JOURNAL - OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000500400011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 13, 1973
• Content Type: NOTES

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JOURNAL
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Thursday - 13 September 1973
1. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Frank Slatinshek, Chief Counsel,
House Armed Services Committee, and reviewed with him our proposed
comments on H. R. 8592. Slatinshek had no problem with submitting as
the Agency report the previous report filed by the Agency with the Senate
Armed Services Committee on the companion bill, S. 1935. Slatinshek
told me also that he has been unable to get with Chairman Nedzi, Intelligence
Subcommittee, even though he has been trying. At the moment he does 25X1C
not know what the schedule will be for Intelligence Subcommittee hearings.
3. (Confidential - JGO) In response to his earlier request, I called
Mike Finley, Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee staff, House Foreign
Affairs Committee, and made a tentative date for briefing of Chairman
Fascell; Marian Czarnecki, Chief of Staff of the full Committee; and Finley
for Tuesday afternoon, 4:00, in Chairman Fascell's office on developments
in Chile. OCI, has been advised.
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 July 27, 1 973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks E 5153
MUTUAL DEVELOPMENT AND COOP-
ERATION ACT OF 1973
SI pis or
HON. JAMES A. BURKE
OF MASSACHTTSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, July 26, 1973
The House in Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union had under
consideration the bill (H.R. 9360) to amend
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for
other purposes.
Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr.
Chairman, for the first time in my 15
years in service as a Member of Con-
gress I voted for cuts in, and finally alto-
gether against, the Mutual Development
and Cooperation Act. This vote was cast
in a very reluctant manner on my part,
done after a great deal of soul searching
and examination of the who, what, where,
when, why, and hows of the overseas poli-
cies of our Government. In the past 18
months we have had two official devalua-
tions and one unofficial devaluation of
the dollar as a result of foreign countries
raising the value of their currencies. This
has had a most disturbing effect on our
economy, the result of which has been
the extreme disruption of our monetary
policies, the skyrocketing of prices, and
an almost uncontrollable increase in our
interest rates. This administration seems
to have placed itself in a hopeless posi-
tion, unable to cope with these inflation-
ary problems whose conditions appear to
worsen instead of improve with each
passing day. In 'fight of this untenable
situation, I was compelled to register my
vote of opposition to this legislation as
a mark of protest. I am not against
foreign assistance per se, in fact, I feel
there is a great deal we can do in this
area if properly administered. In fact,
had I felt that the aid and assistance
we were voting on was reaching down to
the impoverished peoples of the world I
would have had no reluctance whatsoever
in voting to approve that act. Every shred
of evidence we have in our possession,
however, points to the contrary.
With monstrous national deficits, with
the dollar dwindling away in its value,
with high rates of unemployment and the
high cost of welfare, and with the stag-
gering burdens facing those on fixed in-
comes, I make specific reference here to
the elderly of our Nation who are being
forced to live in real misery and depri-
vation, with these concerns in mind I
could not in good conscience vote for this
bill. There comes a time when we must
stop, look, and listen and that time is
here.
There is great debate ongoing about
the abuse of power in the executive de-
partment of Government and this bill
embodies further extensions of author-
ity to the Executive which I do not be-
lieve the President is entitled to have.
Last year the Congress passed a law
establishing a Joint Study Committee on
Budget Control. I am a member of that
committee and in that capacity I feel
that I have a responsibility in this area.
I regret having to oppose my good friend
and esteemed colleague, the honorable
Foreign Affairs Committee, on this bill.
In Massachusetts and Rhode Island,
where we have the highest unemploy-
ment rates in the Nation, we have re-
cently witnessed Department of Defense
decisions to exercise sharp meatax cut-
backs which will result in the loss of 35,-
000 jobs. Other indiscriminate national
policies have contributed to excessively
high and unjustified rates of unemploy-
ment not only in Massachusetts but in
the neighboring State of Rhode Island as
well. Thousands of people have swollen
the unemployment roles and they can
attribute their predicament directly to
these policies. Great hardships have re-
sulted in the 11th District of Massachu-
setts, indeed in the entire Northeast sec-
tion of the country, because of these poli-
cies. In the face of meatax cuts like these
taking place in America without the na-
tional administration stopping even one
moment to consider the economic impact
of their decisions, then I say there is but
one alternative for us, the duly elected
Representatives of the people, and that
is to question each and every spending
policy of this Government. As I stated at
the outset, I was reluctant to cast this
vote; however, I shall continue to do a lot
of soul searching and I shall continue
to investigate, examine, and scrutinize
all questions on future spending policies
of this country particularly where they
seem to run counterclockwise to the
spending policies in selective areas of the
Nation. I refer specifically and unequivo-
cally to the administration's unfair atti-
tude toward the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. I hope and trust that I
will be able to vote for foreign aid and
assistance programs in the future be-
cause I feel that there exists such a need;
however, the loosely drawn policies of this
administration make it very difficult to
do so.
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
PROCEDURES
HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, July 26, 1973
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, on
Wednesday, July 18, the House Commit-
tee on Armed Services released its report
on H.R. 9286, the military procurement
authorization bill for fiscal year 1974.
I would like to compliment my colleague
from Colorado, the Honorable PATRICIA
SCHROEDER on her additional views which
accompanied the committee report and
to lend my support to them.
MS. SCHROEDER demonstrated by her
comments a clear insight of committee
procedures. She presents valuable criti-
cism of those procedures and suggests
possible reforms. Certainly her concern
can only improve the currently inade-
quate method of conducting hearings.
One of the most severe inadequacies
which I have experienced and which Ms.
SCHROEDER also described is the amount
of advance time available to read written
testimony. On many occasions I have
received written testimony only 24 hours
committee prod'bdure requires testimony
be made available to Members. This gives
too little time to fully read and analyze
many of the proposals and arguments
presented. I believe Ms. SCHROEDER's sug-
gestion to require written testimony at
least 3 days in advance would help to
provide the time needed.
Analysis of our national defense pro-
gram is virtually impossible without the
assistance of the committee staff. The
staff, while small in comparison to the
Pentagon, often provides assistance to
Member generally favorable to the mili-
tary. Those of us who have been critical
of our defense program have found that
the committee staff has often failed to
provide necessary assistance to our of-
fice staffs. Criticism of our current de-
fense program is not a disservice to the
country. The failure to meet the respon-
sibility to review programs thoroughly is
a disservice.
MS. SCHROEDER'S criticisms of the ac-
tual hearing process, I believe, are ex-
tremely important. Questioning of wit-
nesses should be sharp and debate should
be open. It is obvious, though, that much
of the responsibility for the lack of such
sharp questioning and open debate lies
with us, the Members. Instead of acqui-
escing to the military preoccupation with
"more," "bigger," and "faster," the Mem-
bers should begin to reassert their over-
sight responsibilities.
The committee's preoccupation with
technology, with "bigger" and "better,"
obscures the committee objective of leg-
islating defense policy. As Ms. SCHROEDER
states, the Armed Services Committee
seems now to be not much more than the
Pentagon's "lobby-on-the-Hill."
I urge my colleagues to read Ms.
SCHROEDER'S comments which I am
pleased to insert into the RECORD:
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HONORABLE PATRICIA
SCHROEDER, DEMOCRAT OF COLORADO
It was with extreme reluctance that I
joined the majority of my colleagues on the
House Armed Services Committee in vot-
ing out the Military Procurement Authoriza-
tion bill for fiscal year 1974.
My primary objection, aside from specific
weapons systems noted in my minority re-
port, centers around what I believe was the
deficient manner in which this legislation
was prepared. Our national defense program
requires more analysis than other aspects
of the overall budget, not only because it
consumes about 40 percent of our taxes, but
because it is presented to our committee by
military men rigidly disciplined in what
opinions they are permitted to express. This
kind of discipline is invaluable on the battle-
field, but when it comes to determining na-
tional defense priorities and strategies, it can
frustrate the work of the committee.
The situation is not helped by the fact
that the relatively small staff of the House
Armed Services Committee, no matter how
good its intentions, cannot adequately cope
with a multi-billion dollar weapons procure-
ment program that, I understand, is pre-
pared by some 30,000 Defense Department
employees with a huge computer system at
their command. Nevertheless, the committee
made no effort to supplement its staff, to
hire outside authorities or to seek its own
computer services. Rarely during the long
process of hearings which I attended did the
committee, or the staff, make the kind of
comprehensive effort to master the separate
parts of the program, or even to challenge
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 E 5154
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---Extensions of Remarks Jul y/ 27, 1973
it as a whole (or in part), that I believe plicated multibillion dollar bill as this one.
should have been made. But I have observed the process and proce-
Unfortunately, the committee seemed to dures of the committee sufficiently to believe
prefer spending its time in a cursory review that they should-indeed, must-be im-?
of individual weapons systems-a "once over proved.
lightly" approach-simply deleting a bit 'l'ie committee must welcome open and
here and adding a bit there. Some members vigorous debate. Such openness would soon
gave the impression that doing the hard result, I believe, in reestablishing the com--
arid tedious work of analysis and criticism miti,ee's independence of action and judg--
h.ow unseenringly, unmilitary-indeed, un-
patriotic.
Rarely during all the hearings I attended
were the basic assumptions behind many
weapons systems ever questioned. Nor was
there adequate discussion of basic national
security questions which would allow com-
nnittee members an opportunity to evacuate
a. particular weapons systems with any sense
of perspective. The" often seemed
preoccupied with the technology of it par-
ticular weapons system--asking whether a
weapon was "bigger" or "faster" than the
previous model-rather than with the larger
long-range prospective of whether or act
the weapon was needed in the first place. We
are all subject to this fixation with technol-
ogy but must not let it become our sole area
of inquiry.
To me this preoccupation with "more" and
"bigger" and "faster" is dangerous thinking.
Those with such a limited vision of our mili-
tary requirements end up, I believe, doing
more harm than good to this country. Taey
are like those French politicians who thou 3ht
a bigger Maginot Line would provide more
defense. They are like our own nuclear stra-
tegists who argue that killing an enemy 15
times over makes us more secure than if we
can kill hira only five times over. They re-
mind me, to use a non-military example, of
those people who believe we would honor
George Washington more if we increased the
height of his monument.
The corrnaittee seemed annoyed, even
frightened, of vigorous and open debate. The
inordinate use of secrecy is a major wea?on
to suppress debate. In my brief tenure on
tale committee it became clear to me that the
excessive use of executive sessions, from
which the '7ublic is barred, and the Penta-
gon's heavy-handed use of classifies ;ion
stamps, is designed more to keep information
from the American public than from an;r of
the country's enemies. -
Two examples come to mind of the trepi-
dation with which the committee views the
prospect of full and vigorous debate. First,
the number of witnesses favorable to the
Pentagon's point of view who came before
the Seapower Subcommittee, for instance,
numbered at least 30, while those critical of
the program numbered only two. Generally,
the 30 witnesses were seldom pressed and
their judgment was rarely questioned. The
two critical witnesses, on the other hind,
were treated in an indifferent manner and
their arguments dismissed by many commit-
tee members.
The other example concerns the showing
during an open Seapower Subcommittee
hearing of the NBC-TV documentary film on
the CVN-70 nuclear carrier. Some members
of the full committee, not just members of
the Seapower Subcommittee, felt sufficient
concern over the showing of this film that
they put in an appearance to criticize it. By
all measures it was a balanced presenta;ion,
but senior members castigated it as, and I
quote, "a diatribe," "unfair," "snide," "de-
structive," "damnable" and "poisonous."
These are strong words for men who should
:look at all sides of a question before they
decide.
None of this is conducive to opening; up
i;he legislative process so that the committee
can examine the proposals in a thorough and
competent manner. As a freshman member of
this committee, clearly I cannot presume to
have mastered the intricacies of such a com-
sponsibility. As it stands now, the committee
is not much more than the Pentagon's lobby.-
on-1 he-hill.
T.se refusal, to open up committee proceed-
ings is, in fact;, a serious mistake because it
promotes many unhealthy trends. Some
members, for instance, have all but abdicated
their critical faculties to the so-called Penta-
gon "experts"; the vision of many committee
members is obscured by the shine of military
brass; and there ace far too many others who
take any criticism at all as a personal affront.
After attending all the hearings I could,
after asking questions, listening intently
and seeking answers, I confess that I am still
somewhat in the dark regording the weapons
systems themselves, their costs, and the role
they are and/or should (or should not) be
playing in our national defense program.
Part of the blame obviously lies with me, for
in retrospect I could probably have dug even
a 1 ittle deeper worked even longer hours,
asked even more questions and demanded
eve's more answers. But the bulk of the
bla;ne, in ray op:inion, lies with a hearing
process and procedures that restrict debate,
stife criticism and leave unanswered im-
portant questions.
The resultis a piece or legislation whose
implications and true costs no one on the
committee, I fear, fully understands.
It is not my purpose here to criticize `the
Integrity and sincerity of Individual mem-
bers. Many spent long hours listening and
reviewing the testimony that was presented.
There are other members of the committee,
both senior and junior, whose experience
and judgment I respect and cherish. My
criticism is directed solely to the procedures
and practices of the committee, and the
debilitating side effects, which I am con-
vinced. deter the committee from doing its
jot properly.
The ideal situation, in my opinion, would
be one in which all hearings were adversary
in nature. As I see it, the military should
present its case, and the committee should
receive it with considerable skepticism, The
questioning should be sharp and the debate
free and open. It should be permitted for
written questions to be submitted for the
military to answer. It would be healthy for
the committee to hear differing opinions
within the military establishment itself, as
we witnessed briefly (anti no doubt by acci-
de:rt) when factions within the Navy clashed
openly in hearings on the 8th and 12th of
June over a request for two additional
DLGN's. Indeed, it should be the policy of
the Pentagon to encourage open and public
debate within its own racks. Having its pro-
gram accepted each year should be a trial by
firs for the Pentagon rather than the cake-
walk which it; is today.
The ideal would include requiring all
written tes?.?imony at least three days in ad-
vance so that our time ii; not wasted having
the witness read it to us. Perhaps more hear-
ings should be held so that we could spend
more time understanding and examining
the proposals. We would also benefit from the
use of more staff, outside consultants and
the use of computers. Instead of acquiescing
to the military, the House Armed Services
Committee should take i lee lead, as it did in
the case of the nuclear Navy.
Reasonable men-and women-should be
able to differ not only philosophically but on
the means we seek to achieve a common
goal. I believe that opening up the proce-
dures and letti:ag in the cleansing light of
criticism and debate will not only enhance
the comm':ttee',i stature but even produce
superior legislation. Indeed, the development
and maintenance of a strong, flexible and
healthy military Ieferrse Program require
that this be so.
MCPL REPORT ON CVN-70
HON. PATRICIA SCHROEDER
OF COLORADO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday July 26, 1973
Mrs. SCHROEDER. Air. Speaker, I
want to share with my colleagues the
excellent repcrt prepared by Congress-
man BINOHAM for Members of Congress
for Peace Through Law on the proposed
nuclear carrier CVN-70. I will be offering
an amendment to delete the $657 mil-
lion authorization for this carrier when
the House considers H.R: 9286 next week.
The report follows:
RESEARCH REPORT ON THE. NUCLEAR-POWERED
AIRCRAr'T CARRIER (!.CVN-70)
SUMMARY CONCLUSION
At a co: t conservatively estimated at one
billion dollars, 0VN-70 adds only a small frac-
tion to the U.S. capacity for air power at sea.
The U.S. capacity already dominates all the
other navies of the world combined, and will
continue ;o do so, even without new con=
struction, into the 1980s.
When the cost of the nuclear-powered. ships
which are regtlred to provide CVN-70 with
a protectb"e es+ ort of comparable endurance
and sea-keeping capability are included, and
when the Jost of CVN-70's air group is added
to the total, the total initial cost of this pro-
gram will react about three billion dollars.
This figure does not Include the staggering
cost: of operation and maintenance and peri-
odic replacement of aircraft. The marginal
addition :o national security provided by
such a nuclear task force I incommensurate
with its cost, especially in view of the exist-
ing and projected lead held by the U.S. in
this type of military power.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that the CVN-70 project
be cancelled and that the 5657 million dollars
requested In the FY 1974 Department of De-
fense budget request by deleted. The Navy
should make every effort to find alternative
uses for the items already on order as long;
lead-time Items.
Description of CVN-70
If built, CVN-70 would be the Navy's fourth
nuclear-powered attack aircraft carrier. It,
would be the third Nimitz class carrier, the
first two of which are still under construc-
tion. Current Navy planning calls for an Inc-
tial Operating Capability (fOC) date of 1981.
The specifications for C-VN--70 are as fol-
lows:
Displaoement: 94,400 tons;
Length 1,092 feet;
Estimated Speed: 36 knots;
Crew (approximate): 5,000.
This new nuclear attack carried is expected
to support an air group of some 100 aircraft.
This air group would consist of a number of
different aircraft types: lighters (for combat
air patrol [CAP] or protection of the carrier
and its escorts against air attack) ; anti-sub--
marine warfare aircraft (to protect the car-
rier task force against enemy submarines)
fighter-bcmbe:-s (for projecting air power In-
land from the seas) ; support aircraft (such
as the carrier on-board delivery [COIF] air.-
craft); rescue aircraft (principally helicop'.
ters) ; and reconnaissance aircraft for photo..
graphic or electronic surveillance missions.
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