REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00157R000100040004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 23, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

SECRET
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED
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National Security Study Memorandum 9
DD/ST#:,, G - 9
JAN 2 3 1969
TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
,The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Review of the International Situation
The President has directed the preparation of an "inventory"
of the international situation as of January 20, 1969. He wishes
the review to provide a current assessment of the political, economic
and security situation and the major problems relevant to U. S. security
interests and U. S. bilateral and multilateral relations. In order to
put this review into effect he wishes to consider responses to the attached
set of questions along with other material considered relevant. The
review should include a discussion, where appropriate, of the data
upon which judgments are based, uncertainties regarding the data, and
alternative possible interpretations of the data.
The responses should be forwarded to the President by
February 20, 1969.
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SECRET
THE U. S. S. R.
1. General
1. How do the Soviets see their position in the world vis-a-vis
the United States?
2. Is there a general trend toward greater' assertiveness in
Soviet foreign policy or toward moxe concentration on internal affairs?
3. What bearing does the military balance have on US /Soviet
relations? What factors tend to promote Soviet efforts at cooperation
with the US; what factors impel the Soviets toward confrontation with.
us?
4. Are there, special factors operating one way or the other
at the moment?
II. Military
A. Strategic Forces
1. What is the inventory of deployed Soviet strategic
offensive and defensive forces as of January 1969? How are these
forces likely to develop over the next 1-3-5-10 years in the absence
of a US-Soviet limitation agreement? What technological changes seem
likely over this time period? What is the extent and significance of
increasing Soviet military presence far from the USSR?
2. How much do we know about current Soviet doctrines,
plans, and procedures relating to the structure, basing and deploy-
ment, command and control, and use of strategic offensive and de-
fensive forces? Which organizations control what particular offensive
and defensive programs and forces? How do we get our information
about Soviet strategic forces? What are the "hard" and "soft" areas
of our information?
B. General Purpose Forces
1. How has the Czechoslovak crisis affected the pattern
of deployment, state of readiness and supply, and numerical levels
of Soviet General Purpose Forces? Have manning and equipping
levels of ground forces changed? Are these short or long-term effects?
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USSR. 2
2. What is the Soviet capability to deploy and support
ground, naval, and air forces (a) in the Mediterranean, (b) in the
Middle East, (c) in Africa and Asia? What trends are likely in the
next 1-3-5 years regarding each of these areas?
3. What are present Soviet doctrines, plans, inventory
levels, and deployments for non-strategic nuclear weapons? What
future trends may be discerned?
1. What are the sources of our information and the basis for
our assessment of Soviet intentions and objectives ? What are the
"hard" and "soft" areas of our information?
2. From the perspective of the Soviet leadership, what
challenges does the US appear to present? What threats to Soviet
interests or to Soviet security?
4. What is the status of US-Soviet negotiations on opening
consulates? What is the status of negotiations on chancery sites,
leased lines, fisheries? What is the status of cultural exchanges with
the US ?
5. Apart from the possible release of Ivanov, what possi-
bilities are available for gestures toward the Soviets ?
6. What is the role of "wars of national liberation" in current
Soviet political-military doctrine and policy? Has this role been modi-
fied since Khruschev's famous speech of 1961?
7. By what means does the USSR currently influence and/or
control the policies of its East European allies? How are the re-
lationships between Moscow and the several East European govern-
ments and communist parties likely to be modified as a result of
the Czechoslovak crisis?
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8. What is the extent and strength of the relationship be-
tween Moscow and the various communist parties of the non-communist
world? Has the crisis affected relationships with Communist parties
in other regions? To what extent is competition with Peking a factor?
9. What are the forces within the USSR tending to promote
internal political and economic liberalization? What elements oppose
liberation? How strong are these forces? How is their balance
likely to be affected (a) by US actions or policies, (b) by other external
sources? How is their balance likely to be reflected in Soviet foreign
and military policies ?
10. How do the Soviets see the future of their relations with
principal West European countries? How do they see the future of
NATO?
1. How rapidly is the Soviet economy growing? What trends
are likely over the next 1-3-5-10 years? What are the likely effects
of these trends on Soviet foreign and military policies?
2. How useful and how effective are existing Western controls
on the export of strategic goods (a) to the USSR, (b) to other East
European countries ? In which areas do our COCOM partners dis -
agree with the US positions and what is the basis of their disagreement?
How useful, and how effective, are limitations on the extension of
credit?
3. What is the existing pattern of trade between the USSR
and (a) the West as a whole, (b) the US? What would be the economic
and political effects on enlargement of this existing pattern of trade,
or other significant modifications of it? Are there goods which, if
traded between the US and USSR, would create a significant threat to
US security? Noting Kosygin's remarks to McNamara about truck
production, are there any initiatives in the trade field which the US
should consider?
V. Foreign Military and Economic Assistance Programs
1. What are the principal objectives of the Soviet Government
in providing military /economic aid to the LDCs ?
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2. What strains and burdens do these programs place upon
the Soviet economy?
3. What are Soviet attitudes with regard to the provision
of sophisticated weapons (surface-to-surface missiles, supersonic
fighters, special radar, etc.) to the LDCs ?
4. What degree of influence has the USSR acquired as a re-
sult of these programs ?
5. What politico -military risks does the USSR incur as a
result of its military assistance program? Is the Soviet leadership
cognizant of these risks ? What will be the pattern of resource alloca-
tion over the next 1-3-5 years?
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EASTERN EUROPE
1. Warsaw Pact
1. What is the status of our bilateral relations with the
East European countries? Is there significant difference in our re-
lations with (a) Czechoslovakia, (b) those EEs that participated in
the Czechoslovakia Invasion, and (c) those that did not?
2. How does Soviet sensitivity to "bridge-building" in Eastern
Europe relate to our policy there and to the policies toward us of the
various East European countries?
3. What is the situation in Czechoslovakia now? What US
policies are explicitly tied to the events in Czechoslovakia?
4. What is the state of (a) Soviet-Yugoslav and (b) Soviet-
Romanian relations? How great is the likelihood of Soviet military
action -against one or both? How likely are crises in Soviet relations
with them short of invasion? What kinds?
5. How has our assessment of Warsaw Pact capabilities
been modified by the invasion of Czechoslovakia? What is the state
of our contingency plans (US and NATO) with respect to deterring and
coping with possible Soviet actions against Romania and Yugoslavia?
6. How have the deployments relating to the invasion of
Czechoslovakia affected the balance of military forces in Europe?
How do Pact forces compare (in gross and in detail) with NATO?
7. How far has the Pact proceeded with unification of com-
mand and force structures ? What trends can be expected over the
next 1-3-5 years?
II. Political and Economic Relationships
1. What are the prospects for liberalization in the various
East European countries over the next five years? What is the US
interest, if any, in this liberalization? How can the course of
politics in East Europe be affected by US policies and actions?
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2. What is the present role and status of COMECON? What
is its role in Soviet policy? To what degree does COMECON create
barriers between Eastern Europe and Western trade and capital?
What are likely future trends over the next 1-3-5-10 years in the
economic relations between the USSR and its East European neighbors?
Between COMECON and the West?
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WEST EUROPE -- GENERAL ECONOMIC
1. What are the most likely courses of development of
the European Communities over the next 1-3-5 years? Identify
(a) what political and economic circumstances in individual member
countries and in the communities as a whole, (b) what policy decisions
or actions on the parts of which member governments, and (c) the
possible external (i. e. , outside the member states) events, which
will most affect these courses of development?
2. What possible developments in the European communities
over the next 1-3-5 years would be most likely to come into conflict
with the interests and aims of the United States? With those of
Japan? With those of the various East European members of COMECON?
With those of the USSR?
3. What are the prospects for British entry into the com-
munities over the next 1-3 -5 years? For the entry of other states?
For some sort of relationship short of full membership for the UK
and/or other non-member states? How will these various contingencies
affect US interests? I-Iow will they affect the interests of other non-
European developed industrial states ?
4, What is the state of West European relations (including
EEC) with the USSR and Eastern Europe? Do these pose any problems
for us? What is the state of consultations between us and the West
Europeans on these matters?
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NATO
1. What are the most likely causes of an outbreak of
hostilities in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces? What
are the circumstances that might surround an actual outbreak? What
less likely contingencies are nevertheless planned for by NATO?
How capable are NATO forces judged to be in meeting this spectrum
of contingencies?
2. What is the state of readiness of the various national
contingents assigned to NATO? What endurance would they have?
What are their reinforcement capabilities ?
3. How effectively- could NATO's command structure cope
with various likely contingencies of hostilities? What are the areas
of most significant weakness?
4. How has the Alliance been affected by the non-participation
of France in the affairs of the Military Organization? To what extent
do NATO plans assume the participation of French Forces and the
common use of French facilities in the event of hostilities? How
realistic are these assumptions?
5. What problems does NATO face regarding planning for,
'deployment, and use of nuclear weapons ? In what manner, and how
seriously do these problems impair the military efficiency or the
political cohesion of the Alliance?
6. Is the Nuclear Planning Group an adequate mechanism of
response to NATO's nuclear problems? What are its deficiencies?
What are the prospects for Anglo-French, or Anglo-French-FRG
nuclear cooperation?
7. How weak are NATO's flanks? What sorts of con-
tingencies might be affected by their weakness? Are these likely
contingencies ?
8. Is the Greek junta still a divisive issue within NATO?
How is the Alliance affected by it?
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NATO: 2
9. To what extent does the Alliance retain popular political
support in its member nations ? In what manner is this support
likely to change over the next five years.? Which nations, if any, might
withdraw from the Alliance during this period?
10. How much agreement is there, in fact, regarding NATO's
present strategy? To what extent does it contribute actual opera-
tional guidance and to what extent is it primarily a general statement
of dessiderata?
11. What alternative modes of political organization for
Western defense have attracted significant support within the govern-
ments or informed publics of any of the members of the Alliance?
12. What are the prospects for increased US-European
cooperation in weapons development and production? For increased
inter-European cooperation?
13. What are the prospects for effective Alliance cooperation
and coordination in the handling of extra-European crisis situations
such as (a) renewed hostilities in the Middle East, (b) post-
Vietnam-war hostilities in South or Southeast Asia, (c) racial con-
flict in Southern Africa, (d) communist-supported insurgency in
tropical Africa?
14. Are major Soviet initiatives in the European security field
likely? To what extent do intra-Warsaw-Pact problems inhibit the
Soviets in this regard?
15. How much pressure is there for a European security
conference?
16. What is the political role of NATO; what is the state of
consultations within NATO on political questions ?
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SECRET'
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
1. What is the role, and the importance, of reunification
as an issue in FRG politics? And for NATO policy?
2. What would be the consequences for FRG politics and
for the FRG's relations with both West and East of an enhancement
in the international status (recognition by a Western government, ad-
mission to international organizations, etc. ) of the GDR? What is
the state of FRG/GDR relations and our posture on them?
3. How strong, and what are the sources of strength, of
right-wing neo-Nazi movements in the FRG? What will be their likely
influence on West German foreign and military policies over the next
five years?
4. How will the FRG's Eastern policy be affected by the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia?
5. What views of Soviet intentions and capabilities are held
by which elements of the FRG political spectrum? What is the state
of FRG-Soviet negotiations on non-use-of-force?
6. How are the intentions and capabilities of the FRG per-
ceived by the Soviet leadership? By that of the Communist states
of Eastern Europe? By the publics of these countries?
7. Why has the West German Government so strongly re-
sisted revaluation of the DM? What measures to ease the international
monetary situation would be most acceptable to the FRG Government
and public? Less acceptable? Unacceptable?
8. What arrangements, if any, will the FRG accept to off-
set US Military Balance of Payments losses?
9. How would West German politics react to a significant
(say, 50%) reduction in US troop levels in Europe? To what degree
does the FRG Government and public expect such reductions over
the next one to five years?
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FRG: 2
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10. How has the US involvement in Vietnam affected US-FRG
relations? How will US-FRG relations be affected by various possible
outcomes of the Vietnam War?
11. How might US interests be affected by the continuance
of dissolution of the FRG governing coalition before or after the
forthcoming Budestag Elections?
12. What is the political background for the decision to hold
the Federal Assembly Meeting in Berlin in March? Are the Germans
firm on this? How do the British and French see this matter?
What is the state of our diplomatic exchange with the Soviet Union?
13. What is the state of FRG-GDR relations? and what
problems, if any, do these pose for us ?
. 14. What does the FRG expect from the U. S. in terms of
bilateral relations?
15. What outcome do the Germans expect from the offset
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1. How viable is West Berlin today? What are the pro-
spects for significant economic decline or political instability in
West Berlin? What is the likely course of political and economic
development in West Berlin over the next 1-3-5 years? Of West
Berlin's political and economic relationship with the FRG?
2. What is present Soviet policy regarding West Berlin?
East German policy? What Soviet or East German pressures
against West Berlin are likely over the next 1-3-5 years? Under
what circumstances ? What is the. status of Alliance planning and
preparations to meet possible Berlin contingencies?
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1. What are the prospects for significant economic and
political instability in France? What are the primary sources of
likely instability? What are the implications of various kinds of
instability for French foreign and defense policies?
2. What is the present status (size, effectiveness, patterns
of deployment, doctrines for employment) of French nuclear forces?
What is their likely course of development over the next 1-3-5-10
years?
3. What sorts of US assistance for the development of French
nuclear forces are desired by various groups within France? What
would be the effect on the French military nuclear program of US
assistance comparable to that which we have given the UK?
4. What Western defense arrangements would be likely to
receive what sorts and what degrees of French cooperation? What
are the prospects over the next five years for greater French partici-
pation in existing NATO military arrangements?
5. What measures to ease the international monetary situation
would be most acceptable to the French government and public? Less
acceptable? Unacceptable?
6. What is the present state of French relations with the
USSR? With the CPR? With the various communist states of
Eastern Europe? How are these relations likely to develop over the
next five years ?
7. To what degree were de Gaulle's world-view -- and
French policy -- affected by the events of May 1968 in France and
those of August 1968 in Czechoslovakia?
8. How strong is the commitment of the French Government
to a pro-Arab, anti-Israeli Middle-Eastern policy? Is such a policy
likely to survive de Gaulle?
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FRANCE: 2
9. What will be the effect on US-French relations of various
possible outcomes of the Vietnam war?
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UNITED KINGDOM
1. What is the present status of US-UK military nuclear
cooperation? What forms does it take?
2. What is the present status (size, effectiveness, patterns
of deployment, doctrines for employment) of UK nuclear forces?
What is their likely course of development over the next 1-3-5-10
years, assuming (a) continuation of present levels and types of
US-UK military nuclear cooperation, (b) increased cooperation,
and (c) reduced, or discontinued, 'cooperation?
3. What are present deployments of UK military forces
outside Europe and the UK itself? What are they likely to be over
the next five years? Are they likely to be affected by a change of
government in the UK? What actions or policies on the part of the
US might induce the UK to alter these deployments ? Is it likely that
the UK will develop an effective strategic mobility capability? What
role is the UK likely to play over the next five years in extra-
European security arrangements?
4. What are the prospects over the next 1-3-5-10 years. for
the UK economy? What are the implications of these prospects for
'UK foreign and defense policies?
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SPAIN
1. What are the prospects for significant political and/or
economic instability in Spain over the next 1-3-5 years? What
would be the most likely sources of instability? In what manner
might US interests be affected?
2. Are changes in the regime likely to affect U. S. base
3. What is the current status of negotiations on renewal of
the base agreement?
4. What is the status of Spanish-UK negotiations regarding
Gibraltar?
PORTUGAL
1. What is the Portuguese goal in re-opening the question
of US base rights in the Azores in December 1968? Is there any
evidence that the Portuguese wish to transfer US air bases to the
mainland (Beja) and phase out the US presence in the Azores?
Should the Portuguese initiative be viewed as an attempt to
capitalize on the current unsettled status of US-Spanish base
negotiations ?
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1. What are the prospects for significant political or
economic instability in Canada over the next 1-3-5 years?
2. What is the present strength of the Quebec separatist
movement? Is it likely to increase over the above time spans?
What factors will affect its strength?
3. Over the next 1-3-5 years will Canada (a) withdraw
from the Atlantic Alliance? (b) cease participating in its military
organization?
4. ' What are the most salient problems in present US-
Canadian relations? What additional matters of contention are
likely to arise over the next 1-3-5 years?
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1. How stable is the present Chiang Government? Are
there any prospects for its overthrow? What is its present mili-
tary strength?
2. What is the state of the GRC economy and what are
its prospects for growth? How much does the high level of military
expenditures affect GRC economic prospects ? What is the likelihood
of Chiang agreeing to a reduction in his armed forces in exchange
for their modernization?
3. What are Chiang's intentions towards the mainland? Does
he really intend to "return to the mainland"? Under what circum-
stances would he launch an attack? Will the current CRC ever ac-
cept a two-China policy, de jure or de facto?
4. Will the policies and attitudes of the Chinese Government
change radically after Chiang's death? Besides CCK, who are the
most important future leaders ? Will they share Chiang's dedication to
"return to the mainland"?
5. Is the GRC likely to develop relations with the USSR?
.Are we confident of our knowledge in regard to possible GRC over-
tures to the Soviet Union?
6. What is the strength of the Taiwan independence move-
ment?. What is the state of relations between the Taiwanese and
Mainlanders? Have these relations improved? How do youths in
both groups look to the future?
7. In what circumstances might the GRC agree to withdraw
from the offshore islands ?
8. Would the GRC agree to have the U. S. develop addi-
tional bases or to relocate bases from other areas? How would
such use of Taiwan be regarded by Peking? What would Peking
do about it?
.9. What are the prospects for greater acceptance of the
GRC into the Asian community?
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1. How strong are the pressures in Japan and the Rvukvus
for reversion of the Ryukyus ? I
would U. S. -Japan relations be affected if we refused to negotiate on
reversion in 1969? What are the prospects for continue Okinawan
acquiescence to U. S. administration if reversion is not agreed to in
1969? Can we depend upon the present Yara Government in the
Ryukyus? How strong is public resistance to stationing of B-52s in
Okinawa for Viet-Nam operations? Could we continue to do this
after reversion?
2. What are the present capabilities of the Self-Defense
Forces ? What additional strength and equipment would be required
for Japan to take over full responsibility for its sea and air defense?
What are the prospects for an increased defense effort? In what
areas, air defense, AS W, etc? What is the U. S. role in the defense
of the Japan area? What U. S. forces are deployed in Japan and --
environs with the specific mission of assisting in the defense of Japan?
3. What are the major U. S. base issues? What base issue
and pressures are likely to arise over the next 1-3-5 years? Are
there additional opportunities for bringing the Japanese into joint-
basing arrangements?
4. What is the state of Japanese relations with Communist
China and with Taiwan? To what extent is Communist China re-
garded as a threat to Japan? How do the Japanese feel China is
likely to use its nuclear power? Does U. S. China policy affect
U. S. -Japanese relations? What factors are likely to influence a
change in Japan's China policy? What is Japan's view of a two-China
policy and what steps is it likely to take towards this objective? Will
Japan move ahead soon to recognize Mongolia? Will Japan continue
to apply strategic trade controls to China and how?
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25X6
25X6
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JAPAN: 2
5. Will Japan wish to retain the Security Treaty? Will
it suggest any changes ? What is the extent of opposition to automatic
continuation? Does Japan face serious civil disorder over the
Treaty in 1969-1970? To what extent is opposition to the Treaty
distinct from pressure on bases and the movement for reversion
of Okinawa?
6. Is Japan interested in developing its own nuclear weapons ?
What would their role be for Japanese security? Is it likely to seek
to acquire an ABM system? Will Japan retain confidence in the U. S.
nuclear umbrella?
7. How does Japan regard the Soviet Union? What are the
prospects for a Soviet agreement to return the Southern Kuriles ?
Will the Soviet Union play this card to embarrass U. S. -Japan negotiations
on the Ryukyus ? As more or less, of a threat than Communist China?
What are the prospects for expanded Japanese trade and investment
in the Soviet Union?
8. What measures is Japan likely to take to reduce its
dependence on Middle East oil? Is Japan likely to seek active parti-
cipation in decisions regarding the defense of the Malacca Straits?
9. I-Iow would Japan react to various events in Viet-Nam?
To accelerated hostilities? To a Communist takeover? Will the
Japanes-e reaction affect fundamental U. S. -Japan economic and
defense relations?
10. Is the LDP likely to win the next election? Is a coalition
government a likely possibility over the next 1-3-5 years? What
about attitudes and prospects of the Komeito? What political trends
are likely to develop among the existing urban population transferred
from rural areas? In.new urban areas?
11. What is the state and prospects of the Japanese economy?
What factors will principally effect the prospects for continued
economic growth? How important is the present level of U. S. -Japan
1trade to Japan's economic strength? What are the major U. S. -Japan
trade problems? What sort of cooperation can the U. S. expect from
Japan in meeting its balance of payments problems?
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12. Will Japan accelerate its space 'efforts? Will it enter
into a cooperative program with the U. S. with controls on exports
of technology to third countries as the price? Can it implement
such controls?
13. What is Japan's present role in the region? How is it
likely to develop in 1-3-5 years? Will it exercise regional leader-
ship and what will be the reaction of countries in the region to
Japanese leadership? How does Japan view the present and future
structure of regional organizations ? What are the prospects of
Japan playing an increased economic, political and security role in
the region over the next decade? What is the maximum contribution
Japan can be expected to make in the next few years to Asian
security -- peacekeeping forces, assistance to police, para-military
and military forces ?
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KOREA
. I. Does President Park enjoy popular support? What are
the attitudes toward the Park administration of key groups, such as
intellectuals, public opinion leaders, labor, students? Is there
rural dissatisfaction? What is the government doing about it?
2. What are the attitudes and plans of political opposition
groups? Are any of these strong enough to challenge Park success-
fully? I-low serious is corruption? What measures has the govern-
ment taken to control it?
3. Is the 1971 Presidential Election likely to come off
peacefully without undermining political stability? Will Park run
and win? Who are the most likely successors to Park?
4. Is there any prospect of a relaxation of tension in Korea?
Will sustained harrassment on the part of North Korea over a long
period weaken the stability or resolve of ROK leaders and political
parties? Leaving aside the security aspects, would attitudes toward
the nation's future be affected by the withdrawal of US ground forces?
5. Is coordination of ROK military and other security forces
adequate, or do relations among the security forces pose problems?
6. Can we rely on assurances by ROK leaders that public
threats of retaliation against North Korea are made for political
purposes? What is the risk of the US being drawn into hostilities
as a result of ROK actions? Could ROK front-line defense be
weakened by concurrent landings on the order of the Unchin landing?
7. What are ROK attitudes toward Japan? Has the govern-
ment become more willing to accept Japanese help? Will it be
possible over the next 1-3-5 years to develop closer defense
cooperation, e. g. , air defense and naval defense of the Sea of Japan,
between the ROK and Japan.
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SECRET
8. What arc the present U. S. -Korean command relation-
ships? How much Korean pressure is there to reduce U. S.
operational control over ROK military forces?
9. What is the state and prospects for Korean economy?
How much external assistance is being provided to it at present?
I-low much will be required in the future and for how long?
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1. What is the present state of the Chinese Communist
political apparatus and control following the cultural revolution?
How strong is Peking's control over the regions? Is there any sig-
nificant opposition to Mao and is a major move against Mao a
possibility?
2. After Mao's death, what are the leadership prospects
and who will control China? What are the prospects for a major
change in Chinese policy after Mao's death?
3. What effect did the cultural revolution have on the
Chinese economy and what are its current prospects? Is China facing
a major food problem and what is it doing about agricultural and
population control? What are its foreign exchange resources?
4. What is the current strength and deployment of the
Chinese Communist armed forces? Is it modernizing its conventional
forces? I-low strong is its air defense?
5. What is the status of the Chinese Communists' nuclear
weapons program? What are the major problems and weaknesses?
When will the Chinese Communists be in a position to deploy
nuclear armed ballistic missiles? What will be Chinese Communist's
nuclear strategy once it has a force in being? Will the Chinese
Communists be willing to enter into international arrangements to
control nuclear weapons? and under what conditions?
6. What is the current state and prospects for Sino-Soviet
relations? Is a rapprochement possible and under what circum-
stances ?
7. What are Chinese Communist attitudes towards the
United States? Will they try to make a deal with the United States
at the expense of the Soviet Union? Are they really interested in
peaceful co-existence with the U. S. and what would be Peking's
conditions ?
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COMMUNIST CHINA: 2
SECRET
8. What is the nature of the Chinese Communist threat
to Asia? Is Peking likely to engage in conventional and/or nuclear
attacks against its neighbors ? What are the principal deterrents
to such attacks ? How much support is Communist China giving to
subversive and insurgency movements in the region? How much
support is it likely to give in the future? What role is China
playing in Laos and Thailand?
9. ' What is the nature of the Chinese Communists relations
with Hanoi and the NLF? Will the Chinese Communists seek to
participate in any large Viet-Nam negotiations?
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PHILIPPINES
1. Is Philippine nationalism likely to develop to the point of a major
departure in foreign alignment? To what extend does nationalism operate
as a force independent of events elsewhere in Asia? Does the U. S. align-
ment depend on the outcome of these events?
2. Will the Philippines expand trade and enter into diplomatic relations
with the USSR? Communist China?
3. Will the Philippines continue to support the U. S. on major Asian
,issues over the next 1-3-5 years?
4. What is the attitude toward the U. S. of key groups such as intellectuals,
students, labor?
5. Are nationalist outpourings by Marcos and other Philippine leaders
likely to develop an uncontrollable momentum? What are the implications
for U. S. bases of nationalist fervor? Will Sangley Point have to be returned
to the Philippines? If so, by what date? Are similar pressures likely to
build up for the return of Clark or Subic? What can the U. S. do to ease
pressures? Is further consultation on Asian security matters advisable?
What about joint basing?
6. Can the value of U. S. bases be determined in dollar terms by assess-
ing alternative means of performing base functions or alternative bases?
If so what is a reasonable price in terms of U. S. aid?
7. Does the Huk insurgency pose a serious threat to the government over
the next 1-3-5 years? How efficient are the armed forces? The police?
What are major problems?. Corruption? Equipment? Morale? What is
the government doing with rural unrest, about urban discontent?
8. What are the major weaknesses of the economy? Is the GOP taking
effective measures to meet the economic problems? What foreign assistance
is, it receiving and are additional external resources required? Under what
conditions?
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MIDDLE EAST -- GENERAL
1. Basic Conditions
a. Is there any likelihood of a change in the basic conditions of
intense hostility between Israel and the Arab nations over the next year?
Four years?
b. Is the. outbreak of another major war between Israel and- the
Arabs likely? By deliberate Israeli initiative? By deliberate Arab
initiative? By spiral?
c. Are any basic changes in the character of Arab nationalism
and efforts at pan-Arab unity likely over the next five years? What are
the prospects for continued Arab-Arab rivalries?
d. What type of threat does Arab fedayeen action pose for Jordan
and Lebanon? For Israel? What are the prospects for further consolida-
tion and growth of the fedayeen movement -- with an Arab-Israeli settle-
ment and without?
e. Identify the leverage of external powers in the Middle East.
To what extent are nationalism and broadening political consciousness subject i
manipulation?
f. What are the prospects for basic changes in the character of
Arab governments, for example the prospects of Arab monarchies, the
Arab Nationalist Movement, etc. ?
2. ' What contingency situations in the Middle East are likely to produce
a U. S. -USSR confrontation?
3. Soviet Policy
a. What are Soviet interests and objectives in the Middle East?
How far is the USSR likely to go in compromising these to avoid conflict
with the U. S. ? What kind of influence does the USSR seek in the area?
b. Why have the Soviets re-equipped the UAR so rapidly?
c. What do Soviet efforts to train Arab military forces suggest?
For what types of engagement will the UAR military be prepared?
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d. Why have the Soviets proposed an imposed settlement? What
does the evidence suggest? For example:
(1)
(2)
fear of another outbreak?
effort to extend their influence in the Middle East?
e. What is the extent of the Soviet naval build-up in the Middle
East? For what purposes? What are the prospects for Soviet acquisition
of basing and overflight rights in the Middle East and North Africa?
4. Other Nations 7
a, To what extent are Western European nations and Japan
dependent on Middle East oil? Can a plausible scenario be constructed in
which that oil would be withheld for any considerable period? How would
such withholding affect oil supplies? How would it affect the economies
of the oil suppliers? Would the suppliers cooperate if a boycott were pro-
longed?
b. Of what importance is transit through the Suez canal? To
5, What is the size, effectiveness, location and political coloration
of the various commando groups which take part in actions against Israel?
What is the quality of their leadership? What relations have these groups
with each other? With the various Arab governments? With local regular
forces?
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ISRAEL
1. Conventional Capability
a. Are Israeli capabilities sufficient to defeat any Arab conven-
tional attack?
b. In the next 1-3-5-10 years is the conventional balance likely
to shift against Israel?
c. Do relevant Israeli political factions believe that Israeli
capabilities are sufficient to defeat Arab enemies? To deter? Where do
they differ?
2. Nuclear Capabilities
a. Is Israel actively constructing an atomic bomb?
b. Does Israel have sufficient materials for a number of nuclear
weapons? Where are which materials available?
c. What delivery vehicles are available to Israel now? Over
the next five years?
d. Where and how would weapons be tested?
3. What political and strategic risks and gains would be involved in
Israeli. withdrawal from occupied territory in:
b. Jerusalem?
c. Syrian Heights?
d. Sinai?
4. What are the pressures within Israel for firm responses to Arab
guerrilla attacks? How might these pressures be eased?
5. What are Israel's alternatives to large-scale (e. g. , Beirut Airport)
retaliation? Why does the present government seem unable to live with
.Arab raids and Israeli counter-raids of similar proportion?
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6. What would be the best combination of Israeli domestic political
forces in terms of facilitating a "solution" to the current Middle Eastern
crisis? What influence do we have should we decide to urge Israel to
adopt a flexible negotiating position? What influence can other nations bring
to bear?
7. Are Israeli-Arab problems within Israel likely to become a serious
race issue?
8. What are the effects on Israeli strategic thinking of the presence
of Soviet military forces in the UAR? What are the likely implications for
Israeli military policy of a continuing Soviet military presence?
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1. What is the spectrum of interests and opinions in Egyptian domestic
politics? Which groups have what power and how is their influence likely
to increase or decrease?
2. Which groups are seriously committed to active war against Israel?
Which groups favor rapprochement? How powerful are these groups?
3. How monolithic is the Nasser regime? Under what conditions might
Nasser be unseated? Are there important dissident groups? What is their
strength and political coloration? Do we have good knowledge about
middle-rank and potential successor leaders and their attitudes?
4. Will the UAR be able to match Israel in equipment and training over
the next two years? Four years? If not, why not?
5. Does the UA.R have any capability for producing nuclear weapons?
What level of outside support could provide such a capability?
6. What is the prognosis for the economic health of the UAR over the
next decade? What are the implications for U. S. policy of economic trends?
7. What are the principal levers of outside influence available to which
nations?
8. Is the Israeli assumption that a post-Nasser government would be
more amenable to negotiations correct?
*NOTE: USE THE ABOVE QUESTIONS, APPROPRIATELY MODIFIED,
FOR SYRIA, JORDAN, LEBANON, AND IRAQ.
OTHER MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES
1. Is the continuing Greek-Turk hostility on Cyprus likely to erupt
again within the next year? Next four years? What are the prospects
for a settlement between the two communities on Cyprus?
2. Are minorities -- such as the Kurdish minority in Iraq, Iran and
Turkey -- likely to present insurgency problems?
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3. What are the prospects for stability in the Persian Gulf area? What
are the objectives for this area of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Iraq? What are the prospects for armed conflicts among them? How might
U. S. interests be involved in such conflicts? What are Soviet objectives?
4. Is there any other problem in the area that has a one-in-ten chance
of commanding serious Presidential attention within the next year?
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SECRET
GREECE
1. What is the likely course of Greek political development over the
next 1-3-5 years? Is it likely that Greece will experience serious political
and/or economic instability? Civil War?
2. What are the likely trends in Greek foreign policy over the above
time span?
3. Can the U. S. count on unimpeded use of its bases in Greece to
respond to non-NATO contingencies?
4. What are the prospects for Greece's full-scale economic integration
into the Western European economic community?
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SOUTH ASIA (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, Maldive Islands)
1. What is the current agricultural situation? What are the prospects
for solving the food-populations problem? What are the general prospects
for economic growth in the area?
2. What is the current state of Soviet influence in the area? To what
extent is Soviet influence likely to increase or decrease--especially in
India, Pakistan and Afghanistan- -during the next two years?
3. What are the domestic political prospects for the South Asian nations?
The answer should deal, among other things, with:
a. Pakistan--The future of Ayub's regime and rivalry between
the two wings.
b. India--The prospects for Congress control, intensified
regionalism, and the subversion/guerrilla problem on the eastern border.
c. Afghanistan--The future of the monarchy and the democratic
experiment. .
d. Nepal--The future of the monarchy.
e. Ceylon--The immediate future of the present government.
4. What role internationally will South Asian nations--especially India--
play? What is the basic orientation of their diplomacy and defense
policies? What are the prospects these will change; and if so, how?
5. What are the prospects for a settlement of Indo-Pakistani problems?
For the South Asian arms race?
6. What role will Communist China play in South Asia?
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TURKEY
1. What are the prospects for U. S. -Turkish relations in the next four
years?
2. What are the prospects for continued democratic government in
Turkey?
3. What are the prospects for economic growth?
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NORTH AFRICA
1. What is the spectrum of interests and opinions in Libyan, Tunisian,
Algerian, Moroccan and the Sudanese politics? Which groups have what
power? How is their influence likely to increase or decrease.?
2. Will Libya break up after the death of the king?'
a. Who are the likely internal contenders?
b. What are the opportunities for Tunisia and the UAR to seek
advantage from disorder in Libya?
c. What are the prospects for continued U. S. tenure at Wheelus?
3. Identify the major threats of .guerrilla war.
a. Will guerrilla activity in the South of Sudan spill over into
Uganda and Ethiopia?
4. What are the prospects for stability in Algeria and Morocco?
a. How extensive and how effective is the Chinese presence?
b. What is the character of their aid to the Arab cause?
5. What are the prospects for economic cooperation in the Naghreb?
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AFRICA
1. Biafra
What is the present situation and likely outcome of the Nigeria/
Biafra war? What are the foreseeable consequences of an FMG victory?
A Biafran victory? Which outside powers have become involved? How
much assistance, in what forms, has each given and why? What has been
the effect including political impact, of outside assistance? Will it or
could it determine the outcome? How much influence has the USSR gained
in Nigeria and in other African countries by its support of the FMG? What
has the U. S. gained or lost by its policy thus far? What is the current
state of food supplies and starvation in Biafra? What food requirements
are foreseen? How will they be met?
SOUTHERN AFRICA
1. What are the prospects for Black African insurgency throughout
the area over the short run? Long run? What is the likely response of
the white-ruled states? To what extent will this violence be supported
by the Soviet Union and Communist China? Is it likely to imperil the
position of local African leaders such as Zambia's President Kaunda?
What will be the likely reaction of other African leaders and the OAU?
2, Is there a reasonable prospect of change in the racist policies
of the South African and Rhodesian regimes over the next year or two?
What are the basic strengths and weaknesses of these regimes and the
Portuguese regimes in Angola and Mozambique? To what extent will
South Africa intervene to prop up the white Rhodesians? The Portuguese
\in Angola and Mozambique?
3. Will the British Government substantially shift its position on
Southern Africa in the face of the economic importance of the area to its
own financial situation? Where 'do other powers stand on the problem?
What are the prospects of action on the subject in the United Nations?
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1. What have been the most significant concerted actions or decisions
taken under the OAS since 1961? What have been the major criticisms by
Latin American governments and political leaders of U. S. participation in
the use of the OAS as an instrument of its foreign policy? Evaluate the
legitimacy of these criticisms?
2. How extensive is the Cuba-based apparatus for instigating and aiding
insurgent movements? What is the extent of the insurgency problem in
each country of Central and South America? How effective are the police
and military forces in each country that has a significant insurgent/terrorist
movement? How solid is the insurgent infrastructure? What outside support
is it now receiving and how dependent is it on such further support? What
is the likelihood of a successful insurgency by Castro?supported insurgents?
3. Identify any countries, and within each, the specific leaders, leader-
ships, or political parties, which have supported in the past, or might be
expected to support and be able to commit their government to regional
peacekeeping forces and security arrangements. Specify in as complete
detail as possible the particular political and military arrangements which.
have been advocated.
4. What is the potential for organized politically-motivated violence in
each of the Latin American countries? (Distinguish between urban and
rural areas and within each the source of leadership and political initiative. )
What are the major sources of social unrest in these countries? How able
and willing will government be to respond to the pressures being generated?
` 5. What evidence is there of the' "socializing" or "modernizing" role
~,layed by military establishments, i. e. , improving literacy, transmitting
skills to civilian economy? Is this role widely emphasized or accepted
within Latin American countries? Are there manifestations of a growing
anti-military sentiment in Latin American countries?
6. Is there any country likely to develop as a recognized regional
leader? If so, in what areas of leadership and with what operational,
significance insofar as the policies of other Latin governments are con-
cerned?
7. What initiatives regarding regional security, trade, or economic
policies might we expect from Latin American governments during the
next five years?
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8. What is the extent of effectively organized opposition to Castro
within Cuba? What is the extent of and potential for social unrest in Cuba,
and from what sources? What is the projected economic health of Cuba?
What are the objectives of the U. S. embargo and how effective is it in
achieving them? How monolithic is the Castro regime -- are there any
factions whose views could be strengthened by U. S. actions? , What actions?
9. What are the major strands of common dissatisfaction with current
U. S. security, trade, and economic policies - - particularly the U. S. role
in the Alliance for Progress -- that have been expressed by Latin American
.governments and political leaders? Evaluate these as to fact and their
national interest.
10. In which countries might communist-dominated or other ideologi-
cally anti-U. S. leaders and parties be elected to government? What kinds
of policies inimical to U. S. interests might they pursue? In each case
that, if any, might be the effect on neighboring countries?
11. What are Soveit strategy and objectives in Latin America? How
high a priority does the region have in Soviet strategy? What is the extent
of Soviet diplomatic, economic and cultural ties with the various countries?
How does Soviet strategy relate to Cuban objectives, and how much coordina-
tion or conflict is there between the two? How much restraint do the Soviets
exert on Cuba's "export of revolution"?
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MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE
1. What is the U. S. interest in Malaysia and Singapore? Are post-
Vietnam events likely to lead to demands for U. S. aid or a U. S. military
presence? Would the U. S. be able to use Singapore naval base facilities'
after Vietnam? Will commercial shipyard facilities continue to be avail-
able?
2. Will communal problems threaten the stability of Malaysia or
Singapore over the next 1-3-5 years? What measures are the two govern-
ments taking to create integrated societies? Is sufficient opportunity pro-
vided for key groups such as students, labor and intellectuals?
3. Will Malaysia and Singapore get along with each other without
violence within the next 1-3-5 years? With Indonesia?
4. Is Singapore's attitude toward China likely to change depending upon
the. outcome in Vietnam? Depending upon the course of events in China?
5. Will Malaysia and Singapore be receptive to Asian regional organiza-
tions taking on security responsibilities?
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INDONESIA
1. What are the major economic problems? Is aid being used effectively?
I-low long will it be before the Indonesian economy will be able to survive on
"normal" doses of foreign aid?
2. Does Suharto have general popular support? What is the attitude
toward the present regime? Of intellectuals? Of students? Are there
serious regional differences in attitude toward the Suharto government?
Is Suharto's position dependent on some minimum degree of economic
growth? What are the leadership alternatives? Are any other Indonesian
leaders likely to challenge Suharto's position?
3. What is the strength of the underground PKI? Do we have sufficient
knowledge of PKI organization to assess its capabilities? Does the PKI
have genuine village support or does it rely on terrorism? Do other
organized gzoups pose a threat to the- government?
4. I-low effective are the Indonesian armed forces? Equipment? Morale?
Are there major regional differences among the divisions and do these affect
loyalty to the regime? How much military assistance is advisable to sustain
the Suharto regime?
5. How serious is friction between Indonesia and Singapore? Malaysia?
In the next 1-3-5 years could Indonesia make a contribution to regional
security? Is Indonesia likely again to turn expansionist?
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CAMBODIA
1. What is the state of opposition to Sihanouk? Does he face a
serious insurgent problem? From the Communists? Other groups?
Does Sihanouk continue to enjoy general popular support?
2. What is Sihanouk's attitude toward the U. S. ? Toward China?
To what extent does his attitude depend upon events in Vietnam?
3. In what circumstances might Cambodia play a responsible role in
the Asian community? -
4. How serious are Cambodia's economic problems? How much
pressure is he under to seek more foreign economic assistance?
5. What is Sihanouk's attitude toward VC/NVA use of Cambodian
territory as a sanctuary? What is his attitude toward a strengthened
ICC?
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1. What is the extent of the insurgency problem in each of the major
regions? I-low solid is the insurgent infrastructure? How extensive is
outside support for the insurgency? To what extent is insurgency de-
pendent upon such support? What is our evidence on these questions?
Does the data support alternative interpretations?
2. Are the Thai properly organized for an optimum counter-insur-
gency effort? What is the extent of friction between the national police
and the military leaderships?
3. Do Thai security forces have the capability of controlling insurgent
movements at present levels? At foreseeable levels? Do the Thai security
forces efficiently use equipment presently provided? Is it feasible to build
up a major Thai fighting force along the lines of the ROKA? What is the
current U. S. military assessment of the combat readiness of the Thai
armed forces, both quantitatively and qualitatively?
4. What is the attitude of local inhabitants toward the behavior of Thai
officials and security forces? What is their attitude toward insurgents?
5. How muchawareness is there in remote areas of the Thai Govern-
ment's devdlopmental efforts? To what extent is Thai economic develop-
ment reflected in rural as well as urban areas? To what extent have the
peasants participated in the development reflected in national income
statistics? Is corruption a major problem in the implementation of
projects at the local level? What is being done about it?
6. Will Thailand wish to have U. S. forces remain after a Vietnam
settlement? If so, will present informal base arrangements suffice?
How many and what sort of forces would the Thai wish to have remain?
For how long? Which installations will the Thai permit us to maintain?
Would the Thai Government be conducive to joint-basing arrangements
or to Thai maintenance of some facilities such as Northeast airfields on
a standby basis?
. 7. Is Thailand's alignment subject to change as a result of the terms
of a Vietnam settlement or the course of post-Vietnam develoments? If
so,. what are the prospects?
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8. What effect on Thai-U. S. relations is likely to flow from the return
to parliamentary government ? What is the general attitude of Thai politi-
cians toward the alliance with the United States? Toward Thai involvement
in the Vietnam war? What is the strength of opposition political parties?
Is the government developing its own political base? What degree of
support does it enjoy?
9. What is the attitude toward the administration of such groups as
youth, labor, intellectuals, young bureaucrats, young and middle-grade
military officers?
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1. Are there realistic alternatives for a non-Communist Laos, short
of the perpetuation of a divided country or a paper-coalition government?
What is left of the neutralist base?
2. Will Souvanna settle for less than an explicit reaffirmation of the
Zurich and/or Geneva Accords in conjunction with Vietnam settlement?
How active will Souvanna be in working toward this goal? Is there risk
that he might at some point throw in the towel?
3. Has Souvanna developed his political base? Is non-Communist
opposition to the RLG a major consideration? What alternative assets
do we have should Souvanna not be available?
4. What is the potential for building up the Lao forces over the next
1-3-5 years? What are the major shortcomings? Equipment? Morale?
Is it reasonable to expect North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao to settle for
non-Communist Lao retention of the Mekong lowlands for an indefinite
period?
5. Is Souvanna at some point in the Paris negotiations likely to call
for a cessation of U. S. bombing in Laos or to indicate publicly that he
does not condone the bombing? In what areas will Souvanna tolerate U. S.
operations? What sort of missions? Will he insist on limiting opera-
tions to the supply corridors for Vietnam? Will he continue to permit
the use of B-52s?
6. To what extent will 'the Thai be prepared to involve themselves in
I~ao events? How much leverage do they have on Lao leaders?
7. What degree of support for a possible solution in Laos acceptable
to, the U.S. . can be expected from the UK? USSR? India? . Other Asian
countries? What countries would be willing to participate in a revamped
ICC or other peacekeeping machinery? Is it practical to conceive of the
peacekeeping forces as an all-Asian effort? To what extent can other
Asian states he expected or induced to take an active role in demanding
a non-Communist Laos?
8. What is the significance of the Communist Chinese roadbuilding
activities in Northern Laos? What is the relative influence of Peking and
pPanoi over the Pathet Lao?
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A. Nuclear Proliferation
1. Describe the state of the capabilities of the nations
which could build a nuclear weapon in the next five years?
a. Which nations have a "stand-by" capability and
how many months are they away from a bomb?
b. Are any nations actively pursuing construction of
the bomb -- rather than acquisition of a stand-by capability?
c. What are the sources of our information? Identify
"hard" and "soft" areas.
2. Identify scarce materials required for a stand-by
capability, and for moving from a stand-by capability to a weapon.
be controlled?
a. How effectively can the acquisition of these materials
b. How effectively can the acquisition of these materials
c. How effective at detecting evasions are the inspection
provisions of the NPT?
3. What testing facilities are available to each nation that
could produce a bomb within the next five years? What facilities would
be required for "safe" tests up to what yields?
4. What is the state of the delivery capability of each nation
that could produce a weapon within the next five years?
5. How effectively can the source of an incoming missile be
identified? For example, if an Israeli warhead fell on Soviet territory,
could it be anonymous ?
6. Do programs for the peaceful use of nuclear weapons,
such as the US Project Plowshare, hinder or aid.the proliferation of
nuclear weapons?
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7. Have any of the present powers (or nations which could
produce a weapon within five years) exhibited an interest in unconventional
delivery capabilities, such as a bomb in a suitcase or a bomb in a freighter
in New York Harbor? How effectively can such activity be monitored?
8. Which nations are unlikely to sign the NPT?
a. What levers are available to whom (to persuade a
particular nation to sign)?
nations sign?
b. How strong is the Soviet interest in having each of these
c. If these nations are coerced into signing, how likely
is their signature to prevent their acquisition of nuclear weapons within the
next five years?
9. Would the Soviet Union sign first or simultaneously?
B. Strategic Arms Talks
1'. Why, and how strongly, does the Soviet leadership want
strategic arms limitation talks with the US? What are the sources within the
Soviet leadership and society, of support for and opposition to meaningful talks'
C. Other Disarmament Items
1. What is the,status of US-Soviet exchanges on "technical"
violations of the test ban treaty? How significant and frequent have such
violations been?
2. What is the status of US contacts with the USSR on problems
of space, including matters pending before the UN?
3. Describe the state of biological and chemical warfare
capabilities and research in relevant countries.
a. Is there any evidence of nations substituting these
forms for nuclear capabilities?
b. Which nations might be tempted to divert energy blocked
by an NPT into these areas?
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AID/,MAP
1. What is the size of the existing program (including authoriza-
tions and/or appropriations for FY 69 and requests for FY 70,)?
a. By agency?
b. By type of program (military, development loans, grants,
technical assistance, supporting assistance, Peace Corps, etc. )?
c. By country?
2. What are the terms of present credits (maturities, interest
rates, grace periods, tying, etc. )?
3. What are the major criticisms of US foreign assistance programs
by governments and political leaders of developing countries?
4. For current major recipients of US economic assistance, what
evidence of past performance and "effective absorptive capacity" can be
offered to justify higher levels of government-to-government resource
transfers?
5. What countries face serious debt burden problems? (Show
separately their debts to US and other major donors.) What are the
projections of the ability of the major aid recipient countries to manage
the increasing level of public and private debt burden generated through
development loans from all sources? What are the implications for US
aid policies?
6. What evidence can be offered to demonstrate the success of
.US economic assistance programs in less-developed countries in cost
benefit terms? What countries have graduated from our aid program?
Which, if any, are now scheduled to do so over the next several years?
Which others, if any, might also be in a position to "graduate" with 5 years?
7.. How effective is the budgetary process within countries that
are major recipients of US military and economic assistance? To what
degree does the lack of coherent national planning, programming, and
budgeting vitiate US efforts to coordinate our own programs?
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AID/MAP - 2
8. List the economic growth, population growth, and growth of
GNP per capita of recipients of U. S. aid during the latest year for
which data are available, the last 5 years, and the last 10 years.
9. Could countries now buying arms from the United States
through credits furnished by or guaranteed by the US Government (DOD)
continue to buy the same level of arms if funds and credits had to be
arranged through national or international capital markets? Would they
continue to buy from the United States?
10. To what extent does the separation of Public Safety programs
for police and paramilitary forces (AID) and military assistance for
military forces (DOD) exacerbate political frictions between indigenous
national police and military establishments? Are there cases in which
Ministers of Interior and Defense "play off" their US advisors against
each other to the detriment of US interests?
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FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
A. Balance of Payments
1. What was our balance of payments position in 1967 and 1968?
a. On both official definitions, with explanations for
the divergences.
b.. With special financing shown separately.
c. With reference to structure, e. g. , the trade balance.
2. What is the outlook for our balance of payments in 1969 and
beyond?
3. What measures are now in force to seek improvement in the
balance of payments? (Include not only 1968 and 1969 programs but also
on going policies such as Buy America, tied AID, etc. )
a. What is the objective of each (quantitatively as well as
qualitatively, if possible) ?
b. What are the costs of each (quantitatively as well as
qualitatively, if possible)? '
4. What are the details (including magnitudes) of the special
arrangements which we have negotiated with other countries to reduce or
finance our deficits (Germany, Canada, Japan, etc. )?
5. What is the size of our reserves?
a. Total.
b. By component (including.how much of foreign exchange
accumulated under swap activations).
6. What are our total monetary liabilities to foreigners (including
near-liquid liabilities)?
a. To private foreigners (estimate)
b. To official foreigners (estimate) -- list the major countries
(any holding more than $100 million) individually
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Foreign Economic Policy - 2
c. Show Roosa bonds, other longer term securities, and
near-liquid liabilities separately in (b).
d. Show liabilities under activated swaps separately.
B.
International Monetary System
1.
What is the status of the SDR process?
a. For ratification?
b. Where do discussions stand on activation?
2.
What agreements now cover the gold markets?
a. Full scope and divergence of interpretation of March 19
b. Re South African gold
3. What is the status of discussions, if any, concerning other
changes in the system?
a. Recycling of speculative funds or other measures to cope
b. Adjustment process
4. What is the British financial position?
a. Reserves -- total and by component
b. Liabilities -- regular sterling liabilities, private and
official, forward commitments); through swaps and other support package
operations, including maturities and lending countries; to IMF, with
maturities; under latest Basel arrangement
c. What is the outlook for further use of the latest Basel
credits, i.e., further departures from the sterling area?
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Foreign Economic Policy - 3
5. What are the reserves and short-term liabilities of the other
Group of Ten countries?
a. Show reserves by component, including separately dollar
holdings and other claims on U. S.
b. Show separately liabilities under swaps or other support
arrangements, esp. for France
6. What is the likelihood of renewed speculative attacks against
the French franc, pound sterling, and/or other currencies and/or in favor
of the Deutschemark, lira and/or other currencies?
1. What parts of the Kennedy Round agreements have been imple-
mented, by the U. S. and by other countries? What remains to be imple-
mented and under what conditions, if any?
a. List value of U. S. imports of each from 1964 through
the latest data
b. How many bills or sponsors stand behind each?
2. What progress has been made since the Kennedy Round and what
is the current status of international discussions in GATT, OECD, or
elsewhere, on:
3. What is the status of trade preferences and other UNCTA7) matte]
a. Non-tariff barriers
b. Agricultural trade
c. Border taxes
d. Responsibilities of surplus countries
s 4. What is the current status of dumping, countervailing duty, and
escape cause actions.
5. What is the status and operation of the cotton textile agreement?
6. What is the status of the new steel agreement?
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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Response Format
National Security Council-Study Memorandum No. 9
General Note: Answers will be brief, held to 1 or
2 pages where possible, and in no event longer
than 5 pages. At the end of each question, recent
CIA reports or estimates which contain elaborations
of the response will be referenced, as appropriate.
Such paragraphs will begin with a side head,
Additional CIA References.
1. For each country, geographic area, or sub-
ject specified in the three page outline, a
separate cover sheet will be prepared, with the
name underlined and centered on the paper in capi-
tals. For example: THE USSR.
2. Each answer will be prepared on letter size
paper, single space, using MTST "COURIER" type,
and copies will be furnished.
3. As a heading for each answer, the specific
question asked will be used, underlined, and
identifying its group. For example:
I. neral
r
1. How do the Soviets see their
position in the world vis-a-vis the
United States?
4. Pages will be numbered for each answer,
using Arabic numerals.
5. Margins will be 1 1/2" all around.
6. All graphics must be coordinated at a
central point as to number and format. All place
names must conform to Board of Geographic Names
usage.
CONFIDENTIAL
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