HOW DO YOU BECOME A NUMBER ONE ENEMY?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000700260020-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: January 15, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For : R)Ll It5851 /,051: CIA-RDP75-00149R000 00269020-8
UNION ,LEADER tta"7
(Sunda NEWS)
d. 52, 21
S. 45, 98
Front E it Othof
Pug. Pape Pig.
Date. JAN 15 1965
;,. How Do You Become
A Number One Enerny? ,''
Prince Norodom' Sihansuk of Cambodia has
announced that we are his "number one enemy.".
How can this be?
.,,On the face of it, this attitude is little short of'
:P'.'redible. In the past 10 years we have given this
i ttion, which was carved out of French Indo-
C'lina, $277.4 million in economic aid and anotherl
$83.7 million in military aid. This amounts to
about $60 per capita. In contrast, the Chinese ;
:C,mmunists have spent a paltry $50 million and,
yet they have won the loyalty of ? this little
;nation so strategically located vis-a-vis our war
in Viet,Nam.
Once-we disabuse ourselves of the notion that
an "buy" allies and begin to look around for',.
...'asons," they are not hard to find.
One of the more serious strains in it.- U.
Cambodiaiixelations followed close on _ the ~ieels
of the considerable evidence that Washington was,J
'exerting pressure against the Diem regime in I
nearby Viet Nam. The murder of the Diem
brothers and t'he' immediate recognition of the l
army chiefs who did the killing is said to have
had a profound effect in Cambodia. It' is indeed'
conceivable that Sihanouk's reaction might have
been, "There, but for the grace of God, go I."
We do know that Prince Sihanouk has
complained bitterly about American meddling in
:Cambodian . affairs. He has even accused a;
I member of the.CIA of trying tb detach two off!
Cambodia's northbrrw?provinces. Where the truth
lies in these matters is difficult to determine.
But the Prince's unwillingness to discuss it,1
and his readiness to forego further American,
assistance, for whatever reason, has a deeper
meaning. It is an opportunistic decision based on
the conviction that, our side is not going tb wing
that we :may not even be wiljing to. stay In
1
Southeast Asia long
no
glh t... 1..
e
u
se
This is the crux of much of our inl'ernational!
'roubles. The ideals of democracy and freedoms
are appealing to most people, in an abstract way.
But the world Is basically non-idealistic and it has.
I to be `shown that democracy and freedom cah
winl
Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP75-00149R00.0700260020-8