VULNERABILITY OF U.S. RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES: THE DELINEATION OF COMPONENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75B00285R000200070013-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 8, 2010
Sequence Number: 
13
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 1, 1965
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75B00285R000200070013-9.pdf109.26 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP75B00285R000200070013-9 SC-03480-65 Cy No I of 10 MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, OSA Assistant Director, OSI Chief, Special Projects Staff SUBJECT: Vulnerability of U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites: The Delineation of Component Responsibilities 1. With the emergence of a potential Soviet threat to the United States reconnaissance satellite capability, it is vitally important that the responsibilities of the various DDS&T components in the assessment and countering of this threat be coordinated and carried through in a timely and thorough fashion. The purpose of this memo- randum is to define clearly these responsibilities in order to insure that all aspects of this problem are being actively and efficiently addressed by the relevant line organizations. 2. The general satellite vulnerability problem is functionally resolvable into two areas of activity: (a) the assessment of the Soviet capabilities to inter- fere with the U.S. satellite program, and (b) the development of techniques and tactics to reduce the vulnerability of these satellites to such interference. The former area is basically an intelligence analysis problem, while the latter is properly an operational and hardware development concern. As it has been in the past, the intelligence analysis activity is the responsi- bility of the Office of Scientific Intelligence. This responsibility shall include the identification of Soviet anti-satellite related activities, as well as the estima- tion of the characteristics of any emergent Soviet anti- satellite weapons system. In order to expedite the flow of information to the operational components of the NRO concerned, AD/SI will institute a series of quarterly status reports summarizing the current understanding of the possible Soviet anti- satellite program. These reports should be issued at an all-source classified level and be aimed at the particular requirements of those concerned ky kv HANDLE VIA COMINT k L.r U "_ . ik L CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP75B00285R000200070013-9 - -r -wry Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-R DP75B00285R000200070013-9 4 *awe 1"W SUBJECT: Vulnerability of U.S. Reconnaissance Satellites: The Delineation of Component Responsibilities with the development of satellite systems and the conduct of satellite operations. These reports will be given appropriate distribution by the Deputy Director for Science and Technology. 3. The DDS&T does not have exclusive responsibility for satellite vulnerability reduction within the NRO, however. Within this Directorate, the Special Projects Staff should have the responsibility for supporting all NRO programs in the area of developing tactics and techniques for reducing the vulnerability of satellite systems. This responsibility includes a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of any measures and tactics now in operational use or being considered for operational use, as well as any detailed damage level estimates requiring particular configuration knowledge of current or planned operational systems. It is imperative that in these matters the Special or Jects Staff, in coordination with the AD/OSA as Director of Program B, be the single point of contact with the NRO and other Government agencies having operational satellit missions within the National Reconnaissance Program. For these reasons it is essential for OSI, SPS and OSA to develop and maintain a close working relationship. ALBERT D. WHEELON Deputy Director for Science and Technology Distribution: Cy 1 & 2 - AD/OSA 3 & 4 - AD/OSI 5 & 6 - C/SPS 7 - Subj. 8 - Chrono 9 & 10 - Reg DD/S&T/ADWheelon/amc/12 Jan 65 tnl - D/-Gt-1.4 HANOL.g V1,4 COMIMr T u 11 SECRET CONTROL, SYSTEM ONLY Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/08: CIA-RDP75B00285R000200070013-9