MANDATE FOR CHANGE 1953-1956 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00793R000200140036-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: BOOK

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Houston
For your visit with Ambassador Eisenhower,
one of President Eisenhower's books is slightly
involved. In the AP appeal to the CIA Committee
of 21 August (which is in the packet of papers you
have), but not in the appeal to the ICRC, the AP
supports its request in part on the fact that Presi-
dent Eisenhower devoted some pages of his book
Mandate for Change to the Guatemalan matter.
Copies of the pages are attached. I think the treat-
ment of the matter given by President Eisenhower
does not support the AP request. It does not revea
sources and methods.
11/3/99
(DATE)
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 10-101
I AUG 54 (ol WHICH MAY BE USED.
NOTE ATTACHED TO MANDATE FOR CHANGE 1953-1956
STA
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The White House Years
I X53-y956
DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC., GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK
1963
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 A region of the world of vital importance to the United States is
Latin America, a vast area of undeveloped resources, whose weight in the
scales of the balance of power has become steadily more important.
We like to think of Latin America as nearby, in our own back yard,
so to speak. In fact, most of it, particularly the large nations of Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile, is actually a great distance from the United States.
Indeed, Argentina and those portions of Brazil south of the Cape of Sao
Roque are farther by water from the United States than they are from
Europe. But distance is only one factor in our relations with these na-
tions. Far more significant is the fact that we both have a tradition of
independence and that we both, though separate from Europe, have an
inheritance of Western religion and culture.
Nevertheless, from time to time, in fact to an extent all the time, our
sister republics to the south feel that the United States pays too little at-
tention to them and their problems. Perhaps, in part, this feeling is
justified. Certainly after World War II, United States diplomacy was
constantly preoccupied with European and Asian crises, any one of which
could have resulted in serious conflict, whereas under normal circum-
stances it would not be expected that global war would break out as the
result of problems in Latin America. Further, our shared ideals of free-
dom have sometimes led our diplomats to expect our sister republics to
stand by us automatically on critical world issues, thus giving them a
feeling of being taken for granted.
I was aware of this danger early in my administration and moved to
prevent such a feeling from growing. The first state visit to Washington
after I entered the White House was, as I have recorded, that of Presi-
dent Remon of Panama, and I had made a special point of attending the
dedication of the Falcon Dam with President Ruiz Cortines of Mexico,
when for the first time as President I set foot on the soil of another
nation, our nearest Latin American neighbor.
But the most important effort to improve Latin-American relations was
to recruit the services of my brother Milton, a dedicated diplomat with
such exceptional capabilities that were it not for the accident of his being
my brother, he would most certainly have been asked to occupy a high
Cabinet position in my administration. From 1953 on, Milton served in a
highly important capacity as my personal representative with the rank
of special ambassador, in making numerous studies in Latin America, and
reporting to me the feelings of the people south of the border. He per-
sistently recommended measure after measure to improve our friendships,
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to establish, as
endure.
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-WESTERN EUROPE, TRIESTE, GUATEMALA 421
to establish, as I once wrote to him, "a healthy relationship" which will
endure.
We all realized that the fundamental problems of Latin America-
which stern from lack of capital; overdependence on the sale of primary
commodities; severe maldistribution of wealth; illiteracy, and poverty-
would take a long time for the nations themselves to correct even with
all the outside help they deserved. No matter how much help we extended
--and United States aid to Latin America increased markedly during the
1950s-we realized that we were going to run into difficulties in our rela-
tions with individual. states before the day came when the major causes
of those difficulties could be erased.
The first of these problems was waiting for me when I entered the
White House. It involved Guatemala, a beautiful land of Central America
whose mountains and moderate climate make it one of the garden spots
of the hemisphere. The troubles had been loner standing, reaching back
nine years to the Guatemalan revolution of 1944, which had resulted in
the overthrow of the dictator General Jorge Ubico. Thereafter, the Com-
munists busied themselves with agitating and with infiltrating labor
unions, peasant organizations, and the press and radio. In 1950 a military
officer, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, came to power and by his actions soon
created the strong suspicion that he was merely a puppet manipulated by
Communists.
The American republics wanted no Communist regime within their
midst. They recognized that subversion by Communism was only another
form of aggression, even more evil than that achieved by naked military
force. However, in unstable regions where revolutions and rioting were
not uncommon, where some governments were being maintained by dic-
tatorial means, where resentments against the United States were some-
tirnes nurtured by groups other than Communist cells, it was difficult to
differentiate positively between Communist influence and uncontrolled
and politically rebellious groups. For example, on February 24, 1953, the
Arbenz government announced its intention, under an agrarian reform
law, to seize about 225,000 acres of unused United Fruit Company land.
The company lost its appeal to the Guatemalan Supreme Court to pre-
vent this discriminatory and unfair seizure. (Of all lands expropriated, two
thirds belonged to United Fruit. In return the company was to receive
the woefully inadequate compensation of $600,000 in long-term non-
negotiable agrarian bonds.)
Expropriation in itself does not, of course, prove Communism; expro-
priation of oil and agricultural properties years before in Mexico had not
been fostered by Communists.
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422 MANDATE FOR CHANGE
Approximately six weeks after the announcement of the United Fruit
Company land seizure, however, Guatemala withdrew from the five-
nation Organization of Central American States, alleging aggression by
Guatemala's neighbors. In this instance, the real reason was apparent:
Guatemala could not risk participation in a debate on an anti-Communist
resolution scheduled for presentation by El Salvador at a forthcoming
meeting of the organization.
Arbenz denied that his government was Communist, a denial that was
issued in a speech at a May Day celebration featuring seventy thousand
marchers. But by the middle of October 1953, the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs, John Moors Cabot, said publicly that
Guatemala was "openly playing the Communist game"; for example, it
accepted the ridiculous Communist contention that the United States had
conducted bacteriological warfare in Korea.
About that time a new ambassador, John E. Peurifoy, was appointed to
Guatemala. He was familiar with the tactics of the Communists in Greece,
where he had served. Peurifoy soon reached definite conclusions on the
nature of the Arbenz government. Later he reported that he had dis-
cussed the Arbenz orientation with the Presidente himself within a
month after his arrival at his new post. He described his discussion
aptly:
In a six hour conversation he listened while I counted off the leading
Communists in his regime, but he gave no ground; many notorious Reds
he denied to be Communists; if they were, they were not dangerous; if
dangerous, he could control them; if not controllable, he would round
them up. He said, in any case, all our difficulties were due to the mal-
practices of American business. The trips of Communists to Russia were
not to get training and instructions, he said, but merely to study Marxism,
just in the same way as other Guatemalans may come to the United States
to study economics. Meanwhile, they would continue to enjoy the full
advantages accorded all Guatemalans, as they were valuable allies to him
in the fight for social reform... . It seemed to me that the man thought
like a Communist and talked like a Communist, and if not actually one,
would do until one came along. I so reported to Secretary Dulles, who in-
formed the President; and I expressed to them the view that unless the
Communist influences in Guatemala were counteracted, Guatemala would
within six months fall completely under Communist control.10
100n October 8, 1954, Mr. Peurifoy testified before the Subcommittee on Latin
America of the House Select Committee on Communist Aggression as follows:
"It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that the purpose of your hearings is to
determine:
"1. Whether or not the government of President Arbenz was controlled and
dominated by Communists.
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-WESTERN EUROPE, TRIESTE, GUATEMALA 423
Something had to be done quickly. The first task was to marshal and
crystallize Latin American public opinion on the issue. The opportunity
presented itself at the Tenth Inter American Conference of the Organi-
of the American States (OAS) which met in Caracas, Venezuela,
zation
in March of 1954. At that meeting the United States urged the adoption
of a joint condemnation of Communism, contending vigorously that it
should not be permitted to control any state in the Western Hemisphere.
Foster Dulles, representing the United States, argued that if Communism
should succeed to this extent, it should be treated as a threat to the peace.
On March 6 he introduced a draft resolution of a "Declaration of Soli-
for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American
darity
States against International Communist Intervention." The draft resolution was harsh. It was meant to be. It condemned in-
ternational IiQ
Communism in the Western Hemisphere as a type of foreign
intervention; pledged the American states "to take the necessary measures
to protect their political independence against" such intervention; de-
clared wa
that the "domination . .. of the political institutions of any
American State by the International Communist movement" constituted
a "threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American
States, endangered the peace of America, and would call for appropriate '
action in accordance with existing treaties." It also called for an exchange
Fa
of data on Communist activity in each country and upheld the right of
each state to defend its own independence and to choose its own form
of government and its own manner of social and cultural life.
On March 26, in plenary session, the organization approved the
resolution by a vote of seventeen to one, with Guatemala opposing, and
Argentina and Mexico abstaining Costa Rica was absent. As passed, it
differed in only one respect from the draft; it called not for immediate
action to meet the Communist threat but rather for a "meeting to consider II'
the adoption of measures in accordance with existing treaties."
"2. Whether or not the Communists who dominated Guatemala were in turn
directed from the Kremlin.
"3. Whether or not the Communists from Guatemala actively intervened in the'
internal affairs of neighboring Latin American republics.
"4. Whether or not this Communist conspiracy which centered in Guatemala rep-
resented it
a menace to the security of the United States.
"My answer to all four of those questions is an unequivocal `yes'
"The Arbenz government, beyond any question, was controlled and dominated by
Communists. Those Communists were directed from Moscow. The Guatemalan
government and the Communist leaders of that country did continuously and
actively intervene in the internal affairs of neighboring countries in an effort to I!
create disorder and overthrow established governments. And the Communist con- s
,
spiracy in Guatemala did represent a very real and very serious menace to the
security of the United States."
P=994
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This resolution formed a charter for the anti-Communist counterattack
that followed. But before these resolutions could become effective, things
got worse.
In the two months from March to May, 1954, the agents of interna-
tional Communism in Guatemala continued their efforts to penetrate and
subvert their neighboring Central American states, using consular agents
for their political purposes and fomenting political assassinations and
strikes. In Guatemala itself the government answered protests by sus-
pending constitutional rights, conducting mass arrests, and killing leaders
in the political opposition.
In May things came to a head. On the 17th of that month Foster
Dulles reported to the press that the United States had reliable in-
formation on a shipment of arms from behind the Iron Curtain. The arms
had been loaded on the Alfhem, a Swedish ship chartered by a British
company, at the East German Baltic port of Stettin. The ship was at that
moment being unloaded at Puerto Barrios in Guatemala. The ship had
mysteriously changed its announced destination and its course three times
en route, apparently in an effort to confuse observers. We learned that the
cargo contained two thousand tons of small arms, ammunition, and light
artillery pieces manufactured in the Skoda arms factory in Czechoslo-
vakia. This quantity far exceeded any legitimate, normal requirements
for the Guatemalan armed forces.
On May 19 Nicaragua broke diplomatic ties with Guatemala. Five
days later we announced that the United States was airlifting arms to
Honduras and Nicaragua to help counter the danger created by the
Czech shipment to Guatemala. Our initial shipment comprised only fifty
tons of rifles, pistols, machine guns, and ammunition, hardly enough to
create apprehension in neighboring states.
On May 24, 1954, I informed the Legislative leaders of measures we
were planning to take. Honduras and Nicaragua had asked for help.
Among other things, we would (1) prevent any further Communist arms
build-up in Central America by stopping suspicious foreign-flag vessels
on the high seas off Guatemala to examine cargo (an action conforming
to the United Nations Charter and Caracas resolution) and (2) convene
another meeting of the Organization of American States to consider
next steps. We would, of course, advise Mexico and other friendly
countries of our plans.
Our quarantine measures soon ran into trouble. We were able to hold
up at Hamburg some six tons of 20-mm. antiaircraft shells in transit to
Guatemala from Switzerland. Action on the high seas, however, was a
different matter. While well within the capabilities of the Navy, such
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measures woul
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WESTE_t\T EUROPE, TRIESTE, GUATEMALA 425
measures would require at least the tacit cooperation of our allies, princi-
pally Britain, to avoid placing an almost fatal strain on our relations. At
first such cooperation was difficult to obtain, at least completely, from the
British. Foster communicated with Anthony Eden on the matter, and the
latter finally, with misgiv gs, issued a statement which we considered it
adequate.Y1
Meanwhile, in Guatemala, Arbenz had declared a state of siege and
launched a reign of terror. Then on June 18 armed forces under Carlos
Castillo Armas, an exiled former colonel in the Guatemalan Army,
crossed the border from Honduras into Guatemala, initially with a mere
handful of men-reportedly about two hundred. As he progressed he
picked up recruits. Simultaneously three obsolete bombers, presumably
under his direction, buzzed Guatemala City and bombed the ordnance
depot. Things seemed to be going well for Castillo's small band until
June 22. On that date Allen Dulles reported to me that Castillo had lost It
two of the three old bombers with which he was supporting his "invasion."
A meeting was arranged that afternoon with Foster Dulles, Allen
Dulles, and Henry F. Holland, who had succeeded John Cabot as As-
sistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. The point at issue
was whether the United States should cooperate in replacing the bombers.
The country which had originally supplied this equipment to Castillo
was willing now to supply him two P-51 fighter-bombers if the United
States would agree to replace them. The sense of our meeting was far
from unanimous. Henry, a sincere and dedicated public servant and a real
expert in Latin American affairs, made no secret of his conviction that the
United States should ?veep hands off, insisting that other Latin American
republics would, if our action became known, interpret our shipment of
planes as intervention in Guatemala's internal affairs. Others, however,
felt that our agreeing to replace the bombers was the only hope for Cas-
tillo Armas, who was obviously the only hope of restoring freedom to
Guatemala.
"What do you think Castillo's chances would be," I asked Allen Dulles,
"without the aircraft?"
His answer was unequivocal: "About zero."
"Suppose we supply the aircraft. What would the chances be then?"
Again the CIA chief did not hesitate: "About 20 per cent."
I considered the matter carefully. I realized full well that United States
Yl The statement by Anthony Eden, dated June 18, 1954, said in part:
"There is no general power of search on the high seas in peace time. The British
Government, however, has certain powers under Defense Regulations and otherwise
to detain or requisition under certain circumstances. The Commander-in-Chief of
West Indies is being instructed to take appropriate action where practicable if the
carriage of arms by British ships should be suspected."
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426 MANDATE FOR CHANGE
intervention in Central America and Caribbean affairs earlier in the cen-
tury had greatly injured our standing in all of Latin America. On the
other hand, it seemed to me that to refuse to cooperate in providing in-
direct support to a strictly anti-Communist faction in this struggle would
be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Caracas resolution. I had faith
in the strength of the inter-American resolve therein set forth. On the ac-
tual value of a shipment of planes, I knew from experience the important
psychological impact of even a small amount of air support. In any event,
our proper course of action-indeed my duty-was clear to me. We
would replace the airplanes.
As my visitors prepared to leave the office, I walked to the door with
Allen Dulles and, smiling to break the tension, said, "Allen, that figure
of 20 per cent was persuasive. It showed me that you had thought this
matter through realistically. If you had told me that the chances would
be 90 per cent, I would have had a much more difficult decision."
Allen was equal to the situation. "Mr. President," he said, a grin on his
face, "when I saw Henry walking into your office with three large law
books under his arm, I knew he had lost his case already."
Delivery of the planes was prompt and Castillo successfully resumed
his progress. After five days, during which the Guatemalan Army an-
nounced its refusal to support Arbenz, he announced that he was relin-
quishing power to a Colonel Diaz as the head of a new provisional gov-
ernment. Two days later a second change deposed Diaz and brought the
anti-Communist Colonel Elfego Monzon to power. Thereafter, further
negotiations, with Ambassador Peurifoy and President Oscar Osorio of El
Salvador as mediators, brought Colonel Castillo Armas into Monzdn's
new ruling junta, eventually as its head.
Meanwhile the United Nations Security Council had deferred action
on the Guatemala matter during an investigation by the Inter-American
Peace Committee of the Organization of American States, but the change
of government had made furthur action unnecessary.
The major factor in the successful outcome was the disaffection of the
Guatemalan armed forces and the population as a whole with the tyran-
nical regime of Arbenz. The air support enjoyed by Castillo A.rmas,
though meager, was important in relative terms; it gave the regular armed
forces an excuse to take action in their own hands to throw out Arbenz.
The rest of Latin America was not in the least displeased.
Arbenz fled via Mexico to Czechoslovakia, and Castillo Armas was
later confirmed first as head of the military junta and then, by a thunder-
ing.majority, as President. He proved to he far more than a mere rebel;
he was a farseeing and able statesman. For the three years of life remain-
ing to him, he enjoyed the devotion of his people.
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 WESTORN EUROPE, TRIESTE, GUATEMALA 427
By the middle of 1954 Latin America was free, for the time being at
"Now the furure of Guatemala," Foster Dulles said in a nationwide
broadcast on June 30, "lies at the disposal of the Guatemalan people
themselves."
One more event deserves mention to complete the chronicle of 1954:
the settlement at Suez.
Probably because of their recognition that in the atomic era large
masses of troops at Suez would have doubtful value, the British modified
their demands to the government of Egypt, headed after April of 1954 by
a new President, Gamal Abdel Nasser. By July 27 the two governments
had arrived at an agreement in principle, which they sealed in a final
agreement on October 19. Progressively, over the next twenty months,
they concluded, the British would withdraw all of their troops. British
and Egyptian technicians would, in various zones, keep the Suez Canal
Base in working order. The Royal Air Force would have rights of over-
flight and landing. In the event of an attack on any of the eight Arab
states or Turkey by any non-Arab state, the British could move back
into the base and put it on a wartime footing. Freedom of navigation
through the canal would remain unimpaired.
On November 7, 1954, having encouraged Egypt to conclude an agree-
ment on Suez, the United States announced a grant of $40 million to fur-
ther Egypt's economic progress.
By the end of the year a historical pattern was emerging: American
political, military, and economic influence was being used to help solve
old quarrels, preserve freedom, eliminate traditional antagonisms, and
give confidence to weak and exposed nations. We had inherited many
problems out of the past. In company with good friends and allies around
the globe-from Seoul to Guatemala City to Teheran to London-these
problems we had solved, at least for the moment, even though others
remained and new ones were certain to arise. But we and our good com-
panions could well feel, as 1954 came to a close, that more than once
in the past two years we had made a good end of the beginning.
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