HUNGARIAN PAPER ACCUSES PROFESSOR OF BEING A SPY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000500270017-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: July 12, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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HUNGARIAN PAPER ACCUSES PROFESSOR OF BEING A SPY
(The following is the full text of an article by Janos
Bolygo which appeared in the 3 July 1966 issue of the
daily paper of the Patriotic-People's Front, Magyar Nemzet
Budapest, p 7.1
Cultural and scientific exchange among, states is an important
thing. It makes possible a better acquaintance with the intellec-
tual forces of various countries, mutual respect, and creative,
useful cooperation in some questions. It is a contact which can
disperse misunderstandings, can resolve rigid prejudices, and can
thin out the fabric of distrust. Thus it can be of benefit, not
only to the countries involved, but can also contribute to the
peaceful coexistence of different social systems and can thus
serve the cause of peace.
Cultural and scientific exchange is a good thing. If it is
used well. But if it is misused, then it becomes the contrary of
what has been said. Among the many good examples there are also
strange cases.
Such, for example, is the following example which began in
August 1955? It was then that John Michael Montias, American cit-
izen and resident of New York., arrived in our homeland on the
basis of an exchange agreement between the Hungarian Institute of
Cultural Contacts and the American Inter-University Committee to
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conduct scientific studies as ascholarship researcher. Mr Montias
is Professor of Economics at Yale University in'the United States
and the subject of his study was "an examination of the chief eco-
nomic factors determining the volume and structure of Hungarian
foreign trade." Naturally, the Professor received far-reaching aid
from the Hungarian State for this, and he received the support and
hospitality of institutions and experts involved in this subject.
Then Mr Montias began to work, but his work was quite differ-
ent than that to which the agreement pertained. He visited those
institutions to which he had an invitation and permit and then he
regularly entered institutions for which he had received no permit.
By the middle of January 1966, he had honored with his constant
visits the National Planning Office, the Central Statistics Office,
the Economics Sciences Institute, the Business Cycle and Market
Research Institute, the Computer Tecanology Institute of the Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences, and other scientific and research insti-
tutes. In the course of hi;: visits, he established contact with
more than 20 Hungarian economists in important offices. For months,
he went about asking questions, informing himself, but, curiously,
not about that which it was his goal in staying here. Instead of
factors determining the volume and structure of Hungarian foreign
trade, he tried to obtain strictly confidential and even secret
state documents. Thus, for example, he asked his. Hungarian acquaint-
antes to give him a "friendly" look at the protocols of commercial
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talks conducted with certain friendly countries by the Hungarian
r
State and documents on our talks pertaining to long range economic
contracts. He was most interested in various CEMA materials,, in
internal questions of the organization and in relations of the
CEMA states to one another. He methodically tried to obtain data
on shipments, imports, and exports of the socialist countries which
were of strategic significance.
Thus, the interest of the professor was considerably broader
than the theme originally announced and authorized. Indeed, it
was so broad that the original theme could hardly be found in
Aftit. Even at the end, he was not interested in that for which he
allegedly came here.
When one of the Hungarian experts mentioned this wonderingly,
Mr Montias shrugged his shoulders and said that Hungarian foreign
trade was not too interesting; an area for him. In any case,
there were a number of good 'publications appearing which could be
studied at hone in America.
Then why did he come here? And why within the framework of
this agreement? It is a strange case. Mr Montias, who asked and
enjoyed the hospitality of Hungary, studied other countries through
Hungary.. It might be added that Mr Montias had honored other soc-
ialist countries with his research work in previous years and, as
it turned out, always inquired about another country when in one
 of these countries. And he was always concerned by questions which
the country involved handled secretly and which, for this reason,
could not be learned about directly in that country, or at least
only with danger. This scientific method is a curious one.
This "economic activity" has yet another aspect which it is
difficult to explain. The economics professor of Yale University
aske&the Hungarian economists about such "economic" questions as
various phenomena of Hungarian internal political and cultural life
the effect of these on public opinion, internal and foreign political
events of the socialist camp, the travels and visits of certain
politicians, various questions about the political life of the soc-
ialist countries, the probable causes of all these and the "inside
iuforxaation" , as he called'it, on certain events.
In any case,-the professor is not exclusively an economics
professor for Yale University but is also a member of institutions
and organs which study the socialist countries according to various
viewpoints and with various methods. It is well-known that these
institutions have close contact with the American CIA. Mr Montias
is an expert in that curious and infamous and we might say doubtful
category which is called in the West "Sovietology" or " kremlinology".
Thus, Mr Montias misused a noble goal and a good cause.
He misused trust and hospitality. But it is worthwhile thinking
how he tried to misuse it. What were those phenomena which he tried
to use and on which he built? It is certain that the attempts of
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Er Montias were frustrated in general in the case of the Hungar-
ian experts. But it would be an error, to remain silent about the
fact that his activity was facilitated to a certain extent by the
relaxation, the thoughtless and irresponsible behavior of certain
persons, the gossip, the almost childish naivete, the lack of vig-
ilance and the lack of civic self-awareness, the kowtowing to a
guest from the West, and that petit-bourgeois characteristic which
in the hope of a Western invitation, travel, and grants loses the
ability to think soberly. One must think about what sort of phe-
nomena and behavior they build on. They do not completely lack
a base, those who like Montias misuse hospitality.
Naturally, no one wants to see again the"distorted vigilance"
of former years, the suspicious, distrustful, bad atmosphere. But
it can be justly expected from every citizen that he will honor the
laws of the state, remember the security and interest of his homeland
and be clear about his civic responsibilities and the responsibility
which a responsible position demands of him.
The curious case of Mr Montias warns us that we cannot forget
about vigilance as long as there are guests who are inclined to forget
so much, and especially that they are guests.