THE PENKOVSKY PAPERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 1998
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: January 14, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

January 14, 1966
Approved For ReleaseCIA-RDP75-00149RO006002400'16-6`
CONGRESSIONAL tECO1 t - SENATE
physics', and electronics to enable themi;o
liye au adventurous efciting-and wondrous
life, with 'Will m1te~d o ortunlty for high=
paid Income
THE PENIIOVSSY PAPERS
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres-
ident, a famous American who has long
been intimately associated with efforts
to combat the encroachments of com-
munism 1 i the United States has said
that today's headlines remind us there
has been no basic change in Communist
imperialism and that the danger which
world communism presents to the free
nations has not abated, but, if anything,
has increased.
And he has rhetorically stated the
question, "Why is our free society inher-
ently superior to communism?" and an-
swered by pointing out that, among other
vital principles, in our American society
freedom of speech, the press, and as-
sembly are protected not only in con-
stitutional guarantees but in practice
and that media of mass communication
are free to praise or criticize without fear
of Government control or governmental
retaliation. By contrast, under commu-
nism, freedom of speech, the press, and
assembly, are permitted only to the ex-
tent that they support official policy,
and media of mass communication-such
as newspapers, magazines, radio, and
television-are strictly controlled by the
government.
Late in 1965, an event occurred in So-
viet Russia which is a classic example of
this cardinal Communist tenet-that
freedom of the press is permitted only to
the extent that it supports that nation's
official policy and the privilege of serving
as a member of the press in the U.S.S.R.
is strictly controlled by that government.
Any so-called violation-failure to sup-
port or cater to the party line-brings
swift retaliation.
On November 25, 1965, the Soviet
Union ordered the closing of the Mos-
cow Bureau of the Washington, D.C.,
Post and the expulsion of that newspa-
per's correspondent, Mr. Stephen S. Ros-
enfeld, because of the publication by the
Washington Post of portions of the Pen-
kovsky papers. It is noteworthy that a
number of other newspapers have pub-
lished or reported in detail on the con-
tests of those papers.
Believing firmly in the right of freedom
of speech for all mankind, the right of
the press, radio, and television to freely
and objectively report news and facts to
those interested in learning the facts,
and the right of responsible men to ex-
press their views and opinions openly
and without fear of retaliation, I wish to
express strong personal censure of the
punitive action by the U.S.S.R. against
the free American press.
I wiskj. to point out that the Post, In
publishing he Penkovsky papers ex-
cerpts, reported fairly" critiques which
questioned the authenticity of the pa-
pers, oe portions thereof, so that the
reading public might' have access to
ava f4le facts and expressions of views
both in support of and in opposition to
the cQnl ents pf the Tapers Indeed, as
No 4-'11
243
recently as this past Sunday, January 9, kovsky's true function and the importance
the Parade-magazine section-of the of his action to the West.
Washington Post carried statements Penkovsky's work as deputy chief of the
which critically appraised the contents committee's foreign department was merely
a cover for his function as a general staff
of these papers. Intelligence officer. And as a former aide
I shall not attempt to evaluate the and confidant of the chief marshal of Soviet
contents of the Penkovsky papers; how- tactical missile forces, Marshal Sergei Varent-
ever, I do wish strongly to affirm the sov, Penkovsky was privy to the most inti
right of American newspapers ko pub- mate details of high Russian military and
lish openly and in an unbiased manner political planning.
material which throws light on the polit- For the next 16 months, Penkovsky con-
ical structure of one of the world's ducted the most amazing s
campaign of espionage in mod ern leha ern history.
ory.
great powers, believing that wisdom in He rocked Nikita Khrushchev's policy to its
conduct of our national affairs arises foundations. For 1961 and 1962, the 2 years
from knowledge of governments, whether in which Penkovsky worked for British and
free or totalitarian in nature. American intelligence, marked the freezing
I do not personally always agree with Point of the cold war.
editorial policies of various newspapers, In June, 1961, Khrushchev risked war with
but as a citizen of a free nation, I am his decision to force an Allied retreat in Ber-
pr0ud to affirm that right of disagree- lin. In August, he put up the Berlin Wall.
In September, 1961, he resumed nuclear test-
ment and the right to express it openly. ing, breaking agreements with the United
I shall continue to defend to the fullest States. His missile buildup of 1962 was cli-
extent in my power the right of the maxed in the Cuban confrontation with the
American press to report fairly, objet- United States, when Krushchev almost threw
tively, and openly that which is news- the world into total war.
worthy. Throughout this time, Penkovsky furn-
I desire to encourage those who direct fished the West with high-priority informa-
tion
media of communications to con- tion on Soviet missile strength, Soviet
nuclear capabilities and the Soviet plans for
tinue to provide such material as reveals a localized shooting war in Germany. Ulti-
the world behind the Iron Curtain to mately, he was a key factor in our ability to
the citizenry of the United States so identify so swiftly the configurations of
that judgments. may be openly derived Soviet missile installations on Cuban soil.
based on the widest range of fact and He also prepared American intelligence for
opinion which can be made available. Khrushchev's decision to use them.
I believe that the entire episode of the THREE LONDON VISITS
publication of portions of the Penkovsky Three times Penkovsky made his way to
papers by the Washington Post, and the London and Paris, ironically using his confi-
retaliatory action by the Soviet Russian dential Soviet intelligence assignments as a
Government, deserves national review. cover for his real espionage work with Ameri-
. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent backt t can to and British Moscow officers to o get Three further times
information
to have printed in the RECORD the col- for the West. In October, 1962 he was finally
lections which I have amassed of Wash- detected and arrested by the Soviet secret
ington Post articles, editorials thereon, police, the State Security.
and pertinent material from other How badly he hurt Moscow's plans for an
sources such as the New York Times. aggressive breakthrough against the West in
There being no objection, the material those two critical years can be gathered from
was ordered to be printed in the REC- the public aftermath of his arrest; one chief
marshal of the Soviet Union demoted and
ORD, as follows: disgraced; the chief of Soviet military intel-
[From the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1965] ligence, Gen. Ivan Serov (the "Hangman of
WHEN WEST HAD A MAN IN KREMLIN-A RED Hungary" in 1956) demoted; some 300 Soviet
WAR HERO PREPARED UNITED STATES FOR ITS, intelligence officers recalled to Moscow from
CONFRONTATION WITH MR. K. ON CUBAN their foreign posts.
MISSILES Penkovsky had exposed them all. Soviet
(By Frank Gibney) military intelligence has not yet recovered
On April 12, 1961, at an unobstrusive meet- from the blow.
ing in Moscow, a high Russian official quietly The recapitulation of matters covered in
handed a double-wrapped, double-sealed en- Penkovsky's Soviet indictment suggests the
velope to an English acquaintance. He extent of his intelligence achievement: "Top
asked that it be given to "interested parties" secret information; documents of great
in the West. value; of an economic, political and military
Later that same month, the Russian said, nature; Soviet space secrets; material on
he would himself be in London. He wanted Soviet troops in the German Democratic Re-
to talk to people in the West "to tell them public; new Soviet war material; command
what conditions in the Soviet Union are personnel of the antiaircraft defenses;
really like." The time was short, he said, (material on) atomic energy, rocket tech-
and it was a critical time. nology and the exploratoin of outer space."
With this action, Col. Oleg Penkovsky, The trial of Colonel Penkovsky and his
Russian war hero, senior officer in Soviet British contact, Greville Wynne, began in
military intelligence, graduate of the Staff Moscow May 7, 1963, and lasted 4 days. It
College and the Missile Academy, friend and was carefully organized by the Soviet au-
confidant of Soviet marshals and generals, thorities.
began his secret career as a volunteer spy for Penkovsky and Wynne had been under
the West. Interrogation in Lubianka Prison for 6
A SCIENTIFIC COVER months preceding it. Both prisoners ad-
Greville Wynne, the British business- mitted their "guilt." Penkovsky apparently
man to whom Penkovsky entrusted his mes- did so in an effort to secure decent treatment
sage, knew Penkovsky only in his capacity for his family.
as an official of the Soviet State Committee Wynne was sentenced to a long prison term
for Coordination of Scientific Research, the but was released in 1964 in exchange for the
huge subministry in charge of all Soviet Soviet spy Konon Molody, who had been
business and technical exchanges with for- arrested by the British under the name of
eigners. He had" then little Idea of Pen- Gordon Lonsdale. Penkovsky was sentenced
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6
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CONG SIONA R : QR -SENATE January 14, 1966
R, {teeth?. Soviet authorities said lie:was,shot, Mo cow in my apartment and write down my senior officers, members of the Central Com-
ee countries. The Pe- nkovsky Papers, ex- useihem_for the truth they say. Khrushchev's is a government of adven-
g ez ssse seol n_ cy omcer. told me that my father saw-me for the first pared to begin a war if circumstances turn
} a papers have never before appeared any.. favorable to him. This he must not be per-
,w ere. They will be published in book form and last time when I was only 4 months old. mitted to do.
My father was a lieutenant in the white
by outileday November 19. In the past, our general staff and our
he,Penkc k _ papers comprise a strange, army. I learned this only recently. My
5 father fought against the Soviets. I still do foreign representatives condemned the con.
.
RT-Lestitrp document-partly a day by day ac- not think they know the whole truth about cept of surprise attack such as Hitler used.
Count of Penkovsky's personal struggle gle him. If the state security forces had known Now they have come around to the viewpoint
against the Soviet regime; partly a running that there is great advantage to the side
fever chart of Klirushchev's drive for aggres- all along that he was in the white army which makes a sudden. missive attack first.
alo in Berlin and Cuba. They were written (although I was only a few months old at From what I have learned and what I
at eat personal risk while Penkovsky was the time), every door would have been closed
~' have heard, I know now that the leaders of
livirng his double life as a secret agent for to me: for an officer's career, for membership our Soviet state are the willing provocateurs
th West. in the party and especially for the inteili- of an atomic war. At one time or another
g QVrgtg th1 m bycausehe was not contept gen5e'service. they may lose their heads entirely and start
me e1y with transmitting his intelligence re- Yet -I-began my life as a believer in the an atomic war, See what Khrushchev is
po ts. Colonel ?enkovsky was a single- Soviet system. I was brought up in a Soviet doing over Berlin?
ml ded zealot who hated the Khrushchev environment said - from the very first, when In Moscow, I have lived a nuclear night-
ie me because he feared that Khrushchev 1- wend at-18 to the Second Kiev Artillery mare. I know the extent of their prepara-
W Ieading the world into a nuclear war. School, I wanted to be a commander in the tions. I know the poison of the new mill-
'lie wanted ordinary .people in the West, not Soviet Army. tary doctrine as outlined in the top-secret
ust Intelligence officers, to hear his story and During the war, I commanded a battalion. special collection-the plan to strike first at
is reasons for breaking with a lifetime of By the end of the war, H was a lieutenant any cost.
service to the Soviet regime. colonel. After one action, Marshal Konev I know the design of the new missiles and
" * a real sense of the word, for the brief recommended me for the Military Staff their warheads. I am decribing them to my
I'd months in which he worked, Oleg Pen- College. friends in the West. Imagine the horror of
111 sky was our man in the -kremlin. With- In 1945, I. began the 3-year course at the a 50-megaton bomb with an explosive force
Abhis guidance and information, Washing- Frunze Military Academy and in 1918 I almost twice what one expects. The people
to could not have acted In either Berlin pinned on my chest the diamond-shaped of Moscow congratulated themselves on this.
,or tuba with the sureness it did. insigna of a Frunze graduate. At the end
my by reading Penkovsky can Americans of 1949, I was transferred to the Military USING THE PEACELOVERS
,fin My understand the pressures and tensions Diplomatic Academy, the training school for The Soviet leaders know that the Western
th t were driving the Soviet leadership to
114 war in 1961 and 1962, 2 years when the
Cold war almost became hot. nage and completed 3-year course in the
_.. -
.--' language, which I mastered, I be-
IFrom the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1965] lieve, fairly well. In September 1958, after
serving as assistant military attache in
PVp Y THE S-THE C PEKO NHoV s#iY PP ANAPERS RED HIS Turkey, I was sent to the DzerbhinskY Mill-
COLORS-T
($y Oleg Penkovsky) tary Engineering Academy to attend a
9-mgnth-acade.mir,Course for the study of
y name is bleg Vladirnirovich Penkovsky. missile weapons
I was born April 23, 1919, In the Caucasus, in
the city of Ordzhonikidze (formerly Vladi- DEEDS DELIED WORDS
It was during the struggles
kagkaz),In the family of a salaried worker; g of World 'War
Russian by nationality, by profession an II that I first became convinced that it was
{offer o f military intelligence with the rank not the Communist Party which moved and
of olonel. inspired us all to walk the fighting road from
have received higher education. I have Stalingrad to Berlin. There was something
'begn a member of the Communist Party of else behind us: Russia.
the Soviet Union since March 1910 , I am Even more than the war itself, my eyes
m Tied; as dependents I have my wife, one were opened by ray work with the higher
da ghter and my mother. authorities and general officers of the Soviet
have never been on trial for criminal or Army. I happened to marry a general's
political offense. I have been awarded 13 daughter and quickly found myself in a
government decorations (5' orders and society of the Soviet upper class. I was one
a I,.edals). I am a resident of the city of of the privileged.
M caw and live on Marxim Gorky Embank- But I soon realized that their praise of
iiieit, House No. 36, Apartment 59. the party and communism was only in words.
'f amii beginning the notes that follow to ex- In their private lives, they lie deceive
western amine for peace Go rnerr own aa-
vantage.
It is necessary somehow to drain the en-
ergy and to divert the great material and
living strength of the Soviet Union to peace-
ful purposes-not to bring about a great
world conflict. I think it is necessary to
have meetings secretly conducted, not sum-
mit meeting. Those Khrushchev welcomes.
He will use the decisions reached at summit
meetings to increase his own prestige.
This you must understand. That is why
I write these observations of mine to the
people of the United States and Britain. I
ask only that you believe the sincerity of my
thoughts. Henceforth I am your soldier,
pledged to carry out everything which is
entrusted to me.
In presenting the above, I want to say
that I have not begun work for my new cause
with empty hands. I understand perfectly
well that to correct words and thoughts, one
must add concrete proof confirming these
words. I have had and do have now a deli-
nits capabilty for doing this.
lain my thoughts about the system in which scheme against each other, intrigue, inform, [From the Washington Post, Oct. 31, 1965]
T live and min revolt against this system. cut each other's throats. In pursuit of more A KREMLINOLOGIST TRrrsTo SRIKE A
Lan fully aware of what I am setting out to money and advancement for themselves, they BALANCE
do. I ask that you believe in my sincerity, in become informants for the state security on (By Edward Crankshaw)
bayidedication to the real struggle for peace. their, friends and fellow worlrers. Their
(The following is a condensation of the
must write hurriedly, hoping that I will children despise everything Soviet, watch foreword to "The Penkovsk. Pa ers" b the
80 me day have the time to elaborate or ex- only foreign movie films and look down on y p y
- --
plan, I am unable to do this all at once-or ordinary people. British journalist and expert on Soviet
to write all 1 .know and feel-for the simple Our communism, which we have been Russia.)
,physical lack of time and space. I imagine that the eeneral reader will he
-? cv - uaaa xu ysru ~r wis i.raua. :tome alsease or in- ------ --- --- ?--- ?' -----_.-._",, - ????
typ p g( Is anoisy ) t Durin wrking hours, fection is gnawing and eating at our country count
system. workings
may very well be appalled
E in is very g g from within.
t an always busy, running like a madman and dismayed by their scope and sheer mag-
The ideals that so many of our fathers
between the visiting (foreign) delegations nitude. But I think we should try to keep
aril military intelligence headquarters and and brothers died for have turned out . be a sense of proportion here.
nothing more tha bluff and a deceitit. I
theLofflces of my committee. I am not for a moment suggesting that
g
ve a
a
y w ys n r-
ee
]lt they know nothing. I associate ,with . highly placed; important rafsingly reckless in the expenditure of man-
east I, have a hiding place in my desk. My been nuts about espionage and counter-
:amity could not find it even if they knew. GOVERNMENT OF ADVENTURERS espiona
e and the ha
l
b
h i
- -- -
e country, it am doing. Someone may al-
'WV $,A ask sk what I a we all work separately. Each man here is as the KGB and GRU. The Russians, not
g. Here at home at alone. to put too fine a paint on it, have always
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 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6
January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
:k.. am quite sure that the material the
Russians receive from their agents is not
worth anything like the expenditure of man-
power, ingenuity and cash which they con-
sider an. appropriate price. I am not an
expert in these matters, but there is one
thing that stands out even to a layman;
that is, that some of the most valuable in-
telligence coups ever achieved by the Rus-
sians have fallen into their laps, contributed
by oddities like Nunn-May and Fuchs, act-
ing from individual conviction.
Conversely, invaluable information pre-
sented to us by Penkovsky was obtained not
as.a result of the efficiency of our own secret
services but as a free gift arising from the
Idiosyncratic behavior of an individual
Russian.
Penkovsky was shocked by the size and
magnitude and malevolence of the secret
service of which he formed a part. He was
also shocked by the behavior of Khrushchev
and others. Here, I think, he can be very
misleading.
He was brought up as a young Com-
munist and developed into an eager careerist
In the regular army, on the lookout for
patronage, keen for promotion, cultivating
the sort of gifts which enabled him quite
naturally and easily to make an extremely
useful marriage, one of the privileged new
class and enjoying it. It is impossible to
decide from his papers the precise point at
which the whole thing went sour, and why.
That he took violently against the whole
system, for the reasons he gives is entirely
understandable; tens of thousands of intel-
ligent Russians-hundreds of thousands, in-
deed-feel the same way. But this does not
lead them to spy on their own country for the
benefit of the West.
One thing is very clear-and this should
be borne in mind constantly when consider-
ing Penkovsky's Indictment of Khrushchev
as 'a man actively preparing to launch a nu-
clear war-and that is that, like so many
defectors from the West, this Soviet army
colonel was in some measure unbalanced.
(A man who will take it upon himself to be-
tray his government because he is uniquely
convinced that he is right and it is wrong
is by definition unbalanced, although he
may also be a martyr.) And almost cer-
tainly, this lack of balance made it impossible
for him.to distinguish between government
intentions and government precautions. Or,
like so many others, he confused loose,
menacing talk with tight-lipped calcula-
tion; contingency planning with purposive
strategy.
Having said all this, read Penkovsky also
for the light he throws on the Soviet world,
which is an illumination rarely vouchsafed
foreigners.
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 1, 19651
OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN SECRET POLICE,
SPYING DOMINATE REGIME AND ALL AGENCIES
ABROAD '
(By Frank Gibney)
By mid-April 1961, Greville Wynne, the
British businessman in whom Colonel Pen-
kovsky confided, had taken Penkovsky's letter
to British and American intelligence officers
in London. In it, the Soviet General Staff
officer described in detail his position in Mos-
cow, together with his motives of volunteer-
ing to spy against the Soviet regime.
He promised to arrive in London later that
month, in charge of a visiting Soviet dele-
gation of technical and industrial experts.
Many of these were in fact intelligence
specialists from Penkovsky's own committee,
the State Committee for Coordination of
Scientifle Research, which regulated all con-
tacts and exchanges -between foreign and
Soviet scientists and businessmen.
Pei4ov?ky's, own record and position were
quickly checked out in London and Wash-
ington-and If Western intelligence had
dreamed up the perfect man to penetrate the
Kremlin's secrets, it could hardly have done
better.
He was then 43 years old. Made a full
colonel in the Soviet Army at 31, he had
graduated both from the Frunze Military
Academy (the Soviet staff college) and the
Military-Diplomatic Academy-cover name
for the 3-year Soviet military intelli-
gence school. He had served as assistant
military attache in Turkey in 1956, run an
area desk in Soviet intelligence headquarters,
and helped select and train intelligence offi-
cer candidates-one of the most sensitive
jobs in the Soviet system.
The colonel was also a veteran artilleryman
who had taken the special Soviet Army
course in military missilery at the Dzher-
zshinsky artillery school. He was the former
aide and still the confidant oT Chief Marshal
Varentsov, who commanded the Soviet tacti-
cal missile troops.
In almost every respect Penkovsky was
wired into the Soviet hierarchy. His great
uncle, Valentin Penkovsky was a lieutenant
general; his wife was a general's daughter.
Penkovsky was on the friendliest of terms
with his boss, Gen. Ivan Serov, Khrushchev's
secret police expert, who now commanded
Military Intelligence. Through Serov and
Marshal Varentsov, he had pipelines to the
highest levels of the Soviet regime and al-
most unlimited access to secret files and
documents.
Other Soviet officers had defected to the
West, over the years, but never anyone this
high up in the Kremlin's operating com-
mand structure. In his own biography, he
gave one big reason for his anger at the
Soviet regime. Only a year or two before
the State Security had discovered that Pen-
kovsky's father had been a White officer in
1919-thus putting a sudden black mark
on his record (and probably blocking his
promotion to general).
As a professional soldier and general staff
officer, also, Penkovsky was increasingly ap-
palled by the network of spies and informers
he found throughout his own government-
fully 8 years after de-Stalinization has sup-
posedly thawed Soviet society.
In the following excerpt from "The Pen-
kovsky Papers," he writes about the secret
police dominance over the Soviet regime:
(By Oleg Penkovsky)
The Soviet Government goes in force for
espionage on such a gigantic scale that an
outsider has difficulty in fully comprehend-
ing it. Daily we expand our already swollen
spy apparatus. That is what Khrushchev's
"peaceful coexistence" and "struggle for
peace" really mean. We are all spies.
Any Soviet citizen who has anything at all
to do with the work of foreign countri' s or
who is connected with foreigners in the
course of his work, is perforce engaged in
intelligence work. There is no institution
in the U.S.S.R. that does not have in it an
intelligence officer or agent.
Here are some of the Soviet ministers and
committees through which we conduct in-
telligence: Intourist and the International
Book Association (almost 100 percent state
security) ; Ministry of Foreign Trade; Coun-
cil for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox
Church; The Academy of Sciences; Union of
the Red Cross; State Committee for Cultural
Relations with Foreign Countries. * ? * The
list is almost endless.
State security officers and agents are every-
where, literally everywhere. I saw fewer of
them under Stalin than now. They control
our whole army and military intelligence,
too. These security police scoundrels even
forced my aunt to be an informer. She
worked for them the whole time she was a
housekeeper in the Afghan and the Italian
Embassies in Moscow.
My poor aunt often came to my mother,
crying and complaining about the degrading
and dishonest things she had to do. She
eavesdropped, stole documents, cleaned out
waste baskets, wrote reports on diplomats,
helped with provocations against them.
Many time she complained to me. But this
was before I began working for military in-
telligence. I could give her no advice only
sympathy.
Khrushchev himself directly supervises the
work of the state security. In this matter
he trusts no one else; he controls the State
Security as First Secretary of the Communist
Party. It Is said that Shelepin, the state
security boss, spends more time in Khru-
shchev's office than in his own headquarters
or. Dzerzhinsky Square. If it were not for
the state security police and General Serov,
Khrushchev could never have become the
"supreme commander in chief."
SPIES ABROAD
The majority of the personnel in Soviet
embassies abroad are military intelligence or
state security employees. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs anC the Ministry of Foreign
Trade exist as such only in Moscow. Abroad
everything is controlled by us. Three out
of five Soviet embassy officers are either from
state security or military intelligence. Thus,
it can be stated wtihout error that 60 percent
of Soviet embassy personnel are serving of-
ficers in intelligence. In Soviet consulates
the figure is almost 100 percent.
In an embassy the state security spies on
everyone, including us in military intelli-
gence Security police watch absolutely
everything that goes on: the purchases peo-
ple make, how they live and whether it ac-
cords with their salary, where they go, which
doctors they visit, how much drinking they
do, their morals. Meanwhile we in military
intelligence watch the security police in re-
turn. We want to establish which of our
own men are connected with them or work as
their informants.
A Soviet Ambassador is first of all an em-
ployee of the central committee of the party,
only secondly of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. Often he is himself part of the mili-
tary intelligence or the state security police.
A great many of the Soviet Ambassadors in
foreign countries are intelligence officers.
Before my duty in the Embassy in Turkey,
I thought that the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs and the embassies were important orga-
nizations with authority. Now I know there
is only the Central Committee of the Com-
iunist Party and the two intelligence orga-
nizations.
To process people traveling abroad, there
Is a special commission for trips abroad
under the central committee. It consists
entirely of state security officers. Any per-
son, even a tourist, going overseas comes for
a conference to the central committee.
When I was leaving, this scoundrel Daluda
from the state security poked through my
file for 2 hours. What was he looking for?
He questioned me about all my relatives,
living and dead, about my family life,
whether I drink, quarrel with my wife, etc.
He also asked me about international prob-
lems. This was done to me, an officer of
the general staff and the military intelli-
gence.
INDISCRIMINATE ESPIONAGE
We are engaged in espionage against every
country in the world. And this includes
our friends, the countries of the peoples'
democracies. Who knows, some fine day they
may become our enemies. Look what hap-
pened with China. Months before the break
with China became clear, Instructions came
direct from the central committee to being
intensive intelligence activity against China.
Quietly, the Chinese section was transferred
from the directorate dealing with peoples'
democracies to that for neutral or enemy
countries in the Far East.
Col. Pavel Demetriyevich Yerzin was for-
merly the state security resident in Turkey,
Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016.6
 Approved For-Releas6--:_ CIA-Rpfl75-00149R000600240016-6
wigre I. knew him.. Later he was promoted to
? t rank _9f,?Figadier general and appointed-
xeCtor of the Patrice Lumumba Friend
-
0e~ur,Ity police-even the people in charge
of dormitories. Only a few professors are
t ere as co-optees," i.e., people who have
Greed to work with the state security. The
basic task of the Friendship University is to
pf'opare a fifth column for the African coun-
tries.
apy of the African students there have
aleady been recruited. They are now work-
ing for the Soviet Intelligence. They are
st ldying Marxism and Leninism, preparing
to become the future leaders of the African
countries.
Pis a first step, after their return from
Moscow, they are directed to organize strikes,
demonstrations to overthrow governments,
etp. At the university they live better than
t11e average Soviet student. Almost every-
nehas special "residencies" (i.e. self-con
to ned operative units) on the territory of
the United States. One Is in Washington,
i) 1C -"residency" personnel include in-
dividual Soviet Embassy secretaries, com-
et rcial representatives, and other employees.
ere are two "residencies" in New York,
o e under the cover of the U.N. (The other,
tY1e "illegal residency," has direct independ-
en contact with Moscow.)
sically "oldtimers" who were recruited a
>
g time ago.
e e New York "residencies" are of greater
s ength. They have, new agents from whose
Tasks they build up the illegal residency."
intelligence officers of legal "residencies"
(i.e. officers who have legally entered the
Vziited States with an official "cover" post-
tign) always use their cover, such as: Tass
CO~esporldent, Aeroflot representative, mer.-.
c ant marine, member of a trade mission.
Sometimes, in order to evade FBI sur-
,V'ellance, Soviet intelligence officers stay in
,the embassy overnight, sleeping on desks,
then get up early in the morning to leave the
embassy unnoticed. In this way, they man-
agle tometimes to avoid surveillance.
fter, 'the Powers affair (the U-2 incident
Of May 1960) Khrushchev issued an order
to,all_WIlts ofhe intelligence service, espe-
i Cia11y those , in the United States, to cease
th it active work temporarily-in order to
to e no chance of putting into enemy hands
evidence pointing to Soviet espionage
agkinet the United States and other coun-
:trt~es. in November 1960, this order was
rescinded. Intelligence activities began
ag n in full swing. Recent directives have
Of eyed establishment of social contacts with
asLlglany Americans as possible.
te#igence officer with the military rank of
lieutenant colonel. He knows English very
weli. At one time he was, an instructor of
English at the Military Diplomatic Academy,
Which trains pfficers for Military Intelligence.
ter special training, Melekh was sent
ut der the cover of,the United Nations see-
Te ariatin *few York to carry out his intelli-
ge ce missions.. That was in 1955. On Oc-
tober 27, 1960, he was arrested by the Federal
Bt}r'eau of Investigation on charges of espio-
nage. In April 1961, the U.S. Government
dropped its charges on condition that Melekh,
leave the United States before April 17. This
should help us to judge the value of Soviet
prbbtests and declarations at, the U.N.
FRIEND OE' SEROV...
The present Chief of Military Intelligence,
Gen. Alexander I. Serov, is not the most bril-
liant of men. He knows how to interrogate
people, imprison them, and shoot them. In
sophisticated intelligence matters, he Is not
so skilled. Serov was a Beria man. :Beria
took a liking to him and pushed him to the
top quickly.
Before coming to Military Intelligence,
Serov was Chairman of the State Security.
After his appointment to Military Intelli-
gence, he remembered my name from my
Turkish assignment and. became personally
interested in.rny work. Eventually a certain
degree of friendship developed between us
and I visited him several times at his apart-
ment and his country house. My personal
relationship with Serov placed me in the
forefront of Military Intelligence officers.
Serov lives on Granovsky Street. Many
ministers, members of the Central Commit-
tee, and marshals live there. Rudenko, the
Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. lives on
the same floor as Serov. When Serov was
Chairman of the State Security, he arrested
people and Rudenko signed the death sen-
tence. One would drop into the other's place
in the evening for a drink and they together
would decide who should be put in jail and
who should be shot. Very convenient.
IFrom the Washington Post, Nov. 2, 19651
OUR. MAN IN THE KREMLIN-KHRUSHCHEV'S
POLICIES COULD HAVE MEANT WAR
(By Frank Gibney)
On April 20, 1961, at 11 p.m. a trimly
dressed foreign gentleman, handsome, red
haired, and of medium height, walked with-
out notice through the lobby of the Mount
Royal Hotel I. London and made his way
to an inconspicuous suite upstairs.
ThV door was quickly opened. Inside the
room, Col. Oleg Penkovsky had his first face-
to-face meeting with British and American
intelligence officers, the "interested parties"
in the West whom he had been trying to
contact for almost a year.
For hours, Penkovsky talked. He had
brought with him from Moscow two packets
of handwritten notes and documents, mate-
rials taken from Soviet top-secret files. The
range of his information was almost ency-
clopedic-the design of new missiles, names
of Soviet undercover intelligence agents in
Europe, troop deployments in East Germany.
As the intelligence officers talked with him,
they began to grasp not only the breadth of
his knowledge about Soviet plans, but the
intensity of his conviction that Moscow's
dangerous brinkmanship in 1961 could well
lead to war.
A lonely Idealist, Penkovsky wanted
neither money nor immediate asylum. Of
the intelligence officers in London he asked
only that he be given either British or
American citizenship and some employment
commensurate with his experience, if cir-
cumstances ever compelled him to flee the
Soviet Union.
On another floor of the Mount Royal Hotel,
Penkovsky had housed members of the
45-man Soviet delegation he headed. The
delegation had been sent to London osten-
sibly to discuss trade prospects, but actually
to gather intelligence, of an industrial and
military nature. It was a sign of the Com-
munist regime's trust in Penkovsky that he
was assigned to lead it.
Throughout this first 2-week visit to Lon-
don, Penkovsky continued to hold night
meetings with the British and American in-
telligence officers, whom he knew only by
their code names, the British intelligence
officers called "G;rille" and."Miles" and the
Amretcans,Alexander" and "Oslav."
Since the U-2 surveillance flights had been
abandoned in 19(10, the West badly needed
January 14, 1966
and new rocket technology. As a missile
specialist himself, Penkovsky had a wealth
of technical background on the state of So-
viet missile readiness--and most important-
ly, plans for missile production and
deployment. The configuration of missile
sites, the type of troops used, war-
heads, performance details-all this in-
formation Penkovsky possessed, from his
own experience and his close association as
aide to Marshal Varentsov, the Soviet tacti-
cal missile commander. In that London
hotel room Penkovsky began the vital flow of
information which, barely a year later, en-
abled the West to understand the serious-
ness of Khrushchev's threat in Cuba, as well
as recognize the exact nature of his missile
weapons there.
In the following excerpt from the papers,
Penkovsky outlines the real facts behind the
Soviet missile effort. These notes represent
only a tiny portion of the information Pen-
kovsky revealed in this area. For 16 months
he produced a stream of reliable intelligence,
technical and strategic, on Khrushchev's
missile buildup. His guidance lay behind
the quick identification of the Cuba-based
missiles in aerial photographs. Also, his re-
ports of Khrushchev's lagging production on
long-range missiles explained the reasoning
behind the risky shipment of medium-range
Soviet missiles to Cuba.
Millions breathed a sigh of relief over
President Kennedy's facedown of KhriL-
shchev's Cuban threat in October 1962. But
until now only a small group of intelligence
experts knew the great contribution made
by Colonel Penkovsky to this U.S. victory.
(By Oleg Penkovsky)
Khrushchev is blabbing that we are ready,
we have everything. That is so much idle
talk. He talks about the Soviet Union's
capability to send missiles, to every corner
of the world, but he has not done anything
about it, because he knows that we are actu-
ally not ready.
Of course we can send our big missiles in
different directions, as far. as the United
States or Cuba. But we are not yet capable
of launching a planned missile attack to
destroy definite targets long range. As Mar-
shal Varentsov, who commands the ground
missile forces, tells me: "We still have a
long way to go before we actually achieve the
things about which Khrushchev keeps talk-
ing and boasting."
Of course, there have been fine achieve-
ments in developing tactical and operational
short-range missiles. But it is too early
to speak of our strategic missiles as per-
fected. Many of the big ones are still on the
drawing boards, in the prototype stage or
undergoing tests. There are altogether not
more than a few dozen of these-not
the 'shower" of missiles with which Khru-
shchev has been threatening the West.
Only the smaller (IRBM) missiles are in
production. The R-12 missile, now being
mass produced, has a range of 2,500 kilo-
meters (1,650 miles). Our "cruise" missile
has been adopted for use by the submarine
fleet as well as ground troops. But our big
R-14 missile is only In the development stage.
The range of the R-14 with a nuclear war-
head is 4,500 kilometers (2,800 miles).
Often a new model missile is still only in
the testing stage-in fact the tests may have
proved unsuccessful. But there is Khru-
shchev, already screaming to the entire
world about his "achievements" in new types
of Soviet weapons.
COSMONAUTS DIE
All the money made available from the
military reorganization is put Into missile
production, and sputnik required the com-
bined efforts of all available Soviet scientists
and technical personnel, with the entire
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6
January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Marshal Varentsov warns in private con-
versations that we do not have enough
qualified people in the missile and sputnik
programs, that training is inadequate, the
quality of production poor. Quantity is in-
adequate, also. Accidents and all sorts of
troubles are daily occurrences. In this con-
nection, there is much talk about short-
comings in the field of electronics.
There have been many cases during the
test launchings of missiles when they have
hit inhabited areas, railroad tracks, etc.,
instead of the designated targets, after
deviating several hundred kilometers from
their prescribed course.
Sometimes Khrushchev's pushing for pre-
mature achievement in missiles and sput-
.niks has disastrous results.
Several, sputniks were launched into the
stratosphere and never heard from again.
They took the lives of several specially
trained cosmonauts.
The sudden death of Marshal Nedelin,
former chief of our missile forces, was an-
other case in point.
Khrushchev had been demanding that his
specialists create a missile engine powered by
nuclear energy. The laboratory work for
such an engine had even been completed
prior to the 43d Anniversary of the October
Revolution in 1960, and the people involved
wanted to give Khrushchev a "present" on
this anniversary-a missile powered by nu-
clear energy.
Present during the tests on this new en-
gine were Marshal Nedelin, many specialists
on nuclear equipment, and representatives
of several government committees. When
the countdown was completed, the missile
failed to leave t(he launching pad. After 15
to 20 minutes had passed, Nedelin came out
of the shelter, followed by the others. Sud-
denly there was an explosion caused by the
mixture of the nuclear substance and other
components. Over 300 people were killed.
A few people miraculously survived, but
all of them were in deep shock. Some of
them died soon afterward. What was
brought to Moscow were not Nedelin's and
other victims' remains, but urns filled with
dirt. Yet we all had read in the "truthful"
official government statements printed in
the newspaper Pravda and Izvestiya only that
Nedelin died, "* *- * in the line of duty-in
an air accident," and we also read about
how these bodies were cremated, as well as
other details about the funeral.
MORE SPACEFAILURES
This is not the first time that a missile
accident took place. There had been others
before this, but the government keeps silent
about them.
When Khrushchev announced at the begin-
ning of 1960 that the Soviet Union possessed
a completely new and terrifying type of bal-
listic missile, he actually had in mind the
order he had issued to invent or prepare
this new type of propellant based on nuclear
energy. Some of the work in this direction
proved quite successful, even after Nedelin's
accident, but it is still far from what Khru-
shchev had in mind. There is a big lag in
electronics,
There were more accidents during tests.
In this respect my sympathies are with the
Americans. If they have an accident, it is
all in the papers; everyone knows about it.
But in our country everything is kept secret.
For example: There were several unsuc-
cessful launchings of sputniks with men
killed prior to Gagarin's flight. Either the
missile would explode on the launching pad,
or it would go up and never return.
When Gagarin made his flight, it was said
officially that there was not a single camera
in his sputnik. This-was a big lie. There
was, a whole system -of camefas'with different
lenses fpr },eking pictures and for intersec-
Lion. The photographic equipment was
turned on and off during the flight by the
astronaut. But Khrushchev tells everybody
that nothing was photographed. Photo-
graphic equipment has been installed on all
sputniks, but this has been denied in order
to prevent the Americans from launching
espionage sputniks, or as we call them:
"spies in the sky."
Right now we have a certain number of
missiles with nuclear warheads capable of
reaching the United States or South Amer-
ica; but these are single missiles, not in mass
production, and they are far from perfect.
Every possible measure is taken to improve
the missiles and their production.
Money is saved everywhere and allocated
to the building of kindergartens. That is the
slang expression we use for missile produc-
tion. Many different towns have been spe-
cially built for these scientists and the tech-
nical and engineering personnel. Scientists
and engineers not only have been awarded
decorations and medals, but some have been
awarded the. title of Hero of Socialist Labor
three or four times.
They have received the Lenin Prize, and
other prizes. The work of these people is
not publicized and their pictures do not
appear in the newspapers.
I have already heard some talk about a
woman astronaut being readied for a flight
into the stratosphere in a sputnik for propa-
ganda purposes. All the higher commanders
think that such a flight will have a strong
propaganda effect. The launching is planned
for the beginning of 1963.
The vigilance of the Western powers must
not be weakened by the shortcomings men-
tioned above. If at the present time the
Soviet ballistic missiles are still far from
being perfect, in 2 or 3 years-perhaps even
sooner-Khrushchev will have achieved his
goal.
In 1961, a firm directive was issued to
equip the satellite countries with missile
weapons. This was by a special decision of
the Central Committee CPSU. Marshal
Varentsov made the following comment:
"They say we must give our brother Slavs
missile weapons. So we give them missiles
now, and later they will stick a knife in our
back."
In my opinion as a general staff officer, it
will take a year or a year and a half for us
to be able to equip all the Eastern European
countries with missiles. In order to stop this
armament of Khrushchev's and his attempts
to launch an attack, the Western countries
must triple both their efforts at unity and
increase their armaments, Only then will
Khrushchev realize that he is dealing with
a strong adversary.
[From The Washington Post, Nov. 3, 1965]
OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN-TRICKERY USED
BY RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AGAINST WEST
REVEALED BY PENKOVSKY
(By Frank Gibney)
Col. Oleg Penkovsky, the brilliant Soviet
general staff officer who volunteered to spy
for the West, was almost the exact opposite
of the drab, mousy professional spy, as cele-
brated in current "realistic" espionage novels.
A sociable man who liked good food and good
conversation, he had a ready wit and was
prone to parlor card tricks.
When he arrived in London, in late April
1961, he was consciously setting out to play
an incredibly dangerous game of espionage
against his own regime. But he managed
to enjoy his stay, at least ostensibly, as
thoroughly as any tourist.
The colonel took long walks through the
city, visited department stores, restaurants
and theaters, generally in the company of
Greville Wynne, his British businessman
friend. The obvious freedom of the British
people delighted him. He told Wynne, again
and again, how different it was from the
closed society of Moscow.
Personally, he was manifestly relieved for
247
once to be out of the orbit of Soviet secret
police surveillance. He even managed some
discreet nightclubbing and a few dancing
lessons. (Soviet intelligence circles in Lon-
don, assumed that Penkovsky, a trusted offi-
cer, was attempting to "recruit" Wynne as
a Soviet agent. So his association with
Wynne was not under suspicion.)
Penkovsky also did some guide work of his
own, which considerably helped his standing
in Soviet military intelligence. Shortly be-
fore he left Moscow, General Seroy, the chief
of military intelligence, had called him into
his office and informed him that his wife
and daughter were also flying to London for
an unofficial tourist visit. He asked Pen-
kovsky to look after them and give them any
help they needed in getting around in a
strange city.
Accordingly, the colonel helped Mrs. Serov
and her attractive daughter Svetlana make
their purchases (with money drawn from
local Soviet intelligence funds). He even
managed to take Svetlana on a tour of the
better London night spots without arousing
undue attention.
Beneath this facade of socializing, however,
Penkovsky's new work continued in earnest.
On the basis of the information he had sub-
mitted, the British and American intelligence
oiicefs were now convinced that his desire
to work with them was genuine.
In their nocturnal meetings, they gave the
Soviet colonel a complete short course in
clandestine radio communications, as well as
a small Minox camera for photographing
documents. It was arranged to make con-
tact with him through Wynne or another
Western emissary, if he found it impossible
to return to Western Europe in the near fu-
tue. If necessary, instructions would be
transmitted to him by radio.
When he finally left London on May 6,
Penkovsky carried with him presents for his
highly placed Soviet friends, including Gen-
eral Serov, a full report of the trade and
technical mission (which Moscow judged
a great success) and a complete set of in-
structions and equipment for getting further
espionage information out of his "new
friends" in the West.
In the following excerpt from the papers,
Penkovsky has some more to say about the
real nature of his own Soviet delegation-
and the stern ground rules still laid down
to cover all Soviet contacts with foreigners.
(By Oleg Penkovsky)
The State Committee for Coordination of
Scientific Research Work is like a ministry.
Our chairman, Rudnev, enjoys all the priv-
ileges of a minister in the U.S.S.R. The
committee is in charge of all scientific and
technical exchanges with foreigners, both
in the Soviet Union and abroad. In fact,
it is a large espionage apparatus, which not
only collects scientific and technical infor-
mation, but tries to recruit Western technical
specialists.
When I began my work in the committee,
I was myself astounded by the number of
intelligence officers working there. Eighty
or ninety senior intelligence officers work in
the foreign relations section alone. When
one walks down the halls in our offices, one
can see some of them saluting each other
in the military manner. They have conspic-
uous difficulty getting away from military
habits, even getting used to their civilian
clothes.
The friendly contacts and "services" we
provide visiting foreign delegations we might
better call "friendly deceit." Often we mili-
tary intelligence officers cannot understand
ourselves why the foreigners believe us. Do
they not understand that we show them in
the U.S.S.R. only those things which are well
known to everybody? If there is something
new at a plant which foreigners are about
to visit, we simply give orders to its director:
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 Approved For Release :.CIA-RDP 5=001498000600240016-6
on May 6, 1961, from his first visit to London On May 1 when this incident happened, I
and set about in earnest to gather more in- -was duty officer at GRU (military intelli-
formation for Western intelligence. gene) headquarters. I was the first one to
Some of this intelligence turned out to report it to the GRU officials.
be the first accurate account of two troubling At that moment, the ROB did not have an
incidents on the Soviet-American policy fron-
tiers-the downing of the U-2 reconnaissance to him because I was the only one around
plane in 1960 and the later Soviet attack on who had some understanding of English-I
another American aircraft off the coast of had already reported the incident to some
Siberia. generals, If they had not found a KGB
When he returned to Moscow, he stored interpreter at the last minute, I would. have
his new camera, film, radio receiver and fre- been the first one to interview Powers.
quency instructions in a secret drawer in Ultimately, they called up to say that I
the apartment which he and his family oc- was not needed. It seems that the KGB
cupied on the Maxim Gorky Embankment. (State Security) chief, this young fellow
But he kept all knowledge of his new espion- Shelepin, who used to run the Komsomol
age role from tl,,em. (he replaced Serov at the KGB), wanted to
As far as Vera Penkovsky was concerned, make the report to Khrushchev personally.
her husband was busy at his normal. con- So he get an interpreter and picked Powers
fidential talks. Her own background as the up himself. But the military had knocked
daughter of a "political" general conditioned Powers down and Powers was considered
Approved For Release : CIA-RDPJ5-001498000600240016-6
CO IF RESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE Januciry 14, 1966
Sbow them everything, but have shops 1 to go abroad. But lately, because these
444 5 closed for repairs.' That is all. scientists must learn something about mis-
,rg tcernate,-,proposals which we use to.keep been given permission to travel-provided
foreigners out of certain. areas___of.___tile hhy_.baye_notparticipated in any missile
1. ~hepianz is under repair. If they defected to the West, their knowledge
2. abridge is closed., would not be so fresh.
'8. There is,, no airport and the railroad TOURING ENSTR
I
C
U
T
ONS
tracks. have been damaged by recent frost; Our intelligence instructions to traveling
therefore- for the time bein
there a r
to
g
forms and autobiographies must be filled
4. The local hotel, is not ready for guests. + hor e e +re , , ---------
.
t--
- ---- submit 18 photographs before a single trip.
t ometimes we take foreign delegates What are they going to do with them? Mari-
through museums and parks in Moscow nate them? My wife and I worked on them
Iuntil the.members are so tired they them-
iseIves call off the trip to a factory, preferring for 2 days, and. still could not finish all the
forms.
(to rest, Or, instead of taking the delegation Instructions we
lby plane, we put them on a train. As a give to Soviet travelers
stipulate that when traveling by train, you
eslilt, the delegation has enough time to see should always be seated with your own sex.
only one or two installations in which they Do not drink, do not talk too much and
art.interested, instead of five or six. Their report any incidents on the trip to the con-
visas expire and they have to leave after sul or Soviet :Embassy representatives. Do
having seen nothing but vodka and caviar. not carry any confidential materials with
RECRUITING TASKS you, do not leave your hotel room, do not
In Moscow our main task as intelligence make any notes, but if this is unavoidable,
officers inside the committee it to recruit keep them on your person.
.S.S R. Of course, this does not often tion to the Federal Republic of Germany.
sonal conversations, eavesdropping, examin- delegation. He: was co-opted, i.e., forcibly
Ong baggage, literally stealing secrets from recruited ' by military intelligence.
He had
the visitors' pockets. a notebook for making notes on the infor-
I have been assigned to British delegations rriation he gathered. He left the notebook
iendly relations with these men, assess was conducted. We found nothing. The
Lh their intelligence possibilities, then write a engineer became so upset that when his
e port on each to our intelligence people in Comrades went out shopping, he hanged
ndon. It will be up to them to collect himself in his hotel room. He used the
iuid technical information as possible of grad by plane. Later, at the enterprise
value to our Soviet industry-everything where he worked, it was announced that he
rom cheaper methods of getting fresh wa- was not normal and suffered from constant
er , from sea water to the manufacture of headaches. That is how things are done in
rtificial fur. Thanks to visits to our coun- our country.
-try by foreign delegations, we obtain vast
(quantities of extremely valuable information. [From the Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1965]
loos traveling abroad are carefully in
TRUE ACCOUNT Or U-2 PLANE INCIDENT
tructed how to answer questions that might (By Frank Gibney)
nere Is nothing new-that_Western scientists
d specialists could, learn from, the Soviet
ecialists-or Soviet exhibitions abroad.
or, example, the exhibits.to be shown at our
odon exhibition in 1961 were first care-
ully checked by intelligence technicians to
Zee sure there was nothing new which
oreign scientists could see or steal. Some
xhibits were purposely put together in a
istorted way; the cone of the sputnik on
isplay was not built that way
the spheres
,
Mere of another type.
Trips of Soviet delegations to foreign
cGountries require special preparation. The
departure of any delegation requires a sepa-
te decree from the Communist Party Cen-
'I'al Committee. And no delegation ever goes
broad without some form of state security
e
ua
195
err 6 past in y ,re, and made their own
Of the Communist Central, Committee, Ten Turkey, where she could practice her French report. He needed medical treatment, be-
T-.?r},iH ~,rw i?+viis,.ea-.o ., .... ,..a,. a..._ ?---'--- --- . .- - -
-- -- ---- - ...wj.a" '-' a,J CSJliVa.. file -'----,-.? -""` "`? "c '-,cuccuuf ,Lail. 1VVnetne-
Iieed, _ Take? my own 45-man delegation to best Vera hoped for was another attache's less, the KGB seized him, took him to
ondon. Five of its members were employees assignment abroad lik
Dzerzhinski S
th
--- ?--ro - ------- ~?.. v,.aiaai Vl Lf1C DllL- Veen notnmg to snout with. As soon as the
As a rule, Soviet scientists and technicians ish firms he represented. Penkovsky, met new rockets appeared, Khrushchev gave the
production missile work are not allowed him with a car at Sheremetevo Airport. On order to use them. So they fired at Powers
NEW ROCKETS
cohere or tourists, There were also three Greville Wynne flew back into Moscow on Earlier, when a U--2 flight came over in
other military intelligence colonels.-l12_ the Maw 97 +? rec,..r.,, ---- ____.,-.,-- .- -.
the way. into the city, "Alex," as Wynne called
him, handed the Englishman a packet of
some 211 exposed films and other documents,
including his own reports, for delivery to
British and American Intelligence.
The same evening Penkovsky visited
Wynne in his room at the Metropol Hotel.
Taking care to keep their conversation In-
nocuous (the room of a foreign visitor like
Wynne would probably be wired), Wynne gave
Penkovsky a package containing 30 fresh rolls
of film and further instructions from the
Anglo-American intelligence team in Lon-
don.
Far from suspecting anything strange in
Penkovsky's meetings with Wynne, his su-
periors in Soviet military intelligence con-
tinued to think that he was "developing" a
promising British contact. Penkovsky's
work with the Soviet delegation in London
was so highly regarded, in fact, that his
pleased superiors arranged to send him there
again in July, to attend the opening of a
Soviet Industrial Exhibition., This time he
was to travel alone, without any delegation.
American and British intelligence could
hardly have wished for such a nice arrange-
ment.
One presumes that Western Intelligence
found intensely valuable. not only Penkov-
sky's estimates of future Soviet plans, but
his reconstruction of recent events in Soviet-
American relations-most of which served
only to underline his warnings about Khru-
shchev's new policy of aggression.
For Penkovsky the intelligence informa-
tion he gave was only a means to an end.
His real purpose was to alert the American
and British people to the danger of Khru-
shchev's "adventurist" tactics.
(By Oleg Penkovsky)
The American U-2 Pilot Gary Powers was
shot down on May 1, 1960. Prior to the
Powers flight, other U-2 flights had been
made over the Kiev and Kharkov, but Khru-
shchev kept his mouth shut, because at that
time there were no missiles that could be
effective at the altitudes where the U-2 air-
craft were flying.
When Powers was shot down over Sverd-
lovsk, it was not a direct hit but rather the
shock wave that did it. The aircraft simply
fell apart from it. During his descent Pow-
ers lost consciousness several times. ? He was
unconscious when they picked him up from
the ground; therefore, he was helpless to do
 January 14, 1966
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'CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
on May 1, 1960. Of course, we had anti-
aircraft defenses before, but not in quantity,
and they were not able to go into action so
quickly.
Marshal Biryuzov, then commander-in-
chief of missile forces, was reprimanded be-
cause he had not correcty estimated the
probable direction of the U-2 flights-he
misgaged the importance of the targets.
His forces wanted to fire when the aircraft
from Turkey flew over Kiev, but there was
nothing to fire with and the aircraft es-
caped. Powers would have escaped if he
had flown one or one and a half kilometers
to the right of his flight path.
On May 5, after Powers was knocked down,
Khrushchev ordered a suspension of (secret)
agent operations to avoid the risk of being
caught by a Western provocation or, possi-
bly, of further material for Western count-
erpropaganda. There were many protests
about dropping scheduled meetings and
other contacts, but it had to be done.
The resident in Pakistan decided on his
own to pick up material from a dead drop
which was already loaded, in order to avoid
possible compromise to the agent. For this
he was severely reprimanded by his superior
at the GRU even though he did the right
thing. Thus, despite the damage it did to
the agent network, Khrushchev ordered ces-
sation 9f agent contacts during the period
when he was going to capitalize on the
Powers incident.
KHRUSHCHEV LIED
Khrushchev followed Powers' investiga-
tion and trial with great interest. He per-
sonally conducted the propaganda activity
connected with the case. He was the first
who began to shout about the direct hit, al-
though actually there had been no such
thing. Khrushchev wanted to brag about
his missiles.
Khrushchev lied when he says that Powers
was shot down by the first missile fired.
Actually, 14 missiles were fired at his plane.
The shock wave produced by the bursts
caused his plane to disintegrate. The ex-
amination of Powers' plane produced no evi-
dence of a direct hit; nor were there any mis-
sile fragments found on it. One of the 14
missiles fired at Powers' plane shot down a
Soviet MIG-19 which went up to pursue
Powers. Its pilot, a junior lieutenant,
perished.
The U.S, aircraft RB-47 shot down on
Khrushchev's order (in July, 1960) was not
flying over Soviet territory; it was flying
over neutral waters. Pinpointed by radar, it
was shot down by Khrushchev's personal
order. When the true facts were reported to
Khrushchev, he said: "Well done, boys, keep
them from even flying close."
Such is our way of observing international
law. Yet Khrushchev was afraid to admit
what had actually happened. Lies and de-
ceit are all around us. There is no truth
anywhere, I know for a fact that our mil-
itary leaders had a note prepared with apol-
ogies for the incident, but Khrushchev said:
"No, let them know that we are strong."
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1965]
OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN-PENKOVSKY FED
DATA To KEEP BOSSES HAPPY
(By Frank Gibney)
Between July f5 and August 10, 1961, Col.
Oleg Penkovsky played out the second round
of his'harrowing espionage game in London.
He spent part of each day working with Soviet
delegates to the trade exhibition, or running
through plans for Soviet espionage work in
Britain with other Russian intelligence of-
ficers In the soundproofed basement room
used by the intelligence "president" (i.e., the
officer in charge) of the Soviet Embassy at
ington Gardens.
K9,34
At" night, or during other off-hours, he
would n}eet with` "the four American and
British intelligence officer$ assigned ao him
in one of MI-6's safe houses for his real In-
telligence mission-explaining the documents
he had obtained from the secret files in
Moscow, exposing further Soviet intelligence
missions in the West, elaborating on technical
aspects of the Soviet missile program as well
as information on Khrushchev's political and
diplomatic strategy. Rarely in the history
of espionage has any country's high com-
mand been so thoroughly penetrated as the,
Kremlin was during the critical 16 months
when Colonel Penkovsky worked for the West..
Since Penkovsky had come to Britain again
on a Soviet spying mission, it was necessary
for the British and Americans to give him
some intelligence material of apparent value
to forward to his superiors in Moscow. This
was provided. Penkovsky thus kept sending
reports to Moscow of ostensibly new informa-
tion On military as well as political objec-
tives (e.g. "In traveling from London to Shef-
field I observed for the second time in the
southern outskirts of the city of Stamford a
military airfield, on which British air force
planes were based. I had the opportunity to
study more carefully the indicated objec-
tives"). Such reports kept Penkovsky's su-
periors in Moscow happy and unsuspecting.
AMAZING COOLNESS
With amazing coolness, the volunteer spy
for the West also went on to advance his
standing as a loyal Communist Party man
with Moscow in other ways. One quiet
morning he and Greville Wynne took a trip
to see Karl Marx's grave in Highgate Ceme-
tery and discovered it was in a bad state of
neglect. Penkovsky wrote a letter of pro-
test directly to the First Secretary of the
Central Committee in Moscow. In the let-
ter, Comrade Penkovsky told Comrade
Khrushchev that, as a loyal Marxist he
found such neglect an appalling reflection
on communism and the Soviet Union.
Moscow took swift "action. The London
Embassy was ordered to set things right
immediately and Penkovsky was commended
for his socialist vigilance.
All the while new assignments for Pen-
kovsky came from Washington. It was a
tense summer In Europe. The continent
still shook from Khrushchev's threats to sign
a treaty with East Germany and force the
Western allies out of Berlin. If anything,
the Vienna meeting of Krushchev and Presi-
dent Kennedy had increased the political
electricity. It was absolutely vital that the
White House and Whitehall have every
available piece of information on the extent
of Khruschev's military preparations and
his political planning. Above all, they
needed to know how far Khruschev was pre-
pared to go in pursuit of his German
objective.
Some of Penkovsky's sessions with the
Anglo-American team lasted as long as 10
hours at a stretch. Now that he had
switched his allegiance, his dedication to the
West was a single-minded as his youthful
allegiance to communism. As a literal sign
that he was now your colonel, he asked his
contacts to provide him with both a British
and an American colonel's uniform V They
did so. Pleased as punch, he had his picture
taken in both.
As the following excerpt from the Papers
indicates, Penkovsky was amazed that both-
the Western peoples and their governments
seemed disposed to accept Khrushchev's
boasts at face value. This only made Khru-
shchev's brinkmanship or adventurism grow
more dangerous. A firm Western stand was
needed, particularly in the case of Berlin.
(By Oleg Penkovsky)
In my considered opinion, as an officer of
the general staff, I do not believe Khru-
shchev is too anxious for a general war at the
present time. But he is preparing earnestly.
If the situation is ripe for war he will start
It first in order to catch the probable enemy
(the United States and Western States) un
249
awares. He would of course like to reach the
level of producing missiles by the tens of
thousands, launch them like a rainstorm
against the West, and, as he calls it, "bury
capitalism." In this respect even our mar-
shals and generals consider him to be a
provocateur, the one who incites war.
The Western powers must do something
to stop him. Today he will not start a war.
Today the Soviet Union is not ready for war.
Today he is playing' with missiles, but this
is playing with fire, and one of these days
he will start a real slaughter.
Look what happened during the Hungarian
events and Suez crisis in 1956. We in Moscow
felt as if we were sitting on a powderkeg.
Everyone in the general staff was against the
"Khrushchev adventure." It was better to
lose Hungary, as they said, than to lose
everything.
THANKS TO KHRUSHCHEV
But what did the West do? Nothing. It
was asleep. This gave Khrushchev confi-
dence, and after Hungary he began to
scream: "I was right." After the Hungarian
incident he dismissed many generals who had
spoken out against him. If the West had
slapped Khrushchev down hard then, he
would not be in power today and all of East-
ern Europe could be free.
Kennedy must carry out a firm and con-
sistent policy in regard to Khrushchev.
There is nothing to fear. Khrushchev is not
ready for war. He has to be slapped down
again and again every time he gets ready to
set off on one of his adventures.
Kennedy has just as much right to help
the patriots of Cuba as we had when we
helped the Hungarians.
This is not just my opinion. Everyone
at the general staff said this. It was said
in Marshal Varentosv's home, even on the
streetcars in Moscow. If the West does not
maintain a firm policy, then Khrushchev's
position will become stronger, he will think
even more about his might and right, and
in this case he might strike.
The people are very unhappy with Khru-
shchev's militant speeches. One can hear
this everywhere, listening to conversations.
Now, at least, one can breathe a little easier
than, in Beria's time. So one can hear and
say a few things.
On the other hand, the world can be
thankful to Khrushchev for his militant
words. They forced Kennedy, Macmillan,
and De Gaulle to double or triple their mili-
tary budgets and defense preparedness. If
Stalin were alive he would have done all
this quietly, but this fool Khrushchev's
loudmouthed. He himself forces the West-
ern powers to strengthen their defense weap-
ons and military potential.
The generals on the general staff have
no love for Khrushchev. They say that he
is working to his own detriment. Why is
this bald devil allowed to do as he pleases?
He blabs too much about Soviet military suc-
cesses in order to frighten the West, but
the West is not stupid, they are also getting
ready. What else can they do?
I believe Marshal Varentosv and Khru-
shchev's assistant Churayev; it was they who
claimed that Khrushchev said, "I will drop
a hail of missiles on them."
At the Soviet Embassy in London I saw a
short comment on Mr. Kennedy's recent
speech. The speech was called "the militant
speech of the President of the United States."
That is all we say officially. The Tass Inter-
cepts, however, contain the entire speech
point by point: first, second, third. First,
Kennedy's references to the increase in the
budget, next, the increase in the strength of
the Armed Forces, in connection with the
new Army draft, then the new specific cate-
gories of naval flyers, etc. If necessary, the
increases must be even greater.
But when we speak privately, it is a dif-
ferent story. At our Embassy, I heard many
good comments on. Kennedy's speech. It
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Abp
rev d or'Re#eas
stopped to watch three English children play-
ing by a sandbox along Tt`svetnoy Boulevard in
Moscow.
He handed them a small box of candy,
which the children brought obediently to
their mother, who was sitting nearby.
The Russian gentleman was Col. Oleg Pen-
kovsky, the English .mother Janet Anne
Chisholm, wife of a British Embassy attache.
.Concealed in the innocent-looking candy
box was a package of exposed film, which
Penkovsky urgently wanted to put in the
hands of British and American intelligence,
in the course of his extraordinary voluntary
spy mission for the West.
The bizarre meeting with the children was
of course carefully planned. Penkovsky had
net Mrs. Chisholm during his second trip
to London and he had been drilled in this
procedure by his Western intelligence con-
tacts.
A few weeks before, the British business-
man, Greville Wynne, Penkovsky's original
contact with the West, had arrived again In
Moscow to attend the French industrial fair.
In Wynne's room at the Metropol, Penkov-
sky had turned over the film and several
packets of highly classified information from
the Kremlin files, as well as a broken Minox
camera-he had dropped it during one of
his nocturnal photograpy sessions. Wynne
had given him a replacement camera and the
little box of candy lozenges to use in the
contact with Mrs. Chisholm.
RISKY FOR FOREIGNERS
The meeting with Mrs. Chisholm was
risky in a city where foreigners are as closely
watched as they are in Moscow. Wynne,
however, and Penkovsky continued to meet
with impunity, because of Penkovsky's official
dealings with him. When Penkovsky saw
Wynne, he told him that he was about to
take a trip to Paris himself with another
Soviet trade delegation, for the purpose of
attending the Soviet industrial fair there.
As Wynne later recalled, Penkovsky seemed
cool, self-possessed and happy in their con-
versation at that time. He was cheered by
the way his intelligence information was
.egistering with London and Washington and
buoyed up, against the hazards of his lonely
espionage mission, by the thought that he
was materially damaging the Moscow regime
which he hated so bitterly.
In the following excerpts from the papers,
he emphasized his disgust at the immorality
of the Kremlin hierarchy.
(By Oleg Penkovsky)
It Is Interesting to observe our prominent
Soviet personages. What a difference there
is between them when they are on the speak-
er's platform and when they are in their fam-
ily circles with a glass of vodka in their
hands.
They become entirely different types. They
are very much like the personalities which
are portrayed by Gogol in "Deal Souls" and
"The Inspector General."
In writing these notes, I have intentionally
omitted the subject of moral degradation and
drunkenness among the top military person-
nel-because there are already too many
dirty stories on this subject. I know one
thing for sure, though: all our generals have
mistresses and some have, two or more.
Family fights and divorces are a usual oc-
currence, and nobody tries to keep them se-
cret.
IMMORAL BEIFAVIOR
Every month at our party meetings in the
GRU we examine three or four cases of so-
called immoral behavior and lack of dis-
cipline among our officers.
The party committee and the chief po-
litical directorate of the GRU examine the
cases involving generals and colonels, while
those cases involving marshals are examined
by the Central Committee CPSU. The Cen-
tral Committee naturally discusses such mat-
ters behind closed doors, in order to conceal
from the general public and the rank and
file officers the dirt in which our high com-
mand personnel Is involved.
Besides, marshals are not punished so
severely as others. In most cases they are
just given a warning.
The explanation for this given by the Cen-
tral Committee is the same simple answer
once given by Stalin:
"A marshal and his services are more valu-
able than a female sex organ."
Khrushchev has shown special favor to
our Minister of Culture, the lady Furtseva,
In the anti-party fight against Bulganin and
the others in 1957 Furtseva helped him a
great deal; she worked day and night dis-
patching planes, and some say that she her-
self made some of the flights campaigning
for support for Khrushchev. She is power-
mad, everybody in Moscow calls her "Cather-
ine the Third."
Later Furtseva fell from favor. After the
party congress in 1960, Furtseva was ousted
from the Presidium of the Central Commit-
tee CPSU. As a result of ;this, her husband
Firyubin was unable to go to the United
States as the Soviet Ambassador.
OUSTER PLEASED ARMY
The entire Army was happy aboutLthe
news of Furtseva's ouster from the Presidium.
At one of the Presidium'meetings, she had
proposed that the additional pay the Soviet
army officers get for their respective ranks
be discontinued. The answer to her was:
"What is the matter with you? You want
to leave them without pants?"
What a fool. And yet there she was, oc-
cupying the post of Minister of Culture.
How can such a person carry culture to the
masses.
Take my friend Brig. Gen. Ivan Vladimiro-
vich Kupin. He is Marshal Varentsov's pro-
tege and a distant relative of his; Varent-
sov's daughter Yelena Is married to Kupin's
nephew.
Kupin is the commander of artillery and
missile troops of the Moscow Military Dis-
trict. Prior to this post, Kupin served in the
German Democratic Republic as commander
of artillery of the 1st Tank Army.
AMOROUS ESCAPADES
He was in a lot of trouble due to his
amorous escapades. While in Germany, he
lived with his cipher clerk Zaytseva. After
Kupin's departure from Germany, she
hanged herself because Kupin had left her
pregnant. During the investigation, a photo-
graph of Kupin had been found among her
belongings.
Kupin confessed that he had lived with
Zaytseva while concealing this fact from his
wife; he admitted that he.promised Zaytseva
to marry her.
When he arrived in Moscow, General Kry-
lov, commander of the Moscow Military Dis-
trict, refused to see him, but, because the
decision concerning Kupin's assignment had
already been approved by the Central Com-
mittee CPSU, the case was hushed up.
Varentsov persuaded Krylov to forget the
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WEST MUST PREPARE
sires, electronics, and other types of equip-
ment.
Khrushchev has lately become confused
on the Berlin matter, particularly because
he has realized that the West is firm there.
He would like to pursue a hard policy and
rattle his saber, but our country suffers from
a great many shortages and difficulties
which must be eliminated before the West
is to be frightened further.
[F'rom the Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1965]
fight, but to be 'ready for a fight if it RUSSIAN ELITE DISGUSTED PENKOVSKY
Mien the. time for a showdown (By Frank Gibney)
Lat
on i
h
in he afternoon
s
e
g
hg roads. and rue cuter ai _ ro tos_ to ast. be
-- -
,
-
l ~ r day in 1961, a smiling Russian gentleman
The. first echelon will consist of East Ger-
an troops, the second of Soviet troops. As
whole, the plan provides for combined op-
by Soviet and East German troops.
f the first echelon is defeated, the second
chelon advances, and so on. Khrushchev
Tropes that before events have reached the
Phase of the second echelon, the West will
~ate jointly in this operation because the
Germans cannot be trusted to act independ-
ently. In the first place, the East German
{11 my is poorly equipped and insufficiently
prepared because we are afraid to supply
hem with everything. The Germans have
So love of us, and there is always a chance
that in the future they may turn against
ifs, as it happened with the. Hungarians.
I Volodya Khoroshilov came home on leave.
is is chief of the artillery staff of the tank
"As soon as the treaty with Germany is
1fined, an alert will be declared immediately,
4nd the troops in East Germany will occupy
1 the controlpoints and will take over their
efense and support. Our troops will stand
by on alert, but they will not occupy these
Cites immediately because this might be
onsidered a provocation. We will simply
day, 'Please,_Americans, British, and French,
o to Berlin, but, you must request permis-
ion from East Qermany.'
"If the Americans, British, and French do
2of want to confer with the East Germans
4nd try to use force, the Germans will open
re.. Of course, the Germans do not have
lxgh strength, and then our tanks will
drove directly into Berlin."
I heard this from many officers, specifically
trOm General Pozovuy, and also from Fed-
tt and Marshall Varentsov. Varentsov,
owever, added, "We are taking a risk, a big
~ 14tFORTANcZ OF. TANKS
In 1961, when Khrushchev decided, to re-
eolve the Berlin question, a tank echelon was
rought to combat readiness on the border
as well as in Czechoslovaka
Find. Poland. That is the truth.
I The NATO countries should give particu-
att~ention to enttarnk,,.weapons. Why?
eeai. se East Germany has two tank armies
ill full readiness; this is In addition to the
t armies -which are part 'of the second
ehelon located on the territories of the
Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
I Ehrushchev personally attached a great
deal of importance to tank troops, especially
attached to tanks in connection with the
rlin crisis, that controversies have already
a-bd that there will not be enough for mis-
 Approved For'Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6
January, 1., 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
251
This ie, the way it goes in our country. Marshal Konev's son,_ Getty Ivanovich secret conferences with them at various safe
As ;long as the Central Committee approves, Konev, is a woman-chaser And a drunkard. apartments in the city. As before in Lon-
as long as one has connections, one can get He also is a member of that same, group of don, Penkovsky gave them a vast store of
away with anything, even crimes; but if a sons of marshals and otiier high officials. military and political information, supple-
similar incident happens to an ordinary offi- He is a motorcycle enthusiast, and he loves menting the documents he had photographed
cer without any connections, he is punished to play the horses. with his own informed analyses of current
immediately-either his rank is reduced, or I studied with Getty at the Military Acad- Soviet plans and military preparations.
he is discharged from the army entirely. emy. During that time Getty had an accident He also laid the groundwork for an even
Look at Krupchinskiy, head of the School while riding his motorcycle. He hit a man more widespread network of communications
for Nurses, and a friend of General Smblikov. who later died. Papa, however, took care with Western agents in Moscow which would
They drink together and indulge in sexual of everything and Getty was not jailed. He allow him to continue his secret communica-
orgies with girls attending the school. was graduated from the academy in 1953, and tions with Washington and London with a
Krupchinskly also provides girls for other is now working in the Information Direc- minimum of risk.
generals of the general staff. torate of the GItU, an the American desk.
Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubei got He knows English well. FRESH ASE
himself soeeply involved with some actress Corkin, chairman of the supreme court, When he was not engaged with either set
that it almost led to divorce, He was given has a son-in-law named Lieutenant Com- of intelligence officers, Penkovsky again
a warning by Khrushchev himself to be more mander Ivanov, a GRU military intelligence turned tourist, with his British friend, Gre-
careful in his adventures. Adzhubei is the employee. (This is the same Ivanov who was villa Wynne, acting as guide. The paint-
chief editor of the newspaper Izvestia, and connected with the Profumo scandal in Eng- ings at the Louvre and the night club ex-
every day he writes articles about Commu- land.) He and I studied together at the travaganzas at the Lido, Penkovsky viewed
nist morality. Military Diplomatic Academy. At present he with" apparently equal interest. Once again,
Yet, look at his own behavior. All the is the Assistant Naval Attache in Great Brit- he acted like a man who had suddenly been
other journalists hate him. ain. His wife is one of Gorkin's daughters. exposed to a draft of fresh air after long
Even Satyukov, the editor of Pravda, has Ivanov loves going to night clubs in London. confinement in a closed place.
slid down to second place after Izestia. As one can well see, all the sons and rela- Without constant Soviet surveillance to
Adzhubei received a Lenin prize for his so- tives of our Soviet leaders and high-level per- worry about, occasionally he lost his normal
called work about Khrushchev's trip to the sonnel are well taken care of. I have told caution. Once, when he and Wynne stum-
United States. This work was compiled and only about those who work in the GRU. bled on an emigre Russian restaurant in
written by the Central ,Committee. All But the same thing may be said about those Paris, Penkovsky could hardly be restrained
Adzhubet did was put his signature to it as who are in the Central Committee, the Coun- from staying far into the night, singing and
its editor. cil of Ministers, the KGB and various other talking Russian with the proprietor-hardly
In our own committee in Moscow, Yevgeniy ministries. the safe thing for a visiting Soviet intelli-
Ilich Levin, secret police (KGB) worker and All roads are open for them. They are the gence officer to do, especially when he was
Ovishlani's deputy, is a drunkard and dis- first ones who get promoted to higher ranks actually working for the West.
solute man. The stories he tells about the and better jobs. Everything is done by pull, Penkovsky liked London better, however.
cheap dives he frequents are hardly con- through friends and family connections. In Paris, also, he faced what he must have
sonant with what the party tells us about The newspapers scream that a struggle suspected was a final decision: to go back
Socialist mprality. must be waged against such practices. But or remain in the West.
After his nightly drunken escapades and what happens? They punish some factory The American and British intelligence of-
amorous-adventures, Levin invariably sleeps director for giving a job to his niece, and he ficers were perfectly willing to have Penkov-
Until noon. Almost every morning Gvishiani is criticized for it in the newspapers. But sky remain then and there, to receive asylum
looks for him: we must look higher and see what is going and a job suitable to his talents in Europe
"Where is my deputy?" Someone says: on at the top level. That is where all the or the United States.
"He has not arrived yet. Probably he is at big crimes are committed. It is they who set The information he had already given on
his other office (that is, KGB)." Gvishiani the example for the others to follow. Khrushchev's missile and Berlin offensives
is afraid of Levin. He knows very well that was so important that they were concerned
Levin is at home sleeping off his rough night, [From the Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1965] about his future personal security.
but he will do notllin For days before his departure Oleg Pen-
g? Qua M4N IN THE KREMLJIQ-SPY's CHOICE: kovsky debated with himself as he walked
The relatives of the highly placed do very HOME OR SAFETY
well in our Socialist society. Almost all of the streets of Paris. He had pressing family
the marshals' sons have finished the Military (By Frank Gibney) considerations at home-a pregnant wife, a
Diplomatic Academy. All of them would like Colonel Penkovsky arrived at LeBourget mother, a teenage daughter? Could he cut
to be sent abroad to work, but the Govern- Airport, near Paris, on September 20, 1961. them from his life forever? And to leave
ment will not let them. His British friend, Greville Wynne, met him the familiar world of Russia, much as he
There is a special decree of the Central at the airport. hated the Soviet regime, meant a cruel
Committee CPSU forbidding the sons of Penkovsky obviously could not have in- wrench. Yet everything in his immediate
marshals to go abroad. Many of them tried, formed Wynne of his exact arrival time with- surroundings argued that he stay.
but to no avail. out arousing suspicion among his superiors He almost did. The plane for Moscow
Marshal Sokolovskiy's son was given a 25-, in Moscow. At the request of the British was delayed by fog and the omen did not
year prison term. He belonged to a large and American intelligence team, Wynne, still escape him. For hours he paced the floor
group of sons of marshals and ministers- Penkovsky's safest contact, had flown to Paris of the waiting room at Orly Airport, virtually
some of our so-called golden youth-who and gone to the airport every day for 2 weeks, arguing out loud with himself, as Wynne
had organized druken orgies at their coun- watching the arrivals on each flight from patiently listened. He hesitated, literally
try houses outside Moscow. Moscow. at the customs barrier, but at the last min-
At one of these, orgies, a girl who had just From the standpoint of Western intelli- ute he said goodby to Wynne and marched
come to Moscow from Leningrad was raped gence, his vigil was wen spent. The brilliant back into a world from which he had long
After she was raped, the girl was placed photographs of secret intelligence docu- the papers, when he wrote shortly after his
in a car and taken somewhere behind the ments, technical processes, order of battle return to Moscow: "I feel that for another
Byelorussian Railroad Station, where they information on Soviet dispositions in Ger- year or two I must continue in the general
dumped her. Because the whole gang was many, and-most important of all-more staff of the U.S.S.R. In order to reveal all the
drunk, the driver of_ the car was driving very top-secret details of the Kremlin's missile villainous plans and plottings of our common
poorly. An militiaman noticed this and production and deployment. enemy; i.e., I consider myself as a soldier of
blocked the car, One of the boys in the car As usual, Penskovsky checked in promptly the West, so my place during these troubled
with the Paris "resident" of the Soviet mill- times is on the frontline. I must remain on
bb
i
d
t
l
d fi
d
b
k
ot
gra
e
s
an
a p
o
re
lan
a
sh
. The
oar was stopped. tart' Intelligence and went over details of the this frontline in order to be your eyes and
This happened under Stalin, and he said, after the Soviet exhibition in Paris. useful in the fight for our hig h ideals for
"I respect Sokolovskiy very much, but there Three days after his arrival, however, the mankind."
will be a trial just the same." And so a colonel began the real business of his trip. The following excerpt from the Penkovsky
trial was held, and Sokolovskiy's son was Wynne drove him to one of the Seine River papers suggests how powerful some of Pen-
given a 25 year prison term. He stayed in bridges, where he met the members of the kovsky's immediate efforts were. He dis-
jail only 3 years, however, and then he "be- British and American intelligence team who cusses the extent of the Soviet intelligence
came ill," allegedly suffering from an, ulcer or had worked with him in London. network operating out of the Paris embassy.
something of that sort. He was ,released. Through the next month he continued his It is now clear that Penkovsky exposed most
Approved ForRelease CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6
 Approved 'For Release : C1A-FDP75-00149R000600240016-6
CO IG RESSf0Nr S L RECO1 fl GATE January 14, 1966
6f the Soviet spy network in Western Europe ' It is true that if we approach an ordi.nar'
to United States and British intelligence dur- Frenchman, and he learns that he is speak-
u
:-I the same month when he was a temporary ing with Russians, he will immediately rn
mbar of Soviet Military Intelligence in and report the contact to the police. But
Peris. French Coinnamaists, generally speaking,
(By Oleg Penkovsky) readily agree to work for us, asking only di-
o er military intelligence officers, of collect- According to Prokhorov, we could not work
iAs I was in charge of the delegation, I did
n
BE
A(
w
we call It. It established contacts, made
quaintances, collected literature which
I- intelligence staff school in Moscow I was
taught entirely different things about the
enchand British "secret police."
After spending some time in those two
countries I saw how natural and unaffected
v.lov, loves England-"Mother England," as
he calls it.
While l was in London, I asked about the
cosmonaut Yuri Gargarin's visit to England.
Gargarin does not speak English, but he had
4mo excellent translators. Everyone as-
signed to him was selected from our "neigh-
rs," the secret police. Shapovalov told me
t at it was uncomfortable to see so many
sate security police surrounding Gargarin.
While he was in London, he lived in House
} o.,,. 13, on the second floor (Kensington
glace Gardens). People by the hundreds
o)ae British girl waited 18 hours to catch a
glimpse of him. When Gargarin was told
a out this, he said, "What a fool. It would
have been better if she "lead shared my bed
for a couple of hours." Here is the new his-
torical personality for you.
7-1 BERLIN CRISES?
entral committee CPfU in my delegation.
hey had a lengthy conference with Ambas-
i;dor Soldatov. Later I was told by our
tion . and. on the probable reaction of the
British,Goveqnlnent in case of a .Berlin crisis.
~entral Committee and military intelligence
to employ all agents and friendly contacts in
assy took off in various directions all over
ngland to gather` the needed information.
The entire force of operational, strategic, and
bou ht- rance easily, and for a cheap price.
"We bought the harlot cheap"-those were
the words he used.
Military intelligence has levied a require-
went on all residencies, especially those in
France, to obtain information on the new
models of NATO weapons. They are to use
all possible contacts, including all the rep-
resentatives of. the countries of the people's
democracies, acquaintances and Communists.
There were many other requirements re-
garding the collection of information of vari-
ous sorts, including approximately 20 to 25
items directly concerned with electronics,
especially electronic technology as used by
missile troops of the American and British
Armies. We were also directed to obtain
Information about certain kinds of small
American missiles launched from aircraft,
which create various forms of interference
in the air and disrupt radar scanning.
All operational intelligence officers were
assigned the task of visiting chemical enter-
prises in France, America, and England in
order to learn the process and ingredients
of solid fuel for missiles.
Information. was desired on heat-resisting
steel; there seemed to be some reason to be-
lieve that the United States had done some
very good work in this field. The GRU con-
siders that the "French have an excellent
solid fuel for missiles and have made great
progress in this direction.
I told the resident in Paris that I would
be traveling through France and could select
suitable sites for dead crops. The resident
replied that they had all the dead drop, sites
needed. He told me not to waste my time
on this.
The resident also said that it was very easy
to arrange agent meetings in France, to
transmit and receive materials, etc. He
even indicated that dead drops were seldom
used because It was simple to arrange direct
meetings with agents. These are not set up
very frequently, however, only when neces-
sary.
At the embassies in Paris and London, Tass
Intercepts and prints all communications
which do not find their way into the Soviet
press. This is done for all the Ambassadors,
Ministers, and Deputy Ministers. In military
intelligence they are read by everyone down
to and including the chief of a directorate.
This is how they learn about everything that
goes on in the world but does not get into
their own press.
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1965]
OUR MAN IN 'THE KREMLIN-DEAD DROPS AND
RED SURVEILLANCE
(By Frank Gibney)
Colonel Penkovsky's Paris visit was his last
to the West. Although his superiors in
military intelligence later made several pro-
posals to send him on foreign assignments,
it became clear that the state security police
were watching him. for some reason. Pen-
aMMUNI oTACTe 3fftcer in the, rE Volution.: He correctly be,
ai"alienations France, especially In Paris. gence methods: . (1) carefully arranged
"chance encounters"; (2) meetings at' the
homes of British or Americans he might
normally be expected to visit; (3) the device
of the "dead drop," the inconspicuous hiding
place where a package can be left for a later
pick up, without the need' for either party
to the transaction to meet face to face.
On October 21, just 2 weeks after his re-
turn from Paris, Penkovsky had his first
meeting with one of his contacts. At 9 p.m.
he was walking near the Balchug Hotel,
smoking a cigarette and holding in his hand
a package wrapped in white paper. A man
walked up to him, wearing an overcoat, un-
buttoned, and also smoking a cigarette. "Mr.
Alex," he said in English, "I am from your
two friends who send you n big, big welcome."
The package changed hands. Another hoard
of documents and observations on Soviet
military preparations was on its way west-
ward.
"Alex," for such was his code name, kept
on collecting and transmitting information,
without skimping on his normal daily
rounds. More than ever, he maintained con-
tacts with his friends in the Army. He ex-
uded confidence.
In December Penkovsky resumed meetings
with his Western contacts, but the risks in-
volved grew ever more apparent. On Jan-
uary 5, after he had passed some more film
to Mrs. Janet Anne Chisholm, wife of a
British Embassy attache, in an elaborately
casual encounter, he noticed a small car,
violating traffic regulations, had swung
around to observe them.
Later that month the same car appeared
again at one of his meetings, a small brown
sedan with the license plate BHA 61-45,
driven by a man in a black overcoat. Pen-
kovsky wrote a letter to a prearranged ad-
dress in London, advising, that no further
meetings with Mrs. Chisholm be attempted.
From that time on, Penkovsky relied on
the two remaining methods of communica-
tion. He either handed over material In the
houses of Westerners, to which he was in-
vited in the course of his duties, or relied on
the relative anonymity of dead-drops which
were, of course, the safest way to communi-
cate. But they had their own peculiar sus-
penses and horrors. In effect, an agent
working through dead-drops finds himself
playing a grown-up game of blindman's
buff.
Through the spring of .1962 Penkovsky's
existence was bounded by a collection of
these inconspicuous hiding places.
Drop No. 1 was located in the doorway of
No. 5-6 Pushkin Street, behind a radiator
painted dark green. Messages to be sent
were placed in a matchbox wrapped in light
blue paper, bound with cellophane tape and
wire, and hung on a certain hook behind
the radiator.
When Penkovsky had something to leave
there, he was to make a black mark on Post
No. 35 on the Kutuzov Prospect. He would
then put the materials in the drop, and make
two telephone calls to numbers G 3-26-87
and G 3-26-94, each with a set number of
rings. And so it went. Such are the com-
plexities of a working intelligence operation.
Through it all, Penkovsky continued to jot
down his observations and his own warning
to the West. The following excerpt discusses
one of the most chilling aspects of Soviet
war preparation: unrestricted chemical
warfare.
(By Oleg Penkovsky)
It is not enough for Krushchev to pre-
pare for atomic and hydrogen warfare. He
is also preparing for chemical warfare. A
special 7th Directorate in the general staff
Is Involved In working out methods of chem-
ical and bacteriological warfare.
The Chief Chemical Directorate of the
Ministry of Defense 3s also concerned with
the-prof [ems of chemical andbacteriOlogieal
warfare. We also have the Voroshilov Mili-
tary Academy of Chemical Defense, several
 Approved ForRRelease: CIA-RDP75-00149ROO06002400' 6-6
January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
military-chemical schools, and scientific, re-
selreil institutes, and laboraWries i11 the
field of chemistry and bacteriology. They
are?all, working on these military projects.
Near Moscow there is a special proving
ground for chemical defense. I know a new
gas has been invented which is colorless,
tasteless, and without odor. The gas is
avowed to be very effective and highly toxic.
The secret of the gas is not known to me.
It has been named "American." Why this
name was chosen, I can only guess.
Many places in the country have experf-
mental centers for testing various chemical
and bacteriological devices. One such base
is in Kaluga. The commanding officer of
this base is Nikolay Varentsov, the brother
of Marshal Varentsov,
Near the city of Kalinin, on'a small island
in the Volga, there is a special bacteriological
storage place. Here they keep large con-
tainers with bacilli of plagues and other
contagious diseases. The entire island Is
surrounded by barbed wire and is very se-
curely guarded. But my readers in the West
must not be under any illusions. This is
not the only place where there are such con-
tainers.
ARTILLERY EQUIPPED
Soviet artillery units all are regularly
equipped with chemical warfare shells.
They are at the gunsights, and our artillery
is routinely trained in their use. And let
there be no doubt; If hostilities should
erupt, the Soviet Army would use chemical
weapons against its opponents. The politi-
cal decision has already been made and our
strategic military planners have developed
a doctrine which permits the commander
In the field to decide whether to use chemical
weapons, and when and where.
I recently read an article entitled "Princi-
ples of the Employment of Chemical Mis-
siles" of the top secret military publication
"Information Collection of Missile Units and
Artillery." It is being distributed this
month, August 1961. (This publication is
intended to explain the latest in tactical and
operational doctrine to the highest rank-
ing officers, i.e., major general and above.)
The article wastes no time and minces no
words. It opens with the statement that
under modern conditions highly toxic chem-
teal agents are one of the most powerful
means of destroying the enemy.
There is no mention made of waiting until
the enemy uses chemical weapons; there is
no reference to the need. for a high-level
political decision for the use of such weap-
ons.
From the start to finish the article makes
It clear that this decision has been made,
that chemical shells and missiles may be
considered just ordinary weapons available
to the military commander, to be used rou-
tinely by him when the situation calls for it.
The article specifically states, "The com-
mander of the army (front) makes the deci-
sion to use chemical weapons."
The authors add that one of the most im-
portant uses for chemical missiles will be
the destruction of the enemy's nuclear strike
capability. Specific mention is made of
the Little John, Horrest John, Lacrosse,
Corporal, Redstone, and Sergeant units,
the width and depth of their dispersed
formations under tactical conditions, and
their vulnerabilities to the chemical attack.
Also American cruise missile and atomic ar-
tillery units. The article contains the usual
precautions about the necessity to prevent
damage to friendly troops, and discussed the
operational situations in which chemical
weapons could be used to greatest advantage.
This is how ~t con_ dudes:
"The purpose`of this article is to present
the main fundamental principles of using
chemical missiles: Those principles should
not, under any circumstances, be considered
as_.iirnly established, because they can be
defined with greater, precision as practical
experience is accumulated."
Soviet officers generally consider Americans
to be extremely lax in matters of training and
discipline for defense against chemical at-
tack. I have heard that American soldiers
even boast of throwing away their gas masks
and other protective equipment, claiming
they have lost them. I can hardly believe
this, but even if it is only partly true, it is
a training deficiency which must be corrected
immediately. Such crucial flaws in an
enemy's defensive armor are not overlooked
by Soviet planners.
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1965]
OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN-PENKOVSKY ON
LAST ARRIVAL IN Moscow KNEW SOVIET NET
WAS CLOSING ON HIM
(By Frank Gibney)
"I am under observation," Colonel Pen-
kovsky said, when his British businessman
contact, Greville Wynne, arrived in Moscow
for what proved to be his last visit before
Penkovsky's arrest. It was July 1962.
Penkovsky had continued to produce tre-
mendous quantities of information for
American and British intelligence, but by
now he was considering means of making his
escape.
He still could not be sure what. the state
security police suspected, but he realized
that a net of surveillance was tightening
around him.
A less bold or zealous man would have
curtailed his activities. But Penkovsky
knew the extent of Khrushchev's buildup
in missiles, as well as his continued plans
for military provocation over Berlin. He
sacrificed caution in his effort to get his
warning across to Washington and London.
Wynne brought Penkovsky letters from his
contacts in ,the West, which improved his
spirits. Western intelligence officers had
forged a new passpRrt for Penkovsky to use
within the Soviet Ulaton in case surveillance
increased to the danger point. He had
previously discussed the possibility of leav-
ing Moscow for Leningrad and somehow mak-
ing a rendezvous with a submarine in the
Baltic. However farfetched the plan seemed,
he was also thinking of some way to get his
family out as well.
On the fourth of July 1962, Penkovsky at-
tended a reception at the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow, where he apparently succeeded in
turning over information on the Soviet mis-
sile buildup to U.S. officers. On July 5, he
and Wynne had a last meeting, at dinner, at
the Peiping Restaurant in Moscow. There
they ran into the most obvious kind of sur-
veillance by the state security.
Penkovsky wrote down this account of the
event after it happened. "On approach-
ing the Peiping I noticed surveillance of
Wynne. I decided to go away without ap-
proaching him. Then I became afraid that
he might have some return material for me
before his departure from Moscow. I de-
cided to enter the restaurant and to have
dinner with Wynne in plain sight of every-
one.
"Entering the vestibule I saw that Wynne
was surrounded (and that surveillance was
either a demonstrative or an inept one).
Having seen that there were no free tables, I
decided to leave, knowing that Wynne would
follow me, I only wanted to find out if he
_,had material for me and then to part with
him until morning, having told him that I
would see him off. I went 100 to 150 meters
beyond into a large, through courtyard with
a garden. Wynne followed me, and the two
of us immediately saw the two detectives
following us. Exchanging a few words, we
separated.
"I was.very indignant about this insolence,
X53
and on the following day, I reported officially
to my superiors that State security workers
had prevented me from dining with a for-
eigner whom we respect, have known for
a long time, with whom we have relations
of mutual trust, with whom I have been
working for a long time, etc. I said that our
guest felt uncomfortable when he saw that
he was being tendered such attention.
"My superiors agreed with me that this
was a disgrace, and Levin (the State security
representative) was equally indignant about
the surveillance. Levin said that the com-
mittee and I as its representative, granted
the necessary courtesies to Wynne and that
we (State security) do not have any claims
on him."
Pankovsky's cool-headed bluff bought him
time-almost 3 months' worth. He con-
tinued to photograph secret documents in the
general staff library, relying on his good con-
nections in Soviet military circles to hold
off further action by the State security police.
Later, the Moscow press strenuously at-
tempted to play down Penkovsky's influence
and associations with Soviet generals and
marshals.
Izvestia, for example, called him "a rank
and file official whose contacts and acquain-
tances did not go beyond a limited circle of
restaurant habitues, drunkards, and phil-
anderers."
How true this characterization was may be
gaged from the papers themselves, a record
of which the regime was, of course, ignorant.
In the following excerpt, Penkovsky describes
one of the many intimate gatherings at which
he hobnobbed with the Kremlin hierarchy:
Marshal Varenstov's birthday party in Sep-
tember 1961.
(By Oleg Penkovsky)
Marshal Varentsov's birthday party was
held at his country home. Many guests were
invited, including the minister of defense,
Marshal Malinovsky. My whole family, in-
cluding even my mother, was invited long
in advance. Yekaterina Karpovna, Varen-
tsov's wife, asked me to be master of cere-
monies (temadan).
On the evening of September 16, 1961, the
guests began to arrive: Marshal Malinovsky
with his wife; Chruayev, Khrushchev's right-
hand man in the Central Committee Bureau
for the Russian Republic (R.S.F.S.R.); Lieu-
tenant Ryabchikov; Major General Semenov,
and many others.
All the military were in civilian clothes
with the exception of Malinovsky, who came
wearing his uniform. Some of those invited
could not come because they were busy,
many of them out of town on business trips.
The most important guests, of course, were,
Malinovsky and Churayev. Both arrived in
Chaikas (the largest Soviet luxury car).
Malinovsky presented Varentsov with a
large (3-liter) bottle of champagne, Chura-
yev gave him a large wooden carved eagle,
someone even gave Sergey Sergeyevich a
black dog. The best and the most original
presents were those from me and my family.
They were the things I had bought in
London. Varentsov openly admitted it by
declaring loudly: "My boy has really outdone
himself this time." And my presents went
from one guest to another. Everyone asked
where and how I managed to get such
beautiful things. Mrs. Varentsov and my
wife quietly explained to the guests about
my latest trip to London. The answer was
always the same: "Oh, well, that of course
explains it."
MOTHER'S QUESTION
At some point, while the party was in full
swing, my mother approached Malinovsky
and out of a clear sky asked him: "Forgive
me, an old woman, Comrade Minister, my
dear Rodion Yakovlevich, tell me please will
there be a war? This question worries all of
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149ROO060024001:6-6-
 'r-d For ease 0 LA-k DP75-00149f 000600240016-6
STCAL ~tbtfi SNA'I January'
~
rYi tie ashngton 7Sov. il, T$$5j strut bons 3or Wt,sterri enacts-tie_C.olo-_ Bien s actii,at force equals thaw o 8Zf mega-
o i
e
t force w s not expect.erl
gr
a
pt and met Greville Wynne in the passenger contacts and, above all, destroyed the incrim- megatons.
Wing loom inattng materials in his desk drawer. Why did Khrushchev unexpectedly begin
sing his Party card to Overawe customs He did not do this precisely because he to conduct new nuclear tests?
(The Soviets resumed nuclear testing on
and
and
e
__
.
r .rw.
-- e
itr t westbound plane, an S.A,S. flight headed world. All nuclear tests have had and some still
The first phase deals with
s
h
o
t
.
ase
p
w
foCopenhagen. In the following excerpt from the papers, have
he discusses the So- the explosive force in TNT equivalents.
ing on the heels of their surveillance
of the last he wrote
,
one
m
atk a Peking Restaurant the night before, viet nuclear menace-and Khrushchev's dis- In these tests the bombs were dropped
The
ecial masts
s
f
ft
.
p
rom
or
this hasty departure must inevitably have regard of any test ban in. 1961 and 1962. from aircra
deepened the suspicions of the State Been- (We must remember that Khrushchev second phase tests nuclear payloads lifted
rl~y Police. But Penkovsky knew that agreed to a test ban in 1963, only after the by missiles.
-Wynne was in some danger. United States faced him clown in Cuba.) The present tests are almost exclusively on
=--- * _- _ - lay "`Ce ----,Y)
are conducted with missiles.
safety,
t Wynne's thre
c is to assure
Man of our nuclear explosions (tests) o
months the colonel y Why Is Khrushchev pushing these nuclear
xt thre
n
th
e
x
e
e
e
ver
succeeded in getting several packets of in- have been conducted in the central part of tests? Why is he unwilling to sign the
a
fio?mail" on out to his Western contacts, most- the U.S.S.R., mostly in Kazakhstan. Some agreement forbidding nuclear weapons tests?
of the smaller tests were not noticed at all B
st of our missiles have not even
"
'
ecause mo
and pre-
dead drops
ly through the use of
arranged messages. and were not recorded by the Western states. passed the necessary tests, let alone of mis-
On September 5,'he brought some film to The large nuclear explosions are reported sile production, as regards quality and there
an American Embassy reception, but he could by Tass and the Soviet press, but nothing is have been many instances of missiles and
find no safe Opportunity to transfer it. ever said about the smaller ones. At the gen- satellites exploding in the air or disappearing
sts bein
f t
i
e
mes now o
g completely.
1'Thenext day he tried to establish con- eral staff we somet
ne of-his British sources That conducted on a, certain type of nuclear But Khrushchev persistently does every-
it1'?
;ee}
o
w
say about this. If Tass keeps silent, then we
. Y He wants to seize the initiative and to show
ti htened
t that he is ahead in the field of
silent
too
k
th
W
,
.
eep
e
es
On October 22, according to official Soviet
1 Cord, Col. Oleg Penkovsky was arrested by Tests of various new types of nuclear missile production, as regards quality as well
r presentatives of the State Security, in Moe- weapons are conducted daily. Nuclear test as quantity.
c ii, and. taker, to Lubianka Prison. On explosions take place more often than re- Khrushchev and our scientists are still
N vember 2, Greville Wynne was kidnaped ported by Tass or the Soviet press. All this quite far from being able to prove such a
it Budapest, where he had gone to make pre- talk about the Soviet Union advocating the superiority; but they are working hard to im-
l nary arran4ements for a mobile trade prohibition of nuclear tests is nothing but prove all types of missile weapons.
edition in Eastern Europe. He was flown lies. General Kupin says there are insufficient
t Moscow in an aircraft commanded by a Khrushchev will fire anyone who mentions defense facilities in case of war, particularly
S ate aecLirity general and` thrown into Lu- complete suspension of nuclear tests. He is as regards defense against radioactive sub-
b anka for interrogation. not ready for it. ^M1N^^_^ stances.
_ _ ul, a
t
rohibi+in
n ..
lon
i?
n
p
g
..
g
d
defense plants that every hing Is u11de1
ynne was-to last ullif six months. clear tests only alter ho b e co111os convi? ce
? hat i? lly'betra.yed Penknvslcy? It was that the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United control and that there is no danger of con-
ouse srne played by an- all-seeing State tary purposes. The negotiations could last Many become ill, after working for 6
and to temporize with, in an effort to learn nuclear warheads. Almost all the ore con- low radioactive leakage.
ore about his contacts, sources, etc. taming uranium comes to the Soviet Union (EDITOI'S NOTE.-On August 25, 1962, Colo-
x nutp_ is~?pying was discovered, it from Czechoslovakia? nel Penkovsky added the following personal
ust have'been made just before his arrest. been round in China, out they are very 111- entries with a date amxea. it was the last
Me State Security's original discovery significant. Soviet monazite sands and ore thing ever received from him.)
___
t .
ti
l
l
rich either in r Lava already
t
the f
t th
t
_ - .. -- _~_____i
ts
no
ar
cu
ar
y
used
o
ac
a
a
t e coursg of the investigation, the State Se- materials, it is small wonder that our govern- "neighbors" continue to study me. There is
Bven~though Penkovsky's position in In.- ore deposits are in the Congo. I a!.i very far from exaggerating the dangers.
elligence permitted such associations, there When Lumumba was temporarily in power StiL', I am an optimist and I try to evaluate
The expensive gifts he brought back from Egypt and Sudan. The aircraft were Of the work. The most important thing is that
lso aroused some suspicion, Wynne still be- not land on the Sudanese airfield, and other tinuc this work. To tell the truth about the
f
th
i
i
or
ss
on
e Soviet system-it is the goal of my life. And
eves that Penkovsky was first suspected of countries would not give perm
lacklnark6teering-not an unusual crime Soviet aircraft to land for refueling. If I succeed in contributing my little bricks
-A good friend of mine, Maj. Aleksey Our- to this great ziiohg Joviet officials. +^he^~ ^~+H cause, there can be no greater
ension with the West was built up by Khru- this mission was toreesittablish Soviet control [From the Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1965]
`
nl
o the C ng
? h
e
ra
u
a._
Tronlcally, the same collision course fore bomb. This was the first test explosion Y v'raiiK x'
.., _
. -..
_
i
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quad the secret drawer with Penkovsky's Later, when a 50?-megaton bomb was of the U.S.S.R. O. V. Penkovsky and the
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-'_,_ _._`.__
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urprise the
a
Appr? ved.?or f i - ~5-0E 14 ROG06O0240O16.6
 Approved For Release: CIA-RDP75-00149R0006002400116-6
January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 255
Ville Wynne." (Information release, Military
Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court.)
The trial of Colonel Penkovsky and
Grevill . Wynne lasted all of 4 days, and
one of these days was occupied by a closed
session. The verdict was never in doubt.
Penkovsky was sentenced to death, Wynne
tt 16 years' imprisonment.
Both defendants confessed their guilt, as
agreed on during the long months of brutal
state security interrogation. Wynne dis-
played some obvious reservations, however,
and he left little doubt about the extent of
his coaching and coercion.
Penkovsky had agreed to the humiliation
of a Soviet "show" trial for only one reason:
to safeguard the lives of his family.
As Wynne later said, it was clear that he
had made a bargain with his state security
interrogators. If he played the game, as
they ordered it, his wife and children would
be spared the imprisonment they might or-
dinarily have expected, as close relatives of
an enemy of the state.
He was probably safe in assuming the
bargain would be kept. The Stalinist terror
has left such a bad taste in, the mouth of
all Russians that reprisals against a political
prisoner's family are generally unpopular.
Penkovsky's wife and children never sus-
pected the dangerous crusade to which he
had committed himself. He naturally
wanted to spare them'the worst of its conse-
quences.
WYNNE FREED IN EXCHANGE
Wynne was released in 1964, in exchange
for the Soviet spy Konon Melody, who under
the name of Gordon Lonsdale had been
passing information to Moscow from London.
Although "Lonsdale's" espionage against the
British can hardly be compared to the magni-
tude of Penkovsky's disclosures to the West,
he was a professional Soviet intelligence offi-
cer and they wanted him back in Moscow.
The very fact that a trial had to be held
must have been embarrassing to the Krem-
lin. But Penkovsky had to have a public
trial. Eight British and U.S. diplomats in
Moscow had been declared persona non grata
for their connections with him. A foreign
national, Wynne was directly implicated.
But Penkovsky himself was too big a fish
to dismiss with the minimal notice reserved
for most such offenses. The wave of trans-
fers and demotions in the Soviet intelligence
service and the army, following Penkovsky's
arrest, was too large to avoid explaining.
(Some 300 intelligence officers alone were
hastily recalled to Moscow.
Finally Penkovsky's associates in the army
were too highly placed to avoid the most pub-
lic sort of warning.
TRIAL PLANNED 6 MONTHS
For 6 months the prosecution had worked
out the details of those 4 days in court.
Wynne was interrogated steadily, since the
day-November 3, 1962, when he was flown to
Moscow after his abduction In Budapest by
Soviet and Hungarian security men.
Inside the Lubianka Prison, the State Se-
curity arranged a meeting with both Pen-
ovsky and Wynne. There Penkovsky begged
ynne to cooperate in a public trial. Wynne
reed to cooperate within limits. After 6
lpless months in a solitary cell of the
ibianka, there was little option left to him,
E`ie feared also, that without a public trial,
nothing would be known of his fate.
In the pretrial interrogations Penkovsky,
who ad a rough time of it, made no attempt
to disguise his motives and actions. He told
his interrogators that he had acted not pri-
marily to help the West, but in the best in-
terests of his. own people, the Russians. This
was hardly a defense which a Soviet court
would permit him to repeat in public. (It
is of interest that the. flual statements Of
both defendants were, made in a closed cow t
session.)
The two defense attorneys assigned to
Wynne and Penkovsky went.through the mo-
tions of talking to their "clients," but, only
after the interrogators had finished.
(Wynne's attorney, who spent most of his
time in court agreeing with the.prosecution,
later presented him with a capitalist-sized
bill.)
DEFENDANTS REHEARSED
When the trial was finally staged, both
defendants had been rehearsed thoroughly,
even to the point of visiting the courtroom
in advance. The military court, presided
over by Lt. Gen. V. V. Borisoglebskly, called
four witnesses, two of them acquaintances
of Penkovsky's, and produced nine experts
to certify the equipment found in Penkov-
sky's apartment, the security nature of the
information which he gave, and other
things.
In the orderly process of question and
answer the whole story of Penkovsky's es-
pionage against the Soviet Union was re-
peated, from the first meeting with Wynne
in Moscow and the confrontation with the
British and American intelligence officers in
London.
Lt. Gen. A. G. Gornyy, the chief military
prosecutor, summarized it at the outset:
"? * * the accused Penkovsky is an oppor-
tunist, a careerist and a morally decayed per-
son who took the road of treason and be-
trayal of his country and' was employed by
imperialist intelligence services.
- "By the end of 1960 he attempted to get
in touch with the American intelligence serv-
ice, further exploiting the undeserved trust
placed in him and his position as deputy
head of the Foreign Department of the State
Committee for the Coordination of Scien-
tific Research Work-having, through the
nature of his work, the opportunity to meet
foreigners visiting the Soviet Union as mem-
bers of the various scientific and cultural
delegations."
NO DOUBT OF GUILT
There was no doubt that Penkovsky had
engaged in the most serious sort of espio-
nage. The catalog of material confiscated
in his apartment as read off at the Soviet
trial would in itself offer ample grounds for
an espionage conviction.
"During the search at Penkovsky's apart-
ment, in addition to the already mentioned
records with the telephone numbers of the
foreign intelligence officers, six message post-
cards with Instructions for them, the report
and the exposed rolls of film, the following
articles were discovered in a secret hiding
place installed in his desk, and were attached
to the file as tangible evidence: a forged
passport, six cipher pads, three Minox cam-
eras and a description of them, two sheets
of specially treated paper for writing secret
text, a memorandum with an indication of
the frequencies on which Penkovsky re-
ceived instructional radio transmission from
the foreign intelligence services, the draft
of a report from Penkovsky to the intelli-
gence headquarters, the article which Pen-
kovsky had received from the foreign in-
telligence services and which he intended to
publish in the Soviet Union, 15 unexposed
rolls of film for the Minox camera, and vari-
ous instruction manuals provided by the
foreign intelligence services-the Sonlya
(Sony) radio receiver which he had received
from the foreign intelligence services and
which he used-to receive enciphered radio
messages from the intelligence headquarters,
and the typewriter on which Penkovsky typed
his reports."
There was no doubt, either, whom Pen-
kovsky had been dealing with. Witness the
prosecutor's angry tirade:
"A leading role in this belongs to the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency of the United
States-J e?s tpport of the most adventur-
ist circles iz the, United, States., bike a, giant
octopus It extends its tentacles into all
corners of the earth, supports a tremendous
number of spies and secret informants, con-
tinually organizes plots and murders, provo-
cations and diversions. Modern techniques
are put to the service of espionage: from the
miniature Minox cameras which you see be-
fore you up to space satellites, spies in the
sky."
IMPORTANT FACTS HIDDEN
But what the Soviet prosecutors could not
do was admit the two most Important facts
in the whole case: (1) Penkovsky's real iden-
tity as a colonel in Military Intelligence and
the real extent of his contacts with the
Soviet hierarchy; and (2) Penkovsky's real
motive in betraying the Soviet regime.
In the Soviet record, he could be a drunk-
ard, a philanderer, greedy, and a girl chaser-
all these motives the prosecution clumsily at-
tempted to adduce. But the Communist sys-
tem is too brittle and insubstantial to admit
that such a highly placed official could revolt
against it because he thought the system was
bad and wrong.
As a result the trial showed up as a farce.
(Even witnesses from military intelligence
had to be disguised as officers from the edu-
cational branch of the Ministry of Defense.)
The Soviet prosecutors left only an agonizing
question mark, when they tried to show
how such a brilliant and promising officer
had gone wrong.
Time and time again Penkovsky's past
credentials were certified: a war hero, a
brilliant officer (and even more brilliant if
one included his real record in intelligence),
and a responsible Soviet official.
Then suddenly came the fall in 1960.
Despite all the prosecutor's attempts to trace
the beginning of careerism, it was, as they
depicted it, a fall as abrupt as original sin
and about as rationally explainable. An ex-
traordinary gap yawned between the able,
hardworking, trusted Soviet official and the
cringing specimen of "moral depravity"
which General Gornyy presented, in a sum-
mation titled "Penkovsky's path from ca-
reerism and moral degradation to treachery."
"Penkovsky is dead," the prosecutor told
Izvestia and the world, a few days after the
'trial ended. "The sentence was carried out
on May 16, in the second half of the day.
When it was announced to him that the
Supreme' Soviet of the U.S.S.R. had denied
his petition for mercy and he was to be
executed, there was not a trace of the poseur's
manner which he had maintained in court.
He met death like a despicable coward."
So ended the career of the most extraor-
dinary volunteer spy of this century.
The free world is forever in his debt.
(By Greville Wynne)
(The following description of Oleg Penkov-
sky was written after Wynne returned from
Soviet captivity, Wynne was the last west-
erner to see Penkovsky alive.)
Oleg Penkovsky was a most extraordinary
man. It was an unforgettable experience to
accompany him, particularly during his first
visits to London and Paris, and to see the
tremendous impact of our free society on a
decent, and by Soviet standards, sophisticated
man, but a man who had been sheltered all
his life inside the prison of the Soviet
system.
It was the people in the West who im-
pressed him most. He was amazed, for
example, to find that the assistants in de-
partment stores were clean, neat in dress and
well groomed, that nearly all the young ladies
there were attractive, smiling and anxious
to please.
I had often visited the gloomy GUM de-
partment store in Moscow and the 'drab
shops in Gorky street with their drab, surly
attendants. So I had some idea of the
mental contrast he must have been making.
Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-00149R00060024001=6-&
 LLApproved For Release" : 'CIA-RQP75-00149 R000600240016-6
CONGRES IONAL - RECO1W - SENATE January 14, 1966
`ire was -interested in religion. Ile had _ Penkovsky first read it in the Course of a 'money,' which means that such a person
n`&c ee' i"Taptizea himself by his pious briefing sesedoil In Moscow while prepay- has a lot of money.
ft 4inr ? `Tb Y:nnrinn one day we. were pasting ia-g for a mission to the United States, which The other side of the question, specifically
O loo around.opTe" of the extent to which Soviet espio- body.
t Americans encourage
id th
It b
'
a
e sa
formalized, its
od,
He was fascinated. "This is go he rage has expanded, In fact, can. d. `"perhaps the religious doctrine is not widespread undercover activities in the any method of getting rich.
ntirely correct, but at least it gives us a United States. American bourgeois propaganda tries in
,principle to guide our life. At home in the Although the language of the Prikhodko every way to convince the population that
Soviet Union we have nothing. There are lecture in professorial, its content is hair anyone can make money if he is sufficiently
o j~lincip]es-only what the Party tells raising. It is literally a professional working resourceful.
it.anual for Soviet intelligence officers in the Such a one-sided upbringing engenders in
_"_ W4=_V0r we went he was accepted as my United States, complete with instructions on some of the people an indifference to every-
Mend... This, first amazed him? but. also how to recruit American agents to do their thing unconnected with business, profits,
Such a terrific con- spying work---tea, most-sini.ster variety of how- and gain. - The American love of money can
d him immensel
le
s
y
a
e
. cast from the Soviet system where it is still to-do-it book. be exploited by paying an agent for his work
highly dangerous for citizens to mix socially As his first step, Colonel Prikhodk.o tries in order to increase his personal interest in
with Westerners. to give his pupils-most of them Soviet in- working for us.
rompt and equitable
ments must be
Pa
'
.
p
y
s or lieutenant
He was bitter about the Soviet regime. telligence officers of major
He would weep, quite literally, when he colonel's rank---an objective introduction to This disciplines the agent and improves the
talked about its misdeeds and the sufferings the strange ways and customs of Americans, Soviet officer's authority.
. or.unhapptness of his friends in the Soviet regarded in his Soviet classroom as virtually To encourage an agent, monthly payments
,Union, citizens of another world. are increased or bonuses, awards, or valu-
At the very, end of his Paris trip he worried coMMUMST CONTACT able gifts are given.
. Thus, for example, agent B, who was on
ld
t
s
ay
He knew he cou
bout going back. shall never forget that day when I picked Although Co:[. Prikhodko was trying to.be a monthly salary, reduced his production
objective, his guidebook is a weird article appreciably. His attendance at meetings and
up Oleg In the early morning for a drive with observed reality constantly being con- visits to dead drops were irregular. Despite
to the airport in thick fog. Then we waited fused with the necessity to interpret every- rebukes by the intelligence officer, the agent's
for over 4 hours for the plane to take off. thing in a Communist context. While the work did not improve.
almost stayed. His face was tense with
colonel finds the Americans, on the one hand, The intelligence officer decided that he
phis decision, Finally he made up his mind,
turncd-to me~nd-said, "Oh Oreville, I must energetic, enterprising, and open people, re- would have to use ninducement.
sourceful, courageous and industrious, they With the Center's permission he began to
go back.- I have more work to do." are at,the same time demoralized by bour-
the only agent for those
actually months worked and
'KNEW HE WAS WATCHED g' Bois societYandconstantlYdiverted by' mo= fog pay the which agent
and
. `
It was then July 1962, and he knew that nopolists" into spending their time in silly performed his operational activities.
the State Security was watching him. He amusements ir.:stead of "meditative and de- Soon B realized' that further backsliding
was a lonely man in` those last months in liberative activity." would result only in the loss of all his extra
Moscow. 'What a burden he carried. They have a natural love of freedom and income, He began to perform his tasks more
The more I knew him, the more I realized independence, but they are always swayed by efficiently.
that Penkovsky was an extraordinarily high- money and indifferent to anything not con- An American's circle of interests is often
minded man. He did what he did because nected with business. rather small. Many Americans do not read
it was the one way he, as an individual, If this clinical Soviet appraisal of Ameri- books. Their main interest lies in advertise-
could strike back at a system that had de- cans is unintentionally funny, it is also ments, sports news, and cartoons; on the
based his country. I never saw him waiver frightening. For the Soviet intelligence of- front pages they only glance at the large
Ffrom this basic decision from the moment we ficers who study lectures like this are the sensational headlines.
first met, very men the gremlin relies on to make Generally speaking, bourgeois society de-
' He, had thought things through many estimates of American responses to Soviet moralizes people.
months before I first made contact with him. actions. Every American family tries to save money
He was willing to put up with the basic de- THE LECTURE for a rainy day; therefore a certain amount is
ceptions of spying and the tremendous strain Agent communications and agent handling set aside from each pay check.
of this lonely life, because he believed in a involve first and last working with people, Wall Street does everything possible to
cause. He believed simply that a free society as a rule from the bourgeois world. For keep Americans from devoting their free time
should emerge in the Soviet Union, and that this work to be successful, it is necessary that to meditation and 'deliberation. Movies,
it could only come by toppling the only Soviet officers know these people well, their cheap concerts, boxing, parks, horse races,
government he knew. He was a heroic figure. characteristics and their personality traits, baseball, football, restaurants-all these are
I shall never forget him. and the political and economic circumstances used to divert the masses from the realities
- ;which condition their behavior. around them.
[Prom the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1965] In the recruitment of agents, preference In general, an Americann's wants Consist of
C OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN-SPY LECTURE should be iven to Americans because they -having his own autonia
BROUGHT -OUT-PENKOVSKY SMUGGLED are highly trusted both in the United States apartment, and a time. Most Ameri-
ri ofagent urpe. deliver It Is much cans, oth men andgwom bile, a comfortable
n, smoke.
TRAINING, DATA To WARN AMERICA and for
(By Frailk Gibney) CONCERNED OVER CLOTHES
for the "Center" "i.e., intelligence head-
(A Soviet Spy's Guidebook to the United quarters in Moscow" from the United States y
States: a -top-secret -lecture, given to Soviet to one of theWest European countries (a and outward appearances. They try always
intelligence officers 1n Moscow at the 1Vtili- neutral country or an ally of the United to have a clean suit, well pressed with a
tary-Diplomatic Academy, by it. Col. I. E. States) and mail to our residencies In the good crease in the trourers, a clean shirt, and
Prikhodko, officially titled: "Characteristics United States, shoes well polished. They send their suits
of Agent Communications and of Agent An intellignce officer, however, Who does regularly to the cleaner and their shirts to
Handling In the U.S.A."). not know the characteristics of the Ameri- the laundry, both of which are everywhere
In. the vast amount of intelligence material can way of life or who neglects those aspects in the United States. It is customary-"
which Col. Oleg Penkovsky smuggled out of cannot be trusted to handle and control change white b shirts
noted, and therefore, daily.
Moscow-Soviet prosecutors at his trial in American agents working for us, at should erefore, than an
1968 themselves, admitted he had passed on TRAITS. STUDIED telligence officer who has an outwai
11 ,000 separate photographed Items-Penkov- slovenly appearance will- not comma
sky ajaparently thought this one item, In The way of life, customs, temper, de- respect from an American agent.
particular, should receive the widest dis- meaner, and personality traits of Americans In American clothing;, light colors pre-
tributlon. have specific significance. Most Americans dominate. Americans like loose-fitting shoes,
are energetic, enterprising, and open people, as a rule one or two sizes larger than neces-
alnt tralSoviet g lecture was given 19 with with a great sense of humor. sary.
some acquaint intelligence officers They can be described as having business In his free time, when not at work, and
of the problems and opportunities wuni of acumen and as bein resourceful, coura- especially in the United States. g pecially during the summer, the American
users short-
genus and industrious
orts clothes: light tr
ears s
o
p
w
,.,s SERVED TN THE UNITED STATES 1 11 IF
Shirts, no nec tie. Sunglasses are it
The over-all situation and the absolute sleeved, Its author, Lt. Col. I. E. Prikhodko, had power of money in the United States arouses common use.
orem oosire in many people-to make ~r ei and relaffixed.a American's behavior
hew We York, from as to 1955, under "cover" just
14 'Many Americans liki
of a post with the Soviet Mission to the In describing a person, Americans often to keep their hands in their pockets and chev
Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-00149R00060Q240016F6
 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6
January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Americans listen to the weather forecast
and, if bad weather is predicted, they take
an umbrella and raincoat; Americans do not
wear rubbers. Both men and women use
umbrellas. Thus, before going to a meeting,
an intelligence officer should listen to the
weather forecast and, if necessary, take an
umbrella or a raincoat.
Americans like to spend their time in bars.
Many bars have no tables. Customers sit
on high round stools next to the bar. As a
rule, bars do not provide snacks or hot dishes.
One can order only drinks: whisky, gin, beer,
etc.
In order not to attract undue attention,
the intelligence officer must know how to or-
der sufficiently well. It is not enough, for
example, to ask, "Give me a glass of beer."
It is also necessary to name the brand of beer,
"Schlitz," .. Rhefngold," etc. For the cus-
tomers' amusement, most proprietors install
a television set in a corner above the bar.
Customers often sit over a single glass of beer
for several hours watching television pro-
grams
American drugstores, especially in large
cities, have almost become department stores.
Therefore they are never without customers.
Drugstores can be used to hold short meet-
ings with agents, as well as for other agent
activities, e.g., signaling, clandestine phone
calls,
Even American movie theaters are distinc-
tive. Most movie theaters in large cities are
open from 12 noon t2 1 a.m. Moviegoers
enter as soon as they get their tickets, and
they may take any unoccupied seat. Films
are shown continuously, Americans are not
content with only a single feature. There-
fore, movie theater proprietors show two
films, one after the other, which last 3 to 4
hours.
Intelligence officers can make extensive
use of movie theaters when organizing agent
communications by spending a certain
amount of time in them before a meeting.
The fact is that there are few people in most
movie theaters, especially on weekdays dur-
ing working hours.
GOLF COURSE MEETINGS
Golf is the most popular sport among the
well to do in the United States. Agent
meetings can be held at golf courses as easily
as in other athletic clubs. During the week
there are very few people at the golf'courses.
On weekdays the intelligence officer and his
agent can arrive at the golf course (prefer-
ably at different times, 20 to 30 minutes
apart), each can begin to play alone, and at
a previously designated time .can meet at, let
us say, the 16th hole or at some other hole
(there is a total of 18 holes).
Saturdays and Sundays are less suitable
days for holding agent meetings at golf
courses because on these days many players
gather, tournaments are held, and single
play is not permitted. Golf courses are
found on the edges of wooded areas or parks
in broken terrain where there are many hid-
den areas. These hidden areas are the best
places for holding meetings. In some cases,
meetings can be held in clubhouse
restaurants.
To hold successful meetings at a golf
course, one should learn the conditions there
ahead of time. A basic requirement is to
know the game and how to play, it. There-
fore students should learn this game while
still here in Moscow at the academy.
Golf club membership is rather expensive,
however. Also, not all clubs are equally ac-
cessible tp our Intelligence officers. It is
even difficult for local residents, to say noth-
ing of foreigners, to get into some golf clubs,
if they do not have a certain position in
society.
With club memberships so difficult to ob-
tain it is advisable to use public golf courses.
The technical knowledge of the average
American is rather high. In his everyday
life he makes wide use of machines, equip-
ment, and instruments. Therefore the train-
ing of an American agent in operational
technology is all the easier.
Yet it should be emphasized that the na-
tional characteristics of American agents are
such that they are often careless in their
operations. Americans make poor conspira-
tors. They therefore need extremely careful
briefing.
When necessary, the intelligence officer
must brief the agent on how to smuggle ma-
terial out of an installation, how to return
it undetected, and how to reproduce the ma-
terial at home or at work. .It is very impor-
tant that our American agents know how to
develop proper and plausible cover stories
for their extra income and for their periodic
absences,
The Soviet intelligence officer can skill-
fully put to use such American traits as
efficiency, resourcefulness, boldness, and per-
severance. These will help an American
agent to carry out operational tasks and to
exploit his operational capabilities fully.
Americans, to a larger degree than repre-
sentatives of many other peoples, have a
natural love of freedom and independence,
and do not like discipline. The officer must
respect this characteristic and not resort to
open pressure on the agent.
Realizing that the majority of Americans
are open, straightforward, and happy people
with a great sense of humor, the intelligence
officer can prepare for and conduct a con-
versation with an agent that is not dull but
lively and witty.
When preparing for a meeting he must
try to anticipate the agent's questions, pre-
pare good answers to them, and at the meet-
ing to answer the agent in such a manner
that the agent will feel that the intelligence
officer is being frank with him.
Americans, like other people, are patriots.
They are proud of their country's achieve-
ments; they honor their national heroes,
and value their cultural monuments.
Therefore the intelligence officer must be
careful not to indiscriminately criticize
things American, but must remember that
an unfortunate statement, for example,
about some popular U.S. President (George
Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jef-
ferson) might offend the agent. A negative
result might also come from an officer's un-
derrating American culture.
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 19651
OUR MAN IN THE KREMLIN-HOW RUSSIAN
AGENTS COMMUNICATE WITH SPIES IN THE
UNITED STATES
(By Frank Gibney)
One of the most significant documents
Which Col. Oleg Penkovaky managed to
smuggle out of Moscow to the West was the
top-secret lecture given by Lt. Col. I. E.
Prikhodko to a select audience of Soviet in-
telligence officers in Moscow, in 1961.
Titled "Characteristics of Agent Commu-
nications and Agent Handling in the United
States," the lecture is nothing less than a
detailed instruction manual for the use of
Soviet spies and their American agents, in
spying on U.S. secrets.
Probably never in the history of espionage
has a document like this ever been surfaced
to public view.
In yesterday's excerpt from the Prikhodko
lecture, the Soviet "American expert," who
had once done spying work in New York
under cover of his nominal work as a Soviet
U.N. delegation member, gave his Moscow
listeners an outline of American national
characteristics, with special reference to the
virtues and defects of Americans in espionage
work.
The following excerpt goes Into the details
of how Soviet intelligence spies in the
Approved For Release :
257
United States, the signals Soviet officers
use, the places they like to meet their agents,
the, methods they use to avoid surveillance
and detection by the FBI.
THE LECTURE
Under modern conditions, when the U.S.A.,
as the principal imperialist power, is prepar-
ing to unleash a surprise war with the mass
employment of nuclear/missile weapons, the
basic task of our strategic agent intelligence
is to give early warning of U.S. preparations
for an armed attack against the U.S.S.R. and
other socialist countries.
In view of the probable nature of a future
war, an important task is the systematic
collection of the most complete data on the
following questions:
1. The locations of U.S. missile bases, de-
pots for nuclear weapons, plants producing
atomic weapons and missiles of various des-
ignations, scientific research institutes, and
laboratories developing and perfecting wea-
pons of mass destruction.
2. Information as to the nature and re-
sults of scientific research work in the field
of creating new models of nuclear and mis-
sile weapons and improving existing ones.
3. The status of antiaircraft defense, in-
cluding the entire radar detection and warn-
ing system.
4. The plans of U.S. military commanders
on the use of nuclear/missile weapons.
5. U.S. military preparations in the vari-
ous theaters of operations.
If the imperialists unleash a war, the
United States will be the target of a crush-
ing retaliatory strike causing damage to all
the most important political and economic
centers of that country. The most impor-
tant tack of intelligence is the prompt re-
porting of objectives in the United States
against which we plan to carry out the first
strikes.
Soviet intelligence, therefore, should adopt
timely measures to guarantee the security of
its intelligence net. To achieve this it is
necessary to disperse our operating "resi-
dences" and to move some valuable single
agents some distance outside the limits of
large cities. As for agent nets engaged in
collecting intelligence on atomic and missile
bases, they should preferably consist of in-
dividual sources equipped with radio having
direct communications with the "Center" in
Moscow.
MEETING VULNERABLE
A meeting between intelligence officer and
agent is one of the most vulnerable means
of communications. Therefore, in organiz-
ing meetings, our intelligence officers must
anticipate everything in order to guarantee
security.
In the United States where the counter-
intelligence effort of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation is highly developed, planning
and preparation for a meeting are of the
greatest importance. In planning a meeting
one should give the greatest consideration to
the characteristics of the American people
and of the country, which we have already
mentioned, the working and family situation
of the agent, his capabilities, etc.
Meetings should be varied as to time of
day, days of the week, and dates of the
month. For example, meetings should not
be held on the fifth day of each month, on
Wednesday of every week, or consistently at
8 p.m., because such consistency in the ac-
tivities of an intelligence officer makes the
work of American counterintelligence easier.
Under present working conditions in the
United States, one should start for a meeting
not later than 2 to 3 hours before the sched-
uled time, and establish a good "cover" story
for the meeting.
For example: An intelligence officer in the
United States had a Sunday meeting sched-
uled for the latter part of the day. After
breakfast he took his family for a walk in
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he? park. FIe usually took such a walk every - We 'do not recommend that meetings be
.4y. On the way, he invited a friend: Held in the area between 42d and 34th
he_ park and talked and glanced through town and therefore has the widest coverage
ewspapers and magazines which they had by the police and by counterintelligence.
ut at a stand while the children played Likewise, it is unadvisable to hold meet-
The all visited-the z66-fog ether, ings in the vicinity of the U.N. Building
t the advertising dis=play and decided to see permanent representattons of various coun-
new new film. They all went inside. The tries to the U.N. and, above all, the delega-
previously selected route. The meeting 880 Park Avenue), nor in the vicinity of
was successful. Toward evening the intelli- -large banks, jewelry stores, etc.
Bence officer and his family returned home WASHINGTON DETAILS
after a restful Sunday. In Washington, meetings should not be
'however. 'As rule, the agent does not work departmental buildings, and other govern-
;the evening and does not have to ask per- mental offices, large banks, stores, and res-
rmission of his boss to leave. In addition, taurants are located. Neither should they
evenings provide the greatest security. It is be held on the main streets of the city
hIIOt,reconlmended, however, to hold meetings or in areas where foreign embassies and,
-#n a"park, because, unlike Nuropeans, Amer- especially, the embassies of the U.S.S.R. and
leans visit parks only during the day. other countries of the Socialist camp are lo-
At the approach of darkness nobody uses cated. Meetings should also not be held in
the parks. At that time of the day only areas near military objectives or in the Negro
criminal elements and persons who are district.
{>!tientaIly in can be found in the parks. In Generally, an. operation can be compro-
Ithe press one can find special warnings con- mised through the improper selection of a
earning the danger in going to parks in the meeting site. For example, an intelligence
evening. It is not unusual for the news- Officer, who dad not know the city well,
papers to publish detailed accounts of rapes once selected a meeting place with an agent
ahd murders which were committed in the on a street corner in the evening. A large
1parks'during the night. bank stood on this corner.
choosing a meeting place, it is necessary The intelligence officer arrive for the
of course to consider the character of the meeting exactly at the appointed time. The
Country as a whole and, above all, the char- agent was late. The intelligence officer was
iecteristics of the area. As a whole, condi- there for less than 2 minutes when a police-
f tions in the cities of New York and Wash- 'man approached, asked him what he was
lligton, for example, are favorable for the doing there, and requested him to move
organization of agent communications, along. The intelligence officer had to leave
The existence of a subway in New York quickly. In addition, two plainclothesmen
helps in locating different places in the city. followed him until he entered a subway sta-
It should be borne in mind, however, that tion. The meeting was not held.
the subwa system there is quite compli- New York and Washington have numer-
yy ous restaurants, many' of them representing
tore eaten'and it o use sho us studied
for carefully be- different nati nalities. Each restaurant has
planning to
os operational its own distinctive characteristics. One may
f pure specialize in steaks (the most expensive
In New York it is easy to establish a cover steaks are sirloin and T-bone steak) another
story for going downtown either during the is seafood; some restaurants have orchestras,
day or at night; because New York has many others have not. Before selecting a certain
public places. Skillful use of transportation restaurant as a meeting site, one should
facilities makes it possible to make a good learn everything about the restaurant; the
check for the detection of surveillance. system of service, the type of customers,
{ Finally, an intelligence officer who speaks whether it has a bad reputation with the
with an accent in New York is quite accept- police, etc.
able since a large segment of the city's popu- It is the practice in all restaurants to tip
lotion speaks with an accent. the waitress 10 percent of the amount shown
On the other hand the organization and on the check,
"utilization of agent communications in
Washington are full of difficulties because of Depending on the nature of the agent
a the city's small size, its limited number of, -operation, the officer and agent may sit at
public places, no subways, and an inadequate the same table and hold the meeting during
public transportation system, especially in dinner. Or they may sit at separate tables,
+.>,e sub ,~bs keeping only visual contact, for the purpose
-i -Differences exist net only among the sec-
tions and cities of the United States, but also
among different sections of cities, often with-
1n tile very same borough or area.
17or example, let us take Manhattan, which
is the busine s area of New York. Negro Har-
lam I. unsuitable for the organization of
{ agent communications in Manhattan. It is
located north of Central Park, and the Chi-
nese quarter,, located "downtown, is also
{ difficult for agents. _- Extreme squalor dis-
tinguishes the Chinese quarter. A properly
dressed person will stand out sharply there.
As for Negro Harlem,- white people cross
it only by automobile. A white person is
Unsafe there, because the Negroes regard
every white person who comes there as a
DuIfos y seeker who came to view them much
as people go to the zoo to view the animals
AVOID TisE PRESS
American stores periodically hold sales of
their merchandise at lowered prices. At the
beginning of the sale a large number of
people usually gather at the store. In their
efforts to advertise the sale, the proprietors
invite newspaper photographers to the
opening of the sale. To, avoid being caught
by the photographer's lens, our intelligence
officers and members of their families should
not visit the store during the beginning of
the sale.
In New York there are no ticket collec-
tors on the subway. The ticket office does
not sell tickets but only metal tokens which
cost.15 cents. In passing through the re-
-volving gate at the entrance, the passenger
inserts the token in a special slot.
An intelligence officer-should always have
several tokens with liiin, especially on the
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trace.
It is hard to imagine how agent communi-
-cations would be conducted in New York
without using the subway, which, despite its
complexity, facilitates one's orientation in
the city. It also affords a convenient place
to check on the existence or absence of sur-
veillance. In some cases, :inadequate knowl-
edge of the subway system has forced officers
to cancel meetings with their agents.
Buses also operate without conductors.
The driver allows the entrance and departure
of passengers, makes change, and hands out
transfers (at the request of the passenger).
Be `gives change for bills,but only up to $5.
Thus the intelligence officer must always be
.certain that he has small change or $1 bills.
A taxi can be stopped anywhere; this is
done merely by waving the hand or, by loudly
shouting. "Taxi" when an empty one
passes.
The driver writes in his log the place a
fare entered the taxi, the place he got out,
and the time. Therefore, an intelligence offi-
cer must never take a taxi directly to the
meeting place.
There are many companies in the United
States which rent cars. Use of rented cars
in the organization of agent communications
is recommended, because this has a number
of advantages. For instance, an intelligence
officer can drive to the city in his own car,
check for surveillance, and then leave it in a
suitable area or in a ptoking. lot. He can
then complete his job in a rented car. This
makes the work of the American counter-
intelligence service more difficult.
USE OY DEAD DROPS
Dead drops (i.e., hiding places where ma-
terial can be left for prearranged pickups)
are extensively used for communication with-
in agent nets, or with individual agents.
Stationary dead drops are selected or spe-
cially prepared in parks and squares, in trees,
in the ground, in fences, in benches, in monu-
ments, in public buildings, and beyond popu-
lated places such as forests, fields, seashores,
riverbanks, etc.
In selecting and preparing a "dead drop" in
a park, one must bear in mind that a num-
ber of American parks (for example, Central
Park in New York) have many squirrels
which can destroy the "dead drop" (especially
in hollow trees) and carry off our material.
The United States has up to 2,000 daily
newspapers with a circulation of about 57
million and more than 7,000 magazines.
Both newspapers and magazines are consid-
erable space to advertisements and all kinds
of announcements. Newspaper companies
receive sizable profits from advertisements
and announcements and therefore accept
them very readily.
Advertisements published in American
newspapers differ greatly in content and in
length. The most common ones deal with
the sale and rental of living quarters, the
sale of personal effects, employment oppor-
tunities, announcements of weddings, di-
vorces, births, and deaths, the loss of valu-
ables and pets, etc. 'Bel'ow are several sam-
ples of advertisements which could be used
in intelligence work. (Following samples
appear in English.)
"POSITION WANTED
"Housework: Mature Colombian maid
speaking a little English will give consider-
able care to children or invalid lady; do effi-
cient general housework; $25-$30 per week.
Exeter 4-0482, 7-10 p.m
"DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT
"Chauffeur, white-wanted. Age 35, mar-
ried. 12 years experience. Intelligent, alert,
neat. Fordham 4-7457 before noon."
"PUBLIC NOTICES AND COMMERCIAL NOTICES
"My wife, Jane Smith Doe, has left my bed
and board. I am no longer' responsible for
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January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL REWRD - SENATE
259
her debts. John Doe, 17 Leslie Lane, Dobbs "There are other people like him" he said, ever the interview threatened to become in-
Ferry, N.Y." "But, of course, you don't hear about them teresting.
One can see from these examples that until they get caught." Neither Mr. Wynne nor Mr. Gibney said
many advertisements can be adapted quite' Penkovsky "was in the holy of holies and enough to dispel the widespread doubts
easily to the transmittal of information. he blew it sky high," Wynne said, describing about the origin of the Penkovsky journal.
Among the code words which can be used his late friend's importance. "They (the It is said to have been smuggled out of Mos-
are: the names or description of a lost arti- Russians) haven't recovered yet and they cow just before the colonel's arrest October
cle; a description of the circumstances' the won't for a long time." Wynne said he did 22, 1962. Mr. Wynne said that, in more than
place and time it was lost; the size of the not bleieve that Russians were aware of his 50 meetings with Penkovsky, the colonel
reward for returning the valuable or pet; etc. own real role in the espionage link despite never mentioned the secret diary by which
illegal' residences have a greater oppor- his prison Interrogation and learned the he allegedly wanted one day to reveal and
tunity to make use of the press in arranging story only when he came back and made justify his treason to the world.
agent communications. Residences under public disclosures. He is writing his own The book, called "The Penkovsky Papers,"
cover may use the press on a lesser scale, pri- book about the affair. says nothing more about how it came to be
marily to transmit information or signals Lonsdale, now back In Russia has also published. "Penkovskiy" is a more literal
from agent to intelligence officer. On the published a book about his activities in the rendering a final double vowel in Rus-
whole, the United States presents favorable West. Wynne said this extraordinary change lion under a transliteration system preferred
conditions for the use of the press for intel- in Soviet policy against discussing Moscow's by the U.S. Government, including the
ligence work. intelligence activities was almost certainly Central Intelligence Agency.
-A sum of money is paid to place an adver- provoked by word that the "Penkovsky Without necessarily questioning that
tisement or some kind of announcement In Papers" would. be published. Penkovsky was the author of most of the
the~ press. The text of these advertisements Lonsdale's book naturally puts Soviet book's anti-Soviet information, speculation
will cQ tarn a prearranged coded secret espionage in a good light while the "Pen- and gossip, many Soviet specialists in Wash-
message. kovsky Papers" does exactly the opposite. ington doubt that he actually duplicated
-A thorough study of the specific features many of his reports to the West in a secret
of the country enables one to select the most [From the New York Times, Nov. 12, 1965] diary. Some officials believe that British
natural signals. For example one of our in- PENKOVSKY's FELLOW SPY HAILS HIS SERVICE and American intelligence services created
telligence officers called an agent for an intro- TO WEST the memoir from the record of their three
ductory meeting by sending the newspaper (By Max Frankel) Interrogations of Penkovsky in London and
Washington Daily News to his apartment. Paris during his 16-month career as a spy.
The intelligence officer went to the city, Oleg V. Penkovsky's service to the capital- The "A is known to have checked the
made a careful check, and then called the 1st world-considerable while he lived and book for security, and, according to Mr. Gib-
,newspaper office from a public telephone and still unfinished in death-reached a pecu- ney, "took out a few things, I assume," Mr.
asked them to start delivery on the next day niary culmination here yesterday. Gibney said he had obtained the papers al-
to the address he gave them (the agent's The mysterious forces of espionage and the ready translated from Peter Deriabin, a de-
address), A week after delivery started, the obvious forces of commerce joined to pro- fector from Soviet intelligence, whose pres-
agent appeared at the prearranged meeting mote a book that purports to be the secret ent job and whereabouts are secret.
place. journal of Colonel Penkovsky, the West's Mr. Gibney would not describe the orig-
Radio communications provide the most best-placed Moscow spy in memory. Thus inal manuscript except to say that it con-
rapid means for transmitting orders and in- they produced yet another extrarordinary sisted of several hundred pages, mostly type-
-struction from the center. chapter in an extraordinary but slippery written, plus pictures of Penkovsky and
Because of our distance from the United tale. photocopies of personal documents, includ-
States, should the need arise, we can set up With an expression of regret that the ling his Communist Party membership card,
radio relay stations which can be located on - executed colonel was unfortunately "not with which appear in the book.
ships, submarines, and aircraft. We also us," the publishers of the book, Doubleday &
,must not exclude the possibility that In the Co., presented the nextbest pitchman, Gre- [From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1965]
not too distant future we can install a radio Ville Wynne, just 19 months out of a Soviet SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTESTS PuBLICA-
station on an earth satellite. Jail for his contact work with Penkovsky in TION OF INISTR SKY PAPERS
'In certain special situations, we might 1961 and 1962.
consider the possibility of getting a courier to Mr. Wynne, whose dark hair and curled The Soviet Foreign Ministry yesterday
the American mainland by submarine. It mustache make him look a little like the called in Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Moscow cor-
must be remembered, however, that the actor Terry-Thomas in repose, showed a cer- respondent of the Washington Post, and pro-
United States shore defenses are stronger tain flair for dramatic narrative but, so as tested this newspaper's publication of the
than those of other countries of the Ameri- not to spoil his own, as yet unwritten book, Penkovsky Papers.
can continent. Therefore one should not Held back most of his own story of 7 years of F. M. Simonov, deputy head of the Min-
always attempt to land an agent directly in 'business journeys in Communist Europe. istry's press department, read the following
the United States. At times it is possible to PENKOVSKY'S FEAT PRAISED statement to Rosenfeld:
send mail to a third country (for example, He was happy, however, to have flown the "The Washington Post began on October 31
Mexico) and then deliver It overland to the Atlantic to help drum up business for the the publication of so-called Penkovsky Pa-
United States. Mail sent in this manner can penkovslsy papers, to be published Friday, pers. The claimed author is allegedly Pen-
be placed in the center's dead drops. because, he said, he wished to call attention kovsky, who was condemned for espionage
to a courageous man, to his warning that and high treason In 1963 for American and
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 12, 1965] the West must show strength to the Soviet British intelligence services.
WEST's SPms ACTIVE, WYNNE HINTS Union and to the importance of their joint "The papers are a falsified story, a mix-
(By Flora Lewis) venture in espionage. ture of anti-Soviet inventions and slander
NEW YORK, November 11.-The Englishman "If it hadn't been for Penkovsky, you which are put into the mouth of a demasked
V ho was freed from a Moscow jail in exchange would have had more than a blackout In spy, provocatory claims whose purpose is to
this fine citY:Mr. Wynne remarked. "Pen- denigrate the Soviet Union, poison the inter-
for Soviet Spy Gordon Lonsdale today indi- national atmosphere, and make difficult a
gated that there are 'top Western spies now kovsky saved a war, in my opinion." search for ways to improve relations between
'functioning In the Soviet Union. The evidence for this judgment could not states.
Greville Wynne, who served as contact for be drawn from Mr. Wynne or Frank Gibney, ..publication of the Penkovsky Papers can-
Western intelligence with -Soviet State Se- the papers' editor, except for vague sugges- not be understood otherwise than as an in-
curity Col. Oleg Penkovsky, appeared at tions that Penkovsky passed along very im- tentional act in the spirit of the worst tradi-
a press conference here to help launch the portant information during a time of crisis tions the cwar, which cannot but in-
serialized Papers." The book, now being in Germany and Cuba. The judgment flint dof the cold f Soviet-American rot but
serialized in the Washington Post, Is said greatly exceeds even the most generous ap-on .
to be Penkovsky's memoirs smuggled to the predation of Penkovsky ever heard in "The press department of the Foreign Min-
W-est before the writer was convicted of spy- Washington. istry is authorized to invite the attention
hag and executed in Russia. At a news conference In the Doubleday of the editorial board of the Washington
Wynne was arrested in Hungary 10 days offices, Mr. Wynne also hinted that he had Post to the provocative character of this pub-
,after Penkovsky was arrested in Moscow. gone to Moscow with the express purpose of lication. It is clear that responsibility for
The Englishman was taken to Russia im- appraising Penkovsky after the colonel had this is shared by anybody who has anything
mediately, tried, sentenced to 8 years in twice tried to make contact with Western to do with the publication of the Penkovsky
prison but sent home after 18 months in intelligence. Soviet efforts to recruit Mr. Papers.
return for Lonsd,ale. Wynne for espionage and Western efforts to "We expect that measures will be taken
Be spoke WWI -ardenteadmiration for Pen- " hi a -their contacts appear like a back- so that no articles and materials of such
kovsky, whose main aiinin providing valua- market conspiracy, at worst, also figured kind will be published in the Washington
ble information to the West was "to prevent - somehow in the story, Mr. Wynne suggested, Post in the future."
:a war," Wynne said. but he kept plugging his own book when- In answer to a question, Simonov added:
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 ppravecf For Release : CIA-RDP 5-001498000600240016-6
y $0 _ CONE .ESSIONAL RECORD SENATE January 14, 1966
8 rve the righ5for ourselves to take neces- went on October 21, Edward Crankshaw
of Xy measures." makes one peculiar assertion, namely that
ire Washington Post on October 31 com- Col. Oleg Penkovsky was "in some measure
~~r#1eneed publication of a syndicated version unbalanced." He supports this contention
{. "1 "The Penkovsky Papers" distributed by with another Sweeping assertion that "a man
P blishers Syndicate (The New York Herald who will take it upon himself to betray his
ri__ bune-Chioago Sun Times). The finalf in- Government because uniquely
T
will .appear as scheduled on Mon- vinced that he is right he and is it is g is by
,da y, November 15. definition unbalanced."
=nTh! excerpts from the papers have created Having thus ;laid a foundation for his
n~ueh controversy among Soviet experts. The argument, Mr.. Crankshaw implies that Pen-
-1pi
sl
0
pets have been credited by Edward Crank- kovsky s indictment of Khrushchev as a man
aw, writer on Soviet affairs for the London actively preparing to launch a nuclear war
iserver, as being the authentic narrative is false because the presumably mentally
d comment of one of the West's major in- disordered colonel of the Soviet military in-
telligence sources. They are criticized for telligence could not possibly "distinguish be-
defects in translation and attacked as part tween government intentions and govern-
iorgery by Victor Zorza of the Manchester meet precautions" and that he almost
,a ardtan. certainly "confused loose, menacing talk with
tight-lipped calculation; contingency plan-
The first article of Zorza's critique of the
papers will be printed in the Washington nine with purposive strategy."
oSt on Monday, as previously scheduled, The so far published summaries by Frank
P
~
~ the second article on Tuesday. Gibney and excerpts from the book fail to
give the faintest, evidence that Oleg, Pen-
-print, as scheduled, a concluding install- _" ui ,cuss he
definition unbalanced" is ridiculous on. the
ffi?nt of syndicated excerpts from the book face of it. Whatever the British Krem-
tbe "Penkovsky Papers." They have aroused linologist might think of Benedict Arnold,
a great deal of discussion among American the participants in the July 20, 1944, anti-
a d British experts on Soviet, affairs with Hitler plot, the Rosenbergs, Alger Hiss, Bur-
patent opinion divided as to the form in Bess and MacLean, Igor Gouzenko and the
W ch the papers were released and as to the host of others, these men were not mentally
ox ent to which they were wholly in the sick either in the legal or clinical sense.
W rds of Penkovsky No one has challenged Another point is that Mr. Crankshaw-
the essential point thatPenkovsky was for a who does not fora moment question the au-
source of the West. sumes to know actual intentions of the
,. ~t would Pot. be conceivable that respon- Kremlin leadership better than a Soviet ofii-
-81 le newspapers in this country would sup- cer who directly and on a high level par-
pr ss notice of a book of this significance in ticipated in the development of his Govern-
hi tort' or . of such 'consequence in foreign ment's strategic moves.
airs, The Washington Post, as one of the In fact, the reason for Mr. Crankshaw's
n , spapers which have published excerpts warning not to trust Penkovsky is trans-
frgnt the papers, has unsuccessfully solicited parent to those familiar with the tenor of
criticism and, comment on, them from the his many writings: Penkovsky's revelations
Soviet Er bassy and will .publish Monday a run contrary to that line of thought which
critique by Victor Zorza of the Manchester Mr. Crankshaw represents and which stub-
Guardian, who doubts that the papers origi- bornly insists that the Soviet Government
nated in the form in which they are pre- under Khrushchev genuinely wished to
seated in the book and who suspects the become friendly with the West.
intrusion of material not originating with With all due respect for Mr. Crankshaw's
Peii,_koysky. No doubt this will long remain concern in preserving his reputation as a
ati interesting subject of conjecture and Soviet expert, one cannot escape the con
ap4culation, and the Washington Post will elusion that the technique he chose to em-
try, to present opposing views as.they appear. ploy to that end--that of discrediting Pen-
the readers of this newspaper should know kovsky's testimony by implying that the man
that the Washington Post's Moscow corre- was essentially insane-serves no good pur-
sp~ndent was summoned to the Soviet For- pose. It does not mean that "The Penkovsky
deign Ministry at 5 o'clock on Saturday after- Papers" should be accepted uncritically. But
noon and told-that 'we expect that measures, it does mean that any serious critical analy-
Will be taken so that no articles and mate-' sis of them must be based on a much more
ria s of such kind will be published in the solid foundation than that laid by Edward
Washington Post in the future." He was Crankshaw.
further told that "if publication continues K. L. LONDON,
We reserve the right for ourselves to take V. PETROV,
lie essary measures."
with stereotyped anti-Soviet insinuations.
Using Penkovsky's name, they ascribe to the
Soviet Union such concepts as, for instance,
the concept of preventive war, which in
reality is hatched by certain quarters in the
West. The authors of the papers apparently
assume that any sort of slander might be
put into the traitor's mouth and that they
could easily get away with that.
The provocative cooking entitled "The
Penkovsky Papers" no doubt deserves serious
analysis. This is not the first case of pub-
lishing slanderous stuff about the U.S.S.R.
and it has the only purpose-to smear the
Soviet Union, to poison international atmos-
phere, to hinder the search for ways of Im-
proving relations between nations.
The publication of the "Penkovsky Pa-
pers" is to be regarded as nothing but a
premeditated act in the worst traditions of
the cold war. Such actions cannot but dam-
age the interests of the development of
friendly relations between the American and
the Soviet peoples. And if those who are
directly or indirectly associated with the
publication of the papers pretend that they
do not understand it, they only reveal the
insincerity of their statements about their
desire to improve relations between the
U.S.S.R. and the United States;
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1965]
ON SEVERAL FRONTS-PENKOVSKY DISPUTE
CONTINUES To BOIL
The Washington Post today concludes
publication of the "Penkovsky Papers"
around which has swirled much controversy
as to their source and authenticity.
The Soviet Union on Saturday protested
the publication. In addition, a letter to the
editor of the Washington Post from the
Soviet Embassy, printed today on page A21,
calls the papers "a crude forgery cooked up
2 years after Penkovsky's conviction by those
whom the exposed spy served."
The Washington Post also is printing, on
page A22, the first of two articles by Victor
Zorza, Soviet affairs expert of the Manchester
Guardian, analyzing the paperx He writes
that "the book itself contains the evidence
showing certain parts of It to be a forgery
even though other sections of the book are
evidently made up of intelligence informa-
tion provided by Penkovsky long before his
arrest."
Last month Zorza had written Vladimir E.
Semichastny, chairman of the Soviet State
Security Committee, asking for evidence to
support the charge that the papers were
forgeries. On Saturday an official from the
Soviet Embassy in London asked to meet
Zorza and declared that the book Is "a
fabrication from beginning to end."
Zorza said the official gave only one piece
of evidence-an inconsistency of dates. At
one point Penkovsky had said that recruit-
ment of Communist Party members in the
West for work with Soviet intelligence had
resumed in 1956-57. At another point it
said this occurred in 1980.
Officials at the Central Intelligence Agency,
whose agents dealt with and interrogated
Penkovsky before his arrest, say that they
read the papers only to determine whether
their publication would compromise intelli-
gence sources. They refuse to pass judgment
for the press on authenticity.
States, the Soviet Government should know in May of 1963 was convicted in the U.S.S.R. [Flom the New York Times, Nov. 15, 1965]
by this time, are not to be told by govern- of treason and espionage on behalf of the PENIcOVSKY PAPERS STIR SOVIET PROTEST
melts, either foreign or domestic, what they United States and British intelligence sere- WASHINGTON, November 14.-The Soviet
must Print or must not nrlnt 4---
They Till not cause the Washington Post to -WASHINGTON. ct cycura Onzverszry.
is .
alter i intent regarding this series of arts- _
cior any subsequent publication. We re- [Flom the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1965
fuse to accept the inadmissible suggestion 1
th t this newspaper must not print material A COMMUNICATION FROM PRESS DEPARTMENT
which the Soviet Government may find in- OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY
ace ptable. Recently the Washington Post and some
I will fulfill its responsibilities as it sees other American newspapers have started
there whatever "necessary measures" of in- publishing the so-called Penkovsky Papers.
tin}idation and censorship Moscow under- The authorship of these papers is attributed
F.t,... +.. ?----. ,i --- .. __ .. _ ._
Apr' ed_For. Release : C1A-RDP7:6-00149800060024001;6; 6
 iAppruveu rur rcelease ; '. iM-rcur1 a-UU-I4UM000CUUL4UU-IO-n
January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 261
issued a statement tonight attacking the right to supply this information. But he - two employers, the Committee.for the Co
Penkovsky papers. -Would hardly write it all down for posterity. ordination of Scientific Research, and the
FEAT Military Intelligence Headquarters. His
l
news INTELLIGENCE
tement was handed to severa
The,sta bureaus here. It was in the form of a com- The introduction says that the extent and, evenings are generally occupied, nor can he
municatlon to the, editor of the Washington ingenuity of Penkovsk 's work add up per- write while visiting his friends In the coun-
Post, which the Embassy noted, along with y y try. "Someone may always ask what I am
other U.S. newspapers had been publishing Nape to the most extraordinary intelligence doing." At home, at least, "I have a hiding
the so-called Penkovsky papers. feat of this century. If there is no Soviet place in my desk." On his own showing, he
that authorship of the spy now working at an even higher level in is hardly likely to have produced in these cir-
The papers was statement attributed d to "the person of Pen- the West, then this claim may well be valid. cumstances the manuscript of what is now a
Much of the intelligence information repro- sizable book.
kovsky-the man who in May of 1963 was duced in the book is obviously genuine.
convicted in the U.S.S.R. of treason and Western government experts revealed their AUTOBIOGRAPHY QUESTIONED
espionage on behalf of the United States and knowledge of it some time ago in the course The description of his domestic circum-
British intelligence services." Col. Oleg V. of discussion about Soviet affairs. Penkov- stances comes from Penkovsky's autobio-
Penkovsky was arrested in October 1962 and sky's information about the ignominious graphical outline, of a kind that any intelli-
was executed after conviction. failure of Khrushchev's "secret weapon," gence service would require from a prospec-
The Soviet Embassy statement also said: which blew up on the launching pad, en- tive spy, so that it could check his credentials
"In fact, the so-called Penkovsky papers is abled the Western leaders to treat Soviet before employing him.
nothing but a crude forgery cooked up, 2 threats and boasts with composure. Pen- Penkovsky passed a paper of this kind to
years after Penkovsky's conviction, by those kovsky's information about Khrushchev's an American Embassy official in Moscow, to-
whom the exposed spy had served. * * * plans during the German crisis of 1961 en- gether with .an offer of his service, but this
"This Is not the first case of publishing abled the West to make the dispositions was not taken up because it was thought that
slanderous stuff about the U.S.S.R. and it has which warded off the Soviet threat to Berlin. he had been put up to it by Soviet counter-
the only purpose-to smear the Soviet Union, _ Penkovsky sent reports on the bickering intelligence. Only 6 months later, when he
to poison the international atmosphere, to over the building up of the Soviet missile made another approach to the British, was
hinder the search for ways of improving force, favored by Khrushchev, and the main- his offer accepted.
relations between nations. tenance of adequate conventional forces, fa- But even the autobiography Is not wholly
"The publication of the Penkovsky papers vored by the marshals. genuine. The description of Penkovsky's
Is to be regarded as nothing but a pre- GREMLIN own war service is woven into a three-page
meditated act in the worst traditions of the DISPUTE IN G potted history of the war in Russia. A man
cold war. Such actions cannot but damage This gave Western intelligence analysts the of Penkovsky's intelligence would not have
.the interests of the development of friendly clues that helped them to study between thought it necessary to waste his time on
relations between the American and the the lines of the Soviet press the most im- supplying this kind of "background."
Soviet peoples." portant political dispute that raged in the A Western compiler of the Penkovsky pa-
Soviet leadership in recent years-on the pers, on the other hand, might have thought
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 15, 19651 allocation of resources between civilian and it useful to provide the wide readership of
_BOVIET ExPERT THINKS PENKOvsKY PAPERS military needs, within the military field the book with a historical sketch that would
ARE A`FORGERY Itself. have made Penkovsky's war career more
,(By Victor Zorza) This contributed greatly to the Western meaningful.
governments' understanding of the factors KHRIISHCHEV IN UKRAINE
.LONDON.-"Their authenticity," say the in- that caused the fall of Khrushchev, even However, it is not safe to sketch in the
;troduction to the "Penkovsky Papers," the though this occurred some 2 years after Pen- background without being familiar with the
memoirs of the Anglo-American spy in kovsky's arrest. details of which it is composed. Penkovsky
Russia, "is beyond question." It is not. For some months before the Cuban mis-
-Indeed, the book itself contains the evi- sile crisis, Penkovsky and his Western mas- spent the last 2 years before the war in a
dence showing certain parts of it to be a ters knew that he was being watched by military school and then in an artillery unit
forgery, even though other sections of the Soviet counter-intelligence. He could In the Ukraine, to which he was posted as
book are evidently made up of intelligence therefore neither acquire nor send any in- a political officer.
information provided by Penkovsky before telligence on what was to prove the most On one occasion the unit was visited by
his arrest. fateful confrontation between East and a number of Soviet military leaders, whom
But the book does not, in fact, claim to be West, and suggestions that he was asked Penkovsky recognized, but there was one
made up of Penkovsky's intelligence reports to report on Soviet operations in Cuba just person "whom I had never seen before." He
to the West. On the contrary, it is said to before the crisis would appear to be with- was told later that this was a certain N. S.
be quite distinct from them, and to consist out foundation. Yet paradoxically, his con- Khrushchev. Yet for the past 2 years Khru-
of notes, sketchies and comments accumu- tribution was probably decisive. shchev had been the first secretary of the
fated by him during his spying career in 1961- He had sent out, earlier, details of the de- Ukrainian Party, carrying out a ruthless and
62 and smuggled out of the Soviet Union only ployment pattern of Soviet missiles. This bloody purge, feared and hated by all-the
in the autumn of 1962, at the time of his enabled U.S. air reconnaissance experts to virtual master of the Ukraine, the "Little
arrest. it is said that Penkovsky hoped that identify the missile sites at an early stage Stalin," with his picture frequently dis-
they might eventually be published to clarify of construction. The early warning made it played in public places and in the news-
--~his motives and to clear his name beyond possible for President Kennedy to make in papers which would have been obligatory
:question. It is curious that a work with so secret the preparations that played so major reading for an aspiring political officer.
,unable \a purpose should include so much a part in his later management of the crisis, No doubt the account of the incident was
purely military and political intelligence. and in compelling Khrushchev to withdraw. Inserted into the papers to make them appear
more authentic, but the result, as happens
THE LOWDOWN LACK OF TIME _so often when enthusiasm outruns good
Much of the book seems calculated to show The most important part of the informa- judgment, is the opposite of what was In-
the Soviet system in the worst possible light, tion he sent out consisted of some 5,000 tended.
but this would be consistent with Penkov- photographs of documents, sketches, etc., There is much tedious repetition which
sky's attempt to justify his defection. It is taken with a miniature camera. Yet we are is hardly accounted for by the explanation
even possible to stretch this interpretation to asked to believe that this highly professional that the papers are arranged with little .at-
explain the "lowdown"-and it really is and valuable spy added to the great risks he tempt at order and none at literary style.
low-on the sexual mores, the drunkenness was already running by keeping a detailed That this is so is painfully obvious, but it
and cupidity of some of the people he knew account of his activities and views, virtually still does not explain why the book should
'in the higher ranks of the political, military every page of which contained enough secret contain several accounts of Khrushchev's
and intelligence quarters. --I have absolutely information to send him straight to the firing intended strategy for the Berlin confronta-
no intention of defaming the marshals and squad. tion, all more or less the same, and two of
generals," he says, after giving some partic- In the foreword we are told that "through- them separated by only one page-a curious
ularly choice details. out the period during which Penkovsky was waste of time and space by one so short of
He ands that he had "intentionally omitted turning over infomation to the West, he sat both.
the subject of moral degradation and drunk- up night after night composing a journal." Nor can these be the written reports sent
eniiess"-which `he had not. "I know one Ye`, in a passage that has the ring of truth out by Penkovsky at the time, re-edited, and
thing for sure, though: all our generals have Penkovsky himself makes it clear that this Is put together in a book. He was clearly much
mistresses, and some have two or more." All? just what he could not do. He has to write too intelligent and efficient a spy to waste
For sure? ' hurriedly, he says, "for the simple lack of his efforts on writing down laboriously, in
It is conceivable that Western intelligence time and space." minute detail, and repetitively, the views,
biganizations might have been Interested in When he writes at night in his two-room impressions and facts which would have suf-
the peccadilloes of members of the Soviet flat he disturbs his family's sleep : typing fieed in much shorter outline.
General' Staff, just as Soviet intelligence is very noisy. During the day he is always Yet sometimes the book arouses the read-
wottld a interested It their Western opposite busy, `running like a madman," in a typically er's curiosity, only to frustrate it with lack
numbers, and that `Penkovsky thought it Russian phrase, between the offices of his of detail. The introduction makes for Pen-
-
Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-00149R00060024001.6-6
 i~rQ~red For'R easy -CIA- RDP -00149 8000600240016-6
LONG SSIO,~T~9,~ -TAx Janu_ar 141966
=fit ,.pw es ujL a wormauxon swept up by nim the Penkovsky Papers was reported in the e - ke
professional would never make the mistake
the, eaac planned ddimensions of the world press, the American publishers of the of listing Marshal Zhukov as "Khrushchev'a
- v ~N a. roaaavvsn
2t.true this.-is- very, important, for it may 8,13A16 publish it in foreign languages. would certainly have known it to be wrong.
;c pro trouble between Washington and Lon- Among these requests _was one from_ a
nzEANfNCfESS TITLES
--021on the one hand, and Berlin on the small Russian emigre publishing house in
o K can hardly have intended. This was accepted without any haggling, Soviet oficers, he often describes them as
go deputies of the Supreme Soviet"-a mean-
t it has always been assumed that the slow since all the proceeds from the book are to ingless dignity on which the good spy that
d fumbling nature of the Western response to the Penkovsky Foundation, formed in the
the-wallwas due in, large measure to the United States for this purpose, he was would not waste his breath. How-
t etxt, he is made to say that "I learned about to the Penkovsky Foundation, the Russian at Khrushchev's recklessness in 1961 in-test-
the Berlin wall 4 days before the Soviet text has not been made available, and it ing a 50-megaton bomb which he describes
s
Government, actually closed it oil " Yet the looks as if it never will be. as having a yield of 80 and, elsewhere, of 100
account of his travels given in the book, and On Monday, the Russian emigre publisher megatons---although the accurate measure-
--
t -at record of his trial, makes it clear that made a telephone call from Frankfurt to menu taken by Western experts have put it
"4 days before" that date Penkovsky was still Doubleday, the New York publishers, to get at under 60 megatons. Similarly, he reports
-London, on one of those extended duty the final answer which had been promised that several Soviet launches of manned
trips on which he took time off from shep- for the beginning of this week. He was sputniks took the lives of !their crews. In
'h ding Soviet delegations-the official rea- told by R. E. Banker, for Doubleday, that fact, all Russian launchings have been
84 S for_hb visits to the West-to spend long they were still unable to provide a Russian monitored. by Western radio and radar track-
:h urs-with the special Anglo-American team text. However, they were prepared to let the ing devices which would have revealed be-
of our intelligence officers who used every Russian publisher go ahead-if he was pre- yond any doubt, through the nature -of the
available minute _to milk _him,of any in- Pared to retranslate the Penkovsky text from communications passing between the satel-
f tipn he alight have. English back into Russian. AS for the Rus- lite and the base, the presence of a human
`SfNLIKELY ANSWERS - - - sian "original," Banker said, they had twice being aboard. Western experts have re-
asked the State Department about it, but peatedly dismissed this particular rumor.
the extremely unlikely event that he had were still not able to provide it. CONFUSION OVEU EVENTS
learned about the Berlin wall still STIUNGE PHRASES The report attributed to I Penkovsky that
~Lg ladon, would he have
gone back ck to to Moscow w
and reported later to his masters that he had The English text is peppered with words Mar al Chulkov, the mander in chief
a
's pf the ground
known about the wall 4 days in advance? and phrases that no man with Penkovsk
w missed from this
a
y
t PP t o andpp and aasted W y Would he do that-to show them after Soviet background would use. He is made in 1oin d chief of civil de-
thee event how well-informed he was? to refer repeatedly to Soviet Russians or to sense is wrong. It is true that he got the
YiotFeB he kept in 'Moscow, would he simply terms would sound as strange in Russian as tinned as the commander'of the ground
hakve Made a bald statement of fact like that, United States Americans or British English- forces-and the Soviet military press referred
almost conversationally, and then gone on man would sound in ordinary English usage, to him repeatedly as such.,
wi h his discussion of Khrushchev's tactics These are not mistakes in translation, but It was only in 1964 that he lost this post,
on----I.-,Berlin? Neither explanation seems credi- they arise from Ignorance of Soviet ter- nearly 2 years after Penkovsky's arrest. It
C answer is that the words attributed to kind of political deviation for which Mar- papers" more recently has confused the two
Pe kovsky were written by someone else-un- shal Zhukov, the Defense Minister, was events and dates, making Penkovsky report
I this was a remark he made in one of his' purged in 1957 is. "Bonapartist tendencies." something that occurred after he was ex-
enequrit conversations with, a member of Yet :Penkovsky is made to report Khrushchev ecuted in 1963. Similar confusion is evident
the,Anglo-American team, who took it down. as saying that Marshal Zhukov was display- in Penkovsky's references to the removal by
th very opposite of what one would expect read an account of the Zhukov affair, -a with membership in the group.
fro a man writing in Penkovsky's difficult faulty memory for phrases might have easily Virtually the whole section on the Soviet
cir umstances, At one point, when discuss- led him to use the associated but, incorrect, military doctrine appears to have been writ-
s Soviet military maneuvers, he is made to term, ten by a Western pen. It is here that the
ask What is the point of these exercises"- Penkovsky is made to Illustrate the change references to "Soviets" and "Soviet Russians"
and then proceeds to give a detailed reply. in Sino-Soviet relations by remarking that are most obtrusive. Penkovsky is made to
on
-
-- ------+ _--
_
wa it perhaps, a -question put to Penkovsky China." However, the official usage was trine to the West-and at the same time to
by one of his Interrogators, and then, road- never "great China"-it was "the great go on for pages on end, giving long quota-
Ver~ently, allowed to remain in the edited Chinese people." tions from it.
transcript of the conversation that might Penkovsky is made to refer to a high party Would Penkovsky really have bothered to
have formed the basis of this passage in the official as an "lt.S.F.S,R. Communist Party write out long passages from a publication
book?
leader" ~a ?hr~re ?ro
The conversational origin of a number of by a Soviet official, who would know that the to his Western masters? This whole section,
a z n ^
p
h
s
i
i
R
ers
..ay
,
us g
v- - ~,
ussian cce- _ -
n he book, is ac-
tng the lie to the claim that the book is made public-has no Communist j Party distinct companied 'by repeated warnings from Pen-
LIP of Penkovsky's written notes. This, how- from the Soviet Party. One of the chapters kovsky about the Soviet determination to
.eve , does not mean that the book as a whole begins with a reference by Penkovsky to his acquire a first-strike posture, and to launch
ma be regarded as a genuine edited tran- recent trip to "Europe"-although a Russian a surprise nuclear attack on the West.
Script of Penkovsky's conversations with returning to Moscow would speak of a visit The chapter on strategy is made the main
Western intelligence officers, ,There are many to the "West." But the reference to a trip vehicle for the message, and the long quota-
7ther passages, and sometimes whole sections, to "Europe" would[ have come naturally to tions from the "Special Collection" are de-
'ghihch betray the, alien hand.or tongue. an American compiler of the papers. signed to give it an air of authority. But
Among Penkovsky's many unlikely digres- the impression is false, for General Gastilo-
q'oin the Washington Post, Nov. 16, 19651 sions, his excursion into the history of the vich, on whose contribution the compiler re-
13o T Ekpswr DouBTS VALmrry of Coxrao- party appears particularly improbable-and lies to drive the first strike lesson home, was
To PROVE FORGERY party leaders over the years who, as suee e s- tative contributors to the "Special Collec-
zBy Victor Zorza) sive editions of the party history went to tion." But the Penkovsky Papers give no
press, were purged and described variously hint of this.
LQxnpN.-Sorfar as can be established, the as enemies of the people, traitors, and im- UNDOUBTED FORGERY
~Lusian manuscript of Penkovsky's memoirs perfalist hirelings. This is an exercise be- General Kurochkin, a respected Soviet
jtmst does not exist. _ loved by
-Approved For Release. CtA RDP75-OO 149RO006002400a6-66-
 Approved. For Release:
-CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6
January 14, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
the more extreme views as anti-Marxist,
This is the chapter that can be described
without any hesitation as forged. The com.
piler of the book adds insult to injury by
making Penkovsky say that "I am sorry that
I Cannot copy here the entire 'Special Col-
lection"'-or is it, perhaps, a private joke
inserted for the entertainment of the com-
piler's colleagues? The use-or misuse-
of the "Special Collection" in this way is a
great pity. Its publication in full would
have added greatly to the understanding of
Soviet strategy among students in the West.
But there is now reason to fear that the ac-
count given in the papers will prevent the
full publication which would inevitably
show up the imbalance of the Penkovsky
book.
It may be that some of the errors pin-
pointed in this article are not necessarily
evidence of forgery, but the cumulative
weight of the evidence is too great to sup-
port any other interpretation.
W 6--?'F'-^9ir'
The book could have been compiled only,
by the Central Intelligence Agency. No
other org zatio i apart from
British Intelligence, and certainly no indi-
vidual, could have had access to the infor-
mation of which the book is made up. Brit-
ish Intelligence officers did at one time en-
tertain the idea of building Penkovsky up
posthumously as something of a hero, but
permission to proceed was withheld.
The has been repeatedly stung and _QIA provoke by the attempts of the Disinfor-
mation Department of the Soviet intelli-
gence organization to discredit its activities
throughout the world. The "Penkovsky
Papers" are the CIA's answer. But in psy-
chological warfare of this kind the intelli-
gence agencies of the democratic countries
suffer from the grave disadvantage that in
attempting to damage the adversary they
must also deceive their own public. It is
the function of a free press to uncover such
deception. Some of my best friends are in
the Q,IA, but if th;y want their psychologi-
cal warfare efforts to remain undiscovered,
they must do better than this.
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1965]
GIBNEY DEFENDS PENKOVSKY PAPERS
On two separate occasions the Soviet Gov-
ernment has attacked the authorship and
the authenticity of "The Penkovsky Papers."
Both the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the
press department of the Soviet Embassy in
Washington have commented predictably.
Such terms as "anti-Soviet invention and
slander," "provocative character," and "crude
forgery" are commonplace In most efforts of
the Soviet regime to discredit anyone who
disagrees with it. It is typical of this ap-
proach that the Washington Post and other
newspapers running the papers were
threatened by unspecified forms of Soviet
retaliation, if publication continued.
' Actually, there is no better evidence of the
papers' honesty, accuracy and authenticity
than this loud, almost unprecedented pro-
test from Moscow. As I said in the intro-
duction to the papers, the continuing power
of state security apparatus-over Soviet citi-
zens is the greatest problem In the way of
any real rapprochement between the West
and the Russians.
Penkovsky felt this strongly himself, as
the papers reveal. The sharp protest of the
Moscow leadership suggests that his arrow
struck home.
A further charge of "forgery"-or partial
forgery, if I interpret his article correctly-
was made by Victor Zorza, of the Manchester
Guardian. His comment relies on conjec-
tures about what Pelikovskywould or should
have done. It abounds In phrases like "would
hardly write," "it is curious that," "it is
conceivable-that,", or "he is hardly likely to
have produced."
This .is understandable. I am sure that if
Mr. Zorza had been In Colonel Penkovsky's
shoes, he would have behaved differently;
and if a panel of Western Soviet experts had
written the papers for Penkovsky, they would
have undoubtedly written them differently.
The fact is that Colonel Penkovsky was very
much his own man. He was a zealot and an
individualist who lived with risk and whose
desire to have his views known drove him to
take even more risks.
Mr.. Zorza does have one point of factual
criticism, which he interpreted incorrectly,
however. He asserts that the acocunt of
Colonel Penkovsky's movements which I
gave in my introduction to the papers and
"the record of his trial" show that he was in
London on August 9, 1961, the day he found
out about the proposed erection of the Ber-
lin wall. Mr. Zorza understandably questions
why Penkovsky did not warn his Western
contacts then about the building of the wall,
since he had free access to them in London.
From this he somehow concludes that "The
Penkovsky Papers" are not genuine. .
I owe him and other readers an apology for
this confusion. In the process of editing,
I incorrectly gave the date for Penkovsky's
arrival in Moscow at that time as August 10,
1961. Actually, it was August 8-and I have
since asked the publisher to correct this er-
ror in subsequent editions.
If Mr. Zorza rereads the October 1963
transcript of Penkovsky's Soviet trial-one
of: the principal sources of this book-he will
discover that the correct date was August 8.
Hence, Penkovsky was in Moscow at the time
he found out about the Berlin wall-and
unable to communicate immediately with
the West.
Mr. Zorza points out that Penkovsky's
writings were often discursive, verbose, al-
most conversational. I am sure any expert
on Russian-English translation would have
his own pet way of rendering them into
English-just as Mr. Deriabin, the trans-
lator, and I have ours. But this discursive-
ness hardly detracts from their authenticity.
On the contrary, I deliberately held all
editing down to an absolute minimum.
Neither Mr. Deriabin nor I felt we had the
right to add any literary or factual embel-
lishments to the words of a brave man, who
wanted to get his own language out to the
world.
FRANK GIBNEY.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Nov. 18,
1965]
HIS GREATEST SERVICE-PENKOVSKY UNMASKED
THREE SOVIET SPIES IN WEST
(By Don Cook)
PARIS, November 17.-Whatever the value
of the spy papers of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, or
even their validity, which Is being questioned
by some experts on Soviet affairs, his greatest
service to the West was the unmasking of
key Russian agents in Paris, London, and
Stockholm,
The three most important espionage cases
in the West in the last 5 years were all broken
by counterintelligence services on the basis
of information passed to Britain and the
United States by Penkovsky. The cases In-
volved:
Georges Paques, a senior French civil serv-
ant who spied for the Russians In the Min-
istry of National Defense and later in NATO
headquarters in Paris. He was caught and
sentenced to life. imprisonment in July of
1964.
Col. Stig Wennerstrom of the Swedish
Army, who spied for the Russians in the Swe-
dish Defense Ministry and also while serving
as Swedish military attache in Washington.
He was caught and sentenced to life impris-
onment in July 1963, at about the same time
that Penkovsky went on trial in Moscow
with his British contact, Greville Wynne.
263
William J. C. Vassall, a senior clerk in the
British Admiralty, who had been recruit-
ed by the Russians through homosexual
blackmail during a tour of duty In Moscow.
He was apprehended and sentenced to 18
years in prison in September 1962.
Penkovsky did not finger these Russian
agents directly. But he did pass to the Brit-
ish and American intelligence services in-
formation that enabled them to trap the
three spies.
A Penkovsky speciality was sending the
Identify numbers on Western documents that
were reaching the Russians. The identity
numbers were sufficient to start the coun-
terintelligence search for the spies in the
West who were passing the documents to
Soviet intelligence.
In the case of the British Admiralty docu-
ments and the Swedish Defense Ministry
documents, the work of isolating Vassall and
Wennerstrom went fairly rapidly. But the
apprehension of Georges Paques was more
complicated and took more time.
Partly this was because many hundreds
of documents had to be sifted and checked.
Partly it was because the French counter-
intelligence services, which are highly effec-
tive, do not as a rule respond very swiftly
to Information provided from American or
British sources.
In the end, the break in the Paques case
came as a result of the assiduous espionage
the Frenchman had done. Paques served
from 1958 to 1962 in the private office of
French Defense Minister Pierre Messmer.
He later became chief press officer at NATO
with a "cosmic top secret" clearance, NATO's
highest security classification.
Among the document identity numbers
Penkovsky sent to the West was one with
a very unusual and limited classification. It
was a French NATO standing group docu-
ment-in other words, a French position
paper prepared for the NATO military stand-
ing group in Washington. When the French
checked on the document, they discovered
that it was the draft of a French ' position
that eventually was altered and renumbered
before it was actually submitted to the
standing group.
The document, therefore, had received
very limited circulation. It had been pre-
pared In Washington by the French element
on the standing group and sent to Paris for
clearance at the Ministry of Defense. Only
six persons signed for it at the Ministry when
it was discussed, altered and sent back to
Washington. One of these was Georges
Paques.
Had Paques limited his activities to gen-
eral Ministry of Defense documents or NATO
documents, with much wider circulation, it
might have taken months to narrow the
search. But in the brief period of approxi-
mately 36 hours in which that particular
French standing group document was in
Paris for clearance, he took it home, photo-
graphed it and returned It to its proper
place next day.
When the French identified the document
on the basis of the number transmitted from
Moscow to the British and Americans by
Penkovsky, they immediately put a 24-hour
tail on each of the six who had signed for
it-including the Minister of Defense. In
about 10 days, Paques was seen in contact
with a member of the Soviet Embassy staff
in Paris whom the French knew to be a KGB
agent.
His arrest followed swiftly, and he con-
fessed promptly. At his trial, he testified in
words reminiscent of some of the Penkovsky
papers that he spied for Russia because he
felt that it would help preserve peace if the
Russians were fully informed of NATO plans.
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1965]
PENKOVSKY PAPERS DEFENDED
As the translator of "The_ Penkovsky
Papers," I would like to make some com-
Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-001 8000600240016-6
< f.
 p o~ _ r R a e R P75=041498000600240016=6
rn-N t 5S ONA'L RECORD - SENATE January 14, 1966
p
pme'ts on Victor ZOrza s rev ew. o
j!K- _t ...to-let involved in polemics with Mr. Papers," as Mr. Zorza seems to believe, why anti-Soviet concoction of the CIA and evi-
i did the not use the correct figures? dently its British associates."
d
erta wrote "The Penkovsky describ the volume today as the "latest
I d not If C&estern ex
m
re . y
Zorza, whose previous work i have a
j l rxaw,`better than anyone, that the papers PETER DERIADIN. In an article by V. Golubov, the newspaper
are genuine, but I also know that there is New York City. said the book "dcea not deserve analysis,"
{$o way`to prove this to the satisfaction of and added: "It has been compiled so crudely
th a determilied to degrade Penkovsky's [From the Washington Post, Nov. 21, 19651 that self-respecting British: newspapers at
leg'y ae the Soviets sought to degrade first lance could not but expose its
PEI7KOVSKYS SPY-CATCHING ROLE DENIED very g
Pen kovaky. Reports that Coi. Oleg Penkove tty supplied authors."
td it surprising that Mr. Zorza has Pravda went on to quote from British press
materials that led to the detection and ar-
up his mind that "the Russian manu- comment that cast doubt on the authenticity
Made Stig
ine pt of the Penkovsky memoirs just does Wenrestn of erstra the m , are are fl mflatlyaster denied spy, by Col. sources ces of the alleged memoir. he exist" simply because r do not wish to close to the case. DERIABIN CITED
re] ase it in Its original form. The published Wcnnerstrom reportedly first came under Soviet sources have suggested privately that
fo t is' as Q. to Penkovsky's notes as it suspicion in 1959--2 years before Penkovsky the book, even if based In part on intelli-
cb Id be, even though Mr. Gibney and I started assisting the West. gence supplied by Penkovsky to the West,
irlgvitably had to translate, select, and edit The Swedish officer had served as air at- was embroidered with information already in
them for publication. I will not, however,
_, _ tach? In Moscow and Washington before: re-. the hands of Western agencies. s-~^-
-RWSian" or "SovIet" for purposes of aim- Tile Penkovsky papers we1'e serialized in on the private lives of the Kremlin leaders is
licit and consistency. newspapers, including the Washington Post also contained in "The Penkovsky Papers."
p
previted with words and phrases no man last year-to 11fe Imprisonment. He Gould nal that allegedly was used. in the volume.
i.e. hesky's Soviet background would be released after 10 years and it is under- Mr. Deriabin, a former ; official in the
u4
tI ,e. he cites the terms "Soviet Rus- stood that he, too, is writing his memoirs. Okhrana, the secret service responsible for
eI ns" or `Soviets" in describing-his country PENK,7vsKY PROTEST guarding Soviet leaders, has refused to make
m n. 'Mr. Zorza's quotes are in English, thus the Russian manuscript public and has de-
they are my translations. But Penkovsky In. another development, the State Depart- clined to say how it came into his possession.
014iarly distinguished between the Russian ment disclosed yesterday that it has received In testimony before the House Committee
pe 'plc and tie Soviet regime. In the papers, a protest from the Soviet Union about publi- on Un-American Activities, made public in
pe}iikovsky used a variety of terms: "Soviet cation of papers atributed to Penkovsky. March 1959, Mr. Deriabin gave a detailed view
t me cite details from Mn Zorza's Ministry in Stockholm. S. Deriabin, was identified as the translator
enkovsky referred to Marshal Zhukov's re- and are now out t III book form. According to reports from Washington, the
ti 4a1 because of his "Napoleonic characteris- A State Department spokesman said that CIA said its representatives had read the
ti 1Vir, Zorza thinks that this should Soviet Ambassador Anat:oly P. Dobrynin ex- book to guard against "security violations,"
red "Bonapartist tendencies" and concludes pressed concern last Monday in a talk with but the Agency disclaimed responsibility for
that "no translator would depart so far from Russian affairs expert Llewellyn E. Thump publication and refused to vouch for the pa-
t1ie original." The exact Russian term used son. pers' accuracy.
by Penkovsky was "Khg,ushchev ego ubral za Later, the spokesman said, Thompson re-
t WYNNE IS DENOUNCED
"had no res on-
En Mr. Zorza's opinion no Soviet official While not further explaining what was in was r
uld refer to -a party h _ official as an the Ravers. Pravda said. that "this fabrics- Gordon A. Lonsdale, who had been convicted
g. -_ _ ~. _ _ .... e..,,i..+ ?., i? itr9 to In Pravd A. alluded
81 n lJred4 lit+itln. Vur '"o y, +awruuy newspaper Pravda rererrea to them yesterday - - -
w not writing an editorial for Pravda. as "another anti-Soviet concoction of the Wynne allegedly was Penkovsky's Principal
"llelikiy Kitay" was what he wrote and that's American Central Intelligence Agency and Western contact.
how I translated it.. apparently of its British associates" Wynne was sentenced to 8 years in jail but
-leased in April 1964 in exchange for
napoleonovskiye zamashki." Colonel Penkov- plied that the GovernmOn p
sky' evidently knew Bonaparte's first name sibility in the matter:' The Soviet denunciations of "The Pen-
aid, prrred to use the term "napoleonov- crA. c O ~~I kovsky Papers" have also been directed
In the first report on the Penkovsky papers against Greville M. Wynne, a British bust-
e lye zamashki."
?va~?,~? ?h was Penknvskv'A codefendant
o
x
ll
w at a ovs y wro e a s the work of Penkovsky with the uncovering
I
16st their lives._ of three Westerners spying for the Soviet [From the New York Times, Nov. 21, 19651
however, "tak nazyvayemyy partlynyy fiections on the character of Greville Wynne, Pravda a d..
gqzhd RSFSR." the British businessman convicted with assailed Wynne for promoting "The
y0
With regard to Penkovsky's statement that Penkovsky and later exchanged for Gordon Penkovsky Papers" by holding widely pub-
several Soviet cosmonauts had lost their lives, Lansdale, a Soviet spy caught in England. licized news conferences in London and New
I loan only repeat that r merely translated Last week, a news story from Paris linked York.
m of them
k t th t
P
i
ssgran wututut+ta~ rtr.~y .. -e =~4^= tion does not aeserve analysis:
- Penkovsky was well aware that there is no A Moscow dispatch from the Washington two the exchange today by saying Wynne had
.. a?- ??ae- ,.ne+nin rnirnnmafannna
translated what he wrote.
(With regard to the antiparty group: Vagain
I simply translated. what Penkovsky wrote.
citizens, it was apparently of little impor-
tance'that BulganIn managed to hang on
1fr. Zorza shows a lack of 'knowledge of
' l e everyday Soviet language when he claims
that a "Russian returning to Moscow would
speak of 'a visit to'the West, not to Europe"
Wenneratrom; George Paques, a senior TAR i
French civil servant who worked in NATO, (By C. L. Sulzberger)
and William J., C. Vassall, a British Ad- PARIS,-"Any fiction spy story you have
miralty clerk. Other sources have denied ever read pales in comparison with Oleg Pen-
that information furnished by Penkovsky kovsky's dramatic account of his extraordi-
led to the apprehension of any of the three, nary personal adventure," says the advertlse-
Times, Nov. 20, 19651 ment of an American best seller. Simultane-
[From the New York ously, English readers are offered memoirs
PENKOVSKY Booic SCORED BY SOVIET-ANTI- called "Spy" by a Soviet agent known in Lon-
RUSSIAN PAPERS CALLED CONCOCTION OF don as Gordon Lansdale until his arrest for
CIA espionage and really named Konon Trofimo-
Moscow, November 20.-Soviet authorities,
apparently embarrassed by the publication in
the West of "The Penkovsky Papers," are
strongly denouncing the controversial book
as a forgery of the Qeatral._Intelligence
A"ggascy-of the United Suites.
- O e Soviet Intent ence omcers uo not ?l'ne papers, pcDasnea IRIS monmu m 1.OU-
P
n f ' I talk of their travels to Euro can -
y P dole and New York, are it coriipiraIori of ant -
o untries as, to "the West' ; they refer to
_.
' evgopa" or the country which they visited.
As far ass the $?80m-I0 megaton bomb Is
`
g hCeStY , i en ovs' y was aarently nom Tn
a position to' measure 'the"pp
bombs yield as
a ourately as Western experts or Mr. Zorza.
purported _to have been supplied to Western
intelligence agencies by Oleg V. Penkovsky,
w`ho was executed by the Russians in 1963 as
'6-0-16-r y for the West.
Pravda, the Communist Party newspaper,
vitch Molody. Molody-Lonsdale was subse-
quently exchanged for Greville Wynne, a
British associate of Penkovsky Imprisoned in
the U.S.S.R. Wynnehas not yet published
a book.
A CIA PRODUCT?
Victor Zorza, t/ c(Manheter) Guardian's
Kremlinologist, believes "The Penkovsky Pa-
pers" are not wholly genuine. He contends
no Russian text has been produced and the
English version Is peppered with words and
phrases no man with Penkovsky's Soviet
background would use. Zorza adduces errors
in dates and facts, asserting much of Pen-
M- QQ '' -24M
 Approved For Release CIA-RDP75-00149R0:00600240016-6
January 1"', 1966
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 265
kovsky's memoir must have been written "by
a Western pen." He concludes: "The book
could hive been compiled only by the Central
Intelligence Agency."
The genesis of Penkovsky's papers seems
valid_but whether part 'of the wgrk is fake
cannot be judged. Whatever its origin, the
work provides juicy reading and embarrasses
Moscow just as Lonsdale's possibly spurious
work embarrasses Washington. Penkovsky
was undoubtedly an efficient Western agent
in the Soviet hierarchy where his boss was
Kosygin's son-in-law. After Penkovsky's ar-
rest in 1962, almost 300 Soviet intelligence
officers were recalled as intelligence networks
were overhauled.
SPIES, FORGERIES, AND FAKES
The period since World War II has been
gaudy with spies, forgeries, and fakes. In-
deed some spies have been widely publi-
cized-like Col, Rudolf Abel, traded for U-2
Pilot Gary Powers; Lonsdale; Ivan Egorov, a
Soviet official in the U.N.; Giuseppe Martelli,
an Italian who spied for Moscow in hollow-
heeled shoes; Burgess, Maclean, and Philby,
who skipped to Russia when their cover wore
thin.
Yet intelligence services don't limit them-
selves to ferreting out secrets; they calumni-
ate each other whenever possible. Moscow's
KGB has its disinformation section with a
subsidiary branch in East Germany that dis-
seminates false papers. Some of these have
included crude documents bearing U.S. Cabi-
net or CIA signatures.
Four y-eA rs ago the CIA claimed it had
uncovered 32 such forgeries in 4 years.
British counterintelligence is equally alert.
Some documents are*sold and others merely
given to naive newspapers.
The befuddled public derives particular
entertainment from the cold war's fake lit-
erary productions. Among these Prof. Paul
W. Blackstock of the University of South
Carolina lists: the purported diary of Maxim
Litvinov, late Soviet Foreign Minister; the
strategic thesis of Marshal Bulganin; mem-
oirs of General Viassov, who organized an
army of Russian prisoners for Hitler and
was later hanged; and two volumes of fas-
cinating recollections by a nonexistent
nephew of Stalin, Budu Svanidze.
Excellent works in this category-including
those of Lltvinov and "Svanidze"-were ap-
parently manufactured in Paris by the lit-
erary artel of a refugee 'Soviet diplomat
named Grigori Bessedovsky. In 1929 Bes-
sedovsky, then counselor at the Russian Em-
bassy in Paris, sought political asylum.
WRITTEN FOR IDIOTS
According to Blackstock, Bessedovsky, a
gentleman of talent and imagination, once
wrote a fellow emigre from Poland: "Sir, I
write books for idiots. Do you imagine that
anyone in the West would read what you
call my apocrpyhal works if, in quoting Kag-
anovich, Zhukov, Mikoyan or Bulganin, I
tried to be faithful to the manner, sense and
form of their speeches?
"But when I portray Stalin or Molotov in
pajamas, when I tell the dirtiest possible
stories about them-never mind whether
they are true or invented-rest assured that
not only all intellectuals will read me, but
also the most important capitalist states-
man, on his way to a peace conference, will
pick up my book before going to sleep in his
Pullman. Allah has given money to the
stupid in order that the intelligent can live
easily."
Facts, fiction, Half-truths and distortions
are mixed together in the strange game played
by competing intelligence services and ambi-
tious entrepreneurs. When an American
military 'attache in Moscow lost his diary,
Russian security officials published it with
fall fled In , serts a ch ap: 1!
."s soon as
Chinese Communist charges that Moscow has
not acted firmly enough on the Communist
side in that conflict.
It also was felt here that one chapter of
"The Penkovsky Papers," commenting un-
favorably on personal habits of high Soviet
officials and officers, was particularly offensive
to Moscow, which has always been highly
sensitive about such criticism.
The most recent correspondent expelled
this year was Sam Jaffe, of the American
Broadcasting Co., who was ordered out in
September because of a report by ABC's
Washington diplomatic correspondent on
possible changes in the Kremlin. Adam
Clymer of the Baltimore Sun was expelled
last February after being accused of striking
a Soviet policeman during a demonstration
by Asian students in Moscow outside the
U.S. Embassy protesting American policy in
Vietnam.
A Newsweek correspondent was expelled in
1962, a National Broadcasting Co. reporter
was ordered out in 1963 and Time magazine's
Moscow bureau was closed in 1964. News-
week and NBC have since been allowed to re-
open their bureaus.
Here is the chronology of the current case:
The Washington Post began publication of
the Penkovsky Papers on October 31. The
last of 14 installments ran on November 15.
On November 2 it was reported to this news-
paper that Soviet Embassy officials were say-
ing the papers were a forgery. A Washing-
ton Post representative called on Embassy
Counselor Alexander I. Zinchuk, by appoint-
ment, the following day to ask any proof of
the accusation. Zinchuk was told that the
Washington Post would publish any such
proof. His reply was that he would look
into it and he asked and was told how long
the series would run.
On November 5, at the Embassy's national
day party, a representative of the newspaper
was told by another Soviet official that he
expected "a strong reaction" to the publica-
tion very shortly. He was told that the
Washington Post would publish the reaction.
The reaction did not come until November
13. On that day Rosenfeld was called to the
Foreign Ministry's press department in Mos-
cow. F. M. Simonov, a department deputy,
read him a statement describing the "Pen-
kovsky Papers" as a falsified story, a mixture
of anti-Soviet inventions and slander and
stating that their publication "cannot be
considered otherwise than as an intentional
act in the spirit of the worst traditions of
the cold war."
Simonov said the press department was
"authorized to invite the attention of the
editorial board of the Washington Post to
the provocative character of this publica-
tion," adding that "we expect that measures
will be taken so that no articles and ma-
terials of such a kind will be published in
the Washington Post in the future."
Simonov added to this threat by saying
that "if publication continues we reserve the
right for ourselves to take necessary meas-
ures." The text of the complaint was pub-
lished in the Washington Post the next day.
The same day it commented editorially
that it would complete publication of the
papers, adding that "we refuse to accept the
inadmissible suggestion that this newspaper
must not print material which the Soviet
Government may find unacceptable."
On November 15 the newspaper published
a communication from the Embassy's press
department condemning the papers as a
forgery and a scar on the Soviet Union. It
also published, as previously scheduled, the
first of two articles by Victor Zorza, Soviet
specialist of the Manchester Guardian, ana-
lyzing the papers. He questioned their au-
thenticity and suggested they had been
written in part by the Central Intelligence
Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000600240016-6
SOME EXPERTS FOOLED
Among amateur factories, Bessedovsky's
ranks high. He fooled some of the most
pretentious Kremlinologists. Even General
Bedell Smith, former U.S. Ambassador to
Moscow and CIA boss, was persuaded to write
an "introductory note" for the highly sus-
pect Litvinov "memoirs."
Penkovsky and Molody may be genuine
authors but, at any rate, the late Ian Flem-
ing had many unannounced anonymous cold
war competitors. Like Fleming's works, they
are pleasant bedside reading.
[From the Washington, Post, Nov. 23, 1965]
AROVAlD THE WORLD: WIFE OF PENKOVSKY IS
REPORTED To DOUBT HE AUTHORED PAPERS
Moscow.-The wife of Col. Oleg Penkovsky
was reported yesterday as saying she did not
believe her husband, executed in 1963 for
spying for the West, could have authored
"The Penkovsky Papers." The papers, se-
rialized by the Washington Post, have been
denounced by Soviet news media as CIA
forgeries.
Mrs. Vera Penkovsky told Viktor Louis, a
Soviet citizen who works for a London daily
newspaper, that her husband was lazy about
writing, never kept a diary, and typed labori-
ously with one finger. Mrs. Penkovsky still
lives in the apartment she shared with her
husband and works as a French-language
translator. Her 65-year-old mother-in-law
and her two daughters live with her.
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1965]
ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN CHARGED-RUSSIA EX-
PELS POST CORRESPONDENT OVER "PENKOV-
SKY PAPERS" SERIES
(By Chalmers M. Roberts)
The Soviet Union yesterday ordered the
closing of the Moscow bureau of the Wash-
ington Post and the expulsion of this news-
paper's correspondent, Stephen S. Rosenfeld,
because of the publication of "The Penkovsky
Papers."
Rosenfeld, 33, was given 7 days to
leave with his wife, Barbara, and their two
children, David, 16 months old, and Rebecca,
born in Moscow 3 months ago. He
opened the Washington Post's bureau there
on November 12, 1964.
Rosenfeld was called to the Foreign Min-
istry's press department at noon and was
read a statement charging that the Wash-
ington Post had engaged in "an anti-Soviet
campaign" around "The Penkovsky Papers"
and that it had refused to halt their pub-
lication after a warning on November 13.
Oleg Penkovsky was a Soviet colonel exe-
cuted by his government for serving as a
spy for the West. The papers, serialized to
newspapers from a just published book, pur-
port to be his diary smuggled out of the
Soviet Union. There has been considerable
controversy as to the paper's authenticity
but the value of Penkovsky's work for the
West was acknowledged at his trial.
An editorial in the Washington Post today
states that Rosenfeld's expulsion is a de-
plorable exercise of arbitrary power and an
attempt by the Soviet Government "to im-
pose on the press of other countries, by treat-
ing the correspondents from these countries
as virtual hostages, a control and dictation to
which no reputable newspaper can submit."
The editorial also terms "a remarkable
hallucination" the charge that the news-
paper had launched a "campaign" against
the __Soviet Union, adding that it "will not be
plunged" into any "campaign of denigration"
because of the expulsion.
Rosenfeld is the third American corre-
spondent to be expelled from Russia this
year. American officials view the action as
part of the hardening Soviet attitude toward
the II i tecl States over the. war in. Vietxtlini,
an attitude pot
unrelated to the, bitter
 o r 1 _ G RDPr oat GO6OO2400=1 -6
OONGRESSIONAL REWORD SENATE January Y4,
kf November 18, Rosenfeld was told by a
ov et'rrTead-R Moscow that"a decision had
Tree taken to expel him. He also was told
1 M the Central Committee of the Commu-
2 arty had given the Foreign Ministry
11sion to threaten Rosenfeld with ex-
y"11 on unless the Washington Post ceased
nb ication of the papers.
pAii1Y Pi}S?URl .- -
_ terthe newspaper ran the two conclud-
ing lartIcles the Centralonimittee was re-
pgrted tp.. hays asked the Foreign Ministry
why it had not expelled Rosenfeld. The in-
iorzant said, that the Ministry would have
like id to forget the affair but that it was
tllier Communist Party pressure and so
agr ed to the exptilsion.
I wss reported here in 'Washington to
t11,e or~t that the Embassy had recommended
exp Ision. Soviet Ambassador Anatoly
I)obnin formally protested publicai ion of
the papers to the State Vie- partment and in
dab' on t a Soviet Ambassador called at the
t[Pi Office to complain about publication
of he, Penkovsky Papers in Britain. The
on Observer serialized the papers as did
ino 4e than 30 _ papers in the United States
IGG- 1 elsewhere,-, - __ - . _ . . _ . _ -
'
Qrei n Ministry's press depart-
lgo tie Soviet.
ine t to be read t_ a following statement by
-
dep, ty chief Pyatisnev:
" A November 13 you were asked to the
]?'e _(epaitment and the attention of the
iddlt~orial board of the Washington Post was
1AV ted to the provocative character of the
publication of the anti-Soviet entitled the
fro- ailed Penkovsky Papers.
"n our statement we pointed out that
+l .e so-called papers were a coarse fraud, a
ure of provocative Invention and anti-
So et slander. Publication of these notes in
the, Washington Post cannot be considered
ith r than as premeditated action in the
wol1t traditions of the cold war, which can-
not but harm .Soviet-American relations.
prsed the hope that measures would be
taken so that no such articles and materials
)f 1h is_kind would appear in this newspaper
[n e future. respite that the Wash
n Post continued to publish the notes
An4 other material which popularized this
rraud
onsidering such a position of the edi-
torai board of your newspaper, which con-
114 ed a _n. anti-soviet campaign around the
io alled Penkovsky Papers, the press de-
pparrrrrr'ttttttment is authorized to state that your
rutuurre stay in the Soviet Union as corre-
tpoYident- of the Washington post is uinde-
eirble and it is proposed that you leave the
territory of the Soviet Union."
yatisnev, after reading the prepared state-
aseit, told Rosenfeld that "we would like
to add that , this measure is not directed
,,against you personally but was made neces-
Sar by actions of the editorial board of your
ne spaper."
1osenfeld asked how much time he had to
lea e. Pyatfinev inquired as to how much
ti a he would need. When Rosenfeld sug-
ggee ed 2 or 3 weeks, Pyatisnev replied that
he cold have b to .7 days.-:- They agreed on- 7.
ass, the Soviet news agency, then made
pu sic the action. It included the state-
ment that abricated the by papers U.S. "are an Intelligence obvious ce service
rvfce
which the exposed spy had served."
jFro
board of the Post of conducting an anti-
Soviet campaign In publishing the Penkov-
sky Papers, a "premeditated action in the
worst traditions of the cold war which can-
not but harm Soviet-American relations."
Stephen Rosenfeld, correspondent here
Since the Washington Post opened its bureau
a year ago, was summoned to the Foreign
Ministry to receive the expulsion order. He
was given 7 days to leave the country.
The U.S. Embassy expressed regret at the
Soviet move. A spokesman said no official
protest was planned since such representa-
tions were not considered likely to reverse
the decision.
THIRD EXPULSION THIS YEAR
Mr. Rosenfeld is the third American corre-
spondent to be expelled this year. The rep-
resentative of the Baltimore Sun, Adam
Clymer, was ordered to leave In February.
He was charged with having struck a police-
man during an -anti-American student
demonstration.
In September, Sam Jaffe, the American
Broadcasting Co.'s correspondent, was ex-
pelled because of a news report originating
in the network's Washington bureau that a
shakeup in the Kremlin leadership was
imminent.
As in Mr. Jaffe's case, the Foreign Ministry
made it clear that the action against Mr.
Rosenfeld was not directed against the corre-
spondent personally for anything he had
reported under a Moscow dateline.
It was rather a punitive action-appar-
ently the most direct one open to the Soviet
Government-aimed at the newspaper.
"The Penkovskiy Papers," published as a
book in London and New York this month,
are random notes critical of the leadership of
former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev. They
allegedly disclose details of the operations of
Soviet intelligence organizations.
The publishers described the material as
the informal comments of Mr. Penkovsky,
smuggled out of the Soviet Union shortly be-
fore he was convicted as a spy for the West
and shot in 1963. The name is spelled in the
book with a literal rendering of the Russian
i the Washington Posts Nov. 26 1966] about this court that is daily fare iri the final vowel.
pl$N%OVS%Y REGRETS IS-.,i'.+ r.
T - .... ~ _ isrom sne wasninglon rost, LJec. S, iaboi
-, f1-eC~8I0n OhLe ~iOVOrnjrlent O~tle --S-o-- as are 1.lle reI'et.i Over this incident, pyrP1KOYSKY REACTION
71e Union- to close the Moscow . ureau of the lV'ashin ton Past for ally the incont en-
`
,t1i Washington Post and to expel this news- iences and un]calpy consequences cannot 3 share Your regrets aver the obtuseness of
iv.
regret Yts ie us IT`i c ow Eo tits demands of "the Soviet authorities in matters pertaining
a erg comes ondent In reprisal for the
publication ofp the Penkovsky Papers is a the 86viet dovermnent that it suspend pub- 'to freedom of the press. -Obviously, you are
ieglorable exercise of arbitrary power. lication of the installments of the Penkovsky under no obligation to show a correct point
cates tha the short-lived relaxation follow- sponsibie newspaper in this country could
ing the death of Stalin has indeed proved submit to such imperious dictation by any
to be a reversible process. Instead of loosen- government.
Ing the rigorous and inhibiting control of its The repressive policies of the Soviet Union
own Writers, the Soviet Government now, are not going to alter the principles of the
attempts to impose upon the press of other free press in this country; but we hope that,
countries, by treating correspondents from in time, the survival of the Government of
these .countiies as virtual hostages, a con- the United States, despite the continuous
trot-,and dictation to. which no reputable and unrelenting criticisms by the press, may
newspaper can submit. persuade the Soviet Union to abandon its
This decision also is to be regretted be- paranoiac and lunatic apprehension that
cause it will diminish the access of the every unfriendly printed word is an assault
readers of. the Washington Post and of upon the foundation of the regime. Perhaps,
other, newspapers in which Stephen Rosen- on that happy day, the Washington Post will
feld's objective accounts have appeared, of be able again to establish a bureau in Mos-
his lucid reporting. (It is to be noted that cow. Until then it will cheerfully rely upon
the-Soviet _Governalent has specifically de- the excellent services that previously pro-
clare4Ir-Rosenfeld in no way to blame for vided it with coverage of the Soviet Union.
this act of reprisal against the Washington --
Post.) [From the New York Times, Nov. 26, 1965]
The _Soviet action also As . to be regretted Moscow EXPELS A U.S. REPORTER-RETALIATES
because this drastic course seems to be pre- FOR WASHINGTON POST'S PENKOVSKY
mised upon the erroneous notion that, the SERIES
Washington Post has launched a campaign Moscow, November 25.-The Soviet Union
against the Soviets Union. That is a remark- today ordered the explosion of the Washing-
able 1ttahle in ble in ron?ulerrbut s s who probably
have one that ton Post's Moscow correspondent in retalla-
ia_inivie grown so tion for the newspaper's refusal to cease
accustomed to utter immunity to internal publication of the purported memoirs of
criticism that any reproach appears to them
to take on the a sects of deliberate peraec - Oleg V. Penkovsky, a convicted Soviet spy.
tion.
Thee Washington Post published excerpts
from the Penkovsky Papers, which were dis-
tributed to it as a. conventional syndicated
newspaper feature, just as did more than 30
other newspapers. The publishing company
(tioubleday) that produced the book is a
responsible firm. The editor of the-papers
(Frank Gibney) is a man of sound reputa-
tion. We have no,-reason to believe, and no
one has produced evidence to show, that
the published matter did not represent the
views and opinions of Penkovsky.
In conformity with the best prevailing
American newspaper practice, the Washing-
ton Post also published attacks on the views
=`of e: ovs y and on the authenticity of the
papers, including the criticisms by the Soviet
Embassy in Washington. It proposes to deal
in the same way with interesting and signifi-
cant material about the Soviet Union that
may come to hand in the future, but it is not
in the midst of any campaign of denigration
aimed at the Soviet Union and will not be
plunged into one by this misguided effort at
press coercion by Soviet officials.
The Soviet Government's action, also, is to
be regretted, because it is bound to result: in
future interruptions and obstructions to a
flow of information between the two coun-
tries that already is frighteningly dispropor-
tionate to their need to know more of each
other. American newspapers inclined to es-
tablish correspondents in the Soviet Union
will be made hesitant by the knowledge that
the Communist government there not only
asserts the right to obstruct, censor, and
punish the correspondent for acts of his own,
but also reserves the right to take reprisal
against him for publications in which he is
not at all involved.
There also will be a strong impulse in many
governmental quarters in the United States
to imitate the reactionary notions of press
freedom that possessed the Soviet Govern-
ment. We hope that this impulse will be
resisted, because not a single Soviet oorre-
spondent would remain in America If the
United States embraced this theory of re-
prisal in order to punish Soviet publications
 Approved -Foy- R I as 1,C ' A4R 1 t~0~1a4'9R000S0 24 0'
51
,January -14, 1966 -!CON 1ES1ONA1J R OkD -, s, ,ATE 29
S
-v'. I are even ei eC 1y at liberty to Rosehierd was given 7 days to leave Russia sonal`in`this-and seriously ii`eved that he
-pi'Int an hing that fis"tbe empty spaces after"lie-eras aJkeS to have his newspaper halt was an adventurer. After the removal of
Russian officers had
for whom man
ko
f a Zh
t
ll
y
s o
u
v,
men
between chuck roast ads. 1rowev2 it is the publication of the last 2 insta
re tta -Ti diet ' e a si`n o your able sey it es of" 14 from "The Yenhovsky Papers," a high respect, it appeared to Penkovsky that
and amiable l oscow c e o deii't should reputedly the notes of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, Khrushchev was surrounded only by military
ltacl from- f'i'e p 1 on of so un- a Soviet intelligence officer executed for spy- yes-men. Ile reproduces extracts from theo-
s
h
ave re
u
#l,worthy maieriai as-' ee Pehkov`skyPapers:" ing for the West. retical military studies which show a danger-
. -- . . ___... _... -. _ --- i
dli.,.
ossibility of world
e to the
n
suc
p
-wo st they trend t6 arouse life suspicions of PENxovsKY's ROLE: A Bxrrlsi4-REVIEW It may well be, as Mr. Edward Crankshaw
the Soviet ,au f`britls that the timing of (-rho Times literary supplement) says in a sympathetic and entertaining fore-
"the pubAca on was?r`not accidental:" word, that Penkovsky confused contingency
o "banned in Boston" used
seful strate but he
l
n
a
r
ith
N
t
l
i
p
g
g
po
so
o
pu
o
ann
ng w
f
The issue is not really the authenticity ogy, the papers (although I personally consider to be one of the most valuable puffs a book was close to the source of danger, and he
'!them, on't'he internal' evidence of the text, could earn. "Pfotested against in Downing believed it real.
'a rather `sulstandard forgery or a doctored 'Street" is less promising in one respect, but The book is made up partly of documents
version_ o' _ marks by Penkovsky re- Messrs. Collins (British publishers of the attributed to Penkovsky himself and partly
eorded orb tape ii``hfs London contacts). Penkovsky papers) must be profoundly grate- of a connecting narrative. American edit-
The bu inesk of spies is to forward factual ful for the publicity which the Soviet Gov- ing and adaptation have been responsible
d' 1 1 t there ernment has given to a book which, by reason for attracting some attacks on the authen-
a
tu403 pL5I Z ; leave ana ys s o
As Edwar `hranlzs~haw so ably pointed out in of a rather scrappy composition and alien ticity of the former, unjustified except pas-
the rear 1cs which you used as a scanty fig- -subject, might otherwise not have received sibly in matters of detail; certain verbal
-leaf for iC papers, Penkovsky confused ca- the attention it richly deserves. infelicities may be attributable to the same
pabilitles with int'entio'ns, a cardinal sin In But for the opportune diplomatic inter -cause. Some have also found it inconceiv-
'ntelligence analysis. - The papers also con- -vention many people might have remained able that Penkovsky could have committed
-''use eonttngency reasoning with evidence of under the impression, which was pretty gen- so much to paper; but it is clear from the
planning, It is interesting and important eral at the time of the trial in May 1963, that evidence of the book and of the trial that
to know. that there exists somewhere in Penkovsky was 6; mere accessory to the case he was madly reckless, and his record of suc-
arguing the merits of against the British businessman, Greville cess shows him skilled at directing material
'Moscow a eta' paper
surprise attack or preventive war or -bad- Wynne, framed to justify the latter's kid- in bulk to the correct address. As a whole,
teriolQgicaf warfare. Such contingency pa- naping in Hungary. This book reveals the what is presented here has the stamp of
-pers arr produced by the dozens in real seriousness of the affair. The trial and genuineness-
t
onviction of Penkovsky was to the Sovie
c
Washington and elsewhere and they are the
legitimate province of strategic military Establishment as damaging a blow as was the
'Chinking. But it is the business of political Hiss case to America. The repercussions were
analysts to assign to them the exact weight of seismic intensity.
--they deserve. It is precisely because Penkovsky was so
"The publication of the papers comes at a highly placed that these papers are of such
time when the Soviet-Union is in an ex- -interest - From a material point of
-trrmely delicate position with respect to the -view Penkovsky was thoroughly well off and
tltside world, ppressured by the Chinese as to all appearances an efficient and convinced
virtually a i ckey of Wall Street and at -member of the ruling class when hevolun-
'the same 'time, charged with responsibility tartly got in touch with British Intelligence
fox real or ,imaginary disturbances in places and during a short run of 16 months handed
'far'removed Irrom 'Moscow's Influence. It over to them more than 5,000 items of infor-
takes little to' gener'at'e in l"ie min of the mation of political, military and economic
Soviet leaders the notion that someone was matters (the figures come from the indict-
trying dellberatefy to complicate still fur- 'ment at this trial) * * ". What were his
'ther the otherwise delicate relations between motives?
the U.S.S R, and the United States. At the trial he was made out to be a disso-
't would, of course,be-of help if the So- lute playboy. The usual antisemitic over-
Viet leaders- or their advisers knew more tones were also brought in. The importance
about the free-wheeling habits of the Amer- of his position was minimized, though scarce-
loan publishing industry. At the very - ly consistently with the details of the indict-
least, the customary delay between the an. ment, and this is still the official line. From
= -the Communist point of view it is difficult to
ra
s a
tu
n
p
c
a
d 'it
e of a manuscript a
ceptanc pearanee in _print should seriously impair see why this should be found necessary: after
the "curious timing" theory. 'On'the other all, nothing in the history of treachery can
hand, once the editors of the 'Was`'fiiiigton equal the record of the Russian ruling class
Post have digested their' indignation, -tilSy since the revolution, if the official version is
be believed
.
might take some 'time to ;ponder this friend-
ly suggestion: The publication of drivel, Why should it be surprising that a colonel
__ _, ht should be in touch for 16 months with Brit-
mat
[From Parade Magazine section, the
Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1966]
Question. In "The Penkovsky Papers," al
legedly the.diary of a Russian agent who de-
fected, there is a statement to the effect that'
Yekaterina Furtseva, the Soviet Minister of
Culture, was Khrushchev's mistress. Is there
any truth to that statement? Is there any
truth to the book? Penkovsky must have
been a stupid secret agent to keep a diary.-
Allen James, New York, N.Y.
Answer. Penkovsky probably never kept
a diary. Intelligence agents suggest that the
book consists of transcribed reports from
tape recordings he made for British Intel-
ligence and the,-CU. Khrushchev and Furt-
seva were close friends, but she was never his
T
THE UNPRECEDENTED SUPPOR
FOR A WAR AGAINST WANT
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, at
the opening of this session of Congress
I am gratified to report to the Senate the
remarkably widespread support ex-
pressed during the congressional recess
for revision and expansion of our food-
for-peace effort into an international
1a not the best way of discharging the pre- ~equirefl to believe that Berta, a marshal of food program that will close the world
cioua resionsibIIities of a free press.
the Soviet Union, was a paid employee of food gap. Many thoughtful people see
n
e
nEr n' -Ar- the same service for 86 years, from 1917 to
such a program, as I do, as an oppor-
n ions
~
i
t
r
e a
onaZ
o}error of Interndt
,.Professocen'university. 1953? Perhaps it is the difference between tunity to reduce hunger in the world
WASHINGTON, '- truth and official truth that calls for con- while opening up new production and
cealdlJent oil the Governments part; and his 3ricome benefits to the American farmer
~ ~'
3'" m 'ealization of i [From the Wa shington ost beo.' 4 ~'I9$5rfw r - and our economy as a whore,
to make sure the rea-
d Penkovsk
i
y
sp
re
, ,,t - . ,~.CPELLEI1 NpwsrvlAN 1sACK IN TxE 'Vr lift son for his action were recorded. Before I report further concerning the
?~TA"~
Isis flgst motive was revulsion against the - tea tion which has been pouring into my
,NEW YORK, Decem g.-Ste hen S. y a rruiig this propose for the
Rosenfeld, expelled Moscow corr"esonderit sionedz aristocrat ~is a~ovelliknawn phenome- .-~Q en~js, 15~1ou-ldlilie t
~0 ~~SS
of the Washington Post, said on his arrival non in all regimes based on privilege. Pen- for -moment to congratulate PreeWellt
-
d
t
h
b
is friend
en
s was being entertained
y
apparentily regard foreign correspon
--"hostages" for the performances of the Varentsov at a table collapsing with food,
organization -they rep esent, "safe on, fish in aspic, sprats, cheese, 10 dif-
I a x e}ys,paper' or a network does some- Yerent kinds of sausage, over 50 bottles of
#Ling the `Russians don t dike "the corr- vodka and cognac, champagne, cakes, pastry,
res tlndent_i? the'hostage and`dut"he goes," ice cream and so on," people in Voronezh
Fibsenlel i said-'rdIe qne elirg'tor horeemeat. He was scan-
"`It silly idea and t fey 1the' 'fuss aris"ftlized-by the behavior of some of his fellow
don't pi to n 'l he -Ton't - have a -aristocrats, their dissolute private lives, their
freeg pre V~ ea. themselves aaTy using Y"dreign 'Immunity -from the law.
01'~t`00thdeitts as hostages they attempt to " His seooni3mo~ive was fear of nuclear war.
,COrltrol the 16relgnpress, but of course they -Be evidently hated and distrusted Khru-
tan; v, "-?" ahd?hdv-there inlay have-been something per-
"Approved For Release : CIAADP75-00:1
Johnson on what I regard as a superb
state of the Union message. It was.-a
message of peace and progress for our
Country. -
Z was especially pleased with the Presi-
:dent's call for a "maximum attack," as
he called it, on hunger and disease and
ignorance in the world.
The President's vigorous espousal of a
"worldwide attack" on human hunger
and misery has my strong support. I
believe that is the kind of war that most