RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION (Sanitized)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00662R000200010028-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 29, 2000
Sequence Number: 
28
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 14, 1952
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00662R000200010028-2.pdf690.39 KB
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App - --_. , O0,0128-2 OFFICE MEMORANDUM 'o: Assistant Director for Research and Reports Subject: Recommendations 25X1A9a pate: 14 May,! 25X1A6a 25X1A 25X1A9a 25X1A 25X1A 1. As you have learned uy cable, was transferred to last week by the General's office after a consultation among_ 25X1A9a 25X1A9a I was isolated at home with the chicken pox, but Mike gave me a briefing on what transpired. The 25X1A main reasons advanced for the change were that badly needed an ec-- 25X1A6a onomist, that -has few sources at the presen time, and that 25X1A9a 25X1A6d would be more strategically located in the-Building. 25X1A 25X1A9a 2. The change is probably a sound one. We need a representative in and Mike was assured by that he would have complete freedom to follow up sources in his specialty at other intelligence collection installa- tions. 25X1A9a 3. In view of this change, and of request to ORR for two or three more analysts, the time seems opportune for reviewing the types of OBR personnel needed. in this theater, and the appropriate places for assigning them. 4. I feel that there is sufficient work to be done here to increase and improve the reporting of economic intelligence to occupy fully the time of any number of analysts that ORR might sent over. So many economic fields are covered in the various reports collected in the theater that almost any branch in OAR could be profit ;,'31y r.9-presoated. 5. Hence it is difficult to chhose three or four specialties, out of the large number of fields covered by ORR, as the ones to be represented in the ORR field team. It is just as perplexing, in view of the new organizational 25X1A6a set up at the to decide where these representatives should be located. In the following pages, I have therefore made some recommendations on these matters and have detailed the reasoning behind. them, in the hope that #J they will be of some help in the formulation of fut' re ORR plans. 6. Types of additional ORB .personnel needed: metallurgical, chemical, and engineering, industries specialists, all with sufficient ORR experience to understand requirements of branches other than their owns. Language qualifi- cations are of secondary importance. A reading knowledge of German would he very helpful; Russian and Satellite languages of slight help only. 25X1X4 SECRET Approved For RelEMW2pjbti CIA-RDP75-Oii62R000200010028-2 8. The following alternatives, in order of preference, are suggested for the assignemt of personnel: 25X1A a. Assign all to provided (1) CRR can select the type of personnel it thinks is needed; 2 ORR can be assured of a minimum integration of its personnel into the field evaluation program 25X1 A and. of complete freedom to follow up sources at other collection centers. 25X1A b. Assign one analyst to and two or three indus- 25X1A9a ?5X1A9a trial specialists to Scientific Di.-~ision; or, one additional analyst (preferably a metallurgical specialist) to and two to Scientific 25X1A Division (preferably a chemical and an engineering industries' specialist). 25X1X4 d.. Assignment of an East-West trade specialist to Survey 25X1A9a Group, Office of Political Affairs, would be of marginal value 25X1A in improving collection of economic intelligence, but would be a good spot for a D/A analyst to observe workings of East-West trade negotiations and enforce- ment of export control. This is a special case and should be considered separately from the rest of the program. 9. Length of tour of duty: Su gent thEt two members of the team be assigned to a full two-year tour to insure continuity of operations, and the remainder on a six month's basis. 10. It is recommended as a special measure that ORR'smost experienced Satellite and USSR railroad analysts be assigned to successive TDY assign- 25X1A6a ments in ranging from two to six weeks for purposes of giving first- 25X1A6a hand guidance to _and other organizations collecting railroad information. TYPO OP ADDITIONAL ORR :FERS011TNR1L NEEDED I. Onae of the fundamental questions to be determined, in the assignment of 25X1A6a personnelto the is whether these analysts should be general economists or specialists in a particular field. Most of the economic intelli- gence collected in this theater is from relatively low-level sources and deals with specific sectors of the economy rather than with overall economic developments. And on these specialized type reports, interrogators and. editors need specific guidance, guidance on the most important insillations that should be covered, guidance on the obtaining of technical information, which is assuming increasing importance in ORR's attempt to assess qualita- tive factors of a country's econo . his type of guidance can best be 25X1A9a rendered by the specialist, and and I both feel that we should. select our representatives accordingly. Since only a few ORR branches can 25X1A6a be represented in however, the specialists chosen should have suffi- cient ORR experience to be familiar with the needs of branches other than their own. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000200010028-2 SEC SECRET Approved For Re[~ea eU2DO0 it 'P bIA-RDP75-00b401R000200010028-2 12. The selection of type of specialists should depend on the volume of information collected on a particular subject and the availability of specialists on the subject already in the theater. On the basis of these factors, I would suggest thekLssignment of a chemical, a metallurgical, and an engineering specialist in ac3ition to the agricultural specialist already on duty. 13. So far as I know there are no metallurgical specialists attached. to any of the intelligence collection groups in this theater. There is a considerable flow of reporting on the subject, and a number of technical questions on iron and steel production have b eon referred to me from time to time that could have been much better answered by a specialist. 14. Much ame situation exists in regard to reporting on the chemical 25X1A9a industry. is the only chemist in Scientific Division, but his time is fully occupied with administrative duties. The Army and Navy both have chemical specialists, but their interests seem to be on military aspects such as chemical warfare, and on research and tevelopment rather than on 25X1A9a proc?_uction. has indicated that he would like very much to have a chemical specialist from ORB attached to his group. 15. In the field of the engineering in.E!ustries, there seem to be no specialists in the theater outside the realm of military production. Navy keeps a zealous eye on shipbuilding. Air Force has a potent staff of ATLO's (Air Technical Offic vering every phase of research and development and production Liaison ers co 25X1A9a of aircraft. iha.s men on naval weapons, *i.rcra.ft, guided missiles, and electronics. In the field of production of ground weapons and ammunition, X1A9a there is plenty of room for an ORB specialist. The briefing that 25X1A gave= on Soviet AFV production was, I believe, the fist such guidance they had ever had; yet armament producing installations are one of their highest collection priorities. Reporting on machinery production probably confounds the interrogators more than any other subject. There are specialists in the area, on electronics; Air Force has a man on production equipment, but his interest is primarily in specialized equipment for aircraft production. That is about all. Reporting on any one type of machinery, with the possible exception of the electrical and electronics field, is hardly sufficient to occupy the time of one analyst. What is needed is a specialist well grounded. in the basic processes of ma.ny.facturing--casting, forging, and machining-- who can represent the interests of all of the branches of D/I. The electronic field is a little different. There seems to be a considerable amount of 25X1A9a reporting, but it is too hi:ghl slanted on the technical side with the economic aspects somewhat neglected. would like an ORR electronics expert working side by side with his electronics specialist. I asked him why his men with a little additional effort could not cover the production aspects for us; but he replied that he felt he should concentrate on research and development. I am inclined to the opinion that inasmuch as our representation in 25X1A6a is going to be a small one that we should not attempt to parallel - 25X1A9a but to supplement him. 16. Language qualifications, I feel, are a secondary consideration to sub- stantive qualifications. As a rule there are an adequate number of interro- gators available to work with our representatives on almost any language. it obi. 1 e .~ a in a minimum of direct interrogations. A6) e dire `se12uu0/08/17 fA-RDP75-00662R000200010028-2 ECR Approved For Rele eSt 0WNR -RDP75-006 000200010028-2 A knowledge (,,f German would be useful for scanning the considerable number of reports that are collected in the German language, narticularly for anyone assigned to Speaking ability in Russian or any of the 25X1A Satellite languages, while useful, is not at all necessary. 25X1X4 25X1X4 25X1X4 25X1X 17, Before discussing the pros and cons of assigning ORR personnel to various organizations, I will review briefly the t,,rpes of sources which will have to be covered by these personnel and the organizations which are exploiting them: 25X1A6a 25X1A6a c. Defectors: exploited at - a half hour's drive from Number of sources varies from time to time. At present only two sources being exploited who have2h_Xo offer in the field of economic intelligence, 25X1 a 1 m A6a turned. exploited at on outskirts of Sources are small in number but high in quality. BET Approved For Rele 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP75-0066 8000200010028-2 - 5 what potential exists among these refugees. 18. In the pursuance of the above program, the following are the organizations to which ORR personnel might be assigned: 25X1A a. (list of functions attached): Strategic offers the Moo owing advantages for the placement of ORR personnel: (1) 25X1X4 25X1A6d (2) It is centrally located in the - Building. (3) It has excellent communications with Washington, including a weekly telecon, in which ORR could participate. (4) Its leadership is dynamic (but will change in September), and the Division seems to be in a favorable position as regards the General's office. Through its representation in 25X1A ORR would be in a good position to emphasize the importance of economic intelligence 25X1A6a to the top level of the On the other hand, there are these disadvantages: (1) Concentration of effort is on East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. has no 25X1A 25X1A9a signific nt mission as regards the USSR, although has indicated that they might expand their coverage in the future. 25X1A (2) has a heavy workload of oral briefings, watch committee work, and weekly, monthly, and other reports. These activities are of little or no value to ORR, yet it is difficult to see how ORR personnel assigned to could 25X1A 25X1A9a avoid shouldering the burden of some of this evaluation work. has assured 25X1A9a that he will be free to follow up sources in other collection organizations. If, however, he has three people from ORR filling his slots, he will want them to produce some evaluated intelligence. In requesting a statistician, he must have in mind doing some analysis of ALwit'l~ Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000200010028-2 Approved For Rele 2Q # I p fi DP75-0066&R000200010028-2 - 6 - Eastern German or Czech production statistics, which activity would be a repetition of work 25X1X4 being done in ORR. Rendering guidance to operations in the field of economic intelligence n rlrl d-4 m? of h e of t nnu ~na~~TQta~ a-,s1 fined to Strategic. They snoula "5X1A6a the remaining 75% of their time at 25X1A6a Once they start engaging in analysis wor , however, they will not have the time to carry out this guidance program. If we could gain assurance that ORR personnel assigned to Strategic would have as their primary mission the rendering ollection organizations, then Strategic would t o c of guidance IR ion. Under the 25X1A6a be a good place to assign our ent ntat new decentralized organization in we may not be in a position to obtain such a guarantee, u feel that 25X1A9a is sufficiently anxious to expand his organization, and par cularly to staff it with economists, that he may be willing to go along with us. The important thing is to have a full understanding on the matter before we assign any additional personnel. Regarding his requests for a general economist and a statistician, we might be able to satisfy him with a specialist with a good economic background (or give in completely on this point) and another specialist with a good statistical background. 25X1A9a out of town for several weeks; but when he returns, and I will discuss the matter with him. 25X1A 25X1A9a c. Scientific Division: - has expressed an interest in having one or two ORR industrial specialists, preferably chemical and electronic, assigned to his division. His people are a fine group to work with, and in many respects, their interests are closely akin to ours. Scientific is an ideal organizational setup for guiding the collection of intelligence. 25X1A9a personnel can move wherever the sources are, have no analytical responsibilities, and serve only one master. This may be one place for assigning industrial spec k' is if we are unable to make satisfactory arrangements with Then Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000200010028-2 SECR ril SECRET Approved For Relea e 29 / CRRA DP75-00666R000200010028-2 too, it may be the one place where we could assign personnel for six-month tours of duty. 25X1A6a ..d. has been an ideal operating center from our point of view. They have given me adequate logistical support 7ATIthmit requiring me to perform 25X1A9a I _ s d me 100% in my outside activities. e on k b e ac have disadvantage, and it has been a substantial one, is its location in the country. This has made it difficult for m~5X1A6d to keep up with developments in the -Building. The number of defectors at the present time is not sufficient to justify a full time ORR Representative, unless that represen- tative'services other activities as well. And these other 25X1A6d activities can be better served from the Building. If we are to have several representatives in it would be25XlA6a better to have the appropriate specialist visit M as the 25X1A6a need arises. If, however, there is no organization in the 25X1A6d -Building to which we can assign personnel without integration into an evaluation program, then the disadvantage 25X1A6a of location might be more than balanced by the advantage of freedom of movement at _ Judging by transfer,25X1A9a it may well be that the General's office would not in the future permit us to place a representative at -, even if25XlA6a we wished to do so. 25X1X4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000200010028-2 sEC~~ Approved For Release 2 YM IWIRDP75-0066.aR000200010028-2 25X1A - 8 - 25X1A 25X1A9a source material consists of var*c* es of intelligence which ORR receives, and in addition, 25X1X4 and ~ reports, wh oes no receive. rom this material ishes a series of East-West trade 25X1A9a , . r,. ,..,.,, ?, -i-,-- -n_ - aa .r_- r - A rIr,,,- ------nA n 4? 25X1A9a For example, - may receive =report indicating that 25X1A6a 25X1X4 25X1A9a would like to have an ORR East-West trade specialist assigned to his group on an integrated basis for a period of six months or longer. This specialist would assist 25X1A9a - section in the preparation of reports and would look out for items in which ORR might be interested. -took 25X1A9a particular pains to point out that ORR would thus have access to certain types of reports which it would not otherwise distri- 25X1X4 receive. I asked him why ORR couldn't be put on the distri- bution list for the if they so desired. He repl e a these were too sensitive to be forwarded to Washington, which I find hard to understand. 25X1A6a Rather than send someone to to read these reports, it might be better to get ORR placed on the distribution list 25X1A9a for them. (Incidentally, is microfilming all25X1A9a of files.) While assignment of an ORR specialist to this group seems of marginal value so far as improving the collection of economic intelligence is concerned, it might be valuable in providing a D/A analyst with an opportunity to observe the workings of East-West trade negotiations in_ and of trade enforcement activities. A deterring factor, however, is the 25) It ~rtaint of the part to be played by the upon completion of the contractual agreement, in East-West trade matters. If ORR is interested in making such an assignment, I feel it should be considered as a special 25X1A9a case apart from the rest of the -representation. 25X1A6a or I will, if further interest is evinced, go to Bonn and obtain the latest information on the future of Survey Group's activities. 19. If either (a) for (b) is adopted, I think that each ORR representative should, in addition to his functional specialty, have the responsibility for monitoring a particular collection program. One analyst should be responsible for following 25X1X4 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000200010028-2 25X1A 25X1A JSEC E L Approved For Release Rg/ gg,7lll A-RDP75-006&2R000200010028-2 - 9 - responsibility might be termed an administrative one, whereby the ORR representative would keep himself fully informed of sources being processed, problems of collection, and support for particular programs which might be required from Washington. It would also fix responsibility for insuring that all subjects of economic interest, whether or not within the field of one of the assigned specialists, are properly covered. 20. In regard to the length of the tour of duty of ORR 25X1A6a representatives in - there are certain disadvantages in a six month's tour. Ordinarily an analyst would require several months to reach full effectiveness in his duties here; shortly after that he returns home. It is somewhat disconcerting to the collection organizations to have a constant turnover in the personnel giving them guidance. For a man with a family, he must either leave his family behind him or bring them over at his own expense. What is more important are the problems involved in uprooting his family for such a short period. On the other hand, the short tour enables more analysts to secure this valuable field experience and permits the sending of a greater variety of specialists over a given period of time. The full two year tour insures a greater continuity of effort, enables an analyst to become more proficient in his duties, but has the attendant disadvantage of keeping the specialist too long out of touch with his analytical duties, probably making it more difficult for him to readjust when he returns. On this problem I would suggest a combination of the two procedures. Assign one or two analysts to a two year tour and the remainder for six month tours. In this way we can preserve continuity, and, at the same time, continually augment the mission with new blood. This method would work best if all our representatives were grouped together, either 25X1A or divided between and Scientific.25X1A fit:. As a special measure, I would recommend that ORR's most experienced analyst on Satellite railroads be sent to 25X1A6a 25X1A6a on TDY for a period of from two to six weeks to give Pirs and guidance on collection of railroad information. This visit should be followed by a similiar one from an experienced USSR railroad analyst. The primary mission of 25X1A9a these analysts would be to confer with of ~ 25X1A6a who, though responsible for collection o all economic intelligence, has for a long period of time been concentrating on railroads. Virtually every source handled by- is 25X1A9a interrogated on this subject. ~ knows his business, knows in general what information to collect, but needs specific guidance from Washington as to how to concentrate his effort and what specific information to collect. The 11111111111111111publicationE25X1A8a on Soviet railroad systems, which we have furnished Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CIA-RDP75-00662R0002089NO2 SECRET Approved For Release M p$//7OR DP75-00662000200010028-2 - 10 - have been of great help to him, in fact have constituted the only guidance he has received from Washington. Further current written requirements would help him, but I feel that the stimulus of personal guidance from experts is what he needs, and that such guidance would pay immediate dividends in the form of better reporting, and reporting better suited to our needs. 25X1A6a Although guidance to - would be their primary mission, these analysts would Also have the opportunity to confer with other groups, such as Air Force and SO, which are collecting railroad information. This very short tour of duty has been suggested, because I feel the best people could be spared for a short time, whereas ORR might feel it could not part with them for as long as six months. I feel, too, that inasmuch as they will be conferring with people experienced in collecting railroad information, that the guidance mission can be accomplished in a relatively short period of time. 25X1A9a Approved For Release 200QA CIA-RDP75-00662R000200010028-2