AIR RECONNAISSANCE OF SOUTH CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00159R000200070015-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 29, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
29 September. 1969
25X1
MEMORANDUM
Air Reconnaissance of South China
1. We have been asked to comment or a draft
memorandum to the President on the views of the 3G3 Comrr_:ttee
regarding reconnai: sance needs against South China and the use
of 147 H/T drone. We have alsc received a request to review
two route tracks over South China which are proposed for the
TAGBOARD drone. In addition there is a proposal being prepared
to resume U-2 co-,:.rage, If 303 Committee considerations of
coverage of South C Tina proceed along these lines, we will be
dealing piecemeal v ith a problem which deserves broad consideration.
This memorandum .)utlines the various needs for reconnaissance
against targets in South China and the assets available to satisfy
them. Paragraph 10 recommends a course of action for consideration
by the 303 Committee.
The Intelligence Pr,-,blem
2. Souti China is the most difficult area of the
Communist world to cover adequately
25X1 is due partly to wea:her--cloud cover averages about 70 percent
over the ear
Copy
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They e are three major South China intelligence
on which existing coverage is deficient:
a. Strategic missile. search Photography of
the strips along selected rail lines in South China is needed
to perform the continuing intelligence search for initial
Chinese deployment of medium range ballistic missiles.
There are 2, 600 miles of the rail net in South China which
are judged particularly suitable for such deployment- F
b. The..border region Continuing surveillance
of tactical intelligence targets along China's border with
Vietnam, Laos, and Burma is needed to detect changes in
army, air, and logistic facilities and to monitor road
building. Tie draft Presidential 'memory 7.~?um deals primarily
with this int:.:lligence problem and requests a decision on four
147 H/T fligats for October. 25X1
South China is needed to determine current posture an ,
over time, force levels and capabilities. Photography is
also badly n :eded on facilities suspected r-.f association with
the nuclear weapons program,
Photographic Collection Assets
aircraft and the 147 H/T and TAGBOARD drones. These -systems,
4 There are four reconnaissance platforms available
I the U-ZR and SR-71 manned
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in varying degrees, can take advantage of weather breaks
in)the South China area, and they all provide photography of
relatively high resolution.
5. Ding a single mission the U-2R can cover an
area 63 by 2, 100 miles, or about 1.32, 000 square nautical miles.
Both the SR-71. and the TAGBOARD can photograph a strip
approximately 30 by 3, 000 nautical miles--about two-thirds the
area plotographed by the U-2R. \ The 147 H can photograph an
area about 20 by 1, 00 miles. Four 147 H/T missions would be
needed to cover the area photographed during a ::.ngle flight of
either an SR-71 or TAGBOARD, and five 147 H/T flights would
be needed to equal t`ie coverage provided by one U-2R.
8. It is questionable whether the Communist Chinese
would make a major distinction between the provocativeness of the
147 drones and the U-2R--both have been used over China before.
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In each case the resumption of airborne reconnaissance would
probably outweigh consideration of the particular systems.
Because the other vehicles have not been usFd before over China,
the Chinese may consider them more provocative. Furthermore,
the use of more than one type of vehicle over a short period of
time may appear more provocative to the Communist Chinese
than extensive use of a single type.
25X1 9. The U-2R is the least provocative in terms of
number of penetrations required to provide a giver: amount of
coverage. It is able to obtain on two missions the approximate
area obtained on three TAGBOARL' or SR-71 missions or on ten
147 H missions. In tei_ :s. of seriousness of loss, a 147 d
would be the least serious and an SR-71 the most serious.
10. It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that
the problem of airborne photo r'oconnaissance of Sr uth China should
system to employ against South China at this time.
sidered as a whole, not piecemeal.
it appears that the U-2R is the most suitable
25X1