LETTER TO DR. JAMES B. RHOADS FROM JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00793R000200120031-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: May 18, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved Forlease A,P75-007910002001
National Archives and Records Service:
Eighth and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20408
Dear. -Dr-. Rhoads:.
of developing:a list identifying those records which require continued
classificaticn, indicating in.each instance. the reason why continued
protection is deemed necessary. When. completed, this list will be
submitted to me for final determination and specification of the dates
materials originated-- by- t:he. Agency. s_ predecessor. arganization, the-
-Office=--of Strategic Services, and now in the custody of the-National
Archives `NABS=Record Group 226). They are currently in the process
task of conducting.a-systematic declassification review of'those
Intelligence.Agency has detailed three experienced-officers to the
'Pursuant to Section.. 5(E) of. Executive- order 11652,. the Central
on. which such material ehall.become declassified..
possible use in the broader-context or the government-wide declass
Declassification: guidelines, have been promulgated to..assist
the reviewing officers in fulfilling their responsibilities. .Al-
though.formulatedwith Record. Group 226specifically.in mind, the.
guidance-is also generally"applicable to related intelligence records
of this Agency..- = The guidelines are forwarded herewith in the belief
that they will prove of interest to the National Archives and of. .
Enclosure
SAIC:CS:GFD:mj
Distribution:-
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:SDPCATEtJRY:
SCHEDULE C i
( Le one or more)
Central Intelligence Agency
"M 0ssi We_ L delerrnrhe-1
GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES RECORDS
General Guidance
The purpose of declassification review is to make available to
the general public the maximum amount of data consistent with the
obligation to safeguard national security interests, to protect
sensitive intelligence methods and sources, to avoid exacerbating
foreign relations, and to respect legitimate rights of, privacy. Of
these, the matter of protection of sensitive intelligence methods
and sources will be of paramount concern in determining whether the
defense classification of OSS records must be continued. At the
risk of oversimplification, "sources" can be defined as the origins
of information and "methods" as the ways in which things are accom-
plished. Often sources and methods utilized in particular. programs
are essentially inseparable and cannot be considered in isolation.
. The Agency's declassification jurisdiction is limited to those
records for which the OSS exercised exclusive or final original
classification authority. If, as is likely, non-OSS documents are
found in the OSS files, such documents should be tabbed or other-
wise noted and eventually referred for declassification action to
whatever agency exercises current security classification juris-
diction over them. Similarly, classified materials which were
received by the OSS from foreign governments or international bodies,
with the express understanding that the information would be kept in
confidence and that security protection be continued, should be noted
for future action but must not be unilaterally declassified or down-
graded.
If it is determined that a document must remain classified, but
that it could be released provided that certain limited portions
(e.g., one or two personal names) were excised, this fact should be
noted on the worksheet. This guidance will enable National Archives
reference personnel to provide sanitized versions of otherwise classi-
fied documents to researchers and should be done, although not required
under the provisions of Executive Order 11652.
Detailed Guidance: Named or Identifiable Individuals
1. OSS personnel identities should be protected only if it is
known that they continued their association with US intelligence organi-
zations or were otherwise involved in intelligence activities beyond
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the date that the OSS was disbanded. If, however, an individual's
affiliation with the OSS has been previously surfaced in open
literature, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the
classification of the document on the basis of his post-OSS in-
telligence associations. Documents not declassified because OSS
personnel are identified can be declassified 40 years after the
publication of the document.
2. Covert agents' identities, even though it is not clear
that they were witting of their OSS connections, should continue
to be concealed unless it is known that they have voluntarily
publicized their intelligence roles or were otherwise exposed
beyond any reasonable doubt. If in doubt, do not declassify;
protection of agent sources from compromise is fundamental to
the continued effectiveness of an intelligence organization.
Ideally, agent identities should never be revealed, but such
action would be impractical in the real world. Adequate pro-
tection can be afforded them and their families if documents
identifying them are withheld.from declassification until 75
years after the publication date of the document.
3. The identities of liaison officers from cooperating
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence services should be
protected from disclosure. Declassification of such matters re-
quires the concurrence of the foreign government concerned. The
date that such documents can,be declassified is thus impossible
to determine.
4. If a contact in a foreign government is identified as
the source of information, his identity should be protected unless
it is clear that he was consciously passing information to a member
of the OSS in accordance with instructions from his superiors. If
the document reveals a degree of collaboration between a foreigner.
and the OSS, the disclosure of which could be a source of acute
embarrassment to him, its classification should be continued. Do
not rule in favor of declassification if any reasonable doubt
exists. The declassification date for such documents should be
75 years after the publication date.
5. The identities of US private citizens who had furnished
information, or otherwise cooperated with, the OSS with the under-
standing that their role would be kept in confidence should be
accorded protection from public disclosure. In those instances
where they are not identified by name, a judgment should be made
as to whether the source description is specific enough to permit
their identification. The date that such documents could be de-
classified is 75 years after the publication date.
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6. Individuals, particularly US citizens, mentioned in
investigative reports or similar records, the release of which
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy or a breach
of confidence, should be protected from disclosure. Though covered
also in the Freedom of Information Act, the need for protection in
national security related-documents justifies continued classif i-
cation. Such documents could be declassified 75 years after the
document's publication date.
7. Any report containing information, the disclosure of which
would place an identified or identifiable person.in immediate
jeopardy--whether covered.by the foregoing categories or not--should,
of course,.continue to be classified. Such documents. could be de-
classified 75 years after the publication date.
Detailed Guidance: Intelligence Methods
1. Sensitive-intelligence methods which must be afforded pro-
tection beyond the 30-year. mandatory,review period include information
concerning or revealing techniques of agent recruitment, nonofficial
and other unconventional cover arrangements, deception techniques,
methods and equipment employed for covert communications, technical
surveillance devices and strategies, microphotographic methods and
equipment, escape and evasion techniques, i.a., provided that such
methods are not essentially identical to those universally employed
by intelligence services and therefore widely known, or that advances
in technology have not rendered such methods and supporting equipment
entirely obsolete. Documents containing such information must remain
classified as long as the methods are utilized in-operations, and
therefore it is impossible to fix a date for automatic declassification.
2. Methods related to logistical and other support activities--
as opposed to intelligence collection and covert action techniques--
adapted to the particular operations and circumstances of World War II,
do not in themselves qualify as sensitive methods requiring continued
protection.
3. Information with respect to the internal organization of the
OSS, the chain of command, component functional missions and personnel
ceilings, and intercomponent working relationships has lost much of
its sensitivity with the passage of time. Moreover, a considerable
amount of this sort of information has already appeared in open
literature. Documents dealing with the various cover organizations
created or employed by the OSS, however, should continue to be classi-
fied for 60. years after the publication date of the document.
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Detailed Guidance: Communications Intelligence and Cryptography
1. Communications intelligence, cryptography, and related
activities must be provided with protection from premature dis-
closure unless technological improvements have greatly diminished
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their sensitive nature. Included are any data concerning or revealing
the processes, techniques, technical materiel and equipment, particular
operations and overall scope of communications intelligence, and
cryptographic security. The date for declassification of such infor-
mation, being dependent upon the factor of obsolescence, is therefore
impossible to predetermine.
2. Decrypted cables should be declassified on the basis of their
subject matter content. Modern techniques of massive computer attack
against encryted intercepts of World War II systems are so effective
that it must be assumed that any hostile intelligence service which
decided to expend the effort to retrospectively process the data could
have read the texts of cable messages.
Detailed Guidance: Subject Matter Content
1. Classified information contained in OSS documents and other
record media, regardless of the subject, the origin of which can be
clearly traced to another US Government agency, should not be de-
classified unilaterally. Declassifying or downgrading action must
await the decision of the agency exercising current declassification
authority and therefore the date would be impossible to determine.
2. Classified information which was passed to the OSS by liaison
representatives of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence services
and subsequently incorporated into OSS documents should not be declassi-
fied unilaterally when it is apparent that this was the case. Declassi-
fication of such material must await the concurrence of the foreign
government concerned, and the date for declassification is therefore
impossible to.determine.
3. Any information which would probably adversely affect the
conduct of present day or future US foreign policy or international
security arrangements if disclosed should not be declassified without
the prior concurrence of the Department of State and/or the Department
of Defense, even though the document and the information contained
therein is exclusively OSS in origin. Declassification or downgrading
action must await the decision of the competent agency, and therefore
the date would be impossible to determine.
4. Biographic information of a nature that would be highly
embarrassing or compromising to friendly or collaborating foreign
nationals, the release of which would be likely to impair US re-
lations with the nation involved, should not be disclosed. Documents
containing such material should not be declassified until 60 years
after the publication date.
5. With the passage of 30 years, the reportorial and analytical
content of the bulk of OSS documentation will have lost whatever sensi-
tivity it once had. Illustrative of the subject matter which can be
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readily declassified are: translations or summaries from the foreign
press and radio broadcasts; prisoner interrogation reports; translations
or summaries of captured enemy documents; statistical data or other
purely factual reporting, with little or no attempt at predictive
analysis; information dealing with conditions prevailing at a particular
.point in time, e.g., enemy order of battle, and thus highly perishable;
and any information which has been extensively and accurately reported
in the press or in other open source publications.
CONFIDENTIAL
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