(UNTITLED)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040139-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 15, 1998
Sequence Number: 
139
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 17, 1965
Content Type: 
OPEN
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040139-2.pdf111.53 KB
Body: 
CPYRGHT FOIAb3 AUGUST 17, 1965 ,raaniitized 4 ApprovedsRbrrrrRelea "restored to otiicial duty" all ouicial n:uned William \Vicland offers a disturbing insight into the security standards of the Johnson Administration. Wieland had been charged by a number of people, in- cluding three former ambassadors, with suppressing in- formation about the Communist ties of Fidel Castro Bur- in; the time Castro was battling for power in Cuba and Wieland occupied a pivotal position in the Caribbean GPYR - HT CPYRGHT section of the State Department. As a result of these Charges, and of questions raised by the Department's top security specialist, Otto Otepka, Wieland's credentials were put under review. The Department has now ex- onerated him. According to the advisory board which examined his case, Wieland's conduct was not reproachably partial to Castro. Instead, said the three board members, "Wieland has honestly exercised his judgment over the years in- cluding the period of the difficult and highly complex Cuban situation." So opining, the State Department says Wieland is considered "completely cleared and his case closed." The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, however, came to some different conclusions about Wieland, after extensive hearings on the State Department's role in the fall of Cuba to Communism. In contrast to the Foggy Bottom verdict' of Wieland's innocence, the senators charged (a) that Wieland had considerable information showing Castro was a Communist well before the Cuban dictator came to power, (b) that Wieland at no point passed this information along to his superiors in the State Department, and (c) that he actively campaigned to sway American policy in favor of a man who by WVieland's own declaration was tied in with the Com- munists. onlmunrst conncc , pointed Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith to be "briefed" on Cuba by Castro's most blatant press apologist, Herbert Matthews; and that he kept the lid on intelligence re- ports showing that Castro was either a Communist or a tool of, the Communists. The Subcommittee seemed less ready than the State Department to believe these actions the result of honest error. It pointed out that Wieland had repeatedly proved his knowledge of the fact that Castro was interlaced with Ar;Gnu ciecScsu~as :.:;oat Wieland during the Subcommit- tee's hearings were the facts that Wieland was instru- mental in having U.S. aid to anti-Communist Cuban boss Fulgencio Batista cut off at the height of the battle with Castro ; that he interfered with intelligence of- ficials trying to inform D:. Milton Eisenhower of Castro', r, ti-"s that he instructed newly ap- t,i u ; .v present in Bogota, Colombia, during the 1943 riots, an,I knew Castro had been involved in this Conunt;nist-in- spired disturbance. He also knew Raul Castro, hid el's brother, had attended a Red Congress in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and that Che Guevara, Castro's other top lieutenant, was a Communist. In addition, Wieland told close friends, including Samuel Shaffer of Newsweek and Mrs. Frank Bccerra- according to their uncontradicted testimony-that Castro was a Communist. Becerra testified Wieland told him in 1957: "Fidel Castro is a Communist. Fidel Castro will be the ruination of Cuba if he gets into power. Fidel Castro was one of the leaders of the famous Bogota uprising in Bogota in 1948. . ." Despite this demonstrated knowledge o ,`tro's Bol- shevik affinities, Wieland did nothing to aicit the U.S. Government to the dangers he privately confided to friends, and worked actively to bring about Castro's rise to power. Ambassador Smith writes in his book, The Fourth Floor, that in January 1958 "Wieland visited the American embassy in Havana and showed us a paper he had written, which depicted the economy of Cuba as crumbling and recommended that the United States apply pressure on the government of Cuba to hasten its downfall." VJ::on qucsiionod about these matters, Wieland suffered memory failure, alleging he could not recall confronta- tionis to which two and three witnesses had given mutually sustaining testimony.. In some instances, according to se- curity expert Otepka, Wieland gave the senators false information. Examining the total record, the Subcommittee came to these conclusions about Wieland: "He was appointed without any security check. . . . "He falsified his job application by omission. "When he later filled out an expanded personal history form, he falsified that by direct misstatement. "Mr. Wieland had a hand in shaping our policy with respect to Cuba both before and after Castro's takeover. One of the things the Department paid him for was his expertise-his own judgment based on his own experience. "Yet he never told his superiors officially or wrote in any Department paper, down to the very day when Fidel Castro stood before the world as a self-proclaimed ;Marxist, what he told his friends privately . . . that Castro `is a Communist,' and . . . `subject to Com- munist influences.'" .~' ciaad, with that record, is "completely cleared, it becomes apparent that' thcre'_is' very little, in- the, State Department view, for which an employee can be "uncleared"--with one exception: Otto Otepka, the se- curity officer who gave Wieland an adverse security rarinn. was of course fired. NA,Tio,xASIat%W IApproved, For Release : CIA-RDP75- & g00600040fi 3b CPYRGHT