CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600350013-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 19, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2001/04/23NGRESSIONj "t49R000
FOIAb3b
cage. As reported in the Aviation Daily
of February 28, the Secretary said:
Our equipment for close air support, I
believe, is the but In the world.
Methinks the Air Force I rotesteth Too
Much
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
EON. OTIS G. PIKE
OF NEW YORE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, April 19, 1966
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Speaker, in two con-
secutive issues of the Air Force and Space
Digest, a magazine published by the Air
Force Association, there have been crit-
ical articles entitled: "Pike Subcommit-
tee Report on Tactical Air," and "An
Open Letter to Congressman OTIS G.
PIKE."
Since they spelled my name right, per-
haps I should just let them keep sniping
on a monthly basis, but since the name
stands almost alone as something they.
got right, a few further comments may
be in order.
The alleged motivation for this little
vendetta is a report made by a special
subcommittee of the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee entitled "Close Air Sup-
port." The subcommittee was appointed
on August 17, 1965, by Chairman L. MEN-
DEL RIVERS of the House Armed Services
Committee and consisted of nine mem-
bers: RICHARD H. ICHORD, of Missouri;
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, of Michigan; G. EL
LIOTT HAGAN, of Georgia; DONALD J. IR-
WIN, of Connecticut; FRANK E. EVANS, Of
Colorado; BOB WILSON, of California;
CHARLES GUBSER, of California; CHARLES
CHAMBERLAIN, of Michigan; and myself
as chairman.
Hearings were held in Washington in
September and October. Witnesses in-
cluded Army Special Forces personnel
who had seen a great deal of ground com-
bat in Vietnam; Air Force, Marine, and
Navy pilots who had flown hundreds of
missions in Vietnam; and Army, Air
Force, and Defense Department wit-
nesses on the policymaking level in
Washington.
The report was filed with Chairman
RIVERS on January 27, 1966. It was unan-
imous. It was critical of both the Air
Force and the Army in certain respects.
If the Army resented the criticism they
shrugged it off. We seem to have struck
a nerve with the Air Force brass, how-
ever, for they have been screaming more
like sick Sea gulls than wounded eagles
ever since. If it were not for the lives at
stake it might be mildly amusing. As it
is, the attempt to make a great success
out of what has been a slighted, down-
graded, underfinanced close air support
role in the Air Force is not only pathetic,
it is dangerous.
On Friday, February 25, 1966, the Sec-
retary of the Air Force praised the Air
Force's close air support performance in
.a speech to- the Executives Club of Chi-
The article listed just four aircraft:
the A-1E, the A-7, the COIN, and the
F-4.
Not one of those aircraft is a plane
developed by the Air Force. Three were
developed by the Navy, the fourth by the
Marines.
Of the four tactical aircraft requested
in the supplemental authorization for
the Vietnam war by the Air Force this
year, not one was developed by the Air
Force; two were Navy planes, one a
Marine plane, the fourth privately de-
'veloped and used by the CIA.
It must be galling to the Air Force to
find - itself so ill-equipped for close air
Support in a guerrilla environment that
it had to get planes from the Army-
-0-1 spotter planes-the Navy, and the
Marines in order to do its job of close air
support in Vietnam. Such has been the
fact; however, and the Air Force does
itself and the Nation a disservice by try-
ing to conceal the fact,
The official organ of the Air Force As-
sociation has gone even further. Before
attacking the subcommittee's report
they rewrote it to suit their own pur-
poses. The committee's report was lim-
ited to the quality of the close air sup-
port provided our own troops and our`
Vietnamese allies. The title of the report'.
was "Close Air Support." It was printed'
on the cover in large letters. The Air,
Force Digest made it- "Pike Subcommit-
tee Report on Tactical Air." This en- ,
abled them to talk about a lot of other
things. Usually erroneously.
In the March issue Mr. Witze, the
senior editor, tells how the subcommit-~!
tee visited Vietnam after the hearings
were over, and were told by the Army'
generals how thankful they were for the;
support they got from the Air Force.!
Fact: This subcommittee never went toj
Vietnam. Mr. Witze points out in a
magnificently garbled paragraph that
there have been political restraints,
In Vietnam and says that when he landed
at Tan Son Nhut airport in mid-1964,'
"the RF-101's?were lined up on the ramp!
ready to 'go." Go where' and do what?
I suspect that the senior editor really
knows that RF-101's take pictures, they;
do not provide close air support.
In the April issue the Air Force Digest)
contains a story by Sam Butz, giving the:
Air Force's version of a part of an oper-
ation. known as Harvest Moon. The.
story features a picture of Mr. Butz rid-
Marine Corps system. It contains such
deljghtful pieces of self-praise as this:
As they came over a ridge they saw a group
of about 100 ARVN troops, led by a U.S.
adviser, running up a hill. Behind them
on the trail were at least 150 VC, - One FAC
(that's the Air Force man in the Army
plane-forward aid controller) swung down
and fired his AR-15 automatic rifle at the
leading VC group, killing two of them.
'Comment: Sure he did.
The other called in an AC-47, one of the
old C-47 transports recently equipped with
three rapid firing Gatling guns.
Comment: This latest addition to the
Air Force's inventory of close air support
aircraft was first flown in 1935.
However, it has not been possible-for a
reporter to get any realistic discussion of
the operation from official sources in Viet-
nam.
Comment: Obviously.
It is too bad that the Air Force is so
sensitive on this subject. They use the
argument that I am prejudiced because
20 years ago I flew with the Marines.
The argument loses much of its persua-
siveness, however, when used only by
people who make their living by butter-
ing up the Air Force. The happy fact
is that our close air support in Vietnam
is better than it was. By borrowing
planes from the other services, and by
using Air Force planes for purposes and
missions for which they were never in
teirded, and through the unlimited cour-
age, dedication, and skill of American
pilots, the job is being done.
The sad fact is, Mr. Speaker, that the
report was and is correct. The Air Force
has concentrated on missiles, bombers,
and interceptors. It has never devel-
oped one plane for the primary purpose
of providing close support for the foot
soldiers on the ground. It is not the
fault of the Air Force pilots in Vietnam.
With the equipment they have been pro-
vided they have done wonders: It is the
fault of the same high level Air Force
policymakers who still feel obliged to
'deny that they have ever ignored the
vital close air support mission. They
count the number of missions flown, and
thb tons of bombs dropped, and the num-
ber of medals awarded, and never, ever,
admit that if the ton of bomb which
we've dropped for each Vietcong had hit
the Vietcong, the Vietcong would have
been long gone. As long as they keep
their heads buried in the sand, they will
continue to present most attractive tar-
gets.
jug In the back seat of an 0-1 Bird Dog.
This is the plane which the Air Force had
to- get from - the Army. After they got
them they painted teeth on them and
took Mr. Butz flying around Vietnam.
Either they fly better or frighten the
Vietcong more with teeth painted on'd
them. In the turgid prose of the Air
Force Digest this is described as distinc
tive marking.
The article, which Is in the form of a,
letter to me, is a supposed testimonial to ;
the proposition that the Air-Force- sys-
tem of close air support is better than the
Approved For Release 2001/04/23 : CIA-RDP75-00149R0006Q0350013-,7