JUSTIFICATION FOR RETENTION OF THE IDEALIST U-2 PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00159R000200020003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 6, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
SUBJECT: Justification for Retention of the
IDEALIST U-2 Program
1. This memorandum is for information only. It contains
preliminary information and background data regarding the
IDEALIST U-2 Program which is on the agenda for discussion at
the forthcoming ExCom meeting. A more detailed background
information book containing IDEALIST supporting documents and
statistics is being prepared, and will be available for your review
on Friday, 8 November 1968.
2. Recently several formal documents and informal con-
versations have indicated that the IDEALIST Program will be
discussed at the November ExCorn meeting. These discussions,
sparked by either the BOB, the DOD, or both, will most likely
examine the need for continuation of this program. For example:
The BOB at both the 1967 and 1968 Budget Hearings, announced
that they would make a point of discussing the IDEALIST Program
in depth at the November 1968 ExCom meeting. The BOB further
states that these in-depth discussions would be directed at determin-
ing whether the program merits continuation. It, therefore, well
behooves the Agency to be prepared to not only discuss its IDEALIST
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Program, but to have arguments that a valid requirement still
exists for continuation of this program.
3. It can be assumed that, in these forthcoming discussions,
the arguments advocating discontinuation of the IDEALIST Program
will be much the same as those used in the past. Indeed, some
of these points were used successfully and effectively by BOB/DOD
during the debates leading up to the demise of the OXCART Program.
The following are salient examples from these now familiar arguments:
a. The cost of the program exceeds the value
of the returns derived from it.
b. The USAF could perform these reconnais-
sance tasks as well and at less expense to the
Government.
c. There is no longer a need to differentiate
between civilian and military pilots for reconnaissance
missions.
d. Two units'(CIA-SAC) means duplication of
costs and expenses.
e. The IDEALIST Program has, on an average,
completed far less operational flying time and missions
than the. USAF, therefore, the USAF is doing more
productive work and should be given all the U-2 resources.
3. Undoubtedly, there are numerous other views in the
same vein that could be brought to bear on this subject. It is
not the intent of this paper to match argument for argument, or
.to rehash the reasons for and against the military assumption of
the IDEALIST Program. If, however, through lack of diligence
and effort on our part these roles and assets were to be lost by 25X1
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the Agency, the impact on the Intelligence Community would be
regrettable. Therefore, this paper will attempt to record only
the advantages and adaptability of the IDEALIST Program to the
U. S. Intelligence Community, and will tend to show the program's
ability to stand above the BOB/DOD contentions for its termination.
There must be sound assurances that a continuation of this program,
will serve the best interests of the USA.
4. It is difficult to escape the fact that the U. S. Government
for and the use of covert manned reconnaissance during periods
preceding crisis or hostilities. It is agreed that in certain situations,
the- period 1960-1962. Fifty-five missions were flown in the Laos,
Vietnam and Cambodia area during the period 1961-1965. The latter
two cases (Cuba and Southeast Asia) clearly reflect the requirement
of 500 missions to date. Twenty-six of these were flown over the
Soviet Union between 1956-1960. Fifty were flown over Cuba during
relative impunity. Specifically, Agency U-Z's have flown in excess
to be capable of. overflying denied territory in peacetime with
eluding the SAC U-2's). The CIA U-2's, simply stated, are required
have in the past, and indeed, will in the future, be entirely separate
and different from any other U. S. reconnaissance aircraft, (in-
.military resources. The missions and roles of the CIA U-Z's
connaissance of denied territory which should be attributed to non-
in the years to come will have a continuing requirement for re-
such as Cuba and Southeast Asia, it is logical that the mission can
and should transition to the military whenever other overt military
actions dictate.
subsequent to 1960 wherein national
objectives and policy did not subsequently require overt military
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involvement. There is little reason to believe that similar re-
quirements will not be repeated in the future.
approvals, considerable efforts are expended by the CIA to adjudge
the overall risk and to estimate the success factor for each
IDEALIST U-2 overflight mission to meet the requirement for
obtaining the maximum of intelligence information with the minimum
amount of political risk and exposure.
Therefore, prior to soliciting these
6. These requirements explain in part the additional cost
and reduced number of IDEALIST operational missions/flying
hours. It is the conviction of those experienced in U-2 operations
that CIA development efforts over the past few years have in fact
made the IDEALIST U-2 a reasonably acceptable low risk, highly re-
sponsive and flexible reconnaissance vehicle. It further bears
noting that CIA enjoys a recognized unique capability for constantly
and promptly developing and adapting equipment, tactics, and opera-
tional procedures that insure the lowest level of vulnerability for
overflight aircraft. IDEALIST has served in the development of many
unique techniques for application of the U-2 reconnaissance system
on a world-wide basis.
IDEALIST
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.8. In summary, and in view of the expected comparisons
to be made of the CIA and SAC programs, it warrants reiterating
that each program is designed to serve a specific purpose and it
is more realistic to consider their relationship as complementary,
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DD/SA/SParangosky:fd (6 Nov 68)
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