OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN TRICKERY USED BY RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AGAINST WEST REVEALED BY PENKOVSKY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 29, 1998
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 3, 1965
Content Type: 
NSPR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5.pdf405.31 KB
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WASHINGTON POST AND TIMES HERALD Sanitized - Approved For NUV,eaielA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5 CPYRGHT CPYRGHT ur Man in the Kremlin against West Revealed by Penkovsliy Ti'iekerv Used livRussian Intelligence Fourth in a Series By Frank Gibney 'trl`iant Soviet General.Staff ,officer who volunteered to spy for the West, was a]- most the-exact opposite of the drab, mousy professional spy, as celebrated in current "realistic" espionage novels. `sociable man who liked good food and good conver- he had a ready wit ks. was prone to parlor card When he arrived in Lon- don, in la,e April, 1961, he Was consciously setting out to play an incredibly dan- gerot. game of espionage agaliOt his own regime. But h- r jaged to enjoy his sta least ostensibly, as hohly as any, tourist. Colonel took long e" rtment stores, res- tau a s' and theaters, gen- erally in_ the company of Grevi, ynne, his British lies _ friend. The ob- vious of, the British people ihted him. He to ne, again and ag; ow different it was fit: the ,.closed society of Mos ow . Personally, he was mani- festly relieved for once to be yyt.of the,;orbit of Soviet sdet police surveillances He ev m managed some dis- creet nightclubbing and a few, 'dancing lessons. (Soviet intelligence circles in Lon- don, assumed that Pen- kovsk a trusted officer, was aexipting to "recruit" Wynne as a Soviet agent. So his association with Wynne was not under suspicion.) Penkovsky also did some. guide Work of his own, which considerably helped his stancing in Soviet Mili- tary Intelligence. Shortly before he left Moscow, Gen. Serov, the chief of Military Intelligence, had called him into his office and informed him that his wife and daughter were also flying to London for an unofficial tourist visit-. He asked Pen- kcvscy to look after them and give there any help they needed in getting around in a strange city. Accordingly, the Colonel helped Mrs. Serov and her attractive' daughter Svetlana make their purchases (with -m=;, droxxsn f,-nn, 1nQ21 an_ viet intelligence funds). He even managed to take Svet- lana on a tour of the better London night spots without arousing undue attention. Beneath this facade of so- cializing, however, Penkoy- sky's new work continued in earnest. On the basis of `he .formation he had sub- mitted, the British and American intelligence offi- ceis were now convinced that his desire to work with them was genuine. rh, their nocturnal meet- ings, they gave the Soviet colonel a complete short course in clandestine radio communications, as well as a small Minox camera for photographing documents. It was arranged to make contact with him through Wynne or another Western emissary, if he found it im- possible to return to West- ern Europe in the near fu- ture. If necessary, instruc- tions would be transmitted him by radio. When he finally left Lon- Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5 CPYFftized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5 ASS FOR SP`5'-This is Crol. Penkovsky's pass as an "expert" of the don on May 6, Penkovsky carried with him presents for his highly placed Soviet friends, including Gen. Se- rov, a full report of the trade and technical mission (which Moscow judged a great success) and , it rnin- plete set of instructions and equipment for getting fur- ther espionage information out to his "new, friends" in the West. In the following excerpt from the Papers, Penkovsky has some more to s about the real nature of s own Soviet :delega'tion' d the stern ground rrles' sTill laid down to cover oviet contacts with fore` ers. By Oleg Pen Jovsky The State Committee for Co-ordination of Scientific Research Work is like a ministry. Our chairman, Rud- nev, enjoys all the privi- leges of a ministe$$ In the U.S.S.R. The comnii-ttee is in charge of all scientific and : technical exch es with foreigners, botki irihe Soviet Union and abt'oad. In fact, it is' a large espionage apparatus, which not only collects scientific and ec;t nical information, bud fries NOV 12 1965 to recruit Western technical specialists. When I began my work in the committee, I was myself astounded by the. number of intelligence officers work- ing there. Eighty or 90 sen- ior intelligence officers work in the foreign relations sec- tion alone. When one walks down the halls in our of- fices, one can, see some of them saluting each other in the military manner. They have conspicuous difficulty getting away from military habits, even getting used tp their civilian clothes. The friendly contacts and "services" we provide visit- ing foreign delegations we might better call "friendly deceit." Often we Military Intelligence officers cannot understand ourselves why the foriegners believe us. Do they not understand that we show then in the U.S.S.R. only those things which are Well known to ev- verybody? `.If there is some- thing new!;,;;jt a plant which foreigners are about to visit, we simply give orders to its director: "Show them every- thing, but have Shops 1 and 5 closed for repairs." That is all. On Yiy"desk I have a list of pretexts and alternate propns'als which we use to keep foreigners out of cer- tain areas of tie U.S.S.R.: 1) The plant is under re- pair. 2) A bridge is closed. 3) There is no airport and the railroad tracks have been damaged by recent frost; therefore, for the time being there are no -trains. 4) The local hotel is not ready for guests. 5) All hotels are conipletr' ly filled with tourists. etc. Sometimes we take for- eign delegates through mu- seums and parks in Mos- cow until the members are so tired they themselves call off the trip to a factory, preferring to rest. Or, in- stead of taking the delega- tion by plane, we put them on a train. As a result, the delegation has enough time to see only one or two in- stallations in which they are interested, instead of five or six. Their visas expire and they have to leave after having seen nothing but vodka and caviar. Recruiting Tasks In Moscow our main task as intelligence officers in- side the committee is to re- cruit agents among the foreigners visiting the U.S.S.R. Of course, this does not often happen. But we collect information by p e r s o n a I conversations, eavesdropping, examining baggage, literally stealing secrets from the visitors' pockets. I have been assigned to British delcga:-:ons visiting 1loseQw. My je1b is to estab- lish friendly relations with these men, assess- their in- telligence possibilities, then Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149RO6 x(006-5 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5 CPYRGHT write a. report on each to our i'ritelligence people in London. It will be up to them to collect enough com- promising information on these men -- family profs- lems, amorous agvq?ntures, personal' finances, etc.- to secure their recruitment. We are also to obtain as much scientific and techni- cal information as possible of value to our Soviet indus- ustry - everything from cheaper methods of getting fresh water from sea water to the manufacture of artifi- cial fur. Thanks to visits to our country by foreign dele- gations, we obtain vast quantities of extremely val- uable information., By contrast, all members of Soviet delegations travel- ing abroad are carefully in- structed how to answer questions that might be put to them. I can honestly say that there is nothing new tha `? V stern scientists and spe'l std could learn from the specialists - or Soviet exhibitions' abroad. For _ex ample, the exhibits to b6 shown at our London ex- hibition in 1961 were first carefully checked by intel- ligence technicians to make sure there was nothing new which f o r e i g n scientists could see or steal. Some ex- hibits were piitposely put together in a distorted way; the cone of the sputnik on display was not built that way, the spheres were of an- other type. Trips of Soviet delega- tions to foreign countries require special preparation. The departure of any dele- gation requires a' separate decree from the Communist Party Central Committee. And no delegation ever goes abroad without some form of State Security involve- ment. After a Soviet delegation has been formed, we select certain scientists, engineers or other suitable members and instruct them individ- dually-onthe type of infor- mation we need. Take fny own 45-clan delegation to London. Five of its mem- bers were employes of the Communist Central Com- mittee. Ten Military Intel- ligence officers left for Lon- .don at the same time in the guise of delegation mem- bers. or tourists. There were also three other Military In- telligence colonels in the delegation, besides myself. As a rule, Soviet scien- tists and technicians in mis- sile production work are no allowed to go abroad. But lately, because these scien- tists must learn something about missile work in the U.S., a few have been give permission to travel-pro- vided they have not parties pated in any missile produ tion work for the last t , years. Thus, if they defecte to the West, their know edge would not be so fres . Touring Instructions Our intelligence instru tions to traveling Soviet de egates are very specifi How many forms and alit biographies must, be filee out before a trip abroad processed! All of them i four or five copies! I myse had to submit ; 18 phot graphs before a single trill What are they going 'to d with them? Marinate the My wife and I worked o them for two days, and sti could not finish all tl forms. Instructions we give Soviet travelers stipula that when, traveling b train, you should always seated with your own sDo not drink, do not tall. CPYRGHT too much and report any in- cidents on the trip to the consul or Soviet Embassy representatives. Do not car- ry any confidential materi- als with you, do not leave your hotel room, do rol, make any notes, but if this is unavoidable, keep their on your person. I rememher.carly in 1961 we sent a delegation to the Federal Republic of Gernra ny. An enginec-- from Lenin- grad went with this delega tion. He was co-opted, i r., forcibly recruited by Jkliii tary Intelligence. Tic had a notebook for making notes on the information he gath- ered. He left the notebook in a raincoat, then it disap- peared. A search was con. ducted. We found, nothing. The engineer became so up- set that when his comrade Went out shopping, he hanged himself .in his hotel room. Ile used the cord of an electric iron which he found attached to the light fixture in the ceiling. (The delegation had taken the electric iron with them to save money on pressing.) The engineer's body was sent to Leningrad by plane. Later, at the enterprise where lie worked, it was an- nounced that he was not normal and suffered from constant headaches. That is how things are done in our country. CcndensPd from the forthcoming hook: "The rctikavsxy P&Pers, 196.5. TJoubledar 7711 UIRSDAY: Penkovsicy arrives in Lox!don, with new top-secret information taken from the Kremlin's files: the true story of how Khrushchev shot down the U-2 and the RB-47. Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600260006-5