OUTLINE FOR JUSTIFICATION OF SECURITY LIST ITEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00662R000100160010-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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SECURITY INFORM THOIT Atteclu lent
OUTLINL?' FOR JUSTIFIeATIO1'T OF SECURITY LIST ITfl&S
(To be followed in docuzientin.g items for Technic-a Manuel, and to be used
as basis for justifying revisions or additions of security list items.
Definition of Items List No.
A. Description
6.
1, State what the item is if not fully explained by tl.e definition
itself, or if this is a now item, a,md describe important varia-
tions in grade, size, or ;:~oCel of the item.
2. Identify the m re in i ortant elements covered by the definition,
iwe~,: 50,,000 ?.nti 25,000 K11 generators t1.thougl. the definition
covers those of 500 121 -,ad over.
Tell what it does,, or how it is used operation-lly,asu1 what
advantages or dis:ati me ;es it Sias over otlier items, with
similar or closely allied uses.
To what axtent .ir hi6lly skilled l-abor ne ded?
tihat level of technology is required in its production?
Give ex-ripleo of its use in U.S. industry' and other OoCom
B, Strategic Significance (Describe in sufficient detail to make an
impressive statement)
Direct U.S.. I kAlttary,, AE, BXI. or CZ uses of the item, if there
1, Military uueo by_.tl~-e Soviet Bloc.
2, Results of analysis of captured enemy equipment
Other strategic uses
6Jl.zt strategic j..iateria].s 'or'strategic coriponent parts are
used in its production?
.*NOW* SECURITY INFORMATION
*DOC Exempt Letter on File*
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SECURITY INFOTION
B, (continued)
.ttachment I
To what extent are these i.iaterials used? are, they
essential or can they be substituted satisfactorily?
C. Sources of SEpriy Outside the Soviet Bloc
1, bhich non-Soviet countries produce the item, and which are
the chief prod-a.-ors quantitatively?
2. WhIch non-Soviet countries produce the best grades or Models
of the iten?
Which non-Soviet countries export the item, and which are the
Liajor exporting countries?
4, Which non.-Soviet countries export the item to the various
countries in the Bloc. and is this a traditional trade pattern
or a recent development?
5.
What is extent of U.S. exports of the item to the-friendly
country exporting the sane iteLi to the Blocj
D. Soviet Bloc Needs and Availabilities (including CoLinunist Ciiina
and North Korea)
1. In-.which countries.of, the Bloc is the iteLl produced, and in
w1hat quantities?
2, Indi_ca.tions>,of eccurul .tecl stocks, if ant's
3. Indications of shhortae of supply, if zny, in various coun-
tries of the B oI c;
(a). Statistics on iLiports under ;send Lease, end
stater?ent regarding Soviet shortage during
I.`orld. War Iii
(b) St?tistics on imports into the Bloc during 1951, and
during the first six months of; 1952, by Soviet Bloc
country of destination,' of if statistics are not
available, a.gener.al statement, as to which countries
in the Soviet Bloc probably import the, item frou the
outside,
2
r SECURITY INFORMATION
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U( SECURITY INFORIvIATION Attacluient I
(c) Statements concerning (1) the degree of urgency
of Soviet attempts to procure the item outside
the Bloc, (2) whether or not the Soviets offer
premium prices prices or offer strategic goods in ex-
change n ~ it , ant (3) whether or not the Soviet s
try to buy the item outside theBloc by indirect
means through middlemen or third countries,
(d) Any other statements concerning a shortage in
supply: (1) of the item, (2) of basic Liaterials
needed for its production, (3) (if the item is
a piece of machinery or equipment) indications
of shortages in the goods manufactured on this
machinery,
(e) Indications of Soviet weaknesses in production
of the item or of items closely relatecl to it,
as for examples deficiencies in quality, or
shortages of skilled labor or technical per-
sonnel.
4. If no evidences of shortage can be listed, as suggested above,
have domestic Soviet requirements for the item been met in the
past year from indigenous production without imports from out-
side the Bloc and without diminution of stocks? (answer this
separately for the USSR, the European satellites and China, if
possible).
5. Can Soviet domestic requirements for the item be :let during the
coming year from indigenous production without imports from out-
side the Bloc, without diminution of stocks or without diver-
sion of manufacturing facilities from other important activities?
(Answer this separately for the USSR, the European satellites
and China, if possible).
During a full-scale wax, if _ll supplies from outside the Bloc
were cut off, which, if any countries of the Bloc would be
short of the goods manufactured on the item? How soon would
such P. shortage occur, and haws serious would be the effect on
the prosecution of the war?
~i/WT S CUBIT Y IId FOtBi ATI ON
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SLCURITY INFORiiATIO`.l Attachment II
RATING CRITERIA
Although the CoCom cou,ztries have not formally establis.aed rating criteria
they have t& en.note.of criteria that guided the Jnited States, United
Kingdom and France in Tripartite negotiations. on the strategic lists. The
Tripartite notes were based on the U.S, criteria,
a_ity BARGO CO TTROL`, /L I. US I Al-',,D US 1A.),
0'ollowiiig are the US 1A criteria, which are in substance the same as those
noted by CoCom for I/L I),
Class IA includes all., imiaterials:or equipment which may contribute
to the war potential of the Soviet Bloc to such a great extent that
no export of such materials or equipment should be permitted to the
Soviet Bloc.
One of the following criteria must be met for Class IA:
(a)
Materials or equipment which are designed or
used principally for the production and/or
development of arms, a:-.Imu:.tition and implements
of war,
(b) Materials or equipment which would contribute
significaatly to the war potential of the Soviet
Bloc where the items incorporate advanced techno-
logy or unique technological know-how, It applies
only to goods sufficiently important to the war
potential of the Soviet Bloc that the absence of an
embargo would permit a significant advance in Soviet
Bloc technology over its present level of develop-
nent,
(c) Materials or equipment which would. con tribute signi-
fimantly to the war potential of the Soviet Bloc in
that the items, if ei:lbargoed, would maintain or
create a critical deficiency in the war potential of
the soviet Bloc.
The United States has adopted the following explanatory notes for use
b,r tic US, only:
1, Criteria (b) and (c) may be qualified in cases where the
materials or equipment arc available from outside the con-
trolled areas (the U,S,,RP countries and any other
SECURITY IIFOR;,AKIO T
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4WOMT SECURITY IiTFORij:ATIOIv
At t aciarient II
1. (continued)
countries that control exports to the Soviet Bloc) in
quantities sufficient to i.ieet the im,)ort demands of. the
Soviet Bloc, and on conditi.tas as to quality of product and
timing of delivery approximating those obtaining in the
controlled area.
2. ;iihcre a materials or equipment iten on the IA List includes
more and less advanced t3tpcs, and only the more advanced
types fall under criterion (b) above, a cut-off point
should. be established and the 1A rating applied to the types
above the cut-off point under this criterion, Where such a
cut-off point cannot be established, the items should be
rated 1B and in licensing, applications for exporting the
mare advanced tyrpes to the Soviet Bloc should be denied..
QUANTITA'1'IVL CO]27TRO (I/Is II. US II ALD US IIB
Items which are highly important from the point of view of their contribu-
tion to the war pots tial of the Soviet Bloc and of which the high strategic
character is directly related to the quantitative extol-it to which they may
be exported to the Soviet Bloc, The, export of items 'in class IIB from the
United States should be restricted to the smallest possible consistent c=ith
the overall policy.
The last sentence in the quantitative criterion is, of course, eliminated
from the international criterion.
1.C" Al'GL 01' I o2i.ATION (I /L. III)
Items of '6otential strategic significance for rlhich information presently
available on the Soviet Bloc needs is insu..ffidiont to establish clearly
the necessity for control otypes indicated.
'.life CoCori countries have taken note of the following in connection with
all criteria:
The trorc'_s "wa. potential!' used in the above criteria should be
interpreted as meani g the followin'; War potential is to be
viewed from both the short term and the long term aspects. It
includes (a) items of direct ,.military application, It may also
include amongst others, selected items which represent (b) sec-
tors of industry in which strategic and industrial interests are
very closely i.ain;led1 and whore the ite_:is concerned can easily and
2
P SECURITY II 1'Odt 'iATIO3
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~! C SECURITY IPTORIviATION Attachment II
quickly be turned over from peacei'ul uses to the manufacture of
war ecla-ipment or other direct military application; and (c) other
industrial fields which serve to support the basic economy of a
country and which t1ierefore support either a peacetime or wartime
economy
,
US LIST IC
List IC Includes materials and equipment (not on U.S, List I, II1 IA or
113) which may support military activityr and the export of which to
the Soviet Bloc should be ,restricted,
The US IC list has not been submitted to other nations,
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