U-2R LOX SYSTEM MEETING, 28 JANUARY 1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00159R000100170033-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: February 5, 1969
• Content Type: MFR

5 February 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD E0/SiA__WY?y0
SUBJECT: U-2R Lox System Meeting, 28 January 1969 DD/Sul__
Approved For Release 2006/10/17 'c ~AR~Tp P75B00159RO0010'0170033?
SEC
IDEALIST 9
IDEA-0125-69
Copy of
REFERENCE: Message 9706 dated 22 January 1969D/SA__
following participants present:
Headquarters
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
~ 25X1
1. Subject meeting was held at LAC, Burbank, with the
2. The agenda for the meeting as presented by LAC is
included as Attachment #1. The.following discussion covers
each of-the agenda items.
25X1 a.. History: resented only the
the LAC mo ifed-system. The emphasis was on the
several cases of zero presas flight on Aircraft
055 a nd 053 that----occurred-gin ear1y-January . pe~
cifically, it was explained--how 055 was instrumented
with pressure gages upstream of-the_checkvalves (i.e.,
measuring converter head pressure), while-the-cockpit
console gages are downstream (i.e., measuring supply
pressure). This aircraft was then flown again, and
again experienced zero supply pressure. However,,,
the converter pressure remained normal indicating'
that the check valve must have been stuck closed.
The converter unit, including the checkvalve, was
replaced, the aircraft flew again, and again
experienced the same problem. This led LAC to attempt
a modification of the existing hardware that would
eliminate the check valve.
IDEALIST
SECRET 9 F lar
A?fMnlrari Fnr RAIAasP 2fflF11O117 ? C;IA-R?P7 B001 R000100170033-7
Detachment G .
ARO Corporation
 Approved For Release 2006/10/17: CIA-RD?P75B00159R000100170033-7
SECRET
IDEALIST
IDEA-0125-69
Page 2 25X1
25X1
b. Design Philosophy: I presented the U-2R
lox-system schematics, included as part of Attachment #2,
and discussed the operation of the modified system.
The main advantage of the system is that reliability
is increased by the elimination of two mechanical
valves (a pressure opening valve and the check valve).
The possible disa.dvantage of the system is that it
will probably operate at or near relief valve
pressure (i.e., 100 to 120 psi) and the relief valve
thus will act as a ssure control valve. Under
questioning, stated that LAC saw no problems
or disadvantages with operating the system in this
way, and presented data. showing no abnormal consumption
--(see--02 useage rate chart in Attach. 2 and Attach. 3
data).
c. Flight Test Results: Attachment #4, presents
pressure versus consumption data. for all test flights
utilizing LAC's RQ 1020 modified converter, with
comparative data. for unmodified PM 24500-1 converters.
No exceptional information is found in these curves
except tha.t.consumption seems normal for the durations
and specific systems used by comparison to the
.unmodified converters. This same , data, was used to
construct the summary chart included in Attachment 2.
d. Answers to[ ___]9706: Generally, the questions.
regarding flight test data were answered satisfactorily.
stated, however, that bench tests and
failure analysis tests asked for, were not completed
at that time. As soon as tests are run, LAC will
forward data. to Headquarters for review. Finally,
questions regarding why the unmodified system gave us
so man problems were left.unanswered by LAC.
Isuggested that perhaps answers could
never be obtained and wondered how far Headquarters
wanted these questions pursued. The undersigned stated
that the quest.ions___were only pertinent as the modified
-----system might be affected-..by the-same unknown factors
that caused- diff_ieulties with the original conver ers:-
Many theories were- pr-opose-d-and__ discussed but
generally no-firm-a-nswers-we-re-prov-ide
e. General Discussions: Furt1 er_discussions
generally covered further aspects of--t-he_items
reviousl discussed. However, ARO Corp. representative
25X1 presented some additional information and
points of view for the group's consideration. First
IDEALIST
SECRET
Annrn /P(i Fnr RAIAAs 20nlln/17 ? (IA-RfP75R6n159Rnnn1nn17nn33-7
 Approved For Release 2006/10/176 ~-ff P75B00159R0 0100170033-7
IDEALIST
IDEA-0125-69
Page. 3
e
resulting in the system res.sure eventua ly reaching
25X1 and sta.ying_a_t._zero . Howe~ver_., taped-tea t---=
the V.
e
proposed to LAC as a possible solution in Dec. 1968.
25X1 sta.ted also that the LAC modified system.
presented nothing new or unknown, but' represented
a system which has been in existence for at least
5 years and used in such aircraft as the F-4.
ARO Corp. had in fact sold 900 such systems and,
had they been consulted by LAC, could have provided
the necessary components for the modification as
25X1 off-the-shelf hardware in lieu of LAC's machining
of new parts. briefly di sed the system
25X1 his company had propose to of LAC on
16 December 1968. This system (schematic presented
as.Atta.chment #5) could also have been made from the
original components with less effort and ex e e
25X1 than the LAC RQ 1020 modification. stated
that he objected to having a. control valve between
the converter-and-the pilot,.since he was concerned
that the-pressure~o-prc-ourld-fail--cl-os
d
25X1 ointed out that the LAC modified system
would be satisfactory for U-2R use, as would the
original system or a. third system which ARO had
p
ssure control valve is igne to fail open
only; therefore, 'the pilot wou-14:never have a zero
pressure condition without a zero quan-t.ity condition.
f. L.A.C. Recommendations: LAC recommended that
their RQ 1020 converter be used throughout the U-2R
25X1 fleet in order to improve reliability and decrease
oxygen problem incidence. I Istated that
turnaround of converters could begin immediately
since LAC had produced enough hardware to outfit
25X1 the fleet. Tech data would be available shortly
after go-ahead was given. stated that
we would accept the system prove ing tech data is
available prior to retrofit. The undersigned was
to advise LAC, after obtaining USAF expert assistance,
as to whether the. LOX systems should be left in vent
or build-up condition between flights.
3. Summary and Actions: As a result of this meeting,
the following actions were and/or are to be taken:
a.. Preliminary version of tech data to be furnished
by LAC for review prior to retrofit of U-2R fleet .
IDEALIST
SECRET
Aooroved-For Release 2006/10/17 - CIA-RnP75R00159R000100170033-7
 Approved For Rel se 2006/10/1 DP75B00159R 0100170033-7
IDEALIST 4
IDEA-0125-69
Page 4
b. Bench test and failure analysis data to be
furnished by LAC for review ASAP.
c. Undersigned to provide LAC with a final answer
on USAF's policy regarding*LOX system being left in
vent or build-up between flights.
d. U-2R fleet to be retrofitted with RQ 1020
converters.
4. Conclusions: As a result of problems encountered,
meetings held and a.ctions taken over the past 5 months and
personal observations made at Detachment G, LAC-Burbank, and
ARO Corp., Buffalo, the undersigned has reached the following
general conclusions regarding the U-2R LOX system:
a.. LAC was justified in selecting the original
system for use in the U-2R since it had performed
exceptionally well in an almost identical installa-
tion in the A-12 and in a similar installation in
the SR-71. However, in looking back to those
installations it was found that the LOX system used
was not "tailor-made" for these vehicles but was
taken off-the-shelf, dua.lized for an increased
safety factor, and used simply because it. existed
as a qualified system. The, only change from
off-the-shelf hardware involved using stainless
tubeing rather than aluminum due to the concern over
high temperatures in the Mach 3. vehicles. Thus, it
may be simply luck that few or no LOX problems were
encountered in the A-12 or SR-71. 1
25X1.
b. Advanced Development Projects of,LAC-Burbank
does not possess a.ny significant expertise in oxygen
systems or any other life support systems,for that
matter. (except the ejection system per se).
F who has been used as a. life support engineer
of life support requirements. who 25X1
was called a. LOX expert by is a
.hydraulics oriented engineer with little or no basic
understanding of life support.requirements or systems.
These conclusions are only presented because they
help explain why LAC was unable to solve the'U-2R
LOX problems sooner,--and why other life support type
problems seem. common . e-.. -the.:-a.ix-_conditioning
system.'
IDEAL IS
SECRET
Annrnvarl Fnr Ralaaca 7flf RR in117 ? flIA-RfP7SR(1f1lF Rfffl10017002:i-7
on several ADP projects, lacks basic understanding 25X1
 Approved For Re ,We 2006/10/17 SCCIIA RTP75B001590100170033-7
IDEALIST
IDEA-0125-69
Paige 5
c. U-2R LOX problems prior to October 1968 were
almost completely due to moisture contamination,
since servicing and purging procedures, as specified
by LAC tech data, were totally inadequate in pre-
venting and eliminating moisture accumulation.
Some ea.rly?LOX problems were also related to a lack
of specified servicing periods prior to flight,
leading to LOX saturation. Again, this was due to
a. la.ck of LOX expertise at LAC.
d. ARO Corp. on several occasions attempted to help
solve the U-2R LOX problems prior to October 1968,
but were generally ignored. When they finally were
officially brought into the problem solving group,,
they were too often not forceful enough in making
their opinions, expert information, and proposed
fixes known. ARO, completely on their own, set up
and conducted extensive testing, on the original LOX
configuration, searching for causes of the problems.
LAC concentrated on only one proposed fix at a time,
whether it was a procedural or a hardware change.
e. LAC did'very little testing or investigation to
find causes for the problems, but concentrated on
"cutting-and-trying" type fixes. This approach led
to LAC modifying the checkvaives in the original
system. This resulted in, for some unknown reason,
an increased incidence of LOX problems which were
also more serious problems. This increased incidence
was then used by LAC as more evidence indicating that
the checkvalve should be removed from the system.
.f. The above conclusions are only presented to be
ma.de a. matter of record for the benefit of subse-
quent individuals dealing with life support systems
provided by LAC. The U-2R LOX system, as modified,
will hopefully perform as advertised.
CAPT. USAF BSC
AMS/OSA
IDEALIST
SECRET
Annrnvarl Fnr RpIpasP ?nnB/ln/17 - t1IA-RrlP75R6f15ARnnn1nn17nn3:i-7