LETTER FROM R.W. KOCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000200090036-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: January 16, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

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16 January 1973
Thank you for your reply pertaining to the distribution of the
"Liberator " pistols in World War 2.
I have inclosed several pages of R. Harris Smith's book to show you
the reference to the "100,000 pistols. Since I have proof that several
of the pistols were found last year in the central region of Vietnam by
some U.S. Special Forces Troops in a cache of old French weapons, I have
included page 333 of said book.
Mile's book makes no mention of the pistol. He does mention that
two ships, the REYNOLDS and the LA SALLE were headed for hi:i arr a with
supplies for SACO. Unfortunately, both ships vanished without a trace
enroute. Several unofficial sources have told me that they ships carried
a quantity of the pistols for the early development of SACU.
Roy 0. Stratton, former supply officer makes mention of the pistols
in his book, " SACO, the Bice Paddy Navy." He states that Unit 4 of SAC^
trained the Chinese ( Changs'S^ldiers ) in the use of various tactics
and weapons including "Special Weapons." Tho term "Special Weapons" was
included in the section relating to hand weapons. His original m,,nu;cript
was published before the pistol was declassified so appea.rantly he did not
choose to refer to it by another name.
Thanks again for your comments.
Sincerely,
R W KOCH
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support for the Kuomintang party and its leader. Everybody is shout-
ing that so loudly, that it has become the goal.. . . Blind to our
avowed aims and ends, we talk about all-out support of Chiang which
dcnics support to others, and many feel (this] makes certain that a
bloody civil war will follow." ?H
Hurley was a poor choice to deal with such a delicate and complex
situation. The ambassador was a believer in "personal diplomacy"; as
he remarked to one OSS officer, "When I think I can risk telling the
Generalissimo a dirty joke, I'll feel I'm really getting somcsyhere." ""
Hurley was atrociously- uninformed about Chinese affairs. His favorite
stunt of yelling Oklahoma Indian war whoops branded him as a buffoon.
Ile reinforced that impression by referring to Chiang as "Mr. Slick"
and to the leader of the Ycnan Communists as "Moose Dung." OSS
men responded by assigning Ilurlcy a special code-name-"The Al-
batross."
Soon after Ilurlcy's arrival in China, the Communists had invited
him to visit Ycnan. Ile flew to their stronghold for the first time on
November 7 and was given a warm greeting, iltulcy's meetings with
Mao led to the Communist acceptance of five principles of "coalition
government." Returning to Chungking in the company of Chou 1?u-lai,
the ambassador presented the proposal to the Generalissimo. Ile re-
jected it and suggested a counter-offer which was refused by the Com-
munists. 'The Ycnan leaders also declined participation in any further
negotiations.
While this political jockeying was in progress, the military situation
had deteriorated so badly that Army strategists were secretly discussing
contingency plans for the evacuation of (;hnngl:iug, AVcdenicycr's head-
quarters also framed new proposals for inilitar, cooperation syitli the
Communist armies. 'lliese sycrc drntifnlly discussed with central gov-
ernment officials who just as dutifully rejected diem out of hand.
At the end of November, Colonel I fcppncr's headquarters received
word that General Donovan would soon visit China. WVedemcyer
planned to take the oc(asion to present time OSS chief with some coin-
prehcnsive ideas for ;assistance toy Cominimist guerrilla forces. Two
separate proposals emerged. The Army recommended that five thou-
sand American paratroopers he sent to north China to work with the
Communist partisans. OSS set forth its own plan to dispatch Special
Operations officers to the north on sabotage missions against the Jill)
anese. In return for the complete cooper;ilion and support of the Com-
munist forces, OSS was prepared to train and outfit zs,noo Ycnan gucr-
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273
, rillas aid to fgrnish \Iao's Army with l~t;lition_al;loo,ooo apls,.
This proposal was strongly endorsed by Captaiili''ClTri ig at Ycnan. Ile
had already requested the immediate dispatch of two plane-loads of
medical and demolitions equipment for the Communist troops.
Rather than follow past practice and discuss these plans with the
Chinese govcrnmcnt, both the Army and OSS decided to First broach
their plans to the Communists. State Department advisor John Davies
sounded a note of caution. "They'll crucify you the way they crucified
Stilwell," lie warned 1Vedemcycr. "I don't care," replied the general.i0
\Vedcmcver's Chief of Staff subsequently instructed Colonel David
Barrett of the Dixie Mission, then acting as an intermediary between
IIurley and the recalcitrant Communists, to present the Arum's pro-
posal to Mao.
Colonel IIcppncr assigned his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Willis
Bird, to carry the OSS plan to Ycnan. A 36-year-old graduate of the
Wharton School of Finance, Bird had been a top executive of Sears,
Roebuck in Pennsylvania and New York when lie was recruited for
intelligence service by his friend Bill Donovan. Ills fellow officers re-
mernber him as a "Coll-mall"' an "operator," and a rather vain man
(he reportedly carried a set of pearl-handled revolvers). One thing is
certain-lie could not be accused by 'T'ai Li of liberal idealism."
On December i5, 1944, Colonels Barrett and Bird flay together to
Ycnan with their military proposals in hand. The Conlniunists received
both propositions suspiciously, but gave their tentative approval. Days
later, Tai Li's agents got mind of the discussions. It was 'list the oppor-
tunity S=ACO had been waiting for. The Communists had repeatedly
warned their American contacts that "Tai's agents planned to carry
out sonic plot ill Ycnan" against the Dixie iAlission, "possibly iuvol?ing
the use of explosives." '' in J;uiuars I