LAOS: FOUR PHASES TO NONEXISTENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600350002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

FOIAb3b
Apprdved For ReleM2001/04/23 : Cl
GHT LAOS: tour Phases
HE-hesitation waltz went on lest week in Laos. Neutrail
but
ist Prince Souvanna Phouma. flew in front Paris,
gov-
threatened that lrnless he got the neutralist coalition
ernment he wanted by June z5, be would fly hack to Fr
-probably for good. Red Prince Souphanouvong remained
tins
in the Communist-held north, issuing occasional hulk
ma's
to the effect that he would be delighted to join Souvan
tern
coalition. But the other vital ingredients--pro-d'i'es
van
Prince Boun Oum and right-wink General Phoumi Nosa
-were missing. Continuing their junketing tountl of South-
T France olicy
the
east Asian nations in search of money and sympathy,
thy.
two arrived at tifanila, where they got plenty of :ympa
is
.Neutralism, declared President Diosdado `vlacapagal.
hen-
the gateway to Communism." He found it incomprc
hurt
Bible, he said. that the U.S. in Laos was giving sup
aid
to neutralists like Souvanna Phouma and ~tttliholding
from staunch anti-Communists like his guests.
card
The questions raised by bfacapagal are frequently h
vers
in the U.S. One reason that the Administration ans
seem to carry little conviction is that. since its inception.
the Laos problem has been murky. full of V .S. p
reversals and disagreements. The record:
throe Brown, just about concluded that Laos could only be
Phase One, Coalition. 't'hough it ha, a king. :, goyern
does kept from cOntlnual eruption by working toward 'a coalition
meat and an army and can be found on ., map, Laos
ogle of the oplosm fortes in the cowury. But the CIA and the
not really exist. Many of its estimated ooo.coo pc
now U.S. military mission in the.tield disagreed opppseid dealing
would be astonished to be called Laotians since they k
with any Laotian katier.wb,4 scented soft on Cemmdtiistns
themselves to be oleo or Black Thai or khalom tribe-,den.
'l hey arguc~i't;tat the U.S.=trained and equipped Royal Ida,
It is a land without a railroad, a single paved highwa r
Army of _3,ooo men under General Phoumi was the only
tian
a newspaper, Its chief cash crop is opium.
el. bulwark against a Red takeover. 'The Pentagon generally
Laos was dreamed up by French I)iplcoat Jean ('hat.
ign backed the CIA, but with the proviso that. under no eondi-
who in 1946 was France's Secretary-General of l re
t its lions. should U.S, armed forces he plunged into the land-
Affairs. At the time. France was Irvine to re,isser
had locked, trackless jungles of Laos.
authority in Indo-China, whose rebellious inhabitants
b- With U.S. encouragement. Phoumi Nosavan in December
no desire to return to their prewar status as tulonial su
1960 launched a northward drive against Kong Le's para-
jests. In place of original Indo-China, consi'.ling of various
' troop battalion in Vientiane. It was about the only victory
and principalities, Paris put toacther three new
Nam. Phoumi Nosavan had ever won.- Kong Le retreated to the
autonomous states within the French Umon. \ iet
vel strategic Plains des Jarres, joining forces with the Pathet
:e
Cambodia and Laos. Drawing lines on it map. Chl
Lao. The Soviet Union poured in supplies by air, and Com-
created Laos by merging the rival kingdoms of Luntghra-
ist North Viet `ant contributed tough guerriI cadres.
hang. whose monarch became King of Lao . with Chanipats- mon
When Phoumi's army advanced, it was badly;.beaten in a
sak. whose. pretender was consoled by (king made penna-
aerie:] Of noisy but largely bloodless battles. Phoumi got a
rent Inspector General of the new state.
t the bretithtng space when, in the spring of ?ry6r, thejgoiernm tt.
French influence did not long survive the drawing o
)ten- eagerly, agreed to a cease-tire, : #r~ , ? s:=r'
map. Nine years later, with the humiliating defeat of I
ldg
bienphu, France withdrew from Indo-China. and the ling state of Laos was on its own, along with the
other Phase Four, Back to Coalition. There have been: bitter;.
lance complaints in the U.S, that R'ashingttin let Phowni >dciwn, In
remnant states of partitioned Indo-China. Indelxtn
trees an effort to force him to accept a coalition gov~ernmendr the,
was complicated by the fact that two Laotian prov
ds U.S. stopped paying Laos $,1.000.000 a month 4n? economic
were securely in the hands of Communist Pat bet Lao band
other, aid. but there has never been any skimping in U:Saequip-
Red Prince Souphanouvong. in tec;o his half-br
anent and the training of Phounii's Royal Laotian A.tmy:..Tlta:,
Prince. Souvanna Phouma. was chosen Premier and soon
integrated the two Red provinces into the kingdom by grim truth-as shown again last month at Nam Tba7t-fartUU
giving Souphanouvong a Cabinet post. In a subsequent Phounji's men simply will not fight. Some observetsiouggedt',
national election, the Reds increased their strength by taking Phouniti actually wanted his army to collapse in order.to forth
nine of : t contested seats in the National As:.cmbly. U.S. i ttervcntion-perhaps relying on President Kennedxa
March; ig6z telecast, when he said that a Red takeOver'fn..
Phase Two, Move to the Right. This surge of Commu- Laos Mould "quite obviously affect the security ol,the,U.S."i
nist power alarmed the Eisenhower Administration, then Atf-ttuy rate, ?.two- thirds of Laos is now in Communist =
engaged in trying to help President Ngo l)inh Diem of hands; The only middle way between either sending U,S.
neighboring South Viet Nam preserve a pro-Western gov- troopja into Laos or letting the country go to the Reds. by de-
ernment against Red aggression. Secretary of State John fault4V1'ashington holds. is to bring about Laotian neutral-
Foster Dulles had tried to seal off Southeast Asia by build- ity. however precarious or short-lived it may be.Theoretical-
ing, the SEATO pact and encouraging anti-Communist al- Iy, the Russians are committed to the same policy. But the
lies. The U.`+. Ambassador to Laos, J. Graham Parsons. U.S. Has now clearly set up main lines of resistance in Thai-
distrusted Premier Souvanna Phounia both a, it neutralist land and South Viet Nam, and has let the Red bloc know
and a comldonliser with the Reds. Withholding U.S. eco- that any further advance in Southeast Asia will be met by
nomic aid was enough to cause Souvanna's downfall. and U.S. troops as well as U.S. equipment.
hehsas replaced by a pro-Western Premier. A ('.s. military In-Laos. however, Washington tinds. itself in the discour-
niission was invited to I-ios, and hard-working CIA amen aging position of striving to achieve what already existed
soon discovered in right-wing General I'howni Nosavan a four years ago.
onexis ; nce ,
dedicated anti-Communist ; who displaycd more signs oC
organizing ability and drive 6an,,rnclat Laotians. , , , . ,
Phoumi Nosavan sot up a militant cottaervative party, finds`'.
Red Prince Souphanouvong.wasa'jailed for treason. In'the, ""
rigged national elections of zg6pD,. Phoumti's group gained ?4t=
sweeping majority. On the surface, a relatively tough U.h,'
policy of containing Communism seemed, to,.be an over-;.=
whelming success.
But some $25o million in U.S. economic and,m0itary..aid,,
had too heady an effect on the Laotian government. which
was soon reeling with corruption. Promised reforms, neyer?
materialized, and practically no funds reached-the peasanta,~.
and forest tribes, The Communist- Pathet Lao guerrilla bands .',
began raidirig_in the north. Red Prince $ouphanollvvttg. not,:,'
only walked out of jail, but took most of his prison guard&;,,
with. him. In- Augu.t rg6o, an, obscure paratroop captain?
named Kong Le staged a military coup in Vientiane and rte
turned Souvanna Phouma to power as Premier. General
Phoumi Nosavan, with his CIA 'advisers. retreaiteld to
southern stronghold of Savannakhet.
J'F
Phase Three, Right Defeated. At this point, the State
Department. on the advice of new U.S. Ambassador Win-
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Approved Approved For Release 2001/04/23 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600350002-9
d L
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TIME, .]ONE 8, 1962 .