VEHICLES FOR OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00159R000100180019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: January 1, 1969
• Content Type: PAPER

TOP SECRET
Approved F.elease 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDF15B00
WORKING PAPER
000100180019-2'
_VEHICLES FOR OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE
INTRODUCTION:
The importance of overhead reconnaissance has continually
increased in importance from June 1956, when the results of the
first U-2 flight were available. The insatiable appetite for current
intelligence as a basis for decision making has led this nation to commit
for strategic overhead reconnaissance
during recent years. In spite of these high costs, the value of the
intelligence has made it prudent to underwrite these programs even
though the more classic methods of intelligence procurement did not
receive similar stimulation. This has resulted in a heavy dependence
on photographic and electronic surveillance from above and while we
may not have all of our eggs in one basket, it is evident that we are not
well balanced. Until the first U-2 operational loss was incurred in
May of 1960, this vehicle carried the heavy burden of overhead
reconnaissance. However, foresight enabled us to have an alternate
system ready and by August of 1960 the first successful photographic
satellite, Corona, was flown. In spite of the fact that the OXCART
vehicle was introduced in December 1965, and the satellites have
NRO review(s) completed.
USAF review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2006/M5 Ele111),1?,75B00159R000100180019-2
Approved F
TOP SECRET
lease 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75B001.000100180019-2
Page 2
carried most of the overhead surveillance load for the procurement
of strategic intelligence, Agency U-2 program has had some notable
successes, such as missile discovery in Cuba. A succession of
orbiting vehicles (Annex I) has provided an ever increasing capability
at a directly proportionate rise in costs. Aerodynamic vehicles,
manned and unmanned, have also been introduced with varying degrees
and
os success,/have contributed considerably to strategic intelligence.
However, recently they have been limited almost exclusively to tactical
and operational intelligence.
Satellites undoubtedly offer the best facility for satisfying
strategic intelligence needs in today's environment. This being the case,
our primary concern focuses on enemy capabilities to neutralize them
although some attention must be directed toward using them only where
they are cost effective. It is under these conditions that it is desirable
to assess the value of the aerodynamic vehicle, both in the present
environment and as a fall-back position in the future.
In making this assessment, costs, vulnerabilities, and growth
potential will be reviewed as they apply under varying circumstances,
and to the different vehicles. Political acceptability and their use in
maintaining forward bases through friendly alliances will also be
Approved For Release 2006/0Mg,:aetI9P,75B00159R000100180019-2
Approved F
TOP SECRET
lease 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP756001
000100180019-2
Page 3
covered. The virtue of maintaining an existing aerodynamic capability
without continued enhancement of that capability through research will
also be explored. The virtue of separate SAC and Agency U-2 fleets
will be reviewed.
SUMMARY:
The Agency U-2 program is essential in crisis management
situations and as a base for the development of systems that have the
only current hope for survival in a hostile environment.
The U-2 can respond to crisis situations anywhere in the world
within 50 hours. It can operate from friendly foreign bases, which
provide plausible denial, or from carrier decks to cover highly critical
military targets or politically critical revolutions, migrations or
suppressive activities of governments. It operates cheaply, on a timely
basis, and can take advantage of weather breaks. Defensive systems
negate its capability for military intelligence over high priority targets
over the Soviet Union but it is still highly useful over China and all
other nations, particularly in the procuring of high value, unique, ELINT
information.
The Agency U-2R program also serves as a base for a small
R&D effort which to date has defined two flight regimes in which maneuvering
Approved For Release 2006/03M5P 6IWIROB7151300159R000100180019-2
TOP SECRET
Approved Apelease 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75B0014.000100180019-2
Page 4
aerodynamic vehicles can probably survive a totally hostile environment.
Considering the very high vulnerability of satellites it can be expected
that decisive military action could be preceded by neutralization of
opposition satellites. In such a case, aerodynamic vehicles are the
only recourse, recognizing that continuous research is necessary to
meet this threat.
In continuing the Agency U-2 program, we retain the low cost
crisis management aid available anywhere in the world, an understanding
of the Chinese electronic capabilities, an informal political base with
foreign governments which can be expanded as needed, and a research
and development insurance policy to provide some capability if all else
is lost.
CONCLUSIONS:
It is obvious that satellites can contribute more to strategic
intelligence than aircraft can at the present time, particularly if cost
is not a factor. To date, systems have been considered individually
rather than by over all planning of collection by the most cost effective
system. Difficult political decisions have been solved by placing more
money on those systems having no chance of embarrassing political
consequences. Very small hedge bets have been placed on those systems
which hold the only chance of procuring intelligence in a truly critical
Approved For Release 2006/03/1p6191-f12F;z7B00159R000100180019-2
Approved F
TOP SECRET
lease 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP15B001.000100180019-2
Page 5
strategic situation. It is difficult to justify budgets for systems to be
used in the event of catastrophe, when catastrophe seems so remote.
The decision to be made is whether or not
is a fair premium for insurance that accrues all of the advantages
discussed above, either during the life of the policy or when it is finally,
if ever, redeemed. This country can operate without the U-2R; it can
operate in SAC; and it can operate as a stagnant program with no future.
However, foresight for the life of the nation dictates that an ongoing
U-2R program with adequate research and development be approved and
the virtues of Agency management make it prudent to continue operations
in that sector.
DISCUSSIONS:
The primary aerodynamic vehicles presently available are U-2R,
OXCART and SR-71 aircraft and the 147 H/T and TAGBOARD Drones.
At present the Agency has the capability to deploy the U-2R's throughout
the world from Edwards Air Force Base.
25X1
25X1
1The OXCART
vehicles, which have considerably more capability than the U-2, (Annex II)
are in storage after having only a brief but highly successful operational
Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75B00159R000100180019-2
TOP SECRET
?
Approved F
TOP SECRET
lease 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75B0010000100180019-2'
Page 6
exposure. The SR-71 is operating successfully over North Korea and
North Vietnam and the 147 H/T is operating successfully in Vietnam
and most recently South China. The single operational TAGBOARD
mission was not completed.
In general, the U-2R's of both SAC and the Agency can survive
in the same environment. Both are vulnerable to SA-2's and to some
extent to MIG-21's and Mirages. Operations therefore require careful
circumnavigation of SA-2 Sites, and the utilization of flight plans to
negate the capability of the intercept aircraft. Even if unexpected SA-2's
are encountered the pilot does receive warning and can take evasive
action. Tail warning devices also permit timely defensive maneuvers
for aircraft intercepts. Both obtain high resolution photography (Annex III)
NRO 25X1
and Agency aircraft procure
The OXCART, t he SR-71 (Annex IV) and to some extent the
TAGBOARD, have capabilities which permit them to survive in the
same environment. All are marginally vulnerable to the SA-2's and
certainly to follow-on systems such as SA-5 Tallin and the Galosh ABM.
(Annex V) All are invulnerable to all other known aircraft. Both the
OXCART and SR-71 have warning devices which dictate defensive
maneuvers in hostile situations.
Both manned vehicles
obtain high
TAGBOARD specifications
25X1
resolution photography'
Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75B00159R000100180019-2
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Approved Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP756001
000100180019-2
Page 7
indicate that resolutions of two feet can be expected. The 147 H/T
has been used most extensively in Vietnam. Used primarily for tactical
intelligence it has a resolution of from two to five feet from an altitude
of 68,000 feet.
Although all aerodynamic vehicles are somewhat vulnerable to
enemy military capabilities, they are particularly vulnerable to
political decisions. The fact that they can be shot down creates a
situation very close to a warlike act and this sometimes is unacceptable
to this country, particularly in an era of trying to better international
1 relationship and enhance our image.
25X1
Total costs of the various systems are elusive and hard to
identify. Military overhead and support is difficult to break out and
the _diversified activities of the people and bases associated with Agency
programs make allocation of costs difficult. (Annex VI) In spite of this,
it is easy to recognize the great disparity in costs between the U-2R
and any of the new satellites. Although almost any figure will be arguable,
Approved For Release 2006/31 .8-RRp1.7513001?59R000100180019-2
TOY 5Z_CRE
Approved Foielease 20015/0 0 LATA-RDP75B001.000100180019-2
Page 8
25X1
This
does not consider the great variation in the amount of photography
obtained by each system, but even on a per square mile cost basis
U-2R photography is only a small fraction of the cost of satellite photography.
The vulnerability of satellites is also pertinent to the need for
an ongoing reconnaissance program utilizing aerodynamic vehicles.
Although virtually invulnerable a few years ago, it is now generally
conceded that either the United States or the Soviet Union can neutralize
any or all vehicles of the opposition when they so desire. (Annex VII)
To date, there seems to be a standoff which is dictated by an expectation
that any such action would bring a reprisal in kind. It can therefore
be reasonably expected that any enemy preparation for decisive military
action would be preceded by a neutralization of opposition satellites.
In other words, they will poke our eyes out before they kick us. In such
a case, aerodynamic vehicles are our only recourse, recognizing that
without continuous research, even this capability cannot be ready and
cannot operate for long.
The real hope of establishing a fall-back position for coverage
of the Soviet, as well as the non-Soviet environment lies in research
and development related to survivable aerodynamic vehicles. Work
Approved For Release 2006/0n5f; Wi37i51300159R000100180019-2
TOP SECRET
Approved Foe lease 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP/513001.000100180019-2'
Page 9
done so far has identified only two flight regimes which offer a
considerable chance of survival of the vehicle. Investigations in both
the High Explosive and Nuclear environment have been studied and
indicate varying Potentials./
Specifically then, what advantages would accrue from maintaining
a U-2R reconnaissance capability? The need of most immediate
importance in considering the maintenance of the U-2R capability relates
to its ability to respond quickly to cover crisis situations. Deployment
to any part of the world, ready for operations can regularly be achieved
in 50 hours. It is then in position to maintain surveillance on any
schedule desired within the limits of daylight and cloudiness. The primary
advantage it has over satellites in this regard is that it can take advantage
of short breaks in the weather not available to the regularly orbiting
vehicles.
Although this advantage is not as decisive in highly defended areas,
there are still many world situations on all continents which require
overhead reconnaissance and are in areas that are not highly defended.
Typical of these are the Mid-East, border areas of Europe, Africa,
Approved For Release 2006/113Lt5 :_CIA-RRI75B00159R000100180019-2
1:
25X1
?
Approved F
TOP SECRET
lease 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDF15B001.000100180019-2
Page 10
South and Central America. With the operation of U-2R's from carriers,
most areas can be reached without any foreign base agreements.
It is not argued that satellites cannot provide the same coverage
if
-
if enough of them are in orbit at all times./
? Secondly and probably most critical is the backup capability if
orbiting vehicles are neutralized. Presently available drones can handle
part of the job but have no maneuver capability responsive to unanticipated
threats encountered during the mission. Vulnerable as they are, the
world situation would necessarily be so citical, and the needs for
intelligence so great, that the risks would be acceptable. A few SR-71's
are available to enhance the U-2 capability but the nine OXCART vehicles
in storage would take a minimum of 12 to 18 months to put in an operational
status.
Problems which arise in the consideration of U-2R utilization by
CIA also relate to cover. Solution of these problems has been one of the
Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75B00159R000100180019-2
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
Approved Foe lease 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75B001.000100180019-2
Page 11
25X1
In considering whether the U-2R capability should exist in both
the Agency and SAC, or should be consolidated in one or the other, the
arguments draw heavily from past experience and auger heavily that the
Agency should retain a U-2R capability.
Historically, the U-2 capability was developed by the Agency and
throughout the years all of the collection and defensive improvements
have been developed there. Systems developed relatively cheaply under
this program have been used by the military services to great advantage
both from the point of view of cost and improved capability. 'It has also
been generally recognized that the Agency system of procurement, which
is possible because of its small size, can respond more rapidly, securely
and effectively than most other systems. In addition, engineers do not
Approved For Release 2006/0305p gA-eRt7f1300159R000100180019-2
Approved F
lease 20E@3
1
5E
W-RDP75B0010000100180019-2
Page 12
migrate to any extent but live within narrowly defined problem areas
most of their careers. The virtue of the system can be argued but
the success it has achieved is irrefutable.
Operations have been just as successful with both the U-2 and
the OXCART. In spite of the fact that the Air Force is now operating
U-2's and finally SR-71's successfully, there is no question that the
Agency has always conducted highly professional and efficient operations.
With the consistent pressure to transfer operational responsibility to
the Air Force after development in the Agency - whether it be aircraft
or satellite - it cannot be expected that the Agency can maintain the
highly capable teams necessary to continually come up with new systems.
Although the decision must essentially be based on "need" it is recognized
that retention of a U-2R capability in the Agency brings with it a continuing
capability for progress at a very reasonable cost.
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/0341tIpGAIKtfg4B00159R000100180019-2
TOP SECRET
Approved Foll,lease 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75B001
000100180019-2'
Page 13
Response time by the Agency organization would be hard to
improve upon. Within 50 hours of an alert, aircraft and complete
support can be in position and ready for deployment. Complete
agreement for film processing
by the Air
Force have been worked out and are effective. Although the military
could be expected to effect a similar deployment pattern, the fact that
Agency personnel have long tenure in their jobs tends to smooth and
retain good relationships as well as retain the initiatives.
A final point in retaining an Agency U-2R capability pertains to
the closeness of intelligence analysis and operational personnel. Complete
dependence does not have to be placed on reports as all source information
is available the moment it arrives in Washington. In addition, highly
skilled analysts with expertise in every part of the world are available
for complete discussion of problems.
Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75600t59R000100180019-2
TOP SECRET
Approved F
TOP SECRET
lease 2006/03/15 : qIA-RDP75B001
000100180019-2'
ANNEX II
- Capability of U-2 and OXCART
25X1
ANNEX IV - Capabilities of OXCART, SR-71's, TAGBOARD, 147H, 147T
ANNEX IX - List of World Situations Which Could Have used U-2
Reconnaissance
Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75B001.59R000100180019-2
TOP SECRET
25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75600159R000100180019-2
Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75600159R000100180019-2
Approved For Release 006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75600159R000100180019-2
BEST COPY
AVAILABLE
Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75600159R000100180019-2
25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75600159R000100180019-2
Next 16 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75600159R000100180019-2
Approved Fo lease 066i0?/W:liNaRDP7513001.00100180019-2
ANNEX IX
WORLD SITUATIONS
In past few years several periods of international tension
have occurred in widely separated areas of the world in which the
U-2 could have been deployed to provide reliable timely information
on these events. Such crises as the June 1967 Israeli-Arab conflict,
the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Chinese-Soviet
Manchurian Border incident to name a few. In all of the above
instances by proper flight planning so as to avoid known SAM Sites
(even those with the advanced SA-2 SAM System) the U-2 could have
provided meaningful photographic inputs for the analysis of the
activity.
Approved For Release 2006/03/15 : CIA-RDP75600159R000100180019-2
TOP SECRET