HEARINGS OF SATURDAY, MAY 12

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000500090014-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: May 12, 1951
• Content Type: OPEN

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MORNING SESSION .
The committees met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:02 a.m., in the Caucus Room, Senate Office Building,
Senator Richard B. Russell (Chairman, Committee on
Armed Services), presiding.
PRESENT: Senators Russell (Chairman, Committee on
Armed Services), Connally (Chairman, Committee on
Foreign Relations), Saltonstall, Johnson (Texas), Morse,
Kefauver, Knowland, Cain, Stennis, Flanders, Long,
George, Smith, Green, Lodge, Sparkman and Gillette.
ALSO PRESENT: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D.
Mudge, of the staff of the Armed Services Committee;
Francis O. Wilcox, chief of staff; Thorsten V. Kalijarvi,
staff associate; and Pat M. Holt, assistant clerk, Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations.
Senator Russell. The Committee will be in order.
Just as the Committee recessed on yesterday, we had
reached Senator Cain. He was given assurances that his
position would be maintained on today. Senator Cain,
you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE
C: MARSHALL, ACCOMPANIED BY FELIX
LARKIN, GENERAL COUNSEL
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.
General Marshall, good morning. If I did not believe
that the free world through the United Nations has
failed to keep its own promises and has failed to carry
out its mission in Korea, because of these failures the
free world is headed from my point of view for trouble
of a far more serious character than confronts us at
this perilous time, I would not bother, sir, to consume
a minute of your time or ask you a question, but.because
I do believe deeply on this matter, I have a number of
questions, but they have been so designed as to permit
of the briefest kind of answer.
During the extended course of your testimony, Gen-
eral Marshall, you have .not suggested how long the Ko-
rean war is likely to continue or what additional methods
and means and strength may be employed to conclude
that war.
It is because of this uncertainty that I seek informa-
tion at the outset concerning the agencies of authority
which consider the policies involved in the Korean war,
but before beginning that inquiry, General Marshall, may
I ask if you have had the Washington Post of this morn-
ing called to your attention?
Secretary Marshall. I read a copy myself.
Senator Cain. It is against that paper, sir, that I
would like to ask you several questions. You testified
yesterday that the message of the President of January
13 was sent to General MacArthur in order to give the
political factors involved in a directive from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to the Security Council of January 12.
Is it not a fact, sir, that the January 12 communica-
tion was dispatched by mail so that it cannot have been
in General MacArthur's hands when he received the
President's telegram of January 13?
Secretary Marshall. The directive I referred to was of
January the 11th. January 12 was not a directive. It
was a proposal to the National Security Council and it
was shown to General MacArthur by General Collins in
addition to being mailed out.
Senator Cain. Do you know, General Marshall, the con-
tents of the message which General MacArthur sent and
to which the President's message of January 13 was a
reply?
I have been advised that the message of January 13
was in response to a request for advice from General
MacArthur, and if that is a fact, it has not thus far been
mentioned in these hearings.
Secretary Marshall. In several of General MacArthur's
communications, once the Chinese Communist forces had
developed in Korea, he stated that this had changed the
character of the war and it required a consideration of
a change of policy on the highest governmental level.
The message you refer to from the President to General
MacArthur developed from the fact that a directive was
prepared by the Chiefs of Staff, and the question was
whether that should include in it other than purely
military terms. It was decided that it was better to
send the directive on a purely military basis and then
have the President himself send the message of Jan-
uary 13.
Senator Cain. If I have understood you, then, sir, cor-
rectly, you have stated it to be a fact that the January
13 message of the President to General MacArthur was
a direct reply to a specific inquiry from General Mac-
Arthur asking for instructions because his previous in-
structions were not clear. And did not then General
MacArthur ask specifically whether he was to evacuate
immediately or to attempt to stay on in Korea for a
limited time or to hold out indefinitely? That is my
understanding of the chronological facts in the question,
General Marshall.
Secretary Marshall. As I stated before, there were
numerous references by General MacArthur to the de-
cisions of this Government once the Chinese Communist
military effort had developed in Korea. Various mes-
sages in reply were sent as to the status of affairs and
-as to the governmental considerations, notably in the
effort to obtain an action by the United Nations to de-
clare the Chinese aggressors in Korea.
Now, this message of January 13 to General MacArthur
was in an endeavor to make clear to him the position in
which we stood from the President, because the message
in the form of a military directive had been sent him
on the 11th at a very critical time in the progress of
military events in Korea.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, do you know it to be
so that General MacArthur, before receiving the com-
munication from the President of January 13, had stated
that in his opinion he could hold on in Korea for any
length of time up to the complete destruction of his own
forces, if political considerations or political factors
dictated such a course?
Secretary Marshall. I think that is included in one of
his replies.
Senator Cain. I think you have told us that General
MacArthur stated in previous messages that the decisions
required involved questions of a highest national and
international importance, above and beyond that which
could be made by a theater commander on his own
responsibility?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Cain. Do you not know it to be so, sir-at least
I was so advised from a news dispatch of yesterday com-
ing out of New York, which quoted General Whitney as
saying-that General Collins and General Vandenberg,
two members of the JCS, were present with General
MacArthur and his senior staff officers when the Janu-
ary 13 message arrived from the President?
Secretary Marshall. I think it will be better, Senator,
to ask them directly:
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.
Have you been advised that during that meeting, which
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General Vandenberg and others that General Vandenberg
or General Collins said he thought it, the message, meant
evacuation after a limil,ed period in which it would, appear
that our troops were being forced out of Korea by
military pressure?
Secretary Marshall. I do not recall at the moment the
.exact account that General Collins gave us of his inter-
view, but he can testify to that.
Senator Cain. I thank you, sir.
Do you know whether or not it is so that General
MacArthur interpreted the January 13 message clearly to
mean that there would be and should be no evacuation,
.and that General Var.denberg expressed himself as in-
clined to agree with General MacArthur's interpretation
of the message?
Secretary Marshall. The message distinctly said it was
not a directive.
Senator Cain. I hope you will not misunderstand this
question. Why were not the messages from General Mac-
Arthur to which the President was replying on January
B, made available to this Committee yesterday so that
the'whole of the matter concerning the circumstances of
the President's reply might have been made available to
this Committee and the nation at the same time?
Secretary Marshall. I don't quite get the point, Senator.
Senator Cain. The point I seek to establish, sir, is
that from my point of view-and I stand to be cor-
reeted--the message of the 13th of January was not
sent on the President's initiative; it was sent primarily
in response to one or more messages seeking advice from
General. MacArthur in the field.
Secretary Marshall. I couldn't answer that specifically
yes or no. As I have repeated, there were a number of
questions from Gene] al MacArthur along this general
line. There were messages from the Chiefs of Staff
which involved militay factors and called to his notice
political factors.
In this particular case-and the Chiefs of Staff can
testify to you directl: ' themselves-in drawing up their
directive to him the question was whether or not any
mention or whether cr not they should inject into that
both the military and the political, and it was decided
it would be far better to make a complete separation,
and that was the genesis of the President's message, to
the best of my understanding.
Senator Cain.. I thank you, sir.
Would you tell us as precisely as you can, General
Marshall, how the January 13 message of the President
contradicts or modifi,-s or clarifies the January 12 rec-
cmmendations of the JCS?
Secretary Marshall. They were two quite different
things. One was a series of possible actions in. a great
dilemma to be consid(red by the National Security Coun-
cil because of their involvement.
The message by the President, as I think he states
in there in so many words, was to bring General Mac-
Arthur into complete understanding of the attitude of
this Government as expressed by the President himself.
Senator Cain. I th:.nk I have understood you to say
that the January 13 nessage was sent to General Mac-
Arthur for a number of reasons, one of which was to
throw some light on the January 11 directive, to which
you made reference yesterday; is that correct?
Secretary Marshall. The expression "throw some light"
I don't think is quite accurate to the point in this case.
It was to avoid complicating the directive of January
11. With political factors and to have them go to General
MacArthur as a distinct statement.
Senator Cain. May I ask, sir, why did the January 13
message of the Presidente state precisely in the language
en
-w
taken in any sense as a directive
tionship to a directive of two days before? Why was one
a directive and the other merely an expression of opin-
ion?
Secretary Marshall. In other words, I am quite certain
the Chiefs of Staff can, I think, give you a very direct
answer on this, although probably it is in the State
Department bailiwick.
In order to avoid any confusion in regard to the direc-
tive they sent him-I might state for myself, that I found
it desirable never to write a letter to a commander in
the field-I. had learned that early in the war, because
it either watered down, or gave some other possibility
of interpretation to the directive. .1 expect that is the
reason that I was not involved in that particular drafting.
Senator Cain. I thank you, sir.
General Marshall, you referred in your previous testi-
mony to two voices in our Government, in a matter of
American policy. Your reference was obviously made to
the voice of the State Department, or our Administration
as a whole, or General MacArthur; but at this time I
wish to ask you this question:
Do you take the view that the Congress of the United
States, a co-ordinate branch of the Government, should
have no part in the making of American policy in the
world?
Secretary Marshall. No, sir. I would not put it that
way; but the President has a constitutional power in
stating our foreign policy, and I am talking about stating
it, not discussing it.
Senator Cain. Is it not true, sir, that under the Consti-
tution, the power to declare war and the power to make
peace is a function of the Congress, and that our Consti-
tution, therefore, calls for two voices in the making of
American policy and the taking of American action?
Secretary Marshall. I think there you have a difference,
that you get into, pretty legalistic for me, between a
statement to the world on a policy, and an action, legal-
istically, under our- Constitution, by both the Congress
and the President.
Senator Cain. I am seriously interested in your view,
sir.
My next question is: Since the Constitution states that
Congress shall have the power, and f quote "to make
rules for the Government, and regulations of the land
and naval forces," do you wish your testimony of recent
days to stand, that no commander of high rank should
furnish. to a member of Congress, and particularly to a
minority leader of the House of Representatives, infor-
mation that may be sought from that commander?
Secretary Marshall. I would have to qualify that to the
extent of saying that you had a very special situation
here, in which the views of the supreme commander in
the field were in direct contrast to that of the Adminis-
tration, and had, in various ways, been given public
notice, to our embarrassment in our relations with our
allies and in the development of fears among those allies.
Now, I think the answer has to be directly related to
that statement.
I had to answer that at considerable length yesterday,
in relation to an article, or an answer by General Collins,
the Chief of Staff, to the Foreign Relations or the Foreign
Affairs Committee.
I took the view there, and I think it is a correct one,
that when we were involved in the special position of a
man, and particularly in regard to military operations,
there it is not at all the procedure that would be followed
by a member of the War :Department, a member of the
Defense Department coming before committees of Con-
gress, and also statements before committees of Congress,
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Here was a world position of the Supreme Commander
of United Nation forces and here was the President of the
United States as the executive agent for those United
Nation forces, and the declarations one way or the other
by. that Supreme Commander have to be very intimately
related to that.
As I recall-the letters will show-Mr. Martin asked
whether this should be treated confidential or not, and
there was no reference to that in General MacArthur's
reply.
Senator Cain. Certainly both of us are in agreement
that the question itself is very troublesome, and the
question has given rise to most of the inquiry in which all
of us are and have been engaged for some time.
May I suggest, General Marshall, that if you consider
that you have previously answered adequately to your
satisfaction any question I may ask you this morning,
if you would merely say so, that will be quite sufficient
for me.
Secretary Marshall. Thank you.
Senator Cain. Because then I can retrace
and get the substance of your answer.
This is a question which appears to be pressing, but
I just want your own view of it. Did you, General Mar-
shall, withhold from this joint Committee any informa-
tion or comment because it might seem to reflect upon
the Democrat Administration in power which you have
called the constituted authority?
Isn't that the ? plain implication of your statements
here that Army officers and members of the military
service in command positions must not give any informa-
tion which could be the basis of criticism of our differ-
ences as to the manner in which the armed forces of
the United States were being employed?
Secretary Marshall. That was not my intention what-
ever and I don't think I can recall anything that I have
withheld along that line.
I am having particular reference in all of this to
leadership in the field of the going operation and a
developing situation.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, if you will help, me
now, sir, understand the nature and position of those
authoritative sources that have the management of the
Korean war in their hands, I will appreciate it.
You testified on Page 804 of the hearing several days
ago that proposals pertaining to directives which are
issued from week to week or sometimes from day to
day are forwarded from the JCS to yourself as the Secre-
tary of Defense, and by yourself to the President. Is
my understanding correct, sir?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, to a limited extent
because in certain cases it goes direct to the National
Security Council.
Senator Cain. I wanted to ask you about that in a
minute, but I wanted to know more than I presently
know of the nature of the directives that by-pass the
National Security Council.
Secretary Marshall. They are of a nature that do not
develop changes of policy and matters of great serious
moment. The President requires that he see all the
instructions from the executive agent of the Chiefs of
Staff, who is General Collins, before they go to General
MacArthur, or General Ridgway. And for convenience I
would either take those to the President but as a rule
General Bradley does in connection with his morning
appointment.
Now if it is a very important thing and yet not one
that seems to be a general policy consideration in a large
way, I would take that personally to the President myself.
But that has been seldom the case.
But when a measure or proposal such as that of Janu-
ary 12 came up, that went directly to the National Secu-
rity Council as a matter of course.
Senator Cain. Because it involved high-
Secretary Marshall. Very major decisions.
Senator Cain. -and fundamental national policy.
Secretary Marshall. Exactly.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, you testified on page
804 of the hearings that basic directives flow from the
JCS to the Defense Secretary to the National Security
Council to the President; is that correct, sir?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir, and that is a statutory
requirement.
Senator Cain. You have stated that the National Secu-
rity Council is composed of the President, the Vice Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board; is that correct?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct.
Senator Cain. Will you briefly outline the functions of
the National Security Council?
Secretary Marshall. Pardon my delay in answering this.
Senator Cain. Certainly, sir. These questions are not
only of interest to me, but several of my colleagues have
said since the hearings began that they had never here-
tofore understood the importance of the National Secu-
rity Council, and I think the nation ought to understand
its relationship to other activities.
Secretary Marshall. In the first place, it is a statutory
organization and the law reads:
"There is hereby established a council to be known
as the National Security Council, hereinafter in this
section referred to as the Council. The President of
the United States shall preside over the meetings of
the Council, provided that in his absence he may
designate a member of the Council to preside in his
place.
"The functions of the Council shall be to advise
the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the
national security so as to enable the military serv-
ices and the other departments and agencies of the
Government to co-operate more effectively in mat-
ters involving the national security. The Council
shall be composed of the President, the Vice Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
fense, and the Chairman of the National Security
Resources Board; and the Secretaries and Under
Secretaries of other executive departments and of
the military departments, the Chairman of the
Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research
and Development Board when appointed by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to serve at his pleasure.
"In addition to performing such other functions as
the President may direct for the purpose of more ef-
fectively co-ordinating the policies and functions of
the departments and the agencies of .the Government
relating to the national security, it shall, subject to
the direction of the President, be the duty of the
Council:
"1. To assess and appraise the objectives, commit-
ments and risks of the United States in relation to
our actual and potential military power in the inter-
est of national security for the purpose of making
recommendations to the President in connection
therewith; and
"(2) To consider policies on matters of common
interest to the departments and agencies of the Gov-
ernment concerned with the national security, and
to make recommendations to the President in con-
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nection therewith. Douglas MacArthur was discussed by the National Se-
"(c) The Council sY all have a staff to be headed by curity Council?
a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed Secretary Marshall. It was not.
by a President, and who shall receive compensation Senator Cain. May I ask, General-for I think this
at the rate of $10,00) a year. The executive secre- question is very important-why it was not, when I bear
tary, subject to the direction of the Council, is hereby in mind what you have just read to this Committee, a
authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the part of which charges the National Security Council with
Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint advising the President of the United States with respect
and fix the compensation of such personnel as may to' the integration of domestic, foreign, and military
be necessary to perf(rm such duties as may be pre- policies relating to the national security so as to enable
scribed by the Couno.il in connection with the per- the military services and other departments and agencies
formance ofits functions. of the Government to co-operate more effectively in
"(d) The Council ,;hall, from time to time, make matters involving the national security.
such recommendations, and such other reports to It is my interpretation of the statute-and I seek not
the President as it deems appropriate or as the to go backwards and to get any change in the decision
President may requite." to remove General MacArthur-that there was every rea-
Senator Cain. I thank you, sir. - son to believe that the National Security Council was
General Marshall, d.) we then rightly conclude from required to consider the question of General MacArthur's
what you have just -ead that the National Security removal in the interests of national security. I may be
Council is with respect to national and global security wrong.
matters in which this country has a definite interest, Secretary Marshall. I think that is a matter of opinion,
and the- war in Korea, by all odds the most important sir. I do not think so. -
policy-making body in the United States? - Senator Cain. I have understood you, General Mar-
Secretary Marshall. that is right, sir. - shall, to testify that the Secretary of the Army was di-
Senator Cain. It, therefore, goes without question that rected to notify General MacArthur in Tokyo that Gen-
its members ought to be individuals possessed of high eral MacArthur was to be removed.
capacity and of names which call forth confidence to the I have understood you to say that the Secretary of
extent possible from the American people. the Army did not fulfill this mission because of a break-
Mr. Secretary, what is your relationship and acquaint- down in communications.
an a with Mr. Robert T. Smith? I have understood you to say that the Secretary of the
Secretary Marshall. I may know him, but I don't Army was not informed before he left the United States
recall. for the Far East that General MacArthur was to be
Senator Cain. He is the Vice Chairman of the National relieved,
Security Resources Bor,rd, sir. Is my understanding correct, sir? -
What is your acquaintance and relationship with Mr. Secretary Marshall. That is correct sir, except that
Jack 0. Gorrie? the matter of his making the delivery to General Mac-
Senator Lodge. Whit is that name? Arthur was prevented not only by a breakdown of power,
Senator Cain. Jack 1J. Gorrie. but by a later decision of the President to proceed im-
Secretary Marshall. I may know him, but I don't mediately with the relief. -
recall the name. Senator Cain. I thank you, sir.
Senator Cain. He is, sir, the executive assistant of the Would you give us in just a sentence or two the pri-
National Security Resources Board. mary functions of the Secretary of the Army? Well, per-
General Marshall, will the acting head of the National haps that isn't necessary. I seek to save the General
Security Resources Board, for Mr. Symington, its secre- as much as I possibly can of his time. Let me ask my
tary, resigned some weeks ago, attend meetings of the next question.
National Security Council-will the acting head? Senator Russell. I have here another copy of the Na-
Secretary Marshall. I presume so, sir. tional Security Act of 1947. -
Senator Cain. Will you state, sir, how often the Na- Senator Cain. I know, General Marshall, that the Sec-
tional Security Council meets, and are minutes taken of retary of the Army is responsible for the discipline and
those meetings? morale of the Army of the United States.
Secretary Marshall. Usually it meets Wednesday after- Would you tell me how a decision would be reached
noons. At one time it was meeting twice a week. to relieve General- MacArthur without consultation by
Senator Cain. Senator Marshall, are you quite familiar the JCS and others in high authority with the Secretary
with the basic functions of the National Security Re- of the Army?
sources Board? Secretary Marshall. In the first place, the Secretary
Secretary Marshall. I have read the directive and I of the Army was not here, and in the next place, as I
have attended some of the meetings. endeavored to explain yesterday, General MacArthur
Senator Cain. I thank you, sir. Was not serving under the Secretary of the Army; he was
Has the opinion of the National Security Board been serving not only as a commander of the United States
requested by the President of the United States con- air, naval, and Army forces in Korea, but also as the
corning the selection c f a new Chairman for the National Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea.
Security Resources Board? . Therefore, it would not, in my opinion, be the function
Secretary Mashall. I don't know, sir. of the Secretary of the Army to enter, into the matter
Senator Cain. Has the question of who ought to replace Of his relief or retention on duty.
Mr. Symington as the Chairman of the National Security Senator Cain. I may appear, General Marshall, to be
Resources Board-for that replacement will become auto- even more curious than some of my colleagues, but I am
matically a member of the National Security Council- endeavoring to anticipate the requirements of the future,
been discussed by the National Security Council since and I want to know before I get through, with your help,
the resignation of Mr. Symington? - if I can., by exactly what means our Supreme Commander
Secretary Marshall. I recall no such discussion. in the Far East was removed, so I will know whom to
Senator Cain. May I ask if the dismissal of General - question should there be a recurrence in some other
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General Marshall, were the views of either the civilian versation no Chief of Staff of any of the three services
Secretary of the Navy or the civilian Secretary of the reflected in your presence on the method, the wisdom
Air Force requested in connection with the dismissal of or lack of wisdom in peremptorily relieving General Mac-
General MacArthur? Arthur of his command?
Secretary Marshall. Not to my knowledge. Secretary Marshall. I don't recall any such, other than
Senator Cain. General Marshall, I am advised that the I think entirely the discussion on Mr. Pace.
Secretary of the Army is a member of the Armed Forces Senator Cain. As to how Mr. Pace was to be employed
Policy Council, which advises the Secretary of Defense in this question?
on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces. Secretary Marshall. If and how.
Was the question of General MacArthur's dismissal Senator Cain. By indirective I have served under your
referred to that Policy Board? command across the seas, so you know that I seek not
Secretary Marshall. It was not. to embarrass you at any time, but the reason I have
Senator Cain. I thank you, sir. asked some of these questions is that it would not have
I have gathered then from your answers-and I want been possible for a conversation of that character to have
to be' very certain if I am right-that no civilian within taken place if those three civilian Secretaries had been
the Department of Defense or the Department of the present at such a meeting, because in being civilians they
Army was consulted or had any influence in the dismis- would not be content with a staff officer's rapid evalua-
sal of General MacArthur, is that correct, sir? tion of the situation.
Secretary Marshall. I am supposed to be the civilian Those civilian Secretaries would have asked pressing
Secretary of Defense. Out of my past I was a soldier. questions concerning aren't there other alternative
My answer would be that I am the supposed civilian courses which we might follow.
representative of the Department of Defense. I recall It is a great pity if not tragedy in my view that such
your action in connection with clearing the way for my a procedure was not followed.
nomination as to the importance of having a civilian General Marshall, you have repeatedly stated that
as Secretary of Defense. General MacArthur. was relieved of all of his commands
Senator Cain. It is not my intention or desire to em- on receipt of orders because of your desire to free Gen-
barrass you, General Marshall. I have and have had eral Ridgway, General MacArthur's successor, of any
a very real respect for your military knowledge. I ad- embarrassment. I am unable to-
dress you as General because old soldiers never die and Secretary Marshall. Embarrassment or complications?
you are and will remain, for as long as you live, sir, a Senator Cain. I am unable to understand what you
five-star general. have meant.
I just want our people to know-and it is without any May I ask if General Ridgway was not sent to Korea
criticism of you whatsoever-that we created through at the direct request of General MacArthur?
the National Security Act of 1947 a Defense Establish- Secretary Marshall. I was not in the Department at
ment which was designed to have at its head as the the moment that that decision was taken; but my under-
Secretary of Defense a civilian. It was designed to have standing is that General MacArthur either made the
at the head of each one of the three services a civilian. request, or specifically confirmed it, but that can be
Under the circumstances which pertain, though the looked up and the information furnished.
Chief of Staff of each of the services is in himself, sub- Senator Cain. General MacArthur testified that Gen-
ordinate to the civilian head of each of those three serv- eral Ridgway did come to Korea at his direct request.
ices, none of the civilians were conferred or consulted i have understood, and I can easily understand this,
with or had any part to play in a great question which that it was the view or the wish-casual, probably-of
involved basically the national security of our country. the Defense Department to send a general other than
I think it is a bad procedure, sir. General Ridgway to Korea, but that the Defense De-
General Marshall, will you please relate any conversa- partment immediately concurred in General MacArthur's
tions you had with Admiral Sherman, with General personal request that General Ridgway come to him.
Vandenberg, with General Collins either individually or . I think there is some small measure of importance in
collectively covering, (a) the question of replacing Gen- that question of mine, and in your answer.
eral MacArthur in his several commands, and (b) the I want, in my own right, now, to take just one or two
method to be followed in replacing the General. seconds to have the record show again that General
Secretary Marshall. I had no personal discussions with MacArthur has publicly said to this Committee, and the
any one of the three officials that you have mentioned country, that he and General Ridgway had a mutual
in the matter. General Bradley carried the questions to and high respect for each other. General MacArthur
the Chiefs of Staff and came back with the information testified:
desired which was largely one of procedure so far as "General Ridgway was my selection and recom-
military-command relationships were concerned, not the mendation as the commander of the Eighth Army
political aspects, not the public aspects. after the unfortunate death of that very magnificent
After the Chiefs of Staff had had a meeting on Sunday soldier, General Walker.
afternoon, the 9th, I believe, of several hours, they came "I have known General Ridgway for 30 years. I
to my office with General Bradley and they each stated don't think you could have a more admirable selec-
respectively their views, and the common view of the tion in the Far East than General Ridgway. I hold
three. him in the highest esteem, not only as a soldier but
I, as I recall, did not discuss the matter with them, as a cultured gentleman and one of the most mag-
I heard what they had to say. General Bradley-there nificent characters I have ever been acquainted with."
must have been some discussion. I don't crystallize it I asked General MacArthur a question as to whether
in my mind now because it lasted from 4 o'clock until 6, or not from the moment General Ridgway went to Korea,
but I think it related to procedure which would be fol- he was not under General MacArthur's direct command,
lowed in the event of General MacArthur's relief in order and the General's answer is this:
to protect the interests of the Army. That is my rec- "That is absolutely correct, and I don't know how
ollection. there could have been any more complete co-opera-
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 tion, devotion 4RJprgy@4yF9KRe1 ",OQ W %J6 :. CIA tp2 7,..tg1141 QtQA@PQ,9(}D,J4&g on the ground at
Ridgway and myself."
General, given this information, may I ask you again
how did you and youw. associates conclude that it would
embarrass General R:.dgway if General MacArthur was
given time in which ;o personally turn over his several
commands to General Ridgway?
Secretary Marshall. I have already stated my views to
t:h.at. Do you wish me to state them again?
Senator Cain. No, sir. If you think you have stated
them adequately, that is sufficient for me.
Secretary Marshall. I think I have, sir.
Senator Cain. Gen, oral Marshall, I ' have stressed this
point because I am not going to be a party to a movement
which is afoot in this country to discredit General Mac-
Arthur by an implication that bad blood existed between
General MacArthur and General Ridgway, and that Gen-
eral Ridgway was sent to Korea in anticipation of the
removal of General Douglas MacArthur; and your obser-
vations have helped in clearing away any possible uncer-
tainty that exists on that question.
Secretary Marshall. I will go further than that to say
that any such idea is extraordinarily incorrect.
Senator Cain. I think that statement is very good for
our country, and I personally and officially appreciate it..
General Marshall, you have stated many times, sir,
that it was not advisable to order General MacArthur
back to this country for discussions with the JCS, with
yourself, and perhaps with the National Security Council
and the President, which might easily have resolved or
found an adequate answer for the differences between
General MacArthur and those in higher authority in
this country, because of the critical situation in Korea.
I: do not understand, rir, your stated reasons when I con-
sider that General Ridgway took command of the Eighth
Army last December.
Would you tell us, (lease, why the situation would have
become more critica. if General MacArthur had been
brought home for consultation? I call your attention to
the fact that General MacArthur was relieved of his
commands in the face of what the President announced
to the country was a pending offensive by the enemy.
Secretary Marshall, I do not, I think, imply that the
situation would have, been made the more critical by
General MacArthur's return to Washington, but that his
return to Washington seemed inadvisable in view of the
critical situation. I have gone into this before, 'out I will
do it again, Senator.
General MacArthur theretofore at various times-I will
refer to some of the dates here if you wish me to---has
indicated a reluctance to come to this country in con-
nection with various factors relating to the Far Eastern
question, and at this time, as you say, a pending offense,
an advance of his troops, was just about to take place.
And when the President consulted me and then instructed
one regarding his having an opportunity to discuss with
General MacArthur the various factors, and with others
at the same time the President would take with him., and
with the Ambassador of ours to Korea, he stated that he
desired. General MacArthur to meet him in Hawaii, and
that he, the Presiden;, would go that far, and that would
not take General MacArthur away from Tokyo for an
undue length of time at such a critical period. And I
suggested to the President that in view of the circum-
stances, it seemed to me that if the President was willing
to go to Wake Island, he should give General MacArthur
the chance to decide for himself what to do; and I put
the question up to General MacArthur-Hawaii or the
President's willingne, s to go as far as Wake Island--and
General MacArthur- :-eplied, "Wake Island."
There was an example, at .least, of my own feeling as
that time. - -
Now, as to his relation to the offensive procedure that
was going on in Korea at the time of his relief, his relief
brought about another commander, so that there was no
question about who was in control of the situation, and
that commander came directly out of Korea; that is di-
rectly out of Korea, and intimately familiar with every
stage of the military fight in that region. In fact, he
was largely the director of it, and I would state that if
it, had been found necessary to succeed General Mac-
Arthur with somebody other than General Ridgway, I
don't know exactly how ]: would have appraised that
situation, but it would have been quite different, because
of the fact that an entirely new man was being put into
the position; whereas the great issue was the battle, and
General Ridgway was intimately familiar with every
phase of it.
Senator Cain. May I ask how much prior warning
General Van Fleet had that he was going to take over
command of the Eighth Army in the face of an offensive
which, presumably, was even beginning to move as of
the time General Van Fleet was brought into Korea?
Secretary Marshall. General Van Fleet had been on
12-hours alert for some time-I think a matter of one
or two months, because they felt that General Ridgway
was taking some risks in the way he was moving about
in his 'theater, and flying up to the: advance posts there,
and in the light of what had happened to General
Walker, that we must have another man immediately
available in case General :Ridgway met with some acci-
dent or became a casualty.. -
Actually, Van Fleet was in Florida at the time, and
his interpretation was that he could fly back by air in
three or four hours, so that he was in the status of an
alert, and he was immediately ordered back to Washing-
ton to get under way to go to Japan. I have forgotten
whether his instructions were sent Monday or in advance
of the decision. I don't think it was; I think it was sent
after the decision Monday morning.
Senator Cain. You certainly know the attitude of mind
of General Ridgway.
Secretary Marshall.
a tor.
Senator Cain. I say you certainly know the attitude
of mind of your great commander, General Ridgway, who
can cover more ground more rapidlyand more effectively
than any person I have ever previously known.
My own view is that one of his handicaps as Supreme
Commander in the Far East, is that he has occupational
and administrative duties in Japan, which will keep him
from doing what he would. most like to do, which would
be to lead his troops into action.-
Secretary Marshall. I might acid that we gave him
the freedom to make his own decision as to when he
transferred the actual command to the army; that is,
if he wished to make Van Fleet his deputy during a
period of this fight, so that he could go to Tokyo and
come back, and be in a- clear status of the army com-
mander, or transfer the command immediately. He chose
to transfer the command 'immediately.
Senator Cain. Well, you had, sir, no other course to
pursue, did you? I mean, with the removal of General
MacArthur and with imposing two different commands
on his successor, General Ridgway, you had to leave it
tip to the discretion of General Ridgway as to where he
could be of the greatest amount of service to his respon-
sibility, and at the time he took command of not only the
commander-not only the continued command of or was
then in command of the Eighth Army, but was going
to be Supreme Commander in the Far East.
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 Secretary Marshall. TAi pprovoed Fos Release 2004/01/16ri JCIlAR u7s51001t4o9R000500P9P0f1 -6 tern Europe?
Senator Cain. One fact seems to remain before me. Secretary Marshall. I would assume so
General Ridgway had imposed upon him new responsi-
bilities at the very moment when he was straining every
effort to defeat the offensive of the enemy.
General Marshall, so far as I know, General MacArthur
has probably turned more swords into useful plough-
shares than any military figure in history.
All of us recognize General MacArthur to be an out-
standing world military leader, and one of the great
Americans of all time.
We likewise know that leadership is the crying need
of the world at this time.
Against this background this question: Did you, sir,
or others in your presence, appreciate and understand
that the methods you and others had in mind for remov-
ing General MacArthur would destroy his usefulness
as a national leader within the Administration in this
continuing day of crisis? Was that one of the considera-
tions before you and other serious-minded people?
Secretary Marshall. The serious considerations that
were discussed within my recollection related to the
immediate reactions that would flow from his relief, and
which I think we had a correct estimate of, and very
particularly the reactions of his army, which was the
most important reaction of all to be considered. Beyond
that, I do not think the discussion went.
Senator Cain. - General Marshall, one last question
about the MacArthur question, please: Was either the
Chairman of the Senate or the House Armed Services
Committee consulted regarding the MacArthur removal?
Secretary Marshall. I cannot answer that. As I said
before, I got the impression, if not the statement, of the
President, that he had seen several-I think he men-
tioned four-important leaders, and discussed that with
them on Sunday, the 9th. Who they were I do not know.
except one case, and I would not state that.
Senator Cain. Well, may I ask you this-
Senator Russell. Senator Cain, will you pardon me just
a moment?
Senator Cain. Certainly, sir.
Senator Russell. I should like to state in this connec-
tion that I had no knowledge whatever that this mat-
ter was - even under consideration. Since you involved
me in that question, I state further that I happened
to be out of the city at the time, and knew nothing
about it until the final order came to me that action
was taken.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, on the basis of your
testimony we know that the JCS discussed the General
MacArthur question. We know that the President did;
we know that the Secretary of State did; we know that
Mr. Harriman did; we know that you did. So far as we
know, no one else was consulted.
I think it very important for us to determine, if we
can, the names and portfolios of every single American
who had anything to do with this question.
My question to you is to whom might we turn for in-
formation regarding those members or those citizens in
or out of the Congress whose views were requested or
who were consulted about the removal of our Far East-
ern Commander?
Secretary Marshall. Certainly not the Secretary of De-
fense, because I don't know, in the first place, and it isn't
my role, in the second, to ' describe just what the Presi-
dent does. I should think the President himself was the
individual concerned.
Senator Cain. I thank you, sir.
General Marshall, I should like very briefly to refer to
the relationship between Western Europe and the Far
East. Is it not generally agreed that the primary desire
Senator Cain. Is it not generally agreed that the de-
fense establishment of our allies in the North Atlantic
Treaty is several years away to be prepared to effectively
resist any large-scale aggression in Western Europe?
Secretary Marshall. I will not-I do not wish to answer
the question as to several years away, Senator; but-
Senator Cain. They are not immediately prepared?
Secretary Marshall. They are not immediately. pre-
pared. -
Senator Cain. I thank you, sir.
General Marshall, are the United States and our allies
in Western Europe not proceeding ofi the assumption
that an aggression is not likely to take place in Western
Europe until the allies have created an adequate defense
establishment?
Secretary Marshall. To that I would say certainly; so
far as the officials involved in this matter in this Govern-
ment are concerned, our present conception is that we
can never tell at what moment the reaction from Russia
might come. -
You have to evaluate or guess the Russian appreciation
of our power atomically, how much of a deterrent that
is, and other factors within Russia itself with which we
Senator Cain. Is there any reason to believe, on the
basis of your intelligence reports, that an aggressor is
presently threatening to invade Western Europe?
Secretary Marshall. The impression from the reports
that we gather, from many sources is there has been a
continuous build-up and not necessarily in strength,
though it may be, but particularly in arrangements,
specifically in the satellite states, and in regard to dispo-
sitions of Soviet troops in Western Europe, and as to
Soviet increases in strength, as we understand them, in
the Far East.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, is it not generally
agreed that America and her Western European allies
would become immediately involved in war if an ag-
gressor occupied Berlin or any part of Western Europe
by force?
Secretary Marshall. I would assume so.
Senator Cain. I seem to recall, General Marshall, that
Russia publicly protested against our sending American
divisions to join the North Atlantic Treaty International
Army. Did the Russians not state that this act by us
increased the possibility of war in Europe?
Secretary Marshall. I do not recall the exact wording
of the statement, but I think that was the general effect.
Senator Cain. My memory seems to tell me that Russia
protested the establishment of our air lift to Berlin.
Secretary Marshall. Very specifically.
Senator Cain. Has Russia, General Marshall, to your
knowledge ever protested against our considering the
need for bombing military installations which are being
employed by our present enemy, Red China; in Manchu-
ria or China? -
Secretary Marshall. I do not recall that specific alle-
gation or statement in regard to that, but I think there
has been a great deal that has come out through
Pravda and others as to American aggression, imperial-
istic effort. -
Senator Cain. But as the Secretary of Defense you
know of no official protest that Russia has lodged either
with our Government or with the United Nations?
Secretary Marshall. I don't recall such.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, you have gone over
this ground quite a number of times. If you care to
recapitulate in just a sentence or two, I would appre-
ciate it. -
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What are your fundamental reasons for assuming that
an aggression will not take place in Western Europe
until we are better prepared to meet it, while seemingly
you believe that Russia' will enter the Korean conflict
if we bomb and de ;troy military installation, possessed
by the Red Chinese's
I ask this questio a in part because it has seemed ap-
parent to me for so ne time that Russia could presently,
today, defeat any forces which might be opposed to her
in Western Europe.
Secretary Marshall. In regard to Western Europe, first
I go on the basis ir.yself that Russia may step into the
.aggression at any, r.ioment. Also that that is no argu-
ment that we do not do our best to prepare for it even
though it may take two or three years.
In other words, u e don't sit impotent and say Russia
can act at any time and therefore we do nothing. That
is the sense of the European situation, and those argu-
ments came up in c rnnection with the rearmament pro-
posals.
They came to me in some cases direct because I was
called in to testify, though I wasnot then in the Govern-
mment in respect to specific office.
I felt that we could never follow any such course as
'that, to just say w., can do nothing because they can
intervene, and again you had other involvements, other
possibilities to consider which I have already referred to.
Now I will try to t e brief again in regard to the differ-
ence :f think in the situation in the Far East. and it is
this in the main: that Russia possesses a very valuable
ally in China. That you might say is a Russian pro-
tectorate in a sense but one who is paying a great bill
of human lives and other things in order to fulfill that
role.
Now in view of their treaty with the Chinese Commu-
nist regime or Government, if it appears that they have
failed to support that Government in its fight in Korea,
we have a very special situation because it affects every
other satellite of thc, Soviet Government.
They get their example from that, and to USE! the com-
Inon expression in this country, that they have been sold
down the river after a great sacrifice of life, so it has
seemed to me and ny associates and advisers that we
are confronted by a Soviet Government in a very diffi-
cult position itself s s to what it does in relation to the
failure up to the present time of the Chinese Communist
forces to drive us out of Korea.
Senator Cain. I thought, sir, the other day you
fled with reference -;o the treaty that you did not
very much about it?
Secretary Marshall.
pertinent sections.
test!-
know
Senator Cain. M:; interpretation of that treaty was
that it ran between Russia and China and was di-
rected. at a militari;;tic Japan in the future, or an im-
perialistic Japan in the future.
Secretary Marshal I. It ran directly to what?
Senator Cain. To the Japanese question and not even
by implication, as I read it, to the Korean question.
Secretary Marshall. It uses the expression "or any
other nation or peo; ?1e."
Senator Cain. Allies, yes, sir, assisting Japan.
Secretary Marshall. Assisting Japan.
Now, if you recall they alleged several times that we
had introduced Japanese into Korea.
Senator Cain. I dc) so recall.
Secretary Marshal.. And we felt that that was for the
very purpose
Senator Cain. Of setting the stage?
Secretary Marshall. -setting the stage
actions we have bee:a concerned about.
Now here are the exact-it uses the word "rebirth of
Japanese imperialism"; that is in it. But "violation
of the peace," and they say we have violated the peace,
that it was not aggression or invasion of Korea. But
we are all familiar with that business.
But it has a very pertinent relation to the possible
Soviet interpretation of this treaty, certainly the in-
structions to their own :people.
(Reading) "The violation of the peace on the part
of Japan or any other State which should unite
with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggres-
Sion."
That gives them a very wide latitude in view of some
of their perversions of the facts in the past.
Senator Cain. Yes, sir. You do not then put very
much. credence in the belief held by some that Russia
might be very strongly inclined to let China and the
United States wage war against each other to the further
weakening of both powers, and by that means leaving
Russia in a far stronger position even than she is today.
Secretary Marshall. I would qualify that as to the
weakening of China, but I would say that the Soviet
Government would be perfectly ruthless in its relation-
ship to China in this matter if the Chinese could con-
tinue to embroil us in a general ,action out there which
would weaken our general position.
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.
As a result of your testimony on Thursday I read a
large headline in the Washington Daily News, which
went like this-"U. S. not strong enough to risk war-
Marshall." Does that reasonably well represent your
view, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Marshall. Well, we certainly do not wish to
risk war at any stage, and now in particular when we
haven't yet developed our strength.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, are we and our allies
not stronger today than we were last June when the
Korean conflict began?
Secretary Marshall. Certainly we are materially strong-
er, because in the period of six months we doubled the
strength of personnel in the Army alone in that time,
and that is a very rapid development. But we haven't
had an opportunity for this all to crystallize into the
means to be employed, nor have vie been able to obtain
the materiel which is an essential part of our defense.
Now, as to allies, they have moved at a very slow pace
until our reaction to the Korean affair, and that stimu-
lated and accelerated, brought to a head in an effective
manner the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Senator Cain. I understand, Sir, that since V-J Day
we have spent roughly a hundred billion dollars for our
own defense and that of our allies. I do not, know how
much money or what amount of materiel and arms we
have provided our North Atlantic allies with since the
Korean war began. It must, however, be a very large
figure and amount of supplies.
Do you know to what extent our assistance in Western
"Europe in the last 10 or 11. months has added to the state
of defense preparation of our allies in We Europe?
Secretary Marshall. I would have to get you the data.
I remember the last paper I looked at about a month ago
showed that about 50 per cent of the product of the first
appropriation in the rearmament had been shipped in
goods to Europe. The others were more long-term items
and there was a question, once, in one particular instance
which I would not care to publicize, where the thought
was-that-the demandsexceeded the capacity to digest it.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, have you reason to
know that there are today more combat divisions among
our allies in Western Europe, than there were 10 months
ago?
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 Secretary Marshall. AppItah d WeigRe; eaS(200"1/16 : CIA t r001 9R0 0~i~b? # of airfields in
figures on that. China, by us, during the war, they said it was hardly
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.
Secretary Marshall. I know what it was to be-
Senator Cain. But you do not know whether it has so
become?
Secretary Marshall. Well, it is a question of how you
evaluate the particular unit, whether you call it really
an effective division, or not; and that is what General
Eisenhower has been in the process of determining, and
he has not yet reported to us in detail.
Senator Cain. I can think of no more important an-
swer, because it is against that answer that we, in the
Congress, must devise plans for the future.
General Marshall, please, if you will, sir, define the
hazards and the risks which are present today, with
reference to Korea, that were not present and recog-
nizable last June?
This question is predicated on the fact that Russia and
China are geographically situated today where they were
last June; and that our Defense Establishment, and a
good many of us in the Congress, were completely aware,
last June, that Red Chinese forces were situated in con-
siderable strength in Manchuria, and that other Red
forces could easily be transported to that area.
What about the risks, today, that were not recognized
last June, when we entered this conflict?
Secretary Marshall. Well, of course I would have to
very carefully evaluate what. we thought last June, be-
cause I not only was not in that, but was very remote
from it.
Senator Cain. I am going
because I seek to-find out, as
we thought, last June-
Secretary Marshall. The
you as to that, sir.
to get into that question, sir,
an American citizen, whether
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.
General Marshall, we have been told in the press that
there are far more than a half million Red Chinese de-
ployed today in North Korea.
Would you tell us from what areas these troops are
being supplied?
Secretary Marshall. I would have to question the Chiefs
of Staff on that. I can give it to you roughly, but I don't
think it would be accurate.
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.
General Marshall, in a colloquy with Senator Hicken-
looper on Thursday, the subject of bombing Red Chinese
bases came up. You said this:
"At the present time, in the opinion of my military
advisers, and my own, the ground forces of the allies
have suffered in a rather remote way from our fail-
ure to do the bombing that you have just referred to."
I fail, sir, to see either logic or reason in this reply.
If those supply depots had been destroyed by bombing,
how would the Chinese Reds now be maintaining more
than a half million troops in North Korea?
Secretary Marshall. The destruction of those supply
bases,.and all, would depend, in its effectiveness, on the
keeping interrupted the railroads and all, coming down
from Manchuria, across the Yalu, into Korea.
Now, we have been bombing the bridges and the tunnels
in Korea, and the supplies come on down the road.
Where unlimited man power is available, there is a
very quick repair in such matters; but when you are-
Senator Cain. What do you mean by that, "when lim-
ited man power is available?"
Secretary Marshall. Unlimited man power.
Senator Cain. I beg your pardon, sir.
Secretary. Marshall. The repairs are very quickly
made.
worth the effort, that the hordes of Chinese were carried
in by the Japanese, and all the holes filled up in a mat-
ter of an hour or two, and things were back to where
they were before, and it was a question of whether this
particular effort was justified, except as a momentary
interruption.
However, in reference to my reply to Senator Hicken-
looper, as to the remote way-
Senator Cain. That phrase.
Secretary Marshall. It is a two-way road there, which
I had in mind, because we have been spared a great deal
because we haven't set up a bombing air war.
Now,. t stated my own .intense interest, and the rec-
ommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, for air action across
the Yalu at the time of this very serious build-up of
Chinese Communist forces in Korea, which General Mac-
Arthur very graphically pictured as the way they were
rolling down the road and coming across the bridges of
the Yalu, and our close distance from the Yalu gave our
planes almost no room in which to operate.
Now, we dropped the pressure on the issue when the
situation entirely changed, and when we were far back,
several hundred miles from the Yalu.
Senator Cain. Do you mind if I interrupt?
You say we dropped the pressure when we were-
Secretary Marshall. I am talking about the hot pur-
suit.
Senator Cain. When we had retired.
Secretary Marshall. When we got within about 200
miles back and we had that distance in which to operate
against their communications.
Senator Cain. Yes, sir.
Secretary Marshall. But in relation to the period when
we were aggressively trying to force our allies into an
agreement, we-meaning the Chiefs of Staff-got into
other discussions which were rather opposing this pro-
cedure for the reason that we didn't want any risk of
retaliatory bombing on our bridgehead, beachhead, on
the northeastern coast of Korea where our losses might
have been terrific in shipping and evacuation, [deleted]
We had a very compact target, the ships tied up to the
docks, a very vulnerable target, and we could have been
done considerable harm.
We went ahead with our effort to get action to meet
the situation on the Yalu, but we realized as we talked
about it that we might get into deep trouble in this
beachhead where we were evacuating. It is on the north-
eastern coast.
[Deleted]
Senator Cain. I hope, sir, you will not think I am
burdening the record or you. I do not pretend to be a
soldier of any capacity, but I have spent many days in
the field, and I am asking these questions in an effort,
a deep effort, to understand what we are doing.
Secretary Marshall. I may suggest, Senator, that you
can get very direct responses to these from the Chiefs
of Staff, because they did the elaborate discussion, and
they came in with the recommendations.
Senator Cain. But the theory and the subject of
logistics is one over which you have been an acknowldged.
authority for a good part of your life, sir.
General Marshall, it seems to me logical to assume that
thousands and thousands of enemy forces have been
maintained in Korea because they have been. supplied
from Rashin. General MacArthur said of Rashin:
"It is the great central distributing point from
Manchuria down the east coast of Korea. Its use-
fulness to the enemy is self-evident. Great accumula
tions, depot accumulations, were made there." End
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 of his quotjtio roved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA- P75~(~ 4l14VR0001 1t~08O0 i& for fear they might
Now, I am 'us summg that is a military estimate of be dangerous, double-edged or merely useless. End of the
it situation made in a theater of operations by officers reference to Jebb.
who were on the ground. It seems fantastic to this American, General Marshall,
How, then, do you reconcile this military estimate, that a chief representative of one of our chief allies
which was concurre . in by General Stratemeyer, with should so firmly oppose before an American audience
your statement of tl.e other day that our ground forces your views as given to this Committee as Secretary of
have suffered in a i ather remote way from our failure Defense and as a member of the National Security
to bomb enemy supply sources? Council.
Secretary Marshall. Senator, if you will propound that Please tell us again what positive steps are being taken
question to the Chie:'s of Staff, they will tell you exactly today to get Great Britain and the rest of our allies in
why they came up with the recommendation. that we agreement on the need for a complete economic and
should. not bomb Rashin. naval blockade of Red China.
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir. Secretary Marshall. Well, as you suggested that is a
General Marshall, my understanding of the require- question for the State Department, but they have been
ments of a military (ampaign is that forces cannot fight pressing in every way. They have to get an action,
without being supplied in the field with weapons, food,. formal action by the United Nations in connection with
ammunition and clothing. If the Chinese Reds were it, and. as I just said, on May 7 the United Kingdom and
prevented from supplying their forces in the field, to France indicated they were now prepared to support a
niy mind, the war jr Korea would soon be over. resolution introduced by the United States for an inter-
Against this truis n, have I not understood you to national embargo against Communist China. There has
testify that you have been and are today strongly in been a change of view.
support of an effective naval and economic blockade of Senator Cain. Thank you, sir. General Marshall, I
China? Suppose we agree that the allied forces have been con-
Secretary Marshall. Correct, sir. i onted by two different kinds of wars since our forces
Senator Cain. Ge aeral Marshall, you have testified were first committed in Korea.
ghat you could only comment on the effectiveness of our As I understand it, the first war began in June against
economic blockade of China. You said that you knew the North Korean aggressor, and ended in late November
very little about what other nations were doing to estab- when the Chinese Reds committed their forces across
lish an economic blcckade of Red China. Did I under- the Yalu River." The second war finds us at war with
stand you correctly? the North Koreans and with the Recd Chinese.
Secretary Marshall. I think I added to it something Will you explain for the benefit of this Committee what
:in regard to the supplies going to the port of Hong Kong, we are doing to win the second war that we did not do
specifically rubber. and employ in practically winning the first war? What
Senator Cain. Ye:,, but you said you were not very I am getting at is, is our general plan today what it was
familiar with what steps our allies were taking to impose when we were confronted with an entirely different
an economic blockade of their own on Red China. situation last June?
Secretary Marshall. I was not familiar with what steps Secretary Marshall. I would say it is not, for the
they were taking because they weren't taking the steps reason that at that time we possessed forces of sufficient
that we thought were necessary. strength and of competence to destroy the North Korean
Senator Cain. Wh it we are trying to get at is: Army, and General MacArthur did destroy it.
Who in our Governm ant is driving in hope that our allies [Deleted]
will take the same sort of steps that we are taking, be- Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.
cause of your testimony that an effective naval and On March 28, 1951, the New York Times said this:
economic blockade of China would result possibly in the `"General Marshall declared today that he was
end of the war and certainly in minimizing the loss of astonished at the relaxation in public and Congres-
life to which our forces are exposed every day in the sional support for a long-term defense effort. De-
week? ploring emotional reaction to day-to-day events,
Secretary Marshall, That is carried on through the General Marshall observed that the Soviet Union's
State Department, ar.d I also added in my statement the activities covered the globe. In his opinion, he said,
other clay here on May 7 we had gotten the agreement the world situation was now more serious than last
with the British and the French which was the most November."
important agreement to get through the necessary reso-- You did not at that time:, sir, clarify your remark about
lotion to the United Rations. how the world crisis had worsened. I wonder if you would
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir. Here is a question care to do so now, and I will appreciate your opinion as
which perhaps you will suggest I should ask of the Sec- to whether the world situation is more serious or less
retary of State. I will be glad to do it, but I want to serious than it was last March.
rose it to you. Secretary Marshall. Las, March`'
You have said in y )ur testimony that Great Britain is Senator Cain. That is when you made this comment,
giving some present consideration to joining with us to sir, in a news conference, the first, I think, you held,
impose an economic and naval blockade on China. I after you became the Secretary of Defense.
have reason to believ ~ that this is a contrary position to Secretary Marshall. Are you referring, when you say
one the British have held for months. I must read this last March, to the change of the situation between last
short passage. March and now? My statement was made in March.
On Monday, April 9, only a little over a month ago, Senator Cain. Yes, sir.
Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Britain's chief representative to the Secretary Marshall. In reference to November-
United Nations, spoke before a large American audience Senator Cain, And you said that the world situation
in San Francisco on a day when I was there. In that was in March worse than lit was inlast November.
speech Jebb warned against the danger of any military Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
action, air raids or n,Lval. blockades against China as in-- Senator Cain. And I wonder, in your opinion-
evitably leading to unlimited war; nor, he said, did he Secretary Marshall. And just a few minutes ago I
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Senator Cain. I thank you, sir.
General Marshall, you have suggested that no request
was made of the Department of Defense or of the Far
East command for an estimate of the military situation
before the United Nations resolved to employ military
force to stop the aggressor in Korea. Is my impression
concerning this a correct one?
Secretary Marshall. I will have to ask you to state it
again, because I don't recall-
Senator Cain. Thank you. I read rapidly in the hope
that you may have time saved, sir, thereby.
You have suggested in all of your testimony, which
began last Monday, that no request was made of the
Department of Defense or of the Far East command for
an estimate of the military situation before the United
Nations resolved to employ military 'force to stop the
aggressor in Korea.
Secretary Marshall. I didn't recall that I stated that,
sir, because I was not connected with the Department
at that time, and the exact maneuvers, diplomatic and
otherwise, that took place in regard to the decision to go
into Korea, I only knew from reading the messages from
General MacArthur.
Senator Cain. That is to say, General Marshall, in
your capacity as Secretary of Defense, you do not know
whether a military opinion was requested of either our
Defense establishment or of General MacArthur's com-
mand in the Far East prior to the decision of the United
Nations to commit American forces in Korea?
Secretary Marshall. I would say, Senator, that I could
look into the records and see, but I was not an actor at
the time.
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.
I had better ask those several questions then directly
of one or more of the JCS.
General Marshall, in your opinion, are there today any
considerable number of Communists in the officer corps
of our Army, Navy or Air Force?
Secretary Marshall. I don't know of any, sir.
Senator Cain. What action would you take if you
found Communists within our armed forces, particularly
in its officer corps?
Secretary Marshall. I think there is a prescribed action
in connection with loyalty tests and matters of that sort,
which I cannot quote offhand.
Senator Cain. Well, you are certain, sir, that if Com-
munists were found among the officer corps, that they
would summarily be dismissed from the service?
Secretary Marshall. Within our recourse to law in the
manner of doing it.
Senator Cain. Do you, General Marshall, out of your
wide experience, see any difference between Russian,
Chinese and American Communists?
Secretary Marshall. My own reaction is that the Chi-
nese Communist leadership is identical with the Soviet
Communists, and these groups in America, so far as I
obtain from the press, and what I got while I was Sec-
retary of State, have the same objectives and employ
different means, according to the circumstances.
Senator. Cain. Are those objectives the total destruc-
tion of free institutions and control of them on the face
of the earth?
Secretary Marshall. I am not quite so certain as to
that, but I do feel absolutely certain it is the complete
domination-
Senator Cain. Of the world?
Secretary Marshall. -of the world.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, would you explain
to the Committee what you had in mind in June of 1946
when you strongly urged the passage of H.R. 6795, which
v R p .k904"$V"0 0p4i%e Communists
and Nationalist Army, in a letter supporting this bill,
where you said, "Without passage of the bill the Presi-
dent and myself would lack authorization to carry out
a phase of American policy toward China which appears
vital to the success of our announced policy. The Presi-
dent, under the terms of the bill, will have the authority
to proceed at his discretion in accordance with the sit-
uation toward the establishment by the Chinese of -uni-
fied or national defense forces to include in its lead-
ership both Communists and leadership"-
Secretary Marshall. What was the bill?
Senator Cain. The bill, sir, was this: "A bill to pro-
vice military advice and assistance to the Republic of
China; to aid in the modernizing of its armed forces
for the fulfillment of obligations which may devolve
upon it."
Secretary Marshall. I understand what the bill is.
Senator Cain. The date of this testimony, at which
your letter was read, was June 14, 1946.
Just what were we trying to get at when we, in Amer-
ica, were insisting that Communists and Nationalist
Chinese leadership be amalgamated within the future
armies of China?
Secretary Marshall. The bill, as I recall, referred to
the establishment of an army mission to Japan, isn't
that correct?
Senator Connally. China. -
Senator Cain. Did he say Japan? He meant China.
This is what the Secretary of State said in support of
your letter with reference to the bill. He was answer-
ing a question apparently by Mr. Eaton.
Senator Lodge. What is the date of that?
Senator Cain. June 14, 1946, Senator.
"What General Marshall was asked to do, and
agreed to do, and what is necessary to be done, is
that when the plan for the amalgamation of the
two armies is accepted and begins to go into effect,
those units of the Communist Army which are going
to be amalgamated within the Nationalist Army
will receive a period of training from 60 to 90 days
before they march out to join their opposite num-
bers in- the other Army."
Secretary Marshall. I recall now what the issue is.
Senator Cain. Yes.
Secretary Marshall. Under the political-consultative-
conference recommendation, which was agreed to by all
concerned, there was to be a demobilization of the
Nationalist Army from some 400 divisions, more or less,
to 50, and on the Communist side, from a million and a
half troops to 10 divisions-in other words, 60 divisions
in all.
Now it was found in this committee, to which I was
the adviser by reason of this arrangement which the
Chinese had entered into among themselves, that when
we tried to establish a rate of demobilization-and it had
to be a comparative rate-between the Nationalist divi-
sions and the Communist divisions, that we had no
measure of organization or setup in a very formal way
in connection with the Communist forces. They did not
have definite divisional organizations; they had very
little artillery; they had no specific unit, except in a
few cases, that was a division. And they were unwilling
to accept any setup of comparative demobilization rates,
we thought, because they had no organized unit of that
character as the basis of such a procedure.
Now it was thought that, with the setting up of this
military mission of ours to the. Nationalist Government
in China, that one of its subsidiary functions would be
to try to get this force of the Communists in such a
shape that we could amalgamate the units and demo-
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 bilize the rest. Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-F W0?,Ar0O14. pOqpV Q@rRQ 1Mtement of fact?-The
Roughly, at a certain stage, which was about a year
later than the initiation of the maneuver, there were
to be two Nationalist divisions and one Communist
division in certain armies, they call them-we call them
army corps-and in others there were to be two Com-
munist divisions and one Nationalist division. That
amalgamation would not have occurred for about a year.
Now, in the first place, this was the normal request
to gel; legal authority other than the President's war
power to set up this nission, which the Navy had already
gotten:; and at the Same time we wanted to have it so
written that we could bring in these additional men
which we needed for about 60 days or something like
that to get this Communist group in a form that we
could bring them i:1 and amalgamate them with the
others.
The whole thing, ;he whole procedure, was in accord-
ance with this agreed program between the Nationalist
Government and the Communist regime as to the exact
procedure to be follcwed in reducing the troops.
Senator Cain. Wel., I think it is just a statement of fact
that all of us have learned a very great deal in :recent
years with reference to the general subject and objectives
of Communism.
Secretary Marshal'.. I think you have to have in mind
that we had the Soviets as our allies during the war,
and we have now a question of something-whether it was
a. civil war or wh ether it was something more far
reaching.
Senator Cain. Thi ; bill, which did not become law, and
which was supporter strongly by our Government, simply
meant; that in 1946 there was no deep-seated recognition
on our part that you simply cannot mix Communists
and free leadership. We thought it was possible.
Is it fair to ask y)u, sir, that if this proposition were
presently before us, or before us immediately before the
Korean conflict than, there would have been any desire
on our part to encou cage an amalgamation of Nationalist
and Chinese Communist armies in China?
Secretary Marshal. No, sir. We reached a point where
--well, you couldn't mediate; that is the reason I left.
And later on we did i,way with our executive headquarters
there for the conduct of cease-fire procedure and abari-
cloned any effort akng that line.
Senator Cain. I a:.k that question not as any point of
criticism but to show how rapidly this world is moving.
Senator Russell. Did you complete your statement,
General?
Secretary Marshal !,. I think I will drop it. Yes.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, have we reason to
believe that the all.ed mission in Korea is a different
mission today than it was for several months after war
began last June?
Secretary Marshall. I am sorry, I can't answer that
offhand. I should be able to, but I can't.
Senator Cain. Permit me to help if I may.
You testified the other day-I have the words down
somewhere-that ou ? mission in Korea when we under-
took it-
Secretary Marshall. I recall that.
Senator Cain. -wc,s to make of Korea, I use the phrase,
free, united and self -controlled. I think you used inde-
pendent,- unified an([ democratic.
Secretary Marshal. Yes.
Senator Cain. Has that original mission been changed?
Secretary Marshall. That is what I am sorry I can't
give you the answer to.
Senator Cain. Do you think, sir-I offer this without
criticism but I want to get the facts-that the following
comment from the President of the United States on
President said with reference to General MacArthur:
"His mission has been to repel aggression and to restore
international peace and security in the area as called
for by the United Nations."
In your opinion is that a correct statement of fact?
Secretary Marshall. I think it is, sir.
Senator Cain. Thank you. Do you think this comment
from Ambassador Austin, offered to the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations, on Oct. 6, 1950 is a correct
statement of fact?-"In rune and July of this year the
Security Council gave all the necessary military authority
to the United Nations commander to repel the aggressor
army and restore peace in. Korea." -
Secretary Marshall. I think he is referring to move-
ments north of the 38th parallel, and I do not think he
is referring to air bombirng.
Senator Cain. No, sir. He is referring, as I understand
it, to General MacArthur having possessed sufficient
authority to win the first war against the North Koreans,
which. was concluded as of the time the Chinese Reds
entered a new conflict. My own impression is that that
is a correct statement as of the time he gave it in October
of 1950.
Secretary Marshall. I should think so.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, does the United Na-
tions commander presently possess "all the necessary
military authority to repel the aggressor army and re-
store peace in Korea"?
Secretary Marshall. Except as to air action. [Deleted]
Senator Cain. It would include a sufficient number
of troops within that authority to carry out his mission
to repel the aggressor, sir?
Secretary Marshall. The authority- is not a question of
the number of troops. The shipment of troops to him
doesn't change the policy.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, if the United Nations
commander does not now possess the necessary military
power to carry out his stated mission to repel the enemy
in Korea, must we not then logically conclude that the
Korean mission has ' beer. changed? That is to say we
are no longer presently attempting to force the aggres-
sor out of Korea; we have changed our posture. In other
words, we are now resisting, where for a long time we
were determined to repel attack.
Secretary Marshall. For a long time our purpose was
to halt the aggression and to destroy the cause of the
action, which was the North Korean Army.
Senator Cain. Right, si:r.
Secretary Marshall. At the present time the method
of destroying the cause of it has changed.
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.
Senator Saltonstall. Senator Cain, would it be possi-
ble to have read General Marshall's answer to your pre-
vious question on that subject?
Senator Cain. Certainly, sir.
(Whereupon the record was read by the reporter.)
Senator Cain. General Marshall, I hope you will re-
flect on the following paragraph which the President
used in a speech before the General Assembly on Octo-
ber 24. The -title of his speech was "A New Page in
History." In it the President stated these things as being
true:--and to me this is the crux of the whole dilemma
which surrounds the free world :right now.
,In uniting to crush the aggression in Korea, these
member nations have done no more than the Charter
called for. But the important thing is that they have
done it, and they have done it successfully.
"They have given dramatic evidence that the Char-
ter works. They have proved that the Charter is a
living instrument backed by the material and moral
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 strength of member )!idiltgo raQ1 Rese 2004/01/16
In your opinion, why did the President-make no
reference to him as a person, that is not intended-
say these things last October when they are so totally
contrary to the facts of today? And I draw particularly
your attention to these two comments:
"United to crush the aggressor," and that "contribu-
tions both moral and material are being provided by all
the free.members of the United Nations," and those
comments were made last October.
Secretary Marshall. Will you read the first part of
your question? I don't mean the present statement.
Senator Cain. In your opinion why did the President
say these things last October with such conviction when
these things are so totally contrary to the facts of today?
Secretary Marshall. They were evidenced by the facts
of the period of which he was talking about, and in
the language of the messages from General MacArthur,
an entirely new situation had developed, in one way
which had developed and in another way which had not.
It was another effort to do the same thing, first by
the North Koreans that failed, now by the Chinese Com-
munist forces.
Senator Cain. Well, there was a great hope and a
great inspiration in what our Chief Executive said last
October. How very, very far we have slid backwards
on the basis of the facts from what we thought was
possible to be true just a few short months ago.
General Marshall, in thinking about Korea and about
possible and likely future acts of aggression, I ask you,
if you will, to comment briefly on the following quota-
tion from the same speech in which the President said:
_"To maintain the peace, the United Nations must
be able to learn the facts about any threat of
aggression. It must be able to call quickly upon the
member nations to act if the threat becomes serious.
Above all, the peace-loving nations must have the
military strength available, when called upon, to
act decisively to put down aggression."
Have you any solid reasons to offer, on or off the
record-I care not which-why the many members of
the United Nations failed so completely in 10 months
of war, and against that beautiful declaration of the
President four months after the war began, to satisfy
the requirements of the war in Korea?
[Deleted]
Senator Cain. Mr. Secretary, I wrote this question,
and therefore, I will read it as I wrote it, but I think
now, against what you have just said, part of it is not
necessary.
It seems clear to me that either the United Nations
or the United States can be charged with a serious
lack of leadership in the last 10 months. After 10 months
of war, 14 out of 55 free nations have contributed any
forces to Korea.
I spent, sir, all of last August and July in Europe, last
summer; I wanted to get an answer as to why people
weren't contributing more to a war which belonged to
them as well as to my country.
There was no evidence during that period of any kind
--and I went to every official source in every country in
Europe-that our American Government was encourag-
ing the governments of our allies to participate in the
Korean war.
There was likewise little evidence that these govern-
ments were even thinking about the question.
You are about as well qualified as anyone I can think
of to reflect on the question of why we have done, col-
lectively, so little in 10 months, to crush an enemy who
is determined to crush and destroy our forces.
[Deleted]
CMei DW_5WWA49R00M0QQ9041dAd not give you
any answer that you couldn't get out of the information
you generally have, in the press from these various
countries, as to their feelings, their all agreeing to the
principles of collective action, and afraid, here and there,
of this consequence or that consequence; and also of
their political, we will say, inability to meet the issue.
I imagine that is a very great factor in various coun-
tries.
Senator Cain. It is, sir.
Secretary Marshall. We had some tragic examples of
that, particularly when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of
State; and we had the birth of the First World War,
and the political repercussions; general public support
or influence discredited, practically, what he was pro-
posing, and that applied to some of the greatest countries
in the world at that time.
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.
Against what you have just said concerning political
uncertainties throughout the world, and particularly
among some of our allies, and about fear in general, let
me ask this question-purely personal:
I see no reason, Mr. Secretary, why we should fail to
face up to mistakes, and refuse to recognize mistakes
when they are made. It seems to me that it is reasonable
to believe and admit, publicly, so that we can get on a
more positive course of action, that the United Nations
had absolutely no understanding of what it was under-
taking when it resolved to crush the Korean aggressor
last June.
Against everything you have said, there couldn't have
been any evaluation of what was likely to happen, or
else the United Nations simply weren't prepared to
undertake it.
We have undertaken something that, up to date, is
beyond our capacity to master, or so it seems to me.
Secretary Marshall. Well, I get the implication from
the form of the question that unless we could see the
way clear to the end, at the, very start, we should do
nothing.
I cannot agree with that.
Also, I think everyone must recognize that when you
once start a military action, it sets up a chain of reac-
tions, and it is pretty difficult to tell exactly where that
is going to end.
We have had a great many examples of that in history.
Senator Cain. That is why I asked that question some
few minutes ago: What are the hazards present today
that were not recognized last June; because to me, the
trap we found ourselves in was an obvious possibility
from the very moment on the 25th of June that our
Government committed American forces to that area
of conflict.
Secretary Marshall. As I have said before, I was not
an actor in the Government at that time, but I should
say you Were faced with a situation where you just
established before the world that you would not protect
any country which has set up a really and truly demo-
cratic country, under our assistance and attendance-at
the accouchment, and let all the world see, and the
smaller nations in particular, that they would sink with-
out any support from us.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, it is my own view
that the choice of decision lies much more fully with our
enemies today than it lies with us. .
Secretary Marshall. That is very much the case.
Senator Cain. As a military man of great experience,
you have testified that we should not authentically tell
the enemy anything. I enjoyed your use of the word
"authentically." I remembered it sufficiently well to
write it down.
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 May I: ask you, si App r e9iJe0v2~JPe : CI - ch5-00 n 9R0 0Q`0009 0014 them by.
any part of the President's speech of April 11 in which he
advised the enemy that the free forces have no intention
of bombing Manchuria or China or permitting the
Chinese Nationalist troops to be engaged against their
countrymen, who are our enemies?
Secretary Marshall. I don't recall, sir. We generally
are called upon to send somebody from the Defense
Department to the White House to see-to participate
in, at least, the revisicn or the drafting of any speech.
Senator Cain. As a military man of great experience,
do you approve of the declarations of intention which
the Chief Executive s sated to the enemy of April 11 in
which he advised the enemy of what we were not going
to do in the future?
Secretary Marshall. That is a question of judgment as
to what: result they were attempting to get at in con-
nection with that matter. That is a considered state-
ment, and not an accidental disclosure, and just exactly
what was the purpo: a of that, I have not discussed
with the President, sc I cannot answer it.
Senator Cain. Your answer is interesting to me, be-
cause you are the chicf military adviser to the President
of the United States, and that the President, now or in
the future, should decide to advise the enemy of adopting
a military course of action without consultation with
his Secretary of Defense is completely beyond ray com-
prehension, sir.
Secretary Marshall. I stated that we had a repre-
sentative, I assume, it the White House at the time
that speech was drafted, to bring-
Senator Cain. You so stated, sir, but you did not
state that whoever your representative was tool: up the
question of the advisability of such a declaration being
made to our enemy.
Secretary Marshall. Well, .he came back undoubtedly
from the White House to consider with our people in the
Defense Department; I don't recall the specific issue be-
ing brought to me pen;onally.
Senator Cain. Thank you.
General Marshall, the United Nations has repeatedly
stated its determination to put out any fire of aggression
which is started by any aggressor anywhere.
As the Secretary of Defense, as a military man, do you
approve of offering this sort of advice to our potential
enemies?
Secretary Marshall. I would rather not comment on
that, sir.
Senator Cain. All right sir..
:I think it is important because we have set up a de.-
termination in terms of words which, in terms of fire
power, we have not been able to accomplish in the first
test of our determination.
It seems to me, sir, that this type of declaration has
added substantially to the enemy's power of decision.
Do you not think ;hat these declarations' permit an
enemy to choose his own time and place for an aggres-
sion? :i think you can answer that one, if you will, sir.
Secretary Marshall. Well, I would say that they don't
restrict his choice of the time and place. He is aware of
most of those, in the first place, and he is now being
told in this particular instance that we will resist in any
region. How we'll resist is another matter, of course.
For example, we have the Communist effort to domi-
nate Indo-China. Ncw, how do we participate there?
The French are carr:iing out the main resistance; we
are providing material; we are providing planes and
transportation to that extent, and we have other pro-
visions that I cannot mention.
Senator Cain. Gen aral Marshall, these are two brief
questions. Perhaps you will think they are repetitious,
Do you not believe as a military strategist that it is
unwise to, for the free nations, say that they are .going to
stop aggression unless they are prepared to do so?
Secretary Marshall. You, are now, I think, Senator,
getting involved in or involving me, rather, in a debate
as to-
Senator Cain. I have no intention of doing that sir.
Secretary Marshall. I mean involving me in a debate
as to the wisdom of certain procedures and declarations,
and to their possible effects. It may be a very deliberate
intention to create a certain impression, and I would
have to sit down and analyze each one with some care.
Senator Cain. Now, I would prefer to ask that ques-
tion when the Secretary of State comes here.
Secretary Marshall. These all amount to a phase of
psychological warfare. Maybe it is not a wise phase;
maybe you don't agree with that, but I could not offhand
reply.
Senator Cain. Well, we Americans of both parties at
this table are trying, with the help of so many dis-
tinguished and qualified witnesses, to determine what
is the Wise course of action to pursue in the future.
From my limited background and knowledge, brain
power, I think the free nations are on very unsound
grounds in some of the declarations they have made,
because they have not, in practice, been able to live up
to their declarations.
You testified, General Marshall, the other day, that
yc,u only know of our atom-bomb st:rength through what
you read in the press.
Secretary Marshall. No, I don't think I said that, sir.
Senator Cain. I understood you to say that.
Secretary Marshall. That certainly would not be the
case. Now, what is the question, sir?
Senator Cain. I merely said that you testified that
you know only of our atom-bomb strength through
what you read in the press.
I was merely going to ask you to whom should this
Committee turn for the fullest possible information we
are entitled to have?
Secretary Marshall. I think there must be some mis-
understanding of the statement. I don't recall that-
Senator Cain. I would withdraw the question easily.
General Marshall, as we move as rapidly as we can
to, a conclusion, how would you characterize the conflict
in Korea? Is it, in your opinion, a police action or a
war, and if it is a war, would you define it to be a large
or a small war?
Secretary Marshall. I would characterize it as a
limited war which I hope will remain limited.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, I read daily in the
press that our forces can practically calculate to the
individual how many casualties they inflict on the
enemy.
In a couple of newspapers in front of me, there are
51 chances out of 52, that I could open it up and see
where on yesterday some authoritative source in the
Oar East said that we killed 5,000 or 4,083. They are
very specific.
No reference has been made, however, in recent weeks
to my knowledge, to American or allied casualties.
Would you tell us, as a military :man, how we can be
sp? accurate with reference to the enemy, while taking
so much time to evaluate our own losses? I believe, sir,
that my nation would be more anxious about the Korean
war, and treat it much more realistically if our casualties,
rather than those of the enemy, were in the headlines of
every American paper every day.
Secretary Marshall. As to the delay, Senator, the first
factor is we wait until the next of kin have been notified.
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 Senator Cain. NotifAp.proved For Release 2004/01116
Secretary Marshall. As to the-I think there are
pretty regular announcements of casualties.
Senator Cain. Well, I personally have not seen them
in the daily press recently.
Secretary Marshall. There are weekly announcements
in detail.
As to accuracy, I will say this: While the snow was
on the ground it was a comparatively easy matter to
check. The aviator or an artilleryman or even the in-
fantryman gave his estimates of what he had done, and
then they went over the ground, if they didn't actually
take it over by conquest, with these small planes, and
actually counted the casualties.
For example, I know-I am just thinking of various
instances when I was concerned with the same problem,
in my mind as to the accuracy of the statement where,
in one case, there was a battalion, or there was an action
and it was fought, and it was thought that it was taken
against some 3,000-odd of the enemy, and they felt they
had inflicted 1,100 casualties.
When they took over the ground they found 2,800
casualties.
They had another case- that I can recall now at. the
moment of where in another battalion we had seven
killed and 22 wounded, and when they took over and
counted, they had 300 enemy casualties.
They had another case where the Navy bombarded
Wonsan, a port on the east coast of China, and later on
they landed a group the way they do from time to time,
and they counted either 3,800 or 4,800 dead as a result of
their catching these fellows in buildings. It was a con-
centration point.
Now, there we had exact figures, and there we had a
confirmation of the previous estimates, and in most
cases, the estimates were below what actually was dis-
covered.
Now, here very recently in the last few days we had a
highly exaggerated estimate by pilots as to the number
of planes destroyed in one bombardment at Sinuiju. I
think they said 35 planes; actually, the report finally
came back to us from the photographs and others that
one plane was destroyed and one damaged.
Well now, there is the check-all the point I am trying
to make is-
Senator Cain. Yes, sir.
Secretary Marshall. There is the check; and I think
that the casualties inflicted have been far-have been
considerably under the estimates for the reason that we
don't pick up the wounded. We don't get that part.
They are all drawn off, as a rule, so under the old
schedules of probabilities, which is not the case now-I
don't know what the probability scale is now-it was
four wounded to one killed.
Well, of course, if that were true, it would be a tre-
mendous casualty list. I don't think that holds any
more. I think it is probably almost one to one or two
to one.
Senator Cain. I raise the question partly because it
seems to me we place an undue emphasis for public
consumption on how many we are killing of the enemy,
when I individually as an American, am much more
concerned with how many Americans are being killed
by the enemy.
Secretary Marshall. Well, there is a release that comes
out every week. There is no holding back on that.
Senator Cain. I did not so mean to imply.
Secretary Marshall. I have been Very much interested
as an important question with respect to the compara-
tive rate of casualties from January, February, March
and April, as compared with the previous period of six
.r1M4R0p-n10j df4e6 involvement as
part of that period, although they had the heaviest
proportions of losses incurred in those early days at
the end of June.
Senator Cain. Have our casualties, General Marshall,
before the recent counteroffensive-
Senator Russell. General, did you finish that state-
ment about casualties?
Secretary Marshall. I have something else. The rate
of casualties per 100 men per week in the last two months
is one quarter the rate during the period of June-August,
and one half the casualties of November and December.
Senator Cain. What is the date from which you are
reading, sir?
Secretary Marshall. Through May 4. This is a per-
centage rate which doesn't appeal to me much because
it is a little difficult to understand.
I was trying to get a clear statement because it is not
only of profound interest as to casualties, but it is of
equally profound interest as to the extent to which we
can conduct this operation against the Chinese without
too serious an attrition on our own part.
Now the casualties per week per 100 starting back in
June, June 25-August 25 were one and two tenths per
cent. In other words, the casualties of 100 men per
week at that rate were one and two tenths per cent, and
that of course includes large numbers in those days who
were absent, unaccounted for, prisoners presumably.
From the 25th of August to the 23d of September, the,
casualties per 100 per week were one and four tenths
per cent. September to October, one month, nine tenths
of a,per cent; October through November 17, three tenths
of a per cent per 100 per week.
Now the 17th of November through the 15th of Decem-
ber there were six tenths of one per cent. You see, it is
considerably lower than it was in June and August, but
it is going up in connection with those heavy operations
of that period.
From the 15th of December through the 12th of Janu-
ary there was seven tenths of a per cent out of 100
men per week. The 25th of January to the 9th of Febru-
ary, two tenths of one per cent. That happened to be
that very critical period, but it was critical in the sense
that we had gotten into a position and they had not
caught up with that position.
Senator Cain. Those are all battle casualties, sir?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir, these are battle casualties.
Senator Cain. You are not referring to theater ill-
nesses and things of that character?
Secretary Marshall. No. From the 9th of February
through the 9th of March, five tenths of a per cent for
every 100 men. From the 9th of March through the 6th
of April, three tenths of one per cent, and the 6th of
April through May 4, three tenths of one per cent, so
we have had an average really from January through
April of about three tenths of a per cent per 100 per week.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, do you consider a
casualty to be any individual who is killed or wounded
or sick or hurt or lost in the combat area?
Secretary Marshall. That is this in terms of killed or
wounded or missing, of course. Now what I had them
go back and check carefully was whether the eliminations
by serious frostbite were involved there, and they have
yet to tell me, but they thought they were not in these
figures.
Senator Cain. That was the question that we had in
mind.
Secretary Marshall. When it, comes to the sick out of
the campaign, I think they have always exceeded the
casualty rate, but in most instances those men -go back
because it is a temporary situation, except that during
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 the winter cam Cro EPF eldi%e /1 ': CIAPR P7 - 141 ?5OO8W 14-6
reason of frostbite, ozen feet in particular and those
You will
robabl
a
ree
I thi
k
that were casualties by reason of pneumonia, they did
not go back because that would render them continuous-
ly susceptible to a ret irn of the previous difficulty.
Senator Cain. Well, when you get an answer to your
question as to whether or not the frostbite and other
sickness cases are included-
Secretary Marshall. I know the other sickness cases
are not. I heard it was a possibility that maybe the
frostbite was in this.
Senator Cain. If it would not be inconvenient, I would
appreciate your advice on this thing.
Just a few more que:,tions, sir. The Senator from Cali-
fornia has asked me to ask a question which I think is
pertinent. Do these figures refer to the combat area or
to the communication:; zone as well?
Secretary Marshall. This is the combat area.
Senator Cain. That would be restricted to Korea, itself?
Secretary Marshall. Korea itself, and I have not given
you comparative casualties. I know at one stage when
I was checking up on the casualties of a month here
rather recently, there were 99 per cent Army and one
per cent combined Navy and Air.
Senator Russell. Where do you place the Marine Corps?
Secretary Marshall. Army and Marine Corps--ground
troops.
Senator Cain. I have never been in Korea, sir. You
have testified that we should give no consideration to
withdrawing from Korea because in part it would expose
the Koreans to assassination and destruction.
i share that view of yours that we shouldn't get.out
unless we have to. Fowever, if we long continue our
present policy of what appears to me to be containment
in Korea, will the free forces through the use of their
air, naval, and artiller:r power not largely destroy all of
North Korea and the civilians who live in that, tragic
piece of real estate?
Secretary Marshall. I lost the question part of it at
the end.
Senator Cain. If we stay where we are in Korea without
forcing a decision by military arms, is it not likely or
is it not logical to assime that a few more months of
this procedure will destroy the future usefulness of all
of North Korea?
Secretary Marshall. Well, of course, that is a factor
In this matter, particularly at we have had to be ruth-
less in destroying but. dings which shelter the enemy
and conceal them from our view.
As to the hydroelectr'c plants and installations of that
character, we have kept, we haven't bombed them out
in most instances beta use their relation to it was not
immediately so direct as to demand that destruction,
and they always remained a possibility in negotiations,
but here, recently, whe.i they blew out the gates of the
reservoir, that affects ;hat very directly; but that was
unavoidable, that had to be done.
Senator Cain. As just a citizen, I am concerned about
civilians everywhere. Military necessity has required us
to do things in this Korean war that we have never had
to do before, at least, so far as I know, in protecting
the integrity of our own troops.
As I understand it, wo have had to pursue a scorched-
earth policy in front o:' our operations just to give our
own people a chance to live.
Secretary Marshall. That is correct.
Senator Cain. You have been known to me nearly all
my :life, General Marsheil, as a man of the highest moral
character. You will agree that we started out lass, June,
in concert with our friends in the United Nations, to
crush the enemy and to: restore Korea to a united, inde-
p
y
g
--
n
you have already so
stated--that the free forces have waged war for months
against the North Koreans and the Red Chinese.
Please just satisfy my deep-seated curiosity and tell
me what modern-day factors require a formal declara-
tion of war against our enemies. That is an important
question, General Marshall.
Secretary Marshall. Not only a moral question, but it
certainly bears a very direct relation to our democratic
processes.
Senator Cain. Right.
Secretary Marshall. Reference has been made here to
the constitutional right of the Congress.
Senator Cain. I made those references, sir.
Secretary Marshall. Thai; is the law, and it is incon-
ceivable that we could have a surprise attack and gain
the advantages of such a sudden procedure. With the
debate :in Congress that can't be done. So under our
constitutional setup that cannot be done.
Now my own reaction to it is that there is an immense
advantage on the part of the nation that can move into
the conflict in a moment without any formal declaration,
and I think there is a much greater disadvantage in the
long term as a result of having done so. So that we have
to face the tremendous disadvantage of being put under
attack in a moment-we don't knew where. And the
world knows that we can not do that ourselves. We
cannot and we would not.
Now, as I say, I have sat in a seat where I feel probably
more vulnerable to the disadvantage than most people
would, because you just can't tell where the event is
going to break out. And yet I do feel that our_ great
strength before the world lies in the fact that we would
not do such a thing as that,
In a sense it's rather an academic discussion because
our Constitution forbids it, and we are certainly not going
to change the Constitution to a more violent form of
action. It goes contrary to all of our feelings.
But I would say this: When you are considering that
there are a great many other considerations that should
come into play, and the principal one is that it should
be apparent before the world that if they do seize this
advantage, they are going to pay a terrible price abso-
lutely and certainly. And that means a state of pre-
paredness in some way that we can maintain without
its destructive effect on our economy and without its
unfortunate effect on our young men.
Senator Cain. Is this a fair question, the answer to
which in. my opinion could be completely off the record
if that is your wish? - It seems to me if we were not
associated with others-and I am among those who
think we ought to be associated with others-that it
would be inconceivable to believe that the United States
of America would be at war for 10 months against ruth-
less enemies without the Congress recognizing that state
-of war officially and declaring war upon our enemy.
Am I right or wrong in my anxiety over this question
of morality, General?
Secretary Marshall. Well, there you are getting a little
beyond the question of morality. You are getting around
very directly, not beyond but you are getting around, it
seems to me, very directly to the question of the compli-
cations of collective action. I might say that the reac-
tions to these troublesome problems that grow out of
collective action are much more emphatic among those
who are trying to direct the military effort. But we have
to come before the public,, and we have to in a very
careful manner, and we 'have to restrain ourselves in
our dealings with our allies if we hope to be able to
pursue on the basis of collective action.
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 Senator Cain. GeneA{bpacrv lF7R I 2 O4AO1/16 :cC -Q f 0149.~00050009gfl,1A-
a relation to what you have just stated. T e quo a ion: We are in a a e er position in
ith
d Chi
R
Perhaps we have reached a state in the development
of the world where official war is a thing of the past.
Perhaps the best we can look .forward to is an age of
aggression which will never formally be recognized as
being war and which will generally reach no positive
decisions. Do you share any of my apprehension on this
subject?
Secretary Marshall. I don't quite believe that, sir. Cer-
tainly some very peculiar things have gone on in these
years-notably the state of, what amounted to an actual
war in China with the Japanese for a long period of
time, which we did not recognize as a war. Of course,
there were certain reasons for that, legal and others, in
connection with what we might do to help in the situa-
tion, but it led to that precedent with regard to the
matter you have just questioned me on.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, if we are to carry
out our stated mission, which is to make Korea free,
but remain satisfied with a war which may reach no
final decision for years, will we not injure our ability to
wage a larger war if it comes, and will we not indicate
or run a risk of indicating to the free citizens of the
world that their governments-there being a distinction
I make between a citizen and his government-will we
not indicate to the free citizens of the world that their
free governments are unable to collectively get together
to crush aggression, Korea being the first example?
Secretary Marshall. I believe you used the plural in
there when you said "years"?
Senator Cain. Yes, sir.
Secretary Marshall. Well, I would say that if the
Korean situation prolonged itself into years, then we
are in a very difficult, very dangerous situation.
Senator Cain. I used the word plurally because there
has been no evidence yet submitted by anyone that gives
any indication of when it is to be concluded.
Secretary Marshall. I think I referred to examples of
that before, which came before committees of Congress,
as to our policy in Greece and as to our policy in the
Berlin blockade and other policies.
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir.
Will you state what reasons you may have as to how
we might reach a reasonable and lasting settlement of
the Korean war without convincing the Chinese Reds
that they will be decisively defeated on the field of battle?
Secretary Marshall. I will say this-that our attitude
in the matter in December was one thing, we were in
a very weak position; and our attitude now is 'quite
another.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, General MacArthur
testified and did so at some length in front of a map,
that if Formosa is occupied by an enemy, that the first
line of defense for the United States would logically move
back to the West Coast of America. May I ask to what
extent do you agree with this military estimate of that
situation?
Secretary Marshall. I think that is an overemphasis-
when you put it that way-as to the result; but I think
it would be a highly dangerous business for the United
States to have Formosa pass into unfriendly hands.
Senator Cain. Thank you, sir. Two more questions.
A very great deal has been said on what General
MacArthur did and did not recommend either to the
JCS or to the public. Will you state if there is any truth
whatsoever in the following comment which was recently
offered about General MacArthur by a prominent person?
I ask this question directly and pointedly because, to
the extent we can, we seek to have fair play for every
person who appears as a witness before this Committee-
na w
e
Korea to meet the added force of
the allied powers who are with us there than we
would be in if we had to continue with what we are
doing in Korea and at the same time commit the
monumental folly which MacArthur said is neces-
sary of sending an independent additional armed
force from this country to the mainland of China."
I think you have testified that General MacArthur
never violated a military order, and I ask you if you have
ever known him to suggest or recommend committing an
American ground force to the mainland of China.
Secretary Marshall. I recall no recommendations of
that character of his.
Senator Cain. General Marshall, I wish only to express
my real appreciation for this opportunity to ask you
a number of questions which are and have been of very
great concern to me.
Senator Russell. General, I have one or two questions
I wanted to ask while Senator Lodge is returning. I have
been sitting here listening to this testimony, and I am
one member of the Committee that has heard practically
every word that has been testified.
As I understand it, North Korea borders both on Man-
churia and on Soviet Russia.
Secretary Marshall. That is correct.
Senator Russell. It has been stated that this Rashin
was an important distribution center for supplies that
come in from Soviet Russia. How could we completely
interdict the supplies that are coming from unfriendly
sources to our enemies in North Korea by merely bomb-
ing in Manchuria? Would it not be -necessary also to
bomb communications and bases in that portion of Soviet
Russia which adjoins Korea to absolutely interdict those
supplies?
Secretary Marshall. Are you talking specifically in re-
gard to Rashin or the whole proposition?
Senator Russell. I am talking about the whole
proposition-of the fact that Korea adjoins both Man-
churia and Soviet Russia. If we bomb the bases in Man-
churia, would that, even if it were completely success-
ful-
Secretary Marshall. The source of supply that comes
from Russia is in their industrial area, which is far back
from the Manchurian frontier.
Senator Russell. How do they bring it into Korea?
Do they have to come in through Soviet Russia?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir; it comes in from Soviet
Russia, goes into Manchuria, and comes down on the
Eastern Manchurian Railroad.
What I am trying to explain, Senator, is that the source
of supply comes from far back in the Soviet Union where
it has its industrial setup.
Now the bombing that has been referred to here. I
believe, relates to destroying the supply accumulations
that you have, depots, after it is brought down near
.the frontier-notably Mukden, and I presume other
points to the southeast of Mukden towards Antung.
Quite certainly they would have dispersed their supply
depots against the possibility of air attack.
Also, I presume that they have depots that are north
of Mukden-Chanchung, for example. To what degree
they would have established and organized supply depots,
I don't know; but the bombing generally, I believe, that
has been referred to `here pertains largely, to between
Mukden and the Yalu frontier, and,to Rashin. That is
inside Korea, but very close to the frontier.
Senator Russell. What prompted the question was
your statement here the other day that if they bombed
Rashin, and incidentally I believe it has been bombed on
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 one occasion, tha ~rk e~r~g tie
a, short distance a o acroshe ~on~ie -an
d if M theme`s' ClA4kbFq5Uhere ft44SR Q@@OO 1 # se of that war when was a Y general troop advance or defense. You
moved those bases ac:;oss the frontier, would they be on could take a casualty rate in the Battle of the Bulge,
Soviet territory, or M inchurian? for example, and get a very definite rate, and there I
Secretary Marshall. In that case they would be in think the rate of casualties was much heavier. -
Soviet territory. At the present time the casualty rate is, considering
Senator Russell. Would be within Soviet Territory? combat, very low. In the latter part of June and in July
Secretary Marshall. However, I would like to add, Sen- and in August it was high, particularly in terms of miss-
ator, that I was speaking from recollection and the ing. I don't know how I Gould answer that, Senator. I
Chiefs of Staff can answer that with precision, because will have to look at the records and see if we can just
they were the ones concerned over the matter and made take one piece that is comparable to the Korean action.
the final recommendation, and they can give you the Senator Lodge. Yes. Would you have any idea of the
distances and facts and railroad connections which are ratio of American casualties to enemy casualties in this
related to the bombing, for instance, and destroying of Korean war as compared with the war against the Ger-
Rashin; but as to the renewal of the same service across mans?
the boundary in Eastern Siberia- Secretary Marshall. I will have to get that information
Senator Russell. Wall, is it possible to bring supplies for you, sir.
from Eastern Siberia directly into Korea? Senator Lodge. I have been asked to ask you this ques-
Secretary Marshall. It is, by way of Rashin. tion. Why do we still reject the use in Korea of 33,000
Senator Russell. Do the Soviets have any supply troops offered by the Chinese Nationalists? Do we still?
depots in Eastern Siberia? Why do we still reject the use in Korea of 33,000 troops
Secretary Marshall. Well, I presume they have-with offered by the Chinese Nationalists?
relation to Vladivostok, and their troops on that portion Secretary Marshall. I think I have answered that be-
of the frontier. fore, but I will do it again. In, the first place, the 33,000
Senator Russell. Woll, if supplies were moved from number has rather gone out of the picture because that
Vladivostok to the Koran border, do you know how they was the first proposal of the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-
would be handled? Would they be brought over Soviet shek, and to which there was an unfavorable reaction
territory, or would they go through North Korea-- both from General MacArthur and from the Chiefs of
Secretary Marshall. That portion of the Korean bor- Staff reaction and the global effects.
der, they would be bro fight from Soviet territory. Then later in November to 60,000, that General Mac-
Senator Russell. The point I want to make is: Is it Arthur I think expressed a desire for, and the view of
possible to, even if you destroy the bases in Manchuria, the Chiefs of Staff as to that were, first, that the primary
to complletely shut off all sources of supply beyond the hazard there is the defense of Formosa, and, in the next
North Korean border, without also bombing the terri- place, that the report that they had received which
tory of Soviet Russia? General MacArthur's Fox committee of some 37 men
Secretary Marshall. It would be possible to work con- indicated a state of readiness which didn't seem to be
siclerable damage to tho supplies coming down in by way conducive of successful action by those troops, and more
of the main arteries, dawn through Mukden, and to the in particular from that record it appeared that if they
southeast, and across the Yalu River. were taken out and they were the best equipped and
I would have to turn to the Chiefs of Staff to give you the chosen troops, it would greatly weaken that garrison.
the exact railroad setup, as to leading into Rashin, Senator Lodge. Is that still the position today?
whether it would be a return of stores from the Valdi- Secretary Marshall. But the main consideration of
vostok district, up to the northwest, and then into course was the possible effect on our relations with our
Rashin, or whether it would be supplies coming from the allies and development of an enlarged war.
west, down to Rashin-I cannot answer that accurately, Senator Lodge. Is that sti;'.l the position today?
Senator. Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Russell. I will take that up with the Joint Senator Lodge. Using hindsight, do you think it would
Chiefs of Staff. have been better for all concerned if our military effort
All right, Senator Lodge. had stopped at the waist of Korea in the general neigh-
Senator Lodge. Before I begin, Mr. Chairman, when borhood of the line Pyongyang-Wonsan instead of spread-
I made the suggestion :yesterday evening, I had in mind ing out all along the northern frontier?
that it would shorten the initial round of questions. I Secretary Marshall. Well, in the light of everything
certainly am not criticizing any of the members of the that has happened, yes, but I don't know as that is a
Committee, and I think there has been very good feeling fair statement.
all the way around. in the first place, the movement north of the parallel
I simply wanted to indicate a way to a democratic by the original effort worked out to the destruction,
and orderly procedure that might tend to shorten some- almost complete destruction, of the North Korean Army,
what the proceedings, cr shorten the time necessary. which would seem to be a very important factor in
Now, Mr. Secretary, f there is any question that I establishing the security of the South Korean Republic
ask you, that you would rather I would ask somebody and making possible a general unification of all of Korea.
else, I hope you will tell me; and if there is anything Later an entirely different question was posed as to the
you want off the record, I hope that you will say so. advance of our force when there were indications of
I will begin with a few isolated questions, and then I the possibility of a Communist build-up of Chinese troops,
have one or two points :: would like to develop. and in the light of after events it was, I think, unfortu-
In response to Senator Cain, you stated that the casu- nate.
alty rate had been falling in Korea; and I wondered how There is the factor we determined what they had and,
it compared with the la,t six months, let's say, with the as General MacArthur puts it, we upset their plans and
casualty rate in World VTar. II in Europe. precipitated their action and made it known to us.
Do you have any idea what such a comparison would You have another situation, of course, in Northeast
show? Korea where the Tenth Corps was deployed over a wide
Secretary Marshall. I don't know how we would get area. That deployment, of course, came out of a period
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 when General MacAu41p{rrO eckf r1Reieateel2OO4/Ofi/16
country, to set up a basis for elections and matters of
that character.
. Then you come to the Monday quarterbacking on the
very first moves that would be niade in regrouping the
entire command in the light of what was happening on
the western flank directly south of the river and down
towards the 38th parallel. I don't like to answer the
question because it is awfully easy to tell what is the
right thing the day after.
Senator Lodge. On March 31st the New York Times
published a dispatch stating that the South Korean Gov-
ernment was being forced to release 120,000 men because
it lacked the means to rearm or to feed them, and it
quoted President Singhman Rhee of Korea as saying
that he had told the United Nations that he is prepared
to supply 500,000 men in addition to the 250,000 South
Koreans who are now fighting. He repeatedly asked for
guns to arm at least 100,000 and hasn't been able to get
them. Do you know what the facts are about that?
Secretary Marshall. I have described that in some
detail in relation to the approach to me by the Am-
bassador of the South Korean Government to the United
States, and my request on the Chiefs of Staff to look in
on the matter.
Their' message to General MacArthur and General
MacArthur's reply to them, and later communications,
one within the last week, in connection with what is the
advantageous use of these men, to what extent is it
profitable to arm them, to what extent we can afford
to arm them.
I would rather not get on the record in that matter
at the present time because. General Ridgway's detailed
report of the last 10 days presents a very complicated
picture.
[Deleted]
Senator Lodge. Thank you.
You stated on Monday that the bombing of Chinese
bases might, and I quote, "expose Western Europe to
attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in Middle
and. Eastern Europe."
Would you care to say what is the basis for the belief
in that possibility?
Secretary Marshall. Of, the effect of our bombing
attack or the poised troops in-
Senator Lodge. On the fact that the bombing of these
Chinese bases might result in an attack on Western
Europe.
Secretary Marshall. Because we felt that carrying the
bombing into China would certainly enlarge the struggle,
enlarge the activities and might develop a situation that
would be much more difficult to meet in view of the
possible Soviet intervention in order to protect China.
The implication, of course, in that is that if we could
eliminate the Chinese effort by bombing, that it would
be a very powerful consideration in the end. But the
general feeling has been that in the opinion of the
Chiefs of Staff and myself and the other agencies of
the Government, if we restrain our activities, restrict
our activities to the Korean border and the seas along-
side, that we can possibly carry on to a successful termi-
nation a limited war and more particularly one in which
we hold our allies with us.
If we had no other reaction than the fact that our
allies think that that would provoke a Soviet reaction,
we would have to consider very, very seriously whether
we just disagree with that and go ahead, the more so
when we have to consider their troops on the ground
serving with us and whether they would continue in
such service.
However, the view is not only that of our. allies but
(DIA-R?Ft) 0"49 5?0n604-Vsary risk to the
situation in Korea.
Senator Lodge. Is that the principal ground, would
you say, on which our allies oppose the policy of delivery
of an ultimatum against the Chinese Communists, to
be followed by bombing?
Secretary Marshall. Will you repeat it, please?
Senator Lodge. Do you consider that the principal
reason that actuates the allies in opposing General Mac-
Arthur's policy of an ultimatum' against the Chinese
Communists, to be followed by bombing, that fear that
it will spread the war and result in Western Europe
being invaded?
Secretary Marshall. My hesitation is in relation to
whether it is only Western Europe, but I will say it is
the fear of the invasion of Western Europe.
Senator Lodge. Because they know there was a time,
was there not, when there was a fear that the strength
of the West might get sucked into the Orient to an
undue degree, but it is definitely established now, is it
not, that we will not permit the major part of our forces
to be engulfed in the Orient; isn't that true?
Secretary Marshall: That is our hope.
Senator Lodge. Certainly, it is true, is it not, that our
allies, generally speaking, have as great an interest as
we have in success in Korea?
Secretary Marshall. I would say certainly that and
maybe more, because many of them are very close to
the. principal enemy, or opponent.
Senator Lodge. And our allies have, have they not,
just as great an interest as we have in establishing the
authority of the United Nations?
Secretary Marshall. I would say that is a fact.
Senator Lodge. And I believe it is true, is it not, that
when the aggression in Korea occurred last summer, the
allies applauded our decision to resist aggression in
Korea very enthusiastically?
Secretary Marshall. I think it had a tremendous effect
all over Europe.
Senator Lodge. And, in fact, it restored the confidence
in Europe in the possibility of avoiding a war, didn't it?
So it certainly seems reasonable to expect, does it not,
that. a really skillful and persuasive American diplomacy
should, be able to hold our allies together as regards a
sound policy in Asia?
Secretary Marshall. That would be my assumption.
Senator Lodge. Must we not do three things simulta-
neously-we have to keep faith with our own troops,
carry out the anti-aggression policy, and retain our
allies-do all three?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Lodge. Now, Senator Cain spoke of the con-
tributions that the members of the United Nations were
making to the fighting* in Korea, which struck a re-
sponsive chord with me, because when Senator Spark-
man and I were at the United Nations, it became very evi-
dent that the contributions of some nations were going to
be disappointing, and I issued a statement in Septem-
ber, I think, saying that there wasn't anything that could
shake American confidence in the United Nations more
than a failure on the part of the members to put up
man power in proportion to population.
With that as a background, let me ask you: Is it not
true that some nations have military commitments in
addition to their commitments, toward Korea, so that
they are not completely free to do whatever they might
like to do with regard to Korea? Isn't that true?
Secretary Marshall. That is true.
[Deleted]
Senator Lodge. Is it not true that the contribution
of other nations to the fighting in Korea is steadily in-
95
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 creasing, albeit rat rC~?For Release 2004/01/16
Secretary Marsh~a]ir. I think 1t is increasing. I think
we have good prospect.,, for further increases.
[Deleted]
Senator Lodge. Yes, Would you say that the fight-
ing in Indo-China had a fairly direct strategic relation-
ship to the fighting in Korea?
Secretary Marshall. I think it has a very direct re-
lationship, and I thin]: the operations in Korea in the
destruction that has been effected on the Chinese Com-
munists' supposedly p,cked troops has quite probably
restrained action by Cie Communist Chinese forces on
the Indo-China frontier.
Senator Lodge. Would you not say that it was vital
for the allies, at least not to hamper the operations of
troops by sending wa:.- materials to the enemy, even
though some of them are not sending troops themselves?
Secretary Marshall. I quite agree with that, sir.
Senator Lodge. It is true, is it not, that in some cases
we are obtaining valuable articles in exchange for the
shipment of war materials? Do you not understand
that to be the case?
Secretary Marshall. L understand that to be the case.
However, when you speak of war material, I don't think
there should be any question about their not permitting
any actual material. I think it is in the raw materials
that we get into troublE, and some materials of a special
kind. I think the time has not only come, but arrived
some time back, for the allies to enforce absolutely a
strict embargo.
Senator Lodge. Upon all finished goods that have a
military ,potential?
Secretary Marshall. Finished goods that are directly
military, and raw matE rials and materials of that kind
that can have an effect on the fighting of the army, and
there, of course, you come to the problem of endeavoring
to provide materials that will only be used by the civil
population, which you R now full well that the civil popu-
lat.ion will certainly not get if the Chinese Communist
armies need it.
Senator Lodge. Yes.
Secretary Marshall. 3o, while you have a compassion-
ate interest in the civilian population you cannot control
the Communist procedu e.
Senator Lodge. I am glad to hear you make that state-
ment.
In addition to the mazy other ways in which allies are
helpful, is it not actually essential for us to have bases
in Western Europe fronn which our strategic air force
can operate against true Soviet potential in case of
trouble?
Secretary Marshall. I think that is vital.
Senator Lodge. Yes. And, therefore, we cannot. make
maximurrm use of our air power without such bases in
Western Europe?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct. We would be
greatly limited.
Senator Lodge. Do yc,u think the Kremlin has enough
influence over the Chir.ese Communists to call off the
Korean aggression if they wanted to do so?
Secretary Marshall. My assumption would be they
could do it in a momen?;.
Senator Lodge. So, they are really the real opponent,
are they not?
Secretary Marshall. That is our opponent.
Senator Lodge. Do you think the Russians are helping
the Communist Chinese much at the present moment?
Secretary Marshall. They are certainly providing them
with the bulk of their warmaking materiel. They have
provided apparently large numbers of planes, which have
not been yet brought in ;o use,'and so far as we can as-
CIA@751FAP1101b,1i' iO0NN14-fhe training of the
personnel that would employ these planes.
To what extent they are involved in the rehabilitation
and build-up of North Korean units, I don't know. They
provide a very solid background in front of which the
Communist Chinese forces operate.
I think it might be put this way:; That the Chinese
Communist forces would be utterly unable to maintain
themselves without a very direct support by the Soviet
Government.
Senator Lodge. That is a logistical support, is it not?
Secretary Marshall. Logistical support in terms of the
actual material, war material, and tremendous moral
support that they are standing behind them.
Senator Lodge. Do you think they are in a position
to increase their help very materially, or do you believe
that they are so far away from the i ain base of Russian
military strength that they could not do much more even
if the conflict were to broaden?
Secretary Marshall. They could do quite a little bit
more.
[Deleted]
Senator Lodge. My question is a limited question aimed
at keeping faith with the troops in Korea, regardless of
the American public at home, and regardless of allies or
anything else, and it is aimed to. get the answer to the
question as to whether the decision not to bomb the
Chinese bases is directly in the interests of the actual
American troops in Korea.
Secretary Marshall. I will answer that, Senator, by
saying to a certain extent it is, and to a certain extent
it is not, and the question is on which side the percent-
age would favor our troops against the restrictions as to
the operations.
[Deleted]
But I must say this: That you have got to consider
very carefully the situation at the time. Now, the situ-
ation about November 6th--no, we will say November
6th to the end of the month-was one where our troops
were at a tremendous disadvantage, because of the proc-
esses of the rapid build-up of the Chinese Communist
forces in Korea.
There is no question in my mind but freedom to bomb
across the Yalu River would have been greatly to the
advantage of our troops.
Now that they are 200-and-some miles south of the
Yalu, the situation is quite different.
Senator Lodge. In other words, the question of
whether you bomb, or whether you don't bomb, changes
constantly with the factors of time, circumstances and
geography, doesn't it?
Secretary Marshall. That is right.
Senator Lodge. And you cannot lay down an arbitrary
rule that is good for all conditions, can you?
Secretary Marshall. You cannot; and right under the
present considerations, it has seemed that we derive
advantages from the fact that no air operations, no
hostile air operations are against us.
Senator Lodge. I am drawing to my close.
It is said that the services of our men in Korea is
buying time, or gaining time for us Here in the. United
States.
Are you. satisfied that we are making the best possible
use of this time, in so far as creating a big enough Army,
Navy and Air Force is concerned?
Secretary Marshall. I made a statement the other day
that I was much concerned over the delay in getting
the necessary legislative action to enable us to go ahead
with the various measures that are concerned in the
build-up of our forces and that, I think, is a delay that
is regrettable, and serious.
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 Approved For Release 2004/01/16 CIA-R0P75-Ot0149R000500090014-6
As to the production of munitions, I think that the overw a ming actical air power.
time we need there is to allow that to go through the Isn't that roughly correct?
necessary processes; and I believe, so far as I can ascer- Secretary Marshall. That is roughly correct.
tain, that we are proceeding there with reasonable Senator Lodge. And I have further been led to believe,
rapidity; when you get into the effect of inflationary and I made some rather conspicuous statements about
reactions and limitations of raw materials-the with- it that nobody has challenged, that in so far as that
drawals of raw materials from civil production-I am not tactical aviation is concerned, we not only do not have
well enough informed to answer that except that I know any superiority, but we are in a very flagrant inferiority,
the inflationary reaction is serious `to us because we lose and that is why I asked the question.
the power to buy the material that was the basis of the Do you consider that the proposed Army strength of
original estimate on which the appropriation was made. 18 divisions and 18 regimental combat teams is big
Senator Lodge. When you referred to legislation, you enough?
have particularly in mind, have you not, universal mili- Secretary Marshall. At the moment it is big enough
tary service and training, is that right? in the sense that it is about all we can get ready hur-
Secretary Marshall. Exactly that, sir. riedly in an efficient and effective manner. There may
Senator Lodge. I remember that you said on Friday, be further increases necessary, and we have the means
in reply to Senator Johnson, that in your opinion we now of making them in a more effective manner than
were not getting ready fast enough; and in connection the original increases which consisted of entirely new
with that, I would like to ask you whether you think the divisions and the National Guard divisions in a very
Air Force today has got enough tactical strength to pro- limited state of training.
vide us with a 2-to-1 superiority in Europe? That is Now particularly if this man-power bill is finally con-
tactical aviation? firmed, we have the means of doing with considerable
Secretary Marshall. I will not attempt to answer that. rapidity what we haven't done up, to the present time.
General Vandenberg can answer that directly. He has I don't want to disclose at this moment just exactly
all the numbers at his .disposal. what the thinking is, but there has been a very careful
Senator Lodge. Maybe you would not want to answer calculation in the matter, all I would -say is that we are
this question, either, and you can say so, of course, if trying very hard to see that these things are effective,
you don't: Whether you think that the proposed total and that we don't proceed faster than we can produce
of 95 air groups which has been the Administration's the effective results. But we set up the machinery like
proposed figure, is big enough or whether it should not the additional facilities-I am talking about in relation to
be 150 air groups? industry-that makes it possible to make these increases
Secretary Marshall. My reaction to that has been that very 'quickly in an effective manner when we feel we
we will have time, under the present setup that is being just must do it.
made, for the production of planes, to increase that, along Senator Lodge. Do you not feel that we did demobilize
with the situation as it appears to us as we get a little too much and too rapidly at the end of World War II?
further along, because the important thing now is the Secretary Marshall. Oh, yes, sir.
rapid turnout of planes up to the 95 groups-that is the Senator Lodge. And that we thereby gravely weakened
first thing; and the next thing is a setup of industry our diplomatic initiative and power for peace by so doing?
in relation to that, in such a manner that they can very Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir. But I would say there
quickly increase production if we find that to be a neces- that the important thing was to firmly set up a system
sary procedure. that had some chance of enduring,, and the failure to
I think we have that setup well under way,, and as do that was the most serious error of all.
we-I have forgotten the date when the 95 groups was Maintaining a very large force, well, I db not think it
to come into being. Maybe you have it there? is a practical political question. But I do think the con-
Senator Lodge. I wasn't talking about the construe- fused and tumultuous demobilization was very injurious,
tion and development that has been authorized as of and I feel more strongly that the failure to establish a
the end of the current fiscal year; I was talking about very definite procedure for maintaining our defensive
for the next fiscal year ending June 30, 1952. posture was a very serious error, just as I think now is
The information that I have is that we are tremen- the time to do this.
dously outnumbered in tactical aviation; that air defense Senator Lodge. Well, do you not think then we ought,
is very inadequate; and in order to build up the tactical to, given-this is a very broad question but, after all,
force and do the other things we need to do, we ought we have to face broad questions-given the intensity of
to have an objective, for June 30, 1952, of 150 groups, our national tempo, we are not phlegmatic like some
rather than 95. peoples are, and given our political institutions and our
Secretary Marshall. I wouldn't reply to that offhand, economic institutions, do you not think it would be better
In these meetings on the budget, in which the Air for us to rapidly build up our military strength and re-
brought forward their proposals; and all that was very gain the diplomatic initiative we have lost, and organize
lengthily discussed, and my understanding of that is- the peace, and try to do it in a hurry rather than to drag
and Mr. Lovett, who presided at each of the meetings, along half in and half out for 10 years?
he could answer that directly-that there was a general Secretary Marshall. I don't think we are dragging
agreement that the setup, as proposed, was suitable to along, sir. I think we are getting this thing in such a
the situation-of course assuming that our outlay in way there is some possibility that we will not suffer from
additional facilities would permit a very rapid rate of these periods of indifference which seem to come so
increase over and above the original estimates. quickly and react against us very directly.
Senator Lodge. Well, I always understood that the When you build up a force the major consideration is
broad tactical theory of the defense of Western Europe the system under which you do it. Now we labored, and
presumed that the Western nations would not have a you were a participant in the labor of developing effec-
superiority in ground forces, and that their chance of tive troops at the time of the last war. However, your
being successful lay in having mobile and highly trained experience was a special one because you were under an
ground troops who could force the enemy to channelize unusual driver, as a man, and you were in a unit that
into certain lines where we could then strike him with was in no way affected by past conditions of that unit.
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 It was a new unftpuriavygou Fug Redle p 2004/ om none o /1se CIAa vRo~i a0month. w0 Well, that 0eat 6 a tremendous power
limitations that were inherent in another system of de- that has heretofore been lacking.
velopment. Senator Lodge. It means you are going to get some
So that we went ir. to these preparations and we had real rotation in Korea, doesn't it?
a. long, unduly prolonged, period of carrying the burden Secretary Marshall. When you put in 20,000 fresh men
of the force and not getting the advantage of it as a in addition to replacement of casualties a month and the
force. prospect of 25,000 without too long a delay, you are
Now I think that is a great error because you carry putting in there the equivalent of over a division.
an immense burden. You have withdrawn man power Actually that would be 7,000 men more than a division
from industry, and you have not only withdrawn man once a month.
power from industry, but we could not get the man power That will have a tremendous effect, and we are getting
to set up the special training that was needed to replace the benefit of those men who come back here with their
the casualties. war experience in all of the units. Now that I think is
You saw some of the effect of reduced units, which is getting at an effective basis of progression.
a very fatal effect. Senator Lodge. Those men who have ' come back will
So that while it arpeared to the public, maybe, that be the seed corn for the new Army, will they not?
we had all these div_sions on active duty, actually we Secretary Marshall. They will be the experts on how
were limited by the numbers. Under the conditions, if you actually do it today.
we could have set up what we have been struggling to Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise a
do now, and I think are doing very successfully at the precedural point by way of a motion to recess.
present time, this basic condition which enables us Senator Lodge. Will you. just let me finish? I have
rapidly to do something effectively, it is very much better listened: to everybody else and I would like to just have
than getting a great many units on active duty when a chance to finish. I won't be long.
they are going to be longer, much longer, in being So you think that the objective of the Army is high
brought to a state of fighting efficiency. enough now?
Now that is my experience. I was forced in many Secretary Marshall. At the present moment.
ways-I say "I"; I w:Ls Chief of Staff of the Army-in Senator Lodge. One final question. Is it now true
going along with the immediate calling out of the entire when you have American troops actually overseas such
National Guard. I wanted to delay even the way we as we will have in Europe, that it is ;just as vital for them
came into the Selective Service. I was told politically to have tactical aviation in support of them as it is to
that was not possible; I had to do it right now or it have artillery or machine guns or anything else?
wouldn't work, we cot ldn't carry it through. Secretary Marshall. Tactical aviation is absolutely
Well, that was wroni,. That didn't accelerate our prep- essential.
a ration, that almost imited it for the time being, and Senator Lodge. And so if we haven't got the tactical
made the procedure one of embarrassment. We were superiority in Europe we certainly ought to go ahead and
submerged under complications, under lack of equipment, get it, oughtn't we?
under all sorts of conditions adverse to a speedy develop- Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
ment of efficiency. Senator Lodge. Thank you very much, General.
I think now we have a setup that has been very Secretary Marshall. I am sorry I took up so much of
rapidly developed to enable us to do these things effi- your time.
ciently and effectively Senator Lodge. I am glad you did. I think it is very
Now when do we nuke the next step in increases is valuable.
something else that I don't want to go into right now. Senator Russell. Just one moment. Senator George
but I think we have aL much more powerful setup than had a question to ask. Before he does, I want to find out
is apparent to the pt blic, and I think also we have a if any member of the Committee wishes us to have the
setup that will enable us, I think, to maintain military security room manned on Sunday?
strength without the : hock of having appropriations cut Senator George. I don't believe we should open it up.
to an extent that causes the collapse of that strength. Senator Russell. If no one suggests- that they want to
Now I have been criticized for talking too much about use it tomorrow, why General Mudge, will you advise the
collapses, but I have seen a good many of them and I officer in charge to that effect?
saw a very recent one, and where the criticism was, Senator George, you wanted to ask the General a ques-
"Not enough is being lone," at the same time I couldn't tion.
get things done and there was talk of asking for too Senator George. I wished to ask the General this. I
much. asked for the initial estimate of the number of our forces
Now that's all in a period of about two months. We and character that would be required to repel the aggres-
are never going to change, so we must have something sion in Korea, the initial estimate, and I am not quite
that is a workable procedure. I think we have got it. sure you said you would get it or that the Joint Chiefs-
]: think the power 'wk have developed now is far beyond Secretary Marshall. I think I recall the question, Sen-
the comprehension of the general public or they would ator George. Of course the record will show it. I called
,bring tremendous pressure to bear I think to pass this on the Joint Chiefs to give me that information.
man-power bill into an effective law as quickly as ;possible. Senator George. I merely wished to know, Gen-
I? am talking at considerable length, but I feel very eral-
strongly about it ant. I am almost absolutely certain Secretary Marshall. I recall the question. Mr. Larkin
I am right. I apologise for my emphasis. tells me that it went to the Chiefs of Staff.
Senator Lodge. Well, that is very, very interesting 'Senator George. Now I wish to ask one additional
and just the kind of- question but merely for the purpose of asking 'whether
Secretary Marshall. The application right now to this the facts are in the record already.
Korean situation. Here we are going into this month You have spoken of this proposal to pursue the planes
where certainly in the next three or four weeks we get that may attack in Korea. You refe:cred to it as the hot-
up to the point `of 20,0(+0 men outside. of replacements for pursuit program, suggestion or recommendation which
,casualties can go into that force, That is more than a was vetoed by I believe you said 13 nations.
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 Secretary Marshall.AlMfRW ?i1 fojelease 2004/01/16
Senator George. Did you put into the record the names
of those nations?
Secretary Marshall. They were the nations who have
troops fighting with us in Korea. Those are the only
ones we polled on that.
Senator George. And that is in the record. They
could be identified from the record already?
Secretary Marshall. Their names I believe are in the
record, Senator.
Senator George. You think they are already in the
record?
Secretary Marshall. I gave you the name of every
country that had a contribution to our forces in Korea.
Senator George. And those were the ones that vetoed
the hot-pursuit recommendation?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator George. Also, General, I don't know whether
the record discloses the period of when that veto . was.
taking place, over which it was taking place; is that in
the record?
Secretary, Marshall.. I do not think it is. We will obtain
the actual dates, though the State Department can give
you that accurately and can give you the reactions of
the nations.
Senator George. And the period of time over which
you were conferring with the nations?
Secretary Marshall. Yes.
Senator George. The State Department can furnish it?
Secretary Marshall. They were the ones who con-
ducted the negotiations.
Senator George. Very well.
Secretary Marshall. That is one specific date in the
Defense Department. That is the recommendation of the
Chiefs of Staff and then the State Department went to
work on the nations involved to get their acquiescence.
Senator Russell. There are a number of matters in
this same status as those referred to by Senator George.
I had a list of them I had asked to have prepared-
haven't been able to locate them in this voluminous mass
of matter I have accumulated.
I had assumed, Mr. Larkin, that you or someone else
was keeping a list of that. When will you be ready to.
respond to those questions?
Mr. Larkin. We are continually gathering the mate-
rial, Mr. Chairman, and some of it is difficult to obtain
or at least it takes time. I think we have responded to
a majority of your written requests. There are a number
of verbal requests from members which we are 'still.
working on.
Senator Russell. Among them there was one by Sen-
ator Knowland on the percentage of arms captured from
the Chinese Reds that were of American manufacture
as distinguished from Chinese, Russian, and German;
and also Senator Knowland wanted to be informed as
to whether General Barr ever insisted upon having in-
structions for American officers and enlisted men to go to
the forward units of the Chinese Nationalist Army; as
to whether or not General MacArthur in January of
1945 forwarded a communication to the White House to
the effect that the Japanese were contemplating com-
plete surrender of everything but the person of the
Emperor; whether, in the preparation for the conference
at Yalta, military and civilian advisers contacted Gen-
eral MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz as to their views on
the advisability of having the Soviet Union enter the
war in the Pacific; as to whether General MacArthur
was first notified, about the Manchurian provisions con-
tained in the Yalta Agreement; and also by Senator
Knowland to ascertain whether the Joint Chiefs in their
memorandum of Dec. 13, 1950, recommended that the
IAtR{c)P71 1i49 0OO900i14d6red not include
any reference to the admission of Red China to the
United Nations or the disposition of Formosa.
I have those listed, and I hope that the Department
will see that that information is furnished at the first
possible date.
Senator Knowland. I have a correction in the record
that won't take half a minute, if I might call it to the
attention of the Committee.
Senator Russell. What page?
Senator Knowland. 1415.
Senator Russell. That is in yesterday's transcript?
Senator Knowland. Yesterday's record, on the fourth
paragraph down, where I was giving basic data from
the United States Department of Commerce on the
amount of aid to certain countries during the war years,
it read, "France; $1,770,000,000." The British Common-
wealth should have read $23,904,000,000. Then the Soviet
Union, $10,769,000,000; China, $1,247,000,000. That is the
World War II period.
Either I inadvertently picked up a wrong column here,
and read Great Britain, $4,281,000,000 when it was
$23,904,000,000.
Senator Russell. I made a notation here to check on
that because it was inconceivable to me that that in-
cluded everything.
Senator Lodge. I would like to request that some time
in the proceedings we hear Mr. George Kennan on his
estimates of the Russian intentions.
Senator Russell. Under the procedure we adopted, if
you will drop me a note giving me Mr. Kennan's name
and saying you want to hear him on just what you stated
there, I will be very glad to proceed with it. When we
proceed further with the hearings, I shall bring to the
attention of the Committee. an entire list of all those
that have been requested, and we will evolve some pro-
cedure for determining the suggested lengths to which
we will go in hearing these people.
The full Committee will have an opportunity to 4partici-
pate but I want members to please let me have them in
writing and I can. bring them all out and have them
before the Committee at the proper time.
Secretary Marshall. May I make a comment?
Senator Russell. Yes, sir.
Secretary Marshall. I recall in the answers I gave to
Senator Cain he coupled the naval blockade with the
economic blockade.
Senator Cain. Yes, sir.
Secretary Marshall. My reply would indicate that I
was applying it to both naval and economic. The answer
applied to the economic.
Senator Cain. Would you care to respond to the ques-
tion as to whether or not you are in support of a naval
blockade as well as an economic blockade, General?
Secretary Marshall. Not at the present time, sir, not
in support at the present time.
Senator Russell. The Committee will now stand in
recess until 2:30 this afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m. the Committee recessed to
reconvene in the same room at 2:30 p.m.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
Senator Russell. The Committee will come to order.
Senator Stennis, you may proceed.
Senator Stennis. Thank you, Mr,. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I think you have"thoroughly exhausted
the subject and then covered it and recovered it again,
and very eminently, so I think, and you have given us
a great deal of very helpful and hopeful light.
I remember when I first came on the' Committee you
99
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 gave me a good s ?VoWeF Z)roRe1ft Q461AW: CIA-RDPe7Sr9Q*4BRN.O%0gW4l4-Pes. I think we feel
military man-power bill that was very helpful. to me that our great opponent is the Soviet Union.
in deed.
Now when you were giving answers there to Senator
Lodge there was a liti le confusion over here and I did
not get the benefit of just what you said with reference
to this matter of bombing, the hazard that' would be
entailed from the bombing of the Manchurian or Chinese
area. Would you mine briefly' repeating that again?
You explained the hazards that would come from it
and how it would lead on over, as you thought perhaps,
into the European picture. Would you mind repeating
that briefly, please?
Secretary Marshall. Well, we feel that the Soviet
interest in the outcome of this Korean struggle is a very
'vital one as it affects their relations with their satellites,
particularly the eastern satellites, and as the Chinese
Communist group is the largest and the most valuable
potential. that they have to fight their battles for them.
Now the bombing into Manchuria, in close proximity,
we! will say, to the Soviet Union territory, both those
cases we think create a. hazard that might result in the
Soviet intervention wh.ch we fear would start a general
struggle all over the world.
[:Deleted]
We do not think it is advisable to take the hazard
which we think is ver.- serious in leading to an all-out
war, and in connection therewith, the comparison as to
the Western European hazards, we feel are quite different
from those that exist in connection with the Korean
operation.
'['he same thought applies to other factors in connection
with the extension of our operations outside of Korea
proper; and in my discussions, particularly today, and
yesterday with Senator Hickenlooper, I also brought
out the factor that it was not entirely a one-way street.
[Deleted]
Senator Stennis. We .1, I thank you, sir, and I apologize
for asking you to repeat that, but I thought it might
be cut off the record, rnd I knew that we did not get
it here over .on this side because of the confusion to the
rear somewhere.
Now, there is some thought right along that line,
General, of what is go: ng to involve Russia in the war
is a victory for us in H orea, and that is the thought to
the effect that she is not going to let her side, so to
speak, lose, and if that theory should be correct, why,
a, quick victory over there--I mean a bombing-or hope
for a quick victory thrc ugh bombing-would not be any
worse than a slow solution through the present tactics,
would it?
Secretary Marshall. I wouldn't answer-I couldn't
answer that yes or no.
Senator Stennis. No.
Secretary Marshall. :3ecause you have got two :factors
in there. You have got a very important factor in there,
in that if you take one presentation there it would
merely mean that we don't do anything-
Senator Stennis. Yes.
Secretary Marshall. -for fear we win. Well, we
cannot accept that.
Sc, on the other hand we are fearful of this particular
procedure's provoking it.
But our position before the world is quite different
if we have been quite sincere and long-suffering in
endeavoring to avoid such a development.
Senator Stennis. We:l, it boils down, after all, in a
very broad way to the question of what will Russia
do? Or what is going ;o be her position? That is the
main argument, and the t is where the real differences of
opinion comes about, is it not, General?
Senator Stennis. Yes.
Secretary Marshall. And that opponent exercises a
tremendous influence over all these satellite countries
and over a country like China, which you may not
accurately characterize as a satellite country, but which,
nevertheless, is highly dependent on the Soviet Union.
Senator Stennis. Well, one thing that has concerned
me all along is about the failure of the embargo, the
failure to stop the flow of the goods in there, and I can
tell from your testimony you have been very much
concerned about that.
I am interested in the future operations of the United
Nations. It seems to me like the big question involved
here is---Is it going to be able to function well enough
on this first test to survive as an institution? And I
cannot understand why they have been so slow about
going into this economic blockade.
Now it is not something you are to blame for, or any
individual or anything like that, but any comment or any
additional light you could give on that I would think
would be very helpful.
Secretary Marshall. Well, I can think of none at the
moment,. Senator, other than your own experience in
the political discussions, in reaching agreements; and
when you add to it the number of nations involved, it
is an extraordinarily difficult 'matter; when you have
their troops involved, you have added to the complications.
Now, I referred, I think before this Committee-but I
will state this in case I didn't-that in the last war, we
were only involved, so far as our direct negotiatory ar-
rangements were concerned, with the British Common-
wealth, that is, Great Britain; as the leader of the
British Commonwealth.
Senator Stennis.. Yes.
Secretary Marshall. So, we had a Combined Chiefs
of Staff of the British and ourselves. The French did
not. come back into the struggle for a long time, of
course-not that we were not able to raise some troops
after taking over North Africa, and equipping them and
training them.
Now, we had many difficulties, and yet there were just
two sides to our discussions, in the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. .
cow, the-minute you add to that a large number of
groups, take the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-
there we have 12 nations, arLd they have their chiefs of
staff, men like . General Bradley, and they have their
committees,-
Senator Stennis. Yes.
Secretary Marshall. Now, when you try to get together
with them, you have instantly gotten the increased diffi-
culty of any negotiatory proceedings, and that is bound
to be-is bound to make it very difficult.
I think the difficulty increases with each stage of addi-
tions to the numbers involved.
Now, I think someone either put the question to me,
or made the observation that we were approaching a
time when collective action, in some ways, became a
rattier impractical proposition?
I would say it becomes a difficult proposition, but a
very essential proposition, but it requires a great deal
of 'patience.
We have that in our procedures here of necessity, and
yet this is all among ourselves.
Now, when you add these other nations to it, that
increases the difficulty tremendously; and as we go into
this business of this group of nations' being involved in
a military question of decision, and all the combinations
involved in that, then you have an extraordinarily diffi-
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 cult procedural setup pproved, For Release 2004/01/16
Yet, unless one is opposed to the policy or the theory
of collective security toward the peace of the world, there
is no other method possible.
Now, how do you do it? Well, I think if you go back
through history, you will find time after time, when we
have these annoying complications, these dangerous of-,
fects of such complications, and yet we have before us
what to me is a matter of vast importance. That is, the
development, gradual strengthening of the United Na-
tions organization itself.
There has hardly been a time when we weren't in-
volved one way or another in extreme complications-
Russian vetoes, for example, complete stalemates, for
example, and this time, at least at the start, they made
a very rapid approach, but it is nothing unusual, it is
nothing unusual when. you get into difficulties, to find
the complete co-operation at the start developed into a
very puzzling complication.
You take, to get very intimate, you take our setup
as we went into the Battle of the Bulge. Everything is
fine up until the time we get into the battle and then
we have recriminations from this source and from that
to do something other than what we were doing. That
is natural. A nation reacts almost like an individual, and
we have got that right now.
Senator Stennis. Well, continuing on with that
thought, it seems to me like what is on trial here is this
idea of collective security in operation, and I believe that
the thing that has. disturbed the American people more
than any other thing about the whole Korean matter
is this economic situation, these goods being fed into
China.
There might not have been as much noise made about
that, but I believe that caused more concern among the
thinking people and here is the idea of collective secu-
rity being on trial and the leading nation, the most
powerful nation, taking a strong position for that eco-
nomic blockade and its people being so deeply concerned
about it, it looks to me like that would be a powerful
argument.
Secretary Marshall. It has caused a great bitterness,
of course.
Senator Stennis. I mean it would be a powerful argu-
ment in favor of the blockade with the other nations
going on, argument to them to go on and accede to it.
If that could be cleared up, it would certainly add a
great deal to the idea of collective action, it seems to me.
Secretary Marshall. I think the economic blockade we
are on the way to very rapidly clearing up.
Senator Stennis. I am referring to the economic block-
ade. Now, we voted overnight, the United Nations voted
overnight to send troops in there and go to war, so to
speak, and now we have spent months since Red China
actually came in without taking a final vote to really
impose sanctions.
Secretary Marshall. The moment the situation became
difficult then you were involved in all sorts of, you might
.say, withdrawals and certainly extreme reticence.
Senator Stennis. I know in my study of the United
Nations that its conception at the time it was being or-
ganized at all, it was greatly emphasized, the effective-
ness of an economic blockade on a nation that set out
to disturb the peace, so to speak, and it seems to me
like the main weapon there is what we have fallen down
perhaps the worst on in this first great test of the op-
erations.
Secretary Marshall. Well, I would think, Senator, we
have a very special condition which I. hope will pass, and
that is a large number of nations who are very weakly
prepared, and one nation that is completely prepared
9tf fEq TA-1frib i99(P9PI99PP9a4ii%ication of action
completely against our interests.
Now I hope that situation gradually fades away in the
world, and if it does to any extent, then I think the
United Nations procedures would be greatly simplified.
Senator Stennis. And as I understood you a while ago,
you said you saw strong hope for developments along
that line, even in the last few weeks.
Secretary Marshall. I expressed my thought I think
as to the developments of accord in connection with this
particular operation, but you are always going to have
an extremely difficult condition in the United Nations
so long as so much of the world is weak and the aggres-
sive nation, the one with an intent which is against all
of our interests, is very strong.
Senator Stennis. Yes. Well, I had a memorandum
here about the nations that objected to the principle
that you referred to as hot pursuit when you wanted to
invoke this policy there of hot pursuit, and you said just
before lunch that you had already put the names of those
nations in the record.
Secretary Marshall. It went in the record as the na-
tions contributing forces or means to the fighting in
Korea.
Senator Stennis. Yes. Well, back to the time that
Senator George questioned you, I believe that was Mon-
day morning or Tuesday morning anyway, about your
mission to China, I was not a member of the Congress
when you made that mission and I did not clearly get
your testimony the other day, although you were clear.
I just did not quite understand it.
Now you went to China, you did not go there as a
soldier; you went there as a special representative of
the State Department?
Secretary Marshall. A special representative of the
President, with the rank of Ambassador.
Senator Stennis. Special representative of the Presi-
dent with the rank of Ambassador. And you said some-
thing the other day, you more or less adopted Senator
George's language, but in referring to your directive
would you mind repeating again there just what your
directive was?
Secretary Marshall. My directive was to endeavor to
bring to an end the internal strife in China-that is,
the civil war-and the policy of our Government, as an-
nounced, related to the expressions by the President of
the feeling of this country that it be advisable-desirable
-that the Chinese would form a representative Govern-
ment; which means, in effect, a two-party Government,
in which all parties would be represented, including the
Communist Party. That directive was based on negotia-
tions that had been started by the Kuomintang Govern-
ment and been carried forward, particularly from 1943
to the summer of 1944, and finally under Mr. Hurley's
attendance in the fall of 1944.
That procedure had come to a definite head in Octo-
ber, 1945, when the proposal was made that they have
this conference, this PCC, political consultative confer-
ence; and on December 18, when they had agreed on
the date for that conference, which was Jan., 10, 1946.
Now, my ;directive in the beginning was to endeavor
to use my influence in whatever way it was possible to
do so, to bring the fighting to an end, and the desire
over there of the various parties interested, Govern-
ment, the Communists and other parties was to bring
the fighting to a close before the meeting of January
10, between these various groups, and that was accom-
plished on the morning of the 10th. I got out there just
before Christmas.
Then, thereafter, when they had reached their own
agreements in this political conference of all the parties,
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 as a result of thatQfAYP, 4 )Af-%5 r-OQo4/,41,/J~
an adviser to their representatives towards the demob-
ilization of the military forces and their amalgamation,
and then later-
Senator Stennis. Now, pardon nie, was that the Na-
tionalist forces and they Communist forces?
Secretary Marshall. The Communist forces.
Senator Stennis. They were going to demobilize?
They had agreed to that?
Secretary Marshall. They had agreed on that.
Senator Stennis. All right.
Secretary Marshall. And there were to be 50 Govern-
ment divisions and 10 Communist divisions, and they
were to be amalgamated in army corps--armies as they
call them.
So, when I returned lo the United States at that mo-
ment to see about gett:ng money and technical advice,
construction companies, and shipping and surplus prop-
erty and UNRRA.
And on my return to China in April I found that, there
had been a very decidec. break in carrying out the terms
of their agreement amcng themselves. From then on I
was involved both in tae military side in endeavoring
to keep the peace and on the political side in trying to
find some basis for implementing their agreements that
would be acceptable to all parties.
Senator Stennis. Wa,; that-or that never was con-
summated. The Nation ,list power gradually went down
from. that time on?
Secretary Marshall. The Nationalist power started on
the downhill the followi ig December.
Senator Stennis. Well, the term has been used so
much that you went ovEr there to form a coalition with
the Nationalists and the Communists. And as I under-
stood the other day, you said that was not the proper use
of the term. As I understood, you said you went to help
form a representative Government, the two-party sys-
tem.
Secretary Marshall. I was having specific reference to
the fact that under the terms of their political agree-
ment among themselves was involved the idea of having
a coalition Cabinet, and that was the thing they couldn't
start at all. All the ot. ier disagreements in the main
were based on representation.
I made a misstatement, it was brought to my atten-
tion, in the record, when I stated the State Council. con-
sisted of representation c f which 40 were of the National
Government; actually it was 20 of the National Govern-
ment and 20 of the others.
Senator Stennis. All of the others combined?
Secretary Marshall. A.1 of the other parties, yes; with
the proviso that the GenE ralissimo had the power of veto,
and that could only be overridden by a two-third vote,
which meant that part of his own party would have to be
disaffected. Now it was a struggle to get that going,
which was to be the intermediate setup until a properly
based constitution could be agreed upon.
Senator Stennis. And lid you see hope there-did you
expect that plan to work when it was agreed on on
January 10?
Secretary Marshall. It looked like it was very favor-
able. It wasn't agreed on January 10. The meeting
started on January 10.
Senator Stennis. It was started and agreed on soon
after that.
Secretary Marshall. It looked like it had. a fair chance
of success because the Communists were very anxious
to go through with it, because I think quite evidently
they felt that their discipline and their strength, par.-
titularly with the people of the lower classes, the peas-
antry, was so much better than that of the Nationalist
CI Vern ne gOthat tthey co ld 9gain the control politically.
And the hope in the matter so far as I saw it was that
Other parties-the Young China Party, Democratic League
and so on, I think there were about four-and the non-
party group could coalesce and the Generalissimo back
them, and they would be a group which I would think
would have drawn strength from both the other parties-
those that were outraged at the character of the opera-
tions of the Nationalist Party in its lower echelons, and
those that had gone into the Communist Party, who were
not real Communists, these individuals, but they were
violently antagonistic to the present regime of the Na-
tionalist Government. And it looked as though there
would be enough drawn from those groups, together
with what existed in the way of an independent group,
which was a very small group, to hold the balance of
power between the two, alongside of the evident fac-
tor to me and to my assoc:iates that the Kuomintang
Government was utterly incapable of suppressing the
Communists by military means. .
Senator Stennis. And when you got back over there
from your trip to America, to check with these business
firms and engineering firms and all, you found that it
and already broken apart, and never did operate-
Secretary Marshall. It had broken apart to the extent
that they hadn't gotten together in the way it was
indicated in their agreements, in council.
Senator Stennis. Well, there was a matter just a few
days ago, mentioned here, that I didn't fully under-
stand.
You were talking about the operation of the State
Department and the Defense Department, in working
together at what you called the lower echelons, the
working squads.
The question was first brought up by Senator Bridges,
I believe, about Secretary :Louis Johnson, and what
changes were made after you went in on that.
I didn't understand exactly how that operated.
You put in the policy, I mean, the program of the
lower echelon, working squads from the State Depart-
ment and. Defense Department working together-was
that it?
Secretary Marshall. I can best explain what the con-
dition was when I went in.
Senator Stennis. Yes, sir.
Secretary Marshall. There was rather a prohibition
against individual contacts that were not formalized;
so it. consisted, except at the top level, largely of an
exchange of memorandums, and what I did was authorize
ands encourage communications back and forth by the
individuals concerned; and when I spoke of the lower
level, working levels, I mean the pick-and-shovel men
that study the documents and see what all of the
implications are that they can. figure out, and as a rule,
propose the solution.
Well, in doing that, they would discuss, back and forth,
so you would have a considerable measure of agreement
before you got any further.
Then it would come to the Chiefs of Staff, and they
would have meetings directly with members of the State
Department.
Finally, when the matter was still in trouble, we would
have those meetings in the office of the Chief of Staff,
with Mr. Acheson and his assistants, and Mr. Lovett and
myself and all the Chiefs of Staff, and go over each phase
of the matter; or, in a very vital period, we would meet
before we ever really got started in the matter, and
discuss it in general, to see how it appealed to the
various members, in trying to-reach a--
Senator Stennis. That was considered the most prac-
tical,way of getting these viewpoints, and all considered,
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Secretary Marshall. That is what I have always found
in such administration. I merely went ahead on the
basis on which I was accustomed to.
Senator Stennis. Switching over to another subject,
I understand General Fox was sent to Formosa by
General 14acArthur in September, 1950-
Secretary Marshall. August.
Senator Stennis. August, 1950, and reported back that
the troops were not in condition, and so forth-were not,
I will say, in condition to go into battle, then.
Well, now, I didn't understand whether there was
another mission which went back later, or that presently
something is going on, I understand, with reference to
training?
Secretary Marshall. A military mission has been sent
out there.
Senator Stennis. Yes, but has there ever been a time
when those men were what you would call ready for
service in Korea?
Secretary Marshall. I could not go back of that com-
mission.
Senator Stennis. I mean they were not in August,
1950, but at any time since August, 1950, have they been
ready for battle service?
Secretary Marshall. I can't tell you that until I see
the report of our military mission which has just gone
out there.
Senator Stennis. Well, I do not mean to try to go into
it in detail, but after reading the Wake Island report,
the report of the Wake Island conference, General
Marshall, the thing that impressed me was how they were
all off, you might say, on their intelligence and how far
wrong they were as to what was going to happen.
There has been a great deal said about the lack of
intelligence and the lack of co-operation among the
different agencies of intelligence. As I say, it has a
great bearing in my thinking because it is quite dis-
appointing to me to see how far off all of them were at
this Wake Island conference. Could you give us any
light on the operation of intelligence, or should that
come better from the Chiefs of Staff? I leave that to
you.
Secretary Marshall. I will say this, Senator, and it is
a rather touchy subject.
Senator Stennis. Well, I am asking it just for light.
Senator Connally. Turn the light on.
Secretary Marshall. Well, I am trying to answer you.
Senator Stennis. I know you are.
Secretary Marshall. It is a rather touchy subject, par-
ticularly because it takes a long time to develop an effec-
tive intelligence service such as we intend for the CIA
under General Smith, and one of our great difficulties
as I see it is the amount of public discussion in regard to
it, because all of that detracts against it.
I think those special agencies, notably Great Britain
and others, you never hear of them, I doubt if you even
know the designation of the unit. It is just kept entirely
out of discussion, comment, and we have a long way to
go to reach the point where we have more authoritative
sources.
However, in this particular case, it is bound to be a
matter of speculation. It is bound to be a matter of
speculation.
You could have a concentration of troops as a threat
and you could have a concentration of troops with the
definite intent to go ahead aggressively; but I believe
that we will be quite a while yet before we have developed
our Central Intelligence Agency to the point where it can
give us more accurate reports.
It is a problem not only of direction, but more particu-
do any of these things openly. ,
We are weakened a great deal by the concentration of
public attention on the instrument from which' we expect
all this secret data, because, if other countries know what
we are about, we don't get anything along that particular
line. So I think it is of great importance that it be made
more effective, but I think it has to be given time and
it has to be given more secrecy, more remoteness from
public attention, or it can never be very effective; in my
own opinion; because its most effective sources you have
just got to be absolutely silent about and hardly even
think about.
That comes up in a great many matters. In its incep-
tion, first build-up, I was opposed to some of the first
contacts being proposed, not by the agency, but by others,
in connection with the Government; and I thought those
contacts should not be because it involved too many
people, involved almost essentially a breakdown, and,
therefore, it would be an ineffective service; and there-
fore it is not as dependable as it should be.
Senator Stennis. I reckon we can express the hope
that the intelligence upon which our Army is having to
operate there is better than it was just prior to the
invasion by the Chinese Reds. I am sure you have cause
to think it will be better.
Secretary Marshall. We have a good many struggles
with intelligence. The Battle of the Bulge, landing in
Normandy was a German struggle for intelligence, our
landing in Africa was a struggle for intelligence. All
that is involved. Some have been successful and some
have not. That is always the case, but I hope it will
be improved.
Senator Stennis. You spoke of this retaliatory bomb-
ing that we could experience. Now, where was this
strength to come from, this retaliatory bombing?
Secretary Marshall. In November, so far as our in-
formation was concerned that I was aware of, there was
a build-up in the number of planes that the Chinese
Communists were reported to have in Manchuria; but
later on in January and particularly March, there were
indications of a very decided build-up, which added to
the threat of a very effective retaliation, but that was
not the case in a large way, as I recall the information,
in November.
Senator Stennis. Well now, this build-up of that
strength, this was not coming directly out of China, was
it? Do you not think there was a Soviet connection there
when that new air strength-
Secretary Marshall. I am quite certain the Chinese
did not build the planes.
Senator Stennis. Yes. They build practically none, as
I understand it, practically none in China.
Secretary Marshall. I don't think they build bombers
and fighting planes.
Senator Stennis. Well, you mention here about the
replacements and all. This replacement program for
the soldiers, then, is already in operation as to, Korea,
and it is just a matter now of the wheel continuing to
turn, is that correct?
Secretary Marshall. Rotation.
Senator Stennis. Rotation, yes.
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir. You see, up until March,
we couldn't even obtain enough men for the actual re-
placements of casualties, except by going into our units
back here and taking them away from those units, and
to that extent decidedly lessening and temporarily de-
stroying, almost, the efficiency of those units.
Finally, in March we began to catch up in the pro-
duction of trained men so that we reached a point toward
the latter part of March where for the first time we could
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 provide all the rep ,LvEigiYagFogrtgNpgr g%41 11/16
Now, the next strug?:1e was to get enough trained and
developed as individua..s to start the rotation. So, I think
actually what happened in the end of March was that
for the :first time we provided all the replacements that
were needed for casualties, discharges and other gradual
reductions of the forces, and about 7,000 men for the
first time for rotation.
Now, since that, we :lave been able in April to provide
all the men for repla ;ements, and I think it is 12,000
for rotation.
As we get into this month, May, by the end of May,
we ought to be approeeching 20,000 for rotation, and be
able to meet all of oiir replacements without touching
any of our units in this country.
To step away from the Korean campaign, we want to
increase this producticn of trained men so that we can
begin to put in the ranks of the National Guard the
trained basic soldiers.
Senator Stennis. So you have then the replacement
program, and the rotation program already in effect now.
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Stennis. But that does not involve any rein-
forcements, not any large-scale reinforcements anyway?
Secretary Marshall. It has involved, up to March, in-
cluding March, the b-rild-up to normal organizational
strength because they were still about almost 2,000 under-
strength in American soldiers. The deficiency was being
made up by South Korean soldiers.
But, by the end of March, I think we had replaced,
in some cases not even replaced because they had never
had them, a full strength of U. S. soldiers.
Senator Stennis. Yeu mean the divisions were some-
thing like 2,000 short and filled by South, Koreans?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Stennis. Bu all that you havd said does not
mean that you are having any additional nuraber of
divisions there at any given time?
Secretary Marshall. What I have been talking about
is the refreshing and stimulating and strengthening of
the unit and the great improvement of mora'e as a
result of those actions I have said nothing about rein-
forcements.
Senator Stennis. Tl..at we understand.
Thank you very mu h, General Marshall, and. thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Russell. Thank you, Senator Stennis.
Senator Fulbright?
Senator Fulbright. Mr. Secretary, I hesitate to burden
this record any further, but for appearances' sake I had
better diirect a few remarks to show my presence here,
and perhaps because or the fact that not all arguments
have been thrust upon you in the last six days, but I
will try to limit myself to just a few questions.
Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the
Senator would like to speak up. We would like to hear
his questions over here.
Senator Fulbright. Well, Senator, General Marshall's
voice is exhausted, anc I unconsciously sort of felt that
mine was, too, after talking for a week. I do not blame
hi:m.
Secretary Marshall. I will try to do better.
Senator Fulbright. Ile sounds just like I feel after I
have been talking for f cur or five hours at a stretch.
You said a moment ago, I believe, in answer to a
question of Senator Stennis, that you regard our great
opponent as Soviet Russia.
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright. You do not regard this struggle
as a sort of modern ideological crusade against Com-
munism, I take it?
CIA-WpeT~rpqaii 0WROPI#fp Soviet Russia and
the Soviet Union, I was thinking in terms of the Com-
munist Government.
Senator Fulbright. Well, that is true; they are com-
munistic, with which I agree. I understood you to say
that the enemy we are concerned about is Russia. It is
the armies of Soviet Russia.
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Fulbright. If those armies did not happell
to be Communist, but were the old-fashioned imperialists
of the Czars, you would still be concerned about them,
wouldn't you?
Secretary Marshall. If they had shown the indica-
tions-
Senator Fulbright. That is what I mean. If they
aggressed against, if they invaded countries; if they
exhibited a tendency to expand, dominate all their
neighbors, which the old-fashioned imperialism did in
various instances from Napoleon and the Czars, whenever
they had an opportunity.
My only point is that you do no-" look upon this as
sort of a crusade against Communism everywhere and
in any form; but it is because! it is an aggressive force, and
has taken on the power of the Russian state is what
concerns you, is it not?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright. Now, with regard to Yugoslavia,
it was my understanding that the Department of Defense
supported our actions in giving relief, assistance to Yugo-
sl&.via this year, is that not correct?
Secretary Marshall. During my period, that is correct,
and I think otherwise elsewhere.
Senator Fulbright. If I recall correctly, General Brad-
ley or General Collins-some member came up and testi-
fied in behalf of that legislation.
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright. Well, now the Yugoslavs are ad-
mitted Communists, are they not?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright. But the significant thing is they
do not adhere nor are they subject to the directions
of Moscow, isn't that what makes them different from
other Communists?
Secretary Marshall. Exactly that.
Senator Fulbright. It seems to me a good illustration
of the point I am seeking to Make is this is not a crusade.
What we are really concerned about is the threatening
force of arms directed by Moscow, is that correct?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, with the results
that would follow.
Senator Fulbright. Granted that Communism has
turned out to be an effective tool in the hands of an
expansive power and one that has made it difficult for
us to combat because as a nation we do not understand
very well psychological warfare, for example. We have
refused up to now to support adequately a propaganda
effort.
Right now the House has recently cut I think 90
per cent off of the recommended program and we have
always had difficulty in the Congress in such a program.
Well, it is in that field that Communism is especially
effective as a propaganda weapon, is it not?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Fulbright. It seems to me that is a matter
which some of our people are a little bit confused about
and it may lead to some important differences as to the
way we approach the war.
Now it leads to one other question. General Mac-
Arthur made a statement that was received with much
enthusiasm that there is no substitute for victory. Now,
if `it is an ideological crusade, I think that idea fits very
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 well that you just c, ppo oFrop%beaee,2Qe4tQ1/i16
a continuation of the age-old struggle between tyranny
in one form or another and the forces of law and order
as we believe they are, it seems to me that there is room
for qualifying the thought that there is no substitute
for victory. Here is what I have in mind. We had
unconditional victory in the last war, did we not?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright. We defeated Germany and Japan
unconditionally.
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright. I would not say that the result
has been entirely satisfactory, has it?
Secretary Marshall. It wouldn't seem so, sir.
Senator Fulbright. So it looks as if we are justified
in examining that idea of unconditional surrender, does
it not?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Fulbright. . Isn't that what you really are ap-
proaching in your policy in Korea, that you are seeking
a way that you can compromise-compromise is a bad
word. It has come to have a meaning perhaps that is
difficult to explain, like the word "appeasement," which
used to be a very respectable word but now has become
a word which you don't dare to use in any connection,
so we will leave those two out. But aren't we trying in
Korea in a sense not to go for all-out victory in the sense
we did in the last war, partly because we found that not
to be effective to achieve our purposes, but to do some-
thing short of that which in this instance is to avoid a
war as long as we possibly can, with, the hope that we
may never have an all-out war? Isn't that what your
real objective is?
Secretary Marshall. That is the objective to the ex-
tent that it first appeared necessary to destroy the ag-
gressor considering the geographical situation and the
continued menace which would follow for the South
Korean Government if that aggressor from North Korea
remained in organized being.
Now, as I understood the application of the United
Nations' action in the matter and our own procedure in
connection with it, we were trying to bring to a halt any
idea of aggression, of any people who attempt that sort
of action, and particularly recognizing that this was an
aggression which was undoubtedly stimulated, organized,
by the Soviet Union.
Senator Fulbright. Yes. I grant that is certainly an
essential and, you might say, primary purpose-to pre-
vent the expansion of Russian power, to prevent aggres-
sion. But I can not quite agree, nor I do not think you
mean to say, that that is all 9f it, that it is purely nega-
tive. It seems to me that we at the same time are try-
ing to establish the machinery by which these inter-
national disputes may be settled by some kind of per-
suasion or reason rather than this idea of complete
victory, unconditional surrender.
To put it another way-do you not think we would be
perhaps faced with a difficult situation assuming we
completely defeated China and Russia? What would we
do with them? Would we not have the same situation
on a bigger scale that we have had with Germany and
Japan-a very difficult situation with regard to admin-
istration? We do not have the people. We would not
want to go in and administer. I mean that idea of com-
plete victory does not entirely solve the situation, does
it? What we really want is for them to give up their
aggression and to accept the United Nations, is it not,
which would bring a machinery for settling our differ-
ences by peaceful means rather by force? Would you
not say that is really our objective?
Secretary Marshall. I think our real desire is to have
CIArRDR7A ,1 RPPAMQQ,9W1{ i@ like a decent na-
tion should.
Senator Fulbright. That is right, through the United
Nations. That is the way we have suggested.
Secretary Marshall. That is our machinery-
Senator Fulbright. That is the machinery we have
accepted-
Secretary Marshall. -for that action.
Senator Fulbright. It seems to me that this idea there
is no policy in Korea, that there is no objective is one
that is not sound, even though this objective is a new
kind of objective and one is not surrounded by all
the glamour and emotional connections that the old-
fashioned victory is surrounded with., It is much easier
to appeal to most people's emotions by talking with the
language and concepts we used a century ago, but it
seems to me this objective is just as real, albeit it is a
new one, a new kind of objective. But it is one we con-
sciously wanted new because we are not satisfied with
the old way of having a war every 25 years. It seems to
me that is what we had in mind.
I grant it is a very difficult thing to put into language
that is appealing to the press and to the people, but
that still remains the job, I think, of the Government
to do it.
I just wondered if some thoughts along that line might
not be helpful, because I feel very strongly myself that
that is what we are groping for in this struggle in Korea,
the first and the most real opportunity to try to make the
United Nations have some substance and have some real
meaning,
We had that opportunity in Ethiopia and it was turned
down by the League of Nations. Wouldn't you say that
is a fairly good example?
Secretary Marshall. I think that is a very good
example.
Senator Fuibright. If we had done the same thing
then as now, or, even better, if we had done the same
thing when Hitler moved into the Rhineland and said,
"No, you won't"-even if we had to go to war, we might
very well have established the principle then we are
trying to establish now; is that.true?
Secretary Marshall. I think that is so. What we are
struggling for is a genuine basis of collective action.
Senator Fulbright. That is right.
Secretary Marshall. To secure the peace.
Senator Fulbright. The trouble we have is that those
words, "collective action" and "reason" and "reconcilia-
tion of differences" don't sound good and they are not
sort of vaguely connected with knights in shining armor
and they don't look good in headlines and that is why
it is extremely difficult to sell these ideas to the people,
it seems to me.
The other approach has a great deal more sex appeal
in a political sense, political appeal, than the old-
fashioned way.
One other thing. I would take it from that that you
do not feel that full-scale war with Russia is inevitable
at all.
Secretary Marshall. I do not think it is inevitable. I
think it is a very dangerous possibility.
Senator Fulbright. I agree with that.
Secretary Marshall. And I think the degree of danger
depends a great deal on how we carry ourselves. One
simple factor is that we prepare to meet such an emer-
gency in time to have the deterrent action that we so
much hope for.
Senator Fulbright. I have had a feeling myself-and,
of course, I don't pose as an expert-but a sort of feeling
about the matter that if we can get through the next 18
months without a real war with Russia, that we might
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 very well be over thAff%V aFgt"ieI~ 1 r QN;41L16
Secretary Marshall. How many months?
Senator Fulbright. Ju:,t out of the air I said 18 months.
I was taking that-that isn't far from what-
Secretary Marshall. That certainly will make a great
difference in our strength if we proceed in the way we
are going and we would present a much more formidable
prospect to the Soviet Government in their undertaking
art aggressive operation.
Senator Fulbright. I hink after this initial difficulty
with our allies that, ar this thing develops, our own
differences can be reconc fled and we are making progress,
I believe, in spite of o---.ir mutual criticisms, toward a
better understanding arrong ourselves.
Which brings me up to my last question. If you have
any statistics on the casualties of this last three weeks,
I have heard it said b3, I believe, and read estimates
of tremendous casualties, something in the neighborhood
of 80,000 for our enemies and. some three or four thousand
for ourselves, of which a very large percentage were of
our allies.
Is there anything secret about those statistics?
Secretary Marshall. tio, sir; we will get you exactly
that.
Senator Fulbright. Do you happen to have them?
Secretary Marshall. I want to get the exact terms of
what you are talking about.
Senator Fulbright. What I would think would be
interesting, and if they are as I have understood them
to be, I think it would b ~-i do not mean that casualties
are ever anything but vf:ry sad things, but still they give
an :insight into the thing.
It was something to this effect: How much of the
casualties were our enemies-I don't know whether you
have it-between just c(ead and battle casualties, as a
whole, and our own; and especially with our own, how
many were Americans a: id how many were allies.
I was told, and I don't vouch for it at all, because it
was unoffi.cial,. that ours were somewhere in the neighbor-
hood of 4,000, and that half of those were our allies
and. half, Americans.
Secretary Marshall. Well, you spoke of the last three
weeks, and I presume you were referring to, or covering
this recent phase of the Soviet attack?
Senator Fulbright. T fat is right.
Secretary Marshall. I will obtain that for you, in those
terms that you have mentioned.
Senator Fulbright. I think it would be very interesting.
Secretary Marshall. We have them in a number of
different ways, but the V are very hard to resolve to a
particular period. I will have that done.
Senator Fulbright. 'Thank you very much, Mr. Sec-
retary.
I want to draw the Chairman's attention to the fact
that I took only 20 minutes.
Senator Russell. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Flanders.
Senator Flanders. General Marshall, I also am going
to try to be very brief.
Did I call you "General Marshall," or "Genera.i Mae-
Arthur"?
I intended to say "General Marshall"
Marshall."
When General MacArthur was here, I questioned him
with regard to whether or not there were any large de-
posits of, or reserves of, supplies in Siberia which were
adequate for carrying on a fairly continued offensive, as
distinguished from a defensive.
I don't remember h s exact words, but he said he
felt that the Soviet preparations were defensive only,
and he knew of no,ja. r? e reserves of supplies.
CWRQR7CO 49AQ1Q5D(159 0'14-61 think you used
the phrase "thousands of planes" in the Vladivostok
region, and large land forces in Sakhalin.
Do you feel that the Russians are prepared for an of-
fensive movement of some dimensions?
Secretary Marshall. I felt, from the information that
has, been given me from our various sources, that the
Soviet had a considerable build-up in the Far East, which
had built up in a rather recent period, notably in Sak-
halin, and the vicinity of Vladivostok, as to the planes,
and Port Arthur and Dairen, as to the planes.
Now, as to the build-up of supplies, I don't recall ex-
actly what has been given me, but as to the possible power
of such a ,Soviet setup, I have gotten the impression from
the information, that it conveys a great threat to Japan,
and it was that reason in particular that caused me to
exercise considerable pressure to have the two divisions
of the National Guard sent out to Hokkaido. General
MacArthur had asked for four divisions at an earlier
period when there were none available for-
Senator Flanders. Hokkaido is the northern island-
Secretary Marshall. The northern island, which comes
very close to Sakhalin, and my own fear without re-
calling the exact details of the thing--my own fear was
very great that our hazard was there, and we should
terminate it as quickly as we could do it; [delete] -so that
my reaction from the data was very different from that I
read-which he stated; but I think you could get a more
precise answer from the Chiefs of Staff.
Senator Flanders. Would you be willing to say whether
you think the difference of opinion between- yourself
and General MacArthur, on this matter, is a difference
of judgment, or a difference of information?
Secretary Marshall. I don't` know, sir. I have
checked very carefully to see that. all the information
from the CIA went to his headquarters, and I presume, of
course, he either saw it specifically, or it was briefed for
his: attention.
Senator Flanders. Here is another matter. This is a
thing which has puzzled me in the testimony.
Why would the various proposals of January 12th,
listed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and sent to General
MacArthur on January 12th--conditioned on the conflict
being stabilized, or having Korea evacuated-why were
these suggested methods of offensive action tied to stale-
mate, or defeat-perhaps the word "stalemate" is not
equivalent to "stabilized," if so, I don't; know what stabil-
ized means?
Secretary Marshall. I have talked about that in vari-
ous ways, Senator; but I do suggest that you ask the
originators of the phrase, and they can give you a direct
answer as to what their intent was.
Senator Flanders. I have listened and, to some extent,
scanned the testimony and still find myself mystified by
that situation; but I will ask the head of the Joint Chiefs
of ;Staff.
The next question I am afraid I will have to wait
for the answer too: Why is not such a stalemate as you
hope for, a justification for the offensive actions proposed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
I will excuse you-I just ask, that question now, and am
excusing you from answering, and reminding myself to
ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
I think. that is a very mysterious situation, from any-
thing I have been able to read in the record here, or
from any of the witnesses.
Now, Mr. Secretary, you and I are about the same age.
I looked -it up in certain books of reference, and find that
I um three. months and three days older than you are.
Secretary Marshall. That gives you an advantage. -
Senator Flanders.. However, I am not going to pull sen-
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 iority on this thing. Approved For Release 2004/01/16
We have seen, I think, in our lifetime, I reckon, about
five wars. We have seen the Spanish-American War,
the Philippine War, the conquest of the native tribes of
the Philippines; the First World War; the Second World
War; and this war, not now officially a war, but having
all of the obvious aspects of a war.
I think in all of those except this last one, we have
seen an immense amount of discussion and dissension
among the American people, and in the Congress as we
approached it.
However, in each case, as Senator Knowland said yes-
terday, or the day before, when it became obvious that
we were in the fight, the American people buckled down
and saw it through.
Now, this latest event, it seems to me, has two un-
usual features: One of them is that almost immediately
it seemed to meet the approval of the people-in fact,
I must admit, or think, I can say that it met, at the
time, with the approval of some of us who are criti-
cizing it now; but it did meet with general approval
because it seemed to be the thing to do, both in policy,
and as a matter of right and morals as well.
Senator Flanders. But there is one thing that it seems
to me in which this particular contest differs from any
we have ever had, and perhaps differs from anything
that the world has seen hitherto, and that is that we
are given no idea as to what the military end of our
present engagement is going to be. We have presented
to us a sort of vacuum. And it is my strong belief that
the attractiveness of General MacArthur's program is
because it drops into this aching void of one knowing
nothing of what the military end is that we are aiming
at. And General MacArthur proposes something to put
in there and nobody else does.
I am speaking for myself when I say that nobody else
does because I cannot get my fingers on anything definite
except just keeping on a while longer and seeing what
happens.
I think that accounts, aside from General MacArthur's
great achievements, his great reputation, and his un-
doubted picturesqueness-he has offered an end.
I think along with that goes a certain suspicion on
the part of the American people that there may be an
end in sight, but one which is not thought politic, to
put into words. It is difficult to think of any conclusion
which can be arrived at by negotiation with those who
oppose us which does not involve appeasement. So I think
that is the question that is in the back of the minds of
everybody, and it keeps continually coming to the sur-
face as the real expectation of the end-an end in which
the military operations are concluded on an agreement
which either immediately or in due course of time,
whatever the due course of time may be, involves the
recognition of Communist China in place of Nationalist
China in the United Nations, and the turning over of
Formosa.
Now you have unequivocally and unhesitatingly dis-
avowed for yourself that end to this military operation,
as I have heard you and as I have read what you have
said. But, in the absence of any other possible conclu-
sion presented, it seems to me that that suspicion is
bound to remain and bound to grow.:
And so I have made a speech instead of asking you
a question, but leading up to this 'question: Can you
suggest any end to these military operations which would
be a reasonable conclusion to come to bring them to a
conclusion?
Secretary Marshall. Of course, I am a little embar-
rassed there, Senator, with going into statements that
"lead to the coinclusiorr of a war plan. However,. I can say
(MA_Fjp - 01tS 9UM4*ticularly during
the last three months there has developed a procedure
as to the way our forces are being conducted, first under
General Ridgway, and now under General Van Fleet,
which has been highly destructive of Chinese Communist
power, meaning trained forces.
[Deleted]
We face a situation where in the opinion of the Chiefs
of Staff-and you can ask them directly-of the pro-
cedures to' be followed-there does not appear at the
moment any along the line of the conventional military
operation.
Just what we can do to change that aspect is a matter
that is constantly under consideration, but, as I have
said many times, we feel that the procedures as pro-
posed by General MacArthur of limitations that we should
not abandon, I mean of not limitations, of conditions
which we consider we should not risk.
Now I appreciate the point of view as to public reac-
tions and congressional reactions in this matter. I don't
know what else to say to you at this time. I do not think
the situation is so dubious as has been expressed here
a great many times, and I am getting an increasing
confidence towards the possibility of a satisfactory con-
clusion. Whether or not it will be a military triumph
or not I don't know how you would characterize it.
It would be a triumphant demonstration I think of
our military powers in proportion to the people engaged,
but it would not include, I am quite certain, the matters
that you referred to which you fear in relation to Formosa
and the entrance of the Communist Government into
the United Nations.
Senator Flanders. Have you any thought or sugges-
tion as to with whom we would treat when it came to
such a conclusion as we hoped for? Would it be with
some exhausted remnant of the North Korean. Govern-
ment or would it be with Communist China or would
it be with Russia or who would it be with?
Secretary Marshall. I hope it won't be with Russia.
I can't answer you specifically, Senator.
Senator Flanders. If I knew with whom we could
treat, I could make a suggestion.
Secretary Marshall. Well, the suggestion might be very
valuable. I will say this, though, that in treating cer-
tainly with the Soviet Union, and I presume with the
North Korean representation, and I also feel certain with
the Chinese-regime representation, that we would have
to proceed to get the best conditions but we would never
dare relax with the feeling that they were conclusive
for quite a time.
Senator Flanders. Mr. Chairman, may I make a three-
minute suggestion?
Senator Russell. Yes, sir, we have no limitation here.
Senator Flanders. Except that we are supposed to
ask questions and listen.
Senator Russell. Well, you will not be setting any
new precedent if you make a great long statement before
you ask a question, Senator.
Senator Flanders. Well, I will promise to ask a ques-
tion at the end of it. This will not take me long, but if
we knew with whom to treat, with whom to discuss, here
is something we might do.
Senator Connally. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Sen-
ator a question?
Senator Flanders. Yes, sir.
Senator Connally. Would you consider it proper that
we might deal with an intermediary, some government?
Senator Flanders. Yes, an intermediary between us
and whom?
Senator Connally. All of them.
Senator Flanders. The question is with whom.
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 Senator ConnallAp011b~9bdlTp Release 2004/01/16
Senator Flanders. es.
Senator Connally. You suggest that.
Senator Flanders. Yes.
Suppose that we ask. our Ambassador, Mr. Austin, in
the United Nations to all attention to the immerse loss
of life, the immense cost and the suffering, both of the
armies and the civilian populations that was going on;
make the proposal, which is essentially the original
United Nations' purpose, of arranging a cease-fre, but
setting up a commission to administer the cease-fire,
and the withdrawal of forces, but have ready a distinctly
United Nations force ia which we would not be 90 per
cent or thereabouts, of the thing, to maintain civil order,
and then spend-allow three years of government under
the United Nations to be followed by a free election at
the end, and then sper.d a fraction of what we are now
spending, and ask the ether nations to appropriate their
corresponding fractior.s to rebuilding that unhappy
country.
Now, that is something that is new in the world's his-
tory, and. it seems to me something new is required; and
it just strikes me that if that is subject to the veto power
of the Soviet Government that their faces would get
very red if they proposed to veto a proposal of that sort.
Secretary Marshall. :: don't think they possess a, blush.
Senator Flanders. Well, it seems to me that some un-
usual way out of this thing has to be found, and _ I am
just making this suggestion, and I promised to ask a
question at the end. of it, and the question would be,
do you think it is worth considering?
Secretary Marshall. Well, I think certain phases of
that have already been considered. I don't undertake
to pass on the complete statement, but I know certain
phases of that we have been considering very carefully;
how, if the fighting wac terminated, would we set up the
situation under those conditions.
Senator Flanders. The additional point then that I
am recommending, and trying to make, is as to whether
the suggestions may nct contain in it some things that
would tend to end the fighting; that is, not merely to
apply it after the fighting, but there may be in it some-
thing useful in shortening the period of conflict.
Secretary Marshall. And I might also say that Mr.
Pace, if you call him be "ore your Committee, as I believe
you. are doing, can give you, I think, some very :illunii-
nating statements regarding the role he was to carry
out in the rehabilitation of Korea after this devastating
experience.
Senator Flanders. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, General Marshall.
Senator Russell. Senator Sparkman.
Senator Sparkman. 1: have sat here all through this
week listening to you. :: have been here, I believe, every
session and most of thcc time and, in addition to that,
I have been reading the transcript each day.
I wish to say I think you have made a wonderful con-
tribution in the manne ? in which you have cleared up
many of these things that many of us were wondering
about.
I think you have given us a background and perspective
that otherwise we might not have had.
I realize that most of the questions that I should like
to ask have been asked, most of them many times, and
I hope that I shall not keep you very long. I do want
to ask just a few brief questions, which I think will call
for very brief answers; first, with reference to the use
of the Nationalist troolis. Now, General MacArthur in
his testimony said that is r his opinion it would take about
four months to make them ready for use.
I did not get whether he meant four months from this
CIA OPr7 OOl 49R009500Il8O@141Stell us about that?
Secretary Marshall. I can't answer that offhand. I
have forgotten. All I remeraber is Chiang Kai-shek of-
fered 33,000 the one period.
Senator Sparkman. In the period-
Secretary Marshall. In the beginning, and it wasn't
found advisable to accept them on the basis of efficiency,
equipment-
Senator Connally. Didn't he refuse to accept them?
Secretary Marshall. I beg your pardon?
Senator Connally. Didn't :he oppose accepting them at
that time?
Senator Sparkman. General MacArthur did.
Senator Connally. That is what I am talking about.
Senator Sparkman. For two reasons.
Secretary Marshall. On our side of the water on the
ground of the hazard introduced into the general situa-
tion in relation to enlargement of the war and the possi-
bility of the Soviet Government coming into the war.
Again in November he made another proposal, which
was either 40,000 or 60,000-I think 60,000-and the re-
action of the Chiefs of Staff to that was based largely
on the Fox group of 37 men..
Senator Sparkman. That was the group General Mac-
Arthur himself sent down.
Secretary Marshall. It came from his headquarters
under his direction, but it was requested by the Chiefs
of Staff.
Senator Sparkman. I remember his testifying-
Secretary Marshall. Covered most of the month of
August and they made the report the 11th of September.
Senator Sparkman. As I understand it, this mission
recently has been sent in accordance with the recom-
mendations made by that. board and in accordance with
the recommendations subsequently carried out with the
Generalissimo.
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, I think.
Senator Sparkman. Now, General MacArthur also tes-
tified before us that it was not his recommendation that
the Nationalist troops be moved to the mainland en
masse, but that he did think that there were possibilities
for a limited number to be used in Korea for some-
through infiltration to join the guerrillas, the non-Com-
munists on the mainland, and others to be used in small
forays or commando landing parties and such as that.
I don't know whether you care to comment on it or
not, but Is there very much guerrilla activity going on?
That is, back of the Communist lines.
Secretary Marshall. I would not like to talk about
that, sir.
Senator Sparkman. I will not press for it.
General MacArthur did say-and as I understand, this
has been the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, too-
that the primary objective of the forces on Formosa is
to defend Formosa.
Secretary Marshall. Correct, sir.
Senator Sparkman. And has been from the first.
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Sparkman. General Marshall, that leads me
to this question, and it seems that you are going to have
to repeat this just about every day in order to keep people
from saying the wrong thing--and that is with reference
to Formosa. You have said here, without any equivoca-
tion, that it is the policy of our Government, and has been,
I believe you said, for at least two years, that Formosa
should under no conditions fall into Communist hands.
Secretary Marshall. The reference to two years, I
don't think is correct.
Senator Sparkman. I thought, I saw that used.
Secretary Marshall. I don't recall making that state-
ment, but it has been for some time the definite policy,
108
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 it has been the reco gipav@#FcqrtDILogtWgs2&O l&V/16
it has been my own thought, and it has been the policy
of the Government.
Senator Sparkman. And it is very definitely the policy
of the Government now?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Sparkman. And that same thing applies to
the recognition of Red China?
Secretary Marshall. It does.
Senator Sparkman. And seating of Red China in the
United Nations?
Secretary Marshall. Yes.
Senator Sparkman: And the admission of Red China-
Secretary Marshall. Just a minute, Senator. The
recognition of Red China I am not commenting on one
way or the other, but the two things I was talking about
were their introduction to the United Nations and the
security of Formosa.
Senator Sparkman. And the security of Formosa?
Secretary Marshall. From Communist control.
Senator Sparkman. Now, General Marshall, you were
quoted as saying that you would advocate the use of the
veto to prevent the seating of Communist China in the
United Nations and, of course, it is charged repeatedly
that the United States is going to favor or at least to
let go by suflrance the seating of Red China in the United
Nations.
Now, you know nothing of any such plan as that, do
you?
Secretary Marshall. No, sir; I do not.
Senator Sparkman. Did you say-the record-it seems
there was a break into your answer, and the record was
not carried out fully-but, in your opinion, if the veto
can be used, do you believe it ought to be used?
Secretary Marshall. Well, I stepped into pretty deep
water there. In the first place, I think I said that the
power of the veto is a legal question in some respects,
and it is any lawyer's respective view.
As to the policy of this Government as to the use of
the veto, I am not sufficiently informed; at the time I
was talking about it, I was endeavoring to make clear
that I thought very positive action should be taken to
prevent Formosa from falling into the control of the
domination of any Communist government or regime.
Senator Sparkman. Or to allow China to be seated in
the United Nations?
Secretary Marshall. The same.
Senator Sparkman. As I recall, you bracketed the two
together.
Secretary Marshall. I have not discussed this with the
State Department as to the veto provision, because that
wasn't exactly my bailiwick, but I did barge into it.
Senator Sparkman. General Marshall, I want to say
I am certainly in complete accord with you; yet I think
it is only fair for the record to show the thing you have
just said, that there is honest difference of opinion over
the legal question as to whether or not the veto can be
used, and I will call your attention-
Secretary Marshall. I was merely told by my lawyer
in the Defense Department that this was a lawyer's
paradise for backs and forths. That is all I know.
Senator Sparkman. We. will not tie you into legal
discussions, but I call your attention to an article in the
Washington Evening Stpr of yesterday afternoon, an
Associated Press article quoting former United States
Senator Warren R. Austin, of Vermont, who is now our
Ambassador to the United Nations and our Representative.
on the Security Council, in which he dictated a state-
ment and, Mr. Chairman, I should like to read the state-
ment into the record. Mr. Austin's statement in part
follows, and I quote:
CIA r7`TQA0 2FRMWQ?Rfi14An the question
of whether or not the seating of the Chinese Com-
munists can be vetoed. The Charter of the United
Nations gives the great powers the right to the admis-
sion of new members, but the Charter names China
as a member of the United Nations.
"Therefore the issue is not one of whether or not
China should be admitted but rather one posing the
question which one of two claimant governments
should occupy the Chinese seat. This is a decision
to be made by two-thirds majority of the 60 members
of the United Nations and not one on which the
exercise of the veto will be allowed. It is a question
of credentials, not of admission. We believe in rule
by law and we believe the, law does not give us the
power to veto in this matter.
"However, we shall continue to do everything in
our power to persuade the majority not to admit
the Chinese Reds."
I just thought that in all fairness to the record it
would be well to have that placed in it at this point.
Senator Smith. Will the Senator yield for just a
second?
Senator Sparkman. Very briefly, yes.
Senator Smith. Would you object to putting in the
editorial on the same subject in the New York Times
this morning?
Senator Sparkman. No, no, I would be very glad to
because I admit the differences that do exist, real differ-
ences of good lawyers, and I would be very glad to have
that in at the same point.
Senator Russell. The editorial will go into the appen-
dix. I believe that will be Exhibit F, according to the
chart I am trying to keep.
Senator Smith. Put those two editorials together as
they are.
Senator Sparkman. This is an Associated Press news
item.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Sparkman. Yes, sir.
Now General Marshall, there is another question I am
not sure has been answered. If it has, I do not care
about cluttering up the record, but the question that has
always come into my mind has been this with reference
to the use of Nationalist troops, and let me say I for
one have always felt that the Nationalist troops on
Formosa did constitute a real asset for this country, both
for the defense of Formosa and for possible use to help
any movement that might be to our advantage, and so
I am not one that believes that they just ought to be
discredited entirely, but the question has often come to
my mind whether or not it would be just as economical
and just as feasible to use these additional South
Koreans that are available in lieu of the Nationalist
Chinese, that is in Korea.
Secretary Marshall. Well, the best military opinion I
can give you now and coming from out there -is our
present use of'them in filling vacancies in the existing
South Korean divisions is their most effective use, and
it.is not desirable under the conditions that now exist to
increase the number of divisions. That is General Ridg-
way's recommendation, and I think approximately Gen-
eral MacArthur's recommendation.
Senator Sparkman. Now, General Marshall, this letter
from President Truman on January 13 that you placed
in the record yesterday or the day before; I have for-
gotten which-it must have been the day before yester-
day because in yesterday morning's Washington Post
was a news item headed-"MacArthur's views on mes-
sage given." General MacArthur himself is not quoted,
but General Whitney, his aide, is quoted. The substance
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 9ph Pr sOJeent
of it is that by the" re eo UPfdJa o aRe4 s
in effect, was intendin; to pull out of Korea, and that
it was to be taken as an excuse-in fact, General Whitney
used the phrase-"to make the 8th Army a scapegoat."
Now, I thought, as a matter of fact, the impression
I got from reading the letter was the purpose of -it, and
perhaps the effect of it, was to stimulate greater resist-
ane over there rather than any urging or indication of
pulling out or withdrawal.
Secretary Marshall. I am quite certain there was no
consideration of any ki:id in the most remote manner of
the President trying to make the 8th Army a scapegoat.
I think the message itself can be read in plain terms, and
I would not endeavor to interpret it because I think it
is a simple matter of understanding.
Senator Sparkman. Was there any intention at any
time to make the 8th ILrmy the scapegoat?
Secretary Marshall. C have just answered that.
Senator Sparkman. I mean not in connection with
this letter but at any tfme.
Secretary Marshall. rhat would almost be treasonable.
Senator Sparkman. Well, I agree with you, and yet
that is the statement that I am reading from this-
Secretary Marshall. I didn't select that aide, you
knew.
Senator Sparkman. .-United Press article. He refers
to it in_ so many words.
Secretary Marshall. :C don't care to discuss it, Senator.
Senator Sparkman. Be says, "MacArthur wasn't going
to use the 8th Army as i scapegoat."
Secretary Marshall. I don't care to discuss
cedure.
Senator Sparkman. All right. I just wanted to be
certain that we got it onto the record that it was not
intended to lessen the resistance but really to step it up,
was it not?
Secretary Marshall. :: think you can read the message
from the President and understand it very clearly.
Senator Sparkman. :Chat is the way I read it.
Now, I was very glad that you brought out many of
these things in a true perspective-for instance, the
message to General MacArthur suggesting the possibility
of sending arms over there to use to arm South Koreans,
by which the number could be increased, as I recall, a
mfn:imum of 75,000 and a maximum of 300,000, and he
decided it would be better to use it on the Japanese state
police. As I understand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff went
along with his recommendation.
Secretary Marshall. I think that is correct.
Senator Sparkman. You told us that, I believe.
Secretary Marshall. '?'es.
Senator Sparkman. Now reading the telegram that he
sent back to Mr. Henry P azlitt in response to his telegram,
there is just nothing wrong on the face of it; but when
you read it together w.th the directive that had gone
out from the Joint Chie:'s of Staff and the decision, why,
it seems to me that, wl.at shall we say, he was passing
the buck. You will rec ell that he said--
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir, I recall.
Senator Sparkman. He said it was a political matter
over which he had no control.
Secretary Marshall. didn't know whether you had
finished or not. He did not receive a directive from the
Chiefs of Staff. He received-
Senator Sparkman. A suggestion?
Secretary Marshall. --a proposal to which they wished
to have a reply. And then he made a reply.
And as to the message he received, I don't care to go
into the interpretation, its possible implication.
Senator Sparkman. Standing alone it would have been
all right. But denying that he had any part in it, it
CIA
seenis RDPt75m0e0thatRd0P0 0?0000de4with the exchange of
the two earlier messages.
Secretary Marshall. I don't think he denied he didn't
have any part in it.
Senator Sparkman. Well, he said it was beyond his
control or some such word. I will get the exact language.
"The issue is one determined by the Republic of Korea
and the United States Government and involves basic
political decisions beyond my authority."
I do not care about belaboring that point. You dis-
cussed it very fully yesterday, as I recall.
Now, General Marshall, General MacArthur also testi-
fied about the trade with Red China, and it is a matter
of; great concern to all of us, any trade that is going in
there, particularly with items that are usable for war
purposes. ,
When he was here he had a report which had been
given to him, as I recall, by the consul general at Hong
Kong which showed that, I believe, some forty million
dollars' worth of products had gone through the Port
of Hong Kong over a period of three weeks time.
He said that they contained both proscribed and non-
proscribed materials. Then, later on he detailed some of
those things that were included in 'there.
Just yesterday, I attended a Committee meeting of the
Banking and Currency Committee in which we had some
people up to discuss this question of trade, and in the
course of it I was given, and I got, a copy of the speech
that Sir Hartley Shawcross, the president of the Board of
Trade, made in the House of Commons on May tenth, and
I was attracted by this paragraph:
"General MacArthur, if correctly reported, seems per-
haps not to have fully appreciated the nature of some of
the information in the document itself." He is talking
about this report. "He referred by name to a number
of items on this so-called strategic list, as I think it was
called, but he did not mention the smallness of the
quantities of many of the items involved. Thus he
referred to petroleum, Diesel oils, fuel oils, gasoline,
kerosene, and lubricants. Certainly, they were on the
list. His recital of the fact caused very naturally great
anxiety. What he does not seem to have pointed out, at
any rate so far as the reports over here are concerned,
is that the list showed nil quantities as having been
exported to China. In fact, all exports of that kind had
been prohibited as long ago as July, 1950." I close the
quotation.
I presume you have no knowledge of those things your-
self?
Secretary Marshall. I have not a detailed knowledge.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, let me ask you, was
this report that General MacArthur purported to be
quoting from-I will not say quoting, but listing these
things from-was it introduced, placed in the record?
Senator Russell. I do not :recall that it was.
Senator Sparkman. If not, I should like for us to
request it from General MacArthur or ask the State
Department to get us a copy of that report, and at the
same time, I should like for you to ask the State Depart-
ment to give us a report covering the trade of Japan with
Red China from July 1st of last year to the present time.
It is my understanding that several million dollars'
worth of goods are going from Japan, and have been,
right up certainly until within the last few days.
I'do not. do this in any sense of criticism, but to indicate
the difficulty of this whole thing.
I: know that the trade with Japan. can be sustained
on economic facts, but I think that it is well to have
it in the record, have it available for the record in order
that we may see the comp;exity of this whole trade
situation.
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 Senator Russell. UP~Ry'1~e~rizt8~t~~`a~Vcr~doEE Q/16 i~ xiTi'tCto7et'PlHi"iii' tS~VTi9fhlrid -~owever.
f~t
here, if the Senator will just drop me a little note indi-
cating these documents he desires, I shall undertake,
as Chairman of the Committee, to secure them for use
of the Committee.
Senator Sparkman. Yes, Mr. Chairman; thank you, I
will do that.
Now, General, just another question or two and I am
going to quit: General Marshall, when General Mac-
Arthur was before us, an excerpt from a talk given by
Dean Rusk was read to him, and I want to quote it to
you just very briefly: "What we are trying to do is to
maintain peace and security without a general war. We
are saying to the aggressors, 'You will not be allowed
to get away with your crime. You must stop it.' And at
the same time, we are trying to prevent a general con-
flagration which would consume the very things we are
now trying to defend."
The question was put to General MacArthur-he was
asked to give his opinion of that statement, and Gen-
eral MacArthur said this, and I quote his words, as found
on page 100 of the transcript: "That policy, as you have
read it, seems to me to introduce a new concept into
military operations, the concept of appeasement."
Do you construe that as appeasement?
Secretary Marshall. Will you read Rusk's statement
again, please?
Senator Sparkman. Yes. "What we are trying to do
is to maintain peace and security without a general war.
We are saying to the aggressors, 'You will not be allowed
to get away with your crime. You must stop it.' At the
same time, we are trying to prevent a general conflagra-
tion which would consume the very things we are now
trying to defend."
Secretary Marshall. It does not appear as appease-
ment to me.
Senator Sparkman. Isn't that a statement of what
we are trying to do, stop the aggressor and to prevent
the spread of the conflagration?
Secretary Marshall. I think that is a simple statement
of the effort.
Senator Sparkman. Secretary Marshall, as I under-
stand, one of the basic differences in the opinions that
you have stated here and the opinions of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as you have given them and those enter-
tained by General MacArthur, has to do with the ability
of the Chinese to fight, the ability of the Soviets to come
to her aid, and also as to the tie between Red China
and Soviet Russia.
General MacArthur has stated on several different oc-
casions that while China, Red China, and Russia were
associates or allies, and I believe he referred to their
courses as being parallel, that he considered Red China
as being independent and acting on her own.
Do you believe that Red China does act on her own
or is she subject to direction and influence from Moscow?
Secretary Marshall. I have gone on the assumption
that she was operating not only in conjunction with but
literally under the direction of the Soviet Union.
Senator Sparkman. Well, of course, I think so too and
I think, I was greatly surprised when General Mac-
Arthur made that statement in effect when he spoke
to Congress and again when he testified here that China
parallels Russia but is not under the power or the direc-
tion, control, the influence of Moscow.
Thank you very much, General Marshall.
Senator Russell. Senator Long. -
Senator Long. I will try to be fairly brief, General
Marshall, although I do want to cover several subjects.
I believe you have been pretty clear with regard to your
mission to China in 1946. There is one thing that I
I believe you stated that after negotiations broke down,
that the Chinese Nationalist troops were defeated by
the Chinese Communists notwithstanding the fact that
there were about 3 million Chinese Nationalist troops
and about a million and a half Chinese Communist
troops, is that correct?
Secretary Marshall. Those were the comparative
strengths I think in December of 1946, and at that time
the Nationalist Government was at the peak of its
military progress, and from that time on it went into
the downgrade. Does that answer the question? -
Senator Long. Are you now referring to the close of
the truce period, the. period at which the truce was
ended?
Secretary Marshall. The truce period closed before
that. The general effort of the Nationalist Government
to destroy the power of the Communist regime by mili-
tary action had its beginnings in June.
Senator Long. What year?
Secretary Marshall. 1946, and it was a sporadic pro-
cedure with a great deal of negotiations in the effort to
terminate the development of hostilities.
Manchuria was somewhat apart at the time. It was
very active fighting there on both sides, but in North
China the truce had been generally kept, but as I say,
in June it began to react in North China and both sides
became heavily involved here and there, and it was con-
stantly increasing the menace of general fighting.
The actual last ameliatory efforts I think were in
October. I have forgotten just what the exact date was,
but it ceased to be a practical proposition to mediate
in any way towards terminating hostilities because for
my own part I felt that the Communists were so en-
gaged in at least propaganda attacks against the United
States and certainly some deliberate attacks which I
referred to in connection with the Marines in North
China, that it was no longer a practical proposition for
me to. attempt to be a go-between between the two
governments.
Senator Long. You stated that at that time you felt
that the Chinese Nationalists were at the very peak
of their military power?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir. Not military power so
much as the military achievements, but I think I also
said afterwards that they had gotten themselves into a
position of great weakness by an overextension.
Senator Long. Because they had overextended their
position? .
Secretary Marshall. They had overextended their
position.
Senator Sparkman. Will the Senator yield to me for
about 20 seconds to correct an error?
Senator Long. Yes. -
Senator Sparkman. If this may be placed back where
I was asking General Marshall questions, I think I asked
this question wrong. General Whitney said that this
letter told MacArthur to hold his position and that it
represented a reversal of policy. I think I stated my
question wrong a while ago.
The final question I asked you did bear on the same
thing, and, Mr. Chairman, if I may in order that it be
straight I would like to insert the item at that point.
Senator Russell. Senator, under the procedure we have
adopted here, you will have to read it if it gets into the
record. Otherwise we can have it appear in the appen-
dix. We will be glad to have it appear in the appendix
just as it is.
Senator Sparkman. If the Senator will let me read
just about 30 seconds, I will do so:.
"MacArthur believed, Whitney said, that the mes-
111
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 sage differed fr ,pr4cvc@Axf 4!irR$19ASgf2%*/A1A16 : CIA e T51Q 900500090014-6
Chiefs of Staff because it directed him to hold : ndefi-
:nitely in Korea. He said MacArthur construed it as
the President's implication that he desired our posi-
tion in Korea to be held indefinitely and that this
was a reversal of the views he, MacArthur, had,
;previously received 'rom Washington."
Senator Russell. D) you desire the remainder of it,
to be printed?
Senator Sparkman. Yes, I think it would be well for
the whole thing to go in as an exhibit.
Senator Russell. TI iat will appear in, the appendix.
Senator Sparkman. Thank you.
Senator Long. The point I had in mind is at the time
these negotiations brc ke down, the Chinese Nationalists
had about 3 million troops and the Chinese Communists
had about a million and a half according to your best
recollection.
Secretary Marshall.
period.
Senator Long. Nov, what is your impression of the
equipment the troops had? How well were the Chinese
Nationalists equipped compared to the equipment avail-
able to the Chinese Communists?
Secretary Marshall. The equipment of the Chinese
Nationalists was of a regular order. They were in
divisional units and they had for the most part. the
equipment appropriate to that sort of a unit.
Senator Long. Did it include artillery? Did they have
good artillery, good tanks, that sort of thing?
Secretary Marshall. Well, they had not so many tanks
and I don't know how good they were. Their artillery
was in part good and a part ineffective.
The Communists were equipped with nondescript ma-
terial, some that they had taken from the Japanese,
some that they had taken from the Nationalist Govern-
ment in various military encounters, and some presum-
ably that they had obtained from Russia, but we had a
very hard time identi'ying equipment picked up in cap-
tures that were of that nature.
As a matter of fact, they seldom lost any equipment.
They salvaged all their equipment in most actions be-
cause there was a-great dearth of it among their troops.
Senator Long. Woi:.ld you say that generally speaking
the Chinese Nationalists were far better equipped than
the Chinese Communists?
Secretary Marshall. Very much so.
Senator Long. Notwithstanding that, the Chinese Na-
tionalists were finally driven off the continent during
the next two years. What was your impression as to the
morale of the Chin(.se Nationalist troops engaged in
those encounters?
Secretary Marshall. It depended very largely on lead-
ership, and I though; in the main they had very inef-
fective leadership and they handled their operations with
a, great deal of ineptitude, and I think that was the char-
acterization of the operations many times by my observ-
ers and those that were out there after I left China.
Senator ,Long. I have read details of even whole di-
visions that were sent into battle well equipped that sur-?
rendered without even firing a shot, it was said, but I:
am sure what the person who told me that meant; was
that they surrendere I without making a serious effort.
Do you know wheth(r any surrenders of that sort oc-?
curred?
Secretary Marshall. I wouldn't like to
because I don't remember specific details.
. It was a general hr.pression of their failure to fight to
the point of justifici tion of the advantages they pos-
sessed in the way of equipment, but not to mention the
disadvantages they possessed in the lack of leadership,
Senator Connally. May I intervene right there just
for a moment. I heard General Barr. General Barr
was our military man with. the troops, was he not?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Connally. He testified and told us that he
never knew of a defeat of the Nationalists by reason of
their lack of arms or equipment or supplies, ammuni-
tion, but that defeats were caused by their unwillingness
to fight.
Thank you.
Senator Long. I wanted. to get the details on that.
Now do you believe or have reason to believe that sub-
stantia). additional military aid from this nation at that
time would have changed the result;?
Secretary Marshall. I do not think so. I think the
question was one of leadership, and the question was
one of the support of the Army by the people.
Senator Long. Do you think they would have changed
the result had we had more American military advisers
to advise the Chinese Nationalists tactically?
Secretary Marshall. I think the presence of American
military advisers with the troops would have been help-
ful, but what was basically lacking was the support of
the Army by the people, meaning the men in the Army
themselves had acquired a feeling of resentment towards
the Government or uncertainty as to the Government
which so weakened their willingness to fight that along
with the incapacity of leadership their effectiveness
was greatly limited.
Senator Long. I have heard this story several times,
that there was a great amount of, shall we say, graft in
the ranks of the Army, that in some cases money that was
supposed to go to pay the troops went to the higher-
ranking officers, and by the time it got down to the
troops, the officers had entered into speculations and in-
flation had set in so that the money wouldn't buy what
it would have brought originally or that possibly the
troops didn't get their full amount anyway. Was it your
impression based on the advice given you by your mili-
tary advisers that there was some merit to those rumors?
Secretary Marshall. There had been considerable
merit to those rumors during periods of the war which
General Stilwell brought to my attention.
At the time I was out there, I think in the main that
procedure had been halted. Always there would be a
certain portion of it because that was sort of habitual
under the conditions of the years in China.
Later on I can only guess what would happen when
the severely inflationary situation developed and it took
so much money to buy anything and the troops or their
leaders couldn't meet the situation without getting ad-
ditional funds.
To what extent that developed, I don't know.
Senator Long. Now, it was subsequent to that time
that the Greek-Turkish aid program was put into effect,
that the Truman Doctrine was announced, is that
correct?
Secretary Marshall. It was authorized, I think, along
about in the late spring of 1947; but probably did not get
under way until that summer.
Senator Long. Now, in the Greek-Turkish aid pro-
gram, particularly as applied to Greece, there were ac-
tually efforts made by this Government to improve upon
the quality of the government by the Greeks, as I under-
stand it, as well as to give them advice and military aid.
That program was announced and adopted subsequent
to the unsuccessful attempt to stabilize the situation in
China, is that correct?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Long. There is some argument that possibly
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 I
at the time we unde y~ oM O8WR%48 s8n2tS 4'/16 : ~f1~ ff 5 ft 0a ~0 1 so far as west
that we should have ?5`` ue a same course in hina. sia. nd i you reca o 0 ov came to Paris with
Looking back on it, do you have the impression that a large entourage of people to work on various aspects
that would have been practical, at the time? of it, and for some reason, which he would not explain,
Secretary Marshall. Well, the effort of our Govern- but apparently his feeling that the British and the
ment, in many ways, through many people, was to try French had sort of ganged up against the Soviet Union,
to bring influence to bear that would improve the ad- and that I was in the plot, he, without any notice, de-
ministrative procedure of the Government, and brighten parted from Paris.
it up, as it were. But, specifically, the proposal was worded so that it
Senator Long. Speaking of the Chinese Government, included all of those nations. And I might say, I think,
now? that in the discussion with my own people in the State
Secretary Marshall. Chinese Nationalist Government. Department there was some opposition to stating it that
Senator Long. Yes, sir. way because they felt that the entry of the Soviet into
Secretary Marshall. But the doctrine promulgated by the matter would merely mean a stalemate-they would
the President of the United States was directly along just make it impossible to proceed. I felt that that was
that line. a probability, but, that, nevertheless, we must make the
What we did in Greece, was not done by compulsion; proposal in those terms because it would be most unwise
it was not done, we will say, assertively; but it was done for us to set the line of demarcation which the Iron
by continual efforts along diplomatic lines, by the Am- Curtain now does define.
bassador, and it was done-and in this group that was Senator Long. In other words, if the world was to be
sent out to Greece to make particularly the economic divided into two blocs, one bloc of largely capitalist
recovery of Greece possible, it was done in connection nations and free nations, and another of Communist
with that, which, of course, exercised quite an influence nations, if that cleavage were to take place, we should
on the Greek Government because they were receiving not take the initiative in making it so?
money to do certain things, and if they were unwilling Secretary Marshall. That is it, sir.
to try to clarify their governmental situation, it was con- Senator Long. And you didn't want the remaining
fessedly in a poor way, why, they would be in a rather free nations to go behind the Iron Curtain, or to become
inconsistent position. Communist because of the economic breakdown of their
However, I think, in Greece, though I don't know this economy?
authoritatively, the complication was-many parties, Secretary Marshall. That is it.
many parties, and under the threat of changes of con- Senator Long. Of course, when the Soviet group de-
trol at any moment. clined to co-operate, that made it fairly simple for you
In China, you were not having any changes at all, to go right ahead then with the free nations that did
and had not had for a long period of years, but they desire to participate?
were suffering from the corrosive effect of people a long Secretary Marshall. In one way it made it simple, but
time in authority. we had continuous efforts, and in a very disagreeable
Senator Long. By and large, one of the main differ- and dangerous way, by Communist procedures to try to
ences of the result in the Greek policy and the Chinese break it down.
policy, I take it then, would be the difference of co- Senator Long. If the Soviet satellite nations had seen
operation between the two governments and the differ- fit to go along, that might itself have posed some prob-
ence of understanding between the people who were, lem for the Soviet, in that by those nations co-operating
trying to work it out, and in Greece you had occidental with this nation, their desire would certainly have been
people who seemed to understand our way of doing things to co-operate with our peaceful intentions to better the
better, and in China we had great difficulty in working world generally. It would have been difficult for the
out an understanding on how to try to meet the situa- Soviet to have lined them up on that basis, inimical to
tion, I take it? the proper interests of this nation; is that correct?
Secretary Marshall. Yes; we were dealing with a China Secretary Marshall. If they had gone along with good
of several thousand years, of, we will say, culture or faith, it would have had a tremendous effect in Europe.
methods or procedures, good, bad and indifferent, and Senator Long. It would have been a tremendous effect
with a fixative which was very hard to overcome. in reducing the aggressive designs of the Communists in
In Greece you had all sorts of complications, but they Russia as well as in their satellite countries.
were quite a different character, I think, in the main. Now the question has been raised about Formosa, and
Senator Long. Yes. Now, after the successful approach I would like to get your judgment on it if you would
in Greece and Turkish aid, you then proposed what has comment on it. Do you believe that if Formosa should
now become known the world over as the Marshall Plan fall into unfriendly hands that it actually throws our
to attempt to stabilize the world economy and particu- defenses back to California and the Western Coast of
larly the free nations. And that was in a large measure the United States?
proposed, I take it, to prevent the spread of Communism, Secretary Marshall. I will try'to recall how I answered
to prevent governments from falling under the domina- that question this morning. I think I said that I did
tion of the Soviet; is that correct? not think it retired our frontiers to that extent, but I
Secretary Marshall. It was to produce a healthy situ- thought it would be a great danger to our position in
ation as rapidly as possible because we felt that in the the Western Pacific.
poverty-stricken state of Europe, if that was long con- Senator Long. Just measuring it on a map or on a
tinued, we would have developed an utterly impossible globe of the world, roughly, I discovered that it is
situation governmentally, which would have been largely farther from Formosa to the United States than it is
Communistic. from the equator to the North Pole, and that we have
Senator Long. Now there has been some point made a large and substantial number of islands between
that it was originally proposed under the Marshall Plan Formosa and the United States no matter what course
that the Soviet and her satellites could have shared in one would take; is that correct?
that program. Is that correct, that originally they could Secretary Marshall. I would have to go sit down with
have participated in it if they cared to? . you to study that map. ' That is a brand-new approach.
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 Senator Long. Appra kfctligeieelste, Q11A6
greatest Navy that t: to world has ever known, and
having air power that certainly need not take a back
seat to any nation, do you see why we would be forced
back in our defenses-[ Deleted]
Senator Long. I see. Now, if we bring Chiang's troops
into Korea, speaking of the Chinese Nationalists, would
that tend to complicate our problem in trying to arrange
negotiations to arrive at a settlement of the Korean
question?
I have in mind, for example, that if we get the civil
war of China going on in Korea, it might make it more
difficult to work out a settlement there.
Secretary Marshall. We thought of that difficulty, but
our main reaction was to the development of a situation
which would introduce the threat of development into
a general war and the Specific reaction in the opinion of
our allies that this would be a very dangerous procedure.
Senator Long. I see. Now, you have stated that under
no conditions should w-~ let Formosa fall into Red hands,
particularly if we were in position to prevent that.
If Chiang's troops are not able to defend it, how are
we going to keep it from falling into their hands?
Secretary Marshall. The move at the present time by
our mission going out there is to try to improve their
training and build up, we hope, their morale, and also
they have the stimulating effect of the commitment of
th".s Government to hE lp them on the sea in resisting,
on the sea and in the air, of course, in resisting an
invasion.
Senator Long. Do you think that we can afford to
make commitments indefinitely that will keep our Navy
in position to prevent them from crossing--
Secretary Marshall. [ could not answer that right now.
Senator Long. -to Formosa.
If we expect to do that indefinitely, that, too, makes
it more difficult to work out a final settlement of the
Korean question, does it not?
Secretary Marshall. It is related to it.
Senator Long. Now, with regard to the fighting in
Korea, how much mor if anything, do you think the
Chinese Government, would be able to do in carrying the
war to us? You stated'-., I believe, that she does have a
substantial number of airplanes that could be flown in,
is that correct?
Secretary Marshall. I stated in regard to-Chinese
Communist forces?
Senator Long. Chinese Communist forces.
Secretary Marshall. The reports we have indicate a
considerable build-up I(,. the number of planes.
[Deleted]
Senator Long. Do yc u have the impression that China
would be able to subs;antially increase the amount of
mechanized equipment that is presently operating against
us in Korea?
Secretary Marshall. Do you mean to introduce it into
Korea or to produce it as a matter of industrial-
Senator Long. I man to send more into Korea. I
do not believe she has the industrial potential to pro-
duce a great amount, lout do you believe that she might
have a substantial amount of additional mechanized
equipment that could 1 e sent into Korea?
Secretary Marshall. We have assumed all along that
they have tanks in some numbers, and probably artillery.
Senator Long. So far, they have used very little in
the way of tanks, have they?
Secretary Marshall. They used' them a. great deal at
the start; that is the North China element. Those were
all knocked out, of cou cse, in the end.
Senator Long. You mean the North Korean elements.
You said North China; you mean the North Koreans.
CIA-REtFe.SrpOd A9M0O05@A90014-6
Senator Long. Have you seen any evidence of the
Chinese Communists using those?
Secretary Marshall. Well it is hard to identify a tank
from the air as being a Chinese or North Korean tank.
Our air has destroyed a good many tanks from week
to week, where they have picked them up on the road,
and the great difficulty of the Chinese Communist forces
in the war and the North Korean forces, has been to
bring this heavy equipment forward, because of the dam-
age that is inflicted upon their transportation, and the
damage that is inflicted on such heavy materiel by our
planes.
They are restricted to movements almost entirely at
night, and they have bad, very bad, trails to go over,
and then in concealment, ;photographically and other-
wise, we generally can locate about where they are, so
that they have had a very hard time introducing this
heavier equipment into the fighting since it has devel-
oped in the present stage.
Senator Long. Well, I take it then that you doubt
that they are pulling their punches in so far as using
mechanized equipment is concerned?
Secretary Marshall. I think they have done the best
they could under the circumstances.
Senator Long. And so far as you know, there is no
reason to believe that they could ;send large numbers
of tanks and half-tracks and motorized equipment in
addition to what they have already sent forward?.
Secretary Marshall. Well, they may have been train-
ing personnel to handle this additional and larger num-
ber of heavy pieces of materiel, because they have had
very heavy losses with what they have had, and they
have to replace that with trained people, as well as the
materiel itself.
I would rather assume that they are having more diffi-
culty in replacing trained personnel than they are in
the matter of the equipment. I am just guessing; and
they are having great difficulty, I know, with all heavy
equipment in carrying it on the front, and keeping it
sufficiently concealed there to be ready for a movement
forward.
Senator Long. Now, China had ail Army of a million
and a half in the civil war, and, presumably, they have
increased their armies substantially more since that time.
Do you believe that they are able to maintain a greater
force of man power in the field than they presently have
against us?
Secretary Marshall. I would have difficulty in answer-
ing that, except to say that I do feel that they have
had a very serious proportion of their trained force
debilitated, dissipated, in one way or another from the
actions they have been in.
Now, to what extent they have remaining well-trained
elements I couldn't answer that, but the Chiefs of Staff
may be able to give you a more direct reply.
Senator Long. Well, my impression is that so far they
have had between 200,000 and 300,000 men operating
against us, who were Chinese Communists.
A country of that enormous popul.ation,,to a layman,
would seem to be capable, at least, of putting millions
of men into the field, or at least an army of a million
or two million men, and that is a desire I have-I am
curious to know whether or not you thought they were
able to maintain a larger army in Korea than they are
presently maintaining there?
Secretary Marshall. Well, I think you would get a
better answer of that from the Chiefs of Staff, but you
have got to consider order in China; you have got to
consider their commitments to the south opposite Indo-
China; and order in China, and various strong locations
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 which have to be kel9lpproetect>.foog Reiea ,e 2004/01/16
Senator Long. General MacArthur made the state-
ment that China is already making her maximum effort
in Korea. Are you inclined to agree with that statement?
Secretary Marshall. Well, I am inclined to agree with
that statement.
[Deleted]
Senator Long. I would like to ask this question with
regard to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty organ-
ization:,
Although we need more troops in Europe, I take it,
why can't we work out some basis upon which they
could share the fighting in Korea, while we send addi-
tional American troops to protect the areas within the
borders of those nations?
For example, we are sending four divisions, as fast as
we can raise them, to Europe. That gives them addi-
tional security. Why can't they send some of the divi-
sions that they are raising, in view of that, to help out
with the actual fighting, bleeding, and sacrifice that must
go into fighting for freedom?
Secretary Marshall. We would be getting nowhere on
that basis of putting in and taking out at the same time.
What we are trying to build up is a 'respectable defense
in Western Europe.
Senator Long. I believe that the average American
would be very happy to have them put in six divisions
,and let us take out six of our combat divisions. They
would get better protection, and at the same time have
the opportunity to share some of the sacrifices, sir.
Has that been considered?
Secretary Marshall. I do not think that has been
considered.
Senator Long. Now, along the same line, wouldn't all
of our troops in Korea be safer if we had a reasonable
margin of safety there? In other words, if we had more
troops, wouldn't each man be safer, and have a better
chance?
Secretary Marshall. I think that is so.
Senator Long. Therefore I was wondering why not
send more troops, even it was more of our own?
Secretary Marshall. You ask that from the Chiefs of
Staff, and get their direct answer to that, because that
is getting right into our general war plans.
.Senator Long. All right, sir.
Along a different line, do you believe that we could win
a war against Russia, if the war was started now?
Secretary Marshall. I don't want to talk about it on
the record, and I,would rather hesitate to talk about it
off the record.
Senator Long. The point I had in mind is that it has
been my feeling that if a war against Soviet Russia
occurred in another two years or another year, say, we
might have a greater certainty to winning the war, but
that to win it would mean a greater cost.
For example, if the war occurred later on, even though
we might have our nation better prepared, you would
have to recognize the fact that the progress our enemies
would make, in terms of atomic preparedness, would
enable them to inflict much greater damage upon us, .even
though we correspondingly would be able to increase-
inflict much greater damage upon them.
Secretary Marshall. [deleted]
Senator Long. Of course the point I had in mind,
again, General Marshall, and if you would not care to
comment on it, I would completely understand-but it
does seem to me that in our planning we are overlooking
the fact that even though we might somewhat increase
our certainty of victory by postponing a risk that we must
someday take, nevertheless we are going to have greater
damage done to us by postponing it..
CI/9I4KWT&00'?10Q61T0N9@*41gake stronger and
more forceful efforts against China, that we could proba-
bly shorten the conflict there.
I don't know, but I assume that would be possible,
might be possible, and as far as the risk of war with
China, at least as far as Russia is concerned, it would
seem like it might be unwise just to indefinitely continue
to let her feel that we are afraid to call her hand.
Secretary Marshall. We are-what?
Senator Long. We are afraid to call her hand.
Secretary Marshall. Well, you would have to qualify
that last expression, because when they are losing many
thousands of people with each operation, the question is
whether they will end. up with any hands.
Senator Long. In other words, you are not inclined
to go along with those who feel that we are being bled
white in Korea, while Red Russia remains aloof, with
every bit as much potential as she ever had?
Secretary Marshall. I think the desire of the Russians
is to have us bled white in Korea. There is no question
about that in my mind-to have us more completely en-
gaged there than we can afford to be, in view of the
situation, the vulnerability of Western Europe.
Senator Long. The point I had in mind being that if
we could adopt measures that would bring it to a speedier
conclusion there, even at the risk of war with Russia,
is she gaining or are we gaining in this case?
I take it that you do believe that time is on our side?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Long. In postponing an ultimate conflict?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Long. And of course what you are hopeful of
is that we will be able to prevent a, war; that sooner or
later we will be able to work it out without any war at
all-that is our real objective?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct.
Senator Long. Do you believe it would be a good idea
to further disperse our industry?
Secretary Marshall. What?
Senator Long. Further disperse our industries in this
nation?
Secretary Marshall. That is getting into a pretty tech-
nical question at the present time. The dispersal of in-
dustry is a very expensive business, and a very difficult
business when you are trying tq increase production.
I would not care to comment on that at this particular
moment. I used to know pretty well all the conditions,
but I don't know them sufficiently well to comment on
them at the present time, except to say that that partic-
ular proposal has not been brought to my attention.
Senator Long. Now, there are some people who feel that
by taking a somewhat hesitant policy about going all
out against our enemies, we may be actually encourag-
ing them to become aggressive, on the theory that be-
cause we do not meet them with a more forceful solution
to the question, that they may be - encouraged to think
that we are afraid of them.
Do you have any comment to make on that?
Secretary Marshall. Well, I would say that we have a
very difficult situation in relation to things like that,
when all of our thoughts have to be expressed publicly,
and we don't get theirs at all.
Senator Long. General Marshall, so far, with regard
to the Berlin blockade and the policy that we followed
in Greece, we have had the previous situations where
there appeared to be stalemates, and that were enor-
mously expensive to this nation; and in those previous
occasions what they called the stalemate proved to be the
dawn just before the daybreak, didn't it?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Long. And that is what you are hoping this
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Secretary Marshall. Very much so.
>enator Long. A pr,;lude to a victory for what we are
trying to accomplish.
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Long. And so, although in one sense it would
appear to be a stalemate, your judgment is that actually
we are winning, at least we are day by day reaching
what we could regard as a successful outcome of this
venture to resist aggression?
Secretary Marshall. We are moving toward that.
Senator Long. Moving toward-
Secretary Marshall. A successful outcome.
Senator Long. Originally we started out, I believe,
in your language, to rc pel an attack, or repel an aggres-
sion and to destroy thr, aggressor.
Now, we are not trying to destroy the Chinese aggres-
sors, as a nation, I take it, or as a government?
Secretary Marshall. The aggressor in Korea we would
destroy, if we could, .f that were a practical military
operation at the moment.
We are destroying them, in one sense, day by day.
Senator Long. Even General MacArthur has not recom-
mended that we attempt to actually destroy the Chinese
Government; so in so far as destroying the aggressor, we
were at one time attempting to destroy the North Korean
Government as an aggressor, but we are not trying to
destroy the Chinese Communist Government, as a-
Secretary Marshall. We are trying to destroy the
North Korean Army, and pacify Korea.
Senator Long. Pacify what?
Secretary Marshall. Pacify Korea.
Senator Long. The statement of the President, on
April 11, 1951, is to the effect that we are trying to
limit the conflict, and that even though it may not be
limited, that we are no'; going to accept the responsibility
of being the ones that broaden it into an all-out war.
That is the policy that this nation is still pursuing, I
take it?
Secretary Marshall. It is not only the question of not
accepting responsibilitr. We don't want to develop into
an. all-out war; and particularly if we would lose our
allies by doing so.
Senator Long. The ?resident said in that speech:
"If the Communist, authorities realize that they
cannot. defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be
foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then
they may recognize the fallacy of continuing their
aggression. A peaceable settlement may then be pos-
sible. The door is always open."
I take it that In line with that, it is your feeling that
when they proceeded t(, launch their last offensive, which
cost them enormously in man power, with very little loss
in man power to this nation, that that type thing should
hasten their realization that they cannot defeat our
forces and drive them out and that should hasten the
day when you should lie able to work out a satisfactory
solution to the Korean question.
Secretary Marshall. Somewhat along that line, sir.
Senator Long. That is all the questions I want to ask
you, General. Thank y )u.
Senator Russell. Senator Gillette.
Senator Gillette. Mi. Chairman, is it the desire of the
Chairman to finish with the General tonight?
Senator Russell. We.1, of course, if that can be accom-
plished without curtailing any Senator in the questions
that he proposes to propound, I should like very much,
if we could, to comp] ate the first round of questions
today.
Senator Gillette. In compliance with that, I shall be
ve:~;y glad-
wishes in that matter?
Secretary Marshall. I beg your pardon?
Senator Russell. What are your wishes in that matter?
Secretary Marshall. I would like to finish, but I am in
your hands.
'Senator Russell. You may proceed.
Senator Gillette. General, a number of years ago
when I was company commander, I used to feel sorry for
the little fellow who was number eight in the last set
of squads down at the end of the line; and during this
long week I have been exemplifying that number-eight
man down at the left end of the line.
:But, realizing how worn and tired you must be in this
prolonged grilling, I shall make my interrogation very,
very short.
We have been sitting here, as you know, General, in
conformity with unanimous-consent request that the
Chairman of the Armed Services Committee had secured
from the Senate and which he very cogently and very
clhlarly presented at the outset of these hearings.
The Armed Services Committee is not only sitting in
that capacity, in conformity with the senatorial per-
rrmission, but they are sitting in conformity with their
responsibility as an agency of the United States under
the rules of the Senate. We of the Foreign Relations
Committee have been sitting in through their courtesy.
None of us are sitting as a high board of strategy, as I
conceive it, but trying to develop facts that will aid in
dispelling the confusion that is general throughout the
country, which has been brought to a head with the
recall of General MacArthur.
In my opinion, there were two great issues that have
been joined here:
First, was there such a conflict of views as to the con-
duct of the military effort in Korea between the Com-
mander in Chief and his Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the one
hand, and the field commander, on the other, as to
seriously imperil the successful conduct of the war?
Was an implementing field commander taking a posi-
ti6n in public pronouncements or statements that would
be made! public incompatible with or having an adverse
effect on policies of our country, which had been deter-
mined through the policy-making process?
This hearing, of course, has covered that over and over
again, and you have been asked numerous questions and
have answered and we shall continue.
1 want to ask you just three of four questions in con-
nection with that issue and then I will refer to what I
conceive to be the second real issue.
It is asserted that we have been reluctant to accept
some of the suggestions made by General MacArthur and
those who believe, as he has asserted, that it does not
meet with the approval of our allies and that we would
risk alienation of our allies.
My first question, is it reasonable to fear that our allies
would risk losing United States great economic and mili-
tary aid by refusing to accept our views as to bombing
Manchurian bases and blockading China coasts or using
Chiang's troops as a Chinese mainland threat if we
presented these proposals with definite insistence?
Secretary Marshall. [deleted]
Senator Gillette. Thank you, sir.
,The second question, can any instance be named where
the Soviet Republic at any time, any place or any circum-
stances, including the Yugoslavian episode, threatened
or, intimated that she would risk total war with us with
our war potential including our atomic-warfare develop-
ment, if we took certain steps contemplated or suggested
by General MacArthur to quickly end the Korean con-
filet?
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 Secretary Marshall. ,q'}t-g?tpvgs@lqT /16
elusively to Korea, was it?
Senator Gillette. Yes, sir.
Secretary Marshall. I thought you said any place.
Senator Gillette. Can any instance be named where the
Soviet at any time, any place or any circumstance, in-
cluding Yugoslavia, threatened or intimated that she
would risk total war with us with our war potential,
including atomic-warfare development, if we took certain
steps to quickly end the Korean conflict?
Secretary Marshall. How does that question include
Yugoslavia?
Senator Gillette. We will eliminate Yugoslavia. Has
she at any time to your knowledge intimated or suggested
that if we took the steps suggested to end the Korean
conflict, that she would risk total war with us?
Secretary Marshall. I think there have been implica-
tions but I don't recall any specific statement.
Senator Gillette. Now the third question, is it reason-
able to assume that Soviet rulers would today, risk a
prolonged highly mechanized war with the free world
when the United States and Great Britain together con-
trol 80 per cent of the world's oil and could quickly
destroy oil fields possibly accessible to the Soviet to keep
these supplies from her? Do you think that she would
risk a war with that potential?
Secretary Marshall. We have felt that she has built
up her power to the extent that would enable her to
inflict great damage on us.
How it would work out in the long run of the fight, I
don't know, but we have been increasingly informed from
various sources that she was poised ready to, do that if
she chose and gave every indication of not allowing the
various moves she made to deter her from an action that
might precipitate the war.
Senator Gillette. Now those three questions I have just
asked you of course are slanted somewhat favorable to
the MacArthur view. This question I shall now ask you
is slanted in the other direction.
Many people are saying throughout the country in
commenting on the MacArthur position: "We do not
want a general war.. We only want to bombard Manchuria
and attack China to shorten the Korean conflict."
Now the question: Is it not a fact that there are others
with great power uncommitted in this struggle who will
take part in that decision? Maybe they will not precipi-
tate a general war if we take the steps indicated, but
maybe they will. Would not those of you and us making
.our decisions be completely irresponsible if not criminal
if you did not take into consideration the awful possibili-
ties of a general war?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, Sir.
Senator Gillette. Now I have four or five very short
questions, or they can be answered, I am sure, very
briefly, that I do not believe have been touched on.
[Deleted]
Senator Gillette. Do you. believe, General, as a mili-
tary man, that the threat such as General MacArthur
has advocated of an attack by troops of Chiang on the
China mainland would have the effect of a diversionary
action that would compel Red China to withdraw the
pressure on the northern end of Korea?
Secretary Marshall. I think that it might be an em-
barrassment to the Chinese Communist Government, but
I do not believe, with my own knowledge of these troops,
and with my knowledge of how much support they would
have to receive from us-water and air, and particularly
in securing their supply service and continuing it in
action-that the result would be commensurate with the
effort that we would have to make.
Senator Gillette. You have argued very cogently, in
:rot E)p7,S @V4JFtdb50,do%ff4t6has been made
that our present method that we are pursuing of at-
tempting to destroy man power would be relatively use-
less because of the comparatively inexhaustible man
power that could be thrown against us by Red China.
You have argued, as Isaid, in my opinion cogently, that
thesupply of trained man power is not inexhaustible,
that to be effective they must throw in trained troops.
You did not in my recollection refer to another factor
which seems to me of importance, and I shall ask you
with reference to it.
I hold in my hand what purports to be a copy of a
memorandum, a letter, given by certain underground
Korean forces to Marshall Carter, of the State Depart-
ment, under date of Oct. 30, 1948, in which the state-
ment was made that "The Soviet Ambassador, Nicholas
Vassily, in May, 1948, initiated the idea of a formation
of an international Red army in the Mongolian Peoples
Republic to be known as the Mongolian Peoples Republic
Army, of 250,000 men, and setting out the component
parts that they contemplated."
But this statement-"2,000 selective, Japanese and
other,s were picked to train 14,500 men to be future
officers of this international Red army in Asia, to be
called the Soviet Foreign Legion." Is it not a very im-
portant factor that the loss of these trained-officer per-
sonnel would be probably to a large extent irreplaceable?
Secretary Marshall. It would be a matter of certainly
very slow replacement, a very serious loss.
Senator Gillette. And it would definitely impair, would
it not, the efficacy of any forces thrown against us?
Secretary Marshall. It would very materially impair
their ability to make use of their unlimited man power.
Senator Gillette. I wanted to ask you one question
with reference to the percentage of casualties. To me
it seems deplorable that with practical lack of air force
thrown against our men in Korea, or the United Nations
army, that we have suffered casualties of approximately
.25 per cent of the troops engaged. Is it not true that is
a very unusual percentage in the type-of warfare we are
conducting there?
Secretary Marshall. I think the larger portions of
those casualties developed during a period when we were
tremendously outnumbered.
The casualties, for example, in the few days of June
were as high, almost, as any month in the war. , The
invasion didn't begin until the 25th of June. The casual-
ties in July and August were very heavy, and a very
considerable percentage of those were men missing in
action, presumably prisoners.
Now, when you come around to the type of warfare
we are now engaged in, of the past three months, those
casualties, those casualty rates, have been very greatly
reduced.
Senator Gillette. Just one other question, and then I
will revert to this second issue.
You spoke, I think in answer to one of the interroga-
tions propounded to you today, in determining where the
President should meet General MacArthur, and in reply
to a question as to why General MacArthur had not been
asked to come over here where the matter could be can-
vassed with him, rather than for him to proceed without,
I believe you stated that he had shown a "marked reluc-
tance" to come to the United States. Is that correct?
Secretary Marshall. I think I stated that I thought it
was unfortunate that he had not come to the United
States, and gotten in touch with the public and the reac-
tions here, and our other problems relating to the gen-
eral situation in the Far East as seen in this locale.
Senator Gillette. Then, I am in error when I under-
stood you to say that he had shown marked reluctance.
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 Secretary Marshpo
~J~}~t e~~ Cflt2r~ ~ 1
that language. O rse,, he record wil show.
Senator Gillette. Of course, marked reluctance of any
soldier, from a private up to the supreme commander is
not usually considered a heavy factor in issuing orders
to him, is it?
Secretary Marshall. Well, the reluctance, if any, ex-
pressed by General MacArthur, in my comments would
be those of the advisability of his leaving his present
responsibilities in the critical state in which they were.
.1 have here a summary, in answer to questions of some
member of the Committee, as to invitations to General
MacArthur to come to this country.
.f might lead off wit: i one dug out of the record sent
by me shortly before I retired as Chief of Staff, Sept. 17,
1915.
I addressed this to General MacArthur:
"When the situation in Japan permits, I suggest
that you make a visit home where undoubtedly a
:series of welcomes ar.d celebrations will be proposed.
This would amount to visits to several representative
cities throughout the United States, including a stop
in your State.
"Admiral Leahy his communicated with you in
reference to a request from the Governor of Wis-
consin that you come home there. In Washington,
the Congress would certainly invite you to address a
joint session, and t:rere would be a reception or
dinner by the President.
"Following all this, you would probably want to
consider a period of rest. Available is a completely
staffed de luxe cotta?;e at the Ashford General Hos-
pital"--which I believe is a reference to White
Sulphur Springs, which was formerly the Greenbriar
Hotel-"at White Sulphur Springs.
"I believe your ret irn should best be timed with
the hearings of the c )ngressional committees on the
postwar national defense. They have indicated their
desire to have you teetify. I understand these hear-
ings will be conducted during late October and
November. Please let me have your views concerning
such proposed visit, together with your desires.
"It would be well to consider bringing back in your
party some representative enlisted men as well as
officers and naval officers, in addition to members of
your staff."
Senator Gillette. What date was that, please?
Secretary Marshall. 'Chat was my message of Sept. 17,
1945.
General MacArthur did not think it was wise for him
to come back at that tine.
Further search of the records showed these invitations
to General MacArthur, and I will give you a brief re-
sponse:
On March 1, 1948, Congressman Eaton asked hm, on
behalf of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He said he
was sorry he could not riake the trip at that time. That
will be in your records up here.
On May 27, 1948, Senator Bridges asked him on behalf
of the Senate Appropr: ations Committee. He said he
was sorry he could not nake it at that time.
On Aug. 12, 1949, the combined Senate Foreign Rela-
tions and Armed Services Committees passed a resolution
that the Secretary of Defense request General MacArthur
and Admiral Badger to return if not incompatible with
national interests to give views on pending arms imple-
mentation bill.
The Secretary of Defense transmitted the resolution
for MacArthur's comments, and MacArthur rejected the
invitation. I don't know what the manner of the state-
ment was, but you would have that here in your own
CI'"-5tb0?419f 000500090014-6
Now, in .addition, I found out on inquiry that in 1946
some time in the summer, the President sent a com-
munication through his aide, to General MacArthur,
inviting him to come back, in particular to receive a
decoration.
I believe that covers that phase of the matter, but I
would like to add to it this further statement in regard
to one of the questions asked, that is the visits to General
MacArthur himself. I found that Admiral Leahy had
not made such a visit, but that the Chiefs of Staff, com-
pl~ete with General Bradley, the Chairman, had visited
General MacArthur in January and February, 1950; that
General Bradley in, June, 1950, interviewed General Mac-
Arthur in Tokyo, with the then Secretary of Defense, Mr.
Johnson; and on the 12th to the 18th of October, as you
just referred, he accompanied the President to the inter-
view on Wake Island.
Admiral Sherman made the visit, of course, with the
Chiefs of Staff in January and February to Tokyo to
set' General MacArthur, and in August, 1950, with Gen=
eral Collins, he made another visit. General Eisenhower
visited him in the period between April and May, 1946.
General Collins, the Chief of Staff of the Army, visited
him in October, 1949, and in January to February ap-
peared with the complete Chiefs of Staff group. Then,
ire July, he proceeded again out there, and interviewed
General MacArthur in company with General Vanden-
berg, and, in August, he duplicated that visit in com-
pany with Admiral Sherman; and, then again, he made
a visit in early December, 1950, and then again in Janu-
ary, January 12 or 18, I don't know what specific time
he was in Tokyo, in company with General Vandenberg
he, made another visit.
General Vandenberg, I have already referred to, visited.
General MacArthur with the Chiefs of Staff in January
ar;jd. February. He visited him with General Collins iii
July, and he visited him again with General Collins in
January, 1951. I am sorry to have interrupted the trend
of your questions.
Senator Gillette. Well, General, that answers much
more explicitly, much more fully than I anticipated, the
question that I asked you, which was specifically whether
marked :reluctance was usually a factor in determining
orders to be issued from any member of the armed serv-
ices, from the top to the bottom.
Secretary Marshall. Well, :his regrets in each case were
based on the importance of the situation there.
Senator Gillette. I see.
Now I have just one more question, and it is based,
it is what I conceive to be this second issue, and it is
based on this quotation from General MacArthur's ad-
dress to the Joint Session of Congress, and I quote:
"Our victory was complete and our objectives had
been reached when Red China intervened with a
numerically superior ground force. This created a
riew war and an entirely new situation, a situation
not contemplated when our forces were committed
against the North Korean invaders, a situation which
Balled for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere
to permit the realistic adjustment of military strat-
egy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming. While
no man in his right mind would advocate sending
Our ground forces into continental China, and such
was never given a thought, the new situation did
urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic
planning if our political aim was to defeat this new
enemy, as we defeated the old."
Now predicated upon that statement, here is my ques-
tion.: Did our policy makers at a time when we were
suffering serious reverses in Korea, through the entry
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 new
condtiAPpa r!ffal t?a9ust p~q lie ittt~tp ae ~,Xe ~y AYE v 9 Y, QWA xaried experience
changd elements
o 416 b{~' fib ti(~P Eie~ ~j iRled that I would
uld
the
the field commander to operate' without specific policies not like to have been put to the test.
or directions for military implementation? Some of these questions have very frankly been repe-
Secretary Marshall. I do not think that was the case. titious and your patience has been almost infinite. You
Senator Gillette. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank have replied to them again and again-not all of them.
you, General. When I say "all," I mean all of them, of course, haven't
Senator Russell. Gentlemen, that concludes the first been repetitious, but some of them unquestionably have.
round of questions. I have heretofore referred to the I think we are building a record in these hearings,
unusual nature of these hearings, and I think the Com- whatever else they might accomplish, that will be a rich
mittee might be interested in some data that the staff treasure house for the historian when he goes to analyze
of the Committee has, assembled with respect to this and to write the history of this period of our nation's
hearing. history.
We have been here now for nine days and in that I thank you, sir, for your co-operation and for the
period we have heard only two witnesses. That is, so far great assistance that you have been to this Commit-
as I know, a new record for investigations by a committee tee. I am afraid that it will be necessary for me to re-
of the Congress. quest you to be back here on Monday morning at 10
The staff has assembled these figures as to dates: o'clock.
General MacArthur was on the stand between 22 and 23 I hope that Senators over the week end, if they don't
hours, and General Marshall has been on the stand for read this record, will reflect upon these hearings. If they
more than 24 hours. General MacArthur's testimony was do, I think that they will see that the ground has been
787 pages; up to last evening General Marshall's testi- rather thoroughly covered as to the general aspects of
mony covered 700 pages, and the estimate for today, the issues before us.
compared with the same time for yesterday's, would run It doesn't mean that there won't be other questions
it over 900 pages of testimony, and that would be the that will be asked to elaborate upon to bring out different
case of General Marshall. thoughts on some of these questions, but I hope that it
If you are interested, the words deleted from General will result in avoiding going over the same ground again
MacArthur's testimony on account of the security angle and again.
.amounted to 2,800, which is 1 4/10 per cent of the total I want to thank the members of this Committee for
words. The words deleted from General Marshall's tes- their splendid co-operation and for the calm and ju-
timony up through yesterday were 6,600, for a percentage dicious approach that each Senator has made to this
of 3 8/10 per cent. subject.
When we see these two men who have made such great I still hope that these hearings will be of great benefit
contributions to their country appear before this Com- to the American people and we shall continue in our
mittee and stand this grueling : examination, I think I effort to arrive at the truth, to gain some knowledge of
can with certitude observe that these men who came into all of these facts that are of such vital importance to
the Army in the period of the old soldiers of the song enable us to discharge our responsibilities as Senators
not only do not die but they are a tough breed and don't under the Constitution.
fade very easily. Senator Knowland. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could
The members of the Committee have been able to get ask to have placed in the appendix of our daily record
up, walk around, even retire from the room for a few here the citations which have been given by the Govern-
moments on, occasion, and neither of these witnesses has ment of the United States to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-
asked at any moment that there be any recess in the shek, one of them awarding him the Distinguished Serv-
hearings for any reason, and have insisted at times when ice Medal and the other one awarding him the Legion of
the Committtee has indicated a desire to recess, that Merit, Degree of Chief Commander, and have it appear
they desired to have the hearings' continue. In our appendix.
General, I want to thank you for your complete co- Senator Russell. Yes, sir; without objection, that will
operation with this Committee. You have been here with appear in the appendix.
us for six days, and you have had propounded to you Any other matter to be brought to the attention of the
innumerable questions dealing with a great many dif- Committee? If not, we stand in recess until 10 o'clock
ferent matters. Monday morning.
In view of the fact that you have served as Chief of Secretary Marshall. You wish me here, Mr. Chairman?
Staff, as Ambassador and Personal Representative of Senator Russell. Mr. Secretary, I am afraid I must
the President to China at one of the most critical periods ask you to be here.
of history, served as Secretary of State, Secretary of De- Secretary Marshall. I will be here.
fense, why you have been asked about not only a num- Senator Russell. I understand your position. If we
ber of policies but a number of specific instances. don't finish with you, we understand entirely that you
Your recollection as to details and as to dates of all must leave here Monday afternoon; but if you can be
of these various transactions has been perfectly astonish- here Monday morning, we would like to have you.
ing to me. I have sat here and wondered if I could recall (Whereupon, at 5:33 p.m. the Committee recessed to
as vividly incidents of my legislative career over the past reconvene at 10:00 Monday, May 14, 1951.)
HEARING OF MONDAY, -MAY 14
The Committees met,.pursuant to adjournment, at 10
a.m. in the Caucus Room, Senate Office Building, Senator
Richard B. Russell (Chairman, Committee on Armed
Services), presiding.
PRESENT: Senators Russell (Chairman, Committee
on Armed Services), Connally (Chairman, Committee on
Foreign Relations), George, Green, McMahon, Gillette,
Smith (New Jersey), Hickenlooper, Lodge, Brewster,
Johnson (Texas), Stennis, Hunt, Long, Bridges, Salton-
stall, Morse, Knowland, Cain and Flanders.
ALSO PRESENT: Mark H. Galusha and Verne D.
Mudge of the committee staff of the Armed Services
Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000500090014-6
 Committee; Franc Ap$r&MT iiJgfe? it0 'f~48
V.:Kalijarvi, staff associate, Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions; and C. C. O'Day clerk.
Senator Russell. The Committee will be in order,
Gentlemen, before we resume our questioning of
General Marshall this morning, I desire to make a brief
statement. Itrelates to a subject which has caused my
increasing concern as these hearings have progressed.
Since this inquiry was first ordered I have experienced
a deep sense of uneasin ess. It was apparent from the first
that the subject matte.- would be broad, as broad. as the
foreign policy of the United States. It was equally obvious
that it would deal wit: i almost every vital military and
diplomatic issue and penetrate to the very heart of the
plans for our nation's survival. Such has been the case.
We are taking testimony not only on the general out-
lines of American foreign policy but on some of the
intimate plans and inf )rmation possessed by our nation.
We are entering door; that have been barred, we are
opening books that have been guarded, we are unlocking
secrets that have been protected in steel safes; in short,
WE,, are stripping the nation's security framework: to the
bare skeleton. In some instances not only is the evidence
stamped with the highest security classification, but the
very form in which w, receive it is secret. Its release
without a paraphrase of the words would aid an enemy
in breaking our carefully guarded codes and crypto-
graphic system.
I had considerable sympathy for General Marshall the
other day when he said that he sometimes feels as though
he were compelled to act as a sort of intelligence agent
for the Soviet. Many of us have shared his frustrati.oris
as we have seen his es-;imates, his recommendations and
his proposed actions printed each day in the press for all
the world to read. A c>rtain amount of public discussion
on these subjects is inherent in our system. It is unavoid-
able in a democracy.
At the outset we agreed unanimously that the matters
under inquiry are so important that we must have all
of the available facts. We have also agreed that the
American people are entitled to every single piece of
information that can be safely spread, on the public
record. To those agre ;ments I am a party, but I have
insisted with all the pcwer of my being that these hear-
ings should not serve to create an arsenal from. which
our enemies can draw intelligence weapons that they may
use to kill our men in Korea or to imperil our future
security.
Gentlemen, I can scarcely conceive of a graver respon-
sibility. American boy, are fighting and dying on a little
tip of'land thousands of miles from this hearing, room.
Our country is confronted on a perimeter of half a world
with the most serious ,hallenge to its very existence.
If any action of ours adds even remotely to the dangers
that face our fighting men, if carelessness or indiscre-
tion increases the peril ; that face our nation, neither our
God nor our fellow citizens will ever forgive us, nor
would we deserve such forgiveness.
We have undertaker. to probe out of these hearings
every possible security safeguard that human ingenuity
can provide. The original documents and the un-
deleted record are guarded as carefully as such things
can be. The transcrif t issued to the press and to the
public is being censored by the most competent and trust-
worthy man that we could find, but, gentlemen, all of
these safeguards, all of these carefully planned measures
depend ultimately upon our acceptance of our responsi-
bilities as Senators.
We can consult security officers, we can install safes,
we can post armed guards, but only an individual sense
of responsibility can p -event any member of this Com-
CIA F$t9P1'5-0 14i I talking outside that
door and revealing his knowledge o he world.
There are already cases in point. I have seen at least
two newspaper stories purporting to quote unidentified
Senators on evidence said to have been submitted to this
Committee which did not appear in the released tran-
script. I shall not, of course, comment on the accuracy
or inaccuracy of such stories. To do so might give the
Soviets a touchstone for determining which of them are
authentic and which are not.
Perhaps neither of these will do material harm, but if
others are to follow, we are indeed embarking upon a
dangerous course. Somewhere along; the line there will
be a vital slip, and because of the slip men will die need-
lesly.
I am, of course, convinced that no Senator would delib-
erately release information. that would endanger his
nation or his fellow Americans. That is not the problem.
The great danger is the ever-present threat of a care-
less word, a slip of the tongue or in disclosing facts in
confidence to those unworthy of such confidence. It
takes very little to give the agents of the Kremlin a clue
which may lead them to a rich mother lode of informa-
tion.
The evidence being adduced here has not been brought
us to appease an appetite for the sensational or to satisfy
idle curiosity. It is being supplied to aid us in fulfilling
our high constitutional duties.
There have been occasions when I have received in-
formation on secret matters that I would rather not
have. It was unnecessary to me in the discharge of my
duties. Some such information will be presented to this
Committee. This has caused me serious misgivings.
I have lain awake at night; wondering whether by some
incautious act, some error of judgment, we may betray
something of vital import to our country. Although care-
fully censored, even the public record has carried some
material. which strike me as dangerous. I am sure it is
a great understatement to say that there have been
some matters publicized which it cannot help the coun-
try to have our enemies know.
As the custodians of secret information, we have a
double responsibility to the American people. It is our
responsibility to make wise, courageous and patriotic
use of it.
We have the added responsibility of jealously protect-
ing it to insure it will not be used to our nation's harm.
This is no time to gamble with security.
Such stakes as the lives of Americans and the safety of
our nation are too precious to hazard. Let us embrace
this opportunity to prove that democracy can meet such
a challenge. This we can do if we accept in full the
responsibilities of Senators of the United States.
Now, gentlemen, when we recessed on Saturday we
had completed the first round of questioning of Secretary
Marshall. There are those who had not been present and,
of course, they will be reached on this second round.
I have only one question, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Russell. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hickenlooper. If it is not offensive, before we
get into your question may I be accorded the privilege
of a slight comment on you:r statement?
Senator Russell. Yes, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. I agree with the most sensible
purposes and objectives of the Chairman's statement. I
think we ought to try to follow it most meticulously.
Now, I think that an admonition is not out of order,
or out of place; but I call the Chairman's attention, and
the Committee's attention, to the great discouragement
that Qccurs to the members of Congress when certain
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 newspapermen appar I3'r eaj pO V V rtW-200# /16 : OAuRDDYS-,007 0AO510 14s6litary thing that
ments that. could come only from administrative agen- the Defense Department or anybody else has done to
ties, and where no effort is made in tracing down these find out where that leak came from, not only find out
leaks that come out of administrative agencies; and I where it came from, but take steps to punish the people
think that an admonition and concern should be the that gave it out.
portion of this Committee about those unwarranted and Now,'I agree with you on all you say about the Com-
unauthorized access to top-secret information that is mittee and the Senators, but I also say that people who
given certain favored newspapermen and certain favored have originally in their possession this top-secret classi-
columnists. fled information are the chief offenders.
Those things have happened with too great frequency Senator Russell. I reiterate that I condemn rather
in the past, and have happened under such circumstances than condone any of the releases to which the Senator
that they could not have come from members of Con- refers or any other releases that might have taken place,
gress or congressional committees, but could have only but I shall not use dereliction on the part of anyone
come from administrative agencies; and I think the else as an excuse for dereliction on my part, nor do I
admonition can well be taken by the administrative think this Committee would like to use that as an excuse.
agencies, and I would like to see a far greater zeal on Now, General Marshall, I have one question that I do
the part of those agencies to protect top-secret docu- not intend for you to answer now, but I wish to have
ments in the future than they have exercised, appar- you prepare an answer for the benefit of this Committee.
ently, in many instances, in the past. I would like to have you furnish in writing for the
Now, just one example, Mr. Chairman: I refer to the record the text of all of General MacArthur's statements
Wake Island top-secret minutes. That is one of the latest. which are regarded as having significance in connection
There is a myriad of them that emanate; and so, I with his dismissal.
think the Chairman is perfectly proper in his statement I would also like you to furnish in writing a full ex-
to this Committee. planation as to why it is contended that each of these
I also feel that there are administrative agencies that statements was considered to be in violation of directives
have a primary responsibility regarding these documents, or in conflict with known policies of the United States.
these top-secret documents, that can well exercise not I think it is very important that that matter be pre-
only a great deal more discretion but a great deal more sented for the record. We have dealt with it here in
of their legal responsibility in seeing that leaks do not bits and dribbles but I should like to see a complete
occur, and that information, portions of information out statement, and I think it would be very helpful to this
of these top-secret documents, are not made available Committee.
to the public and in that way letting the Kremlin know,
if you please, what newspapermen have particularly fa-
vored access to information that the committees of Con-
gress are not permitted to have.
Senator Russell. I should like to say in reply to that
that release from any source whatever, whether it be
executive, administrative, or any other branch of our
Government, on the part of anyone who is charged with
responsibility of handling documents that are classified
is abhorrent to me, as abhorrent as it is to the Senator
from Iowa or anybody else.
I have been greatly concerned about releases that have
apparently come through the administrative agencies of
the executive branch. Some of them occurred even before
this incident we have under inquiry here that I con-
demned, but I, of course, have no control over the admin-
istrative branch of the Government.
But I do have a very definite responsibility here that
has disturbed me greatly, and for that reason I made
that statement; but certainly the same admonition that
I have undertaken to state here applies with equal force.
to any portion of the executive branch of the Government.
Senator Bridges. Mr. Chairman, may I comment on
it, too, just a moment? The thing Senator Hickenlooper
refers to. disturbed me. If you recall, the Wake Island
report which appeared in the New York Times, it ap-
peared when it was classified top secret. It appeared
there, and the version that appeared in the New York
Times contained the things that when it was declassified
and given to this Committee, the release to the New York
Times carried certain items and certain matter that,
even when it was declassified, were considered to be too
classified to be released.
Now, that is certainly a serious breach, and personally
I would like to see us find out who released that. That
is a violation of a top-secret thing of the United States
Government. Who gave this to the New York Times,
which was classified top secret?
That is the most specific case in connection with these
hearings but there have been others, and, as far as I
Senator Connally.
Senator Connally. Senator George is in a hurry.
Senator George. Go ahead.
Senator Connally. Very well.
TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE C.
MARSHALL, ACCOMPANIED BY FELIX LARKIN, GENERAL
COUNSEL
Senator Connally. General Marshall, do you believe
that our air power and Navy could win a war against
Red China and keep them out of an invasion of-
Secretary Marshall. Keep them from-
Senator Connally. Keep them from making an in-
vasion of Korea.
Secretary Marshall. Formosa, you mean?
Senator Connally. No. I mean keep them from coming
over like they are now. Could our Navy and Air alone,
without any ground troops-
Secretary Marshall. I do not think they could, sir.
,Senator Connally. I believe it is contended by General
MacArthur that he would not favor sending a single
soldier, ground soldier to China, General-
Secretary Marshall. That was my understanding.
Senator Connally. -if we become involved in a war
with Red China, and Russia should intervene, and then
in that case we would Have to send ground troops, would
we not?
Secretary Marshall.. Well, we would have to accept the
fact that we could not reach the ground in China proper
except by air and close naval action otherwise. -
Senator Connally. I believe that is all for the present.
Senator Russell. Senator Bridges?
Senator Bridges. General Marshall, you said that the
reason why General MacArthur was recalled, as he was,
and that he got the rather unusual notice, was due to
the fact that the plan which you set up or was set up
for notifying him of his recall, that of having Secretary
Pace formally call on him and notify him, was changed,
and you indicated that it was changed for two reasons:
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 One, that the poweAfiblVO]reFlbftgser0o/04446
sage could not get hrough to Secretary Pace on time
and, secondly, there was a leak.
Now, we have been talking about leaks this morning,
and I would like to a ;k you who was present at ;the
conference where this c ecision was reached on the recall
of General MacArthur?
Secretary Marshall. I was not present, Senator, but
General Bradley was, and I think the question had. better
go to himc, because I don't recall exactly who was present.
Senator Bridges. Well, you were not present when the
decision was made?
Secretary Marshall. I was not present.
Senator Bridges. So, my point that I was getting at
is that the leak must have come from a pretty high
source, and if you wer : not present and did not know
about the procedure to be followed, why then, of course,
you could not be considered responsible for the leak, and
the question should be addressed to somebody who was
present.
Secretary Marshall. I was communicated with over
the telephone.
Senator Bridges. Ye,;.
Secretary Marshall. About 10:30 at night, I believe.
Senator Bridges. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the
question that has been rsked you on the conflict between
the views of the Defense Department and the State
Department, are you f rmiliar with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff views on the National Security Council policy paper
toward Asia which was being considered by the Security
Council in 1949?
Secretary Marshall. No, I am not familiar, sir.
Senator Bridges. If you are not familiar with it, then
you could not commen; on whether the Joint Chiefs of
Staff were in conflict with the position taken by the
State De:partment?
Secretary Marshall. I am not familiar with that, sir.
Senator Bridges. What is your basis for believing-
you reiterated several times here in answer to several
questions. that the bombing of Chinese Communist bases
and attacking of Chine;e Communist lines might involve
its in a war with Sovie', Russia. But, as I followed your
answers to the questio:is, at no time have you given a
specific reason as to why you think the bombing of
Chinese Communist bates might bring on a war. I mean
you have referred to it in very general terms. .i mean
do you have some reason for that belief, specific reason
for that belief.
Secretary Marshall. I am sorry my previous state-
ments were not clear enough. I thought I had explained.
However, it starts with the treaty relationship between
the Soviet Government and the Chinese Communist re-
gime; the possible reaction that might be the basis is one
factor. Another factor is that carrying of the war into
Manchuria, that is, no nth of the Yalu, would involve a
very considerable reaction, and as to the Chinese Com-
munist regime, whether or not the Soviet Government
was letting them down. in the circumstances that were
created by that bombing, and the Soviet reaction as to
what extent they could have a satellite as important to
them as the Chinese Communist regime develop a feel-
ing that-they would have to go it alone.
Those would be the main considerations involved in the
opinion that it was dangerous to carry out that bombing
you have referred to.
[Deleted]
Senator Bridges. Mr. Secretary, you referred several
times to the unusual strength or the very sizable strength
on the borders up there in this area and indicated it is
of unusual strength.- I want to ask you if it is not true
that Russia has consistently maintained large -numbers
ClK-RDRJT6-0Q449F=QW(10ft@ so forth on these
borders for a period of many years even before this
thing started. -
secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir, but I was
given the impression or the information that more
recently, notably since I think December, that there had
been sizable increases in the garrisons in that region.
Senator Bridges. General Marshall, another thing that
you have referred to quite consistently in your testimony
is the Berlin air lift, and commenting very favorably upon
our ability to meet the challenge to the air lift. You
haven't discussed at all who was responsible for the
necessity of meeting such a challenge to the - air lift, in -
other words, who negotiated the terms which allowed us
holding Berlin, for example, without a land corridor
accessible or in access to it. Are you familiarwith that,
General Marshall?
secretary Marshall. I think that came to its head in
the Potsdam Agreement, but I cannot be too certain
between Yalta and that period.
Senator Bridges. But, who would we ask that could give
us that?
Secretary Marshall. The State Department would have
the records.
Senator Bridges. The State Department would have the
details of that thing? -
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
senator Bridges. You, General Marshall, according to
your testimony, do you see anything strange in the logic
which blames the Government of the Chinese Nationalists
for its failure to stave off Communism after aid had been
cut off to it, and which praises the governments of
Europe for being wise enough to accept our aid so that
the same thing did not happen to them?
Secretary Marshall. I am not quite certain that I
understand the question, Senator.
Senator Bridges. What I mean is there is a difference
of 'logic here as I see it in running through your testimony
where Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists we
are blaming for their failure to resist the Communist
hordes in China after we had given them certain aid,
and then we turn around and we are praising European
governments who have been resisting on Communism,
and after accepting our aid.
In other words, what I am getting at is that we have
done the reverse in these areas of the world.
Secretary Marshall. Well, I- am still a little doubtful,
but I will try to answer. It, seems to me that the way
you have stated the question implies that the withdrawal
of our aid from the Chinese' Nationalist Government
brought about the fall, the inability of that Government
to' resist the Communists' infiltration and military-
Senator Bridges. That was what .1 intended to infer,
that it was a major cause of it. I said you were right,
I intended to infer that was :a major cause in China.
Secretary Marshall. Then. if I have got the question
right, I don't think it's comparable on that basis for the
reason that we provided a g:reat deal of aid, and I know
while I was Secretary of State we brought before Congress
an item of 570 millions which involved the practicability
of the Chinese Nationalists or Kuomintang Government
of utilizing the funds that they already had to pay for
imports into China, to buy the - armament they might
need, and that would be replaced out of this 570 million
that I referred to. Four hundred million was actually
appropriated, I believe, and one portion of 125 millions
I think was left for them to dispose: of as they saw fit.
In other words, they could buy arms with it or not as
they saw fit.
What actually happened as I analyze the situation was
that they had taken the equipment that we- had given
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 them, the munitionyq bwedlftrRL4 di20*g11/I16 : CIA-RWFAr30 f4005 fiW0A4-6
air lift and fighting planes that we had provided them
with, and had attempted something that we all considered
was a military impossibility for them, and they had
wrecked themselves on that basis together with the
character of leadership that was involved.
They had a great advantage in equipment, they had
an advantage in numbers. They lacked in leadership
and they lacked the general support of the Chinese public
because of the character of government that had been
carried on through a period of years.
Now when they had overextended themselves, particu-
larly in the matter of capturing cities, which they had to
support, and the communications which they had to
cover, they fell you might say, of their own weight. That
was quite a different situation in Europe. That is as near
as I can answer the question, Senator.
Senator Bridges. Are you familiar with the statement
made by one of the principal leaders of the Communist
Government of Red China to the effect that-back here
while the fighting was still going on on the mainland-
that they had suffered terrific losses, and that they had
lost 1,300,000, or had 1,300,000 casualties?
Are you familiar with that?
Secretary Marshall. "They" being who?
Senator Bridges. The Chinese Communists announced
that they had suffered great losses.
Secretary Marshall. I don't recall that statement, sir.
Senator Bridges. That differs quite a lot from the in-
formation which is put out in this country, that the
Chinese Nationalists didn't fight.
If the Chinese Communists suffered 1,300,000 casual-
ties, certainly somebody did something to inflict those
casualties, and that came as a statement from one of the
Chinese Communist Government officials.
Are you familiar with the statement that Mr. Acheson
made March 20, 1947, before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, in which he said:
"The Chinese Government is not in the position at
the present time that the Greek Government is in,
not approaching collapse, not threatened with defeat
against Communism. The war with the Communists
is going on much as it has for the last 20 years."
Secretary Marshall. Well, if I was familiar, at that
time I presume I was, I have forgotten just the details
of that.
Senator Bridges. Do you think that is a correct state-
ment, at that time?
Secretary Marshall. Hearing it today, the way you
have read it, it would seem so.
Senator Bridges. You think that the State Depart-
ment was justified in its opposition to certain congres-
sional demands for aid to China?
Would you say, now, that the rather publicized 80th
Congress possessed some foresight, and might have been
unnecessarily belittled, in our actions, in the light of
recent events in Asia?
Secretary Marshall. That is quite a question, Senator.
Senator Bridges. If you remember, the 80th Congress
did take rather a forthright position on aid to China, and
so that it would be-just asking you for comment,
General.
Secretary Marshall. All I can say is, in the document
I read here before a committee, we asked for 575 millions,
and, as I recall, I may be incorrect, but as I recall, the
Congress appropriated 400 millions, which would have
some bearing on that particular question.
Senator Bridges. I did not get that.
Secretary Marshall. Which would have some bearing
on that particular question.
Senator Bridges. Y. asked for how many?
Senator Bridges. And Congress appropriated how
much?
Secretary Marshall. 400 million. That can be checked.
I can be wrong, but that is my recollection.
Senator Bridges. I want to check on it, too, because
I think you are wrong; but I would not say so now. You
are talking from memory, and I am, but I certainly
would like to check it very carefully.
Well, do you think the statement that Senator McCar-
ran made in the United States Senate recently, when he
said, "Thanks to General MacArthur, Japan, who was our
enemy, is now our friend, while thanks to the State
Department, China, who was our friend, is now our
enemy," is correct?
Secretary Marshall. I do not think it is. In part it is
correct; in part it is not, in my opinion. '
Senator Bridges. Now, General, do you have a memory
of a copy of a draft prepared before you went to China
on your mission, Chinese mission, and was there a draft
prepared of instructions to you by the Defense Depart-
ment at that time?
Secretary Marshall. I don't recall. There may have
been, sir; I don't recall.
. Senator Bridges. Would you check for us and find out
whether that is true? My information is that there
was a draft prepared for you, which was prepared and
cleared by the heads of the Department at that time,
and then your formal directives or instructions which
you received from the State Department were far dif-
ferent from. this directive which was prepared or sug-
gested by the then heads of the Defense Department;
and if so, I think that the Committee should have a copy
of each to see the changes in the two directives.
Secretary Marshall. I presume when you say "Defense
Department," of that period, you are talking about the
War Department.
Senator Bridges. Let me see-1947, 1948-we had a
Defense Department-yes, that is right; it would be the
War Department at that time.
No more questions.
Senator Russell. Senator George?
Senator George. General Marshall, have you any de-
pendable estimates of the petroleum supplies held by the
Soviets in Siberia, the Vladivostok area, or in that area?
Secretary Marshall. No, sir, I have not with me. I would
have to go back to find out.
Senator George. Have you that? Is that available?
Secretary Marshall. Well, I will inquire of the Muni-
tions Board and see if we have anything, and submit it
to the Committee, if you wish me to do so.
Senator George. I would be very glad if you would
do' so.
There is no oil in that area that is being taken out
of the ground now, is there, of any consequence?
Secretary Marshall. I think so, but I am too vague at
the moment to answer that.
Senator George. Of any great consequence.
Have you any estimate of the oil supplies available to
Soviet Russia, the Soviets, in the Western European area?
Secretary Marshall. I have not myself, sir. Baku is
the nearest principal supply that I recall.
Senator George. General, this perhaps does not lie
within your knowledge, but even if we had-if Russia
had the oil supplies in the Middle East now, it would
take her months, would it not, under the circumstances
of war, to lay pipe lines and construct the necessary
machinery and equipment for the refining of that oil?
Secretary Marshall. If she did not control the refining
establishments already in that region and they were
not destroyed, I would assume that would be the case.
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 Senator George. iApUpno'e1 .lEeofl4Relev s2OQz ( Id16 : ClAeRDFk7;fQ&M9RO Ar9? 4 66th General Mac-
you be able to estimate ]i w many months?
Secretary Marshall. I could not do that offhand, sir.
I think possibly-
Senator George. I think it is generally conceded, is it
not, General Marshall, that even their refining processes
are not strictly modern, even those that they have in the
Western European and the Baku area, let, us say. So
I would like for you, if 3 ou can, to give us an estimate
of the oil in storage, held in tankers-I can conceive of
no other way Soviet Russia could have any great supply
of oil in the Far East, n the Siberian or Vladivostok
area or Manchurian area, available to them.
Secretary Marshall. I will take your question from
the record and see what information they can give you.
Senator George. Wha; she has available in storage
or from production in the Western European area in
comparison with the supplies that would be available
to the North Atlantic area countries in Western Europe
in the event of an outbreak of hostilities.
Now, General, in emphasizing the number of casualties
that we might suffer in the event of the bombing of
American cities, I think it has been suggested here and
outside, as well, by responsible spokesmen of the Govern.-
ment, that the bombing of a single American city would
resu.t in more casualties than we have suffered in Korea
since June 27 last.
I want to ask you one question, General. Do you not
believe that the bombing of a single American city would
unify this country against the Soviet forces everywhere
instantly and to a higher degree than they have yet
been. unified?
Secretary Marshall. I, would assume that would be the
case, exactly as it was w: th Pearl Harbor.
Senator George. It wo aid mean if Russia should bomb
a single American city, she would have decided upon all-
out war; is that right?
Secretary Marshall. That would be my
Senator George. No further questions.
Senator Russell. Sena ;or Saltonstall.
Senator Saltonstall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; I
would like to ask just a very few questions in summing
up.
General Marshall, Chairman Russell has asked you for
the written statements of General MacArthur that the
Defense Department considered violating the President's
instructions, and why. "hat is one question that is be-
fore this Committee, as .1 see it.
The other question is the question of the policy in the
Far East.
Now, may I just ask you to see if I have these summed
up fairly clearly in my mind-the differences between
you and General MacAr;hur.
Now, I have read and reread General MacArthur's
speech before Congress, and I have listened to your
testimony. General MacArthur stated emphatically that
we should never let Formosa get into the hands of the
Chinese. On that I and 3rstand you to agree with him?
Secretary. Marshall. Yes.
Senator Saltonstall. Mr. Secretary, General Mac-
Arthur has stated that we should never assent to the
Red Chinese becoming a member of the United Nations.
Do you also agree with him on that?
Secretary Marshall. Si'es, sir.
Senator Saltonstall. Three: General MacArthur advo-
cated an economic and .a naval blockade of China. An
economic blockade is now, we hope, becoming more effec-
tive.. When it is effective, I understand from you. that
you consider a naval blockade becomes relatively unim-
portant.
Secretary Marshall. That is correct.
Arthur that no ground troops should under any circum-
stai:es be sent onto the mainland of China?
Secretary Marshall. Correct.
Senator Saltonstall. General MacArthur advocates the
removal of restrictions on air reconnaisance of Chinese
coastal areas and Manchuria. As I understand it, on this
you do not agree with him as you believe it might tend
to bring Russia actively into the war.
Secretary Marshall. [Deleted]
Selnator Saltonstall. General MacArthur advocates the
bombing of centers of supply in Manchuria.
Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Chairman, I hope the Sen-
ator; Massachusetts will excuse my interruption, but
I believe his question applied both to the coast of China
and; to air reconnaissance of Manchuria, and I do not
know whether General Marshall understood that fully
in the answer to the question.. [deleted]
Senator Saltonstall. I thank the Senator from Iowa.
General MacArthur's statement was on air reconnais-
sance over China and Manchuria.
[Deleted]
Senator Saltonstall. You axe also not in agreement
with him as to the advocacy of bombing the supply
centers in Manchuria?
Secretary Marshall. Under present circumstances.
[Deleted]
Senator Saltonstall. General MacArthur advocates the
removal of restrictions on Chiang's forces on Formosa
and' logistical support to contribute to effective opera-
tions against the Chinese mainland. As I have listened
to your testimony and to the evidence given Congress,
we are now doing more to he 'p Chiang's forces, and we
are sending over a military mission to advise with them.
On this, how much difference of opinion now exists
between you and General MacArthur?
Secretary Marshall. [Deleted]
We also feel that, at the present time, while we are
endeavoring to hold this to a limited war confined to the
Korean peninsula, that it would be ill advised to carry
out such action since we are directly contributing to the
defense of Formosa by the instructions to the Seventh
Fleet, by our mission that we have established there, by
the supplies that we are shipping there, and that there-
fore; we would be endangering the confinement of the
present operations to the Korean peninsula. I think
that covers the attitude.
Oh, I remember now. May I add what I was trying
to think of. It does not appear to us-and you can
question the Chiefs of Staff very directly on this-that
the return from such action would be in proportion to
the probable results brought about by such action. That
is all, sir.
Senator Saltonstall. I thank you, sir. Do I sum that
up, what you have just said, reasonably correctly from
your previous testimony and what you have just said
[deleted]. Is that a fair statement, summary of your
statement?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir, but it implies the general
trend of my answer which I prefer to have off the record.
Senator Saltonstall. Yes. Now I believe that those
sum up General MacArthur's recommendations. As I
see it, you and he agree on some; the principal ones of
which you do not agree are the questions of bombing in
Ma>$ichuria and the use of Chiang's forces on the main-
land.
Does not the real difference between you-and I have
beets trying to get the differences of opinion to make up
my own mind-boil down, as ]: tried to ask you the other
day, to an effort to determine the Soviet's intentions and
the Soviet's capabilities to carry out those intentions in
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 the Far East, and]Apptovt iF Cffft le1aS*(20Wt M1(ff CIA 4MFa756O4 000500090014-6
World War III? Senator Smith. The reason for my question is that
(The reporter read back the last question.)
Secretary Marshall. Senator, the portion of your ques-
tion which brings up the consideration of developing the
Soviet intentions I don't quite understand, because we
could find out very quickly if we did some of these things
that we think hazard our entrance into a full war.
We would learn their intentions in a very positive man-
ner. Now, other than that, I assume you are referring to
our intelligence services as to what is going on.
Senator Saltonstall. No. Perhaps I didn't put my
question clearly, General Marshall.
What I was trying to analyze was the difference of
opinion between you and General MacArthur, through
your testimony and his, before this Committee, particu-
larly of the effect of bombing in Manchuria, and the use
of Chinese Nationalist forces on the mainland.
As I get it, I am asking you, to put it in the form of a
question: Doesn't the difference of opinion between you
really boil down to the question of trying to analyze,
as a calculated risk, to use that expression, the Soviet's
intentions in the Far East, and their capability of carry-
ing out those intentions, in other words?
Secretary Marshall. I understand that question; and
I think-
Senator Saltonstall.. That is what I am trying to say.
Secretary Marshall. That is a positive difference. An-
alyzing that difference met my previous comment.
Senator Saltonstall. Well, haven't we, as members of
this Committee, got to,determine, in our judgment, if
we have to reach a conclusion on this subject, as to
whether the calculated ' risk is best, one way, or the
calculated risk is best the other way, as far as the
United States is concerned?
Secretary Marshall. I think so.
I might add a consideration to those questions that
you have just asked, which I would assume General
MacArthur did not bring into his statements here in
this country: That is, the effect of utilizing Chinese Na-
tionalist troops from Formosa, in Korea; and I would
disagree as to that.
Senator Saltonstall. What was that last?
Secretary Marshall. I would disagree as to that.
Senator Saltonstall. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Russell. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. General Marshall, I have a few ques-
tions here that I would like to ask you, if I may.
I was talking with Senator Thye, of Minnesota, on
Saturday, after the hearing, and he raised a question
with me with regard to the Yalta Conference; and I
told him that I would be glad to join with him in asking
certain questions to clear up some doubts in my own
mind on that subject.
My first question is: You testified that you were one
of the United States representatives at Yalta?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Smith. Let me ask you: Why were Nationalist
China and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek not included'
in the Yalta Conference?
Secretary Marshall. Well, that is a question directed
at a portion of the Conference with which I am not
familiar. I should imagine the reason was that the
Russian Government was not at war with Japan at that
time, and one of the problems the Japanese had to con-
sider was whether or not the Russian Government would
go to war with Japan.
The Chinese Nationalist Government under General-
issimo Chiang Kai-shek was at war with Japan. I should
imagine in those circumstances there was that reason,
though I don't know, and you will have to ask that of
there was some disposition of China's status, and so
forth at the Yalta Conference. I was wondering why-
Secretary Marshall. I was not in the political portion.
Senator Smith. That was the political side, of course.
Do you recall what was the secret agreement that affected
China at Yalta?
Secretary Marshall. Well, I wish you would ask that of
the State Department and not of me, sir.
Senator Smith. I find in the book by Edward R. Stet-
tinius, Jr., entitled "Roosevelt and the Russians; the
Yalta Conference"-
Secretary Marshall. I think I know what you are
talking about. I remember your question the other day.
We have been checking to see if there was a secret
agreement of a military nature.
Senator Smith. Mr. Stettinius was there as Secretary
of State at that time. He says on page 93 and 94 of
that book that on Feb. 11, 1945, the following agreement
was signed by Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill,
and President Roosevelt, and then follows the agreement,
which is just a page.
Mr. Chairman, if I may have this inserted in this place
in the record, I won't read it, except the high spots, but
if it has to go in the appendix-
Senator Russell. In accordance with our policy, it will
have to appear in the appendix unless you read it.
Senator Smith. The following agreement, referred to
later as the secret agreement, is as follows. Now I am
quoting from Mr. Stettinius:
"The leaders of the three Great Powers-the Soviet
Union, the United States of America and Great
Britain-have agreed that in two or three months
after Germany has surrendered and the war in
Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter
into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies
on condition that:
"1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mon-
golian People's Republic) shall be preserved;
"2. The former rights of Russia violated by the
treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored,
viz:
"(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all
the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the
Soviet Union;
"(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be inter-
nationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet
Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease
of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R.
restored;
"(c) the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South
Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to
Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment
of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being under-
stood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet
Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall
retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;
"3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the
Soviet Union.
"It is understood that the agreement concerning
Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred
to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures
in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from
Marshal Stalin.
"The heads of. the three Great Powers have agreed
that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be un-
questionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.
"For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readi-
ness to conclude with the National Government of
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 China a pact of fr c E?pv .gd a0 iB*~WWRPgg1/16 : ';WR[lt e'40{ A0 ` QQ9Rgg4n6force.
U.S.S.R. aand China in order to render assistance to
China with its armed forces for the purpose of liber-
ating China from the Japanese yoke."
That is the end of tho secret agreement as reported
by Mr. Stettinius.
This is important. Mr. Stettinius goes on to say in
his book on page 94, just following the quotation of the
text of this secret agreement:
"'.Phis agreement regarding Japan, a top-secret
document, did not ap:?ear in the protocol of the
Yalta Conference. It was taken to Washington and
deposited in the President's personal safe. Few of
the President's closest advisers knew of its existence.
It was feared that if ;oo many people knew about
it, the information would leak out and reach Japan."
Then, a little lower down the same page, Mr. Stettinius
writes, and I quote again:
"The Chinese were not notified immediately of
this, agreement at Yal ;a for fear the secret would
not be :kept in Chungking. Marshal Stalin told
President Roosevelt at Malta that the Russians would
start sending divisions across Siberia but insisted that
this must be done in complete secrecy. The Presi-
dent agreed, therefore, that only after the troop
movements were completed would he explain the
situation to the Chinese.
"The President, of co rrse, did not live long enough
to do this."
That is the end of Mr. Stettinius' quotation.
Now, the question I vrould like to ask you, first, is
were you familiar with this so-called secret agreement
with regard to China?
See:retary Marshall. I lid not know the factors of it
at the time.
Senator Smith. Can you tell me how was this agree-
:mewt with Russia carries out; in other words, if Russia
was to take over the surrender of Manchuria? I do not
remember that.
Secretary Marshall. Russia did.
Senator Smith. That was my recollection. Did Russia
turn over the Japanese captured arms and so forth which
they got in Manchuria by surrender, to the Chinese
Communists?
Secretary Marshall. So far as we know, they left them
in dumps in Manchuria, and when they withdrew they
were opened to Chinese Communists, who rearmed them.-
selves.
Senator Smith. The Chinese Communists got them.
Did this possibly cause Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
to lose face in China, and especially in Manchuria? He
was not notified of some1,hing happening. The Russians
came in and took over the surrender of the Japanese,
and these arms were tt rned over to the Communists,
just at the time the Generalissimo was having his trouble
with the Communists.
Secretary Marshall. I think, Senator, most of the
weapons from dumps in Manchuria were taken over by
the Chinese Communists at a much later date, after the
Generalissimo was and had been apprised of the factors
that you have been referring to.
My own recollection is that that apparently occurred
with the Russian formal withdrawal from Manchuria,
after I went to China, and in 1946.
I know they were as :`ar south, as the reports show,
as the Yellow Sea at the time I was there, and this was
quite a long period before they made the evacuation.
The Chinese Government, I believe, requested a delay
of one or two months in the evacuation schedule for the
Soviet troops, because t:aey were not prepared to take
.over, and they wished to take over from the Soviet troops
Senator Smith. You meant by that, the Nationalist
Government, Chiang Kai-shek's Government?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Smith. Very well.
Secretary Marshall. Now, after that, the Soviet troops
withdrew, and my recollection of the factors involved in
that were that they virtually removed most of the rolling
stock in that withdrawal, which left little for the National
Government to utilize for its troops in following up the
withdrawal, and we never knew specifically what hap-
pened, but there were rumors, and there were accusa-
tions, on the part of the Chinese Nationalist Government
that Communist troops had been facilitated in their
movement north, and they then obtained these dumps
of supplies.
Senator Smith. Well, those are the rumors that, I
think, and the story, that we have all, heard with regard
to that; ana, of course, it would be followed up by the
thought, I think-or I was told so-in China that with
those developments the people of China felt that Great
Britain and the United States, at least, had not done
much for Chiang Kai-shek; and to use a slang expres-
sion, they had sold him down the river at Yalta in this
secret agreement with the Russians taking over, and
those supplies going to the Chinese Communists.
My question is to this purpose: We have been saying
later Chiang Kai-shek lost his prestige, lost face. A lot
of his troops defected, went over to the other side.
Now, is it not a fair question to ask whether these
developments in Manchuria, this secret agreement at
Yalta, was not an important contributory factor because
of the loss of morale in Chiang's troops, and their later
defection, and also the falling away of the Chinese
-people from Chiang, which you testified to earlier, which
undoubtedly was the case?
Secretary Marshall. I assume that the knowledge
of these proposed concessions, as it were, to be made by
the Chinese Nationalist Government in their established
relations with the Soviet Government, certainly were a
great worry to the Generalissimo. How much was publi-
cized over China generaly I don't know. But, on the other
hand, there was a movement of troops into Manchuria,
which was carried out by our Navy, and they were landed
there; and supplies were gotten for them there.
I personally arranged to have all of our subarctic
clotting brought down; had the officer go with it until
it was all shipped, headed for the Manchurian coast.
We also transported ammunition, I think, directly
from Okinawa to the Manchurian coast, as a base of
supply for those forces, because they were going in with
very inadequate supplies and very inadequate clothing
into the winter of early 1946, so that so far as the mili-
tary' reaction is concerned, we had a very large movement
I think of five or six armies to Manchuria-these figures
are Obtainable from the records-and transported by our
naval shipping, and the troops themselves equipped with
these special clothes that we were providing for them
when the first units had gone in there with cotton
clothes from down near Canton, and it was 30 and .40
degrees below zero, so you will have to make your own
estimate as to the reaction of the troops, as to the Gen-
eralissimo losing face.
I would suppose that so far as those troops are con-
cerned, that would not have been the case.
Senator Smith. One question more on that China
situation when you were there. What steps, if any, were
taken by the United States to help train a free and demo-
cratic leadership in China? We have heard General
Chiang criticized for not developing a democratic leader-
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 ership and meetin
Now I know we di& contribute military aid and advice
for a time there, but did we contribute any efforts to
develop a free and democratic leadership in China to
bring about reforms that might have helped Chiang Kai-
shek's Administration?
Secretary Marshall. I am trying to figure out in my
own mind how much is the military part and how much
is the political part.
On the military side we set up this military mission
to which I have referred, and did it under the war powers
of the President, and that was to engage in developing
an effective army.
We ran into the difficulty of not being able to con-
vince them that they could do a great deal south of the
Yangtze River in preparing a solid basis for their military
forces, what we are doing in this country, what we call
basic military training.
I wanted that established all over that portion of Cen-
tral China south of the river, and had virtually picked
out the man to direct it and arranged it so it would be
done in such a manner ii; wouldn't revitalize the military
control of the civil authority which we were trying to
see developed, but we were not successful in that.
As to the commanders, where I thought their great
weakness lay, a large number were demobilized but had
to be continued on the pay roll, and as to top com-
manders, we were far less successful because where I
proposed the relief of this one and the relief of that one,
I was not successful in doing so, notably in Manchuria.
They were getting into trouble in which they could not
sustain themselves.
That is the best I can give you on the military side.
Now, on the political side, in the setup of the military
system that was proposed and which was approved in
connection with the demobilization of the forces and
their reorganization and their integration, it was so
set up that the military would no longer have control
of the civil authorities, that military command would
be restricted to military forces just as it is in this country.
And the supply factor would be handled, so nearly as it
was arrangeable, in a way that could not be perverted
and twisted off to some other use, and would be less
subject to bad faith in the way it was conducted.
That is a statement largely military, but it was basic
as to the build-up of any kind of a democratic govern-
ment, because in each region where there was a military
commander he commanded that region and his troops
were his sanction for that control. That had to be broken
down or we got nowhere beyond a military dictatorship,
in effect. So the terms of the demobilization, which are
in print, as a matter of fact, envisaged a very careful
setup to prevent the continuance of that manner of
military control, which was exerted throughout the
country.
Senator Smith. During that, General, as ~ read the
White Paper, is just about the time some of our repre-
sentatives in China were arguing in favor of the Chinese
Communists, as agrarian revolutionists, and we ought to
be turning our attention to them and giving less support
to General Chiang and the National Government. It is
that turnover of policy that I am trying to locate the
timing of. '
Secretary Marshall. I think you are. involved there,
Senator, in a gradual procedure.
Senator Smith. Yes.
Secretary Marshall. For example, there was the period
there along about August and September of 1946 when
a last effort was made to see if we could call off the
military contests, in Central China in particular, that
we ceased shipping munitions for use on the battlefield
P&Vf U9f 1 el a 2004/01/16 : CIA DPT51O0&WPWW6a609QWifring to a halt the
military operations that were then going on and which
were developing into a general war all over North China.
It had developed into a fight in Manchuria, but we had
been able up to the middle of June to avoid that in
North China.
Now it was in the final effort to try to control that, in
which it was quite evidently a campaign of the General-
issimo to defeat the communistic effort by military action,
that the first step was taken to cut off the further ship-
ments at that time of munitions that could be immedi-
ately used on the battlefield. For instance, it didn't affect
transport planes but it did affect combat planes. How-
ever, their state of equipment was such that they were
amply provided up through, we will say, into the middle
of the winter. It did not succeed to that end. And then
there was a gradual procedure where the supply of
military materiel, part of that was resumed later on. I
have forgotten just what the dates are, but that can be
gotten out of the record and particularly out of the State
Department evidence.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I want to turn again to the MacArthur situation and
ask you this question; whether any misunderstandings
or disagreements between General MacArthur and the
Department of Defense or the Department of State
existed prior to the Korean aggression of 1950-June,
1950. We have been discussing here the differences be-
tween the departments here and the General since the
Korean outbreak. Well, what I want to know now is
whether any disagreements or misunderstandings existed
between General MacArthur and the Department prior
to the Korean outbreak.
Secretary Marshall. I cannot answer that, sir.
I can find out, on the Defense Department side. I could
have the records looked into and send you an answer;
but you can get a direct answer, I think, from General
Bradley, as Chief of Staff; and, on the State Department
side, I do not know.
Senator Smith. You were, I think, Secretary of State
prior to the Korean aggression?
Secretary Marshall. I was Secretary of State until
Jan. 3, 1949; and I ceased to function as Secretary of
State the first week of December
Senator Smith. Do you recall any disagreement or
misunderstanding with General MacArthur while you.
were Secretary of State?
Secretary Marshall. I would not wish to answer that
offhand, because we were in the midst of discussions all
the time as to the manner of how the Japanese nation
was to be set up again, and more particularly in regard
to the economic procedures. All of those matters were
settled in the discussions.
Now, just the various phases of the matters, I couldn't
testify to, offhand.
Senator Smith. Well, could you say whether those
discussions on economic and other problems were on an
amicable basis, or were there sharp divergencies? I
understand that some of the conferring with General
MacArthur on the economic situation came to some dis-
agreement with the General.
Secretary Marshall. Well, I couldn't answer that very
well. I know we sent out various people in connection
with it.
Senator Smith. Now, General, did any of the policy,
makers in the Department of State or the Depart-
ment of Defense get to the Par East, and consider Gen-
eral MacArthur's problems with him, prior to the Korean
aggression, in June of 1950; and I ask specifically if any
of the following with the Department of State were there:
You testified you didn't go, yourself.
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 I understand that lpftvea, RbYdRe ade2g0 t16 : a RDP7 WWGDSMSM 4e6tified at the time
hadn't been out there; Iecretary Acheson, of the State that they had never been to Formosa---that none, of our
Department, had not been out there; Under Secretary _ chief policy makers have ever been to Formosa?
Webb, of the State Department, never was out there; Secretary Marshall. They are looking up the record
Assistant Secretary Dear. Rusk, up to that time, had not now. I haven't got the word, but they can tell you
been out there; Ambassador Jessup, who had taken quite directly, when they come in here.
an active part in developing foreign policies, I was told, Senator Smith. My next question on this same line is:
had never been out there until after my trip in 194?'; and Were there any disagreements with General MacArthur
I am just wondering whether I am mistaken in the infor- thatt? were taken up with him at Wake Island?
mation that I have, tha none of the group, this group, From this report that' we have had published here,
had ever been out there end discussed with General Mac- apparently there was nothing very much in the way of a
Arthur, on the ground, some of the problems that he disagreement at Wake Island.
was facing? Secretary Marshall.. All I have had is that report. I
Secretary Marshall. I think that Mr. Dean Rusk, pres- have had nothing in addition to that; and General Brad-
ent Assistant Secretary :)f State, who is involved in Far ley, who was present, can give you a direct answer.
Eastern policy, made the trip out there. Senator Smith. Well, finally, on this point:
Senator Smith. Of coirse he has been there since the Iam troubled by this question: Why could not a per-
Korean outbreak, I know, a number of times; but I was sonal meeting in Washington or Tokyo have been ar-
wondering if he had been there prior to that time? ranged with General MacArthur, to request him to turn
Secretary Marshall. I think so, but that information over his Korean command to General Ridgway, in the
can be obtained from the State Department. light of the differences, and discuss the general SCAP
I will ask for it. situation with him?
Senator Smith. Now, none of the following from the It would seem to me, with a matter of this importance,
Departmentof Defense was out there: it is hard to understand why someone of the Joint Chiefs
The Secretary of War, or of the Navy, prior to unifica- of Staff wouldn't have gone to General MacArthur and
tior..; yourself, since you have been Secretary of Defense called attention to this disagreement, and asked him, as
--you testified you have not been out there; Secretary I asked him here, the question-whether he wouldn't
Lovett, of Defense, has not been out there. turn over his Korean command to General Ridgway, in
I understand that of tae Secretaries of the Army, Navy the light of those differences, and he answered that he
and Air, only Secretary Pace has been out there, and would have, of course, had he been asked; and I am not
that is very recently. clear why it was necessary to take this abrupt action
Secretary Marshall. Mr. Matthews has been out there. with a man of his caliber, and a five-star general.
Senator Smith. Secre ;ary Matthews was out there? Secretary Marshall. It was felt, in the opinion of all
Secretary Marshall. Yes. those I have mentioned, sir, it was necessary to do that.
Senator Smith. But nit prior to the Korean outbreak? Senator Smith. Had to move rapidly.
Secretary Marshall. After the Korean outbreak. Now, could I ask you this question, which may be a
Senator Smith. Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, only Gen- little embarrassing, but I do want to get an answer to it?
era`. Collins came out there, when I was there in the fall I the :report true that the removal of General Mac-
of 1949. Arthur had been planned by the Executive Department
Of course they have al. been out there since- the Korean for a long time, long before you were made Secretary of
outbreak; but, prior to that, when some of these other Defense?
problems were brewing, I cannot find that any of our Secretary Marshall. It would have to be-depending on
Joint Chiefs of Staff, or any of our leaders in the Defense just a guess, on any part, or a staternent from what I'd
Department or State Department ever went out there, know.
although all of them were going to Europe constantly. I would have said that that was not the case at all;
Secretary Marshall. Creneral Eisenhower was outs there that there was really very genuine regret that the action
in April and May, 1946. of dismissal was actually taken, and. that very careful
Senator Smith. '46? consideration was given to ways and means possibly to
Secretary Marshall. Yes. avoid that action.
Senator Smith. Was 1 e Chief of Staff then? I cannot speak for the President. I cannot speak for
Secretary Marshall. He was Chief of Staff then, and- my predecessors, but I have received no indication what-
Senator Smith. I am glad to get that- soever that there was any such idea on foot.
Secretary Marshall. And General Collins was there in The general assumption was that General MacArthur
149would remain in office until the Japanese peace treaty
Senator Russell. Let the witness finish answering the was signed; and the question then was, how-where
question, please. should he go, and where did he wish to go.
Secretary Marshall. General Collins was there in '49. Senator` Smith. That would be after the Japanese
Those are the principal visits I have here. peace treaty-
Senator Smith. Tha, is what I thought, from your Secretary Marshall. After the peace treaty was signed.
testimony, that General Collins had been there, and you Senator Smith. That is what I understood him to say,
say now, General Eisenhower. that it had been in his mind to retire, himself, after the
Secretary Marshall. Now, I am not including Secretary peace treaty was signed, because he felt that he should
Pace. We would have to look that up, because I think then withdraw.
that he was out there several times. Secretary Marshall. That was the general assumption,
Senator. Smith. I jut am not clear why, with these and I have already stated that one of the considerations
matters developing out there, if there were any mis under- that were talked over, was this action that was taken,
standings with Genera:. MacArthur, there wasn't some and whether it could be stayed until such time as the
attempt made to go out there andtry to straighten them peace treaty had been accomplished--and that was con-
cut. sidered at some length.
Let me ask you this c uestion: Senator Smith. Now, this is just confirming, I think,
I3:id any of those named, since the outbreak in Korea, what you have testified to here before.
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 Approved For Release 20 4/ 16 : C 7
It has been stated in some quarters that the PmetT ~fgo~i~Ql~~aully to see if at
Arthur had been notified that
l M
States Government plans eventually to agree to the
entrance of the Red Chinese Government into the United
Nations.
The testimony presented thus far has not produced
any clear understanding on this point.
I think you have testified, or stated quite categorically,
that as far as the Defense establishment was concerned,
it is unalterably opposed to Red China's entrance into
the United Nations.
I think you stated that- previously.
Secretary Marshall. That part that applies to the
Defense Department is correct; but you can question
the State Department on the general procedure.
Senator Smith. Will it continue to be the policy of the
Department of Defense, or does the Department stand
ready to consider the question of the entrance of the
Red Chinese into the United Nations as a bargaining
point in the Korean peace settlement?
Secretary Marshall. I don't think that I could be
more categoric in my replies than I have already been
on that subject.
Senator Smith. That lays the foundation for the next
question:
Do you believe, General Marshall, that what has hap-
pened in China is a conquest of that country by Soviet
Russia, and that there is consequently a control of China
today by an external power, namely, Russia?
Secretary Marshall. I think that is generally a fact.
Senator Smith. Does that imply that the admission
of Communist China to the United Nations would mean
the recognition by the United Nations of the conquest of
China by an external power-Russia? Wouldn't that
inevitably follow?
Secretary Marshall. I think that would be the natural
assumption. It means an additional vote of the Com-
munist group.
Senator Smith. Would this be something quite different
from the mere determination of a procedural question
of credentials when the question of the veto comes up?
Secretary Marshall. It is undoubtedly a consideration,
but as to the procedural part, I won't attempt to answer
that.
Senator Smith. The statement has been made that it
is simply a procedural point for the credentials to be
accepted. Here we have a conquest by an external power
and control by an external power.
Secretary Marshall. Which they will deny.
Senator Smith. They will deny it, of course, but they
will ask that their puppet be admitted to the United
Nations. ?
Now, the next question is this: Would this control
of China by an external power be a sound ground to
use the veto against the admission to the United Na-
tions and to the Security Council of this externally
controlled Peiping Communist Government?
Secretary Marshall. I have already involved myself
in the legalistic, and I would rather not answer the ques-
tion.
Senator Smith. I want to get the question in the record
as a suggestion. One more question and I am through.
I just want to get this clear, because I am still con-
fused in my own mind by the Joint Chiefs of Staff state-
ment of January 12. You have testified several times,
General Marshall, that the January 12 Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommendations were modified later in January
in light of the improved conditions in Korea.
General MacArthur stated before the Congress and
before these Committees that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
shared his view on. the four important courses of action
he recommended.
ac
any point Genera
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had changed their views. I
can't find any place that MacArthur was notified of the
change in their views. I wonder if I am wrong about
that. Were his views shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on January 12 or did he share the Joint Chiefs of Staff
views on January 12 and was he incorrect in..any respect
when he said he had not learned that they had changed
their views since that time?
Secretary Marshall. Senator, I have done my best here
a number of times to explain the relationship between
the paper of January 12th which was to the Security
Council, and its reference to General MacArthur by
General Collins in person as a ? matter of information,
which would naturally be of great interest to him, and
the directive of the Chiefs of Staff of the previous day,
January 11th and its relationship to the President's
message of January 13th.
Now really I think you should go further for informa-
tion from the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves.
Senator Smith. I thank you. I do not want to press
that. I just want to make it clear I am not clear on that
matter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Russell. I have just received notification from
Senator Byrd's office that he telephoned and asked that
I be informed that he is detained in Virginia due to the
illness of his mother. He asked that the message go in
the record.
Most of us have had the privilege of meeting Mrs. Byrd,
the mother of the Tom, Dick and Harry team, three great
Americans who have contributed to their country.
I am sure that I voice the sentiments of every member
of this Committee and the members of the Senate who
are visitors here, when I say that we all fervently hope
that Mrs. Byrd's illness will not be serious and that she
will soon be restored to complete health.
Senator Johnson?
Senator Johnson. General Marshall, in the light of
present world conditions and present conditions in the
Far East, you are of the opinion that the programs and
policies that we are now carrying out in Korea is the
most prudent and wise policy that this Government could
carry out under the circumstances?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Johnson. General, do you know whether your
viewpoint is shared by the civilian heads of the three
services, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force?
Secretary Marshall. I wouldn't answer that. I don't
know of any difference in viewpoint.
Senator Johnson. Do you know of any disagreements
they may have as to the wisdom of the present policy?
Secretary Marshall. I don't know of any, sir.
Senator Johnson. Do you know of any disagreement
that any individual member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
may have with the wisdom of the present policy?
Secretary Marshall. No, sir.
Senator Johnson. Do you believe that they are in
harmony and agreement with the wisdom of that policy?
Secretary Marshall. That is the impression that I have.
Senator Johnson. Do you know of any responsible or
respected high military man now in the Department of
Defense that feels that our policy is unwise?
Secretary Marshall. None has been brought to my at-
tention.
Senator Johnson. Is it your opinion that General
Ridgway feels that our course of action and our pro-
gram is a wise one?
Secretary Marshall. We have had no indications from
him to the contrary.
Senator Johnson. Have you had any indications from
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 General Van FleetAVpdiF6rr lel 290AM1kJ@ : CI&-~07y3e0QJ'IM9A9~q,Q10Pl9Rit14 6d with a very con-
Joy that they would prefer to embrace or substitute any sidered understanding of the problems involved.
other program for the program we are now following? The general procedure under Mr. Wilson, I would not
Secretary Marshall. I recall, of course, in the case of attempt to analyze that because it is a very complicated
General Stratemeyer, that he made statements in an matter, and I am principally concerned with the infla-
interview in relation to the U. S. News magazine advocat- tionary factors which cut down our Defense Department
ing, I believe, the bombing in Manchuria. purchasing requirements.
Senator Johnson. Hive you seen any official recom- The attitude of the people, of course, is a very impres-
mendation of either General Van Fleet, General Strate- sive factor in the whole affair; and what I am always
meyer or Admiral Joy in that regard? worried about, and reference has been made to something
Secretary Marshall. I have seen none; There may have of,the sort this morning, is that we have to wait for some
been communication, as I think there frequently has catastrophe to bring the unified action that the country
been between General E tratemeyer and General Vanden- will always give you.
berg,. I don't know on this particular point, but General I am very hopeful that they can all realize that we
Vandenberg can answer that. must move together in reasonable unity and very solidly
Senator Johnson. Do you know of any member of the behind the whole program.
National Security Council that feels it would be the That is talking in generalizations, but my main con-
better part of wisdom to embark upon the MacArthur sideration there is that we don't have to wait for a
program instead of the one now being carried out? catastrophe to bring about that energy, that unity that
Secretary Marshall. Senator, I do not think that I is so essential.
should comment on the views of a group like that. It Senator Johnson. You mentioned the important basic
is a matter of the in lividual himself. I hesitate to phases of the man-power program. Would you care to
answer this way because it sets up the implication that elaborate on what you consider the more important ones?
there have been such di 3agreements. Secretary Marshall. The most important factor in the
Senator Johnson. I know of none but I just assumed man-power bill is, of course, the universal military
that the National Security Council was well aware of our training and service.
policy and our program, and if there had been any vital I have talked about that so often, I almost give offense
disagreement with that policy, that program, we would by talking about it again. I was concerned in General
have heard about it. MacArthur's statement in regard to it, but he prefaced
Secretary Marshall. 'Nell, I am establishing a prece- his comments by the fact that he had not studied the
dent when I begin to interpret the various members. I bill, and lie made a special reference to his concern as to
amn quite sure that our rction has been sufficiently har- its effect on labor.
mon.ious? - Well, of course, he was not aware of the fact that labor
Senator Johnson. Ha ,e you at any time received any has endorsed the bill, and it has been written in a way
recommendations from any of the foreign commanders to cause the least unfortunate effect on the labor situa-
to the effect that we should abandon our present pro- tion in our industries.
grain and embark upon the MacArthur recommenda- As to the part that gave me most concern, it was the
tions? implication, if not the direct statement, that it was a
Secretary' Marshall. Such recommendations would matter that must have very, very serious consideration.
normally go to the Sup eme Commander in Tokyo, and He had said almost the same words before the 72d
I have no information on that subject. The Chiefs of Congress, and I think ever since then we have been giving
Staff could give you a more detailed answer. it Very, very serious consideration; and I cannot think
Senator Johnson. You have indicated that in your of much else that can be said on the subject.
opinion we are not as prepared as we might be or as we Senator Johnson. Do you :know of any proposal ad-
should be at this time. I wonder if you would give this vanced by the Department of Defense in your experience
Committee the benefit of your recommendations as to that has had more adequate consideration than the uni-
what we can do, what the country can do, what the versal military training program?
Congress can do, what y )ur Department can and should Secretary Marshall. Offhand, I cannot think of any,
do to speed the day when. we will be prepared. except, maybe-but in a quite different manner-the
Secretary Marshall. 'Ihe most important action that question of what an officer can and should talk about
I can think of at the ir. oment is the conclusion before before a committee, and what he should not, if anything.
the Congress of their consideration in relation to the (Laughter)
man: power act, which ccntains the basis for a continued Senator Johnson. There is certainly no disagreement
improvement in our military posture with a decreased within the services or within the Department that you
cost. That is not to my mind merely the question of the are aware of with regard to the bill passed by the Senate
general discussions, but the time factor is becoming: very on man power?
serious because our furt:aer actions, particularly in the Secretary Marshall. It had the complete endorsement
way of legislation regard:.ng the reserves and all, are de- of all the various portions concerned.
pendent on what the sett.p is to be. Senator Johnson. Are you satisfied with the deliveries
At the present moment, then, I feel that prompt action that are being made to the various services of equipment
regarding that man-power bill-and, I hope, action that that would be required to give training and equip them
does not destroy the mos'; important phase of the matter for combat?
-should be brought to a conclusion. Secretary Marshall. I have had no reports brought to
As to the appropriatio as, I think I have already said my ` attention or to me of what were thought to be
that I thought the Congress had acted with commend- serious delays in the matter. But I cannot give you any
able promptness despite the large sums involved in regard details at the moment because they have not been
to the various supplementary appropriation items. I brought to my attention, as they would most certainly
believe the Senate still hr,s to act-I am not quite certain have been if there were undue delays in the production
-on the third supplemental of some 6Y2 billions. But deliveries.
what, comes in your act..ons relating to the new 1951- Senator Johnson. In short, it is your opinion that the
1952 budget I can make no comment on. The hearings civilian heads of the services and the military heads
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 of the services, nan ppnwedifriocf eteames2gfl41 16 : CIA 1pr"0 k'49Mft5 9 4l6 exhibit?
the other responsible and respected officials in the De-
partment believe, as you do, that the program we are
now carrying out in Korea is the more prudent one, and
the wisest one in the light of all the conditions?
Secretary Marshall. The Secretaries, the Chiefs of
Staff, and my immediate associates that I work with
give me that impression.
Senator Johnson. And if they felt otherwise, you
think they would be frank enough to submit recom-
mendations to you?
Secretary Marshall. I am quite certain they would.
I get a great deal of frankness in the day's business.
Senator Johnson. Is General Eisenhower familiar with
the program we are carrying out in Korea?
Secretary Marshall. I think he is.
Senator Johnson. Have you received from him at any
time in your discussions with him and his problems-
have you received any indication that he feels that our
program is an unwise one in Korea?
Secretary Marshall. I have had no detailed report
from General Eisenhower since he has gone to Europe
except in one matter which concerned his own local
problem, in which he wished to be certain we all under-
stood it and took his point of view.
Senator Johnson. I am not asking for detailed reports.
Undoubtedly before he went there he was aware of what
our policy was and what our program was and how
it meshed in with his plans and his program and what
I want to ask you is:
Has he at any time given you any indication that he
thinks the course we are following out there is not a
wise and prudent one?
Secretary Marshall. He has given me no such indi-
cation. I have been trying to think of what had hap-
pened in my few conversations with him before his
departure, and I think his only concern was that he was
not left without any American acquisitions to his mili-
tary force.
Senator Johnson. Do you think the adoption of the
MacArthur recommendations would require adjustments
of General Eisenhower's plans and would seriously affect
those plans?
Secretary Marshall. We fear that it might.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, General.
Senator Russell. Senator Green.
Senator Green. Mr. Chairman, the questions I had in
mind to ask are minor ones. They are matters of minor
importance, and in view of the length of General Mar-
shall's testimony, I will shorten it by not exercising my
right to ask questions.
Senator Russell. Senator Morse.
Senator Morse. General Marshall, I hold in my hand
a document, a secret document, entitled "Joint Chiefs
of Staff Report for Senate Committees on Korean Oper-
ations."
It is a report which purports to set forth the actions
taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the beginning
of the Korean war starting June 25, 1950, to April 11,
1951.
It sets forth paraphrased statements of messages and
communications which the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to
their superiors, the Secretary of Defense, President of
the United States, along with communications which
they sent to other officials of Government, such as the
Secretary of State.
It also contains paraphrased statements of communi-
cations which the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to General
MacArthur, referred to constantly in the volume as
CINCFE.
With that description of the exhibit, Mr. Secretary,
Secretary Marshall. I have read it, sir.
Senator Morse. Next I ask you if, in your opinion, the
exhibit presents a great deal of evidence in support of
the conclusion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept Gen-
eral MacArthur informed in great detail as to all steps
which were being taken on the part of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in connection with their command obligations
and responsibilities with the Korean war?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Morse. In your opinion, does the exhibit show
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought at all times in
connection with every major problem and many prob-
lems that might be classified as not major arising in
connection with the Korean war to obtain General Mac-
Arthur's views and recommendations with respect to
the same?
Secretary Marshall. I think it does, sir.
Senator Morse. Now, General, I want to turn to the
exhibit-I shall not dwell on it any longer than I feel
necessary-in order to establish one thing that I think
needs to be established in this record, because I look
upon this exhibit as the best evidence that anyone has
submitted in this hearing as to the relationship, the
official relationship, that was maintained between the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur, and also
the best evidence of any information that has been sup-
plied to the joint Committee to date as to the lengths
to which the Government went in its relationship with
General MacArthur at CINCFE, in an endeavor to avoid
the development of any misunderstandings between the
General and the Government.
I think it rather important that the record relate
rather definitely some of the major events in connection
with the Korean war concerning which subsequent dif-
ferences of opinion seem to have developed between
General MacArthur and the Government.
On page 24 of this document, under Item 32, I find that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff are very much concerned about
Formosa, and:
"... on July 28, 1950, informed CINCFE that the Chi-
nese Communists had announced their intention of
capturing Formosa and that the Communist capabili-
ties therefore could probably be resisted effectively
only if the Chinese Nationalists made timely efforts to
defend that island. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also
informed CINCFE of their recommendation to the
Secretary of Defense that the Nationalist Govern-
ment be permitted to employ its military forces in
defensive measures to prevent Communist amphibious
concentrations directed against Formosa or the Pes-
cadores even if such measures included attacks
against concentrations on the mainland. CINCFE
was further informed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
had recommended that the United States inform the
Nationalist Government, if the recommendations of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were approved. Later, on
2 August 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed
CINCFE that no action had been taken on their
recommendations and that pending such action the
existing policy toward Formosa would remain un-
changed.
"In his reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 29
July 1950, CINCFE stated his complete concurrence
with their recommendations regarding the Island of
Formosa and the Chinese Nationalists. He also in-
formed them that he was proceeding to Formosa
with a selected group of staff officers on or about 31
July 1950 to make a brief reconnaissance of the
situation there."
Now, in view of this exchange between the Joint Chiefs
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 of Staff and CINC OfdtyavA kw Miami 20"d1Jh1r
28, 1950, the Joint h; efs of Staff and CINCFE were in
agreement as to the policies that should be followed with
regard to Formosa?
Secretary Marshall. It appears so.
Senator Morse. Do you know of any incident since July
28, 1950, when the Join; Chiefs of Staff and CINCFE were
not in agreement as to policies to be followed in regard
to Formosa?
Secretary Marshall. The only one I can think of at the
:moment is the desire o f General MacArthur in November
to 'bring some 60,000 F )rmosan Nationalist China. troops
into Korea.
Senator Morse. Into Korea. But with respect to For-
mosa itself-
Secretary Marshall. rhat has a relation to that as to
what it would do to the garrison of Formosa.
Senator Morse. That is correct. I think my question is
certainly subject to the qualification you make in respect
to it. But let me put my question this way: Save and
except for General MacArthur's recommendation in No-
vember, 1950, that som ~ 60,000 Nationalist troops should
be taken to Korea from Formosa, was there any difference
between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as to the defense of Formosa proper?
Secretary Marshall. I do not recall any, sir.
Senator Morse. In res;)ect to-let us pause for a moment
now that you have raised this and ask a question or two
with regard to his recommendation concerning the use
of Nationalist troops in Korea, some 60,000 or 'thereabouts.
[Deleted]
Senator Morse. Anotiier question or two in regard to
the Formosan issue and its relationship to the National-
ist troops, General. Ane I correct in my understanding
that; the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against Gen-
eral MacArthur's propo: al of November, 1950, for the use
8f some 00,000 Nationalist troops?
Secretary Marshall. [ think that is correct, sir. Of
course, they can give you a very specific answer, but I
think the records show that.
[Deleted]
Senator Morse. At th, time of the General's proposal
in November, 1950, to u:;e some 60,000 Nationalist troops
in Korea, had strong re,)resentations already been made
to the Government by our allies through which represen-
tations they made clear that they were opposed to'the
use of Nationalist troop:; in Korea?
Secretary Marshall. That is my recollection, Senator,
but I would prefer that you go to the State Department.
Senator Morse. But it is your opinion that this whole
question of the use of Nationalist troops in connection
with the Korean war from n the very beginning of that war
has raised. a complicated problem with our allies?
Secretary Marshall. T:zat is correct, sir.
Senator Morse. Now while we are still on this point of
the Nationalist troops, General, it is my understanding
that General MacArthur favors the sending of a mission
to Formosa, American military mission, to give technical
advice and technical training. It is my understanding
that he also favors an is crease in American military aid
by 'way of equipment to the Generalissimo's troops, is
that your understanding?
Secretary Marshall. That is my recollection.
[Deleted.]
Senator Morse. I agree that they should be off the
record. However, I just d) not see how we can go through
the record in the exhibit which the Defense Department
has submitted to us with )ut giving some attention to the
chronological steps that occurred which I think outline
the final disagreement that caused the removal of Gen-
eral MacArthur, and tha t is why I am-
CIA-R0W5P90dAQB&100BQN9A01ifing any suggestions
as to the chronological steps. It is the reasons for the
viewpoint of the Chiefs of Staff.
Senator Morse. It is my understanding, General, that
it is the position of General MacArthur that after we
supply the Generalissimo's 'troops with military aid and
technical advice, the question should then be left up to
the Generalissimo to decide 'what he wants to do with his
troops thereafter.
,Secretary Marshall. So long as it does not involve
us in a world war, or an enlargement, which we think Is
dangerous.
Senator Morse. I am glad to. have your answer. You
have anticipated another question I was going to ask you.
Secretary Marshall. Of the Korean conflict, without
giving adequate return.
Senator Morse. I simply say, that I happen to be one
who has felt for some time that it was a mistake for
uss by way of unilateral action, to prevent the Generalis-
simo from carrying on war on the mainland of China
if he wanted to carry it on.
It seems to me that when we took that course of
action we necessarily involved ourselves in a phase of
the China war that was bound to result in some em-
barrassment. But, be that as it may, that is the situa-
tion in which we find ourselves, so I now ask you the
question, do you know of any offer on. the part of the
Generalissimo to fight on the mainland without-main-
la id of China-assistance from American troops, if we
desist, if we desisted, from our naval policy of preventing
him from conducting a raid on the mainland, and he
wanted to do it?
Secretary Marshall. I don't recall such.
Senator Morse. Do you think the Joint Chiefs of Staff
will be in a better position to advise this Committee if
the Generalissimo has ever made an offer since the out-
break of the Korean war to fight on the mainland of
China on his own initiative, without support from Amer-
ican troops, if we release him from the naval restrictions
which now prevent him from, conducting an amphibious
landing on the mainland, if he wants to?
Secretary Marshall Well, the Chiefs will give you a
better answer to that than I can, sir; a more precise
answer.
Senator Morse. Do you agree with me, General-strike
that.
General, do you not think it would be a proper course
for our Government to follow, if we are to provide the
Generalissimo with the military mission and the military
aid which he apparently seeks, find out before we make
all those commitments whether or not :he would be willing
to conduct an operation on the mainland of China?
Secretary Marshall. Read the first part.
(The question was read as requested.)
Secretary Marshall. I become involved in a rather
difficult answer because I would consider at the present
moment it would not be advantageous to our interests
to have him do so.
In a general way, we should know what he would
purpose doing with better equipment, but as to our im-
plying that the equipment would only be produced for
that specific purpose or that general purpose, I find
myself in some doubt.
Vole want to make certain that he can manage the
defense of Formosa without assistance by ground troops
from us, and with the assistance that we could divert
from Korea in the air, and by sea to the defense of
Formosa.
Senator Morse. Am I correct in my understanding
that the military assistance we now propose to give to
the Generalissimo, including both technical training
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 from a military missionpncQ miitao~'~$~t21/16
not be needed in the quantity that we propose to supply
it if his function is to bQ primarily the defense of For-
mosa,, and not an attack on the mainland of China?
Secretary Marshall. I would think the present proposal
as to equipment and such, all of the equipment involved,
would be needed to make certain of his capability of
defending Formosa.
[Deleted]
Senator Morse. I am very glad to have that answer,
General, because I think, for the record, it is a very
important answer because of this problem, namely, I
assume that we will be confronted with a rather compli-
cated situation in relation to our allies if they continue
to hold what I think is a mistaken point of view, but
they have held it to date, the point of view that the
United Nations should not give support to the General-
issimo in conducting a civil war in China. But I under-
stand your answer to mean that whatever assistance we
now are giving or propose to give to the Generalissimo
can be defended, as far as the United States is concerned,
on the ground that it is assistance that can be used very
effectively in the defense of Formosa, irrespective of
whether he sends one soldier to the mainland of China.
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Morse. Now, returning to the exhibit of secret
information previously identified and referred to, I notice
on page 26, item 38, it says that:
"By the end of July it became apparent that it was
necessary to expand the scope of air operations be-
yond that of close support of ground forces and air
supremacy. Accordingly on 31 July 1950 the Joint
Chiefs of Staff informed CINCFE that they would
make available to him two additional bomber groups
for the destruction of certain military targets."
Item 37 points out:
[Deleted]
Senator Morse. Page 27 of the secret exhibit previously
referred to indicates, and I find that:
"On August 4, 1950, the Secretary of Defense, with
the approval of the President and the Secretary of
State, dispatched a message to CINCFE, after
CINCFE's visit to Formosa, reaffirming the decision
of the President of 27 June with respect to Formosa,
and pointing out that only the President has author-
ity to order or authorize military action against con-
centrations on the mainland. While keeping the Joint
Chiefs of Staff fully informed as to intelligence mat-
ters, the message to CINCFE stated that it was in the
most vital national interest that no United States
action precipitate general war or give excuse to others
to do so. He. was also informed, however, that his.
recommendations as to action to be taken were de-
sired whenever appropriate."
Does not this message make clear to CINCFE the
policy of our Government in respect to its position on any
action that might lead to widening the war or conduct-
ing operations on the mainland of China?
Secretary Marshall. I think it does, sir.
Senator Morse. Does it not, in part, provide an an-
swer to the question that one reads so frequently in the
press these days, did.the Government keep CINCFE fully
advised as to its position on Asiatic policy?
Secretary Marshall. I think it does, sir.
Senator Morse. Item 41, page 27 of this exhibit says:
"CINCFE replied on 5 August 1950 to the effect
that he was operating meticulously in accordance
with the President's decision of 27 June which he
fully understood. He further stated that he would
under no circumstances extend the limitations of his
authority as theater commander, and expressed the
g611P 5rK1A9RW39W9W1 ' the Secre-
tary of Defense had been misled by false or specu-
lative reports from any source."
I have two questions on that paragraph, at least, Gen-
eral. One, does not General MacArthur's reply to the
communication of Aug. 4, 1950, previously referred to,
make clear that General MacArthur understood the im-
port of the message of August 4th, and apparently also
understood that the message of August 4th might be
subject to the interpretation that there was some con-
cern on the part of the Government as to whether or
not General MacArthur was in agreement with the
policies that the government had set forth in not only'
that message but previous messages?
Secretary Marshall. It seems so.
Senator Morse. It is rather difficult, is it not, to inter-
pret his assurance set forth in the latter part of this
message, that he. hoped that neither the President nor
the Secretary of Defense had been misled by false or
speculative reports from any source, in any other light;
is that not right? to interpret the
It would be rather difficult, I say,
language from the latter part of his-report, which I just
read, in any other light than that General MacArthur
himself was apparently concerned as he read the message
of August 4-
Secretary Marshall. I think so.
Senator Morse. -concerning whether or not the Gov-
ernment was concerned about his attitude.
In fact, may I ask this question, General, at this point.
Is it not true that although General MacArthur did
meticulously carry out to the letter the directives that
were given to him in regard to military matters, never-
theless, this exhibit as well as other evidence in regard
to which you have already testified in this hearing, shows
that for many months preceding his recall the relation-
ship between -the commander in the field and the Gov-
ernment was such that a considerable amount of effort
was gone to by the Government in exchanges with Mac-
Arthur to make clear in detail the Government's posi-
tion on Asiatic policy?
Secretary Marshall. I think the record indicates that,
sir.
Senator Morse. General, would it be a fair interpreta-
tion in your opinion to draw from the exhibit, through
which I am now going, logically as to what I consider to
be some of its major points, that although the relation-
ship between General MacArthur and the Government
did not show any failure on the part of the General to
carry out meticulously his military directives, it did show
a considerable degree of difference between the General
and the officials of the Government in regard to the over-
all Asiatic policy, both military and diplomatic?
Secretary Marshall. Read that, please.
(The pending question was read by the reporter.)
Secretary Marshall. That is correct sir, in my opinion.
Senator Morse. It is only your opinion that I seek.
True, I am suggesting certain tentative conclusions that
I think the record supports to date, and I am checking
those conclusions against your opinion, because I want
to be fair to all parties concerned.
Do you think, General Marshall, that in view of the
contents of the exhibit which I am now examining in
this questioning of you, it would be fair to say that the
Government on the one hand and General MacArthur
on the other seem to be dealing at .arm's length with
each other in connection with the conducting of the
Asiatic operation?
Secretary Marshall. I do not think of any actions on
the part of the Government that suggests that it was
proceeding on the basis of being at arm's length. I do
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 Approved
feel that beyond the decisions as to policy it was the view
of the Government that we had to proceed in a very
careful manner in ouc interchanges with General Mac-
Arthur because of his attitude, because of what he had
stated publicly in reg ird to the matter, because of our
allies and their reacti )ns and the general complications
and delicacy of the situation under those conditions.
Senator Morse. Would it be fair to say that one of the
problems which developed between General MacArthur
and the Government was due to the fact that although
General MacArthur carried out meticulously military
directives that were sent to him, he nevertheless was
inclined from time to time to make such public state-
ments or release such news releases that created both
within the Government and within American public
opinion that there was not complete harmony and agree-
ment between his administration of affairs in Asia in-
cluding those of his military command, and the an-
nounced policy of the Government with respect to the
same?
Secretary Marshall. .[ think that was the case.
Senator Morse. In your opinion did not the creation
of that attitude concerning what appeared to be a dif-
ference between General MacArthur on the one hand and
the Government on the other create a very serious situa-
tion. in connection with our Government's relation to her
alLes in the United Nations?
Secretary Marshall. :[ think that is correct.
Senator Morse. Do yeu think that the subject matter
I am now discussing, which can be summarized by say-
ing that, irrespective of cause, the impression was
abroad in this country and in the world that there were
differences between MacArthur and his Government,
is one of the reasons for our allies wanting to know whose
voice spoke in Asia, ou:: Government's or MacArthur's?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Morse. And is it fair, do you think, for me to
say that the impression of a difference which was
created over a period of many months can be pretty
much summarized by phrase that you have already
used in this testimony, namely, it was a mistake to have
two voices attempting to speak for American policy in
Asia?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Morse. Now returning to the exhibit pre-
viously identified, Mr. Secretary, I find on page 27 the
following:
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff on Aug. 5, 1950, author-
ized CINCFE to conduct aerial reconnaissance over
all Korean territory including up to the Yalu River
on the west coast but short of the Korean-Soviet
boundary on the east ,oast in order to establish the
fact of support to the North Koreans by the U.S.S.R.
or the Chinese Commu gists; but that all such flights
must respect the northern frontiers of Korea."
Now that was Aug. 5th, 1950, where apparently again
he was authorized to do some aerial reconnaissance up
to the Manchurian border in one case and apparently
on the east coast of China, is that not true?
Secretary Marshall. I do not see an indication here
of further reference at this time to the general coast of
China. With that exception I think that is 'true.
Senator Morse. I thin], you are right. It doesn't say
the east coast of China but it does include all of North
Korea,.
Secretary Marshall. YE s, sir.
Senator :Morse. Now General, page 29 of this exhibit,
item 98, under the heading, "The decisions to pass to the
offensive in. Korea," it reads:
"The Department of Defense made a major effort
to build up United States forces in Korea -first for
the purpose of halting the North Korean aggression,
next for the purpose of stabilizing a military front,
ultimately with the objective.of passing to the of-
fensive. Although there were some deficiencies, the
requirements of CINCFE were met to the extent it
was within the power of the Department of Defense
to do so, but with due regard to United States Mili-
tary commitments and requirements elsewhere."
Now :[ raise this particular point, Mr. Secretary, be-
cause of the use in this paragraph of the phrase, "for
the purpose of stabilizing a military front," and I want to
relate that to the so-called directive or plan of January
12th in which the word "stabilize" is used.
As I read this exhibit-and I have studied it with con-
siderable care-I have formed the conclusion-and I
want you to check me as to whether or not you think
it' is proper-that by stabilize our military officials
meant a status of our troops in defense, they meant
laying down a line of defense that we could hold with-
out further retreat, they meant a defense position in con-
trast to an offensive position, and that the proposal of
January 12th has to be read in light of what the military
meant by stabilize. Am I correct in that interpretation of
stabilize as it is used in the directive of January 12th?
Secretary Marshall. I think that is correct, sir. You
might add to that that it was used in connection with the
situation at that time where we had been involved in
retirements.
Senator Morse. This reference that I have just read
on page 29 is in connection with instructions to General
MacArthur concerning changing his tactics from a posi-
tioii of stabilization to a position of offensive. Does that
not show that the Defense establishment here in this
country and CINCFE in Asia understood what . the Joint
Chiefs of Staff meant by the use of the word "stabilize"?
Secretary Marshall. I would assume so, sir.
Senator Morse. The January 12 proposal was not only
a proposal in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General
MacArthur of their tentative plans, set forth their tenta-
tive recommendations and p:^oposals, but the very lan-
guage of the order itself made clear, didit not, that they
were talking in terms of falling back to the Pusan area
or in a territory of proximity thereto, or evacuation?
Secretary Marshall. Yes sir; except that it was not an
order, nor was it a directive. It was not to General Mac-
Arthur, it was to the National Security Council.
Senator Morse. I am sorry that I used the word "direc-
tive," and I think I did in my question. I think I also
said, or meant to say, tentative proposals for a program
to be followed by CINCFE in case the retreat then being
engaged in continued to the point of the beachhead of
Pusan or the complete evacuation of Korea. But for the
purposes of reiteration and clarification, I want to put
the question this way: Am I correct in my interpretation
of the tentative proposals which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
advised MacArthur on January 12 they were giving
favorable consideration to, involved a military plan for
continued retreat, possible evacuation, and that they
were proposals that should be followed, carried out, when
the American-United Nations forces position became
stabilized?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, correct.
Senator Morse. And by stabilization the Joint Chiefs
of Staff meant, and the exhibit from which I am quoting
shows, that the word "stabilize" is used in that connec-
tion in military exchanges, a defense line which they
were to hold?
Secretary Marshall. Correct.
Senator ]Morse. Against the offensive of the enemy?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Morse. Do you think that this exhibit from
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 which I am taking excLrt sQ i ~1 i~t ~ /16
Chiefs of Staff sent to General MacArthur either direc-
tives or recommendations in connection with an offensive,
they did not use the term "stabilize"?
Secretary Marshall. That is correct, sir.
Senator Morse. On page 35 of this exhibit, General, I
jyWM"Item 20. On Aug. 29, 1950, the President dispatched
a personal message to General MacArthur giving
him, for his information, the text of a letter which
had been forwarded to Ambassador Austin on Aug.
27, 1950. The President mentioned a letter which
Ambassador Austin had, on August 25, addressed to
Secretary General Lie. This letter admirably summed
up the position of the United States Government, as
stated by the President in his address on June 27,
1950, and again in his message to the Congress on
July 19, 1950."
And then it sets forth seven points, covering the
United States Government's position as to policy in Asia.
Do you think, General Marshall, that this message on
the part of the President of the United States, to General
MacArthur, was a very clear notice to General Mac-
Arthur as to his Government's policy as of that time?
Secretary Marshall. I think it was.
Senator Morse. In Asia?
Secretary Marshall. I thought so, sir.
Senator Morse. Do you think, then, General Marshall,
that I make a correct conclusion from. this exhibit, that
it does supply an answer to the question: Did the Govern-
ment keep General MacArthur advised as to its policy in
Asia, both militarily and politically?
Secretary Marshall. I think it does.
Senator Morse. May I say again, to you, sir, that the
purpose of this particular examination, as far as the
questioner is concerned, is that I think it is of vital
importance that the record of this case produce an an-
swer to the - question: "Is it true that the Government
failed to keep MacArthur advised as to its policy in Asia?"
because I think the American people are entitled to
know the answer to that question; and as I have com-
pleted my examination, or my study of this exhibit, I
cannot understand the charge that the Government
failed to keep General MacArthur advised as to both its
military and political policy for Asia.
To the contrary, I think the Government was just as
meticulous in keeping MacArthur advised, as Mac-
Arthur was meticulous in carrying out, to the letter,
the military directives that he received; but as I read
this exhibit, I also come to the conclusion that the sad
fact is that for months, although both the Government
and General MacArthur were participating in very
meticulous conduct in keeping each other informed as to
their respective positions, that unfortunately they were
dealing at arm's length-that apparently a lack of mu-
tual confidence had developed.
As a juror, I ask you that; but I think you ought to
know what is going through my mind, as I ask more
questions.
As a juror I. would say, after studying this exihibit,
which I think to date is the most important exhibit in
this whole record-and we have to deal with most of it
in secret-but as I studied this exhibit page by page, I
came to the conclusion as a juror that the parties to
the controversy were dealing at arm's length, because
apparently each side felt that was necessary; and I
think that is unfortunate, but I think it explains-
according to my lights, at least-why the final break
became inevitable.
I just don't think you can have a situation where you
even have to go to all the detail that apparently the
i s communications
with General MacArthur in or er o eep the record
perfectly clear.
Now, on page 37, item 21, we find that:
"Prior to the dispatch of the above message"!
referring there to the President's message of Aug.
25, 1950, covered by my preceding question-"Prior
to the dispatch of the above message, General Mac-
Arthur had been invited to speak at the 51st Na-
tional Encampment of the Veterans of Foreign
Wars in Chicago. Unable to appear in person, by a
cover letter dated 21 August, he sent a paper to be
read at the meeting. In his paper General Mac-
Arthur placed much emphasis on the strategic as-
pect of Formosa and on its importance to American
security. President Truman came into possession
of a copy of General MacArthur's Veterans of Foreign
Wars statement early Saturday morning, 26 August.
The President instructed the Secretary of Defense
to direct General MacArthur to withdraw his state-
ments to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in order to
avoid confusion as to the United States position
with respect to Formosa. General MacArthur com-
plied immediately with this directive."
As I think the record shows he did with every directive
that was placed in his hands, but the report goes on to
say:
,,The statement by General MacArthur, however,
was published in the United States News and World
Report."
General, in your opinion, did the publication of the
General's letter to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, referred
to in this paragraph 21 on page 37 of the exhibit, accom-
plish practically the same amount of harm that would
have been accomplished if the General had delivered his
message in person and had not complied with the re-
quest to withdraw his letter?
General Marshall. I was not in office at that time. I
would assume from what I know of such matters that the
fact of the withdrawal would increase the interest in the
terms of the message.
Senator Morse. Is it your opinion that the publication
of the letter in U. S. News & World Report provided
further evidence that there was not complete agreement
between General MacArthur and the Government con-
cerning. Asiatic policy?
Secretary Marshall. I know nothing whatever, Sena-
tor, regarding the circumstances of that release.
Senator Morse. Page 41 of this exhibit, paragraph 33,
or rather item 33, I find that:
"On 15 September 1950, CINCFE was informed of
the following conclusions which had been approved
by the President concerning United States course of
action with respect to Korea:
"a. Final decisions cannot be made at this time
inasmuch as the course of action best advancing
United States national interest must be determined
in the light of:
"(1) Action by the Soviet Union and the Chinese
Communists;
"(2) In consultation with friendly members of the
United Nations; and
"(3) An appraisal of the risk of general war;
"b. The United Nations forces have a legal basis
for conducting operations north of the, 38th parallel
to compel withdrawal of the North Korean forces be-
hind the line or to defend against these forces."
And then the message to General MacArthur sets out
further details, including item c:
"c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were authorized to
direct General MacArthur to plan for the possible
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 onl
only with the apprc wai of the President;
"d. General. MacArthur should undertake no
ground operations ncrth of the 38th parallel in event
of occupation of North Korea by Soviet or -Chinese
Communist forces. In this event, air and naval
operations north of the parallel should not be dis-
continued; and
"e. In the event o:' employment of major Chinese
Communist units south of the 38th parallel, the
United States would (1) Not permit itself to become
engaged in a general war with Communist China;
(2) Authorize Generc,l MacArthur to continue mili-
tary action as long a:. it offered a reasonable chance
of successful resistance,
[Deleted]
Then the message sets forth other details.
In your opinion, General Marshall, does this message
to CINCFE on Sept. Ili, 1950, constitute another piece
of evidence in support of a conclusion that the Gov-
err.,ment kept MacArthur advised in detail as to its
position and policies or. the questions presented by our
Asiatic struggle?
Secretary' Marshall. I think it does, sir.
Senator Morse. On page 42 I read:
"On 27 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ad-
vised the Secretary (if Defense that they hacl no
objection to the Department of State proposals for
action by CINCFE in the event the North Koreans
sued for peace or foi an armistice. Further, they
had no objection to thi' Department of State program
with respect to bringir. g Korean hostilities to an end.
General MacArthur advised, from the standpoint of
the field commander, that both proposals seemed
entirely feasible and practicable."
General Marshall, doe, not this exchange of messages
on Sept. 27, 1950, show that the Government not only
was :keeping General MacArthur fully advised as to the
plans it had under consideration for attempting to bring
about an armistice in the Korean war, but as of that
date, Sept. 27, 1950, General MacArthur advised the Gov-
ernment that he was rot in disagreement with those
proposals for an armistice?
Secretary Marshall. C )rrect, sir.
Senator Morse. Therefore, am I again correct in my
conclusion that certainl'r up to Sept. 27, 1950, there is'
no doubt about the fact ghat the Government was keep-
ing General MacArthur fully advised as to its policies,
both :military and diplom ,tic?
Secretary Marshall. It seems so to me, sir.
Senator Morse. Page 43 of the exhibit, I find a para-
graph, paragraph 36, which reads as follows:
"General MacArthur then submitted his plan for
operations north of the 38th parallel, the substance
of which was an attaek north along the western
coastal corridor by the Eighth United States Army
and an amphibious landing by the United States
Tenth Corps at Wonsan on the east coast of North
Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Mac-
Arthur's plan on 29 September 1950."
Does not this item show, General Marshall, that as
late as Sept. 29, 1950, this 'Government and General
MacArthur were in agreement as to the military policy
that ought to be followec. in the immediate future fol-
lowing. Sept. 29, 1950, in :respect to operations north of
the 38th parallel?
Secretary Marshall. It would appear so.
Senator Morse. Does not the paragraph from the
secret; exhibit from whicl: I just read, in your opinion,
justify the conclusion tha, General MacArthur was cer-
tainly receiving prompt action from the Government in
occupation of N(>~ IStDVedb~aplE ~2s~x@R Qal>!s16 : CI~ ~75f9%1 eR000t50fo090~ho 6ation in connection
with his recommendations for the conduct of the war
in Korea?
Secretary Marshall. I think that is a fact, sir.
Senator Morse. On page 46 of this exhibit I find the
following paragraph:
"On Oct. 6, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff trans-
mitted. to General MacArthur the text of the proposed
United. Nations General Assembly resolution on post
hostilities in Korea. He was informed that the Gen-
eral Assembly would probably vote on the resolution
on Oct. 6, 1950, and that any textual changes would
be immediately transmitted to him. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff further stated that it was considered that
the resolution provided for support of operations
north of the 38th parallel. After approval of the
resolution by the General Assembly, General Mac-
Arthur was requested to transmit immediately the
text of the resolution to North Korean authorities
and to call upon them to lay down their arms.
"On Oct. 7, 1950"-which, incidentally was the very
next clay-"the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed
CINCFE that the General Assembly had passed the
resolution on post hostilities in Korea with certain
minor textual changes, of which he was informed.
"On :) October 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rec-
ognizing that the Chinese Communists might inter-
vene in North Korea, amplified CINCFE's current
directive and included, among other things, the pro-
vision that, in the event of the employment in Korea
of major Chinese Communist units without prior an-
nouncement, CINCFE should continue the action as
long as, In his judgment, his forces had a reasonable
chance of success. He was cautioned, however, that
he would obtain authorization from Washington prior
to taking any military action against objectives in
Chinese territory."
Do not these three paragraphs in your opinion, Gen-
eral Marshall, taken from page 46 of the exhibit pre-
viously identified, show again that our Government was
keeping General MacArthur informed step by step of
minute details of negotiations that were taking place
between our Government and the United Nations?
Secretary Marshall. I think it does, sir.
Senator Morse. On page 49 of the exhibit, item 24, I
find that--
"On 2:1 October 1950 CINCFE replied to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff message of 20 October regarding the
redeployment of the 2d and 3d Divisions. CINCFE
stated that this matter had been discussed with the
President at Wake Island. He believed that, upon
the close of hostilities, the Eighth Army should be
withdrawn to Japan. He hoped this movement would
start before Thanksgiving and be completed before
Christmas. Upon the cessation of hostilities the 2d
Division would be made available for return to the
Zone of Interior."
Does not this exchange in your opinion, General Mar-
shall, between CINCFE and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
show again: that detailed information and careful con-
sideration was being given mutually by CINCFE and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with the post-hostili-
ties problems that would develop in Korea once the North
Koreans were defeated?
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Morse. Does not the particular language that
I have just cited from the exhibit show that as far as the
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were con-
cerned there was at that time no serious disagreement
between them and General MacArthur as to what should
be done by way of post-hostilities operations?
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 Secretary Marshall. Appn ia.Ftn Releazes2004/01/16
Senator Morse. I refer now, General Marshall, to page
51 of the exhibit, paragraph 29:
"On 25 October CINCFE informed the Joint Chiefs
of Staff that the instructions reported in his message
regarding the lifting of restrictions with regard to
the employment of United Nations forces in North
Korea were a matter of military necessity. [Deleted]
More seasoned commanders were necessary. CINCFE
further stated that he saw no conflict between the
removal of these instructions and his directive dated
27 September. This directive indicated that the
instructions sent to CINCFE could not be considered
final since they might require modifications in ac-
cordance with developments. CINCFE felt that he
had the necessary latitude for modifications in a
message from the Secretary of Defense on 30 Sep-
tember which gave CINCFE tactical, and strategic
latitude to proceed north of the 38th parallel. He
further stated that he understood the basic purpose
and intent of his directive and would take all pre-
cautions. However, he felt that tactical hazards
might result from any action other than that which
he had directed. He pointed out that the entire
subject had been covered in his conference at Wake
Island."
[Deleted]
Secretary Marshall. I think, Senator, that there is
a confusion there in exactly what is being referred to.
That question could be better answered by the Chiefs
of Staff. But my recollection is the issue was whether
or not he was pushing the United Nations forces, ex-
cluding the South Korean forces, too far to the front
in connection with the desire to have the South Korean
forces carry out the forward movement towards the
Yalu River, and ' avoiding the necessity of having other
United Nations forces approach close to the river, and
his answer is made to that. But it could be answered
more definitely for you by the Chiefs of Staff.
Senator Russell. Gentlemen, I regret very much to
interrupt this interrogation at this point, but on Friday
last, you will all recall that it was stated that General
Marshall had had an engagement of long standing at
the Virginia Military Institute for this afternoon and
tomorrow.
I assured him that we would undertake to release him
by 1 o'clock today. It is almost 1 o'clock now. That
matter was discussed, and I am quite sure that all mem-
bers of the Committee,are aware of the factors involved,
and it is unnecessary for me to go into any more details.
It is my intention to have General Bradley here to-
morrow morning.
Mr. Secretary, it would seem to be necessary for you
to return at some later date, and I will communicate
with you sometime later in the week.
Secretary Marshall. Yes, sir.
Senator Russell. I will communicate with you to ar-
range a mutually convenient time for your reappearance
before this Committee.
Secretary Marshall. If you wish to do so, I can manage
to 1:30 without undue inconvenience.
Senator Russell. Well, I have told several members
of the Committee that I intended to recess about j o'clock
and I think that, perhaps, we had best follow that course.
So, we thank you very much.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, may I say that if I find
it possible in the meantime to cover through other wit-
nesses further questions on the particular exhibit to
which I have been referring this morning, without re-
calling, as far as I am concerned, General Marshall, I
will so advise the Chairman.
.b(y6&ttn r do many of these
questions are peculiarly wit in t e jurisdiction of the
Joint Chiefs that we may save time by interrupting Gen-
eral Marshall's testimony.
I ordinarily do not like to do that, but in this case, I
think that, perhaps, it will serve a useful purpose, apd
we will have General Bradley here tomorrow morning at
10 o'clock, and if it is possible to do so without too great
interruption of the business of the Senate, gentlemen, I
intend to have an afternoon session. I will notify you
prior to the recessing tomorrow morning as to whether
that is possible.
General, I wish to extend to you again our very best
wishes for a pleasant day down at V.M.I. I know some-
thing about the feeling that all of us have about return-
ing to the atmosphere of the campuses where we had
our education.
I also wish to thank you for your assistance to this
Committee over a period of seven days. It has been a
remarkable exhibition of stamina, both physical and
mental, to handle the very wide field of questioning to
which you have been subjected, and I think it has cov-
ered nearly every point on the globe, and all of the his-
'tory of the last 10 or 15 years; indeed, if I recall correctly,
why, we went as far back as the Napoleonic wars, and
the strategy employed in some of those campaigns on one
or two occasions.
It has been a very grueling experience, I know, and it
is one that would have tested the fire of any man.
Throughout it all, you have handled yourself as a soldier
would-as the soldier we know you to be.
You have answered the questions fully and frankly,
and I am convinced that you have not hesitated to state
the facts as you see them to be. Of course, I did not
anticipate any other course.
There are few men in the history of our country who
have played as prominent a part in the outstanding
events in the past several years as you have done.
I referred the other day to the very remarkable fact
that you had within a relatively short period of time
served as Chief of Staff during the greatest war in which
this country has ever been engaged; as Ambassador to
China during a very critical period in our history, and
as Secretary of State and as Secretary of Defense.
You have participated in thousands of important deci-
sions and have helped to shape the course of our nation
during the years to follow the war. You have been gen-
erously sharing with this Committee your vast informa-
tion on a wide variety of subjects.
I also wish to thank you for the time you have given us.
You occupy a very important position today, one of the
highest in the Government, that of Secretary of Defense;
and I know that you have innumerable problems to settle
every day in addition to answering the questions that
have been propounded here.
The hours that you spent here must have caused a
great accumulation of work on your desk.
On behalf of our Committee, I wish to express to you
my sincere thanks for your testimony.
Senator Connally. General Marshall, I want to join the
Chairman in congratulating you upon the vivid and
dramatic events that have transpired at the Virginia
Military Institute and these celebrations which will be
held. I know what pride and interest the V. M. I. has
in your career.
I had occasion some years ago to make an address to
the cadets of the Virginia Military Institute, and I know
of the high position which you occupy in their admira-
tion and affection. I thank you deeply along with the
Chairman for the labor and the toil through which you
have gone in these examinations.
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 I want to say rgfvdb4 dfakeaslea2OWDlis'litC CIA- B[ ?-014MM?p qg9AO ~tes for each senator,
many questions, practically no questions, very few. My on each round of questions, and that the questioning
reasons for that have been that as Cochairman I will be completely exhausted by the time we get through.
wanted. to give every member of this Committee oppor-? That; will be the pending business in the morning.
tu.nity to fully invest..gate all the questions pending be- General, there is one other matter I should bring to
fore us without my consuming a great deal of time your attention.
which otherwise might be allocated to them. General Bradley has communicated with me, and
Furthermore, as Ch airman of the Committee on For- advised me that he, and each of the Joint Chiefs of
eign Relations over t. -le years I have been more or less Staff, have had some speaking engagements for some
familiar with many of these questions and have had months for Armed Services Day, which, of course, is
contact with you as Chief of Staff and as Secretary of one of the notable days recognized in our country.
State and now as Secretary of Defense. ; The :importance of it, as a great day, is as great as it
It is possible that when you return I may desire to has ever been.
ask a number of other questions, but I have endeavored ` General Bradley will be available on tomorrow and,
to so conduct myself as to shorten as much as possible I think, through Friday, noon.
the time that we have consumed or are about to consume Senator Bridges. I think, Mr. Chairman, of course,
in the investigation of all these questions. that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the one day of the
:I think this is a mcst unusual procedure, but I do not year when it would be particularly appropriate, and
regret'it because in ,a democracy, like ours we like to when they would be most pleased at being shown the
think that the people are fully advised as to all important courtesy of not being involved before our Committee.
decisions, whether the decision is to be made by them ~ Senator Russell. Thank you, and we will arrange it
or by their constitutional authorities that they have set sp as not to interfere with their program on that day;
up. So, thank you, General, very, very much for the mar- but that does not mean that we won't have a hearing on
velous memory that ,7ou possess, for the great ability Armed Forces Day.
which you have shown in all of the high positions which Senator Knowland. One question, Mr. Chairman, on
you have occupied, by your frankness and by your tour- the list of information which you Indicated to Mr. Larkin,
age in answering the great variety of questions covering Ithink either yesterday or the day before, there was one
such a ,long period of years. additional bit of information which I do not think we
I marvel at your ability to remember and recall and hive yet received; and that was--on the day before
to refer to all of the many and multitudinous questions these hearings commenced, when you first; brought up
which you have been called upon to decide or to partici- the Wake Island report, you recall that we requested a
pate in. list of those that had been. entitled to receive a copy
So, sir, I strike har.ds with you across the distance of the, l: think, 40 copies that were distributed, and that
from here to the Virginia Military Institute, and wish information has not been supplied to the Committee as
for you a great occasion and much joy and success and yet.
happiness. Mr. Larkin. No, sir; it hay not; but now I will have a
Secretary Marshall. "hank you, Senator; thank you, sir. little time to check into that matter for you, sir.
Senator Bridges. Mr. Chairman, are we going to decide Secretary Marshall. General Bradley controlled that,
before tomorrow, and the taking of a new witness, on and he can give you that information.
Senator Morse's motion as to limiting the first round Senator Russell. Senator Sparkman.
of gtlesti.oning? Senator Sparkman. Along that same line, I had in-
Senator Russell. I leave heard no objection to 'the tended to ask, and forgot, when questioning General
course suggested, of limiting each Senator to 30 minutes, Marshall., if we might not have a listing of the members
in order to expedite the hearing, and get around the of the United Nations showing, not just the contribu-
table. tiQns that they have actually made, and which have
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, in fairness to all of our actually been received in Korean--General Marshall gave
colleagues, some of whom are not here at the moment, that several days ago-but to offers that have been made
I would hike to serve not ice that I will renew my motion- at any time, and the disposition that has been made
Senator Russell. I h),d understood that your motion ofthem.
was pendin here, to be acted upon prior to another Mr. Larkin. We will get that for you.
witness being introduced. Senator Russell. The Committee will stand recessed
Senator Morse. I meant to renew- until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
Senator Russell. The first thing in the morning, the (Thereupon, at 1:09 o'clock, p.m., the Committee stood
first matter to be cons..dered will be a vote on Senator in recess until 10 o'clock, a.m., the following morning,
Morse's motion, which I am sure you all understand, Tuesday, May 15, 1951.)
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