INQUIRY INTO THE ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE WATERGATE AND ELLSBERG MATTERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000100090080-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: October 23, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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INQUIRY INTO THE ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IN THE WATERGATE
AND ELLSBERG MATTERS
REPORT
OF THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
OCTOBER 23, 1973
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1973
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
NINETY-TIIIRD CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
F. EDWARD HEB:ERT, Louisiana, Chairman
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana
O. C. FISHER, Texas LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
CHARLES E. BENNETT, Florida BOB WILSON, California
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York ~ JHARLES S. GUBSE,R, California
OTIS G. PIKE. New York CARLETON J. KING, New York
RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, Alabama
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, Michigan ,JOHN E. HUNT, New Jersey
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri J. WILLIAM WIIITEHUKST, Virginia
CHARLES H. WILSON, California t. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina
H'LOYD V. HICKS, Washington WALTER E. POWELL, Ohio
RICHARD C. WHITE, Texas ROBERT PRICE, Texas
BILL NICHOLS, Alabama DAVID C. TREEN, Louisiana
JACK BRINKLEY, Georgia WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado
ROBERT It. (BOB) MOLLOHAN, West Virginia GEORGE M. O'BRIEN, Illinois
DAN DANIEL, 'Virginia ROBIN L. BEARD, Tennessee
G. V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi DONALD J. MITCHELL, New York
HAROLD .RUNNELS, New Mexico MARJORIE S. HOLT, Maryland
LES ASPIN, Wisconsin ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR., Virginia
RONALD V. DELLUMS, California
Mi)NDEL J. DAVIS, South Carolina
.JAMES R. JONES, Oklahoma
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado
FRANK M. SLATINSHEK, Chief Counsel
WILLIAM H. CooK, Counsel
JOHN J. FORD, Professional Staff Member
RALPH MARSHALL, Pro)essionaI Staff Member
GEORGE NORRIS, COnn831
JAMES F. SHUMATE, Jr., Counsel
WILLIAM H. HOGAN, Jr., Counsel
11. HOLLISTER CANTUS, Profee8ional Staff Member
ONETA Lr STOCKSTILL, Executive Secretary
S1'ECLIL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, Michigan, Chairman
F. EDW. ]HEBERT, Louisiana WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
O. C. FISHER, Texas BOB WILSON, California
FRANK M. SI.ATI SSHEK, Chief Counsel
WILLIAM H. EtOGAN, JR., Counsel
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C., 20402 - Price 35 cents
Stock Number 5270-02041
(II)
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The Honorable F. Edw. IIebert
Chairman, Con maittee on Armed Services,
October 16, 1973.
House of Representatives, WVashington, D.C. X0515
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : I have the honor to transmit herewith the
report of the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence on its Inquiry into
the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the
Watergate and Ellsberg Matters.
The report has been unanimously approved by the subcommittee
members and I would appreciate your early approval in order that
it may be printed.
With kind regards, I remain
Sincerely,
LUOIEN N. NEDZI,
Chairman,
Special Subcommittee on Intelligence.
Approved for printing :
F. Edw. Hebert
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CONTENTS
Page
Background ---------------------------------------------------------
1
Preliminary statement----------------------------------------------
1
Legislative purpose-------------------------------------------------
.1
Procedures --------------------------------------------------------
2
Principal witnesses-----------------------------------------------
2
Ceveat ------------------------------------------------------------
-3
Basic observations----------------------------------------------------
3
Discussion ----------------------------------------------------------
5
White House concerns----------------------------------------------
5
The CIA contact----------------------------------------------------
5
How this happened in the CIA---------------------------------------
7
The Ellsberg psychiatric profile--------------------------------------
8
The Ellsberg psychiatrist caper--------------------------------------
10
The Dita Beard interview-------------------------------------------
11
The Watergate-----------------------------------------------------
11
"Pressure to blame Watergate on CIA"-McCord---------------------
12
The White House attempt to involve CIA in Watergate------------------
15
The laundered-money allegation-------------------------------------
15
The White House meeting on June 23, 1972-Haldeman's version-------
15
The Helms version--------------------------------------------------
16
The Ehrlichman version--------------------------------------------
16
As General Walters saw it-------------------------------------------
16
The Walters-Gray meeting on June 23, 1972-General Walters' version__
17
Mr. Gray's version of the Walters' meeting----------------------------
17
The effort to entrap the CIA-----------------------------------------
18
The FBI concern---------------------------------------------------
19
The Gray call to the President---------------------------------------
20
1970 Interagency Committee on Intelligence----------------------------
22
Final statement------------------------------------------------------
22
(v)
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 Ap ?,~ I 'pr ~ye M3L01 CT1 BpWWA~ 0 1QRWAQ.q*080-8
GENCE ON ITS INQUIRY INTO THE ALLEGED IN-
VOLVEMENT OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY IN THE WATERGATE AND ELLSBERG
MATTERS
BACKGROUND
In early May 1973, the Chairman, House Armed Services Committee,
and the Committee membership became deeply concerned over reports
that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was implicated in the
Daniel Ellsberg Pentagon Papers case and in the abortive break-in
of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the Water-
gate complex on June 17, 1972 and its subsequent eoverup. Those con-
cerns resulted in the Chairman, the Honorable F. Edward Hebert,
assigning to the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence the task of
inquiring into those matters in connection with the Committee's CIA
oversight responsibility. That subcommittee was reappointed on Feb-
ruary 27, 1973 at the organization meeting of the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee pursuant to the authority contained in H. Res. 185,
93d Congress, under the chairmanship of the h onora.ble Lucien
N. Nedzi.
Preliminary Statement
As noted, the events that triggered the investigation were the release
of information regarding the illegal break into the office of Dr. Lewis
J. Fielding, the Ellsberg psychiatrist, on September 3, 1971, and the
Watergate entry into the Democratic National Committee Headquar-
ters on June 17, 1972 with the speculation that CIA was involved in
both operations. The probe was commenced 'with an :inquiry into the
relationship between the White house consultant, E. Howard Hunt,
the CIA and the alleged improper use of CIA technical 'materials
(disguises and alias material). That inquiry led the subcommittee into
the so-called Daniel Ellsberg profiles which the White House allegedly
commissioned the CIA to produce. Then came information regarding
the break-in of Dr. Fielding's office which purportedly housed the
Ellsberg psychiatric file. In between all this, the subcommittee learned
that the CIA disguise and alias materials were reportedly used in
domestic interviews in 1971 involving a Mr. Clifton DeMott who was
allegedly peddling Kennedy family information and with Mrs. Dita
Beard in connection with the ITT affair. During the entire -inquiry
there was the requirement to look carefully into Watergate since it
was established that the CIA technical materials provided to Mr. E.
Howard Hunt and Mr. G. Gordon Liddy were confiscated during
the ensuing arrests.
With the Watergate inquiry 'came the attendant requirement that
the subcommittee looked into post-Watergate White house activities
that reportedly sought to use the CIA to impede the FBI investigation
and to assist the Watergate defendants with CIA funds. In that same
general context the panel heard testimony on Mr. James McCord's
allegations of a massive effort to lay the blame for Watergate on the
CIA. Each of these areas is addressed in this report in more detailed
chronological coverage. Also examined is the CIA legislative charter
and the need for its amendment.
Legislative Purpose
The basic reason for the probe was to determine whether there was
any CIA activity in the reported incidents which was contrary to the
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letter and spirit of CIA authority and, if so, to determine what, if
any, legislative recommendations should be made to remedy the situa-
tion. The CIA charter as contained n the National Security Act, of
1947, as amended, provides in part: That the Agency shall have no
police, subpoena, law-enforcement pcwers, or internal-security func-
tions and That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible
for protecting intelligence sources and methods from uitauthori,ed
disclosure.
Thus, in the context of this investigation, the question must be
whether the activities under inquiry involved the CIA in purely do-
mestic intelligence matters and thus were outside its charter, or pos-
sibly by any stretch of credulity, whether CIA involvement was some-
how proper under some "sources and methods" authorit. The sub-
committee concluded that the involvement in issue had no' support. in
reason or law.
Procedures
Subcommittee hearings were commenced on May 11, 1973 with the
unanimous adoption of a rule that meetings would be conducted in
executive session to protect the sansiti vity of information with regard
to the CIA. In detail, some seventeen meetings were held with some
twenty-four principal witnesses appearing, among whom were the
following :
Dr. James A. Schlesinger
Former 1 ireetor of Central Intelligence
Mr. William E. Colby
Deputy Director for Operations, CIA
Dr. John R. Tietjen
Director of Medical Services, CIA
Mr. Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel, CIA
Mr. George L. Cary, Jr.
Acting Legislative Counsel, CIA
Mr. John M. -Maury
Legislative Counsel. CIA
General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Former Director of CIA
Lt. General Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
The Honorable Richard Helms
Ambassador to Iran
(Former Deputy Director of Central In-
telligence)
Mr. How:. rd J. Osborne
Director of Security Affairs, CIA
Mr. Paul F. Gaynor
Chief of Security Research Staff, CIA
Mr. William V. Broe
Inspector General, CIA
Mrs. Nancy C. Lewis
Secretary to Deputy Director, CIA
'Jr. L. Patrick Gray, III
Former Acting Director of the FBI
Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Former White House S'taff' Member
Mr. John D. Ehrlichman
Former White House Staff Member
Mr. James McCord
Former Staff Member
Committee for the Reelection
President (CREEP)
Mi. E. Howard Hunt
Former White House
Mr. William Bittman
Counsel for Mr. Hunt
Mr. Charles W. Colson
Former White House Counselor to the
President
Mr. Tom Charles Huston
Former White House Staff Member
Mr. Gerald Alch
Fo flier Attorney
~.IeCord
Mr. Egil Krogh
Mr. David Young
Fo rrne.r White House Staff Member
Mr. John W. Dean, III
b'o curer White House Cour:sel
Mr. George Gordon Liddy
Fo;-mer Counsel
Committee for the Reelection
President
Mr. Peter A. Maroulls
Ati orney for Mr. Liddy
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In the process, subcommittee subpoenas were issued to Messrs.
Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Dean, and due to their confinement status,
Messrs. Hunt and Liddy were before the subcommittee pursuant to
Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum duly signed by the Chief
Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Messrs.
Krogh, Young and Dean claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege
throughout their appearance, aside basic identification. During his
appearance on July 20, 1973 Mr. George Gordon Liddy refused to
be sworn to testify, claiming that right under the Fifth Amendment.
As a result, the subcommittee, and in turn the House Armed Services
Committee, resolved that Mr. Liddy be referred to the U.S. Attorney
for the District of Columbia for contempt of Congress under the
processes of applicable law. By a vote of 334 to 11 the House of
Representatives adopted the resolution on September 10, 1973 and
reported the committee action in House Report No. 93-453 dated
September 10, 1973. That matter now remains pending in the Depart-
ment of Justice.
Caveat
This report is based solely upon evidence submitted to the sub-
committee and the subcommittee has attempted to be meticulous about
eliminating from its consideration the plethora of information that
has come from the media reporting other congressional actions, leaks
and endless "sources." Also, the subcommittee limited its inquiry to
CIA related matters.
BASIC OBSERVATIONS
(1) Alias identification gear, disguises and other technical materials
were provided improperly to Mr. E. Howard hunt of the White House
staff by the CIA for use by non-CIA personnel due to a failure to
determine whether the purposes were in keeping with the statutory
mission of the CIA.
(2) Those improper purposes included :
a. A disguised interview with an informant who allegedly
was to provide information of a purely domestic-political
nature in connection with the Kennedy family ;
b. A surveillance under disguise in August of 1971 in con-
nection with the unlawful break into Dr. Fielding's office in
California in what proved to be an unsuccessful search for
Mr. Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatric records;
c. A disguised visit to Mrs. Dita Beard in a Denver, Colo-
rado hospital during March of 1972 in connection with the
ITT affair; and
d. The abortive break-in at the Democratic National
Committee Headquarters in the Watergate complex on
June 17.1972.
(3) Utilized at one time or another in the above-noted actions was
the following CIA provided material : 2 wigs, speech-altering devices,
alias materials commonly called "pocket litter," a tape recorder, a
clandestine camera, one-way tinted spectacles and film developing
facilities. Among the items requested but not provided were credit
cards, a telephone service and a secretary.
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(4) There were continued CIA dealings with Mr. Mint after Gen-
eral ("ashman first questioned Hun ,:'s judgment in requesting addi-
tiotral PTA- assistance. These "dealin,rs" included a contact in October
1971 %vith reference to a, 7954 , Fren:~h case involving the leakage of
docume]its, contacts concerning Agencv retirees regarding whom data
was furnished to :11r. Hunt and tho Ellsberg profile. This resulted
from sirch compartmentation within the CIA organization as delayed
the internal disseminat.ior, of information of hunt's activities and
thus regyrrires comment in this, report.
(5) Had the equipment: been deni.anded by CIA and returned by
Hr. Hunt when further assistance was terminated, its use in subse-
quent activities would have been prevented.
(6) Demanding the workup of domestic-psychiatric profiles on
Daniel Ellsberg during the period Jnly-November 1971 by CIA
technical personnel was an abuse of CIA facilities.
(7) [+~fi'o,?ts were made by Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman and
Dean of the White House staff to deflect the FBI investigation of the
Watergate break-in by invoking nonexisting conflicts with CIA
operations.
(8) Substantial efforts were made by Mr. John Dean. then White
house. Counsel, to involve CIA in the Watergate break-in without
any foundation in fact. Particularly. Mr. Dean attempted to use the
CIA to provide assistance to the IlTatergate defendants in a clear
violation of the statutory charter of the CIA.
(9) When these requests for CIA assistance were made there vas
a clear picture. of'Wbite House aides avoiding former Director Helms
and looking to career military officers. Cnslunan and later Walters, for
unquestioned compliance.
(10) Substantial evidence of record leads to the inescapable con-
clusion that Mr. H. R. Ilaldema,r., former White House Chief of Staff,
and Mr. John Ehrlichman, former Chief of Domestic Programs in the
White Ilonse_ were the sources of enormous executive authority and
were considered by the, Acting Director of the FBI and CIA officials
to be speaking for the President.
(11) There exist material inconsistencies between the, statement
and certain testimony offered by General Vernon A. Walters, Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, in his appearance as a witness on
Mav 16, 1973 and the statements and certain testimony presented dur-
ing his return appearance on May 21, 1973, both as to omissions and
changes in language.
(12) llr. James McCord sent six memoranda by mail to the CIA
during r he period August 1972-January 1973 regarding alleged at-
tempts to involve CIA in the Watergate. This correspondence was
tiled and not turned over to the FIB]and the Department, of Justice
until a request from the Department of Justice was received in i11ay
1973.
(13) As late, as February 1973, Mr. Dean called Dr. James A.
Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence, to see if CIA could get
=rack from the F13T the file material CIA had provided Justice rela-
ive to the Agency's contact with IIur t. This was not dome.
(14) Legislative recommendations are necessary in the following
Three areas with regard to Sec. 102(d) of the National Security Act:
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a. To expressly prohibit the Director of Central Intelli-
gence from performing any acts not included in Section 102
without the express authorization of the President.
b. Tighten the phraseology of the section with regard to
protection of intelligence sources and methods by the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence; and
c. Prohibit transactions between former CIA employees
and the Agency above and beyond purely routine administra-
tive matters.
DISCUSSION
White House Concerns
During the summer of 1971 leading members of the White House
staff were reportedly concerned over serious security leaks mainly
centered around the Pentagon Papers affair and a decision was made to
add to the staff a consultant who would be the central person responsi-
ble for research on such matters. The person eventually recommended
by Mr. Charles Colson, White House Counselor, and retained by Mr.
John Ehrlichman, was Mr. E. Howard Hunt, retired career Central
Intelligence Agency officer, former news magazine writer, novelist
and at that time, a ranking member of a public relations firm in Wash-
ington, D.C.
The CIA Contact
Early on in his employment as a consultant' Mr. Hunt requested
through. Mr. Colson that arrangements be made for certain alias and
disguise gear in connection with an interview. Apparently there was
some internal discussion with Mr. Col son as to who should supply this
material but a reasonable interpretation of the testimony establishes
that in the final analysis Mr. John Ehrlichman, Senior White House
Aide in charge of domestic programs, made an introductory call to the
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence, General Robert Cushman,
on or about July 8, 1971 introducing Mr. Hunt as a newly retained
White House Consultant who was in need of CIA assistance. That
call. was announced at a subsequent CIA staff 'meeting. An appointment
was -made and on July 22, 1971 Mr. Hunt and General Cushman had
a meeting at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. At that meeting
arrangements were made for Mr. Hunt to receive "technical assistance"
from the CIA in the form of flash alias documentation and physical
disguise material for an undisclosed mission of some alleged sensi-
tivity. Mr. Hunt expressed it in this way to General Cushman :
"I've been charged with quite a highly sensitive mission by the White House
to visit and elicit information from an individual whose ideology we aren't
entirely sure of and for that purpose they asked me to come over here and see
if you could get me two things : flash, alias documentation * * * and some degree
of physical disguise, for a one time op[eration]-in and out."
General Cushman approved the request. Mr. Hunt's documented alias
was Edward J. Warren. From the advantage of hindsight, it is un-
fortunate that Mr. Hunt was not pressed for the details of his mission
prior to any agreement to meet his request, as normally should be the
case.
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Wlle the total evidence is in some conflict as to just what Hunt's
sensitive mission was to be, it is er,-stal clear from Mr. Hunt's testi-
mony ghat the project was a purely domestic caper to gain information
on the Kennedy family which had been offered by a Mr. Clifton De-
Mott, then apparently located in Rhode Island. Parenthetically, it is
obvious that the projected DeMott i aterview was hardly the sensitive
it ask represented to General Cushman during the meeting on July 22,
1971 at the CIA. Headquarters. The DeMott interview was conducted
1n a motel at the Providence, Rhode, Island airport where Hunt ap-
peared in the CIA disguise, including the "ill-fitting wig" and pocket
litter. 'ripe, interview proved to be fi4.t and unproductive according to
Mr. 1 tent.
Meanwhile, Hunt was making ad,led demands on the Agency for
technical assistance including disguise and alias material for
Mr. George Gordon Liddy. Mr. Liddy's documented alias was George
F. Leonard. On August 27, 1971 after receiving internal complaints
from ('IA staff members concerning the Hunt request, General Cush-
man called Mr. John Ehrlic}man and advised brim that assistance to
Mr. Hunt would have to end since I runt obviously was overreaching
theori;inal agreement.
As future events graphically illustrated, the, deed had then been done
and Mr. Helms, General Cushman and the CIA had become the un-
witting dupes for purely domestic 1Vhite House staff endeavors that
were beyond the realm of CIA authority. Not only did the "technical
assistance" material appear in the DeMott interview as previously
noted, but as we shall see, certain materials appeared in the illicit
search for Ellsberg's psychiatric records, was also in evidence at the
Dita Beard interview in Denver, Colorado and finally at the infamous
Watergate complex entry.
It should be mentioned here that early in his employment in the
White House during July 1971. Mr. Hunt was apparently assigned
the task of developing certain information on U.S. relations with
South Vietnam with specific referenda. to the circumstances which led
to the coup, and assassination of former Premier Diem. In that con-
nection Mr. Charles Colson suggested that Hunt seek out 'a Lieutenant'
Colonel Lucien 'Conein who was reputed to be knowledgeable in har
Eastern affairs through his OSS associations and later CIA work in
South Vietnam. At the time Colonel Conein was said to be retired from
the CIA and living in McLean. Virginia as a private. person. Report-
edl.,y-. Mr. Colson thought it necessary for CIA to approve such an in-
terview, and Colson considered this an additional motive for Hunt to
be cleared through Mr. John Ehrlichman for contact with the CIA. In
fact, Colson testified that the requirement for this clearance was "im-
mediate" in view of the need to interview Colonel Conein.
Hunt stated he knew Conein through earlier association in the OSS,
and after locating him directly through the telephone book, a meeting
was arranged in Hunt's office at the White House. There ensued a diis-
cussion of the Diem era in South Vietnam and the circumstances of
the revolt that led to Diem's assassination. Hunt reported that he also
discussed with Colonel 'Conein the narcotics control situation in South-
east Asia. I-Iunt concluded that the interview was of interest in con-
nection with Hunt's review of the Department of State chronological
cable files on the Diem regime. It was this review that among other
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matters led to the reported controversial and fraudulent alteration of
State Department cables by Hunt "which would clearly point to Wash-
ington, the Kennedy Administration, as having in effect, hoped for
or brought about the assassination of the former Vietnamese Premier."
Thus, the subcommittee determined, to its satisfaction, that the
Hunt-Conein interview did not involve the CIA.
How This Happened in the CIA
Former CIA Director Richard Helms testified that often the Execu-
tive Office of the President made requests of the CIA for assistance
and advice. The principal limit on such CIA assistance is the statutory
barrier to its operation in the domestic-intelligence field, as noted
earlier in this report. On the other hand, witnesses associated with the
CIA were unanimous in their views that requests from top level White-
House aides in the present Administration were, almost without excep-
tion, taken as orders from people who were speaking for the President,
which could and did put a strain on those statutory barriers. In that
setting, then, we have the request from the White House staff for the
cooperation of the CIA with Howard Hunt.
General Cushman, a four-star general officer in the Marine Corps,
and the former Deputy Director testified that he received that request
from Mr. John Ehrlichmnan. Ehrlichman, with rather obvious vigor,
testified that he had no recollection of making any such call to the
CIA. The evidence of record supports General Cushman.
Mr. Ehrlichman in his testimony before the subcommittee assumed a
rather cavalier, hands-off attitude about the CIA technical assistance
to Hunt in an obvious attempt to lay the responsibility at the doorsteps
of others-first for getting Hunt into the White House organization
("Colson hired him") and then by wondering aloud why the CIA gave
"carte blanche for nearly a month without asking [Hunt] what he was
doing." The overall subcommittee record is enlightening on Mr.
Ehrlichman's approach to the matter at hand. Mr. Ehrlichman's
impression of his force and effect in conducting White House business
appears to be unduly modest. The clear impression from the record is
that Mr. Hunt was given CIA assistance solely because Mr. Ehrlich-
man intervened. In this instance, the CIA had not one scintilla of
information concerning the actual purpose of that assistance, and the
lack of such information was not questioned. Indeed, assistance was
given in almost a complete "absence of the procedural steps and
approvals normally required by Agency regulations," according to
former Director of Central Intelligence, Dr. James A. Schlesinger.
Thera is little doubt from the testimony that General Cushman was
impressed with the source of the telephone call introducing Mr. Hunt
as a White House Consultant. General Cushman concluded that Hunt
was hired to work on the security leaks problem, and "the CIA was
being ordered to assist him." [Emphasis Added.] Further, stated
General Cushman, he never envisioned such a request to be for an
improper purpose. Thus, when a meeting between General Cushman
and Hunt resulted on July 22, 1971, there was a clear-cut spirit of
cooperation on the part of the Deputy Director despite the fact that
Aunt beclouded the reason for the "technical assistance" except to
describe the need for a sensitive one-time interview. Hunt was not
pressed for further explanation and the arrangements for assistance
were agreed upon. Ironically, although Hunt suggested privacy, that
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meeting was bugged and it is clear on the, verbatum record that
Mr. Ehrlicnman's name was dropped by Mr. Hunt in the. correct places
to con ','e, the message to General Cushman. Thus commenced a string
of reqirests from Hunt for the agr,~ed upon technical a,ssistanca, as
well as other materials as prev ous]' reported. The extent and depth
of the technical assistance prc.vided to Mr. Hunt can be better under-
stood when it is noted that on no less than three occasions CIA tech-
nical personnel met with Mr. Hunt and/or Mr. Liddy i,a a so-called
`'safe house" location in Washington to fit disguise materials, as well
as deliver other disguise and alias items. A safe house is generally
described as a detection-secure location maintained by Be, Agency for
clandestine meetings.
This all came to an end on August 27, 1971 when the CIA staff and
General Cushman became. concerned over the propriety of Hunt's
increasing demands in relation to the CIA and the assistance stopped.
ITnhappily, neither at that date nor at any time thereafter did the
CIA make a request for the return of the materials and, except, for
the camera, none of the material was in fact returned.
The Director of CIA was advised of the Hunt-Cushman agreement
and Hunt's CIA contacts after the fact but considered it "fait aecom-
pIi," partica1arly since "there was absolutely no indication of wrong-
doing." In "hindsight" said Ambassador Helms "maybe we should
have asked [Runt -1 a lot more questions." The subcommittee can only
add its unanimous and
solemn concurrence to that observation. Mr.
Helms said that "when. the top man in the White House asks for
support and assistance, it is given to him." Interestingly, Mr. Hunt's
view as, a retired CIA agent and former White House Consultant was
expressed thusly-: "* * * the CIA was regarded as a service organiza-
tion for the intelligence community and certainly to the Chief Execu-
th e." [Emphasis Added.1 The better view, although charitable, was
probably expressed by Dr. :James R. Schlesinger, the succeeding
Director of Central Intelligence at the time of this inquiry and now
Secretary of Defense: "The Agency was insufficiently car.tious in the
i nitiat ion of assi stance to Hunt."
Thi' Eihd)rrrg Psychiatric Profile
Lrcredible as it may seem, at the very time that Mr. Hunt was
eonducting his business with the CIk for "technical assistance" an-
other W White House staff project; was being engineered which was to
involve the CIA in one more undertaking which was outside of its
mission. This, aside from the separate Ellsberg's psychiatrist's
break-iii, which apparently was undergoing concurrent planning, also
had C"IA. implications and which will be, addressed under the next
subheading.
'flre profile operation originated in the, White house Investigations
Unit, better known at the time as the Room 16 Group, and. now poprr-
larly called "The Plumbers." The group was reportedly concerned
with se.curitry matters involving leaks of classified information. Ap-
parenil IN,, t.h2 unit was under the overall aegis of Mr. John Ehrlichrr an,
with Ali. h; it Krogh in immediate charge, as assisted by Mr.. David
Young, and Mr. George Gordon Liddy. According to his testimony,
Mr. E. Iloward Hint joined this group about the middle of July
1971-while continuing to work on his original assignment. At that
time the group was apparently in the process of organizine'.
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The mission at hand seemed to be to get a complete backdrop on
Ellsberg and his entire psychiatric makeup, for the purpose of gain-
ing a better understanding of the total Pentagon Papers problem and
to apparently assist in Ellsberg's prosecution. From those considera-
tions developed a suggestion by E. Howard Hunt that CIA, had the
technical capability of putting together a personal profile as ad been
done in the case of certain foreign leaders and secondly, an interest
in certain psychiatric records that were reportedly in the files of a
Los Angeles psychiatrist. Hunt recommended, therefore, that CIA be
requested to construct a profile on Ellsberg. Apparently, Mr. David
Young was the contact man with CIA on this project. At some point
in time, Mr. Ehrl.ichm.an talked with Mr. Young about the project and
it had his approval. This could have been after work on the profile was
underway.
In late July 1971, the first contact was made with CIA requesting
an Ellsberg profile. This resulted in some conversations between Mr.
Young and Mr. Helms, in which CIA's reservation were expressed but,
stated Mr. Helms, Young assured him "it had the highest White House
level support * * *", and an agreement was reached. Young supplied
the materials to be used. The CIA psychiatric personnel involved, in-
cluding medical doctors, expressed varying degrees of concern over the
propriety of the project in view of the limited information on Ellsberg
at hand, and the question of whether it was CIA-mission oriented since
the subject was a U.S. national. Also there was concern that the prod-
uct could be misinterpreted as coming from a doctor-patient relation-
ship, which, of course, would not be the case. The evidence indicates
that the project was finally approved with some reluctance by "'senior
Agency officials because of the peculiar problems posed by the case."
The initial effort was produced from articles from media sources, as
well as FBI documents. This first effort did not satisfy the White
House staff and an August 12, 1971 meeting was called in the Execu-
tive Office Building on the matter with a CIA medical representative
present. A witness who attended that meeting attributed the following
to Mr. Young : "That the Ellsberg study had the highest priority and
had been requested by Mr. Ehrlichman and Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Young
also stated that the President had been informed of this study. He
stated that it was a multi-faceted approach and the psychiatric report
would be only one facet." Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy were
also present with that group, and further discussion ensued on the
points they hoped to develop in such a profile.
New material as forthcoming from the White House which was
biographical in nature and appeared to have Justice Department
origin. At no time, it was testified, was sufficient material received upon
which a valid report could be assembled. There were several other
meetings with White House personnel and there was a CIA attempt to
fend off White House staff insistence on the second paper on the
grounds that the material added very little to the production. But the
Room 1G Group insisted on a final profile. With much expressed re-
luctance by the CIA professional staff involved, the final product "was
delivered * * * to the White House and to Mr. Liddy, Mr. Young
and Mr. Hwit" on November 12,1971 after being reviewed by Director
Helms. Interestingly, General Cushman was not aware of the Ellsberg
profiles project.
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The Ellsberg Psyehiatris; Caper
Also incredible as it may appear, while E. Howard Hunt was inak-
ins: demands upon the CIA for additional technical material, he was
doing it not for purposes of tha "se=nsitive" interview, but rather for
use in connection with the Room 16 Group's plan for the surreptitious
entry into the office of a Beverly Hill,; doctor, Dr. Henry Fielding, who
was identified as Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. It should be noted that
shortly prior to the break-in CIA hid indicated that the psychiatric
information for the profile lacked sor;re sufficiency for the task at hind.
While the tinning would indicate some known connection between CIA
and the Ellsberg break-in, the testimony shows a coincidence rather
than any suggestion that CIA had any prior knowledge of the illicit
entry into I)r. Fielding's office.
According to Hunt, and as was noted earlier, sometime during
.Tuly 1971, after the Room 16 (:Plumbers) Group was formed, it was
determined by the Group that information on Ellsberg's life and life-
style, mental competency, tendencies, propensities and the like, would
be valuable in a better nnderstandin;; of the entire Pentagon Papers
matter. Thus. the plan to burgle the psychiatrist's office.
Per the Group's plans, Mr. Hunt and Mr. Liddy were scheduled to
make a preliminary reconnaissance trip to Beverly Hills in connection
-%vith the Fielding break-in and Hunt asked CIA for a camera conceal-
meet device for indoor photography. This was the camera concealed
in the infamous tobacco pouch that was later used during the recon-
naissance for photographing the inside of the building in which Dr.
Fielding held office space.
Indeed, in addition to having the camera, the surveillance was con-
ducted with both Ilunt and Liddy using the disguise material and
"litter," including the "ill-fitting wigs" provided earlier by the CIA.
to Mr. hunt and Mr. Liddy in a sa`e house. Among other services,
CIA provided Mr. Liddy with techi ical instructions for the use of
camera, and developing services when the job was completed. But in
all fairness, it must he repeated that the CIA was not aware of the
true purpose for which the camera and equipment was to be used.
Mr. .lohrr Ehrlichman disclaimed prior knowledge of the basic
plan-"I certainly cannot recall saein? such a memo, Mr. Chairman'"-
1ut did testify that, "there was a written proposal that Hunt mid
Liddy be sent to the coast to do investigation work. * * * The sub-
stance of it was they would. go and investigate these questions I alluded
to before, E lsberg's relationships, how he got the papers out, what
sort of a, person lie is, is he a part of a conspiracy, all the lingering,
remaining questions about Ellsberg as an individual that we were, not
getting answers to. * * * I approved that proposal." Ehrlichman
added that he would not have approved any proposal that included
a plan to burglarize the psychiatrist's office.
Following the West Coast trip Mr. Hunt saw a need for credit cards
and a sterile. telephone for back up in case an alias address was checked.
'Che credit card problem came up on the surveillance trip when credit
cards were asked for to pay bills and none were available. This request
to CIA was not granted. Also, upon returning, Mr. Hunt made an
effort to show the Fielding pictures to Mr. Charles Colson, but Colson
rebuffed Hunt out of hand before, Hunt could explain what he had to
offer.
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During the actual burglary of the Fielding office on September 3,
1971, Mr. Hunt stated that he did not personally make an entry upon
orders that nobody with a White House connection was to be "any-
where near the target area." On the evening of the Fielding break-in,
Hunt stated he was miles away covering the Fielding house, for said
Hunt, "I had to be there. I was the planner."
Mr. Liddy was close by in a car to provide mobile surveillance, and
both Hunt and Liddy were in touch with the entry team by walkie-
talkie. As it developed, nothing of worth was received as a result of
the operation.
The Dita Beard Interview
It will be recalled that in 1972 at the time of the Richard Klein-
dienst confirmation hearings as Attorney General, there was consider-
able discussion and publicity regarding the authenticity of an ITT
memo allegedly written by Dita Beard, a Washington ITT representa-
tive, which allegedly linked the ITT antitrust settlement with a re-
ported contribution for the benefit of the Republican National Con-
vention then planned for San Diego.
Mr. Charles Colson stated that in early March 1972 he received
information from Mr. Hunt that the Beard memo could be a forgery
and Colson concluded that there may be a way of gaining information
on the matter through an interview with Mrs. Beard in a Denver
hospital where she was undergoing treatment.
The arrangements were, made and'Hunt (in disguise-the "ill-fitting
wig" and Edward Warren "litter") visited Mrs. Beard in the Denver
hospital to seek her version of the infamous memo. The results were in-
conclusive. Hunt's story is that the disguise was used to shield his
White House identity. Mr. Colson stated that he did not order the dis-
guise, it was Hunt's idea. In any event, we had another clear-cut use of
CIA equipment to assist in carrying out a purely domestic-intelligence-
gathering mission, without the knowledge of the very people who sup-
plied the material.
The Watergate
As probably very few people are unaware, on the evening of
June 17, 1972, a group allegedly sponsored by the Committee for the
Reelection of the President made an abortive entry into the Watergate
Headquarters of the Democratic National Committee reportedly to
photograph files, "* * * install a room bug * * * which would per-
mit the transmission of conversations * * *", and also to put in place
a telephone listening device. There had been a prior successful entry
into the Headquarters on Memorial Day Weekend 1972. That entry
was classified as successful because nobody was caught, but the -
bugging of a telephone failed for mechanical and technical reasons,
and there was a new demand for photographic copies of additional
documents from the files-thus the plan for a second try.
Although there seemingly was repeated reference to- "the
principals"-"* * * the Attorney General, Mr. Dean and Mr.
Magruder * * *", said Hunt-George Gordon Liddy reportedly was
the leader and planner for the entry with Mr. Aunt as one of his top
assistants, along with Mr. James W. McCord who was a "hitch-hiker"
on the operation as the electronics man. McCord was a former FBI
agent who later joined the CIA from where he retired in 1970. Later
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in September 1971 McCord was employed by CREEP as a security
man and was operating his own business in the security and investiga-
tive field.
I Iiu t was the recruiter for the Cuban-American branch of the entry
team wl +ose principal task was photography. ("The team 1-_ad demon-
-Crated its a'ility in Los Angeles. That was certainly a clean opera-
tion," said Hunt.) Among those "team" individuals were Mr. Baker
Mr. Martinez. Mr. Hunt and 1M1r. Liddy were not part of the
and
enti,v team. Interestingly, some 50 35MM cameras were ought for
the mission.
On the critical evening, Hunt and Liddy were in a room in the
Watergate Hotel where the team assembled prior to entry. Hunt 11 ad
,earried the CIA-supplied disguise gear to the room to make distribu-
lion as might be desired. McCord stated that Hunt handed McCord
some credentials including, he thought, a driver's license. When
McCord was apprehended later, the CIA cover name of .-Edward L.
Warren was on the documents which were confiscated by the police.
Hunt, in his testimony, stated that he thought Barker used his "set"
of disguises and pocket litter and Liddy's was used by another mem-
ber of the entry team. This evidently included the wigs. A portion of
Hunt's direct testimony on the subject is succinct :
["Let me put, it this way, sir : 11 took all of that [CIA] disguise equipment down
to the operations room of the Watergate, Room 214, that evening, The men who
.na.de up the entry team helped themselves to whatever they wanted. And the last
time I recall seeing any of that material was in Room 214 in the Watergate
Hotel."]
Hunt normally stored the alias and disguise gear in a, safe in the
Executive Office Building, but on. June ,17 all of it was confiscated by
police at the Watergate. The only item. left was a tape recorder which,
during his testimony, Hunt promised to return to the CIA.
Again, as the world knows, the "lights went out" as Mr. Hunt put it,
and the team was caught. It is ironic, too, that certain doors had been
taped at the lock and McCord reported over walkie-talkie that he had
to retape. them. Hunt was startled by that report and wanted to stop
the operation but Liddy refused. McCord, too, wanted to press for-
ward. A. short while later the group was arrested on the scene.
None of those involved in the break-in were employees of the CIA;
however. Martinez was at the time an active Florida informant for the
CIA and was being paid for his information at the rate of $100 per
month. He is no longer on the payroll of CIA, and there is no evidence
that CIA had any advance knowledge of his prospective participation
in the break-in. Interestingly, Hunt stated that following Watergate
lie, Mrs. Hunt and Attorney Rittman received some $156,000 for
lawyers fees from mysterious sou:?ces by what can be best described as
cloak and dagger deliveries. Also, payments of $27,000 in additional
moneys -for personal use and for the Cuban-Americans were reported.
McCord stated that he received $46,000 for lawyers fees and subsist-
ence from "committee" sources.
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21
not be covered up and he [Gray] felt the President should get rid of
the people involved.); Walters would have the President replying, "I
should get rid of whoever is involved, no matter how high." Air. Gray
is adament that no such statement was ln:a.de by himself or in answer
by the President.
So that the record may be complete, it should be stated that Mr. Ehr-
lichman, having been at San Clemente at the time, has some notion of
the conversation as reported to him by the President. In that regard,
Mr. Ehrlichman testified in part as follows :
"During the first week of July, 1972, the President told me Pat Gray told him
on the telephone that General Walters had told Gray there was no CIA objection
to a full FBI investigation of the Mexican aspects of the Watergate case. The
President said he then instructed Gray to conduct a full investigation.
"The President told me then that he still personally believed and feared that
the FBI investigation might harm the Agency.
"He said he believed the CIA would be making a mistake if it pretended an
investigation would not disclose some of its current operations. He said lie hoped
the General and other CIA management were not covering up for their
subordinates."
Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony, indicates , that the President called
Mr. Gray at the "strong urging" of 111r. MacGregor because of 111r.
Gray's concern over the FBI role in the Water gate investigation, and
after the call the President had a "lingering doubt" that there was
some CIA "exposure" despite assurances to the contrary. Yet, in his
May 22, 1973, public Watergate statement, the President said :
"On July 6, 1972, I telephoned the Acting Director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray,
to congratulate him on the successficl handling of the hijacking of a Pacific
Southwest Airlines plane the previous day. During the conversation Mr. Gray
discussed with me the progress of the Watergate Investigation * * * "
[Emphasis Added.]
Mr. Ehrlichman's testimony in that regard is pertinent :
* *
Mr. NEDZI. But the call was prompted by MacGregor's report?
Mr. EURLicrrMAN. By MacGregor's conveying a request from Gray to the
President.
Mr. NEDZr. Ora call?
Mr. Ecru icxM,AN. Yes, sir.
Mr. NFnzi. Are you acquainted with the President's statement which was
made on May 22nd?
Mr. EIILICHMAN. I have read it, yes.
Mr. NEDZI. Does his account square completely with your account of that
conversation?
Mr. EHnLICIIMAN. I don't believe it does.
Mr. NEDZI. I didn't think it did. I was just wondering whether you recognized
that fact.
Mr. Eiinmca.tirAN. I do. I think the drafter of that statement did not have the
advantage I had of my verbatim notes of the conversations-I say verbatim-I
take substantially verbatim notes of my conversations with the President.
Mr. NEDZi. The President is rendering the statement?
Mr. EuRLrdnarAN. At least nominally so. Although I know the research that
went into it stumbled in a few places.
Mr. NFazi. Where else did it stumble?
Mr. EanLIcnMAN. It stumbled at the place where the statement says "Within
a week after the Pentagon Papers leak the special unit was formed at the White
House." That is not accurate. That is a discrepancy as far as I am concerned.
I called it to the attention of Mr. Buzhardt at the White House as soon as 1 saw
it. He acknowledged it was a discrepancy.
Mr. NEnzr. Has that been publicly acknowledged?
Mr. ExaLICxMAN. I don't believe so. [Emphasis Added.]
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Aside additional meetings with Walters on July 12 and 28, this
cnmpleted, for all intents and purposes, the saga of the CIA-FBl-
,MM(,.xican connection with regard to Watergate.
1970 INTERAGENCY CoNIMI'r'r E ON 1N1 INTELLIGENCE
In addition Co the testimony taken in connection with the basic
Watergate-Ellsberg-CIA matter, the subcommittee in exercising its
oversight responsibilities heard detailed testimony from former White
Ilouse Aide Tom Charles Husto.a in executive session with regard
to the 1970 Ad Hoc White ].louse Interagency Committee Report on
t )omestic Intelligence. At the time, the President was reportedly con-
cerned over having a current assessment of the internal security threat
and wanted a recommendation on options to fill the alleged gaps in
intelligence gathering methods to cope with the threat. Apparently,
because the Ad Hoc Committee could not agree, the plan was never
finally implemented. The subcommittee records discloses that the Cl A
role in this venture can fairly be described as passive; nevertheless,
that testimony has been taken into consideration in arriving at the
above ler;?islative recommendations.
Fl ti AI S7'ATI'3I]'.NT
The investigation has illustrated clearly that during the period
covered by the inquiry there existed in the White House staff a pro-
pensity for using the CIA for purposes not intended by the Congress
sn enacting; the National Securr;:y AA of 1947 ., as amended. While
r:est.imonv indicated that in the White House staff organization matters
regarding the CIA were normally handled by Dr. Henry Kissinger,
the White IIouse involvement with the CIA, as dramatically illustrated
acv this investigation, was basically through direct CIA contact by
,Nfr. H. R. Haldeman, Mr. John Ehrlichman, Mr. David Young (of
the Plumbers Group) and Mr. John Dean. While it is understood Dean
was handling the Watergate case, nonetheless, he was exerting con-
tinuing personal pressure on the CIA to involve itself in a. matter that
was clearly illegal. The "requests" for assistance to Hunt and for the
Ellsberg profiles were no less blatant. It is not only that the deeds
were in fact done, but also the propensity of certain White House
aides to dip directly into the CIA for improper purposes, leaving
in doubt the serious question of whether this was done with
authorization. However, we are convinced that the CIA did not know
of the improper purposes for which i.he technical materials provided
were to be used and resisted. later efforts to involve the Agency.
It is clear, then, that-the National Security Act must be srrengthened
to assure that the CIA not engage in any activity not included in
Section 10.2; of the Act, except as is personally approved by the
President.
Mr. Richard Hehns, former Director of Central ,intelligence,
itiforlued the subcommittee that, there were problems with respect to
the statutory charge on the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intellmence sources and methods. Said Helms :
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"* * * I would like, Mr. Chairman, to put a parentheses in here now to say
that as a citizen who is no longer involved in the Agency, I think it would be well
to look at that provision of law as a charge against the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, because he has no investigative power, he has no facilities for looking
into who might have leaked what, and when classified papers disappear, or the
stories appear in the New York Times, or whatever the case may be, all he can
do is wring his hands and check around with other Agencies of the Government
and ask who might have talked to that reporter, and so forth, but he has no way
to really follow up. So he has a charge against him which lie has an awful time
trying to fulfill. * * *."
Thus, the language of the sources and methods section of the statute
must be reexamined with a view to making it more workable in fact, if
the language is to remain in the law.
This inquiry revealed some association between former employees
of the CIA and the active organization which went beyond purely
social contact. Both Hunt and McCord testified to using Agency lists
to recruit personnel in addition to contacts heretofore described. The
subcommittee also noted, in an earlier inquiry, publicity about former
Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John A. McCone making contacts
with the CIA on official matters, which is another example of activity
by former CIA members that should be avoided. This justifiably raises
suspicion and should be eliminated. Statutory language should be
included in the CIA charter to outlaw such contacts except for purely
administrative matters.
The subcommittee is currently committed to conduct hearings on
these legislative proposals and other suggested changes in the overall
foreign role and operations of the CIA at the earliest possible date with
a view to bringing legislation to the floor of the House in the 93rd
Congress.
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JOURNAL
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Tuesday - 23 October 1973
1. (Secret - GLC) Checked with Jack Ticer, Senate Armed Services
Committee staff, about the matter of a briefing of Frank Sullivan, of the
Committee staff, on Soviet general forces and Soviet and Chinese nuclear
programs. I reminded Ticer that we were awaiting word from him that
Sullivan's top secret security clearance had been reinstituted through the
Department of Defense before proceeding to grant him compartmented clear-
ances and provide him with the briefing. Ticer recalled our prior conversation
on this subject and assured me he would let me know when they have final word
from DOD.
2. (Confidential - GLC) Dorothy Fosdick, Senator Jackson's Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations staff, called to say that Senator Jackson wanted
Richard Perle and her to get a briefing on the "cease fire line" in the Middle
East. I told her it was my impression there was no cease fire line as such
but I would check and be back in touch with her. Later in the day, after
25X1A conversations with and Mr. Maury on the subject, I told
Fosdick and Perle that indeed there were no clearly defined "cease fire lines"
or clear lines establishing relative positions of the Arabs and Israelis. Perle
asked what kind of a map Kissinger, State, had before his discussion in Moscow
and I told him I had no idea. I went on to say that with respect to Kissinger's
maps, he might want to check with the State Department or, as Maury had
suggested to Senator Jackson the other day, they might want to contact the
Department of Defense to see if they had any more specific information on
the relative position of the Arab/Israeli forces. Perle's only comment was
that he would go back to Senator Jackson and perhaps check with the "military
people. "
3. (Confidential - GLC) In response to a call from Scott Cohen,
Executive Assistant to Senator Charles Percy (R., Ill.), Mr. Maury and I
talked with him about the situation in the Middle East and Maury briefed him
on the scale of military activities of both the Egyptian and Syrian forces using
the latest situation reports and the prepared statement which the Director
used before the douse Armed Services Committee this morning.
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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 2
Tuesday - 23 October 1973
4. (Secret - GLC) Left with Guy McConnell, Senate Appropriations
Committee staff, the unclassified statement prepared by IC Staff on the
functions and responsibilities of the Agency and the classified material
prepared by OSR on Soviet military weapons which have been used in the
Arab/Israeli war.
5. (Unclassified - PLC) Called Ralph Malvik, in OMB, to determine
the status of H. R. 7135, which raises the ceiling for claims of employees
of civilian agencies from $6, 500 to $12, 000. Malvik. did not know the
status of the bill. Under new procedures established 1 July, GSA handles
for OMB all proposed legislation involving claims against the Government.
He refused to disclose who in GSA was handling the bill. I explained our
interest. Ma.lvik stated that when the positions of the executive agencies
are received by OMB, he will give us an opportunity to submit an Agency
position if a stronger case for civilian agencies is needed.
6. (Unclassified - JMM) Accompanied the Director who briefed
the' House Armed Services Committee. This was a joint session with
Department of Defense officials. See Memo for Record and transcript.
7. (Unclassified - JMM) Called General Ray Furlong, DOD Legislative
Affairs, to ask that we be provided copies of whatever follow up material
Deputy Secretary Clements et al were providing the House Armed Services
Committee in the wake of today's hearing.
8. (Unclassified - LLM) Hilda Schreiber, Legislative Reference
Division, OMB, said she has farmed out for comments the Agency's
proposed amendments to the CIA Retirement Act and requested that we
send a copy of the classified five-year cost figures to Hugo A. Ranta,
Assistant General Counsel, Treasury Department, which has been done.
She noted that the funding amendments provided for interest payments
on unfunded liability for fiscal year 73 and appeared to appreciate the
reasons, therefore, and the adjustments that would be necessary if the
date slipped forward to fiscal year 74.
I told Schreiber that we expect to get the cost of living amendment
over shortly and she said she is expecting it and will push it along.
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25X1A
STATSPEC
Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 3
Tuesday - 23 October 1973
9. (Internal Use Only - LLM) George Murphy, on the staff
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, called to report that he
.had closed out in the Committee questions relating to the August 15
letter by Edward J. Bauser, Executive Director, Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, to the Director concerning an article by Alsop
in the Post, with a statement that CIA representatives had met with
the members of the JCAE staff and answered the questions raised in
his letter. He asked that - be informed of this outcome.
10. (Internal Use Only - RJK) Delivered to the offices of Senators
Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.), Edward Brooke (R., Mass.), Henry Jackson
(D. , Wash. ), Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), and Representative Gerald
Ford (R. , Mich.) in which their names were mentioned.
11. (Unclassified - RJK) Spoke with the receptionist in the office of
STATOTHR Representative Victor Veysey (R. , Calif.) about a constituent,
STATOTHR who has a claim against the Agency. I told her the Agency was
STATOTHR in the process of settling this claim directly with She said
this seemed fine with her.
25X1A
25X1A
12. (Secret - JGO) Met with Frank Slatinshek, Chief Counsel, House
Armed Services Committee, and reviewed with him the IC staff horse
blanket entitled "Intelligence Programs 1974. " A copy of the three-sheet
document was left with him. I also left with him a copy of an Agency research
paper "Costing the Soviet Defense Effort: Estimating Procurement Costs
of Naval Ships and Boats" (SR RP 73-4, October 1973). I also delivered to
him a letter of 19 October from Jack Maury enclosing the response to questions
posed by Representative Robert Leggett (D. , Calif.) concerning Air America.
These responses are for Committee use and not for relay to the members.
I confirmed with Slatinshek the security handling of the transcript of today's
briefing by the Director and Secretary Clements.
13. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Dr. John Brady, House Foreign
Affairs Committee staff, and returned to him the map entitled "The Drug
Traffic" (Figure 2) which had been forwarded for
review. will not be using the map in the Committee report now in
preparation.
Approved For Release 2002/01/31 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000100090080-8