ADVISABILITY OF RESTRICTING US STATISTICS ON THE IMPORTATION OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00662R000100170062-8
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 29, 1998
Sequence Number: 
62
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00662R000100170062-8.pdf195.72 KB
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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000100170062-8 ow D I SABILITY O r~'i' CI0`f'I' G U ~ TATI T O]'] TNti IN.dORT1-TION OF c 'r n T i 'T `._ IALS .sere are several ways in which this -problem 1migh be formulated. be might attempt to determine the possible benefits w'r icb a potential enemy could derive from the import information in question as against the cost to the United stales of restricting it. if we were to assume that the value of the data to the tactical or strate :-i_c Planning of the USSR was rather small, we might postulate that we should at least -make it more difficult for the ,soviets to obtain the inlor-rmation. We might then consider ;-.'he cost to ourselves of this restriction in relation to the Sovie cost of ccirci,mvention. All of these considerations have a bearing on the problem, bi?t it must be pointed out that they are extremely unamnenable to precise determination. It is ,articu_larly to comment on the uses which the IT i could make of spec i_fic infor ma. io:n, or of the difference wl-,ich the ready avnJ_labilit-r or lack o + the informa :ion, as T,he case ma.,,r be, would make in `soviet ag^ressive capah _lities. In general, all economic intellig .nce .onceri~.in .countrp,r is closely interrela- e:d, and the importance of a sin.;..: e fra f--ment to the whole will var. y. Accepting the above limitations, it is believed the focus of this _;rob lem ought to be on whether the particular t-\ u_.c of info r ma-[-,ion would provide -r ?^e USSR with the, capacity to arrive :rtt intelli en-e evalu- apion.;; which. 'could not otherwise be obtained. Ti,). this rea ' the _following ppoint' ss can be made: Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000100170062-8 Approved For Release 2000/0/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000100170062-8 *40~ 1%W (b) import date,., as such, ca::.n be derived from numerous a.lteri a -ive sources import data, even for the strategic- commodi tic:,,, Pave a relati~_velu.r low utility value ~.:"or most intelligence 1.)ur-..:oses (c) the type of intelligence indications which 1.mnort data do reveal about, `,A-,e T;nited States is, for the r~ost partreadily available i ,:tore , seful form in other dome--ti-allyuk?lisreed ester. ials. he `irs, 1_~oint, ha;- of a 1-,ernative sources, need not concern ~. is extensively, it should su...i ce to state that import statistics are either directly available or can. be derived from the export accounts of other countries, fr. om. the activities of foreign producing and export- ink; firms, and to some extent from the movement of land and sea transport. The Import statistics for most strategic raw materials have a limited value for intelligence. Such, data Co riot in themselves reveal industrial use patterns, probable stockpiling rates, or specific strateg-sic ?Mans. This type of intelligence is more ren.d-J_1y obtained from domestic production ficures, from t%i.e allocations o_f critical tmmaterials, wnc fromm~t. various __ i, is inc_listr-. al exooansion pro f rams . --?. r h 4, ,r1 or, .. stn ~ s ~i are ~.,nra..cac.ive of the general level of industrial ac;tivitbut inform nation on the C P or on genera levels: of employment provide use useful Information on trade i~ most useful in intelli7en,_~ for the application o -' trade jontrols. TToweve r, 1l_nder s resen',_ old 4Tar cor.:diti_ons, US' in r. is ar ~ sources of s C ra imports are in areas no',,- subject to Russian influence. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000100170062-8 Approved For Release 2000799/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000100170062-8 Lh_t le thy: forerVoinr. discussion ~~~:oule. seem to y l _te a a_ ns ~. ??~Le adoption of widescread restriction of it port ~ statistics, a case can be made for sele,',i_ve restriction on. individual commodities when the following conditions or f n 1_r7~ obtain: (a) commodity is one enters direr tly almost solely into t ,e production of a strategy ically% significant end. product, in isuch a way as to indicate. the total output iVow t',-.a-L-. produc-t 4 (b) information on the ~~3 ^ of the end product has been, or is about- to be, restrict-led the bourc es from which the import is obtai-n-~ed are amenable security control. Pu eurc u--le of a. commodity which meets he above criteria is uraniTm. "n nature. ,..ere r;~..~T;r 9eVer,-..,.l of-her import 1 tens of this . word on the cos--u of restriction of import information s',-ould be R i_ncl,u-de.:. ? v cost, ?-ewe do no,"*, refer to tr. t?-.naible costs related to an ert,ainly these are important. uninformed citizenryT e refer, rather, to costs related no intelligence ob` c-`-ti_ves. An overall -,program for restricting import statistics i.n order ~- o be m.eanin -ful would involve t} e co-operative sup ~ressi..on of trade datra. -cr tJ e ocher countries of the non-^o,1~~~ni_su -~orld. i-These measures, in :,urn, .ould cut off sources of inforr~ati on on the exports n . J f. - y n..1 n g ~,.? ._, _ 1. l ~. ;.d i. facilitate the USS?t' s circumvention, of US trade control. Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000100170062-8