WE HAD THE FACTS ON CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000700400010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 1, 1963
• Content Type: NSPR

NEW YOATC'
JUN 1 1963
TERALD TRIBUlproved For Release 2005/01/04: CIA-RDP75-0'
Letters to the Editor
We Had the Facts on Cuba . I
o the Herald Tribune:
As a naval reserve intelligence officer?I cannot,
let Mr. Roscoe Drummond's analysis of the Stennis.
Subcommittee Report on our intelligence in the Cuban
crisis go unchallenged.
Mr. Drumlpsays "something needs to be done"
becaulae of the inability of Mr. John A. McCone and
our other intelligence chiefSta convince" the sub.
committee that all. ..Soviet long-range missiles :have
been removed from Cuba.
Well, this report is a wondrous document: you
can prove either side of the question by it. I suppose
this comes from a desire for unanimity. But there
is a grave question, when as fundamental an issue
as the integrity and competence of our nation's in-
telligence}services are concerned, whether the public
interest is really served by an inquiry that stops short.
of a clear-cut verdict just to keep everybody happy.
In any event, one thing is clear: all of the report's,
conclusions which refute charges against our intelli,
gence services are based on facts, while those which
give aid and comfort to the critics are either self-,
contradicto,ry or rest on nothing more substantial
than theoretical skepticism.
Take the matter of strategic missiles. The in-
telligence chiefs "to a man" conclude these missiles
have.-been removed. To oppose,this impressive prp
fessional judgment the committee offers only "abso-
lutes" and philosophical skepticism. Theoretically,,
to be sure, anything is possible. But is this really anyi
way to run a railroad-or a country?
Likewise, the "substantial errors" the commit-
tee says resulted from a belief by some intelligence
fficials that the Soviets would never put missiles
An Cuba vanish in the face of facts appearing else-
where in the same document. For example, from;
July 1962, on all rumors about such missiles-whether
contrary to "subjective" beliefs or not-were "scru-
pulously" checked out, we are told, with uniformly
negative results. Until the pictures came in from
that Oct. 14 U-2 flight nobody-either in the Senate
or out-had any confirmation of any long-range mis-
sile rumors.
So what "substantial errors" were there? What
more could intelligence have done, even had they
believed otherwise? Should' they have represented
as confirmed fact rumors for which no confirmation
could be found? Or was the subcommittee perhaps
indulging some of the Administration's more vocal
.critics in its midst by taking the intelligence com-
Washington, D. C.
House of Representatives.
Whatever the ate "answer to our trouble-
some problems in qh it can only be complicated
by an unwillingness on the part of those in possession
o;. the . facts to ' repudiate unequivocally unfounded
charges -against an' intelligence community' that ac-
tually turned in a magnificent and highly successful
performance. last October.
Approve,4cF -eP,glmap,49 "irni e. i e 'a s 9R000700400010-3
munity to task f r ' ,
powers prior to Oc IF,