BRITISH SPIES FOR THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600330054-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: October 9, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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BRITISH SPIES ON THE SOVIET
' Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, there appeared in the Washington
Sunday Post an article entitled "bow
~ Phiiby Stabbed Into the Heart of British
~ Security; ' and another entitled "Mac-
3 lean's Spying More Vital Than British
i Have Ad_aitted:'
These articles she ~ i be read by people
I interested iri the history of the Korean
~ war. They h+ghligl_a the fact that when
tl_~ Chinese Communists came into that
~ war British traitors made it possible for
~ the Chinese to know for certain that the
r United States would not use the atom
bomb against the Chinese aggressors in
that fight, and also that America's ene- -
mies in that war were in a position to
know what this Nation was planning to
1 do before we could get around to doing
it. FIaving, that information in advance,
a they must have felt safe in taking the"
~ gamble to risk a major war with the
United States.
Traitor Phiiby and traitors Maclean
and Burgess, it seemed,. had very sue-
r cessfully taken charge of the highest
' connections of British intelligence. This
Nation, it seems, had an understanding
with the British that we would not use
' atomic weapons or attack the Chinese
~ coast without consultation with them.
bjected to
u
The Attlee government was s
such treachery that the .Communists
were in a positic_'i to know, through the
Russian connections conveyi:.L' informa-
tion to the Far East, every move that
Americ. communicat~?" to its allies.
That was a very unfortunate situation,
and is sorriething we should keep irl mind
in the future, when this Nation takes
steps that it regards as being essential
and aital in it? own defense and to help
preserve the liberty of other countries
ties
lib
.
er
fighting to defend their
I ask unanimous consent to have the
article printed in the RECOxn.
There being no ob3ection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the Tt~zcoan,
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BaITIaII SF.CUiLITY-I~ISUUIIit:D SPY BLIPPED
PnsT HIS Lnx SUPERIORS
Loxnox.-FIarold (Kim) Philby's achieve-
ment in becoming head of the Soviet section
oP the Britlsh Secret Intelligence Service,
while himselY being a Soviet agent, must
rank as one of the great processional coups
in the twisted history oY espionage.
Phiiby later went on to higher things when
" he became the linkman between the SIS and
~1 the U.B. Central Intelligence Agency, Prom
which position he could give his Soviet apy-
masters thorough general knowledge of the
operations oP both the major Western intel-
ligence agencies.
But them is a classic quality about the
earlier achievement. The selection in 1944 of
Phiiby, already a Soviet agent oY more than
ten years' standing as the man to' conceive,
build and control s new Britlsh operation
against the Russians is an event embodying
the purest essence of espionage.
WELL EQUIPPED
How was Phiiby able tq do it7
First, he was superbly equipped for the
role oY spy: His markmanship waa excellent,
-his mind was swift and clear, his nerves
were strong. Despite some powerful drinking,
he remained physically tough and resilient.
He was. also extremely attractive to women.
But above these qualities Phiiby had the
capacity to disguise his feelings and lntea-
bons, a crucial professional attribute of a
epy. For 80 years he lived as a .passionate
Communist behind the facade oP a middle-
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 S 54432 Approved Fo~~~~4?1~0~~~P7~~~+,4~0006003300?~#~ber 9, Y967
class Englishman with Liberal-to-Consarva- TxE PrRST cx.rr2lrrERS until. 1951 and .the model for Ian Flemings
tive opinions. When the civil war ended, Philby had coin- fictional security chief "M." The etiquette of
It is still almost impossible to find chinks pleted two years as an undercover Commu- the time was to leave Menzies alone with his
in the mask that Kim Philby fltst put on nisi in Franco's camp. But was he already personal assistant when they were together,
when he was 22. There are one or two clues: spying on the British? There are two bits of since it was understood that they were "run-
His writing was careful and restrained, and evidence. ning the secret service or something."
many people who knew him recall an elusive One is that an ofilcei? named Pedro Giro re- White's provided, too, a fertile source for
sense of distance or remoteness. Rarely did calls that in a cafe in Salamanca a German. emergency wartime recruits, on the basic
he allow himself to be engaged in such a way agent passed a note to him with a warning English principle that if you could not trust
as to reveal his inner thoughts, against two men then in the cafe. According your club, who could you trust?
Had Philby been forced to spend more to the German, these men were British As for Menzies himself, one former sub-
time in first-class intellectual company dur- agents. Twice subsequently, Giro saw Philby ordinate recalls: "He was terrifying to work
Sng those 30 years, it is questionable whether locked Sn conversation with tho same two with because he acted entirely on instinct.
he could have kept up the charade. But the men. He rarely read a single case right through,
ineptitude of the British Intelligence Servico Another point was noticed by Sam Pope yet he often came in with the answer."
helped to make his fantastic career possiUle. Brewer, a New York Times correspondent COUNTERESPIONAGE
Because the SIS bureaucracy was protected (whose wife, Eleanor, Philby was to acquire Kim Philby became part of Section Fivc
by layers of official mystery, the agency was 20 years later in Beirut) . At press confer- of MI-6 which was responsible for counter-
even less prepared than others in the Sritish Daces, Kim was always the last questioner espionage, or more exactly, spying on the
establishment to cape with the mid-20th and the man who wanted to know just which ~ German spies. Through personal contact
century. The Service was a caricature of the regiment had made just which move. supplied by his? old colleague Guy Buugess,
establishment, and so this is an account of perhaps at this point Philby, anxious to Philby became head of the Iberian subsec-
a great breach that opened up the defenses ingratiate himself with British intelligence Lion.
of a social class, and therefore the defenses men, was collecting and passing on any tid- "Philby just did not have the contacts to
of the nation, bits he could get. get that sort of job on his own," said one o[
Philby was born on New Year's Day, 1912, ZANY CORRESPONnENT hiS colleagues. "I know it was Burgess who
in imperial India. Ironically, young Philby's ran a someone and of him in."
Indian piaymates nicknamed him "Kim," When the British expeditionary force lest g p g
after the half-caste boy of the Kipling book for France to fight the Germans, Kim Phil- The Iberian subsection's theater was a
b went with them as the London Times' vital one. Spain was a neutral, friendly to
whose 'central theme is intelligence work. Y Germany, and provided the perfect Uase for
The boy's father, Harry St. John Bridger No. 1 war correspondent. His colleague, Bob o erations a 21nst Britain's communications
Philby, was an officer of the Indian civil Cooper, thought Philby a wild, slightly ke stone, Gibraltar. Portugal was friendly
service, a distinguished Arabist who, though drunken and rather brutal young man. Kim, to Britain, but Portuguese MozamUfque was
he came of mkldle-class background, rejected it seems, was addicted to a curious bar game the center of German espionage operations
its ordered virtues for the passionate, egotis- which involved busting people's knuckles. in southern Africa. It was Sn this connectic~i
tic culture of the AraUian deserts, St. John Also, as in Spain, where he had acquired that Philby sent Malcolm Muggeridge to
Philby, like T. E. Lawrence, fought to free a Royalist mistress, he was rather conspicu~ Lourenco Marques and Graham Greene to
the Arab lands from Turkish rule and later. ously living with a girl, this time Lads Mar- SlerraLeone.
came to share the Arab belief that Britain grret Vane-Tempest-Stewart. As a boss, Philby was a quick success. He
reneged on her promises at the end of World Other colleagues still saw him as slightly ossessed both ras and humans 'tth
War I. pro-fascist. He wore the Franco decoration faculties whichgevidently won himmintcusr
Iri 1929 Kim Philby entered Cambridge, on his uniform. The disaster of Dunkirk in ersonal to alt This was to be a feature of
where he met future colleagues Guy Burgess June, 1940, brought Philby back to London, hfs entire career, and it is with an almost
and Donald Maclean. Philby's political bend At last conditions were ready for his crucial unspeakable sense of irony that assocfatrs
was steadily leftwards. His views were ex- penetration of British intelligence. recall the word which they always felt
pressed more in private, although with great 'Phew conditions were nowhere better than summed him up: "integrity."
conviction. at the house where young intelligence ofTi- ?you didn't just like him, admire him.
-Philby had traveled in Central and Eastern cers set up residence. Among them were Guy .agree with him," says one man who saw him
Europe during university vacations, and after Burgess and a number of homosexuals, heavy. often from the war until his defection. "You
graduation in 1933 he went for an extended drinkers and hangers-on of varying types. worshipped him."
stay to Germany and Austria. Lt was here Philby was immediately taken into the B .1943, two ears after comin in, Phith
and then, in the early days of the Nazi terror, department for sabotage, subversion and was firmly established as one of Menzies' verq
that Philby's resolve was hardened. He be- propaganda. His particRlar job was lecturing best men.
came a determined Communist, and he was on propaganda leaflet technique. Philby was gut by early 1944 Philby was getting bored
recruited as an agent. later transfered to a unit training for un- b the limitations of the Iberian subsection.
A few months -after he left Cambridge, armed combat behind enemy lines, but his Y
Philb was tven his lifetime task-to ene- stammer anti the fact that his work in It was theri that Menzies asked Philby,
y g' P ust a few months before D-Day, to reviee
irate British intelligence. Every piece oP ob- Spain had made him known to a great many the defunct counter-espionage operation
jective evidence available points to this pe- German military people made it seem sulci- against the Soviet Union. To Philby, tlils
rind in late 1933, and is corroborated by the dal to send him into occupied Europe. must have seemed the ultimate apportunlty,
accounts Fhilby has given to his children So in the summer of 1941 Philby was re- and also to represent the ultimate folly of
who have visited him in Moscow since his cruited. for work in the Secret Intelligence ,.the men above him.
defection from Beirut fn 1963. Service. Philby's appointment is a measure of the
On Feb. 23, 1934, Philby married an Aus- This agency, better known as MI-6, was blind faith in him on the part of his supr?
trian Jewish girl, Alice Friedmann, in Vienna. and is concerned with espionage and counter- riors, whose own reputations had been aided
She was an avowed Communist, and now lives espionage in foreign countries. (MI-5, the b Fhilb s work. Had Philb s earl Com?
in East Berlin with her third husband. home unit of the mythical James Bond, con- Y Y~ Y Y
Philby and Alice returned to London, where terns itself with counter-espionage in Brit- monist experience been forgotten? ilad ii
he Uecame an assistant editor on a dying ain and the colonies). Both agencies had been oUliterated from the record by his es-
liberal magazine. But Philby was to spend the suffered a severe contraction since the palmy cellent performance.? Or was it, Just concclr-
next five years carefully obscuring his left- days of World War I. ably, noted and, in a moment of supremr
wing past beneath aright-wing camouflage. MI-6 had escaped any basic reforms. Dur- political naivete, ignored?
Obviously an excellent way to insulate one- . ing the 30s it had done its recruiting, in the The aging colonel who was the sole ln-
sclf against charges of communism was to tradition oY the Great Game of the establish- cumUent of the inactive Soviet section Seas
condone Hitler's Nazi regime, which both meat, from the British police force in India' pensioned oft, and Philby moved in to build
Philby and Burgess did by joining the Anglo- and partly among rich, uppor-class young pn empire which, within 18 months, occuplyd
German Fellowship. Philby managed to have men from London's financial district. an entire floor and employed more than 1l>a
his picture taken at aSwastika-decked din- It was these men, often known as "the people. Within two years, the section had ac-
ner. This was in 1936, just before the out- stockbrokers," who gave the Service its con- cumulated a vast store of information on
Ureak of the Spanish Civil War, which gave nection with White's Club, one of London's Communists in Western countries, front rr?
Philby another opportunity to establish his most exclusive men's clubs. This notorious ganizations and the other now-farniliar stn"
public political position. liaison stands at the center of any picture of of Cold War counter-espionage. And Kim
Philby went to Spain in February, 1937, the wartime secret service. And it epitomizes Philby had acquired the confidence of lus
and Ucgan reporting as a free-lance writer trie rougish, dilettante quality of MI-6, of staff.
from tho Franco side. which the rest of Whitehall, and especially "lie could get them to do anything ter
Recently in Moscow, Philby told his son ,the embryonic professionals of MI-5, were him," one of them has recalled.
John: "I wouldn't havo lasted a week in to become increasingly contemptuous over This witness remembers that. everye~~
Spain without behav a@e p~~ the n - here came from a strict security backgro::^~
behaved so well, in f~~x~artlx2Edea~~~~~rA~r.l6~t~i ~~~1~01~496~3~Ia0~~ion was that c'~?:~
awarded him the Red Cross of Military Merit. aluding Sir Steward Menzies, the MI-6 chief desks should be locked at night. But a~ .
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 :CIA-RDP75-001498000600330054-4
.broke that tradition as hD broke so many
others. "Don't worry about that;' he said,.
"I'll lock them up later."
"I didn't like to do it," this witness now
says, "hut he was so charming that Icouldn't
refuse anything he asked:'
MACLEAN'S SPYING MORE VITAL TFIAN BRITISH
? HAVE ADMITTED
LONDON, OCTODER 7.-A secret intelligence
report which the Sunday Times tracked down
in Washington in the course of its investiga-
tions into the Philby conspiracy makes it
clear that, contrary to repeated British gov-
ernment assertions since 1951, Donald Mac+'
lean had access to every crucial Angle-Arner-
ican policy decision at the height of th4
Cold War.
The report was compiled in 1958 by U.9.
State Department intelligence officers in an
attempt to assess the damage done by Mac-
lean and Guy D. Burgess .who fled with him
in 1951, For the first time, the report reveals
the magnitude oP Maclean's espionage
achievements.
It is also the first evidence from official
files that the British government has been
conafstentIy misleading in its. statements on
Maclean's duties .and the type of material
to which he had access.
In fact, the U.S. intelligence report reveals
that Maclean had knowledge of secret Anglo-
American exchanges on the North Atlantic
pact, the Korean War and the Japanese peace
treaty.
It also shows, for instance, that Maclean
had Pull knowledge of the critical American
determination to "localize the conflict;' and
therefore of its decision not to allow the
United Nations forces under Gen. Mac-
Arthur to carry the war against the Chinese
coast.
Both MacArthur and his chief of intelli-
gence, Gen. Charles Willoughby, were cer-
tain at the time that this information had
been passed to the Russians. Just before he
died, MacArthur complained that the Chtnese
not only knew of this policy decision but
"all our strategic troop movements."
Until now it has generally been believed
that Maclean, first secretary in the British
Embassy in Washington and later head oP
the American Department in the Foreign
Office, passed to the Russians only marginal
atomic secrete. He saw these in the course
of his duties as U.K. secretary oP the com-
biped policy committee-the body set up to
regulate the Angle-American exchange of
scientific information on the atomic pro-
gram.
This information was vital enough, the re-
port reveals. Maclean was able to tell the
Russians the estimates made at that time
oP uranium ore supply available to the three
governments-Britian, America, and Canada.
To appreciate the significance oP this the
circumstances of 1847 have to be recalled. In
the early post-war years the world supply
of uranium was thought to be limited. The
Went therefore embarked, In extreme secrecy
upon a program of "pre-emptive buying" oP
uranium, in an attempt to corner all the
known resources. Maclean was in a position
to tell the Russians every detail of these vital
negotiations.
The revelations provide the first credible
explanation oP the necessity that drove the
master-spy Harold Philby to risking, and in
the event wrecking, hie whole espionage
career, to tip o8 Maclean before the Brittsh
security services could reach him.
Maclean was not, as previous explanations
have suggested, simply an old friend. He was.
Russia's moat Important known diplomatic
spy in the cold war years.
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