OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN TRICKERY USED BY RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AGAINST WEST REVEALED BY PENKOVSKY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 29, 1998
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 3, 1965
Content Type:
NSPR
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Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5.pdf | 405.31 KB |
Body:
WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD
Sanitized - Approved For NUV,eaielA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
ur Man in the Kremlin
against West Revealed by Penkovsliy
Ti'iekerv Used livRussian Intelligence
Fourth in a Series
By Frank Gibney
'trl`iant Soviet General.Staff
,officer who volunteered to
spy for the West, was a]-
most the-exact opposite of
the drab, mousy professional
spy, as celebrated in current
"realistic" espionage novels.
`sociable man who liked
good food and good conver-
he had a ready wit
ks.
was prone to parlor card
When he arrived in Lon-
don, in la,e April, 1961, he
Was consciously setting out
to play an incredibly dan-
gerot. game of espionage
agaliOt his own regime. But
h- r jaged to enjoy his
sta least ostensibly, as
hohly as any, tourist.
Colonel took long
e" rtment stores, res-
tau a s' and theaters, gen-
erally in_ the company of
Grevi, ynne, his British
lies _ friend. The ob-
vious of, the British
people ihted him. He
to ne, again and
ag; ow different it was
fit: the ,.closed society of
Mos ow
. Personally, he was mani-
festly relieved for once to
be yyt.of the,;orbit of Soviet
sdet police surveillances
He ev m managed some dis-
creet nightclubbing and a
few, 'dancing lessons. (Soviet
intelligence circles in Lon-
don, assumed that Pen-
kovsk a trusted officer,
was aexipting to "recruit"
Wynne as a Soviet agent. So
his association with Wynne
was not under suspicion.)
Penkovsky also did some.
guide Work of his own,
which considerably helped
his stancing in Soviet Mili-
tary Intelligence. Shortly
before he left Moscow, Gen.
Serov, the chief of Military
Intelligence, had called him
into his office and informed
him that his wife and
daughter were also flying to
London for an unofficial
tourist visit-. He asked Pen-
kcvscy to look after them
and give there any help
they needed in getting
around in a strange city.
Accordingly, the Colonel
helped Mrs. Serov and her
attractive' daughter Svetlana
make their purchases (with
-m=;, droxxsn f,-nn, 1nQ21 an_
viet intelligence funds). He
even managed to take Svet-
lana on a tour of the better
London night spots without
arousing undue attention.
Beneath this facade of so-
cializing, however, Penkoy-
sky's new work continued
in earnest. On the basis of
`he .formation he had sub-
mitted, the British and
American intelligence offi-
ceis were now convinced
that his desire to work with
them was genuine.
rh, their nocturnal meet-
ings, they gave the Soviet
colonel a complete short
course in clandestine radio
communications, as well as
a small Minox camera for
photographing documents.
It was arranged to make
contact with him through
Wynne or another Western
emissary, if he found it im-
possible to return to West-
ern Europe in the near fu-
ture. If necessary, instruc-
tions would be transmitted
him by radio.
When he finally left Lon-
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5
CPYFftized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5
ASS FOR SP`5'-This is Crol. Penkovsky's pass as an "expert" of the
don on May 6, Penkovsky
carried with him presents
for his highly placed Soviet
friends, including Gen. Se-
rov, a full report of the
trade and technical mission
(which Moscow judged a
great success) and , it rnin-
plete set of instructions and
equipment for getting fur-
ther espionage information
out to his "new, friends" in
the West.
In the following excerpt
from the Papers, Penkovsky
has some more to s about
the real nature of s own
Soviet :delega'tion' d the
stern ground rrles' sTill laid
down to cover oviet
contacts with fore` ers.
By Oleg Pen Jovsky
The State Committee for
Co-ordination of Scientific
Research Work is like a
ministry. Our chairman, Rud-
nev, enjoys all the privi-
leges of a ministe$$ In the
U.S.S.R. The comnii-ttee is
in charge of all scientific
and : technical exch es
with foreigners, botki irihe
Soviet Union and abt'oad. In
fact, it is' a large espionage
apparatus, which not only
collects scientific and ec;t
nical information, bud fries
NOV 12 1965
to recruit Western technical
specialists.
When I began my work in
the committee, I was myself
astounded by the. number of
intelligence officers work-
ing there. Eighty or 90 sen-
ior intelligence officers work
in the foreign relations sec-
tion alone. When one walks
down the halls in our of-
fices, one can, see some of
them saluting each other in
the military manner. They
have conspicuous difficulty
getting away from military
habits, even getting used tp
their civilian clothes.
The friendly contacts and
"services" we provide visit-
ing foreign delegations we
might better call "friendly
deceit." Often we Military
Intelligence officers cannot
understand ourselves why
the foriegners believe us.
Do they not understand that
we show then in the
U.S.S.R. only those things
which are Well known to ev-
verybody? `.If there is some-
thing new!;,;;jt a plant which
foreigners are about to visit,
we simply give orders to its
director: "Show them every-
thing, but have Shops 1 and
5 closed for repairs." That
is all.
On Yiy"desk I have a list
of pretexts and alternate
propns'als which we use to
keep foreigners out of cer-
tain areas of tie U.S.S.R.:
1) The plant is under re-
pair.
2) A bridge is closed.
3) There is no airport and
the railroad tracks have
been damaged by recent
frost; therefore, for the
time being there are no
-trains.
4) The local hotel is not
ready for guests.
5) All hotels are conipletr'
ly filled with tourists. etc.
Sometimes we take for-
eign delegates through mu-
seums and parks in Mos-
cow until the members are
so tired they themselves
call off the trip to a factory,
preferring to rest. Or, in-
stead of taking the delega-
tion by plane, we put them
on a train. As a result, the
delegation has enough time
to see only one or two in-
stallations in which they are
interested, instead of five or
six. Their visas expire and
they have to leave after
having seen nothing but
vodka and caviar.
Recruiting Tasks
In Moscow our main task
as intelligence officers in-
side the committee is to re-
cruit agents among the
foreigners visiting the
U.S.S.R. Of course, this
does not often happen. But
we collect information by
p e r s o n a I conversations,
eavesdropping, examining
baggage, literally stealing
secrets from the visitors'
pockets.
I have been assigned to
British delcga:-:ons visiting
1loseQw. My je1b is to estab-
lish friendly relations with
these men, assess- their in-
telligence possibilities, then
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CPYRGHT
write a. report on each to
our i'ritelligence people in
London. It will be up to
them to collect enough com-
promising information on
these men -- family profs-
lems, amorous agvq?ntures,
personal' finances, etc.- to
secure their recruitment.
We are also to obtain as
much scientific and techni-
cal information as possible
of value to our Soviet indus-
ustry - everything from
cheaper methods of getting
fresh water from sea water
to the manufacture of artifi-
cial fur. Thanks to visits to
our country by foreign dele-
gations, we obtain vast
quantities of extremely val-
uable information.,
By contrast, all members
of Soviet delegations travel-
ing abroad are carefully in-
structed how to answer
questions that might be put
to them. I can honestly say
that there is nothing new
tha `? V stern scientists and
spe'l std could learn from
the specialists - or
Soviet exhibitions' abroad.
For _ex ample, the exhibits to
b6 shown at our London ex-
hibition in 1961 were first
carefully checked by intel-
ligence technicians to make
sure there was nothing new
which f o r e i g n scientists
could see or steal. Some ex-
hibits were piitposely put
together in a distorted way;
the cone of the sputnik on
display was not built that
way, the spheres were of an-
other type.
Trips of Soviet delega-
tions to foreign countries
require special preparation.
The departure of any dele-
gation requires a' separate
decree from the Communist
Party Central Committee.
And no delegation ever goes
abroad without some form
of State Security involve-
ment.
After a Soviet delegation
has been formed, we select
certain scientists, engineers
or other suitable members
and instruct them individ-
dually-onthe type of infor-
mation we need. Take fny
own 45-clan delegation to
London. Five of its mem-
bers were employes of the
Communist Central Com-
mittee. Ten Military Intel-
ligence officers left for Lon-
.don at the same time in the
guise of delegation mem-
bers. or tourists. There were
also three other Military In-
telligence colonels in the
delegation, besides myself.
As a rule, Soviet scien-
tists and technicians in mis-
sile production work are no
allowed to go abroad. But
lately, because these scien-
tists must learn something
about missile work in the
U.S., a few have been give
permission to travel-pro-
vided they have not parties
pated in any missile produ
tion work for the last t ,
years. Thus, if they defecte
to the West, their know
edge would not be so fres .
Touring Instructions
Our intelligence instru
tions to traveling Soviet de
egates are very specifi
How many forms and alit
biographies must, be filee
out before a trip abroad
processed! All of them i
four or five copies! I myse
had to submit ; 18 phot
graphs before a single trill
What are they going 'to d
with them? Marinate the
My wife and I worked o
them for two days, and sti
could not finish all tl
forms.
Instructions we give
Soviet travelers stipula
that when, traveling b
train, you should always
seated with your own sDo not drink, do not tall.
CPYRGHT
too much and report any in-
cidents on the trip to the
consul or Soviet Embassy
representatives. Do not car-
ry any confidential materi-
als with you, do not leave
your hotel room, do rol,
make any notes, but if this
is unavoidable, keep their
on your person.
I rememher.carly in 1961
we sent a delegation to the
Federal Republic of Gernra
ny. An enginec-- from Lenin-
grad went with this delega
tion. He was co-opted, i r.,
forcibly recruited by Jkliii
tary Intelligence. Tic had a
notebook for making notes
on the information he gath-
ered. He left the notebook
in a raincoat, then it disap-
peared. A search was con.
ducted. We found, nothing.
The engineer became so up-
set that when his comrade
Went out shopping, he
hanged himself .in his hotel
room. Ile used the cord of
an electric iron which he
found attached to the light
fixture in the ceiling. (The
delegation had taken the
electric iron with them to
save money on pressing.)
The engineer's body was
sent to Leningrad by plane.
Later, at the enterprise
where lie worked, it was an-
nounced that he was not
normal and suffered from
constant headaches. That is
how things are done in our
country.
CcndensPd from the forthcoming
hook: "The rctikavsxy P&Pers,
196.5. TJoubledar
7711 UIRSDAY: Penkovsicy
arrives in Lox!don, with new
top-secret information taken
from the Kremlin's files: the
true story of how Khrushchev
shot down the U-2 and the
RB-47.
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