LETTER TO DICK FROM DAVID [ ]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00159R000200150002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1971
• Content Type: LETTER

25X1 In addition tolassigned photo reconnaissance missions,
the Air Force fleet has- been providing test aircraft for
accomplishm 'rst of 25X1
these, the system
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
Continuing the line of discussion opened with you on
Wednesday, 26 May 71, I am most anxious, as I know you are,
to achieve better utilization of our U-2R aircraft. In
particular, I feel the altitude advantage and comparatively
low risk associated with U-2 employment in a peripheral
reconnaissance role make it an attractive alternate to
some of the existing airborne intelligence collection
platforms, For example, there is pressing need for
I The difficulty is
that the present - s arrangement hampers achieve-
ment of optimum utilization and flexibility in use of the
total resource. 25X1
is now ready for us and will provide a much d adds- 25x1
tion to the capability.
I have directed deployment of a three aircraft
task force to SEA. Employment of the U-2R
for is purpose in the Gulf of Tonkin will enable the
JCS to release some multi-engine ACRP aircraft from assign-
ment to that area to cover other important intelligence
targets. Furthermore, use of the U-2 will reduce the
requirement for the protective fighter cover needed by
other manned reconnaissance platforms.
T current target date for operational readiness
of the force is 15 August 1971. Position-
ing of three U-2 aircraft.in SEA on a continuing
OSD REVIEW COMPLETE
USAF review(s) completed.
MOR
CDF
Approved For Release 2006/08/21: CIA-RDP75BOO159R000200150002-2
11nfil i j 1 } 25x1
Copy 1
 Approved For Release 2006/08/21: CIA-RDP75BOO159R000200150002-2
basis, together with extend use of a fourth aircraft
as an experimental test bedi 25x1
makes it virtually impossible for e r orce
meet combined commitments, for Cuba overflight missions
proficiency training of an increased number of aircrews
and rotation of aircraft through normal maintenance with
only two aircraft remaining to them.
The attached paper, with which your staff may already
be familiar, examines in some detail a number of alternate
approaches to resolving the problem. The alternatives
range from minor to major changes in roles and missions,
redistribution of aircraft between the two operating
fleets, and a number of ways to consolidate all of the 25x1
aircraft within a single unit.
It would appear to me that the minimum acAnn we 25x1
can take would be the shifting of one aircraft
to the Air Force. This would be a minima an ,
at best, a temporary solution, in that loss of an aircraft
by either operating unit would require a review of the
whole question. The most satisfactory long range solution
appears to. be consolidation.
In view of the growing urgency of this matter, I
would appreciate an early expression of your views.
~~~~ ylilll1
25x1