FISH IN CALIFORNIA, AND PERCENTAGE THEREOF REPRESENTED
BY TUNA,' 1972-1960, 1955, AND 1952
[In LS. dollarsi
Year
Total
landing value
Total tuna
landing value
Tura
percentace
landing vak
1972'
$93,
704,
009
$74,
838,
000
79. 16
1971
86,
266,
200
66,
705,
203
77.22
1970
86,
253,
713
64,
066,
695
74.E 8
1969
62,
516,
322
45,
499,
103
72.28
1968
53,
695,
507
37,
164,
931
69.21
1967
50,
948,
900
36,
614,
466
71.t'7
1966
55,
149,
708
39,
680,
364
71.2,5
1965
50,
116,
208
36,
193,
656
72.i 2
1964
49,
925,
674
35,
945,
891
72.69
1963
48,
752,
456
35,
725,
890
73.78
1962
54,
264,
302
41,
144,
072
75. 82
1961
55,
440,
728
39,
762,
267
71.72
1960
48,
905,
266
35,
027,
098
71.62
1955
53,
184,
536
39,
088,
537
73.20
1951
66,
796,
883
46,
867,
670
70.16
Includes tuna-like fill.
2 Preliminary.
Source: State of California, the Resources Agency, Department of Fish and Game.
TABLE 8.-HISTORICAL REVIEW OF NEW CONSTRUCTION AND C3NVERSION IN U.S. PURSE SEINE FLEET, 1957-23
Year
Total
vessels
TotalCO
capacity
New construction
Military hull
conversions
Baitboat hull
conversions
Estimated
st
(rollionr)
Number
Capacity
Number
Capacity
Number
Capacity
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
1957
Total
9
16
13
11
13
4
3
1
2
1
7
11
21
52
14
3
4
185
10, 200
18, 800
15, 150
9,200
8, 084
3,200
2,450
550
690
779
5,443
4,468
7,808
15,264
4,319
927
1, 272
9
15
13
11
10
4
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
10, 200
17, 850
15, 150
9,200
6, 224
3,200
2,450
550
550
779
779
779
460
340
680
1, 020
1
2
4
2
2
950
1, 560
3,959
1,042
1,414
1
2
8
18
52
13
1
1
300
140
705
2,647
5,934
15,264
3,979
247
252
$25. 5
49. 5
37. 8
20,5
18, 7
6. 9
4. 1
1. 0
1, 0
12
5.5
3,9
4.8
7,8
2.4
1.1
, 1
108,604
77
70, 211
11
8,925
97
29, 468
191.8
Nate: Prior to 1957, so baitboats were converted to purse seiner.. The purse seine technique was used extensively on
tuna by a large group cf vessels from San Pedro. In the industry, this group has been called regular purse seiners. Until
the early 1950's the fleet fished seasonally on tuna wits more emphasis on the sardine and mackerel fisheries. During
the period Jan. 1 throath Apr. 1, 1974, 9 vessels have ccmmenced their maiden voyages and 1 vessel has been launched.
About 15 other vessels are under construction or order. The value cif these 25 vessels is about $75,000,000.
Source: American Tunaboat Association, 1 Tuna Lane, San Diego, Calif.
Mr. FELANDo. I. would like to say one, thing. All through these years
we have been taking the seizure business. We have tried in every way
to see whether the United States would prevent a seizure from occur-
ring on the high seas. It never happened. We were always told we
were seeking a diplomatic solution and would have the major initia-
tive of the Law of the Seas Conference, and now we see we are heading
in that direction, and in our view it is sort of upsetting to see what is
happening.
R MAN. Mr. Yonker, we are glad to have you, sir.
You are with the Association of Pacific Fisheries?
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STATEMENT OF WALTER YONKER, ASSOCIATION OF PACIFIC
FISHERIES, SEATTLE, WASH.
Mr. YONKER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a prepared statement?
Mr. YONKER. A very brief one, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You would rather read it?
Mr. YONKER. Yes, sir.
My name is Walter Yonker. I am executive director of the Associ-
ation of Pacific Fisheries from Seattle, Wash.
I am also making this statement today on behalf of the Seiners
Association, a group of seine vessel owners, some 186 who operate out
of the Seattle area.
By way of background, the Association of Pacific Fisheries rep-
sents salmon canners who produce 90 percent of the U.S. pack and
also produce substantial amounts of frozen salmon.
We are opposed to S. 1988 because, while the legislation speaks to
a unilateral ban on this country, by this country on the high seas fish-
ing for salmon, it is our view that it will be impossible for this Nation
to enforce such a ban.
We also question the legislation because it provides for no immedi-
ate management or conservation within the 3- to 100-mile zone; it
only provides for a council to study the matter. These are the areas
that concern us.
There is no question a 200-mile zone will provide protection. Salmon,
as you know, spawn in the inland waters and estuarian waters of their
host country, and go to the high seas where they spend from 1 to 4
or 5 years, and return to their own river system.
Under the provisions of the 200-mile limit alone, it would be possible
for foreign nationals fishing outside of 200 miles to completely destroy
the U.S. salmon runs.
The other problem of the legislation is that it speaks to a high seas
ban on salmon fishing imposed unilaterally by the United States.
In the first place, it is very difficult for us to imagine how the United
States can mount a surveillance effort which would cover some half-
million square miles of the North Pacific Ocean during a major part
of the year when salmon would be vulnerable to high sea fishing.
This point is particularly evident when you consider at the same
time the United States must now start to patrol or would start to
patrol a 200-mile limit.
Additionally, we have a very real concern that the United States
would not be able to enforce this provision for protection of the anad-
romous fish in the area of the ocean beyond any jurisdictional claim.
It is difficult for us to believe that the United States will go 400 or 500
miles off its own coast, or the coast of Canada for that matter, inspect
and arrest foreign flag vessels. This I think would lead to the reverse
of what Mr. Feland spoke to.
We would be practicing gunboat diplomacy on the high seas.
I think a great number of countries would consider this piracy if
we started this sort of operation.
Another problem we have on high seas enforcement is that the
salmon of both Canada and the United States intermingle in the North
Pacific Ocean. This again makes it very difficult for enforcement peo-
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pie boarding and inspecting vessels on the high seas to determine
whether the vessels are substantially taking American or Canadian
sal mon.
So the enforcement problem is extremely difficult and it is very
unlikely in our view that the United States will undertake Ruth a
I rogram.
This country has been involved in the planning and preparatory
imeetinff, and a Third -Law of the Sea Conference, an exercise that has
involved some 10 years. Our country is the leading advocate of such a
conference. All of us are well aware that there are many issues of im-
rertance to all countries involved.
Fisheries is only one of the issues of importance to the United.
States. After ;laving gone down this road and pushed as hard as we
have, it seems strange that as the Conference is under way that the
'United States would abandon its position of reaching agreements
through a multinational conference and taking jurisdiction on the
f2004nile basis.
It seems to its that for the United States to assert such jurisdiction,
it is not only inconsistent with our past position, but makes it virtually
impossible we will get favorable consideration in such a conference.
For this reason, if for no other, Congress should consider very care-
fully the course of action which might jeopardize important segments
of the American fishing industry, including the salmon fishing in the
Pacific Ocean.
We see no future in unilateral protection for salmon. Our only hope
is to have international recognition of a ban on high seas fishing.
There are many reasons why high seas fishing is wrong. You cannot
-manage the resource and provide conservation. It is inefficient because
:you are harvesting immature animals. Scientists have estimated that
Ii igh seas fishery results in the landed loss of over 60 million pounds
.01*-. salmon in the world every year.
Finally, high seas fishing on salmon results in a dropout loss. The
nets working in the heavy swells of the ocean are estimated to lose
about 30 percent of the fish that are caught in the nets initially.
For these reasons, we just do not see that S. 1988 provides any pro-.
tection for the salmon industry, and we cannot support the legislation
for that reason.
[Prepared statement follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF W. V. YONKER
Air. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Senate Armed
;?4ervices Committee. The purpose of my statement today is to express the opposi-
tion of the Association of Pacific Fisheries and the Seiners Association to S. 11)8.
For your information, the Association of Pacific Fisheries is a trade association
which, since 1914, has represented salmon canners of Alaska, Washington, and
Oregon who prcduce in excess of 90 percent of this country's pack of canned
salmon. The Association members also produce substantial amounts of frozen
-salmon. The Seiners Association is an association of seine boat operators who
lish primarily for salmon in the above states with a membership of 186. Both of
these Associations are headquartered in Seattle, Washington.
We are opposed to S. 7988 because, while the legislation speaks to a unilateral
ban by this country on the high seas fishing for salmon, it is our view that this
nation will not be able to enforce such a ban beyond any claim of national juris.-
diction. Also, we feel that the proposed legislation does not adequately provide
for management and conservation of our fishery resources in the 3 to 200 miles.
Extended jurisdiction by the United States over its coastal waters to a distance
oF 200 miles will obviously provide protection for its coastal fisheries. However
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it seems to us that the real responsibility of our government is to provide protec-
tion to all segments of its fishing industry and this will not be accomplished under
the provisions of S. 1988.
To illustrate this point, the nation's fishery on Pacific salmon would be deci-
mated by a 200-mile limit. If, for example, Japan alone were to fish for salmon in
the Gulf of Alaska with its present fleet of ten montherships and 350 catch
boats for its present 60-day fishing period it would have the capacity of taking
approximately 23,500,000 salmon of North American origin (see chart). Based
on 1973 prices such a catch would have amounted to $105,500,000. Two-thirds of
this total interception would be U.S. salmon ($70,500,000). The present rate of
interceptions of U.S. salmon by foreign nationals averages about 3,500,000 per
year.
The National Marine Fisheries Services estimates this take as follows:
Sockeye
15,
180,
000
Steelhead
330, 000
Pinks
4,
555,
000
Chinooks
25,000
Chums
3,
100,
000
Cohos
265,
000
Total
23,
455, 000
These estimates show that a 200-mile line by itself would not provide an ade-
quate degree of protection for North American salmon stocks.
Additionally, a high seas fishery for salmon is completely destructive because
immature fish are harvested, management of runs to individual river systems is
impossible, and there are excessive numbers of fish lost from high seas nets.
S. 1988 provides that the United States will extend its jurisdiction to its
anadromous fish wherever they may range in the oceans. It is our view that this
unilateral extension of jurisdiction of anadromous fish will not in fact protect
anadromous fish. In the first place it is very difficult for us to imagine how the
United States can mount a surevillance effort which would cover some half
million square miles of the North Pacific Ocean during a major part of the
year when salmon would be vulnerable to a high seas net fishery outside of 200
miles. This point is particularly evident when we consider that at the same time
the United States must mount a greater patrol than that presenly used to enforce
a 200-mile provision.
Additionally, we have a very real concern that the United States would not be
able to enforce this provision for protection of anadromous fish in an area of the
oceans beyond any jurisdictional claim. It is difficult for us to believe that the
United States would go 500 or 600 miles off its own coast or the coast of Canada
for that matter and arrest foreign nationals for fishing United States salmon on
the high seas. This probably would be considered an act of piracy by other coun-
tries. Because of the intermingling of North American salmon in the Gulf of
Alaska, which we mentioned earlier, we doubt that there is sufficient scientific
data to determine whether or not such foreign nationals would be fishing on
Canadian or United States salmon; undoubtedly they would be fishing on stocks
from both countries. Proof that foreign vessels were catching primarily U.S.
salmon and not salmon primarily of Asian or Canadian origin would be prac-
tically impossible on a vessel by vessel basis. Assuming such proof were necessary
to apprehend foreign vessels, enforcement beyond 200 miles would be non-existent.
This country has been involved in the planning, preparatory meetings, and the
Third Law of the Sea Conference, an exercise that has involved ten years of
time. Our country is the leading advocate of such a conference and all of us
are well aware that there are many issues of importance to all countries involved.
Fisheries is only one of the issues of importance to the United States. After
having gone down this road and pushed as hard as we have, it seems strange that
on the very eve of the Conference the United States would abandon its position
of reaching an agreement through a multination conference and take jurisdiction
over fisheries 200 miles off the coast. It seems to us that for the United States
to assert such jurisdiction is not only inconsistent with our past position but also
makes it virtually impossible that we would get favorable consideration in the
Law of the Sea for the special exceptions which are required if we are to preserve
salmon and other important species of fish such as tuna and shrimp. For that
reason if for no other, Congress should consider very carefully the course of
action which might jeopardize important segments of the American fishing in-
dustry, including the salmon of the Pacific Northwest and Alaska.
We appreciate that S. 1988 provides very good protection for coastal fisheries
but for the reasons detailed above, we do not see that the proposed legislation
adequately protects salmon and in fact its enactment could reduce the limited
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protection that the salmon industry has now. We strongly urge that for the above
reasons S. 1988 not be given favorable consideration by this committee.
ESN
NORtH AIVISRICAN
Japan High Seas
31N\
Wsz.wa
Canada f Ak
137,V
23%
C ;Ora! Ak
V/-0-C 26%
9% /
SE A.
21%
1,168 MILLION FISH
7 U. S. S. R.
35%
Japan
Inshore-
ASIAN
(M.S. )
24%
Japan High Seas
(LB.) 36?,
1,850 MILL ION FISH
CATCHES OF MTH AMERICAN AND ASIAN SALMON, ALL SFACIES AND 1954 TO 1968 COMBINED
AND PERCENTAGES Tani BY FISHERY AREA - COUNTRY
(From FrOdin, vnpubl. MS., NOAA, NIPS. Startle, WA)
ESTIMATES OF POTENTIAL AVERAGE ANNUAL CATCH r,F SALMON
BY A HIGH SEAS GILLNET FLEET OF 369 CATCHER-BOATS
FISHING DURING A 60-DAY PERIOD IN TEE SPRING OUTSIDE
200-MILE LINE IN TEE GULP OF ALASKA..
(From Fradio, Lopubl. MS., NOAA, NKFS, Seattle, EA)
450
400
35.
I II Ii2'
I I iiT -
Fv..5.- in1--
, 200., .1.11.E-
II.
1 r I-1 1 1 1 t-"I i--- 1 -
MILLIONS OF Fl3H _--I-I
SOCXEYE 15.130 ..! 1-.1 1- 1
--i PINKS 4.555 -1- -,
! p T
--i CHUMS 3.100 1 ' ' --'
COHOES 0.255 . .1_ _.,.
--i cH1NOOKS 0.0'25 : J
_1 sTEELHERO 0.3:30 1 I -
--; TOTAL 23.-4-35 idil
-HMI MIL! i_LU 1 11-1.1
00
5015
1,0W 40
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-65?N1
IRO? I70?W 160? 150?
55? ?
,50.-
40?
st\te
130?
65?N
000
200-MILE LINE
;" c9: 8. I?. ? ? ? ' netillif.eit op
oo ?% esez, : . :00:44::......?4:0
0000.
oo.o
? littlgtr 88DES: ? 3?46'9)
.. V: 1
: :::11.0. .` 0-sfie::???-???ft.?
to. -firs:::..
0 0 0 . occ:.: 8 T,oa 00co. 00,01.
c0000 2g Vco ? "Er. ?
'o .. . .,, o 06 p oo
0 0 0 P og. ;
IIIIIIIII1 I
NUMBER OF SALMON
PER 1,000 HOOKS
0 1 - 50
0 54 - 150
0 OVER 150
60?
55?
0I01E1BUTION OF SALMON IN TEE GULP OP ALASKA DURING APRIL, MAY AND EARLY JUNE
1962-1966 VONGLINE SURVEYS (ALL SPECIES COMBINED)
506
45.
40?
(Pro? Fred1n, unpubl. HE., MOM, MIPS, Seattle, WA)
The CHAIRMAN. We have Mr. Carry. We are glad to have you here.
You represent the Tuna Research Foundation
STATEMENT OF CHARLES CARRY, TUNA RESEARCH FOUNDATION,
TERMINAL ISLAND, CALIF.
Mr. CARRY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That is a trade association rep-
resenting 85 percent of the production of canned tuna in the United
States.
Mr. Felando and I came in from Mexico City at 10:30. We have been
there at another international conference.
I would like an opportunity to file a statement later.
I might say for the record that I testified extensively in two hear-
ings before the Senate Commerce Committee. The material is now
printed, the transcript is now available, and part 2 contains our testi-
mony for future reference.
The CHAIRMAN. That is fine. We have already sent for that testi-
mony, by the way, and we are going to have the benefit of it.
Mr. CARRY. I want to touch on two points, Mr. Chairman2 that have
not been touched on by my friends here, and these are points that I
think are very important.
In the first instance, this legislation is absolutely useless, as it reads,
and I cannot cite the page or the line at the moment, I have not looked
at it for several months. It says this will not supersede any interna-
tional agreement we now have.
All of us, the species that are at risk are covered by these agree-
ments. Therefore, you cannot do anything under this legislation to
protect them.
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230
Secondly, 77 to 80 percent of all of the fish caught by the U.S.
coastal fishermen are caught inside the current 12-mile 'Contiguous
zone. So the only thing left is -23 percent, and a gooet bit of that is
tuna caught off of the other coasts.
So really, this is, as the old saying goes, a tempest in a teapot, and
it is probably a hoax on some of the people that think it will help
them. It just will not do them any good.
I was at Caracas, as all of us were. We saw the effect down there on
our negotiating posture. It was disastrous. And that is one of the
reasons why we are here today to tell you that, because we want you
to know it ruined every chance that the United States had to nego-
tiate anything of any value, and it was all because of this pending
Mr. Chairman, those are the only three points I want to make. I
will submit a Etatement later, but I want to get those three points
before you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
All right, now, all four of you gentlemen.
1 yield to Senator Thurmond.
Senator THURMOND. Gentlemen, there is one question I would like
to ask. I think each of you can answer for the record. You are op-
posed to the Law of the Sea Treaty that establishes a 200-mile eco-
nomic zone. From the testimony, it sounded as though you are oppcsed
to any controls that might require the distant water fleet, ,shrimp
fleets, or tuna to return to local waters.
The point is, are you opposed to the 200 miles because we are doing
it unilaterally, as the Defense Department is? That is your main
objection, because doing it unilaterally, you are afraid retaliation will
take effect in other fields as well as fishing, or are you in favor of the
200-mile Law cf the Sea Treaty which is being worked on now and
which the State Department says they will have worked out in about
a year ?
Mr. Urz. I would like to try to answer that for the shrimp industry.
The approach that the State Department is taking to the Law of the
Sea Conference as far as protecting the distant water shrimp fleet, is
the one that is most critical in balance in that negotiation.
What they are attempting to do is work out in the end result an
economic zone, and understanding of maximum utilization of the
resources of coastal states waters so. It would apply this way. The
coastal state can fish those resources to the extent of its ability. The
difference between its ability and. the maximum sustainable yield,
which is a scientific, term, as to how many fish can be caught and still
replenish, that difference would be available for international fishing
efforts, so that distant water fleets could continue to fish in areas of
Brazil and so forth, and as the Brazilian fleet increased its catch
capability we, of course, would have to diminish our catch effort. But
this would be done hopefully over a very extended period of time so
that we could very easily adjust to this.
Senator Trutrummvn. Do you favor the Law of the Sea Treaty
the. State Department is working on now
Mr. ftrz. Yes, sir.
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Senator THURMOND. You would favor that?
Mr. ITTz. We would favor it provided
Senator THURMOND. That carries 200 miles the same as is proposed
here, except here it is proposed to do it unilaterally and not wait and
get the concurrence of other nations of the world.
Mr. UTZ. We are in support of the State Department efforts pro-
vided they can secure for us the specific rights and duties that they are
undertaking at this time. If they cannot secure those rights and duties
to protect us, we would not support them.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I just have a couple of questions here.
As I understand it now, you say that tuna, shrimp, and the salmon
constitute 50 percent of the landed value, I believe.
Mr. FELANDO. A little better than 50 percent of the landed value,
Senator.
In 1973, the total value of fish landed in the United States by U.S.
fishermen was about $920 million. Salmon was about $125, tuna was a
little better than $135, and shrimp was about $241. It comes up to a
little better than 50 percent.
The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Mr. FELANDO. Ninety-one percent of our tuna is caught away from
the shores of the United States. That is where that figure came from.
Excuse me. The other figure, the 90 percent, represented the value
of the canned product, and when you include shrimp, tuna, and salmon
there, then you are talking about 90 percent of he canned fish value. to
the processors.
The CHAIRMAN. Canned fish value. It is those three?
Mr. FELANDO. That is right.
T110 CHAIRMAN. I am surprised at that.
I am going to pass now to Senator McIntyre.
Senator, you know these four gentlemen, you were here when they
testified.
Senator McINTyllE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like
to ask a few questions.
It seemed to me the testimony of Mr. Felando, representing the
Tunaboat Association, continually talked in terms of what you might
say if you were talking to our friends in the Caribbean and Latin
America, that this is a territorial effort of the United States to ex-
clude, that this is not what we contend this bill would do, and that is
to bring good, sound conservation practices to that 200-mile coastal
area.
You completely talk as if what we intended to do here is exclude and
to extend our territorial boundaries 200 miles, and that is not the pur-
pose of this legislation.
Let me read to you,, specifically it says on page 9., line 23, under
policy, "it is further declared that the policy of the Congress in this
act is to authorize no impediment to or inference with the legal status
of the high seas except with respect to fishing to the extent necessary
to implement this act."
In all of your testimony you talk as if we were going to say we are
going to bring our gunboats down and shoot you up?this is USA
territory. And this is not the purpose of this thing, this is an interim
act and this whole bill is couched in emergency terms.
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232
Mr. FELANDO. With all due respect, you sound like some of my Latin
American friends, but the fact is that the character of the claim sud-
denly changes.
The CHAIRMA.N. You mean his argument sounded like that?
Mr. FELANDO.. Yes, sir.
Thank you, Senator.
The fact is that when going back to other actions taken by the
-United States, what the United States says is not necessarily followed
by other countries. Other countries will decide what they want to
claim.
The underlying feature of this bill is that it represents unilateral
action by the United States to claim jurisdiction or control or enforce-
ment authority beyond 12 miles.
Now, when you talk about a management program in itself, it seems
to me that you have to talk a management program for all U.S. fish-
eries, and we think that in order to do this properly you have to seek
cooperation from all countries and that the best approach is through
a multilateral one, the one that we are trying to seek, trying to obtain
at the present time.
You can say what the United States intends, but what we are con-
cerned about in tuna is the fact that the reaction of other countries is
quite different.
Suddenly fishing claims change into territorial sea claims and I
think that is well-documented.
Senator McINtYnn. I understand some of you witnesses represent
distant shrimp fishing. This I interpret to mean that your boats go out
and fish for shrimp on distant foreign shores; is that correct?
Mr. UTZ. Yes, sir.
Senator MCINTYRE. SO I take it that the argument here that you are
afraid of it is that you are now able to fish as you please off those
shores.
I am not a student of conservation of shrimp, but I suspect there are
some practices that are good for the shrimp future and had. So what
yon are saying is that if we pass this sort of a bill and move in this
direction, that some foreign country is going to step on your toes by
requiring you do things that should be good conservation practices
for shrimp fish ; you do not want any regulation of that because it.
may interfere with your chasing the almighty dollar now. Is that not.
true?
Mr. UTz. No. sir, not quite.
We presently are involved in a conservation agreement off Brazilian.
waters. In working with Mexico, Texas shrimp fleet and Florida
shrimp fleet depend a great deal on international waters off Mexico..
Mexican boats to some degree come into the Texas Gulf. We see noth-
hig wrong with conservation practices as far as shrimp is concerned,.
ln fact, they are practiced extensively throughout the Gulf. In fact,
I believe that the shrimp industry has a very good record of extensive
efforts in conserving shrimp.
There is one difficulty. That difficulty is, there is very little known
about shrimp in certain respects.
We have boll size standards and very Stringent time requirements
as to when people can shrimp and when they cannot and when they are
not permitted, and this is carried on throughout the gulf. That is one
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reason that we think we have been as successful as we have been in
this industry, because we do manage the industry as best we can.
We have no regrets or concerns to see an international effort to
conserve shrimp and conservation standards applied, I think it would
be to everybody's benefit to have that. Our chief concern is a total
kickout. Mexico says that they want 1,800 shrimp boats out. It is not
a question of under what conditions we would be permitted to come in
there. We just would not be permitted to come in there. That is all.
We cannot survive.
The only alternative we would have under those conditions would
be for the entire fleet to come into the gulf domestic shrimping
ground.
Senator MCINTYRE. They are going to come anyway, are they not,
as soon as they use up their shrimp they are going to come into your
area?
Mr. UTZ. We are not using up
Senator MCINTYRE. They are practicing good conservation with their
shrimp?
Mr. UTZ. To some degree; not what I would call good conservation
with this shrimp.
Senator McINTYRE. You say you practice good conservation.
Mr. UTZ. We try.
Senator MCINTYRE. You had better practice it or you will have no
shrimp.
Up in the Northeast, Senator Stevens of Alaska was telling us about
some of this exploitation that is going on by foreign nations; we do i
not have any more, the haddock s gone. The cod is gone; the hake is
gone. I cannot remember all those fancy names. They have gone.
Let me ask you this: You four people are here. One I understand
is a researcher and we are proud of that because we do an awful lot
of research in defense, do we not, Mr. Chairman?
You say you represent better than 50 percent of the landed value
of the fishing industry in America. Is that right?
Mr. UTZ. Yes. sir.
Senator MCINTYRE. Let me ask you this. You are here for salmon,
tuna, and shrimp. What percentage of the labor force involved in that
salmon, tuna, and shrimp do you four people represent?
Mr. FELANDO. What percentage of what?
Senator 11/cINTyllE. The labor force, the people that work at it.
Mr. CARRY. May I answer that on behalf of the tuna industry?
Senator MCINTYRE. You are a researcher and I suspect you could
probably claim 100 percent.
Mr. CARRY. No, sir, I am not a researcher. I will not claim to be a
researcher. That is the name of my organization.
However, the answer is, the unions in our industry, and we are 100
percent organized in our industry, our fishermen?
Senator MCINTYRE. What industry is that?
Mr. CARRY. They are all in opposition to this legislation too.
Senator MCINTYRE. We had Senator Magnuson here the other day
and he told us people will be in to talk about how they are against
tuna. Let me tell you, Mr. Chairman and members of the. committee,
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they do not represent the full body either, even half of the tuna
industry.
I am paraphrasing what Senator Magnuson said. I got the impres-
sion there were other tuna people not of the same frame of mind that
you are.
Mr. FELANDO. I would like to answer that.
Senator MCINTYRE. Make it short.
Mr. FEIANDO. No. 1, I have fished. Our family has been involved in
the .fishing, tuna business all our lives.
No. 2, Senator Magnuson made the remark that the Russians are
.fishing tuna of California. How ridiculous can that be? That is not
true.
Let's talk about the fishermen, the tuna fishermen I am familiar
with. I do not know of one tuna fisherman that does not recognize that
when we leave San Diego we are going south, if it is 200 miles, my
friend, we are i.n trouble.
Let's talk about so-called access. Let's take Mexico. They claim a
12-mile territorial sea. Now, in order to fish within Mexico, you have
to buy a license. Incidentally, there is rio license to fish for shrimp
because they are owned by the cooperatives..
As a condition to purchasing a tuna license from Mexico, 50 percent
of the employes must be Mexican citizens. That is a condition to fish
within 12 miles.
do not know where the information is that Senator Magnuson
talks about, bull can tell you this: That the tuna industry recognizes
it would be a disaster if 200 miles goes out. It would be a disaster.
Senator McINTynE. Let me say the halibut industry and the former
haddock industry already says the present system is a disaster and it
is a known fact. You are still fishing for tuna, are you not?
Mr. FELANDO. I would like to answer one question.
The problem I have with my constituents, in 1972, the landed value
of cash in Alaska was approximately $80 million. In 1973, the landed
value of cash in Alaska was $162 million.
In 1973, the total landings in the United States by fishermen were
up over 1972. The total value of landings in the United States by
fishermen was up over $200 million, in 1973 from 1972.
Senator, with all due respect, we have some difficulty with these
figures when we hear people say that they are in trouble. We know
that some fisheries are in trouble, but we feel there are other alternative_
approaches than this suggestion of S. 1988.
We think that this is the approach that should be used: When there
are some. conservation problems with some difficulties with treaties.
with bilaterals, then I think this is the way that those problems should.
be attacked, but not on legislation that completely divides, that pro-
vides jeopardy for many segments of the fishing industry, important
segments, and I think this is the way that Congress should approach.
this type of relief for the fishing industry, not the one that is, in my
opinion, highly discriminatory and that unfortunately leads to con-
f rontation between yourself and myself.
Senator Mc:[NTYRE. We have these confrontations all the time.
I want to ask, do you, Mr. Utz, represent the United States at this
I ,aw of the Sea Conference?
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Mr. Urrz. For the shrimp industry, yes.
Senator MCINTYRE. You are here in opposition to this bill?
Mr. UTZ. Yes, sir.
Senator MCINTYRE. Do you not recognize that this bill is the an-
nounced position of the United States?
Mr. UTZ. No, sir.
Senator MCINTYRE. Toward this whole problem?
Mr. UTZ, No, sir.
Senator MCINTYRE. This is very substantially the policy of the
United States.
Mr. UTZ. This bill is not. Some of the provisions within the bill
might be, but I distinguish between the bill and what is provided in it.
Senator MCINTYRE. Personally, I would think if you were repre-
senting the shrimp industry down there, you are probably not working
too hard to get any sort of a treaty because you really do not want this
reonlation.
r. UTZ. To the contrary, Senator; I think many of the people that
are providing you with this type questioning and this type of infor-
mation have been selling this legislation really under a false flag.
We have endeavored to find out how some people from areas that
would be harmed by this legislation have come up in favor of this
legislation. We made questions and put questions to some of these
people as to how they happened to take that, position and the question
initially put to them was, would you be in favor of legislation that
would totally prohibit any foreign fishermen entering within 200 miles
of the United States. They said yes, that sounds like a good idea.
Let's examine that idea. People have contended the Cuban fishing
fleet is going to put the American shrimp industry out of business. I
believe the fast information given me by the National Marine Fishery
Service was that last year they cited something like eight Cuban
vessels in all of the gulf.
In addition to that, there has been a contract between Cuba and
Peru to purchase something like 98 shrimp boats. That contract is
more than 1 year old, and I was advised this summer by the Cubans
in Caracas that they have yet to receive one shrimp boat, in fact they
were making exploratory comments as to, if relations between our
countries would normalize, whether they might buy some boats in the
? United States.
I have made inquiries throughout the Gulf of various and sundry
fishermen who have fished for shrimp in proximity to Cuban vessels.
They are not nearly as concerned about any substantial influx of
Cuban vessels as they are about our own vessels being forced back into
the gulf from the international waters where they presently operate.
That would have a devastating impact, to the point that Mr. Felando
raised earlier and I also touched on, it is of extreme concern to me
to see legislation such as this and a segment of our industry which
supports it putting our representatives in a position of deciding as to
whether they vote for legislation that would damage one segment and
might possibly help another segment of our industry.
I think we would be much better off if we could examine this ques-
tion and see if there is not some alternative approach such as, I believe
it is S. 3783, that has been introduced into the Senate, some alterna-
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tive measures that we could take toward conserving the Northeastern
and Northwestern fisheries.
I recognize they have a problem. I do not recognize that that prob-
lem totally came about at the hands of the Russians and Japanese and
so forth. I think some of these problems were of their own doing. But
I did not say that in terms we should not help them, I think we should,
but I think the industry should pull together to help each other, rather
than sit here and fight among ourselves, and I think this bill does
nothing but divide the fishing industry as a whole and certainly would
not help the shrimp industry.
Senator MCINTYRE. just for the record, and you will have full op-
portunity to refute this with facts and figures by statement in the rec-
ord prior to the closing date: It is my understanding, I am informed
that you gentlemen testifying here today against this bill represent
about 2 percent of the labor force involved in the fishing industry and
about 20 percent of the dollar investment involved in the fishing in-
dustry, and, as you say, the salmon, tuna, and shrimp industry does
represent slightly over 50 percent of the landed value. I do have in-
formation that the Western fishboat owners, coastal tuna, 600 tuna
boats, fish in Mexico under license? and the Senate record already has
testimony they :Favor S. 1988, some tuna boat people favor S. 1988. Bet-
ter get to see them and tell them your horror stories.
Mr. Urz. Could I quickly answer one part of the question, though
I ean give more detailed information.
First off, I MCI not sure where those figures came from, but I repre-
sent, among others in the National Shrimp Congress is the American
Shrimpboat Association, which is the organization that represents
the entire distant water shrimping: fleet. That industry produced 25 to
'26 percent?they produced an amount of shrimp brought into the
United States in 1973 that was equivalent to 25 to 26 percent of the
entire shrimp catch in the gulf.
As far as representing a labor force, there is a question.
How many people in New Hampshire do you represent? Do you
determine by the number of people that voted for you
The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me a minute, gentlemen. We do not have
time for all of this. Time is very short.
Senator McIirrvim. He will have ample opportunity. I am talking
about the fishing industry and I am told you represent about 2 percent
of the labor forL:e and 2 percent of the investment. You can put all of
the testimony you want in the record showing I am wrong, and I am
perfectly willing to be refuted.
One last question. You are talking about the treaty. We have had
testimony here from two fine Senators who went down there and took
a look at the thin!): and we asked them, when do you think we will get
a Law of the Sea Agreement?
At the, best, if we are lucky, it looks like 1976, 1977. We in the fish-
ing industry in the Northeast, and I anticipate from Alaska, we
are hurting beyond any hurt that you people have had in your
industry.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Nunn?
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Senator NUNN. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Utz, do you represent shrimpers on the Atlantic or just on the
Pacific?
Mr. Urz. Through the Southern Fishery Association we also repre-
sent Atlantic shrimpers.
Senator NUNN. You represent shrimpers off of the coast of Georgia?
Mr. UTZ. Yes, sir.
Senator NUNN. They are part of your organization?
Mr. UTZ. They are part. The National Shrimp Congress is composed
of basically four organizations: Texas Shrimp Association, Louisiana
Shrimp Association, Southern Fisheries Association, and Florida
Shrimp Association.
The Southern Fisheries Association has among its membership the
South Carolina Shrimp Association and a group of Georgia shrimpers.
Senator NUNN. Are the Georgia shrimp operators in any other
shrimp organization?
Mr. UTZ. I could not answer that.
Senator NUNN. Is there another shrimp organization nationally
other than yours?
Mr. UTZ. No, sir.
Senator NUNN. Are shrimpers in Georgia opposed to this bill?
Mr. UTZ. Not to my knowledge. I have not received any information
from them.
Senator NUNN. One way or the other?
Mr. UTZ. Not from them.
I have received all of my information from the Southern Fisheries
Association, which represents people in that area.
Senator NUNN. But the organization that represents the Georgia
shrimpers are opposed to this bill?
Mr. UTZ. It has not come to my attention.
Senator NUNN. I thought you were representing that organization.
Mr. UTZ. I am. Every piece of information that has conic to me has
been through the Southern Fisheries Association.
Senator NUNN. Is the Southern Fisheries opposed to this legislation?
Mr. UTZ. Yes; they are.
Senator NUNN. And Southern Fisheries Association represents the
Georgia Shrimpers and South Carolina Shrimpers?
Mr. UTZ. That is correct.
enator NUNN. So you are speaking for that organization?
Mr. UTZ. Yes, sir.
Senator NUNN. In opposition to the bill?
Mr. UTz. Yes, sir.
Senator NUNN. That is all the questions I have.
T4e CITAIR1VIAN. Thank you.
Gentlemen, is there anything else either of you want to say?
We want to thank all of you.
Mr. U'rz. I would like to make an apology to the Senator from New
Hampshire. I think maybe my question was misinterpreted. Where
I was drawing a conclusion was, I represent the people that are mem-
bers of these organizations and sometimes you have many people that
do not participate in organizations, period. So I cannot say how many
people there are that do not belong to these organizations.
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The CHAIRMAN. I know that. I do not think the Senator took
any offense. He is not quick to take offense. He is a good courtroom
lawyer and you were not offensive.
Anything else you want to say? You are credible witnesses and we
appreciate very much your coming here.
Thank you -very much.
We are going to have others now. You: do not have to leave.
I am sorry that things have filled up, I am going to have to leave, but,
Senator McIntyre is here and he is going to stay. We will now hear
from Mr. Christopher M. Weld, who represents the National Coalition
of Marine Conservation, and Mr. Robert Walker, representing Save
Our Seas. Senator McIntyre is in charge.
II want to thank all of you for coming, and Senator McIntyre will
conclude the. hearings and I thank him, too.
We will both go vote now. You will be first up when we get back.
Senator Mc IiciryRE. We have as our next witness Mr. Christopher M.
Weld, representing the National Coalition of Marine Conservation.
Mr. Weld, in view of the time constraints any time you can save us
in the presentation of your case?your statement in its entirety will
appear in the record and perhaps you can state the case as succinctly
as possible, but we will give you :full opportunity to make your points.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER M. WELD, REPRESENTING THE
NATIONAL COALITION OF MARINE CONSERVATION, INC.
Mr. WELD. Senator McIntyre, I am happy to take advantage of the
Chairman's invitation to submit the written testimony to be included
in the record and to discuss the highlights of it and to submit to any
questions you might want to put to me.
The National Coalition for Marine Conservation is essentially an
organization representing recreational fishing interests and conserva-
tionists, and to a lesser extent the costal fishing industry.
Our basic premise is that the coastal fisheries are a national asset
and a strategic resource, having substantial economic importance, ani
that two major industries depend on the well-being of these coastal
fisheries: that is the coastal fishery industry and the marine fishing
recreation industry.
We have testified before other committees of the Senate as to the
Importance of the resource and the importance of conserving the
resource and what we intend to address ourselves to before this Mtn-
Mittee is some of the remarks made by General Brown and John
Morton Moore on Tuesday, October 8.
If there is a single thread that seems to wind through the position
of most of the opposition to S. 1988, it is the concept that by acting
unilaterally tie U.S. sets a precedent that will lead to a, form of creep-
ing jurisdiction around the world, that in turn will inhibit our strategic
ability to defend ourselves.
The history of the 12-mile limit amply demonstrates that regardless
of when we act or how we act the nations of the world that intend to
adopt 200-mile limits will go ahead and do
That the 1958-60 Geneva Conventions demonstrated to the world
community that there was a climate of acceptance for a 12-mile jurig-
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dictional limit and, following the conclusion of those Conventions a
great number of nations adopted 12-mile limits.
In 1966, after some 32 or 33 or 34 nations had in fact adopted a 12-
mile limit, the Departments of State and Defense withdrew their op-
position to the adoption of the 12-mile limit by this country.
In October 1966, the Congress acted and established the 12-mile
limit. We were among the last nations to adopt the 12-mile limit.
In this year, in Caracas, it was demonstrated there was a climate
of acceptance for the 200-mile limit. It is clearly the trend; it is going
to happen.
Senator MCINTYRE. Let me interrupt you to ask you, how do you
come to tine conclusion that a climate of acceptance of the 12-mile limit
was demonstrated ?
Mr. WELD. I think that in remarks made first by independent re-
porters covering the convention and also by Mr. Stevenson, Mr. Moore,
others in the U.S. delegation, made clear that more than 100 nations
had expressed approval of the 200-mile jurisdictional concept in some
form, whether in terms of an economic zone or in terms of total
jurisdiction.
Senator McINTYRE. One of the objections that does fall on some
pretty solid ground is that if we attempt to exercise a 200-mile ex-
clusionary jurisdictional limit we will then in fact get ourselves into
some very serious problems. If we are bent on conservation, and we
attempt to put into coastal management, and good conservational
practices, some number of these things are being done by foreign
ships, and perhaps even by our own fishermen, are prevented, then we
will be aiding and abetting the great sea which looms as a very im-
portant producer of food in the year and years and centuries and
decades ahead.
Mr. WELD. Yes, sir, we are of the opinion that conservation of our
own coastal fisheries is for the good of the entire world. I do not
think anywhere in S. 1988 it is implied that the intention is to exclude
any other nation from fishing within our 200-mile limit. I think the
language is clear that the intent of the legislation is to manage and to
conserve the resource. Without control of the resource, there is no
possible way of conserving it.
The dismal record of the failure of management by international
agreement is quite plain. I think anybody who studied the record of
ICNAF in the Northeast knows that ICNAF machinery has been in
existence throughout the history of the decline of the fisheries in the
Northeast.
Similarly, the arrangement with the Japanese in the Bering Sea,
where there have been treaty arrangements since before World
War II, which supposedly regulateed the halibut fishing there, and
year by year we have watched the diminution of the halibut catch
up there.
Mr. Felando and others like to point with pride to the record of the
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention. So far as I know, the
tuna populations in the Pacific and elsewhere have not prospered
under the regime of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention.
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I think the reason that all of these various arrangements have been
unsuccessful to date is that they do not have control over the resource.
There is no authority to enforce the convention regulations.
General Brown in his remarks to the committee on October 8, :1974
went into great length to describe the Defense Department opinion
that universal 200-mile limits would have a very deleterious effect
on our nuclear deterrent, our second strike capability represented by
nuclear missile submarines.
There was recently published an article by Dr. Robert E. Osgood,
who is dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Interna-
tional Studies, entitled "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law." It
was published in Ocean Development, and International Law Journal
of Marine Affairs, Volume 9, No. 1. Pr. Osgood addressed himself
specifically to this argument and came, after very thoughtful analysis
to the conclusion that all of the Soviet Union could be targeted from
the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, and the Arabian Sea without hav-
ing to use any of these straits the Defense Department fears nmy be
closed by extensions of jurisdiction.
We do not think that in considering the validity of the Defense
Department contentions one should be bound by the horizons which
they impose on your thinking. ?
When you come down to the practicalities of the mobility of our
defense forces, there is really only one nation in the World that can
seriously challmge the. movement of either our air or ocean forces,
and it is Also unlikely -that in a time of military emergency the niceties
of. ocean boundaries will be observed by our military forces.
I do not think that when Teddy Roosevelt went up San Juan I till
he, looked for no trespassing signs, and I think it is the sort of argu-
ment that is being propounded by the Defense Department.
- Finally, several of time offshore fishing industry spokesmen who were
here today, referred to the defect in S. 1988, that the legislation con-
tained no management scheme, therefore, it was really an empty
gesture.
That may be true of the House bill but, not S. 1988. In any event
there is legislation pending before the Congress that, will empower
the Secretary of Commerce to promulgate fishery management regu-
lations within the, contiguous fishery zone, and at such time as we do
adopt a 200-mile fishery zone it would simply be a matter of clarifying
this pending legislation as to what zone it refers to.
think that is about all I have to Say this morning.
Senator MCINTYRE. The next witness represents the Save Our Seas.
How would you contrast your association's position with his? You
are both conservationists, yet he is going to testify in opposition and
you are testifying for it. Is it because he is commercially bent and
you are more recreational, or what?
Mr. WELD. No, sir. I am not particularly familiar with Mr. Lever-
ing's reasoning but I suspect we, are more pragmatically oriented
than he is.
Senator MCINTYRE. We are going to hear it so you will not have
to answer it.
Mr. WEED. I am not qualified to speak about it.
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Senator MCINTYRE. Let me ask you this question. In what specific
ways will this legislation promote fishery conservation? How soon
can this legislation be expected to have a significant impact on fishery
conservation and how effective do you expect the enforcement of any
conservation measures to be under this S. 1988?
Mr. WELD. I would think that as soon as it became effective it would
be possible to promulgate and enforce a management regime. I think
the history of adoption of the 200-mile limit by other nations indicates
that these limits are respected by the distant water fishing nations.
When Iceland adopted its 50-mile limit that extended toward the
Continental Shelf, the Soviet bloc nations withdrew from Icelandic
fishing immediately and the confrontation was only between the Ice-
landics and the British, as I understand it, with maybe some minor
incidents involving the West Germans.
I think that the logic and the necessity of management is so clear
that it will be quickly respected by other nations. Whether or not it
contributes to international tensions, as claimed by the State Depart-
ment, is purely conjectural. I think the record, from conversations
with the Coast Guard officers who have been in charge of boarding
inspection in the ICNAF area, for example, the remarks made to them
by captains of the Soviet fishing fleet, would lead you to believe that
will be the first to respect a 200-mile limit. I think they understand
that conservation of the resource is for the good of the world, for every-
body's good. Nobody profits by having the fish go out of existence.
Senator MoINTYRE. In view of our time situation, we will have the
staff submit to you further questions for the record, and I express my
appreciation for your patience here this morning in waiting so long
to testify.
Thank you very much.
Mr. WELD. Thank you, Senator.
[Prepared statement follows:]
My name is Christopher M. Weld and I am Secretary of the National Coalition
for Marine Conservation. I have asked the general counsel to put into the record
of this hearing a paper submitted by Dr. Frank E. Carlton of Savannah, Georgia,
the President of the National Coalition. Dr. Canton's paper is partly based on
an article by Dr. Robert E. Osgood, Dean of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies, entitled "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law" which
was published in Ocean Development and International Law, The Journal of
Marine Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 and an article by David C. Loring entitled "The
United States-Peruvian Fisheries Dispute" which was published in the Febru-
ary 1971 issue of the Stanford Law Review. I can recommend both of these
articles as informative, perceptive and germane to the issues under considera-
tion by this Committee. Dr. Canton's paper states:
"Defense Department officials have stated that United States security requires
free transit through straits and the right of military overflight. It must be
pointed out that the distinction is not between the terms 'free' and 'innocent' in
so far as strategic consideration is concerned. In reality the relevant comparison
must be between 'free' and 'secret'. Defense contends that the invulnerability of
American missile-launching submarines and their indispensable role to our de-
fense depends on their legal right to secret passage.
"Dr. Osgood's scholarly examination of the 121 straits listed by the Depart-
ment of State that would be nationalized by a 12 mile territorial sea demonstrates
flint there are only 16 that could have importance and that 9 of those are either
non-essential or fall within the territory of our military allies. Of the remaining
7, all but 3 either offer no significant targeting advantage or are too shallow or
dangerous to approach submerged. Dr. Osgood's analysis reveals that only
Gibralter and two Indonesian straits are strategically significant areas which
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might be politically questionable if a 12 mile territorial boundary were es-ab-
fished. For the purposes of the nuclear deterrent the entire Soviet Union can
be targeted from the Atlantic and Pacific weans and the Arabian Sea. Dr.
Osgood's studies nearly demonstrate that the physical and political necessity
of free transit through ini ernational straits is not supported by objective infor-
mation and should certainly not be considered a non-negotiable item inhibiting
ini ernational agreement on ocean use.
"Furthermore. it should be pointed out that logic as well as experience in-
dicates that the concept cf innocent passage is actually related to commercial
vessels. If there is any real question that the passage of a warship is not innocent.
one must wonder why any nation would sign a treaty permitting unimpeded
passage, or conversely, how such an agreement would deter any nation from
'necessary' military action against such passage? Obviously, strategic significance
is related to the ..apacity to place missile-launching submarines in secret posi-
tion, which Dr. Osgood's analysis demonstrates does not depend physically or
certainly- legally upon free 'transit'.
"Attitudes underlying the position of the Departments of State and Defense,
which now indicate the opposition to extend jurisdictions manifest that same
rigidity whch lots characterized United States i)erformance in internatonal rela-
tionships for the last 25 years and waich have materially contributed to the
difficulties the United States faces today. The 200 mile issue, itself, is an excellent
example of the United States steadfast opposition to a concept and physical
reality that will shortly become the accepted world norm. The Defense Depart-
ment's archaic an illusory attitudes toward the necessity of maximum mobility
to maintain our defensive security and the Department of State's insistence upon
underrating the importance of harmony with less developed coastal nations, has
supplied further impetus toward the total problem of the United State's decline
in its capacity to maintain a global posture as an economic and political force and
its acceptance by other nations as a world leader.
"The traditiona- attitudes and methods that created the Peruvian fisheries dis-
pute remain very much in affect to this date. ID discussing the Peruvian fisheries
issue. David Loring states, 'The background for growth of the dispute . . . can
be attributed largely to a series of mistakes by the United States'. In asking the
Senate Arms Services Committee not to support the position of the Department
of Defense and State, we recognize the catacylsmic disruption with historical
precedents such an event would require
"The National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmospheres third Annual
Report dated June 28, 1974 stated in its foreword, 'This year, NACOAA worked
with the consciousness that our society may well be on the threshold of mdjor
discontinuity in human history?from a world in which natural resources such as
food and energy, and . . . the regenerative capacity . . . seemed to exceed effec-
tive demands, we _appear to be moving toward a state of affairs in which consump-
tion and utilization of vital resources are generating new stresses and strains at
home and abroad. To contain the resulting instabilities we must respond to un-
precedented demands on our capacities to manage natural resources'.
"It is my respectful contention that these considerations are more vital to our
national interests than those unsupported allegations made by the Department
of State and Defense and do not, in fact, jeopardize either our international
relations or our strategic defense. To the contrary, the Congress should recog-
nize that the continued threat of passage of 5-1988 has been one of the more
positive and constructive forces impinging upon international negotiations on
ocean use. It must remain for the Congress to forcefully counteract a long tradi-
tion of policy and practices which have demonstratively worsened domestic and
international problems. Only the Congress itself can bring the necessary forces
to bear and insure the necessary changes. I earnestly entreat the Committee's
consideration of these alternatives.
"The 200 mile limit cortroversy has its origins in Presidential Proclamation
No. 2668 entitled 'Policy of the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in
Certain Areas of the ugh Seas'. In this proclsmation President Truman articu-
lated a policy supporting the extension of fisneries jurisdiction by coastal na-
tions. Beginning with Mexico in 1945 and followed shortly by Argentina and
Chile, a number of Latin American nations relying upon the Truman prof:lama-
tbm claimed fisheries jurisdiction and in some cases total sovereignty to a dis-
tance of 200 miles.
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"In 1945 no United States fishing interests existed in the area affected by the -
Mexican proclamation. When other nations jumped onto the 200 mile limit band-
wagon, however, representatives of the California tuna industry served notice?
on the State Department that they expected to expand operations into Latin ,
American waters in the future. Thereupon the United States reverted to the
three-mile rule, declaring it to be in the best interests of all nations.
"The looming confrontation between coastal nations asserting the right to
protect contiguous fisheries and overseas fishing nations determined to exploit
those fisheries led to the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Seas Conferences. Whatever
else these conferences may have accomplished, they demonstrated a growing in-
ternational acceptance of the concept of extended fisheries jurisdiction at least
to a distance of 12-miles from shore. By the middle of 1966 at least 32 nations
claimed 12-mile fisheries jurisdiction. At this point the State Department and
the Defense Department withdrew their opposition to the demands of coastal
fishermen, and in October 1966 Congress adopted a 9-mile extended fisheries zone
beyond the territorial sea.
"By the beginning of 1973 at least 16 nations had established territorial or
fisheries jurisdiction limits of 50 miles or more. Once again a Law of the Seas
Conference was convened, this time in Caracas. Once again it was not at all clear
what was accomplished at this conference; however, it was evident that there
was widespread acceptance of the 200 mile limit in the international community.
Nevertheless, the State Department and the Defense Department continue to
oppose adoption of a 200 mile extended fisheries zone on the grounds that it will
be used as justification by other nations claiming sovereignty to a distance of
200 miles thereby seriously jeopardizing our defense capabilities.
"This contention totally ignores the history of the evolution of the 12-mile
limit. The United States was one of the last nations to adopt a 12-mile limit.
The demonstrated reluctance on the part of the United States to go along with
the 12-mile limit had little or no effect upon the decisions of other nations
desiring a 12-mile limit once the spirit of acquiesance was demonstrated by the
1958 and 1960 Geneva Conventions.
"Whether or not the United States adopts a 200 mile limit in 1974 or 1975
and even if it never adopts a 200 mile limit, the nations that intend to do so
will do so, because they learned at Caracas that the rest of the world is ready
to live with the 200 mile limit.
"The survival of our coastal commercial fishing industry and marine rec-
reational fishery industry is contingent upon the ability of our coastal marine
resources to renew themselves. Continuous overfishing in the last decade has
reduced the abundance of many species of coastal fishes to the point where their
ability to renew themselves is impaired.
"Existing international arrangements for the management of coastal fisheries
have been a dismal failure. Without control of the resource there can be no
effective management of the resource and without jurisdiction there is no control.
This principle is well understood by the major fishing nations and is one of
several good reasons why none of these nations is likely to provide a con-
frontation in connection with the enforcement of a rational management regime.
"Reasonable men might differ as to whether enactment of 200 mile limit legis-
lation will strengthen or weaken the bargaining position of our delegation to the
Law of the Seas Conference. Similarly the degree of international tension that
may be generated by the enactment of this legislation is speculative. The de-
structability of our coastal marine resources, on the hand, is a matter of fact.
The question before the Senate is one which balances the possible destruction
of a natural resource having substantial long term economic and strategic value
against international political considerations having uncertain and unmeasurable
potential.
"If a majority of the Senate is convinced that the probabilities propounded by
the State Department are meritorious?meaning that (i) adoption of a 200 mile
limit at this time will probably have a disadvantageous effect upon international
relations generally and upon the outcome of the Law of the Seas Conference spe-
cifically and (ii) an adequate solution to our fisheries problems will probably be
achieved by the Law of the Seas Conference in 1975, then I suggest to this Com-
mittee that the correct course of action is to adopt extended fisheries jurisdiction
now, effective as of January 1, 1976; because even if our delegation is successful
in Geneva next year, implementing legislation will be required and should be
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244
enacted as quickly as possible. Conversely, if our delegation is not successful in
1975, a number a State Department spokesmen have already indicated a will-
ingness to accept unilateral action by the United States on the grounds that if
there is no accord in 1975, the possibility of future agreement will become in-
creasingly remotc.
"We beg you t) weigh the reality of an increasingly impaired national asset
against the fabric of baseless promises and predictions, woven by State and
Defense Department witnesses who have appeared before this Committee."
Senator MCINTYRE. I call as our next witness Mr. Robert Walker,
representing the Save Our Seas.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT WALKER, SAVE OUR SEAS,
WASHINGTON, D.P. ?
Mr. WALKER. I am giving Mr. Levering's statement, but he is in
North Carolina on what he hopes will be the last day of the apple
harvest.
Senator MCINTYRE. You have heard my admonition to Mr. Weld.
We are beginning to run out of time and so anyway his statement will
appear in the record in its entirety. You can highlight or stress those
points that you think are important on this particular bill. We would
appreciate it so we can finish up a little after 12:30. So that will give
you about 15 or 20 minutes.
Mr. WALKER. We have submitted a statement for the record. I will
try to highligin it.
I should explain that Mr. Levering is Secretary of the U.S. Com-
mittee for the Oceans. It is an organization of citizens headed by
Arthur Goldberg and its concern is the preservation of the resources
r the sea.
For that reason, we are very pleased that this committee is holding
these hearings to bring into focus the problems involved in this par-
ticular resource of the oceans.
The committee believes that the purpose of the bill is excellent, the
preservation (L=. fish and the coastal and anadromous fishing industry.
We agree with the basic assumptions many coastal and anadromouE
fish stocks are in danger of being seriously depleted. ?
We further agree that the authority for Conservation of these stocks
must be placed in the coastal states and, finally, we concur that the
progress of the Law of the Sea Conference is such that even if sue-
cossful, its results may be too late.
Our problem is that we did not think that the principles involved.
in S. 1988 will achieve the results that are claimed.
We do not think that the 200-mile unilateral declaration is likely
to achieve protection.
The objective of extending our fishing rights is the immediate eon-
oil of foreign fishermen in the areas enclosed. But who is going to
decide just what areas are enclosed?
Senator MCINTYRE. Let me ask you, the rules and regulations, of
eourse, would have to be obeyed by ou.r own fishermen, would they
?
Mr. WALKER. Basically.
Senator MCINTYRE. I am not that wellversed, but I suspect some
o f the methods that our own fishermen use are not the best in the eyes
or the conservationists.
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Mr. WALKER. I think that is correct.
Senator MCINTYRE. We do not seek to regulate although they are
raising the devil with us up in the Northeast Coast in New England,
we do intend whatever rules will apply to all fishermen in that area.
Mr. WALKER. I think the basic thrust of the measure is exclusion.
Certainly there will be regulations and hopefully those will apply to
U.S. fishermen also. But it is not clear at all that the same regulations
are going to apply to everybody.
This is one of the points that we feel is important.
Senator MCINTYRE. That ought to be amended because I am certain
that the implication of this is equal to all.
Mr. WALKER. I think from our reading of the bill that it is highly
discriminatory and intended to be such.
But one point is that just what will compose the 200-mile area is
something that is going to take a long time to figure out. Many of the
banks that are traditionally fished by U.S. fleets now may well be
part of Canada's 200 miles and not those of the United States.
Furthermore, we are not at all sure that the 200-mile limit will
assure the preservation of the stocks on which U.S. fisheries depend.
The bill applies not only to migratory coastal species that go in
and out of the 200 miles, but also is intended to apply to the anadro-
mous species like salmon that come back and spawn within the United
States.
The bill attempts to extend U.S. jurisdiction to anadromous fish
"wherever they may range in the oceans," but there is no reason to ex-
pect that other nations will treat this, which is a huge extension of
sovereign jurisdiction, with anything but anger and disregard.
A second major point is that the unilateral declaration would
damage major U.S. interests. This has been referred to by many
previous witnesses.
We feel that exclusion of foreign fishermen might provoke Soviet
and perhaps Japanese withdrawal from the Law of the Seas Confer-
ence. That, certainly, even if they continue participating, present U.S.
position at the Conference would be substantially weakened.
The provision of the bill by which it would terminate when the Law
of the Sea treaty or treaties now being developed regarding fisheries
jurisdiction and conversation shall enter into force would not save the
situation even if the Conference participants could guess what agree-
ments might qualify under this provision. Its enactment would be a
public threat which would only provoke resistance and retaliation.
It will encourage many nations now seeking sovereignty over the
straits and passages essential to free navigation by sea and air to make
their own unilateral decisions, perhaps on a nonnegotiable basis.
It will of course have questionable benefits to some fishermen who
bring in over half of the value of the U.S. catch, as certain industry
representatives have mentioned today. That is the distant water
fishermen.
Senator MCINTYRE. Say that again now so I understand what you
just said.
Mr. WALKER. It will be trading questionable benefits to some fisher-
men for serious risk to those certain people who in 1972 brought in
over half of the value of the U.S. catch.
Senator MCINTYRE. Landed catch, shrimp, tuna, and salmon ?
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Mr. WALE ER. Yes, sir.
With all this, we think that there are other measures available that
will be more effective and can be put into effect just as rapidly.
The 1983 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas recognizes in its article 6 the special inter-
ests of coastal States in maintaining the productivity of fish stocks in
areas adjacent to its territorial waters and in its article 7 provides that
after 6 months of negotiation a coastal State may unilaterally declare
appropriate conservation measures.
Those measures must reflect the need for conservation, be based on
scientific findings, and, be nondiscriminatory. Disputes over sueh ac-
tion may be referred by any State to a special commission provided for
in articles 9 and 10 of the Convention, but the conservation measure
remain in effect pending the Commission's decision unless it makes a
prima facie anding that there is no need for conservation measures.
Ti view of the plight of coastal and anadromous fishing stocks, the
U.S. Government should at once institute negotiations under article, 7
of the Convention and should notify prospective participants that in
6 months it. will promulgate specific conservation measures unless sat-
isfaetory agreement is reached before that time.
shook( add that this alternative proposal has been substantially.
embodied in S. 3783, presented by Senator Fnlbright and currently
under consideration by the Foreign Relations Committee.
The IT.S. Committee for the Oceans has proposed some amend
.-
intuits to sharpen the effect of this S. :1783, but supports it as a step to
aeldeve the purposes without the risks of S. 1988.
This is substantially our statement.
Senator McIN-trym,i. Tell me a little bit about the Law of the Sea
Conference, how was that going, were you down at Caracas?
WataitER. I was not. Mr. Levering was.
S, llator MclwrvnE. Was lie down there?
Mr. WALKER. Yes, sir.
Senator Wiwi-nu% Did he come back hopeful or dismal or neutral?
_Mr. WALKER. I think reasonably hopeful. He had said before he
went that the very scheduling of a followup conference in Geneva
meant that final agreements were not going to be reached in Caracas,
that everyone would hold on to their -positions as firmly as they pos-
sibly, could up until the very last minute.
I believe he considers that they ironed Out some details and got sonic
p?eneral agreements tn Caracas, but that all of them hang on related
agreements and many different areas under consideration.
Senator Mratic-ryRE. One of the participants at that, maybe he was
not a participant, maybe an observer, stated to the committee here a
day or so ago that all that was achieved there was an outline of the
parameters of the differences that existed between the various partici-
pants in the problems not only of the seabed and pollution, but fish-
eries themselves.
Did Mr. Levering indicate to you or are you hopeful that in the
Geneva Conference we can get a meaningful agreement, meaningful
treaty signed, and move to really have a law of sea that is agree-
able. all around?
Mr. WALKER. Yes, I think we are very hopeful. It is a tremend.ously
complicated conference and .a tremendous number of issues.
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Senator MCINTYRE. I certainly hope you are right because I think
that even this bill envisages it is an interim sort of operation; once the
law of the sea was agreed upon this would be discarded.
Mr. WALKER. It is, yes, sir. I feel two things on that.
First, I do think that it is sort of a gun to the head to the other
negotiators and that they will react that way.
Second, it is not really clear from the language of that what kind of
agreements the Law of the Sea Conference would qualify as cutting
off the effect of this.
Senator MCINTYRE. I suppose we would consider a meaningful agree-
ment in the eyes of conservationists reasonable conservation.
Our friends, the tunaboat people, get shot at when they go to Peru
and the Mexicans get so committed even when they are trying to bring
a man in for medical services in the Canal Zone, their boat is seized
and they are thrown in prison according to the testimony here this
morning. That is not the sort of thing that we are looking for.
I think that some of the testimony that the experts in fishing give
you are, for instance, Senator Stevens' who seems to know a great deal
about this, from Alaska, talked about the just reasonable precautions
of not fishing during a certain season for a month would do much to
help the halibut fish.
Another description, too, that seems to be foolishness, that fishing
for fish A, they get fish B that they do not want?that is, this inci-
dental fishing, as they term it?and it represents a substantial portion
of the fishing for that. I am talking about halibut.
I hope that you are right, that something will come in Geneva that
will be looking down toward good sound practices that will be helpful
to our fishing industry, the other half which represents a lot more in
my mind than shrimp, tuna, and what is the third one, salmon. I do
not like salmon, I like tuna and shrimp; I should not eat them.
But I want to thank you very much for coming here this morning.
Sorry we had to keep you Waiting so long.
Mr. WALKER. All right, sir, I do hope you will look at this S. 3783.
Senator MCINTYRE. Yes, I will tell my staff to make sure we take
a look at S. 3783.
Are there any other witnesses? If there are, there is no existing time.
? We will be glad to accept their statements and include them in the
record here at this point.
[The prepared statements follow:]
I wish to congratulate Senator Stennis, the Chairman, for bringing critical
fishing conservation problems into public focus by holding hearings on S. 1988.
The purpose of this bill is excellent?to preserve the fish and the U.S. coastal
and anadromous fishing industry. Its basic assumption, that many coastal and
atradromous fish stocks are in danger of being seriously depleted and in some
cases of elimination, and that present measures to prevent this are inadequate,
is true. Its solution, that authority to deal with this critical problem must be
clearly placed, and that coastal states are best equipped to exercise this authority
for coastal species, is generally agreed, and almost certainly will be recognized
at the Law of the Sea Conference. Further, this bill responds to the need for the
-U.S. to act now, as the Law of the Sea Conference, even if successful, may be
too late.
Such a step also has the appeal of appearing to be a simple solution to the
problems that have seriously injured U.S. coastal fishing interests. In fact, in
our judgment, it is not a simple step; it is not likely to solve the problem; and
taking it would severely damage other major U.S. interests. The major goals
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sought by these bills would be more likely to be achieved by conservation measures
taken under the 1958 United Nations Convention on Fishing and Conservatior.
of the Living Resources of the High Seas, which could be put into effect by the
U.S. in six months whether or not other nations: concur.
THE 200 Max UNILATERAL DECLARATION IS UNLIKELY To ACHIEVE PROTECTION
One objective of extending exclusive fishing rights is the immediate control of
foreign fishermen in the areas enclosed. But the traditional rules of international
law for setting such boundaries were based on much more limited areas. Negotia-
tions with neighboring countries such as Canada, Mexico, Cuba and the Soviel:
Union will be necessary to settle where the new limits are to be drawn. In the
northeast it is certain that they won't include all the banks traditionally fished
by the U.S., and in no area can there be certainty where the lines can be drawn--
or how soon.
Even when the limits are set, there is no assurance that they will be observed by
foreign countries. Enforcement measures will be required. It is doubtful the t the
U.S. would be well advised to use force to expel ships of major nations. To do
so would risk a "cod war" with Russia and would certainly damage other aspects
of our relations with the Soviets and japan.
At the very least these countries would be likely to bring the U.S. before the
World Court, where its case would be weak in the face of the ninny international
efforts being taken to deal with fishing problems. U.S. participation in current and
prior international negotiations would make ridiculous any attempt to avoid
World Court jurisdiction by use of the Connally Reservation.
Finally, even assuming eventual resolution of disputes over area and exclusive-
ness, many of the stocks on which U.S. coastal fisheries depend will remain unpro-
tected. These include not only the migratory coastal stocks that pay no attention
to man-made limits, but also anadromous species like salmon. Though this Bill
attempts to extend U.S. jurisdiction to anadromous fish "wherever they may
range in the oceans", there is no reason to expect other nations to treat this huge
extension of "sovereign jurisdiction" with anything but anger and disregard.
THIS UNILATERAL DECLARATION WOULD DAMAGE MAJOR U.S. INTERESTS
Exclusion of foreign fishermen, or requiring licenses from them might provoke
a Soviet, and perhaps Japanese, withdrawal from the Law of the Sea Conference,
making its failure attributable to the U.S. Even if all countries continue their
participation, the present U.S. position at the Conference would be destroyed in
matters of fishing and seriously weakened in others, such as navigation, seabed
exploitation, pollution controls and settlement of disputes. This will flow from the
loss of bargaining power and the lack of credibility which this unilateral. U.S.
action would assure.
The provision of this Bill by which it would terminate when "the Law of th 3
Sea Treaty or Treaties now being developed regarding fisheries jurisdiction and
conservation shall enter into force" will not save the situation. Even if th3
Conference participants could guess what agreements might qualify under this
provision, its enactment would be a public threat which could only provoke resist-
ance and retaliation.
This bill will encourage the many countries now seeking sovereignty over the
straits and passages essential to free navigation by sea and air to make their OW:1
unilateral decisions, perhaps on a non-negotiable basis. Even if they remain at
the bargaining table on this issue, their stance will be more rigid and their post-
thin less assailable; at least by the U.S.
With respect to fishing, the U.S. will be trading questionable benefits to some
fishermen for serious risk to those fishermen who in 1972 brought in over half
the value of the U.S. catch. Coastal nations exercising controls over shrimp
and tuna will be in excellent position to demand stiffer terms. The Russians
and Japanese will see less reason to restrain their far ranging fishing fleets.
The provisions on anadromous species might provoke the Japanese to consider
that the U.S. had abrogated the agreement restricting Japanese salmon fisher-
men to areas east of 175 west, and certainly would not make them more ready
to accept any arrangement less favorable to them.
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OTHER IMMEDIATE MEASURES ARE AVAILABLE
The fact that an attempt by the Congress to exclude or control foreigners
in a unilaterally extended fishing jurisdiction is unlikely to succeed, and that
even the attempt assures foreign retaliation and serious consequences, does not
mean that the U.S. Government is helpless to protect coastal and anadromous
fish. Nor does it mean that protection must be withheld until the conclusion of
the negotiations of the Law of the Sea Conference. There is another way, with a
better legal basis, greater chances of conserving the fish and being acceptable to
other nations, and less damaging to other vital U.S. interests.
The 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas (adopted 49 to 1, with 18 abstentions) recognizes in its Article
6 the special interest of coastal states in maintaining the productivity of fish
stocks in areas adjacent to its territorial waters, and in its Article 7 provides
that after six months of negotiations with other concerned nations a coastal
state may unilaterally declare appropriate conservation measures.
As indicated in the attached text of Article 7 such measures must reflect a
need for conservation, be based on scientific findings, and be non-discriminatory.
Disputes over such action may be referred by any state to a special commission
provided for in Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention, but the conservation meas-
ures remain in effect pending the commission decision unless it makes a prima
facie finding that no need for the measure exists.
In view of the plight of coastal and anadromous fishing stocks, the U.S.
Government should at once institute negotiations under Article 7 of the Con-
vention and notify prospective participants that in six months it will promul-
gate specific conservation measures unless satisfactory agreement is reached
before that time.
The Congress might well pass a bill immediately empowering and requiring
the Administration to proceed immediately to implement the 1958 Convention.
This is a desirable interim step. If the 200 mile fishing jurisdiction bills should
also prove necessary, they could be passed later.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY FOR THE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON THE EMERGENCY MARINE PROTECTION ACT OF 1974
I want to thank the distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services Committee
for this opportunity to discuss legislation which I have co-sponsored to extend
the fishing zone to 200 miles.
There is no more important piece of legislation to the American fishing indus-
try and the future of our fish resources than S. 1988. This Committee will learn
from both the opponents and proponents of a 200 mile fishing zone about the
dimensions of the marine resources crisis off our coasts. There is virtually
unanimous agreement that our fish stocks are in jeopardy. At the same time, it
is clear that existing treaty arrangements and enforcement procedures are inade-
quate to reverse the spiralling decline of these coastal resources.
There is, as well, agreement among members of the House and Senate that
effective action to protect Our fish stocks in no way be detrimental to our na-
tional security interests. And it is to these concerns, as expressed by the Depart-
ment of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that I address
my remarks today.
First, this Committee has received testimony that unilateral action to ex-
tend the fishing zone will jeopardize the chance for effective agreement at the
Law of the Sea Conference. In my view, enactment of this legislation will en-
courage speedy and effective agreement. The nations represented at the Law
of the Sea Conference are aware that S. 1988 is an interim measure specifically
designed to pass out of existence as soon as effective international agreement
is ratified. And with passage of this legislation they will be aware as well of our
very serious intention to preserve our dwindling fish stocks.
The Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974 is not incompatible
with international agreement; it will stimulate early and effective agreement.
It is not a novel approach to protect fish and marine resources; it is clearly the
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consensus of the major fishing nations of the world that the most effective con-
servation measure is management and regulation of extended fishing zones.
Second, sonic witnesses before this Committee have suggested that interna-
tional good will and cooperation will be adversely affected by extension of our
fishing zone pending international agreement. Yet fishermen from Massachusetts
and other parts of the nation will testify regarding the tension between our
domestic fishermen and the fishing fleets of foreign nations, about the incidents
of ramming and lost gear, about the endless claims process to establish loss of
gear and livelihood. Fishermen from New England will explain the frustration
that results from abiding by quota regulations which some foreign nations openly
and frequently violate because of lack of enforcement authority.
The extension of our fishing zone is imperative to reestablish friendly relations
between our fishermen and those of Other nations, to set up equitable and en-
forceable enforcement. procedures, and to assure the preservation of fish stocks
while assuring all fishermen with traditional fishing rights a fair share of the
fish take.
- Extension of the fishing zone is not unilateral action precipitated by only a
national interest. It is an invitation to all the fishing nations of the world to
join with us in this emergency conservation measure to guarantee that in the
future we will all have fish to share.
The third and most disturbing argument made during recent testimony is that
U.S. action in extending the fishing zone will result in claims by some foreign
nations to 200 mile territorial limits which will affect our military and naval
mobility. I believe this argument is extreme. S. 1988 extends our fishing zone
oily. What evidence is there that in response to this emergency conservation
measure, foreign nations will extend territorial limits.? S. 1988 does not exclude
foreign fishermen from our coastal fisheries. What evidence is there to suggest
that retaliation rather than cooperation will be the reaction of other fishing
nations? S. 1988 does not interfere with commerce, navigation, or innocent pas-
sage. What evidence is there to suggest that, in response to a conservation meas-
ure, other nations which value and will continue to benefit from commercial
activity and navigation rights in waters off the coast of the United States will
jeopardize those efforts?
Mr. Chairman, we all agree that the best way to protect the fish resources of
the oceans for th3 future is through effective international agreement. But it is
also the longest and most difficult process of agreement. S. 1988 simply recog-
nizes that, until .such an agreement, emergency, interim measures must be im-
plemented to prevent the destruction of much of our remaining fish stocks.
I am hopeful that the the Armed Services Committee will require (before
completing its report on the Emergency Maine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974)
that any claims of retalitory steps by foreign nations in response to this con-
servation measure be substantiated. I hope that this Committee will require more
than vague and unverified comments regarding closing of military operating
areas by nations which do not fish off our coasts and which have much to lose by
interfering with commerce or navigation.
Mr. Chairman, in testimony before this committee the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff said unequivocally:
The effect of a 200-mile territorial sea extending off the coasts of many na-
tions in the world would be devastating to military mobility. It would result
in the prohibition of overflight by aircraft and submerged operation of sub-
marines except at the sufferance of a coastal state in almost forty percent of
what is now internationally recognized as high seas. The entire Mediterranean
would be territorial seas of the littoral states and could be closed completely
to the United States. Virtually the entire operating area of both the Seventh and
Sixth Fleets would become territorial sea. An unconstrained extension to even 12
aides would close the straits of Bab El Mandeb, Dover, Gibralter, Hormuz, and
Lombok. Virtually every passage now narrow enough to be called a strait would
be closed by 200 miles.
I am hopeful that the Armed Services Committee, before acting on S. 1988,
will require that any information which substantiates the intention of foreign
nations to claim 200 mile territorial limits as a result of our extended fishing
zone will be included in the record.
The conservation of our marine resources is. in the best interests of us all?
in the best interests of our commercial fishing industry and our sports fishermen ;
of the economy of the developing nations of the world and the peoples of the
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251
world who depend on fish resources for protein; and it is in the interest of inter-
national good will and cooperation.
We cannot shirk our responsibility to the ocean resources off our shores. We
can no longer ignore the grim forecasts of depleted stocks. It is our happy duty
to lead the other maritime nations of the world into recognition of the conser-
vation crisis and the potential for cooperation in alleviating this crisis. We hold
out the proposal of an extended fishery zone to all of those maritime nations of
the world which fish off our coasts to join with us in implementing this resource
protection zone which will assure that in the 21st century we still have the op-
portunity to share the ocean's wealth. We ask all the nations of the world to join
with us as responsible custodians of the ocean's resources for all generations to
come.
I am hopeful that the testimony we receive today will demonstrate the strong
support of the New England fishing industry for this legislation designed to
reverse the devastating decline of America's, oldest industry and the devastations
of the world's oldest resources.
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
Washington, D.C., October 17, 1974.
HOD. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR JOHN: S. 1988, the "Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act," is
presently under consideration by the Armed Services Committee. I would like
to urge you to report this bill favorably from your Committee, and to support
its passage on the floor of the Senate.
As a Senator from a Coastal state, I am deeply interested in the existence of
a healthy and competitive domestic fishing industry, and the preservation of a
means of livelihood for all those dependent upon fishing and related industries.
Equally important is the assurance that the fishery resources of the ocean are
preserved as a source of food for the fitture. Wasteful depletion of fish stock
with no conservation controls can only result in a long-term crisis which may
require costly and perhaps impossible replenishment efforts. We have learned
this lesson well and harshly in other areas of economic development, and present
depletion rates of our fishery resources require that conservation efforts be
implemented as soon as possible.
The first step in this effort is the effective limitation of foreign fishing off
our coastlines, and institution of a long-range management program for our
fisheries. S. 1988 accomplishes both of these objectives by establishing a 200
mile fisheries zone and requiring the development of a marine fisheries man-
agement plan within two years of enactment of the bill.
The extension of the United States fisheries jurisdiction has been opposed on
the grounds that the entire question of ocean policy and fishery management
should be left to international resolution. In principle, I agree with this posi-
tion. In reality, however, prolonged international conferences have not produced
results, and historically the record of enforcement of existing agreements has
been disappointing. The conclusion to be drawn from this past summer's Law
of the Sea Conference is that agreement in this area may be well in the future,
with implementation and enforcement of any agreements several more years
distant. By then, the condition of our fishing industry may be such that the in-
ternational solution reached may be both inadequate and untimely.
Further, S. 1988 does not undercut any future international agreement in the
area of ocean fishery management. It is an interim measure to be preempted by
international agreement, carefully limited in application to fishery jurisdiction
only, and it preserves the traditional fishing rights of foreign nations on a
reciprocal basis. The clearly stated policy of the Act is to maintain existing
territorial and ocean jurisdiction of the United States in all areas other than
fish conservation. Since it is well coordinated with expressed United States
goals at the Law of the Sea Conference, enactment of S. 1988 may well be an
impetus for swifter international accord.
Finally, I would emphasize that S. 1988, while offering specific protection for
fishing and related industries, has far reaching beneficial implications. For ex-
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ample, limitation of foreign fishing off shores should beneficially al-Te
balance of ptyments. While United States consumption of seafood has incr
dramatically, the U.S. percentage of the take of fish has remained n'Att
stable. As a result from 1950 to 1072 we increased our importation of se__
from 23.4% to over 00%. From 190 to 1909, world production of fish increased
three-fold, resulting in serious depletions of numerous species of fish, including
several species of direct importance to United States fishermen. Several of these
species are presently regulated under current international arrangements, yet
depletion of the stock has continued.
A favorable report of S. 1988 from the Armed Services Committee wit.; aid in
final enactment of this bill. I urge you to give it your support as an appropriate
interim measure to preserve both our domestic fishing industry and to insure
the wise management of all our fishery resources for future needs.
With best regards,
Sincere1r,
WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY,
U.S. Senator.
HOATOWNERS UNITED, INC.,
New Bedford, Mass., October 15,1074.
Re S-1988 Legislation to Extend Our Exclusive Fisheries Zone from 12 to 209
Miles
lion. JOHN C. STENNIS,
fl'hairmon,
ors:mittce on A rued Services
TUNA INDUSTRY
We have heard that the Tuna fishermen are opposed to extended jurisdiction.
Who says their cpposed? Many of the Tuna people are quietly buying licenses
from foreign countries now in order to fish within their 200 mile limits. In addi-
tion. Star Kist Tuna Co., a subsidiary of Rats ton-Purina has plants and fishing
boat operations in South America, Africa, and trust territories. They have a joint
venture with the Japanese in Japan. It is their representatives you will tear
from in opposition not the ftshermen.
SHRIMP INDUSTRY
Who says they are opposed? Not all shrimpers are opposed, Those who fish off
of the Coast of the United States and the Gulf need and want this protection,
because they fear what the Cuban and Mexican fishing interests will do when
their resources dwindle.
The Cubans are building large fishing fleets now. You know where their exper-
tise and financing tome from. Will it be in the best interest of our security and
defense to allow a large fleet of Cuban vessels to operate in the Gulf and Atlantic
as the Soviets now do off of the New England Coast?
The Shrimping interests who are opposed to extended jurisdiction are those
who own facilities and operate vessels :inside of the 200 mile zone of other
countries. Ask them when they testify. They represent 2% of the shrimp labor
force and only 20% of the value of landings.
QUESTiON eN JEOPARDY OF THE UNITED STATES SECURITY
This legislation is an interim measure?repeat?until the Law of the Sea
Conference and ICNUI does their job. The legislation does not stop free and
innocent passage over, upon, or under waters covered by the legislation. It simply
is for fisheries protection?nothing else?te protect the resource for the future.
No joint research projects with other countries, security agreements, or any-
thing else are effected in any way what so ever.
It does not effect any bilateral agreements in anyway. If it did they could be
adjusted as they have -oeen in the past.
For those paranoid who spend the ridiculous fear that the legislation is a
detriment to defense anti will cause confrontation, I must state that without the
legislation there win be .confrontation.
Over a month ago, one of our member vessels was hit from behind by a huge
Foreign National vessel, and so severely damaged that it still Is being repaired
at tremendous cost to the individual captain who owns it.
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On Sunday, September 22nd another vessel from our fleet was hit and sunk with
the loss of the mates life. Confrontation is taking place.
Even our Allies are taking our fishermen over the hurdles, while our Govern-
ment stands by. I cite these statistics as proof. In a closed haddock area, where
no haddock was supposed to be taken, the following British vessels were found
on September 2, 1974:
1. Marbella, 11-384, 130 Tons Haddock, 135 Tons Fish on Board. Undersized
cod-end 113mm. Vessel cited for violation. The Master of the Marbella stated
that he had no intention of leaving the area until he reached his 600 ton capacity.
2. Seafridge-Slcua, 11-138, 10 Ton Haddock, 45 Ton fish on board. Vessel cited
for violation.
3. Farnetta, II-135, 96 Ton Haddock, 101 Ton fish on Board, Undersized cod-
end, 118mm. Vessel cited for violation.
4. Coriolanus, II-412, 10.5 Ton Haddock, 11.5 Ton fish on board, vessel cited
for violation. The Master of the Coriolanus stated he would leave area if owner
directs.
5. Northella, II-206, 10.5 Ton Haddock, 45 Ton fish on board, undersized cod-
end 110mm. Vessel cited for violation.
6. Southolla, 11-40, 45.2 Ton Haddock, 48.8 Ton fish on board, undersized cod-
end 11.6mm. Vessel cited for violation.
Our men are upset and angry and confrontation will become international
incidents. We can avoid these confrontations if the legislation is enacted because
surveillance and enforcement could become fact.
The Canadians and the Americans could jointly institute surveillance and
enforcement on two coasts with their overlapping boundaries and interests.
Canada is going to institute a 200 mile limit. If they do it without the United
States there will be confrontations. Many other countries are going to institute
a 200 mile limit, without United States approval or acceptance. There will be
more confrontation. Our final answer for the brass paranoids in the Pentagon?
The Law of the Sea Conference has already agreed to a 12 mile territorial exten-
sion and, in principal, a 200 mile economic zone. In effect they have already
closed the straits and other passages to cover-ted military passage, which the
pentagon is worried about.
This legislation in no way effects the military. It only gives the American fish-
ermen his just due. Mr. Chairman, without this legislation we cannot survive as
an Industry?not even for two more years.
FISHING VESSEL OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Seattle, Wash., October 12, 1974.
Hon. JOHN STENNIS,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR: We regret that we were unable to have someone appear in
person before your committee to testify on Senate Bill 1988 and to urge its
passage by your committee. The notice of your hearing reached us too late to
enable us to have someone in Washington on the date of the hearing. We are there-
fore going to confine ourselves to presenting this brief statement on the bill con-
cerned primarily with our views of the bill as it relates to armed services issues.
Our testimony at the hearings of the Commerce Committee on S. 1988 as well
as the testimony of others fully outlines the need for this bill and its effect upon
the conservation of resources which provide U.S. fishermen the opportunity to
feed their families and which provides not only U.S. consumers but also consumers
of many other countries as well with wholesome sea food at reasonable cost. The
contribution of seafood to the U.S. consumer is of military importance by itself.
A healthy United States fishing fleet useful in time of war is of extreme mili-
tary value for two reasons. The first is the value of the vessels themselves as a
ready available force during war time for surveillance duties, cargo carrying,
patrolling and many other activities. The second involves the pool of highly
experienced seamen available for many military duties in times of emergency. The
value of a prosperous fishing fleet available at a moment's notice is self-evident. It
needs no elaboration. Such a domestic fleet in our opinion can only exist if the
stocks of fish within an economic zone of 200 miles off the coast of the United
States are maintained in a healthy renewable condition. This can occur only if
the United States has jurisdiction over the fishery resources in this zone. The
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U.S. need not have territorial jurisdiction as jurisdiction over the coastal fishery
resources is adequate for the purpose.
Those who oppose United States fishery jurisdiction in the proposed 200 mile
zone do so by citing the possibility that other nations will use our extension of
the economic zone from 12 to 200 miles to justify extensions of their territorial
sea from 12 to 00. In our opinion the danger is just the reverse. If the United
States fails to indicate in a positive way as outlined in S. 1988 the type of regime
it is willing to create, other nations less conservative than the United States will
extend their jurisdictions but they will be extreme jurisdicions including ex-
tensions of their territorial seas in addition to economic zones. To protect its
interests, the United States should pass S. 1988, encourage other nations tc pass
similar legislation and thereby set the pattern and example of a 12 mile territorial
sea rather than one of 200 miles. If there is no appreciable binding movement
toward a 12 mile territorial sea and a 200 mile economic zone, it is a foregone
conclusion that Dther nations will claim all they can of offshore jurisdiction. In
other words the real danger is doing nothing rather than doing something. By
enacting S. 1988, the U.S. will be leading the way, other countries will follow and
before long a pattern of 12 mile territorial seas will be established with enough
support from tile maritime countries to make, extreme territorial extensions
unpopular except for a small number of minority countries.
It has been said also that the passage of a 200 mile bill will lead to a confron-
tation with the Soviets. This is most unlikely. The bill provides for fishing by
foreigners within our 200 mile zone. This the. Soviets are now doing off the
Pacific Coast. Their fishing vessels this year took 150,000 metric tons of hake off
Washington and Oregon. This could continue under the terms of S. 1988. The
difference is the; under S. 1988, we would have greater authority to insist that the
Soviets limit their fishing to the amount of annual catch that the hake stocks
could stand. The United States has had bilateral agreements with the Soviet
Union covering certain of their fishing activities off the Pacific Coast. These
agreements would be continued under circumstances that the Soviets could
clearly understand. No confrontation would result. An example of this can be
seen off South America where the Soviets have respected the 200 mile limit de-
cleared by certain countries resulting in no confrontation. The Soviets wish no
confrontation with the U.S. nor do we. It is therefore unthinkable that when we
set up a high sees regime to provide for adequate conservation and utilization of
fish within 200 miles both for domestic as well as foreign vessels that a military
confrontation will occur.
S. 1988 is a provisional bill only and it will end as soon as a satisfactory Law
of the Sea Treaty is brought into being. It does not tie the hands of the negoti-
ators. Its interim character gives needed protection during the time our negoti-
ators are trying to hammer out an agreement. Our Law of the Sea negotiators
van change the terms of S. 1988 in any way they wish as long as the result is
satisfactory to the United States.
Another military factor in the Eastern Pacific to consider is the good possi-
bility that many new nations will enter this area. This will create new burdens
for our security. Passage of S. 1988 will deter many of these nations from entei--
ing the area. This certainly is of value from a Military standpoint.
Another security plus is that as additional high seas areas are added to those
now under United States control, our surveillance of these areas will hnprove.
There will be more overflights and more surface patrols than is now the case.
This will result in greatly added security.
Another criticism made against S. 1988 is that it will encourage foreign coun-
tries to deny United States fishing vessels the right to fish within their 200 nine
zones. Such action would be against the best interests of those countries. :If
they have the capability to fish there themselves, they would be doing so now.
If they do not. lave the capability which is the case with almost all of them, they
will be seeking the help of the United States to assist them in getting their
share of these resources. U.S. 'fishermen will be able to negotiate reasonable
terms for fishing coastal resources as United States shrimp fishermen are success-
fully doing now on the northeast coast of South 'America. Here the United States
has an agreement which permits our fishermen to fish shrimp within Brazil's
900 mile limit Out outside its 12 mile limit. If it is possible to do it here, it is
also possible to do it elsewhere. S. 1988 will have no effect on oceanic resources
such as tuna as the bill provides for the maintenance of the status quo.
It is our firm belief that S. 1988 offers no threat to our security or to the
manner in which our armed forces are operating. The bill refers to marine
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resources only. It provides for foreign fishing within our 200 mile zone. It pro-
vides for consultation with foreign countries governing their conduct within our
zone. It would therefore lessen the danger of confrontation and at the same time
provide for the conservation of marine resources which will be much needed in
the future as a part of the food supply necessary to feed an increasing number
of people in all parts of the world. There certainly is less danger to world peace
from an adequately fed population than from one which is inadequately fed.
The views given here are those based upon 60 years of experience in the field
of international fisheries as this is the length of time that our association has
been in continuous existence. Also, our manager has had over 50 years of con-
tinuous contact with the problem created by unrestrained foreign fishing off the
shores of the United States.
We can only conclude that action on S. 1988 is most necessary if coastal,
anadromous and oceanic resources are to survive. We therefore urge that your
Armed Services Committee report this bill favorably to the Senate.
Respectfully submitted,
FISHING VESSEL OWNERS ASSOCIATION,
HAROLD E. LOKKEN, 31 anager.
EXTENDED TESTIMONY OF CHARLES R. CARRY
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee on Armed Services of the United
States Senate, my name is Charles R. Carry and I am Executive Director of the
Tuna Research Foundation of Terminal Island, California, which organization
represents some 85 per cent of the producers of canned tuna in the United States.
I thank you for having given me the opportunity to present some brief testi-
mony on the subject of S. 1988 at the hearing in Washington, D.C., on Friday,
October 11, 1974, and further express my gratitude for your welcoming these
extended remarks into the record of your proceedings on this subject.
As the representative of a multi-billion dollar industry including investments,
the processing and marketing labor force and ultimate consumer sales?I must
emphasize that our opposition to S. 1988 is principally based on the fact that
this proposed legislation will not truly protect the U.S. domestic fishery (as it
is supposed to do).
To the contrary. It will seriously cripple a major portion of it.
S. 1988 is detrimental legislation. It is detrimental, as previous testimony
before this and other committees has indicated, to the most viable of United
States fisheries?the shrimp fishery, the salmon fishery and the tuna industry.
While I am authorized to speak primarily for the tuna industry, I must in all
fairness at this point clear the record of a misunderstanding that arose at the
hearing in Washington on Friday, October 11.
At that time reference was made to the fact that the fishery opponents of
S. 1988 represented but two per cent of the commercial fishermen in the United
States. The reference was, however, a misquotation of the testimony of Mr.
Leonard Roche.
It is a matter of fact that the fishermen engaged in the shrimp, salmon and
tuna fisheries comprise more than 40 per cent of the total labor force of Amer-
ican commercial fishermen; they are in opposition to S. 1988 and it is they who
are responsible for bringing in over half the total value of all United States
domestic seafood production.
According to the Current Fishery Statistics of the United States, (C.F.S. 0400),
issued for 1973 by the National Marine Fisheries Service, there are some 160,000
full-time and part-time commercial fishermen at work in this country. A study
further shows that at least 66,000 persons in this total force of 160,000 are em-
ployed in the shrimp, salmon and tuna fisheries. We contend this is a labor force
with a second record of high productivity which is deserving of priority con-
sideration.
The opposition to S. 1988 is not a chauvinistic one, however. It is based on
reality.
S. 1988, untimely and truly unwarranted, would set up a "domino philosophy"
among other coastal states which would drastically hamper the most modern
and advanced fisheries of our nation. A succession of 200-mile zones would be
prohibitive to these fisheries. Take the tuna industry, for example.
Since about 90 per cent of U.S. caught tuna occurs within 200 miles of Latin
American and African coasts?countries which would retaliate with their own
200-mile zones if S. 1988 were law?our sources of supply would be shut off.
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What would tifis mean to us?
lonsider these facts :
At least 80 per cent of all T.S. households used over $1 billion of canned tuna
in 1973-50 per cent of the entire world supply :
Two-thirds of all U.S. homemakers purchase tuna as an excellent and coo-
amide:if source of protein and other nutrients on a regular basis;
During 1973,. canned tuna represented 74 per cent of the value of all U.S.
canned fish products for human consumption.
These are some of the economic and sociological aspects to consider. As legis-
lators conversant with the current problems of the national economy, I am cer-
tain you can easily relate to them.
P. /it let us view with eandor some other facets of S. 1988 which could wa:::rant
:peeial concern for this committee cUarged as it is with responsibilities whirl.
ranseend basic industrial and economic factors.
In my previous testimony at hearing before the Subcommittee on Oceans and.
mosphero of tie Committee on Commerce, United States Senate, I stated that:
S. (.988 was "discriminatory, unnecessary and unenforceable".
'rho discriminatory part I have touched upon. S. 1988 doesn't protect U.S.
fisheries. Not insofar as the tuna industry is concerned. It would put us out of
fusiness.
S. 1985 is unnecessary because, as I stated on Friday, October 11, before this
committee, 77 to 80 per cent of all the fish taught by the United States com-
mercial coastal fishermen are taken in.qd:c the. current. 12-mile contiguous 7,one.
And this catch has been increasing in size despite all of the cries of coastal fi ther-
men to the contrbry.
So. I address; my remarks to what is a principal area of concern to this coat-
mit-tee?the unenforcenbility of S. 1988.. ?
This proposed legislation would add 2,282,0(Y) nautical miles to the jurisdietion
of United States naval vessels and aircraft?and this poses an economical and
physically irnpraetical policing effort upon our armed forces.
Au economic appraisal of S. 1988's enforceability has been offered by Admiral
o. W. Sher, Commandant, of the U.S. Coast Guard, the text of which I offer
tis .kppendix A.
In essence this document indicates that in the first year following S. 1988
hecoming law, a total sum of $60 to $100 million would be required to implement
at legislation in the enforcement aspects of an extended fishery zone. And an
additional $30 to $60 million would be required on an annual basis.
How much better it would he to invest those slims in programs that would truly
aid our flsherie. programs of oceanographic and biological research, support
Or untangement urograms on a. domestic as \vett as an international basis and;
yes:. financial a id to depressed U.S. fleets.
There is another factor concerning enforceability.
You are familiar with the reference by General George S. Brown, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the 1958 Convention on the High Seas?to which
our country and 52 other are party.
These countries recognized as general principles of international law the
following : I. freelom of navigation ; 2. freedom of fishing; 3. freedom to lay
sabnotrine cables Wad pipelines, and 4. freedom to fly over the high seas.
If these, as General Brown contends, are endangered by S. 1988, they should
have a nigh pricrity insofar as our country's economic and protective security
concerned.
Quite frankly, the passage of S. 1988 would present our citizens with a huge
powder keg. It would court direct military confrontations with foreign powers
over fishing righ-s on the high seas. General Brown alluded to that in his testi-
mony. This country?hopefully?has ended an exercise, a costly one in dollars
fid, more tragically, lives, in Vietnam. Why do we beg more trouble?especially
When it is unnecessary, esincially when there are far better alternatives?
There are altPrnatives offered, intellig,ent13, by the President of the United
States in a r.-seertt letter to Senators Hugh Scott and Mike Mansfield. We have
at [ached a copy cf that letter as Appendix B.
Similar expressions were voiced by United States Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger in correspondence with Senator J. William Fulbrig,ht, Chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, and I would note
the Secretary's message has been documented in Report No. 93-4166 of the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
In this letter, Secretary Kissinger states, in part:
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"Passage of S. 1988 would hurt our relations with Japan and the Soviet Union
as well as with other nations fishing off our coasts. In addition, any effort to
enforce a unilaterally established 200-mile fisheries zone against non-consenting
nations would be likely to lead to confrontations. Adverse reactions by foreign
nations would be understandable for the United States itself has consistently
protected unilateral extensions of fishery jurisdiction beyond 12 miles. A uni-
lateral extension by the United States now could encourage a wave of claims by
others which would be detrimental to our overall oceans interests, including our
interests in naval mobility and the movement of energy supplies."
In view of all that has been presented, Mr. Chairman and Members of this
Honorable Committee, we hold that not only is S. 1988 "discriminatory, un-
necessary and unenforceable" but?and this is of extreme importance?contrary
to the best interests of our country.
Thank you for your attention and consideration.
SEAFOOD PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION,
New Bedford, Mass., October 15, 1974.
Senator JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chaiirman, Senate Armed Services Committee, Suite 212, Russell Senate Office
Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR STENNIS : Last week at the meeting of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, you heard pros and cons concerning the Studds/Magnuson bill and I
wish to reaffirm our position of support for the Bill.
Too many people involved in making this important decision are greatly re-
moved from the scene and perhaps are not fully aware of the ramifications and
the severe economic hardships caused by the intrusion of the massive foreign
fishing fleets. The principal opponents of this Bill, the Tuna men, chasing a
migratory fish which takes them almost to the shores of some foreign countries
and the distant water Shrimpers, who produce a high priced delicacy in com-
parison to our basic species, lose sight of the fact that the foreign fleets, upon
complete devastation of the fisheries stocks of the Northwest Atlantic will quite
assuredly move and concentrate and take their species. Then, they will be in
the same boat as we are.
The domestic fishermen, who harvest basic food fish from the Northwest At-
lantic produces an economical, every day menu product of high nutritional value
comparable to beef, pork, poultry, and lamb. This domestically produced fish is
what the average American, Senior Citizen and School Lunch Program can
tolerate economically. The production by foreign nationals, some of which is
imported by the U.S. amounts to about 80 percent of all fish consumed in the
U.S. This costs the consumer much more and at the expense of our dwindling
fishing fleet.
In New Bedford alone, our 120 vessels have a present market value (depreci-
ated) of 18 million dollars. Fifteen years ago, this Port had 216 commercial fish-
ing vessels which plied the high seas.
The total poundage landed by the Ports of New Bedford; Boston; Gloucester;
Provincetovvn ; Pt. Judith, R.I.; Newport, RI.; Portland, Me.; and Rockland,
Me. total 374,986,000 lbs. The value of the various edible fisheries species landed
is $54,195,000.00. Presently in New Bedford, there are 750 persons directly em-
ployed aboard the fishing vessels as compared with 1200 in 1959. The same ratio
of decline has been experienced by these other New England ports because of
the influx of the foreign subsidized fleets, who have been taking fish in our own
backyard from our historical fishing grounds.
The Magnuson Bill S. 1988 could provide a temporary method of regulating
all vessels who are fishing on George's. The methods and quotas which have
been forced upon the U.S. fishermen by I.C.N.A.F. have not and never will work.
The Caracas meeting provided no agreement other than the next meeting date.
In the meantime, the depletion of our fishing grounds continues at a faster
rate than our law makers can come to some agreement.
Therefore, we ask that your committee understand the bill and the imperative
need for its passage. We must do something now to protect one of the world's
best sources of food protein. Let us not be embraced in a "Fish robbery" similar
to the so called "Grain robbery."
Yours truly,
WILLIAM BEAUMONT,
President.
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APPPNDIX
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 24, 1974.
ion. HUGH SCUTT,
Senate,
Washington,,
DEAR }luau : As you know, the Senate now has before it a bill. S. 1988, which
would unilaterally extend the contiguous fisheries zone of the United States
orn 12 to 200 miles. T greatly appreciate your vote against reporting this bill
i-ayorably out of the Foreign Relations Committee. While I fully understand the
tiroblems in protection of living resources off the United States coast which have
1,41 to the consideration of this legislation, passage could seriously harm U.S.
.coans and foreign relations interests, including our fishery interests, and could
paradoxically distroy the best opportunity we have had to definitively resolve
our fisheries problems: That is by a comprehensive new oceans law treaty now
;icing negotiated within the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
When the new oceans law treaty is concluded I expect that it will offer broad
itioliection for our fisheries interests. In the meantime, you may be assured that
I will do everything possible consistent with our present legal rights to protect
Me interests of United States fishermen and to preserve the threatened stocks of
iiving resources off our coasts.
The Law of the Sea negotiations are most important, and our nation is deeply
-ormnitted to th?Ar success. As such it is vitally important that the United States
-iopport the CorCerence in every way possible.
I would appreciate your calling the attention of the Senate to the strong
opposition of the Executive Branch ihc) this legislation. I am sending identical
ters to Nlike Mansfield and John Rhodes.
Sincerely,
fIERALD R. FORD.
AMERICAN TUNABOAT ASSOCIATION,
an Diego, Calif., October 15,1974.
lie S. 1988 --Sur plementary remarks.
JOHN C. STENN[S,
ohairman? U.S. Senate Armed Services Comngttee,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR Mn. CH &MAIN: Attached hereto are copies of statements I prepared on
behalf of the American Tunaboat Association for hearings conducted by the
.ferrate Commerce Committee. It would be appreciated if these statements could
he included in the Hearing Record.
The American Tunaboat Association (ATA) is a non-profit fishery cooperative
association, incorporated under the laws of the State of California, with its prin-
md office of business in San Diego, California. The ATA has been in existence
..inee 1923. The membership is comprised exclusively of U.S. flag tuna fishing
vessels. At present. there are ninety-five (95) member vessels in the ATA.
Annually. our members catch and unload over 60% of all tropical tunas landed in
Pie United States by vessels operating from the United States and Puerto Rico.
As of laieember 31. 1973, there were one hundred forty-nine (149) Tuna vessels
i it the U.S. Flag: Tuna Fleet that had a frozen tuna capacity of greater than 101
r-thort tons. According to the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, as cf
August 1974, there were 205 tuna vessels in the U.S. Tuna Fleet regardless of the
frozen tuna capacity size.
All of the member vessels in the ATA are of a frozen tuna capacity greater
than 101 short tons. The Associations that represent other tuna vessel owners are
111e Eishertnens Cooperative Association of San Pedro, California, and the West,-
Fishboat Owners Association. We are informed and believe that the Fisher-
iiiPTIS Cooperative Association opposes the passage of S. 1988, and that the
%Vestern Fishbcat Owners Association (WEOA) has not taken any position on
11. 19:;8. Please see the attached letter from AkTFOA to Senator John Tunney.
.',ecoriling o a publication of NOAA/NMES "Fisheries of the United States,
it73, Current Fi.shery Statistics No. 6400," on page 82, there were estimated about
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87,208 full time commercial fishermen in 44 states for 1973. (Please see page 82).
In 1972, it was estimated by such publication that processing and wholesale fish
establishments averaged about 68,964 employees and an employment season high
of 91,268 employees. (Please see page 88). Based upon government and industry
estimates, I am inbreed and believe that there are about 22,800 people employed
by U.S. flag tuna vessels and by tuna processing plants located in the United
States, Puerto Rico and American Samoa.
It is the position of the American Tunaboat Association that it is to our inter-
est and that of the United States of America to achieve an acceptable Law of
the Sea Convention. This objective can be achieved only if the U.S. Senate avoids
the temptation to enact legislation that would establish a unilateral declaration
of ocean jurisdiction and sovereignty. We urge you to oppose the passage of
S. 1988.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
AUGUST FELANDO,
General Manager,
American Tunaboat Association.
WESTERN FISHBOAT OWNERS ASSOCIATION,
San Diego, Calif., May 15, 1974.
Hon. JOHN V. TUNNEY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR TUNNEY : I am writing with regards to the public hearing on
S.B. 1988 conducted by you in San Francisco, California on April 19, 1974. There
were two members from our Association that testified very eloquently in favor
of S.B. 1988.
I am not rebutting their testimony in any way nor should you construe it
to be a rebuttal in any manner whatsoever. I'm taking exception only to their
statement that they were representing the official position of Western Fishboat
Owners Association. This came about through a misunderstanding during a
telephone conversation between myself and the two gentlemen that testified.
I admit that I must bear the blame for the poor communications in explaining
our official position.
In attempting to clarify this position on S.B. 1988, I feel that it is necessary
to present a thumbnail sketch of our Association. W.F.O.A. is comprised of six
hundred and eleven (611) boat owners, home ported from San Diego, California
to Seattle, Washington with five members residing in Alaska. This lengthy area
is divided into 12 districts and governed by a board of directors. Although
W.F.O.A. was founded strictly for matters pertaining to the albacore tuna, unlike
American Tunaboat Association or Eureka's Fishermen's Marketing Association,
our members are engaged in several different fisheries. Where A.T.A. members
are only concerned with tuna or the Eureka group, coastal bottom fish, our mem-
bers, in addition to the albacore tuna, are engaged in yellowfin tuna, salmon,
Dungeness crab, shrimp, and halibut fisheries, depending on where they reside.
It is for this quite apparent reason that within our Association there are di-
vergent views, pro and con, on S.B. 1988.
Until late 1973, W.F.O.A. had strongly supported the three species approach
for managing the pelagic, anadromous and coastal stocks of the world's fisheries.
However, with the continued postponement of L.O.S. and the ever increasing
fishing pressures by foreign fleets on our coastal stocks, our central and north-
ern members became much more vocal and expressed deep concern over this
foreign intrusion and also felt that strong support should be given to S.B. 1988.
On the other hand, those members fishing albacore and yellowfin tunas became
quite concerned that the widespread publicity on S.B. 1988 could have an
adverse affect on ,he tuna industry. Our primary function is to negotiate a
season price for albacore with the various tuna packers and you can only
negotiate adequately by having a strong organization, not one splintered by
internal strife. For this reason, our Board made the decision that our official
position would be one of neutrality. However, we did not preclude our members
from openly opposing or supporting S.B. 1988 as an individual fisherman.
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In no way am I attempting to demean Mr. Speer's or Mr. Munro's testimony
in favor of S.B. 1.988, as it is quite probable that they represented the general
feelings of at least a simple majority of our membership. My only wish is to
clarify W.F.O.A.'s official position on this most controversial matter as one of
neutrality.
Sincerely,
JACK O. BOWLAND,
(loner-al Manager.
A MEET.-IA N TTJNABOAT ASSOCIATION,
San Diego, Calif.
'Er. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for allowing us to
again record our opposition to S. 1988.
1. am August Felando, General Manager of the American Tunaboat Associa-
tion. This non-profit fishery corporative association has its principal office
of business in San Diego, California. The American Tunaboat Association
( ATA) has been in existence since 1923. Its membership is comprised exclusively
of 1T.S. flag tuna fishing vessel owners.
have previously testified before this Committee on this subject during a
hearing conducted by Senator Tunney in San Diego on April 18, 1974. An exten-
sive background Statement, attached, with numerous charts, tables and other
data relevant to the subject, was introduced. I ouring such hearing, time require-
ments prevented a complete reading of the statement.
During this hearing, I intend to answer some of the questions raised by Sen-
ator Tunney during the hearing in San Diego, and provide new information that
updates my previous statement.
In my previous statement, which is before this Committee today, I stressed
the point that in our judgment, S. 1988 "adversely affects existing treaties that
provide for the rational use and conservation of tunas presently harvested by
our members in the Eastern Pacific and Atlantic Oceans." My statement did not
go into detail on how successful such management Commissions have been in
carrying out their purposes. I believe it is necessary to supplement this state-
ment by providing information on the workings of the Inter-American Tropical
'Pima Commission (.1ATTC), and the International Commission for the Com-
servation of the Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), primarily because of remarks made
by the Chairman during this hearing, and also during the hearings conducted
by this Committee on Monday, February 11, 1974, in Bellingham, Washington,
and on Thursday. February 14, 1974, in Aberdeen, Washington.
im. page 30, Volume 2 of the transcript of the hearings conducted in Belling-
ham. February 11, 1974, (luring an exchange between the Chairman and witness
Walt Yonkers, tie subject of tuna conservation controls exercised by an interna-
tional fisheries organization was discussed.
On page 21, Velume 5 of the transcript of the hearings conducted in Aberdeen,
February 14, 1974, during an exchange between the Chairman and witness Harold
T,okken, the Chttnnnan again referred to the impact of S. 1988 on existing tuna
I. reaties.
Contrary to suffi statements, an Atlantic Tuna Commission was established by
a treaty negotiaTed in 1966. As my previous statement points out, the United
States ratified such treaty in 1966, and, at present, there are 13 countries who are
members of such Commission. The International Commission for the Conserva-
tion of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) initiated censervation measures on yellowfin
tuna in 1972, aid is presently examining a variety of measures for albacore,
bluefin and skipjack fisheries.
In 1973, the woduction of yellowfin tuna reached its highest level in the his-
tory of the fishery. Nevertheless, U.S. scientists are expressing concern about the
status of the Atlantic bluefin stocks. No concern has been expressed about the
status of other tuna stocks in the Atlantic, such as albacore, skipjack, hip:eye,
and the southern bluefin. Scientists have expressed the view that skipjack stocks
:Ire greatly underutilized. In our opinion, it is not correct to charge that because
we did not have a treaty in the Atlantic?even a loose treaty?the "tuna dis-
appeared finally."
With respect to the tunas in the Eastern Tropical Pacific and the success of
the conservation regime established by the Titer-American Tropical Tuna Corn..
mission (IATTC , the following comments are Dffered.
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First, of the five tuna species fished in such area, only the yellowfin tuna is
under regulation. The IATTC has been in existence since 1950. The yellowfin
tuna fishery has been regulated since 1966. In 1966, the annual quota established
for all member countries of the IATTC was 79,300 short tons. In 1974, the annual
quota set by the IATTC was 175,000 short tons, subject to the right of the Direc-
tor of Investigations to raise such quota to a total of 195,000 short tons.
The yellowfin tuna stocks under conservation controls by the IATTC are not in
decline. Extensive documentation published by the IATTC are available to the
interested public. The success of the IATTC is recognized throughout the world.
However, this is not to suggest that the conservation regimes established for
tunas are free from improvements, particularly in the area of international
cooperation for enforcement purposes. The fisheries proposal of the United
States as presented to the preparatory sessions of the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence reflects a need for improving the control aspects of the international fish-
eries organizations delegated the power to regulate highly migratory stocks such
as the tunas.
We believe, however, that not only would S. 1988 represent a "stab in the back"
to the conservation regimes established by IATTC and ICCAT, but such proposal
would frustrate future actions to strengthen such organizations or to create new
international conservation organizations dealing with the tunas. Statistical data
and other information contained in my previous statement support this conclu-
sion. I will not take the time of this Committee to again review such
documentation.
At the commencement of this hearing, the Chairman stated that the record
developed by this Committee thus far revealed that international fisheries orga-
nizations are completely ineffective. In our opinion, we believe this conclusion is
not supported by the record of the international fisheries organizations regulat-
ing the tuna stocks in the Pacific and the Atlantic. The American Tunaboat
Association strongly urges the complete support and improvement of such regula-
tory devices to conserve and manage the tunas. We believe that this can be best
accomplished by a successful Law of the Sea Conference. If, however, S. 1988 is
enacted into law, we are of the opinion that such action by the United States will
have an adverse impact on the political will of countries to seek international
cooperation via an international fisheries organization, particularly as it is ap-
plied to tuna stocks. And, as it is well recognized, tunas are a species of fish
that cannot be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one nation. Therefore,
in order to properly conserve tunas, we must enhance and improve the effective-
ness of international fisheries organizations like ICCAT and IATTC.
Should the Committee desire further documentation on the effectiveness of
ICCAT and IATTC to support our favorable opinion of such organizations, then
we shall be most pleased to cooperate. In any case, it should be made clear for
the record that the tuna industry denies the charge that the international fish-
eries organizations conserving tunas are "completely ineffective."
The Chairman of the Committee also stated that the record supports the charge
that there is a general decline in the catch of the domestic fishing industry.
On pages 12-13 of my previous statement, I offered the opinion that contrary
to the proposed findings in Section 2(a) of S. 1988, there does not exist sufficient
facts regarding overfishing to support the type of interim action proposed by
S. 1988.
It is clear that S. 1988 is opposed by segments of the 'U.S. domestic fishing
Industry (salmon, shrimp and tuna) that account for nearly half of the U.S.
catch of fish sold for human food. This type of opposition requires that the need
for the drastic action suggested by S. 1988 be "real" and completely persuasive
on totally factual grounds.
As stated in our previous statement, 1973 landings and values for all U.S.
caught fish and shellfish exceeded 1972. Landing values on the fisherman's level
approached a billion dollars in 1973. If you except tuna statistics, 1973 repre-
sented a one-year increase of about $194.3 million, or 30% (thirty percent) over
1972. More importantly, landing volume increased in 1973 over 1972. (Please see
tables 3 and 4 in my previous statement.)
My earlier statement also provided preliminary statistics on landing values and
volumes for 1973 and 1972 covering the States of Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland. (Copies of the statistical docu-
ments prepared by the National Marine Fisheries Service concurring such sta-
tistics are attached.)
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These six States enjoyed an increase in both volume and value of fish and
shellfish landings in 1973 over 1972. In 1973, total fish and shellfish landing
volume was 806.6 million pounds; in 1972, it was 763.3 million pounds. In 1973
total fish and shellfish values was $162.1 million; in 1972, it was $145.3 million.
On April 1, 1974, the National Marine Fisheries Service published statistics on
the 1973 production of fish and frozen fish fillets and steaks in the United States.
The statistical bulletin entitled "Current Fisheries Statistics No. 6408" is at-
tached. These statistics are particularly relevant because they deal with the
production of coastal species in all sections of the United States. Over thirty
species of fish are involved
As the summary indicates, both landings and value increased in 1973 over 1372.
In 1973, landing volume came to 129.8 million pounds; in 1972, landings came
to 126.6 million pounds. In 1973, landing value came to $108.6 million; in 1972,
landing value came to $91.9 million.
This statistical bulletin also published an historical review of the production
and value of fish and frozen groundfish and Atlantic Ocean perch fillets and
steaks covering the years 1945-73. In 1973, cod landing volume was the third
highest since 1945, and the highest in value for the entire 29-year period. In 1973,
cusk landing volume and value were the highest recorded poundage and dollar
value for the 29-year period. The review also indicated the decline of haddock
in both volume and value. Except, that haddock landing volume in 1973 did
exceed 1972, and haddock landing value was the highest in the past five years.
Within the past few weeks, additional statistical information has been pub-
lished regarding :he catch of U.S. fishermen for 1973. We note the preliminary
estimates offered by Harry L. Rietze, Regional Director, Alaska Region, Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service, published in the Fishing Gazette, Annual Review
Number. Mr. Riet7.e stated that:
"Alaska's major fisheries (salmon, halibut, and shellfish) show an increase
in value to the fisherman of seventy percent, or from approximately 100 million
dollars in 1972 to about 169 million dollars in 1973. Even though the value to
fishermen showed a sharp increase, the amount of salmon and halibut decreased.
Shellfish continued its upward trend and showed a gain of 27% because elf an
increase in landings of all shellfish except king crab."
The Gloucester Fisheries Commissio:a of Gloucester, Massachusetts, reported
by the above-referred Fishing Gazette, pages 136-140, that annual fish landings
for 1973 exceeded 1972 by 16 million pounds, and fish values for 1973 exceeded
1972 by 2.5 million dollars. The statistics for the past five years covering Glou-
cester reflected the following upward trends in landings and values:
Linding
Year (pounds) 'Values
1969
69, 000,000
$6, 635,000
1 970
92, 000,001
8, 370, 010
1971
111, 000, 000
7, 800, 000
1 972_
113, 000, 000
9,640, 000
1973
129, 000,000
12, 147, 000
As stated in our previous statement, the statistics being reported on fish
landings and values raise some serious questions in our minds as to whether
S. 1.988 can be ;.ustilied on the grounds that the fish stocks utilized by U.S.
fishermen are all being overfished.
Recent statistics do reflect, however, that certain fish stocks are in decline.
This is particularly true for the halibut stocks in the Northeast Pacific. Most
people attribute this decline to the large-scale Japanese and Soviet trawl fish-
eries. According to published reports, Japan has agreed to impose restrictions
on her fishing fleet which should reduce the incidence of immature halibut from
being caught by Japanese longliners and Japanese motherships and land-based
trawlers. Concern appears to be justified also by the catch statistics in the
wenn region off the U.S. coast from Maine to Cape Hatteras and within the
regulatory responsibility of the International Commission for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF). However, since January 1st, 1974, conservation
measures have been implemented for the purpose of reducing the region's total
allowable catch for the next three years. in 1974, a total catch quota of 92:3,000
tons has been esl:ablished. For 1975, the quota will be 850,000 tons and for 1976,
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the quota will be whatever tonnage the Commission scientists agree to allow
the region's biomass to begin to rebuild to maximum sustainable yield. ICNAF,
which is comprised of ten member countries, including the United States, also
agreed to continue trawl mesh size, but also to prohibit fishing from any of
their vessels longer than 145 feet with other than pelagic fishing gear for the
last six months of each year off Southern New England and in parts of the Gulf
of St. Lawrence to Maine. Further, all member countries have agreed to an
ICNAF joint inspection scheme for below-decks inspection as of 15 November,
1973.
It would appear from the above information that responsible and effective
action has been initiated to resolve the problems confronted by U.S. fishermen
off New England and by U.S. fishermen fishing for halibut. Such information
seems to support our position that the "meat-ax" approach of S. 1988 is not
necessary, and that the most meaningful alternative on an interim basis is for
Congress to effectively support the U.S. fishing industry in strengthening both
bilateral and multilateral agreements with-nations whose vessels fish off U.S.
shores. Again, we refer this Committee to the Geneva Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High seas, and to the need for
implementing such treaty by a federal statute as a way of resolving overfishing
problems of coastal fishery resources.
In my previous statement, I contended that S. 1988 would harm our foreign
trade in fish products. The statistical information provided only covered eleven
months of 1973. I have now received information covering the entire 12 months
of 1973.
Value?U.S. general imports for consumption, cumulative, January-December
1973 1
Grand total $68, 655. 954, 588
Fish and fish preparations (2 percent grand total) 1, 386, 052, 650
031.0 Fish, including shellfish?simply prepared or fresh (87
percent of total fish and shellfish)
31.1 Fish, except shellfish?fresh, chilled or frozen
31.2 Fish, except shellfish?salted, dried, or smoked
31.3 Shellfish?except prepared or canned
1,217,968,829
718, 180, 898
34, 772, 147
465, 015, 784
032.0 Fish, including shellfish in airtight containers (12 per-
cent of total fish and shellfish) 168, 083, 821
1 Includes only imports for human consumption.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Imports?General and Consumption, Schedule
A, Commodity and Country Report FT 135, December, 1973.
As these statistics indicate, canned or otherwise prepared fish only represents
twelve percent (12%) or $168 million of the $1,386 million of fishery imports for
human consumption. Over eighty seven percent (87%) or $1,218 million of fishery
imports comes in fresh, frozen, chilled, salted, smoked, dried or otherwise simply
prepared.
A significant share of this eighty seven percent segment of fishery imports is
shellfish. S. 1988 will not help to reduce shellfish imprts. In fact, it would
drastically reduce U.S. production of shrimp and lobster and in fact stimulate
shellfish import dependency, particularly from Latin America.
With respect to fishery imports that are salted, dried or smoked, S. 1988 would
not help reduce imports in this area. This is because in 1973, Canada's share of
this import market was seventy one percent (71%), while another thirteen per-
cent (13%) was taken by Iceland, Norway and Denmark.
As to the fishery imports identified as fish, except shellfish, fresh, chilled or
frozen, and amounting to fifty-two percent (52%) of our total fishing imports,
or $718 million, the following analysis is offered: about $194 million is repre-
sented by tuna imports; the remaining $524 Million covered other ocean and
also fresh water species of fish, principally groundfish. Significantly, $339 mil-
lion of this total is represented by imports from Canada, Iceland, Norway, Den-
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mark and Greenland. We are of the opinion that S. 1988 will not reduce imports
From these countries.
As we analyze the foreign fishery trade import statistics for 1973, we conclude
that S. 1988 would definitely not reduce, but rather increase shellfish imports,
canned or otherwise ($465 million plus $51 million) nor would S. 1988 reduce
fish imports that are salted, dried or smoked ($34.7 million). Further. that
S. 1988 would cause an increase initially in frozen tuna imports ($194 million),
and later a substantive increase in canned tima imports ($40 million). Finally,
that S. 1988 wpuld not reduce imports of groundfish and other fish products
From Canada. I..-Tland, orway, Denmark and Greenland ($437 million).
Ti should be of interest to this Committee to note that for 1973, six countries
controlled over fifty nine percent (59%) of the fishery imports for human
consumption.
Amount
Percent total
Canada
$299, 447,075
21. 6
Japan
227, 142, 602
16. 4
Mexico
127, 959, 208
9. 2
N or wa y
61, 806, 610
4. 5
Iceland
51, 306, 485
3.7
Denmark
50, 815, 472
3. 6
Greenland
8, 057, 464
. 6
Total
826, 534, 916
59. 6
In conclusion, we thank this Committee for offering us again this opportunity
to provide data and documentation supporting our opposition to S. 1988. We urge
you to reject S. 1988. Such proposed legislation Will not protect the fish of interest
to the United States from overfishing, nor will it'protect the U.S. domestic fishing
industry.
U.1. GENERAL IMPORTS FOR CONSUMPTION, JANUARY?DECEMBER 1973
Schedule A
commodity by
country of
origin
anada
Mexico
Japan
Iceland
Norway
Denmark
Greenlar d
I -031.1 _ $202
Percent_ _ _
505, 022
28. 2
19, 132, 402
1. 3
$164, 049, 658
22. 8
$45,
552,
079
$35,
756, 313
$47, 947, 537
7
$8,
040,615
11
31.2 24
Percent
576, 103
70. 7
126, 660
0. 3
418, 940
I. 1
669,
780
2. 0
2,
948, 7.96
8. 3
I, 006, 686
2. 8
52
928, 431
113, 904, 031
11,205, 402
1,
013,
632
2,022,
394,569
Percent_,._
11.4
24.5
2.4
.9
.0
.08
11-032.0 19
437, 519
4.796, 115
51, 418, 602
1,
070,
994
23,
099, 479
1, 466, 680
16,869
Percent_ __
11.5
3.0
30.6
.01
13.7
.01
0
Total 299,
Percent_
447, 075
21. 6
127, 959, 208
9. 2
227, 142, 602
16. 4
51,
306,
485
3. 7
61,
806, 610
4. 5
50, 815, 472
3. 6
8.
057, 434
6
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
Washington, D.C. October 17, 1974.
11011. JOHN C. STENNIS,
e?,hairman, Armed Services Committee,
(1.5. Senate,
Washington. D.C.
DEAu JOHN: S. 1988, the "Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act," :Is
presently under consideration by the Armed Services Committee. I would like
to urge you to report this bill favorably from your Committee, and to support
its passage on the floor )f the Senate.
As a Senator from a Coastal state, I am deeply interested in the existence
of a healthy and competitive domestic fishing industry, and the preservation of a
nicsans of tiveliimod for all those dependent upon fishing and related industries.
Equally important is the assurance that the fishery resources of the ocean are
preserved as a source of food for the future. Wasteful depletion of fish stook
with no conservation controls can only result in a long-terni crisis which may
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require costly and perhaps impossible replenishment efforts. We have leared
this lesson well and harshly in other areas of economic development, and pres-
ent depletion rates of our fishery resources require that conservation efforts
be implemented as soon as possible.
The first step in this effort is the effective limitation of foreign fishing off our
coastlines, and institution of a long-range management program for our fisheries.
S. 1988 accomplishes both of these objectives by establishing a 200 mile fisheries
zone and requiring the development of a marine fisheries management plan within
two years of enactment of the bill.
The extension of the United States fisheries jurisdiction has been opposed
on the grounds that the entire question of ocean policy and fishery management
should be left to international resolution. In principle, I agree with this position.
In reality, however, prolonged international conferences have not produced re-
sults, and historically the record of enforcement of existing agreements has been
disappointing. The conclusion to be drawn from this past summer's Law of the
Sea Conference is that agreement in this area may be well in the future, with
implementation and enforcement of any agreements several more years distant.
By then, the condition of our fishing industry may be such that the international
solution reached may be both inadequate and untimely.
Further, S. 1988 does not undercut any future international agreement in the
area of ocean fishery management. It is an interim measure to be preempted
by international agreement, carefully limited in application to fishery jurisdiction
only, and it preserves the traditional fishing rights of foreign nations on a
reciprocal basis. The clearly stated policy of the Act is to maintain existing
territorial and ocean jurisdiction of the United States in all areas other than
fish conservation. Since it is well coordinated with expressed United States
goals at the Law of the Sea Conference, enactment of S. 1988 may well be an
impetus for swifter international accord.
Finally, I would emphasize that S. 1988, while offering specific protection for
fishing and related industries, has far reaching beneficial implications. For
example, limitation of foreign fishing off our shores would beneficially affect
our balance of payments. While United States consumption of seafood has in-
creased dramatically, the U.S. percentage of the take of fish has remained rela-
tively stable. As a result from 1950 to 1972 we increased our importation of sea-
food from 23.4% to over 60%. From 1950 to 1969, world production of fish in-
creased three-fold, resulting in serious depletions of numerous species of fish,
including several species of direct importance to United States fishermen. Several
of these species are presently regulated under current international arrange-
ments, yet depletion of the stock has continued.
A favorable report of S. 1988 from the Armed Services Committee will aid in
final enactment of this bill. I urge you to give it your support as an appropriate
interim measure to preserve both our domestic fishing industry and to insure
the wise management of all our fishery resources for future needs.
With best regards,
Sincerely,
WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY,
U.S. Senator.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., October 17, 1974.
Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Last Friday morning, five other Members of the House
and I discussed with President Ford the very real threat to our national?and
global?supply of protein-rich food which is being caused by the massive foreign
over-fishing on our shores. Since the Senate Armed Services Committee is now
considering S. 1988, sponsored by Senator Magnuson, we want to report to you
on that discussion.
During our discussion with the President, we asked if he. would be willing?
having now heard the fishermen's side of the story and our rebuttal to the argu-
ments from the Departments of State and Defense?to take a fresh look at this
legislation. The President responded, "I will approach it with an open mind."
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see no reason why na.ssage of S. 1988 should precipitate retaliation against
the United Sta te by any other country, or why passage of such emergency
interim legislation should jeopardize the conclusion of an agreement at the Law
of the Sea Conference. T concur with the judgment of Senators Muskie and
Stevens that st eh dire predictions represent only the worst fears of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense, and are not supported by any tangible evidence.
As primary House sponsor and on behalf of the 169 Members of the House
vito are eosponsoring the companion legislation to S. 1988, I respectfully urge
your Committee to recommend its immediate passage. I would appreciate it :if
:his letter could be made a part of the record of your recent hearings on S. 1983,
Sincerely,
GERRY E. STUDDS.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
SENATE, STATE -HOUSE,
Boston, October 16, 1974.
lion. JOHN STE'VNIS,
Chairman, Armed, Services Committee, Senate Office Building, Washington-, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN I understand that the Armed Services Committee held
its hearing on H. 1988 last Friday and that the record is still open. May I express
,fiy views for the record.
Slime the years immediately following World War II our New England oft-
;there fisheries have been steadily declining, first through foreign competition.
11roducts have been caught by foreign fishermen making lower wages than
American fishermen and shipped into our country, either in the processed or
anprocessecl state. Many of these foreign fishermen were .using government-
Aubsidized vessels, a few of which may even have been purchased with United
States foreign aid money. During the years my father served in the Congress he
worked oil tariff and vessel subsidy problems, as you know, and had some small
itc.cess hi improving the conditions under which our fishermen had to work.
In the last accede a new problem has arisen which has proved to be more
4erious than the former. Our own fishing grounds off the New England coast have
teen invaded by substantial numbers, often in the hundreds, of vessels from
eastern and western Europe and Japan. The 1arger fleets of these vessels operate
almost like naval vessels and in fact they are government-owned. For example,
last week I flew on a Coast Guard surveillance flight over an area where the
omvious week approximately 160 vessels hail been seen, I was told. In one week
this entire fleet had moved to fishing grounds off Long Island, leaving a scouting
i"tirce of some dczen large vessels behind which. I saw.
Those large fleets are denuding our fishing grounds not only of the marketable
fish but often of the breeding stock. The international controls through the
CONAN' and bi-lateral agreements have come generally too little and too late.
While, for insta nee, there are prohibited areas now to protect haddock breeding,
stocks of haddock are badly depleted and even though the price is high the
fishermen are rot making a successful living. The most serious problem is that
ao one is willing to invest in new vessels because they cannot make enough money
;.4) pay the mortgages.
At the Law cif the Sea Conference in Caracas substantial progress was made
toward securing a coastal fisheries management agreement. However, the con-
?eirence broke no in disagreement over other subjects and will not reconvene until
,text, spring. The United States delegates to the conference have returned en-
thusia.stic that an agreement can be secured. Other observers have returned with
!-Ioomy forecasts. We in New England are frustrated over the future of our
iisheries.
S. 1988 is a r?sponse to this problem. It provides that any agreement achieved
at the Law of tie Sea will supplant it and, in fact, in its present form would not
Lake effect for a year. A treaty in any event overrides a statute.
I understand objections have been raised by the Defense Department that this
Legislation will impede naval and commercial free passage throughout the world.
bill does not speak to this point and, in fact, any coastal nation which wants
impede free passage now must do this by force. The international reaction
wonid bP swift. Fisheries management, however, appears to be recogni2.ed as
r0at.41,11:1bie sphere of influence. Certainly the approach taken off Brazil already
;mho] tes as much, where the United States is paying for fisheries enforcement
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off that coast. If the nations of the world are willing to agree that fisheries man-
agement is necessary?and it appeared at Caracas that they may be?it seems to
me that we should take steps to establish this management before the fish are
depleted beyond the point of return.
I hope that the committee can give early approval to S. 1988 or a bill embody-
ing its principles. I believe that we must keep the United States in a position of
leadership toward preserving its coastal fisheries, for they are in a dangerous
state here in New England.
Sincerely yours,
WILLIAM L. SALTONSTALL,
Senator, Third Essex District.
APPENDIX A
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,
August 10, 1974.
HOD_ WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of 2 May 1974 in
which you request the Coast Guard's estimate of the cost of enforcing a 200-mile
fisheries zone off the coasts of the United States. You also requested information
with regard to the break down of Coast Guard cutter and aircraft operating
costs between our various missions.
The situation with regard to resource requirements remains as it was when
the Chairman of the National Security Council Interagency Task Force on the
Law of the Sea advised you by letter of 18 January 1974 of the Executive Branch
views on S. 1988, the "Interim Fisheries Zone Extension and Management Act
of 1973."
". . . the extension of jurisdiction contemplated under this bill would
require a substantial increase in enforcement capability to adequately
patrol the expanded area. The precise extent of enforcement effort would
depend upon a number of factors making the long-range impact on the extra
resources needed impossible to assess at this time."
We have, however, developed cost estimates based on available information
with full recognition that the estimates will require adjustment. The range of
$30,000,000 to $60,000,000 for annual enforcement costs given to you by Dr. Robert
M. White, Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, reflects the estimates that had been discussed between our agencies. Our
estimates are revised from time to time as the underlying plans change or simply
to adjust for increasing costs.
The Coast Guard will in the long run be more affected by any regulations
actually imposed on foreign fishing vessels than by an extension of the con-
tiguous fisheries zone. These regulations will probably change from time to time
depending upon such things as the status of the fish stocks off our coasts, the
availability of protein from other sources, and the harvesting capacity of the
U.S. coastal fishing fleet. Probability of violation will vary with such things as
the status of fish stocks in other parts of the world, the attitude of other coastal
nations toward foreign harvesting of their coastal stocks, and the degree of
acceptance of the regulations by the nations whose vessels are fishing off our
coasts.
We think that we know where and for what species foreign fishermen are
now fishing off our coasts. Enclosure (1) is a composite plot of sightings over
a two-year period. The patterns change from time to time and new fisheries are
developed, but there is no reason to believe that the active fishing areas will
expand dramatically following an extension of jurisdiction. The coastal and
anadromons species are found in areas that are more or less defined. Enclosure
(2) is material on fish ranges copied from the sources indicated. The areas are
for the most part those where we now have responsibility involving the fisheries
under such provisions as:
1. 16 U.S.C. 986. National and international measures of control in connection
with the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. En-
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closure (3) shows the area involved which covers the primary fishing areas off
the east coast and extends well beyond 200 miles.
2. 16 U.S.C. 10E3. Enforcement of the prohibition on foreign taking of Con-
tinental Shelf fishery resources. Enclosure (4) shows the area within the 900
meter isobath. The area of enforcement of this provision actually extends beyond
that isobath as far as the superjacent waters admit exploitation of the resources
and the sealed and subsoil are adjacent to the United States. This area covers
primary fishing areas off all coasts.
3. 16 U.S.C. 1027. National and international measures of control in connection
with the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific Ocean. This Convention applies to North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea
areas that are in some cases more than 200 miles from the U.S. coast.
We think that Mr. Richard H. Philips, editor of Pacific Fisheries Review and
The Fishermen's News accurately describes our fisheries patrol effort on all
coasts in his article on west coast fisheries in the May 1974 issue of the United
States Naval Institute Proceedings:
"The U.S. Coas- Guard does a remarkable job of patrolling the West Coast
in the areas whefe foreign fleets operate. Those areas stretch from San Fran-
cisco to Kodiak, and on to Adak and include an of the eastern Bering Sea. It is
a huge expanse of ocean, most of the year the weather is miserable, and the
Coast Guard's surveillance ships and airplanes are spread very, very thinly."
Like any other law enforcement agency, we are uneasy when we are spread
"very, very thinly." That spread will become more apparent with an extension
of jurisdiction if only because of increased demand for information on offshore
activity within the full range of that jurisdiction. This is likely to be true
without regard to the regulations imposed on foreign fishing vessels, probability
of violation, etc. We have developed a number of coverage approaches, and cost
figures are set out in enclosure (5). The figures are based on recent data, but
costs are changing rapidly. Assumptions have been made with regard to the
availability for fisheries patrols of cutters and aircraft that must also serve
other Coast Guard missions.
The cost factors included in the estimates shown in enclosure (5) are those
relating to operating, activating, and procuring cutters and aircraft. Operating
and procurement costs are based on cutters and aircraft now in our inventory or at
such an advanced stage of planning that costs may be determined with a reason-
able degree of ceitainty. Operating costs are those associated with a 12-month
period when all the cutters and aircraft required for the enforcement approach are
available and operating. This will not be the case immediately upon implementa-
tion of any new legislation due to the delays in activating and procuring addi-
tional cutters and aircraft required to fully implement the approach adopted.
Two approaches to continuing coverage of a 200-mile zone have been developed
simply to demonstrate the costs involved. They serve no other purpose in our
planning considerations, and we do not feel that the very large expenditures
they require would be in the public interest. The first approach uses a mix of
high and medium endurance cutters on stations 60 miles apart along the 200-
mile perimeter. A mix of long and medium range aircraft would patrol the zone
twice a week. The second approach uses cutters every 400 miles along the 200-
mile perimeter on the theory that mosi: violators sighted by twice-weekly over-
flights could be boarded within 24 hours.
A third approach, which we favor, is based primarily on coverage of known
active fishing areas off our coasts. It is presently being used in our planning
with full recognition that it and its related costs are subject to many variables.
This planned approach would provide various levels of coverage of known active
fishing areas in eirect proportion to the experienced intensity of foreign fishing
mitivity, i.e. our enforcement efforts would concentrate on those areas where
and when the fishing, is actually being done. Enclosure (6) presents the experi-
enced variations in that activity over the last few years. In addition, some
coverage to the full range of our jurisdiction will be provided to determine if
changes in present patterns of fishing activity are occurring, to make our presence
known throughout the arca, and to facilitate apprehension. This approach would
be usable with any foreseeable extension of fisheries jurisdiction. It is, in fact,
useful now in planning our current effort to enforce our jurisdictional limits,
monitor compliar ce with international agreements, and keep informed on fishing
off our coasts.
If this approach were to be fully implemented, we will need to increase our
operating facilities by six high endurance cutters, six long range search aircraft,
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four medium range search aircraft, and then shipboard helicopters. To operate
these facilities will require an increase in our annual operating funds of $47.2 mil-
lion. The start up, acquisition and reactivation costs are estimated at $63.2 million.
Both costs are estimated in fiscal 1975 dollars. Details are shown in enclosure
(5). I would like to caution that these cost estimates are determined by both
the latest economic trends and acceptance of our coverage concept. For this
reason, the estimate must be used with care. If either the concept or the eco-
nomic trends change, the estimate will have to be adjusted accordingly.
The period immediately following an extension of jurisdiction presents par-
ticular difficulties in planning. Added to the unknowns such as the regulatory
scheme in effect and the probability of violation, there will be such other un-
knowns as the positions of various nations with regard to existing international.
agreements and the U.S. position with regard to any interim period and escalat-
ing enforcement measures. The time of year will also be important as demon-
strated by enclosure (6). We expect some cutter shortages until the ships we
now hold in reserve are reactivated. We also expect significant flight hour short-
ages until additional aircraft can be procured. Until this occurs, interim pro-
visions will have to be arranged to ensure adequate aerial surveillance. These
interim costs are not yet available. It should be noted that they are not included
in the estimates shown in enclosure (5).
We could respond to any extension of fisheries jurisdiction immediately by
using our active inventory of cutters and aircraft to best advantage by limiting
safe speeds only as necessary to maintain the desired range of operation with-
out regard to fuel cost. We could also overload our cutter crews for a period of
time. If the extension comes within the next two years, we will have in reserve
six high endurance cutters and a number of helicopters. The cutters could be
reactivated in six to eleven months. The first helicopter could be operational
in about six months. Costs of these actions are in enclosure (5).
A program breakdown of operating costs of cutters and aircraft used for
fisheries enforcement during fiscal 1973 is enclosed. Although several other cut-
ter types were used on fisheries patrols, their involvement was so slight that
they have not been included in the cost data provided. Indirect support costs
allocated to the program, e.g. shore stations, repair and training facilities, sup-
port 'staffing etc., are also not included.
I must correct one misimpression you expressed in your letter. We are not
in the process of acquiring any additional fisheries patrol vessels. The six old
high endurance cutters are being held in reserve as a stopgap measure for
fisheries patrols if an extension of jurisdiction comes within the next two years.
Normal planned cutter replacement will be required after that.
This is a difficult and complex issue which is complicated by rapidly increas-
ing prices. For this reason, I request the opportunity to revise the estimates
in light of the latest information available should you find need to use these
data in the future.
Sincerely,
0. W. SHER,
? Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard.
STATEMENT BY THE NATIONAL COALITION FOR MARINE CONSERVATION BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1974
The membership of the National Coalition for Marine Conservation is com-
posed of recreational marine fishermen, sportfishing clubs, commercial fishermen
and others interested in the preservation of the ocean's living resources. Although
the specific interests of some segments of the Coalition's membership are some-
times divergent, every segment of its membership shares the conviction that our
coastal fisheries are a natural asset of vital, strategic importance to the nation
that we must keep productive for future generations. Both the coastal commer-
cial fishing industry and the marine recreational fishing industry are dependent.
upon the maintenance of high levels of abundance of coastal species of finfish and
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shellfish. On a combined basis these industries generate annual revenues in the
order of 8 billion dollars and provide employment for a half million Americans.'
The National Marine Fisheries Service estimates that utilized pursuant to an
effective management regime the potential annual harvest of the coast fisheries
might be as much as 40 billion tons of seafood and fish products. In a world which
demand for food in beginning to outstrip production the importance of preserving
the regenerative capability of coastal marine resources cannot be overstated. The
productive capacity of marine resources is limited, and if the abundance of any
given species is reduced beyond a certain level, the ability of the species to re-
produce itself hi commercially harvestable qualities becomes impaired. This is
what is meant by the term "overfishing". Continued overfishing of a resource
Inevitably leads to severe and sometimes lasting damage. The total destruction
of the California sardine fishery is frequently cited as an example of the eco-
nomic extinction of a species caused by overfishing. Intensive fishing by foreign
fleets off the coastlines of the United States from Maine to Alaska is leading to
the rapid depletion of a number of commercially important fish some of which
are nearing the point of commercial extinction.
Voluminous testimony concerning the depressed condition of the coastal fish-
ing industry and the damage being wrought upon our coastal resources has been
presented to the Committee on Commerce. Your attention is respectfully called
in particular to the testimony of Jacob Dykstra, President of the Point Judith
Fisherman's Cooperative, Narragansett, Rhode Island, given on December 6, 1973,
Harold E. Lokken Manager of the Fishing Vessel Owners Association of Seattle,
Washington, given on February 14, 1974 and William Mustard, Executive Di-
rector of the National Federation of Commercial Fishermen, Washington, D.C.,
given before this Committee on October 11, 1974.
According to the National Marine Fisheries Service, "The volume of fish har-
vested off the U.S. coast has increased dramatically in 25 years from a level of
about 4.4 billion pounds in 1948 to about 11.1 billion pounds in 1972. Almost all
this additional catch has gone to foreigr. fishermen in their worldwide search for
further protein supplies. The growth in CIS. consumption has therefore been sup-
plied by imports". The arrival of fleets of foreign fishing vessels off U.S. shores
has greatly increased the number of vessels between which diminishing fisheries
stocks has to be divided greatly and the number of incidents between U.S. and
foreign fishermen. Recently a U.S. vessel was sunk by a Soviet or Soviet-bloc
ship escalating existing tensions and contributing to the potential for open con-
frontation.
Most of our coastal resources are being oxerexploited, and virtually all are fully
utilized. Since the resources are limited in that they cannot be exploited without
damage beyond a certain point, the only way to protect them is to find a means
of limiting participation in the various: fisheries. The history of fisheries man-
agement through international agreement inspires no confidence in State De-
partment promises to secure interim treaty solutions pending the successful out-
conic of the Law of the Seas Conference. In fact all of the machinery created by
the International Council for North Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAP), International
North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC), Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC). International Commission for the Conservation of At-
lantic Tuna (ICCAT) and many other bi-lateral and multi-lateral treaties has
been in existence throughout the period of the decline in the abundance of the
stocks they supposedly manage and conserve. The 12 mile limit is also ineffective
because, as pointed out by Mr. Dykstra, most of the target species of our coastal
fishermen migrate seasonally across the 12 mile limit to the outer edge of the
Continental Shelf.
In short, there can be no effective management without control of the resource.
Tho purpose of 11)88 is to establish the degree of control over the resource
without which there can be no effective management. The only significant differ-
ence between the provisions of S. 1988 and the draft fisheries treaty presented
In 1972 the vane of the catch landed by 150,000 fighermen employed in the coastal
fisheries exceeded $d00,000,000. which is approximately equivalent to $1.5 billion on the
retail market. In the same rear an estimated 12 I nillIon American anglers spent $2,5
billion to fish in salt water. These figures do not take into account the amount of invested
funds or number of persons employed in manufacturing, sales, distribution, transportation
and service related to the sports and coastal comnercial fishing indutry ; however. the
total revenues generated by one marine recreational fishing industry alone has been re-
sponsibly estimated at 5 billion dollars I
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to the Law of the Seas Conference in Caracas is the fact that S. 1988 would
annex the required jurisdiction to regulate fisheries by unilateral action while
the draft treaty would accomplish the same result by international agreement.
Spokesmen for the State Department, the Department of Defense, the tuna
industry and the shrimp and Pacific salmon industries have appeared before this
Committee to oppose the adoption of S. 1988. Two contentions are common to
all of their testimony : first, that unilateral action by the United States will
trigger unilateral extensions of territorial sovereignty by many other nations
and second, that unilateral action by the United States could undermine the
political compromise by which all nations would agree on a single package
treaty at the Law of the Seas Conference.
The spectre of "creeping jurisdiction" is alarming to the Defense Department
because it would tend to limit maximum mobility of our military forces in the
pursuit of their global defense mission. The State Department fears "a crazy
quilt of uncontrolled national claims . . . seriously harmful to our vital inter-
ests in both military and commercial navigation." Tunamen and shrimpers
say they are concerned that they will be excluded from fisheries within 200
miles of other nations and the salmon people believe that if we exclude the Japa-
nese from our coastal waters they will abrogate their agreements to abstain
from fishing for salmon on the high seas.
All of these contentions appear to be based upon the assumption that if the
Congress does not adopt S. 1988, other nations will not claim extended juris-
diction for any purpose, which is a very dubious assuniption, or upon the assump-
tion that having claimed exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a distance of 200 miles
from shore by the adoption of S. 1988, the United States will proceed to exclude
all foreign fishing within the management zone?a totally groundless assumption.
With respect to the first of these assumptions it should be pointed out that
the United States was among the last of the coastal nations to adopt a 12 mile
limit. The looming confrontation between coastal nations asserting the right to
protect contiguous fisheries and the distant-water fishing powers determined to
exploit the coastal fisheries of other nations led to the convening of the 1958
and 1960 Law of the Seas Conferences. Whatever else these Conferences may
have accomplished, they demonstrated broad acceptance of the concept of ex-
tended fisheries jurisdicton?at least to a distance of 12 miles. By the middle
of 1906 some 32 nations claimed fisheries jurisdiction of 12 miles or more. By
that time the rapid build up of foreign fishing fleets in the Northwest Atlantic
and Northeast Pacific had given new impetus in the United States for extended
limits, and the State Department finally withdrew its opposition to the proposal.
Two hundred mile limits are developing in a manner which closely parallels
the history of the 12 mile limit. By the beginning of 1973 at least 24 nations had
established territorial or fisheries jurisdiction limits of 50 miles or more. This
situation led to the convening of the Third Law of the Seas Conference in
Caracas where, according to the testimony of Ambassador John R. Stevenson,
given before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, there was a "strong
trend for acceptance of a 200 mile economic zone providing coastal states with
jurisdiction over coastal fisheries in a 200 mile area off their coast." It is this
general climate of acceptance that will encourage widespread adoption of the
200 mile limit by other nations. Whether or not the Congress adopts S. 1988, the
nations that intend to adopt a 200 mile limit will do so, because they learned
at Caracas that the rest of the world is ready to live with the 200 mile limit.
As to the second assumption, the assumption that adoption of S. 1988 will
mean the expulsion of all foreign fishing vessels from the fisheries zone which
will lead to retaliatory action harmful to our distant water fishing industry,
there is no language in S. 1988 that expresses or implies an intention to exclude
all foreign fishing from the management zone. Section 5(b) entitled "Foreign
Fishing Rights" provides that "the allowable level of traditional foreign fishing
shall be set upon the basis of the portion of any stock which cannot be harvested
by citizens of the United States". This is entirely consistent with the principle
of preferential rights of coastal states to coastal stocks embodied in the 1958
Geneva Convention on Fisheries and generally accepted in the international
community.
As a matter of fact there are many stocks which the domestic fishing industry
Is incapable of utilizing to the point of optimum sustainable yield at this time;
there are some stocks that may be restored in a few years to a level of abundance
that will sustain harvests in excess of domestic capacity; and there are some
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stocks as to which there Is no significant commercial market in the United
States. An such stocks represent opportunities for continued foreign fishing. In
addition, it is inevitable that entry to the management zone will be used as an
inducement in negotiations for concessions from other nations concerning
anadromous and migratory species.
Among the objectives specified in Section 6(a) of S. 1988 are "enhancement
of total national and international world food supply . . . maximum feasible
utilization (consistent with) protection of the ecosystem which fish are a part,
conservation of stocks and effectuation of the purposes stated in Section 2(b) (4)
of this Act". Section 2(b) (4) calls for the development and implementation
within two years of the date of enactment of S. 1988 of the best practicable
management system "consistent with the interests of the Nation, the several
States and of other nations". Thus the language of the Act itself rebuts the
assumption that the intent of the Act is to exclude foreign fishing.'
in the world would be devastating to military mobility. It would result in pro-
hibition of overflight by aircraft and submerged operation of submarines except
at the sufference of a coastal state in almost forty percent of what is now
internally recognized as high seas."
General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified that
"The effect of a 200 mile territorial sea extending off the coasts of many nation s
In addition to the assumption that other nations will not adopt 200 mile limits
if the Congress does not adopt S. 1988, this assertion contains the suggestion
that if the Congress adopts S. 1988, the United States must abandon its tradi-
tional insistence upon the right of free passage, The basis for this suggestion
is unclear because the scope of S. 1988 is specifically limited by Section 2(c) (3)
which provides that "it is further declared to be the policy of the Congress in
this Act ? . . to authorize no impediment or interference with the legal status of
the high seas, except with respect to the extent necessary to implement this
Act". Therefor if adoption of S. 1988 would act in effect as an estoppel to our
right to object the claimed jurisdiction of other coastal nations, that estoppel
is limited to acts interfering with the legal status of the high seas to a degree
of no greater consequence than the assertion of the right to manage fisheries
on an interim emergency basis, and the United States would remain logically
and morally free to continue to oppose unilateral claims interfering with freedom
of navigation and freedom of overflight.
In its statements concerning its requirements with respect to freedom of
navigation, the Defense Department has infiltrated a number of concepts which
are basically alien to the traditionally accepted meaning of the term. In a
recently published paper Dr. Robert E. Osgood, Dean of the John Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies,' points out that the generally accepted con-
cept of innocent passage relates to commercial vessels; nevertheless, as used by
the Defense Department it refers to a claimed right of secret passage under the
high seas and through international straits Without which "both the survivability
and utility of our nuclear deterrent" are threatened. Dr. Osgood's scholarly
analysis concludes that for the purposes of the nuclear deterrent the entire
U.S.S.R. can be targeted from the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Arabian
Sea without transit through international straits which could be closed as a
result of a genaral 200 mile extensions of national sovereignty; that military
requirements are overstated; and that submerged transit through international
straits should not be considered a non-negotiable item inhibiting international
agreement on ocean use.
The second proposition articulated by most opponents to the adoption of
S. 1988 is that adoption of S. 1988 will so weaken the United States negotiating
posture at the Law of the Seas Conference as to threaten the successful outcome
of the Conference. Referring to the Law of the Seas Conference, John Norton
Nfoore told this Committee that "we have reached a rare and perhaps fleeting
moment in history when there is opportunity for all nations to agree on a
comprehensive legal regime for over two-thirds of the earth's surface".
2 The current version of this bill pending in the House (H.R. 9136) does not contain
I he language quoted hereinabove however, it does provide in 'Section 4(a) (2) that the
Secretary of the Treasury may authorize foreign vessels to fish within the zone "upon
determining, fater consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Com-
merce, that such fishing would not result in deplelion of such fish beyond the level neces-
sary for proper conservation purposes."
"U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law," Ocean Development and Internationa Law.
The Journal of Marine Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1974.
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A less enthusiastic reporter for the Wall Street Journal concluded that "after
7 days of talk about a law to govern use of the oceans and their resources, the
conference is making only one decision: to hold more conferences". Indeed
any other result would be more surprising. Of the 149 nations taking part in
the deliberations more than 50 states have never participated in a Law of the
Seas Conferences. According to Senator Stevens of Alaska, "most new partici-
pants are developing nations, newly independent, which have only recently
turned their attention to Law of the Seas issues. They mistrust the motives of
developed nations and doubt their own present ability to discern their future
national interest in Law of the Seas issues. Many have, therefore, taken highly
nationalistic and secure positions which are, unfortunately, quite unacceptable
to developed maritime nations, such as the United States".
A further impediment to swift action, or indeed to any action, by the Law
of the Seas Conference is that more than 80 issues are under consideration. On
July 11 Ambassador Stevens stated that the United States would accept nothing
less than a single comprehensive treaty resolving all of the issues before the
Conference. Senators Case, Muskie, Pell and Stevens came away from Caracas
convinced that this would take a very long time to accomplish. Thus while Mr.
Moore, General Brown, and Messrs. Carry and Felando, representatives of the
tuna industry, allege that S. 1988 undermines the United States' position at the
Law of the Seas Conference and the likelihood of the Conference resulting in
an acceptable agreement, it appears to others that that likelihood of the Con-
ference resulting in an acceptable agreement was remote to begin with and
made more so by the State Department's insistence upon a single comprehensive
treaty.
Of all the subject matter to which issues before the Conference relate only
the fisheries are endangered by further protracted deliberation and delay. There
is every logical reason why these should be treated separately and expeditiously.
The refusal of the State Department to accede to this obvious imperative casts
doubt upon the sincerity of its many reassurances to the coastal fishing indus-
try and justifies the suspicion that fisheries issues are low on the State Depart-
ment's order of priorities.
Opponents of S. 1988 frequently allege that adoption of S. 1988 would abro-
gate the 1958 Geneva Conventions on Fishing. This is undoubtedly true, but
there is considerable difference of opinion as to the significance of the 1958
Geneva Convention on Fishing. To begin with only a relatively few nations
signed and ratified the 1958 Convention and of these that did only the United
States can be counted a major fishing power. Moreover, no specific limit on
either fisheries jurisdiction or the territorial sea was achieved by the Conven-
tion. In 1958 few could have foreseen the rapid evolution of fisheries tech-
nology and the vast build-up of distant water fishing fleets which has produced
a capability by concentrations of intensive effort to deplete fisheries within a
short period of time. Clearly, the Convention is of no effect between non-signers
or between a signer and a non-signer. It is no longer certain that the Convention
is binding upon the nations which signed it. An international convention, after
all, is no more than an attempt to codify generally accepted international cus-
tom. Inasmuch as a majority of nations did not sign the 1958 Convention, it
cannot be said that the principles of the Convention represented generally ac-
cepted international custom, during the period that the Convention was open
for signing.
In addition, approximately 36 nations have declared exclusive fisheries zones
beyond 12 miles and we have Ambassador Stevens' statement that upwards of
100 nations represented at Caracas expressly endorsed a 12 mile territorial sea
with an economic zone extending to 200 miles, all of which would appear to
Indicate that whatever the custom may have been in 1958 it now no longer con-
forms to the principles set forth in the 1958 Convention. The calling of the Third
Law of the Seas Conference is further evidence of that fact.
Turning now to the specific concerns of our distant water fishing industry, it
is patent that these concerns are legitimate, if perhaps somewhat overstated
There is no doubt that an increasing number of nations will claim the right to
regulate fisheries within 200 miles of their seacoasts and it is probable that most
regulations will be imposed with a view to raising revenue rather than conserv-
ing the stocks concerned. Many Latin American nations have already acted in this
respect. Many African nations will undoubtedly follow their example, and they
will do so whether or not the Congress adopts S. 1988. The Brazilian Shrimp
Act demonstl'ates that the requirements of other coastal nations can be satisfied
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by international agreement. If such arrangements are in effect a form of sub..
sidization of our offshore fishing industry, such a subsidy is more than justified
by the economic benefits which will result from a healthy offshore industry. Such
arrangements will not cure the problem of over-capitalization facing the offshore
fishing industry which must not be allowed to result in overfishing of migratory
stocks, or lead to unjustified claims as to underutilized stocks in the coastal
waters of other nations or in the high seas.
The specific claim of the salmon industry is somewhat different in that it pre-
sumes that unilateral action by this country will lead to the abrogation of
Japanese abstention agreements. With Japan, however, there is a direct trade-off
which should enable the negotiation of an agreement permitting entry into the
management zone in return for continued abstention from fishing for salmon on
the high seas. This point was covered exhaustively by Mr. Lokken before the
Senate Commerce Committee.
Because the Japanese, like the Soviets, have a superior understanding of fish-
eries population dynamics and the adverse impact of continuous overfishing, and
because they ha-ie more to lose than most other nations in the event that any
major fishery is totally destroyed, it is unlikely that the enforcement of fisheries
management regulation will lead to the type of confrontation or the build-up of
international tensions alluded to by the opponents of S. 1988. Such tensions and
the potential for such confrontations already exist in some degree and threaten
to increase whether or not S. 1988 is adopted. The Japanese and the Soviets are
willing to accep.: the risk during the period prior to the creation of exclusive
fisheries zones by unilateral action or by international agreement partially be-
cause of the investment tied up in excessively large fishing fleets. However,
Soviet and Japanese planners cannot be unaware of the general move toward
extended jurisdiction. Also it is likely that in view of the depleted state of most
fisheries operation of such fleets can no longer be justified economically.
In summary tie Coalition contends that the preservation of our coastal marine
resources are more vital 1:o our national interests than the overstated and unsup-
ported contentions made by the State Department and the Defense Department
and does not, in fact, jeopardize either our international relations or our stra-
tegic defense. To the contrary, the Congress should recognize that the continued
pendancy of S. 1988 has been one of the most positive and constructive forces im-
pinging upon international negotiations concerning ocean use. It must remain for
the Congress to countermand the continued inflexibility and short-sighted plan-
ning which have characterized international policy for many years and con-
tributed materially to the decline of our nation's acceptance as a world leader
and as a global ?Dolitical and economic force. S. 1988 should be considered as an
opportunity for the Congress to exercise leadership in World affairs by enacting
an exemplary 200 mile limit measure.
RESPONSE OF THE NATIONAL COALITION POR MARINE CONSERVATION TO QUESTIONS
STTEMITTED BY THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COIVIMITTEE
Question. In what specific ways will this legislation promote fishery conserva-
tion?
This legislation will create the legal authority without which no meaningful
conservation can be imposed or enforced. Virtually all coastal fisheries lie within
the contiguous fishery zone established by Section 4(a) of the Act. Virtually all
previous attempts to manage high seas fisheries by international agreement have
failed for lack of enforcement authority. Enforcement authority, otherwise re-
ferred to as "control of the resource" has repeatedly been proved to be the key
to successful fisheries management.
By operation of Section 5 foreign fishing rights with respect to any given stock
are subordinated first to overall conservation considerations and second to the
preferential rights of U.S. citizens. The Secretary of Commerce is directed to
determine the optimum sustainable yield for any given stock on the basis of the
best available scientific information and then to allocate the amount by which
optimum sustainable yield exceeds the U.S. catch among foreign fishing fleets on
the basis of traditional fishing interests. Specifically, then, this will limit the
total catch to the level of optimum sustainable yield.
The Act also creates a Fisheries Management Council for the purpose of de-
veloping a management scheme (Section 6) and directs the Secretary of State
to seek supplementary solutions by international agreement (Section 7).
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The immediate conservation benefit relates to the coastal fisheries. The Act
recognizes that the Congress cannot claim jurisdiction over anadromous and
migratory species within the territorial waters or contiguous fishery zone of any
other nation. For the most part, treaty arrangements, the authority of which
supercede the provision of the Act, supposedly control fishing rights to such
species. The purpose of Section 7 is to encourage the expansion of the scope
and effect such treaty arrangements.
Question. How soon can this legislation be expected to have a significant
impact on fishery conservation?
The leadership of the National Coalition for Marine Conservation is firmly
of the opinion that this legislation has already had a significant impact on
fishery conservation which will be greatly magnified immediately upon the
adoption of this legislation. Other nations negotiating fisheries treaties with the
United States are and have been aware that S. 1988 is pending in the Senate
and that although it is contested it has attracted substantial support. The
pendancy of and support for S. 1988 is a clear signal to such nations that there
is a growing concern within the Congress and the nation for this long-neglected
area. The same knowledge and awareness has stimulated a response from the
State Department which although largely misdirected and mostly ineffectual to
date could in view of the more realistic response by other nations lead to some
improvement in international arrangements relating to fisheries.
Section 2(b) (4) calls for the development and implementation of a manage-
ment system within two years of the enactment of S. 1988. This provision seems
to have given rise to the misconception evident in some testimony relating to
the Act that there will be a 2-year lag between the adoption of the Act and its
impact upon fishery conservation. Actually, all foreign fishing except as per-
mitted by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to the Act is outlawed 90 days
after adoption of the Act (Section 5(e) ) and at the same time the rule-making
authority of Section 4(3) (d) becomes vested in the Secretary.
As a practical matter most of the critically depleted fisheries are subject to
treaties which supercede the Act, so that technically the impact of the legisla-
tion would be deferred until such treaties expired or were terminated. However,
inasmuch as the adoption of S. 1988 will completely reverse the bargaining posi-
tion of the United States with respect to international fishing rights within the
contiguous zone, the impact of the Act on fishery conservation would be imme-
diate for all intents and purposes.
Question. How effective do you expect enforcement of any conservation meas-
ures to be under S. 1988?
The effectiveness of the enforcement of conservation measures depends in part
upon the effectiveness of the conservation measures and in part upon the effort
expanded in enforcement.
To be effective, conservation measures must be tailored to the state of the
stock sought to be conserved and to the techniques and capabilities of the in-
dustry harvesting the stock. Whether these criteria are achieved depends upon
the success of the rule-making effort under the Act, but so long as the regulators
seek to limit total effort to levels which species within a given area can with-
stand, conservation measures should be effective and easy to enforce. Because of
the hi-catch problems of mixed species, regulations seeking to set quotas on
a per-specie basis will be very difficult to comply with and nearly impossible
to monitor or enforce.
Recent increases in inspection efforts under international treaties presently
regulating coastal fisheries have turned up an increased number of violations.
There is no evidence to indicate that increased efforts has reduced the over-all
number of violations of fisheries regulations within regulated fisheries nor have
we enough information to permit us to guess what level of enforcement effort
is required in order to achieve a level of compliance that results in effective
conservation. On the other hand, there is every reason to expect that adoption
of S. 1988 will immediately result in a reduction of foreign effort within the
contiguous fishing zone simplifying the enforcement problem.
State Department spokesmen are fond of comparing our fisheries problems
to the early days of oil drilling. Before spacing and allowables regulations were
imposed, economics favored the operator who could extract the most oil from
the pool?however wasteful that might be in terms of the total amount of oil
that could be pumped from the pool. Similarly where there is no management
scheme, operators will compete to seek out and destroy the most fish without
regard to future abundance. The economic consequences of this course of action
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are already becoming apparent to the large fleet operators. It is becoming
increasingly difficult to justify the large investment in distant water fish:ng
vessels in terns of the diminishing amounts of harvestable protein. The essen-
tial economic fact of fisheries that have been overfished is that an increase in
effort does not result in a corresponding increase in yield. For this reason the
fishing power 3 are already grappling with the necessity to redeploy or reduce
their fishing efforts in several fisheries within the contemplated contiguous
fishery zone. To the extent that these realities are already recognized and the
need for management accepted the task of imposing and enforcing a reasonable
and effective management regime is made easier.
Re S. 1988.
Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, 11.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR STENNIS : Our office represents the menhaden fishing industry,
whose members on a volume basis harvest 40-45 percent of the total catch and
landings of all fish and shell fish harvested by U.S. fishermen, including that of
both our coastal and distant water fishermen. Attached is further background
information on this fishery.
We were n3t advised that witnesses from the fishing industry could testify
at the hearings conducted by your Committee last Friday on S. 1988. Apparently
some segments were invited and did testify. We would have welcomed an oppor-
tunity to appear and present our views on this most important legislation. As
we did not have the opportunity to do so, I respectfully ask you and other mem-
bers of the Armed Services Committee to read and consider the views and
suggestions of our segment of the fishing industry with respect to S. 1988, as
briefly outlined herein,
The Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 1988, printed
August 8, 1974, clearly sets forth its findings on the damage and destruction
that has been inflicted on U.S. coastal fisheries and fishery resources over the
past decade by the unrestricted fishing of the large foreign fishing fleets I
attended many of the hearings held by the Committee, including those held in
Alaska, and found the proposed legislation strongly supported by most coastal
fishermen and the various coastal State Fishery Agencies, which have the
responsibility for conservation and management of these fishery resources and
by conservation groups. Like these, NFMOA is strong in support of its passage.
Even spokesmen for the Federal Agencies of Government who are strongly
opposed to S. 1988 do not dispute the findings of the Committee with respect to.
the over fishing and destruction of the fishery and coastal fishery resources by
the foreign fleets. In fact, some have privately said that because of the run-down
condition of the various segments of the U.S. coastal fleets and the depleted
status of the fish stocks, it is questionable if the fishermen would be able to
replace their rundown vessels and gear bark up for fishing, even if the foreign
fleets are removed, or their fishing operations curtailed.
With this kind of indifference towards our coastal fisheries, the view hits been
expressed by some of these officials that the U.S. can afford to withstand the
continued uncontrolled fishing pressure of these large fleets for several years,
if it takes tha-, long, in the interest of making further effort to reach agreement
on a fisheries Convention and the other issues before the Law of the Sea Con-
ference. It seems to me that this kind of reasoning and policy does not provide
much hope for the future welfare of our coastal fishermen, or for the fishery
resources themselves, which are in such critical need of protection before these
fish stocks are wiped out as resources of economic importance and food value.
I know the members of Congress who hive conducted or participated in the
Hearings this Pall on S. 1988 and the companion Bills in the House are aware of
the optimism government witnesses appearing before these Committees have
expressed about reaching agreement on a package deal next year at Geneva on
all of the highly controversial issues that are before the Conference. I would
like to be able to share. that kind of optimism, but, for a number of reasons, I
THE NATIONAL FISH MEAL & OIL ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D.C., October 17, 1974.
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cannot, when considering the varied interests of 148 nations participating, their
expressed positions, the status of some of their present ocean uses and the benefit
they would expect to accrue to them in the development of a world agreement
covering all the interests involved in such a Convention. Not only is it to cover
the renewable and non-renewable marine resources of the waters and seabeds,
but would include and require agreement on such issues as the breadth of the
Territorial Sea, navigation and over flights of the narrow Straits and sea lanes
by commercial and naval vessels, including warships and submarines, and by
airplanes?both commercial and military?pollution control, scientific research,
and a number of other broad issues that are important and controversial.
Considering just the question of fisheries, we should realize that with few
exceptions the nations with the large over seas fleets such as the USSR, Japan,
Poland, East Germany and others that conduct fishing operations on the high
seas off the shores of other countries, with few exceptions, are presently enjoying
freedom of fishing for their fleets. Largely this same situation prevails with
respect to the U.S. overseas tuna fleet, but with the added protection whereby
the U.S. taxpayer pays for any fines, license fees and lost fishing time that the
tuna vessels encounter as a result of being seized by foreign countries off whose
coasts they fish.
Government witnesses have said that the provisions of S. 1988 are quite
similar to the draft Articles on Fisheries tabled by the U.S. last summer in
Caracas.
Even so, most of us are familiar with the all-out effort of the U.S. tuna and
shrimp industries with overseas fishing fleets to have S. 1988 defeated. If this is
an example of the kind of effort the nations with the large overseas fishing
fleets mentioned above will organize at Geneva next year to forestall agreement
on a world convention on fisheries that would hamper their present fishing opera-
tions, I can foresee there will be very little chance of reaching an agreement.
It is inconceivable to me that these nations, or for that matter the tuna in-
dustry, will go into the Law of the Sea Conference and negotiate away the fish-
ing rights and other benefits they now e,ajoy, and by so doing, put aside for all
times the concept of freedom of fishing on the high seas which they otherwise
could continue to use to their great advantage. In many ways this concept is now
being used to the great advantage of the overseas fleets in gaining access to the
coastal fishery resources off other nations, or in getting license fees, fines, and
lost fishing time paid for when vessels are arrested by foreign nations.
As for the nations that presently claim jurisdiction over fisheries in the area
from 50 to 200 miles off their shores (16 nations) and their strong supporters,
which account for a large majority of the developing coastal nations participat-
ing in the Law of the Sea Conference, they will not willingly or likely, in my
view, accept a Convention on the living and non-living marine resources that
does not give them absolute, or at least substantial control over these resources
in the so-called 200 Mile Economic Zone off their coasts. They also have many
other interests in the issues before the Conference which this large group of de-
veloping nations have been able to stick together on as a group, and which have
to be reckoned with before an agreement acceptable to the developed nations
can be reached.
Ever since the first Preparatory Conference on Law of the Sea was held sev-
eral years ago, those of us who attended recognize that a stalemate has developed
and dragged on year after year because of the strongly opposing positions taken
by the various nations. In my view this will continue in 1975, and perhaps for
years to come if this is the only course the U.S. Is willing to pursue.
Last year, for the first time, the U.S., Russia, the UK, France, Poland, East
Germany, and some of the other countries with overseas fishing fleets (not
Japan), agreed to the "concept" of a 200 mile economic coastal zone. This action
for the first time established a common ground on which the Delegations at
the Conference could meet and, perhaps, negotiate Treaty Articles for the Zone.
The differences among the nations as mentioned above are quite wide, and little
progress was made on this issue.
In my view, the introduction of S. 1988 and the companion Bills in the
House and the subsequent holding of hearings on these Bills in Washington and
in widely scattered coastal areas throughout the U.S. have had a most signifi-
cant bearing on the acceptance of the 200 mile economic zone concept by the
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U.S. and the other nations referred to above at the Caracas Conference last
summer. The problem now is to prDvide further incentive that will cause the
Conference to go forward and spell out an acceptable set of Articles that a large
majority of the nations can agree upon and which will provide a workable k et
of rules for all nations with respect to the oceans. I strongly believe the passage
of S. 1988 would have an important bearing on accomplishing this ob:ective.
Without its passage the stalemate at, the Law of the Sea Conference most: likely
will continue. In the meantime, the fishing pressure from the large fishing
fleets will continue off our shores, thus precluding any relief for the rebuilding
of those coastal fish stocks already depleted or seriously damaged, and allow
depletion of other stocks that remain.
Finally, our group feels that S. 1988 applies solely to fisheries jurisdiction,
as did S. 2218, the legislation passed in 1966, which unilaterly established a
contiguous fishery zone of 9 miles beyond the Territorial Sea. We do not recall
any adverse rmercussion from the passage of that legislation, either from a
military or defense standpoint, or from any other. We, therefore, do not under-
stand why the Departments of State and Defense take the position they dc about
the adverse impact the passage of S. 1988 would have on U.S. relations and
defense.
Respectfully submitted.
Sincerely yours,
J. STEELE CULBERTSON, Director.
Enclosure.
THE MENHADEN FISHERY AND INDUSTRY
The menliadm industry has a history of more than 100 years. The fishery
extends along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts from Maine to Texas. It provides
direct employment for approximate 6,000 fishermen and shoreside workers and is
the only major segment: of the U.S. :fishing industry whose fishermen and plant
employees are mostly blacks. In addition to the direct employment, the :fishe:Ty
generates employment for thousands of additional workers in the shipyards ar d
in other industries supplying nets, rope, fuel, transportation, vessel and plant
equipment, etc.
The menhaden itself is a herring like fish but it is so bony and oily that it is
not desirable as an edible species. Instead, it is processed into fish meal, fish
oil and condensed fish solubles. The fish meal and condensed fish solubles are
high quality animal proteins that are used as ingredients in the manufacture
of poultry and animal feeds. Menhaden fish oil constitutes one of the U.S. most
important fishery export item, mostly to Europe, where it is manufactured into
margarines and shortenings.
TUNA RESEARCH FOUNDATION INC.,
Terminal Island, Calif., October 25, 1974.
Senator Jou 0. STENNIS,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Senate Office Building, Wash-
ington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR STENNIS : MT. Charles It. Carry testified before the Committee
on Armed Services in Washington, D.C. on Friday, October 11, 1974 in reference
to S. 1988. In addition, he submitted a supplemental statement on October 17,
1974 regarding this matter of extreme interest to our tuna industry.
Mr. Carry has requested that I contact you and request to have placed in the
record of those hearings, if possible, the enclosed copy of the report entitled,
"The Potential 'Economic Impact of a 200-Mile Fishery Zone on the United States
Fisheries for Tuna, Shrimp and Salmon".
We would appreciate any consideration you may give us in this regard.
Sincerely yours,
DOYLE E. GATES,
Assistant Eoecutive Director.
Enclosure.
Senator likicTisrryi/F. If there are any other witnesses here that were
hoping to testify, I am sorry, we will take your written testimony. If
not, we will accept statements on this issue, S. 1988, until October 18.
The committee meeting is adjourned. ,
[Whereupon, at 12 :30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
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THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A 200-MILE FISHERY ZONE
ON THE UNITED STATES FISHERIES FOR TUNA, SHRIMP AND SALMON
Gordon C. Broadhead and
Charles J. Peckham
INTRODUCTION
The United States tuna fleet takes about 90 percent
of its catch in waters off foreign shores. It is the
Industry view that declaration of a 200-mile zone by
the United States would terminate these fishing
activities as they exist today. Countries off whose
shores tuna are found may be expected to follow the
United States lead and the result will be the creation of
a series of national lakes through which the tuna move
indiscriminately. This would seriously disrupt the
United States fishing and processing operations and the
entire industry infrastructure. The present
international conservation and management regimes in
the eastern Pacific and Atlantic will be threatened.
The United States distant-water shrimp catch
represents about one-sixth of the total value of the
United States shrimp landings and about one-quarter of
the value of the United States harvest from the Gulf of
Mexico and contiguous fishing areas. The shrimp
industry believes that declaration of a 200-mile zone
by the United States would weaken seriously the
present arrangements which permit United States
vessels access to these distant water resources. If the
distant-water fleet was required to return to the United
States Gulf of Mexico grounds, where the shrimp
stocks are utilized fully, a serious overexploitation
problem could develop rapidly. This would have a
direct and disastrous economic impact on the entire
industry.
The United States salmon industry is concerned that
/--?unr
thing urine resources, Inc.
Prepared at the direction
of Tuna Research Foundation
June, 1974
a declaration of a 200-mile zone by the United States
would place the present north Pacific salmon
management system in serious jeopardy, endanger the
resources and reduce substantially the United States
catches of salmon. A 200-mile zone does not protect
adequately the United States salmon stocks.
The potential catch of salmon by the present
Japanese high seas fleet operating in the Gulf of Alaska
beyond 200 miles during April, May and early June,
could reach 23.5 million fish, valued at $105.8 million
based 'on 1973 price levels. Two-thirds of these fish
would be of United States and the remainder of
Canadian origin. Under the present International North
Pacific Fisheries Convention, Japanese fishermen take
about 3.5 million salmon of North American origin
annually.
Thus, the three major United States domestic
fisheries, tuna, salmon and shrimp, in the opinion of
knowledgeable industry representatives, will be
seriously impacted by the extension of United States
fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. These industries are
the perennial leaders in total value among all United
States domestic fisheries, and during 1973 returned a
combined value of $480 million to United States
fishermen; 53 percent of the total value of all United
States production. More importantly, tuna and shrimp
provide the rare examples among the major world
fisheries where the United States has a clear lead in
fishing, processing and marketing technology.
United States fisheries have the image of an obsolete
group of small vessels manned by an old and fading
group of fishermen. In the case of tuna and shrimp
nothing could be further from the truth. Our modem
fleet of tuna seiners represents an efficient and
prestigious element in world fishing circles unmatched
by the Soviets, Japan or any of the other major fishing
nations and our shrimp vessel designs set world
standards for that type of gear.
United States consumers constitute the major world
market for tuna, salmon and shrimp products and any
major reduction in domestic supplies of these
commodities will have a serious secondary impact upon
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supporting industries and place a heavy cost burden
upon the United States consumers.
The following study was prepared to provide an
economic yardstick, wherever data was available, of the
value of these major fishing industries at three levels:
the vessels and their supporting infrastructure, the
processors and their allied suppliers and the United
States consumer who ultimately provides the economic
support for the total system.
TUNA
The United States tur a industry is a large, healthy
and growing segment of the United States economy.
The general well being of an industry often can be
measured by the flow of capital into its various
component parts. Tuna ve ssels presently represent over
30 percent of the total replacement value of the entire
United States fishing fleet. More importantly, tuna
represents a major growth industry. A recent study of
financing and the United 3tates fisheries indicated that
during 1972, 53 percent of all the dollars expended for
new fishing vessels went into tuna operations. A similar
percentage was indicated for 1973. Thus, during the
2
past two years, the tuna industry has accounted for
more than 50 percent of the dollar flow in Riling
vesael construction in the United States.
At present construction costs, the United States
tuna fleet has a replacement value of just under 3500
mi lion, partitioned by area and type of operation as
shown in Table 1.
That year, United States shipyards constructe 1 an
estimated $72.5 million worth of tuna vessels ($66.1
million domestic and $6.4 million for export). Of this
total revenue, about $36.0 million went to direct and
indirect labor and social benefits for employees of the
yards and their subcontractors. An additional 16.4
million went to suppliers of steel, $4.9 million to retain
engine manufacturers, $5.1 million to net end fluting
gear suppliers and $8.0 million to suppliers of pc.wer
blacks, winches, hydraulics, refrigeration units,
electronics, auxiliary engines and generator equipment.
13ased upon the present firm orders in Uneted States
yards, this level of tuna vessel construction Ls forecast
to continue through 1976 and will add more than $200
million in modern vessels to the fleet during this
period.
In 1973, the United States tuna fleet landed 543
Table 1
Replacement Value if United States 71ina Fleet as of December, 1973
At Present Construction Costs (April, 1974)
Area
U.S. West Coast
Puerto Rico
Hawaii
U.S. East Coast
Long-Range
$211,000,000
143,000,000
$499,500,000
Short Range
$140,000,000
3,500,000
2,000,000
During 1973 alone (Table 2) there were 73 tuna vessels, with a value of $66.1 million added to the fleet.
Table 2
Number, 7'ype and Value of United States Tuna Fleet Additions 1973
TYPe
Purse-Seiners
Baitboats
'Trollers
Number
Value
18
$57,600,000
15
5,300,001)
40
3,200,000
73
$66,100,000
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million pounds of tuna (including bonito), worth $135
million at the dock. Some $14 million of this went to
the albacore fleet and the remainder to the tropical
tuna vessels. These latter vessels fished almost entirely
off foreign shores in national and International waters.
A major share, about $65 million, of the total dollars
went for crew wages and bonuses. Most of these dollars
flowed into the economy of southern California, where
many of the fishermen and their families reside. In
addition, a myriad of manufacturing and supply and
service firms shared in the fleet revenue. Many fuel
docks in San Diego, San Pedro, Ponce, Mayaguez and
San Juan shared most of the $11 million the fleet
expended for fuel during 1973. Some ten shipyards
shared nearly $10 million in maintenance and repair
support to the fleet, in addition to $72.5 million in
new vessel construction.
Many small provisioners shared the $5.4 million
spent by the fleet for food during 1973. In addition,
the fleet spent more than $2 million on fishing gear,
equipment and supplies during the year. Insurance
firms received about $8 million in premiums for hull,
protection and indemnity and cargo insurance. This
coverage was shared among many agents and reinsurers
throughout the country.
Lending institutions: commercial banks, insurance
companies, finance companies and leasing companies
received an estimated $17.5 million in interest, rentals
and service charges from the vessel owners during
1973. In all, an impressive number of people and jobs
are directly related to the tuna fleet or their customers
who comprise the primary support elements. The
industry survey has indicated that the tuna fleet
provided direct employment for about 6,800 people
with a payroll of about $65 million during 1973. In
addition, shore support for the fleet, shipyard
employees and their subcontractors provided about
5,000 additional jobs and a payroll of approximately
$48 million last year.
Economists project that each dollar of primary
industry income results in fivefold impact on our
nation's economy. Thus, in 1973 the tuna fleet support
of $135 million, combined with the new construction
of $72.5 million, a total of $207.5 million, had an
impact of over $1 billion (multiple of five) on the
United States economy. Obviously, the new
construction portion of this figure cannot be expected
to continue indefinitely (although a sustained rate
through 1976 is anticipated), but the fleet operations,
which comprise two-thirds of the total dollar volume
represent a rapidly expanding economic base.
During 1973, the United States tuna processing
industry packed $714.5 million (at processor level) of
canned tuna, in addition to $33.4 million of tuna
petfood products and $23.0 million of tuna fish meal,
oil and solubles. The mere existence of the tuna
industry provides the opportunity for these latter
operations as they would otherwise not be viable.
To process this volume, the industry has made
major capital investments in tuna processing
machinery, equipment and infrastructure. One large
new processing plant was constructed in 1971 in
Puerto Rico at a cost of $10 million and a total of $30
million is projected for investment in two new facilities
at San Diego and American Samoa by 1975. Recent
construction and engineering projections for the two
new facilities indicate that a tuna cannery and support
facilities require about $75,000 of capital investment
for each ton of canning capacity per eight hour day of
operation.
Currently the tuna industry has plant capacity to
process about 3,650 tons of raw material per day on a
one-shift basis. Thus, replacement value of all the
United States tuna canning and support facilities can
be estimated at $274 million ($75,00 x 3,650). During
1973 the tuna processors spent $135 million for
domestic-caught raw material. The transportation of
import frozen tuna and the transshipment of
domestic-caught fish via common carrier added
substantially to the processing costs for canned tuna.
Many nations share in the tuna export market to the
United States. During 1973, 413,000 tons of import
tuna and 8,000 tons of transshipped fish were delivered
to United States canners at an average shipping cost of
about $100 per ton and a total cost of about $42
million.
The tuna processing plants employed a total of
about 16,000 people in administrative and factory
tasks during 1973. Total payroll was in excess of $90
million and provided economic support for San Diego,
San Pedro-Los Angeles harbor areas; Ponce and
Mayaguez, Puerto Rico; American Samoa; Honolulu;
Astoria, Oregon and Cambridge, Maryland. During
1973, the tuna processing industry spent about $58
million for cans for tuna and petfood and an additional
$12 million for labels, cartons and vegetable oil.
Processors in American Samoa depend largely upon
supplies of tuna from Korean and Taiwanese longline
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vessels fishing the south Pacific grounds. Figure 1
indicates that a major portion of the south Pacific tuna
grounds would be encompassed by 200-mile zones
around the many island areas. Enforcement of the
fishing rights could eliminate this fishery or
substantially raise operational costs and ultimately
prices for raw material. In American Samoa, the tuna
industry and support industries provide the major labor
base for the area, aside from civil service, so that
disruption of fishing in the south Pacific could result in
job losses and/or increased costs to be passed along to
the United States consume].
The United States consumed 50 percent of the
world supply of tuna during 1973 (Figure 2) and the
,1GUPE 2
!INIT. STATES ARKET , NO 1 TO
31-197
d
1'1/1 1973
market has sustained a six percent volume and a 13
percent value growth rate during the past ten years.
The retail value of United States carned tuna usage
during 1973 was in excess of $ I billion. Projection of
the historic rate of annual growth of 15 percent in
dollar value results in an estimated retail value of
canned tuna in the United States of 51.78 billion by
1978 and $3.66 billion by 1983.
Domestic fishing activities have expanded rapidly
(Figure 3) and maintained a 40 percent share of the
United States market fcr canned tuna. The United
States is not self-sufficient in raw material for canning,
nor can it ever hope to be. Howe5er, the flow of
domestic fish provides ins efficient mechanism to
4
F,,,URE 3
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF TUNA
19,3-1971
(Round 4inaghe ?
t,o
o'r , ?
1953 1965 196,
moderate the price demands by foreign producers for
fencers tuna. A rough parallel may be drawn between
the need to control energy supplies and the neeC, to
control our sources of raw tuna. If the United Stites
tuna fishing fleet is crippled economically and/or
owners are forced to sell their vessels to foreign
interests, raw tuna prices may escalate to multOles
recently experienced in the oil industry. Such a rise
could result in an additional price tag of one or two
billion dollars per year to the American consumer on a
continuing basis.
A less drastic outcome than loss of the United
States tuna production capability would be a sharp
increase in the costs of vessel operation as is result of
establishment of 200-mile fishing zones. First,
additional running time for United States vessels under
a 200-mile concept for Pacific coast countries (see
Figure 1) will result in substantial increase in fuel usage
and loss of fishing time. Fuel, an $11 million fleet
expense item in 1973, will increase to over $20 million
during 1974 as the result of fuel price increases. Even
mute costly, however, could be the loss of fishing time
and productivity due to increased travel.
Second, the present operational pattern of fishing,
by geographic areas and season is the result of fleet
experience concerning the productivity of 'the fisliing
grounds. Division of the oceans into a series of private
national lakes will disrupt efficient fishing patterns for
the United States vessels and many foreign vessels, thus
reducing fishing efficiency, while increasing, operating
costs. Tuna fishing is a highly leveraged enterprise, with
minor fixed expenses (fuel, food, maintenance, repair,
insurance and financing), which are little related to
catches. Thus, any reduction in the yearly volume of
tuna captured per vessel has a multiple effect upor the
cost per ton of production.
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FIGURE 1
Global Effect of 200 Nautical Territorial Sea Claims
Third, if foreign countries license vessels to fish
within their 200-mile zone, fees will add sharply to
vessel operating costs. In the past, license fees have
been a minor cost item as most vessels, on the advice of
the United States Department of State, have not
purchased licenses to operate in waters beyond 12
miles of foreign shores. The United States fleet
operates in international waters off the shores of more
than 25 nations bordering the eastern Pacific and
Atlantic tuna grounds. A single vessel may enter ten or
more of these 200-mile zones yearly. Ecuadorian
Table 3
Employment and payroll for the US. tuna industry, 1973.
Area
Fishing fleet
Processing Plants
Shipyards
license fees to fish in the 200-mile zone are about
$55,000 per trip for an 1,100 ton seiner. Recognition
of the 200-mile zone by the United States could add
$100,000?$200,000 in operating costs per vessel, per
year and make license fees equal to fuel costs, the
single largest operating expense aside from crew
salaries.
The tuna industry provided direct employment for
about 28,000 people and a total payroll in excess of
$200 million during 1973 as illustrated in Table 3.
Employment
Payroll
6800
$ 65,000,000
16000
90,000,000
5000
48,000,000
27800
$203,000,000
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The initial economic impact of a 200-mile zone will
be upon vessel crewme a. Although highly skilled, they
are specialized and for the most part, cannot adapt
readily to shore occupations. Those engaged in fleet
support activities will also be affected immediately as
there will be a reduction in business volume In these
industries.
There is intense competition for the world surface
tuna resources. Presently, the United States has a major
lead in purse-seine vessel construction and fishing
technology. About 90 percent of the United States
tuna catches are madc off foreign shores. Recently,
many of these countries have accelerated their interest
in tuna fishing. Mexico, Ecuador, Cuba, France, Spain
and Japan have publicly announced programs for major
expansion of their surface tuna fishing fleets. During
1973, eight United States tuna vessels, valued at about
$4 million, were sold to foreign interests. All but ont
of these vessels were of the smaller and older type
which cannot compete, under United States flag, with
the new super-seiners.
Loss of the United States domestic fleet could cause
broad changes in the flow of raw material to the
processing plants. The extent of the resulting econoink
dislocation cannot be assessed at this time, but
certainly the fallout would be unfavorable to the
industry and its entire economic and social base.
Limitations in access to straits or free passage for
merchant ships, which result from a 200-mile regime,
could add substantially to transportation costs. Foreign
flag vessels are not permitted to unload in the
continental United States, Puerto Rico or Hawaii.
Therefore, loss of the United States fleet to foreign
interests would increase the tonnage of imported
frozen tuna required tc meet United States needs, add
to processing costs and adversely affect United States
foreign exchange.
SHRIMP
The United States shrimp industry has grown
steadily for the past two decades and is second only to
tuna (in recent years), among all United States fishing
elements, in the volume of capital flowing into fishing
and processing units.
During 1973, the United States shrimp fleet landed
372 million pounds of raw material valued at $219
million to the fishermer.. Thus, the economic impact of
the United States shrimp industry exceeds Si billion
6
annually (multiple of five). Gulf of Mexico and foreign
port landings, taken in international waters off foreign
shores, totaled 37 million pounds, valued at $41
million.
A 1972 survey estimated the replacement value of
United States shrimp fishing vessels at $320 million,
with new construction during that year being valued at
$25 million. This represented about 30 percent of the
value of all fishing vessels added to the United States
fleet that year. Vessel construction continued during
1973 at this rapid rate. An additional 100 shrimp
vessels, with a value of $15 million were expoited in
each of these years. The United States shipbuilding
industry is competitive on the world market as the
result of construction techniques and the production
line economies which result from the high volume of
domestic and export orders.
During 1969, the most recent year for which official
statistics are available, there were 4,478 vessels (over
live gross tons) and 11,399 fishermen engaged in the
Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery.
Since 1969, it is estimated that the net additions to the
fleet have been about 500 vessels and 1,250 fishermen,
bringing the total vessels to approximately 5,OCO and
employment to about 12,600 fishermen.
The United States is the major world market for
shrimp products. Domestic and import supplies rose
steadily until 1972 to meet the growth in de nand.
Since then, total volume has temporarily leveled off in
the 450 to 485 million pound (heads-off weight) range
(Figure 4). During 1973, United States supplies of
FICIIRE 4
475
450
025
400
375
ISO
325
300
UNITED STATES MARKET DEMAND FOR SgR.P
1963-1973
(Heade-off Weight
.---?
1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973
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shrimp totaled 450 million pounds, valued at
approximately $500 million.
If the upward trend in value during the past ten
years continues, the total value of supplies in 1978 and
1983 will total $640 million and $815 million,
respectively. Domestic supplies of shrimp provide
about 50 percent of market needs (Figure 5). At the
FICF1.6
220
200
P1111 ions of Pounds
140
o-T
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC SUPPLY OF SHRIMP
1963-1973
(Heads-off Weight)
1963 1965 1067 1969 197L 4973
retail and institutional levels (most usage is in the
latter) the 1972 value was estimated to be $792
million. Despite a modest volume decline in 1973, the
sharp price increases raised the 1973 value to over
$900 million.
Any major reduction in United States domestic
catches are certain to affect consumer costs and to
have an adverse impact upon United States foreign
exchange.
SALMON
The United States salmon industry, due to resource
limitations, has not shown the dynamic growth of
either tuna or shrimp. However, salmon fishing,
processing and marketing make a substantial
contribution to the United States economy.
The static nature of the United States salmon
fishing industry is reflected in the modest flow of
capital into new fishing craft in recent years. However,
the fleet of gill net, seine, set net, tender and troller
vessels (22,000 + units in 1969) has a replacement
value in excess of $400 million.
In 1973, the United States salmon fleet landed 213
million pounds of fish, which was one of the smallest
catches on record. Total value at the dock was $125
million, up substantially from recent years due to the
high unit prices paid to the fishermen. The canning
industry packed 1.4 million cases, having a value of
$117 million at the processor level, fresh and frozen
exports totaled 60 million pounds valued at $60
million and United States domestic consumption
accounted for about 47 million pounds, valued at $47
million.
The salmon processing industry has major capital
investments. An industry survey in late 1973 of 82
plants in Alaska, Washington, Oregon and California
indicated a total replacement value of $191 million for
cannery facilities and support operations. The cyclical
nature of salmon runs result in substantial year-to-year
variations in the volume of landings and the number of
people engaged in fishing and processing operations.
These operations employ about 7,700 people, many of
whom depend upon the seasonal salmon operations for
a major share of their income. The fleet operations
provide seasonal employment for about 48,000
fishermen.
Salmon fishing provides major recreational activity
for sportsmen in northern California, the Pacific
Northwest and Alaska. In 1971, the catch was
estimated at 2,165,000 fish valued at $65 million ($30
per fish).
SUMMARY
The tuna, shrimp and salmon industries represent
over half of the total value of all United States
domestic seafood production. The economic impact of
these fisheries on the United States economy is in
excess of three billion dollars annually. The
replacement value of these fleets approach 70 percent
of the value of all United States fishing vessels.
Further, during the past two years, the new vessel
construction value in these fisheries represented about
90 percent of the value of all fishing vessel
construction in the United States. In addition, tuna
and shrimp vessels have a substantial export market
and United States is the recognized world leader in the
technology of tuna seining and shrimp dragging.
The three fisheries provide employment on a year
around and seasonal basis to more than 66,000
fishermen each year. Many of these people are highly
skilled at fishing but could not adapt readily to shore
occupations. The fleet infrastructure is composed of a
network of manufacturing and service businesses.
The replacement value of United States tuna and
salmon processing facilities are valued at $465 million.
Administrative and factory employment in these
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industries is about 24,000 people.
The United States E the major world market for
tuna, shrimp and salmon products. The flow of
domestic catches to the processing industry provides a
check on the prices for foreign produced raw material.
Any serious reduction in United States domestic
supplies would require increased volumes of imports
and could result in a mu:ti-billion dollar adverse impact
upon foreign trade and 'nod costs to the United States
consumer.
This report is not designed to minimize the plight of
certain segments of the United States fishing industry.
The dominance of the economic statistics for tuna,
shrimp and salmon only accentuate the depressed state
of many of the other fisheries. These areas require both
protection from resource depletion and financial
assistance as a catalyst to develop economically viable
fishing operations. However, the trade-off of all or
portions of the United States fislung industry in an
attempt to revive others is neither a sound economic
nor social solution.
REFERENCES
Fisheries of the United States, 1973. Current Fisheries
Statistics, No. 6400, t,larch, 1974. NOAA/NMFS,
Washington, D.C.
Economic Survey of the Tuna Industry, Living Marine
Resources, Inc. April, 1974, San Diego, Ca.
Processed Fishery Products, Annual Summary 1972.
Current Fisheries Statistics, No. 6103. April, 1974.
NOAA/NMFS Washington, D.C.
Canned Fishery Prodints, 1973 Annual Summary
(Preliminary) Current fisheries Satisfies No. 6401.
April, 1974. NOAA/NMIS Washington, D.C.
Fishery Statistics of Ms United States 1969. 1972.
Statistical Digest No. 61. NOANNNIFS, Washington,
D.C.
Economic Survey of the Salmon Industry, Association
of Pacific Fisheries. Unpublished data, 1973. Seattle,
Washington.
Quick Frozen Foods, December, 1973.
8
0
Statement of W.V. Yonker before Senate Commerce
Committee, February, 1974. Bellingham, Washington.
Statement of C.W. Sahlman before Senate Commerce
Committee, April, 1974, Washington, D.C.
Statement of W.N. Utz before Senate Commerce
Committee, April, 1974, Washington, D.C.
Statement of CR. Carry before Senate. Commerce
ommittee, April, 1974, San Diego, California.
Statement of A. Felando before Senate Commerce
Committee, April, 1974, San Diego, California.
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