SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS ACT OF 1974 JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY THIRD CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON S. 2495 AMENDMENT NO. 153

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000500080001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1974
• Content Type: REGULATION

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Appr F e )e IMOa'lA-A PLIOM ONoA? o
OF 1974
JOINT HEARING
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
COMMITTEE ON
AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
S. 2495 Amendment No. 1537
TO AMEND THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ACT
OF 1958 TO APPLY THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
EXPERTISE OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION TO THE SOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PROB-
LEMS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, VIZ:
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-4070 WASHINGTON :. 1974
elf .,J, 4162
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COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington, Chairman
NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire
JOHN O. PASTORE, Rhode Island
VANCE HARTKE, Indiana
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada
RUSSELL B. LONG, Louisiana
FRANK E. MOSS, Utah
ERNEST F. IIOLLINGS, South Caroline.
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
JOHN V. TUNNEY, California
ADLAI E. STEVENSON III, Illinois
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee
MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky
TED STEVENS, Alaska
J. GLENN BEALL, JR., Maryland
FREDERICK J. LORDAN, Staff Director
MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, Chief Counsel
BARRY I. HYMAN, Staff Engineer
ARTHUR 1'ANKOPF, Jr., Minority Counsel and Staff Director
MALCOLM M. B. STERRETT, Minority Staff Counsel
(II)
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CONTENTS
Page
Opening statement by Senator Moss-----------------------------------
1
Opening statement by Senator Tunney--------------------------------
2
Text of S. 2495 amendment No. 1537---------------------------------
4
Agency comments, National Science Foundation------------------------
16
LIST OF WITNESSES
David, Dr. Edward E., Jr., executive vice president, Gould, Inc., Chicago,
Ill. ---------------------------------------------------------------
29
DuBridge, Dr. Lee A., president emeritus, California Institute of Tech-
nology ------------------------------------------------------------
31
Hornig, Dr. Donald F., president, Brown University, Providence, R.1 ---
38
Kistiakowsky, George B., professor emeritus of chemistry, Harvard Uni-
versity ------------------------------------------------------------
21
Mansfield, Hon. Mike, U.S. Senator from Montana, statement ------------
17
Wenk, Dr. Edward, professor of engineering and public affairs, University
of Washington, Seattle, Wash---------------------------------------
44
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS ACT
OF 1974
THURSDAY, JULY 11, 1974
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE AND
COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES,
Wasl/,ington, D.C.
The joint hearing of the Senate Committee on Commerce and the
Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences met at 10:10
a.m. in room 1319 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building; Hon. John
V. Tunney presiding.
Senator Moss [presiding]. The hearing will come to order. We de-
layed a few minutes because some of the other Senators have been de-
layed. We have a very full list of important witnesses to hear, and we
should get started.
This is a joint hearing between the Senate Committees on Aeronau-
tical and Space Sciences and Commerce on S. 2495, of which Senator
Magnuson is the principal sponsor.
A more secure existence for Americans must be based in part on
the recognition that science and technology pervade the entire fabric
of our society and are among the principal causes, of change for better
or for worse. The wisdom with which we use our technology will either
lead us to further greatness or diminish us among the community of
nations.
The National Academy of Sciences has listed examples of current
problems which require the most competent and imaginative science
and technology that the Nation can muster. Some of the problems
listed are :
The threat of worldwide famine and the importance of continuing
agricultural research and of related technological development in in-
dustry as well as in Government; the need for new technologies to pre-
vent or reverse the deterioration of our environment; the need to find
new sources of energy : the modernization of our transportation sys-
tems as an essential part of maintaining a benign environment; the
need to advance the science and technology required to provide, gen-
eral access to health care of high quality and to reduce the incidence
of disease; the maintenance and improvement of Government policies
to ensure that American science, technology, and industry continue
to flourish.
Staff member assigned to this hearing : Barry I. Hyman.
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Considering this list of problems, we begin to realize that a basic
tool in their solution-technology-has also become one of our most
valuable resources. Like our other resources, its use should be planned
to increase efficiency and reduce waste.
The bill being considered today, S. 2495, recognizes science and tech-
nology as a primary national resource and provides for their efficient
utilization in the resolution of many current and potential national
problems.
I would like to place in the record a statement by the chairman, Sen-
ator Magnuson, who will be here shortly.
[The statement follows:]
STATEMENT of HON. W"ABREN G. MAONUsION, U.S. SENATOn FROM WASHINGTON
Ladies and gentlemen : I am extremely pleased to see the Senate Commerce
Committee proceeding with hearings on the amendment introduced by Senators
Moss, Tunney, and myself just before the holiday recess.
The amendment is an outgrowth of a series of hearings by both the Commerce
and Aeronautics Committees which discussed the need for an independent presi-
dential panel to advise the White House on scientific and technical matters.
Our amendment would establish at permanent council of advisors on science
and technology to advise the President on a broad-range of scientific and en-
gineering matters. The Council will focus policy recommendations in science and
technology for the President. It will harness the scientific and technical resources
of this country to improve the quality of life of all our citizens. It holds the prom-
ise of contributing to the solution of most of our present critical national prob-
lems. The council's job would be to advise the President and to coordinate and
evaluate the scientific and technological efforts of the Executive Branch of Gov-
ernment. The chairman would be the President's science advisor.
I am extremely pleased that this bill parallels the recommendations of the
National Academy of Sciences. On June 26, the day before we introduced our
amendment, the academy released a report calling for the establishment of a
Science advisory panel. The recommendation was drafted by a blue ribbon
Scientific Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. James Killian, Jr., former
president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The need for such a panel has become acute since last year, particularly since
the demise of the previous White House machinery to give the President scien-
tific and technology advice. There is not now a capability for an independent
scientific technology analysis in the Executive branch. The President is totally
dependent upon analyses developed through departmental loyalties and pres-
sures of internal bureaucratic competition.
I hope our bill will solve this dilemma.
Senator Moss. My colleague from the State of California, Senator
Tunney, is a cosponsor of the bill before us, and will be presiding at
this hearing, sine I have to leave to attend a legislative conference
with the House within about 45 minutes.
I would ask the Senator from California if he has any opening re-
marks he would like to make at this point.
Senator'I uNNEY. Thank you, Senator, I do.
I believe that these are very important hearings that we are em-
barking on. We live in a technological world. However, few of us
realize just how technological it is, and the extent to which we take
this technology for granted.
Our everyday lives are shaped by the adaptation of scientific knowl-
edge to the promotion of human welfare. The clothes we wear are
produced by a highly technological textile industry. The paper we
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write on, the buildings we live and work in, our means of getting
from one place to another, are all the fruits of the development of
technology.
Many of us are alive today because of technological developments
applied to the field of human health care and preventive medicine.
Advances in science and technology are going to be needed even
more than ever to assist in the resolution of many of our existing
and emerging national problems, such as the energy crisis, materials
shortages, environmental degradation, and overpopulation. Yet, this
country has never had an effective organizational framework for
long-range planning in science and technology, and for integration
of science and technology into the decisionmaking process regarding
critical national problems.
This morning's joint hearing of the Commerce Committee and the
Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee represents another sig-
nificant advance in our attempts to develop such a framework.
After our hearings in March on S. 2495, the comments offered at
those hearings and in written statements submitted for the record were
carefully reviewed and many of them were incorporated into a new
version of the bill, which is before us this morning.
Amendment 1537 to S. 2495 recognizes that long-range planning for
science and technology, and the development of policy with regard
to science and technology, must take place at the highest levels of the
executive branch of the Government.
The establishment of a Council of Advisors on Science and Tech-
nology will provide a focus for science and technology that has never
before existed in this country. An organizational structure is created
which would have an ongoing and continuous responsibility with re-
gard to federal science and technology plans, programs, and policies.
The Council is also given the task of assisting the President in
the preparation of an annual Science and Technology Report to
Congress.
This morning we will hear from gentlemen who have extensive
personal experience with science and technology policymaking at the
upper echelons of the executive branch. Their insights into the ex-
tremely intricate and delicate process of high-level governmental pol-
icymaking will be extremely helpful to use as we continue to refine this
extremely important legislation.
I would just like to say in addition, that I can't help but believe
as we approach a world with material shortages, with vastly increased
costs for energy, with a population that is growing as fast as it is,
and with the limitation of food resources, and with pollution prob-
lems, that we have a desperate need in this country to start focusing
on the technological means to cope with these problems that face
society. We need to demonstrate a willingness to put some money up,
more money than we have in the past, for research and development
so that the human race can survive.
I happen to be one who feels that unless we make major systemic
changes worldwide, in the way we handle our affairs, that the future
of mankind is not bright.
[The bill and agency comments follow:]
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93n CONGRESS
20 SESSION
S. 2495
IN TIIE SENATE OF TIIE UNITED STATES
JUNE 27, 1974
Referred to the Committees on AeronauticaI and.Space Sciences and Commerce,
jointly, and ordered to be printed
AMENDMENTS
Intended to be proposed by Mr. MAGNUSON (for himself, Mr.
Yobs, and 211.r. TuNNEv) to S. 2495, a bill to amend the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 to apply the
scientific and technological expertise of the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration to the solution of domestic
problems, and for other purposes, viz:
1. Strike out all after the enacting clause and substitute in
2 lieu thereof the following:
"That this Act may be cited as the `Science and Technology
4 Applications Act of 1974'.
5 "STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY
6 `SEC. 2. (a) The Congress, recognizing the profound
7 impact of science and technology on society, and the inter-
8 relations of scientific, technological, economic, social, polit-
9 ical, and institutional factors, hereby finds and declares that-
Amdt. No. 1537
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1 " (1) the scientific and technological capabilities
2 within the United States, if properly applied and di-
3 rected, could effectively assist in improving the quality
4 of life and in anticipating and resolving many critical
5 and emerging national problems;
6 (2) it is the responsibility of the Federal Govern-
7 ment to assure adequate opportunity for the full and
8 efficient use of such scientific and technological capabili-
9 ties;
10 " (3) the maintenance and strengthening of diver-
11 sified scientific and technological capabilities in the Fed-
12 era] departments and agencies, in State and local gov-
13 ernments, in industry and the universities, and the en-
14 couragement of independent initiatives based on such
15 capabilities, are essential to the most effective use of
16 science and technology in resolving critical and emerg-
17 ing national problems;
18 " (4) a more systematic approach is needed to
19 identify critical and emerging national problems and to
20 analyze, plan, and coordinate Federal science and tech-
21 nology programs, policies, and activities intended to
22 contribute to the resolution of such problems;
23 " (5) the effectiveness of scientific and technological
24 contributions to improvements in the quality of life
25 and to the resolution of critical and emerging national
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1 problems depends on the maintenance of a strong base
2 of knowledge in science and advanced technology to-
3 gether with a resource of highly qualified scientists and
4 engineers;
5 " (6) an annual Science and Technology Report to
6 the Congress would facilitate more effective utilization
7 of science and technology in the resolution of critical and
8 emerging national problems; and
9 " (7) science and technology can fully serve the
10 Nation only if adequate means are established in the
11 Executive Office of the President to provide a source
12 of scientific and technological analysis and judgment to
1.3 the President, drawing on the best talents available with-
14 in and outside the Federal Government.
15 "TITLE'' ]-NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECH-
16 NOLOGY RESOURCES PLANNING AND COOR-
17 1)INATION
1.8 "THI COUNCIL OF ADVISERS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
19 "SEC. 101. (a) There is established in the Executive
20 Office of the President a Council of Advisers on Science and
21 Technology (hereinafter referred to as the 'Council'). The
22 Council shall be composed of three Members who shall be
23 appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
24 consent of the Senate, from ,among individuals who, by
25 reason of their training;, experience, and attainments, are
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1 exceptionally qualified to analyze and interpret scientific
2 and technological developments; to appraise and recommend
3 programs, policies, and activities of the Federal Government
4 in the light of the policy declared in section 2; and are sen-
5 sitive to the economic, social, esthetic, and cultural needs and
6 interests of the Nation.
7 " (b) The President shall designate one of the mem-
8 bees of the Council as Chairman and one as Vice Chairman,
9 who shall act as Chairman in the absence of the Chairman.
10 " (c) Mer fibers of the Council shall serve full time and
11 the Chairman of the Council shall be compensated at the
12 rate provided for level II of the Executive Schedule pay
13 rates. The other members of the Council shall be com-
14 pensated at the rate provided for level IV of the Executive
15 Schedule pay rates.
16 " (d) The Council may employ such officers and em-
17 ployees as may be necessary to carry out its functions under
18 this Act. In addition, the Council may employ and fix the
19 compensation of such experts and consultants as may be
20 necessary for the carrying out of its functions under this
21 Act, in accordance with section 3109 of title 5 (but without
22 regard to the last sentence thereof).
23 "(e) The Council shall have the authority, within the
24 limits of available appropriations, to enter into contracts or
25 other arrangements for the carrying on by organizations
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1 or individuals, including other Government agencies,, of
2 such activities as the Council deems necessary to carry out
3 the purposes of this Act.
4 "FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL
5 "SEC. 102. (a) It shall be the duty and function of the
6 Council to serve as a source of scientific and technological
7 analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major
8 policies, plans, and programs of science and technology of
9 the Federal Government. In carrying out its duties, the
10 Council shall:
11 " (1) seek to define a coherent approach for apply-
12 ing science and technology to critical and emerging na-
13 tional problems and for coordinating the scientific and
14 technological responsibilities and programs of the Fed-
15 eral departments and agencies in the resolution of such
16 problems;
17 "(2) assist and advise the President in the prepara-
18 tion of the Science and Technology Report, in accordance
19 with section 103 of this title;
20 " (3) gather timely and authoritative information
21 concerning significant developments and trends in science
22 and technology, both current and prospective, to analyze
23 and interpret such information for the purpose of deter-
24 mining whether such developments and trends are inter-
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6
1 fering, or are likely to interfere, with the achievement of
2 the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act;
3 " (4) initiate studies and analyses, including sys-
4 tems analyses, to identify and assess alternatives avail-
s able for the resolution of critical and emerging national
6 problems amenable to the contributions of science and
7 technology and, insofar as possible, determine and com-
pare probable costs, benefits, and impacts of these alter-
9 natives;
10
"(5)
review and appraise the various programs,
11 policies, and activities of the Federal Government in the
12 light of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act for the
13
14
15
16
17.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
purpose of determining the extent to which such pro-
grams, policies, and activities are contributing to the
achievement of such policy, and to make recommenda-
tions to the President with respect thereto;
" (6) report at least once each year to the President
on the overall activities and accomplishments of the
Council;
" (7) perform other duties and functions and make
and furnish such studies, reports thereon, and recom
mendations with respect to matters of policy and legis-
lation as the President may request.
" (b) In exercising its powers, functions,
25 under this section, the Council shall ;
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1 " (1) work iin close consultation and cooperation
2 with the heads of the Federal departments and agencies;
3 (2) utilize the services of consultants, establish
1 such advisory committees, and consult with State and
i local governmental agencies, with appropriate profes-
G signal groups, and with such representatives of industry,
i the nniversities, agriculture, labor, consumers, conserva-
tion organizations, and other groups, organizations,
and
9 individuals as it may deem advisable; and
10 "(3) utilize to the fullest extent possible the serv-
11 ices, facilities, and information (including statistical in-
12 formic ion) of public and private agencies and organiza-
13 tions, and individuals, in. order drat duplication of effort
14 and_ expense may 1)0 avoided.
15 Each department, agency, and iris trurnentalilly of
1G the executive branch of the Gloverument, ir:chtditig any ilk-
17 dependent agency, is authorized and directed to furnish the
18 Council such information as the Council deems netcessary-to
19 carry out its functions under this title.
20 " (d) 'rhe Chairman of the Council shall, in addition to
21 the duties and functions set forth in subsection (a)-
22 " (1) serve as the Science and Technology Adviser
23 to the President:
21, " (2) appoint, assign the duties, and fix the compen-
25 sation of personnel without regard to the provisions of
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title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in
the competitive service, and without regard to the pro-
visions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53
of such title, relating to classification and General Sched-
ule pay rates, at rates not in excess of the maximum
Tate for GS-18 of the General Schedule under section
5332 of such title; and
" (3) perform other duties and functions as as-
signed by the President or this Act.
"SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY REPORT
"SEC. 103. (a) The President shall transmit annually
to the Congress, beginning July 1, 1975, a Science and
13 Technology Report (hereinafter referred to as the `Report')
14 which shall set forth-
15 " (1) a review of developments of national signifi-
16 cance in science and technology, including, but not
17 limited to, the mathematical, physical, social, and life
18 sciences, and civil, chemical, electrical, and mechanical
19 engineering, and related technologies;
20 " (2) the significant effects of current and foresee-
21 able trends in science and technology on the social, eco-
22 nomic, and other requirements of the Nation;
23 " (3) a review and appraisal of selected science and
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1 technology-related programs, policies, and activities of
2 the Federal Government;
3 " (4) an inventory and projection of critical and
4 emerging national problems the resolution of which
5 might be substantially assisted by the application of
6 science and technology;
7 "(5) the identification and assessment of scientific
8 and technological measures that can. contribute to the
9 resolution of such problems, in light of the related social,
10 economic, political, and institutional considerations;
11 " (6) the existing and projected scientific and tech-
12 nological resources, including specialized manpower, that
13 could contribute to the resolution of such problems; and
11 " (7) recommendations for legislation on science
1.5 and technology-related programs and policies that will
16 contribute to the resolution of such problems.
17 " (b) Upon request, the National Science Foundation
18 shall furnish assistance to the Council in carrying out the
19 Council's responsibilities under subsection 102 (a) (2) in
20 regard to the matters called for in paragraphs (1) and (6)
21 of subsection (a) of this section.
22 " (c) The Report shall be printed and made available
23 as a public document.
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1 "TITLE II-THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
2 APPLICATION
3 "OFFICE ESTABLISHED
4 "SEC. 201. (a) The Administrator of the National Acro-
5 nautics and Space Administration shall establish within the
6 Administration an Office of Technology Application to be
7 headed by an Associate Administrator.
8 " (b) In order to carry out the purposes of this Act,
9 the Administrator, through the Office of Technology Appli-
10 cation, shall utilize the resources of the National Aero-
1.1 nautics and Space Administration to the fullest extent con-
12 sistent with its areas of scientific and technological com-
13 potence, and shall-
14 " (1) upon request, furnish assistance to the Council
15 in carrying out the Council's responsibilities tinder para-
16 graphs (2) and (4) of section 102 (a)
17 (2) upon direction of the President, conduct re-
18 search, development,, and demonstration projects, in
19 order to carry out the purposes of this Act, consistent
20 with the provisions of section 102 (d) of the National
21 Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended by
22 this Act; and
23 "(3) conduct exploratory research and develop-
24 moat projects in support of his responsibilities under
25 this Act,
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1. " (c) Except as otherwise provided in this title, the
2 Administrator shall, in carrying out his functions under this
3 title, have the same powers and authority he has under the
4 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.
7 "SEC. 202. (a) Section 102 (d) of the National Aero-
8 nautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S.C. 2451 (d) ) is
9 amended to read as follows :
10 " ` (d) The Congress declares that the expertise de-
11 veloped by the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
12 tra.tion in research mud in the development of new and
13 advanced technology to solve complex problems in the con-
14 do ?t f > o f 1 d t 't' h 11 ' dd'
~
o acrna
c
"AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ACT OF 1058
.
u
a an space ac cvc ies s a , Is a, )tion, at
the direction of the President, be made available and be used
to farther the purposes of the Science and Technology
19 activities.'
20 " (1)) s4ect4o 102 f h A t d'd b
o
dd
A pplications Act of 1974, to the extent not inconsistent
with or in diminution of such aeronautical and space
sue c )s amen c, y a
m9
at the end thereof the following new subsection :
"` e It is the
purpose of this Act to carry out and
effectuate the policies declared in subsections
(c) , and (d) of this section.'
(a), (1)),
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1 "TITLE III-GENERAL PROVISIONS
2 "APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZED
3 "SEC. 301. (a) There is hereby authorized to be appro-
4 priated to the Council of Advisors on Science and Tech-
5 nology, such sums as are necessary to cary out its fuctions
6 under this Act.
7 " (b) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to
8 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration $10,-
9 000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, to carry
10 out its functions under this Act. The provisions of section
11 4 of the Act of June 15, 1959 (73 Stat. 75, 42 U.S.C.
12 2460), shall apply to authorizations of appropriations to the
13 Administration to carry out its functions under this Act for
14 fiscal years after June 30, 1975."
Amend the title so as to read: "A bill to provide a
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, to provide
for an annual Science and Technology Report, and for other
purposes.".
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NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION,
Hon. WARREN G. MAarrusoN Washington, D.C., July 24, 1974.
,
Chadrman, Committee on Commerce,
U.S. Senate,
Washington,, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : This is in response to your request of July 12, 1974, for
the views of the National Science Foundation on S. 2495, Amendment No. 1537,
the "Science and Technology Applications Act of 1974."
Much of the testimony before your Committee and also the House Committee
on Science and Astronautics stresses the continuing importance of introducing
science advice into the policy-making activities of the Government. S. 2495
clearly recognizes this need. Indeed, decisionmaking at a national level that does
not take account of the best scientific advice, the most careful scientific judg-
ments available, is fool-hardy and often dangerous. Acknowledgment of this
and the emphasis laid upon it by you and the other members of the Commerce
Committee, the Aeronautical and Space Science Committee, and the Congress-
at-Large, are 'very gratifying. I must introduce a note of caution, however, with
respect to this bill. In the last. analysis, the value of any advisory mechanism
depends upon how and whether it is used. In my opinion, leaving to each
President the decision on a particular organizational mode for obtaining science
advice will better assure Its responsiveness to policy requirements and inte-
gration with other Presidential machinery.
The Administration has chosen one particular mode of organization for
science advice, one that we believe can be effective. But whatever the arrange-
ment-whether a single individual or a three-member council, whether an
Agency head. or the head of an Office in the White House-it must make use of
all available talents in the Federal Government and elsewhere in tackling
civilian problems. The assistance of all of the Executive Agencies, each within
its own expertise, is needed and the talents of Congress, as well. Thus, any
scientific mechanism, established or used by the President, should call upon
all Agencies with high technology capabilities, not just one or two, such as
NSF or NASA, as is provided in S. 2495.
The present arrangement for science advice, established a year ago under
Reorganization Plan No. 1, is intended to foster maximum use of diverse
resources. The NSF's science base is very broad, indeed. As the sole Federal
Agency with a mandate covering all of science and with a network of close
ties to academic, industrial, and local government communities, NSF has mul-
tiple sources to draw upon and it should play an important: role in any science
advisory mechanism. The National. Science Board, composed of 24 eminent
scientists, educators, and administrators, which is the policy-making body of the
Foundation, by its very composition constitutes yet another strong link with the
scientific community. In addition, the Foundation has established the Science
and Technology Policy Office and an Office of Energy R&D Policy to form
additional links among Federal Agencies and The White House. These Offices
have already contributed extensive sound scientific advice at high levels and there
is much evidence that this advice has in fact been listened to.
I am aware that the present arrangement, involving the head of an operating
agency as science advisor with Government-wide responsibilities, has been criti-
cized on the basis of possible conflict of interests. I believe that this criticism,
while plausible, is not well-founded. The Science Advisor at present, as he has
been in the past, does not make decisions, but rather draws upon the knowledge
of other Agencies to present analyses and options. In this particular circum-
stance, the NSF's total activities involving as they do only four percent of the
total R&D budget, is so small that a serious conflict of interests would seem
to be negligible.
I think that the procedures now being followed by the Administration in
science policy matters can work and work well. That is not to say that the
present arrangement is perfectly effective. In my experience, there have been
very few organizations which could not be Improved. However, the problems
being addressed by S. 2495 are so complex and involve such powerful, diverse,
and conflicting forces, that solutions should not be adopted hastily. I would
recommend that the Committee explore further the many facets of the complex
process of effectively coupling scientific advice into national decision-making
before recommending the bill for passage.
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The Office of Management and Budget has advised use that there is no
objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the Administra-
tion's Program.
Sincerely yours,
RAYMOND L. BISPLINGHOFF,
Acting Director.
Senator Moss. Several months ago, Senator Mansfield addressed
himself eloquently to the kinds of problems we face. In the interest of
time, I will not repeat his remarks here, but would ask that they be
included at this point in the hearing record. They are part and parcel
of the issues we are considering.
[The statement follows:]
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MANSFIELD, U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
We are convened at the joint suggestion of the president and the congressional
leadership on an issue of surpassing significance. This is an unprecedented gather-
ing, of sorts. I hope that it foreshadows future contacts of a similar nature at
the emergent stages of other issues that go to the core of our national well-being.
As to the immediate concern, this meeting represents a step in a process which
began last February. Let me start by defining the question before us, at least as
I perceive it. Later in my remarks, I will suggest how the necessary legislative
framework might be created to begin to come to grips with it.
Scarcity, diminishing resources, expanding usage, cartels, production restric-
tions, steep price rises and crash-based planning-for many of us these words help
to describe the issue. In a more fundamental sense, the question we confront in-
volves the manner in which vital elements of our national economic life have
come to be organized. In particular, we need to ask ourselves : How are we
equipped-or not equipped-to address the next crisis in resources or materials
or commodities that may engulf the nation?
What we are here to explore is the possibility of creating an instrumentality
that would, first, perceive what the fundamental needs of the nation will be now
and in the years ahead, then sort out the information that relates to these needs
and, finally, provide alternative policy recommendations that might help us-in
the Congress and in the executive branch-to take the action deemed essential to
avert catastrophes and to minimize hardships in the future.
On this very point let me quote briefly from the report of a highly distinguished
commission on a major aspect of the problem before us :
"For all its wide diversities the materials problem is indivisible. There must
be, somewhere, a mechanism for looking at the problem as a whole, for keeping
track of changing situations and the interrelation of policies and programs. This
task roust be performed by an agency near the top of the administrative structure.
"Such an agency should review all areas of the materials field and determine
how they can best be related to each other. It should maintain, on a continuing
basis, a forward audit ; collect and collate facts and analyses of various agencies ;
and recommend appropriate action for the guidance of the President, the Congress
and the Executive agencies."
The quotation is from the report of the President's Materials Policy Com-
mission-the so-called Paley commission. The date : June 2, 1952, twenty-two
year,,, ago. Many of the same conclusions were drawn by the National Commission
on Materials Policy whose findings were reported a year ago. Yesterday, the
General Accounting Office reported similar conclusions.
In short, for at least a quarter-century experts have warned about coming
crises with regard to vital basic materials. What manifested itself so clearly last
year when long lines of cars began stacking up for short rations of gasoline was
not so much a lack of data and information but, more importantly, the fact that
we simply had no systematized method of assessing information in order to deter-
mine our needs clearly enough and to move quickly enough to provide a reasoned
answer, or even to make the attempt.
What if the government, at any time in the past two decades, had established
a central information unit, a data bank so to speak, that was charged with com-
piling statistics on energy resources, analyzing the status of supply and sources on
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a continuing basis. projecting consumption rates, reporting refining capacity,
and evaluating current technology and future application, and that was equipped
to report anticipated deficiencies directly to Congress and to the president with
specific recommendations? There is little doubt, I think, that had such an agency
existed, there would have been no fuel. crisis and, certainly, no reason to have
addressed the matter on a crash. basis merely to meet immediate requirements
for heat, light and transportation.
And if it is energy today, of what will we as a nation be in dire need
tomorrow? Three or four years ago, the Interior Department told us that there
were at least thirteen basic materials for which we depend largely upon supply
sources outside the United States. The figure has now grown to forty or more.
They range from aluminum and chromium to tin, lead, nickel and so on. For at
least thirty of these materials, the nation has already become over 60 percent
dependent upon other countries. In part, the dependence may be answered at some
unknown future date by new technologies such as the recapture and recycling
efforts that are at present little more than an idea. For now, however, that depen-
dence is with us, and it. is complicated by what happens when supplier nations
gang together.
I realize full well that the president and Secretary Kissinger are trying to
improve the bargaining strength of the consumer nations insofar as petroleum
is concerned. But what happened with oil is very likely to happen with bauxite or
copper or nickel or zinc or tin or whatever, when the basic needs of heavy con-
sumer societies must be met by sources beyond their national boundaries. At the
White House last Wednesday morning, Secretary Kissinger stressed to the
Leadership that the Interdependence of developed and developing nations with
regard to key resources was essential to global stability. But the international
instrumentalities he envisioned to accommodate cooperation between producer
and consumer nations can he established, it seems to me, only after there Is
constructed within our nation a mechanism able to grasp what is needed for our
own people, not only today but five or ten. years hence.
The problem goes well beyond metals or minerals and relates not only to those
goods for which we are dependent on foreign sources. In 11173, the nation experi-
enced the biggest boost in the cost of groceries In over twenty-five years,
Prices for fibers have risen 93 percent. The story of how inflation continue' to
wrack our people on every front was written graphically in the double-~ it
figures released just a couple of weeks ago--10.5 percent from March of 1973 to
March of 1974; 14.5 percent for the first three months of this year.
And while Americans are made to pay more, let us not forget that in some
areas of the world, the basic commodities are not even available. The problem is
worse in Europe, Asia and Latin America. A whole corridor spanning the African
Continent is now caught in a struggle for survival under the twin burdens of
drought and famine.
In the United States, however, I believe it is largely the question of basic short-
ages and related matters which will mandate the crises. And the crises, one after
another, will most assuredly pounce on us unless and until we are prepared as
a nation to adjust our government apparatus to meet the fundamental problem.
That problem is not really so much one of the absence of information. At last
report, more than fifty federal agencies and administrations were collecting and
compiling relevant data, and that was before any apparatus was set up to ad-
dress enviromnental concerns or to monitor product safety or to perform a host
of other recently legislated activities.
Take a specific example. In the Commerce Department there are some 160
professionals in the Office of Business Research and Analysis, and 20 or 30 of
them alone are dealing with information on industrial commodities. Look at it in
broader terns. We find that for data on imports and exports, we can turn to
the Agriculture, Treasury and Commerce departments, the Council on Economic
Policy, the Federal Energy Office (FEO) and Special Trade Representative and
more; for production. there are the Interior and Agriculture departments, Hous-
ing and Urban Development, FEO and more; for basic regulatory decisions,
there are the Department of Transportation, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Reserve and more ; and
so it goes. While the mint wants to watch silver for one reason, the Defense
Department tans a different objective in mind. In some instances, two or three
different agencies with overlapping responsibilities arrive at contradicting ap-
praisals of the present state and future prospects of the same industry.
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The situation is not very different here in the Congress, except in magnitude.
When it comes to our diverse and seemingly insatiable appetites for economic
information, our committees reflect the same fractured state as the executive
branch. In the Senate, it is Agriculture and Forestry for agriculture, minerals,
pesticides, fertilizers and timber and wood materials ; Armed Services for stra-
tegic materials, stockpile; Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs for materials
export policy, foreign trade, and silver and gold production ; Commerce for ma-
terials recycling, resource development, materials allocation, materials com-
modity controls ; Foreign Relations for the importation of Rhodesian chrome ;
Interior and Insular Affairs for mining and minerals policy ; Public Works
for national materials policy, materials recycling; Select Committee on Small
Business for materials production ; Finance for the gamut of trade ; Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy for fissionable materials ; Joint Economic Committee
for materials recycling ; Joint Committee on Defense Production for strategic
materials, stockpile ; Government Operations for any or all of the above ; and
so on.
In the House, it is much the same story.
So, I repeat, it is not necessarily the lack of knowledge that confronts us. Nor
is it that we are seeking governmental intervention, controls or what-have-you.
It is, rather, the question of how to coordinate and apply available knowledge
in a manner which permits wise and rational policy choices to surface in a
timely fashion and at a sufficiently high level of government to make them useful.
In 1952, the Paley commission called for an organization to discharge this
overall function which would be neither an operating agency nor a supervisory
agency but rather one with the function of "forward audit," concerned with
"the total pattern of activities in the materials and energy field; the relation-
ships of individual programs to each other ; the scope and dimensions of foreign
production materials programs and their relationship to domestic programs ;
the probable effects of current production programs on the long-term materials
position, the selection and development of current programs in the light of long-
term requirements ; programs for both scientific and technological research on
materials, and their interrelations ; and the relationship of materials policies
to manpower, and to fiscal and foreign policies which may in various measure
bear on materials."
Needless to say, little was heard of these suggestions subsequently. At best,
portions of these overall functions were scattered through the government in
the usual pattern of fragmentation. So we are here today to try once more.
What we are seeking to do is to explore whether or not there can be created
a meaningful instrumentality to coordinate and interpret and forcast, which will
enable the nation to expand its field of vision in this fundamental area of our
national life.
The Senate minority leader (Mr. Scott) and I put in these words in our
letter to the president proposing this meeting :
"It is our suggestion that we consider bringing together representatives of
the Legislative and Executive Branches of the government on a regular basis
with those of industry and labor and other areas of our national life for the
purpose of thinking through our national needs, not only as they confront us
today, but as they are likely to be in five, ten or more years hence, and how
they are best to be met. If the government is to intervene in these matters.
as it is now doing, an effort ought to be made to put that intervention as far as
possible, on a rational and farsighted basis."
To sort our information, look at the whole and identify potential areas of
cris,es and provide alternative policy recommendations in that perspective-that
is how I think the mandate of a new instrnmentiality, if it were to be established,
ought of be envisioned. To this instrumentality would fall the responsibility
of perceiving the imnaet of adversity in one narrow economic segment on
other segments ; of recognizing how for example, a fertilizer shortage might
affect food supplies on down the line, and what might be done to remedy that,
since fertilizer depends on such essentials as natural gas, phosphates and
nitrogen. Do we not also need the capacity to perceive the whole of federal
intervention in the economy, if it must occur, and the relation of the individual
parts of that intervention to one another? That such a capacity did not exist
when we sold off our wheat reserves is obvious. Did it fail to exist, too, when
we sold abroad in the last six or eight months half of our national reserves of
tin-a material for which we can be classified as 100 percent dependent on
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foreign sources? Does it exist when we overseed our fields with soybeans today
knowing that price instability lies even now on the horizon as evidence accumu-
lates of a replenished protein feed source off the coast of South America?
1 think all of use here sense that there exists some kind of requirement to
deal with questions of this kind or, I daresay, we would not be meeting at all.
At the end of this meeting, therefore, it would be my hope that we might at
least be able to state that much affirmatively. It would be my hope, too, that
we might go on from there and begin to clarify our thinking on some additional
questions, I would like to set forth the following points.
First, what kind of instrumentality, if any, might meet this requirement?
As proposed in the Leadership letter to the president, it was our thought that
such an instrumentality, if it is to be effective, should be one that is representative
of the nation; one, therefore, that would embrace representatives not only of
the legislative and executive branches but of industry, labor, agriculture and
other significant segments of our national life. First, it should be a continuing
instrumentality equipped to draw on information from all sources on the status
of resources, materials and commodities and other aspects of our economy-
tasks performed now by dozens of agencies and organizations across the spec-
trum of national life, both public and private. Second, it must have the means
to forecast the problems by drawing information out of the present massive
but fragmented system. Third, it must have the capacity to convert its pro-
jections into recommended policy options that might embrace such measures
as conservation, research, stockpiling, allocation, modernization, manpower,
export controls and whatever else may be necessary to keep vital the nation's
economy. Finally, it must be in a position to report its findings authoritatively
to the president and the Congress, the ultimate arbiters of policy and the sources
of action for the federal government. That is only one posssible approach
to this question. Others might see the requirement in different terms.
I think it was last December at the annual meting of the American Economic
Association that Dr. Stein said, "Maybe, we need an economic planning agency."
The statement reflects for me and for many others a deep frustration with the
disjointed way government has tended for decades not so much to act but in-
stead to react when a component of this gigantic, intricate machine of the
U.S. economy gets out of whack. It is not only, for example, that a. decision
to build or not to build a new steel mill or chemical plant or to start a mining
operation can have major repercussions throughout a community, the nation
and even abroad : it is also that a shortage of raw materials derived from
petroleum can shut down auto plants in Detroit and manufacturers of re-
cording tapes in Los Angeles. As one noted economist characterized our present
approach not long ago, it is like the old circus act with five clowns in a car,
one pressing the gas, another pulling the brake, the third spinning and steering
the wheel, the fourth blowing the horn and one sitting on top holding on for
dear life. That one on the top, I suppose, is the American public.
As a second focal point of this preliminary discussion, I would note that a
number of congressional committees are interested in aspects of this problem
and are advancing concepts and proposals which are designed to deal with at
least parts of it. There comes to mind, for example, the work in the Senate Com-
merce Committee and the Senate Government Operations Committee. There are
probably other explorations under way in House committees and undoubtedly in
other Senate committees. Others, I would assume, are working on the problem
in executive agencies, not to speak of the activity of the United Nations, private
foundations and universities. In any event. it would be my hope that we would
consider in this group whether or not we wish to recommend to the president
and the Congress the establishment of a temporary commission of executive and
legislative representatives and private citizens to examine all of these proposals
and any others having to do with this question. Such a commission might pro-
pose the design of a continuing instrumentality which would be capable of giving
the president and the Congress the kind of integrated perception of our national
requirements now and in the future which has heretofore. been lacking. Senator
Scott and I have had draft legislation prepared along these lines. In the event
that this route of establishing a temporary commission on the question meets
with general approval, I would hope that this draft, a copy of which is before
you, would be studied and that the group would he prepared to move ahead, to
the end that legislation to create .a special temporary commission along these
general lines might be introduced in the next couple of weeks.
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I should like to conclude these remarks on this note. As we have had this
draft resolution prepared, it is designed to minimize political factors and to place
the consideration of this fundamental national problem on a basis of equality
between the branches of government and between government and the private
sector. In my judgment, the system under which this nation survives and grows
depends as much on cooperation as it does on competition among the cores of
power and responsibility within the government and within the nation. If there
is any area in which the element of cooperation is imperative, it is in safeguard-
ing the livelihood and well-being of the nation, not only in terms of the needs of
today but in terms of the needs of tomorrow and tomorrow. Whatever we do,
therefore, let us try to do it in that context, in the context of cooperation between
the two parties, cooperation between the two branches and cooperation among
the basic segments of our national life. When it comes to the nation's basic eco-
nomic needs, there is no advantage to be gained for any particular segment in
government or private life. If we do not work together today, in this sphere,
there will be no need to ask for whom the bell tolls ; it will toll for all of us
tomorrow.
Senator Moss. I am delighted to be able to call as our first witness,
Dr. George Kistiakowsky, professor emeritus of chemistry, Harvard
ITniversity, who will be able to give us some advice as to how, at the
Federal level, we should handle our affairs.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE B. KISTIAKOWSKY, PROFESSOR
EMERITUS OF CHEMISTRY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Dr. KIsTIAicowsTcY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is a great pleasure to appear before this distinguished committee
and to speak on the subject of the bill S. 2495 and the amendment No.
1537 you are considering.
I don't think I would be qualified to speak on this subject by virtue
of being a professor emeritus of chemistry. However, I have spent
many years in Washington in various positions, including being mem-
ber, chairman and general consultant of the President's Science Ad-
visory Committee, and for more than a year and a half, as full-time
assistant to President Eisenhower on science and technology. These
experiences and others, which I won't mention here, have led me to
the conviction that it would be to the advantage of the country and
also to the benefit of the Presidency, if the President had within his
circle of top advisers, an individual representing a science office, who
had had experience in the various aspects of science and technology,
and who could give a view on the technological aspects of many of
the problems which have to be presented to the President.
The range of these problems is large. For instance considerably
more than a quarter of that part of the budget that is subject to
Presidential choice is of that nature, far more than the $20 billion of
the so-called R. & D. budget.
And so, needless to say, I am welcoming S. 2495 and its amendment
wholeheartedly in principle, and what I have to say, although it may
sound somewhat critical, refers to specifics rather than to the objectives
of the main substance of the bill.
My most important criticism concerns the special relationship, stat-
utory relationship, which is proposed in title 2, with respect to the
Council of Advisers on Science and Technology, and the Office of
Technology Application.
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This special relationship, which comes close to putting management
responsibility over the Office, in the Council, means to me that the
Council will be very much weakened in its broader role, because it
would have a special function, and therefore could not be seen as a
dispassionate assessor of other activities of the Government.
I believe that it would be much better if there were no such special
relation. My general position in my paper on Presidential science
advising which was published in "Science" magazine on April 8, is
that such a Council should have an analytical and critical function and
be strictl y free of administrative and managerial authority, which only
weaken that function which the President needs.
I ant also not completely convinced that the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, which is mn extraordinarily skilled organi-
zation in the technology of space, and in special managerial techniques
which are involved in this operation were the same agency orders
R.. & D. and then purchases the finished product, that such an agency
is particularly suited to deal with the many civilian problems. Here
the Government has to be only a catalyst for technological innovations
in which the central issue is not the ultimate height of performance
regardless of cost.
As you know, the cost of typical space products runs into thousands
of dollars per pound, whereas civilian economy typically operates on
products which cost only a few dollars a pound.
The dollar prices, 1 must say. keep going up rapidly, so a year from
now 1. may have to change these figures. But they are indicative of how
different, the space and civilian technologies are. But that is secondary
to my concern about the special relation to the proposed office, which
I believe is bound to weaken the effectiveness of the Council.
My other points are minor. On page 4, the bill states that the Council
may encploy-and I am not clear whether that implies that it may also
use staff by transfer from cabinet departments and independent offices.
I think such transfer would be very useful, in this case and presume
this is implied.
On page 6, is an important, point : Section 5, which, although it
doesn't use the word "budget," speaks of the review and appraisal of
the various programs, policies and activities of the Federal
Government.
I presume that would involve participation in the budgetary process,
and that is of great importance to a Council which is to propose new
N'ederal policies to the President when appropriate. Such involvement
in a budgetary process, coordinate rather than subordinate to OMB, is
the only way in which the. Council could have a clout over the various
Executive agencies that is essential to insure cooperation and ;joint ef-
forts to put into effect. Presidential pol ivies.
There is also one minor point on page 8. Section 101(1) speaks of
the report which is to deal with developments in mathematical!, physi-
cal, social, and life sciences, and engineering.
I subscribe to that, except I would like to see the word "social"
crossed out, because it takes the report so far out that practically
speaking it would not be possible to produce an effective document.
Surely the council should be primarily concerned with the influences
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and impact of physical and life sciences, and engineering upon the
social structure of our society, but that is different from dealing with
social sciences as such.
Well, sir, this concludes my remarks.
Senator Moss. Thank you very much, Dr. Kistiakowsky. We ap-
preciate your appearance and your assessment of S. 2495. We are
particularly interested in the specific points where you would recom-
mend some change.
I take it from your statement that you agree with the findings in the
declaration of policy very much, but you simply have some rather
minor suggestions as to some of the details?
Dr. KisTIAxowsKY. Yes ; I do.
Senator Moss. As you know, the President abolished the Office of
Science Adviser in the early part of 1973.
Why do you think he did this?
And what are the advantages in maintaining such an office?
Dr. KisTIAKowsKY. Well, sir, I am not a psychlogist, and therefore
I cannot quite fathom mental processes which led to that event.
In my article, I pointed out that Mr. Ehrlichman, in a press inter-
view, when asked about the Office of Science and Technology then
existing in the White House and what was its function, remarked that
he didn't need any advice on policy. He just needed facts from that
office.
Now, when you only ask for facts from an office, you don't have to
have it next door. You can move it out. So, I haven't answered your
question, but that is the nearest I can come to it, sir.
Senator Moss. It has been our feeling that abolishment of the Office
of the Science Adviser constituted something of a downgrading of the
whole structure of science and technology in the federal system. There-
fore, that was one of the reasons we feel S. 2495 is needed.
Dr. KisTIAKOWSKY. It certainly has downgraded it very seriously.
Senator Moss. One of our problems has been the makeup of the
Council proposed by this bill.
Do you feel the composition is contained in the amended version, do
you feel that is desirable?
Dr. KISTIAKOWSKY. I believe that 3 members while not magic, is a
reasonable number. It certainly shouldn't be big enough to be a com-
mittee, and unanimous consent was to be developed.
These have to be individuals, strong, competent, and that number is,
therefore, appropriate.
I am troubled by one minor point in title 1, namely, if I read cor-
rectly the language, it instructs the President to establish a council
and to appoint the members.
Senator Moss. Yes.
Dr. KiSTIAKowsICY. I have a feeling that it is not quite right for
Congress to tell a President how he ought to organize his own office..
It is a sort of an old ponit that you can take a horse to water, but
you can't make it drink. And I remember, for instance, when Congress
set up the Space council in President Eisenhower's administration,
President Eisenhower privately kept saying he is absolutely against
it and he doesn't want to have anything to do with it. He refused to
Chair the council, told me to Chair it, and I passed the buck, since I
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would be in the middle and be squeezed by the members. The council
never amounted to anything during the Eisenhower administration.
I think that this is something which ought to be more in the nature
of permissive legislation, making it easy and attractive to set up such
a thing.
Senator doss. Concern has been expressed that the established policy
of the agencies might suffer if the council came into existence.
What is your response to that contention?
Dr. KiSTIAKKOWL-sRY. I think that is quite an incorrect assessment.
Senator Moss. I)o you feel that the annual science and technology
report is comprehensive enough, or overly ambitious?
What. other recommendations do you have for improving the scope
of the report?
Dr. I1_ISTiAKOWsKY. I don't think a report like that should be com-
prehensive. The scope of science and technology in this country, about
$30 billion of R. & 1). annually on the national level, is an activity
which it is impossible to summarize effectively in a single readable
document.
I think, therefore, such a document should identify the key issues
which will be significant to the: country in the future and talk about
progress achieved, the stumbling blocks, the needs for radical change
and so on, but I think it should be a very selective document. Other-
wise, it. will be quite useless.
Senator Moss. One point of contention is whether the tax money
that we spend on our R. & D. ultimately benefits the average citizen.
Do you believe that Federal R. & I). money properly directed gives
the average taxpayer a good return on his investment?
I)r. KISTiAKOWSKY. Yes, I do., sir.
I think it gives a considerably better return than some other money
that is expended, and I think we have long ago passed the point where
we could have chosen not to be a technology-based society. We are
technology based. and our future is inextricably dependent upon tech-
nology to solve the problems of shortage of raw materials, to spread
the higher standards of living, protect the environment and keep
strong industrial activity and so on.
That does require R. & D. without any question.
So the only issue. is, should the Federal Government. be involved
in it or not? Of course, actually more than half of Federal R. & D.
goes to the military and military-related topics.
Whether all of them benefit the taxpayer, I very seriously doubt.
But certainly the rest is essential because the private sector of the
economy doesn't have the resources and the willingness to finance,
especially the long-range efforts, because they do not bring in ade-
quate returns at the moment.
If we. are, dealing with a single industrial corporation, there is
always the concern that what they spend money on, on inventions,
and then put it into production, it will then be copied by somebody
else.
I used to be a consultant to a large chemical corporation, which I
will leave unnamed, and the cynicism among the research staff was
such that in quite a few of the laboratories, there was a big wall sign,
"When better products are invented, we will copy them."
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Senator Moss. Of course, the problem of the private industry is
that they are in a profitmaking business. That is the reason they exist,
and therefore, long-range R. & I). is a drain on them. They must pay
dividends and consequently the management might be turned off if
they spend to much on R, & D.
Dr. KISTIAKowSKY. That is right.
.The argument is that as a Nation we are big enough that what we
do in R. & I)., what we finance in long-range R. & I). is certainly of
benefit to us as a Nation, as distinct from a typical corporation.
Senator Moss. Thank you.
I yield to my colleague from California.
Senator TUNNEY. Thank you.
I was interested in some of the answers to the questions Senator
Moss put to you, Doctor. I have a sense that what we are talking about
is that it depends a good deal upon the President himself, and his
top advisors as to the impact that any science advisor is going to have
on national policy.
Perhaps it is fair to say, and correct me if I am wrong, that it
doesn't make much difference what the institutional structure is if the
President doesn't pay any attention to his top science adviser. If that
man is isolated from the decisionmaking process, it would be rela-
tively unimportant what the structure is.
Dr. KIBTIAKOWSKY. Yes.
In fact, it would be a waste of taxyers' money to keep that office
going.
I think access to the President, which implies that the President
is interested in the views of his advisors, and feels that he is benefiting
from them, although not necessarily accepting their advice every
time-such access is absolutely indispensible.
When it is lost, the office might as well be abolished, as I said, and
I suppose that is essentially what
Senator TUNNEY. I am obviously interested in this legislation, as
I am a cosponsor, as are Senator Moss and Senator Magnuson as
well. We all have a very deep interest in seeing that the science adviser
to the President is institutionally backed up within the Federal struc-
ture in a way that would give him ready access to the President, to
the Oval Office.
But one of the things that depresses me a bit from what I have
heard from you and from others, is that you can have the structure
and have the science adviser in the White House and give him an
office in the White House, but if the President won't listen to him,
he really is not going to have much value to the President, or the
country.
You mentioned the Eisenhower years where the science adviser was
pretty well isolated.
Dr. KIsTIAK0w5KY. No, sir, I was referring to the Space Council.
Senator TuNNEY. I see.
Dr. KISTIAKOwsKY.No, as the science adviser, I had contact, Dr.
Killian, my predecessor, and myself had very good access to the
President.
Senator TuNNEY. It was the Space Council you were referring to,
I am sorry.
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What is your assessment of the current science advisory apparatus
and the dual role that the Director of NSF and Science Adviser to the
President, considers?
Dr. KiscJAxowsKY. Without criticizing Dr. Stever, personally, be-
cause I think he is a very good man, I think he has been put in a diffi-
cult position. He has to plead with OMB for the NSF budget, for
NSF policies, and the the other half of him is supposedly not depend-
ent on OMB. And the point that I mentioned earlier is that a science
adviser must be free of managerial and administrative responsibilities
in order to be essentially like Caesar's wife, above suspicion, by the
other agencies, of having improper preference to get more money for
his projects and so on.
So I think that is a very bad arrangement. Dr. Stever is having
some beneficial effect upon the Federal policies, but I would think that
as time goes on, his position will become more and more untenable
as Government people get irritated by things which he had to do and
so on.
It simply is not a Presidential science advising. It is something
entirely different,.
Senator TUNNEY. Is your opinion, to your knowledge, shared in
the science community as it relates to Dr. Steyer's dual role?
Dr. K TSTIAKOWSKY. I haven't found anybody who doesn't share it
with nie, but that doesn't mean that there aren't many who do not.
Senator FUNNFY. Are you recommending that the council review
all agency R. & D. budget requests?
Dr. KIsrrAKOwfiKY. I don't think it should be necessarily an across-
the-board review, because the details are so many that it could easily
sort of make the Council lose itself in a mass of detail, and not see
the forest for the trees.
I believe it ought to be, given Presidential authority to inquire into
any aspect of the, R. and I). and related budget and I would like to
emphasize that the military and military-related R. and D. budgets
should certainly not be excluded.
One of the major weaknesses of Dr. Stever's position is that he has
been told that he has nothing to do with those, and thus there is really
no technical competence for looking at those budgets outside the
Pentagon, which is really an extraordinary situation.
Senator TUNNFY. What, interests me, is that the military R. & D.
effort is certainly the largest share of the Federal R. & 1). effort.
What percentage of the total. R. & 1). effort, both public and private
money, does the military R. & D. budget represent?
Dr. KIS'r]AxowsICY. A few years ago when I)r. Foster was I)DRE,
that was :i or 4 years ago, he delivered a public address in which he
deplored the underfinancing of military R. & D., pointing out that
it only added to $13 billion out of a total national sum of $211 billion.
To' me that was really a, horrible set of figures. I believe that now
the figures are not quite as bad. That is, I think if you include the
official military R. & D. which is about $9'/2 billion, plus hidden por-
tions, for intelligence and other such agencies, plus military-related
NASA budget, plus AEC military-related budget, you will probably
come to something less than half of the $30 billion which is estimated
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to be the national R. & D. budget, but not very much under $15 billion;
$13 billion is a possible figure.
Senator TUNNEY. Doctor, how does that compare with other coun-
tries in the Western World?
Dr. KIsTIAiiowsiiY. I believe it is relatively higher than in any
major industrialized country in the Western World. There is no way
of comparing it with the Soviet Union, or China, because we have
no ground on which to base such comparisons. Certainly their military
budget does not include R. & D. and R. & D. is hidden in the various
other items.
Senator TUNNEY. As you know, the legislation that we have before
us does not have any language in it that would give to the Council
any explicit right to review the military R. & D. budget.
I am wondering if you feel that there should be language contained
in the legislation which would give that explicit authority, or do. you
think that by doing so that we would pretty well have created sufficient
controversy surrounding the legislation so that it would be impossible
to get it through?
I am asking you now not as a professor emeritus, but as a person
who has had experience in governmental infighting.
Dr. KIsrIAnowsKY. What experience I have had does not qualify
me to assess the likelihood of passing a bill in Congress. I simply
cannot judge it.
I would favor page 6, item 5, where you speak of the programs and
policies and activities of the Federal Government, to include those in
the domain of national security, or words to that effect, because the
exclusion of that, considering that the rest of the language is not
permissive, but very explicit, the exclusion of that implies that you
don't want them to do it.
Senator TuNNEY. What kind of interface do you think that we
ought to have between OMB and the council?
What sort of review should OMB have the Council's recommen-
dations ?
OMB apparently reviews every agency's recommendations now-
adays. Do you think that we should make an exception in this par-
ticular case?
Dr. KIsTIAKowsKY. No, sir.
I think that OMB should continue reviewing all the budget, in-
eluding R. & I), but I would think that in the review process of R. &
D.-related activities, the staff of such a council should participate an
a regular basis, and should have the authority also, to make inquiries
on its own.
Senator TUNNEY. That is not quite what I meant.
I meant, do you think they should review the Council's report and
be in a position where they can make suggestions, not only suggestions,
but. deletions, in that report?
Dr. KISTIAIowsIcY. Well, I would think that the Council, with the
aid of its staff., could and should intervene with OMB in essentially
two classes of events.
One is where it feels that a certain activity of the Federal. Govern-
ment should he terminated or downgraded as being unproductive,
and maybe a little out of date, and another class, and a more important
one comprises those activities which the council feels have extraor-
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Binary promise for the future and which, therefore, should be sup-
ported regardless of any financial tightness of the budget as a whole.
In other words, they should be given the highest priority.
I would think that this kind of advice and recommendation should
be done on a staff level. If it is unaccepted, I would assume that the
chairman of the council would go to the head of OMB as an equal, not
It subordinate, and say essentially, "Look here, my boy, bookkeeping is
all fine, but this is an important project, and I believe it should be
supported strongly."
If there is a disagreement, I conceive of the issue being carried
to the. President.
I have participated in just that sort of thing in 1959 and 1960 in
the budgeting process, including the presentations to the President,
and I see no reason why it shouldn't be restored.
Senator TuNNF.Y. In other words, what you are saying is that they
should be equal in the advice they are giving the President, and the
Director of CMB should not be in a position where lie makes the
final decisions?
I )r. KTSTTAKOWSKY. Precisely.
Senator TuNNFY. Thank you very much.
Senator Moss. The Senator from Ohio?
Senator MFTZFNI3AUM. Dr. Kistiakowsky, in examining this pro-
posal with your great experience in government, is there anything
that you might suggest that would make it possible not only to move
forward with the planning stage, the exploratory stage, but to further
implement the actual program aspects so that the Office of Science
and Technology would not only be making studies, but would be
seeing to it that there would be an implemented kind of program?
Dr. KISTIAKOWSKY. Sir, my own feeling is that it would not be bad
to have that office an analytical and planning operation, and let the
existing Federal agencies do the management and implementation,
which, of course, as we all known, do not always comply with the
Presidential wishes. That is one reason why I think that involvement
in the budgetary process would provide the council. the necessary
clout to insure that the implementation is carried out.
I am afraid that giving such a council executive responsibility could
weaken its central role.
Senator MFTZF.NBATTM. I have no further questions.
Senator Moss. Thank you, Doctor. We appreciate your testimony
and your responses to our questions. Our next witness will be Dr.
Edward E. David. Jr., executive vice president., Gould, Inc.
yre are very pleased to have you, Dr. David. I must be excused.
The Senator from Ohio, Mr,. Metzenbaum, will preside. Senator
Tenney had to slip out because he had to go to an appropriations
markup that is going on. He will be back in a very few minutes. I
don't like this revolving door thing, but we all have so many assign-
ments that we have to try to keep all the balls in the air at once.
I ani very pleased to turn the chair over to the Senator from Ohio,
and we look forward to your statement which I will not be able to
hear directly, but I assure you I will read it very carefully.
Senator M ETZE cRAUM (presiding]. You may proceed.
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STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD E. DAVID, JR., EXECUTIVE VICE
PRESIDENT, GOULD, INC., CHICAGO, ILL.
Dr. David. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Senate
Commerce Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you to express my views on Amendment No. 1437 to S. 2495. I would
like to make a statement and then would be delighted to answer your
questions.
I am much in sympathy with the intent behind the amended bill.
In my view, it is in the national interest that scientific and tech-
nological influences be manifest in both the upward and downward
flow of activity in the Executive Office of the President. By upward
flow, I mean the activities leading to policy making and decisions at
the highest level. By downward flow, I mean the execution and im-
plementation of those policies and decisions through R. & D. programs
in the agencies and departments.
The need for such technical participation is perhaps self-evident.
The principal. issue concerns what form this participation should take.
My thoughts about this matter lead me to a somewhat different image
of an effective scientific and technological apparatus than that en-
visioned in S. 2495.
First and foremost, I believe that any new Executive Office science-
based group must be more than merely advisory in character if it is
to be effective and survive in the long run. Such a group must become
a part of the operating executive mechanisms with recognized re-
sponsibilities and the authority to discharge them.
I have described such a group as a Council or an Office of Research
and Engineering Management. Of course this title itself is not im-
portant. I merely use these alternative words to indicate an enhanced
action and operational orientation as contrasted to the contempla-
tive image, raised by the title, Council of Advisers on Science and
Technology.
The c,irrent advisory arrangement involving the National Science
Foundation is purely advisory. Nevertheless, the Director of NSF and
his staff have been helpful to OMB and other executive elements ac-
cordin%t to accounts. I have said before, that it is too early to just see
how effective this arrangement can be.
However, T believe it is essentially unstable. That is if NSF tran-
scends suc.cessfu ly its past concerns solely with basic research and aca-
demic science and becomes more worldly it will rise in the executive
hierarchy. If this growth does not occur, then the apparatus will
atrophy or become completely subservient to other executive elements.
Reggardless, I believe the Nation requires a science-based group in
the. Executive Office which is coequal with other policy and execution
mnechanisms.
In order for such a new group to be accepted and made legitimate
in the eyes of administrators, assistants, and decision.makers it must
not be seen as an advocacy group for the technical community. It must,
serve the Executive- and it must not depend exclusively upon personal.
relationships for its influence.
Let me go into greater detail about these matters.
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Unless such specific responsibility and authority are legislated or
assigned by an executive reorganization plan, I do not believe a science
and technology office or council in the Executive Office or as part of the
White House can endure.
I appreciate this opportunity of bringing these views to your atten-
tion.
[Recess.]
Senator METZENBAUM. Dr. David, you may proceed. I am sorry I had
to leave. I have had a chance to peruse your remarks, and I generally
understand the thrust of your position, but I would like to ask you
about your whole argument with reference to the Department of Sci-
ence and Technology and your concern that if it exists that there would
be a plurality of support for your industry and universities, and there-
fore there might be some loss as far as the universities and industry are
concerned.
I wonder if you can expand on that and tell us whether or not you
believe that necessarily has to be so.
Dr. DAVID. Well, Senator Metzenbaum, from the experience I have
had in the past with government agencies. I can say that each has its
own point of view with respect to the most important research and
development programs, and which approaches to national problems
are preferred.
Therefore, a proposal by either industry or university groups, or
anyone outside the Government, or even proposals from laboratories
inside I be Government to undertake certain R. & D. programs are
judged against the preconceptions of the particular agency which is
evaluating the proposal. Programs which are extremely important can
be turned down or denied funding because of these preconceptions.
1 think it is very important to have more than one source of funding
so that a group proposing an R. & D. program can have a second hear-
ing or a third hearing in a different. e.nvironinent and with people who
have different conceptions of what the problem is and how to solve it.
T would not think that this would be likely in a single organnization.
Senator METZENBAUM. I think that a. single organization just could
not have that breadth of concern, and that it would have to be pulled
apart or that those who have special interests would be able to be more
effective?
Dr. DAVID. Well, it is a relative matter, Senator Me tzenbaum. But
I believe the single organization is likely to be governed strongly by
policies from the top levels, and that policy is a constraint upon every
element. in that organization. Therefore it is easier to maintain the
llexibility which f think is desirable in a pluralistic situation,
Senator METZENBAUM4i. If we were to follow your line of thinking,
wouldn't an agency such as the :National Cancer Institute or the Heart
and Stroke Institute, wouldn't we just dissolve those? Because some
might argue that. there would be a division between the chemothera-
pists and the virologists and the radiologists, and yet isn't it in the na-
tional interest to try to bring all of these. specialties together?
I have. difficulty in following your thinking that you do better when
You disperse and have no centralized kind of program as far as-science
and technology are concerned.
Dr. DAVID. I would say again that I think it is a matter of degree. I
would not like to see all programmatic aspects of science and technol-
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ogy abandoned, and I think the National Institutes are reasonably
well organized to maintain a balance between diffusion and pluralism
on the one hand and programmatic activities on the other.
However, when one program becomes too large, then the fabric of
biomedical research does suffer. As a matter of fact, I think it is the
opinion of many people that the medical and biological community
is suffering because the national cancer program has gotten to be a
very substantial fraction of the total funding in the National Insti-
tutes of Health.
Senator METZENBAUM. That is a division of the NIH vis-a-vis its
separate participating agencies. I was addressing myself to divisions
in the National Cancer Institutes itself. As the executive vice president
of a multi-faceted company that it has to bring together a coordinated
type of effort, I just wonder whether you aren't suggesting for govern-
ment a different kind of program than that which you would advocate
in the business world, because in the business world, your own cor-
poration, you believe, is in a large number of areas, and I don't think
they all relate exactly one to the other.
You seem to be doing a good job of it, and probably by your own di-
rection, but isn't government in the same position?
Dr. DAVID. Yes. The corporations take the view I am talking about,
namely that a great deal of research and development must be tied to
a customer base, and therefore must be done by the divisions of the
company which serve those customers. This is a diffuse effort related
primarily to serving specific markets and specific customers. It is a
pluralistic effort.
The central research laboratories spend a relatively small fraction
of the R. X, D. funds of our corporation, and I think that is true in
most corporations. We look at that central R. & D. activity as a backup
to the people who are serving customers, and as a means for infusing
new ideas and vigor into the people who are serving the customer base.
Senator MFTZENBAUM. What do you think of the role Dr. Stever
plays in the NSF?
Dr. DAVID. I have the same problems with it that I think Dr. Kistia-
kowsky expressed. I want to go out of my way, as he did, to say that I
think Dr. Stever is doing a fine job given the constraints under which
he labors.
I do believe, as I said in my testimony, that the situation that he has
is essentially unstable. He is purely an adviser to an unspecified mech-
anism in the Executive Office of the President. In order for a viable
and effective mechanism to exist, the apparatus has to be more than
merely advisory.
Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much, I)r. David.
Dr. Lee DuBridge.
We are pleased to have you with us this morning, Dr. DuBridge.
STATEMENT OF DR. LEE A. DuBRIDGE, PRESIDENT EMERITUS,
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Dr. DuBRIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
During the period that has intervened since I first heard about this
hearing and was asked to participate, I have been traveling, and I
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have not had an opportunity to prepare a statement in advance, so I
will simpy make some remarks. I will be gad to answer any questions
that you have.
As the previous two speakers have said, I also agree with the in-
troduction and the policy formulation aspects of this bill. I agree with
the thesis in the bill, on the importance of science and technology to
the United States and to the welfare of the people. I believe, also, the
finding that it is desirable to have in the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent a suitable mechanism for insuring, not only the health of science
and technology, per se, but insuring that the best results and the best
talents in the fields of science and technology are brought to bear on
national problems, issues, and policies.
As Dr. David said, one must have a policy for science and also use
science in the formulation of national policy. Both of these, are impor-
tant, and I think a council of the sort that is proposed here should
and can perform both of these functions to insure that science is incor-
porated in, and is considered and is made a part of, national policy.
At the same time, the policies of the country are such that science
can strengthen them and contribute more and more to the strength of
the country.
I have been in favor of creating in the Executive Office of the
]'resident a council for science advisers, or for science and technology,
or with some similar name. Therefore, I endorse completely the idea
proposed in this bill, that there be such a council, and that it be con-
stituted about as you indicate in the bill, and that it be of the size and
in general perform the functions that you outline.
So I think I would say that I am in general in support not only of
the import, but of most of the specific provisions of this bill.
I have not had the time, however, to review every sentence. 1 do
hope that the committee and the staff will check carefully with the
recommendations of the Killian report., which outlines, I think, in an
effective and comprehensive way the kinds of functions and relation-
ships that such a council shoul(l have to the other offices within the
Executive Office of the President, and to the other agencies of
Government.
I think many of, the recommendations in the Killian report, which
I subscribe to, are possibly not appropriate to include in legislation,
because they specify relationships which in fact have to be left to
the President when the council is created. But I think if the legisla-
tive history of this bill includes the general thoughts that the Council
of Science and Technology should have relations to the Domestic
Council, the National Security Council, the Office of Management and
]Iudget, and other agencies in the White House as well as close rela-
tionships to all departments and agencies of government which had to
do with research and development, this will be helpful to the President
and to the council members themselves eventually, in implementing
and expanding and carrying out the intentions of the Congress.
The portion of this bill that has to do with the creation of an appli-
cations office in NASA, I have serious reservations about. NASA has
ai, particular area of technological interest and concern and competence,
and NASA has already been doing what it feels it can do in transfer-
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ring this new knowledge and new results of their technology into the
civilian and nonspace sector.
As has been mentioned by Dr. Kistiakowsky, this is not easy, be-
cause a navigation device that will go on a spacecraft may cost hun-
dreds of thousands or even millions of dollars, and it is not quite feas-
ible as a navigation device on a commercial airplane, although the
functions it performs may be exactly what the commercial airplane
needs. The cost involved is too great.
This is a tremendous task, not an impossible task, of converting the
space instrumentation and equipment to commercially adaptable
equipment, and I think NASA is trying to do this, and should do it.
I would prefer that the Congress authorize any agency of govern-
ment, NASA, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, the National Science Foundation, HEW, and any other agen-
cies that are heavily involved in technological R. & D. to spend money
and hire staff for the specific purpose of transferring into the private
sector the results and the ideas and the equipment that have been de-
veloped by these agencies with government funds, so that there can be
a continual transfer of knowledge and ideas and technologies from the
government into the private sector.
This ought to be flowing freely-not just allowed to happen, but to
be encouraged. So, rather than just say it would all be done by NASA,
I would prefer that every agency of government be authorized to seek
appropriations for the purpose of carrying out this function of the
transfer of technology from the public into the private sector .
I think it is important now, going back to the Council of Science
and Technology, that two things be noted : First, that the policy as-
pects of ite duties be emphasized, and that it be authorized to have
funds to hire adequate staff and to enter into contracts with study
agencies to develop policy recommendations for the President and for
the Executive Branch of the Government.
I think this is provided, and I just want to emphasize how important
it is that policy aspect be strengthened.
While I was in OST, we did try to build a stronger policy study
group. However, our budget was inadequate to do that to the extent
that we would have liked to have done it.
This brings me to a second point which probably cannot be accom-
modated in this legislation, but I hope in the legislative history it will
be emphasized, that this office of the council must be adequately fi-
nanced. That doesn't mean that it is going to be hundreds of millions
of dollars. I do know that the OST in my day had a budget of some-
thing like $2 million. I regarded this as quite inadequate. There were
many staff positions that we wanted to fill ; we wanted to get higher
level people. I wished to have a second deputy as well as a single
deputy in the Office of Science and Technology. We wished to organize
a. policy study staff, and we did not have funds, or authorization for
personnel for that purpose.
We often ran short of fees for consultants that we wanted to bring
in to form advisory panels. We even ran at times short of travel funds
to take care of the travel of the members of the advisory consultants
that we wanted to bring in.
So I do emphasize the importance of an adequate budget. What it
should be, I don't know. I think $2 million is too small. Maybe $4
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million is as much as could be used after the office gets organized and
going.
I would like to comment, though, I hesitate to do so extensively, on
I)r. David's remarks about what he called the management function
of an office in the Office of the President.
My definition of management, I think, must be different from the
one that he has in mind, because I do not think that an office within
ilie White House can have real management responsibilities in the sense
of running laboratories, hiring scientists and technologists, formulat-
ing and directly managing research and development programs.
I do think, however, that management oversight of the type that is
lone now by the OMB to check on the management of R. & D. by
Government departments and agencies is a feasible function and is a
function that we tried to do in OST where we saw programs falling
on their faces or inadequately being pushed forward because of inade-
quate management.
We tried to bring pressure on the departments or even '.inform
the President that something needed to be done to improve the
management.
I think this is an important function, but the actual putting of a
White House agency into the direct management of research, lE don't
think that is what I)r. David meant, and I hope you dont interpret
his remarks that way if I am correct in my interpretation.
I think, Mr. Chairman, those are the only points. There is one other
remark: It has been often said that there is no use creating a council
or office of science and technology or anything else in the White
I louse unless the President wants it. This is indeed true. I trust- that
in the deliberations of the Congress. both in the House and the Senate,
that there will he, as soon as these bills have been drafted, there will
be close liaison with the White House staff so that when the brills are
prepared. the White House will indeed go along.
I know this has happened in the past. The White House may ini-
tially have been doubtful or opposed to a bill being considered in the
Congress, but, when the facts were out and the discussions were pushed
forward, an agreement was reached.
T believe liaison with the White House on the kind of structure you
a re here proposing would be good.
The question of how close the science adviser has to be personally
to the President is not an easy one to make flat assertions about. I
think there have been cases where the personal relations between the
,clerics adviser and the President have not been terribly intimate, or
terribly con(inuous, or terribly frequent, and yet in which the adviser
and his ollice were very effective in dealing with other agencies of
government, with the 10I), and HEW, and other agencies having
U. & D. responsibilities.
The fact that this office is in the White House gives it it great deal
of influence with other agencies and departments of government, and
it can exert a large and wholesome effect upon the effectiveness of
the Government's H. & 1). program even though the science adviser
personally is not seeing the President every day or every week.
There must, however, be a clearcut indiction that the President is
interested in the work of this office and the other departments must
know this.
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I think that concludes my statement.
Senator TUNNEY [presiding]. I was wonder, Dr. DuBridge, if you
had an opinion, and maybe you expressed it already-on the func-
tions of the Office of Technology Application which in the legislation
is, of course, put under NASA.
I was wondering if you thought that that Office of Technology
Application should be separate, or should exist at all?
Dr. DuBrmGE. I find it difficult to imagine how a single central
Office of Technology Application of the sort that you visualize here
can be effective. I am sure you don't intend that such an office be lo-
cated in the Executive Office of the President; on the other hand, if
it is within any single department or agency, then it can be inade-
quately effective on a broad enough scale, a wide enough range of
technologies to do the job that you would like to do. That is why it is
my feeling that every department or agency having substantial re-
search and development responsibilities and activities be authorized
and encouraged to do its utmost to transfer its technology into the
private sector as rapidly and effectively as possible.
I have been told that some agencies would like to do this more ac-
tively, but they do not feel it is within their authorization, and they
can't get the funds and staff to do it. It is by no means easy to trans-
fer technology into a new area and for new purposes. A great deal of
effort, writing reports, consultation, rewriting descriptions of tech-
nological developments so they are suitable and understandable by
other agencies is a big job and takes money and staff.
I would like to see the authorization and encouragement for that
placed in every department, and not in any single one.
Senator TTNNEY. One of the things that I have heard caused the
greatest difficulty in transferring technology from the Federal sec-
tor to the private sector is our patent laws, and could you just-I
mean that is a whole other area that I know we could spend hours
on, but would you just care to briefly describe that problem as it re-
lates to the question of technology application and transfer?I am probably asking the impossible, but would you quickly sum-
marize your thoughts on that?
Dr. DuBRIDGE. I must say it is an impossible question for me to
answer. The patent law and provisions have always been among the
great mysteries in my life, and I have not had very much contact with
them.
I do feel that there is much misunderstanding about the purpose
and function of a patent and the patent law. For example, for the
Government to take a patent in its own name over some device that
has been developed under Government contract has always seemed
to me illogical. That is because Government funds were used for a
public purpose.
If an invention is made under a Government contract, the Govern-
ment should want that invention to be used for the public good. The
only way the invention could be used for the public good is for it
to be produced and made available to the public ; and the only pro-
duction mechanisms in this private capitalism system that we have
is for an industry, a company, to get the idea and to put it into
practice; and to make the goods, produce the goods, or equipment
and whatever it is, and make it available for the public. If patents
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prevent this sort of thing happening., then your funds are not being
adequately used for the public, good; and though you think, when
a patent is used by the Government to hold onto information, it is
exactly the inverse of what the patent law ought to be doing. The
patent law ought to make wide use possible within the private sector.
Now, in a private program., a patent is a different thing. They
would like to hold onto that information and the rights to use that
patent until they have had the chance to develop it and get it into
use and recover their development costs. This is a perfectly proper
tiling for a private company to do. I don't think it is proper for the
Government to adopt this same attitude.
I am afraid that is all that I could say in answer to your question.
Senator 'I'UNNEY. I understand what you are saying. Your state-
ment is very good. I am concerned about the problem, and I serve
on the Judiciary Committee as well as on the Commerce Committee,
and we are now undertaking to study patent laws; and there will
he a reform bill soon reported by the patent subcommittee. I am con-
cerned about the problem as it relates to public funds being used
to promote research by private concerns. When there is a breakthrough
that would be subject to patent, what type of profit incentive should
be given to the company or the individual in the private sector that
developed the new process for the purposes of perhaps encouraging
others in the future to contract with the Government for similar pur-
poses? I don't know whether there should be some kind of mandatory
licensing scheme, which seems to me at this time to be a good approach,
and then give some royalty to the developer of the invention.
There are others that suggest that what we ought to do is to just
have the Federal Government own it under all circumstances, and
disseminate it and distribute it without any kind of royalty payment
being made to the developer, that his payment was adequate at the
time he made, the contract.
One of the things that I do know within my own limitations in
the subject matter, as you have expressed yourself-I Just have not
had enough experience in the field to really have a valid judgment-
but do you think this new council could be effective in helping to
reform our patent policy?
Dr. I) uBsunoE. I think it is very important that the patent policy
of the country be considered. The Office of Science and Technology
has been engaged in deliberations and has made proposals for changes
in the patent policy of the Government for a number of years, and
a report on this was issued while I was here, making some recommen-
dations on L.S. Government patent policy. I have forgotten what
the specific recommendations were, but. they were comprehensive and
seemed to he acceptable to all departments of the Government repre-
sented on the Federal Council, and I hope by now those recommen-
dations have gone into effect. I do not recall to what extent they
required changes in the law.
Senator TUNNEY. The only thing f can say is that I have had
several governmental employees who are inventors and are develop-
ing new processes, tell me that, they thought that the Government
patent policy was a nightmare as it related to them, and that it was
inhibiting breakthroughs and new discoveries. I am ashamed to say
that it was impossible for me to follow up on that problem, because
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of the multitude of other responsibilities that I have, but it seems
to me that if there is that kind of critcism by Government employees,
that we ought to have a policy that is sensitive to the viewpoints of
those employees. Maybe the new council could look into it, and in a
way that would develop a policy that would be more. adequate.
Dr. DuBxmGE. My experience at Cal Tech was that the Govern-
ment patent policies, particularly as they applied to the Jet Propul-
sion Laboratory, were, in the word you used, a nightmare. We felt
they were a damper on the free, creative instincts of the people on
our staff.
Senator TUNNEY. Do you think the Council should get involved in
military R. & D. matters?
Dr. DuBRIDGE. I certainly do. It seems to me a primary weakness
of the present arrangement is that Dr. Stever in his capacity as
science adviser has no authority in the field of military research and
development. I think one of the greatest achievements of the Presi-
dent's Science Advisory Committee throughout its history has been
its contribution to better technology in our defense system.
Mr. David Packard, shortly after he retired from his position as
Deputy Secretary of Defense a couple of years ago, told me privately
that the Defense Department was going seriously to miss the advice
of the President's Science Advisory Committee, because he felt the
independent advice on weapons technology which had come through
the years from the Science Advisory Office and the President's Science
Advisory Committee were invaluable to the Department of Defense.
It helped them to evaluate and examine from an external point of
view the technological values, the technological soundness and poten-
tialities of various weapons systems that were being discussed or
developed.
Furthermore, the defense technology is in many areas closely re-
lated to technologies in other areas, such as space, atomic energy,
and even certain areas in the biomedical field.
Technology is interrelated across the board. To suppose that a
separate office of military technology is one thing, and all other tech-
nology is something else, is a misapprehension. I think the two should
be covered in the White House.
Senator TUNNEY. How close do you think that the relationship be-
tween the President and the Council should be? Do you think there
has to be a ready access to the President?
Dr. DuBRIDGE. Well, I think the greater access the better from the
point of view of the work of the Council and its effectiveness in the
Government.
As I said a while ago, the intimacy of that relationship will de-
pend very mulch on the personality and the tastes and the habits of
the President himself, and on the qualities and personalities of the
staff people around him. I don't think one should expect this relation-
ship to be the same from one administration to another, or even from
time to time in the same administration. But the existence of such
a council, its attachment to the White House structure, and the know-
ledge that it is the President's instrument, I think gives it the neces-
sary clout that it will need.
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You can't legislate the intimacy of the relations between the Presi-
dent and anybody on his staff, and it will change, and I think it can
be expected to change.
But I do think leaving the structure in the White House will
give the President, opportunities to use it which any President, f am
sure, will do to a greater or lesser extent. More important even than
just advising the President is the advice and help that such an agency
can give to all the other agencies and departments of our vast
Government, nearly all of which are concerned in some aspect or
another with the problems and potentialities of science and
t(chnology.
Senator TiJN:VEY. What relationship should there be between the
existing Federal Council of Science and Technology and the new
Council that is envisioned in the bill?
I)r. ] hrBR.uDor:. I think the confusion of names is unfortunate, and
maybe one or the other should find a different name, but the functions
are very clear and the compositions are very different.
,r he Federal Council is a committee which meets once a month or
whatever it is, with many subcommitt(es--a committee composed en-
tirely of officers of the Government, members of the Federal estab-
lishment that have scientific and technical responsibilities within
their departments. In some cases, the member of the committee may
he the head of the agency, such as I)r, Glenn Seaborg, when he was
Iaead of the AEC, and soon.
The Federal Council is a committee of Federal officers responsible
for scientific and technology R. Sn D. management. I think that is very
important for them to have :meetings and exchange ideas, and getting
their ideas together on specific problems or proposals, such as this
patent issue. This is a very important and specific coordination func-
tion within the Government R. & I). establishment. As you know, this
other new Council of Science and Technology has a very different
function. The confusion about names may be something you would
like to look to.
SenatorTuxNEY. Of course, the new Council would be a participant
in the Federal Council?
I)r. I)UBRirooE:. I would assume the Chairman of the new Council
might continue, as in the past, to be the Chairman of the other Coun-
cil, ves. The science advisor was always ex officio Chairman of the
Federal Council, and now Dr. Stever is Chairman of it.
Senator TUNNEY. Thank you very much, I)r. DuBridge. It is a real
pleasure heaving you here. I have had the opportunity to visit Cal Tech
on a number of occasions, and also have had the opportunity to be a
frequent visitor at the Jet Propulsion Laboratories.
I)r. I)UBRnxaE. Please come again.
Senator TUNNEY. Thank you.
I)r. I)onald Hornig, president,, Brown University, Providence, R.I.
STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD F. HORNIG, PRESIDENT,
BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE, R.I.
I )r. I IORNIG. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the invitation to present
my views with respect to amendment No. 1537 to S. 2495, the Tech-
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nology Resources Survey and Applications Act. My views are based
on my experience on the President's Science Advisory Committee
under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy and the 5 years I spent in
Washington as President Johnson's science adviser. Circumstances
have changed since then and I recognize that structures which are
appropriate under one set of historical circumstances become inap-
propriate with the passage of time. Nonetheless, on the basis of my
experience and observations of the Government process I feel that
some conclusions remain valid.
The Science and Technology Applications Act, in my view, provides
a sound answer to a most difficult problem, the provision of scientific
and technical advice at the highest levels of our Government and the
incorporation of scientific and technological considerations into po-
litical, social, economic, and security policies. In all of the discussion
I have heard of this subject there seems to be no dissent from the prop-
osition that the science and technology are central forces which will
shape the future of the world, on the one hand, and provide powerful
tools with which, intelligently used, we can meet our problems and
shape our destiny on the other. They enter into a host of national po-
sitions and policies, which we do not think of as scientific in themselves.
We just have to find a way of introducing these considerations to the
President and those close to him, most of whom are trained in law, eco-
nomics, business and so on.
I am very pleased, therefore, that this outlook is clearly and force-
fully put in the policy statement of the amendment. It recognizes also
that if this be true it is the responsibility of the Federal Government
to insure that science and technology are fully used to assist in meet-
ing current and prospective national problems. More than that, it rec-
ognizes that to do so the Federal Government must nurture and culti-
vate the capabilities of its departments and agencies, of State and local
governments, and of universities and industries. Furthermore, it must
lay the groundwork through education, training and research for the
availability of these resources in the future.
Finally, it recognizes that under these circumstances the President,
his staff, and all of the top executive officers of the Government ought
to be well-informed as to the probable impact of scientific and techni-
cal developments on national security and national welfare as well as
on other Federal programs. They should also understand the oppor-
tunities science and technology may provide to attain new goals. The
question is how the Executive Office should be structured to provide
and use advice so that we may have wise leadership for the country
in an age when scientific and technological considerations enter almost
every maior policy decision.
The question is also what the management role of such an agency
in the Executive Office should be vis-a-vis departments and agencies,
and how responsibilities within the Executive Office should be divided.
When I left office in 1969 I recommended the establishment of a
three to five member Council of Scientific and Technical Advisers.
That suggestion still seems sound to me and I am pleased that this
amendment would provide a statutory base for a much better version
of that suggestion.
It lays a correct emphasis on the close tie the Council must have to
the President. To me this is essential. The Council will only carry
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weight in its various roles and duties to the extent that the head of the
Council has access to the President, and his immediate staff and is per-
ceived by others to have this access. Others in and out of the Govern-
ment pay attention to the President's advisers to the extent that they
believe them to have the confidence and support of the President and
his close associates. This is a point to which the bureaucracy is very
sensitive and the influence of the Council will depend heavily on the
support it receives from the President. For this reason, I see no point
in establishing the Council unless the President can be persuaded that
ne needs it to- meet his responsibilities and that it will be an asset to
hire, or at least that he gives it his benevolent consent.
It was also my conclusion when I left office that it would be wise to
ask the Council to submit to the President and the Congress an. annual
report on the state of U.S. science and technology, roughly analogous
to the annual economic report. I still believe that this is an important
function. I only caution that such a report must be carefully planned
and researched. It cannot be an incidental task of an overloaded staff
with other responsibilities. This may be a danger, since the Council
is given a great many responsibilities but with the assistance of NSF
this danger can, 1 believe, be overcome. The report will lend a focus
to the activities of the Council and provide a specific tool for identify-
ing those major Problems which concern the President and the Con-
gress and the public, and should provide a vehicle for the discussion
of the major issues with the President and his staff.
As to the functions of the Council, goal setting and coordination are
badly needed as is the collection of information and the performance
of analyses. I can only concur in the instruction to work with Federal
departments and agencies, professional groups, representatives of uni-
versities, industry and so forth. What is not said but I hope is under-
stood is that it must not merely consult but bring to the assistance of
the President the, very best thinking that exists in every relevant
sector.
Whether all of this can be done by a small executive staff causes me
some concern, but the ability to call on NSF and other Federal
agencies, but particularly NSF, may provide the appropriate answer
to my question.
My main concern is with the programs review and appraisal func-
tion of the Council. It offers a temptation for bureaucratic tinkering
and meddling rather than intelligent broad oversight and direction.
It is a role which competes for time withpolicy advising to the Presi-
dent so that it must be done selectively and with discretion. The
Council must not he asked to exercise a degree of supervision which
is incompatible with a small, flexible, high quality office. And I should
add, which is not compatible, I think, with the role of the Executive
Office in any case. This has been touched on before. Nonetheless, if the
supervision is directed toward major programs, either in terms of size
or significance to the President and the Nation, this difficulty can be
avoided. It is in this function that the Council must work very closely,
with the OM13. I might say it is in this function, also, that the analogy
tvith the Council of Economic Advisers breaks down somewhat. The
Council of Economic Advisers is charged with macroeconomic.policy
questions, taxes, fiscal policy, monetary policy, unemployment and so
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on; it is not charged with reviewing, the effect of every agency and
its programs on the unemployment situation, for example.
In the case of economics, this detailed overview function, of course,
is given to OMB. It is a division of labor.
In this case, I think it is appropriate to give this responsibility with
discretion to the new Council, but it must not attempt to have an over-
view of everything, because the OMB, after all, has an enormous staff.
I am not prepared at this time to comment in detail with respect to
title II-the Office of Technology Application. The charter of the
office is so broad that it is hard to evaluate the potential impact it may
have. The charter it has is so broad that I have the same reservations
mentioned by previous witnesses. NASA is enormously competent, and
it has an enormous body of skills. On the other hand, technology appli-
cation is what approximately $12 billion of industrial research is
about. I don't think that NASA has a particular background or ability
to translate advanced technology into economically workable applica-
tions. Furthermore, it seems to me that the extent to which title II
indirectly involves the Council in the direction of experimental pro-
jects, and dilutes the function of an organization which is already
assigned an overpowering list of responsibilities weakens the Council.
I suppose my main concern about the bill as a whole is that if the
Council can selectively do all the things that are mentioned, it is very
good. I think no reasonable Council can really be expected all the time
to do all the things that are described. Anyway, I therefore confess to
some reservations as to whether title II strengthens or weakens the
amendment.
In conclusion, I strongly support the statutory creation of a Council
of Advisers on Science and Technology to advise and assist the Presi-
dent. We are in the midst of a continuing revolution based on the
systematic application of knowledge and skill to the problems of our
society. It cannot be ignored in the political process and must play a
part at the highest levels of our Government. I hope the chief execu-
tive will concur in this view and that the Congress will give a strong
statutory base to a Council by passage of this amendment.
The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much. I am sorry I
was a little late getting here today, but I have been on an airplane
returning from Washington State and we had some technological
difficulties.
Don, what we are trying to do, and you can throw some light on
this since you were a President's science adviser, we had the advisers
to the President on these various matters, and I found and I think that
you must have found, that you were mainly dealing with Government
agencies, were you not?
Mr. IlorNiG. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. So you were tied up with something that might
have been an intergovernmental agency matter. This is the problem
we had in oceanography over the years. What we are trying to do
here is to see if we can't get some form of independence established,
if it is by a Council or otherwise, to advise the President, rather than
have it all come from a Government agency.
Do you agree with that? Now you have to work with the agencies,
I understand that.
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42
Mr. HoRNrc. I think it is absolutely essential that there be some-
one close to the President, who is independent of the agencies, who can
get, advice and assistance and studies from any quarter whatever, so
that the President and the Congress, for that matter, have access to an
unbiased point of view. Because agencies, no matter how good, as you
know, have their own history to contend with, they have the responsi-
bilities for the programs they have built up over a period of years,
so they always have a position. The President has got to be a free man.
The C11AiR;MAN. Yes. I was hoping that by setting up this kind of
counci]-we haven't any particular pride of authorship, whether it
should be 3 or 10 or what-but to get some independence and some
outside views and not be tied to the parochial interests of the agencies.
1 suppose all of the people here this morning that were down there
as the adviser spent 90 percent of your time meeting with agencies,
is that right?
Mr. HoitKm. No, I don't think so.
The. Crr A ]RMAN. Well, not your spare time, but your time down
there.
Mr. lIoRNUr. Well, we had a lot of contacts with groups from out-
side of the Government. But I think within the Government there was
a great part of the effort, yes, sspent with the agencies.
The CHAIRMAN. Not that this is wrong, you have got to have this
liaison and dialog with the agencies. But they seem to take it over
and then they get into arguments, feuds.
I know what happened on oceanography. It got slowed up at least
5 years, because everybody wanted to get into the act.
This is what we want to avoid with this bill. We are glad to get
your suggestions. The Senator from California has done so much work
on it. So has Senator Moss.
The reason we have been doing this-and doing it so quickly-is
that apparently the old office down there that was reporting to the
White House is gone. And I don't think this is right in this (lay and
age.
So I thank you very much for coming. The Senator from California
and I have had many conferences on these matters and discussions over
the past few years.
I have no other questions.
Mr. HORNIG. Thank you, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. We will recess for 5 minutes. We have a vote on
the floor. I will be back shortly.
Recess j
The CHA1RbtAN. Mr. Chairman, I asked Mr. Hornig a few questions,
and I had no more to ask him, unless you do.
Senator TUNNEY [presiding]. I have just a couple of questions, Mr.
Chairman.
I was wondering. Doctor, if you would comment on the difference
between science policy and the policy for science.
I)o you feel that this council should be involved in both?
Mr. IIoRNIG. Well, with the analogy to economics I gave in my
statement, they are of course the Council of Economic Advisors that
are principally involved in generating policy, macroscopic economic
policy, and are not involved in the management function.
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I think it has to be involved in both here, but it presents, I think,
the biggest difficulty, because I think the problem of managing, help-
ing to manage R. & I). can be a trap for a small group.
It is a. big job. I think it is essential, I think the most essential func-
tion in the management of science is the goal-setting and coordination
role and particularly working together with OMB in setting priorities
in the budgetary process.
Senator TUNNEY. how about with respect to OMB? Do you feel
that there should be a co-equality?
Mr. HoRNIG. Absolutely. I think I could not have functioned except
for the fact that at times I could disagree with the then Director of
BOB, and we would both take our case to the President for resolu-
tion. If it weren't for the fact that occasionally I was invited down
to the ranch to sit in on final budget decisions in parallel with depart-
ment heads and the Director of BOB, I Wouldn't have carried any
wei n}rt.
This co-equality is terribly important, just in the ambiance with
which the director will deal with agencies.
Senator TUNNEY. You indicate that you view the annual report as a
critical function, but you also commented that perhaps other functions
of the council would be diluted in importance.
Do you have any suggestions as to the structural form or the status
of the council that would perhaps make the report a significant aspect
of the council's work without creating problems that you suggest could
otherwise occur?
Mr. HoRNIG. I think the problem you raise with respect to the report
occurs generally, that the task is almost too big for what you can do
in the Executive Office as we now conceive of it.
I think there is a limitation which goes beyond the report and to
me it looks like this : I don't believe that while we are trying to
restrain the size of the Executive Office of the President any organiza-
tion with more than 25 or 30 people fits the Congress' or anyone else's
idea of what ought to be in it.
I think it will be hard to give it as part of the Executive Office a
budget of more than $2, $3, or $4 million. So there is a restraint there.
So what do we, do? I think the answer both for the report and for
these other ,functions is to fall back on the studies conducted primarily
in the National Science Founation, but also in other agencies, to rely
on expertise wherever it exists in the Government. I think it can be
done.
Senator TUNNEY. One final question, and that is with respect to
title II.
You have expressed reservations about title IT. Other witnesses also
have expressed reservations and you have identified with the remarks
they have made.
I wonder, do you feel that title II should be deleted from the
legislation?
Mr. HoRNTG. As I indicated, I don't think I have thought that
through adequately. I don't think the legislation would be weakened
without title IT.
Senator TUNNEY. You don't think it would be weakened without
title II?
Mr. HORNIG. That is right.
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Senator TUNNEY. Some of the witnesses, or at least one of the
witnesses, suggested that it is very difficult to give to NASA the
responsibilities that are suggested in title II. It was mentioned that in
a capitalistic society, technology application to a considerable extent
is dependent upon the mechanisms of the marketplace and the, ability
of a private corporation to utilize the technology and science for the
purpose of putting out a product that could be sold. NASA just does
not have any special expertise in this particular area, although they
have great expertise in other areas.
T understand that you agree that NASA does not have any par-
ticular expertise in this area.
Mr. HORNIG. Well, NASA has some very great skills and in some
very specialized areas, but it is not used to developing things for the
marketplace. I suppose that within our Government the technological
agency which has the most, expertise in technological application, if
You like, is the Department of Agriculture.
Senator TUNNEY. Right. Thank you very much. I appreciate your
testimony. It is very kind of you to have come down and given us the
benefit of your thinking at this hearing.
Mr. TToRN:rn. I appreciate the opportunity to be here.
Senator TUNNEY. Thank you.
Our next witness is Dr. Edward Wenk, Professor of Engineering
and Public, Affairs, University of Washington.
STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD WENK, PROFESSOR OF ENGINERING
AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, SEATTLE,
WASH.
Dr. WFNK. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, members of the
Senate Commerce and Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committees :
The Science and Technology Application Act of 1974 that is before
your committee could well prove one of the most salient measures of
national technological policy of this decade, and it is thus a very
special privilege to have been invited to testify on its provisions. May I
add that it is also a great pleasure to renew an association with both
committees. As Executive Secretary of the National Council on Marine
Resources and Engineering Development. I reported to the Commerce
Committe. That Council, incidentally, was designed by this committee
as a presidential advisory body devoted to marine technological af-
fairs, and in this commentary I shall try to share insights as to its
track record which could provide guidance for the measure now under
consideration. I also had the privilege of undertaking policy studies
for the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee while on the staff
of the Legislative Reference Service, and regard that association as
instrumental in my own education in technology policy.
This review is thus based on a perspective of direct involvement in
science and public policy since 1959, that includes an appointment to
the White House Science Advisor's Office, and currently vice chair-
ii ianshio of the Congressional Technology Assessment Advisory Coun-
cil, and it continuing analysis now from outside government at the
University of Washington.
As T understand the thrust of this measure, it is to correct a, critical
shortfall in the contributions which science and technology could make
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toward improving the human condition. That proposed remedy in-
volves institutional reform, primarily by creation of a new statutory
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology located in the Execu-
tive Office of the President, "To provide a direct and effective source
of analysis and Judgement to the President, drawing on the best tal-
ents available within and outside the Federal Government." Title II
would also establish a Technology Application Office in the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, ostensibly to direct that
agency's technical resources to a broader area of public service.
I should like to endorse both the intent of the measure and the pro-
posed advisory machinery of title I. However, I should like to suggest
several changes in specific provisions of the bill so that Congress does
not inadvertently reinvent older and perhaps obsolete mechanisms.
And I should like to add a further set of considerations that go beyond
structural reform, but which I believe to be crucial to effective imple-
mentation, if new instrumentalities are to meet your expectations
and those of the Nation.
By way of introduction, I should like to explain premises which
underpin these remarks, particularly as to the social and political
context of Presidential advisory apparatus dealing with science and
technology, and with changing circumstances that may prompt
different approaches from the past.
TIIE CIIALLENGE TO TIIE PRESIDENT-SOCIAL MANAGEMENT OF
TECHNOLOGY
Within its rich and varied legislative agenda, both committees have
been particularly aware. of how our society copiously employs spe-
cialized technical knowledge to achieve its needs and wants, and to
protect man from the harshness and caprice of his natural environ-
ment, to facilitate life free from hunger, poverty, and disease, and to
provide high standards of living to a steadily increasing fraction of
our population. There is ample evidence, however, of grievances in-
advertently prompted by technology on the one hand, and on the other,
of unrealized opportunities to deploy science and engineering because
of conflicts in goals and because of institutional constraints in a plural-
istic, democratic society.
As several public opinion polls have shown, our technical prowess
has not always been matched with social satisfaction. For most citi-
zens, the problem is not whether science and technology can be
servants of society, but toward which goals, and how.
Accepting as we have that technology served as an amplifier of
man's muscle and more recently of man's mind, we have been late dis-
covering that technology has also served as amplifier of defects in our
social organization. Indeed, technology has revealed a number of
significant attributes :
(1) It promotes growth in scale of human enterprise, in fact, be-
comes an organizing principle for capital and enterprises which tend
to follow well known principles of self preservation.
(2) It produces inadvertent, unexpected second and third order con-
sequences which may be either harmful or benign. Indeed, the arena
for innovation has become so crowded that narrowly conceived devel-
opments do not mature in isolation but collide with other initiatives.
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The consequences are often not detected until an enterprise has devel-
oped such momentum that remedies are economically expensive, politi-
cally difficult, or both.
(3) It, inextricably intermingles nature and man. The ancient dis-
tinction between artificial and natural influences becomes even more
elusive as we prolong life through organ transplants, steer hurricanes,
and simulate man's intervention with nature on our computers.
(4) Ii; couples otherwise disparate-social organizations and may
bring them into conflict (as urban freeways bring together the black
community and the highway lobby).
(5) It has historically fostered unwitting and swift use of non-
renewable resources.
(6) Finally, technology increases the role of Government. It is diffi-
cult to find any technology today in which Government is not sig-
nificantly involved. There are incentives to private industry through
tax writeoffs, grants, and subsidies; Government regulates occupa-
tional safety, food and pharmaceuticals. Government defrays social
overhead by sponsoring research. Finally, at all levels. Government
engages in many key enterprises which employ technology.
At one time, the Government's conscious technological involvement
was directed toward principally defense, atomic energy, and space.
For these missions, the Federal Government determined the scale and
mode of R. & D. and directly applied these discoveries. It was its own
R. & D. client. But today, to contribute to economic growth and indus-
trial productivity, to improve transportation, prevent or control crime,
to manage the environment, provide health care, or assure a stable
supply of energy, the Federal Government is given a vital role in re-
flecting collective needs and aspirations of society and as a steward for
protecting the environment where the people themselves are the clients.
That government role in civilian technology was illuminated at least as
early as 1962; yet it has since stuttered and staggered in bursts of
unproductive attempts to function in the civilian arena.
Because of the Government's pervasive role, the President, has in
effect become the systems manager of all our Nation's technology. He
occupies the central position of power to set national priorities of
public purpose and public purse, to harness the energy of a variegated
people with a, delicate balance among different interest groups. He
invokes key decisions for nourishing science resources of research and
manpower, for deploying these, resources toward priority objectives,
and for exploiting technology to meet public needs. By virtue of the
pace and complexity of decisions, and potency of consequences, the
technological age has injected a new order of complexity in public
administration. It has also increased pressure on the budget. Inevi-
tably some of this incremental burden of administrative pressure falls
on the President.
It is therefore appropriate that your examination of the effective-
ness of our Nation's science and technology enterprise focus on the
Office of the President and the capabilities which surround him, to
advise and assist in carrying out his constitutional duties.
Any analysis of decisionmaking by the President on technology
policy issues should evoke fundamental questions on the dynamics of
reciprocal interaction of technology and society. With considerable
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insight, section 2(a) of the statement of findings and declaration of
policy recognizes not only "the profound impact of science and
technology on society," but also the complex web of "the interrelations
of scientific, technological, economic, social, political and institutional
factors."
One way to convert to operational terms this important holistic and
multidisciplinary approach taken in the bill is to consider the notion
of a technological delivery system. Such a concept serves to portray
how the intricate processes by which technical knowledge from the
research bench is utilized to achieve desired outputs of consumer
amenities and social values. The system involves an ensemble of insti-
tutions and processes which invest and blend inputs of technical infor-
mation, capital, natural resources and manpower with inputs of
society's value preferences. The array of institutional components in-
clude both public and private. They interact through nominal legal
economic, social and political processes, animated and differentiated
by each special output desired. The technological delivery system con-
cept thus sets forth in a unified way all aspects needed to comprehend
how the system works-to deliver oil, to produce TV sets, to transport
passengers from coast to coast, or to provide health care.
Scientific discovery and engineering innovation are key, necessary
inputs. But they are not sufficient. While technology through its de-
livery systems may have impacts on society and the physical environ-
ment, the social structure and its processes also affect the performance
of technological delivery systems. Of special importance are the social
context and political influence on public decisionmaking. Thus, the
consequences of a technological development are only partially de-
termined by inherent technical attributes, and by the core of special-
ized knowledge. I would strongly emphasize that the system of con-
cern is not the "hardware" alone, but also the "software." The social
structures and processes, the institutional actors in the system and
their motivation and behavior, the subtleties of internal and external
milieu all affect the outcome.
This point was made in a comprehensive study for the NSF by the
National Academy of Engineering of priorities for research applica-
ble to national needs. Before setting out a shopping list of research
projects, they noted that many delivery systems have broken down or
fallen far short of expectations in terms of intended results, distribu-
tion or balance of social costs and benefits, not because of inadequate
scientific or engineering inputs but because of :
Faulty definition of objectives and expectations ; insufficient resource alloca-
tions to make the delivery system work ; lack of incentives to implement policy
or misguided application of policy ; inadequacy of organizational arrangements
or lack of management ability ; failure to make use of existing technology or to
develop new technology to cut costs or improve quality ; lack of consideration
paid to indirect policy impact; division of responsibility for problem-solving;
attempts to force change within too short a time.'
Because policy guidance critically influences the outputs and per-
formance of technological delivery systems to produce socially satis-
factory outcomes, the role of the President becomes even clearer and
the scope of inquiry broader.
1 Priorities for Research Annlicable to National Needs. Committee on Public Engineering
Policy, National Academy of Engineering, Washington, D.C. 1973.
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To summarize :
(1) Effective utilization of research and development extends well
beyond the processes and practices governing knowledge generation;
that is, science and technology subsume but are much more than re-
search and development.
(2) Effectiveness of the knowledge transfer mechanism critically
depends on strengths (and weaknesses) of institutional arrangements.
(3) Beyond the, structure of operations, individuals who apply
technical knowledge must autheiitically consider and integrate social
fabric of the Nation and its diverse values which operate to influence
political goals and strategies..
(4) Those in positions of responsibility for public decisionm~aking,
including those in advisory roles, must combine with technical ex-
pertise a familiarity with legal, economic, social, political and institu-
tional processes which affect technology utilization.
(5) The focus of policy decisionmaking including that of the
President n)ust be on social ends, as well as technical means; on ob-
jects of R. & 1). as well as subjects of R. & D.
(6) As a sixth general principle, the specialized subject matter
involved, complexity of issues and need for advice independent of
parochial departmental advocacy clearly suggest the need for sepa-
rate staff apparatus to assist the President.
I'RRFORMANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY APPARATUS
I would next like to consider specific implications for such future
advisory apparatus that can be drawn from a diagnosis and evalua-
tion of the machinery that, was previously established beginning. in
1957 by President Eisenhower and dismantled in 1973. Four entities
were involved : (1) Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology in the White House; (2) President's Science Advisor
Committee ; (3) Federal Council for Science and Technology ; (4)
Statutory Office of Science and Technology. The first three were
established by President Eisenhower in 1959; the last, by Congress.
It is often forgotten that the concepts of a channel through which
broad results of the Federal research and development program as
a whole can be brought to the top policy councils of government were
clearly articulated in a five-volume report in 1947 under John R.
Steelman. In response to Executive Order No. 9791 of October 17,
1940, that study called for a thorough investigation of the Federal
scientific program, with recommendations for coordination and im-
proving efficiency. Steelman's proposals included designation of
a White Rouse staff officer as scientific liaison and as executive officer
of an interdepartmental coordinating group. Indeed, all three steps by
President Eisenhower, which were triggered by defense needs of the
Korean conflict and the Soviet space surprise in 1957, can be traced
to Steelman's original propositions.
In June 1961 through the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy
Machinery, the Congress deemed that, the initial troika of Presidential
arrangements was inadequate and proposed what was to become by a
f Act
of Science and Technology. For the first 3 years, it functioned with
high effect.
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Only a few years later, however, Congress was asking questions
again about adequacy of Federal science management. Doubling every
3 years, the R. & D. enterprise was so large as to be conspicuous, so
exotic and complex as to be hard to understand, and so diffused
throughout Government as to be difficult to monitor, yet so close to
the President as to circumvent usual strictures on power. One major
issue was accountability. Other issues concerned : lack of focus of
science on national goals; inadegnate leadership to focus on civilian
application; lack of long-range planning; lack of evaluation of Gov-
ernment organization for science; need to identify gaps left between
agencies; poor communication with Congress; lack of review of pro-
gram performance; failure to clarify roles of the private sector; im-
balance in geographical distribution of research and graduate educa-
tion.
By 1967, one committee of the Congress undertook a staff review
of OST that led to a diagnosis expressed as a set of additional key
questions on its performance :
(1) Did OST meet needs of the President?
(2) Was there loss in objectivity or vitality when reviewing com-
peting, self-serving claims of special interests and Government agen-
cies?
(3) Had the Office become a conspicuous protagonist of science for
its own sake, thus mixing advocacy with advice?
(4) Was the Office prepared to operate on technology as well as
science-based issues in which a new mode of public information and
debate may be needed, and should the Office initiate measures to fa-
cilitate public understanding?
(5) Should OST be given additional statutory authority to reflect
technological as well as science-based responsibilities and thus go be-
yond scope of the Reorganization Act authority that was extracted
from 1950 NSF legislation?
(6) Can the Office maintain adequate relationships with the Con-
gress when its Director is protected by Executive privilege-by virtue
of other White House hats he wears?
(7) How should OST work more closely with other Executive Office
agencies on matters of national security, foreign policy, economic pol-
icy? What should the relationship be to the National Science Board?
(8) Should OST exert more effort in selecting and stimulating par-
ticular programs of great promise to meeting national needs? Should
these priority fields be designated (or endorsed) by Congress?
(9) Should the Office engage proportionately more in long-range
precrisis planning and operate less as a fire brigade?
(10) Should OST be obliged to prepare annual reports?
(11) Should the coordinating role be given legislative underpinning
by changing the status of FCST that was established by Executive
order?
(12) Should advisory apparatus for military and civilian issues be
separated? 2
(1.3) Should a broader mix of disciplines and experience be rep-
resented in staff ?
2 The Office of Science and Technology : House of Representatives, Government Opera-
tions Committee, 90th Congress.
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Although the Congress did not follow up this inquiry, it was clear
from the nature of these questions that OST was not fulfilling ex-
pectations.
One reason lies in the changing political and social consciousness
of the Nation., a new demand for citizen participation, and for bal-
ance between economic growth and quality of life.
't'hus, this inquiry undertaken by the Commerce Committee would
have been warranted and potentially valuable even if the OST-related
advisory apparatus had not been disestablished.
In reviewing past performance of technical advisory apparatus, it
has to be said that almost all outside observers agree that At distin-
guished itself in the field of national security affairs, especially weap-
ons and intelligence technology. The entire Defense Establishment
as well as the President appeared to benefit, notwithstanding their
possession of sizeable in-house technical capabilities. The advisory
bodies propelled a policy that with the potency of new armaments
and the possiblity of surprise delivery, our national security could
no longer afford the old luxury of peacetime decline of its innovative
technical core, with frantic mobilization in the event of a new con-
flict. The cutting edge of scientific research had to be kept sharp, in
a state of constant readiness to guard against the unpredictable. Gov-
ernment became the patron of American science and the scientific
community welcomed the prestigious hot line of communication estab-
lished between them and the President. But as the requests for ad-
vice evolved from military to civilian affairs, the advisory apparatus
itself failed to change, and that rigidity proved disabling.
The advisory apparatus could not seem to broaden its grasp of
civilian technology as it had previously with science and military
technology. It could not deal with technological priorities of public
goals and conflicts in values settled in the cauldron of political debate
as it had science priorities settled in private executive councils. It
seemed unable to cope with priorities stemming from new expressions
of human need rather than from the pressure of scientific discovery
seeking application; it did not equip itself (despite congressional
attention to this new topic) to deal with unwanted effects of tech-
nology in a new era of environmental concern and consumer protection.
And it, abdicated the rough, sensitive and energy-consuming task of
herding the wild horses of the bureaucracy toward common, Govern-
ment-wide goals.
In short, while many of thc advisers believed that. they dealt with
the engine of social change, they inadvertently overlooked the general
state of our society that sets the destination and timetables, and
commits resources. Changes had occurred in value preferences, with
emphasis on environmental conservancy. Changes had occurred in
problem priorities reflected in attention to energy and resource con-
sumption. And changes had occurred in policy orientation with em-
phasis in long range policy planning. There was little recognition of
the role of the citizen in public decisionmaking and the need for public
understanding and engagement with the issues involved.
It should thus be clear to your committee that in reentering this
area of policy need, it is important not to re-create an Office of Science
and Technology.
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Is there another model to consider?
I suggest first you examine the track record of the National Council
on Marine Resources and Engineering Development that was estab-
lished in 1966 under Public Law 89-454-landmark legislation intro-
duced and stubbornly defended b you, Mr. Chairman, against opposi-
tion. On a smaller scale, that Council had advisory responsibilities
similar to OST, but there were major differences in style. It focused
far more on civilian than on military issues; it formulated program
proposals to the President nominating maritime solutions to meet
broad social problems that the President had singled out for priority
attention. It maintained decorous relationships ,with Congress and
consulted them on key issues. With vigorous leadership of the Council
chairman-the Vice President of the United States serving as an
"assistant President"-it did not hesitate to rock the bureaucratic
boat and generate consensus on a Government-wide program. It
attempted to integrate efforts of diverse competing agencies to gain
total effect greater than the sum of individual parts. It published an
annual report that served as a planning document not only for 23
constituent agencies of Government, but also for industry and uni-
versities who were key partners in the marine affairs enterprise.
In its staffing and techniques of policy planning, it emphasized soft-
ware as well as hardware, blending economics, law, public admin-
istration, foreign affairs, resource and environmental management.
The Secretariat was a multidisciplinary problem rather than science
oriented.3 Outside analysis of coordinating mechanisms gave the
Council unusually high marks for performance,4 both in terms of an
activist and effective advisory role for the President and in terms of
policy initiative.
The Council was permitted to lapse in 1971, and now there are
noises of regeneration, both in Congress and in the White House. What
is believed most critically needed is machinery to integrate separate
public delivery functions from different members of the Federal
family into a system, when the program goals so require.
LEGISLATIVE ANALYSES OF CURRENT PROPOSALS
FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM
Turning to specific provisions of the proposed Science and Tech-
nology Application Act of 1974, by and large they are compatible both
with the general principles set forth earlier and with remedies im-
plicitly needed to correct deficiencies in the operation of OST that
Congress earlier identified.
First, as to the statement of findings and declaration of policy, it is
difficult to take issue with any of the seven itemized purposes of the
act. They assert that science and technology should be utilized to
improve the quality of life and resolving national problems; that such
endeavor falls conspicuously on Government, and that implementa-
tion depends on statutory roles and strengths of resources in its vari-
ous operating arms. The statements focus on planning and better
a The Politics of the Ocean. E. Wenk, Jr., University of Washington Press, 1972.
P. 373-393.
4 Testimony of William Carey on Presidential Advisory Committee House of Repre-
sentatives Government Operations Committee, 91st Congress.
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coordination : on the need to maintain a strong base of science re-
sources; on the requirement for an annual report, to Congress, and
finally on reinforcement of Presidential advisory apparatus. Minor
changes in language could add emphasis to the future orientation of
planning, especially through techniques of technology assessment; to
underscore the blending necessary of social preferences with technical
opportunities, through multidisciplinary approaches which draw on
social as well as natural science, law and public administration; to em-
phasize the role of public awareness of issues, facts and action alter-
natives that affect their welfare..
The objectives of better coordination could also be spelled out more
definitely.
As to title I, section 101 creates a Council of Advisers on Science
and Technology to serve the President toward which I find myself in
substantial agreement. The committee is aware of similar proposals
I made several years ago as an evolutionary step for OST, then still
in existence. The preponderance of emphasis was on technology, how-
ever, rather than science. I have found no recent development altering
a rationale for such measures. The organizational arrangements for a
three-member Council and their interdisciplinary orientation make
sense.
Sections 101(4) and 1.02(a) deal with staffing arrangements. To
meet points listed earlier, it is essential that the composition range
widely across science and engineering, including it balanced represen-
tation of social sciences, public administration, and law. Experience
in technology policy planning has also indicated that eminence in
technical disciplines is not a sufficient qualification to undertake inter-
disciplinar:.v functions in a governmental milieu. The legislative pro-
vision for staff might also spell out a few details as to how the Congress
expects staff to blend technical competence with social awareness.
Provisions for contract studies are of special value, if favorable ex-
perience with such studies by the Marine Science Council serve as a
guide.
As to section 102 concerning Council functions, while I generally
support, the stated provision, three aspects are of concern.
The first question regards the breadth of commitment to advise the
President "with respect to major policies, plans and programs of sci-
ence and technology of the Federal Government." Recalling science
and technology substantially transcend the ambit of activities defined
as research and development, and using the Federal budget level of
potential activities of the Council as it measure of its workload, the
Council would be involved potentially not with the $20 billion an-
nually associated with R. & I)., but perhaps 5 to 10 times that effort
representing the full range of technological activities of government.
To be effective in all areas, the supporting staff for the Council might
well have to be. five times the size of OST staff when it was closed out.
Such a large operation has the hazard of being cumbersome and in
trying to do too many things might end up doing none well. Such a
massive operation is politically unrealistic.
There are viable alternatives, by limiting somewhat the scope of the
Council, and by depending on other existing advisory units to rein-
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force and collaborate in carrying out the function intended by the bill.
The policy planning agenda of OST was often defined as compris-
ing two elements-of "policy for science" and of "science for policy."
The first component pertains to policy for nourishing scientific re-
search and its capabilities of laboratories and manpower. The second
concerns activities where science-and technology-are potent ingre-
dients contributing to public purposes across the full spectrum of
human needs. Implicitly, according to the draft bill, the Council is
expected to deal with both. On the other hand, the President has avail-
able a National Science Board created by statute that could well per-
form the first function. It is of high level, with members appointed
by the President with advice and consent of the Senate.
Moreover, it is currently required to report annually to the. Presi-
dent on the health of science resources and thus could well accept part
of the burden for the report called for in the legislation. The Director
of the National Science Foundation who currently serves as the Presi-
dent's Science Adviser and his staff would have a key role in analysis
and in programing to meet new and unexpected Government-wide
needs and to fill gaps.
A second example of adjusting the Council's workload lies in a de-
liberate separation of military from civilian issues. The National Se-
curity Council was created by legislation to advise the President in this
key area. Clearly contemporary strategic options critically depend on
ingredients of science and technology. Some observers contend that
the NSC staff is thin regarding technological competencies, and it has
no systematic way of picking brains from the technical community.
As a consequence, it may be outmaneuvered and outgunned by techni-
cal expertise of the parochial defense establishment. A counterbalance
to such pressure existed previously in the Science Adviser's office and
could be ledged in the proposed Council. As an alternative, along the
lines of section 2(a)3, Congress could provide explicit authority to the
President to create a Science Advisory Committee to serve him
through "NSC that would provide a pipeline of assistance of a quality
found so portentous in the advisory apparatus of earlier administra-
tion.
By carrying out these two functional areas, the Council would still
be left with a sizable set of tasks-in a wide range of areas, includ-
ing energy, transportation, health, housing, environmental manage-
ment, food production, materials conservation, etc. These are areas of
civilian technology, more than science. Moreover, they involve diffi-
culties not, encountered in military issues, because technical prescrip-
tions are likely to be less quantitative, the play of the marketplace
is ambiguous, customer consensus is less assured, the locus of decision-
making is diffuse, the transfer route for technical information be-
tween knowledge producer and knowledge consumer is undefined in
organizational hierarchy and time.
The second concern I have over section 102 is the relatively meager
emphasis given in section (a)1 on coordination.
Adding horizontal warp to the woof of vertikial government struc-
ture is a longstanding problem in public management. There are very
few major national goals where achievement rests on the missions
and underpinning of specialized research and development of a single
agency.
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Indeed, mobilizing all of the technological engines of Federal
bureaucracy to focus on common social goals is one of the most be-
wildering enigmas of modern democratic government. The problem
is how to gam a sense of unity and direction when the compart
inented bureaucracy, created one step at a time, is constantly stressed
by pluralistic goals of our society and outside clientele. Under such
battlefield conditions, the fragmentation leads to ineffective manage-
ment in achieving goals; worse, it can generate stalemate. The funda-
mental process for gaining coherence is coordination.
But few carrots and sticks are available to the President to foster
coordination. Each agency is expected to advocate its functions in the
face of impediments. The Constellation. of Federal agencies, however,
may be thought of as multiprogram instruments that can be w1red to-
gether in new ways to accomplish unprecedented requirements. Some
of the most creative moves of the Marine Science Council arose from
recognition of the potency of such cross-connections, rather than crea-
tion of new organizations.
Coordination becomes the proving ground of effective public ad-
ministration. It is the sense of community, suppression of parochial
interests to a common weal, the systemic rather than sectorial ap-
proach that ultimately tests the degree to which a public enterprise
can fulfill its purpose. The Council cannot intervene between the
President and Cabinet officers, but it should have a license to serve
as more than an umpire in helping the President to adjudicate dis-
putes, by constructively harmonizing relevant elements in a systems
approach to public administration. In an environment of depart-
mentalism, coordination must operate through consensus. In the con-
text of commonly developed fact, techniques employ mediation and
persuasion.
The Federal Council for Science and Technology was created by
executive order in 1959 to serve these coordinating tasks. It has had a
checquered career. Among other factors, the President's science ad-
visor as its chairman has often been too busy or sparing of his energies
in stubborn, time-consuming persuasion to make it work. And it has
suffered by lacking statutory support. Paradoxically, the Congress
which has a long record of intent about exorcising the devils of waste
and duplication, has never taken initiatives to underpin the FCST
with legislative authority. This present legislation could be greatly
strengthened by some modification toward that end.
A third concern I have over section 102 relates to the recitation in
(a) 2, 3, and 4, regarding information gathering, analysis and report-
ing without mention of technology assessment. Congress has equipped
itself with such a capability to serve its own needs; this bill could as-
sure that the President has symmetrical capabilities. If society is to
manage its technology to produce the desired outcomes, it will need to
collect facts and estimate in advance whether a technological initiative
will produce the desired results; or whether alternatives are likely to
produce better performance. In the presence of a historically venture-
some spirit of rugged individualism, we have set the stage for every-
body doing his own thing. Technological strategies and tactics, poli-
cies and programs, have been narrowly directed toward individual,
isolated goals, with a blithe tunnel vision as to interaction. But now,
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everything seems to affect everything else. Room for technological
maneuver has been sharply circumscribed.
We must look ahead at future impacts and ways to preserve future
choices. And we must look sideways to identify social or environmental
impacts beyond the boundaries of the nominal technological trans-
action.
Technology assessment is thus more than a new instrument of sys-
tems analysis. Its value lies in reducing the range of uncertainty, or in
the presence of uncertainty, to? help distribute risk equitably. Tech-
nology assessment can increase the range of options, reduce arbitrari-
ness and expedience of solutions, and increase accountability. It should
identify who wins, who loses, and how much. It can identify what we
do know; what we don't know; what we could know and what we
should know. Indeed, it can identify technical research needed to be
supported by Government to reduce uncertainty, a twist on usual
nominations of such topics by researchers from their desire to advance
frontiers of knowledge or by those having narrow end applications.
It is thus a key element needed by the President in the political proc-
ess because it can potentially alter the distribution of benefits and
costs; by limiting penalties of poor choices, it can improve allocation
of public resources which is much of what Presidential decisionmaking
is all about.
. Section 103 concerns the science and technology report to be pre-
pared by the President with assistance of the Council and transmitted
annually to the Congress.
Except for President Nixon's special message in 1972, Presidents
have dealt with technology policy on an issue-by-issue basis, thus con-
tributing to fragmentation and confusion. An overall evaluation could
foster coherence.
Again, I find myself in hearty agreement. The record shows that a
Committee of Congress first proposed in 1964 that OST prepare a
similar report. Individual analysts have so -urged since 1965. The
President publicly requested such a report of OST in 1970 but none
was completed or at least issued. It may be worth while discovering
why.
By way of analogy, the Marine Council was required by Public Law
89-454 to undertake such a task for the President, and its products
constitute some of the most valuable contributions of the Council to
advancement of a coherent program in marine affairs. Among other
uses, it was a fundamental source of information to many committees
of the Congress because it reported activities in so many agencies in
one place and in coherent relationship to each other. Such a report,
incidentally, could go a long way toward identifying inherent con-
flicts in our various national policies that are exacerbated by actions
of technology.
Finally, the proposed Technology Council could go a long way
to contribute to public understanding, not simply through a single re-
port annually, but with frequent releases on current issues, using the
techniques of technology assessment to pinpoint implications for
affected parties.
Finally, may I comment on title II to establish an Office of Tech-
nology Application in the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration. The intent here seems to be a directed effort to extract and
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deploy the fruits of advanced technology developed for space objec-
tives, where results could be applied to more catholic objectives of the
act to meet general national needs.
One can only agree with the objective. But there are serious ques-
tions as to whether this is the appropriate action. NASA initiated a
technology utilization program with this purpose in mind in 1962.
Toward similar objectives of the current act, an Office of State Techni-
cal Service was created in 19,35 in the Commerce Department, then
abolished in 1970. In 1971 NSF's RANN program was established to
accelerate problem-focused research, also directed toward objectives of
this act. The President's science and technology message of March 16,
1972, was directed toward marshalling "science and technology in
the work of strengthening our economy and improving the quality of
life," visualizing a stronger Federal role, applying Government-spon-
sored technologies, improving the climate for private imiovation, and
fostering partnerships at the State, local and international levels.
Three new programs related to these goals were established in 1972:
One. The national R. & I). assessment program (NSF).
Two. The experimental R. & I). incentive program (NSF').
Three. The experimental technology incentives program (NBS).
In the meanwhile a wide variety of technical information and tech-
nology utilization activties have been underway in HEW, Interior,
Transportation, Labor, EPA, Agriculture, AEC, Commerce, Defense,
SBA, and Smithsonian. (A study of the overall functioning of these
programs is currently under study by the National Academy of
Engineering.)
To accomplish the objectives set forth in this title, it would seem
worthwhile to integrate all of these technology utilization programs
under direction of the Council. I would urge the committee to defer
action on title II and to undertake a careful review of the entire
array of governmental programs that could be integrated, at least
for management purposes, under a single coordinator.
I do want to underscore the motivation for better utilization of
technology, which springs from two separate clientele. One is the
private sector, where concerns have emerged on needs for improved
industrial productivity, especially to meet foreign competition. The
second is in the field of State and Local government. These entities
have a technology interest not only because of national policies of
grant-in-aid federalism, but also because the diversity of problems
involving technology require a diversity of solutions.
Examples range from environmental management through solid
waste disposal, law enforcement, health care, shoreline management,
and so forth. Although the draft legislation makes a casual reference
to States, their needs and direct involvement in formulation of tech-
nology policy-but could well deserve a special provision.
In concluding this statement, you will find strong support for the
institutional reform set forth in the proposed legislation. I should
like, however, to note that creation of a new governmental structure
cannot by itself assure solution of the problems it was created to
tackle. It is like the construction of it hi-fi amplifier of such general
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purpose; its existence says very little about the quality of music being
played, or about who is listening.
The bare skeleton set forth in legislation needs to be advanced with
some qualitative assertion as to the spirit of a new instrumentality
of government. It is my belief that they should be thought of in
terms not of more government, but better-more responsible to the
public, to sort out goals in the face of pluralism, ambiguities, con-
flict, and inequities, to forecast effects of technology and illuminate
choices, to counter the understandable preference for instant political
satisfaction versus future benefits, and to identify new possibilities
to circumvent a zero-sum game. This looks to a healthy evolution in
our inircle of self-government, where we extend the experiment of
almost 200 years by better steering of a powerful socio-political-
technological engine, rather than using technological levers in an old-
fashioned game of political power.
We must begin to anticipate, rather than always react to crisis,
and we must be more sensitive to what the citizen wants without
assuming that planning is the prerogative of the technical elite.
By such apparatus proposed by the bill, and implementation along
lines suggested, the council could well help the President ask better
questions, make better decision, help defy forces that threaten to
impair humanity.
Clearly he must want to utilize such assistance. While this measure
is directed at reinforcing advisory function to serve the President,
I am sure the committee is aware of the potential for a properly func-
tioning Council to concomittantly serve the Congress. Many of the
advisory activities should be protected by privacy of communication
with the Pi-esidential client. But the Congress must have access to
similar body of fact" and analysis so it can evaluate issues and make
up its own mind. The Congress could well hold a set of hearings
annually to review the President's annual science and technology
report.
I believe that a convincing case could be made for this bill simply
in terms of the alternatives-a society made pathological by its tech-
nology, because we did not seek ways to survive in a technological
world with self-respect.
Senator TuNNEY. Thank you very much.
Chairman Magnuson?
The CHAIRMAN. I am always pleased to have Dr. Wenk here, be-
cause he and I are old friends and lie has contributed so much to
this whole field of science policy. He has a great record in helping us
accomplish a lot of things in oceanography that never would have
been started without his efforts. So I respect his viewpoint.
Ed, I get the feeling from your statement, that we should make
this council, and particularly the staff-this is going to be the impor-
tant part of it, as you well know-to be as independent as possible
and not to be tied up too much with the Government agencies. We
should use the agencies for what they are worth. They have good
expertise, you have served in them, so you know this.
But the agencies are never going to correlate themselves, I know
that. Somebody has got to be looking over their shoulder in this field
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and have some authority, or at least a semblance of authority through
the Presidency. if need be.
Now do you agree with that on the basis of your long experience?
Dr. WINK. I agree with that fully, Senator. I think you made two
key points.
One is that the President needs the benefit of independent advice,
and secondly, that. there be some mechanism to assist him in getting
a full benefit from all of the independent agencies, I think this pro-
posed Council can do both.
The CHAIRMAN. And that the goals and the approaches should be
broader than they have been in the past, where some agency or group
had just one mission and that was it. Because as you so well point out,
what we are talking about not only involves technology, it involves
the social progress of humanity. We are talking about some of our
great social issues, such as housing and transportation.
So 1. think your statement was very good, and very helpful to us,
because it pinpoints, what we hope that this council would be able to
do.
As I understand it, Dr. David suggested that the council be given
be given the responsibilities of reviewing and evaluating all of the
agency R. & D. budget requests.
Do you agree with that?
Dr. WExx. Senator, in part. I believe that in order to get the in-
tegrated effect of all of these bits and pieces of research, it is necessary
to have some overview as to priorities. I believe this office could do
it. As a matter of fact, the Marine Council that we referred to earlier
did do that in the marine field.
But to look at every R. & D. dollar, as indeed the OMB may look
at it, could bog down the staff in bookkeeping exercises. Among other
things, the office needs to get involved in public technology policy
that goes beyond R. & D. and I would hate to see that vital function
diluted.
So I hate to sound like I am hedging, but I believe there are really
two considerations here.
The CrIAIRMAN. Well, if we could achieve a happy balance there,
that would be fine.
Dr. WENK. I think there is every reason for you to want this office
to clearly have that responsibility, and in fact you could request it
by being specific in your language for the annual report which the
office prepares.
Then leave to their devices or their decision just how much of their
staff energy they would invest in the process of evaluating the whole
government's B. & D.
The, (1HAIRMAN. I noted what you said about title 1I, and we will
take a look at that. But there is a study being conducted by the
Academy of Engineering of three new technology applications
pro-yrams of this administration.
Have you any information about when that study will be completed?
Dr. WENK. Senator, that is a study being conducted by the Com-
mittee on Public Engineering Policy. I would say it is in' the second
draft. form. It does bear quite specifically on the objectives of title
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II. Ordinarily I wouldn't be able to speak for the academy, but
by coincidence I chair the committee that is preparing the report, and
if it should be your wish, I think we could make certain this is avail-
able and at an early date for your study.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Well, I am glad that you feel that this is the main objective of this
effort, because I think the situation has been slipping in the last few
years. It has been piecemeal, and even the academy or the National
Science Foundation just never had a handle on it like they should.
I want to make this Council and its staff as independent as possible,
and I want them to have some muscle, so they can do something.
Because we are losing ground all of the time, we are not keeping up.
You mentioned what we know, what we can know, and we can
know a low of things, but we are losing ground. As we look around
us at some of our major social problems, we see that scientists and
engineers have to be part of the efforts to solve them.
We would like to gather these efforts together and bring some
direction and authority to them.
Dr. WENK. Senator, on that question of the authority of this Coun-
cil, one brief point: If indeed this Council is going to be creative,
it is going to be looking ahead and seeing areas that need urgent
attention before a crisis occurs. It is very difficult if they have no
money at their direct command to make the necessary efforts to deal
with those problems, because very often all the individual. agencies
are committed to programs that were established years before.
You might want to consider giving this Council some authority
of a budget, not for its own staff, but some funds that could be di-
rected, under their direction, to the agencies, to carry out new pro-
grams that the agencies themselves would be very slow at doing, or
felt they couldn't do, or those programs which cross agency lines.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think you sumup what we are thinking.
As you understand the thrust of the measure, you say it is to correct
a critical shortfall in the contribution which science and technology
could make for improving the human condition. And that is what it
is all about.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator TUNNEY. Thank you, Senator Magnuson.
The CHAIRMAN. I have to leave, I have to start another hearing.
These are busy days around here. Appropriations for HEW, the
human condition.
Dr. WENK. Thank you, Senator.
Senator TuNNEY. I)r. Wenk, I was interested in two of your sug-
gestions, one as it related to the NSB, and secondly, as it related to the
separation of the military from civilian issues.
Now your suggestion with regard to having the National Science
Board responsible for establishing a policy for science, and taking
away from the proposed Council the responsibility for this type of
work would represent a rather significant change in the legislation
as it is presently drafted.
I wonder if you are satisfied that by doing that there could be a
proper coordination of the .science for policy and policy for science
problems?
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Dr. Wv;xx. Mr. Chairman, your point is an extremely important
one.
I think this is somewhat a matter of degree. First, this new Council
should be in a position to take on any responsibilities which the Presi-
dent assigns to it. It therefore potentially occupies a role where it
could always synthesize, integrate, coordinate the whole range of con-
siderations, policy for science and science for policy.
The thrust of my suggestion had two objectives in mind. One was
to try to put some of the burden of the staffing load somewhere else be-
cause of the tremendous number of issues that need to be dealt with
in that office. Incidentally, these are of a new dimension of complexity,
because they involve the economic, social, political, and legal aspects
that transcend science and engineering per se. And I believe if they
are to be carried out satisfactorily, working from social ends, there
isn't going to be time to invest in the agenda that OST used to do
regarding policy in science.
There is a second reason for this, however, with regard to my pro-
posal, and that is 1 have a view that the Office of Science and Tech-
nology operated as though the word "science" were in capital letters
and the word "technology" in lower case.
It is the purpose of my testimony to reverse that past procedure.
It is not to make science unimportant; as a matter of fact, it is the
end applications that give the very point to science. But it is to say
that today the new needs, the new demands on the President, put this
heavier emphasis on technology, as many of us define it. The science
aspect, I think, could be handled with real competence if the Na-
tional Science Board or NSF were not only adequately buttressed,
but directed to undertake these tasks.
I do not believe, however, that your Council need be out of that.
Senator TUNNEY. The problem of course is that we are dealing with
agencies that have organic characteristics, and as such they tend to
expand and to contract, dependent upon the leadership that one finds
in both or each, depending I suppose on whether or not the Congress
creates this Council.
It would seem therefore that if we left too great an ambiguity in
the legislation as it relates to the new Council's functions in the area
of policy for science we might create all the ingredients for strife and
contention, confrontation, between NSF and this new Council.
And I am not sure that 1 understand how we could achieve the
goals that you suggest and at the same time not have a fair degree of
p recision in the language as it relates to the new council's role in policy
for science.
I am just speaking from certain experience that I have had in the
Congress, having watched the way congressional committees some-
times attempt to take jurisdiction away from other committees.
I think probably the toughest battles we have around here are the
jurisdictional battles between the committees. I am wondering if, if we
accept your suggestion, we might not create the same kind o:problem
here.
Dr. WFNK. Senator, this is a very telling point you have made, and
I am sympathetic both to the substance of the remarks and the impli-
cations in terms of the contemporary jurisdictional questions.
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I don't think I have a very simple answer. I do feel that perhaps by
maintaining the title of the Council as the Council of Scientific and
Technological Advisers, you will have made your point, and indeed it
deserves to be made, that you are not excluding any important related
area anywhere within the Federal Government, including basic
science, from a necessary integration and purview of this Council.
But section 2 (a) 3, as I recall it, and this is from memory, and I
may be wrong about that, but my recollection was that it underscores
the importance of buttressing the capabilities throughout the whole
Federal Government.
I think it is on page 2 of the bill : "The maintenance and strengthen-
ing of diversified scientific and technological capabilities in Federal
departments and agencies, State and local governments," and so on. I
was much struck with that phrase.
I know it is not an operational phrase ; it is in your statement of
findings and declaration of policy. But I would like to say that you
cannot compensate for weaknesses in the agencies by strengths in this
Council unless the agencies have the staff capabilities, the independ-
ence from special interest groups, personal integrity, unless they have
a laboratory and research capability to buttress the knowledge of the
staff positions, it cannot be compensated for in the Executive Office
of the President.
Therefore I think that that provision of your bill is extremely
important. It relates then specifically to saving-I don't know
whether this need be done in the bill or maybe in your committee
report-that one way to deal with policy for science is make sure that
the greatest possible strength exists in the agency of Government that
is responsible for it, which is the National Science Foundation, and
the Science Board.
Senator TUNNEY. The other problem, of course, is the separation of
the military from the civilian.
We had witnesses testify today that they thought this Council ought
to have oversight responsibility of the military R. & D., and appar-
ently you disagree with that.
Dr. WENK. I guess I do, Mr. Chairman, and I am bothered by the
disagreement, because I do respect the judgments of these other
witnesses.
I arrived at this point of view from two directions, however.
First, again with some insight as to that advisory apparatus when
I was associated with the staff, noting the effectiveness with which it
dealt with the military issues, the corresponding ineffectiveness in
dealing with the civilian issues.
I am afraid within the reasonable limits of staff and funding for that
council, it boils down a little bit to an either-or proposition.
I simply do not believe both can be done. Now in the meanwhile the
staff of the National Security Council has grown enormously over
what it was when OST, for example, was first formed. The National
Security Council is established by legislation ; it has some advisory
roles here that are very explicit.
But so far as I can recall, there was never any initiative by the Con-
gress to buttress it with an outside advisory board. There are such
statutory boards elsewhere to serve the NSF, to serve the NIH, to
serve the DOD establishment.
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It may well be that that is some way, Congress could make the point
that it wants the staff of the National Security Council to maintain the
same independence, vis-a-vis the Defense Establishment, that the
President's science adviser did. in earlier years, and that it wants that
staff to pick brains, the best brains this country has to offer, outside
of the governmental establishment.
Senator TuNNEY. Just one last thought. What is your assessment of
the current science advisory apparatus and the new role Dr. Stever
plays as the Director of NSF and as the President's adviser?
Dr. WENK. First, I have the highest regard for Dr. Stever personal-
ly. I have known him many years in professional associations, and I
hold him in the highest esteem,
I believe, however, that there are some structural limitations that
interfere with his being effective. His association with one agency of
Government makes it very difficult for him to supervise others, even
in the name of the President.
Secondly, there is reason to believe that the channels of communica-
tion are not as direct with the President as one might hope for.
Finally, I think this is very clear he does not have at his fingertips
the staff resources needed to carry out the duties for the President, not
the Science Foundation, but, the Presidential duties, the kind of
resources you have in mind in your bill.
I don't think the present arrangements fulfill your needs.
Senator TUNNEY. Thank you very much, Dr. Wenk, for your view-
point. It has been very helpful. I particularly appreciate the fact that
you dealt in some detail and specifically with the language of the
legislation in the recommendations that you made.
As you know, we here are in the position of having to translate
ideas into legislation, and sometimes it is difficult to take opinions of
witnesses which are not specific and refine them to the point that they
are capable of being placed in. the legislation. And I think your state-
ment., whether the committee will agree or disagree with the specific
objectives which you outline, is benefitted by the detail with which
you express it.
Dr. WENK. Thank you very much, Senator Tunney. In turn let me
underscore how important I think your initiative is to get this legisla-
tion through. Many of us hope you success in passing it.
Senator TUNNEY. Thank you.
The committee will adjourn subject to the call of the Chair.
[Thereupon, at 1:40 p.m. the hearing was adjourned, subject to the
call of the Chair.]
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