AVIATION WEEK ARTICLE OF 5 NOVEMBER ENTITLED 'SOVIET POISE THREE-FRONT GLOBAL DRIVE'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000100080003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 6, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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6 November 1
.Aviation Week Article of 5 November
Entitled Soviet Poise Three-Front Global Drive"
1. Cecil Brownlow endeavors to demonstrate that
-the Soviets are moving on three major fronts--the
Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Cuba--to gain stra-
tegic political advantages over the US. Brownlow
states that the Soviets apparently believe that the
US would be hard pressed to respond militarily to
all three threats at the same time and that they
believe that the Nixon Administration is in such a
-weak condition politically that it is incapable of
responding to the threats. Although the article is
based on some facts, it contains a number of errors
and Brownlow offers little evidence to support his
thesis that the Soviets are engaging coordinated
power moves in three disparate areas of the world.
In essence, Brownlow appears to have taken the
Middle East crisis and from there extrapolated a
scenario linking that crisis with other areas of
tension where the Soviets have long been involved.
Middle East
2. In our j-udgment, Soviet conduct prior to the
Middle-East was~taas,'mainly reactive to events and
Moscow had little-or no control over the Arabs de-
cision to go to war. There is no good evidence to
support Brownlow's apparent belief that the Soviets
encouraged Egypt and Syria to begin the war. The
Soviets have sought advantages for themselves from
the war, however, and have shown clearly that they
are not ready to let their interest in detente
totally override their objectives in the Middle East.
TCS 1989/73
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.Furthermore, the Kremlin's .behavior suggests that its
motivation is no longer merely an effort to maintain
its influence-and physical presence in the Middle East.
Rather, the Soviet leadership probably sees the crisis
as a key test of the credibility of its world-wide
image of a superpower equal to that of the US.
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proper as asserted~~y Brownlow. The Soviets, as
Mr. Brownlow notes, have augmented their Soviet
Mediterranean_Squadron since the Middle East
crisis began ~began~ but the number of Soviet naval
units in the edterranean is expected to decline
over the next several days.
Southeast Asia
6. Brownlow's comments on the North Vietnamese
threat to South Vietnam contain both fact and fiction.
The Communists have improved their military position
in Sauth Vietnam since the January ceasefire, parti-
cularly in Military Regions 1 and 3. Hanoi has the
capability to launch a major military campaign with
little additional preparation, but only a moderate
increase in fighting is expected in the coming weeks,
primary North Vietnamese activity directed at securing
the rice harvest.
7. Brownlow's figure for the number of North
Vietnamese that have infiltrated into the South since
the January cease-fire (194,000) is grossly inflated.
CIA estimates that only about 90,000 North Vietnamese
have moved into Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam
since January. Brownlow's estimates on the number of
tanks in the south also appear high. The North
Vietnamese are believed to have infiltrated about
400-tanks and armored personnel carriers since the
-cease-fire into the South, rather than the 750 stated
in the article. The Communists have built or refurb-
ished airfields in Communist-controlled areas of
South Vietnam, but no MIGs are stationed at these
fields, nor is there any hard evidence that the
Communists have utilized any of the strips. One
heavily def-ended strip in northern Quany Tri Province
could, however, be used by North Vietnamese fighters.
8. Brownlow appears to be the fartherest off
base in his assertion that the Soviets are calling
the shots in Hanoi. If an offensive does come, the
TCS 1989/73
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decision to do so will be made in Hanoi, not Moscow.
Most of the Soviet military equipment that has re-
cently been moved into South Vietnam arrived in the
north before the cease-fire. There is substantial
evidence to indicate that the Soviets have restricted
the flow of military supplies to North Vietnam over
t:he past several months. The two countries have not
signed a military aid agreement for 1974 and concluded
an economic agreement only after great difficulty.
9. Brownlow's assertion that a "distinct
possibility" now exists of a Cuban attack on the US
base at Guantanamo and the US Atlantic Fleet appears
premature at best. New artillery positions are being
built near the base, raising the question of Cuban
intentions toward the installation. This and other
Cuban military developments, however, do not provide
any specific indications that Castro is attempting
to capitalize on US preoccupation with the Middle
East conflict. The artillery positions have been
under construction at least since last July, and
contrary to Brownlow's assertion, no artillery has
been emplaced. No military equipment, moreover, has
been detected and no Cuban build-up has been observed
at military installations near the base.
10. The 25 October alert of Cuban military forces
was in response to the general US military alert and
was terminated on the night of 31 October. The Cuban
Navy includes 4 Osa and 18 Komar guided-missile patrol
boats, a force that presents no substantial threat to
the US Atlantic Fleet. We have no evidence that the
Soviets have significantly increased or are planning
to increase the Cuban inventory of these patrol boats.
TCS 1989/73
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